From 0370ad10b67a27aadfcf01122d14fbf54f617d5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: theagora Date: Sat, 26 Nov 2022 08:18:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 01/12] 0x17 Archive past _heros posts in _0x16 --- .../2003-02-16-ChuckMorse-a1_l-dimensions-of-chinese-anarchism.md | 0 .../2013-10-09-Echo-a1_c-rejectionary-anarchist-critiques.md | 0 .../{ => _0x16}/2022-10-09-Initium-a1_r-memory-is-freedom.md | 0 3 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) rename _collections/_heros/{ => _0x16}/2003-02-16-ChuckMorse-a1_l-dimensions-of-chinese-anarchism.md (100%) rename _collections/_heros/{ => _0x16}/2013-10-09-Echo-a1_c-rejectionary-anarchist-critiques.md (100%) rename _collections/_heros/{ => _0x16}/2022-10-09-Initium-a1_r-memory-is-freedom.md (100%) diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2003-02-16-ChuckMorse-a1_l-dimensions-of-chinese-anarchism.md b/_collections/_heros/_0x16/2003-02-16-ChuckMorse-a1_l-dimensions-of-chinese-anarchism.md similarity index 100% rename from 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08:23:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 02/12] 0x17 Init commit _heros posts --- ...2003-01-09-HakimBey-a1_l-pirate-utopias.md | 625 ++++++++++++++++++ ...mbornWilson-a1_r-roses-and-nightingales.md | 85 +++ ...ive-a1_c-survey-study-on-kangle-village.md | 231 +++++++ 3 files changed, 941 insertions(+) create mode 100644 _collections/_heros/2003-01-09-HakimBey-a1_l-pirate-utopias.md create mode 100644 _collections/_heros/2003-10-06-PeterLambornWilson-a1_r-roses-and-nightingales.md create mode 100644 _collections/_heros/2022-11-18-SYSUStudentCollective-a1_c-survey-study-on-kangle-village.md diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2003-01-09-HakimBey-a1_l-pirate-utopias.md b/_collections/_heros/2003-01-09-HakimBey-a1_l-pirate-utopias.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a358f80d --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_heros/2003-01-09-HakimBey-a1_l-pirate-utopias.md @@ -0,0 +1,625 @@ +--- +layout: post +title: "海盗乌托邦" +author: "Hakim Bey" +date: 2003-01-09 12:00:00 +0800 +image: https://i.imgur.com/jECZyQM.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "海盗乌托邦：摩尔海盗与欧洲叛逆者" +position: left +--- + +多年前，马拉巴塔角的尽头矗立着一座高塔；基督徒称Torre Blanquilla，穆斯林则称El-Minar。这座塔终日眺望大海；夜里，风在水面上的低语声使它安眠。这是一座古老的塔，塔壁上覆盖着多节的藤蔓；蝎子躲在她的石头中间，邪恶的精灵在黄昏时聚集在附近。无所不知的吉普赛人说这座塔是葡萄牙人为了对抗穆斯林而建造的。安杰拉的登山者知道的更多；他们说这座塔是由海盗拉斯.贝哈尔建造的，目的是把他的财宝藏在塔内。 + +拉斯.贝哈尔来自拉巴特。他是一位技术娴熟的航海家；而且擅长一门更难的艺术——指挥的艺术。西班牙人和意大利人对他的名字再熟悉不过了。贝哈尔的护卫舰像燕子一样纤细轻盈；一百名基督教奴隶的桨使它在海浪上迅速掠过。这艘船非常可怕，因为它勇敢的水手和许多门大炮，每一门炮都不一样，都是海盗们从不同国家的基督教船只上缴获的。 + +拉斯.贝哈尔年轻、英俊、勇敢。许多被俘虏的基督教女性深深地爱上了他，如同那些富有而有权势的穆斯林的女儿一样。但他拒绝了基督徒和穆斯林的爱，因为他的船对他来说比女人的美貌更重要。他爱他的船，爱他英勇的战士们的陪伴，爱那些后来在歌曲和诗歌中被颂扬的光荣战役。最重要的是，他爱大海；他深爱着她，他对她的爱是如此之深，以至于他无法离开她而生活。他对她说话就像男人对他们的爱人说话一样。他的战士们说，在祈祷的时候，他会把眼睛从麦加的方向移开，以便凝视大海。 + +在羊祭的那天，拉斯.贝哈尔和他的战友们在El-Minar村，他拒绝去丹吉尔听法官的布道并在虔诚信徒的陪伴下祈祷。 + +“如果你必须去的话那就去吧！”他对手下说，“至于我要在这里休息。” + +他把自己关在塔里；从那里，他可以看到大海和船只在地平线上缓慢移动。微风中比风还多的沙，使水在温暖的夏日阳光下翩翩起舞。贝哈尔心想：“法官最好的布道，也永远比不上这景色的美丽。哪怕是再完美不过的祈祷，又怎么能与水波荡漾的甜美淙淙声相比呢？在世间有什么比从世界的一边延伸到另一边的大海更强大有力呢？哦，但愿海浪是一个女人，那我就可以娶她；但愿大海是一座清真寺，这样我可以在里面祈祷。” + +当这些想法在他的脑海中闪过时，一场风暴正在西方集聚；它席卷了平原和山脉，并在塔周围咆哮。海鸥惊恐地叫着飞走了；成群的羊疯狂地跑向它们的围栏。这场暴风雨持续了一天一夜。 + +当风停了下来，大海不再像数千头牛一齐咆哮时，贝哈尔从塔上下来。在岩石和水之间的一条狭窄的沙带上，他看见一个女人躺着，脸色苍白，浑身冰冷。他走近了一些。 + +“她一定是基督徒，”他对自己说，“因为她的头发是新出土的黄金色。”他把她抱起来，搂在怀里。也许她还活着。 + +那个女人睁开了眼睛；那是一双绿色的眼睛，像生长在岩石缝隙中的海藻一样绿。她是一个bahria，一个海中的精灵。她的美貌如同具有魔力一样以至于贝哈尔疯狂地爱上了她。他不顾他的战士；忘记了他的快船，他的荣耀，甚至他对真主的祈祷。“我爱你胜过这世间的一切，”他对她说，“胜过我的生命和我的救赎。” + +在春分期间，愤怒的大海再次袭击了塔楼，威胁着附近的村庄。她的水与查夫河的水混合在一起，甚至到达了丹吉尔巴利亚的花园。 + +“大海要冲垮我们的塔，”海盗对他的爱人说，“让我们逃到山上去吧。”“为什么害怕大海？”她笑着问。“你不是爱她胜过一切吗？你不是不断赞美她的力量和她的权力吗？难道你不是把头从麦加的方向转过来，以便注视着大海吗？我是海的女儿。我来到这里是为了回报你对她的爱。现在，大海召唤我回去。再见了，拉斯.贝哈尔，你将永远不会再见到我。”“不要离开我，”海盗恳求道，“不要离开我，我求你了。没有你，我将会永远不会知道幸福是什么。”“幸福，”她回答说，“只属于那些敬畏真主和尊重他的人。我必须离开你。我不敢违抗召唤我的声音，但如果你愿意，你可以跟着我。”精灵随潮水漂流而去，拉斯·贝哈尔跟随她进入大海阴暗的深处。再也没有人见过他。他沉睡在塔里克山（直布罗陀）和特雷斯-福尔卡斯角之间的波涛之下。他将永远不会醒来，直到人类为自己的行为受到审判，地球将成为最终消失的阴影的影子那一天。 + +这一切都是因为全能的真主。 + + +### 变成土耳其人的基督徒 + +> 基督徒变成了土耳其人，而土耳其人是魔鬼之子。 +> #### Newwes from Sea of WARD THE PIRATE (1609) + +大约从15世纪末到18世纪，成千上万的欧洲男人和女人皈依了伊斯兰教。他们中的大多数人在阿尔及尔、突尼斯、的黎波里和摩洛哥的拉巴特-萨里地区——即所谓的巴巴里海岸生活和工作。大多数妇女在嫁给穆斯林男子后成为穆斯林。这一点很容易理解，不过如果我们能追踪其中一些人的生活，寻找17世纪的伊莎贝尔·埃伯哈特，那将是一件非常有趣的事情。（伊莎贝尔·埃伯哈特，俄罗斯无政府主义者的女儿，在阿尔及尔旅行和生活，有时打扮成男人，皈依伊斯兰教，并支持阿尔及利亚独立。她以浪漫的笔触写下了她离奇的情色冒险，英年早逝，悲惨无比。见Bowles（1975）和de Voogd（1987））。但那些男人呢？是什么原因导致他们改变了信仰？ + +欧洲基督教徒对这些人有一个特殊的称呼：Renegadoes，“叛逆者”：叛教者、异教徒、叛贼。基督徒有理由产生这些情绪，因为欧洲基督教仍然在对伊斯兰教发动战争。十字军东征从未真正结束。西班牙的最后一个摩尔人王国格林纳达直到1492年才被加入到重新征服计划中，而西班牙最后一次摩尔人起义发生在1610年。充满活力、声明赫赫、武装到牙齿的奥斯曼帝国（就像其当代的伊丽莎白/雅各布英国一样），在两条战线上对欧洲发起进攻，陆路上向维也纳进发，海上则向西穿过地中海。 + +在欧洲的方言中，“土耳其人”可以用来指任何穆斯林，包括北非的摩尔人。据说Renegadoes有“Turn’d Turke”的意思（1612年在伦敦演出的罗伯特·达伯恩的戏剧《A Christian Turn’d Turke》的标题）。[Ewen，1939：3；Lloyd，1981：48。据Lloyd说，剧作家的名字是罗伯特·奥斯本]。好色的土耳其人和邪恶的士兵形象充斥着流行文学——“mussulmano！”在威尼斯仍然是一种致命的侮辱。 + +想一想最近和伊拉克进行海湾战争期间的美国媒体，也许就能理解欧洲的这种无知和偏见。自19世纪以来，欧洲对伊斯兰教的反应变得复杂得多，因为19世纪的欧洲实际上征服并殖民了穆斯林居住区的大部分。但在17世纪，并不存在这样的文化交融点，不管是怎样的交融。在大多数情况下，欧洲憎恨并误解了伊斯兰教。至于伊斯兰教这边，“圣战”一词概括了它对基督宗教的态度。存在文化鸿沟的两边几乎都不会有宽容和理解。 + +因此，对大多数欧洲人来说，叛逆者似乎是地狱一般神秘的生物。他们不仅“背叛了我们的主”，还走得更远，加入了圣战。几乎所有的人都被雇用为“巴巴里海盗”。他们袭击并掠夺欧洲船只，将基督徒俘虏带回巴巴里，然后被赎回或以奴隶身份出售。当然基督教的“海盗”，包括马耳他骑士团在内，对穆斯林的船只和船员也做了同样的事情。但很少有穆斯林俘虏“变成基督徒”。叛逆者的流动基本上是单向的。 + +欧洲人认为叛逆者是人渣，并认为他们皈依的动机是能想象到的里最低级的：贪婪、怨恨、报复。他们中的许多人在皈依时已经是海盗了——显然，他们只是想找一个借口进行更多的海盗活动。当然，他们中的一些人被俘虏了，并被提供了一个选择，即皈依或当奴隶。但他们像懦夫一样，选择了叛教和犯罪。显然，至少有一些叛逆者相当渴望改变信仰。一位名叫莱昂·德兰的傲慢的法国驻阿尔及尔领事（1731-1732），“他曾在坎迪亚（克里特岛）担任法国领事，并因其傲慢和对土耳其人的蔑视而引起许多麻烦，他阻止了一名来自圣特罗佩的水手试图变节的行为，尽管两国之间的条约明确规定（第19条），如果一个法国人连续三天坚持其变节的想法，这一行为就应该被承认。”德兰被尴尬的法国政府调离克里特岛[Spencer，1976：159]。叛逆者在所有欧洲国家都应被当场击毙，而在西班牙则是被烧死（至少在理论上），即使他们想重新皈依基督教。在这个意义上，伊斯兰教被看作是一种道德瘟疫，而不仅仅是一种敌对的意识形态。 + +在伊斯兰王国内部，对皈依的态度可以说更为开放。西班牙人强迫犹太人和穆斯林皈依基督教，但随后还是将他们驱逐出境。然而，伊斯兰教仍然保留着自己作为一个新宗教的形象，试图通过一切可能的手段，特别是通过改变信仰来扩张。“新穆斯林”仍然被认为是受祝福的，甚至是“幸运的”，特别是在伊斯兰教的边境地区。这些对皈依的不同态度有助于解释为什么是更多的基督徒转变为“土耳其人”，而不是反过来——但“为什么”这个问题仍然没有答案。[一位名叫汉密尔顿的上尉说明了诱使一些叛逃者留在巴巴里的动机：“他们受到诱惑，因为爱上土耳其（穆斯林）的女人而放弃了他们的上帝，这些女人一般都非常漂亮。”他表示能够谅解了这些可怜虫，因为这些女人“精通巫术...被俘虏的人永远不会有自由”。[Wolfe, 1979: 237]]也许我们可以首先假设，无论是基督教还是“土耳其人”对叛逆者的解释，都不能满足我们的好奇心。我们一方面可以怀疑这些人都是单纯的恶魔，另一方面也可以怀疑他们都是圣战的天使。我们可以假设，我们的答案——如果有可能的话——将比这两种17世纪的理论都要复杂得多。 + +奇怪的是，似乎很少有现代历史学家真正尝试去了解叛逆者。在欧洲历史学家中，“恶魔理论”的影响仍然存在，尽管它已经被合理化和详细论述，甚至被颠倒成一个听起来很合理的假设。这一理论是这样的： + +为什么各个欧洲大国在三个世纪的时间里都未能消灭巴巴里海盗？不言而喻，伊斯兰人的军事水平和海军技术都不如欧洲。众所周知，穆斯林们是糟糕的水手。如何解释这个明显的难题呢？很明显，原因就在于叛逆者。他们作为欧洲人，把欧洲的技术介绍给了穆斯林，并且为他们而战。因此，巴巴里的海盗行为似乎是“一种外来者的行为”，如果没有这些叛逆者，它就不可能发生[Coindreau, 1948]。他们是最坏的叛徒，但他们的才华在粗鲁和狂暴中展露无疑。海盗行为是卑鄙的，但它却足够浪漫! + +至于伊斯兰教历史学家这里，他们自然对任何伊斯兰教低人一等的说法感到反感。例如，19世纪和20世纪初的拉巴特-萨里地方史清楚表明，从长远来看该国的摩尔人、柏柏尔人和阿拉伯人对“海上圣战”历史的贡献远远超过几千个皈依者。至于皈依者本身，他们的后代仍然生活在拉巴特-萨里，不管出身如何他们最后都成为了摩尔人。海盗的历史不是“外国人的事”，而是马格里布、伊斯兰居住区远西地区和新兴的摩洛哥民族历史的一部分。[Hesperis, 1971] + +这些对叛逆者的“解释”都没有让我们更接近他们拥抱伊斯兰教并与巴巴里海盗一起生活的可能动机。狡猾的叛徒，或是被同化的英雄——这两种刻板印象都不具有任何真正的深度，即使这两者都包含部分真理。正如我们将看到的那样，叛逆者们确实为巴巴里带来了某种技术和战略上的创新。他们确实也以更复杂的方式影响了伊斯兰教，而不仅仅是作为受雇的打手或“专家”，我们也将看到这一点。但是，我们对整个现象的“原因”仍然没有头绪。我们早应该注意到，尽管一些叛逆者精通多种语言，但没有人是文人。我们没有关于他们的第一手资料，没有叛逆者们自己写下的文本。他们的社会出身使他们不适合进行自我分析的写作；这种奢侈品仍然为贵族和新兴中产阶级所垄断。书写历史的笔在叛逆者们的敌人手中；他们自己只能沉默不语。 + +因此，我们可能永远无法揭开他们的动机，也许我们只能得出一些复杂甚至是矛盾的感想和猜测。但是，我们仍然可以比那些新殖民主义欧洲历史学家或摩洛哥民族主义者做得更好，因为他们都只是根据自己的意识形态以及先入为主的观念来看待叛逆者。我们可以尝试去欣赏叛逆者们，作为个人（如果可能的话）和团体，他们有自己的利益和规划，自己的价值观，自己的自我形象。我们可以尝试（在证据允许的情况下）从现象的内部看清楚，而不是依赖外部诠释的视角。 + +相比从全局考察整个现象，将注意力集中在特定的历史（或者说“微观历史”，如C.金茨堡所说）能使我们更为轻松地完善对叛逆者的看法。[这篇文章并不构成真正的微观历史，因为它主要基于二手资料。我只是想表达对C.金茨堡和他的学派的方法论上的亏欠，但我并不强求自己在任何方面与他们的严谨性和原创性相提并论。］这里使用的方法包括根据“宗教史”的视角来阅读历史/民族志文本。我更愿意把这一框架称为宗教史的原因有二：首先，为了避免我追随埃利亚德学派方针的指责，该学派几乎已经把自己同“宗教史”的标签绑定在一起。我采用了埃利亚德和亨利·科尔宾开发的一些策略，但随后发现它们在处理“抵抗”或“叛乱欲望”等概念时不太有用。这就引出了我更喜欢宗教史这个术语的第二个原因，任何自称为“任何东西的历史”的学术学科，都必须被怀疑是在可疑的绝对性基础上先验地构建了一个虚假的整体，而这只会掩盖和加强精英们的意识形态。因此，这篇文章的第三个主要方法论成分来自尼采式的思想史、图像史、情感史、审美符号史等等。它们是由巴什拉、本雅明、巴塔耶、福柯等人所发展，这些历史学科并不将自身视作一种具有自己历史的观念，而是以质疑和批判历史的绝对性作为出发点。最后，这里主要的方法论工具实际上是海盗学。众所周知，这完全是热情的业余爱好者的领域。 + +综上所述，我们将以一个短暂时期（约50年）内的一个社区为中心进行研究。拉巴特-萨里，在17世纪上半叶的所有的巴巴里国家中唯一一个依靠海盗取得独立的国家。