From 133303aa82161a5c121ca8509eff2307276944d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hokoi <hokoeye@pm.me>
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2024 01:49:07 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x27 Mar.27

---
 .../2024-02-26-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-32.md   | 197 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../2024-02-27-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-33.md   | 169 +++++++++++++++
 .../2024-02-27-ukraines-private-sector.md     | 112 ++++++++++
 .../2024-02-28-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-34.md   | 160 ++++++++++++++
 .../2024-02-29-food-as-silent-weapon.md       | 111 ++++++++++
 .../2024-02-29-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-35.md   |  79 +++++++
 .../2024-03-01-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-36.md   | 112 ++++++++++
 7 files changed, 940 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-02-26-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-32.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-02-27-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-33.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-02-27-ukraines-private-sector.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-02-28-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-34.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-02-29-food-as-silent-weapon.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-02-29-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-35.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-03-01-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-36.md

diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-02-26-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-32.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-02-26-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-32.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第卅二日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2024-02-26 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 陳沛敏稱與黎智英一樣認同民主自由 惟未必每次認同其做法或路線
+- 陳沛敏：黎智英還柙後 沒有指示更改報導角度和編採政策 僅向同事講「撐住」
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/Nqa1A9M.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（26日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第32日審訊。前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。2020年8月黎智英首次被捕，之後釋釋，陳稱沒有印象黎曾提及要更改《蘋果》的報導角度。她確認按照黎的意思行事，因為「基本上佢係老闆啦，啫係佢都係比較強勢嘅作風。」被問到陳是否認同黎的政見，陳表示與黎一樣認同民主自由等基本價值，但是未必每一次都會認同黎的做法和路線，例如她不認同以《蘋果》名義發起「一人一信救香港」。
+
+已承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」控罪的前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏，第11天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，由控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤作主問。
+
+#### 陳沛敏確認黎被捕獲釋後稱「一切繼續」、「《蘋果》一定撐落去」
+
+控方上周談及黎智英於2020年8月10日首次被捕，以及壹傳媒大樓被警方搜查。控方展示同年8月13日的《蘋果》報紙頭版，題為〈黎智英羈留室感悟 「坐監都揀呢條路」〉。報導提及黎從警署獲釋後，返回壹傳媒大樓，「獲大批員工在地下大堂英雄式歡迎」，又指：「當被問及對《蘋果日報》將來的看法時，即簡單而有力明言：『一切繼續』，又對讀者承諾：『《蘋果》一定撐落去。』」陳沛敏確認黎有說過相關言論。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/ZIDkIxW.png)
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+控方續指，報導引述黎稱：「性格決定咗我嘅命運，咁我接受我嘅命運，等如我接受上帝嘅祝福一樣，我以後唔使驚；係咪要重新考慮？我從來冇諗呢樣嘢，使唔使腳軟呀？我從來冇考慮過！」報導又提及：「黎智英之後再接受專訪，坦言性格較為樂觀，認為被政權以國安法拘捕的一天『遲早會嚟，但冇諗到咁快』，被捕的早上當時在家面對國安部門警察上門仍處之泰然面對，『當時諗法係，嚟就嚟啦，煮到嚟就食啦！』又直言沒有擔心自己會直接『被送中』。」陳沛敏亦確認黎說過上述言論。
+
+控方指版面下方有一張相片，顯示黎智英、時任壹傳媒集團行政總裁張劍虹和時任營運總監兼財務總裁周達權在大堂會見一眾員工。控方問陳，黎在該次場合中，有否提及要改變《蘋果》日後的報導方向和角度。陳指：「冇任何嘅改變。」
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/sZZwb5c.png)
+▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）
+
+#### 陳沛敏不記得有否再開飯盒會、沒印象黎提及更改報導角度
+
+控方指黎於2020年12月再度被捕及還柙，問陳於同年8月至12月之間，有否見過黎在壹傳媒大樓出現。陳表示有，但是她不記得有否再召開過「飯盒會」。
+
+控方續問，黎在這段期間有否透過 WhatsApp 和 Signal 提及要改變報導角度，陳則稱沒有印象黎提及過。至於黎有否在 Slack 的員工群組中提及要改變報導角度，陳則稱沒有。
+
+#### 陳沛敏：按照黎智英意思行事 因他是老闆、作風比較強勢
+
+控方問陳，她是否按照黎的意思行事？陳回答是。被問到原因，陳起初表示「因為佢⋯⋯點講呢⋯⋯」，其後稱：「基本上佢係老闆啦，啫係佢都係比較強勢嘅作風。」她打算提及有關美國大選期間的事例，惟該事例是時任社長張劍虹告訴她的，因為法官杜麗冰打斷指這是傳聞證供，因此陳未有詳述該事例。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/1xnWWIO.png)
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）
+
+控方繼續提問，陳按照黎的意思行事，除了因為黎「作風強勢」之外，還有否其他原因。陳指沒有其他原因，「啫係因為佢都會好堅持佢嘅做法係啱嘅。」
+
+#### 陳沛敏表示與黎一樣認同民主自由 惟未必每次都認同其方法和路線
+
+控方問到，當其時陳是否同意黎的政見？陳表示：「如果係好宏觀、好基本嘅價值，例如民主、自由嗰啲，咁我會講我係認同，但如果係話方法呀、路線呀嗰啲，我唔會覺得我係每次都會認同囉。」
+
+控方舉例指，陳早前作供提及她不認同以《蘋果》名義發起「一人一信救香港」，惟黎最終沒有接受她的意見。陳確認。
+
+#### 法官質疑8.31太子站報導乃「陳述」警方過度用武 而非「提出質疑」
+
+控方展示2019年9月1日的《蘋果》頭版，題為〈港鐵大搜捕 釀元朗恐襲2.0 速龍無差別毆市民〉。控方問陳，此報導以什麼角度來撰寫。陳指：「角度係質疑警方嗰晚有冇過份使用武力。」
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/pvvElZU.png)
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+控方指，陳較早前的證供指黎曾經提及「警暴」，而此頭版的報導角度是否與黎的觀點有關？陳表示「可以話有」。法官李運騰追問有何關係？陳稱：「啫係佢（黎）覺得警暴呢樣嘢係違反公義啦」，而「嗰晚好多段影片影到嗰啲市民喺車廂入面被打得好犀利啦，所以我哋就用咗A1嚟報導呢件事」。
+
+法官李運騰指，陳剛才指報導角度是質疑警方有否過度使用武力，但是該報導似乎在「陳述」警方有過度用武，而非「提出質疑」，問陳此報導做的是哪一種。陳僅回答：「陳述」。
+
+就標題所指的「元朗恐襲2.0」，控方指稱「元朗恐襲」是形容2019年7月21日發生在元朗站，白衣人與黑衣人之間的衝突。陳確認。
+
+#### 陳沛敏：黎智英透過給予指示或轉發新聞稿 指示報導反映其觀點
+
+就2020年7月1日的《蘋果日報》頭版〈惡法生效 兩制蓋棺 泛民7.1繼續抗爭〉，陳指選擇此標題是因為黎都覺得國安法破壞一國兩制和損害法治，而他一直以來都會給予指示，指示他們如何在報導中反映他的觀點。
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/OXayYPE.png)
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+法官李運騰追問黎會如何影響《蘋果》的報導。陳回答指，就一些重大新聞，黎會好明確地指示「做到最大」，他有時亦會透過轉發新聞稿給她，或者好像佔領立法會事件之後，黎吩咐他們報導多些示威者的心聲。
+
+控方展示2020年7月7日的《蘋果》頭版，標題為〈爆門搜屋 限制離境 充公財產 秘密竊聽 查國安案警察大晒〉。控方指標題上方有一雙眼睛，問陳為何有如此設計。陳相信負責設計的同事想反映國安法賦予警察很大權力去監視和搜查市民的資料。陳指美術組的同事會先獲告知頭條標題，以及會出席會議，也會有人講解設計意念。
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/JEAbjsM.png)
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+
+![image08](https://i.imgur.com/NwT0uaB.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（26日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第32日審訊。前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。2020年8月黎智英首次被捕，之後獲警方擔保，至同年12月再度被捕還柙。陳稱記得她曾經赴監獄探訪黎兩至三次，但是在探訪期間，黎並沒有提及要更改《蘋果》的報導角度。不過陳確認她有繼續按黎的觀點和想法來行事。另外，陳提及黎曾經批評《蘋果》國際版對特朗普的競爭對手拜登醜聞「做得唔夠大」，使同事「感受到壓力」，在處理特朗普和拜登的新聞時會因應黎生的要求而調整比重。陳於2021年6月被拘捕，報導引述陳在較早前的訪問中說：「今時今日做《蘋果》，唔係純粹只想做記者，係 more than 一份工。」
+
+已承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」控罪的前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏，第11天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，由控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤作主問。
+
+#### 報導提及黎被捕獲釋後如常經營「經營國際線」
+
+黎智英於2020年8月首度被捕後，《蘋果》在同月刊登報導〈獲釋後 Twitter 直播 黎智英：手銬不能侮辱我〉，當中提及：「壹傳媒創辦人黎智英被指違反港版國安法被捕後保釋，昨早在 Twitter 如常經營『經營國際線』」，問陳為何會使用「經營國際線」字眼。陳則表示，相信同事按照網上即時新聞的字眼，正如她較早前提及，張志偉都會使用這些字眼，「我諗當時係借用呢個講法嚟講呢樣嘢，因為 Twitter 對象係面向國際社會。」
+
+![image09](https://i.imgur.com/DVvDEBD.png)
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+控方問，黎「經營國際線」的目的是什麼，陳指是為了「爭取支持」，或者向國際社會發表他的一些觀點。控方追問，黎想達到什麼目的？陳指包括爭取外國就中央或港府的政策施壓。
+
+控方指，陳沛敏於2020年8月20日獲委任為蘋果日報有限公司和蘋果日報印刷有限公司的董事。陳確認。
+
+#### 特朗普指黎是勇者 黎Twitter兩度發文標註特朗普
+
+控方指，黎在2020年8月20日在 Twitter 發文稱：
+
+> “Thank you Mr @realDonaldTrump, #HK can't be successful without freedom and it can't be the international financial center it once was. It is very sad.”
+
+控方指，《蘋果》於2020年8月21日刊登報導〈特朗普：黎智英是勇敢的人〉。陳指，時任美國總統特朗普在記者會上發表相關言論，外媒都有報導，《蘋果》的網上即時新聞亦有報導，然後在翌日報紙刊登。她又確認報導提及黎的 Twitter 帖文，引述黎感謝特朗普，又稱香港沒有自由的話不會成功。
+
+黎於同日在 Twitter 轉發同一新聞的英文版報導，並發文稱：
+
+> “President @realDonaldTrump calls me a brave man. I am flattered. But I am not brave enough to stand against the whole world like #Xi. I only #StandWithHongKong #StandwithTaiwan”
+
+#### 訊息顯示黎要求翻譯中國糧食問題新聞 其後在Twitter轉載英文版連結
+
+控方指，黎智英於2020年8月26日向 WhatsApp 群組「English news」發送兩張圖片，分別為報紙報導〈每年進口糧食一億噸 難自給自足〉和〈中共威權炮製惜食鬧劇 專家：政策半年玩完〉的照片，黎並要求負責英文版的主筆楊清奇將兩則新聞翻譯成英文。
+
+控方指，黎智英於8月27日在 Twitter 轉發相關英文新聞連結，並稱：
+
+> “Food import problems reflect that China needs imports to compensate its insufficiency. China cannot afford to decouple its trade with the free world especially US. But can China reconcile its many conflicts with universal values of freedom and democracy?”
