diff --git a/Literature/ArborVote.bib b/Literature/ArborVote.bib index 6b7fc34..eecabb8 100644 --- a/Literature/ArborVote.bib +++ b/Literature/ArborVote.bib @@ -3,84 +3,36 @@ BibTeX export options can be customized via Preferences -> BibTeX in Mendeley Desktop -@incollection{Greene2016, -author = {Greene, Amanda}, -booktitle = {Oxford Stud. Polit. Philos. Vol. 2}, -doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198759621.003.0004}, -file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Greene/Unknown/Greene - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Volume 2.pdf:pdf}, -month = {mar}, -pages = {71--97}, -publisher = {Oxford University Press}, -title = {{Consent and Political Legitimacy}}, -url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198759621.001.0001/acprof-9780198759621-chapter-4}, -year = {2016} -} -@article{Wood2014, -abstract = {The blockchain paradigm when coupled with cryptographically-secured transactions has demonstrated its utility through a number of projects, not least Bitcoin. Each such project can be seen as a simple application on a decentralised, but singleton, compute resource. We can call this paradigm a transactional singleton machine with shared-state. Ethereum implements this paradigm in a generalised manner. Furthermore it provides a plurality of such resources, each with a distinct state and operating code but able to interact through a message-passing framework with others. We discuss its design, implementation issues, the opportunities it provides and the future hurdles we envisage.}, -author = {Wood, Gavin}, -file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Wood/Ethereum Project Yellow Paper/Wood - 2014 - Ethereum a secure decentralised generalised transaction ledger.pdf:pdf}, -journal = {Ethereum Proj. Yellow Pap.}, -pages = {1--32}, -title = {{Ethereum: a secure decentralised generalised transaction ledger}}, -year = {2014} -} -@article{Hogan2020, -abstract = {In this paper we provide a comprehensive introduction to knowledge graphs, which have recently garnered significant attention from both industry and academia in scenarios that require exploiting diverse, dynamic, large-scale collections of data. After some opening remarks, we motivate and contrast various graph-based data models and query languages that are used for knowledge graphs. We discuss the roles of schema, identity, and context in knowledge graphs. We explain how knowledge can be represented and extracted using a combination of deductive and inductive techniques. We summarise methods for the creation, enrichment, quality assessment, refinement, and publication of knowledge graphs. We provide an overview of prominent open knowledge graphs and enterprise knowledge graphs, their applications, and how they use the aforementioned techniques. We conclude with high-level future research directions for knowledge graphs.}, -archivePrefix = {arXiv}, -arxivId = {2003.02320}, -author = {Hogan, Aidan and Blomqvist, Eva and Cochez, Michael and D'Amato, Claudia and de Melo, Gerard and Gutierrez, Claudio and Gayo, Jos{\'{e}} Emilio Labra and Kirrane, Sabrina and Neumaier, Sebastian and Polleres, Axel and Navigli, Roberto and Ngomo, Axel-Cyrille Ngonga and Rashid, Sabbir M. and Rula, Anisa and Schmelzeisen, Lukas and Sequeda, Juan and Staab, Steffen and Zimmermann, Antoine}, -doi = {10.1145/3418294}, -eprint = {2003.02320}, -file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Hogan et al/Communications of the ACM/Hogan et al. - 2020 - Knowledge Graphs.pdf:pdf}, -issn = {15577317}, -journal = {Commun. ACM}, -month = {mar}, -number = {3}, -pages = {96--104}, -title = {{Knowledge Graphs}}, -volume = {64}, -year = {2020} -} @techreport{Lesaege2021, +address = {Paris}, author = {Lesaege, Cl{\'{e}}ment and Ast, Federico and George, William}, file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Lesaege, Ast, George/Unknown/Lesaege, Ast, George - 2021 - Kleros.pdf:pdf}, +institution = {Cooperative Kleros}, pages = {60}, title = {{Kleros}}, url = {https://kleros.io/yellowpaper.pdf}, year = {2021} } -@misc{Cuende2019, -author = {Cuende, Luis Iv{\'{a}}n and Duncan, Luke and Light, John and Agha, Uneeb and Quispe, Mio and Spagnuolo, Facu}, -title = {{Aragon Network}}, -url = {https://github.com/aragon/whitepaper}, -year = {2019} -} -@techreport{Lesaege2019, -abstract = {Resumen Kleros es una aplicaci{\'{o}}n descentralizada construida sobre Ethereum, que funciona como una tercera parte descentralizada para el arbitraje de disputas en cualquier tipo de contratos, ya sean simples o muy complejos. Se basa en incentivos de teor{\'{i}}a de los juegos para lograr que los jurados juzguen los casos correctamente. El resultado es un sistema de resoluci{\'{o}}n de disputas que alcanza resultados de manera r{\'{a}}pida, econ{\'{o}}mica, confiable y descentralizada. 1 Introducci{\'{o}}n "Quien controla las cortes, controla el estado." Arist{\'{o}}teles. El mundo est{\'{a}} experimentando un proceso acelerado de globalizaci{\'{o}}n y digitalizaci{\'{o}}n. Un n{\'{u}}mero exponencialmente creciente de transacciones son realizadas online entre personas ubicadas en distintas jurisdicciones. Si la promesa de blockchain se hace realidad, en un futuro no muy distante, la mayor{\'{i}}a de los bienes, el trabajo y el capital ser{\'{a}}n asignados a trav{\'{e}}s de plataformas globales descentralizadas. Las disputas seguramente estar{\'{a}}n a la orden del d{\'{i}}a. Los usuarios del eBay descentralizado reclamar{\'{a}}n que los vendedores no les enviaron los bienes especificados en el contrato, los hu{\'{e}}spedes del AirBnb descentralizado reclamar{\'{a}}n que la casa alquilada no era como se mostraba en las fotograf{\'{i}}as, e inversores en una plataforma de financiamiento colectivos van a reclamar reembolsos en la medida en que los emprendimientos financiados no obtengan los resultados prometidos. Los contratos inteligentes son lo suficientemente inteligentes como para ejecutarse autom{\'{a}}ticamente tal como fueron programados, pero no pueden realizar juicios subjetivos o incluir elementos que provengan de fuera del blockchain. Las tecnolog{\'{i}}as existentes de resoluci{\'{o}}n de disputas son demasiado lentas, costosas y poco confiables para una econom{\'{i}}a global que funciona en tiempo real. Por ello, una instituci{\'{o}}n clave en la era de blockchain es un mecanismo de resoluci{\'{o}}n de disputas r{\'{a}}pido, de bajo costo, confiable y descentralizado que permita resolver disputas en contratos inteligentes.}, -author = {Lesaege, Cl{\'{e}}ment and Ast, Federico and George, William}, -file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Lesaege, Ast, George/Unknown/Lesaege, Ast, George - 2019 - Kleros.pdf:pdf}, -pages = {17}, -title = {{Kleros}}, -url = {https://kleros.io/whitepaper.pdf}, -year = {2019} -} -@article{Buzziol, -author = {Buzziol, Evelyne and Maggie, Clarendonl}, -file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Buzziol, Maggie/Unknown/Buzziol, Maggie - Unknown - Democracy Decentralised Voting, Governance {\&}Transparency.pdf:pdf}, -title = {{Democracy Decentralised: Voting, Governance {\&}Transparency}} +@article{Berg2020, +abstract = {Commitment voting is a mechanism for signalling intensity of preferences and long-term commitment to governance decisions in proof of stake blockchains. In commitment voting, the voting weight of a vote in any given election is determined by 1) the amount of tokens under a voters control and 2) the time that the voter is willing to lock their tokens up for that election. Winning votes are locked up for the nominated amount of time. Losing votes are released as soon as the election has results. Commitment voting requires voters to commit to the decisions they make while still allowing those who disagree with the majority to exit the community.}, +author = {Berg, Chris and Davidson, Sinclair and Potts, Jason}, +doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3742435}, +file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Berg, Davidson, Potts/SSRN Electronic Journal/Berg, Davidson, Potts - 2020 - Commitment Voting A Mechanism for Intensity of Preference Revelation and Long-Term Commitment in Blockcha.pdf:pdf}, +journal = {SSRN Electron. J.