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-Learn & practice GCP Hacking: 
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+Learn & practice AWS Hacking:
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+Learn & practice GCP Hacking: 
[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
diff --git a/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-files-folders-and-binaries/macos-sensitive-locations.md b/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-files-folders-and-binaries/macos-sensitive-locations.md
index 95a4f630cc9..1da15560d49 100644
--- a/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-files-folders-and-binaries/macos-sensitive-locations.md
+++ b/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-files-folders-and-binaries/macos-sensitive-locations.md
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
# macOS Sensitive Locations & Interesting Daemons
{% hint style="success" %}
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-Learn & practice GCP Hacking: [**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
+Learn & practice AWS Hacking:
[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)\
+Learn & practice GCP Hacking: 
[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)\
-Learn & practice GCP Hacking: [**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
+Learn & practice AWS Hacking:[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)\
+Learn & practice GCP Hacking: [**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ sudo bash -c 'for i in $(find /var/db/dslocal/nodes/Default/users -type f -regex
```
{% endcode %}
+Another way to obtain the `ShadowHashData` of a user is by using `dscl`: ``sudo dscl . -read /Users/`whoami` ShadowHashData``
+
+### /etc/master.passwd
+
+This file is **only used** when the system id running in **single-user mode** (so not very frequently).
+
### Keychain Dump
Note that when using the security binary to **dump the passwords decrypted**, several prompts will ask the user to allow this operation.
@@ -187,12 +193,50 @@ for i in $(sqlite3 ~/Library/Group\ Containers/group.com.apple.notes/NoteStore.s
## Preferences
-In macOS apps preferences are located in **`$HOME/Library/Preferences`** and in iOS they are in `/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application//Library/Preferences`.
+In macOS apps preferences are located in **`$HOME/Library/Preferences`** and in iOS they are in `/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application//Library/Preferences`.
In macOS the cli tool **`defaults`** can be used to **modify the Preferences file**.
**`/usr/sbin/cfprefsd`** claims the XPC services `com.apple.cfprefsd.daemon` and `com.apple.cfprefsd.agent` and can be called to perform actions such as modify preferences.
+## OpenDirectory permissions.plist
+
+The file `/System/Library/OpenDirectory/permissions.plist` contains permissions applied on node attributes and is protected by SIP.\
+This file grants permissions to specific users by UUID (and not uid) so they are able to access specific sensitive information like `ShadowHashData`, `HeimdalSRPKey` and `KerberosKeys` among others:
+
+```xml
+[...]
+dsRecTypeStandard:Computers
+
+ dsAttrTypeNative:ShadowHashData
+
+
+
+ uuid
+ ABCDEFAB-CDEF-ABCD-EFAB-CDEF00000000
+ permissions
+
+ readattr
+ writeattr
+
+
+
+ dsAttrTypeNative:KerberosKeys
+
+
+
+ uuid
+ ABCDEFAB-CDEF-ABCD-EFAB-CDEF00000000
+ permissions
+
+ readattr
+ writeattr
+
+
+
+[...]
+```
+
## System Notifications
### Darwin Notifications
@@ -251,8 +295,8 @@ These are notifications that the user should see in the screen:
* **`NSUserNotificationCenter`**: This is the iOS bulletin board in MacOS. The database with the notifications in located in `/var/folders//0/com.apple.notificationcenter/db2/db`
{% hint style="success" %}
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-Learn & practice GCP Hacking: [**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
+Learn & practice AWS Hacking:[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)\
+Learn & practice GCP Hacking: [**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
diff --git a/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-macf.md b/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-macf.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..08f750bd138
--- /dev/null
+++ b/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-macf.md
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+# macOS MACF
+
+
+
+{% hint style="success" %}
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+
+
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+
+
+
+
+{% endhint %}
+
+## Basic Information
+
+**MACF** stands for **Mandatory Access Control Framework**, which is a security system built into the operating system to help protect your computer. It works by setting **strict rules about who or what can access certain parts of the system**, such as files, applications, and system resources. By enforcing these rules automatically, MACF ensures that only authorized users and processes can perform specific actions, reducing the risk of unauthorized access or malicious activities.
+
+Note that MACF doesn't really make any decisions as it just **intercepts** actions, it leaves the decisions to the **policy modules** (kernel extensions) it calls like `AppleMobileFileIntegrity.kext`, `Quarantine.kext`, `Sandbox.kext`, `TMSafetyNet.kext` and `mcxalr.kext`.
+
+### Flow
+
+1. Process performs a syscall/mach trap
+2. The relevant function is called inside the kernel
+3. Function calls MACF
+4. MACF checks policy modules that requested to hook that function in their policy
+5. MACF calls the relevant policies
+6. Policies indicates if they allow or deny the action
+
+{% hint style="danger" %}
+Apple is the only one that can use the MAC Framework KPI.
+{% endhint %}
+
+### Labels
+
+MACF use **labels** that then the policies checking if they should grant some access or not will use. The code of the labels struct declaration can be [found here](https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/94d3b452840153a99b38a3a9659680b2a006908e/security/\_label.h), which is then used inside the **`struct ucred`** in [**here**](https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/94d3b452840153a99b38a3a9659680b2a006908e/bsd/sys/ucred.h#L86) in the **`cr_label`** part. The label contains flags and s number of **slots** that can be used by **MACF policies to allocate pointers**. For example Sanbox will point to the container profile
+
+## MACF Policies
+
+A MACF Policy defined **rule and conditions to be applied in certain kernel operations**.