+
+#### 蘋果報導指稱警方「竄改7.21歷史」及「隱瞞8.31真相」 陳沛敏指屬於陳述
+
+控方展示2020年8月29日的《蘋果》報導〈林卓廷錄口供 一時證人一時犯人 憂白衣兇徙遭放生 促警交代角色〉，有關林卓廷因牽涉7.21元朗站事件而被拘捕，版面上方顯示「顛倒黑白」四字。
+
+控方續展示2020年9月1日的《蘋果》報導〈PK鄧恐嚇講「打死人」違國安法〉，內文首段便提及：「過去一年，警方一邊竄改7.21歷史，一邊隱瞞8.31真相，更利用國安法封殺人民對8.31的質疑。」控方問陳，這句子是屬於「提出問題」還是一項「陳述」。陳回答是「陳述」。
+
+#### 專欄文章列「煽動刊物」 陳沛敏表明不認同煽動罪
+
+控方續展示由陳沛敏撰寫的文章〈這星期給香港人的通識題〉，於2020年9月12日刊登在其個人專欄「堆填生活」，被列為本案的「煽動刊物」之一。文章談論《刑事罪行條例》下的煽動罪。被問到文章是支持還是反對政府，陳表示：「我係對嗰條法例唔認同囉，我亦都對於有啲影片影到警察嘅一啲行徑，我都係唔認同嘅。」
+
+控方指文章有一段指：「政權以言入罪，大興文字獄，無所不用其極。國安法下，『光復香港、時代革命』是罪；幾百萬香港人喊了超過一年的『五大訴求，缺一不可』呢？國安法不適用，就用陳年惡法殺無赦吧。『721唔見人』39分鐘也好18分鐘也罷，好歹是事實陳述，但政權殺快必儆香港人，紅線不斷收龍門不斷搬，反正誰大誰惡誰就可以指鹿為馬。」控方問這段是「提問」還是「陳述」，陳指是「陳述」。
+
+#### 陳沛敏：黎智英批評國際版對拜登醜聞「做得唔夠大」 同事感受到壓力
+
+控方另展示2020年10月16日的「Englsih news」群組訊息，張劍虹傳出一系列台灣《蘋果》有關當時美國總統候選人拜登的報導，包括：
+
+-【獨家｜拜登兒子曾訪台「神祕牽線人」曝光 密會金融高層吳敦義女兒代父現身】
+-【獨家調查2｜與前立委謝國樑私交不錯 拜登兒子訪台牽線人林俊良起底】
+-【獨家調查3｜關係直通中共最高層 林俊良助拜登兒成吸引中資招財貓】
+-【獨家調查4｜袁健生搭火車堵拜登做外交 國家檔案1983年有封拜登密信】
+-【獨家調查5｜從鄧小平交往到習近平 拜登父子被譏「中國啦啦隊」】
+
+張指：「台蘋今天的精彩獨家報導。」、「我們可盡快翻譯。」時任《蘋果》兩岸版主管蔣美紅回覆：「收到。」控方問陳，憑上述文章的標題，可見台蘋報導的立場是支持還是反對拜登？陳指台蘋立場是反對拜登。
+
+![image10](https://i.imgur.com/RkDsUti.png)
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長張劍虹
+
+控方追問香港《蘋果》對於拜登的立場又如何？陳則指：「黎生曾經批評過我哋國際版報紙，話我哋太跟《紐約時報》、CNN，啫佢哋對特朗普比較批判啲，而對拜登和拜登屋企人嘅醜聞，做得唔夠大。」不過陳指黎上述看法乃張劍虹向她轉述的，所以陳翻看報導和向國際版同事了解後，得知很多美國小報和社交媒體的確有報導關於拜登的醜聞，但《蘋果》國際版的同事認為該些報導「唔係好 conclusive 嘅報導」。雖然她曾向張劍虹解釋，可是「啫國際版同事都會感受到壓力，啫係處理特朗普和拜登新聞嘅時候，可能嗰比重會因應黎生嘅要求調整返，但我都覺得當時整體上係跟返個新聞原則去做囉。」
+
+#### 陳沛敏：黎智英還柙後讀者關注會否繼續營運 故刊登聲明「我們不會認命」
+
+控方指，黎智英在2020年12月再度被捕及還柙。同月4日，《蘋果》以〈涉違租契 國安官禁保釋 黎智英成政治囚徙〉作為頭版標題。頭版下方有欄目顯示一則聲明，題為〈《蘋果日報》告讀者書：我們不會認命〉。
+
+![image11](https://i.imgur.com/vHk3nm8.png)
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+陳沛敏解釋，她認為在黎還柙之後，很多人都關注《蘋果》會否營運下去，所以有需要表態。她不記得聲明是由自己還是同事撰寫，「但都係我嘅意思囉」，她確認當時同意刊登聲明內容。
+
+#### 陳沛敏：到獄中探訪期間黎沒提及要更改《蘋果》的報導角度
+
+控方續展示2020年12月5日的《蘋果》頭版〈黎智英：無畏無懼 繼續戰鬥 子送《蘋果》 懲教退回〉，當中引述黎向員工和讀者傳話「No fear, we have to fight on（無畏無懼，我們要繼續戰鬥）」。控方問陳知不知道這些引述黎的言論是來自哪裡。陳則指「應該係探佢嘅人講返佢嘅說話囉」，但是她本人當時不在場，乃依賴其他探望黎的人轉述。
+
+控方指，證據顯示陳曾於2020年12月10日到獄中探訪黎，問她是否記得。陳則表示不記得具體探訪日子，只記得曾經探訪兩至三次。控方追問，黎有否在探訪期間提及要更改《蘋果》的報導角度。陳則指沒有，但她補充：「我記得佢有同同事講『撐住』。」
+
+#### 報導引述陳沛敏稱：今時今日做《蘋果》，唔係純粹只想做記者，係more than一份工
+
+控方續展示2021年6月18日的《蘋果》報導〈夫︰她冷靜堅強鎮定 陳沛敏選擇留在災難現場〉，首段提及：「尚餘兩日，便是《蘋果日報》創刊26年。逾百名國安處警員昨晨再度大舉搜查蘋果大樓，並以涉嫌違反國安法第29條『串謀勾結外國或境外勢力危害國家安全罪』拘捕五名高層，包括《蘋果》副社長陳沛敏。陳沛敏丈夫、前網媒《立場新聞》總編輯鍾沛權形容她被捕後的狀況說：『她冷靜、堅強和鎮定』。」
+
+![image12](https://i.imgur.com/ga7R3Q0.png)
+▲ 陳沛敏丈夫、前網媒《立場新聞》總編輯 鍾沛權
+
+陳庭上指，同事在她被捕之前數星期曾訪問她，原本打算留待《蘋果》報慶時才刊出報導，可是由於她被捕，所以「佢哋（同事）就將呢個訪問，喺呢個時間出咗，咁當然會交代返我被捕呢件事」。
+
+控方提到報導引述陳說：「今時今日做《蘋果》，唔係純粹只想做記者，係 more than 一份工。」陳確認這是她當時的想法。
+
+#### 陳沛敏稱黎獄中沒指示改變報導角度和編採政策
+
+報導又指：「探訪時間只有15分鐘，敏姐說黎智英曬黑了，也瘦了，幸好仍站得筆直。『佢話佢個肚腩大咗，我哋望落去又唔係。』她擔心老人難捱牢獄之苦：『佢本身有糖尿底，好似有一次唔知邊個話佢血壓好高，有一排又話牙痛，老人家實有好多呢啲嘢，咁佢睇醫生始終唔係好方便。』」
+
+報導續指：「被探望者卻說自己很好。『佢係好刻意想啲同事放心，成日都講『同出面同事講OK、繼續、冇問題」。』但演技都有穿煲一刻，有次敏姐與《壹週刊》退休社長楊懷康一起探訪，黎智英隔着膠板眼濕濕說：『幾十年前識你，冇諗過好似𠵱家咁傾偈。』兩位老人相對無言。」
+
+![image13](https://i.imgur.com/HJ9b8oB.png)
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+陳沛敏確認曾經與楊懷康一同探望黎，又提及「佢（黎）話覺得香港情況變壞咗好多」，她會將黎的說話轉告時任社長張劍虹和時任總編輯羅偉光等同事。控方追問，黎有否向陳表示要改變《蘋果》的報導角度？陳則指沒有。
+
+控方問陳，黎還柙之後，她還有否繼續按黎的觀點和想法來行事。陳確認有，因為張劍虹是她的上司，惟張並未有指示她轉變編採方向，所以她便按照一向的指示工作。
+
+法官李運騰追問，就《蘋果》的編採政策而言，有否在黎還柙之後出現任何改變？陳記得在《國安法》實施之後，高層曾經討論一些報導字眼需否改變，「張生都有提醒關於制裁嗰啲報導，要謹慎啲」，但是黎還柙之後，「我就印象中（黎）冇講其他嘢囉。」
+
+控方早前表示有信心今日之內可以完成主問，惟臨近下午散庭時間，控方表示還需要多15分鐘，法官杜麗冰遂押後至明日續審。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻表示，已準備好明天控方完成主問之後開始盤問。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-02-27-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-33.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-02-27-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-33.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f472a898
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-02-27-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-33.md
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第卅三日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2024-02-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 陳沛敏：被捕獲釋後辭職 工作直至《蘋果》停運 同意最後一份報紙印100萬份
+- 辯方：黎智英非仔細地管編採事務 陳沛敏：若黎堅持己見，會影響新聞決定
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/Edjgn6T.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（27日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第33日審訊。前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。2020年12月黎智英被起訴及還柙，群組訊息紀錄顯示高層之間曾討論報導字眼，包括「閹割選舉」和「武漢肺炎」，其後決定棄用「武漢肺炎」。時任警務處處長鄧炳強曾稱傳媒違國安也要付代價，不過陳指即使黎智英還柙之後，直至2021年5月召開員工大會這段期間，《蘋果》從未被指稱新聞報導有問題，所以沒有印象任何人說要更改報導角度，「大方向冇更改。」陳於2021年6月被拘捕，之後獲警方擔保，她稱數日後正式請辭，並工作至《蘋果》最後一天。
+
+已承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」控罪的前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏，第12天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，由控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤作主問。
+
+#### 陳沛敏稱張劍虹曾吩咐下架黎智英文章 惟不記得最終有否下架
+
+控方圍繞黎智英在2020年12月還柙之後的時期提問。控方指根據紀錄，陳沛敏先後於2020年12月10日和2021年3月22日到監獄探訪黎。陳確認。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/v1mmAuj.png)
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）
+
+控方展示2020年12月13日的《蘋果》頭版，題為〈控勾結境外危害國安禁保釋 黎智英國安法前開 Twitter 追蹤蓬佩奧蔡英文成「罪證」〉，版面有一張表格列出控方指證內容，包括黎所撰寫的文章和直播受訪言論。
+
+控方問《蘋果》有否因應控方的指控而將黎的文章從網站下架。陳憶述時任《蘋果》社長張劍虹曾吩咐將一些黎的文章下架，但她不記得當時是在哪一個時間點，即不記得是在黎還柙之前還是之後發生。法官李運騰追問，該些文章最後有否下架，陳則稱：「我唔記得咗。」
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/ZAWZJn2.png)
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹
+
+#### 時任警務處長鄧炳強稱「違國安要付代價」 陳沛敏不記得《蘋果》有否因而改做法
+
+控方展示2021年3月28日的《蘋果》頭版報導〈中大生揭國安審問過程 早被監視開file 鄰房偷聽盤問〉。首段提到：「港區國安法由去年6月30日起生效以來，至今已有數以百計香港人在這幅血紅幌子下被拘捕，他們當中有具備影響力的傳媒大亨，有誓言抗爭到底的民主派初選者，也有不過是熱愛自由的年輕人。」控方問「傳媒大亨」是否指黎智英，陳確認。控方問「血紅幌子」是指什麼，陳指是《國安法》。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/oVOz347.png)
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+2021年4月16日《蘋果》頭版標題為〈鄧炳強恫嚇傳媒：違國安要付代價 《蘋果》總編質疑鋪路嚴厲打壓〉。控方問，時任警務處處長鄧炳強作出報導所指的陳述之後，《蘋果》有否改變任何編採做法？陳則指：「唔記得有做過任何嘢。」
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/BQEe9FI.png)
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 陳沛敏：高層曾開設群組討論報導字眼 免觸犯法律
+
+控方指，張劍虹於2021年4月17日創立 WhatsApp 群組「應變小組」。陳確認，並稱因應《國安法》和警方指稱煽動的字眼，設立群組是為了討論報導所使用的字眼，加上同事亦就此有疑問，會問某些字眼：「用唔用得？」她指在創立群組之前，因應牽涉「光復香港 時代革命」口號的案件，高層之間當時曾經討論「針對嗰八個字，幾時用得、幾時唔用得」，或者是否刊登某些廣告。
+
+群組訊息紀錄顯示，有群組成員轉述政治組同事詢問陳沛敏應否將「閹割選舉」改為「完善」，或改用「北京修改香港的選舉制度」。時任《蘋果》總編輯羅偉光之後回覆：「我與同事討論了，認為可繼續用閹割選舉，因為都係陳述事實；也有同事提出『武漢肺炎』，我認為可繼續用。如要引述官方聲明、文件必須提及，加『新冠肺炎』，顯示是官方或有關人士說法。如有其他情況、疑問，會聽同事意見，商量如何處理。」
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/3VJRK6R.png)
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》總編輯 羅偉光
+
+陳解釋，群組會討論某些字眼在當時的社會氣氛和法律環境之下會否有問題，「加上鄧炳強亦都有嗰個講法啦，總編輯個判斷係，當時我哋唔再謹慎啲用字嘅話，會唔會犯咗鄧炳強講嘅情況呢？」，於是他們便就字眼提出討論，不希望《蘋果》實體報紙和網站版各有各做。她指，張劍虹和羅偉光商討之後，便在群組中表示會統一字眼。
+
+控方展示2021年4月18日的訊息紀錄，陳沛敏向當時管理論壇版的主筆楊清奇傳訊息：「老總決定，今起報道不用『武肺』，因此社論也不用，論壇則作者自決。編輯會通知社論其他作者。謝謝」，陳庭上確認「老總」是指時任總編輯羅偉光。
+
+陳並向楊轉發另一則訊息：「各位，我打倒昨日的我：武漢肺炎這題 tag，即日起暫時唔用，水印亦唔用。」該訊息指會以「最新疫情」、「疫苗接種」、「防疫措施」取代。
+
+#### 陳沛敏：黎智英還柙之後 《蘋果》亦未被指稱新聞報導有問題 故「大方向冇更改」
+
+控方提到高層於2021年5月曾召開《蘋果》員工大會，並展示2021年6月18日的《蘋果》報導〈夫︰她冷靜堅強鎮定 陳沛敏選擇留在災難現場〉，當中指：「早前在《蘋果》員工大會上，陳沛敏說過，即使有消息指《蘋果》會被取締，她都會留至最後一刻，『今時今日做《蘋果》，唔係純粹只想做記者，係 more than 一份工。』」陳確認有講過上述言論。
+
+控方追問，有沒有任何人在該次員工大會上提及更改《蘋果》的報導角度。陳稱沒有。她其後補充道，由黎智英被拘捕、還柙直至5月的員工大會，其間「我哋都冇被直接話我哋嘅新聞報導有問題嘅」，因此她印象中除了更改「武漢肺炎」等一些字眼之外，便沒有印象任何人說要更改報導角度，「大方向冇更改。」
