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+---
+layout: post
+title : The Gulf And Gaza
+author: Tobias Borck
+date  : 2023-12-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/VIV7NxQ.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Staying the Course Amid Renewed Crisis"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_As Israel’s war in Gaza rages on, the Gulf Arab states continue to try to strike a balance between working to contain and end the violence and maintaining momentum for their respective national projects._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+On 5 December, Qatar hosted the annual summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the regional grouping that includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Inevitably, Israel’s ongoing war against Hamas in Gaza topped the agenda of the discussions between Gulf leaders, which were also attended by Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
+
+The message from the summit was straightforward and unsurprising. The six Gulf monarchies called for “an immediate cessation of hostilities and Israeli military operations”, demanded “the release of civilian hostages and detainees”, and backed efforts to “revive the peace process in the Middle East” and “the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital” .
+
+Besides the various agreements to adopt joint positions and work together – in areas going far beyond the war in Gaza, from efforts to remove trade barriers and collaborate on tourism, to shared commitments to investing in oil and gas as well as renewable energy – recorded in the lengthy 122-article final statement, the summit ultimately appeared to be intended to signal one thing above all: Gulf unity.
+
+
+### Pragmatic Gulf Unity
+
+Indeed, with the Middle East in the midst of a crisis defined by the long-standing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, it is perhaps easy to forget that until just three years ago, a deep fracture between the Gulf Arab states – specifically between Qatar (backed by Turkey) on one side, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other – was one of the defining features of regional instability. Today, things are different. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have become particularly close over the past year or two. Differences and intra-Gulf competition still persist, perhaps especially between Saudi Arabia and the UAE these days, but the overall mood is one of pragmatic alignment – certainly vis-à-vis the war in Gaza.
+
+Saudi Arabia has clearly assumed the mantle of regional leadership. It hosted an extraordinary Arab-Islamic summit in Riyadh in November, notably with the attendance of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi; and Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud has led a group of his counterparts from across the region on an international tour with stops in Beijing, Moscow and London, among others. Qatar has led mediation efforts with Hamas to facilitate the release of hostages, which resulted, for example, in the seven-day truce at the end of November. The UAE – which has the closest ties with Israel of all Gulf states – has remained quieter thus far, but it appears poised to play a key role whenever there is eventually a more permanent ceasefire in Gaza, precisely because it is probably the Arab country Israel trusts the most.
+
+Crucially, Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi have thus far worked together and vocally endorsed each other’s efforts. They have looked to leverage their different relationships with the Israelis and Palestinians, as well as across the region, rather than to compete with one another. The eventual question of helping to establish and strengthen a future Palestinian leadership could well bring intra-Gulf competition back to the fore, but for the moment at least, the three monarchies are clearly aligned in their view of the conflict.
+
+___`Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are in very similar positions and share very similar interests with regard to the current crisis`___
+
+All three were clearly horrified by Hamas’s 7 October attack. Saudi Arabia and especially the UAE have long been critical of, and even hostile towards, Hamas. Qatar has a different relationship with the group, hosting its political office in Doha in coordination with the US and the Israeli government, but it clearly also did not support the attack. However, what Israel has done since 7 October has, form the perspective of Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha – and the wider region, for that matter – gone far beyond exercising a legitimate right to self-defence. In their view, Israel’s operation to go after Hamas has become a brutal all-out assault on the Palestinian people. The attempt by US President Joe Biden to equate Russia and Hamas as evil aggressors and Israel and Ukraine as victims worthy of support does not resonate in the Gulf (or indeed anywhere in the Arab world). Rather, if there is any relation between the wars in Ukraine and Gaza from the Arab perspective, it is between Ukrainian civilians and the Palestinian people.
+
+
+### The Ongoing Quest for Stability
+
+Ultimately, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are in very similar positions and share very similar interests with regard to the current crisis. While the war is taking up a lot of their bandwidth, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha are united in their determination to maintain the overall strategic course they were on before 7 October. All three are pursuing highly ambitious domestic agendas.
+
+In Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030 – a root-and-branch transformation of the Kingdom – is the all-important North Star for all decision-making, including on foreign policy. The UAE wants to consolidate its position as the most dynamic regional power and a hub for global affairs; its hosting of the ongoing UN Climate Change Conference COP28 is illustrative of this. Qatar, meanwhile, is looking to build on the success of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, including by expanding its gas production capacity to solidify its status as the world’s most important exporter of liquified natural gas.
+
+Critical to all of these ambitions is the maintenance of a modicum of stability in the wider region. In many ways, the war in Gaza erupted just as Gulf leaders felt like their regional strategy to de-escalate and reduce tensions wherever possible was working. Not only had they buried the hatchet of their intra-Gulf dispute, but they had also managed to steer their relations with Iran into calmer waters. In fact, in the effort to contain the war at least geographically, the new channel of communication between Riyadh and Tehran has undoubtedly been crucially important.
+
+Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar remain worried about the violence in Gaza stoking regional instability, even if the spectre of a wider regional war can be kept at bay. While they are confident that they can manage popular anger about Israel’s conduct in Gaza at home, they are aware that their counterparts in Egypt and Jordan – two countries whose stability they regard as pivotal for the region – might have a harder time doing the same.
+
+___`The Gulf states have seen the US’s strong support for Israel as another sign that Washington’s strategy in the Middle East is out of step with the regional mood`___
+
+Furthermore, even if Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha are feeling more confident about their ability to manage tensions with Tehran, they nevertheless see – and have always seen – a great risk in Iran’s ability to use the Palestinian cause and its claim to leadership of the resistance against Israel to shore up its regional position. The attacks on commercial ships supposedly linked to Israel by the Yemeni Houthis – one of Iran’s partners in the region – obviously worry Saudi Arabia, for example. For now, these activities are not directed at the Kingdom, but with the Red Sea central to Riyadh’s economic development plans, they clearly represent a long-term threat.
+
+The Gulf states are therefore likely to continue to emphasise the need for pragmatism and de-escalation. They will try to protect the gains they have made in their relations with Iran, even if this proves to be an uphill battle. Similarly, they are unlikely to fundamentally change their approach towards Israel. The UAE has made it clear that it has no desire to give up what has been from its perspective a tremendously beneficial expanding relationship with Israel since the conclusion of the Abraham Accords in 2020. Saudi-Israeli normalisation may have become a more distant prospect due to the war, but it remains on the horizon. The strategic drivers behind normalisation, ranging from shared security interests vis-à-vis Iran to the promise of lucrative economic opportunities, remain unchanged. Even Qatar will continue to maintain its pragmatic arms-length relationship with Israel, not least because it is precisely its ability to talk to the Israeli government and security services, as well as to Hamas, that makes it such a valuable mediator and interlocutor, both in the current crisis and likely in the future too.
+
+In their relations beyond the region, the Gulf states are also trying to stay the course. The war has re-emphasised the centrality of the US to regional security, as impressively illustrated by the extensive ramping-up of the US military presence in the immediate aftermath of the 7 October attack. At the same time, however, the Gulf states have also seen the US’s strong – and in their view uncritical – support for Israel as another sign that Washington’s strategy in the Middle East is out of step with the regional mood and their own priorities.
+
+They have therefore continued to express their conviction that the world – and the region with it – is moving towards a multipolar order, and have done what they can to make this a reality. This has included the Saudi-led foreign ministers delegation’s demonstrative choice to make Beijing the first stop of their tour to build international consensus around a call for a ceasefire in Gaza, regardless of the fact that China has shown very little ability or willingness to make any meaningful efforts to resolve the crisis. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visits to the UAE and Saudi Arabia also fit into this pattern.
+
+In sum, it is very clear that the war in Gaza has made life harder for the Gulf Arab states. Leaders in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha want to focus on developing their countries and claiming their places on the global stage, and they are determined not to let either the volatility of the region they happen to find themselves in or the unstable global environment prevent them from doing so. In this context, the war in Gaza is a setback, but not one that changes the overall strategic calculus in the Gulf.
+
+---
+
+__Tobias Borck__ is Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security Studies at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His main research interests include the international relations of the Middle East, and specifically the foreign, defence and security policies of Arab states, particularly the Gulf monarchies, as well as European – especially German and British – engagement with the Middle East. He also co-leads the development and delivery of the RUSI Leadership Centre’s programme of executive education training courses, including for diplomats, military personnel, and security professionals from the Middle East and beyond.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-12-heavy-armed-forces.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-12-heavy-armed-forces.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Heavy Armoured Forces
+author: Nick Reynolds
+date  : 2023-12-12 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/vQBIqjS.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Heavy Armoured Forces in Future Combined Arms Warfare"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_Adaptations are necessary if heavy armoured forces are to remain relevant. This paper argues that the primary requirement is to implement a comparative shift away from protection and towards mobility._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+The British Army is likely to be called on to engage in high-intensity warfighting at some stage in the future, and must be able to do so credibly in order to contribute to NATO’s deterrent posture. Heavy armoured forces and main battle tanks will remain an important element of warfighting, and will therefore continue to occupy an important position in the British Army’s Order of Battle. There have been concerns about the vulnerability and survivability of main battle tanks on the contemporary battlefield, as well as the ability of lighter forces backed up by ISTAR capabilities and indirect fires to create difficult operational problems for the enemy in high-intensity warfighting. However, heavy armoured forces – through their substantial combat power – ensure that a force can remain mobile while in direct contact with enemy forces, and as such heavy armour still has a valuable role to play on the battlefields of the future.
+
+However, adaptations are necessary if heavy armoured forces are to remain relevant. This paper argues that the primary requirement is to implement a comparative shift away from protection and towards mobility. Secondary requirements are numerous, and include better use of deception and decoys to counter improved enemy ISTAR capabilities, and the potential integration of uncrewed ground vehicles to add situational awareness and defensive capabilities without increasing vehicles’ weights (already problematically high). The British Army’s heavy armoured forces will also need to relearn old lessons about logistics, sustainment, vehicle recovery and the reconstitution of armoured formations that have suffered a significant level of battlefield attrition. Finally, crew expertise matters, and will – as always – be essential for keeping vehicles in working order on operations and minimising the need for the concentration of vulnerable elements of the support apparatus such as forward repair facilities. Investment in the British Army’s people should therefore not be overlooked in the heavy armour context.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War is the largest conventional land war in Europe since 1945. The conflict has registered high losses – many at the hands of new weapons – among the main battle tank (MBT) fleets of both sides, and in this context a longstanding debate has regained prominence: what future does the MBT have on the battlefield or in the force structures of modern militaries? The debate has been one of the more controversial and divisive ones over the future of warfighting. Although tanks were pivotal to 20th century warfare, their utility was often questioned – even during the Cold War – in a way that the utility of other revolutionary technologies such as aviation and radio communications was not.
+
+Tanks were introduced in the First World War to reduce casualties and break the deadlock imposed by trench warfare, notably in the Battle of Cambrai in 1917. After experimentation and increasing adoption during the interwar period, the Second World War saw tanks become established as a mainstay in the European and North African theatres of operations. However, since 1945, their utility has routinely been questioned and discussed. Most – but not all – of these discussions have concluded that MBTs still retain utility, but nevertheless concerns (particularly about whether the role of tanks can survive when faced with new threats) are periodically revived by instances of high losses.
+
+This debate is hugely relevant to the UK defence establishment (and particularly the British Army) as it looks to overcome years of underinvestment in conventional capabilities. A major component of this paper, therefore, will be to identify the implications of the MBT’s changing role for the British Army’s force structure if it is to have the capability to fight on future battlefields. In 2022, Chief of the General Staff General Sir Patrick Sanders declared that Operation Mobilise – to deter Russian aggression in Europe – was to be the British Army’s priority. This will mean the acceleration of the Future Soldier modernisation programme, with the aim of restoring the British Army’s ability to conduct mobile combined arms warfare. While the strategy is explicit about having a positional character, this is because it is largely focused on deterrence and as such will involve posturing.
+
+However, for deterrence to work, it must be credible. Credibility requires not just a presentational force but the ability to warfight, and British warfighting doctrine is defined by the “manoeuvrist approach” – doctrinal terminology for manoeuvre warfare. Manoeuvre and heavy armoured forces – both heavy armoured combat vehicles classed as MBTs and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) or armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) and the associated support and logistics vehicles and apparatus – are deeply interconnected. Heavy armoured forces are known for their ability to manoeuvre and for using their unique characteristics to maintain this ability, even against other heavy armoured forces, and have traditionally been able to remain mobile under heavy direct and indirect enemy fire, and to engage and destroy conventional ground forces (including other tanks). Heavy armoured forces, if they are well-trained and well-led, can also quickly reform after taking objectives, and then immediately exploit further opportunities to do the same again (although, as will be explored below, these characteristics are not absolute and may not be guaranteed in future). The key characteristics of heavy armoured forces can be summarised as mobility, firepower and protection – criteria against which individual vehicles are judged.
+
+These concerns about the continued viability of MBTs, coupled with the clear imperative for the British Army to retain its ability to credibly fight wars, provide the context for this study, which examines the fate of the MBT and heavy armoured forces within the British Army, based on a survey of the changes to combined arms warfare and of evolving British strategic policy. There is much at stake here: force structure changes and procurement decisions have long lead times and must be made early. Unpacking the debate about heavy armoured forces in sufficient depth to identify trade-offs and opportunities (and, indeed, dead-ends) is therefore essential if policymakers and military leaders are to reshape land forces so as to remain credible for future warfighting.
+
+This study frames issues in broad terms in order to be as accessible and useful as possible to international military practitioners, academics, policymakers and observers from outside the British defence establishment, but is UK-focused and, where appropriate, explores inherently technical issues. Chapter I covers British policy in the context of strategic warfighting requirements. Chapter II analyses the basics of combat power and the characteristics of MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles in order to provide a baseline understanding of/guide to the underlying issues. Chapter III covers the challenges to the continued utility of heavy armoured forces and discusses what adaptations should be made to ensure that they remain viable in the context of the changing threat landscape and operational environment. The paper concludes with recommendations for the way ahead.
+
+This is not an engineering study, and although engineering issues will be introduced or discussed where pertinent, some issues – for example, the adoption of remote turrets or rubberised tracks – may be left unaddressed where they do not have sufficient relevance for the tactical, operational or policy choices identified. As a primarily theoretical analysis of the nature of operations, the study relies on a mixture of approaches to address the questions outlined above: a survey of the existing literature; engagement with military practitioners; observations of military exercises; and fieldwork in relevant operational areas. Much of the utility of armour is reliant on enablers and supporting capabilities, as well as the coordination of different arms in combination: combined arms. Thus, parts of this study will discuss other systems, rather than focusing solely on tanks per se. This is essential, as the utility of MBTs/heavy armoured forces cannot be adequately addressed if that capability is examined in isolation. However, the primary focus will be MBTs, as the issues of combined arms integration and supporting capabilities are too broad to be addressed comprehensively here.
+
+As will be outlined in Chapter I, this study is predicated on credible conventional deterrence and thus the ability to warfight on land as an important pillar of security. Although this is current British policy, it is not a universally advocated strategy, and may justifiably be questioned. The key variables that determine the validity of conventional deterrence include to what degree an adversary’s activity is constrained by how it sees its options for escalation management, and whether it is actually deterred from crossing the threshold of conventional war. Only the latter question can be answered within the scope of this study, through the metric of credibility. Subordinate to this are questions of the flexibility of conventional forces. Arguably, conventional forces have utility across the spectrum of operations short of high-intensity war, and indeed it has sometimes even been argued that they are essential for these tasks due to the limited combat power of lighter forces. Consequently this study will, as a secondary consideration, also briefly touch on the dual-utility of heavy armoured forces for expeditionary and sub-threshold operations, as the strategic questions left unaddressed by this study indicate that it is essential that heavy forces whose primary application is high-intensity war should have secondary utility or be adaptable to other lower-intensity forms of competition and conflict. In more practical terms, the fact that the UK’s strategic imperatives and defence policy could change in the future means that these questions about utility, which affect force structure and procurement decisions for conventional forces, should not be omitted.
+
+One final baseline assumption for this study is that the future of armoured warfare should not be predicated on a less-capable adversary employing its forces poorly. Russia, the declared adversary and primary threat to NATO, is in the process of depleting its conventional forces, which have also proved themselves to have been presentational – investment was dedicated to impressive-looking technical capabilities, while basic practicalities were ignored. Catastrophic political decisions in the Kremlin, aside from the overall strategic blunder of launching a full-scale invasion in the first place, led to the prioritisation of equipment procurement over reforming the Russian armed forces’ system of logistics and sustainment, hierarchical command structure, training and education doctrine, and military culture. The failure to recognise the need for revolutionary organisational change has contributed to Russia’s military failures, but the extent of the self-created disaster in Ukraine will inevitably prompt reflection. Russia is likely to learn and rebuild its capabilities, while remaining an adversary and European security threat for the foreseeable future. This long-term threat should not be underestimated.
+
+
+### I. Warfighting as a Component of British Defence Policy
+
+Although warfighting has returned to prominence for the British defence establishment, the progressive reduction of Britain’s fleet of MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles over the past 14 years represents a cause for concern. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review stated that heavy armoured forces, which were deemed to include the Challenger 2 and Warrior IFV force, and the supporting AS90 self-propelled artillery and Titan and Trojan engineering vehicles, would be reduced in number, albeit with sufficient numbers retained for high-end warfighting and maintaining the possibility of regenerating these capabilities should the situation demand it. However, the Review was agnostic about the divisional force structure and only specified the retention of a division headquarters under which brigades might be commanded. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, meanwhile, committed explicitly to a warfighting division, stating that its ground combat component would comprise two armoured infantry battalions and two Strike Brigades. Although the armoured infantry brigades would continue to field Warrior and Challenger 2, the Strike Brigades, with their Ajax vehicles, indicated a shift towards comparatively lighter mechanised forces that would trade sheer combat power for increased strategic mobility.
+
+The 2021 Integrated Review likewise directed the British Army to become smaller and lighter. Former Chief of the General Staff General Sir Nick Carter considered competition – the constant use of a blend of military and non-military tools by the UK’s enemies and adversaries without breaching a threshold that might trigger a decisive military response – to be a higher priority than warfighting, and directed that concept/capability development and restructuring efforts should reflect this prioritisation. This approach flipped older assumptions that the Army’s warfighting functions served as an insurance policy to be held at readiness, with warfighting formations being able to adapt to lower-intensity conflicts if required. Although counterintuitive, there was a certain rationale to this, as well as plenty of historical evidence suggesting that capabilities developed for low-intensity conflict could prove not only useful but transformational for high-end warfighting.
+
+Despite this clear direction of travel, the aforementioned elements of British defence policy have received significant criticism, with repeated controversies over whether plans have been realistic or affordable. As for the higher strategic direction that such plans are intended to deliver against, the 2023 NATO Vilnius Summit did not include any detailed updates regarding the UK’s direct contribution to the Alliance, and Paul Cornish has noted that the recent Integrated Review Refresh included 22 sub-strategies, which therefore provides little guidance for subordinate parts of government about what to prioritise (given that resources and leverage are finite). While explicitly de-prioritising certain areas of policy can appear undiplomatic and incur a short-term political cost, the current failure to clearly prioritise has resulted in the members of the professional military community expressing increasingly divergent understandings of what is being asked of them. Some fundamental points about the Integrated Review therefore require examination. First and foremost, the Integrated Review Refresh, although it argues for a tilt, still privileges the Euro-Atlantic over the Indo-Pacific, and the land domain and Russia are seen as the most prominent arena and threat to the UK. In terms of alliances, NATO is “the highest priority”. While the Indo-Pacific and China receive a great deal of attention in their own right within the Integrated Review, this paper is redicated on the view that Indo-Pacific security is most efficiently supported by ensuring that European security is adequately addressed by European countries, such that lines of effort in the Indo-Pacific are not undermined by drawing excessively on the US capabilities required in that theatre.
+
+Even with regard to European security, the Defence Command Paper outlines other capabilities that will be grown as a matter of priority. This is a different approach from other members of NATO. The French Army, for example, is aiming to restore its ability to conduct armoured warfare at corps level, and while many French units are light- or medium-weight, the eventual replacement of the Leclerc with another more modern MBT remains a key French defence policy aspiration. The British Army will not experience the same regeneration for warfighting at scale, and its heavy armoured capabilities will not grow unless there is a fundamental shift in guidance; however, neither has the British Army been directed to shed this capability. The Future Soldier Guide issued in 2021 outlined the British Army’s warfighting division, 3rd Division, as containing two Armoured Brigade Combat Teams equipped with Ajax, an upgraded Challenger 3 and Boxer, and a Deep Recce Strike Brigade Combat Team equipped, after restructuring, with a mixture of guided multiple launch rocket system (GMLRS) and AS90 fires capabilities and Ajax and Jackal 2 for reconnaissance. And so although the structure and enabling capabilities of the British Army’s warfighting component are shifting, it is clear that the British Army will retain its heavy armoured forces, exemplified by the Challenger series of MBT, for warfighting: a rare scenario to be sure, but one at the core of why the UK maintains its armed forces in the first place.
+
+Despite the focus on warfighting, a competing priority that must be highlighted is that of expeditionary operations and limited conflict, and the role that heavy armoured forces can play in these contexts. The post-Cold War move away from conventional deterrence, during which heavy forces suffered from a degree of neglect, was part of a shifting paradigm that prompted a resurgence of interest in smaller conflicts dating back to Britain’s colonial era. During the Cold War, there had been divergent imperatives: on the one hand, to resource conventional deterrence between superpower-backed alliances; and, on the other, to fight small wars in distant expeditionary conflicts, often colonial in nature. Both scenarios involved superpower and ideological competition, but manifested very differently in terms of the lower stakes involved in the expeditionary conflicts (at least for the Soviet and NATO participants). Previously, the problem was conceived of as how to use lighter, more agile, more politically engaged expeditionary forces when militaries were prioritising heavier European warfighting forces that were based more on maintaining the peace through deterrence. The prospect of a major war between superpowers was a frightening one, but also a scenario that was more easily comprehended by the military units that were committed to it. The debate re-emerged, supposedly new but echoing the same considerations that previous generations had grappled with: conventional deterrence versus grey-zone competition, with the split between heavy and light forces predicated upon deployability and sustainment.
+
+Despite the traditional division of labour between heavy and light forces, therefore, a strong case has been made for the utility of heavy armoured forces even in such delicate missions as peace support. In positive contrast to the shortcomings of Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu, for example, the Swedish-Danish-Norwegian heavy armoured battalion Nordbat 2 exemplified this utility in Bosnia in 1993 when it was able to provide decisive overmatch and retain freedom of movement, which in this case was essential to the UN mandate in their area of operations. Canadian forces, too, found Leopard 2 MBTs to be invaluable tactically in the Afghanistan counterinsurgency campaign, despite having envisioned being able to make do with the 17-tonne wheeled Light Armoured Vehicle III (LAV III).