阿尔及尔、突尼斯和的黎波里都处于“高墙”（奥斯曼帝国）的保护之下，但萨里在这数十年间由“Divan”（土耳其人的国务会议）或是称之为“海盗船长委员会”管理。这是一个真正的“海盗乌托邦”，也就是说，我们有希望在布赖格共和国，或者说是摩尔人的萨里海盗共和国中找到叛逆者最先进的形式，最成熟的政治和精神形态。 + +不过首先，我们先尝试做一些历史学家（据我所知）还没有为叛逆者做过的事情。我们可以问，欧洲是否真的是铁板一块地反对伊斯兰教？伊斯兰教是否在欧洲文化中有着潜在的积极影响，并且这一影响甚至在叛逆者逃到巴巴里之前就已经存在了？我们可以假定他们获得了某种收益，而不是简单地认为他们的皈依动机都是卑鄙的，没有真正的意义。我们可能会想，伊斯兰教本身（而不仅仅是对海盗黄金的希望）是否会吸引他们来到北非——或者，如果不是伊斯兰教本身，而是有关伊斯兰教的一些形象、谣言、神话或误解。那么，一个17世纪的工人阶级水手又会以何种方式对伊斯兰教产生兴趣，甚至被其所吸引？ + +在十字军东征期间，“神秘的伊斯兰教”的思想开始跟随着所有的香料、丝绸和书籍——基督的圣战士们设法将它们从圣地“解放”出来——被带回欧洲。伊斯玛仪派的“刺客”，们是否将一些绝密的知识传授给了圣殿骑士团？这就是为什么圣殿骑士团成员们被禁闭、拷打、处决，最终以看起来如此疯狂的仇恨被消灭的原因吗？炼金术和新柏拉图主义是否是通过西班牙的摩尔人传入欧洲其他国家，特别是意大利和法国？圣方济各和罗杰·培根以及其他前往撒拉逊人居住地的神秘主义传教士是否带回了一些伊斯兰教的神学、密教科学和苏菲主义的教义的内容？ + +无论如何，不管这些接触是否真的发生过，到了17世纪初时，一些欧洲知识分子认为它们已经发生过了，而且实际上一些真正绝密知识的传播也在进行。（这种接触的真实与否是另一个研究课题；在这里，我们只关注图像、信仰和思想的历史，无论它们是否基于“历史现实”，都会对人类社会产生深远的影响）。文艺复兴晚期的赫尔墨斯主义学者开始表现出对伊斯兰教的喜爱。大约1610年左右（西班牙最后一次摩尔人，或称之为摩里斯科人起义的日期），一些德国神秘主义者公开了一系列文件，它们概述了一个秘密组织——玫瑰十字会的历史。根据文件描述，14世纪时该组织的创始人，据说是传说中的克里斯蒂安·罗森克洛兹，曾在伊斯兰世界（大马士革、阿拉伯半岛、一个名为达姆卡的神话城市和摩洛哥城市非斯）大范围周游，并在那里接受了完整的赫尔墨斯主义课程学习。他的坟墓据说最近才重现世间，里面有大量加密过的文献，教团也因此重新振兴。有关玫瑰十字会的文件在博学而虔诚的基督徒中引发了巨大的轰动，他们对天主教和新教的争吵和战争相当反感，对一种基于知识而非信仰的普世宗教充满渴望。伊斯兰教（和犹太教）的科学和智慧被热切期待对这个最终的密宗启示有所贡献。玫瑰十字会公开宣称“即使对犹太人和土耳其人也要宽容”；他们可能会暗地里承认没有一种宗教拥有对真理的垄断。尽管他们仍然是基督教徒，但不是“宗派主义者”。对他们来说，伊斯兰教只是另一个教派，拥有一些真理（甚至包括关于耶稣的某些真理），但不比天主教或路德教多，也不比其少。因此，虽然玫瑰十字会没有皈依伊斯兰教，但他们对伊斯兰教表现出的抗拒和仇视远少于大多数基督徒，他们甚至还对伊斯兰教的深奥和神秘传统赞赏有加。 + +在更广泛的背景下，伊斯兰教可能对一些单纯反宗教，或是至少反教会的欧洲人有一种模糊的吸引力（例如伊丽莎白时代的“夜校”，以及马洛“摩西是个魔术师”的俏皮话）。伊斯兰教不受任何神学权威甚至教条束缚的印象已经渗透到欧洲文化，或者很快就会渗透到其中。一大批喜爱伊斯兰教的欧洲知识分子开始出现。 + +玫瑰十字会影响了共济会，而共济会影响了启蒙运动，启蒙运动又影响了尼采。他们中的一部分事实上对伊斯兰教有所了解，但在多数时候这只是一个“敌人的敌人就是我的朋友”的问题：牧师们讨厌伊斯兰教；而我讨厌牧师；因此我喜欢伊斯兰教。即使在19世纪80年代，尼采对伊斯兰教的看法仍然是相当片面的，他似乎把伊斯兰教看成是一个贵族战士和僧侣的修道会，但他对伊斯兰教的印象已经是自由思想家传统的顶峰了，因为他们主要把伊斯兰教看作是一种单纯反基督教的宗教。 + +赫尔墨斯主义反过来又影响了新教中某些非理性的倾向。许多将在十七世纪四十年代发动英国革命的极端分子都受到了雅各布·勃姆，以及其他倾向于赫尔墨斯主义的基督教神秘主义者的影响。即使是工人阶级中的“平等派”、“掘地派”和“喧嚣派”也对赫尔墨斯主义的思想和理想有所了解——比如对圣经深奥的阐释、普遍的宽容、“泛神论的一元论”、不以牧师或教会为中介而是直接与神灵接触、反律法主义倾向、对物质本质的神圣性的信仰、将上帝视为“普遍理性”（或心灵）的倾向、相信想象力能够改变现实、社会平等主义、千禧年或“天翻地覆”等等。 + +没有证据表明任何喧嚣派分子对伊斯兰教有兴趣。不过有一些证据可以证明喧嚣派主义和海盗之间的联系。马达加斯加的一个“喧嚣湾”在17世纪晚期庇护了一个海盗乌托邦。在加勒比海的“海盗黄金时代”，一些喧嚣派分子被流放到那里。伊斯兰思想的某些方面很可能会吸引极端的新教徒——比如反三位一体、有人性又有神奇本质的耶稣、圣经解释学、“精神民主”，甚至是圣战的概念。喧嚣派（或其他类似的教派）专门研究大胆而又骇人听闻的精神悖论和反传统的极端主义，他们可能对那些注定要在阿尔及尔或萨里度过余生的被边缘化和反叛的人产生了一些影响。[除了Hill（1978）和Cohn（1970）的正规资料，也见Friedman（1987）；Morton（1970）；Smith（1983）。关于喧嚣派与海盗的联系，见Hill（1985：161-187）] + +一个喜欢“光荣地渎神”，一边喝酒抽烟一边在酒馆里说教，膝盖上坐着一个妓女的喧嚣派分子或原喧嚣派分子，可能也会被欧洲人对伊斯兰的性感印象所吸引。实际上，伊斯兰教是一种比基督教更支持性的宗教，而且在某种程度上把快乐视为神的恩惠。《古兰经》中的天堂中的美女、执酒人、花园和葡萄酒喷泉，在那些对自己的传统强调贞操、处女和自我毁灭不满的基督徒中一直是臭名昭著。在大众层面上，“性欲旺盛的土耳其人”的刻板印象维持了对这一神圣又感性的伊斯兰教的讽刺。东方开始被视为（通常是秘密的）一个可以满足禁忌欲望的地方 + +最后，伊斯兰教是欧洲基督教文明的敌人。正如M. Rediker（1987）所指出的，到了17世纪，海洋世界已经揭示了工业时代的某些特性，它们在未来的地平线上显得如此之近。船只在某些方面就像漂浮的工厂，海员形成了一种原始无产阶级。欧洲商船的劳动条件呈现出一幅新兴资本主义的悲惨景象，欧洲海军的条件更加可怕。水手们有充分的理由认为自己是所有欧洲经济和政府中最低级和最被排斥的人物，他们无权无势，报酬低下，被残酷对待，惨遭折磨，在海上随时可能被坏血病和风暴消灭，他们实际上是富商和船主们的奴隶，是吝啬的国王和贪婪的王子们的奴隶。C.Hill和Rediker以J.Lemisch早期研究为基础，相继指出在这样的背景下，必须将海盗行为作为一种社会反抗的形式来研究。海盗（用笛福的一位受访者的话说）“与全世界为敌”，他首先是自己文明的敌人。而且，“我的敌人的敌人”再一次可能证明是我的朋友。我恨欧洲，而欧洲憎恨伊斯兰教。因此...我也许会喜欢伊斯兰教？在1637年，一个有文化但未受专门教育的英语读者可能对伊斯兰教了解多少？在那一年，摩尔人海盗共和国的一位大使访问了伦敦，一些专业记者就这一奇迹编撰了一本小册子。其中说到： + +就他们的宗教而言，他们严格遵守穆罕默德的律法；他们认为基督是一位伟大的先知，生来就是世界的救世主（但不是道成肉身），他是上帝之息，是由一个处女所生，犹太人本应该相信他，但他们不愿意相信。因此他们要谋杀他并把他钉在十字架上，他离开了他们，从他们那里升到了天堂，然后他们把另一个人代替他处死，他们折磨那个人并残忍地钉死了他。因此，这些伊斯兰教徒认为犹太人是最坏的人，是世界上所有民族的奴隶。 + +他们宗教中唯一的书籍被称为“古兰经”，是由他们的假先知穆罕默德编写的，他是一个阿拉伯人。他们不得在任何其他书籍上投入时间；即使在失去生命的情况下，他们也不敢审查或质疑其中的任何部分；但如果有任何不明确的地方，或者任何观点或句子复杂难懂，那么询问一个贫穷又缺乏学识牧师的意义是合法的。他们都受了割礼。他们使用一种洗礼，但不是在教堂，而是在他们家里。 + +他们的四旬斋和我们的差不多，他们的四旬斋只持续30天；但在黎明和黄昏之间的任何一天他们都不吃饭或喝酒，而当星星出来的时候，他们整夜禁食。牧师或神职人员如果不能在耶稣受难日当晚把《古兰经》（或《穆罕默德法》）一书读完，就会被认为不配担任这一职务。他们从早到晚祈祷六次，并经常清洗自己的全身。他们没有钟声来通知他们前往教堂，但担任牧师的人大多有一个大嗓门，因而由他走到尖塔的顶端，在那里发出通告，让人们来参加礼拜。任何人都不得穿鞋子进入教堂。他们的教士或牧师只要愿意，都可以有一个或几个妻子。普通人可以占有被俘虏的妇女，但他们不能在夜间与她们同床共枕，因为那是属于妻子们的权利，如果任何妻子被引诱离开她的丈夫，她可以通过向行政长官投诉来满足她的要求。有四个妻子的人一定是有钱人；因为穷人也可以有这么多妻子，但他的钱太少了，无法养活她们；因此必须有一两个妻子轮流陪他。新娘和新郎在他们洞房前不得见面，如果他发现她是个处女，那就没有问题；如果不是，他可以把她赶走，并可以不退还她带来的财产。 + +他们的教徒不贪婪，不爱钱财，为此他们每天都在各城镇开庭审理和裁决案件，这些案件必须由那些没有被发现或已知被诽谤酗酒、通奸、遗孤及其他丑闻的证人来作证（因为得知他们如此行事过后，他们的证词就不会被接受）同样，如果被告能证明指控他的人没有在24小时内做六次祈祷，他或他们将完全失去指控的权利，或在任何情况下提供证词的权利。在公正和诚实的指正后，最繁琐的诉讼也会在一周或最多八天内结束。 + +他们言而有信；故而他们中很少有人使用票据、债券或债务（这就是在摩洛哥、菲塞或苏斯几乎没有一个富有的文士的原因），因为违背诺言在他们中被认为是一种不可挽回的耻辱。用假秤或假量具的人，会被没收家里所有的器物供穷人使用，同时做为一个罪人，他会遭受残酷的鞭打。他们的死刑处决通常是由刽子手割断被判决死刑的人的喉咙。 + +总的来说，这是一个有趣的，事实与幻想的混合体，而且总的来说是相当积极的。我们将回到所有这些猜测的主题，并试图在萨里的海盗共和国的具体环境中更集中地弄清它们。但在我们行动之前，我们需要了解更多共和国的历史背景，以及它的主要经济来源——海盗行为。具体来说，我们需要更多地了解整个巴巴里海岸的历史，以及奥斯曼帝国的阿尔及尔、突尼斯和的黎波里这些受保护地。 + + +### 暗杀式民主 + +> 阿尔及利亚人是一群流氓，而我是他们的首领。 +> #### 阿尔及尔某位欧洲领事[Spencer，1976:58] + +对突尼斯、的黎波里，尤其是阿尔及尔的研究要比萨里更加透彻；感兴趣的读者很容易就能找到大量的参考书目，所以我们在这里无需花太多时间来细致地关注地中海沿岸国家，这是徒劳无功的。几乎任何一本关于海盗历史的书都会讲述阿尔及尔的状况，更不用说有许多作品专门讲述阿尔及尔的历史。而萨里规模较小，离欧洲人的视线更遥远。我们对它感兴趣不仅是因为它不够出名，而且还是因为它的政治独立性。即便如此，萨里依然是一幅巨型画卷的一部分，我们至少需要有一个大致的了解。《大英百科全书》（1953年版）在其关于“巴巴拉海盗”的条目中甚至没有提到萨里，但它给了我们这样的信息： + +北非沿海的海盗势力兴起于16世纪，在17世纪达到了顶峰，在18世纪逐渐衰落，直到19世纪才被彻底消灭。从1659年起，阿尔及利亚和突尼斯的沿海城市，虽然名义上是土耳其帝国的一部分，但实际上是无政府的军事共和国，它们自己选择统治者，靠掠夺为生。而在海上这一长期存在的舰队则是由船长（Reises）指挥。他们形成了一个阶级，甚至是一个公司。巡洋舰由资本家赞助建造，由船长们指挥。帕夏或其继任者（他们拥有Agha或Dey或Bey的头衔）的国库可以获得战利品的10%...直到17世纪，海盗们还在使用桨帆船，是弗拉芒叛逆者西蒙·丹泽（Simon Danser）让他们明白了大型帆船的优点所在。在17世纪上半叶，据说仅在阿尔及尔就有超过2万人被俘虏。富人们可以赎身，而穷人只能成为奴隶。在多数情况下，他们的主人不允许他们通过改信“穆罕默德主义”来获得自由。在19世纪初，的黎波里塔尼亚（今利比亚西北部地区）由于其海盗行径，曾多次与美国发生战争。在1815年的全面和平之后，英国曾两次试图镇压阿尔及利亚的海盗，但都是徒劳无功，直到1830年法国征服阿尔及尔才宣告结束。 + +（请注意，这里伊斯兰教被称为“穆罕默德主义”，这些海盗式的“穆罕默德人”拒绝“在多数情况下”允许奴隶们皈依；合乎逻辑的结论是，在某些情况下，他们确实允许这样做，但作者倾向于避免这种结论，而只用负面的语言来谈论“穆罕默德人”和海盗。） + +这里使用了两个有趣的政治术语——“无政府主义”和“资本家”——这可能不太合适。“资本家”听起来太过于18-19世纪，无法描述那些为海盗国家的经济提供支持的商人和拥有船只的船长。此外，我认为作者在使用“无政府主义”这个词时，并没有想到无政府主义，而只是用这个词来表示暴力骚乱。阿尔及尔受制于奥斯曼帝国，因此，从任何严格意义上讲，阿尔及尔都不可能实现无政府主义的组织形式。至于“暴力骚乱”的指控，一些学者会问，如果没有某种内部的连续性和稳定性，阿尔及尔作为一个“海盗国家”如何能存活几个世纪。早期以欧洲为中心的历史学家和关于海盗问题的耸人听闻的作家给我们描述的印象是，阿尔及尔是一个处于永久亢奋状态的掠夺部落；而威廉·斯宾塞（William Spencer，1976）等年代较近且不那么沙文主义的学者倾向于强调阿尔及尔的稳定性，并寻求对其成功存活那么久做出可能的解释。像“无政府主义”这样的术语被应用在描述北非时，其所蕴含的准道德主义的恐惧往往掩盖了一个秘密事实，即历史学家经常为帝国主义和殖民主义——18-19世纪欧洲真正可怕的掠夺行为——提供回溯性的理论依据。如果阿尔及尔被证明为一个没有丝毫体面人类价值观的污水坑，那么我们就可以继续相信欧洲随后在非洲和其他地区殖民冒险的“文明化使命”。因此，有必要对欧洲（和美州）伪理性主义者所写的历史进行大面积修改，从而揭露不是仅仅由摩尔人“无政府主义者”实施，同时还有白人基督教民族国家实施的海盗行为。[对于海盗的飞地来说，一个有用的术语——也许不是很恰当——可能是“有序的无政府状态”，最初是由E. Evans-Pritchard用于努尔人的部落组织，并被Richard Drinnon引用，用来描述理切罗基酋长查德·菲尔兹（Richard Fields）和迷人的约翰·邓恩·亨特（John Dunn Hunter）在德克萨斯州建立的“弗雷德尼亚红白共和国”（Red-White Republic of Fredonia）。亨特是一个在还是婴儿时就被印第安人俘虏的白人，后来在伦敦遇到了罗伯特·欧文和其他激进分子，并于1824年返回美国。亨特是另一种叛逆者——他皈依“印地安主义”——因此受到憎恨和谴责。弗雷多尼亚最终失败了，而亨特也于1827年被谋杀[Drinnon，1972:208]] + +事实上，阿尔及尔似乎既不是无政府状态，也不是由无政府主义者统治，而是以一种奇怪而出人意料的民主形式存在着。与逐渐屈服于君主专制主义的欧洲国家不同，阿尔及尔表现出更“扁平化”和平等的结构的迹象。当然，在理论上，它始终服从土耳其帝国的政策和指导，但在实践中，这个城邦是由各种各样的“议院”组成的，这些“议院”由禁卫军士兵和海盗中的精英组成，他们制定了自己的政策，有时他们甚至会把苏丹的代表赶回伊斯坦布尔，直截了当地表示拒绝执行“高墙”的意愿。 + +在某种程度上，阿尔及尔、突尼斯和的黎波里等受保护国或“摄政国”确实是“外国人的事务”，甚至可以称为准殖民地。在阿尔及尔，奥卡克（Ocak，禁卫军下属部门）或禁卫军（Janissaries）的统治根据法律不是由当地人（摩尔人、阿拉伯人、柏柏尔人）担任，而是由“土耳其人”担任。当然，更复杂的是，禁卫军的来源最初并不是土生土长的安纳托利亚人，甚至不是天生的穆斯林，而是苏丹的奴隶，他们在小时候就因奥斯曼帝国的“男孩税”被招募，该税在帝国的外围地区，如信奉基督教的阿尔巴尼亚进行征收；他们接受训练，皈依伊斯兰教，起初被用作奥斯曼帝国的禁卫军。建立阿尔及尔摄政国的巴巴罗萨兄弟是阿尔巴尼亚人，也有说法是希腊岛民出身。然而他们得到许可，开始招募本地安纳托利亚人加入禁卫军团的阿尔及利亚分部，最后甚至连欧洲的叛逆者也一并接纳。奥卡克，就像马耳他的医院骑士团一样，由一场圣战中的军事组织、占领军和政府人员组成。似乎没有一个奥卡克成员出生在北非——事实上，如果一个禁卫军娶了一个本地妇女并生了孩子，这些孩子无法加入奥卡克（这种情况导致了这群“混血儿”的几次失败的叛乱）。阿尔及利亚本地人也有机会获得显赫的地位和权力——作为海盗，但从未能成为军事管理者。哈米达.雷斯（Hamida Reis），9世纪阿尔及利亚最后一位伟大的船长（Ar. ra’is）。在奥斯曼帝国，雷斯（Reis）原意是“船长”，后来变为对海军高级将领的尊称。但在阿尔及尔，他只是一个例外。无论如何，奥卡克的“民主”都排斥本地的阿尔及利亚人——但它也越来越倾向于独立于土耳其。如果它是某种“殖民地”，那么它与祖国的联系只是松散的，与后来法国人的“省”不同。而且，由于共同的宗教信仰，“土耳其人”始终比任何9世纪的欧洲殖民者更接近当地人。无论摩尔人和柏柏尔人多么憎恨土耳其人，当西班牙或法国的舰队在地平线上出现时，他们都会与土耳其人联手。 + +我们将阿尔及尔政府与萨里政府进行比较的话，萨里政府可能部分模仿了阿尔及尔政府。但阿尔及尔和萨里的比较对我们来说用处有限，这是由于前者与奥斯曼帝国的联系。几个世纪以来，阿尔及尔吸收了大量土耳其文化。禁卫军主要信仰拜克塔什·苏菲（Bektashi Sufi）教派，这是一种相当异端的信仰，有时会在仪式上使用葡萄酒，并表现出许多突厥萨满教的特征[Birge，1937]。著名的禁卫军行进曲最初是苏菲派创作的。 + +佩雷·丹（Pere Dan）是一位牧师，他于1630年来到阿尔及尔为俘虏交赎金，并留下来创作了一部重要的摄政国史。他描述了1634年阿卜杜勒·哈桑·阿里从君士坦丁堡出发抵达这里后作为任职三年的新帕夏的授职仪式：城市派出了两艘装备精良的大帆船向他致敬。御前议会（Divan）的军官团共500人在港口迎接他。当他走出帆船上岸时，他受到城中的堡垒和海盗船约有1500门炮的欢迎，其中约有40艘船在海上航行。随后，禁卫军的统帅在两名鼓手（Cavus）的陪同下行进，随后是首席秘书和24名Ayabashis，他们是国家的主要顾问。紧接着是两个戴着巨大头巾的布卢克巴希人，然后是奥达巴希人的队伍；在他们之后是六个土耳其双簧管演奏者，另外还有一些摩尔人在演奏长笛和其他铙钹，整个合奏的声音非常奇怪，在我们心中引起更多是恐惧而非快乐。