+
+#### 陳沛敏憶述被捕獲釋後辭職
+
+控方指，陳沛敏及其他《蘋果》高層在2021年6月17日被警方拘捕，之後從警署獲釋。《蘋果》頭版報導稱：「陳神情略見疲累，向在場記者點頭道謝，表示得知張劍虹及羅偉光仍未獲釋，被當局以國安法起訴，感到難過，希望二人能盡早獲釋，今天將會到法庭支持二人。」報導又稱：「對於《蘋果日報》昨日仍能順利出版，陳沛敏感到『好感動』，勉勵同事『盡量做』，『過去40個鐘，我被拘捕，都知道公司《蘋果》同事都繼續好專業謹守崗位，繼續採訪新聞、報道新聞，我以佢哋自豪，辛苦哂佢哋』。」陳庭上確認以上皆是她當時的言論。
+
+陳確認她在6月18日深夜從警署獲釋，翌日則到法庭旁聽張劍虹和羅偉光提堂，之後並未有返回公司上班，因她請假一天，「因為我嗰時俾人扣咗40幾個鐘，個人都好攰」，於是她接受同事的建議休息。其後6月20日是星期日，所以她在6月21日（星期一）返回公司上班，並憶述她在當天向時任壹傳媒董事會主席葉一堅口頭上表明打算辭職，其後才正式遞交表格或辭職信，辭去副社長一職。不過陳提到「當時公司入面好混亂」，「連咩人可以批我張 form 都冇人知道。」
+
+控方又指，根據公司註冊處紀錄，陳於6月25日正式辭去蘋果日報有限公司和蘋果日報印刷有限公司的董事職位。
+
+#### 陳沛敏同意最後一份《蘋果》印刷100萬份
+
+控方指，《蘋果日報》營運至2021年6月24日才停運，陳沛敏亦繼續工作直至當天。對於為何6月24日出版的《蘋果》實體報紙印刷100萬份，陳憶述當時發行部同事指這是最後一份出版的報紙，「應該好多人想買」，之後某位高層同事提議不如印100萬份，發行部同事經研究後認為他們有能力發行這個數量。
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/YNUFUvz.png)
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+法官杜麗冰問，所以陳是批准印刷100萬份？陳表示：「可以咁講。」她特別補充：「其實當時我覺得我嘅身位有啲尷尬，已經辭咗職，啫係我返緊去執緊嘢，但同事同我講嘅時候，我話：『OK呀，幾好吖，100萬份啦。』」
+
+控方最後向陳展示一張黎智英會見時任美國副總統彭斯的照片，要求陳辨認出相中哪一人是黎的助手 Mark Simon。陳指出坐在黎智英旁邊的一名男子就是 Mark Simon。控方表示盤問完畢，結束12日的主問。
+
+
+![image08](https://i.imgur.com/49WGCg5.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（27日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第33日審訊。前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。辯方開始盤問，並指《蘋果》不是「為批評而批評」，而是透過報導引起關注，希望使政府改變政策或施政，例如遊說撤回修例草案和阻止《國安法》實施。辯方又問陳沛敏是否同意《蘋果》有編採自主，陳則回答：「如果黎生冇出聲嘅時候，都係嘅。」陳舉例，當黎要求聘請某作者替《蘋果》撰寫時評文章，總編輯是不能提出反對。她又指若然黎就一些事很堅持他的意見，其意見會影響她的新聞決定。
+
+已承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」控罪的前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏，第12天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤主問完畢後，代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻開始盤問。
+
+![image09](https://i.imgur.com/kXDij5a.png)
+▲ 代表黎智英的資深大律師 彭耀鴻（左）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右）
+
+#### 陳沛敏：當黎智英「冇出聲」的時候 便有編採自主
+
+辯方問陳沛敏是否同意《蘋果》有編採自主。陳則回答：「如果黎生冇出聲嘅時候，都係嘅。」辯方指，黎智英並沒有參與編輯每日召開的3個會議，包括「鋤報會」、「初會」和「編前會議」，會議紀錄亦不會傳送給黎，報紙出版之前，樣版也不會先給黎過目。陳確認。
+
+在辯提問下，陳確認她是有豐富經驗的新聞工作者，在業界工作超過20年，在前線採訪過不同新聞，而且有一段時間主力負責保安和人權新聞。陳又確認，她曾經因為緬甸大選報導而獲頒「人權新聞獎」，被囚禁的中國異見作家劉曉波於2010年獲頒諾貝爾和平獎，陳亦親赴瑞典採訪頒獎禮。辯方指，陳在業界工作的時間裡，一直做出高水準的報導。陳回應：「我希望我係啦。」
+
+#### 陳沛敏確認《蘋果》擁抱人權、自由、新聞自由等價值
+
+被問到是否與黎智英的價值觀一致，包括相信民主，陳沛敏表示她相信香港是適合發展民主的政治制度。此外，陳確認她相信人權、自由、新聞自由和政府透明度，而以上均是《蘋果日報》所擁抱的價值。至於同事是否都擁抱以上價值，她稱不能代其他同事回答，除了一些共事多年的同事之外，「如果要好科學咁答係咪 majority，我唔敢答。」
+
+在辯方提問下，陳逐一確認據她所知，時任《蘋果》社長張劍虹、時任《蘋果》總編輯羅偉光、時任執行總編輯林文宗和主筆馮偉光均擁有一致價值觀，即相信人權、自由和新聞自由。陳亦相信他們反對警暴，對修例草案和《國安法》有憂慮。惟她不肯定時任英文版主筆楊清奇和時任動新聞平台總監張志偉是否擁抱上述價值觀。
+
+#### 辯方：《蘋果》非「為批評而批評」 冀引關注、改政策、阻警暴
+
+辯方指，《蘋果》經常發表帶批判性的報導，例如前財政司司長梁錦松在公布財政預算案之前偷步買車，顯示《蘋果》在揭發政府濫權上是走在前端。陳回答：「可以咁講。」
+
+辯方續指，《蘋果》並不是「為批評而批評」，而是透過報導引起關注，希望使政府改變政策或施政。陳稱：「可以咁講。」
+
+辯方續指，陳早前作證表明不認同警方過份使用武力，而《蘋果》報導「警暴」的目的是希望說服當權者約束自己不要過份用武。陳同樣稱：「可以咁講。」
+
+#### 辯方：《蘋果》報導反修例示威、國安法 冀游說政府
+
+辯方又指，陳早前表明反對《逃犯條例》修訂草案，《蘋果》亦針對此議題發表很多帶批判性的文章，目的是為了遊說政府撤回修例草案。此外，《蘋果》以大篇幅報導反修例示威，顯示大批市民反對修例，目的是游說當權者修例並不是一個好主意，問陳是否同意。陳表示：「都有咁嘅作用。」
+
+辯方指，在《國安法》實施之前，《蘋果》發布很多關於《國安法》的文章，問陳是否反對《國安法》。陳表示：「會有憂慮」，即是「傳媒界嗰種擔心」。辯方指陳擔心隨著《國安法》實施，新聞自由和其他個人自由會減少。陳同意。
+
+辯方追問所以陳是否反對《國安法》實施？陳則說：「啫我覺得如果要推行嘅話要有多啲咨詢，同埋收集多啲香港人嘅意見。」她並確認《蘋果》因而會有很多具批判性的文章，「不過有啲係反映黎生嘅立場。」
+
+辯方繼而問陳是否同意，黎擔心《國安法》影響新聞自由，和削弱其他方面的個人自由，因此黎盡其所能地作出游說，冀阻止國安法生效。陳同意。
+
+#### 辯方：黎智英提出制裁時 未有明文禁止呼籲制裁
+
+辯方指黎一直以來都主張和平示威，問陳是否同意。惟陳僅指：「喺2019年之前，係嘅。」
+
+辯方續指，在人大通過《國安法》之前，黎智英的確有提出制裁等施壓方式，以游說當權者不要通過《國安法》，然而當時並未有任何法律禁止市民呼籲制裁。陳同意。辯方指，因此《蘋果》和黎智英作出批評是為了游說當權者不要實施國安法。陳稱：「係，但係都係黎先生想透過《蘋果》，想做到呢個效果。」
+
+![image10](https://i.imgur.com/EdaY4Jl.png)
+▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）
+
+#### 陳沛敏確認《蘋果》揭發醜聞和濫權 直至結束營運為止
+
+辯方談及《蘋果》一貫立場，遂向陳展示2015年6月19日的《蘋果》20週年報慶文章，題為〈爆料新聞背後Juicy：記者揼石仔 追查真相〉。辯方指，版面下方有一篇由陳撰寫的「後記」，題為〈毋忘《蘋果》初衷〉，她當時是《蘋果》總編輯。文章提到：「創刊以來，《蘋果》屢揭權貴醜聞，不單為爆為 juicy，更因為我們相信第四權的角色。」陳確認《蘋果》一直以來有揭發醜聞和濫權，直至它結束營運為止。
+
+辯方提到陳2021年6月被捕之後，《蘋果》於同月18日刊出的報導引述她說：「今時今日做《蘋果》，唔係純粹只想做記者，係 more than 一份工。」辯方問陳「多於一份工」是否指第四權，陳則回答「包含第四權」。
+
+#### 陳沛敏：如果黎智英堅持己見 會影響到《蘋果》新聞決定
+
+辯方指根據訊息紀錄，陳沛敏和林文宗曾於2019年1月討論草擬《蘋果日報編輯室約章》，期間特別強調要納入「編採自主」和「編業分離」原則。陳確認，她又補充「編業分離」中的「業」是指廣告，因此意思是編採和廣告分離。
+
+辯方引述《約章》草稿第五條指，新聞報道秉持真實、公正、客觀、獨立原則，這並非等於將所有各方觀點、所有資料全部鋪陳出來，而是不受任何政府、商業、宗教或其他利益左右，力求報導全面的事實真相，不要有偏袒或畏懼，要給予受質疑的人發言、充份解釋和交代的機會。陳確認這是她當時所相信的，因此寫入約章中。
+
+辯方另引述《約章》草稿第十條指，總編輯為《蘋果》編採事務最高負責人，秉持新聞專業理念和操守，落實報社之編採方針，並遵守此約章，維護《蘋果》公信力。辯方問陳，就《蘋果》而言，這條是否真確。陳則指在實際運作層面而言，例如當黎要求聘請某作者替《蘋果》撰寫時評文章，「總編輯喺呢段時間係羅偉光啦，我理解羅偉光係冇機會反對，或者講唔同意呢個人做寫手囉。」
+
+辯方則回應，黎智英是《蘋果》創辦人，也是最大股東，其意見當然會被給予最高尊重。辯方指出，至少就陳本人而言，她不會讓黎或其意見影響她的新聞決定，問陳是否同意。惟陳指：「如果係佢（黎）好堅持嘅時候，會影響到（新聞決定）。」
+
+辯方展示陳被捕之後，《蘋果》於2021年6月18日刊出的報導，當中稱：「敏姐說，雖然與黎智英共事多年，不影響新聞判斷，當日頭條重點是資深大律師中資歷最深的李柱銘首次被判罪成。」陳確認，可是文章這一句是談論一宗法庭新聞。
+
+#### 陳沛敏：有時認為黎落指示 視乎不同情況
+
+辯方問陳是否同意，如果說黎並不是仔細地管理（micro-manage）《蘋果》的編採事務，是一個公道的說法。陳則回答：「我覺得要視乎嗰個係咩事，因為有啲事佢（黎）係唔理嘅」，不過若然有的新聞是黎重視的，例如早前提及的佔領立法會事件，黎會給予指示；但「如果佢冇出聲嘅話，我哋當然可以行使編採自主，唔需要行使佢嘅指示」。
+
+![image11](https://i.imgur.com/14p1m7k.png)
+▲ 2019年7月1日 佔領立法會（資料圖片）
+
+辯方則指，黎並不是明言「要這樣做、不要這樣做」，而是提出建議，問陳是否同意。陳指：「唔同情況有唔同嘅」，有的時候她會覺得黎的說話是「指示」。辯方續指，黎與她溝通時態度是有禮貌，往往使用「可否這樣做」或「會否適合」等言辭，甚至曾說「請自行決定」。陳僅指黎有時的確會以上述方式說話。
+
+辯方表示欲向陳展示逾十段相關訊息對話，預料需時不短，希望押後至明天繼續盤問。彭耀鴻又明言，他的盤問不會好像控方那麼長。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-02-27-ukraines-private-sector.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-02-27-ukraines-private-sector.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Ukraine’s Private Sector
+author: Romina Bandura, et al.
+date  : 2024-02-27 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/ztXeYGA.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Supporting Ukraine’s Private Sector during Wartime"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_During Russia’s war against Ukraine, the private sector is playing a decisive role in Ukraine’s economy, as companies are keeping the economy running by employing Ukrainians, transferring technology and know-how, and financing the government by paying taxes._ <excerpt/> _Ukraine’s allies and partners are also supporting the country by providing military aid, as well as humanitarian and budgetary assistance, thus helping the economy stay afloat._
+
+However, only a small part of this aid is being directly used to help current businesses and attract new investors. So far, the West has committed around $2 billion through the World Bank’s Economic Resilience Action program, which aims to provide financial and advisory support for Ukraine’s private sector. In comparison, government-to-government commitments to Ukraine between January 24, 2022, and January 15, 2023, totaled $154 billion, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
+
+Ukraine also needs to attract significant foreign direct investment to transform and modernize its economy. Although it is risky to invest in the country due to the war, not all of Ukraine has seen damage or is in active combat; less than 20 percent of Ukraine’s territory is currently illegally occupied. Regions that do not require demining — primarily in the western part of the country — are ripe for business opportunities. Investors and international partners do not have to wait for every part of Ukraine’s territory to be freed from Russian troops to start operating there.