+
+Nevertheless, arguments in favour of the continued use of heavy armour outside of high-end warfighting are likely to fall victim to the financial and logistical challenges associated with deploying and sustaining heavy armour. Even for the best-resourced militaries, heavy armour is likely to be an unaffordable luxury except when facing a peer or near-peer conventional force. Likewise, for all the strong arguments that can be made in favour of Nordbat 2’s deployment to Bosnia, it must be remembered that there were numerous peace support operations ongoing at the time, all of which could lay justifiable claim, on moral or humanitarian grounds, to receiving serious military resourcing from the international community. The realities of multiple conflicting demands and limited capacity mean that British heavy armoured forces will at best be committed sparingly to such future missions, if at all, as a secondary benefit of maintaining a warfighting force that might on occasion donate small force elements if able to do so. Their presence can help peacekeepers, policing missions, counterinsurgencies and stability operations to focus on their core missions more effectively (through tactical overmatch), thus removing the distraction of these missions getting bogged down in indecisive combat situations. This useful function of heavy armoured forces should not be overlooked.
+
+The broad utility of heavy armoured forces across the spectrum of conflict – both their utility in their primary role, and as a hedge against future sub-threshold contingencies should the acute requirement for conventional deterrence in Europe decline in the long term – means that, from one perspective, the argument in favour of MBTs is clear-cut. Yet sceptical arguments about MBTs generally point to technological changes that compromise the ability of heavy armoured vehicles to maintain one or more of their three traditional characteristics – mobility, firepower and protection. Many of these concerns are valid, particularly those relating to pervasive UAV ISTAR, networked headquarters and forces, and precision fires able to strike large numbers of targets far from the frontline, which bodes poorly for forces that are either slow, easy to detect or require a large logistics tail. In this conception of the future, lighter ground forces will be more viable through a reduced signature, more operational mobility, and through their reduced cost allowing them to be generated in larger numbers, offsetting the enemy’s ability to concentrate precision fires against an identifiable centre of mass. Implicit in this vision is that geographical concentration of forces in the attack will be difficult, meaning that units will have to fight dispersed for an increasing proportion of operations.
+
+As will be discussed in Chapter III, this hypothetical conception of the future is not unchallenged and its precise implications are disputed. Nevertheless, experimental evidence indicates that changes of one sort or another will be required for ground forces to remain effective, with experience from Ukraine suggesting that alternatives to dispersion are to “dig deep, or move fast”. All three of these alternatives will likely play a role during different phases of operations and campaigns, but dispersion looks set to remain the prevalent approach, and several resulting adaptations to force composition and structures would in theory create a survivable, viable warfighting force. But it would be one that lacked combat power in the direct fight – that is, when engaging an enemy force within direct line-of-sight using weapons systems organic to the units employing them (whether supported by enabling indirect capabilities or not). The conflicting imperatives to disperse or concentrate forces pose difficult dilemmas that have yet to be conclusively resolved. The resolution of these questions requires an examination of exactly what MBTs bring to high-end combined arms warfighting – and it is to this that we turn next.
+
+
+### II. The Role of the MBT in Combined Arms Warfare
+
+The theoretical underpinnings of combined arms warfare, though well established, are worth reiterating here. While heavy armoured forces have numerous applications, their primary purpose is warfighting – the application of violence in order to defeat an enemy. This requires combat power, traditionally understood to comprise three core elements: mobility; protection; and firepower. Firepower is sometimes referred to as lethality or offensive power. Mobility, protection and firepower have long been components of combat power in US Army doctrine, and provide a widely accepted theoretical framework. Leadership was sometimes considered to be an additional fourth component. In US doctrine, this model was expanded to eight components by 2017: “leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection”, a departure from the underlying principles that attempted to integrate disparate elements into the model. The result, at the risk of blurring what aspect of war was being described by the original model, nevertheless highlights the importance of supporting arms and integration.
+
+This model of combat power is not directly replicated in British doctrine, but, where combat power is euphemistically referenced in the British Army’s keystone ADP Land publication, it is seated within the physical component of fighting power. The tactical functions of a combined arms force provide the best analogue to US doctrine: these are command, intelligence, outreach, information activities, fires, manoeuvre, protection and sustainment, a valuable contrasting model in that it highlights the inevitable transition from warfighting to stability operations, even in the context of a warfighting campaign, in a way that US doctrine does not.
+
+Other academic models can also be useful. For example, operability has been hypothesised by Yoo, Park and Choi as an alternative fourth function of combat power when considering the original triangular framework at the platform level; the technical and tactical reasons for this will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. While operability might better be described as a cross-cutting attribute that helps deliver and sustain all forms of combat power, and the suggestion may be conceptually flawed, the importance of operability, logistics and sustainment should nevertheless be highlighted.
+
+Understanding warfighting and combat power in terms of the original triangular framework of mobility, protection and firepower is useful, as it encourages thinking about how a force should function overall and deliver the required effects when conducting operations in the land domain. In particular, the triangular model is useful for identifying the core trade-offs that are inherent to different types of force, whereas augmented versions of the model include elements – for example, leadership and command and control – that are applicable regardless of the type of force being assembled, and which therefore do not usefully illustrate the trade-offs between heavy armoured forces (built around MBTs) and other lighter formations. However, as will be discussed, integration of other elements is essential to ensure the viability of heavy armoured forces, and so should not be discounted.
+
+Ultimately, and regardless of which variation of the conceptual model of combat power is preferred, their value lies in countering the technological determinism that is prevalent in commentary on defence and security issues. While this determinism is often driven by an appreciation of technological capability, it can result in overestimations of the impact of technological change, or in a failure to understand the second- and third-order impacts of this change on other parts of a military system and on battlefield dynamics. All of the elements discussed above factor into effective combined arms warfare at some stage. Those forces that make warfighting their forte and can credibly fight wars at scale do so in large part due to combining arms, whereby a variety of different arms – artillery, infantry, armour, engineers, logistics, medical services and so on – act in concert. However, not all militaries can be considered combined arms forces, as this status is achieved only by mastering the simultaneous integration of capabilities to create the right synchronised effects to prevail in war, preferably decisively.
+
+#### Mobility, Firepower and Protection
+
+Within this model, MBTs are not the only element of a force that delivers combat power. At a platform level, however, the original triangular concept of mobility, firepower and protection best encapsulates their value, for while they trade these characteristics off against each other (as does any type of platform), MBTs nevertheless embody all three in a unique, heightened manner. The way that armour operates at the platform level governs the broader tactical and operational dynamics when these vehicles are fielded at scale. A deeper understanding of armoured vehicles is therefore useful, as it explains why they have developed the characteristics that now typify them.
+
+MBTs developed their current format in the interwar period: a tracked hull with an engine; an independently rotating turret; and a main armament. By the end of the Second World War, this configuration had been almost universally refined to eliminate features such as hull-mounted machine guns and had standardised the MBT crew at either three personnel – commander, gunner and driver (if an autoloader is used to reload the main gun) or four (if an extra crew member is added to load the main gun manually). Apart from the driver, most MBTs have all other personnel located in the turret and turret basket assembly.
+
+Mobility is the most complex of the three characteristics that this configuration delivers. Although tracked vehicles are valued for their versatile mobility characteristics, MBTs and heavy armoured forces should not be described as the most mobile type of formation: rather, they are useful under certain circumstances. Physical terrain is not homogenous and so generalisations tend to be unreliable, and light infantry can of course move through and fight in almost any environment impassable to other forces if given sufficient time (the obvious example being primary jungle). Restrictive terrain has – perhaps erroneously – been deemed unsuitable for armoured forces. Tracked armoured vehicles can operate in most types of mountainous terrain except for alpine-like mountain ranges (where even light infantry would require technical rock-climbing skills to achieve full mobility) and the summit zones of interior and coastal mountain ranges. However, outside of these extreme instances, it is broadly correct to say that tracked vehicles – which in military terms largely mean heavy armoured forces – are the most tactically mobile.
+
+The technical reason for this is that the increased contact area of tracked vehicles’ running gear generally gives them lower ground pressure than their wheeled counterparts, thus providing improved thrust and traction (even if the tracked vehicles are in absolute terms far heavier). Theoretically, this improved traction will be less pronounced on loose or frictional soil (such as sand) than on cohesive soil (for example mud or clay), but in practical terms the difference is limited. Tracked vehicles are less likely to become bogged in or to slip, and can thus cross more difficult terrain than wheeled vehicles. Provided that ground is not so soft that vehicles start to sink, tracked armoured vehicles also have a significant advantage over light infantry, and if the ground is trafficable then their engine power means that they will be able to move much faster than dismounts.
+
+Aside from the power of the engine and the design of the drivetrain, a major limitation on the off-road mobility of individual vehicles is the shearing effect between the tracks (or wheels) and the terrain, which causes a loss of traction and hampers vehicles’ ability to cross ground. Shearing is most likely to occur on steep slopes; traversing slopes is significantly more difficult than heading directly up ascents and down descents, and the consequences of a failed traverse are more likely to involve a roll-over. With regard to clearance angles, the approach, departure and belly-clearance or ramp angles will also influence what obstacles a vehicle can climb over. While wheeled vehicles are also good at traversing slopes, tracks have the advantage of being comparatively resilient to small arms fire and fragmentation from artillery, which have a tendency to shred rubber tyres and immobilise wheeled vehicles. This allows tracked vehicles to retain mobility even in the midst of heavy fighting, although this comes at the cost of increased mechanical complexity, with implications over longer distances that will be discussed shortly.
+
+Hull shape and drivetrain design can give remarkable tactical mobility under the right circumstances. During the Korean War, British troops often marvelled at the ability of their Centurion MBTs to climb up slippery, muddy hills and to wade through flooded rice paddy fields. Unfortunately, this kind of ability involves inherent trade-offs, and different designs within the same vehicle class and formal tactical role can exhibit markedly different performance. For example, a low number of road wheels grants sufficient tactical mobility while being mechanically simple, but the resulting high ground pressure degrades the ability to operate on soft ground. Likewise, tracked armour is excellent in mountainous terrain up to a certain gradient, but where lighter tracked vehicles excel, heavier tracked armour might struggle, both because of tight mountain roads and generally constricted terrain, and due to the weight and ground pressure of the vehicles making steep slopes impossible to traverse. Most principles and techniques of off-road tactical mobility are transferable between wheeled and tracked vehicles, but tracked vehicles tend to be more forgiving. Nevertheless, reading the ground and how to move across it is a skill, and tanks must still be driven carefully. With professional and well-trained operators, heavy armoured vehicles can cross difficult ground quickly, and push through many obstacles, in a way that other forces cannot. Likewise, the mobility advantage does not necessarily make wheeled or heavy tracked armour more suited to manoeuvre. In forest, jungle or mountainous terrain, armour may be better employed positionally due to the requirement for slow, careful movement, or by leveraging its high level of firepower and protection when forcing an enemy from key terrain, with manoeuvre derived from the employment of light infantry. It is first and foremost the environment and context that determine how heavy armour is employed. The employment of armour to enable manoeuvre is a product of geography first, and of the characteristics of the vehicles second.
+
+Over long distances, wheeled forces may enjoy comparative advantage over heavy tracked armour if trafficable routes are available. Due to the simplicity of their running gear and drivetrains, wheeled vehicles require less maintenance and experience a far lower breakdown rate. They also require less fuel, and the reduced maintenance requirement in turn reduces the volume of spare parts, maintenance stores and recovery mechanics that need to accompany them. It has thus been argued that lighter wheeled vehicles provide better operational mobility when moving between positions, areas and objectives, an attribute that is written into the British Army’s Strike Concept. The truth is more complex: heavy armour is still able to move at pace over great operational distances, and can do so over worse ground, whereas wheeled armour, with its different mobility characteristics, remains competitive with its heavier counterparts at the operational level, depending on the environment.
+
+Issues of strategic mobility also need to be considered. When driving into theatre or to a forward assembly area, MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles are carried on heavy equipment transporters (HETs) for substantial parts of the journey to reduce wear and tear on the drivetrain and running gear. Long road moves are often associated with a high rate of breakdowns if heavy armoured forces need to drive without support from HETs, and those vehicles that do arrive will still incur a higher maintenance burden. MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles can technically be airlifted into a given theatre, but only the largest transport aircraft are able to carry them, and cannot transport them in large numbers. Thus for large armoured formations to arrive in theatre quickly, an unattainably vast strategic airlift capability would be needed, as otherwise such a move would be impossible within any reasonable timeframe due to the number of trips that would be required. Access to runways of sufficient dimensions (and paved to a standard to safely accept heavy transport aircraft) is also a limiting factor. Sealift is the most efficient method of moving MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles over long distances and between theatres, but this requires time and safe ports at which to offload vehicles (unless a specialised amphibious landing capability for heavy armoured vehicles is also factored in). Railway transport is also efficient, but involves similar bottlenecks to airlift, this time with regard to rolling stock and available railheads.
+
+All modes of long-distance transport for heavy vehicles still require practice if they are to be completed without unnecessary delays; no one should underestimate the inherent coordination challenge facing the combat units themselves, the logistics units supporting them and the organisations in charge of the infrastructure stemming from the distances involved and the transport volumes associated with large numbers of vehicles. Consequently, the threat posed by heavy armour is most credible when it is either forward-based or reserved for use within an operational distance of its home base. Nevertheless, it should be noted that deployment of heavy armoured forces is possible, and that medium armoured forces, particularly those built around tracked armoured vehicles (regardless of whether they are of a lighter weight) also incur many of the same costs and constraints.
+
+Protection is the one inherent attribute of heavy armoured forces that cannot be replicated by lighter combat vehicles. This protection traditionally came from large amounts of passive armour, either rolled homogenous steel or some form of composite material, which could deflect or absorb the energy from an incoming projectile. Passive armour can be angled, and is generally concentrated on the frontal aspect of vehicles in order to provide the best protection for the least weight. Some vehicles complement this arrangement with explosive reaction armour (ERA) blocks: boxes of explosives that detonate when struck with a sufficiently powerful projectile, dissipating the energy of the incoming projectile and reducing the likelihood of the armour being penetrated.
+
+Passive armour has increasingly been enhanced by active protection systems, which can be split into “hard kill” and “soft kill” systems. Hard-kill systems physically shoot down incoming projectiles. For example, Rheinmetall’s APS-Gen3 comprises short-range radars (which detect incoming projectiles on approach), electro-optical sensors (which locate projectiles immediately before impact) and an explosive countermeasure (which detonates to destroy the projectile) – this latter kinetic element could be described as a guided ERA block. Other systems, such as the Israeli-designed Trophy, fire their own shotgun-like munitions to intercept incoming projectiles. Soft kill systems are more diverse, and encompass any system that interrupts the guidance systems of incoming projectiles or the systems from which they are launched or guided. Retro-reflective detection, laser warning receivers and defensive electronic warfare systems all aid in the detection of anti-tank weapons attempting to target the vehicle. In terms of defeating the anti-tank systems themselves, lasers may be used to dazzle electro-optical sensors, while radio frequency jamming may serve to disrupt command signals between a missile and its launcher. While the technologies/methodologies of different soft-kill systems vary, they are for the most part only relevant to defeating guided systems. The promise – and limitations – of technological developments in this area will be discussed in the next chapter.
+
+In terms of firepower or lethality, modern MBTs remain one of the most potent platforms on the battlefield, particularly when focusing on direct line-of-sight or close-range engagements. This is due to the power of their main armament and their ability to carry other anti-tank weapons, all of which can quickly be brought to bear by virtue of being mounted in a stabilised turret. Jonathan House usefully split anti-tank weaponry into two categories – chemical energy weapons and kinetic energy weapons. This distinction remains valid and applies equally to weaponry mounted on MBTs, or on lighter vehicles, or carried by dismounted infantry. Chemical energy weapons typically equate to anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), although long-ranged precision fires and loitering munitions technically fit within this bracket; as these weapons are generally employed within the anti-tank role performed by other forces (with limited use by MBTs themselves), they will be discussed in Chapter 3. While MBTs do not have a monopoly on lethality, the size of MBTs as a platform means that carrying anti-tank weapons does not require them to forsake mobility.
+
+The kinetic energy weapons category essentially encompasses the main guns of MBTs, as self-propelled or towed anti-tank guns have been deemed tactically ineffective by most militaries, and man-portable anti-tank rifles are considered to be too low-powered to threaten all but the lightest modern armoured vehicles. Whether of Western or Russian design, MBT main guns now generally fire armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS) rounds, the core penetrator dart being made from either depleted uranium or tungsten. While other forms of munitions can be fired, other types of specialised anti-tank round such as high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) and high explosive squash head (HESH) are less effective against modern armour. If equipped with modern ammunition, the main gun remains a potent anti-armour weapon, with the added benefit of being comparatively light, quick to reload, and cheap.
+
+MBT main guns have long been stabilised, allowing them to fire accurately on the move. This remains a significant engineering challenge, putting established defence contractors who have mastered the manufacturing of stabilised guns at a distinct advantage to competitors. Most Western MBT main guns are of 120-mm calibre, which is the approximate maximum size for a main gun round that can be handled quickly by a human loader without mechanical assistance. Any significant increase in calibre would force Western heavy armour to swap the human loader for an autoloader: this would probably require the four-person crew of commander, gunner, loader and driver to be reduced by one, a move that is considered undesirable due to workflow issues both in the vehicle itself and in the field more generally. Were the fourth crew member to be retained alongside the autoloader, MBT turrets – which are already approaching practical size limits – would have to become even bigger. Given the trade-offs involved, and bar any unexpected technological advances in main gun technology, tank main guns are unlikely to significantly increase their lethality in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, they remain potent, especially when factoring in the weight and rate of fire that an MBT can employ from its stock of onboard ammunition.
+
+Overall, the ability of MBTs to quickly cross difficult terrain and obstacles, to quickly engage successive targets (including other MBTs) in their direct line-of-sight with a highly effective main gun, and their ability to absorb punishment and continue fighting unless targeted by dedicated anti-tank capabilities, make for a potent and flexible ground combat unit. While this comes at the cost of a higher logistics and sustainment framework to support them, MBTs’ sheer combat power makes them uniquely capable not only of destroying other heavy armoured forces (if employed correctly), but of maintaining momentum while doing so. They are particularly useful, if properly employed and enabled, for offensive operations transitioning to breakthrough-and-exploitation.
+
+In practical terms, breakthrough-and-exploitation corresponds to deep battle theory (or deep operations theory, in the parlance of its Soviet authors), which emerged in the run-up to the Second World War. This was an offensive doctrine centred on striking deep into an enemy’s rear areas following the penetration of its lines and then causing sufficient disruption to prevent an enemy from moving forces to effectively plug the hole in its lines or encircle the attacking forces. Breakthrough-and-exploitation is advantageous, if achieved, in that it can overrun rear areas, and is “designed to induce systemic collapse”. If momentum cannot be sustained, offensive operations may instead aim to bite and hold objectives and ground, a less ambitious but still valid approach to operational design. Of course, these concepts of operation date to the early- and mid-20th century, and the combined arms integration required for successful offensive operations of either kind will require adaptations to be made to force design, composition and structure. While many of these adaptations relate to the changing character of war and fall upon supporting arms, MBTs and the units fielding them must likewise embrace change to stay relevant.
+
+
+### III. Challenges and Necessary Adaptations
+
+The challenges and necessary adaptations fall under several categories. Some relate to additions to the combined arms system, others to the integration of the component arms, and some to the MBTs at the core of heavy armoured forces. There are also two alternative force structures that in theory offer a warfighting capability with sufficient lethality to fight against heavy armoured forces: motorised or dismounted light forces equipped with ATGMs (but without the ability to fire them while mobile); and medium armoured forces. The utility of these alternative force structures for high-intensity warfighting is effectively a separate research question, as they are arguably in competition with heavy armoured forces. However, given that the question of their effectiveness against MBTs and heavy armoured forces overlaps with questions about the effectiveness of MBTs and heavy armoured force themselves, a brief overview is still required. More importantly, this overview encapsulates the technical challenges and adaptations required for MBTs due to the threat posed by ATGMs themselves. Armoured forces that fight on the move are mechanised, while those which fight by dismounting and working in conjunction with their infantry can be considered motorised; by this definition, for example, a Stryker brigade combat team is a motorised formation. These should be addressed as two separate but related structures, against which heavy armoured forces can be subjected to comparative assessment. Another major aspect to be addressed in depth relates to the support to and sustainment of MBT-equipped formations, an understudied area which is nevertheless fundamental to their viability. Finally, there are also issues of technological change at the platform level to be considered below.
+
+#### Pervasive ISTAR/Precision Strike
+
+A combination of pervasive ISTAR, command and control (C2) modernisation and strike capabilities through precision-guided munitions have been at the forefront of the debate about the changing character of warfare and the implications for military forces. One way that this should be countered is throug improved force protection, delivered by the adoption of new (or at least improved) capabilities and through restructuring combined arms formations. This issue has been covered extensively, and while the associated debates cannot be comprehensively re-examined in this paper, suffice to say that electronic warfare (EW), artillery and counterbattery capabilities, and short-range air defence (SHORAD) all play a role. The issue is in any case largely agnostic of force type – whether light and dismounted, or medium or heavy armoured: all force types must integrate the capabilities discussed and embrace change according to the evolving character of combined arms warfare. The one caveat is that, given that heavy armoured forces have a correspondingly larger logistics footprint and greater maintenance and support requirements than most other types of forces, they may prove particularly vulnerable to this changing battlefield dynamic if combined arms integration is not effective. There are several relevant issues to cover here.
+
+There are serious differences of opinion over the consequences of recent developments, including how to interpret the effectiveness and efficiency of C2 modernisation at moving information internally and the effectiveness of precision fires at fighting the deep battle. In the context of the difficult challenge that the deployment of uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) imposes on land forces, the debate surrounding the best way forward often loses sight of the fact that the pervasive ISTAR and precision fires complex offers quite narrow effects. Drones and precision fires face the same inherent boundaries that aviation encountered in previous eras: aviation could attack enemy forces and systems throughout the area from the frontline to the strategic deep, and have outsized effect in certain regards, but could not independently hold ground or control populations, nor have other persistent effects. Similarly, drones and precision fires, even though they constitute a distinct line of effort, are still effectively only enablers of other ground forces. What drones and precision fires have long promised – and are now able to achieve – is attrition of key capabilities, and potentially (if targeting is done properly) the degrading of the enemy military’s system of systems. Events such as Exercise Green Dagger, nested within the larger Exercise Warfighter 22, both of which took place in late October 2021, provide evidence about the potency of pervasive ISTAR, C2 modernisation and precision strike when a professional NATO force implements highly refined targeting procedures. In this instance, long-ranged precision fires cued on by a combination of UAV ISTAR and traditional forward reconnaissance patrols mauled participating ground forces, and while manoeuvre was possible during certain intervals, at other times ground combat formations that were identified while in unfavourable positions were heavily attrited, with few options available in response. Lighter ground forces experienced struggles of their own, with issues relating to attrition and a failure to maintain momentum in the close fight. Furthermore, although the impact of new technologies was concerning, it should be remembered that open desert environments provided ideal conditions for UAS, and the lopsided performance under these conditions would not necessarily be replicable in a different climate and in more complex terrain. Even in Ukraine’s Donbas region, characterised by open fields and limited cover, the extensive use of UAS – for all the changes it has wrought – has yet to prove decisive and has not pushed traditional ground combat capabilities from the battlefield.