}, +number = {December}, +pages = {1--4}, +title = {{Commitment Voting: A Mechanism for Intensity of Preference Revelation and Long-Term Commitment in Blockchain Governance}}, +year = {2020} } -@article{Burnett2021, -abstract = {This paper seeks to critically assess how “radical” sustainability approaches that challenge “mainstream” development trajectories—and politics—are crafted and contested within local government. We explore the extent to which these approaches account for a consolidation, break down or transformation of role boundaries and political identities and their implications for the politics of niche–regime dynamics. In our in-depth study of Independents for Frome (Somerset, UK), an “independent” group who took control of the town council in 2011 and consolidated a non-partisan approach within its administrative functions, referred to as its “Flatpack Democracy” model, we take a closer look at adversarialism and the intersection of power dynamics within local government. The findings reveal the capture of local mainstream political institutions by niche “protagonists” through an orchestration and consolidation of transition governance, woven in strategically and opportunistically into new forms of localized political identities at the niche–regime interface, which helped to create a community-level regime of transition governance. We suggest that informal institutional capital, such as the role of personal ties can impact on legitimacy, accountability, or the validation of sustainability agendas. Our findings also advance debates on transition thresholds within “liminal transition spaces”, interstitial spaces between a previous way of knowing and doing, and a new way. Here ground rules dictating socio-political norms are unclear, collaborative actions are potentially working at cross-purposes and/or multiple forms of (transformative) power are exercised simultaneously at distinct moments, or instantiations of transition. That is, there remains a much-needed theoretical debate around the fragile and imperfect processes of democratization within the everyday politics of transition management.}, -author = {Burnett, Amy and Nunes, Richard}, -doi = {10.1002/eet.1931}, -file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Burnett, Nunes/Environmental Policy and Governance/Burnett, Nunes - 2021 - Flatpack democracy Power and politics at the boundaries of transition.pdf:pdf}, -issn = {17569338}, -journal = {Environ. Policy Gov.}, -keywords = {frome,independent politics,liminal space,power,sustainability transitions,transition management}, -number = {3}, -pages = {223--236}, -title = {{Flatpack democracy: Power and politics at the boundaries of transition}}, -volume = {31}, +@article{Xu2021a, +abstract = {As an integral part of the Decentralized Finance (DeFi) ecosystem, Automated Market Maker (AMM) based Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs) have gained massive traction with the revived interest in blockchain and distributed ledger technology in general. Most prominently, the top six AMMs -- Uniswap, Balancer, Curve, DODO, Bancor and Sushiswap -- hold in aggregate 15 billion USD worth of crypto-assets as of March 2021. Instead of matching the buy and sell sides, AMMs employ a peer-to-pool method and determine asset price algorithmically through a so-called conservation function. Compared to centralized exchanges, AMMs exhibit the apparent advantage of decentralization, automation and continuous liquidity. Nonetheless, AMMs typically feature drawbacks such as high slippage for traders and divergence loss for liquidity providers. This work establishes a general AMM framework describing the economics and formalizing the system's state-space representation. We employ our framework to systematically compare the top AMM protocols' mechanics, deriving their slippage and divergence loss functions. We further discuss security and privacy concerns associated with AMM DEXs, and conduct a comprehensive literature review on related work covering both DeFi and conventional market microstructure.}, +archivePrefix = {arXiv}, +arxivId = {2103.12732}, +author = {Xu, Jiahua and Vavryk, Nazariy and Paruch, Krzysztof and Cousaert, Simon}, +eprint = {2103.12732}, +file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Xu et al/Unknown/Xu et al. - 2021 - SoK Decentralized Exchanges (DEX) with Automated Market Maker (AMM) protocols.pdf:pdf}, +title = {{SoK: Decentralized Exchanges (DEX) with Automated Market Maker (AMM) protocols}}, +url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2103.12732}, year = {2021} } @article{Ellis2017, @@ -94,39 +46,6 @@ @article{Ellis2017 volume = {2017}, year = {2017} } -@article{Hanson2012, -abstract = {In practice, scoring rules elicit good probability estimates from individuals, while betting markets elicit good consensus estimates from groups. Market scoring rules combine these features, eliciting estimates from individuals or groups, with groups costing no more than individuals. Regarding a bet on one event given another event, only logarithmic versions preserve the probability of the given event. Logarithmic versions also preserve the conditional probabilities of other events, and so preserve conditional independence relations. Given logarithmic rules that elicit relative probabilities of base event pairs, it costs no more to elicit estimates on all combinations of these base events.}, -author = {Hanson, Robin}, -doi = {10.5750/jpm.v1i1.417}, -file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Hanson/The Journal of Prediction Markets/Hanson - 2012 - Logarithmic Markets Coring Rules for Modular Combinatorial Information Aggregation.pdf:pdf}, -isbn = {7039932326}, -issn = {1750-6751}, -journal = {J. Predict. Mark.}, -number = {1}, -pages = {3--15}, -title = {{Logarithmic Markets Coring Rules for Modular Combinatorial Information Aggregation}}, -volume = {1}, -year = {2012} -} -@article{Berg2020, -abstract = {Commitment voting is a mechanism for signalling intensity of preferences and long-term commitment to governance decisions in proof of stake blockchains. In commitment voting, the voting weight of a vote in any given election is determined by 1) the amount of tokens under a voters control and 2) the time that the voter is willing to lock their tokens up for that election. Winning votes are locked up for the nominated amount of time. Losing votes are released as soon as the election has results. Commitment voting requires voters to commit to the decisions they make while still allowing those who disagree with the majority to exit the community.}, -author = {Berg, Chris and Davidson, Sinclair and Potts, Jason}, -doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3742435}, -file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Berg, Davidson, Potts/SSRN Electronic Journal/Berg, Davidson, Potts - 2020 - Commitment Voting A Mechanism for Intensity of Preference Revelation and Long-Term Commitment in Blockcha.pdf:pdf}, -journal = {SSRN Electron. J.}, -number = {December}, -pages = {1--4}, -title = {{Commitment Voting: A Mechanism for Intensity of Preference Revelation and Long-Term Commitment in Blockchain Governance}}, -year = {2020} -} -@article{Zhang2018, -abstract = {We formalize the constant product market maker model (aka, x × y = k model) [2], and formally analyze the integer rounding errors of the implementation in the Uniswap smart contract [1].