+
+___`Although it is risky to invest in the country due to the war, not all of Ukraine has seen damage or is in active combat; less than 20 percent of Ukraine’s territory is currently illegally occupied.`___
+
+Supporting the private sector is an area in which international financial institutions (IFIs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) could do more, even amid the war. Strengthening Ukraine’s private sector in the present will fundamentally shape how recovery efforts proceed during the postwar period. As these institutions approach their operations in Ukraine, they should be more creative, coordinated, and willing to take on risks.
+
+
+### Financing Challenges
+
+Businesses in Ukraine are facing many obstacles. As the war drags on with no immediate prospect for a political settlement, this situation complicates the outlook for the private sector. There are many financing hurdles, including a lack of affordable credit, a dearth of equity investments, and a disrupted insurance market. Additionally, scant health and life insurance coverage in war zones, requirements for new construction to have bomb shelters, and expensive security details compound the costs that firms confront.
+
+Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are finding it particularly difficult to attract capital or get credit at reasonable rates. Most of the multilateral funding goes toward larger companies, ones that had been receiving money even before Russia’s full-scale invasion. This, in turn, affects the client pool for the banking sector. Companies are also unable to access medium- to long-term loans. There are some sources of more affordable capital for SMEs, such as the German-funded 5–7–9 interest-subsidy program through the Business Development Fund, yet these programs are still limited.
+
+In addition, there is a major mismatch between the demand and supply of capital in Ukraine. The destruction of manufacturing facilities, logistical lines, and supply chains has forced some companies to rebuild their business models from scratch. While a few were able to adapt to the war, many businesses need new sources of capital.
+
+Companies operating in Ukraine and potential investors also voice unease over political uncertainty and the unavailability of political and war risk insurance mechanisms. Risk-mitigation and risk-sharing instruments are crucial in unleashing the private sector in Ukraine, especially as the war wages.
+
+___`Risk-mitigation and risk-sharing instruments are crucial in unleashing the private sector in Ukraine, especially as the war wages.`___
+
+
+### Barriers to Doing Business
+
+Beyond access to finance, there are other hurdles for the private sector. Even before the war, the conditions for doing business in Ukraine were not optimal. The country attracted little foreign direct investment (FDI) because of its difficult business climate. From 2011 to 2021, the net inflow of FDI in neighboring Poland and Romania averaged $16.9 billion and $5.4 billion per year, respectively. Meanwhile, during the same period, Ukraine saw an average FDI net inflow of $4.3 billion per year.
+
+The World Bank’s Doing Business project ranked Ukraine at 64 out of 190 economies in 2020. Ukraine scored higher on indicators related to starting a business and dealing with construction permits, but electricity access and resolving insolvency weighed down the overall score. Ukraine also has a negative reputation in terms of corruption. For 2023, Ukraine ranked 104 out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index with a score of 36 out of 100. Although the score is low, it is Ukraine’s best result since 2012 because of various measures that Kyiv has instituted in the past two years to combat corruption. By gaining three points, Ukraine showed one of the best improvements of any country in 2023 despite the war.
+
+President Volodymyr Zelensky demonstrated his willingness to uproot sources of corruption by removing over a dozen officials in the Ministry of Defense in January 2023. Moreover, the government has ramped up criminal proceedings against suspected perpetrators, introducing much-needed judiciary reforms and a competitive selection process for the heads of the main anti-corruption agencies, along with other steps such as improvements in public procurement. As a result of these efforts, the New Europe Center, along with several civil society and media organizations partners in Ukraine — the National Interests Advocacy Network, Anti-Corruption Action Center, Dejure Foundation, European Pravda, Centre of Policy and Legal Reform, Transparency International Ukraine, Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, and Detector Media — gave Ukraine an 8.1 out of 10 in its September 2023 joint assessment of Ukraine’s implementation of recommendations for EU candidates. Ukraine scored the highest in media regulation reforms and weakest in constitutional court reform and fighting against money laundering.
+
+The mass exodus of working-age talent also presents a challenge for the private sector. According to the United Nations, there were 6.5 million Ukrainian refugees as of January 2024 and 3.7 million internally displaced as of September 2023; approximately 14.6 million people in the country are projected to require humanitarian assistance in 2024. In addition, many internally displaced Ukrainians do not have the infrastructure and housing that would enable them to thrive professionally.
+
+Personnel shortages are a significant problem for labor-intensive sectors such as construction and metallurgy. A December 2022 survey by Deloitte and the American Chamber of Commerce found major concerns among business managers regarding how to attract, retain, and ensure the safety of talent during wartime. However, this brain drain is not new, since many Ukrainians were already leaving the country before the war. The difference, however, is that the human capital shortage has significantly intensified and is affecting every sector of Ukraine’s economy, including information technology (IT), which has been a catalyst for economic innovation and growth even during the current conflict.
+
+
+### Support from the International Community
+
+Companies in Ukraine are operating in a difficult war environment. The international community plays a crucial role in supporting these firms with tools adapted to wartime realities. DFIs and multilateral development banks (MDBs) need to be creative and further adapt their operations and capital-deployment mechanisms to support a country at war. How can they go about this task?
+
+First, these institutions can consolidate their currently scattered efforts. For example, although there are multiple war insurance programs (see the appendix for a list), these are isolated and insufficient. Businesses are struggling to know where to look and whom to trust. A consolidation effort could ameliorate the problem, for example, by setting up a user-friendly and transparent portal. If an investor is willing to co-invest or share the risk of an investment with another party, this could have a powerful effect in catalyzing Ukraine’s private sector. As such, it is essential that Ukraine’s DFI and MDB partners coordinate and pool together resources, which will alleviate the risk burden for any one institution and scale both financing and insurance for Ukrainian companies.
+
+Second, as mentioned earlier, many of these institutions are refinancing to reduce their risk exposure but not making new investments. To complicate matters, some institutions do not allow their staff to be on the ground in Ukraine to execute due diligence on local projects. There is a need to attract new investments in Ukraine rather than simply continue using grants to support existing projects, refinance clients, or fund only technical assistance and policy work. Multilateral institutions could establish new vehicles such as investment funds or enterprise funds that would provide targeted technical assistance in combination with their debt products and support for private equity. The impact that new capital can produce in this environment is enormous.
+
+Third, there is a need for financial innovation. These institutions can provide capital to help jump-start creative financial initiatives in Ukraine that the private sector can then replicate at a much larger scale. Risk sharing, including with commercial banks, can be highly beneficial. To unleash this money effectively, these institutions should experiment with various approaches before they “triple down” on those that work best. While ambitious multi-million- and billion-dollar projects are welcome, there is need for small-scale community pilot programs that can bolster Ukraine’s resilience. For example, diversifying Ukraine’s water and energy systems to smaller-scale sources would make its infrastructure less of an easy target for missile attacks. Furthermore, multilateral projects should prioritize businesses that have a rebounding effect: those that strengthen Ukraine’s EU accession and internal absorption capacity, as well as reduce trade turnover bottlenecks such as border controls. There is an ongoing discussion regarding whether to allow multilateral institutions to use hybrid capital products to invest in start-ups but with capped returns in case the country’s recovery happens more quickly than predicted. This could encourage a more level playing field within the business environment and help ensure that equity stays within the country and thus encourages faster recovery. The opposite of this happened in 2015 when Ukraine’s government, to avoid a default, agreed with its creditors to a 20 percent write-down and delayed maturities in exchange for linking the securities to Ukraine’s GDP growth without capping the investment returns (more commonly known as GDP-linked warrants).
+
+In this regard, targeting projects and companies that can create jobs for Ukrainians — and thus attract Ukrainian externally displaced people back home — is paramount.
+
+___`DFIs and multilateral development banks (MDBs) need to be creative and further adapt their operations and capital-deployment mechanisms to support a country at war.`___
+
+Finally, Ukraine’s partners could also do more to improve governance and support the country’s fight against corruption, including through technical assistance and training programs. This is an area in which the international community can play a critical role, providing both advice and pressure for reforms. Ukrainian civil society and independent journalists are important allies in this fight.
+
+Ultimately, for DFIs and IFIs to be effective, they need to be more innovative and collaborative, willing to take more risk and to understand what specifically works in the Ukrainian market. By demonstrating a willingness to experiment and set up collaborative frameworks, they can catalyze the flow of more private capital into Ukraine. Much of this will require more effective coordination and pooling of resources among institutions, allowing them to co-invest in projects without repeating or overlapping efforts. Moreover, these institutions need to create concrete plans for execution and set specific performance indicators for measuring results and holding themselves accountable.
+
+
+### The Role of the Ukrainian Government
+
+In parallel, Ukraine needs to make more significant governance and economic reforms to reduce barriers to doing business. Kyiv is working with partners on legislation and initiatives that will improve the business climate. For example, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is assisting the National Bank of Ukraine in aligning its regulations, policies, and practices with those of the European Union regarding bank and capital market supervision. Moreover, Ukraine is working on public-private partnership (PPP) legislation that should provide more flexibility and speed for these types of ventures. Having the appropriate PPP legislation can play a significant part in Ukraine’s recovery, as international investors will be able to contribute a wide range of assets. Whatever the law is on paper, it will have to ensure that in practice there is a robust, transparent, fair, and open PPP framework that encourages privatization in key sectors such as energy and transportation. As part of a reform initiative that started in 2023, Kyiv is in the process of removing and updating hundreds of documents to boost Ukraine’s business climate.
+
+Ukraine is also developing an Export Credit Agency (ECA) that will help insure investments into the country. In April 2023, Kyiv announced it will provide state guarantees such as war insurance for domestic exporters via this agency. In addition, the Ukrainian parliament passed draft law No. 9015 at the end of November 2023 to provide war insurance for investments of both international companies and Ukrainian companies. Currently, the Ukrainian government is communicating with the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the EBRD, and other donors regarding the need for $100 million to reinsure its ECA.
+
+The war has obviously disrupted Ukraine’s financial attractiveness, so Kyiv is offering special investment agreements, according to the Ukraine Investment Promotion Office (UkraineInvest). These include
+
+- up to 30 percent state support of the investment’s capital expenditure;
+
+- state funding for the construction of related infrastructure;
+
+- up to 10 years of corporate income tax (CIT) relief for most companies; and
+
+- CIT relief for electric vehicle manufacturers through 2036.
+
+
+### The Special Role of Frozen Russian Central Bank Assets
+
+In addition to these mechanisms, there are untapped resources that could be used to buttress the private sector. There are currently more than $300 billion in Russian central bank assets in Group of Seven (G7) countries that have been frozen since the full-scale invasion. Ukraine has suggested using these assets to back the issuance of reconstruction bonds and as loss-absorbing, risk-curtailing capital. Kyiv has also demonstrated that the seizure of Russian assets is possible, as it relocated at least 28.3 billion hryvnias ($784 million) to its state coffers between February 2022 and November 2023. These assets could also be used to set up new finance vehicles, such as investment funds through which donors could provide a first-loss tranche to attract other investors.
+
+There are legal, economic, and reputational arguments for seizing these assets, and leading experts have analyzed these issues and proposed solutions to move forward. Moreover, some countries have taken initial steps to make use of these assets:
+
+- In June 2022, Canada implemented measures to enable it to seize and sell Russian assets that belong to individuals on the country’s sanctions list. More recently, the World Refugee and Migration Council, a refugee advocacy group chaired by Canada’s former minister of foreign affairs Lloyd Axworthy, advocated for a trust fund that would distribute seized Russian assets to Ukrainians.
+
+- On November 8, 2023, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved a bill to transfer billions of dollars in frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s recovery. The bill also prohibits the return of these assets to Russia until the Kremlin fully compensates Ukraine for the damage it has caused. On January 23, 2024, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity (REPO) for Ukrainians Act, which paves the way for the United States to confiscate the assets and transfer them to Ukraine.
+
+- Belgium holds about two-thirds of the EU-housed Russian assets via its Euroclear Despite Belgium being one of the largest critics of the seizing of Russian assets, Prime Minister Alexander De Croo has said the country is putting together a €1.7 billion fund for Ukraine financed by tax revenue generated from the seized Russian assets.
+
+- In January 2023, the European Council Legal Service came up with a plan for how to transfer close to $40 billion in frozen assets to fund Ukraine’s recovery.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Ukraine and its international partners need to find practical solutions to sustain Ukraine’s economy, especially to support the private sector. Creativity will be at the core of finding such a multilayered approach. By working with Ukrainian stakeholders and private actors, development and finance institutions can explore innovative tools and avenues to support current businesses in the short run and attract new investments in the medium run.
+
+There is huge business potential in Ukraine, where investors can make significant returns. However, some investors are more skeptical and believe the country is currently more of a charity case. Regardless, the opportunity is there — especially within the context of Ukraine’s path toward EU accession, availability of raw materials, large consumer base, and high-quality and relatively inexpensive labor.
+
+---
+
+__Romina Bandura__ is a senior fellow with the Project on Prosperity and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Ms. Bandura is an economist with more than 20 years of experience in international development research, policy analysis, and project management. Her current research focuses on digital transformation and the future of work in developing countries.
+
+__Ilya Timtchenko__ is the program manager and research associate with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS, where he supports the program’s research agenda, business development, and management.