+
+A further consideration concerns the emphasis placed on offensive capabilities without the same regard for their defensive counterparts. Following a 20-year period of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan during which neither the air domain nor the electromagnetic spectrum was contested, even the exceptionally well-resourced US military has come to exhibit a mismatch between these different specialisations. While UAS and precision fires technology have been invested in and progressively refined, defensive EW, SHORAD and counter-UAS (CUAS) have received sporadic and comparatively limited attention. Of these, only CUAS has claimed a belated prominence in the discourse about the future of warfare. Forces rotating through iterations of exercises such as Warfighter are exploring how to address the issue, but the evidence suggests that, rather than this being an inherent offence–defence mismatch which favours new technologies, Western forces are simply playing catch-up and need to rebalance their capabilities and concepts of operations.
+
+One resultant avenue that is often forgotten is within the broad field of camouflage, concealment, deception and decoys (C2D2), where camouflage and concealment receive far more attention than deception and decoys. Part of this is because it is easier to build standardised technical solutions or procedures to implement camouflage and concealment. Deception, on the other hand, is situation-dependent, and requires intellectual investment and problem solving for every iteration. It is also difficult to do consistently and effectively in the absence of a nuanced understanding of the adversary’s procedures and mindset – understanding of enemy technical ISTAR capabilities alone will not suffice. Meanwhile, the cost of decoys can create disincentives to utilising them extensively in training, and there is also a risk that deception and decoys will draw too much resource and undermine the main effort. Depending on the type of decoys used, significant numbers of personnel might be needed to manage them, especially if decoy units and activities are to be convincing even when viewed with a variety of different sensors and detection capabilities. (As a basic example, an enemy might be convinced that a decoy vehicle is real when viewing it in the visual light spectrum, but its thermal signature or the lack of radio frequency activity could reveal it for what it is, meaning that an enemy with capable and diligent ISTAR specialists would likely not be deceived for long.) One solution might be to homogenise the appearance and signature of ground forces, containerising logistics, ensuring that vehicles appear as similar as possible, and adopting communications systems that disguise which nodes are of critical importance – mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) or mesh networks are a good example here, as this kind of disguise is an inherent feature of the way that they transfer data.
+
+Likewise, simulated formation-level activity in the electromagnetic spectrum may not stand up to scrutiny if cyber analysis reveals inconsistencies or a lack of concurrent activity in the social media space, as the pervasiveness of social media and the tendency of local inhabitants to naturally document any unusual activity happening in their vicinity means that such inconsistencies can be easily detected using open sources; such activity is hard to control, suppress or convincingly fabricate. Improving the D2 element of C2D2 is therefore a challenging proposition in terms of both resourcing and overall feasibility. Nevertheless, if turned into a dedicated line of effort and practised and refined on exercise, it may prove a powerful tool for creating uncertainty, slowing enemy decision-making, and causing the misallocation of enemy resources, all of which increase the survivability of ground forces.
+
+An alternative approach to force protection and C2D2 is that of counter-reconnaissance. Although counter-reconnaissance – prioritising offensive action against an enemy’s ISTAR rather than relying on passive or reactive force protection – is a longstanding concept, militaries have only partially adapted it in response to technological change. In an example that proves useful for illustrating both current challenges and potential solutions, in February 2020 the US Army’s 25th Infantry Division took part in Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 20-03, a computer-based simulation. The division found itself fighting a difficult initial shaping battle against enemy long-ranged precision fires and ISTAR assets due to attrition that these enemy capabilities were causing. Passive and reactive air defence deployed against UAS proved inadequate, and so the division approached the problem not as one of force protection but of prioritising the targeting and destruction of enemy ISTAR in order to break their kill chain. The 25th Infantry Division attempted to target different elements throughout the kill chain – the UAS themselves, dismounted forward observers, and UAS ground control stations, as the launchers for enemy indirect fires were assigned to corps-level assets. They had little success against UAS, downing some systems but being unable to destroy enough to have any overall effect. UAS ground control stations were identified as a more vulnerable element of the kill chain. The prioritisation of the counter-UAS battle, and the detection and collation of the enemy forces’ electronic and signals signature allowed the division to understand what effects they needed to apply and where, though the division’s own C2 processes proved insufficiently integrated to consistently destroy identified targets or render the enemy’s UAS network ineffective until the division could adapt and reorganise these processes. While this adaptation was taking place, the division’s ground manoeuvre elements had been badly attrited.
+
+While accepting the limitations of such simulations in terms of realism, even those as well-resourced and layered as Warfighter, and that the measures taken achieved only partial success within the duration of the exercise, nonetheless the division’s identification of the least successful line of effort (kinetic CUAS) and the most promising (aggressive counter-reconnaissance against enemy ground stations) provides a useful indicator of the direction that force restructuring and the reform of concepts of operation should take. Overall, for heavy armour to be survivable, combined arms formations need to be able, one way or another, to prevent an enemy from saturating the battlespace with UAS, disrupt or slow down the links between UAS sensors and the precision weapons to which they feed targeting information, and to retain the ability to deceive.
+
+#### Alternative Ground Combat Force Structures
+
+_ATGMs and Fighting Dismounted_
+
+In the direct fight, increasingly capable ATGMs pose the most obvious threat to MBTs. While opposing MBTs can be armed with barrel-launched or tube-launched ATGMs, the fact that ATGMs do not rely on velocity means that they can be launched from a tube, and that in theory any light vehicle or dismounted soldier can thus be equipped with an effective anti-tank weapon. The technology continues to develop, and at present the lethality of modern systems such as Javelin, NLAW and Kornet is difficult for MBTs to counter directly. The most effective ATGMs, such as Javelin, have a top-attack function whereby the missile guides itself via an irregular trajectory to strike the weaker top armour of a targeted vehicle. Top-attack munitions also have the advantage of being difficult to counter with active protection systems (APS), as these must track and calculate the trajectory of the incoming missile in order to intercept it. However, ATGMs come at a high per unit cost, and top-attack munitions are the most expensive of all (and will require skilled operators until sensor and guidance technology improves). They are also bulky and heavy for dismounted infantry to carry, not to mention the difficulties of a dismounted unit carrying more than a handful of spare missiles with it, are slow to reload compared with the main gun of an MBT, and so have severe tactical constraints, even if they are more lethal in absolute terms. In a direct line-of-sight fight with MBTs and heavy armoured forces, the operators of ATGMs can be vulnerable, although if they are well-sited and implement good battlefield discipline to minimise their visual signature, they are very difficult to spot and can be used to conduct effective ambushes.
+
+ATGM use by lighter armoured forces bears consideration, as these forces can in theory conduct offensive operations. Here, it is worth differentiating between mounted and dismounted forces. The US experience is that any medium formation that requires dismounts for lethality will be difficult to manage because of the constant transition between mounted and dismounted tactics. The British experience of exercising dismounted ATGM-armed light cavalry forces in the anti-armour role resulted in similar conclusions. Such forces are versatile and effective in defensive operations but difficult to use for offensive purposes due to the time required to manoeuvre and deploy them. In order to attack a heavy armoured force, a medium armoured force without mobile anti-armour capabilities of sufficient lethality will generally need to move to within 3 km of the enemy, advance or infiltrate on foot, and engage with man-portable anti-armour weapons. If the medium motorised force is paired with more mobile anti-armour capabilities such as heavy armour of its own, these dismounts can operate in a targeting role, but this points to their being a complementary capability rather than a substitute.
+
+There are some advantages to motorised anti-armour capabilities. On operations in Afghanistan, without tracks and with a quiet engine, Strykers were found to be able to approach targets without being detected before deploying their dismounts. However, displacement and exfiltration is difficult in general, as is manoeuvre. If a medium motorised force is committed against a heavy armoured force, the sub-units that make contact with the enemy will lose momentum and the initiative, although they will be able to hold ground and retain lethal effectiveness.
+
+In complex terrain, medium motorised forces may fit operational needs. During the Battle of Irpin in the Russo-Ukrainian War, Ukrainian infantry forces armed with ATGMs were not only lethal but also extremely mobile. However, the terrain around Irpin, Bucha and Hostomel is not conducive to armoured and mechanised mobility: the three suburbs are bounded by dense forest, and most of the open ground is part of the marshy floodplain around the Irpin and Bucha rivers, presenting a further obstacle. The village of Demydiv was one of many deliberately flooded to block Russian movement. The Russian Army did use light infantry in its attempts to manoeuvre away from the main roads, but these performed poorly. However, the battle was one of urban and forest fighting that heavily favoured the defender, and Ukrainian victory owed much to Russian planning failures – both factors being situational and not necessarily replicable.
+
+Furthermore, evidence from Ukraine suggests that fighting armoured forces is difficult and dangerous for ATGM-armed dismounted light infantry, even if they possess Javelin, one of the most effective and lethal systems currently available. If such forces are detected by enemy tank crews they become acutely vulnerable to the tank’s main armaments, which cause large numbers of casualties. The main gun of an MBT can also outrange all but the most capable of ATGMs, such as Javelin, and the evidence from Ukraine indicates that the addition of thermal shielding to Russian T90s could successfully reduce the effective range of Javelin to well within that of the vehicle’s main armament by making it harder for the command launch unit to lock on to targets.
+
+Ultimately, the presence of ATGMs on the battlefield puts pressure on armoured forces, and is driving changes to tank design (such as the adoption of APS), prompting weight increases – as will be discussed later. Conversely, the presence of armour requires the careful husbanding of anti-tank capabilities which would otherwise be useful for other tasks. For example, the British Milan ATGMs deployed in the Falklands War, which were used in an anti-fortification role and were critical to overcoming dug-in Argentine infantry and marines, would have been less available (if available at all) for those tasks had the British task force been simultaneously guarding against the threat of even a small Argentine armoured force. ATGMs pose a distinct threat, but cannot lay claim to having made the MBT obsolete.
+
+_Medium Armoured Forces_
+
+Medium tracked armoured forces require the briefest commentary, as they are most similar to the heavy armoured forces built around MBTs. They operate on the same principles, but are comparatively lighter, less protected and carry less firepower, and they have the same drawbacks (albeit to a lesser extent in some regards). RAND conducted a study of the utility of medium tracked armoured forces, and concluded that they performed well, and benefited significantly from strategic, operational and tactical mobility and a less burdensome logistics requirement, but also found that their reduced combat power resulted in less successful outcomes if they were deployed against competent heavy armoured forces. These outcomes could only be offset by either close air support and artillery dominance or by the opposing heavy armoured forces not being employed competently (and without combined arms integration of their own). This study factored in the use of ATGMs (both vehicle-mounted and carried by dismounts) by medium armoured forces. The history of US light and medium armoured forces in the Second World War, at the point when they encountered German heavy armoured forces with a significant combat power advantage in the direct fight, was not a happy one, and involved significant losses, an experience that still shapes current US thinking on the employment of MBTs. This has been termed the Sherman Dilemma, whereby a force adopts a less-capable combat vehicle with the expectation that combined arms integration will offset its disadvantages in the direct fight, only to discover that combined arms integration does not provide the expected benefits under actual operational conditions.
+
+The category of medium forces is quite a varied one. The US Army Stryker formations fit at the lower end of the category, at just over 16 tonnes; although the MGS variant was armed with 105-mm main gun, this made for a top-heavy and unstable vehicle (mechanical issues with the turret were also an issue), and this variant was eventually retired. Thus, Stryker formations remain reliant on ATGMs for lethality when engaging heavier forces. Meanwhile the British Army’s Ajax vehicles, which weigh 38 tonnes, occupy the upper end of the medium forces category. The dividing line between “medium” and “heavy” forces, in fact, is blurred, as many MBTs – particularly those of Soviet or Russian design – are considerably smaller and lighter than their Western equivalents: for example, the T90 weighs 48 tonnes, while the T72 weighs only 46 tonnes. An alternative framing might be that, given the obvious pressures on heavy armoured forces, that heavy armoured vehicles and MBTs, when they are employed, should perhaps be lighter in future. However, as will be discussed in the section on logistics, sustainment, recovery and reconstitution, adopting Soviet design principles to achieve this end would be unwise.
+
+In addition to their lesser logistical/sustainment requirements and increased deployability, medium armoured vehicles enjoy niche advantages over their heavy counterparts. Medium armoured vehicles with rapid-firing main armaments can generally hyper-elevate their guns compared with standard MBT designs, and therefore have a tactical advantage in urban, mountainous or complex terrain (noting the exception of the South Korean K2 Black Panther MBT, whose innovative suspension system allows the engagement of high- and low-angle targets)., However, when it comes to warfighting, the evidence suggests that medium armoured forces have consistently been at a disadvantage against heavy armoured forces, resulting in high losses when these two force types go head to head in the direct fight. Overall, these different force structure options are best seen as being complementary, rather than as substitutes for each other.
+
+#### Wheels and Tracks
+
+Wheels and tracks remain a recurring topic of discussion, and therefore should be briefly acknowledged. The discussion continues even though the dynamics, in themselves, are generally agreed. It has already been mentioned that more difficult terrain will generally be more easily traversed by tracked vehicles, whereas wheeled vehicles will have to move more carefully and be more selective about their route – or indeed may not be able to cross the same terrain at all if it is sufficiently difficult. The implication is that the choice of routes, tactical formations, and use of ground for cover involving both tracked and wheeled vehicles will force the formation to conform to the mobility capacity of the least capable vehicles. Alternatively, concepts of operation need to make allowances for a disjoint between the wheeled and tracked elements of the force, and accept them not operating entirely in tandem. Incidentally, different types of vehicle may also experience interoperability issues, even if they fit within the same category. For example, CVR(T), though extremely useful in Afghanistan and other theatres, suffered in the First Gulf War in large part because, on the advance in open terrain, it could not keep pace with the Challenger- and Warrior-equipped heavy armoured forces for which it was supposed to provide forward reconnaissance.
+
+Despite these challenges, wheels and tracks have often been forced to operate together out of necessity, as even the best-resourced militaries must go to war with the equipment they have available – and this sometimes involves integrating disparate platforms and units. Wheels and tracks can verifiably work together successfully. However, where it is economically feasible, states with heavy armoured forces have tried to maintain as much commonality or similarity of hull and drivetrain as possible within formations. This should remain an aspiration, if British Army vehicle fleets can be rationalised over time.
+
+#### Logistics, Sustainment, Recovery and Reconstitution
+
+Micah Clark has argued that: “An experienced tank crew is the ultimate combat power multiplier for its ability to conduct field-expedient maintenance to unconventionally repair issues that would otherwise render a tank non-mission capable”.
+
+Given the threat environment, MBTs need to remain mobile to avoid detection and targeting – but this creates dilemmas when factoring in the need to go static in order to conduct maintenance and repairs. Thorough preventative maintenance in garrison is a first step, but even with new vehicles, in good order, armoured forces require constant maintenance to keep them operational, and consume significant volumes of supplies. A squadron of MBTs requires a large amount of fuel, and heightened mobility will proportionally heighten the logistics burden for fuel resupply. Likewise, crews require rest, which the increased maintenance burden inherent in MBTs disrupts, further degrading operational tempo compared with simpler wheeled platforms.
+
+In addition to the key characteristics of protection, mobility and firepower that ground combat vehicles embody, Yoo, Park and Choi identified operability as the fourth key function. While the standing of operability as an equal consideration is open to debate, it is nonetheless important to highlight overall logistics and sustainment functions. Clark’s observation referenced above is often underappreciated, except by armoured personnel themselves, and “the often-overlooked operator’s perspective calls for the focus to fall on maintainability in the field over incremental upgrades to firepower and survivability”. Future MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles should be designed and constructed with modularity and repairability in mind, ensuring that as many repairs as possible can be completed on-site by the vehicle crews themselves, without having to recover the vehicle to a rear maintenance area or bring forward specialist repair crews; this dynamic is a much-overlooked – but critical – element in influencing heavy armour’s effectiveness.
+
+Likewise, recovery of immobilised MBTs is challenging, especially under fire, requiring well-practised and properly-equipped recovery crews if it is to be effective, but it can allow technically killed vehicles to be rapidly returned to service if they can be withdrawn from enemy contact and evacuated to forward repair facilities. Delays to recovery operations in Afghanistan for damaged Stryker vehicles could fix units for 24 hours even when recovery vehicles were readily available. Units were forced to defend what proved a tempting target for insurgent attacks, showing that the challenges of recovering and repairing heavier vehicles in warfighting conditions should not be underestimated.
+
+The Second World War, although in many regards a dated case study, provides some critical lessons. In particular, the long duration of the war means that the multiple campaign seasons, large distances covered by advancing and retreating units, and the intensity of fighting (which resulted in high levels of tank loss) can provide useful insights into questions around the extended sustainment of heavy armoured forces in the face of attrition during warfighting campaigns, even if some fundamental differences can be identified with regard to contemporary scenarios (discussed below).
+
+The Soviet experience on the Eastern Front in the Second World War was that tanks might be knocked out, repaired and returned to service as many as four times during an operation. Tanks lost in a repairable state outnumbered those which were irrecoverable by two-to-one.
+
+Wartime and post-war Soviet research found that on average during an operation which lasted 15 to 20 days the overall tank loss rate was 82% of the starting strength, with 70% of the losses being repairable and 30% of the repairable losses due to non-battle reasons such a mechanical problems or getting stuck in a swamp.
+
+After approximately 20 days of constant operation, the Soviet Army found that the breakdown rate started to escalate dramatically, illustrating the importance of preventative maintenance. If Soviet forces lost ground, the rate of irrecoverable tank losses would increase dramatically as repairable tanks – and, in the worst-case scenario, tank repair facilities and recovered tanks undergoing repairs – were overrun and fell into German hands. Recovery and maintenance personnel organic to tank formations were invaluable: not only were they well-placed to quickly conduct repairs, but – if well-led – were likely to consider themselves an integral part of the team and perform better than centralised recovery and maintenance personnel based at higher or rear echelons; moreover, additional benefits were derived from their familiarity with specific vehicles. The importance of stocks of spare parts should not be underestimated, an oversight which plagued German forces in the Second World War, as a lack of spares could turn what should have been a quick repair job into a lengthier delay as tanks spent an extended period of time in the care of a maintenance unit, awaiting the necessary parts. Another flaw in the German operation was that cannibalisation of vehicles and inter-unit competition exacerbated the system’s deficiencies and meant that more damaged or broken-down tanks were unavailable than otherwise might have been the case. Interestingly, the experience of German tank crews was that, although they were trained to conduct basic repairs and could in theory assist the dedicated mechanics, in practice (when accompanying badly damaged tanks to rear echelon maintenance facilities) some crews had a tendency to interfere with the work of the maintenance personnel and generally make a hinderance of themselves unless other activities could be found to keep them occupied. Although this dynamic is at odds with the experience of well-trained modern crews, it is worth bearing in mind for unit commanders.
+
+Gary Dickson’s distillation of the Soviet experience bears citing in full:
+
+> The number of tanks in service at any one time during a battle was very dynamic. On the minus side tanks were being destroyed or damaged due to battle or non-battle reasons. On the plus side was only the ability of the repair units to put damaged tanks back into service. Therefore the pool of damaged tanks was a great asset to a tank unit as long as they could be repaired in a timely manner. This had several significant consequences:
+
+1. As long as repair units were able to repair all or most of the tanks which were damaged, a tank unit was able to maintain its strength, only slowly weakening due to irrecoverable losses and the time it took to repair tanks.
+
+2. The faster a tank unit advanced, the farther behind the repair units lagged and the more time they had to spend moving to keep up. Both reduced the number of tanks which could be repaired.
+
+3. Retreat was a potential disaster for the damaged tank pool. With a limited number of evacuation vehicles, most tanks had to be abandoned on the field, never to be repaired. Loss of the damaged tank pool resulted in a dramatic reduction in tank strength.
+
+4. Operational pauses were critical and allowed repair units time to catch up and clear the backlog of tanks to be repaired. This, and the fact that it did not retreat and lose its damaged tank pool, is why the 5th Guards Tank Army was able to reconstitute itself after the battle at Prokhorovka.
+
+Most of these points remain entirely valid for the modern employment of heavy armour.
+
+More recent experience complements these lessons. The South African Defence Force (SADF) in the Border War provides an interesting example of an armoured force operating at reach and lacking mass, which could neither rotate formations nor reconstitute them during operations. In Operation Hooper, as the majority of the SADF’s armoured strength had been assembled, SADF Ratel IFVs and Olifant MBTs could not be replaced and had to either forgo maintenance – sometimes for up to 800 hours of combat – or be refitted at the front by their sub-unit mechanics. Both wear and tear and combat damage aggregated, whittling away at the number of available vehicles, and those that did go into combat often did so in a degraded and less effective state. This contributed to the inability of the SADF to maintain operational momentum and reinforce or exploit successful offensives. Concurrently, Cuban airpower served to limit SADF frontline resupply and maintenance. In most regards frontline combat units were kept supplied, albeit austerely, or could make do without non-critical items. However, spare parts for artillery and armoured vehicles were the two areas in which the logistics problems could not be solved through improvisation, resulting in ever-reducing capability due to the importance of armoured and indirect fire support and the heavy maintenance burden imposed on the units in question by the high and sustained operational tempo.
+
+In terms of lessons learned from recent operations in Ukraine, the majority of Russian armour losses have still been the result of poor maintenance or logistics. In the case of the Ukrainian armed forces, the majority of repairs are carried out up to 300 km away from the frontlines in order to protect irreplaceable maintenance machinery and personnel from artillery fires. While the journey from the frontline to these facilities could be only five or six hours, an impressive feat of logistics in itself, this still constitutes a major endeavour. In the summer of 2022, Ukrainian tanks that had been destroyed on the battlefield, but recovered, were being repaired in Poland at a rate of 20–30 per month.
+
+This all has implications for the current and future operational contexts for Western forces: unless formations can be furnished with ample layered air defences or the enemy thoroughly blinded by counter-reconnaissance operations, the requirement to keep major maintenance hubs safe from as much of the enemy’s precision fires as possible will probably necessitate them being based far from the frontlines. This could make tank pools less vulnerable to overrun, but would also mean that the tank pool would not be able to reconstitute armoured units as responsively as might be desired given the greater geographical distance between them and the units deployed forward. This would also increase coordination challenges and reduce the benefits of repair units being associated with frontline formations (the echelon at which maintenance units should be held). As well as creating the traditional logistics problems, this would also entail the concentration of large numbers of vehicles under repair, creating a large signature that could be detected and targeted even if located deep in the rear. Forward repair units should therefore be structured, equipped and protected in such a way as to operate dispersed and avoid developing a backlog of tanks under repair, while investment in education, training and track miles in developing crew skills will be key determinants of their ability to keep vehicles operable, enabling many repairs to be completed without the assistance of mechanics or the need for a vehicle to be recovered.