最后来的是新帕夏，他身穿一件巨大的白袍，以示和平。他骑着一匹上等的巴巴里马，银马鞍上镶满了宝石、马刺和马镫，丝质的缰绳上挂满了绿松石，马鞍上的绣花布也非常精致。游行队伍按照这个顺序进入了城市，帕夏被带到了为他准备的住所。[Spencer，1976] + +有趣的是，佩雷·丹提到了音乐在“我们”欧洲人心中激起的恐惧。禁卫军似乎是历史上第一支使用军乐进行曲的军队，据说当他们的乐队在维也纳城门前喧闹、轰鸣时，基督教士兵一听到声音就扔下武器逃跑了。很有意思的是，奥卡克是否曾在海盗船上运送过乐队（阿尔及利亚禁卫军作为武装人员跟随海盗出海时，只有在运送战利品的船被强行登上并占领时才出手动武）。17-18世纪在加勒比海和印度洋活动的欧洲海盗据说非常喜欢音乐，并在他们有能力的时候雇佣全职人员演奏，但显然这是做为了他们自己取乐，而不是作为一种心理战！[Spencer对阿尔及尔可以听到的各种音乐作了如下注释：阿尔及利亚音乐主要是军事性质的，反映了其奥斯曼渊源。奥卡克军乐队由27个演奏者组成：八个大鼓，称为davul，用手指演奏；五个壶鼓（nakkare）；10个军号；2个小号；以及2对铙钹。音乐类型为mehter，这是一种强烈的重音节奏风格，在奥斯曼帝国由禁卫军推广，在奥斯曼帝国中和军事盛宴，权力为同义词。第二种流行的音乐类型是安达卢西亚音乐，由来自西班牙的摩里斯科难民带来，采用了半音阶的东方乐器，如安纳托利亚梅夫莱维的苦行僧作品中的乌德琴、塔尔琴、雷贝布（一种双弦小提琴）和奈伊（一种芦笛）。在摄政国时期，阿尔及利亚的咖啡馆里经常可以听到二三十人的安达卢西亚管弦乐队演奏，正如Renaudot告诉我们的，“他们随机应变地演奏，匆匆忙忙地从一个乐章转到另一个乐章，但同时又以最统一和准确的方式演奏了一整夜”。] + +在萨里，苏菲派和土耳其军乐不为人知，但安达卢西亚音乐综合体，包括波斯、阿拉伯、摩尔、伊比利亚和其他有影响力的音乐，在信奉伊斯兰教的西班牙地区发展了几个世纪后突然传到北非，这一定是由西班牙的摩尔人和摩里斯科人迁徙的浪潮带入萨里；而新的柏柏尔人及其他非洲人的影响也会被加入到这个组合中，从而催生出今天演奏的古典北摩洛哥音乐，不过它仍然归属于安达卢西亚音乐。 + +与其他巴巴里国家相比，萨里不受奥斯曼帝国的控制，甚至没受到什么影响。阿尔及利亚和萨里特海盗之间的密切联系（下文将讨论）可能是导致萨里土耳其文化影响的原因。例如，萨里用土耳其古老的烛光游行习俗来庆祝一个特殊的节日。但萨里在任何时候都是摩洛哥的属地或自由的摩尔人海盗国家，没有“外国人”以外国政府的名义在那里夺取权力。 + +从结构上看，阿尔及利亚奥卡克最显著的特点是其“按资排辈”的民主制度。在大多数情况下，一个新兵理论上能以每三年一个军阶的速度在军队中晋升。如果他活得够久，他就能担任两个月的总司令，或称之为“两月的Agha”。然后他将退休，进入政府的御前议会或议院，对所有重要议题和人事任命有投票权。所有这些都与“功绩”无关，而只是一个时间问题。不管是来自安纳托利亚内陆的最低贱的阿尔巴尼亚奴隶男孩或农村青年，又或是被俘后遭遗弃的改信的欧洲水手，只要他活着并为“海盗共和国”服务，都同样有希望在某一天进入政府，这就是奥斯曼被保护国的真正权力结构。正如佩雷.丹所说的那样。“这个国家只是空有一个王国的名称，因为实际上他们已经把它变成了一个共和国。”难怪奥卡克在招募新成员方面似乎从未遇到过困难。世界上还有什么其他地方可以实现这种“向上的流动”吗？ + +御前议会使用的是有史以来所有团体所能设计的最奇怪的“秩序规则”之一。议会进行会议时的规则非常简单。任何成员都不允许携带任何形式的武器，由武装警卫维持秩序。任何成员都不得使用拳头做出任何攻击性动作，否则将被处死。但他可以用脚来表达自己的感受，可以是跺脚或踢脚。曾有一位法国领事在会议厅内被“脚踢”时差点死去。所有的讲话都是用土耳其语进行的；必要时翻译（dragomen）会将其翻译成柏柏尔语，阿拉伯语以及欧洲的语言。“发言”是按资历或重要性顺序进行的，其中最常见的程序是由演讲者组织参会人员齐声喊叫。由于这种程序，这些会议显得异常混乱。参加会议的外国人往往相信他们是在与狂野、暴力、非理性的人打交道；有证据表明演讲人通过利用这一程序来强调他们的计划，并将任何反对意见压制下去。然而对一个英国人来说，这种程序似乎是不合理的；例如，弗朗西斯·奈特（Francis Knight）在17世纪的第四分之二个世纪时作为奴隶在阿尔及尔呆了几年，他显然能够亲眼目睹这一会议。他对这一程序的描述值得引用。“他们站成一排，通过官使（chouse，疑为choush）或从者（suchivant）传话，用手臂或肘部互相挤撞，高声叫喊，仿佛怒不可遏，或者说像一个加大了火的锅在沸腾...他们显然对可能的祸患早有防备，因为[他们]被命令在来之前不要饮任何烈酒...或带刀前往...这是一个世界上绝无仅有的政府...” + +[Wolfe，1979:78]在为金钱而长期努力发展的过程中，阿尔及尔目睹了各种人类已知的欺诈、暴乱、叛乱、腐败、政治谋杀和混乱。但不知何故，阿尔及尔得以幸存和繁荣发展。有些人甚至将其政府形式定义为“暗杀民主”。但它是否比17世纪（或任何其他）的任何其他国家都更腐败或充斥暴力？它是否比欧洲君主制更混乱，更狂野，以至于它可以吹嘘一种只有通过混乱才能获得的自由——至少对少数成功者来说是这样？又或者说，这些描述（由欧洲游客撰写，请记住）过度强调了负面因素，向我们展示了一幅阿尔及尔的邪恶漫画？我的怀疑是，在历史的长河中，这座城市日常生活的暴力程度与其他人类群体的相比并无多少差别。阿尔及尔之所以不同的是它的经济依赖于其在边界以外的暴力——海盗。而它却比欧洲或伊斯兰君主国更加民主。这两个特点是否有某种联系？我更乐意把它先留作问题。 + +在船长们当中，相当于御前议会的是Taiffe reisi，或称之为船长议会。不幸的是，我们对它的了解远远少于对御前议会的了解，因为海盗没有奥斯曼帝国的官僚和博学的抄写员来担任记录者。船长议会被比作中世纪的公会，但这是一种误导性说法，因为海盗的原始工会也是摄政国内一个事实上的统治（或至少是协商）机构。在权力斗争中，御前议会和船长议会不时会相互竞争或起冲突，但我们可以肯定二者都不会轻易冒疏远对方的风险。海盗依靠奥卡克获得政治保护以及资金和兵力供应。而御前议会的经济命脉，亦或说摄政国的经济繁荣，主要依靠海盗的战利品和赎金来维持。很明显，萨里的御前议会是基于阿尔及尔的船长议会的结构（而不是奥卡克的御前议会），因此遗憾的是，我们对船长议会组织知之甚少。与奥卡克不同，资历显然无法作为晋升的资本。船长（reis）之所以成为船长，要么是因为他的功绩（大多数海盗称之为“运气”），要么是因为他拥有一两艘船。当然，同样地，一个地位低下的船舱水手男孩（比如哈米达·雷斯）可能希望有朝一日成为舰队的海军上将，不管他的阶级或出身如何——这与英国海军的情况大不相同！我们知道，船长议会在一些问题上进行了民主投票，并选举了领导人。总的来说，16-17世纪阿尔及利亚的“Divan-Taiffe”形式的“两院制”很可能被看作是美国和法国的共和政府的先驱，而这些政府是在几个世纪后才出现的；至于真正的萨里共和国，它甚至早于革命时期英国的受保护国/联邦结构（1640年代和50年代）。一个奇怪的想法：欧洲民主制度是否真的欠了“海盗”的债？当然，没有人会公开承认这一点，因为巴巴里海盗是异教徒——但正如Rediker指出的那样，水手是17世纪的无产阶级，我们可以想象在海盗船间流传的窃窃私语（英国在1637年向萨里派遣了一支舰队！），关于“海盗和叛逆者”令人羡慕的自由。[1659年，奥斯曼帝国任命的帕夏要求从海盗的战利品中获得更多的分成。这引发了一场革命，并终结了阿尔及尔的帕夏的统治。一位名叫哈利勒的Boulouk-bachi（奥斯曼军阶）号召议会发动叛乱以“恢复祖制”。据称，这些“祖制”是一部宪法，它将所有实权收于禁卫军首领和议会的手中。当然，这纯属妄想，但就像十七世纪中期的英国、法国、巴塞罗那、那不勒斯和其他地方的革命者一样，这位阿尔及利亚议员坚持认为自己只想回归古代。在这个时代，没有人会承认自己是一个“革命者”，然而其结果是革命性的。几年后，达兰达可以写道：“帕夏...在口头上承认对大领主的服从，但很少在意他的命令...士兵们对他来说比大领主更可怕。”他们已经成为阿尔及尔的实际统治者，而帕夏只是一个象征性的首领，支付着固定的薪水，却没有权力。[Wolfe，1979：84]] + + +### 群侠 + +我们必须跳过阿尔及尔之后历史中政治结构的有趣发展，这仅仅是因为它不能为我们理解我们主要兴趣所在——萨里提供多少帮助。至于那些我们称之为阿尔及利亚海盗的人种学或社会史，后面我们在讨论诸如摩洛哥布赖格的海盗的色情风俗或经济政策时还会回到它以作比较。但是，在我们前往远东之前，还有一个阿尔及利亚的主题仍在吸引着我们——叛逆者。 + +阿尔及利亚的船长和船员中有一部分——有人说是大多数——确实是某种形式的“外国人”。来自西班牙的安达卢西亚摩尔人和摩里斯科人带来了新式盔甲和大炮，他们中的许多人也被证明是经验丰富的航海家。来自东地中海的“黎凡特人”（指东地中海地区的人）——包括希腊人、埃及人、叙利亚人、某些岛民，以及每个港口都能见到的流氓和人渣——在阿尔及尔为圣战服务。阿尔巴尼亚人和其他巴尔干/奥斯曼的山地人和强盗，与土耳其人的队伍也一齐涌入了这里。当然还有来自欧洲各个国家（尤其是地中海沿岸）的叛逆者，无论是他是自愿的还是被俘的。 + +1621年至1627年间，据说有两万名基督徒在海盗之都被俘，其中包括“葡萄牙人、佛兰芒人、苏格兰人、英国人、丹麦人、爱尔兰人、匈牙利人、斯拉夫人、西班牙人、法国人、意大利人；还有叙利亚人、埃及人、日本人、中国人、南美洲人、埃塞俄比亚人”，这证明了当时航海事业的多民族性。“被救赎者”保存的关于叛教的记录同样具有启示性，尽管这对叛教者自己来说是痛苦的。据Gramaye观察，在1609年至1619年间，由于伊斯兰教的舒适而自愿放弃信仰的叛逆者包括“857名德国人、138名汉堡人、300名英国人、130名荷兰人和弗莱明人、160名丹麦人和东方人、250名波兰人、匈牙利人和莫斯科人”。[Spencer，1976：127] + +曾经有过整支西班牙人军队为了避免被俘都改信伊斯兰教，而且显然被完全吸收了，甚至还有一些被奴隶商队带着北上的非洲黑人，他们赎回了自己的自由，加入了伟大的海盗淘金热活动。犹太人，无论是本地人还是外国人（包括来自西班牙的马拉诺人和皈依者）均指那些被怀疑秘密信奉犹太教的受洗犹太人的后代），以及其他西班牙犹太人团体），都以商人和金融家的身份服务于所有的巴巴拉城市，并经常在政府中获得巨大权力。欧洲商人、领事、救赎论修士和牧师，他们成为这个异国风情又丰富多彩的侠盗联盟的一部分受惊的见证者，幸运的是，他们中的一些人写下了自己的回忆录，因为海盗们自己一句话也没给我们留下。 + +海盗们的英雄和憧憬人物是Khizr Redbeard（Khaireddin Barbarossa，即巴巴罗萨·海雷丁），他是一个海员家族（可能是阿尔巴尼亚人，但居住在莱斯博斯）最伟大的后裔，他作为埃及日渐衰落的马穆鲁克政权的代理人首次来到了西地中海。从突尼斯出发，他和他的兄弟们以及格拉纳达的摩尔人开始袭击西班牙海岸。 + +他们组建了自己的舰队，并向各个北非政权兜售他们的服务；在必要时他们会刺杀当地的统治者并接管城镇（贝贾亚，1512；吉杰勒，1514；阿尔及尔，1515）；杰尔巴岛曾一度成为他们的总部。1518年左右，在西班牙的重压之下，海雷丁向奥斯曼苏丹塞利姆一世（“冷酷者”）求援，并被任命为阿尔及尔的副总督（或说为总督）。他在1529年将西班牙人赶出了他们在阿尔及尔海湾的岛上堡垒，并在1534年占领了突尼斯。[当海雷丁大约50岁时，他俘虏了一位年轻的意大利贵族玛丽·德·加埃塔诺，并娶了她。Wolfe还提到，后来阿尔及尔的一位总督的妻子是“一个英国叛逆者”。也许我们可以想象，并不是所有这样的妻子都是不情愿的俘虏，而是其中有些人很享受这种冒险。]之后苏丹任命他为整个土耳其舰队的海军司令。当时奥斯曼人与法国签订了条约，巴巴罗萨作为盟友出现在普罗旺斯海岸。他是如此强大以至当他的舰队停泊在港口时，他有权禁止教堂敲响钟声（在伊斯兰传统中钟声是一种冒犯性的声音）。他死在君士坦丁堡宫殿的床上，他的儿子哈桑·巴巴罗萨（Hassan Barbarossa）继任了阿尔及尔的总督。这是一部真正的海盗史诗，从贫穷到富有：这是所有叛逆者的梦想。[Spencer，1976：18] + +在下一代叛逆者英雄中，另有一个阿尔巴尼亚人，莫拉特·雷斯，因俘获一位西西里公爵和掠夺一艘教皇的船而声名鹊起。然而，他最大胆的冒险是带着一个由四艘半帆船组成的中队穿过海峡前往萨里，在那里他与三名海盗船长会合，然后一起前往加纳利群岛。海盗们洗劫了兰萨罗特岛，抓走了总督的妻子和女儿以及数百名俘虏。在绕岛游弋一圈，又为了获得更多的战利品和俘虏而多次登陆后，他们挂起了旗帜开始谈判，允许重要人物被赎回，其余的人则被运回阿尔及尔作为奴隶出售。西班牙人在得到警告后试图在海峡拦截他们，但莫拉特·雷斯在一场风暴中成功地躲过了马丁·德·帕迪利亚的舰队，并将他的船队带回了阿尔及尔。这是一次大胆的突袭，因为半帆船并不是真正适合在大西洋航行的船只，所以这一行为更为显得大胆。基督徒喜欢相信是上帝惩罚了莫拉特·雷斯，致使他的儿子在他回来之前就死了，但在宗教裁判所里所述关于这次突袭的证词中的故事应该并不可信。[Wolfe，1979：146-7]莫拉特·雷斯似乎在阿尔及尔开启了一种特殊的“贸易关系”，这催生了一个使两个城市（指阿尔及尔和萨里，见下文）受益的独特计划。当阿尔及尔与某个欧洲国家签署和平条约后——这在地中海周围复杂的外交背刺网络中经常发生——阿尔及尔同意不袭击该国的船只——比如英国。同时，比方说，萨里暂时与法国和平相处，因此法国船只是“萨里海盗”的禁区。所以...当一艘阿尔及利亚海盗船接近一艘法国船时，它挂着萨里的旗帜，因此不会引起怀疑。在扣押了法国船之后，它又恢复了阿尔及利亚的旗帜，并返回阿尔及尔（那里允许法国的战利品），出售货物和俘虏。而一艘来自萨里的船可以对一艘来自英国的船施展同样的伎俩。随后的不难想象，尤其是阿尔及利亚和萨里的船只可以自由地使用对方的母港设施进行维修、以及出售战利品和休整。 + +阿里比钦（化名Picenino）在同一时期（1630年至1960年）也在阿尔及尔蓬勃发展，这一时期也见证了摩洛哥布赖格共和国的建立，这似乎是巴巴拉海盗真正的黄金时代。他是意大利人，也有人说是威尼斯人，原名叫皮奇尼奥，他指挥一艘海盗船从亚得里亚海出发抵达阿尔及尔；随后皈依了伊斯兰教，并凭借他的勇气迅速在船长议会中崭露头角。他的战利品使他变得富有，他将所得重新投资于新的海盗船，直到他凭借自己的舰队为他赢得阿尔及尔海军司令的头衔。他在城里有两座宫殿，在郊区有一座别墅，有几千名奴隶、大量的珠宝、板材和财富。他在阿尔及尔修建了一座豪华的公共浴室和一座大清真寺，作为对这座城市的回馈。他有自己的步兵和骑兵保镖，主要从库库部落招募，库库部落的苏丹是他的岳父。在十七世纪三十年代，阿尔及尔的救赎论神父们将他，而不是帕夏视为这座城市的真正统治者。弗朗西斯·奈特是他的奴隶之一，他称其为伟大的“暴君”，不尊重任何人，甚至连大领主也不尊重。然而，并不是所有的奴隶都认为他们的命运“极其悲惨”，也不是所有奴隶都认为他们主人是暴君。有一个故事，讲述了一个伊斯兰狂热分子，他希望通过杀害一名基督徒来进入天堂，并乞求比钦给予他杀害一名奴隶的特权。海盗同意了，但实际上是给了一个肌肉发达的年轻人一把剑，然后邀请那人在果园里与他会面；当那人吓得逃跑时，比钦放声嘲笑他。另一名奴隶归还了他“发现”的钻石；比钦对此评论说，不利用机会使自己获得自由是多么愚蠢！ + +比钦可能有篡权的野心。他与库库苏丹的结盟、数百名士兵的保镖、私人海军，以及他与库鲁格利领导人的关系都表明了他的政治野心。然而他在法罗拉遭遇了惨败，在那里他损失了八艘战舰（弗朗西斯·奈特在那场战斗中从他手中获得了自由；他是一艘被俘船只上的奴隶）和两千名奴隶。几年后，当苏丹计划进攻马耳他时，比钦拒绝让阿尔及利亚海军前往，除非苏丹预先支付一笔补贴。苏丹派了一名“chaouch”（信使或使者）前往阿尔及尔为质；使者和帕夏都不得不到清真寺暂避，以躲避这位海盗与其手下的怒火。然而此时，帕夏拒绝支付禁卫军的工资，士兵们要求比钦提供这笔钱。显然，他还没有为政变做好准备。他逃到了岳父的领地，禁卫军则洗劫了他的城区和犹太人区。接下来会发生什么？苏丹显然担心比钦可能带着军队返回阿尔及尔；于是给他送来了钱、赦免和荣誉，只差没让他成为帕夏。但当他带着苏丹的使者回到阿尔及尔后，他很快就生病去世了。他的葬礼隆重得近乎皇室，但许多人怀疑他是在苏丹的授意下被毒死的。 + +[Wolfe，1979：1489][比钦的清真寺建于1622年，以奥斯曼的模型为基础，“一个八角形的圆顶设在一个中央拱廊式的广场庭院上，拱廊的屋顶是较小的八角形圆顶。”[Spencer，1976：77]修建清真寺当然不能证明他是真诚的皈依者，但它确实表明比钦至少希望表面上显得虔诚。] + +西蒙·丹瑟（Simon Danser），“老舞蹈家”或“暗黑破坏神船长”（Diablo Reis），是著名的海盗。他（至少根据传说）首先教导北非人放弃他们陈旧的地中海式桨帆船，改乘“圆船”，即欧洲式的前后帆船（如哥伦布著名的caravel）。丹瑟和他的战友沃德船长（稍后将再次出现）赢得了足够的声誉，以至于在托马斯·德克尔的戏剧《如果这不是一出好戏，迪韦尔就在其中》（1612）中出现。[Ewen，p.3] + +丹瑟最初是荷兰多德雷赫特人，从马赛来到阿尔及尔，在那里定居、结婚并从事造船业。目前尚不清楚是什么原因导致他叛变并在不到20岁就开始从事海盗生涯，但在随后三年内他就成为了船长议会的头号船长，并因其大胆的冒险行为而获得了Deli-Reis（Captain Devil，“魔鬼船长”）的绰号。丹瑟用缴获的战利品作为奖赏，教他的同伴们如何管理和驾驶配备了高甲板、风帆和大炮的圆船。他亲手俘获了40艘船，它们被并入了海盗舰队。从丹瑟时代起，阿尔及利亚人学会依靠被俘船只和他们自己的造船厂中弥补了他们的损失。丹瑟还带领阿尔及利亚人到了前所未有的更远的地方。他们穿过直布罗陀海峡，深入大西洋，向北一直远至冰岛，1616年，还有一支海盗中队在冰岛沿岸掠夺。 + +具有讽刺意味的是，似乎秘密保留了基督教信仰的丹瑟利用在巴伦西亚附近俘获一的艘载有十名耶稣会牧师的西班牙船只，秘密地向亨利四世的法国宫廷通报他打算返回马赛，他在那里还有妻子和孩子。