+
+__Austin Hardman__ is a research assistant for the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS. In this role, he supports the team’s research agenda, business development opportunities, and event coordination.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-02-28-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-34.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-02-28-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-34.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-02-28-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-34.md
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第卅四日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2024-02-28 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 辯方：黎智英反對港獨 陳沛敏：未曾與黎深入討論、不記得黎曾否明言反對
+- 陳沛敏確認黎智英從沒指示做違國安法事情 惟當時不肯定發布黎文章是否違法
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/IEycp9Z.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（28日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第34日審訊。前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。辯方向陳展示數段訊息，以確認黎提出建議時有禮貌，惟陳雖然認同黎的語氣可謂客氣，但是當他親自提出建議的時候，「我好難置之不理咁囉。」辯方另指黎智英從不曾主張港獨，陳確認未曾聽過他有如此主張。惟當辯方指黎更加反對港獨，陳僅說：「我冇深入同佢討論過呢個問題」，也不記得黎有否使用過「我反對港獨」這類字眼來表達意見。陳另指黎建議找時評作者桑普撰文，但是他曾主張港獨，高層討論過相關法律風險之後，最後沒有邀請他撰文。
+
+已承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」控罪的前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏，第13天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻繼續盤問。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/vGjBWDY.png)
+▲ 代表黎智英的資深大律師 彭耀鴻（左）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右）
+
+#### 陳沛敏：黎智英提議時語氣客氣 惟「我好難置之不理」
+
+辯方昨日提到黎智英提出建議時態度有禮貌，他今向陳沛敏展示數段訊息以作確認。2018年5月6日，黎向陳傳送訊息：「沛敏，例如今日的頭條我們是否可以找退休警官或前 ICAC 官員撰寫些 insight 融合其中？Jist (Just) a thought. Thanks, Jimmy」；2019年4月8日，黎向陳轉發民主黨李永達的訊息：「可否考慮將其中幾個重點/分析，在新聞版逐日詳細寫，等讀者易消化」，並稱：「以上是李永達提議，是否可以像他提議再處理，或甚至找到這人訪問，可以不出面用背影出現？謝謝。」
+
+辯方問，從以上訊息可見，黎是否有禮貌地提議。陳沛敏指：「佢個語氣係客氣啦，可以咁講，但係係佢親自提出（建議）嘅話，我好難置之不理咁囉。」陳續指，時任《蘋果》社長張劍虹有時都會知道黎的建議，張會向她查問進展，「咁我會視之為我要執行嘅事囉。」
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/DUNfrtn.png)
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）
+
+#### 黎智英轉發香港監察新聞稿 陳沛敏：理解黎作為老闆推薦報導
+
+辯方另展示黎智英與陳沛敏之間的 WhatsApp 訊息紀錄，黎向陳轉發來自「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯（Benedict Rogers）的訊息和新聞稿，黎並稱：「Don’t know what you want to do with it. It’s from Ben Rogers.」，陳則回覆黎「他有傳給我們，thanks」。
+
+辯方稱，黎傳送上述訊息、提出建議之後，便沒有任何跟進，由陳決定做法如何。陳則認為，黎既已將她的聯絡電話交給羅傑斯，讓羅傑斯可以直接向她傳送新聞稿，「點解又要透過黎生，又要再傳多一次畀我呢？」因此她當時的認知是，羅傑斯會覺得若然直接傳送新聞稿給她，「我哋會未夠重視啦」，所以黎在知道羅傑斯會直接傳送給她和《蘋果》編輯的情況下，依然會替羅傑斯傳送多一次給他們，「我會理解係，黎生作為一個老闆，佢會推薦我哋出呢個新聞稿囉。」
+
+辯方指黎的做法可以有另一個詮釋，因黎是羅傑斯的朋友，所以黎認為自己有責任傳送新聞稿給編輯，但具體做法則交給編輯決定。惟陳堅稱她當時的理解是上述提及的理解，又形容黎「似乎好重視 Benedict Rogers 同埋佢個機構嘅事」。
+
+陳指正如訊息顯示，她回覆黎：「他有傳給我們，thanks」，用意是想「婉轉地話畀黎生聽，我哋其實已經收到啦」，可是正如早前庭上展示的訊息可見，每當有羅傑斯和香港監察的新聞稿，黎便會轉發給她。
+
+#### 陳沛敏：若黎認為事情不重要 大可以叫對方直接傳送新聞稿給同事
+
+辯方續展示另一組訊息，羅傑斯向黎傳送一份給被捕香港示威者的公開信，並說：「I was asked if I would release an open letter to detainees to encourage them, and so attach it here. If you felt able to cover it that would be great.」；黎回覆羅傑斯「I’ll send to my publisher for her to decide. Thanks, Jimmy」。黎之後轉發以上兩則訊息給陳。
+
+辯方指，上述訊息的其中一種解讀可以是黎不想明確答覆羅傑斯可否報導，而是交由陳沛敏決定。法官李運騰修正問法，問陳認為有沒有可能黎並不是在給予指示，而她覺得黎在給予指示，只是她的個人感覺。惟陳表示：「我覺得可能性唔大囉」，因為如果黎認為事情根本不重要，他大可以叫對方直接將新聞稿傳送給同事。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/SK7cEq9.png)
+▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）
+
+#### 陳沛敏確認有時黎會給予指示
+
+辯方展示2020年3月29日訊息紀錄，羅傑斯指與英國保守黨人權委員會成員裴德倫（Luke de Pulford）撰寫了評論文章，希望《蘋果》可以報導；黎回覆羅傑斯，會交予陳沛敏和主理網站的時任總編輯羅偉光處理。其後黎向陳轉發上述訊息，並稱「Please see what you can do to help Ben. Thanks, Jimmy」。陳回覆「收到」。
+
+辯方指，黎的訊息看起來較像「指示」，多於「提議」。陳表示「字面上可以咁講」。辯方繼而指此類情況是例外情況，問陳是否同意。陳僅表示說不出頻率，但她憑早前的訊息，例如黎就美國大選提出個人見解，或在7.1衝擊立法會事件之後感覺到要求採訪某些人，「我都會覺得係指示囉。」
+
+辯方續問陳是否同意黎很少就其建議作出跟進。陳說「可以咁講」，但是黎不只向她落指示，例如張劍虹也會知道這些指示，「咁張劍虹先生都會嚟問我跟進成點。」
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/iegxVz2.png)
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹
+
+#### 陳沛敏確認8.31放頭版 因有新聞價值 同時意識到黎很重視警暴新聞
+
+辯方續展示陳沛敏與時任執行總編輯林文宗之間的訊息紀錄，林向陳說：「我已跟社長打了招呼，星期一報紙頭版開天窗，並會有段文字交代一下我們支持罷工，但基於社會角色欲罷不能之類。」陳庭上稱當時將此決定告訴張劍虹，但不知道張有否轉告黎智英。
+
+訊息紀錄又顯示，在8.31太子站事件之後，林向陳表示：「我改太子站無差別打人做A1」、「臥底警察做A2」、「有打人，有攬住喊」。
+
+陳稱當時她已經下班，不在公司，因為8.31事件比較夜發生，林便通知她會把原本的「臥底警」頭版報導調往A2，改以8.31事件作為頭版，「當然我係同意做A1嘅，因為我喺電視睇新聞，同埋睇到社交媒體嘅一啲片段，同埋輿論嘅即時反應，咁我覺得（8.31事件）可以做A1嘅。」
+
+辯方追問，是否因為8.31太子站是一件有新聞價值的事件，而且陳反對「警暴」，所以決定做頭版。陳確認是，但她同時補充，正如她早前作供提及，她與林文宗都意識到黎很重視警暴新聞。
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/lc53mav.png)
+▲ 2019年8月31日 太子站（資料圖片）
+
+#### 黎智英提議邀請桑普撰文 後者曾主張港獨 陳沛敏：考慮法律風險後最終未有邀稿
+
+辯方另展示陳沛敏與楊清奇之間的 WhatsApp 訊息，陳曾經向楊提議邀請前《有線新聞》林妙茵撰文，又轉發社運攝影師「蕭雲」的投稿文章給楊。辯方問陳是否向楊提議，然後交由楊決定是否採用。陳則表示她在訊息中並不是「提議」，只是當有人投稿，她會傳送給楊。辯方則指這與黎智英的做法無異，分別在於黎的身份是一名老闆。陳僅指雖然她有份簽署批准楊請假，但是她不會過問論壇版的事務，新聞部與論壇版之間可謂獨立運作。
+
+二人的訊息顯示，陳曾提到黎建議找時評作者桑普撰文，問論壇版是否有位；楊則回覆「他的文章怪怪的，而且公開主張港獨。所以，一直沒敢讓他開專欄。否則，交了稿，出唔出都麻煩」。陳庭上解釋，張劍虹轉述黎智英提議邀請桑普，惟討論過相關法律風險之後，最後沒有邀請他撰文。
+
+#### 辯方：黎智英反對港獨 陳沛敏：未曾與黎深入討論
+
+辯方續指，談到港獨這話題，黎智英從不曾主張港獨，問陳是否同意。陳僅回答：「冇聽過佢有咁嘅主張。」辯方指，黎不只沒有提倡港獨，更加反對港獨，問以陳所知這說法是否正確。陳僅說：「我冇深入同佢討論過呢個問題。」
+
+法官李運騰追問陳是否知道，黎有否曾經說過他「反對港獨」。陳回答，她不記得黎有否使用過「我反對港獨」這類字眼來表達他的意見。
+
+#### 辯方：梁振英追擊廣告商 致《蘋果》收入減少
+
+辯方另提到，壹傳媒集團在2015至2018年之間錄得虧蝕，而黎智英在這段時期並不投入於集團事務。2018年之後，黎變得積極地參與在《蘋果》事務，並於2019年重新擔任壹傳媒集團主席，自此集團錄得的虧損有所減少。
+
+辯方又指，一般報紙的主要收入來源理應是廣告商，而且是銷售報紙所得收入的兩倍，可是自2020年起，《蘋果》的情況「掉返轉」，即銷售報紙和讀者訂閱所得的收入，是多於廣告收入。陳則表示不太記得，只記得《蘋果》的訂閱人數顯著增加。
+
+辯方指，自2019年3月起，《蘋果》的廣告收入大大地減少，因為前特首梁振英發動一個針對《蘋果》的「運動（campaign）」，即梁會將在《蘋果》的廣告客戶資料發布於梁的個人臉書，明顯地想廣告客戶不要在《蘋果》落廣告。而這「運動」引起了組織「無國界記者」的關注，曾發表聲明反對該「運動」。陳表示記得上述事件令《蘋果》收入減少，但是她不記得減少幅度和數據。辯方透露稍後會在證人講述相關證供。
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/Toc8zwh.png)
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+
+![image08](https://i.imgur.com/ZxaTkUS.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（28日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第34日審訊。前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。辯方指黎智英在《國安法》生效之後，向陳表示：「看了國安法細節嚇了一跳」，並籲「先要想好策略對付，不容魯莽」，意思是叫她行事不要違反《國安法》。陳亦確認高層之間曾經討論報導時避免使用某些字眼，又在黎還柙之後研究將其文章和直播節目下架。辯方指出，黎從沒有指示陳做任何違反《國安法》的事情，陳同意但同時補充，她當時雖然不肯定黎的文章是否違法，但是的確有在《蘋果》實體報紙和網站發布黎的專欄文章和直播節目。她確認如果當時意識到文章和節目觸犯國安法，是不會發布，「但係黎生嘅文，我哋基本上唔會改動，而 Live Chat 我哋更加係冇得參與。」
+
+已承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」控罪的前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏，第13天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻繼續盤問。
+
+#### 黎智英訊息稱「不容魯莽」 陳沛敏確認其後商討報導字眼、研下架黎文章 免違國安法
+
+辯方談及2020年7月《國安法》生效，黎智英向陳沛敏傳送訊息：「沛敏，看了國安法細節嚇了一跳」，並指：「香港將無法治和自由，政府行政無法無天，泛民寸步難移，動彈不得，先要想好策略對付，不容魯莽。」
+
+辯方問，以陳的理解，黎以上訊息的意思是否籲她行事不要違反《國安法》。陳表示「係」，但同時補充，正因為如此，所以當她見到黎繼續進行直播對談節目時，「我同同事都有啲驚訝囉。」
+
+辯方指，所以陳與其他編輯採取行動避免違反《國安法》，包括討論避免使用某些字眼，又研究將黎智英的文章和直播節目下架。辯方遂展示訊息紀錄，在2020年12月11日，即黎還柙之後，張劍虹向陳沛敏傳送訊息：「老闆在副刊、Twitter live、Twitter post、外媒訪問，不少被列出來做證據」，又表示會徵詢《蘋果》內部法律顧問和外間法律意見。
+
+#### 辯方：黎從沒指示做違反國安法事情 陳確認 惟補充有份刊登
+
+辯方又提到，陳早前作供表示2020年8月警方拘捕黎智英及搜查壹傳媒大樓時，她不認為《蘋果》有做任何違反事情。陳則解釋，當時雖然警方搜查報館，但是他們的講法是並非針對新聞材料，加上牽涉案件的人例如李宇軒，都不是《蘋果》的人，所以她理解警方的行動與《蘋果》所作的報導並沒有關係。
+
+![image09](https://i.imgur.com/EVJ2M1v.png)
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+辯方指出，黎從沒有指示陳做任何違反《國安法》的事情。陳說：「可以咁講。」她其後補充，黎的專欄文章和直播節目分別透過《蘋果》實體報紙和網站發布，雖然她與其他同事在內容上不能參與，但他們的確有刊登黎的文章，當然刊登時不肯定文章是否違法，「但喺咁嘅情況下，都係登咗出嚟囉。」
+
+辯方問，如果當時意識到文章和節目觸犯《國安法》，陳是否不會發布？陳表示：「可以咁講」，張劍虹亦曾提醒他們小心處理，「但係黎生嘅文，我哋基本上唔會改動，而 Live Chat 我哋更加係冇得參與。」
+
+#### 辯方稱黎純粹轉發訊息惟陳沛敏誤解為落指示
+
+早前證供提到2020年7月14日時任美國總統特朗普簽署《香港自治法》之後，黎智英向陳沛敏傳送相關行政命令內文，訊息中包含一句：「I’d say we should work up a shit list on those involved in censorship, which can include intimidation.」，因應黎的訊息，陳曾跟同事商量。
+
+辯方的說法是，上述連同行政命令和含「shit list」字眼的訊息，均是另一人的訊息，而黎純粹將該訊息轉發給陳，因「shit list」並不是黎慣用的行文字眼。
+
+辯方指陳有機會誤解黎的訊息為一個「指示」，問陳是否同意。陳則說：「但係我會覺得好奇怪，無端端整段咁嘅嘢畀我睇」，黎亦未有交代訊息是由誰人撰寫，「咁我又唔明佢嘅用意係咩囉。」辯方表示會在陳詞中處理此議題。
+
+#### 辯方：黎從沒叫其他人「撐住」 陳沛敏不同意
+
+辯方庭上播放《蘋果》25週年慶典的錄影片段，黎智英在壹傳媒大樓內向員工發表講話，陳確認當時她在場。辯方指，黎說：「無人會迫你哋點樣去做，無人會迫到你哋做烈士」，意思是他不會叫人去違反《國安法》。陳則回應：「我諗佢（黎）呢個係一個好空泛嘅講法，啫係佢話喺呢度返工都係你嘅決定嚟嘅。」
+
+辯方指，黎智英在2020年12月還柙之後，曾說自己會「撐住」，但沒有叫其他外面的人「撐住」。陳堅稱：「我記憶中，佢有叫公司嘅人撐住囉。」
+
+![image10](https://i.imgur.com/bxHYFUz.png)
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+辯方遂展示張劍虹於2020年12月7日傳送給陳沛敏的訊息：「老闆說，不要把他新聞放太大，我說已經沒有」，又列出黎的說話：「1. 不用擔心我；2. 對我來講，係造化，有機會定落嚟睇吓書；3. 亂世，仍然要往前行」，陳回覆張：「收到他很勇敢，宗教信仰也有幫助」。辯方指以上訊息並沒有提及「撐住」。陳僅說：「佢係冇用到呢個字眼囉。」
+
+辯方指，事實上陳探訪黎的時候，黎亦沒有叫外面的人「撐住」，並向陳出示由她本人撰寫的文章，當中提及她第二次到監獄探訪黎：「他說讀報看到有關47人案的文章，很感動。『我會撐住，但我唔會叫出面啲人撐住囉。』他的意思是，香港情況太壞，叫人撐住，撐下去的人承擔的代價可能很大。」陳則回應，根據撰寫文章當時的語境，黎是指初選案，因為他有些朋友來自政界，所以「出面啲人」是指政界和社運界朋友，而黎的意思是叫這些朋友撐住，代價會很大。
+
+#### 陳沛敏確認《蘋果》報導角度不變 於法律限制之內
+
+辯方在庭上播放2021年5月《蘋果》全體員工大會的錄音，張劍虹發言時稱：「我哋唔係犯法，我哋唔係一個犯罪組織，我哋係做新聞㗎嘛」，辯方問陳是否相信張的說法。陳表示：「我當時係相信張先生講嘅嘢。」
+
+辯方續指，張在大會中引述黎智英的獄中信：「新聞自由的工作是危險的，大家保重，盡量要小心。」辯方指張的意思是不但高層要小心，前線同事也要小心。陳確認張有說過上述說話，但她補充張同時有說：「咁樣唔代表我哋褪呔，《蘋果》絕對唔會褪呔。」
+
+辯方指《蘋果》的報導角度不會改變，但同時會在法律限制之內。陳回答：「可以咁講。」
+
+案件明日續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-02-29-food-as-silent-weapon.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-02-29-food-as-silent-weapon.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Food As “Silent Weapon”
+author: Caitlin Welsh and Joseph Glauber
+date  : 2024-02-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/EGdAQj2.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Russia’s Gains and Ukraine’s Losses"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_As Russia’s war on Ukraine enters its third year, new data on the growth of Russia’s global agricultural market shares and the extent to which it has forcefully diminished Ukraine’s production and exports indicates a long-term trend._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+### Introduction
+
+Russia’s war in Ukraine has caused the greatest military-related disruption to global agricultural markets in at least a century. Ukraine’s agricultural sector has been a major front in Russia’s war since February 2022, and the primary purpose of Russia’s targeting of Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure is likely to undercut a main source of Ukraine’s income. Ukraine’s GDP contracted by more than 29 percent in 2022 compared to 2021, and the value of agriculture as a proportion of Ukraine’s GDP was 39 percent lower in 2022 than 2021.