+
+In terms of the scale at which forces operate, policymakers and senior leaders should understand that in order to credibly generate a warfighting capability at a given scale – be it battle group, brigade or division – a military will require sufficient depth to rotate it with a counterpart formation. Furthermore, avoiding spending on spare parts will amount to a false economy, and one that has in previous conflicts proved disastrous on operations. A sustainable supply of a large number of spare parts should be factored into procurement and fleet management decisions, otherwise a force may be exposed to excess attrition during warfighting and will accumulate an unnecessarily high level of permanently lost vehicles.
+
+#### Changes to Tank Design
+
+There are a number of changes to tank design that can be suggested, implemented either through modifications to existing vehicles or by including them in more comprehensive upgrade programmes. Unfortunately, some of these will prove impossible to implement even within the framework of the ongoing Challenger 3 upgrade, but these could still be made at a later date.
+
+MBTs and heavy armoured forces require better ISTAR capabilities, both within and beyond line-of-sight. Beyond line-of-sight, one capability that should be integrated into heavy armoured forces is UAS reconnaissance to assist with tactical-level detection (although this point is force type-agnostic – light and medium forces equally require this capability). Within direct line-of-sight, “see-through armour” (a type of augmented reality) is promising, although literally transparent armour is far enough away from being practicable to be discounted for the moment). See-through armour involves mounting high-resolution cameras on the outside of the vehicle and using software to merge their feeds together to give the crew an expanded view that eliminates blind spots, allowing them to look in different directions more quickly than is possible with traditional sights and viewports. Given that kinetic strikes against the vehicle’s armour will quickly damage or destroy cameras, the existing series of armoured viewports and optics should not be eliminated, but see-through armour capability would still reduce the chances of MBTs being successfully ambushed or blundering into ATGM-armed dismounts without warning (both scenarios that can reduce the advantages normally held by heavy armoured forces).
+
+Refining MBTs’ onboard optics and detection systems is another important avenue of improvement. Challenger 2 remains an impressive sensor platform, with both electro-optical and thermal optics able to identify targets beyond the effective range of direct fire anti-tank weapon systems if the crew actively scans the right arcs and areas. However, upgrading the range and fidelity of sensors and, more importantly, increasing their field of view is an obvious area for ongoing improvement, and one that private industry will continue to provide new commercial-off-the-shelf options for due to the wide applications.
+
+Detection systems operating outside of the visual light spectrum should also be considered, such as laser and radar warning receivers: it is already planned that Challenger 3 will be equipped with a laser warning receiver. As this type of system can only feed data to APS or provide immediate warning of an enemy contact, other forms of sensor may also prove useful in increasing situational awareness. Retro-reflective detectors, ground-moving target indicator (GMTI) radar and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) are all options that would provide advance warning of surveillance – although these come with constraints: passive retro-reflective detection seems unlikely to be able to distinguish scopes and sensors from coincidental backscatter and reflections from other sources, particularly in urban environments, and so an active laser emitter would probably be necessary bar any unexpected technological breakthrough. GMTI and SAR systems, meanwhile, would be best mounted on an antenna and thus might only be deployable when static; these systems would therefore not give passive protection at all times, but would provide the capability to periodically scan for threats, and would require a tactical pause or short halt to do so. Note the risk of the radar emissions being detected must be factored in when considering such options.
+
+This in turn raises questions about crew and commander workload and about the echelon level at which these systems could be integrated. While a retro-reflective detection scan produces near-instant results, outside of a headquarters setting GMTI data would require artificial intelligence (AI) support to even partially automate target classification – and even then the data would still require human analysis to filter out clutter and noise. These systems may therefore be inappropriate for platform-level integration. The commander of an unmodernised Challenger 2 already has a high cognitive burden when managing a tank crew and, in the case of sub-unit commanders, also has a troop or squadron to oversee. Maintaining situational awareness while closed down takes practice, given the limited fields of view and the fact that rotation of the turret where the commander is located is independent of the position and direction of travel of the hull – even before the designation of targets, issuing of other instructions, and communicating via radio inter- and intra-echelon are taken into consideration. In addition, space is at a premium in the turret given the battle management systems already in place. This situation is unlikely to change with the introduction of Challenger 3.
+
+When considering the adoption of extra systems, one caveat is that there is limited space available in the current Challenger 2 turret for additional battle management and situational awareness equipment. In order to prevent intended improvements being counterproductive for the crew operating the platform, it would be much more preferable to undertake a wholesale overhaul of the interior ergonomics and a thorough integration of new capabilities with existing ones, rather than incrementally add systems in a piecemeal manner. It would be a mistake to add systems that require a significant level of management by tank commanders; such systems should instead be operated either by attached specialists or handled an echelon above, with data passed down, using AI support to ensure that the cognitive effect on the tank commander is beneficial rather than overwhelming. There are also serious questions about whether these technologies could be added to MBTs without increasing their weight to an impractical level.
+
+With regard to the proposition that future MBTs and heavy armoured vehicles should be lighter, John Stone argued this exact point when he noted that, although the US and the UK adopted manoeuvre warfare as the core of their warfighting doctrine in the 1980s, their MBT designs were still rooted in the 1970s in terms of size, amount of armour, and weight (60–70 tonnes). In Stone’s view, the logistics tail made necessary by this misalignment of concepts of operations and vehicle design amounted to a bloating that directly impeded the very operational tempo and mobility that the vehicles were supposed to enable. Whether Stone was correct or not, MBTs certainly cannot afford to get any heavier than they are now. Once a tank weighs above approximately 80 tonnes, the engineering and design choices required to overcome increasing ground pressure result in vehicles that are useful only for niche tasks or which are simply impractical. Even at 70 tonnes, problems abound. The Department of Defense (DoD) and US Army have in the past been at odds over whether tests indicated that weight increases had compromised the Abrams M1A2 SEPv3 MBT’s ability to cross standard bridging equipment, be carried by Heavy Equipment Transporter System (HETS), and be recovered in the event of damage or breakdown. Nor does Challenger 2 enjoy the same cross-country mobility as its smaller forerunner, the Centurion. The current balance between weight and equipment requirements may be the best balance possible given the threat environment, but seeking further protection may prove counterproductive and mobility issues should not be exacerbated, as mobility too is critical to survivability, allowing tank crews to better use ground and avoid slow movement or being forced into remaining static.
+
+Despite the potential benefits of moving to lighter vehicles, Russian design principles for MBTs, which might be characterised as being design-optimised for ease of manufacture and extreme mechanical simplicity, are probably best avoided. As Michael Kofman recently highlighted, Western platforms, particularly armoured vehicles, have proven significantly more survivable than Russian-designed and -manufactured equivalents. Despite a similar vulnerability to being mission-killed, crews are far more likely to survive and vehicles are more likely to be recoverable and repairable. This results in forces that can be organically reconstituted far more easily.
+
+Ultimately, increased battlefield lethality might make it difficult to achieve improved survivability through passive or reactive protection. Technological developments in this area might offer some promise, but also involve limitations. For example, expectations of the benefits to be derived from countermeasures such as APS should be moderated. APS have a high power demand when they are active, and some vehicles cannot provide such power. Moreover APS, when active, also involve the use of radar guidance, generating an associated electromagnetic signature that in theory could assist enemy targeting. APS are also generally single-use or quickly expended, such that a moderate volume of incoming fire can overwhelm even an effective and reliable APS, leaving the vehicle in question reliant on its passive protection systems. APS technology may provide a layer of protection, but is no guarantee of survivability against a determined or well-armed enemy. They are most effective when heavy armoured forces can concentrate and quickly overwhelm an enemy, whether that enemy is equipped with heavy armour itself or is composed of lighter forces armed with anti-tank weapons. Improved ISTAR capabilities and situational awareness technologies, coupled with concepts of operations that prioritise counter-reconnaissance, may be the best way to ensure that the MBT remains a viable platform.
+
+#### Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (UGVs)
+
+A final question is whether the role of the MBT can be performed by UGVs. Unfortunately for enthusiastic technologists, the answer is that the future MBT will not be able to operate uncrewed any time soon. A hypothetical head-to-head comparison with the MBT will serve to illustrate the shortcomings of UGVs. UGVs can be controlled remotely, or they can be autonomous. If they are controlled remotely, they rely on data links, which present a vector for attack – they can be hacked, or the signal can be disrupted. Alternatively, UGVs can be autonomous, but this presents its own problems – most importantly, the technology controlling the UGV’s autonomous performance must be mature and sophisticated enough for the vehicle to be useful. UGVs of both kinds will perform best if managed by human personnel nearby, and these personnel must be protected.
+
+Crewed MBTs do not suffer from any of these disadvantages. An armoured vehicle such as a modern MBT is extremely versatile: it can be employed with a great deal of precision, can operate independently for an extended period of time fulfilling a variety of different mission-sets, and can rapidly switch between these mission-sets, provided it has a well-trained and competent crew. For example, on a single patrol, an MBT crew could, if required, perform a variety of different combat missions with tactical flexibility, including patrolling, reconnaissance, attacking, and holding or defending ground. The crew can handle surrendered enemy combatants, provide limited on-the-spot humanitarian relief such as first aid or emergency supplies to civilians, and conduct maintenance on its vehicle, and do all of this independently in extremis. While an MBT and its crew are not optimised for many of these tasks, and might perform some of them poorly if unsupported or in an environment not conducive to them completing that task effectively, they could nevertheless turn their hand to different tasks as necessity dictated. This range of capabilities is a difficult standard for a UGV to match.
+
+There are, however, situations where the UGV concept can complement the use of MBTs. For instance, in tanks where the crew operates the turret remotely from inside the hull (Remote Weapons Stations, RWS) some elements of UGV technology could be leveraged, making the vehicle less vulnerable to enemy fire when taking hull-down positions. Crewed vehicles also provide useful platforms for mounting the infrastructure required to supervise UGVs and for stationing their human operators (albeit accepting that MBTs themselves currently suffer from internal space limitations, meaning that command and control of UGVs would probably have to be performed from supporting vehicles).
+
+There is some overlap between MBTs and UGVs in terms of their technology and the purposes for which they are deployed – especially when crewed tanks are fitted with systems that have elements of automation, such as improved sensors and situational awareness, and the off-boarding of hard-kill and soft-kill countermeasures. In this context it seems highly likely that UGVs will play a complementary role within heavy armoured forces rather than have a realistic prospect of replacing MBTs.
+
+
+### Conclusion and Recommendations
+
+A heavy armoured force remains the best option for high-intensity warfighting due to its combat power. While it exhibits vulnerabilities, so do all types of force structure, and facing a heavy armoured force compels an enemy to make difficult choices and places the burden of operational planning upon it if it hopes to be successful. Nevertheless, if the British Army were called on to engage in high-intensity warfighting without a significant number of MBTs, it would still be viable. A smaller, lighter, more autonomous force backed up by critical enablers in the form of ISTAR capabilities and indirect fires could maintain a high degree of lethality and pose difficult operational problems for any enemy force. However, the integration of many of these critical enablers must happen at battlegroup level and above, due to the limited capacity of company headquarters (even if assisted by advanced C2 tools that allow capabilities to be delegated) and due to the expense and inefficiency of distributing such capabilities evenly across small units. This analysis of the implications of using lighter forces raises questions about the ability of sub-units to perform offensive operations effectively due to a lack of combat power. Moreover, a warfighting capability built around a core medium armoured force would struggle to achieve its likely operational objectives were it to come up against a capable combined arms enemy force built around MBTs and heavy armour. While a medium or light force might be cheaper at a platform level, as well as more numerous and more distributed, ground combat units would suffer in the close fight, in both material and human terms. Medium armoured and light forces would be better seen as complementary to heavy armoured forces, with different formations able to cover one another’s weaknesses and augment one another’s capabilities when necessary.
+
+The British Army faces several challenges in maximising the utility of its current armoured forces. They have suffered years of underinvestment, the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 having identified heavy armour as an area of low priority. Ambitions were set low, at:
+
+> preserving the ability to reconstitute our levels of military capability in areas which are currently low priority, such as heavy armour – tanks – should international circumstances change. This means both holding in reserve certain sorts of equipment not needed for current operations and – importantly – maintaining core levels of training and experience among our personnel. This would provide us with the potential for expansion in the future.
+
+This approach has only recently begun to change amid decisions such as procuring Challenger 3 and Boxer, but many areas require investment. Consequently, there is a need to understand where resources and financial investment should be prioritised, since a complete, simultaneous overhaul of all the areas requiring modernisation is unrealistic. Critically, for heavy armour to be effective and survivable, the combined arms force as a whole needs to be able to conduct effective shaping of the battlespace to prevent saturation by enemy UAS and precision fires, and to be able to create sufficient uncertainty through deception that these enemy capabilities cannot target and attrit ground combat formations for decisive effect.
+
+Ensuring that heavy armoured units have sufficient track miles and collective field training to maintain expertise at armoured warfare is more important than any technological advance. The major determinants of whether heavy forces will prove viable given the pressures put on them will be training, skill, and, critically, motivation – that is, the human element, the moral component and the professionalism of the force, which will culminate in the continued ability to fight in a truly combined arms manner. However, beyond this, changes and adaptations are still required. At the sub-unit level, technological improvements can improve situational awareness and contribute to better tactical employment, but will have to be integrated in such a way as to not compromise the existing strengths of MBTs: off-boarding of capabilities on to support vehicles and UGVs may prove a fruitful avenue of adoption and experimentation. Future MBT designs would benefit from prioritising mechanical simplicity and repairability, and from prioritising the resilience of parts that cannot easily be repaired in the field. If weight reduction to improve mobility over difficult terrain is to be considered when modernising platforms, this should not extend to adopting Soviet design principles that trade away platform or crew survivability (although the British defence establishment is in any case unlikely to go down that route given the pattern of increasing vehicle weight and a healthy appreciation of their duty of care compared with the Russian Armed Forces). The Challenger 3 upgrade provides an opportunity to improve the design in line with at least some of the principles outlined in this paper. A critical enabler with regard to turning these recommendations into reality is an overhaul of MBTs’ interior ergonomics and the thorough integration of systems housed in the turret to ensure that crews benefit from technical improvements.
+
+The MBTs and other heavy armoured vehicles at the core of combined arms formations remain important for both warfighting and other operations, as their unmatched combat power in the close fight helps ensure that a force can remain mobile when necessary. However, the balance must be shifted away from protection and towards a greater emphasis on mobility. This encompasses both strategic and operational mobility, since mobility contributes to survivability. The success of MBTs in the Gulf War set high cultural expectations regarding the survivability and offensive lethality of MBTs and heavy armoured forces organised, equipped, trained and employed as per the Western/NATO model of the time. These expectations need to be recalibrated, as individual tanks are increasingly vulnerable on the battlefield; nonetheless, well-trained, competently led and adequately equipped heavy armoured formations, supported by the correct enabling capabilities, are mobile, lethal and exceedingly difficult to counter.
+
+Historical lessons about attrition in armoured warfare must also be relearned. Due to high maintenance requirements, crews may need to be rotated to prevent exhaustion and maintain a tempo of operations, and units may need to increase headcounts to ensure that some rotation is feasible. Heavy armoured forces need to get used to recovering and repairing damaged vehicles and replacing crew casualties as an inherent part of their operations. This also needs to be done in as dispersed a manner as possible in order to contend with an increasingly transparent battlefield and the threat of precision fires. It will be critical to maintain both recovery and repair units, as well as specialists, so that heavy armour can be quickly returned to its units after repair, with a particular emphasis on spare parts availability in the long term to ensure that vehicle losses do not translate into high rates of attrition.
+
+Crew expertise in maintenance (both preventative and curative) is essential to reduce the burden on forward repair facilities run by dedicated mechanical engineers, and will also reduce the facilities’ detectable signature, offering them greater protection.
+
+All of these measures will need to go hand-in-hand with investments in track miles and training time: the traditional qualitative superiority of the human element can make the difference between a viable and non-viable armoured capability.
+
+---
+
+__Nick Reynolds__ is the Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI. His research interests include land power, wargaming and simulation.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-15-profiting-from-proliferation.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-15-profiting-from-proliferation.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b8b85545
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-15-profiting-from-proliferation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Profiting From Proliferation?
+author: Daniel Salisbury and Darya Dolzikova
+date  : 2023-12-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/XEljFga.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "North Korea’s Exports of Missile and Nuclear Technology"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_This paper examines North Korean onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology, based on a review of Pyongyang’s recent technological advancements and developments in North Korea’s customer base. The authors assess the likelihood of North Korea selling its missile and nuclear technology onwards, and the kinds of technology that may be for sale and to whom._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+The September 2023 meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un raised concerns over the possibility that Pyongyang may supply Moscow with arms to support its war of aggression in Ukraine. Subsequent reports of North Korean transfers of ammunition to Russia and unconfirmed intelligence of suspected ballistic missiles transfers solidified those concerns. While the fact of Russia – host to one of the world’s most capable military–industrial complexes – turning to North Korea for arms was shocking, it did not come as a surprise to those familiar with the latter’s long history of arms trading and missile proliferation activities.
+
+North Korea has exported missile technology since the 1980s and has, on several occasions, also transferred technology directly relevant to the development of nuclear weapons. Despite the introduction since 2006 of a progressively extensive sanctions regime against North Korea and its proliferation activity by the UN Security Council (UNSC), North Korean exports of missile and nuclear technology have persisted. Considering developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities in recent years, the range of technologies that Pyongyang may be able to offer potential customers has also expanded. These technological advances, combined with the expansion of the UNSC sanctions regime over the past two decades, as well as other recent developments – like North Korea’s apparently expanding military collaboration with Russia, Moscow’s increasing disregard for UN sanctions, and North Korea’s reopening after the Covid-19 pandemic – make a reassessment of North Korea’s missile and nuclear exports timely.
+
+This paper builds on existing literature on North Korea’s missile and nuclear proliferation, supplementing it with expert interviews and leveraging the emergence of new information and cases related to North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities and transfers over the past decade. The authors consider the potential for future missile and nuclear sales by Pyongyang, asking: how likely is North Korea to sell its missile and nuclear technology onwards, what technology may be for sale, and to whom? With a growing technological offering and a continuing need to generate hard currency, incentives for North Korea to sell its missile, nuclear and dual-use technologies to foreign customers persist. As well as North Korea’s more novel technologies potentially being for sale, Pyongyang’s technological progress may also have created surpluses of older technology which it may be looking to sell off.
+
+However, despite clear supply-side drivers, there are a range of restraining factors that are likely to prevent an all-out onward proliferation bonanza emanating from North Korea. A variety of factors have whittled down the potential markets for these technologies, while the restrictive sanctions landscape and unprecedented monitoring of the Korean peninsula have also worked to reduce opportunities for sales and increase the risks posed by interdiction. North Korean concerns over the possibility of its more advanced capabilities falling into adversary hands, thus potentially putting its own deterrent at risk, are also likely to temper its willingness to export such capabilities, despite the potentially high price tag that could be attached to them.
+
+The changing geopolitical landscape resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may, however, open new opportunities for North Korea. Russia’s willingness to engage in military trade with North Korea could give other countries the green light to accept North Korean arms, missiles and perhaps even nuclear technology. There remains a real risk of a broader collapse of the UNSC sanctions regime and the resurgence of North Korea’s arms and missile export enterprise.
+
+Building on the analysis of North Korea’s expanded technological offering, reduced customer base and other factors affecting export decisions – and the clear need to pay attention to the issue – this paper presents 10 recommendations to help in countering North Korean missile and nuclear technology proliferation. These recommendations are organised in two categories, which attempt to address the supply side of the problem – deterring, dissuading and encouraging North Korea to refrain from engaging in onward proliferation – as well as demand-side factors – by trying to reduce North Korea’s customer base.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+In September 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un travelled by armoured train to Russia’s far east to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Kim’s visits to the Vostochny Cosmodrome and a fighter jet factory in Komsomolsk-on-Amur further raised existing concerns that the two countries were seeking to exchange military technology. Indeed, recent research has confirmed that hundreds of shipping containers, likely carrying ammunition, have been moved from North Korea to Russian military bases since the leaders’ meeting. The meeting was preceded two months earlier by the visit of Russian and Chinese delegations to North Korea to mark the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice, with officials from Moscow led by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu. Russia and North Korea – both countries under extensive international sanctions and with acute military equipment needs – put on a strikingly united front. Notably, Shoigu was treated to a defence exhibition featuring many of North Korea’s newest weapons systems – including UAVs, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and even ICBMs. In November 2023, South Korean intelligence publicly shared its suspicions – otherwise unconfirmed – that North Korea may have already sent SRBMs to Russia.
+
+Pyongyang has long been an exporter of missile and nuclear technology; this has included exports of Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) to Iran and Pakistan in the 1990s, Scud SRBMs to a range of customers (largely in the Middle East) through the 1980s and 1990s, as well as nuclear reactor technology to Syria, and uranium hexafluoride gas to Libya in the early 2000s through the proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan (Boxes 1 and 2 summarise North Korea’s historical trade).
+
+North Korea’s exhibition of missiles to Shoigu is far from the only indicator that Pyongyang remains open for business to countries looking to procure missile and even nuclear technology. Reporting by the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718 Committee Panel of Experts (PoE) has noted that Pyongyang has engaged in missile cooperation with Iran and Syria as recently as 2020 and 2019, respectively. A 2020 documentary film of unclear veracity entitled The Mole also showed an actor – playing the part of a private arms dealer – venturing to Pyongyang undercover in 2017 and being offered a wide range of short- and even intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). While most of the handful of known nuclear technology transfers by North Korea date back two decades, the last publicly known case of North Korea offering nuclear-weapons-relevant materials on the open market – in that instance, the isotope lithium-6 – was uncovered just six years ago.
+
+North Korea has engaged in these transfers despite an expansive UNSC sanctions regime that prohibits most trade with the country, including a prohibition on trade with the country in missile and nuclear technology, and most types of arms, in place since 2006. Pyongyang’s advancements in its nuclear and missile capabilities have had an impact on what, how and to whom North Korea may sell its nuclear and missile technology in the future. Its experience in identifying customers and engaging in illicit trade under the international sanctions regime over the past two decades will also have influenced its patterns of onward proliferation.
+
+Developments in the international sanctions regime and North Korean missile and nuclear capabilities, as well as changing geopolitical dynamics, necessitate a re-examination of North Korean onward proliferation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has resulted in the widening of existing schisms in the international community, with countries opposing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on one side, and those that have supported Russia or remained ambivalent on the other. Those in the latter camp, which includes North Korea and Iran, appear to have found in Russia a willing trading and diplomatic partner as Moscow seeks to reduce its isolation. This study is thus particularly timely in light of the recent high-level meetings between Pyongyang and Moscow, and the more general apparent expansion of relations between the two countries, as well as other developments – such as the gradual reopening of North Korea’s borders following the Covid-19 pandemic, the expiry in October 2023 of the UN Security Council (UNSC) embargo on trade in nuclear-capable missile technology with Iran, and the expiry of UNSC proliferation-related targeted financial sanctions on Iran.
