diff --git a/cheatsheets/Threat_Modeling_Cheat_Sheet.md b/cheatsheets/Threat_Modeling_Cheat_Sheet.md
index def09a19cd..26a57d0b40 100644
--- a/cheatsheets/Threat_Modeling_Cheat_Sheet.md
+++ b/cheatsheets/Threat_Modeling_Cheat_Sheet.md
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ STRIDE is a mature and popular threat modeling technique and mnemonic originally
 | **D**enial of Service       | Availability      | An attacker locks a legitimate user out of their account by performing many failed authentication attempts. |
 | **E**levation of Privileges | Authorization     | An attacker tampers with a JWT to change their role.                                                        |
 
-STRIDE provides valuable structure for responding to the question of "what can go wrong". It is also a highly flexible approach and getting started need not be complex. Simple techniques such as brainstorming and whiteboarding or even [games](https://github.com/adamshostack/eop/) may be used initially. STRIDE is also incorporated into popular threat modeling tools such as [OWASP's Threat Dragon](https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon) and [Microsoft's Threat Modeling Tool](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/develop/threat-modeling-tool). Additionally, as a relatively high-level process, STRIDE pairs well with more tactical approaches such as kill chains or [MITRE's ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) (please refer to [this article](https://blog.isc2.org/isc2_blog/2020/02/under-attack-how-mitres-methodology-to-find-threats-and-embed-counter-measures-might-work-in-your-or.html) for an overview of how STRIDE and ATT&CK can work together).
+STRIDE provides valuable structure for responding to the question of "what can go wrong". It is also a highly flexible approach and getting started need not be complex. Simple techniques such as brainstorming and whiteboarding or even [games](https://github.com/adamshostack/eop/) may be used initially. STRIDE is also incorporated into popular threat modeling tools such as [OWASP's Threat Dragon](https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon) and [Microsoft's Threat Modeling Tool](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/develop/threat-modeling-tool). Additionally, as a relatively high-level process, STRIDE pairs well with more tactical approaches such as kill chains or [MITRE's ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) (please refer to [this article](https://web.isc2ncrchapter.org/under-attck-how-mitres-methodology-to-find-threats-and-embed-counter-measures-might-work-in-your-organization/) for an overview of how STRIDE and ATT&CK can work together).
 
 After possible threats have been identified, people will frequently rank them. In theory, ranking should be based on the mathematical product of an identified threat's likelihood and its impact. A threat that is likely to occur and result in serious damage would be prioritized much higher than one that is unlikely to occur and would only have a moderate impact. However, these both can be challenging to calculate, and they ignore the work to fix a problem. Some advocate for including that in a single prioritization.