法国人同意的条件是让耶稣会牧师安全返回，这一点已经做到了。1609年，丹瑟与家人团聚，并被马赛市议会恢复了正式公民身份。1610年，丹瑟向国王和马赛市议会提交了一份对阿尔及尔进行远征的大胆提议，考虑到他对该城市内部详细的了解，这很可能会推翻摄政政府。不幸的是，法国人不信任这位前海盗的忠诚，拒绝接受他的计划。[Spencer，pp.125-6]然而，老丹瑟最后还是成为法国和阿尔及尔之间战争的罪魁祸首。看来丹瑟对法国政府的慷慨对待心存感激，他向该省省长吉斯公爵赠送了两门铜炮，不幸的是，这两门铜炮是阿尔及尔政府借给他的。自然，阿尔及利亚人对丹瑟的“叛国行为”感到震惊，要求归还这两门大炮。这场政治危机发展缓慢却又似乎早已注定。吉斯拒绝放弃他的大炮，而此时丹瑟无关的事件推迟了行动：亨利四世被谋杀了，而摄政王玛丽·德·美第奇在莱茵地区和巴黎都有麻烦要担心，因而他们最终什么都没做。这正是阿尔及利亚的叛逆者们所等待的危机。法国在地中海的商业活动富足而富有诱惑力，加上法国国王拒绝给予补偿，这对海盗们来说是一个绝佳的机会。[Wolfe，1979：181-2]这些大炮最终被送回了阿尔及尔——这也许是法国在其未来殖民地手中遭受过的最严重的耻辱。 + +我们还可以继续挖掘许多以阿尔及利亚为基地的叛逆者的名字，甚至他们的一些船只和战利品，但我们并不能因此更多地了解关于他们的生活，更不会了解他们的想法和感受。不用说，他们中的一些人充其量只是名义上的穆斯林，而且被虔诚的信徒所鄙视，因为他们在皈依之后仍然继续喝酒、大骂和“像基督徒一样唱歌”。但是，那个来自圣特罗佩的水手，因为法国领事试图阻止他转向土耳其人而引发了一场外交事件，又是怎么回事？他的动机是什么？阿里比钦的清真寺和澡堂又是怎么回事？一个玩世不恭的伪君子的建筑？或者是标志着一种更模糊的情感，一半是自我利益，一半是其他东西？真正的虚伪毕竟在人性的历史上是相当罕见的。大多数人倾向于通过对某些观念和理想来证明他们的选择和行为的合理性——首先是证明这些行为的合理性。当个人利益和自我形象，与意识形态的修辞和指向目标相吻合时，意识形态就很容易被内化。假设叛逆者都是马基雅维利式的阴谋家和装腔作势者，那只能怪是我们给予他们太多信任。想象一下，他们中的一些人，至少是“相信”他们声称相信的东西，这样在心理学上会更有说服力。 + +叛逆者的模糊性甚至在语言上也有所反应。阿尔及尔人的多民族混杂，肯定造成了一场多语言误译的噩梦。这种状况呼唤着一种通用语言，事实上，这种语言被称为“佛朗哥”，是“法兰克人”（以及所有欧洲外国人）的语言，或萨比尔语（来自西班牙语的“了解”）。阿拉伯语、西班牙语、土耳其语、意大利语和普罗旺斯语混合在这种典型的海港隐语中。如果在萨里发展出了一种平行的方言，它可能利用了阿拉伯语、柏柏尔语、西班牙式阿拉伯语（摩里斯科语）和西班牙语、葡萄牙语、法语和英语。“新”语言反映了新的，独特的和大规模的社会现象；它们不仅仅是交流的手段，也是思考的模式，是说话人的内外经验的载体，是他们新的交流方式和他们新的（或新采用的）意识形态。佛朗哥与海盗们一起消亡了，但它的隐约的存在表明，叛逆者已经成为——无论这一说法多么勉强——一个“民族”，一个语言社群。在合适的历史环境下，一种通用语言可以成为一种成熟的书面语言，如乌尔都语或马来语。佛朗哥从来没有达到这个水平——但知道它的存在后我们必须改变对叛逆者的看法。我们不能再把他们看作是四散的迷途叛徒。一种语言（无论多么简陋，多么杂乱无章）就是一种文化，或者至少是一种新兴文化的可靠标志。 + + +### 突尼斯的雪花石膏宫殿 + +在我们最终启程向萨里出发之前，我们应该再作一次短暂的地中海航行：寻找叛逆者。没有这些男人（或女人）的真实地理信息是令人难以置信的。在大多数情况下，他们记忆中仅剩下一两件轶事，或许是一场激动人心的海战，而这些都没有揭示出叛逆者的心理、思想和动机。但是，偶尔会有一丝点燃的硫磺般的洞察力照亮纯粹猜测的阴霾。例如，英国叛逆者彼得·埃斯顿（Peter Eston）： + +他以萨默塞特农场工人的身份起家，到1611年时指挥一支由40艘船组成的舰队。1612年，他袭击了纽芬兰岸边的捕鱼船队，正如西印度群岛的海盗在他之后所做的那样。在那里，他修理了船只，掠夺了所需的物资和弹药，并招募100人加入他的舰队。无论他出现在哪里，无论是在地中海西部还是在爱尔兰海岸，所到之处他都留下一片狼藉。最终，他厌倦了叛逆者的生活，加入萨伏伊公爵的麾下，买下了萨伏伊侯爵府，并娶了一位出身高贵的女士。[Lucie-Smith，1978：83] + +有一次，埃斯顿被告知英格兰的詹姆斯一世赦免了他。“既然我自己也是国王，我为什么要服从国王的命令呢？”他这句俏皮话让我们想起了笛福在《海盗通史》中记录的无数演讲，这些演讲暗示了海盗的“意识形态”（如果这不是一个太宏大的术语的话）的存在，一种原始的个人主义-无政府主义态度。尽管不带哲学色彩，但它似乎启发了更聪明和更具阶级意识的海盗。笛福描述说，一个名叫贝拉米船长的海盗向他俘虏，并且刚刚拒绝加入海盗的邀请的商船船长发表了这番讲话： + +我很遗憾他们让你不再拥有你的单桅船，因为我不屑于在对我不利的情况下给任何人带来麻烦；该死的单桅船，我们必须击沉它，而它可能对你有用。虽然你是一只鬼鬼祟祟的小狗，所有那些愿意服从富人为自己的安全而制定的法律的人也是如此；因为这些懦弱的幼崽们没有勇气捍卫他们通过被奴役得到的东西；但你们都该死：他们是一群狡猾的流氓，而你们，为他们服务的人，是一群胆小的傻瓜。他们诋毁我们，这些无赖，而其实我们和他们唯一的区别在于，他们在法律的掩护下抢劫穷人，而我们在我们自己的勇气的保护下掠夺富人。难道你不应该成为我们中的一员，而不是偷偷摸摸地跟在些坏蛋后面工作吗？ + +当船长回答说他的良心不会让他违反上帝和人类的法律时，海盗贝拉米继续说道： + +你是一个邪恶的良心恶棍，我是一个自由的王子，我有权力向全世界宣战，就像在海上有一百艘船，在战场上有十万人的军队一样；这是我的良心告诉我的：但是和这种哭哭啼啼的小狗没什么好说的，毕竟他们会忍受上级在甲板上随意踢他们。 + +将拥有君主之心胸的“农场工人”埃斯顿与亨利·梅因沃宁（Henry Mainwaring）进行比较是很有趣的，后者是一位绅士海盗，他确实接受了英国的赦免，并且像若干年后的亨利·摩根（Henry Morgan）一样背叛了他以前卑鄙的伙伴。或者考虑一下唯一一个变成土耳其人的贵族（据我所知），弗朗西斯·弗尼爵士（Sir Francis Verney）。弗尼是个不安分的青年，在与继母就遗产问题的争吵中败下阵来后，于1608年秋充满厌恶地离开了英国。他来到了阿尔及尔，在频繁的继承战争中崭露头角，成为一名海盗。1609年，据英国驻西班牙大使报告，他掠夺了“三四艘普尔船和一艘普利茅斯船”。1610年12月，威尼斯驻突尼斯大使说他已经叛教了。在这个时期，他是约翰·沃德的助手。但他的成功并没有持续多久。1615年，根据Lithgow的说法，他在西西里大帆船上被囚禁了两年之后，在墨西拿病入膏肓。他在重新皈依基督教后被一名英国耶稣会士赎回。虽然他获得了自由，但他的命运也变得残破。为了生存，他被迫入伍成为一名普通士兵。Lithgow找到他时他已濒临死亡，“在极端痛苦的灾厄中”已经失去求生的意志。[Lucie-Smith，1978：84]。四年后（1615年），他死在墨西拿的圣母怜悯医院[Senior，1976年：98]。他确实“死于非命”，就像旧时代的编年史家对海盗的评价一样——无论这是否属实。 + +另一位英国“绅士”叛逆者（来自康沃尔）是安布罗斯·塞耶（Ambrose Sayer）[同上，p.83]。1613年，塞耶是一艘阿尔及利亚船的船长，该船在萨里被一艘英国船俘获，该船船长决定将这位海盗送回伦敦受审。托比·格兰维尔（Toby Glanville），塞耶的一名战友，意识到“游戏结束了，几次试图自杀，最终成功地从船尾跳了下去”。[同上，p.97]据推测，像大多数水手一样，他从未学会游泳。塞耶被送回国，并被判犯有海盗罪，但不知何故，他设法逃脱了，而且很可能就此隐退，因为我们没有听到他的更多消息。 + +我们了解最多的海盗可能是约翰·沃德。沃德享有“主演”1612年在伦敦西区风靡一时的《一个变成土耳其人的基督徒》中反派角色的殊荣；沃德至少还出版了两本可怕的黑字小册子和两首流行民谣——旧时代的超市小报——它们可能充满错误和赤裸裸的谎言，尽管它们描绘了一幅有趣的画面。[关于沃德，见Ewen，1939] + +沃德大约于生于1553年，是肯特郡法弗舍姆的“一个贫穷的渔民的孩子”。在伊丽莎白统治的最后一年和詹姆斯统治的第一年，我们可以得知他在普利茅斯身无分文，显然在这之前他有过相当长久的私掠生涯——50岁，“肥胖、秃头、白发”。[Norris，1990：63]。1603年，他倒霉透顶，因海军“鼓励服役”而感动，被迫在托马斯·索克韦尔船长（后来他也成了海盗）手下的“狮吼号”上服役。正如许多历史学家所指出的那样，极低或干脆不存在的工资、令人筋疲力竭的劳役和暴力体罚构成了当时的海军生活，这是“可能降临到任何人身上的最糟糕命运之一”。[Senior，p.87。约翰逊博士在某处说过，任何明智的人都宁愿选择监狱而不是英国海军；至少可以保证有更好的食物和同伴！]。据说沃德曾感叹他从事私掠时的日子，“那时我们可以像你们的蛋糕师一样自由地唱歌、打炮[即做爱]、骂人和杀人；那时整个大海是我们的王国，我们在那里随意抢劫，世界是我们的花园，我们在那里散步。”仅仅经过两周的海军军纪训练后，沃德就重新振作起来，组织了30名水手跳船，在普利茅斯港偷了一艘小船，[他本来只打算抢劫船上的财宝，那是属于一个逃往西班牙的英国天主教徒的，但显然他的情报有误，发现“金翅雀都从它们的巢里飞走了”——所以他改偷了这艘船]，最后出海重获自由。50岁的沃德开始了崭新的、令人震惊的海盗生涯。 + +沃德驶往爱尔兰南部，可能是比勒哈文或巴尔的摩，都是以接待海盗而闻名的偏僻无名的小港口。[六年后，1609年，沃德和他的同伴毕晓普船长（Captain Bishop）再次造访了芒斯特（爱尔兰南部一省）。当地官员因与海盗打交道而被监禁，毕竟海盗有10或11艘船，约1000人。芒斯特的英国“副总督”无法用武力击退他们，于是试图赦免他们，但这一权宜之计也失败了。那年晚些时候，英国海军上将派一艘船到巴巴拉，由佩普韦尔船长带领，劝说沃德和他的同伙“放弃他们邪恶的人生道路”。不仅他的任务失败了，而且所有的水手都抛弃了他，加入了沃德。佩普韦尔不得不“以较低的价格将他的小船卖给土耳其人”，然后回到伦敦，这看上去很愚蠢。毕晓普船长（1609年）后来因沃德投靠土耳其而声称鄙视沃德，他收受贿赂而去谋杀沃德，但没有成功。毕晓普恳请赦免，并低声下气地说：“如果可以的话，我宁愿在我自己的国家里做一个贫穷的劳动者死去，也不愿成为世界上最富有的海盗。”[Ewen，1939：20-21]。而沃德显然另有计划]。1603年11月，他在当地某个地方遇到了“伦敦紫罗兰”号，并俘获了它。 + +> 当他们到达锡利群岛时，海盗们很幸运地遇到了一艘法国船，但由于那艘船很坚固，他们只能寄希望用诡计来俘获。因此，大多数海盗都躲在舱口下面，而其他同伴则在甲板上与对方进行交谈。他们就这样持续了几个小时，直到诡计最终得逞，他们接近并制服了他们的猎物。[Senior，p.88]。沃德将这艘船改名为“小约翰”（Little John，传说中罗宾汉的同伙），这让我们对他的想法和他的自我形象有了宝贵的了解：显然他认为自己是海上的罗宾汉。我们有证据表明，他向穷人施舍，而他显然只打算从富人那里偷东西。[大约在1604年，沃德到达萨里，“为他的船筹集物资，并将他们的货物全部卖掉”；他在那里与其他海盗一起筹集并“支付了100英镑，赎回了一个被俘的同胞”[Ewen，1939：3]。沃德在其他几个已知的场合用自己的钱来赎回俘虏；也许这是他“施舍给穷人”的方法]沃德对普利茅斯进行了最后一次秘密访问，他在那里为旗舰招募了一批船员，然后出发去东南方——再也没有回来。在南下的航程中，沃德乘坐一艘100吨的快船来到里斯本以北，然后进入（直布罗陀）海峡。他驶向阿尔及尔，但在那里受到了敌意的接待，因为为托斯卡纳公爵服务的英国冒险家理查德·吉福德最近试图烧毁港口的战舰。因此，他继续在地中海游弋，而他的实力和财富一直在增加。1604年12月，他在赞提（Zante，希腊港口）海域俘获了一艘满载葡萄干和丝绸的威尼斯船只“Santa Afaria号”，同年圣诞节，他洗劫了一艘载有胡椒、蜡和靛蓝的佛兰德船。 + +沃德在地中海的各个港口处理了他的战利品，然后再次穿过海峡，修整他的船并准备补给。当在他在摩洛哥大西洋海岸的萨里（Sale）时，又有23名英国人加入了他。这些人乘印着荷兰文的“祝福”号起航，但由于受到西班牙军舰的粗暴对待，他们的处境很糟糕。当他们看到沃德和他的伙伴们“货真价实，满载而归”时，他们毫不犹豫地离开他们的船，加入到沃德他们之中。在拉拉谢，沃德的人数进一步增加，另一名英国船员也加入了他的行列。这些人的船长迈克尔很快就返回英国，但副手安东尼·约翰逊留在沃德身边，成为他最信任的人之一。 + +到1605年，沃德已经成功地在自己身边聚集了一支强大的力量。他的战船被恰当地命名为“礼物号”，是一艘200吨以上的快船，装有32门炮，船员约100人。除了“礼物号”之外，他还有他的手下，能够陪伴他掠夺任何他认为适合他的战利品。他们以英国人为主，也包括相当数量的荷兰人。当然也不乏有能力的海员急于加入他的队伍。沃德的小册子的作者安德鲁·巴克，对这些海盗的能力有更高的评价，他说他们中的许多人都是“值得尊敬的人，如果他们的决心是为了在海上或岸上的光荣行为...他们可能会因为在世的最伟大的王子服务而受到青睐和赞扬。” + +1603年，沃德是一名普通海员，生活贫困，在国王一艘条件恶劣的船上工作。在50岁的时候，他最好的年华似乎已经过去了。而现在仅仅不到两年后，他就成了一个有钱人，成了一艘精良又坚固的船的指挥官，成了受一大群走投无路的人尊敬的领袖。 + +沃德的海盗行为在横跨1605和1606年的整个冬季持续进行。1605年11月，他在塞浦路斯附近的海域抢劫了一艘来自墨西拿的船只上的丝绸、天鹅绒和绫罗绸缎，金额达5500英镑。大约在这个时候，他还在莫东的码头上劫走了一艘满载香料、药品和棉花的法国船，随后在1606年4月，他在撒丁岛附近劫走了一艘载有纺织品的佛兰德船。这些劫掠行动使海盗们对一个安全的行动基地的需求日益增加，这样他们可以在那里出售战利品和暂存财富。到1606年，他们在突尼斯的土耳其人那里找到了这样一个避难所。这一年的8月，据说沃德住在该城市，并帮助了一些暂时陷入困境的英国海员。 + +沃德在突尼斯的保护者是卡拉·奥斯曼，他作为禁卫军的首领，自1594年以来一直对该城有着绝对控制权。两人之间达成了一项协议，奥斯曼对海盗带回突尼斯的所有货物有优先购买权。在这之后这些货物被存放在突尼斯的仓库里，并转卖给基督教商人以获得可观的利润。 + +一切都表明，沃德和奥斯曼间维持着良好的工作关系，他们甚至可能成为了亲密的朋友，因为海盗称土耳其人为“兄弟”。然而，人们怀疑奥斯曼在交易中得到了最好的回报。然而，有人怀疑奥斯曼在交易中占了上风，而海盗们完全依赖奥斯曼的友谊，因为如果没有友谊，他们很可能无法将突尼斯作为基地。托马斯·米顿（Thomas Mitton）在突尼斯居住了三年，与沃德一起出海，他在海事法院作证时证实了这一点： + +...上述卡拉·奥斯曼是沃德进行海盗活动和掠夺的唯一助手、顾问和支持者，因为被指控的沃德除了在突尼斯之外，没有其他地方可以提供住宿，而在突尼斯，他无法自己解决食宿，只能通过卡拉·奥斯曼的手段。他授权沃德可以在突尼斯和周围地区购买补给。之所以让被告的卡拉·奥斯曼这样做，是因为当沃德获得战利品时，卡拉·奥斯曼以他自己的价格向他购买货物。 + +沃德在发现新基地后开始的第一次航行是在1606年10月。卡拉·奥斯曼为沃德的老式战舰“礼物号”支付了四分之一的补给费。这艘船的船员除了奥斯曼派来的，费用自理的12名土耳其人外全是英国人。沃德并没有为他的第一个战利品等待太久。11月1日，在科罗内附近，他劫获了重90吨的“施洗者约翰号”，这是一艘属于伦敦商人的船只，在当地从事沿海贸易。在这次行动中，随行的有一艘由安东尼·约翰逊（Anthony Johnson）指挥的50吨级的小船，似乎有理由认为这两艘船是一起从突尼斯出发的。 + +下一个落入海盗手中的是一艘更富有的船，即“鲁比号”，这是一艘超过300吨的威尼斯帆船，它正从亚历山大港返回，满载着香料和3,000块黄金。1607年1月28日，悬挂荷兰国旗的“礼物号”在距离摩利亚海岸40英里的地方看到了“鲁比号”，沃德和他的手下无疑充分利用了出其不意的优势，通过“非常谨慎和无畏”的登船作战俘获了她。在这次大获成功之后，沃德又拿下了另一艘威尼斯船“卡尔米纳蒂号”，这艘船在航行到纳夫普里翁和雅典之后正往回走。沃德对这次航行非常满意，他带着他的两艘威尼斯战利品胜利地回到了突尼斯。与本世纪初一样，威尼斯人不得不再次遭受英国人的掠夺。然而，他们还没有遭受最惨痛的损失。 + +1607年初，沃德整修好了他的船，再次出海。这一次他乘坐的是“鲁比号”，他的威尼斯战利品。他把它改装成了一艘战舰，配备了140名船员，其中大部分是英国人。卡拉·奥斯曼再次从土耳其军械库中为海盗们提供了枪支、火药、火柴和子弹，从而买下了这次冒险战利品的四分之一份额。然而，这一次，探险队中没有土耳其人。 + +震撼整个威尼斯共和国并使海盗们发财的事件是劫获“Reneira e Soderina号”，一艘重达600吨的古船。这艘大船在塞浦路斯附近被两艘由沃德指挥的海盗船劫走，据说每艘船都有40门炮，至少有100名全副武装的船员。在”Reneira e Soderina号”的惊人货物中，有价值至少10万英镑的靛蓝、丝绸、肉桂和棉花（一份夸张的英国报告称其价值“至少200万”）。在里亚尔托岛上引起如此大的轰动不仅仅是经济损失的规模，而是俘获这艘船的方式本身就是对威尼斯共和国的一种羞辱。从一个搬运工的描述中可以看出，商船的船员被海盗的凶猛攻击吓坏了以致几乎没有做出任何抵抗： + +> 船长根据大家的建议决定战斗，他把所有的船员和乘客分开，一些人驻扎在后甲板，另一些人驻扎在主甲板和船尾，这样，他们看起来都是英勇的士兵，手里拿着武器。前来攻击的两艘船，即使有人向他们开了两三枪，也毫不犹豫地努力让自己靠近，并在进入射程范围后开枪12轮，每轮6发，始终瞄准船员和船帆，没有向水中开过一次枪。他们旨在恐吓的计划取得了极大的成功，因为有两个守卫后甲板的人被他们击中，当他们受伤后其余的人都吓得逃走了，把他们所有的武器丢在后甲板上。即使在两艘船靠近时，所有的人都只顾着跑向自己的财产。