+
+The paper builds on existing academic literature, expert analysis and case studies relating to North Korea’s onward proliferation of nuclear and missile technology by considering how what is already known about North Korean transfers of nuclear and missile technology may have been – or may in the future be – impacted by some of the technological, economic and geopolitical developments outlined above and throughout the paper. Based on this analysis, the authors explore developments relevant to already-identified factors, as well as emerging ones, that shape whether Pyongyang may transfer its nuclear and missile technology, and what wares North Korea may transfer, and to which client states.
+
+#### Existing Literature
+
+While some previous work has considered North Korea’s onward proliferation, the literature is limited and much of it is more than a decade old. Much of the existing literature on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes has focused on developments in its nuclear and missile capabilities, Pyongyang’s revenue-raising efforts under sanctions, and its procurement of WMD and military technologies. More broadly, discussion of the threat posed by North Korea’s weapons programmes has focused on denuclearisation and (more recently) deterrence, rather than on the threat posed by onward proliferation.
+
+The most insightful and in-depth work on North Korea’s onward proliferation was published by Joshua Pollack. In 2011, Pollack examined North Korea’s missile sales and how these had changed since what he called the “Golden Age” of North Korean missile exports in the 1980s. Pollack observed that Pyongyang had shifted – with some exceptions – from supplying complete missile systems to transferring parts, materials and expertise instead. He also noted that North Korea was moving its focus towards cooperation in joint missile development and production with a smaller number of countries – particularly Iran and Syria – as opposed to transferring full missiles to a range of customers. Pollack argued that these shifts stemmed from market saturation for North Korea’s missile offerings as a result of past missile transfers and requirements for components and maintenance services from past customers. He also attributed this shift to a deprioritisation of ballistic missiles among some potential customers, particularly in the Middle East, in favour of Western-supplied piloted aircraft, cruise missiles and missile defence systems, and pressure from the US to curtail engagement with North Korea. As the authors outline in this paper, some analogous factors appear to be impacting on more recent supply and demand drivers in North Korea’s onward proliferation.
+
+Pollack also examined North Korea’s nuclear exports, arguing that Pyongyang seems to have prioritised technological exchange instead of currency generation in the limited number of known transfers of its nuclear technology. However, Pollack also argued that Pyongyang may seek to leverage its nuclear expertise and technology for revenue generation in the future. Naturally, his work relied on the data available to him over a decade ago; since then, additional cases and data points on North Korean missile and nuclear exports have afforded greater understanding. The present-day utility of other works in understanding the phenomenon of North Korean onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology has been even more limited by their age. Others studying North Korean onward proliferation have limited their study to discrete aspects, such as transfers to non-state actors, or China’s role.
+
+This paper has also benefited from research on adjacent topics such as North Korea’s arms exports and sanctions evasion networks. Notably, in her 2016 book, Target Markets: North Korea’s Military Customers in the Sanctions Era, Andrea Berger identified a range of factors driving demand for North Korean military goods, considering customers in three categories: “resilient” customers with deep political and military ties to Pyongyang, “reluctant” customers with few other options in terms of suppliers, and less committed “ad hoc” customers. Berger’s work highlights the unique nature and context of specific relationships and their developments, which has helped to inform some of the analysis in this paper. Others have considered the role of specific entities in North Korean proliferation activities and procurement networks. However, no study in the past decade has revisited the question of North Korea’s onward missile and nuclear proliferation activities.
+
+#### Key Arguments, Research Methodology and Structure
+
+Given its growing technological offering and continuing need to generate hard currency, North Korea has significant incentives to sell its missile, nuclear and dual-use technologies to other states. Surpluses created by technological advances may also be available for sale. However, despite clear incentives to proliferate, a range of factors that work to constrain North Korea’s sales are likely to prevent an all-out onward-proliferation bonanza. Many of these drivers and restraints, discussed in the literature, continue to shape North Korea’s onward proliferation activity.
+
+Furthermore, the changing geopolitical landscape – particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – may provide new opportunities for North Korea. Russia’s willingness to engage in military trade with North Korea may give other countries the green light to breach UN sanctions and accept North Korean arms, missile or even nuclear technology. There is a real risk that such developments could lead to a resurgence of the North Korean arms and missile export enterprise.
+
+In re-examining the topic and building on others’ work, the authors were able to consider a wider range of data, as new material has become available over the past decade. Part of the reason for limited research on North Korean onward proliferation is the methodological challenge inherent in the study of Pyongyang’s proliferation activities. The extreme opacity of the North Korean economy, its regime and policymaking process makes the country a challenging target for researchers. Like any other country, North Korea guards the details of its military programmes – including procurement, technological developments and exports – particularly closely, making the study of its nuclear and missile matters especially difficult. Partial data on specific cases most often becomes available with a significant time lag, following interdictions of technology, the discovery of major proliferation rings such as the AQ Khan network, or in reports on the movement of North Korean technicians to customer states.
+
+More data on North Korean missile and nuclear developments and transfers is available than ever before. The UNSCR 1718 PoE has produced almost 20 detailed public reports since it was established in 2009, rich in details on North Korea’s sanctions evasion activities and illicit networks. Pollack’s work was largely unable to benefit from this data, which has provided insights into North Korea’s missile relationships with Egypt, Iran and Syria, as well as its dual-use technology exports. Increased access to open source data by investigative journalists, think tank analysts and academics has also led to the proliferation of analysis on NorthKorean capabilities and sanctions evasion.
+
+The authors have supplemented the information available in public sources with 20 semi-structured interviews conducted with experts through video conferencing and in person in London between June and early August 2023. Interviewees included former government officials and former members of the UNSCR 1718 PoE, as well as academics and other researchers working on matters related to North Korea’s nuclear, missile and broader military programmes, North Korean domestic, economic and security policies, and broader Asian security issues. Interview questions were tailored to each expert’s respective area of knowledge, but broadly focused on North Korea’s missile and nuclear programmes, proliferation activities and networks, domestic and foreign policies, and international efforts to counter North Korean proliferation. The interviews allowed the authors to gauge current views on the state of North Korea’s onward proliferation enterprise and to test hypotheses as they were developed over the course of the research.
+
+Given the methodological challenges in studying matters related to the North Korean missile and nuclear programmes, and the dearth of current data on the subject, interviewees often had to caveat their assessments, noting that they were based on limited data and assumptions and were thus speculative. Consequently, the authors extend the same disclaimer to the findings outlined in this paper. Nevertheless, common themes in interviewees’ assessments emerged and these were supported by further research, allowing the authors to confidently formulate their conclusions.
+
+The authors’ analysis is presented across two main chapters. Chapter I considers recent developments in North Korea’s technological offering and assesses which technologies may be of interest to customers. Chapter II outlines the likely factors influencing North Korean decision-making on whether to transfer its nuclear and missile technology, and how these may have evolved in recent years. The paper concludes with 10 recommendations to address supply of and demand for North Korean missile and nuclear technology.
+
+> #### `Box 1: North Korea’s Historical Missile Sales`
+
+_`North Korea has long acted as an exporter of ballistic missile technology – particularly SRBM systems. According to one estimate, North Korean supply made up around 40% of the ballistic missiles supplied to the developing world between 1987 and 2009; more than 500 missile systems in total.`_
+
+_`The genesis of North Korea’s own missile programme was the transfer of Soviet-design Scud SRBMs from Egypt in the 1980s. North Korea in turn supplied the Scud system – and related components – to a wide range of customers, many based in the Middle East. This included Iran, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen and the UAE. North Korea also transferred Scud missile technology to Myanmar and Vietnam in East Asia.`_
+
+_`Pyongyang transferred Nodong MRBMs, a scaled-up version of the Scud SRBM, to Iran and Pakistan in the 1990s. Both states’ programmes have advanced far beyond this early North Korean assistance – as is the case for a number of North Korea’s earlier customers.`_
+
+_`North Korea has also transferred IRBM technology to Iran and has allegedly offered IRBMs to private arms dealers in the past.`_
+
+> #### `Box 2: North Korea’s Historical Nuclear Sales`
+
+_`The authors are aware of just four cases in the public domain of North Korean transfers of technology pertaining directly to nuclear weapons capabilities, from the 1990s to 2016.`_
+
+- __`Nuclear trigger technology to Pakistan.`__ _`North Korean technicians assisted Pakistani weapons scientists in producing krytrons – components used to trigger a nuclear device – in the mid-1990s. This was part of a series of technological deals between the two states, with Pakistan receiving complete missiles and parts from North Korea, as well as North Korea receiving centrifuge technology, and its technicians training in Pakistani facilities.`_
+
+- __`Uranium gas to Libya.`__ _`In December 2003, after the revelation that Libya was purchasing a centrifuge enrichment plant from the AQ Khan proliferation network, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors in the country were shown three mystery cylinders of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), a uranium gas that is fed into the centrifuges during the enrichment process. US analysis of contamination on the outside of the cylinders showed that they had originated in North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Centre. The IAEA later stated that the 1.7-tonne shipment was the first of a larger planned series of transfers of 20 tonnes between North Korea and Libya brokered by Khan.`_
+
+- __`A reactor for Syria.`__ _`North Korea worked with Syria to construct a nuclear reactor near Al-Kibar in Syria between the late 1990s and 2007 (when the site was bombed by Israeli aircraft). The reactor – the most extensive example of North Korea’s nuclear exports in the public domain – was a smaller-scale version of North Korea’s 5-megawatt (MW) graphite-moderated reactor at Yongbyon. Intelligence reports suggested that the reactor would have been capable of producing plutonium for one or two weapons annually, had it been fuelled or gone critical.`_
+
+- __`Sale of thermonuclear weapon isotope online.`__ _`In 2016, an open source investigation revealed an advertisement for lithium-6. Lithium-6 is an isotope that can be used in thermonuclear weapons – either directly, or by irradiating it in a reactor to produce tritium. The advert was posted openly on a business-to-business (B2B) website and listed a phone number linked to the North Korean embassy in Beijing.`_
+
+
+### I. North Korea’s Current Technological Offerings
+
+North Korea has acquired and developed – and therefore could potentially export – a wide range of missile and nuclear technologies. This potential technological offering has expanded over the past decade as North Korea has advanced its missile and nuclear capabilities – both indigenously and through acquisition of technology from other countries. While the offering has expanded, the fundamental range of options for transfer has not changed, and includes everything from fuel cycle facilities and complete missile systems to capabilities for building these facilities, individual dual-use goods and components, as well as expertise relating to elements of missile production, and to the nuclear fuel cycle or to weaponisation. Table 1 summarises some of the main types of transfers North Korea could consider (there is evidence of past exports across all these categories, except for the transfer of complete nuclear warheads).
+
+North Korea’s developments in nuclear and missile technology over the past decade could have a dual effect on its supply of technology. First, newly developed capabilities – which are more attractive to a wider range of customers – could be transferred. Second, the replacement of older designs and systems with newer, higher-quality or more capable ones could create surpluses of older systems, goods and expertise that could be exported. These surplus items may be appealing to a different subset of customers – those with less ability to absorb technology, lower capability needs, limited budgets or perhaps similar older systems in need of spare parts or interoperable systems. At the same time, North Korea’s expanding catalogue of missile systems and nuclear capabilities raises the question of whether it could now consider a sub-set of this catalogue of technologies to be too strategically important for its own security for them to be transferred to customers abroad. These security concerns are explored further in Chapter II.
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/EeOPpc3.png)
+_▲ __Table 1: North Korea’s Potential Missile and Nuclear-Related Offerings.__ Source: Author generated._
+
+#### Missile Technology Offerings
+
+Historically, North Korea has mostly exported short-range, and sometimes medium-range, ballistic missiles. Could recent developments in its short-, medium- and longer-range ballistic missiles create new sales opportunities?
+
+_Developments in SRBM and MRBM Capabilities_
+
+North Korea has debuted a series of solid-fuelled SRBMs since 2018. Although the exact specifications of the systems – some of which have multiple variants – are unclear, they will likely replace the liquid-fuelled Scuds and Tochka-type systems in North Korea’s arsenal, and potentially also in its sales catalogue.
+
+North Korea first revealed the KN-23 solid-fuelled SRBM during a 2019 parade. Since then, several variants have been developed, including smaller shorter-range and larger longer-range versions. KN-23 variants have been developed for deployment on a variety of platforms, such as road mobile transportable erector launchers, underground silos, railcars, submarines and underwater silos. The KN-24 – another solid-fuelled SRBM, with a range of around 400 km – was also unveiled in 2019. A further 2019 debut, the KN-25, is a solid-fuelled system described in North Korean media as a “super-large multiple rocket launcher”. It has four launch tubes on each launcher, and a range of up to 380 km.
+
+These newer solid propellant missile systems could appeal to customers for several reasons. Beyond their quicker time to launch, solid-fuelled systems are easier to operate than liquid-fuelled ones (which require greater expertise for maintenance and handling of highly explosive, corrosive and toxic fuels). Older liquid-fuelled systems also require the procurement of a range of support vehicles and handling facilities – increasing the human and financial investment required. North Korea has also recently shown signs of exploring ampulisation technology – a set of measures to ensure maintenance of liquid-fuelled missiles in combat readiness for longer periods of time. This could both make a more appealing product, overcoming some of the shortcomings of liquid-fuelled systems, and see North Korea find ways to reduce the maintenance burden and investment required by customers for liquid-fuelled products.
+
+_Developments in IRBM and ICBM Capabilities_
+
+North Korean advances in missile technology that have received the most media attention relate to the country’s long-range systems, such as IRBMs and ICBMs. This includes the KN-17 IRBM, successfully tested in 2017; the KN-26 medium- range submarine-launched ballistic missile, successfully tested in 2019; the KN-28 (Hwasong-17) ICBM, successfully tested in 2022; and, most recently, the Hwasong-18. The latter, debuted in February 2023 and successfully tested in April, is North Korea’s first solid propellant ICBM – a significant development in its strategic capabilities.
+
+Some have suggested that Pyongyang may consider transferring some of its longer-range missile systems to customers abroad. Indeed, North Korea did transfer IRBMs to Iran, which were likely based on imported Soviet missile technology. However, the strategic significance of these systems to North Korea’s own defence – and the insights they could betray into North Korea’s technology (including the state of its missile capabilities and domestic production capability, or reliance on foreign components) – may disincentivise Pyongyang from transferring them to others. The strategic importance that North Korea places on its missile capabilities, as well as the limited opportunities for intelligence collection on these systems by external actors, may make Pyongyang sensitive about having these capabilities fall into the hands of an adversary. Similar considerations could be applied to the Hwasong-8 carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle, which – while being an SRBM – has strategic significance for Pyongyang that could make transfer less likely. Although, as some of the experts interviewed for this project noted, any missile technology might be for sale for the right price, and Pyongyang may not care about its technology being intercepted provided it has received payment from the customer. These competing security and economic considerations are discussed in more detail in Chapter II.
+
+The potential customer base for longer-range missile systems is also limited. There are few countries that would benefit from an ICBM capability (which suggests the need to hold at risk an adversary further than 5,500 km away) who have not already shown some interest in developing these systems domestically. The relationship between ICBMs and nuclear weapons, in which one technology often necessitates the development of the other to have strategic value, also reduces any potential customer base. Iran may be the most obvious exception, and would likely benefit from further collaboration with North Korea on long-range missile technology (albeit probably without the transfer of complete long-range missile systems), and is a case discussed further below and in Chapter II.
+
+_Potential for Surplus Sales_
+
+There is also a risk that North Korea may export surplus older systems, notably those based on liquid-fuelled Scud or Nodong technology that are likely being replaced (or may be in future) by newer solid-fuelled systems. North Korea used to frequently parade these missiles, but a system based on Scud or Nodong technology has not appeared in a parade since 2017. The KN-02, an early North Korean-manufactured version of the solid-fuelled Soviet OTR-21 Tochka missile, which was first unveiled in 2007, has also not been paraded since 2012.
+
+While it remains unclear how many newer systems North Korea has been able to deploy, the apparent phasing out of older missile models raises questions as to what might have happened to these older systems, and whether surpluses could be for sale. Arms marketing material of unclear veracity handed over in the 2020 undercover documentary film The Mole included Scud C and Nodong (marketed as Scud E) systems and supporting vehicles allegedly for sale, as well as a system described as “Tochika-U”, likely the KN-02.
+
+Surplus missile technology – including full missile systems, spare parts or components – may appeal to customers still operating Scud- or Tochka-type systems (see Table 2). However, this group of states is declining in size, with the returns of maintaining such aged technology diminishing, if not already non-existent – particularly if states have access to more modern options in the form of more advanced missiles or UAVs. The two states that received North Korean Nodong-type missiles in the 1990s, Iran and Pakistan, both indigenised the technology and have since progressed in their own programmes, although surplus Nodong-type systems could potentially be of interest to new customers.
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/ANTGa59.png)
+_▲ __Table 2: States Holding Scud and Tochka Technology.__ Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2023 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2023) and a survey of other open source information. Note: Current data is difficult to compile – but inclusion in this table suggests that there is either evidence these countries currently operate these systems, or little evidence to suggest that the capability has been retired._
+
+Surpluses created by the superseding of North Korea’s Scud fleet could lead to parts being available for sale. Evidence of North Korean trade in spare parts for these older systems, though, is dated. A 2013 shipment of Scud parts originating in North Korea, including connectors, relays, voltage circuit breakers and a barometric switch, was interdicted en route to Egypt from Beijing. North Korean markings were visible on two of the items – suggesting manufacture in North Korea. Egypt has continued to maintain and operate Scud systems, and it is not out of the question that more recent (and successful) shipments of spare parts and components have occurred.
+
+North Korea may have other uses for its surplus missiles besides sales – including recycling, cannibalising them for materials, parts or components, mothballing them for future contingencies, or launching them in provocations. The war in Ukraine may also yield lessons. As one interviewee pointed out, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the continued value of short-range systems on the battlefield, and this may lead North Korea to retain older systems in great numbers for future contingencies.
+
+_Collaboration in Missile Development_
+
+Due to the sanctions environment and an evolving customer base, North Korea’s missile proliferation behaviour has largely adapted from the shipment of full systems towards the provision of spare parts, materials and technical support. As an unnamed UN member state noted to the UN PoE in 2019, “Instead of exporting full missile systems, the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) is sending technicians to a buyer country and establishing a complete supply chain”, noting that this pattern had been seen in Egypt, Iran and Syria.
+
+Missile collaboration with Syria has been ongoing for many years. North Korean technicians were reportedly involved in the upgrade of the Scud D to create a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle in 2008. A delegation of Syrian engineers allegedly spent six years in North Korea from 2011 to 2017, and further exchanges took place around 2016, with a group of North Korean missile technicians staying on a Syrian airbase. North Korea has also supplied missile-related components to Syria as part of its collaboration with the country. Five containers of commercial items (many with applications in Scud missiles) originating in Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, Denmark, Japan and the US were seized by an unnamed state while being shipped to Syria from Dalian, China in 2014. The PoE also noted in 2015 and 2016 that a Syria-based official from North Korean arms exporter Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) imported ball bearings and fibre optic cables, as well as bringing in three North Korean technicians.
+
+North Korea’s missile collaboration with Iran has involved higher-end missile technology, given that Iran has a large (and expanding) missile industrial base and export capability of its own. Collaboration with Iran has not always been smooth sailing, with trust levels taking a significant hit after North Korea supplied the BM-25 Musudan IRBM, a missile with significant technical issues. US information suggests that over recent years there has been further collaboration on technology that is potentially of use in longer-range systems.
+
+A 2016 sanctions notice suggested that North Korean technicians were collaborating with Iranians on an “80-ton rocket booster” being developed by North Korea. The notice stated that Iranian technicians from liquid-fuel missile producer SHIG travelled to North Korea for this purpose and named individuals who had travelled to Pyongyang for “contract negotiations”. It also suggested that KOMID had made shipments of missile-related goods to Iran, including “valves, electronics and measuring equipment suitable for use in ground testing of liquid propellant ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles”. Further information on this collaboration was included in a 2021 UN PoE report, which noted that North Korea and Iran had “resumed cooperation on long-range missile development projects”, with the report focusing in particular on the development of a space launch vehicle (SLV). This collaboration included the “transfer of critical parts” and 13 North Koreans were named who had travelled to Iran to support KOMID’s work. The report also noted the high level at which such engagement was signed off within Iran, naming senior SHIG and Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) officials, and noting that the current director of AIO was a “key player in negotiations” when he had been the SHIG director.
+
+#### Nuclear Technology Offerings
+
+Short of the transfer of a complete warhead – something that all experts interviewed for this paper suggested was highly unlikely – there is a range of other nuclear-related technologies that North Korea could transfer. For instance, Pyongyang could sell nuclear material or isotopes, with a range of options short of weapons-usable fissile material. However – beyond the transfer of dual-use technologies with applications relevant to the production of nuclear weapons – the transfer of nuclear-weapons-relevant technology, nuclear material and other relevant isotopes was judged relatively unlikely by experts interviewed for this paper, for a number of reasons outlined further below. Nevertheless, previous North Korean transfers of nuclear technology – including reactor technology, nuclear materials, and even weaponisation technology (see Box 2) – suggest that the possibility for future transfers exists.
+
+While US government assessments have suggested that North Korea likely has an arsenal of “up to 60 nuclear warheads”, there are significant gaps in public knowledge about the state of its programme and stockpile. Early attention to North Korea’s nuclear programme focused on the plutonium aspects of the fuel cycle and the 5-MW reactor at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre. While it was suspected that North Korea may have uranium enrichment capabilities, the plutonium programme was, for a long time, the only publicly known North Korean nuclear weapons pathway. This changed in 2010, when a US delegation, including former Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Siegfried Hecker, was shown a centrifuge facility at Yongbyon. There have been no further public reports of foreign access to North Korea’s nuclear facilities since.
+
+Uncertainty persists regarding other potential enrichment facilities, the numbers and types of centrifuges North Korea may be deploying, and many other details about its uranium and plutonium fuel cycles and weaponisation processes. The limited number of recently seized shipments of goods or materials destined for North Korea’s centrifuge programme or other parts of the country’s nuclear weapons programme also restricts public understanding of the programme and how its recent development may have shaped North Korean nuclear wares available for sale.
+
+_Reactor and Enrichment Technology_
+
+Although North Korea has shown a willingness to transfer reactor technology in the past – namely, in its provision of assistance and materials for the construction of the Al-Kibar reactor in Syria – it would be incredibly risky for North Korea and any potential customers to engage in a further reactor construction project. Any such project would be relatively easy for foreign intelligence agencies to detect using a variety of human, signals and technical means. Reactors are large construction projects that are visible in open source satellite imagery. Even if the reactor being constructed were relatively small (as in the case of Al-Kibar), and even if most of the necessary physical materials could be sourced overseas, the development of such a structure would almost certainly be noticed by various national intelligence agencies, the IAEA or even open source analysts using commercially available satellite imagery, drawing significant scrutiny. As in the Al-Kibar case, other intelligence sources – such as human and signals intelligence – would likely reveal any North Korean involvement.