+
+The global disruptions to the agricultural market due to Ukraine’s diminished production and exports have been stark: world food prices reached all-time nominal highs in March 2022, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization Food Price Index. In 2022, 258 million people suffered from acute food insecurity, an all-time high, according to the Global Report on Food Crises. At the same time, the cost of addressing these challenges also soared due to concurrent shocks in the global energy and fertilizer markets brought on by Russia’s war. For example, the cost of the delivery of humanitarian assistance also peaked due to the increased cost of food and fuel for operations. At the same time, for countries hoping to address domestic food insecurity with domestic agricultural production, the increased cost of fertilizer became a limiting factor. Likewise, countries dealing with the high price of food imports, high prices of agricultural inputs, and high levels of food insecurity also had less fiscal space for social programs following the Covid-19 pandemic, which drained national budgets.
+
+If Ukraine’s depleted agricultural GDP has been a boon to Russia, the rising global food insecurity that has resulted from Russia’s war has also been beneficial: Ukraine’s diminished exports have created openings for Russia, another major global agricultural exporter, to make up for Ukraine’s losses, with Russia using its agricultural exports as a source of soft power. In early 2022, Dmitry Medvedev, the former Russian president and current deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, declared food to be Russia’s “silent weapon.” By August 2023, President Vladimir Putin declared Moscow’s intention to “replace Ukrainian grain” with Russian grain, particularly to “needy countries.”
+
+Since 2022, data show increases in Russia’s production and exports and decreases in Ukraine’s production and exports of key agricultural commodities. However, the specific regions to which Russia has exported more, and to which Ukraine has exported less, are unclear. Likewise, trends in Russia’s fertilizer exports have been difficult to discern. Using the best data available, this white paper assesses the change in Ukraine and Russia’s agricultural exports and trading partners for wheat and corn, as well as Russia’s fertilizer exports, since February 2022.
+
+
+### The Impact of the War on Ukraine’s Crop Production
+
+The war has had direct and indirect impacts on agricultural production in Ukraine. The occupied regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia accounted for about 21 percent of wheat, 17 percent of barley, and 19 percent of sunflower seed produced in Ukraine between 2016 and 2020, while very little corn is grown in the occupied areas. Analysis by NASA Harvest, NASA’s Global Food Security and Agriculture Consortium, estimates that the amount of abandoned cropland in Ukraine in 2023 due to the war is equivalent to about 7.5 percent of total cropland in the country. In addition, the war has increased the costs of transporting grain and other agricultural products to export markets. Most of these costs have been absorbed by Ukrainian producers in the form of lower prices, which has reduced profitability of crops such as wheat and corn. As a result, Ukraine has planted and harvested fewer crops. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates that harvested area for wheat, corn (maize), and barley for 2023 is down 32 percent, 27 percent, and 37 percent, respectively, from 2021 levels.[1] Sunflower area is also down 15 percent, while the combined area for soybeans and rapeseed has actually increased 21 percent. However, net area for the six crops is down 19.5 percent over the past two years. For 2024, Ukrainian producers are expected to cut corn-planted areas further but continue to increase areas with oilseeds, especially soybeans, according to survey results from a recent survey from the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine.
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/0MqyVHY.png)
+_▲ Figure 1: Ukraine Harvested Area_
+
+
+### Impacts on Ukrainian Exports
+
+The impact of the war on Ukrainian exports was immediate (see Figure 2). Shipping out of Ukraine’s ports on the Black Sea came to a halt in the week leading up to the invasion as shipping lanes were mined and Russian ships patrolled sea lanes. By the time of the invasion on February 24, Ukraine had shipped most of its wheat and barley harvested in the previous summer, but about 40 to 45 percent of its corn remained to be shipped. With shipping out of the Black Sea halted, exports were transported over land and by river on rail, truck, and barge through Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania to destinations in Europe and to the Romanian port of Constanta. These so-called solidarity lanes exported about one-third of the level that would typically be shipped through the Black Sea ports during that period. As crops planted in the fall began to be harvested in the spring, Ukrainian producers began to face storage constraints which, combined with higher transportation costs, drove down local grain and oilseed prices. Sunflower seed crushers, many located near Black Sea port facilities, found it more profitable to export the oilseed rather than the oil and meal components.
+
+The UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) went into effect in late July 2022, and Ukrainian grain and oilseed exports resumed shipping out of three ports around Odesa. Export volumes more than doubled, which eased storage constraints at a critical juncture when the fall harvest began. By February 2022, grain export levels were approaching prewar totals. Russia temporarily suspended the agreement in November 2022 and then repeatedly threatened to pull out in 2023 before finally terminating the agreement in July 2023. Nonetheless, over the 12 months during which the BSGI was in effect, Ukraine shipped nearly 33 million metric tons (mmt) of grains and other agricultural products from its Black Sea ports, which helped contribute to a decline in international prices of staple foods and helped sustain global food supplies.
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/nlvKvkS.png)
+_▲ Figure 2: Ukraine Grain Exports, January 2022 – November 2023_
+
+Termination of the BSGI resulted in a sharp decrease in exports in the late summer and early fall of 2023 as exporters sought alternative routes. Ukraine’s military successes in the Black Sea resulted in a retreat of the Russian naval fleet from the western Black Sea, which helped enable the re-establishment of a “humanitarian corridor” that allows shipping of agricultural products from Black Sea ports. Export volumes by the late fall of 2023 had rebounded significantly.
+
+
+### How the War Has Affected Trade Flows
+
+Disruption to shipping in the Black Sea has resulted in more Ukrainian exports going to Europe and less going to regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Between January 2021 and February 2022, less than 2 percent of total Ukrainian wheat exports went to European markets, but since February 2022, European markets have received 50 percent of total wheat exports (see Figure 3). While countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA, including Turkey) remain large markets for Ukraine, the share of exports has dropped from 53 percent to 34 percent over these same periods. The largest impact to wheat exports has been felt by Sub-Saharan Africa, which fell from 10 percent to 3 percent, and South and Southeast Asia, which fell from 30 percent to 12 percent.
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/np9FkYs.png)
+_▲ Figure 3: Ukraine Corn Wheat Exports by Region, January 2021 – November 2023_
+
+Europe also saw a large increase in corn imports from Ukraine after February 2022 (see Figure 4). Over 64 percent of total corn exports from Ukraine went to European markets after the start of the war, compared to 36 percent in the 14-month period prior to the invasion. Corn exports to Middle East and North African countries (including Turkey) dropped from almost 25 percent of total exports to 17 percent. Ukraine corn exports to East Asia (primarily China) have also fallen since the war. Corn exports to East Asia accounted for over 34 percent of total corn exports before the invasion, but that share fell to less than 19 percent after February 2022.
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/dXRg7X5.png)
+_▲ Figure 4: Ukraine Corn (Maize) Exports by Region, January 2021 – November 2023_
+
+
+### Impacts of the War on Russian Exports of Wheat and Fertilizers
+
+Russia is the world’s largest exporter of wheat and accounts for a large share of global exports of fertilizer components such as potash, urea, diammonium phosphate (DAP), and anhydrous ammonia. Market prices for these commodities spiked after the invasion in February 2022, in part because of the fear that Russian exports, as well as Ukraine’s, would be adversely affected. The sanctions imposed by the European Union, United States, Canada, and other countries on Russia and Belarus following Russia’s 2022 invasion included restrictions on banking, trade, technology transfers, and specific individuals. (These came on top of earlier sanctions on both countries — on Russia in response to its 2014 annexation of Crimea and on Belarus in response to human rights violations in 2020 and its forced grounding of Ryanair Flight 4798 to seize a dissident journalist in 2021.) But these sanctions exempted the agricultural sector, including inputs such as fertilizers, to avoid side effects on global food security.
+
+Russian wheat production over the past two marketing seasons has been at a record high due to record plantings and yields (see Figure 5). The USDA estimates that Russian wheat exports will likely be a record-high 51 mmt for the 2023–2024 marketing year.