尽管船长竭尽全力，但他不仅无法迫使船员返回后甲板，甚至无法让他们从甲板下或艏楼里出来。事实上，船上的木匠和其他一些人拿着武器与他对峙，并告诉他不应该再指挥这艘船了。 + +似乎这个奖品还无法满足，沃德接着又俘获另一艘威尼斯船只，最后回到了他的基地。1607年6月的一天，他和手下在突尼斯La Goleta港下锚，这次的战利品价值至少40万克朗。沃德不想失去让战利品获得好价钱的机会，他多次提出要把船和货物运到另一个港口，因为卡拉·奥斯曼不会按他的价格来，为此，沃德抗命骑马离开了城堡，并把他的说客们留在那里，直到他们达成协议。最终，沃德和卡拉·奥斯曼商定了7万克朗的价格，略高于货物实际价值的六分之一。 + +沃德现在正处于成功的顶峰。1608年，一位英国海员在突尼斯看到了他，他给我们留下了一个关于大海盗的描述： + +> 头发很短，而且很白，前面是秃的；脸和胡须都很黑。说话不多，而且几乎总是骂人。从早到晚都在喝酒。最为放荡不羁，胆大妄为。睡得很多，在港口时十有八九都在船上。一个彻头彻尾的老不死。在他的那一行中是个傻瓜和白痴。[Senior，1976：8893] + +无论他在那一行的中智力水平如何，沃德现在都正处于他的事业成功的巅峰。他身边聚集了一群强大的海盗。桑普森船长被任命为俘获的船的指挥官，雅茅斯的理查德·毕晓普成为沃德的第一副手，南安普顿的詹姆斯·普罗克特和普利茅斯的约翰·史密斯成为他的炮手。沃德统治了中部海域，尽管丹瑟在地中海西部仍可与他匹敌。当被问及他是否愿意像丹瑟那样加入法国时，他回答说：“我喜欢法国人？我告诉你，如果我在海上遇到我自己的父亲，我会抢劫他并把他卖掉。”当一个叫理查德·布罗姆菲尔德的海员指责他投靠土耳其并生活在这样一个异教徒国家时，沃德只是说他是“一个清教徒中的恶棍和流氓”。 + +> 然而就在这时，他开始谈判争取获得皇家赦免。他的一个熟人说，他拿出了价值200英镑的“巴巴里黄金”给英国的朋友，以打动海军大臣。威尼斯大使说，他得到了30,000克朗。但即使是詹姆士一世也对接受这样一个臭名昭著的海盗的贿赂嗤之以鼻，甚至在1609年1月的逮捕海盗公告中特别提到了沃德。沃德似乎对他的请求被拒绝感到非常恼火。“告诉那些导致我被放逐的家伙，在我处理完他们之前，我会为我的赦免起诉他们。”[Lloyd，1981：50-51] + +正如沃德的一位传记作者所说，在一首名为“沃德船长与彩虹间的著名海战”的民谣中，“去告诉英国国王，去告诉他我的这句话/如果他在所有陆地上称王，我将在海上称王。”1607年，著名的外交官安东尼·谢利爵士“在突尼斯写信给沃德，劝说他放弃他的生活方式和罪恶的事业”。沃德被激怒了，他给他刚刚俘获的一艘船以自由，条件是船长必须找到安东尼爵士并向他转达沃德的决斗的挑衅。很相信懒散的名声与这种浮夸的姿态集中在一个人身上。 + +大约在去年（1608年）9月，沃德在海峡遇到了前往英格兰雷德里夫的费舍尔，并给了他100英镑让他带去给自己的妻子。其他同伴也为妻子和朋友捎去了钱。费舍尔践踏了他们的信任。在他们的下一次会面中，沃德掠夺了费舍尔的船，并对他放声谩骂。他把费舍尔绑在船桁上并杀死他。其他的人为了避免同样的命运都加入了海盗行列。 + +沃德刺伤了一名韦斯特的船长副手，他的手下发生了叛乱。在萨拉科塔海峡的一场大风暴中，朗伊斯特和其他人请他去祈祷，但他拒绝了，说“他既不害怕上帝也不害怕魔鬼”。[Ewen，1939：14。这些引文和轶事来自于关于沃德的小册子之一，《Ward, Newwes from the Sea》] + +沃德似乎已经决定留在巴巴里并放弃了和平退休的希望。他把“Soderina号”改装成了他的旗舰，并为下一次航行做好了准备。她看起来确实是一艘好船：600吨的重量，在下层甲板上安装了40门铜炮，上层则安装了20门。1607年12月，他驾驶着这艘船，载着400名英国和土耳其船员出海。然而，“Soderina号”很快就被证明她并不适合作为一艘战舰。她过多的军备使她变得沉重，她的木板已经开始腐烂。沃德一俘获新的船就立即改乘，把那艘笨重的战舰留在那听天由命。1608年初，这艘大船在塞里戈（Cerigo）附近沉没，几乎所有人员——250名土耳其人和150名英格兰人都丧生了。 + +> 然而，这只是沃德在1607到1608年的冬天所遭遇的一系列灾难的开始。首先，他指挥的新船在海上沉没了，随后他在纳瓦里诺俘获并装配好的一艘大帆船被击沉。更糟糕的是，他的一位重要的船长，一位名叫扬·卡斯滕的弗莱明人，于1608年3月21日带着两艘战舰和一艘俘获的船，在莫东附近被威尼斯的大帆船袭击并战败。在这场对阵海盗所取得的罕见胜利中，威尼斯人杀死了包括卡斯滕在内的50人，俘虏了44人。 + +> 在这些挫折之后，沃德仍然继续参与在突尼斯的远征。1609年，他与两名土耳其船长一起出海前往黎凡特，并在1610年、1612年和1618年进一步出征。1622年他似乎还参与了俘获一艘威尼斯船的行动，当时他肯定已经将近七十岁了。然而，他发展出了其他的兴趣，晚年时他更多呆在岸上。他很快就融入了突尼斯社会。在1609年他已经“变成了土耳其人”，取名优素福·雷斯（Issouf Reis），而且据说他还娶了另一个叛逆者，一个人名叫Jessimina的巴勒莫女人（尽管他在英国的妻子定期给他寄钱）。[Senior，1976：93-4] + +1616年，爱说长道短的苏格兰旅行家威廉·利思戈在突尼斯遇见沃德：“我在突尼斯这里遇见了一位英国船长，Waird将军[这是利思戈的苏格兰发音：达恩神父称他为爱德华]。他曾经是一名伟大的海盗和海军指挥官；尽管他在英国不受欢迎，但他变成了土耳其人，他在那里建造了一座美丽的宫殿，用大量大理石和雪花石膏装饰。与他一起有15名接受过割礼的英国叛徒作家奴，他们的生活和面容都是相似的，甚至绝望和鄙夷的表情也是一致的。然而，他们的主人Waird心平气和，和我一起从陆路安全地回到阿尔及尔；是的，在我待在那里的十天里，我多次和他一起吃饭，但都是在法国船上。”他传奇般的名声仍在继续，因为几年后在突尼斯被俘的爱德华·科克塞（Edward Coxere）说，沃德一直“有一个土耳其人的习惯，他只喝水，不喝酒，在他的土耳其人的鞋子下戴着像马蹄铁一样的小铁片。”[Lloyd，1981：53] + +正如一首流行的民谣所说： + +> 在突尼斯巴巴拉 + +> 他建造了庄严的 + +> 雄伟的皇室宫殿 + +> 用最多的饰品装点 + +> 相比他更适合王子 + +> 这终将证明他的耻辱。 +> #### [Norris，1990：94] + +与民谣歌手的虔诚希望相反，沃德的建筑幻想没有以耻辱告终。 + +利思戈还告诉我们，在晚年沃德对在骆驼粪便中孵化禽蛋的问题感兴趣。我们可以想象，他拿着一盆臭气熏天的泥土在雪花膏宫殿里闲逛，旁边还有好奇的鸡。瘟疫是所有海盗必须遭受的不可避免的“厄运”，在1623年它对北非进行了一次定期访问。沃德死在床上，时年约七十岁。他被埋葬在海上，就像他一直期望的那样。 + +和沃德同时代的英国人在他和其他英国叛逆者身上浪费了大量尖刻的语言，他们用一种几乎是中世纪的眼光看待他们，认为他们放弃了基督教转而信奉伊斯兰教。然而，人们不能不同情海盗们为了反对他们那个时代的教条主义而采用实用主义。当然，沃德对基督教航运发动了战争，英国船也不能例外，但关于他在海上遇到自己的父亲就会抢劫他的故事似乎只是表面上的恶意。他的本性还有另一面。据了解，他至少有两次释放了在突尼斯被奴役的英国人，而实际见到他的利思戈称他为“慷慨的Waird”。[Senior，p.94]。C.M. Senior，这篇墓志铭的作者，显然对沃德产生了同情，尽管他很残忍，很混账，很叛逆。这个想成为小约翰的家伙，这个相当愚蠢的老不死，无疑继续在餐桌上喋喋不休地谈论过去的美好时光，[1608年有一次，沃德带着一艘满载“忠诚葡萄酒”的西班牙船驶入阿尔及尔，在那里遇到了另一个海盗（来自莱姆豪斯的约翰·金），他刚刚俘获了一艘载有啤酒的船。沃德用一桶葡萄酒换了一桶啤酒，这笔交易无疑亏了，这也暴露了他工人阶级的品味[Ewen，1939：9]]这与这位突尼斯绅士形成了一种奇怪的配合，他有时节制，有时“慷慨”，而且——谁知道——也许甚至有点虔诚。（有意思的是，沃德在突尼斯生涯中很晚才皈依，这表明他可能完全是自愿的，甚至是真诚的）。这几乎构成了一个令人信服的人物研究；其中有着足够多的矛盾和悖论以致于让人听起来有心理上的真实感。没有其他叛逆者能在时间的鸿沟中展现如此完整的个性——唯一例外是萨里的穆拉德船长，我们以后会见到他。事实上，人们会情不自禁地喜欢上沃德——不过人们也可能像威廉·利思戈一样犹豫是否要在他的雪花石膏宫殿里过夜，因为要担心早上会不会发现自己的手表和钱包都丢了! + + +### 萨里的摩尔人共和国 + +萨里周围地区似乎早在智人出现前就有人居住。铜石并用时代或“卵石文化”就是很好的代表，尼安德特人也出现在那里。旧石器时代的所有阶段都有记载，当然还有新石器时代或“大西洋巨石时代”[Brown，1971]。萨里（Sala或Sla）这个名字可能非常古老，来自柏柏尔语单词asla，意思是“岩石”。萨里的古墓群被称为Chellah（实际上是同一个名字），至少可以追溯到迦太基时代（大约公元前7世纪）。罗马人把这个地方称为Sala Colonia，它是Mauritania Tingitane省的一部分。老普林尼提到它（一个满是大象的沙漠小镇）。在公元5世纪汪达尔人摧毁了这一地区，只留下了一些金发碧眼的柏柏尔人。阿拉伯人（公元7世纪）保留了这个旧名字，并认为它源自诺亚之孙，含之子萨拉；（此处存疑，含的儿子中没有叫萨拉的）他们说萨里是柏柏尔人建造的第一座城市。 + +萨里在皈依伊斯兰教方面显然有些迟缓，并被穆斯林称为“边境城镇”；但到了9世纪，它肯定已经是伊斯兰地区，而边境已经变成海洋本身。在10世纪，当开罗的伊斯玛仪教派哈里发征服远西地区时，萨里显然已被当作一个军事驻地：在萨里对面布赖格河南岸建造的一个堡垒或者说“Ribat”，即是后来被称为拉巴特的定居点。这一军事行动针对的是采用哈瓦利吉派教义（一种同时反对什叶派和逊尼派正统教义的原教旨主义）的当地柏柏尔人部落。到11世纪，萨里已经发展成一个成熟的城市，其主要特征与现在的基本相同。 + +为了理解后来的事件，重要的是将地理状况和城市地形可视化，因此有了这个示意图。欧洲评论家后来用“萨里”（Sallee或Sally）这个名字来指代整个建筑群，但实际上这里有三个不同的“城市”，每个城市都将拥有独特的身份和命运：一，“旧”萨里（即今天的萨里市）；二，河南边的“Casbah”（意为要塞，城堡），一个有围墙的小飞地，自成一体；三，“新”萨里（最终发展成为拉巴特，即今天的摩洛哥首都）。为了简化问题，我们将这三个定居点称为萨里、卡斯巴和拉巴特。 + +11世纪，第一批西班牙穆斯林，或“安达卢西亚人”从科尔多瓦来到萨里，并带来了他们强势而精妙的摩尔人文化、建筑、音乐、精神信仰、食物、民俗等。在这一点上，萨里表现出其恒定的社会学外观——一个港口城市，在这里，城市的“阿拉伯”安达卢西亚文化和农村的柏柏尔文化相遇、交融，并变异成摩洛哥文化。 + +在阿尔摩拉维德（1061-1164）和阿尔摩哈德（1130-1269）时期，萨里发展成为与欧洲贸易和与非洲贸易（著名的年度黄金商队）之间的重要纽带，也是公认的摩尔人文化、学术、信仰的复合型中心城市之一。更多的安达卢西亚人，特别是格拉纳达人来到这里。萨里已经被称为虔诚者的避难所，一个由圣人、隐士、坟墓和神龛组成的城市。这些圣人中的一些人将在我们的历史中发挥积极作用——甚至在他们死后（这可能更重要）。这里有两种精神信仰，与文化组合中的“城市”安达卢西亚和“农村”柏柏尔元素相当。也就是说，一些圣人是正统的，虔诚的，参与了古典苏菲派的沙兹里教团；[起源于埃及，由阿布·哈桑·沙兹里于13世纪创立，在伊斯兰世界有多个分支，尤其是埃及、北非和也门。见Douglas（1993）；az-Zirr and Durkee（1991）]。其他人则更“疯狂”，即异端、更具民族性、相信奇迹。许多重要的萨里圣人出现在13世纪左右的马林王朝（1216-1645）的“黄金时代”，当时与欧洲的大规模贸易以及马格里布（阿拉伯语意为“日落之地”，即非洲西北部地区）和西班牙间的相对和平与繁荣使得文化和建筑学高度繁荣。萨里著名的清真寺和宗教学校（神学学校）仍然被认为是摩洛哥最美丽的建筑之一，它们是在马林王朝统治下修建的，此外还有医院、引水渠、苏菲派收容所和其他公共工程。 + +来自格拉纳达的流亡维齐尔，利桑·丁·伊本·哈提卜（“信仰之舌”）在14世纪中叶参观了萨里，对萨里的美丽和其集市的欢娱赞不绝口，其中包括“最精致的阿比西尼亚奴隶”；也许当他写作那首成为萨里的非官方座右铭的诗时，他正想着他们： + +> 即使分心也无法驱除 + +> 那心头涌现的悲苦 + +> 但萨里的微风吹过 + +> 它就此随风散了 +> #### [萨里（城市名称）和萨里（阿拉伯语）的双关语，意思是“控制台”。见Brown，1971：34] + +大约在同一时期，博学的正统派学者，萨里最重要的圣人之一定居在这个城市：西迪·艾哈迈德·伊本·阿希尔，“医生”，是隆达的伊本·阿巴德等著名苏菲派学者的老师，一个富有教养的人物，一个来自土耳其的珊瑚渔夫，被称为“土耳其人”。他成为当地水手的一位守护神。西迪·艾哈迈德·伊本·阿希尔本人可以保佑海洋，使风暴平静，因此他的坟墓后来成为海盗们的热门朝圣地。 + +1362年伊本·阿希尔去世后，萨里和马里尼德进入了漫长而缓慢的衰落期，但这是一个和平的、仍然相当繁荣的衰落期。16世纪访问该市的“非洲的列奥”（阿尔·法西，阿拉伯旅行家）留下了这样的描述：房屋是按照古代的风格建造的，多以马赛克和大理石柱装饰。此外，所有的礼拜场所都非常漂亮，装饰得很精致。位于巨大而美丽的拱廊之下的商店的情况也是如此。在经过一些商店时，人们会看到一些拱门，据说是为了将一种工艺与另一种工艺分开而建造的。 + +我得出的结论是，萨里拥有区别于一座文明精致城市的所有奢侈品，也是一个不同国籍基督教商人经常光顾的好港口…因为它是菲兹王国的港口。 + +虽然萨利很快就被[从1260年卡斯蒂利亚人的进攻中]夺回，但此后它的人口和吸引力都变得较少。特别是在城墙附近有许多空房子，有非常漂亮的圆柱和大理石及各种颜色的窗户。但人们并不能欣赏它们。 + +这里有许多花园，还有大量的棉花种植园。这座城市的大多数居民都是纺织工，他们也在制作了大量的梳子，这些梳子被送到菲兹王国的所有城市出售；在城市附近有一片森林，里面种满了黄杨树和其他种类的木材，很适合用来制作这些梳子。 + +无论如何，这时的人们在萨里中生活得非常舒适，有一位总督、一位法官和许多其他官员——海关和盐场的官员——因为许多热那亚商人来到这里，处理重要事务。他们的贸易是国王重要的收入来源。[引自Brown，1971：40-1] + +同一时期（15世纪末16世纪初），萨里的官方守护神西迪·阿卜杜拉·伊本·哈桑（Sidi Abdullah Ibn Hassun）出现了，他至少在精神层面上深入参与了萨里随后的独特历史展现。西迪·阿卜杜拉代表着博学和隐士传统的有趣结合。他既不是特别有学问的人，也不是先知的后裔，[先知赛义德或谢里夫后裔当然在伊斯兰世界各地都受到尊敬，尤其是什叶派和伊斯梅尔派，但他们在逊尼派摩洛哥也发挥了重要作用。这些家族拥有巨大的政治威望，其中一个至今仍统治着摩洛哥。对谢里夫家族的这种崇敬可能要归功于法蒂玛的影响，这种影响仍然以著名的“法蒂玛之手”的形式存在于民间传说中，它在北非各地被用作对抗邪恶之眼的符咒。见Westermarek（1968）[1926]；参见“邪恶之眼”、“手”等下的索引]但他以写作为生。当他来到萨里时，他身后跟着一棵正在行走的棕榈树，这棵树扎根在他未来陵墓的遗址上。城里的苏菲派欣喜若狂，变成了鸟。当城里的女人来拜访他时，他把自己变成了一个女人，这样他就可以不惧丑闻地接待她们了！为纪念他而举行的节日在先知生日（Mawlid）前夕举行，以海盗们特别喜欢的烛光游行为中心（根据土耳其的习俗）；届时他们穿着最艳丽的衣服。西迪·阿卜杜拉最有名的弟子是一位名叫穆罕默德·阿亚希（Muhammad al-Ayyashi）的隐士和圣战者，他在海盗的伟大时代中发挥了重要作用——现在这个时代即将开始了。 + +在15和16世纪，西地中海国家之间的力量平衡发生了戏剧性的变化。1492年穆斯林格拉纳达的沦陷标志着摩洛哥在伊比利亚半岛长达七个多世纪的定居和扩张的结束。在四分之一个世纪内，摩洛哥大西洋沿岸的所有重要海上城市，除了一个以外都沦落到了崛起的西班牙和葡萄牙帝国手中。萨里是唯一的例外。在这一时期前来萨里的众多人之中，穆罕默德·阿亚希（Muhammad al-Ayyashi）（上文提到他是伊本·哈桑（IbnHassun）的弟子）是摩洛哥历史上最著名的英雄之一。阿亚希生于巴努·马利克（Banu Malik），后者是希拉利阿拉伯部落之一，定居在萨里腹地的盖尔（Gharb）。据说，他在16世纪末左右在这座城市定居，在他的谢赫（阿拉伯语，老师，长者）阿卜杜拉·哈桑的指导下，致力于学习和实行禁欲主义生活，并以虔诚、沉默、持续禁食和阅读《古兰经》而闻名。据传说，有一天，一群前来拜访的部落领袖赠给西迪·阿卜杜·阿拉一匹马。他叫来了他的弟子阿亚希，并告诉他骑上马，放弃他的学业，以便在真主的帮助下，发现他在今生和来世的幸福。这位圣徒要他的门徒发誓要履行他的职责，为他祝福，并指示他骑马前往艾宰穆尔城。 + +在这一传奇事件发生后的几年内，阿亚希已经成为艾宰穆尔的总督，在摩洛哥南部对抗西班牙人和葡萄牙人的保卫者，并成为16世纪上半叶上台的萨第安王朝的重要对手。1614年，阿亚希逃脱了萨第安苏丹策划的暗杀，回到了萨里。从那时起，直到1641年死于盖尔的一个阿拉伯部落之手，阿亚希一直沿着大西洋和地中海与西班牙和葡萄牙人作战，并成为萨利北部和东部地区的独立统治者。[Hesperis，45] + +在1492年之前和之后，萨利的人民一直欢迎来自西班牙的摩尔人进入他们的社区。在17世纪的第一个十年，一群新的移民开始出现：西班牙的最后一批摩尔人，无论是仍然坚持伊斯兰信仰的留守者（Mudejares），还是名义上皈依基督教的“摩里斯科人”（在萨里称为“安达卢西亚人”），都被西班牙的种族主义和复仇主义政策激怒而发动了一系列的叛乱，并在1609至1614年间被腓力二世通过一系列法令大规模驱逐出境。萨里的一位传统历史学家[Hesperis, 47]告诉我们，当这些新难民出现并试图租住房子时，“由于他们的非穆斯林方式、西班牙的衣着、语言和礼仪，他们缺乏羞耻心和尊严，他们不被允许留下来。”[新来的人有一些听起来很陌生的名字，如Vargas、Pelafres Blanco、Rodriquez、Carasco、Santiago、Galan、Guzman等——他们中的许多人一句阿拉伯语都不懂。