+
+Centrifuge enrichment technology perhaps offers greater opportunities for export, as demonstrated by the AQ Khan network’s sale of centrifuges and related technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya in the 1990s and 2000s. The transfer of centrifuge capabilities could range from a small number of machines with associated expertise to a full turnkey centrifuge facility, and could be harder to detect than the construction of a reactor, given that facilities can be constructed covertly underground and that they lack the distinctive visual signatures of a nuclear reactor. However, the construction or expansion of such facilities in past instances has also been monitored using open source satellite imagery in the context of North Korea, Iran and other states. Disassembled shipping – consisting of many shipments of largely benign-looking industrial goods and materials (as seen in some of Khan’s transfers of enrichment technology to Libya) – could also make detection difficult. However, greater awareness of the risks posed by the transfer of centrifuge technology among customs and intelligence agencies following the Khan case, as well as the enhanced ability of NGOs to collect and monitor data on illicit trade activity, could mean that multiple connected shipments would be detected more readily.
+
+Limited knowledge of North Korea’s centrifuge technology makes it difficult to assess whether it has old surplus centrifuge models it may want to sell and/or whether it possesses newer technologies that are more appealing to customers. During his 2010 visit, Hecker observed a facility with around 2,000 machines that appeared to be based on the Pakistani P-2 centrifuge model, and fabricatedwith rotors made from “alloys containing iron” according to one North Koreanengineer – interpreted by Hecker to mean maraging steel. As some analysts have noted, that North Korea is still operating these P-2 type machines is “an assumption that should be treated with caution”. Indeed, a paper published by a North Korean scientist indicates at least some interest in more advanced models of centrifuges. Taking the Iranian nuclear programme as a point of comparison, Tehran has developed multiple generations and models of centrifuges in a similar time span. It would be reasonable to assume that North Korea could have made comparable progress. However, the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and the motivations behind it are different from those of North Korea: Iran is more focused on publicly displaying its technical capabilities and trying to create leverage in the context of diplomacy over its nuclear programme, while North Korea is likely focusing on improving the efficiency of its centrifuge technology to expand its fissile material stocks and nuclear arsenal, with no public communication aspect – at least for the time being.
+
+Movement towards more advanced models would suggest that North Korea has developed domestic advanced centrifuge production capabilities and may indicate that there are fewer chokepoints for the sub-technologies required for production. Full centrifuges (whether more or less advanced) or constituent dual-use technologies (discussed further below) could both appeal to customers. However, the extreme secrecy surrounding this aspect of North Korea’s programme would make the practicalities of marketing and sharing this technology difficult and risky for North Korea, as the interdiction of shipments could provide significant insights into Pyongyang’s programme. Development of more advanced centrifuges could also create surpluses of older machines and spare parts – items that Khan’s network tried to provide to Iran and Libya, with mixed success.
+
+_Intangible Nuclear Transfers_
+
+Beyond the transfer of tangible enrichment or reprocessing technologies, North Korea may seek to capitalise on the export of intangibles – that is, expertise, skills and design information relevant to nuclear weapons development. Such an offering could certainly be useful for states looking to develop aspects of a nuclear fuel cycle or move towards a nuclear weapons capability. Transfer of intangibles could accompany tangible transfers, as was the case in Syria when North Korea deployed experts and transferred technology to construct the Al-Kibar reactor. It could also involve North Korea aiding other states in solving specific technical challenges, such as North Korean technicians’ support to Pakistan in producing krytrons in the 1990s (see Box 2).
+
+The value of the different aspects of North Korea’s nuclear knowledge will ultimately be decided by Pyongyang’s prospective customers/partners, but the most useful and unique offering is likely to be North Korea’s tacit knowledge – the things that cannot easily be codified and transferred, and only learned by doing. This could include the experience of producing fissile materials through reactor operation and reprocessing, running an enrichment plant, or experience related to nuclear weapons design, testing and weaponisation (an even rarer area of expertise outside the nuclear weapons states). This sphere of knowledge might be of particular interest to Iran, a state that has mastered enrichment technology and may have an interest in pursuing a weapons capability in the future.
+
+#### Dual-Use Technologies
+
+Given that the level of monitoring of North Korea’s borders has risen, and the transfer of full missile systems or other large missile and nuclear-related technology has thus become riskier, North Korea is likely to look to export more innocuous dual-use technologies and materials – those that have both civilian and military applications. While North Korea likely relies on imports for a large proportion of the higher-end items for its WMD and military programmes (the so-called “chokepoint” technologies), as its programme has advanced, Pyongyang has undoubtedly indigenised the production of some dual-use components and materials, and may look to capitalise on these production abilities and any surpluses through onward sales. It may also look to act as a broker, leveraging its procurement networks around the world to source dual-use goods for customers, either for use directly by the customer or by North Korean technicians assisting in missile- and nuclear-related manufacturing and development projects.
+
+While the transfer of dual-use items from North Korea would still violate UN sanctions, such transfers would be more inconspicuous than the movement of large missile and nuclear technologies. North Korean-manufactured goods could be laundered within the extensive legitimate global trade in dual-use technologies and would, if uncovered, be less politically contentious than full systems. Russian or Chinese markets provide extensive laundering opportunities which could be capitalised on with minimal risk, as Moscow and Beijing have historically turned a blind eye to North Korean sanctions violations. Online platforms – such as the Chinese B2B site used to market North Korean lithium-6 in 2016 (see Box 2) – could provide opportunities for the anonymous sale of technology, obfuscating obvious links to North Korea.
+
+There is precedent for North Korean transfers of dual-use goods to countries that had previously purchased North Korean missile technology. For example, PoE reports note the interdiction in 2010 of a shipment of aluminium alloy rods, copper bars and brass discs to Syria, with the products likely originating in North Korea. A shipment of North Korean-origin graphite cylinders was also interdicted in 2013 en route to Syria. North Korea has also previously marketed its dual-use machine tools overseas. In 2013, the UN listed Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation – North Korea’s main machine tool producer – for its involvement in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes. As researchers noted in 2014, the company attended a trade fair in Dandong, China in 2013 and marketed machine tools in China and Russia under the names of “Millim Technology Company” and “Koryo Technologies” (or “KORTEC”), respectively.
+
+
+### II. Evolving Factors Influencing Supply and Demand
+
+While technological developments in North Korea’s missile and nuclear programmes help dictate what may be available for sale, a range of political, economic and security factors also play an important role in influencing both demand for – and North Korean willingness to supply – these technologies. This chapter explores in more detail what is likely to motivate and restrict both North Korea and its potential customers when it comes to engaging in missile and nuclear technology transfers. While the need to generate revenue remains a strong motivator for Pyongyang, demand for its wares has been progressively waning. This decline is the result of several factors, namely, changing technological needs and greater supplier choice among Pyongyang’s customers, as well as concerns over the quality of North Korean goods and the risk of interdiction. The chapter also maps out the changing sanctions context, and how Russia’s arms purchases from North Korea could undermine the sanctions regime and risk a resurgence of North Korea’s arms and missile export enterprise.
+
+#### Continued Need for Revenue Generation
+
+As in the past, revenue generation remains a key incentive for North Korean missile technology transfers. North Korea’s economic troubles long predate the UN sanctions regime, with the country repeatedly defaulting on debt repayments from the 1970s onwards. The imposition from 2006 of increasingly expansive UNSC sanctions on the country’s economy exacerbated existing economic challenges, while more recent sectoral sanctions introduced in 2016 and 2017, and the border closures stemming from the Covid-19 pandemic, have put North Korea in an especially precarious economic situation. States are prohibited from virtually all economic engagement with the country, leaving it cash-strapped and desperate to seek out and exploit economic opportunities.
+
+Precisely how much revenue North Korea has generated, or may be able to generate, through the sale of missiles or nuclear technology is challenging to ascertain. Public reporting on individual North Korean missile and nuclear transfers is extremely limited and very rarely includes data on the value of transactions. Furthermore, reported figures may not include estimates for the transfer of expertise, manufacturing facilities, or maintenance and support services. Some of the available figures unsurprisingly suggest that military transfers offer North Korea lucrative opportunities for revenue generation, with estimates – which are based on sources that are either unclear, dated and/or difficult to verify – citing figures in the hundreds of millions of US dollars.
+
+Some examples provide insights into the revenue raised from individual transfers,transactions or weapons systems. While comparing the prices offered for ballistic missile systems is extremely challenging, a review of the prices of North Korean conventional weapons offerings supports the hypothesis that North Korean systems are generally cheaper than the alternatives. The prices offered in the 2020 documentary The Mole, and to British arms dealer Michael Ranger in a deal around a decade ago, suggest that North Korean arms are often offered at a price below the market rate of equivalent systems. This has historically made North Korean arms appealing to customers, particularly in the developing world.
+
+The Mole saw marketing materials – including a price list for North Korean weapons systems – handed to an actor playing the role of an investor during a 2017 trip to Pyongyang. The price list included a cost breakdown for missiles with different types of warheads, launchers and associated handling vehicles. Missiles and vehicles were priced per unit and in quantities of five, three or two units. For example, Scud C missiles with high explosive warheads were offered for $2.795 million per unit, but sold in lots of five for $13.975 million, whereas Nodong missiles (termed Scud E for extended range) were offered for $4.94 million per unit and $24.7 million for five. While they are impossible to verify, such values are not outlandish compared to figures seen elsewhere. Sale of components and parts can also be lucrative: the PoE noted in 2015 and 2016 that a KOMID official based in Syria (with the rank of major general) shipped ball bearings and fibre optic cables, and brought in three North Korean technicians, earning over €100,000.
+
+North Korea could potentially leverage more sensitive nuclear transfers for extensive profits far above the market rate, especially in situations where the customer has no alternatives. Illicit procurement networks often see intermediaries monetise the risk by charging a premium, and North Korea could do this through selling goods it has either produced or procured, as part of a package for customers. Analysis of the cost of the UF 6 sold to Libya through the Khan network in the early 2000s suggests that the three cylinders of 1.7 tonnes were sold for $2 million, the equivalent of 40 times the then market rate. Similarly, transfer of North Korea’s more advanced missile systems (or, more likely, related technology) such as its IRBM, ICBM or newer hypersonic technologies may offer particularly lucrative opportunities for revenue generation. However, as mentioned, Pyongyang may be reluctant to transfer some of these higher-end technologies to avoid betraying the details of its advanced systems and production capabilities to adversaries.
+
+Despite the high risk, larger projects such as the construction of facilities could also garner significant sums. While of unclear veracity, media reporting from 2009 citing an Iranian defector and Israeli intelligence claimed that Iran financed Syria’s purchase of the Al-Kibar reactor from North Korea, paying Pyongyang between $1 billion and $2 billion for the project. The Khan network – and especially Khan’s Libya deal – saw the transfer of a 10,000-centrifuge plant for between $100 million and $200 million.
+
+North Korean arms sales have also been heavily shaped by the financial incentives of North Korean arms trading company representatives – essentially, the salespeople – working overseas. These representatives are often accredited as diplomats, work out of embassies, and are entrepreneurial in building relationships and exploiting opportunities. Indeed, they are compelled to be entrepreneurial: North Korea’s overseas missions, including embassies, are believed to be self-funding, tasked with raising funds to sustain themselves and the regime back in Pyongyang. While the financial driver at this working level may manifest itself through arms sales, decisions to sell missiles and nuclear technology are likely far more sensitive, and almost certainly are taken in Pyongyang. Nevertheless, North Korean operatives abroad are likely to be under pressure to identify revenue-generating opportunities to decision-makers in Pyongyang, which may include potential deals for the transfer of missile or even nuclear technology.
+
+There is also potential for North Korea to engage in barter trade as it has in the past, exchanging missile and nuclear technology, expertise and materials for other goods. Experts interviewed for this paper pointed to oil, grains and fertiliser as goods that North Korea may be especially interested in procuring in a barter arrangement. In the 2000s, the Myanmar government “gifted” rice to North Korea in exchange for “technical services and equipment”, which reportedly included conventional weapons. Recent reports have suggested that Moscow may offer Pyongyang food in exchange for munitions. Such barter arrangements allow North Korea to receive payment without needing to access the international financial system, while also accessing goods it is prohibited from (or may struggle in) procuring freely as a result of sanctions.
+
+Transfers of the full missile and nuclear systems that are likely to prove most lucrative to North Korea have become riskier and more challenging due to increased global awareness of UNSC sanctions on North Korea, improved interdiction capabilities and expanded open source scrutiny of the country’s trade activities. This led some of the experts interviewed to ask whether Pyongyang would continue to pursue missile and nuclear transfers, or shift to less risky and easier to move commodities for revenue generation. North Korea’s increasing exploitation of cryptocurrency is one example of an alternative yet highly lucrative revenue-generation line, with cryptocurrency hacks allegedly generating $1.7 billion for North Korea in 2022.
+
+Sales of more innocuous but still sanctioned goods and services – such as textiles or the export of construction labour and IT services – are also less risky sources of revenue. For instance, coal has historically been a major source of revenue for North Korea and has been directly linked to the financing of the country’s missile and nuclear programmes, although it may be seen by the broader international community as being less politically sensitive than trade in missile, nuclear or other military technology. However, North Korea’s desperate economic situation may mean that it does not have the luxury of choosing between revenue streams, and may instead require it to pursue all means available to raise funds.
+
+#### Opportunities for Technology Barter
+
+One form of barter trade which may be particularly attractive to North Korea is the exchange of its missile- or nuclear-related expertise and capabilities for that of other states, or engagement in collaborative missile and nuclear technology development. As mentioned earlier, striking deals which benefit North Korea technologically has long been at the core of the country’s proliferation deal-making. As Pollack has noted in his work on North Korea’s nuclear trade:
+
+> While the evidence is ambiguous, a careful examination suggests that many past transfers were actually done not for profit but in exchange for components or materials that benefited Pyongyang’s own nuclear program.
+
+Of the three nuclear cases that Pollack examines (see the first three listed in Box 2), he noted that each potentially had a barter aspect to them. However, evidence is admittedly thin in places. For example, assisting Pakistan’s krytron development came after the transfer of centrifuge components, drawings and plans to North Korea; transfers of UF6 into the Khan network may have been repayment for Khan’s assistance to North Korea in producing it; and North Korea could potentially have benefited from plutonium produced in the Al-Kibar reactor.
+
+As Pyongyang continues to develop its missile and nuclear programmes, exchanging complementary expertise or working on new advances in collaboration with partners will remain an attractive option, albeit one that likely has less necessity and more limited returns than in the past, given North Korea’s own recent technological successes in its nuclear and missile programmes. Priority areas for North Korea’s missile development – and for potential collaboration opportunities – are likely to include items outlined in the five-year plan for the development of defence science and weapons systems adopted at the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in January 2021. These include improvements in missile accuracy up to a range of 15,000 km, improvements in solid fuel propulsion for submarine-launched and ground-based ICBMs, military reconnaissance satellites, and R&D in hypersonic glide vehicles, nuclear-powered submarines and UAVs.
+
+Given North Korea’s technological successes and the sanctions regime, there is now a smaller range of countries that could both offer technology the country could benefit from and, importantly, be willing to offer such technology in exchange for North Korean wares. An obvious candidate would be Iran, as it has made great leaps in its centrifuge and missile programmes over the past decade. One expert interviewed for the project also suggested that there may be room for cooperation between Iran and North Korea on hypersonic glide vehicles. Russia could be another candidate. Further North Korean arms transfers to Russia (potentially including ballistic missiles) could allow North Korea to request technology from Russia’s extensive WMD and other high-technology programmes – such as its space launch or submarine programmes – in return. Moscow’s willingness to provide such technologies, given its historical commitments to non-proliferation and its potential security concerns vis-à-vis a North Korea with more advanced missile and nuclear capabilities, are not a given, but recent engagement seems to suggest a potential willingness to cooperate (see Box 3).
+
+> #### `Box 3: War in Ukraine and the Growing North Korea–Russia Technology Transfer Axis`
+
+_`Recent developments in North Korea’s relationship with Russia are concerning for the future of both non-proliferation efforts and the UN sanctions regime. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created a need for weaponry and materiel, as well as renewed efforts by an increasingly isolated Moscow to garner political support from a smaller range of allies and partners. Initial arms transfers of “infantry rockets and missiles” were allegedly made between North Korea and the Wagner Group in November 2022. More recently, research has suggested that hundreds of containers of weaponry – likely ammunition – have been transferred from North Korea to Russian military bases, while South Korean intelligence reported indications of North Korean ballistic missile transfers to Russia in early November 2023.`_
+
+_`The potential for exchange of more advanced and strategically important technology is clear. In July 2023, Russian Defence Minister Shoigu was shown around an arms fair in Pyongyang by Kim Jong-un, where he viewed ICBMs, SRBMs, hypersonic missiles and UAVs. During Kim’s trip to Russia to meet Putin in September 2023, the Russian leader hosted his North Korean counterpart at Russia’s Vostochny Cosmodrome and noted North Korea’s interest in rocket and space technology. Media reports surrounding the meeting also suggested North Korea was interested in “advanced technology for satellites and nuclear-powered submarines”. Further details are yet to emerge. However, advances in missile technologies – including items identified in Pyongyang’s 2021 plan for the development of defence science and weapons systems – are also likely to be on North Korea’s wishlist for Moscow.`_
+
+_`With these breaches of the arms embargo and possible movement towards breaches on the prohibition on transfers of other technologies, the future of the UN sanctions regime – which in some senses has been on life support for several years – is precarious. In September 2023, around the time of Kim’s visit, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov noted that sanctions were “adopted in a completely different geopolitical situation” and accused Western states of “lies” over humanitarian support. If Russia, a UNSC permanent member, so blatantly violates sanctions and is seen to use North Korean arms or missile systems in Ukraine, it may lead other states to look to North Korea for arms, and could potentially open the floodgates for further North Korean arms and missile sales.`_
+
+#### Ideological and Foreign Policy Considerations
+
+In the past, North Korea’s sales opportunities have been influenced – in part – by its broader foreign policy relationships and objectives, and vice versa. Pyongyang’s arms exports began during the Cold War, expanding significantly through the 1970s and 1980s, as North Korea built its military–industrial complex. Through its Cold War military sales, the country sought to demonstrate its commitment to the socialist cause, strengthen the capabilities of fellow members of the socialist bloc, and gain favour with Moscow and Beijing. Even during the Cold War, however, ideology was not the sole driver of North Korea’s military transfers, with the export of military technology and expertise being part of its broader efforts to consolidate relationships with developing countries around the world and compete with Seoul for influence.
+
+Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea has continued to do business and conclude cooperation agreements in a range of fields with a variety of countries, with no indication of any discrimination on ideological grounds or links to any known direct North Korean security interests. Unlike Iran, which has been known to transfer missiles to its proxies across the Middle East, North Korea does not have similar relationships with proxies on whom it might rely to achieve certain security objectives, and thus be incentivised to transfer capabilities to.
+
+Recent geopolitical developments may create greater opportunities for North Korea to strengthen political ties through technology transfer. Russian arms purchases from, and growing engagement with, North Korea creates political benefits for Pyongyang. While new UN sanctions resolutions have been an unlikely prospect in recent years, with no agreement even on new entities to be added to the UN sanctions list, the relationship with Russia helps to bring North Korea out of its sanctions isolation. The apparent degradation of the international sanctions regime could also see a resurgence in what Berger describes as “reluctant” customers, as well as “ad hoc” ones. This could make other potential customers view relationships with North Korea involving arms transfers as acceptable, and could even give North Korea new opportunities to pursue such relationships alongside (and in support of) Russian activities in Africa, for example.
+
+In short, these recent developments mean that North Korea has more to play for in pursuing its international relationships and in using technology to that end. However, there is no indication that ideological sympathies or diplomatic priorities are going to be the only or even the primary driver of North Korean sales of military technology abroad – including missile and nuclear technology. Rather, these considerations will serve as a facilitator for, and an additional benefit from, Pyongyang’s illicit trade, which will still likely be driven by opportunism and the need for revenue generation.
+
+#### Sanctions, Transfer Environment and Risks of Interdiction
+
+The risk of interdiction, sanctions and other punitive measures is a major disincentivising factor for most countries when it comes to engaging in missile, nuclear and most other trade with North Korea. As such, North Korea’s biggest customers for arms and missile technologies today largely fall within what Berger describes as the “resilient” group. These are customers that continue to engage in business with Pyongyang despite UNSC sanctions, driven by longstanding political and military ties or else similarly under international arms embargoes or otherwise isolated. Iran, Syria and potentially Myanmar (see Box 4) clearly fit this profile, as countries that have little to lose politically by engaging with North Korea, have historical ties with Pyongyang (including in the sphere of military cooperation), and which are themselves isolated and limited in their weapons procurement options. The benefit (or necessity) of doing business with North Korea outweighs the risk of further sanctions or other reprimands for these countries from the US, the UN or others, as their economies are already subject to sanctions. However, the actual demand for North Korean longer-range missile and/or nuclear technology from these countries is likely to be tempered by some of the other factors outlined in this paper – including absence of need for these more strategic technologies, perceived unreliability of North Korea as a supplier, and the availability of similar options from other isolated suppliers.
+
+> #### `Box 4: Myanmar: A Relationship Renewed?`
+
+_`Myanmar is believed to have previously purchased ballistic missile technology from North Korea alongside a more extensive variety of other conventional weapons technology. However, the specifics of the transfers are opaque. In 2012, the US government noted that Myanmar had been a customer of North Korea’s missile programme, while a leaked Myanmar government report suggested that Burmese military representatives had visited a missile factory in North Korea capable of producing Scuds and likely Nodong missiles in 2008, alongside a range of other facilities in the country. A more recent, unconfirmed report notes that 20 North Korean missile technicians were in Myanmar until 2015, and – citing independent researchers based in the country – that missile cooperation has restarted between the two countries in the wake of the 2021 military coup.`_
+
+_`Myanmar’s military regime has also been accused of nuclear weapons aspirations in the past, notably around 2010, centred around allegations by a defector who worked in Myanmar’s strategic industries – but these were largely discounted. Experts interviewed for this paper expressed scepticism that Myanmar would be interested in a nuclear weapons capability, noting the country’s pressing economic and internal security challenges. Past reports that Myanmar was interested in building a nuclear weapon have also been rejected by members of the US intelligence community and other experts. The fact that the Myanmar military’s primary concern is domestic armed insurgency also raises questions over the utility of procuring advanced missile capabilities or nuclear weapons technology from North Korea, although such capabilities could help the regime feel more secure against external invasion.`_
+
+Moving large physical shipments to and from North Korea covertly (see Box 5) has become markedly more difficult amid an improved understanding of common sanctions-evasion practices, and in light of the ability of governments and non-governmental organisations over the past decade to scrutinise North Korea’s airports, ports and border crossings using satellite imagery, trade and corporate data, and other investigative resources. The border closures caused by the Covid-19 pandemic (see Box 6) and resultant reductions in trade have also made recent movements of goods easier to detect. Increased monitoring and the potential for interdiction has therefore raised the risks of undertaking transfers of missile and nuclear goods, as well as deploying North Korean technicians, from North Korea itself. In contexts where interdiction was not possible previously, ships believed to be carrying suspicious cargo for Pyongyang have been pursued by naval vessels and forced to return to North Korea.