}, -author = {Zhang, Yi and Chen, Xiaohong and Park, Daejun}, -file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Zhang, Chen, Park/Unknown/Zhang, Chen, Park - 2018 - Formal Specification of Constant Product ( x × y = k ) Market Maker Model and Implementation.pdf:pdf}, -pages = {1--14}, -title = {{Formal Specification of Constant Product ( x × y = k ) Market Maker Model and Implementation}}, -year = {2018} -} @article{L.A.A.1924, author = {Zhang, Fan}, doi = {10.1093/nq/146.29.48-a}, @@ -148,25 +67,6 @@ @article{Juels2020 title = {{Mixicles: Simple Private Decentralized Finance}}, year = {2020} } -@article{Xu2021a, -abstract = {As an integral part of the Decentralized Finance (DeFi) ecosystem, Automated Market Maker (AMM) based Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs) have gained massive traction with the revived interest in blockchain and distributed ledger technology in general. Most prominently, the top six AMMs -- Uniswap, Balancer, Curve, DODO, Bancor and Sushiswap -- hold in aggregate 15 billion USD worth of crypto-assets as of March 2021. Instead of matching the buy and sell sides, AMMs employ a peer-to-pool method and determine asset price algorithmically through a so-called conservation function. Compared to centralized exchanges, AMMs exhibit the apparent advantage of decentralization, automation and continuous liquidity. Nonetheless, AMMs typically feature drawbacks such as high slippage for traders and divergence loss for liquidity providers. This work establishes a general AMM framework describing the economics and formalizing the system's state-space representation. We employ our framework to systematically compare the top AMM protocols' mechanics, deriving their slippage and divergence loss functions. We further discuss security and privacy concerns associated with AMM DEXs, and conduct a comprehensive literature review on related work covering both DeFi and conventional market microstructure.}, -archivePrefix = {arXiv}, -arxivId = {2103.12732}, -author = {Xu, Jiahua and Vavryk, Nazariy and Paruch, Krzysztof and Cousaert, Simon}, -eprint = {2103.12732}, -file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Xu et al/Unknown/Xu et al. - 2021 - SoK Decentralized Exchanges (DEX) with Automated Market Maker (AMM) protocols.pdf:pdf}, -title = {{SoK: Decentralized Exchanges (DEX) with Automated Market Maker (AMM) protocols}}, -url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2103.12732}, -year = {2021} -} -@article{Adams2020, -abstract = {This technical whitepaper explains some of the design decisions behind the Uniswap v2 core contracts. It covers the contracts' new features-including arbitrary pairs between ERC20s, a hardened price oracle that allows other contracts to estimate the time-weighted average price over a given interval, "flash swaps" that allow traders to receive assets and use them elsewhere before paying for them later in the transaction, and a protocol fee that can be turned on in the future. It also re-architects the contracts to reduce their attack surface. This whitepaper describes the mechanics of Uniswap v2's "core" contracts including the pair contract that stores liquidity providers' funds-and the factory contract used to instantiate pair contracts.}, -author = {Adams, Hayden and Zinsmeister, Noah and Robinson, Dan}, -file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Adams, Zinsmeister, Robinson/Unknown/Adams, Zinsmeister, Robinson - 2020 - Uniswap v2 Core.pdf:pdf}, -pages = {1--10}, -title = {{Uniswap v2 Core}}, -year = {2020} -} @article{Zhang2020a, abstract = {Thanks to the widespread deployment of TLS, users can access private data over channels with end-to-end confidentiality and integrity. What they cannot do, however, is prove to third parties the provenance of such data, i.e., that it genuinely came from a particular website. Existing approaches either introduce undesirable trust assumptions or require server-side modifications. Users' private data is thus locked up at its point of origin. Users cannot export data in an integrity-protected way to other applications without help and permission from the current data holder. We propose DECO (short for decentralized oracle) to address the above problems. DECO allows users to prove that a piece of data accessed via TLS came from a particular website and optionally prove statements about such data in zero-knowledge, keeping the data itself secret. DECO is the first such system that works without trusted hardware or server-side modifications. DECO can liberate private data from centralized web-service silos, making it accessible to a rich spectrum of applications. To demonstrate the power of DECO, we implement three applications that are hard to achieve without it: a private financial instrument using smart contracts, converting legacy credentials to anonymous credentials, and verifiable claims against price discrimination.}, archivePrefix = {arXiv}, @@ -183,14 +83,24 @@ @article{Zhang2020a title = {{DECO: Liberating Web Data Using Decentralized Oracles for TLS}}, year = {2020} } -@article{Aoyagi2020, -author = {Aoyagi, Jun}, -file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Aoyagi/Unknown/Aoyagi - 2020 - Liquidity Provision by Automated Market Makers.pdf:pdf}, -keywords = {aoyagi,automated market makers,berkeley,blockchain,constant product market makers,decentralized exchanges,edu,email,first draft,jun,may,strategic liquidity provision,the department of economics,uniswap,university of california at}, -number = {May}, -pages = {1--29}, -title = {{Liquidity Provision by Automated Market Makers}}, -year = {2020} +@article{Schneider2021, +abstract = {Governance in online communities is an increasingly high-stakes challenge, and yet many basic features of offline governance legacies-juries, political parties, term limits, and formal debates, to name a few-are not in the feature-sets of the software most community platforms use. Drawing on the paradigm of Institutional Analysis and Development, this paper proposes a strategy for addressing this lapse by specifying basic features of a generalizable paradigm for online governance called Modular Politics. Whereas classical governance typologies tend to present a choice among wholesale ideologies, such as democracy or oligarchy, Modular Politics would enable platform operators and their users to build bottom-up governance processes from computational components that are modular and composable, highly versatile in their expressiveness, portable from one context to another, and interoperable across platforms. This kind of approach could implement pre-digital governance systems as well as accelerate innovation in uniquely digital techniques. As diverse communities share and connect their components and data, governance could occur through a ubiquitous network layer. To that end, this paper proposes the development of an open standard for networked governance.}, +archivePrefix = {arXiv}, +arxivId = {2005.13701}, +author = {Schneider, Nathan and {De Filippi}, Primavera and Frey, Seth and Tan, Joshua Z. and Zhang, Amy X.}, +doi = {10.1145/3449090}, +eprint = {2005.13701}, +file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Schneider et al/Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction/Schneider et al. - 2021 - Modular Politics.pdf:pdf}, +issn = {2573-0142}, +journal = {Proc. ACM Human-Computer Interact.}, +keywords = {governance,institutional analysis and development,interoperability,online communities,peer production,platforms,standards}, +month = {apr}, +number = {CSCW1}, +pages = {1--26}, +publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery}, +title = {{Modular Politics}}, +volume = {5}, +year = {2021} } @article{Breidenbach2021, abstract = {In this whitepaper, we articulate a vision for the evolution of Chainlink beyond its initial conception in the original Chainlink whitepaper. We foresee an increasingly expansive role for oracle networks, one in which they complement and enhance existing and new blockchains by providing fast, reliable, and confidentiality-preserving universal connectivity and off-chain computation for smart contracts. The foundation of our plan is what we call Decentralized Oracle Networks, or DONs for short. A DON is a network maintained by a committee of Chainlink nodes. It supports any of an unlimited range of oracle functions chosen for deployment by the committee. A DON thus acts as a powerful abstraction layer, offering interfaces for smart contracts to extensive off-chain resources and highly efficient yet decentralized off-chain computing resources within the DON itself. With DONs as a springboard, Chainlink plans to focus on advances in seven key areas: • Hybrid smart contracts: Offering a powerful, general framework for augmenting existing smart contract capabilities by securely composing on-chain and off-chain computing resources into what we call hybrid smart contracts. • Abstracting away complexity: Presenting developers and users with simple functionality eliminates the need for familiarity with complex underlying protocols and system boundaries. • Scaling: Ensuring that oracle services achieve the latencies and throughputs demanded by high-performance decentralized systems. • Confidentiality: Enabling next-generation systems that combine blockchains' innate transparency with strong new confidentiality protections for sensitive data. • Order-fairness for transactions: Supporting transaction sequencing in ways that are fair for end users and prevent front-running and other attacks by bots and exploitative miners. • Trust-minimization: Creating a highly trustworthy layer of support for smart contracts and other oracle-dependent systems by means of decentralization , strong anchoring in high-security blockchains, cryptographic techniques, and cryptoeconomic guarantees. • Incentive-based (cryptoeconomic) security: Rigorously designing and robustly deploying mechanisms that ensure nodes in DONs have strong economic incentives to behave reliably and correctly, even in the face of well-resourced adversaries. We present preliminary and ongoing innovations by the Chainlink community in each of these areas, providing a picture of the broadening and increasingly powerful capabilities planned for the Chainlink network. 