[Caille，1949：248]]。1610年，一个叫做奥纳乔斯（来自埃斯特雷马杜拉的奥纳乔斯）的群体作为一个有凝聚力的民族来到这里，他们仍然是狂热的穆斯林，讲阿拉伯语，而且相当富有。不幸的是，他们的财富似乎来自于贿赂基督教官员允许他们携带武器、抢劫和造假；奥纳乔斯被认为不足以在圣徒之城老萨里定居。因此，他们向南过河，建立了卡斯巴，并在那里定居。卡斯巴包括旧的“ribat”或“t’ort”的废墟。阿布·纳赛尔称其为阿尔摩哈德建筑；它是在1150年左右建造的（或重新建造的），同时还有哈桑塔，这是一个尖塔，作海上船只的地标自用。[Coindreau，p.30-31] + +然而，新来的摩里斯科人更加奇怪——他们说的是西班牙-阿拉伯语，甚至是西班牙语，有基督教的名字，却没有任何财富，看起来甚至比奥纳乔斯人更粗俗。因此，摩里斯科人只得满足于卡斯巴（今拉巴特的一部分）以下的土地，他们在那里形成了一个完全独立的群体。他们渴望对西班牙进行报复，并迅速成为充满热情的海盗。 + +布赖格的三个城市现在都有人居住——就在马林王朝最终完全崩溃，使整个摩洛哥陷入了动荡、内战和王朝争斗的时候。[正如一位摩洛哥历史学家所言，普遍的动荡“足以使哺乳期的婴儿头发变白！”见Caille（1949：209），引用El-Oufrani的话。]这片土地的名义统治者现在是马拉喀什的萨第安人，他们远在南方，而且缺乏组织。 + +与此同时，隐者阿亚希（Marabout al-Ayyashi）在反对西班牙和其他基督教国家侵占摩洛哥的圣战中声名鹊起，事实上，他作为伟大的摩洛哥民族主义英雄被铭记至今。他被他的老师西迪·阿卜杜拉·伊本·哈桑推上了圣战的道路，并设法成为艾宰穆尔的总督；他在欧洲人和马拉喀什的萨第安人中都非常不受欢迎，后者在1614年试图暗杀他，随后派军队对付他。 + +他回到萨里，三个城市的领导人都同意保护他。不久之后（日期尚不确定），拉巴特的摩里斯科人宣布自己是一个独立的共和国，总督或“大领主”任期很短——一次一年，以及一个由14位长老、顾问或船长组成的御前议会或委员会。1627年左右，卡斯巴人效仿他们，建立了奥纳乔斯共和国。两个共和国最初都同意承认由阿亚希担任“圣战指挥官”，前提是他尊重他们的自治权，但这种良好关系并未持续很久。 + +阿亚希在老萨里居住，在城墙外正对拉巴特的方向为自己建造了两座堡垒，有一条地下隧道（至今仍在）通往他在城墙内的宫殿。旧城的独裁者是他最热情的支持者，新萨里现在也宣布自己在他的精神与政治权威下独立。现在，在布赖格河上有三个共和国，它们都参与了圣战、海盗和反抗萨第安的叛乱，并且彼此之间争吵不断。 + +1614年左右，当沿海城市马莫拉被西班牙人占领时，大批国际海盗逃往萨里，并受到奥纳乔斯人和安达卢西亚人的欢迎。[事实上，马莫拉在亨利·梅因沃宁船长的激励下，一直在扮演一个海盗共和国的角色。这个英国人显然从未皈依伊斯兰教，这表明，成为土耳其人仍然是一种自愿的行为，因为尽管他与巴巴拉有着密切的联系，但他并未这样做。后来，他通过“接受赦免”在英格兰隐退，为自己取得巨大成功的职业生涯加冕。他在那里写了一篇关于航海的重要论文，过着绅士般的生活。他还写了一篇关于如何压制海盗的论文——不要提供任何赦免，梅因沃宁在其中建议到。]他们在拉巴特定居，成为了叛逆者社区的核心。因此实际上，“萨里流浪者”是拉巴特流浪者，尽管这两个定居点通常都被称为萨里，而且所有三个共和国都参与了海盗贸易。也许有人会认为他们就像苏格兰边境游击队的三个部族，彼此之间不断争斗，但又联手对英国发动袭击。狙击、争吵、异议、诋毁荣誉和其他消遣活动不时让位于内战，特别是在1627年至1641年间，但任何东西都不允许妨碍商业活动或战利品的流通。 + +这种情况很混乱，资料来源也同样混乱，但据我所知，情况是这样的：奥纳乔斯人资助海盗活动并建立舰队，他们既憎恨萨里的旧独裁者，也欺负拉巴特的下层摩里斯科人或安达卢西亚人。安达卢西亚人在海盗船上担任军师，有时还担任间谍（因为他们可以冒充西班牙人）。在他们的拉巴特市，住着国际海盗团体和欧洲商人及领事（在领事街，现在仍然存在），估计这里也是大多数酒馆和妓院的所在地。[正如佩雷·丹所描述的那样，日日夜夜都有争吵声从酒馆和摩尔人的咖啡馆中传出，这些酒馆和咖啡馆的主人大多是本土商人，“海盗把战利品卖给了他们”；随后立刻把他们的收入花在“歌舞厅和其他放荡的地方，因为他们最热衷于把他们在海上赢得的财富浪费在狂欢中”。[Coindreau，1948：41]。对这些“场景”的感受可以从有关皇家港的描述中获得，皇家港是后来牙买加的海盗城镇，它是如此邪恶以至于被洪水吞没，就像水里的索多玛。[Exquemelin，1699]]。安达卢西亚人是所有三个群体中对阿亚希和圣战最缺乏热情的，尽管他们最初是基于对西班牙的同仇敌忾而接受他。他们憎恨他的独裁主义，可能还憎恨他试图干涉他们的共和政治。最后，他们气急败坏地拒绝帮助他发动任何进一步的十字军东征——于是，他把他的圣怒转向了他们，用他安装在萨里堡垒的城墙上珍贵的大炮（包括铁炮和更为高级的青铜炮）向拉巴特开火。 + +老萨里主要关注阿亚希的圣战和对萨第安人的反抗，但他们人绝对没有参与海盗活动，无论是作为投资者、船长、船员、武装人员，还是收购战利品、俘虏和奴隶的商人。然而具有讽刺意味的是，人们将萨里当作海盗之城，而这个浪漫的称号授予河对岸的卡斯巴/拉巴特定居点显然更为恰当。时至今日，萨里和拉巴特之间的竞争依然存在。正如K.Brown所说：“17世纪的斗争在时间上成为模糊的历史记忆。”旧萨里人认为拉巴特的新入侵者是an-Nasara ’l-Qashtaliyin（卡斯蒂利亚的基督教徒），后来又开始称他们为l-Mslmin d-r-Rbat（拉巴特的穆斯林），这是对他们在宗教问题上的宽松的略带幽默又苦涩的暗喻。拉巴特人以一种类似的讽刺方式，记住了萨里人的疯狂行为。他们说：kayihmaqu fi-l-asr（原话：他们在下午祈祷的时候发疯）。旧萨里人也记得。他们说，在阿亚希的时代，当拉巴特的人白天与异教徒打交道时，萨里就在工作。然而，在晚间祈祷的时候，他们拿起武器与拉巴特的叛徒作战。但是，这两座城市是同一根绳上的两个蚂蚱（按照兰斯伯勒上将的说法），他们彼此了成为友好的敌人。他们被称为al-aduwatayn（两岸），通过对阿拉伯语词根的发挥，使人们想起了al-aduwayn（两个敌人）。这两个民族的相互反感不过是戏谑，他们都用一句贤明的口语谚语来表达这一点：wakha ywelli l-wed hlib war-rmel zbib maykunshi r-Rbati li-s-Slawi hbib（如果河流[布赖格]变成牛奶，沙子变成葡萄干，拉巴特人就永远不会成为老萨里人的朋友）。在拉巴特的对岸，友好的敌人最差也是敌对的兄弟。尽管如此，他们都是穆斯林，并且已经融入了该国的阿拉伯文化。 + +[Brown，1971：50-51]拉巴特的安达卢西亚人和卡斯巴的奥纳乔斯人之间最初的争吵集中在关税收入上，奥纳乔斯人拒绝分享收入，说他们需要要将其全部用于防御和修理城墙。安达卢西亚人不相信这些论点，到1630年，“卡斯巴的骄傲主人和下层城市的被剥夺继承权的居民公开处于内战状态。”[Coindreau，1948：44]老萨里站在奥纳乔斯一边，具有讽刺意味的是，最终在英国领事约翰·哈里森的外交干预下才恢复了和平，[哈里森肯定很受欢迎。查理一世与摩洛哥签订了条约，这位“威尔士亲王府的绅士”带着礼物来到萨里，包括六门大炮。关于哈里森的故事，见下文第七章。[Coindreau，1948：108]。他在1630年5月起草了一份协议，结束了敌对状态。该协议的三个要点是：第一，安达卢西亚人将选举他们自己的总督或领主，但他将居住在卡斯巴；[此时，奥纳乔斯人由穆罕默德·伊本·阿卜杜勒·卡迪尔·塞龙领导，而安达卢西亚人则推举阿卜杜拉·伊本·阿里·卡塞里担任领主；他们两人在共和国时期仍然活跃各个岗位上。[Caille，1949：2171，卡塞里在1638年被暗杀。]]第二，议会将由来自卡斯巴和新萨里的16位知名人士组成；第三，收入（包括海事收入和关税）将在卡斯巴和新萨里之间平均分配。 + +因此，这两个城市与老萨里之间仍保持相对独立，但“实际上，卡斯巴成为摩尔人萨里共和国的中心所在地，其政府对（布赖格河）两岸的城市行使着或多或少的权力。”[Coindreau，1948：44] + +新的权力平衡被证明是不稳定的，1631年阿亚希再次打破了和平。安达卢西亚人背叛了他，拒绝给他送来他在围攻马莫拉时需要的登城梯。他要求老萨里的宗教领袖们作出法特瓦（伊斯兰律法的裁决或教令），或者说裁定，允许他镇压新萨里和卡斯巴的海盗，“因为他们反对真主和他的先知，帮助异教徒并给他们提供建议...他们按照自己的喜好管理穆斯林的财产，剥夺他们的利润并垄断贸易，使他们自己受益。”[Brown，1971：49]阿亚希用他的大炮开火，对南岸发起的围攻一直持续到1632年，在这一年的10月最终宣告失败。 + +和平只持续了很短的时间，1636年，安达卢西亚人对卡斯巴发动了攻击并取得成功。许多奥纳乔斯人逃离了城市，任由摩里斯科人完全控制了城市。胜利的安达卢西亚人现在把他们的怒火转向了老萨里。他们在布赖格河上建造了一座浮桥，并在北岸开始了对该城市的围攻。阿亚希立刻离开圣战的战场回来保卫他的人民。 + +不幸的是，对于安达卢西亚人来说，权力平衡（似乎对他们有利）现在因英国舰队的回归而被打破。在一年前（在新泽西州创始人卡特赖特勋爵的领导下）为赎回英国俘虏而访问过萨里的英国舰队，于1637年4月3日在海军上将兰斯伯勒的指挥下重新出现。一位曾在兰斯伯勒手下服役的海盗给我们留下了一篇关于这次探险的有趣报道。[Dunton，1637；卡特赖特，1638，1929年由费城的MS出版社出版。卡特赖特本人后来总结了他对萨里的印象：“...[至于]政府，就我所知，他们没有任何基本的法律！”[资料来源：Inedites III，1935：453]]。英国人决定只与艾亚希打交道，他们称他为“圣人”（无疑是典型的英国讽刺）。也许这位隐者只有在得到帮助才会释放英国俘虏，但兰斯伯勒显然带着额外的热情加入了这场战斗，他把一些强大的现代大炮从船上转移到了岸上，并开始了对新萨里的炮击。浮桥被击沉，围攻被解除。随后阿亚希在英国的帮助下，有效地切断了通往卡斯巴/拉巴特地区的所有后勤供应路线，并烧毁了城墙外的田地。 + +兰斯伯勒于1637年8月30日起锚，但安达卢西亚人已经受够了。他们投降了，同意修复对旧萨里造成的损害，允许奥纳乔斯人回家，并回到五五分成的关税和战利品分配。 + +此时摩洛哥的萨第安苏丹决定重新行动；他雇佣了一名叛逆者船长，一名名叫莫拉特·雷斯的法国人（不要与上面提到的阿尔巴尼亚/阿尔及利亚船长混淆，也不要与荷兰叛徒穆拉德·雷斯混淆，我们将在稍后见到他）以苏丹的名义占领了卡斯巴。现在，安达卢西亚人和奥纳乔斯人解除了他们之间的仇恨，联手驱逐那些重新开始征收了令人憎恶的10%税的苏丹士兵。他们取得了成功，但和平再次证明是短暂的；几个月后，阿亚希再次决定尝试消灭拉巴特的“无父无母之人”。这一次，四面楚歌的摩尔人和海盗意识到他们需要一个盟友。阿亚希是苏菲派，所以他们向苏菲派的对手穆罕默德·哈吉·伊本·阿布·贝克尔·达拉寻求帮助。 + +穆罕默德·哈吉的祖父是阿特拉斯山脉中部地区的一位伟大的圣人，他在那里建立了一个重要的苏菲派文化中心，并将当地的柏柏尔部落转化为一个巨大的宗教团体——达拉伊亚。他传授了贾祖利/沙兹里的苏菲主义生活方式，以对先知的崇拜为中心，并开展了广泛的公共工程和慈善活动，祖父基本上不参与政治。他的儿子继承了他的衣钵，与阿亚希和萨第安苏丹都保持着友好的关系（如果不是他的圣洁，那肯定是他的外交手段的证明！），但他的儿子哈吉的政治野心开始损害家族的中立的声誉。最终，哈吉接替了他的父亲，成为教团的第三任团长（1636年），并开始重组教团——作为一支军队。[1638年，萨第安苏丹从马拉喀什向阿特拉斯中部地区派出军队，试图遏制哈吉日益增长的野心，但萨第安人被哈吉的柏柏尔部队完全击溃，向南逃窜，让他控制了整个地区。他现在决定，他的新王国需要一个海港，并将他神圣的目光转向了萨里。巧合的是，就在这时，安达卢西亚人发出了绝望的呼吁，他们再次被“圣人”阿亚希在拉巴特围攻。 + +穆罕默德·哈吉认为，阿亚希是他控制他在海洋上的出口萨里的最大障碍，因此，他以阿亚希对安达卢西亚人的迫害作为他参战的借口。1640年，达拉伊亚军队占领了阿亚希势力范围内的梅克内斯。随后，以阿拉伯人为主的阿亚希军队和达拉伊亚柏柏尔人之间展开了旷日持久冲突。1641年4月锡布河的交战决定了最终结果：阿亚希被杀，他的追随者四散而逃...阿亚希的失败使达拉伊亚成功占领了萨里。 + +在萨里被占领后的十年里，达拉伊亚酋长（他后来被称为苏丹）保障了安达卢西亚人的自治权。他们更了解如何与欧洲人打交道，与基督徒的间接接触并没有对酋长的宗教地位造成太多损害，同时也确保了他所需要的商品，尤其是武器。 + +在安达卢西亚人受名义上的达拉伊亚统治的十年（1641-1641年）里，被派去的欧洲领事主要处理海盗或商业相关的问题，并直接与他们交易。从1643年起，萨里有了一名荷兰领事，1648年，法国政府任命了一名实质性领事居住在萨里。自1629年以来，法国政府一直满足于让一名居住在马赛的商人担任领事，同时在萨里有一名代理人。1651年，穆罕默德·哈吉任命他的儿子阿卜杜拉为萨里总督。由于阿卜杜拉兼任达拉伊亚的外交事务主管，这足以表明达拉伊亚与欧洲的关系已经变得相当重要，以至于需要委托给统治家族的一名成员。但安达卢西亚人仍然可以影响外交关系的开展，他们充当口译员和秘书、起草阿卜杜拉写给外国统治者的信件，并就他与其中一些统治者谈判的条约向他提供建议。 + +在达拉伊亚的外交关系中，最亲密的是与荷兰人的关系。阿卜杜拉与荷兰就1651年签署、1655年和1659年修订的条约条款展开了漫长的谈判，这表明荷兰在1650年代与摩洛哥的贸易相当积极。这些谈判中反复出现的一个问题是萨里作为贸易中心和海盗基地的双重性质。荷兰人准备授权萨里海盗攻击他们共同的基督教敌人——西班牙人的船只，同时取得他们自己的船只不受骚扰的承诺。与此同时，他们反对萨里海盗和达拉伊亚酋长与阿尔及尔统治者保持友好关系。 + +阿尔及利亚海盗在萨里得到了便利，并被允许在那里出售他们的战利品。荷兰人试图在条约中加入一项条款，禁止安达卢西亚人与阿尔及利亚海盗合作并与阿尔及尔进行贸易，这往往使谈判陷入僵局。每当萨里总督威胁将进出口关税提高到10%以上时，荷兰的态度就会缓和下来。这也从侧面突出反映了这一时期荷兰与摩洛哥的贸易量之大。[Nasr，第221-2页] + +布赖格共和国可能在达拉伊亚政权下失去了一些自治权，但也许在名义上的苏菲教团的统治下——最终——获得了一些和平与平衡。无论如何，三分共和国的最后二十年是其最辉煌的时期，至少在海盗方面是如此。三个城邦终于摆脱了自相残杀的冲突，可以把所有的敌意都向外转移到海盗圣战中。此外，如果最纯粹形式的海盗共和国（1614-1640）作为政治实体是独一无二的，那么人们只能用“人人平等”这样的多余之词来描述从1640年到1660年的海盗和苏菲派共治制度。这让人难以想象，事实上，它实在太美好了以至于无法持久。对安达卢西亚人和海盗来说，达拉伊亚的首领“萨里王子”西迪·阿卜杜拉的手伸得越来越长。他们开始寻找一些方法来恢复他们完全独立的原始状态，到目前为止，这种状态已经展现出一种古老而受人尊敬的传统的所有光彩。 + +与此同时...一位来自拉拉谢的阿拉伯人、殉道隐者阿亚希的信徒（因此也是达拉伊亚柏柏尔人的敌人，一位伊斯兰历史学家称他们为“赤膊上阵的动物”，“除了醉酒或恐惧之外，不受束缚的动物，”另一位学者以城市阿拉伯人的典型偏见这样说）拿起武器，在北方建立了自己的王国。[Coindreau，p.47；Caille，p.222]这个名叫盖兰的人看起来像是拉巴特安达卢西亚人的潜在救世主。他们发动了起义，并在卡斯巴围困了“王子”阿卜杜拉。达拉伊亚首领哈吉派军队解救他的儿子，但军队于1660年6月被盖兰击败。然而，阿卜杜拉在英国丹吉尔总督运送的一批物资的帮助下，在卡斯巴又勇敢地坚持了一年。最终在1661年6月，他弹尽粮绝，不得不移交城堡的控制权。 + +此时安达卢西亚人已经开始不信任盖兰，就像他们不喜欢达拉伊亚一样——事实上，他们更不信任盖兰。尽管他们刚刚把达拉伊亚赶出了镇子，但他们决定重新表达对该政权的忠诚来驱逐盖兰，以免他成为一个更糟糕的统治者。四年来，他们一直在努力争取，但最终在1664年向盖兰投降，并同意付给他金额吓人的10%的收入所得。 + +1668年，阿拉维王朝在苏丹穆莱·拉希德（MoulayRaschid）的领导下崛起，并自1603年以来首次成功地统一了整个国家，萨里仅存的最后一丝自由也被被抹除。阿拉维苏丹无意结束布赖格对欧洲的高利润圣战，并承诺保护海盗。因此，虽然共和国消失了，但海盗活动仍存在了一段时间。不幸的是，阿拉维王朝有着巨大的胃口，一点一点地将“吞噬”的比例从10%增加到远大于一半。海盗们最终意识到他们不可能再获得可观的利润。摩尔人海盗留下来成为苏丹“海军”的船长，也许一些叛逆者也这样做了。其他人可能会想继续这一事业，去加勒比海或马达加斯加，那里的海盗活动正在蓬勃发展。后来的萨里历史已经与我们无关，巴巴拉的后来历史也与我们无关。随着共和国的消失，我们不再关注叛逆者。由于我们已经了解了他们的政治/军事历史，因此在接下来的章节中，我们将回到共和国的全盛时期（1614-1660），并尝试研究叛逆者本身以及皈依者的日常生活。 + + +### 穆拉德船长和巴尔的摩劫案 + +> 这将会是一次愉快的航行 +> #### 穆拉德船长 + +虽然我们很想见到一整队的萨里流浪者，这些人有名字、有生平，有我们可以研究的传记，有我们可以分析的“案例”，以便更好地了解叛逆者的性格和命运，但遗憾的是，这种调查是不可能的。如果我们对阿尔及尔和突尼斯的皈依者知之甚少，那么我们对萨里的皈依者了解得更少。我一直在想为什么会这样，只能说萨里一定被认为（至少被欧洲旅行者和编年史家认为）比阿尔及尔和突尼斯更偏僻，也许更难接近，甚至可能是一个危险的地狱。即使是好心的，为我们提供了一个关于萨里的简短描述的佩雷·丹，他显然从来没有访问过这个地方，而是根据道听途说来描述它；而且少数第一手资料也没有什么参考价值。在任何情况下，关于萨里的作家，也就是有文化的欧洲人对叛逆者没有什么兴趣，他们鄙视和害怕这些人，并尽可能以最耸人听闻的方式描述他们。与此同时，那些可以告诉我们一些有趣的东西的人——皈依者本身——并不是作家。我们可以了解海盗的所有范畴都是由外界的敌意和宣传预先确定的。