the rfbGetScreen() function triggers the stack-buffer-overflow vulnerability

[Dabiaoge6]

testcase:EASYFUZZ(FwqYLJGS){
//用户被测接口需要的与fuzz无关的变量声明以及接口上下文。
// ---comment int * rfbGetScreen.argc
int * argc_YNnvjaJn = (int *) fuzzInt32(0);
// ---comment char * * rfbGetScreen.argv
char * EcOVZIWm = (char *) fuzzstring(1);
char * * argv_fUdAxCJF = & EcOVZIWm;
// ---comment int rfbGetScreen.width
int width_uLpmnCVk = * (int *) fuzzInt32(2);
// ---comment int rfbGetScreen.height
int height_fpHPNqHb = * (int *) fuzzInt32(3);
// ---comment int rfbGetScreen.bitsPerSample
int bitsPerSample_WAHEnxom = * (int *) fuzzInt32(4);
// ---comment int rfbGetScreen.samplesPerPixel
int samplesPerPixel_hGttfBZf = * (int *) fuzzInt32(5);
// ---comment int rfbGetScreen.bytesPerPixel
int bytesPerPixel_uxkrfWUW = * (int *) fuzzInt32(6);
rfbScreenInfoPtr FvPkThpQ = rfbGetScreen(argc_YNnvjaJn, argv_fUdAxCJF, width_uLpmnCVk, height_fpHPNqHb, bitsPerSample_WAHEnxom, samplesPerPixel_hGttfBZf, bytesPerPixel_uxkrfWUW);
}

the crash logs:

==132==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffca1760de8 at pc 0x7f360bdbc780 bp 0x7ffca1760c20 sp 0x7ffca1760c10
READ of size 8 at 0x7ffca1760de8 thread T0
#0 0x7f360bdbc77f in rfbProcessArguments /cloud_proj/pr1679550382741imagysjawxnitcux/libvncserver/cargs.c:88
#1 0x7f360bd51d35 in rfbGetScreen /cloud_proj/pr1679550382741imagysjawxnitcux/libvncserver/main.c:999
#2 0x5593caa738c4 in easyloop /dockerin/test_file.c:35
#3 0x5593caa7340b in main /opt1/software/betafuzz/srap/wrapentry.c:108
#4 0x7f360ba63d8f (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x29d8f)
#5 0x7f360ba63e3f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x29e3f)
#6 0x5593caa73464 in _start (/dockerin/clouditera+0x1464)

Address 0x7ffca1760de8 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 72 in frame
#0 0x5593caa73538 in easyloop /dockerin/test_file.c:7

This frame has 2 object(s):
[32, 40) 'forkloop' (line 14)
[64, 72) 'EcOVZIWm' (line 20) <== Memory access at offset 72 overflows this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
(longjmp and C++ exceptions are supported)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow /cloud_proj/pr1679550382741imagysjawxnitcux/libvncserver/cargs.c:88 in rfbProcessArguments
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x1000142e4160: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x1000142e4170: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x1000142e4180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1
0x1000142e4190: f1 f1 04 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x1000142e41a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x1000142e41b0: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 00[f3]f3 f3
0x1000142e41c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x1000142e41d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x1000142e41e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x1000142e41f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x1000142e4200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
Shadow gap: cc