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/2YAAZP8.png)
+_▲ Figure 5: Russian Wheat Production and Exports_
+
+Analyzing the impact of the war on Russian exports is complicated by the fact that Russia discontinued reporting exports (and imports) to the United Nations in early 2022. To estimate the impacts on trade, one must resort to so-called mirror trade methodologies (aggregating data from importing countries who report imports from Russia) or by examining maritime shipment data that is collected by private sources. Neither is ideal, but shipment data for wheat is superior to mirror trade data, as the latter only captures a small share of total exports due to missing key data from regions where import reporting lags, such as Sub-Saharan Africa. (For example, for the July 2020–June 2021 marketing year, Russia reported wheat exports at 38.1 mmt, while mirror trade data over the same period showed only 14.0 mmt.) This paper uses shipment data collected by KPLR and processed by the International Grains Council (IGC) and World Trade Organization (WTO) and published by the WTO’s Global Trade Data Portal.
+
+Cumulative shipment data collected over the period July 1, 2023, to January 31, 2024, allows a comparison of exports during the current 2023/24 marketing year to last year’s exports over the same seven-month period and to a three-year average level taken over the 2020–2021, 2021–2022, and 2022–2023 periods (see Figure 6). Russian wheat exports dipped in the first few months after the invasion began but recovered by mid-summer that year. Total wheat shipments over the period July 1, 2023, to January 31, 2024, totaled 22.1 mmt, compared to 21.9 million tons for the same period last year and an average 20.4 mmt over the three-year average).
+
+Figure 6 shows that more wheat shipments during the 2022–2023 marketing year went to North Africa and Western Asia and proportionately less wheat went to Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern and Southeastern Asian markets than in prior years. But for the first seven months of the 2023/24 marketing years, Russia’s wheat trade has largely reverted to more traditional pattern, with more wheat going to Sub-Saharan Africa.
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/Uw3sYHn.png)
+_▲ Figure 6: Russia Cumulative Wheat Exports through January 31_
+
+The impact of the war on Russia’s fertilizer exports has been mixed (see Table 1). Based on mirror trade data, potash exports were down in 2022 compared to 2020 and 2021 levels but have rebounded strongly in 2023. Urea and DAP exports both were up in 2022 and for the first 11 months of 2023. By contrast, exports of anhydrous ammonia fell by more than 70 percent in 2022 and have declined further in 2023. This largely reflects the impacts of the closure of the Tolyatti-Pivdennyi ammonia pipeline and Russia’s difficulties in moving exports to more remote ports on the Baltic Sea. Unlike for wheat, where key import data is lacking, mirror trade data for fertilizer typically captures 80–90 percent of exports based on data for 2020 and 2021.
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/B9FkiZK.png)
+_▲ Table 1: Global Fertilizer Imports from Russia_
+
+
+### Analysis
+
+The data presented here offer insights regarding the impact of Russia’s war on agricultural production, exports, and market shares for both Ukraine and Russia.
+
+Ukraine’s wheat and corn exports have fallen relative to prewar exports for every region except Europe. Wheat exports to Europe grew from 2 percent in the period preceding Russia’s invasion to 50 percent post-invasion, and corn exports to Europe grew from 36 percent pre-invasion to 64 percent. These figures mask the ultimate destinations of much of Ukraine’s wheat and corn, as some European countries further export Ukrainian grains to countries outside of the region. Nonetheless, the sudden increase in Ukrainian exports to its European neighbors resulted in market disruptions in many of these countries, particularly the “frontline five” — Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. Trade disputes have erupted between Ukraine and these countries, and disagreements have emerged within the European Union regarding ways to maintain support for Ukraine’s agriculture sector while not overburdening its neighbors’ agricultural markets or diminishing their farmers’ incomes. Agricultural market disruptions have influenced national elections in some countries, and tensions with Ukraine and within the European Union are ongoing.
+
+While Ukraine’s exports to Europe spiked and exports to all other regions fell, one country noticeably affected is China. Prior to Russia’s invasion, East Asia (primarily China) accounted for 34 percent of Ukraine’s corn exports, but it has accounted for less than 19 percent since February 2022. While the BSGI was operational, China was the major beneficiary of Ukraine’s exports, importing nearly 8 million of the almost 33 mmt of grains and other agricultural products exported under the BSGI between July 2022 and July 2023. Almost 73 percent of China’s imports (by volume) from Ukraine under the BSGI was corn, with Ukraine providing 27 percent of China’s corn imports during this period. China’s reliance on Ukraine as a relatively inexpensive source of corn, a major form of animal feed, kept these countries close for much of the period since Russia invaded Ukraine, perhaps tempering Russia’s influence on China during this period. Since the cessation of the BSGI, however, China has turned from Ukraine to South America, mainly Brazil, as a source of corn.
+
+From the prewar period to today, Ukraine’s wheat exports to Sub-Saharan Africa fell from 10 percent of Ukraine’s total to 3 percent, and Ukraine’s wheat exports to North Africa fell from 53 percent to 34 percent. Whether Russia has successfully “replaced” Ukraine as a source of wheat to the African continent is not possible to determine with available data, but certain patterns are clear. Between the 2022–2023 and 2023–2024 marketing year, Russia’s exports of wheat increased to each WTO region of Sub-Saharan Africa (Eastern Africa, Central Africa, Western Africa, and Southern Africa). In this period, Russia has tried to assuage opposition from African countries who disapproved of Russia’s termination of the BSGI on the grounds that it would increase the cost of food imports. Speaking at a Russia-Africa summit in St. Petersburg on July 27, 2023, President Putin said that Russia was ready to replace Ukrainian grain exports to Africa and offered to provide Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic, and Eritrea with 25,000–50,000 metric tons of free grain each in the next three to four months. Russian state news reported on February 21, 2024 that Russia’s agriculture ministry had completed delivery of grains to these countries, including 25,000 million tons of wheat each to Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Mali, and Zimbabwe, and 50,000 million tons of wheat to Somalia and the Central African Republic. In September 2023, Russia announced an agreement with Turkey and Qatar to move 1 mmt of Russian grains to the “neediest countries” in Africa. Increased exports to Sub-Saharan Africa reflect efforts by Russia to bolster support in the region and deflate criticism over termination of the BSGI.
+
+Russia’s wheat exports to North Africa for the first seven months of 2023–2024 are down from the same period a year ago, but their market share has remained roughly the same at 47 percent, and North Africa remains the top destination of Russian wheat. Russian wheat exports to Western Asia over the first seven months of 2023–2024 have similarly declined, but Russia’s market share has actually increased from 51 percent to 59 percent.
+
+The BSGI had promised to secure Russia’s exports of anhydrous ammonia through the Tolyatti-Pivdennyi pipeline, which terminates near Odesa. Ukraine has obstructed the flow of ammonia through the pipeline since February 2022. In early June 2023, Russia and Ukraine reported damage to the pipeline. As a result, BSGI-facilitated inspections of ships into and out of Pivdennyi ground to a halt in June 2023. Some analysts suggested that repairs to the pipeline, and eventual resumption of exports of Russia’s anhydrous ammonia, would be necessary to renew the BSGI in July 2023. Instead, Russia terminated the deal that month.
+
+Regarding fertilizer, Russia’s exports of potash, urea, and diammonium phosphate have rebounded, though exports of anhydrous ammonia have stalled. Sales of all fertilizer types were lower during the first 10 months of 2022 than in November and December of that year. Nonetheless, because Russia’s war disrupted fertilizer markets, causing fertilizer prices to climb, Russia’s revenues from fertilizer sales in the first 10 months of 2022 were 70 percent higher than the same period in 2021. One of Russia’s explanations for terminating the BSGI was that its own agriculture sector has suffered during the war and particularly since the BSGI was implemented. Record-high levels of wheat exports and rebounding sales of fertilizers (except anhydrous ammonia) indicate Russia’s bluff, underscoring the real reasons Russia has been targeting Ukraine’s agriculture sector: to gain wartime economic and political advantage.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Agriculture and food security are central to Russia’s war strategy. Ukraine’s agricultural sector has been a major target of Russia’s attacks since February 2022. Ukraine’s agricultural production, exports, and GDP have declined as a direct result. Russia’s war in Ukraine has also led to historic disruptions to global agriculture, energy, and fertilizer markets, with food insecurity increasing among millions as a result. Russia has exploited food insecurity in low- and lower-middle-income countries for its benefit in two ways: (1) by aiming to decrease (or even eliminate) Ukraine as a source of food for these countries, thereby decreasing Ukraine’s potential influence in these places, and (2) by increasing these countries’ reliance on Russia as a source of food, thereby increasing Russia’s influence.
+