这就是由修正主义历史学家调查一个早已消失的非文盲社区的文化或抵抗政治的命运。当然，最近修正主义者自己也发展了（或复活了）一些自己的范畴。像霍布斯鲍姆和科恩这样的“社会强盗”和千禧年的马克思主义或马克思化历史学家提供了一些有用的方法论，而那些倾向于自由主义——左派的作家（像希尔、莱米什、莱恩博和雷迪克）实际上已经发明了一种全新的海洋激进主义的历史学。但他们都没有讨论过叛逆者。据我所知，在摩洛哥、阿尔及利亚或突尼斯的历史学家中没有出现过类似的学派，尽管他们可能有机会接触到未开发的文献资源（假设存在这样的资源）；东方学家忽略了这个问题，无论是出于他们自己天生的文化保守主义，还是因为找不到文本；因此，这个领域就留给了我们这些业余的海盗学家。毕竟没有更好的选择了。 + +Coindreau（1948：80-84）从欧洲收藏品的档案和未经编辑的原始材料中搜罗了一份关于萨里流浪者的简要名单。因此，我们有： + +> 哈吉·阿里，可能是一个摩尔人，他于1624年10月14日在菲尼斯特雷角附近俘获了一艘由Euwout Henriexz船长驾驶的荷兰船，当时萨里应该与荷兰和平相处所以他本应停止对荷兰船只骚扰。哈吉·阿里要求船长声明自己是法国人，因而这就是合法的战利品，否则就把他扔下海。 + +> 赖斯·查弗（Ja’far），一个英国叛逆者（1630年提到），哈桑·易卜拉欣（可能是本地人，1636年），以及迈姆·莱斯，一个荷兰叛逆者（1636）。其中最后一个人指挥着一艘200吨的，装有13门炮的船，俘虏了一艘英国船，在返回萨里的路上被抓了。 + +> 查班·雷斯（Chaban Rais）葡萄牙叛逆者，在1646年指挥一艘阿尔及利亚船“克拉布号”（16门大炮，175名船员）在萨里停靠，以获取物资和武器。在海上航行了三个月后，他除了在加斯科尼湾缴获了一船英国盐船和一艘渔船外，没有其他更好的收获。这时（7月22日）他自己被荷兰海盗科内利斯·韦贝克抓走了。 + +> 艾哈迈德·科托比是来自科尔多瓦的西班牙叛徒（摩里斯科？）。1658年10月6日，他指挥着萨里船“太阳号”在菲尼斯特雷角附近与荷兰人的一支舰队相遇。同样，荷兰和萨里应该处于和平状态，艾哈迈德决定对旗舰进行友好访问。回到自己的船上后，他惊恐地看着其中一艘荷兰船，即由船长皮特·诺尔领导的卢贝克的“先知丹尼尔号”，突然袭击了他。几名海盗被杀，其余的人——包括艾哈迈德——被俘虏了。随后荷兰人洗劫了“太阳号”，放火烧毁了她并使其沉没。这一奇特的事件引发了一场巨大的外交丑闻。萨里要求赔偿，而荷兰人（急于维护和平）对这一事件相当重视。1659年1月，海军部对“先知丹尼尔号”的船长处以9500弗罗林的罚款，并将一艘在吨位和装备上与沉没的“太阳号”相当的船只移交给了萨里，而“先知丹尼尔号”本身则归艾哈迈德·科托比所有。[Coindreau，1948：187]。 + +> 阿里·坎波斯（西班牙）、凯斯·马雷斯（英国）和库尔特比（艾哈迈德·科托比的儿子），他一定和他父亲一样“矮小”——除非他的名字只是科托比的变形）是我们名单上的另外几个名字；维尼夏是意大利叛徒，以其胆识和勇气闻名。这些人相当程度上穷尽了拉巴特-萨里共和国时期的叛逆者名册，但有一个主要例外。 + +> 穆拉德船长（又名莫拉特、约翰·巴伯、约翰船长、凯德·莫拉托），是所有萨里流浪者中最著名的一个，他在荷兰的哈勒姆以扬·扬斯的名字出生，年份和生日不详。 + +> 扬·扬斯和大多数最终成为海盗的荷兰航海家一样，在解放战争期间作为国家的私掠者因对抗西班牙人而开始了他的职业生涯。 + +但这种准合法的战争得到更多是荣誉而非利益，扬斯很快就背叛了他的使命，找到了前往巴巴里的路。在那里，他对所有基督教国家的船只开战，荷兰的船只也不例外，只是当他攻击西班牙人时，他悬挂着奥兰治亲王的旗帜，以示对其出身的尊敬。当他攻击其他国家的船只时，他悬挂的是土耳其人的红色半月旗。 + +[Gosse，54-5][Coindreau认为这面旗帜是奥斯曼帝国私掠者和海盗经常悬挂的红底上有三个金新月，但它也可能是萨里的旗帜，在红底上印有一个金色的月中人。］1618年在兰萨罗特岛被巴巴里海盗俘虏后，扬斯在阿尔及斯叛教——尽管这种皈依可能是被迫的，但它似乎已经生根发芽，因为穆拉德从未乞求过赦免，也没有表现出希望回归基督教的迹象。 + +他在伟大的阿尔及利亚海盗苏莱曼船长（可能也是荷兰人）的领导下开始了他的职业生涯，但苏莱曼在第二年于1619年去世。穆拉德为我们说明阿尔及尔和萨里之间的联系提供了一个完美的例子，因为他现在开始在它们之间来回穿梭，就像一个拥有双重国籍的人。 + +Gosse对穆拉德有这样的评价：起初他作为阿尔及尔一个叫苏莱曼的著名海盗的副手出海，但在他的首领于1619年去世后，他在萨里定居。这个港口（“它的名字在整个基督教世界都臭名昭著”）对于这种新形式的海盗活动来说是非常有利的，它位于大西洋沿岸，离直布罗陀只有50英里，海盗们可以在那里埋伏所有通过海峡的船只，并迅速冲出去迎战东印度和几内亚的商人。萨里舰队的规模并不大，大约有18艘船，而且每艘船都很小，因为港口里有一个栏杆，除非先卸货，否则吃水很深的船只无法进入。该港口名义上受摩洛哥皇帝的管辖，但在扬斯到达后不久，萨里人就宣布独立，并建立了一个实际上的海盗共和国，由他们中的十四个人管理，总督也是海军司令。这个荷兰人是第一个当选的人。为了向他的同胞表明他已经彻底成为他们中的一员，他娶了一个摩尔女人，尽管他在哈勒姆还有妻子和家庭。[Gosse，p.55] + +有其他消息来源称，穆拉德于1624年被摩洛哥苏丹穆莱·扎伊丹任命为萨里总督，但这种误解可能是因为苏丹希望至少维持表面上的主权，只是批准了穆拉德当选的既成事实。我们可以猜测穆拉德是一个有魅力的人，是一个真正有领导才能的人，他拥有海盗们所珍视的品质，远胜过其他所有人。我们可以猜测他是海盗共和国的狂热分子，也许是它的主要理论家，也是它的第一位当选的海军司令。我们甚至可以假设，一个如此聪明和勇敢的人可能已经具有了一定程度的政治意识和革命热情。 + +在扬斯高效的管理下生意兴隆，他很快就不得不找了一个助手，他选择了一个同胞马蒂斯·范博斯特尔·奥斯特林克担任这个职位。副司令为了庆祝他的任命，效仿他的上司，变成了穆斯林，并与一个14岁的西班牙女孩结婚，尽管他在阿姆斯特丹有一个妻子和小女儿。 + +扬斯，由于在海上获得的战利品和他作为海军司令的津贴，包括所有的锚地费、领航费和其他港口收入，以及赃物的中介费，很快就成了一个非常富有的人。然而，他偶尔也会发现例行公事令人不快，他内心的海盗情结就会显现出来，于是他就去出游了。1622年11月，他前往英吉利海峡试试运气。在其中一次航行中，他的补给品用完了，被迫停靠在荷兰的费勒港以补充库存。这似乎是一次冒险，但萨里海军司令是摩洛哥皇帝的臣民，而他最近与荷兰签订了条约；因此，扬斯可以合法地要求在该港口拥有特权，尽管他受到的欢迎是冷淡的。 + +第一个上船的访客是在荷兰的扬斯夫人，陪同她的是小扬斯们。“他的妻子和他所有的孩子，”一位当代作家记录道，“上船来请他离船；船员的父母也这样做了，但他们失败了，因为他们（荷兰叛徒船员）对西班牙人过于仇恨，并渴望想得到战利品。”他的船员不仅没有离开，而且还招募了很多人，尽管地方官下了严令不许任何人上船服役。但是由于与西班牙近半个世纪的战争，荷兰的日子很难过；费勒的年轻人更倾向于在打击老对手的同时获得轻松生活的机会，相比之下对地方政府不悦的恐惧就不足为道了。扬离开费勒时，船上的人比他来时多了很多。 + +几年后的隆冬，扬斯再次来到荷兰，这次他几乎没有躲过灾难。在海岸边，他遇到了一艘悬挂荷兰国旗的大船。扬斯一时忘记了条约，“一下子就被这艘好船迷住了，并试图俘获它”——很可能在他成功后，律师会让他重申条约的好处。但事情的结果却截然不同：当他来到船边时，荷兰的旗帜被扯了下来，西班牙的旗帜在原地升起，顷刻间，西班牙军队涌上了他的甲板。海盗们寡不敌众，在经过激烈的战斗后才设法逃脱，许多船员死伤。他们庆幸最终安全地进入阿姆斯特丹的港口。 + +扬向当局申请对伤病员的救助，但被断然拒绝。这个不幸的海盗本想违反条约，结果失败并受到了惩罚，现在又因其利益被剥夺而受到了进一步的惩罚，就好像他实际成功了一样。他甚至没有得到埋葬死者的许可，因此不得不将尸体抛到冰层下，作为处理尸体的唯一手段。 + +在直布罗陀海峡度过了几年相对糟糕的日子后，扬决定去巴巴拉或其他海盗从未涉足过的地方碰碰运气。1627年，他雇佣了一名自称去过冰岛的丹麦奴隶作为领航员，并指示他带路前往那个遥远的岛屿。扬斯的三艘船上除了摩尔人外还有三名英国叛逆者。这次航行在当时是一次大胆的航行壮举，但结果与风险不相称。他们掠夺了首都雷克雅未克，但只获得了一些咸鱼和一些兽皮。为了弥补他们的失望，为了弥补他们的失望，他们抓到并带回了四百个——有人说是八个——冰岛人：男人、女人和孩子。[Gosse，pp.55-7] + +到1627年，萨里的政治形势变得相对温和。那一年，奥纳乔斯人在卡斯巴宣布建立了他们自己的共和国，而阿亚希则积极地在旧萨里中建立自己的共和国。穆拉德那限制他出海的海军司令职位很可能已经尴尬地结束了。无论如何，在他从冰岛返回后，他与摩尔家庭一起搬回阿尔及尔，并立即恢复了作为海盗的活跃生涯。1631年，他组织了另一次伟大的冒险，洗劫了爱尔兰科克郡巴尔的摩镇。 + +关于巴尔的摩被洗劫一事，真正的、仍然悬而未决的问题不是“如何做到的？”虽然穆拉德的航海技术显然是一流的，但和冰岛一样他决不是这方面的先驱。“小约翰”沃德去过爱尔兰好几次，而且我们可以肯定他不是唯一一个沿着这条路线航行的海盗。[事实上，正如B.Quinn在其精彩的著作《亚特兰蒂斯：爱尔兰的北非和海洋遗产》中指出的那样，对巴尔的摩的袭击可能可以追溯到新石器时代甚至是巨石时代历史的最后一幕。有趣的是，芒斯特的前凯尔特部落被称为Hibernii，他们被认为是来自西班牙伊比利亚的一个分支；BER这个音节只是相信这两个民族与北非的柏柏尔人有关的一个理由（Quinn提供了许多其他理由）。这为研究和推测爱尔兰与摩洛哥的关系开辟了一个广阔的未开垦的领域，而奎恩只是刚开始耕耘这一领域。另见阿里和阿里（无日期）对同一主题的“非洲中心主义”的处理。] + +巴尔的摩被洗劫的真正问题是“为什么？”在我们的研究中，失落的历史迷雾似乎有一次被揭开——只是一点点——为我们提供了一些可能动机的蛛丝马迹。 + +首先，当时爱尔兰南部和西部的海盗几乎与巴巴拉海岸一样猖獗。在伊丽莎白时代，著名的女海盗格雷丝·奥马利（Grace O’Malley）统治着她自己在梅奥的小王国，事实上，她曾在1593年对这位统治者进行过一次国事访问。女王对女王。[Chambers，1979。毫无疑问，伊丽莎白和格雷丝的关系非常好。]至于科克郡，我们从B.Fuller和R.LeslieMelville写的一本相当罕见的书《海盗港及其秘密》中了解到： + +芒斯特副总督威廉·赫伯特爵士在1589年对该省的状况做了如下总结：“如果海盗在那里继续存在，而且这些地方的每一个港口和避风港都能接纳他们，我们就必须放弃居住在那里，因为我们自己以及我们的商品都不能在海上通行，而只能听任他们的摆布。该省已成为海盗的聚集地。他们在凯里太受宠了。爱德华·丹尼爵士收到了从法国人那里抢来的嘉肯酒（梦杜斯），兰尼·丹尼收到了从‘英国人’那里抢来的货物。一位来自尤格尔的马里斯上尉是这类事务中有名的谈判专家，他不久后将搬到特拉里附近爱德华·丹尼爵士的Tawlaght城堡终，并在那里从事这种贸易。”后来被封为诺里奇伯爵的丹尼在康沃尔郡也有席位，因此是基里格鲁家族的邻居。事实上，他为爱尔兰的海盗所做的，就像基里格鲁家族和约翰·佩罗爵士为他们在康沃尔和南威尔士所做的那样。当有影响力的贵族充当“保护伞”时，海盗行为当然是一种付费游戏...由于皇家海军在本世纪后半叶詹姆斯二世为其奠定健全的基础之前几乎不存在，此时此刻，用丹弗斯勋爵富有诗意的话说，“要想让居民不与这些毛毛虫进行交易，并使其感到敬畏”几乎不可能。 + +海盗占上风的程度可以从以下事实表现出来：1609年初，丹弗斯勋爵本人在科克被四艘载有约300人的海盗船封锁了。总督大人甚至无法筹集到一艘足够强大的船只来抵御这些掠夺者，因此他不得不滞留在科克，而这些不受欢迎的访客则在海岸上来回航行，寻找食物。为了防止他们在凯里郡重新定居，从科克郡出口的玉米供应被终止。而相比海盗这似乎更让居民们感到恼火。 + +这一年的晚些时候，一支更大的海盗队伍在海岸边集结，他们有11艘船和1000人。[这是从突尼斯来的沃德船长和他的舰队。][时任芒斯特省总督的理查德·莫里森爵士无力对他们采取行动，只得采用老掉牙的赦免的办法，而这显然是不能令人满意的。他对索尔兹伯里勋爵说：“海盗们不断地前往该省的西海岸，由于该地偏远，人民野性十足，加上他们自身的力量和财富，既能作战又能坚守等待救援，我们很难阻止或补救。” + +这就是贝雷港第一次引起英国政府愤怒并开始关注时的状况。这里目前是唐纳·奥沙利文·比尔的时代。这个地方过去是，现在也是理想的避风港。为了证明这一点，只需知道它是英国根据1921年条约保留的海军基地之一这一点即可。它确实是一个避风港中的战斗机，因为它远在班特里湾，而班特里湾本身就作为世界上最好的天然港口之一而闻名，也是一个非常美丽的港口。 + +即使在十八世纪中期，也可以说班特里湾大得足以容纳欧洲所有的船只，这种说法绝非荒谬，因为该海湾长约21英里，平均宽度为3英里。此外，它还很深。贝雷港是由贝雷岛构成，这是一个长约七英里、宽一英里半的驼背状地带，位于班特里湾的北岸。从湾头，也就是从它的东端看去，该岛与一条晒太阳的鳄鱼有着惊人的相似之处。该岛与大陆大致平行，并在其向海的一端几乎与大陆相连，当班特里湾本身处于风暴中时，该岛为航运提供了一个完美的避难所。 + +唐纳·奥沙利文的主要据点是邓博伊城堡，它位于大陆上，控制着通往港口的狭窄的海上入口。他是一个狂野的海上漂流者，凭借着他老巢的力量，以及该地区所属的强大的奥沙利文氏族的支持而胆大包天。即使到了今天，在岛对面大陆上的偏远小镇卡斯特莱顿·贝尔，至少有75%的居民是奥沙利文家族。这里有大大小小成群的海盗，他们愉快的做着他们的营生，因为贝雷港有一个竞争对手，那就是邻近的巴尔的摩港，它还有一个风景如画的名字，叫杜纳沙德（Dunashad），或宝石堡。杜纳沙德港是一个避风港湾，用托马斯·斯塔福德爵士的话来说：“在这里可以乘坐各种各样的船只，潮汐较小，水很深，是一个停靠船只的好地方。” + +这个避风港由作为天然防波堤的谢金岛构成。更远的海面上是克里尔岛，它是离法斯内特岩石灯塔最近的陆地，这座灯塔极强的光亮为许多跨大西洋的旅行者照亮了航路。这个隐蔽的巢穴和周围的地区，当时是奥德里斯科尔家族，爱尔兰最大的男爵所经营的领地，他们也许应该作为爱尔兰航海家中最著名的家族被铭记。海盗们带着从可恨的英国人手中抢来的战利品在顺风前回来，而男爵他们可以从中获得丰厚的收益。因此，可以认为奥沙利文家族和奥德里斯科尔家族之间没什么感情。毫无疑问，海盗们很清楚这一事实，并凭借这一事实获得了丰厚的资本。 + +因此，贝雷港和巴尔的摩并不是海盗的巢穴，因为它们的主人就是自认的海盗，他们把它们作为其行动的重要基地。它们是有用的站点，任何海盗都可以驶入这些站点，为其货物争取更好的价格，或者在困难的情况下撤退到这里以获得保护。同时，毫无疑问，这两个港口的主人都亲自从事了一定的海盗活动，他们在侵犯对方的利益或任何其他爱尔兰人的利益方面并不愚蠢地讲究。例如，有一次，菲尼恩·奥德里斯科爵士——众所周知的“船王菲尼恩”——因为一船的葡萄酒而载了个大跟头。 + +在二月的一个暴风雨天，这位值得尊敬的人与他的私生子吉利·达夫（绰号黑小子）一起，看到一艘船在巴尔的摩湾的入口处无助地转悠着。这对体贴的人跳上一艘船，主动为这艘陌生的船引路，这使受苦的水手们松了一口气。这艘船是一艘葡萄牙船，满载着托付给沃特福德商人的100吨葡萄酒。奥德里斯科尔父子很快就发现了这一切，他们决定把这批宝贵的货物据为己有。当这些迷人的陌生人邀请船长和他的手下在他们的避风港与他们一起用餐时，葡萄牙船长非常高兴。显然，当船员们也被邀请时，他没有怀疑。这是一个蜘蛛和苍蝇的典型案例。 + +水手们刚进城堡，就被抓起来并被戴上了镣铐，转移酒的工作也开始了。但沃特福德的商人们并不愿意让他们的自尊心（和他们的口袋）受到这样的伤害，他们迅速装备了一艘武装船只，为他们的损失报仇。 + +奥德里斯科尔父子这时还在搬运酒船，他们被吓了一跳，勉强逃过一劫。沃特福德市长为这次胜利感到兴奋，几天后又派出了一支探险队，他们把巴尔的摩城堡夷为平地，并烧毁了奥德里斯科尔的所有船只，大约有50艘。他们把奥德里斯科尔的有30个船桨的船拖回沃特福德，作为他们能力的证明。不过巴尔的摩没过多久就从这次失败中恢复过来，因为新的财富可以轻松地从与海盗的贸易中获得。 + +贝雷港的人们不甘落后，把注意力转向任何能使他们赚钱的计划。即使不是因为他们的自我利益，他们的自尊心也不会允许他们落后于巴尔的摩。因此，唐纳·奥沙利文通过向外国人出租捕鱼权，在他的活动中增加了大规模的“围栏”。而且奇怪的是，他出租的权利大部分都是他自己的。托马斯·斯塔福德爵士写道：“沿海地区出产的海鱼之多，是基督教国家中少有的，在捕鱼的时候，各国的渔民都在这里度假，虽然他们付给奥沙利文的关税非常少，但至少对他来说，每年值得1500英镑。”今天，相等的金额至少是15,000英镑。 + +两个海盗窝点之间的竞争就这样持续了很多年。而贝雷港是第一个倒下的。1602年9月16日，乔治·卡鲁爵士对邓博伊城堡发动了猛烈的攻击。这次围攻是这位将军对1600-1603年叛乱的无情镇压的一部分。当时，这个避难所只有一百二十人驻守，而卡鲁的部队至少有五千人，但英勇的守军一直坚持到18日，城墙终于被攻破，攻击者冲了进来。即使在保皇党进入城堡的最后时刻，爱尔兰人也几乎取得了惨败的胜利。当士兵们冲进弹药库时，他们看到城堡里英勇的指挥官理查德·麦克吉根（Richard MacGeoghegan）手里拿着一根点燃的蜡烛，痛苦地爬向一堆火药桶。他们在千钧一发之际抓住了他，虽然他已经受了致命伤，但还是以一种毫无意义和令人厌恶的残暴行为被杀死。 + +奥沙利文本人正在其他地方作战，他设法逃到了西班牙，但却被一个英裔爱尔兰人以奸计刺死。作为一个海盗窝点，贝雷港可能完全应该被镇压，但卡鲁并不是因此而攻击它。他惩罚海盗是因为他们所谓的对王室的不忠，而这件事根本没有被证实。因此，伴随着攻占邓博伊城堡而发生的大屠杀是英国人宁愿忘记的事情。它是不必要的，不值得的，也是没有道理的。邓波伊城堡现在只剩下一堆摇摇欲坠的废墟，而它所处的位置则已是树木丛生。就这样，贝雷港一度沦陷。