+
+A kernel extension could configure a `mac_policy_conf` struct and then register it calling `mac_policy_register`. From [here](https://opensource.apple.com/source/xnu/xnu-2050.18.24/security/mac\_policy.h.auto.html):
+
+```c
+ #define mpc_t struct mac_policy_conf *
+
+/**
+ @brief Mac policy configuration
+
+ This structure specifies the configuration information for a
+ MAC policy module. A policy module developer must supply
+ a short unique policy name, a more descriptive full name, a list of label
+ namespaces and count, a pointer to the registered enty point operations,
+ any load time flags, and optionally, a pointer to a label slot identifier.
+
+ The Framework will update the runtime flags (mpc_runtime_flags) to
+ indicate that the module has been registered.
+
+ If the label slot identifier (mpc_field_off) is NULL, the Framework
+ will not provide label storage for the policy. Otherwise, the
+ Framework will store the label location (slot) in this field.
+
+ The mpc_list field is used by the Framework and should not be
+ modified by policies.
+*/
+/* XXX - reorder these for better aligment on 64bit platforms */
+struct mac_policy_conf {
+ const char *mpc_name; /** policy name */
+ const char *mpc_fullname; /** full name */
+ const char **mpc_labelnames; /** managed label namespaces */
+ unsigned int mpc_labelname_count; /** number of managed label namespaces */
+ struct mac_policy_ops *mpc_ops; /** operation vector */
+ int mpc_loadtime_flags; /** load time flags */
+ int *mpc_field_off; /** label slot */
+ int mpc_runtime_flags; /** run time flags */
+ mpc_t mpc_list; /** List reference */
+ void *mpc_data; /** module data */
+};
+```
+
+It's easy to identify the kernel extensions configuring these policies by checking calls to `mac_policy_register`. Moreover, checking the disassemble of the extension it's also possible to find the used `mac_policy_conf` struct.
+
+Note that MACF policies can be registered and unregistered also **dynamically**.
+
+One of the main fields of the `mac_policy_conf` is the **`mpc_ops`**. This fied specifies which opreations the policy is interested in. Note that there are hundres of them, so it's possible to zero all of them and then select just the ones the policy is interested on. From [here](https://opensource.apple.com/source/xnu/xnu-2050.18.24/security/mac\_policy.h.auto.html):
+
+```c
+struct mac_policy_ops {
+ mpo_audit_check_postselect_t *mpo_audit_check_postselect;
+ mpo_audit_check_preselect_t *mpo_audit_check_preselect;
+ mpo_bpfdesc_label_associate_t *mpo_bpfdesc_label_associate;
+ mpo_bpfdesc_label_destroy_t *mpo_bpfdesc_label_destroy;
+ mpo_bpfdesc_label_init_t *mpo_bpfdesc_label_init;
+ mpo_bpfdesc_check_receive_t *mpo_bpfdesc_check_receive;
+ mpo_cred_check_label_update_execve_t *mpo_cred_check_label_update_execve;
+ mpo_cred_check_label_update_t *mpo_cred_check_label_update;
+[...]
+```
+
+Almost all the hooks will be called back by MACF when one of those operations are intercepted. However, **`mpo_policy_*`** hooks are an exception because `mpo_hook_policy_init()` is a callback called upon registration (so after `mac_policy_register()`) and `mpo_hook_policy_initbsd()` is called during late registration once the BSD subsystem has initialised properly.
+
+Moreover, the **`mpo_policy_syscall`** hook can be registered by any kext to expose a private **ioctl** style call **interface**. Then, a user client will be able to call `mac_syscall` (#381) specifying as parameters the **policy name** with an integer **code** and optional **arguments**.\
+For example, the **`Sandbox.kext`** uses this a lot.
+
+Checking the kext's **`__DATA.__const*`** is possible to identify the `mac_policy_ops` structure used when registering the policy. It's possible to find it because its pointer is at an offset inside `mpo_policy_conf` and also because the amount of NULL pointers that will be in that area.
+
+Moreover, it's also possible to get the list of kexts that have configured a policy by dumping from memory the struct **`_mac_policy_list`** which is updated with every policy that is registered.
+
+## MACF Initialization
+
+MACF is initialised very soon. It's set up in XNU's `bootstrap_thread`: after `ipc_bootstrap` a call to `mac_policy_init()` which initializes the `mac_policy_list` and moments later `mac_policy_initmach()` is called. Among other things, this function will get all the Apple kexts with the `AppleSecurityExtension` key in their Info.plist like `ALF.kext`, `AppleMobileFileIntegrity.kext`, `Quarantine.kext`, `Sandbox.kext` and `TMSafetyNet.kext` and loads them.
+
+## MACF Callouts
+
+It's common to find callouts to MACF defined in code like: **`#if CONFIG_MAC`** conditional blocks. Moreover, inside these blocks it's possible to find calls to `mac_proc_check*` which calls MACF to **check for permissions** to perform certain actions. Moreover, the format of the MACF callouts is: **`mac_