+
+> #### `Box 5: Evolving Means of Transfer`
+
+_`Historically, transfers of North Korean missiles were undertaken by state-connected air freight and shipping fleets. In large part, a shift away from the more obvious state-connected modes of transport towards commercial shipping has been observed since the mid-2000s. A 2021 PoE report, however, notes that state-owned shipping companies have continued to play a role. According to one unnamed UN member state, KOMID – which has been called North Korea’s “primary arms dealer” and main exporter of missile technology – has reportedly cooperated with Iran’s SHIG on shipment logistics, engaging in “shipments to Iran, using vessels belonging to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and routinely operating non-stop voyages from one third country ports to Iran”.`_
+
+_`Geography also determines the easiest shipment routes, with rail connections across the border between North Korea and Russia allegedly being used to move weapons to the Wagner Group in November 2022. Russia and China’s evolving stance on North Korean sanctions could make North Korea’s land borders important vectors for proliferation-sensitive exports. However, more recent arms transfers between North Korea and Russia seem to have involved initial shipments from the former to a Russian submarine base using Russian-flagged and military-connected cargo ships running a “shuttle” service with their automatic identification system (AIS) transponders turned off to avoid detection.`_
+
+_`The challenging logistical environment will likely see North Korean proliferation networks continue to adapt. Pyongyang may seek to fulfil more of its contracts entirely outside its borders, establishing manufacturing facilities in client states – as it previously had in Namibia to produce conventional weapons, for example – or in third countries, and relying increasingly on the extensive procurement networks it has established, notably in China but also around the world, to source the necessary components and materials. There may also be fewer interdiction risks if North Korean exports continue to shift towards projects that combine tangible and intangible support. In these arrangements – as seen in missile relationships with Iran and Syria, and the Al-Kibar reactor project – North Korean operatives can procure goods for projects largely outside of North Korea, and exports from North Korea can be limited to specific goods and technicians.`_
+
+The constraint that the sanctions environment is currently imposing on North Korea is contingent to a significant degree on Russia and China’s future actions, with the evolution of North Korea’s growing relationship with Russia being pivotal. However, several interviewed experts noted that China’s willingness to turn a blind eye to North Korea’s onward missile and nuclear proliferation is not likely to be unlimited, especially in cases where developments affect China’s national security interests. Beijing is a signatory to a range of non-proliferation agreements and has its own security interests that may be undermined by North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear weapons technology transfers. For example, China’s clear interest in avoiding instability on the Korean peninsula, and particularly any proliferation actions by North Korea that might elicit a response from the US and its allies, could potentially lead Beijing to exert pressure on Pyongyang to prevent it from engaging in such transfers. However, the degree of influence that Beijing has over Pyongyang’s onward proliferation decision-making calculus is likely limited. Some analysts have argued that China’s interest in maintaining stability in Pyongyang actually makes Beijing reticent about applying political or economic pressure, unless the risks of inaction outweigh the costs (for example, in the instance of potential North Korean nuclear warhead or fissile material transfers). Ultimately, the degree of direct coordination between Beijing and Pyongyang on sensitive matters such as missile and nuclear transfers – which would likely take place at the highest levels – is very difficult to ascertain.
+
+> #### `Box 6: The Covid-19 Pandemic`
+
+_`North Korea shut its borders to all passenger and commercial traffic at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic. Satellite imagery in March 2020 showed North Korean ships being recalled to the country’s ports, while land crossings with China and Russia were closed and border fences, guard posts and patrol roads were reinforced and expanded. North Korea also stopped the rotation of diplomats from its missions abroad – as it likely also did with its missile and arms technicians and procurement operatives based overseas. The country, relatively isolated in normal times, closed itself off almost entirely from the rest of the world. In the second half of 2023, though, there were signs that the borders were starting to open up again. Movement through ports and land crossings increased, restrictions on some official travel eased in spring, and North Korean nationals abroad (including some workers) were allowed to return as of August 2023, with limited commercial flights restarting that same month.`_
+
+_`It is difficult to definitively assess the impact of these restrictions on North Korea’s procurement efforts and the onward transfer of missile and nuclear technology from the country. It is reasonable to assume that transfers slowed significantly between early 2020 and 2023. Several experts interviewed for this paper pointed to the pandemic restrictions as a reason why they were sceptical that North Korea was actively exporting missile and nuclear technology. However, North Korean technicians based overseas were also likely stuck abroad in customer states and unable to return home. As the country begins to open its borders and resume trade, missile and nuclear technology transfers may become more likely – particularly given recent North Korean efforts to exhibit its wares, and amid the further disintegration of the UN sanctions consensus. The restrictions on trade and travel since 2020 have also further exacerbated the economic situation within North Korea, creating further pressure to generate revenue or source critical supplies like food from abroad, which may further incentivise the sale of missile and/or nuclear technology.`_
+
+#### Security Concerns Over Advanced Deterrent Capabilities
+
+Security concerns, paired with the challenging transfer environment, will likely make North Korea carefully consider the transfer of certain particularly strategically important systems and technologies. These sensitivities are likely to stem from the risk that transferred technologies or information surrounding them may fall into enemy hands, with negative impacts for North Korea’s own nuclear deterrent. For example, North Korea’s adversaries could gain valuable information about North Korean capabilities from seized shipments of nuclear or missile technologies, related goods and materials, or even wreckage recovered from the battlefield. Intelligence can be derived from seized technologies, providing insights into manufacturing, supply chains and capabilities.
+
+Examination of interdicted missiles, or wreckage recovered after their use, may yield insights into North Korea’s manufacturing capabilities or the specific types of technology that it is importing to develop its programmes. This could allow North Korea’s adversaries to better counter the country’s illicit supply chains. Nuclear forensic techniques could provide insights into North Korea’s fuel cycle if North Korean fissile material or contaminated goods were seized in transit. Intelligence gained through examination of seized or recovered goods can also be used to construct countermeasures. This is a particular concern with regard to more modern ballistic missiles that might yield insights to inform developments in missile defence capabilities and arrangements by the US or its partners such as South Korea and Japan. The transfer of certain newer systems unique to North Korea would also reduce the prospect of potential plausible deniability of Pyongyang’s involvement in the transfer.
+
+If North Korea is concerned about undermining its own security through transfers, this would lead to the development of two categories of systems. The first includes items that are core to North Korea’s security, and which would not be transferred: interviewees referred to these as the “crown jewels” or “top state secrets core to North Korea’s survivability”. This would include nuclear warheads and fissile material – which would be unlikely to be transferred for several reasons – as well as ICBMs and other missiles core to North Korea’s deterrent. The second category would include lower-level and older technology, which North Korea would be less concerned about transferring.
+
+Chapter I explored some of the surplus technologies that may fall into this second category and discussed several reasons why North Korea may not be willing to transfer all of its older systems. A few further considerations may also follow from this security thesis. Reluctance to export newer systems and reveal information could lead to the development of export variants for the new SRBMs. However, this would require significant upfront investment from Pyongyang or its customers, which would be challenging in an environment with limited cash flow – which is exactly the situation in which North Korea and many of its historical and potential customers find themselves. It is also possible that if the design information of certain systems is compromised (for example, after wreckage is recovered after a test, or following a hack of the manufacturers), the security rationales against wider transfer for that particular system may be undermined, if concerns about the compromise of strategically important information on certain North Korean capabilities is indeed a consideration.
+
+#### Changing Technologies and Markets
+
+Technological developments may also restrict demand for North Korea’s missile offerings. Chapter I outlined the remaining (but shrinking) market for the Scud-and Tochka-like technologies that North Korea may have in surplus. Indeed, due to its extensive history of Scud exports and – in some cases – related manufacturing capabilities, North Korea may have reduced its appeal as a supplier to some customers that managed to absorb the technology. However, in the present day, North Korea’s missile sales also have to compete with newer technologies and suppliers.
+
+For instance, militaries’ growing demand for UAVs is well documented. UAVs may be seen as a less expensive and more operationally appropriate system by some countries that would have previously sought short-range missiles. While UAV and SRBM capabilities differ significantly, including in their utility, the former may be well-suited – if not more desirable – for states without an active missile programme and in need of low-yield but high-precision capabilities to carry out limited and precise attacks in neighbouring countries or against factions on their own territories. UAVs are cheaper, more versatile, and easier to produce and transfer than ballistic missiles.
+
+North Korea has shown some advances in its UAV programme, with drones penetrating South Korean airspace in recent years, and two large novel UAV systems shown to Shoigu in Pyongyang in July 2023. However, Iran’s capabilities for producing and exporting these systems are more advanced: Iran has well-established UAV capabilities and has exported drones to partners in the region and further afield. Critically, Iranian UAVs have now been extensively battle-tested – not only by Iranian proxies in the Middle East but also on a large scale by Russian forces in Ukraine. As such, past customers of North Korean SRBMs may now look to Iran as a UAV supplier instead. As Pollack noted, the 1991 Gulf War helped to shape missile markets, reducing interest in North Korean products as cruise missiles played a prominent role. Russia’s war on Ukraine could also affect potential North Korean missile markets, although extensive UAV and missile use makes it difficult to establish possible lessons at this stage.
+
+Iran is also an established proliferator of missile technology, having exported missiles to proxies and partners in the Middle East. With the expiry of the UNSC embargo on nuclear-capable missiles and related technology trade with Iran in October 2023, Iran may seek to expand its customer base and thus pose competition for North Korea in securing new customers for its missile technology (although such trade with Iran is still sanctioned by the US, Europe and others).
+
+#### Claims to Nuclear Responsibility
+
+A final restraining factor – albeit one with unclear salience – consists of the non-proliferation norms that emerged after 1945, and North Korea’s notion of nuclear responsibility. The UN sanctions regime imposed on North Korea was, in some sense, an embodiment of these norms. Since acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, North Korea has repeatedly referred to itself as a “responsible nuclear power”, including in the context of onward nuclear proliferation. These are likely efforts by Pyongyang to normalise itself as a legitimate nuclear power outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – akin to the status enjoyed by Pakistan and India.
+
+In an October 2006 statement, just days after North Korea’s first nuclear test and the subsequent UNSC resolution condemning it, North Korea’s foreign minister referred to the country as a “responsible nuclear weapons state [that] will never use nukes first and will not allow nuclear transfer”. These claims have most recently been codified in the September 2022 Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces (Section 10):
+
+> The DPRK, as a responsible nuclear weapons state, shall neither deploy nuclear weapons in the territory of other countries nor share them and not transfer nuclear weapons, technology and equipment concerned and weapon-grade nuclear substances.
+
+Of course, the earnestness of these claims is unclear. By virtue of developing a nuclear weapons programme outside the recognised international non-proliferation framework – namely, the NPT – North Korea has already demonstrated its disregard for nuclear non-proliferation norms. Several experts interviewed for this paper also noted that North Korea has not offered any definition of what it means by “responsibility” in the nuclear non-proliferation context. However, the excerpt from the 2022 law could arguably be taken as a definition of what Pyongyang considers to be “responsible” behaviour by a nuclear power. Whether Pyongyang’s commitments can be taken at face value is debatable, but its past proliferation of nuclear technology after the 2006 statement should raise serious doubts. There is less of an international consensus regarding missile non-proliferation. North Korea has tended to deny allegations rather than make claims about responsibility when it comes to the transfer of missile systems.
+
+
+### Conclusion and Recommendations
+
+With a growing technological offering and a persistent need to generate hard currency, North Korea still has significant incentives to sell its missile, nuclear and dual-use technologies to foreign customers. It now has a wider range of more advanced missile and nuclear technologies than ever before, some of which may be available for sale to interested buyers. Pyongyang’s technological progress may also have created surpluses available for transfer, particularly Scud, Tochka and Nodong missiles, or even surplus or second-hand nuclear and dual-use technologies.
+
+Despite these clear supply-side drivers, though, a range of factors work to constrain North Korea’s sales – particularly on the demand side of the equation – and these are likely to prevent an all-out onward-proliferation bonanza. The potential markets and customers for North Korean missile technology have been whittled down by a variety of factors, including North Korea’s assistance to customers in indigenising the technology it has sold, the emergence of competitors such as Iran, and the development of newer and more appealing technologies – namely, UAVs, but potentially also other suppliers and systems in future. The sanctions landscape and the unprecedented monitoring of the Korean peninsula also reduce sales opportunities and increase the risks of interdiction. Given Pyongyang’s recent technological advances, there may also now be only marginal returns on North Korean efforts to obtain technology for its own programmes through barter.
+
+Concerns about putting its own deterrent at risk are also likely to temper North Korea’s willingness to export more advanced capabilities, despite the potentially lucrative price tag that could be attached to them. Offering these systems for sale is far riskier than peddling the Scud or even the Nodong systems that were based on well-understood and frugal 1960s Soviet missile technology. Insights gained from interdicted systems or those recovered from the battlefield after leaving North Korean control could do harm to North Korea’s national security. The export of such systems would increase the chances of them falling into adversaries’ hands, despite minimal recent large interdictions of North Korean military shipments.
+
+In a continuation of some of the trends observed by Joshua Pollack in his work over a decade ago, the limited potential customer base, as well as a more challenging transfer environment, suggests that North Korea is most likely to continue engaging with established missile customers – those that Andrea Berger termed “resilient”, such as Iran or Syria. Future transfers are likely to involve dual-use components or intangible transfers of expertise rather than complete systems – because of limited demand and due to the greater chances of the latter being interdicted. North Korea’s extensive procurement networks outside its borders may also allow it to procure technology from third countries to transfer to customers, meaning that fewer direct shipments would be required. The ubiquity of largely anonymous online platforms may also help to identify potential customers and facilitate the sale of dual-use technology, despite the extensive international sanctions regime.
+
+At the same time, the changing geopolitical landscape resulting from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine may bring new opportunities for North Korea. On the one hand, Pyongyang may benefit financially and technologically from technological exchanges with Russia. On the other, Russia’s willingness to engage in military trade with North Korea and Moscow’s ability to veto further UNSC sanctions against Pyongyang or any of its future customers may give other countries the green light to accept North Korean missile and maybe even nuclear technology. The cover provided by Russia’s – and, to a less public extent, China’s – patronship of Pyongyang could lead to a significant change in North Korea’s fortunes as a supplier. Although only time will tell how the relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow develops, there remains a real risk of a broader collapse of the UN sanctions regime and the resurgence of North Korea’s arms and missile export enterprise.
+
+Building on the above analysis – and the clear need to pay attention to the issue – this paper presents 10 recommendations, organised into two sets, to help in countering North Korean missile and nuclear technology proliferation. The first set concerns efforts to deter and dissuade Pyongyang from engaging in onward proliferation – that is, they address the supply side of the equation. The second set addresses the demand side, suggesting ways to reduce North Korea’s customer base. The recommendations call for an approach that relies both on diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang and on harder measures that signal a willingness to disrupt and punish violations of sanctions and international non-proliferation norms.
+
+#### Recommendations for Addressing Supply-Side Factors
+
+__Recommendation 1: Clearly message and demonstrate commitments to interdict, learn from and exploit North Korean missile and nuclear transfers.__ A concern that North Korea is likely to have over the transfer of its missile and nuclear technology – particularly more advanced or strategically significant systems – is the potential for that technology to fall into the hands of Pyongyang’s adversaries. This concern should be validated and leveraged. The US, the UK and their partners need to continue prioritising efforts at interdicting North Korean shipments of weapons technology, as per their UNSC obligations – either in transit or at their destination (for instance, in Ukraine, should Russia procure and use North Korean missiles in the future). They must also make clear that the technology will be inspected, shared with North Korea’s adversaries and used to help develop effective countermeasures, including missile defence. Outreach should also continue to be conducted on the relevant UNSC resolutions and through informal networks such as the signatory states to the Proliferation Security Initiative “Statement of Interdiction Principles”.
+
+__Recommendation 2: Bolster intelligence efforts, engage with allies and support open source researchers as force multipliers.__ Further bolstering intelligence collection to target potential North Korean procurement and export networks can help strengthen countermeasures across the board. The US, the UK, and Western and Asia-Pacific allies should ensure that the necessary processes are in place to allow for intelligence-sharing and collaboration in this sphere. They should ensure that new means to monitor potential intangible transfers (especially the movement of people such as technicians and engineers) are developed. This also includes greater exploitation of open source intelligence to further investigate North Korea’s relationships and monitor the internet for potential North Korean marketing of dual-use technologies on B2B websites. The lithium-6 and machine tool examples discussed above, as well as North Korea’s recent arms transfers to Russia, are all export or marketing activities that were uncovered by non-government researchers using open sources. Open source exploitation by non-governmental organisations can be a force multiplier when the intelligence community’s resources are stretched.
+
+__Recommendation 3: Strengthen counter-proliferation-financing efforts to weaken the revenue-generating potential of North Korean missile and nuclear transfers.__ Revenue generation is likely to be North Korea’s key driver for engaging in onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology. Continuing to invest in efforts to prevent Pyongyang from receiving or moving funds can help weaken that incentive. While North Korea may receive some payment by way of barter trade (not involving the formal financial system), targeting financial flows can impact how lucrative Pyongyang believes its proliferation activities to be. This should include continued awareness-raising of international and multilateral sanctions on North Korea, of standards and best practices for countering proliferation financing (CPF), and of common sanctions-evasion methods. National governments and international organisations engaged on CPF issues should prioritise sharing best practices and resources – for instance, model CPF legislation or lists of entities suspected of supporting North Korean proliferation financing (even if these are not sanctioned). While there have so far not been any known cases of North Korea using cryptocurrency as payment for proliferation-related transactions, Pyongyang is clearly transitioning its activities to the online space and has engaged extensively in crypto theft for revenue generation. Ensuring that CPF efforts keep up with these adaptations will be critical.
+
+__Recommendation 4: Include non-proliferation commitments in any nuclear negotiations with North Korea.__ Any future negotiations with North Korea on its nuclear programme should include commitments to international non-proliferation and nuclear security standards. Including an explicit commitment from North Korea to not transfer nuclear technology to other states – particularly with reference to the 2022 law on its policy on nuclear forces and clarifying North Korea’s definition of nuclear “responsibility” – as part of future negotiations could help positively reinforce any existing tendencies in Pyongyang to present itself as a responsible nuclear custodian. Such an approach, however, would require some level of recognition (even if tacit) of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability – a proposition that is the subject of much debate within the expert community.
+
+__Recommendation 5: Engage with China on preventing North Korea’s onward proliferation, including by highlighting implications for Chinese interests and security.__ China has been a key facilitator for North Korean sanctions-evasion activity and likely has at least some, albeit limited, influence on Pyongyang’s decision-making in relation to onward proliferation. Engaging with China on the issue may therefore yield some benefit, especially if Beijing can be convinced to curtail Pyongyang’s access to transhipment routes, as well as financial and corporate infrastructure. To be sure, the likelihood of this approach’s success is dubious, as Chinese interests and security concerns diverge significantly from those of the US, Europe and other East Asian countries concerned with North Korean proliferation. In fact, creating instability in certain parts of East Asia might be in China’s interest if such instability were to absorb US resources and attention. There may be potential to incentivise Chinese cooperation, including through appeals to Beijing’s desire to be seen as a responsible nuclear power, as well as through continued identification and sanctioning of Chinese entities involved in supporting North Korean sanctions evasion. Taking a transactional approach may be another possibility – linking US openness to addressing issues of Chinese concern with Chinese willingness to prevent – or at least not support – North Korean onward proliferation activity. However, the currently limited state of dialogue between the US and China, as well as other issues such as the tension over semiconductor export controls and the issue of Taiwan, will make having an impact in this regard challenging.
+
+#### Recommendations for Addressing Demand-Side Factors
+
+__Recommendation 6: Double down on counter-proliferation messaging and support.__ If indications emerge that North Korea’s onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology is starting to ramp up again, the US and its partners should consider making a clear statement that buyers of North Korean arms, missiles or nuclear technology will be heavily punished with sanctions and other tools. This messaging should, among other things, make clear that states purchasing North Korean technology will be cut off from Western technology across the board, and that they will be made subject to unilateral sanctions and other measures. Messaging should also continue to include the broader implementation of UN sanctions on North Korea. A tailored approach should acknowledge that some states may not perceive engagement with North Korea as problematic – despite international prohibitions to this end – and may actually be sympathetic to supporting the growing camp of anti-Western countries, or may be ambivalent about condemning or countering the behaviour of these anti-Western countries. As such, providing incentives to these countries to comply with their international obligations – whether through appealing to their standing as responsible members of the international community or by offering economic or other support – may be necessary. A combined “carrot and stick” approach is likely to be most effective.
+
+__Recommendation 7: Consider offering alternatives to North Korean missile technology.__ Following Recommendation 6, the US and its partners should consider offering alternative technologies or other incentives to potential customers when possible. Some states that seek to source missile capabilities from North Korea might do so because they lack – or cannot afford – alternative technologies or suppliers. As part of a targeted approach, the US and its allies should consider whether helping such states find alternative missile technology suppliers may be possible, without compounding the global proliferation problem or exacerbating situations of insecurity. Offering alternative sources of nuclear technology is, of course, a lot more problematic. In these instances, interested governments may be able to engage with countries on other strategic issues to identify drivers for the desire to acquire nuclear technology and identify possible solutions to addressing these concerns.
+
+__Recommendation 8: Target demand-side countermeasures to specific customers and prioritise engagement with those that are most likely to be receptive.__ At the same time, the US and its partners should prioritise engagement with countries that are likely to be most receptive to being dissuaded from engaging in trade with Pyongyang, and tailor approaches to individual potential customers. Trying to prevent missile transfers between North Korea and states that have had long-term missile cooperation partnerships with Pyongyang or which are themselves already subject to sanctions – the likes of Iran and Syria – through diplomatic engagement or threats is unlikely to bear fruit. Offering alternative suppliers in these instances is also not an option.
+
+__Recommendation 9: Make North Korea an unreliable supplier and technical partner.__ Countries interested in preventing North Korea’s onward proliferation should commit to efforts to making Pyongyang an untrustworthy supplier and partner for technical collaboration. As mentioned earlier in relation to Iranian reservations about the dependability of North Korean missile systems, sowing such mistrust can help discourage future purchases from – or collaboration with – Pyongyang. This should include increasing efforts to interdict shipments of weapons and materials, and could also include attempts to target North Korea’s procurement networks operating overseas, using some of the established extraterritorial tools targeted at customers’ programmes. Efforts could also be made to try to insert compromised technology into North Korea’s procure-to-supply networks, thus further undermining the credibility and reliability of North Korea as a supplier. Countries that are important suppliers of key technologies that North Korea may need for its missile and nuclear wares – namely, countries in North America, Europe and Asia – can play an important role in efforts to prevent North Korean procurement.