2}, @@ -200,6 +110,23 @@ @article{Breidenbach2021 title = {{Chainlink 2.0: Next Steps in the Evolution of Decentralized Oracle Networks}}, year = {2021} } +@article{Adams2020, +abstract = {This technical whitepaper explains some of the design decisions behind the Uniswap v2 core contracts. It covers the contracts' new features-including arbitrary pairs between ERC20s, a hardened price oracle that allows other contracts to estimate the time-weighted average price over a given interval, "flash swaps" that allow traders to receive assets and use them elsewhere before paying for them later in the transaction, and a protocol fee that can be turned on in the future. It also re-architects the contracts to reduce their attack surface. This whitepaper describes the mechanics of Uniswap v2's "core" contracts including the pair contract that stores liquidity providers' funds-and the factory contract used to instantiate pair contracts.}, +author = {Adams, Hayden and Zinsmeister, Noah and Robinson, Dan}, +file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Adams, Zinsmeister, Robinson/Unknown/Adams, Zinsmeister, Robinson - 2020 - Uniswap v2 Core.pdf:pdf}, +pages = {1--10}, +title = {{Uniswap v2 Core}}, +year = {2020} +} +@article{Aoyagi2020, +author = {Aoyagi, Jun}, +file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Aoyagi/Unknown/Aoyagi - 2020 - Liquidity Provision by Automated Market Makers.pdf:pdf}, +keywords = {aoyagi,automated market makers,berkeley,blockchain,constant product market makers,decentralized exchanges,edu,email,first draft,jun,may,strategic liquidity provision,the department of economics,uniswap,university of california at}, +number = {May}, +pages = {1--29}, +title = {{Liquidity Provision by Automated Market Makers}}, +year = {2020} +} @article{Mercier2016, abstract = {The argumentative theory of reasoning suggests that the main function of reasoning is to exchange arguments with others. This theory explains key properties of reasoning. When reasoners produce arguments, they are biased and lazy, as can be expected if reasoning is a mechanism that aims at convincing others in interactive contexts. By contrast, reasoners are more objective and demanding when they evaluate arguments provided by others. This fundamental asymmetry between production and evaluation explains the effects of reasoning in different contexts: the more debate and conflict between opinions there is, the more argument evaluation prevails over argument production, resulting in better outcomes. Here I review how the argumentative theory of reasoning helps integrate a wide range of empirical findings in reasoning research.}, author = {Mercier, Hugo}, @@ -215,6 +142,18 @@ @article{Mercier2016 volume = {20}, year = {2016} } +@incollection{Greene2016, +author = {Greene, Amanda}, +booktitle = {Oxford Stud. Polit. Philos. Vol. 2}, +doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198759621.003.0004}, +file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Greene/Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Volume 2/Greene - 2016 - Consent and Political Legitimacy.pdf:pdf}, +month = {mar}, +pages = {71--97}, +publisher = {Oxford University Press}, +title = {{Consent and Political Legitimacy}}, +url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198759621.001.0001/acprof-9780198759621-chapter-4}, +year = {2016} +} @article{Wells2020, author = {Wells, Simon}, doi = {10.3233/FAIA200541}, @@ -228,6 +167,20 @@ @article{Wells2020 volume = {326}, year = {2020} } +@article{Goldberg2021, +author = {Goldberg, Lior and Papini, Shahar and Riabzev, Michael}, +file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Goldberg, Papini, Riabzev/Unknown/Goldberg, Papini, Riabzev - 2021 - Cairo – a Turing-complete STARK-friendly CPU architecture.pdf:pdf}, +number = {August}, +pages = {1--62}, +title = {{Cairo – a Turing-complete STARK-friendly CPU architecture}}, +year = {2021} +} +@misc{Omen2020, +author = {Gnosis}, +title = {{Omen and the Next Generation of Prediction Markets}}, +url = {https://blog.gnosis.pm/omen-and-the-next-generation-of-prediction-markets-2e7a2dd604e}, +year = {2020} +} @article{Slonim2021, abstract = {Artificial intelligence (AI) is defined as the ability of machines to perform tasks that are usually associated with intelligent beings. Argument and debate are fundamental capabilities of human intelligence, essential for a wide range of human activities, and common to all human societies. The development of computational argumentation technologies is therefore an important emerging discipline in AI research1. Here we present Project Debater, an autonomous debating system that can engage in a competitive debate with humans. We provide a complete description of the system's architecture, a thorough and systematic evaluation of its operation across a wide range of debate topics, and a detailed account of the system's performance in its public debut against three expert human debaters. We also highlight the fundamental differences between debating with humans as opposed to challenging humans in game competitions, the latter being the focus of classical ‘grand challenges' pursued by the AI research community over the past few decades. We suggest that such challenges lie in the ‘comfort zone' of AI, whereas debating with humans lies in a different territory, in which humans still prevail, and for which novel paradigms are required to make substantial progress.}, author = {Slonim, Noam and Bilu, Yonatan and Alzate, Carlos and Bar-Haim, Roy and Bogin, Ben and Bonin, Francesca and Choshen, Leshem and Cohen-Karlik, Edo and Dankin, Lena and Edelstein, Lilach and Ein-Dor, Liat and Friedman-Melamed, Roni and Gavron, Assaf and Gera, Ariel and Gleize, Martin and Gretz, Shai and Gutfreund, Dan and Halfon, Alon and Hershcovich, Daniel and Hoory, Ron and Hou, Yufang and Hummel, Shay and Jacovi, Michal and Jochim, Charles and Kantor, Yoav and Katz, Yoav and Konopnicki, David and Kons, Zvi and Kotlerman, Lili and Krieger, Dalia and Lahav, Dan and Lavee, Tamar and Levy, Ran and Liberman, Naftali and Mass, Yosi and Menczel, Amir and Mirkin, Shachar and Moshkowich, Guy and Ofek-Koifman, Shila and Orbach, Matan and Rabinovich, Ella and Rinott, Ruty and Shechtman, Slava and Sheinwald, Dafna and Shnarch, Eyal and Shnayderman, Ilya and Soffer, Aya and Spector, Artem and Sznajder, Benjamin and Toledo, Assaf and Toledo-Ronen, Orith and Venezian, Elad and Aharonov, Ranit}, @@ -244,17 +197,96 @@ @article{Slonim2021 volume = {591}, year = {2021} } -@article{Goldberg2021, -author = {Goldberg, Lior and Papini, Shahar and Riabzev, Michael}, -file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Goldberg, Papini, Riabzev/Unknown/Goldberg, Papini, Riabzev - 2021 - Cairo – a Turing-complete STARK-friendly CPU architecture.pdf:pdf}, -number = {August}, -pages = {1--62}, -title = {{Cairo – a Turing-complete STARK-friendly CPU architecture}}, +@article{Burnett2021, +abstract = {This paper seeks to critically assess how “radical” sustainability approaches