+Since February 2022, it is apparent that Russia’s production and exports of food has increased, and that Ukraine’s has decreased. The data presented here sheds light regarding the specific regions to which Russia’s exports have increased and the regions to which Ukraine has exported less because of Russia’s war. Time and innovations in trade data will further clarify the patterns explained here. Without a significant change in the course of the war, however, one can expect Russia to continue to use food and fertilizer as potent soft power tools, and to continue to capitalize on the destruction of Ukraine’s agriculture sector and the damage done to global food security as a result.
+
+---
+
+__Caitlin Welsh__ is the director of the Global Food and Water Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she analyzes the drivers and consequences of food and water insecurity around the world, including for U.S. national security. Her specific areas of focus include the impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine on global food security and nutrition, food insecurity in the U.S. military, and the coherence between U.S. global water security policy and U.S. global food security policy.
+
+__Joe Glauber__ is a senior research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and currently serves as interim secretary of the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS). He is also a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a non-resident senior adviser at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-02-29-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-35.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-02-29-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-35.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-02-29-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-35.md
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第卅五日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2024-02-29 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 辯方：黎智英開會談業務、改善報紙 非落編採指示 陳沛敏：黎一錘定音
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/nRW0eYN.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（29日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第35日審訊。前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。辯方指，黎智英在2018年有見《蘋果》內部士氣低落，遂設立「飯盒會」以收集員工的意見。辯方又指，黎重視報紙質素，「飯盒會」是為了討論公司業務、經營事宜和如何改善報紙，而不是為了給予編採指示。惟陳沛敏表示：「唔係好同意」，因黎有在會上提及編採指示，「如果你話改善報紙，好難唔觸及點樣做新聞。」而且她形容黎「都係一個好有睇法嘅人」，有些時候會比較強勢，雖然會議上有討論，但最後決定會由黎一錘定音。
+
+已承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」控罪的前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏，第14天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻繼續盤問。
+
+#### 辯方：《蘋果》士氣低落 飯盒會設立目的是收集員工意見
+
+辯方昨日提到，黎智英在2014年下半年辭去壹傳媒主席，《蘋果》其後錄得虧蝕，但黎在2018年回來積極參與之後，公司利潤有所增長，但是《蘋果》內部的士氣仍然低落，所以黎想設立渠道與員工溝通。陳僅指：「我記得佢（黎）係改善咗飯堂嘅服務囉。」
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/uKkAyNW.png)
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）
+
+辯方續指，「飯盒會」設立的目的是收集《蘋果》員工的意見。惟陳表示：「佢（黎）搞飯盒會，我會覺得佢係會多啲佢嘅理念」，包括做生意和時政的理念。
+
+辯方續指，黎智英更籌備問卷調查，以收集員工意見，並展示2018年5月的訊息紀錄，顯示陳向黎傳送問卷調查的初稿過目。辯方又展示陳沛敏與時任《蘋果》執行總編輯林文宗的訊息紀錄，林向陳傳送「老闆同網主管開會的紀錄」，顯示黎曾經與《蘋果》網站主管開會。辯方問陳，這是否「飯盒會」的前身，陳則不肯定。
+
+#### 陳沛敏形容黎智英「好有睇法」 若對某議題有興趣會講多些 若缺興趣會輕輕帶過
+
+辯方指，黎在該段時候開始與不同部門開「飯盒會」，包括實體報紙、網站、廣告部門等的「飯盒會」。在開會之前兩至三日，黎會先要求員工就一些議題提出問題和意見，而出席會議的人會透過通訊平台 Slack 群組提出觀點，以替會議設立討論框架。
+
+陳指「飯盒會」上會討論 Slack 群組所設立的框架，「但係我有個感覺係，如果黎生對某個題目冇好大興趣嘅話，就會輕輕帶過」，她又指，「咁黎生都係一個好有睇法嘅人，如果黎生有個題目係好想講，佢會講多啲，同埋發揮多啲佢嘅意見囉。」
+
+辯方指，「飯盒會」的總結會被傳閱，以讓員工做跟進工作。陳確認會議紀錄由張劍虹負責，當張沒有出席會議時，她才會負責會議紀錄。若果黎未能出席會議，便沒有需要開「飯盒會」，因管理層之間可以直接開會。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/L4Tldfh.png)
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹
+
+#### 辯方：飯盒會為討論業務、改善報紙而設 而非供黎落編採指示
+
+辯方指，黎智英重視報紙質素，設立「飯盒會」的用意是討論公司業務、經營事宜和如何改善報紙，而不是為了給予編採指示。陳則回答：「唔係好同意。」因為黎會提到辯方所指如何改善報紙生意和經營策略，但是他亦會講一些編採指示，而且出席會議的人都是編採人員，「有時好難分開」，「如果你話改善報紙，好難唔觸及點樣做新聞。」
+
+辯方質疑，如果會上有提到編採指示的話，會議紀錄理應會顯示出來。惟陳指會議紀錄只會講重點和需要跟進的工作。
+
+辯方則指「編採指示」的意思是特定指示某些新聞要報導、某些新聞不要報導，而不是指一般的報導角度。法官李運騰問，黎有否在會議中提及哪些新聞要報導、哪些新聞不要報導。惟陳指黎比較少講哪些新聞不要報導，但是當發生重大的新聞，例如2019年的社會運動和2020年爆發疫情，這些事件不常見，而且持續很長時間，黎便會在該段時期的「飯盒會」中提及。陳又指，黎當然不會要求訪問特定的示威者，但是他「可能講到嗰個方向，例如佢想講多啲呢啲人嘅心聲」。
+
+李官續問，黎有否在「飯盒會」上提及一般的新聞角度。陳回答：「我嘅認知係都會有討論到囉。」
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/3Kd9Pom.png)
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 陳沛敏：雖有討論 但最後由黎智英一錘定音
+
+辯方向陳展示《蘋果》Slack 群組「港蘋報紙對話」的訊息紀錄，張劍虹會傳出「飯盒會」的會議紀錄重點，黎智英曾吩咐陳根據張傳出來的會議紀錄作出跟進；黎智英亦曾在群組中要求各位同事，就「報紙雜誌化」過程中做了什麼、準備做些什麼，在群組中提出意見，陳歸納意見後傳出群組，黎回覆會稍後一起討論。
+
+陳又確認，從訊息紀錄可見，黎會就林文宗提出的建議回應，但同時補充：「咁其實都係會觸及到做新聞的角度。」她又指，黎作為老闆在「飯盒會」上給予的意見，會作為總結及跟進工作；相反，如果黎在會上提出某些事情不需要做，他們便不會作任何跟進。
+
+陳同意辯方所指，黎會就一些議題與其他人討論，之後才得出結論，但她同時重申：「黎生係好有睇法，同埋喺某啲時候都係比較強勢」，所以最後會由黎一錘定音。
+
+不過辯方指，黎有時會使用「呢個意見幾好，我哋咁樣做啦」之類的言辭，例如黎在群組中說：「OK。就依他們做法吧。謝謝。」陳亦確認。
+
+#### 陳沛敏：「飯盒會」會議紀錄只會寫下黎智英同意及需要跟進事項
+
+被問到庭上展示的 Slack 群組訊息紀錄是否準確地反映黎與員工之間的討論，陳確認。但當法官李運騰問到，以「飯盒會」的討論而言，是否能如實及準確地反映在上載至群組的會議紀錄中。陳則說：「只能夠講呢個（會議紀錄）係一個簡略」，若然「飯盒會」有一小時，他們只會將黎智英同意而且需要跟進的事項寫在會議紀錄中。
+
+辯方指出，「飯盒會」的討論主要是關於公司業務和怎樣改善報紙，問陳是否同意。陳同意會議會談到這些議題，但是亦會討論到時事和新聞報導角度。她又指，黎會要求邀請哪些作者替論壇版撰文，或者要求報導和訪問多些曾經質疑內地隱瞞疫情的人。
+
+辯方則指，新冠肺炎病毒源頭是有新聞價值，而且是全球關注的議題。陳確認。
+
+案件明日續審。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-03-01-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-36.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-03-01-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-36.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..472a4f37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-03-01-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-36.md
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第卅六日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2024-03-01 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 陳沛敏：黎智英對示威者非和平手段諒解、認同「和勇不分」
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/kDpCygS.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（1日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第36日審訊。前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。陳供稱，在2019年之後，黎會以諒解態度看待示威者的非和平手段，例如7月1日示威者衝擊立法會之後，黎想《蘋果》報導多些年青人心聲，從而「令公眾都會諒解，同明白點解佢哋會咁做」。陳又指，基於對運動的支持，黎亦會認同「和勇不分」。
+
+已承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」控罪的前《蘋果日報》副社長陳沛敏，第15天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻繼續盤問。
+
+#### 辯方：封面報導指黎智英「出賣」壹週刊 社長未有因此被處罰
+
+辯方向陳沛敏展示2017年7月20日的《壹週刊》封面，題為〈出賣壹週刊內幕〉。辯方問陳，是否同意封面上的黎智英黑白大頭照看似不討好（unflattering）。惟法官杜麗冰打斷指這是一個很主觀的形容。
+
+辯方則指，該期封面似乎指稱黎智英出賣由他一手創辦的《壹週刊》，當時負責此封面的《壹週刊》社長黃麗裳，並沒有因此而被處罰。惟陳表示她對《壹週刊》的內部事務不太清楚。辯方則指，根據公司年報所述，黃於1998年2月入職，直至2017年10月，之後於2018年重新入職，這是不爭議的紀錄。
+
+法官杜麗冰一度指，「出賣」的中文意思未必帶有背叛或負面的意思，有可能純粹指「出售」。法官李運騰留意到，封面標題中的「出賣」兩字是黃色，不肯定是否有特別意思。辯方回應指，標題可以有很多字眼選擇，但是他們選擇了使用「出賣」一詞，如此措辭至少是引人注目（eye-catching）。
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/i5Bn6yN.png)
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 辯方指媒體有特定立場並不是問題 陳沛敏同意
+
+辯方談及新聞角度，問陳是否同意不同報紙或媒體均可以有不同報導角度。陳同意。辯方舉例指，《紐約時報》立場上比較偏向自由主義（liberal），《華爾街日報》立場則偏向保守（conservative）。法官杜麗冰打斷指，辯方的例子未必恰當，因以上兩間媒體的取態隨著不同時期而改變，只能說他們較支持美國民主黨或共和黨，而不能說他們較傾向自由主義或保守。
+
+辯方遂以本地報紙為例，《蘋果》在2020年的時候較傾向自由主義（liberal）和對於政府較批判性。陳確認：「可以咁講。」
+
+辯方續指，《明報》和《經濟日報》則稍微偏向保守和支持政府。陳則笑言：「我唔想演繹其他傳媒嘅路線。」辯方指，《文匯報》和《大公報》則是比較極端的例子，兩者都是支持政府。陳回答：「我觀察到都係嘅。」她亦同意辯方所指媒體有特定立場並不是問題。
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/beTg6Dk.png)
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》執行總編輯 林文宗（左）、副社長 陳沛敏（右）
+
+#### 陳沛敏：2019年後黎智英對非和平手法諒解
+
+辯方盤問完畢。其後控方代表、助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤作出覆問。陳早前供稱黎智英在2019年之前主張和平示威，控方問陳，在2019年之後，黎的立場又如何呢？陳回答：「我係會覺得，佢對於非和平嗰啲手法，佢係會用一種諒解嘅態度囉」，例如7月1日示威者衝擊立法會，事件在好多人眼中並不是和平，「佢畀我嘅指示係，我會理解為，因為佢唔想個運動消失或者停止啦」，所以黎會想《蘋果》報導多些年青人心聲，「令公眾都會諒解，同明白點解佢哋會咁做。」
+
+陳又指，當時示威者之間有一句口號「和勇不分」，即和平和勇武示威者要團結，「咁黎生同樣，因為對個運動個支持，都會認同呢個講法囉。」她又確認早前提及按照黎的觀點來行事，當中的觀點包括上述提及的觀點。
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/pbnN2n0.png)
+▲ 黎智英（資料圖片）
+
+#### 陳沛敏指報導要基於事實 確保編採自主乃靠同事意識
+
+辯方早前盤問時提及《蘋果日報編輯室約章》，控方指約章於2019年4月1日生效，陳確認。其中第五條指出「新聞報道秉持真實、公正、客觀、獨立原則，這並非等於將所有各方觀點、所有資料全部鋪陳出來，而是不受任何政府、商業、宗教或其他利益左右」。陳沛敏同意不同的報紙可以持有不同的政治立場，可以在社論中討論哪一個政治系統較好，但是第五條所指的「新聞報道」是基於事實真相去做報導，所以新聞報導與評論文章是不同的。假設有人將評論文章投稿，該文章明顯是表達觀點和立場，但新聞報導則是基於事實。
+
+法官杜麗冰問陳是否同意，不論報館的立場如何，他們都應該「秉持真實、公正、客觀、獨立原則」。陳同意。
+
+法官李運騰問到，《蘋果》有否設立任何機制去確保「編採自主」。陳一邊思考一邊表示：「其實都係靠同事自己嘅意識囉⋯⋯啫係 awareness。」
+
+#### 陳沛敏：黎智英支持罷工 員工關注能否行使罷工權
+
+控方展示陳沛敏與時任執行總編輯林文宗之間的訊息紀錄，2019年8月1日陳向林說：「我已跟社長打了招呼，星期一報紙頭版開天窗，並會有段文字交代一下我們支持罷工，但基於社會角色欲罷不能之類。」
+
+陳沛敏補充相關事件背景，公司的人都知道黎支持罷工和有叫張劍虹寫「反送中」和「罷工、罷課、罷市」毛筆字，有部份中層和前線的同事提出「可唔可以行使佢哋嘅罷工權呢？」，「咁我哋管理層呢，就覺得我哋作為傳媒嘅角色，我哋唔可以話我哋參加罷工而唔出報紙。咁我哋拗咗好耐呢件事，我哋最後決定咁樣處理」，即頭版留白。
+
+控方問到頭版「開天窗」是誰人的主意。陳回答：「係管理層商討出嚟呢個方法，既解釋到點解我哋唔可以參加罷工，但又表達咗我哋嘅態度囉。」
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/lOXAn4A.png)
+▲ （資料圖片）
+
+#### 黎智英訊息稱「先要想好策略對付，不用魯莽」 陳沛敏：未細心思考「策略」所指為何
+
+2020年7月1日，黎智英向陳傳送訊息稱看到《國安法》條文後「嚇了一跳」，又籲「先要想好策略對付，不用魯莽」。控方問陳，黎所指的「策略」是什麼、「魯莽」是指什麼。陳則指黎當時「就咁好空泛咁講完啦」，而時任社長張劍虹曾經提醒他們報導敏感字眼、敏感題目時要謹慎，因此她理解「不要魯莽」是這個意思。
+
+控方追問黎所稱「對付」是要對付什麼？陳表示當時沒有細心思考要「對付」什麼，因為黎之後稱「劍虹已有方案」，所以她理解張劍虹稍後會跟她詳細解釋，因而「冇深入諗黎生講嘅策略係乜嘢」。
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/TtfrKdC.png)
+▲ 前《蘋果日報》社長 張劍虹
+
+#### 報導指陳與黎共事多年不影響新聞判斷 陳：關於法庭報導重點應否落在黎身上
+
+辯方早前問及黎智英的觀點會否影響到陳沛敏的新聞判斷，而辯方引述2021年6月18日刊登的《蘋果》報導〈夫︰她冷靜堅強鎮定 陳沛敏選擇留在災難現場〉，當中提及同年4月1日，黎智英、民主黨創黨主席李柱銘和前公民黨立法會議員吳靄儀等人因為非法集結罪成，並指：「敏姐說，雖然與黎智英共事多年，不影響新聞判斷，當日頭條重點是資深大律師中資歷最深的李柱銘首次被判罪成。」
+
+控方問該次報導的背景。陳解釋是關於一宗非法集結的報導，該案件中黎智英是其中一個被定罪的被告，有編輯詢問報導重點是否應該落在黎身上，但她與其他同事則覺得，另一名被告李柱銘是首次被判罪成，所以報導重點應該放在李身上。
+
+翻查資料，黎智英、李柱銘等人牽涉8.18「流水式集會」而被裁定組織及參與未經批准集結罪成。相關上訴程序仍然進行中。
+
+#### 陳沛敏質疑網上節目參考《頭條新聞》加入評論環節不符認真報導風格 惟黎堅持
+
+控方向陳沛敏展示通訊軟件 Slack 群組「港蘋報紙對話」的訊息紀錄，其中2019年9月的「飯盒會」會議議程包括討論「最近公眾最關心的8.31」、「福健幫起底」、「勇武升級的考量」和「可供讀者收藏的百日特刊」等。陳確認「百日特刊」是指《自由之夏》。
+
+2020年5月6日的群組訊息顯示，黎智英要求「飯盒會」改期舉行。控方問為何要改期。陳指因為張劍虹未能準備該次「飯盒會」，她確認後來改期進行的「飯盒會」上有討論到《蘋果》英文版。
+
+2020年10月的群組訊息紀錄曾提及參考已遭停播的港台節目《頭條新聞》。陳沛敏解釋，當時黎提出籌備一個類似電視新聞的節目，在《蘋果》網上平台播放，但黎不想節目太傳統，例如好像晚間電視新聞的風格，而且黎想邀請一些人作評論，例如藝人王喜和時事評論人桑普。
+
+陳續指，在「飯盒會」期間，她曾就此表達意見：「如果你想做認真嘅報導，但又加入呢啲環節，咁我又覺得唔係好合適囉」，不過最後黎堅持加入這些環節，「話會『活潑啲』。」法官李運騰追問，即是陳的意見被黎拒絕了？陳確認：「係，同埋反正唔係實體報紙關事嘅嘢」，而黎所提議的新聞報導節目後來有在網上平台實行到。陳亦確認以上是她早前形容黎「比較強勢」的例子之一。
+
+#### 控方下周一傳召另一證人 官關注審訊進度
+
+控方表示覆問完畢，法官杜麗冰指示陳沛敏可以先行離開。她遂由3名懲教人員的帶領下，循法庭特別通道離開法庭。
+
+控方另向法庭申請下一名證人的「提犯令」。法官李運騰指，現時控方只傳召了兩名證人，卻使用了接近一半的審期，問控方還需要多久時間舉證。助理刑事檢控專員張卓勤則指下一名證人的作供時間不會如早前的證人般長，並承諾會盡力有效地運用法庭時間。
+
+法官則指他們正在認真地考慮6月的工作日程，因他們手上有一些案件仍待安排，而本案的審訊進度將有所影響。張卓勤則稱，保守估計下一名證人的主問需時7日。
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/aGhyJNK.png)
+▲ 高級檢控官 吳加悅（左）、助理刑事檢控專員 張卓勤（右）
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022