+
+__Recommendation 10: Carefully utilise unilateral counter-proliferation tools.__ While the current political dynamics on the UNSC will likely preclude any further UNSC sanctions against North Korea (or its facilitators or customers) in the foreseeable future, individual governments should continue to sanction North Korean and related entities that facilitate North Korean proliferation, or target them with other unilateral tools. While unilateral sanctions technically create no obligations for compliance by entities outside the relevant country’s jurisdiction, their appearance on sanctions lists will – or at least should – trigger adverse media and other compliance-screening measures at financial institutions or companies proactively seeking to comply with export controls. In the case of the US in particular, the importance of its financial sector and the US dollar to global markets means that many financial institutions around the world screen against US sanctions lists even if they are under no domestic obligation to comply with them. Such designations can also help facilitate open source investigations or the sanctioning of these entities in other jurisdictions. Use of other elements of the unilateral toolset developed and deployed by the US in recent years – which includes civil asset forfeiture as well as other targeted efforts against specific entities overseas – may also be appropriate in certain cases. However, application of these powerful tools should be considered on a case-by-case basis due to the risks of political blowback.
+
+---
+
+__Daniel Salisbury__ is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is currently undertaking a three-year research project on arms embargos as part of a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship.
+
+__Darya Dolzikova__ is a Research Fellow with RUSI’s Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme. Her work focuses on understanding and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including proliferation financing and other illicit trade by actors of proliferation concern. Her research areas include the Iranian nuclear programme and related diplomacy, Iranian and North Korean proliferation-related sanctions evasion, as well as other issues concerning nuclear technology and proliferation.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-18-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-1.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-18-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-1.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第一日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-12-18 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 黎智英爭議串謀發布煽動刊物罪逾時檢控、涉新聞自由應寬鬆詮釋法例
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/N3aORzf.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（18日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）開審。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻，爭議控方前年加控串謀刊印煽動刊物罪時，超出了檢控時限4日，法庭沒有司法管轄權處理；又指本案涉及新聞自由等基本權利，應以較寬鬆的尺度詮釋法例，但對於控方應較嚴謹。至於控方指在檢控期限未屆滿前，曾去信通知法庭「有意」申請新增控罪，辯方則認為直至控方把黎智英帶上法庭加控，才算正式就該罪開始進行檢控。辯方明天將繼續陳詞。
+
+已還柙逾3年的黎智英，今身穿淺藍色恤衫、灰色西裝褸，被4名懲教人員帶進被告欄。黎身形明顯消瘦，但精神不俗，向旁聽席的家屬揮手、點頭，又微笑豎起拇指，天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君亦有站起身向黎揮手。黎於審訊期間戴上耳機輔助聆聽，神情專注，休庭時與女兒多次互相飛吻。
+
+被告為：黎智英（76歲）、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/p65rndW.png)
+▲ 黎智英
+
+黎的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及Marc Corlett。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。
+
+控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處高級警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。
+
+黎智英的太太李韻琴、黎的3名子女，及天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君均坐在家屬席。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/w1eW6Ho.png)
+▲ 黎智英太太 李韻琴（左）、幼子 黎順恩（右）
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/HO15qyg.png)
+▲ 天主教香港教區榮休主教 陳日君
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/FEZLJ8i.jpg)
+▲ 國安處高級警司 李桂華
+
+#### 媒體報導稱黎申請海外證人作供被拒 法官澄清沒有收到相關申請
+
+甫開庭，法官杜麗冰指，有見本地傳媒上周報導稱法庭拒絕被告申請海外證人以視像形式作供，特此澄清《刑事訴訟程序條例》規定，海外證人如要作供，須在案件交付至高院後42日之內提出申請，但本案並無任何人申請海外證人作供，也沒有任何申請要求延長42日期限。代表黎的資深大律師彭耀鴻及代表3間蘋果公司的大律師王國豪在庭上確認。
+
+#### 辯方爭議煽動刊物罪超出檢控時限 法庭無司法管轄權處理
+
+黎智英就控罪答辯之前，其代表資深大律師彭耀鴻先就「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪逾時檢控提出爭議。控方案情指稱黎智英與其他被告於2019年4月1日起，一同串謀發布煽動刊物，該串謀直至2021年6月24日《蘋果日報》停運為止。
+
+彭指，根據《刑事罪行條例》第11條，煽動控罪的檢控「只可於犯罪後6個月內開始進行」；而據《刑事罪行條例》第159D條，對於依據協議而犯下的串謀罪行，若果提出檢控的時限已經屆滿，便不能就該串謀罪行「提出法律程序」。
+
+彭續指，若果由串謀的首天2019年4月1日起計，檢控時限是同年10月1日；若法庭不接納，由最後一天2021年6月24日起計算，控方的檢控時限亦是同年12月24日。然而黎在12月28日的法庭聆訊上才被正式加控「煽動刊物」罪，已逾時4日。
+
+彭指，逾時檢控的問題關乎法庭是否有司法管轄權處理控罪，若果超過檢控時限，法庭便沒有司法管轄權處理「煽動刊物」控罪，且本案涉及新聞自由等基本權利，應以較寬鬆的尺度詮釋法例，但對於控方應較嚴謹。
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/F4o5yub.png)
+▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻（中）、大律師 關文渭（後）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右）
+
+#### 法官質疑串謀屬持續 辯方指不能以此避過檢控時限
+
+法官杜麗冰問及，若果串謀並非一次性，而是持續一系列的串謀呢？彭耀鴻回應，若果串謀罪行只是一次性，檢控時限便須由作出串謀的首天起開始計算。
+
+法官李運騰亦指，本案被告是持續干犯一連串的罪行，若控方分成多項控罪提控，並如辯方所指運用相同的檢控時限，或會出現較早干犯的控罪超出檢控時限、而較遲干犯的控罪則在時限之內檢控的情況；又質疑後來加入串謀者便不能被控。彭耀鴻同意，但強調控方可分開檢控，亦須及時檢控，不能以串謀來繞過檢控時限。
+
+法官李運騰又問及，若被告人不在香港，但在海外導致煽動刊物在香港發布，控方便未能趕在檢控限期內將他帶上法庭提控。彭耀鴻則指，同樣的檢控期限依然適用，被告人依然受到條例所規定的時限保護。
+
+#### 辯方：帶上法庭加控始算開始進行檢控 控方仍違檢控時限
+
+而就控方於2021年12月13日曾去信法庭表示「有意」申請新增煽動刊物罪、黎智英於翌日獲悉，彭耀鴻認為控方當時並未將黎帶上法庭正式加控，至12月28日才正式加控，故即使採納12月24日為檢控期限，仍然超出檢控時限4天。
+
+彭解釋，《刑事罪行條例》第11條列明煽動罪須於6個月內「開始進行（begun）」檢控，是立法時特意選用的字眼，強調直至控方把黎智英帶上法庭加控，才算「開始進行」檢控，而非如控方據《裁判官條例》第26條所指，於12月13日去信表示有意加控，「作出申訴或提出告發（making any complaint or laying any information）」，便可視為已「開始進行」檢控。
+
+根據《裁判官條例》第26條，若罪行無規定作出申訴或提出告發的時效，則「申訴或告發」須於6個月內作出或提出。彭認為，只有很少罪行會訂明檢控時限，若《刑事罪行條例》第11條已為煽動罪訂明檢控時限，則將兩條法例的字眼理解為同一意思，會令《刑事罪行條例》第11條變得完全多餘，故「開始進行」檢控必定指「作出申訴或提出告發」以外的意思。
+
+案件明續審，彭耀鴻將繼續陳詞。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-19-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-2.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-19-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-2.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ec0edb3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-19-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-2.md
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第二日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-12-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 控方指黎智英持續串謀、無逾時檢控 官周五頒判決
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/eOV0D6a.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，踏入審訊第2天。黎智英一方昨爭議控方加控煽動罪屬逾時檢控，法庭無權處理，辯方今補充指，煽動罪設6個月的檢控時限是平衡公眾利益，以盡快制止煽動刊物發布，強調控方應及時檢控。控方則指，串謀屬持續的罪行，被告在案發兩年間持續發布逾160篇煽動刊物，可視為同一犯罪計劃，檢控期限應由串謀結束當天、而非被告首次犯法起計；而控方向法庭表示有意加控已屬「開始」檢控，故控方檢控並無逾時。法官聽畢陳詞後，押至本周五就法律爭議頒下裁決，料控方同日將不會讀出開案陳詞。
+
+身穿淺藍色恤衫、灰色西裝褸的黎智英，今步入法庭時向旁聽席微笑揮手和點頭，其妻子和兩名子女也有到庭，女兒向黎飛吻，黎亦微笑回以飛吻。有旁聽人士高呼「撐住！頂住！」，司法機構職員及保安人員立即阻止稱：「保持安靜！」
+
+辯方昨爭議，控方前年加控黎智英串謀刊印煽動刊物罪時，已超出煽動罪6個月的檢控時限，法庭無司法管轄權審理；亦認為就《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條列明煽動罪檢控「只可於犯罪後6個月內開始進行」，當中「開始（begun）」一詞是立法時特意選用，只有在控方把被告帶上法庭加控才算「開始」進行檢控，而控方於2021年12月13日去信通知法庭有意加控，並不算「開始」檢控，控方仍然超出檢控時限。
+
+#### 辯方：檢控時限為確保盡快制止煽動作為、平衡公眾利益 無對控方不公
+
+代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻今重申，控方單單去信法庭「提出告發（laying any information）」並不算是「開始」檢控，解釋煽動條例立法時確保需保障基本權利，因此設有嚴格的6個月檢控時限，亦列明須律政司司長的同意才能提出檢控。
+
+彭亦認為，檢控時限無對控方造成不公，指當有人發布煽動刊物，為了公眾利益，應盡快檢控來制止刊物發布，並讓公眾知悉哪些刊物不應發布；而若控方認為煽動罪不足以反映刑責，望以串謀罪檢控，亦可於6個月的時限內進行。彭強調，控方應及時檢控，不能什麼也不做，等到數年後才因時限已過、無法以煽動罪檢控，而改用串謀罪檢控；又指檢控時限雖或令一些人逃過法網，但相關「不公」是條文所固有，立法者制定時已平衡公眾利益。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/FtSrYyr.png)
+▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻（中）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右）
+
+代表3間《蘋果日報》相關公司的大律師王國豪，採納彭的陳詞，同意3間公司被帶上法庭加控才算「開始」檢控，並補充3間公司於2022年2月10日才被正式加控串謀發布煽動刊物罪，比黎智英遲兩個月。
+
+#### 控方：被告持續串謀、分開檢控屬「荒謬」
+
+就辯方主張檢控時限應由被告首次完成犯罪、即2019年4月1日發布首篇煽動刊物起計算，副刑事檢控專員周天行回應，串謀是持續的罪行（continuing offence），而本案串謀協議歷時多於兩年，被告並非僅在案發首天發布一篇煽動刊物，而是於2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日《蘋果日報》結束營運期間，持續發布逾160篇煽動刊物，因此檢控時限應由串謀最後一天、即6月24日起計算。而本案所涉行為性質相似、互相關聯，故可被視為同一個犯罪計劃（criminal enterprise）。
+
+周又指，即使只是發布一篇煽動刊物，但若能持續被公眾瀏覽，串謀時期亦應由刊物首次出現至其下架為止；並認為辯方稱應分開檢控每項串謀行為的說法荒謬，直言會令案件變得支離破碎（fragmented），無法反映整體罪行的嚴重性。
+
+#### 控方：法庭收到提控已屬「開始」檢控、若須親帶上庭令控罪難實行
+
+而對辯方爭議將黎智英帶上法庭加控才算「開始」進行檢控，周天行則認為法庭收到有關控罪的告發（laying information），即控方於12月13日去信法庭指有意加控，已算是「開始」檢控，解釋《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條中的「開始」，與《裁判官條例》第26條的「提出告發」，用字不同但意思一樣。
+
+根據《裁判官條例》第26條，無規定時效的罪行須於6個月內「作出申訴或提出告發」。惟法官李運騰指，《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條正規定了煽動罪的檢控時限，因此第26條不適用；又指制訂第11(1)條時，第26條已存在，若兩項條文效果一樣，為何還有需要制訂第11(1)條？又指控方詮釋會令第11(1)條變得多餘。周天行同意兩條法例字眼不一，但認為只是字眼上的改變，實際意思是一樣；並指若須將被告帶上法庭才算「開始」檢控，會令控罪難以實行（impracticable），因被告或潛逃和無法聯絡。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/VBtF4VI.png)
+▲ 副刑事檢控專員 周天行（左）、高級檢控官 陳穎琛（右）
+
+#### 周五頒判決 料不會同日讀出開案陳詞
+
+彭耀鴻回應時重申，《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條比《裁判官條例》第26條較遲制訂，若「開始」檢控等同「提出告發」，則會令《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)條變得毫無用處，故兩者必然有分別。彭亦重申檢控時限應由被告首次犯罪起計。
+
+雙方陳詞完畢，法官杜麗冰表示需時考慮，將於周五（22日）頒下裁決，並認為不會在當天讀出開案陳詞。法官李運騰亦補充，控方開案陳詞或受裁決結果影響，不方便於當天開始讀出。
+
+黎智英於中午1時由俗稱「鐵甲威龍」的囚車送走，警方電單車及私家車護送囚車離開，現場亦有反恐特勤隊警員持槍戒備。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/l9HmHiF.png)
+▲ 黎智英的囚車駛離法院，多名警員戒備。
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/U9vlpr5.png)
+
+#### 記者採訪一度遭司法機構職員阻止 後新聞主任澄清屬誤會
+
+今早西九龍法院外警力較昨日稍微減少，但仍有至少60名警員在場戒備，每輛進入法院的汽車同樣須接受檢查，有部分車主及乘客須下車及打開車尾箱。
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/5rDxVOG.png)
+
+另外，記者欲於法院大樓地下採訪排隊市民時，遭掛上司法機構證件的職員阻止，指今早獲指示該處不得進行採訪。記者追問下，職員稱會邀請「新聞官」向記者解釋，其後3名警民關係科警員到場，向記者指相關安排是法院的「house rule（場地規則）」、是管理的政策，要「尊重返」，又指警方本身無權入法院執法，但被司法機構職員邀請入內。
+
+司法機構新聞主任到場了解後，向記者澄清法院並無相關「house rule」，純粹誤會，又指職員是擔心擾亂秩序，故溝通上「多咗啲」、「誤會咗」，記者可與人聊天採訪，只是不得進行拍攝。
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。黎的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及Marc Corlett。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處總警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/YDgfIpE.png)
+▲ 警方國安處總警司 李桂華
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-22-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-3.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-22-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-3.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d2342907
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-12-22-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-3.md
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第三日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2023-12-22 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 官裁煽動刊物罪非逾時檢控 去信法庭「提出告發」未等黎智英上庭 已屬啟動程序
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/MU9Mlh9.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（22日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第3日審訊。就辯方所提出的串謀煽動刊物罪逾時檢控爭議，3名《國安法》指定法官作出裁決，指法庭在檢控期限屆滿10日之前收到控方通知擬加控罪，所以認為不存在逾時檢控的情況，因此駁回辯方申請，換言之控方就煽動刊物罪的檢控仍然有效。案件押後至明年1月2日續審，屆時黎將庭上答辯，之後控方將讀出開案陳詞。押後期間黎繼續還柙。
+
+76歲的黎智英由3名懲教人員帶往被告欄應訊，近日氣溫降至只有10度或以下，黎亦穿上深藍色厚褸，並戴上灰色頸巾。他透過耳機聽取判決時表現平靜。
+
+#### 黎智英稱煽動刊物控罪逾時檢控：期限應由串謀首天起計、帶上法庭加控才算啟動檢控
+
+黎智英尚未正式就各項控罪答辯，在審訊首天，控辯雙方先處理法律爭議。黎的法律代表、資深大律師彭耀鴻指「串謀刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」罪逾時檢控，法庭無權處理。3名《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰及李素蘭頒下書面裁決，駁回辯方申請。
+
+據判詞，黎智英在2021年12月13日被控3項罪名，包括兩項《國安法》控罪及一項串謀妨礙司法公正罪。控方在同日去信西九法院，表示有意申請新增「煽動刊物」控罪，而西九法院裁判官翌日收悉信件及相關文件，副本亦送達黎的法律代表。至12月28日的提訊日，控方申請加控，而黎的代表律師並未有提出反對。
+
+辯方指檢控期限應由串謀犯罪首日起計算6個月，即2019年10月1日便屆滿；即使辯方接受檢控期限由串謀犯罪的最後一天起計6個月，控方也需要在2021年12月24日或之前提出檢控，可是黎智英在12月28日才被帶上法庭加控，超出了期限4日。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/tNrNm97.png)
+▲ 代表黎智英的資深大律師 彭耀鴻（左）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右）
+
+控方則稱「串謀」屬持續的罪行，被告在2019年4月1日至2021年6月24日《蘋果日報》結束營運期間，持續發布逾160篇煽動刊物，可視為同一犯罪計劃，檢控期限應由「串謀」結束當天、而非被告首次犯法起計。此外，控方稱他們於2021年12月13日向法庭表示有意加控，已屬「開始」檢控，故控方檢控並無逾時。
+
+#### 判決：檢控期限應由最後一日起計算
+
+判決指，不接受辯方稱檢控期限由首天串謀起計，因為控方現時指控黎不只一次串謀犯罪，與一次性的串謀罪行並不相同，所以被告完成首天串謀犯罪之後，串謀協議仍然存在（still be very much alive），直至串謀完結當天，控罪並不會「過時」（stale）。
+
+判決指，只要控方有足夠證據證明有一個串謀協議貫穿整個控罪時段，那麼檢控期限便應由串謀的最後一天才開始計算，不會對被告帶來不公。就本案而言，法官裁定檢控期限應由2021年6月24日起計6個月，因此於2021年12月24日才屆滿。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/gRtGNy8.png)
+▲ 2021年6月24日，《蘋果日報》發刊最後一份報章。
+
+#### 官：條文引入「提出」檢控是為統一字眼 原意非改變條文內容
+
+《刑事罪行》條例第11(1)條規定，煽動控罪的檢控，「只可於犯罪後6個月內開始進行。」第11(2)條亦規定，未經律政司司長書面同意，不得就煽動控罪提出檢控。沒有爭議條文目的是要確保相關檢控及時，而不會起訴「過時」的罪行。上述兩項條文首次寫進煽動罪條例以及生效是1938年9月2日。至1972年12月31日，煽動罪條例合併入《刑事罪行條例》，經修訂後成為第11(1)及(2)條，而「提出檢控」中的「提出（instituted）」此時首次出現。
+
+判決指，從上述過程可以推論，立法機關之所以在《刑事罪行條例》中引入「提出（instituted）」一詞，原意是對於所有需要首席檢察官（Attorney General）同意而檢控的罪行統一用字，而不是有意改變條文內容。直至1997年香港主權移交，條文中的「首席檢察官」修訂為「律政司司長」，除此之外便沒有任何其他修訂。
+
+#### 官：當控方「提出告發」檢控程序便算開始
+
+判決指，沒有爭議「煽動罪」是可公訴的罪行（indictable offence），受《裁判官條例》第三部管轄，考慮《裁判官條例》第8及27條有關「申訴」或「告發」的字眼，法官認為不論在公訴程序或簡易程序中，當控方「提出告發（laying of an information）」，檢控程序便算是開始，而毋須等到被告人出庭應訊或帶上法庭才算開始。
+
+根據《裁判官條例》第2條的定義，「告發（information）」意思包括「控告」。而第75(1)條規定「任何指稱有人犯了可公訴罪行的申訴或告發，均須以書面提出，並須載有或包含有指稱已犯罪行的陳述，以及為提供有關該項罪行性質的合理資料的所需詳情。」
+
+就本案而言，法官認為西九法院裁判官在2021年12月14日收妥控方的信件、控罪詳情及相關文件後，毫無疑問地已充份地構成「提出告發」，符合第75(1)條的要求。而控方一旦提出了告發，便毋須做額外功夫，檢控程序已算是啟動。（“The information once so laid, no more was required of the prosecutor and the prosecution had ‘begun’.”）
+
+當控方提出告發後，裁判官可以發出拘捕令把被告人帶上法庭，或簽發傳票要求被告人自行到庭應訊，不論是哪一種的上庭方式，它們只是為了被告能被帶到裁判官席前的程序，是法庭的事務，與控方無關。
+
+判決指，雖然《刑事罪行條例》第11(1)及(2)條分別使用「開始（begun）」及「提出（instituted）」，字眼不同，但是兩者均指向相同的東西。判決又提到，兩項條文目的是保障被告人，若果立法機關有意賦予兩詞不同意思，理應提供兩詞各自的釋義。
+
+#### 倘被告留院或不在港 致未能及時檢控 法官不接受辯方稱不應受審
+
+判決又指，辯方堅稱只有當被告人上庭應訊及面對控罪時，檢控程序才算啟動，會導致令人驚訝（surprising）的結果。法官曾在庭上問及，若然被告人留院、不在香港或潛逃，以致未能趕及在檢控期限之內上庭應訊呢？辯方則回答在如此情況下，被告人便不應就控罪受審，因他未能在檢控期限屆滿之前上庭。法官表示不接受辯方說法，因這不是立法原意。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/D33tRay.png)
+▲ 黎智英
+
+判決指，第11(1)及(2)條處理檢控程序的不同範疇，第11(2)條從控方角度出發，即提出告發者，並聚焦檢控須經律政司司長同意，以免濫用程序；第11(1)條則從法庭作為接收告發者的角度出發，以確保控方乃及時檢控。
+
+總括而言，法官認為西九法庭於2021年12月14日，即檢控期限10日之前，已收妥控方通知及有關煽動控罪的資料，故此檢控並沒有超出期限，遂駁回辯方的申請。
+
+被告為：黎智英（76歲）、蘋果日報有限公司、蘋果日報印刷有限公司及蘋果互聯網有限公司。
+
+審訊不設陪審團，由《國安法》指定法官杜麗冰、李運騰和李素蘭審理。
+
+黎的律師團隊包括資深大律師彭耀鴻和大律師Marc Corlett、關文渭、黃雅斌、董皓哲及李峰琦。3間蘋果日報公司清盤人由大律師王國豪代表。
+
+控方由副刑事檢控專員周天行、署理助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤、高級檢控官吳加悅及陳穎琛等代表。警方國安處總警司李桂華則坐在律政司團隊後排。
+
+同案8名被告：前行政總裁張劍虹、前總編輯羅偉光、前副社長陳沛敏、前執行總編輯林文宗、前英文主筆馮偉光、前主筆楊清奇、李宇軒和陳梓華，早前已承認「串謀勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪，現正還柙，等待黎智英審訊完畢後判刑。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022