that challenge “mainstream” development trajectories—and politics—are crafted and contested within local government. We explore the extent to which these approaches account for a consolidation, break down or transformation of role boundaries and political identities and their implications for the politics of niche–regime dynamics. In our in-depth study of Independents for Frome (Somerset, UK), an “independent” group who took control of the town council in 2011 and consolidated a non-partisan approach within its administrative functions, referred to as its “Flatpack Democracy” model, we take a closer look at adversarialism and the intersection of power dynamics within local government. The findings reveal the capture of local mainstream political institutions by niche “protagonists” through an orchestration and consolidation of transition governance, woven in strategically and opportunistically into new forms of localized political identities at the niche–regime interface, which helped to create a community-level regime of transition governance. We suggest that informal institutional capital, such as the role of personal ties can impact on legitimacy, accountability, or the validation of sustainability agendas. Our findings also advance debates on transition thresholds within “liminal transition spaces”, interstitial spaces between a previous way of knowing and doing, and a new way. Here ground rules dictating socio-political norms are unclear, collaborative actions are potentially working at cross-purposes and/or multiple forms of (transformative) power are exercised simultaneously at distinct moments, or instantiations of transition. That is, there remains a much-needed theoretical debate around the fragile and imperfect processes of democratization within the everyday politics of transition management.}, +author = {Burnett, Amy and Nunes, Richard}, +doi = {10.1002/eet.1931}, +file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Burnett, Nunes/Environmental Policy and Governance/Burnett, Nunes - 2021 - Flatpack democracy Power and politics at the boundaries of transition.pdf:pdf}, +issn = {17569338}, +journal = {Environ. Policy Gov.}, +keywords = {frome,independent politics,liminal space,power,sustainability transitions,transition management}, +number = {3}, +pages = {223--236}, +title = {{Flatpack democracy: Power and politics at the boundaries of transition}}, +volume = {31}, year = {2021} } -@misc{Omen2020, -author = {Gnosis}, -title = {{Omen and the Next Generation of Prediction Markets}}, -url = {https://blog.gnosis.pm/omen-and-the-next-generation-of-prediction-markets-2e7a2dd604e}, +@article{Wood2014, +abstract = {The blockchain paradigm when coupled with cryptographically-secured transactions has demonstrated its utility through a number of projects, not least Bitcoin. Each such project can be seen as a simple application on a decentralised, but singleton, compute resource. We can call this paradigm a transactional singleton machine with shared-state. Ethereum implements this paradigm in a generalised manner. Furthermore it provides a plurality of such resources, each with a distinct state and operating code but able to interact through a message-passing framework with others. We discuss its design, implementation issues, the opportunities it provides and the future hurdles we envisage.}, +author = {Wood, Gavin}, +file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Wood/Ethereum Project Yellow Paper/Wood - 2014 - Ethereum a secure decentralised generalised transaction ledger.pdf:pdf}, +journal = {Ethereum Proj. Yellow Pap.}, +pages = {1--32}, +title = {{Ethereum: a secure decentralised generalised transaction ledger}}, +year = {2014} +} +@article{Buzziol, +author = {Buzziol, Evelyne and Maggie, Clarendonl}, +file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Buzziol, Maggie/Unknown/Buzziol, Maggie - Unknown - Democracy Decentralised Voting, Governance {\&}Transparency.pdf:pdf}, +title = {{Democracy Decentralised: Voting, Governance {\&}Transparency}} +} +@misc{Buterin2021, +author = {Buterin, Vitalik}, +booktitle = {ethresear.ch}, +title = {{Minimal anti-collusion infrastructure}}, +url = {https://ethresear.ch/t/minimal-anti-collusion-infrastructure/5413}, +urldate = {20. August 2021}, +year = {2021} +} +@article{Hogan2020, +abstract = {In this paper we provide a comprehensive introduction to knowledge graphs, which have recently garnered significant attention from both industry and academia in scenarios that require exploiting diverse, dynamic, large-scale collections of data. After some opening remarks, we motivate and contrast various graph-based data models and query languages that are used for knowledge graphs. We discuss the roles of schema, identity, and context in knowledge graphs. We explain how knowledge can be represented and extracted using a combination of deductive and inductive techniques. We summarise methods for the creation, enrichment, quality assessment, refinement, and publication of knowledge graphs. We provide an overview of prominent open knowledge graphs and enterprise knowledge graphs, their applications, and how they use the aforementioned techniques. We conclude with high-level future research directions for knowledge graphs.}, +archivePrefix = {arXiv}, +arxivId = {2003.02320}, +author = {Hogan, Aidan and Blomqvist, Eva and Cochez, Michael and D'Amato, Claudia and de Melo, Gerard and Gutierrez, Claudio and Gayo, Jos{\'{e}} Emilio Labra and Kirrane, Sabrina and Neumaier, Sebastian and Polleres, Axel and Navigli, Roberto and Ngomo, Axel-Cyrille Ngonga and Rashid, Sabbir M. and Rula, Anisa and Schmelzeisen, Lukas and Sequeda, Juan and Staab, Steffen and Zimmermann, Antoine}, +doi = {10.1145/3418294}, +eprint = {2003.02320}, +file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Hogan et al/Communications of the ACM/Hogan et al. - 2020 - Knowledge Graphs.pdf:pdf}, +issn = {15577317}, +journal = {Commun. ACM}, +month = {mar}, +number = {3}, +pages = {96--104}, +title = {{Knowledge Graphs}}, +volume = {64}, year = {2020} } +@techreport{Lesaege2019, +abstract = {Resumen Kleros es una aplicaci{\'{o}}n descentralizada construida sobre Ethereum, que funciona como una tercera parte descentralizada para el arbitraje de disputas en cualquier tipo de contratos, ya sean simples o muy complejos. Se basa en incentivos de teor{\'{i}}a de los juegos para lograr que los jurados juzguen los casos correctamente. El resultado es un sistema de resoluci{\'{o}}n de disputas que alcanza resultados de manera r{\'{a}}pida, econ{\'{o}}mica, confiable y descentralizada. 1 Introducci{\'{o}}n "Quien controla las cortes, controla el estado." Arist{\'{o}}teles. El mundo est{\'{a}} experimentando un proceso acelerado de globalizaci{\'{o}}n y digitalizaci{\'{o}}n. Un n{\'{u}}mero exponencialmente creciente de transacciones son realizadas online entre personas ubicadas en distintas jurisdicciones. Si la promesa de blockchain se hace realidad, en un futuro no muy distante, la mayor{\'{i}}a de los bienes, el trabajo y el capital ser{\'{a}}n asignados a trav{\'{e}}s de plataformas globales descentralizadas. Las disputas seguramente estar{\'{a}}n a la orden del d{\'{i}}a. Los usuarios del eBay descentralizado reclamar{\'{a}}n que los vendedores no les enviaron los bienes especificados en el contrato, los hu{\'{e}}spedes del AirBnb descentralizado reclamar{\'{a}}n que la casa alquilada no era como se mostraba en las fotograf{\'{i}}as, e inversores en una plataforma de financiamiento colectivos van a reclamar reembolsos en la medida en que los emprendimientos financiados no obtengan los resultados prometidos. Los contratos inteligentes son lo suficientemente inteligentes como para ejecutarse autom{\'{a}}ticamente tal como fueron programados, pero no pueden realizar juicios subjetivos o incluir elementos que provengan de fuera del blockchain. Las tecnolog{\'{i}}as existentes de resoluci{\'{o}}n de disputas son demasiado lentas, costosas y poco confiables para una econom{\'{i}}a global que funciona en tiempo real. Por ello, una instituci{\'{o}}n clave en la era de blockchain es un mecanismo de resoluci{\'{o}}n de disputas r{\'{a}}pido, de bajo costo, confiable y descentralizado que permita resolver disputas en contratos inteligentes.}, +address = {Paris}, +author = {Lesaege, Cl{\'{e}}ment and Ast, Federico and George, William}, +file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Lesaege, Ast, George/Unknown/Lesaege, Ast, George - 2019 - Kleros.pdf:pdf}, +institution = {Cooperative Kleros}, +pages = {17}, +title = {{Kleros}}, +url = {https://kleros.io/whitepaper.pdf}, +year = {2019} +} +@misc{Cuende2019, +author = {Cuende, Luis Iv{\'{a}}n and Duncan, Luke and Light, John and Agha, Uneeb and Quispe, Mio and Spagnuolo, Facu}, +title = {{Aragon Network}}, +url = {https://github.com/aragon/whitepaper}, +year = {2019} +} +@article{Hanson2012, +abstract = {In practice, scoring rules elicit good probability estimates from individuals, while betting markets elicit good consensus estimates from groups. Market scoring rules combine these features, eliciting estimates from individuals or groups, with groups costing no more than individuals. Regarding a bet on one event given another event, only logarithmic versions preserve the probability of the given event. Logarithmic versions also preserve the conditional probabilities of other events, and so preserve conditional independence relations. Given logarithmic rules that elicit relative probabilities of base event pairs, it costs no more to elicit estimates on all combinations of these base events.}, +author = {Hanson, Robin}, +doi = {10.5750/jpm.v1i1.417}, +file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Hanson/The Journal of Prediction Markets/Hanson - 2012 - Logarithmic Markets Coring Rules for Modular Combinatorial Information Aggregation.pdf:pdf}, +isbn = {7039932326}, +issn = {1750-6751}, +journal = {J. Predict. Mark.}, +number = {1}, +pages = {3--15}, +title = {{Logarithmic Markets Coring Rules for Modular Combinatorial Information Aggregation}}, +volume = {1}, +year = {2012} +} +@techreport{Zhang2018, +abstract = {We formalize the constant product market maker model (aka, x × y = k model) [2], and formally analyze the integer rounding errors of the implementation in the Uniswap smart contract [1].}, +author = {Zhang, Yi and Chen, Xiaohong and Park, Daejun}, +file = {:Users/michaelheuer/Mendeley Desktop/Zhang, Chen, Park/Unknown/Zhang, Chen, Park - 2018 - Formal Specification of Constant Product ( x × y = k ) Market Maker Model and Implementation.pdf:pdf}, +institution = {Runtime Verification, Inc.}, +pages = {1--14}, +title = {{Formal Specification of Constant Product ( x × y = k ) Market Maker Model and Implementation}}, +year = {2018} +} diff --git a/Paper.tex b/Paper.tex index c17155e..a44af41 100644 --- a/Paper.tex +++ b/Paper.tex @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ \newcommand{\tot}{\text{total}} \newcommand{\sib}{\text{siblings}} -\newcommand{\T}{\text{T}}\newcommand{\debateTokens}{debate tokens} +\newcommand{\T}{\text{T}} \newcommand{\Y}{\text{Y}} \newcommand{\N}{\text{N}} @@ -94,7 +94,8 @@ \setlength{\parskip}{0.4em plus0.1em minus0.1em} \begin{acronym} - \acro{AMM}{automated marker maker} + \acro{AMM}{automated market maker} + \acro{CPMM}{constant product market maker} \acro{PM}{prediction market} \acro{RM}{rating market} \acro{DAPP}{decentralized application} @@ -191,10 +192,10 @@ \section{Introduction} Curated registries of unique digital identities are already available on several blockchains. % Incentivization A last and optional requirement is the ability to incentivize participation. -Because the time and collective attention of the people is scarce resources, +Because the time and collective attention of the people are scarce resources, the ability to allocate reputational or monetary rewards is useful and especially easy to realize in the form of blockchain tokens. -To put this economic view in perspective: +To put this rather economic view in perspective: One might see this deliberative decision-making as the decentralization of the job of politicians and consultants that are also getting paid. @@ -211,7 +212,6 @@ \section{Design Rationale} This can only be achieved if deliberating and weighting of the arguments is more favorable than steering the decision outcome towards one's own interests. } - \deleted{ \subsection{Trust assumptions} %\subsection{Blockchain Infrastructure} @@ -223,16 +223,13 @@ \subsection{Trust assumptions} \section{Structuring Debates in Argument Graphs}\label{sec:Structure} The reasoning behind making a decision is rarely linear. -Most of the time, debates consist of multiple, nested arguments -forming threads forking off multiple times being directed towards the root node. -% +Most of the time debates consist of numerous, interdependent arguments +originating from the root node and branching off multiple times. This results in a tree structure as depicted in \cref{fig:Tree}, -where arguments constitute the nodes of the tree. -% -Three node types exist in the debate graph: +where arguments \highlight{(or facts)} constitute the nodes in the tree. +Three node types exist in this tree graph: root, argument, and fact nodes. -Nodes without child-nodes below them are called leaves. - +Nodes without child nodes below them are called leaves. \begin{figure} \resizebox{0.95\linewidth}{!}{ @@ -240,9 +237,9 @@ \section{Structuring Debates in Argument Graphs}\label{sec:Structure} } \caption{ Visualization of a debate as an argument tree with - the root node (dotted) $\Root$, - argument nodes (solid) $\Arg$, and - fact nodes (dashed) $\Fact$ + the root node $\Root$ (dotted), + argument nodes $\Arg$ (solid), and + fact nodes $\Fact$ (dashed) numbered by their order of creation. Nodes have an impact $\imp$ and a weight $\wgt$ relative to their siblings and can support or oppose their associated parent as indicated by green and red links, respectively. @@ -252,38 +249,24 @@ \section{Structuring Debates in Argument Graphs}\label{sec:Structure} \subsection{Root Nodes} -The decision option forms the root $\Root$ of the tree and is expressed as a statement that will ultimately be -%supported -approved -or -%opposed % -disapproved -by the participants of the debate, e.g., 'We should execute process A.'. +The decision option forms the root $\Root$ of the tree and is expressed as a statement, +e.g., 'We should execute process A.', +that can be \replaced{approved}{supported} or \replaced{disapproved}{opposed} by the participants of the debate in the voting process. % -To facilitate multiple decision options, multiple trees can be constructed% ----all of them having their own root statement, e.g., 'We should execute process B.', etc.). +To facilitate multiple decision options, +multiple trees can be constructed---all of them having their own root statement, +e.g., 'We should execute process B.'. \subsection{Argument Nodes} -%\todo{ -% People can create arguments $\Arg[i][k]$, $k>0$. -% An argument $\Arg[i][k]$ can have multiple child arguments -% whose indices we collect in the set $\Children[i][k]=\{c_1, c_2, \dots\}$. -% Likewise, we collect the indices of its direct siblings in the set $\Siblings[i][k]=\{s_1, s_2, \dots\}$. -%} -%\todo{Clarify} Participants of the debate can create arguments $\Arg$ below the root or other arguments. % Within a debate, each argument points to one parent node (either the root or another argument) it is referring to. - -To identify each node $\Node$ in the tree, we introduce the notation $\Node[i][p]$ +To identify each node $\Node$ in the tree, the notation $\Node[i][p]$ is used, where $i$ and $p$ are unique identifiers of the argument itself and its parent, respectively. For convenience, we define the set containing the identifiers of all children and siblings of a node $\Node[i][p]$ by $\Children[i]$ and $\Siblings[i]\equiv\Children[p]$ -%Depending on if one argument can point to one or multiple other nodes, -%this results in a tree graph or a directed acyclic graph. -%\todo{Jede verlinkung/edge ist ein eigener Rating market} \subsection{Fact Nodes} Facts can be pro or con as well but no other node can point to them. @@ -292,38 +275,17 @@ \subsection{Fact Nodes} Examples for fact nodes are scientific, peer reviewed articles, or other curated information, e.g. from decentralized oracles such as \href{https://reality.eth.link/}{reality.eth}, \href{https://chain.link/}{Chainlink}, or other trustworthy sources of information. -%or links to a curated knowledge graph (see the underlay \cite{UNDERLAY}). - - -%\subsection{Establishing a Link to the Knowledge Graph} -%\cite{Hogan2020} -%Rational decision-making: -%establish a link between the decision and knowledge by a directed argument graph. -% -%-> this derives important features -%The longer the argument chain, the less influence has the knowledge -% -%%OR - curation of arguments - % Reuse in Multiple Debates Although argument and fact nodes can point to only one parent argument per debate, they and their associated sub-trees can be reused in multiple debates. -%\begin{figure*} -% Stakeholders -% \caption{Text} -% \label{fig:Tree} -%\end{figure*} - - \section{Phases, Stakeholders, and Stakes of the Debate}\label{sec:DebatingProcess} - -% Motivate formalization before? +\todo{Motivate formalization before?} The decision-making process in ArborVote consists of three phases: \begin{enumerate}[noitemsep] - \item editing (with an grace period for each author subtree) + \item editing \item rating \item tallying \end{enumerate} @@ -338,16 +300,16 @@ \section{Phases, Stakeholders, and Stakes of the Debate}\label{sec:DebatingProce Debaters author arguments or fact nodes and add them to the debate tree. Curators can flag and propose edits to the content that authors can accept or reject. In the latter case, a dispute is raised that is resolved by jurors in a digital court. -Lastly, voters can invest \debateTokens{} to rate the impact of nodes in the debate tree. +Lastly, voters can invest debate tokens to rate the impact of nodes in the debate tree. To maintain neutrality, jurors are excluded from the other roles. % Debate Tokens \todo{Move elsewhere} In this system, -each participant has a predefined amount of \debateTokens{} $\T$ that can only be spend within the debate. +each participant has a predefined amount of debate tokens $\T$ that can only be spend within the debate. These are either distributed equally among the participants or based on the reputation in the \ac{DAO}. % -Participants can spend the \debateTokens{} +Participants can spend the debate tokens to create, curate, and rate arguments. % The system rewards participants behaving deliberate- and constructively in the debate @@ -361,7 +323,7 @@ \subsection{Editing Phase}\label{sec:EditingPhase} Within a predefined grace-period, an argument owner can edit the argument or post sub-nodes, whereas other participants cannot. -However, other participants can suggest edits, moving, or removal of the argument in which case they are called curators. +However, other participants can suggest edits, moving, or removal of the arguments and are thus called curators. The editing of the author includes \begin{itemize}[noitemsep] @@ -379,43 +341,38 @@ \subsubsection*{Ownership, Curation, and Dispute Resolution} %Despite suggesting edits or removal of arguments, Disputes about argument ownership might arise, if duplicates or very similar statements are present in different parts of the tree. -% -Curators can flag nodes that contain -\begin{itemize}[noitemsep] -\item plagiarism, -\item spam, or -\item offensive content such as hate-speech or sexism. -\end{itemize} - -These participants are called curators and have to lock up a deposit, -i.e, tokens that have monetary value and are not \debateTokens{}, -in order to raise a dispute. -If the argument author agrees with the accusation, he/she can remove the argument \replaced{and pac only a small}{without any} penalty \added{to the curator}. +Curators can flag nodes containing +plagiarism, +spam, or +offensive content such as hate-speech or sexism. +In order to raise a dispute, +curators have to lock up a deposit, +i.e, tokens that have monetary value and are not debate tokens. +If the argument author agrees with the accusation, he/she can remove the argument \replaced{and pay only a small}{without any} penalty of the deposited debate tokens \added{to the curator}. If not, the author has to match the deposit and the dispute is escalated to a digital court such as \href{https://kleros.io/}{Kleros Court}\cite{Lesaege2019,Lesaege2021} or \href{https://anj.aragon.org/}{Aragon Court}\cite{Cuende2019}. Depending on the court decision, the node either remains in the tree or is deleted. -As a result, either the creator or curator loses the deposit, which is then split between the opposing side and the jurors. \todo{What happens to the debate tokens? Curator gets them but cannot spend them - used for reputation rewards in the end} +As a result, either the creator or curator loses the deposit, which is then split between the opposing side and the jurors. +\todo{What happens to the debate tokens? Curator gets them but cannot spend them - used for reputation rewards in the end} \subsection{Rating Phase}\label{sec:RatingPhase} % Voting Phase - After the editing phase ended and the argument tree is completely finalized, the debate enters the rating phase---the actual voting process. % challenge % Design rationale -\highlight{The key game-theoretical challenge} here is to incentivize the participants to +\highlight{The key challenge} here is to incentivize the participants to rate the impact $\imp$ of an argument or fact node -and to decouple it from the individual outcome preference or in simple terms: to eliminate tactical voting. +and to decouple it from the individual outcome preference. +In simple terms: to eliminate tactical voting. Voting solely with the goal to influence the decision should be a unprofitable long-term strategy. -\todo{How is the design rational achieved?} % Rating markets This design rationale can be achieved by employing a market mechanism---we call this a \ac{RM}. %This impact is determined separately for each argument via a market mechanism that we call \ac{RM}. A \ac{RM} is a slightly modified \ac{PM} such as the \href{https://omen.eth.link/}{Omen \ac{PM}}\cite{Omen2020} and also uses an \ac{AMM}\cite{Zhang2018} for liquidity provision. - -Participants can spend their \debateTokens{} to invest in approval or disapproval shares $\Y$ and $\T$ +Participants can spend their debate tokens to invest in approval or disapproval shares $\Y$ and $\N$ \deleted{being minted at the current market ratio}. These participants are called voters. @@ -431,22 +388,14 @@ \subsection{Rating Phase}\label{sec:RatingPhase} % Voting Phase % PM contrast In contrast to a conventional \ac{PM} where all shares except that of the correctly predicted outcome (determined by an oracle) are invalidated after the market close, -all shares maintain their last value and are redeemed for \debateTokens. +all shares maintain their last value and are redeemed for debate tokens. \todo{How to prevent unwanted dynamics shortly before the market close?} % Arbitrage -%\replaced{ -% In said system, voters can spend their \debateTokens{} $\T$ -% and swap them for approval ($\Y$) or disapproval ($\N$) shares on the argument market. -% Depending on if the \ac{RM} has moved in the opposite direction at the point if its close, -% participants gain or lose tokens. -% This is can be a profitable or unprofitable trade. -%}{ - Accordingly, voters who buy approval or disapproval shares of under- or overrated arguments that turn out to be rated higher or lower at the market close, respectively, make a profit in \debateTokens. -%} +Accordingly, voters who buy approval or disapproval shares of under- or overrated arguments that turn out to be rated higher or lower at the market close, respectively, make a profit in debate tokens. % Liquidity provision by the author -The liquidity of the \ac{AMM} is provided by the author of the argument who has to deposit \debateTokens{} at the point of the creation of the argument. -Moreover, the author determines the initial amount of the approval and disapproval shares $r^\Y$ and $r^\N$ minted from the \debateTokens{} at the market start +The liquidity of the \ac{AMM} is provided by the author of the argument who has to deposit debate tokens at the point of the creation of the argument. +Moreover, the author determines the initial amount of the approval and disapproval shares $r^\Y$ and $r^\N$ minted from the debate tokens at the market start and therefore the initial impact $\imp$. If the argument creator does not specify a ratio, the amount of approval and disapproval tokens is set with $r^\Y=r^\N=\nicefrac{1}{2}\,r^\T$. @@ -472,19 +421,12 @@ \subsection{Rating Phase}\label{sec:RatingPhase} % Voting Phase as the actors end up with \highlight[comment={How to proof this?}]{less vote tokens than the average participant.} \todo{Discuss in more detail.} - % Tallying In the subsequent tallying phase, the impact value $\imp$ determined by the markets is tallied up, which is described in the following section. - - - - - - \subsection{Tallying Phase}\label{sec:TallyingPhase} In the tallying phase, the impact of the different nodes is accumulated and weighted. We define the weight of a node $\Node[i]$ by @@ -493,10 +435,10 @@ \subsection{Tallying Phase}\label{sec:TallyingPhase} \wgt[i][\Siblings] = \frac{\liq[i]}{\sum_{j\in \Siblings[i]}\liq[j]} \end{equation} as the -amount of \debateTokens{} spent on node $\Node[i]$, $\liq[i]$, +amount of debate tokens spent on node $\Node[i]$, $\liq[i]$, in relation to all its siblings $\Siblings[i]$. -to the total number of deposited \debateTokens{} of its siblings. +to the total number of deposited debate tokens of its siblings. This allows for expressing the impact of a node $\Node[i]$ \begin{equation}\label{eq:Impact} \imp[i] = @@ -514,24 +456,26 @@ \subsection{Tallying Phase}\label{sec:TallyingPhase} The first term $\impOwn[i]$ is the nodes own impact determined directly from the associated \ac{RM}. -The other term contains the impact influence exerted by the children nodes +The other term contains the weight-averaged impact of all children nodes \begin{equation} - \imp[i][\Children] = \sum_{j\in \Children[i]} \supportive[j][i] \imp[j]\,\wgt[j][\Siblings], + \imp[i][\Children] = \sum_{j\in \Children[i]} \supportive[j]%[i] + \imp[j]\,\wgt[j][\Siblings]. \end{equation} -being weight-averaged by the sibling-weight impact of all children nodes -\deleted{which recurses from the root to the leaf level of the argument tree,}. -and a prefactor +with the prefactor \begin{equation} - \supportive[j][i]= + \supportive[j]%[i] + = \begin{cases} - +1 & \text{if node $j$ supports node $i$}\\ - -1 & \text{if node $j$ \,opposes\, node $i$}\\ + +1 & \text{if node $j$ is supporting}\\ %node $i$}\\ + -1 & \text{if node $j$ is opposing} %\, node $i$}\\ \end{cases}, \end{equation} -leading to the subtraction of impact, if the node is opposing. +resulting in the subtraction of impact, if the associated node is opposing. % Mixing -Both terms are scaled with the mixing parameter $\gamma$. -The higher the value of $\gamma$, the more influence the children nodes have on $\imp[i]$ +Both terms are scaled with the mixing parameter $\mixing$. +The higher the value of $\mixing$, the more influence the children nodes have on $\imp[i]$. +Because the influence of a single node on the decision outcome decreases with increasing distance from the tree root, +it becomes less attractive to add too many layers to the tree, which incentivizes keeping debates short. Special cases arise for the different node types in the tree: \begin{equation} @@ -543,25 +487,24 @@ \subsection{Tallying Phase}\label{sec:TallyingPhase} \end{cases} \end{equation} % root -For the root node, the impact is solely determined from the children's approval ($\mixing=1$). +For the root node, the impact is solely determined from the child impacts ($\mixing=1$). % leaf For a leaf node, the impact is determined solely from its own rating market ($\mixing=0$). % all others For all other nodes, -the ratio between the two is defined by to a constant $k\in[\nicefrac{1}{2},1)$. +the ratio between the two is defined by constant $k\in[\nicefrac{1}{2},1)$ specified by the debate creator. \todo{Add example.\\ -For example with $k=\nicefrac{3}{4}$...} +For example with $k=\nicefrac{3}{4}$... +} \todo{ \section{Incentive Structures}\label{sec:Incentives} % Creation - \subsection{Rewards} - debate summoner has to offer rewards (either reputation or money) - - rewards are split between participants that performed above average } @@ -570,7 +513,7 @@ \section{Attack Scenarios} In the following, different attack scenarios and means for mitigation are discussed. \subsection{Spamming Attacks} -The number of nodes that can be created is limited by the number of \debateTokens{} and +The number of nodes that can be created is limited by the number of debate tokens and curators can remove the spam nodes. \subsection{Ownership Attacks} @@ -578,14 +521,14 @@ \subsection{Ownership Attacks} or ultimately decided by jurors in a court. \subsection{Sybil-Attacks} -Ensure that users are real humans by employing curated registries such as \href{https://proofofhumanity.id/}{Proof of Humanity}. +Curated registries such as \href{https://proofofhumanity.id/}{Proof of Humanity} +ensure that only real humans participate. + \subsection{Collusion} -Todo -\todo{ - What types of collusion are possible and - can they be prevented by utilizing \ac{MACI}? -} +Collusion (such as bribery or blackmailing) is still an open problem in decentralized governance. +However, it can be solved in the future if \ac{MACI}\cite{Buterin2021} becomes available. +In the context of ArborVote this means that the debate participants remain secret and cannot proof to each other that they have created or voted for a certain tree node. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% @@ -608,25 +551,9 @@ \section*{Acknowledgments} \section*{Appendix} %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - - \subsection*{Rating Markets}\label{sec:RatingMarkets} - -An \ac{AMM} is used to provide liquidity for the rating markets. - -\todo{ - Contrast to \ac{PM}: - half as many shares are minted so that one share is allocated for each \highlight{collateralized} \debateTokens - instead of two. -} - -\todo{ - This impact of each node is influenced by two quantities: - the approval $\imp$ and \highlight{weight} $\wgt$. -} - - -The argument creator uses $r^\T$ \debateTokens{} +An \ac{AMM}, more specifically a \ac{CPMM}, is used to provide liquidity for the rating markets. +The argument creator deposits $r^\T$ debate tokens to mint $r^\Y$ approval ($\Y$) and $r^\N$ disapproval ($\N$) shares @@ -639,36 +566,31 @@ \subsection*{Rating Markets}\label{sec:RatingMarkets} \begin{equation} r^\Y+r^\N = \liq. \end{equation} -The $Y$ and $N$ tokens form a trading pair -that has to maintain a constant value +The $\Y$ and $\N$ tokens form a trading pair +whose product has to remain constant \begin{equation} - k = r^\Y\cdot r^\N + k = r^\Y\cdot r^\N. \end{equation} -If a voter invests \debateTokens{} to buy, e.g., approval shares, +If a voter invests debate tokens to buy, e.g., approval shares, both share types are minted at the \highlight{current} \ac{AMM} ratio of $r^\Y: r^\N$. Then, the unwanted shares are sold at the \ac{AMM} for the wanted share type, which is the same implementation as in \href{https://omen.eth.link/}{Omen \acp{PM}}\cite{Omen2020}. -\todo{ - %Use this for curators that suggest edits? - The value k can change if more LPs join - \begin{equation} - \sum_i w_i \, p_i = k - \end{equation} -} An example is depicted in \cref{fig:RatingMarket}. \begin{figure*} \includegraphics[width=0.75\textwidth]{Graphics/RatingMarket.pdf} \caption{Process flow diagram in a rating market showing - (1) liquidity provision by the argument creator Carl with a ratio of $r^\Y:r^\N=1$ + 1.) liquidity provision by the argument creator Carl with a ratio of $r^\Y:r^\N=1$ and - (2,3) two consecutive market trades by Alice and Bob where each of them buys approval shares for an equivalent of 2\,\T{} on the underlying \ac{AMM}. + two consecutive market trades by + 2.) Alice and + 3.) Bob where each of them buys approval shares for an equivalent of 2\,\T{} on the underlying \ac{CPMM}. After the market close, Alice and Bob redeem their approval shares \Y{} for \num[round-mode=places,round-precision=1]{2.534597515403166} and \num[round-mode=places,round-precision=1]{2.0801261686545804} - \debateTokens{} \T{}, thus generating profit. + debate tokens \T{}, thus generating profit. Carl redeems his \Y{} and \N{} shares for $\num[round-mode=places,round-precision=1]{4.813525792017222}\,\T +\num[round-mode=places,round-precision=1]{4.571750523925031}\,\T