[Fuller and Leslie-Melville，1935：168-173] + +至于巴尔的摩，我们要感谢爱尔兰的一个资料来源，即H. Barnby的“巴尔的摩的劫难”。[Barnby（1969）] 费恩·奥德里斯科尔爵士，“船舶”，在《海盗阿尔博》中作为一个迷人的流氓出现过，而现实中他的气质不那么浪漫。他原来是英国人的合作者；他在德斯蒙德叛乱中与他们站在一起。他把几个“杀人犯”（叛乱者？）交给了当局。由于债台高筑，他开始向英国殖民者出售他的部分领地的租约，任由他的爱尔兰臣民自生自灭。 + +1605年，一个名叫托马斯·克鲁克的英国人提出以2000英镑的价格购买巴尔的摩镇及其周边犁地的21年租约。费恩·奥德里斯科尔爵士接受了他的提议，并起草了租约。令人惊讶的是，没有记录显示城镇居民有任何抱怨。有一种可能是在1605年前，许多巴尔的摩居民就已经因英国军队在该地区的驻扎而感到不快，搬到了北方或咆哮湾一个较大的岛屿上的避难所。 + +当托马斯·克鲁克于1605年从费恩·奥德里斯科尔爵士那里购买租约时，英国人在西科克的实际存在规模非常小，他在巴尔的摩地区安置几百名英国种植者的计划肯定是科克、都柏林和威斯敏斯特的当局都非常乐意接受的。然而，如果当局停下来问自己，这么多定居者是如何在这一地区生存的，他们可能会得出一些稍微令人不安的结论。用一句老话说，“法律在飞跃中终结。”在1606-1608年的《爱尔兰国家文件日历》中，有21次提到巴尔的摩，其中大部分提到了海盗行为。 + +然而，巴尔的摩英国种植园的正式建立稳步推进。1607年7月3日，巴尔的摩获得“英国高级法院大法官...的授权，在6月24日和10月28日及其随后两天举行...一场星期五集贸以及两场集市...”1612年9月26日，巴尔的摩市收到了其正式章程。任命“...托马斯·克鲁克（Esq.）为第一任君主，詹姆斯·萨尔蒙（James Salmon）、丹尼尔·利奇（Daniel Leach）、约瑟夫·卡特（Joseph Carter）、威廉·哈德森（William Hudson）、约瑟夫·霍斯金斯（Joseph Hoskins）、斯蒂芬·亨特（Stephen Hunt）、托马斯·贝内特（Thomas Bennett）、年长者托马斯·贝内特（Thomas Bennett）、年轻者罗杰·贝内特（Roger Bennett）、威廉·霍尔（William Howling）、托马斯·杰尔蒙（Thomas Germon）和理查德·科米（Richard Commy）为第一批十二位议员...”这位君主每周五将对轻微犯罪和民事诉讼进行裁定，同时他和他的议会有权制定细则。他们还被赋予选举两名谨慎的人参加詹姆斯一世计划在不久的将来在都柏林召集的议会的职责。托马斯·克鲁克（ThomasCrooke）被任命为第一任君主，但在未来，议员们将每年举行一次会议，专门选举他们中的一个人担任这一职务。 + +那些留下来与新的地主打成一片的爱尔兰人似乎很愿意忍受任何形式的变化。然而事实上，本就没有多少人选择留下，一个1608年乘船进入巴尔的摩港的西班牙人被告知，现在那里的爱尔兰人很少。 + +托马斯·克鲁克的成就是显著的。用科克主教的话说，他“...以自己的名义...从英国移来了一整座英国人的城镇，它比本省任何一个最近成立的城镇都更大、更文明、更有宗教秩序”。我们新西科克的种植园主成功的让这位可靠的圣公会神学使，詹姆士国王的代表忽略了托马斯·克鲁克新安置地一些不太明显的地方。托马斯·克鲁克在巴尔的摩建立安置地，似乎更有可能是为了与海盗交易。这并不意味着那里的种植者不从事其他活动，但他们是一个海港定居点，需要依靠来访的船只购买他们的产品和技能，以换取金钱或交易商品。他们的客户是如何获得金钱和贸易品的与他们无关。巴尔的摩的新种植者的行为方式与英格兰西南部许多港口几十年来的行为方式完全相同，但在一个具有法律意识的国王统治下的英格兰对海盗来说正变得不安全。托马斯·克鲁克已经预见到了这种情况的发展，并采取措施从中获利。 + +在巴尔的摩进行的官方贸易规模小得可笑。据一位消息人士称，在1614年和1615年期间，只有三船葡萄酒进港。与此同时非官方贸易一定相当可观。当然，通过巴尔的摩带入爱尔兰的海盗货物在全省范围内流通，芒斯特总督本人和科克的许多其他高等公民都是从该来源购买的。1608年，也就是英国人来巴尔的摩不到两年后，托马斯·克鲁克（Thomas Crooke）被传唤到伦敦枢密院，因他受到与海盗有交易的指控。正是这一指控促使科克主教写了推荐信，枢密院以荣誉作担保宣布他无罪；他们怎么能不这样做呢？芒斯特以前也发生过叛乱，有英国种植园主被割喉而死。如果像理查德·博伊尔（Richard Boyle）和托马斯·克鲁克（Thomas Crooke）这样雄心勃勃、精力充沛的人能够说服大批新教英国人前往这个不确定的地区殖民，那么英国当局怎么会因为过于善待他们的贸易方法而危及他们的事业呢？ + +枢密院可能会宣判托马斯·克鲁克和其他种植园主同伴无罪，但其他人则不那么顺从。1608年，威尼斯人写道，英国海盗有两个主要巢穴，其中一个位于爱尔兰海岸的巴尔的摩。1608年，一位英国消息人士表示，芒斯特的所有港口对海盗来说都是安全的，而巴尔的摩的海盗最多。同样是1608年，芒斯特总督写道，海盗罗宾逊乘坐一艘120吨并装有20门大炮的船抵达巴尔的摩。“...起初，居住在巴尔的摩的人遵守了他的严格指示...虽然弱小的居民不能拒绝给予他们一般的补济，但他们在一段时间内无法获得了可能修复（其船）损伤的物资。直到后来他们每天都用新人来补员，他们使渔民和整个国家都变得无比恐惧，以至于他们没有能力保护自己也不敢冒犯他们。为了不冒犯他们，他被迫与他们...签订了一项条约...”既然芒斯特省的首席官员已被确认与巴尔的摩的一名海盗有交易，那么可以合理地假设，由于离国王最近的官员也在数英里之外，该地区仍以盖尔语为主，并腹地所包围的居民们已经准备好并愿意进行交易。 + +他们也有办法用合法的外表掩盖自己的行为。这一时期最成功的人之一是一个名叫亨利·梅因沃宁的人。他接受了国王的赦免，并写了一本关于爱尔兰海岸海盗所用方法的最全面的著作。他说，当海盗需要肉类供应时，他们会派一个谨慎的人上岸，寻找一个有牲畜出售的农民。农场主会说他将把牛放在哪里，海盗会在天黑后派一队人上岸去抓它们。他们会用火枪开上几枪，就好像在进行一次陆地突袭作战。当地人已经被警告过，会躲得远远的。梅因沃宁说这项业务非常受欢迎，因为通过这种方式出售的牛通常能卖到市价的两倍。 + +巴尔的摩新的英国种植园似乎很繁荣。詹姆斯国王因外国商人的抱怨感到尴尬，故而坚持采取措施镇压爱尔兰西南部的海盗。偶尔会有一艘皇家舰船沿着海岸航行巡逻。但皇家船只通常都很旧，保养得很差。海盗们的性命全依靠他们的敏捷性，他们使用荷兰制造的小型战舰，这些战船在定期清理的情况下可以说是在海上最快的。 + +海盗们很少让自己被皇家船只抓到，如果被抓到，他们似乎也能经常设法与俘虏他们的人达成谅解。许多海盗在活动，但很少有人被绞死。荷兰人获得了詹姆斯国王的许可，可以在爱尔兰西南部的小溪和港口搜寻海盗，但当他们在巴尔的摩附近出现，并要求一名领航员将他们带入港口时，托马斯·克鲁克让他们离开。这似乎是对在皇家许可下的荷兰中队指挥官所采取的大胆举动；但托马斯·克鲁克肯定知道自己在做什么，因为他继续保持生意的繁荣。我们只能猜测他经济上繁荣的程度，但我们知道他在1624年去世前不久成为了一名男爵。 + +巴尔的摩的新英国社区几乎完全是巴特·托马斯·克鲁克爵士的进取心、活力和无所顾忌的产物。而奇怪的是，几乎从他去世的时候起，事情就开始出问题了。 + +有些作家（PivatehTa/hora）认为，克鲁克（Crooke）去世后，巴尔的摩的人民决定改过自新，这似乎是可能的。事实证明，他们的沙丁鱼渔业非常有利可图，而当局也正在慢慢加强对“无法无天”地区的控制。我们可以假设，1624年，巴尔的摩的领导人通过海盗小道消息的所有途径宣布，好客的日子已经过去，除了一些无害的走私活动外，该港口对所有非法行为都拒之门外。与此同时，无能的费恩爵士更是深陷债务泥潭。此时一个债权人出现了。 + +沃尔特·科平格·巴特爵士（Sir Walter Coppinger Bart.）是科克市的一名治安官，他的贪得无厌与他的祖先的挥霍行为有明显的相似之处。他和理查德·博伊尔或托马斯·克鲁克一样清楚地认识到，西科克人口不足，发展的时机已经成熟。然而，他是一个坚定的罗马天主教徒，不喜欢开始在这片土地上定居的英国新教徒。他不希望在西科克安置英国人。他的兴趣是在这一地区置办个人财产。他最初主要的收购来源是爱尔兰的老业主；有时他们的所有权十分混乱，沃尔特爵士会与其他占用者发生争议。在这些场合他的举止可能很粗暴。 + +1612年，伦敦东印度公司收购了班顿河的潮汐河口高处的树林。他们开始在这里建造船只。沃尔特爵士相信这块土地是属于他的，他不愿意看到英国人砍伐他的树木，所以他派武装人员去骚扰他们。这些受雇的壮汉吓跑了船厂的工人，并拆毁了为操作锤式磨坊而修建的水坝。关于邓·丹尼尔树林的纠纷平息了，但沃尔特爵士很快又出现在记录中。他接下来试图接管巴尔的摩，而这并不是一个轻率的要求。 + +1573年，费恩·奥德里斯科尔爵士与芒斯特的其他领主一起将他们的土地交给了英国皇家。这是复杂的土地所有权改革的一部分，其最终结果是费恩爵士现在以个人身份拥有他的土地的所有权，而不是像以前那样，仅仅以他作为领地当选的领导人的身份拥有。此时的费恩还是个年轻人；多年来，这一变化没有产生实际影响，他在西科克的生活继续保持原样。1583年，他访问了伦敦并接受了他的爵位。作为费恩·奥德里斯科尔爵士，他的生活标准很可能变得更为昂贵。1602年，当他被迫将三座城堡移交给英国人时，他的威望受到了严重打击，但他的政令仍能在西科克执行，同年，他拘留了在其领土上寻求庇护的杀人犯，并将其移交给英国当局。然而，他的财务状况似乎在那时急剧恶化，其直接后果之一是他于1605年将巴尔的摩的21年租约出售给托马斯·克鲁克。 + +大约在1616年，沃尔特·科平格爵士似乎以费恩·奥德里斯科尔爵士在巴尔的摩的种植园所占用的土地为抵押借给了他一笔钱。托马斯·克鲁克爵士只购买了巴尔的摩的租约，为期21年。该购买是在1605年进行的，这意味着在1626年，租约必须重新进行谈判，或将财产的使用权归还给费恩爵士、他的继承人或受让人。而如果费恩爵士不偿还贷款，沃尔特·科平格爵士就自动成为他的受让人，并在租约到期后成为巴尔的摩的绝对所有人。在此期间，他以各种方式骚扰英国地主，以显示其坚定的意图。起初，沃尔特爵士使用了武力，但地主似乎很快就组织起来，为自己辩护；因此，他改变了策略，开始迅速对个别地主提起民事和刑事诉讼。作为一个在科克市长期任职的地方法官，沃尔特爵士一定是一个令人不安的对手。 + +托马斯·克鲁克爵士于1624年去世，巴尔的摩种植园失去了它的主要领导者和赞助者。1626年，费恩爵士的租约到期，英国人在巴尔的摩占据的土地和建筑将落入新英国人的顽固反对者沃尔特·科平格爵士的手中。种植园主们向上议院申请了援助。这是一个精明的举动，因为英国当局显然不愿意看到在爱尔兰偏远的西南部地区如此具有战略意义个的英国新教种植园，落入一个忠诚度可疑的罗马天主教绅士手中。谈判就这样开始了。 + +我们不知道这些谈判采取什么形式，但它一定有最终的的结果。1629年4月14日，费恩爵士和沃尔特爵士签署了一份放弃的契约。这样做的结果是，英国种植园主仍然不受干扰地拥有他们在巴尔的摩的租赁财产，而沃尔特爵士将拥有杜纳沙德城堡。[Barnby，1969]因此，总结起来就是在1629年，债权人沃尔特·科平格爵士被骗走了对巴尔的摩的所有权。 + +沃尔特爵士憎恨英国人，并曾多次对他们使用暴力。他憎恨巴尔的摩人，因为他们成功地抵制了他的进攻，而且他们是帝国主义的新教徒。沃尔特爵士有两个非常好的动机——至少在他自己看来，对那个小殖民地造成伤害是出于爱国主义和利益。两年后，巴尔的摩确实受到了巨大的伤害。正如律师们所说的那样。 + + +### 海盗的日历 + +在整个研究过程中，我们使用了海盗（corsair）和海盗（pirate）这两个词，就好像它们是同义词一样，但这确实不太准确。从严格意义上讲，海盗（pirate）是海上罪犯，而海盗的运作就像私掠者一样，被一国政府授予“特许证书”或委托攻击另一国船只。从他袭击的船只的角度来看，私掠者只是一个罪犯；而从私掠者自己的角度来看，他正在进行合法的战争行为。就海盗（corsair）而言，这种情况因超越国家利益的宗教战争概念而变得复杂。阿尔及尔、突尼斯和的黎波里以奥斯曼的名义给私人舰船发放委托，这些港口期望海盗遵守所有奥斯曼条约，不攻击与土耳其和平相处的国家的船只。有一些几次试图违反这一规则的海盗；如果这些企图不是不认真的，那也通常都是失败的，所以说从他们自己的角度来看，海盗们只是在服从一个更高的权力，即永久圣战的要求。Brown引用摩洛哥历史学家的话来证明萨里行动的意识形态基础： + +在题为“圣战舰队或斯拉维海盗”（ustul al-jihab aw alqarsana as salawiya）的一章中，穆罕默德·哈吉（Muhammad Hajji）指出，海盗行为，阿拉伯语（qa/lvana）不能用其原始拉丁语含义的外来派生词来理解，即法语的私掠。“相反，”他写道，“我所说的斯拉维海盗是指那些战士（圣战者）、安达卢西亚人和摩洛哥人，他们勇敢地乘船在海浪中航行，以保卫祖国的领土或反抗西班牙人，西班牙人迫使安达卢西亚的穆斯林遭受最严重的痛苦，并不公正地让他们离开家园和抛弃财产。” + +因此，对萨里的人来说，在公海或欧洲海岸上进行战斗和抢劫是有理由的，因为这既是早期王朝圣战的延续，也是阿亚希等人保卫海岸的延续。海盗中那些“品格高尚而令人骄傲的人”得到了萨里圣徒的祝福，并被城市社区接纳。然而，这并不是要否认，至少有一些海盗是叛逆者，他们来萨里的最初目的是分享“圣战”带来的遍地都是的财富，“看看哈萨尔家族的箱子，你会找到一顶旧的基督教水手帽。芬尼什家族的‘uluj’（基督教奴隶）血统并不比他们的蓝眼睛更隐蔽。”这是萨里人谈论这个城市的一些老叛逆者家庭时仍能听到的嘲讽言论。虽然在萨里有“aslamis”（同上，皈依伊斯兰教者），但他们的出身并没有成为完全同化于社会规范和价值观的障碍，也没有成为他们在社会中获得权力地位的障碍。在萨里，社会和文化融合的压力使这些叛逆者海盗以宗教的名义变成了战士。[Brown，1971：53] + +萨里-拉巴特共和国（Sale Rabat）在17世纪上半叶当然不受任何外部政府的约束，而只是以共和国的名义委托海盗；共和国或多或少地会考虑到海盗本身。阿尔及尔、突尼斯和的黎波里被称为“海盗国”，但实际上只有萨里才配得上这个名称。 + +要理解海盗和私掠者之间的区别，最简单的方法是研究他们分配战利品方式的不同。海盗船长经常只拿一份半或两份，船上的军官拿一份半或四分之一，船员拿一份，非战斗人员（男孩和音乐家！）拿二分之一或四分之三。相比之下，一个私掠者的船长通常拿的是船员的四十倍。当然，在一次成功的私掠巡航中，一份战利品的价值可能远远超过商船队的工资——或海军的无偿预付款——但这依然与海盗的平均主义形成鲜明的对比。海盗在其正常的状态下几乎是共产主义的。那些把他们简单地视为原始资本主义的学者犯了一个大错误。海盗不符合马克思主义关于“社会强盗”（即“原始革命者”）的定义，因为海盗没有“社会”背景，也没有在农民社会中作为抵抗的焦点。像霍布斯鲍姆这样的马克思主义者从未将海盗纳入他们认可的真正激进主义的“先驱”之列，因为他们认为海盗——充其量是参与抵抗的个人，只是作为一种自我扩张和原始积累的形式。他们忘记了海盗群体形成了自己的社会领域，而这些群体的“政府”（如船上的“规则”所表达的）既是无政府主义的，因为它提供了最大的个人自由；又是共产主义的，因为它消除了经济等级制度。海盗的社会组织在15-18世纪的任何国家中都没有类似的情况——除了拉巴特-萨里。布赖格共和国不是一个纯粹的海盗乌托邦，但它是一个建立在海盗原则之上的国家；事实上，它是唯一一个建立在这些原则之上的国家。[除非是G. d’Annunzio臭名昭著的阜姆共和国（1919年），它靠海盗活动资为其短暂的存在提供资金，并且其宪法有着基于音乐作为社会组织的唯一力量的理念。见Philippe Julien，trans. D’Annunzio] + +对战利品的划分再一次研究将使我们对海盗社会有一个精确的结构性认识。在奥斯曼帝国的巴巴里国家，出巡所得利润的分配比例很有启发性。1630年，帕夏在阿尔及尔拿了12%，在突尼斯拿了10%，船只的修理费是1%；隐者拿了1%。剩下的88%或86%中，一半给了船主，另一半给了船员和士兵。在后半部分中，船长得到10-12份，司令3份，领航员3份，领航员3份，帆长3份，舱口长2份，外科医生3份，水手2份；如果船上有摩尔人，他们只得到1份，“因为他们是人们不怎么指望的人。”如果这些人中有任何一个是奴隶，主人就拿走他们的份额，有时还把一部分分给奴隶。丹对分配的描述与其他信息提供者的描述大致相符。[Wolfe，1979：144，隐者们是苏菲派或圣地守护者，他为船只祈福，并为它们的成功祈祷。］ + +我们看到，船主在除去“税收”之后获得一半的利润，但在许多情况下，船长们都拥有自己的船只。即便如此，这种做法无疑是原始资本主义的。另一方面，作为船长（而不是船主），船长的收入只是工资最差的船员的10到12倍，而欧洲私掠者船长的工资是40倍。这似乎表明了一种有那么一点平等主义的做法。 + +萨里的数据有点难以解释。据Coindreau说，在摩尔共和国统治下，分配战利品的通常方法如下： + +- 10%给中央当局（萨里议会）； + +- 剩余部分的一半，交给装备供应商[l’arnzateur]（或船长），以赔偿其在探险中遭受的损失； + +- 而另一半——船员战利品总额的45%。军官、领航员、炮手长和外科医生通常获得三部分，而舵手、水手和炮手则获得两部分。[Coindreau，p.64] + +没有猎物，就没有报酬。这是所有海盗都同意的——但即使是没有结果的出航，也不会向船员收取补给的费用。 + +这并不能告诉我们如果船长不是船舶的船东/舰装商，而是直接受议会（拥有自己的船舶）或一些股东或船东集团委托时，船长会得到什么。假设船长拥有自己的船并为其提供给养，那么他的收入为45%，与欧洲私掠船船长的收入差不多。如果不是，他的收入可能更像是10-12%的阿尔及利亚船长。拥有许多船只的船长可能会变得非常富有，就像穆拉德船长那样，这位荷兰叛逆者实际上已经升到了共和国领导的位子。 + +显然，拉巴特/萨里的组织形式不像一个纯粹的海盗企业，但它的组织形式也不像一个欧洲或伊斯兰的君主制国家。阿尔及尔和萨里之间的最大区别是，前者的“税”去了伊斯坦布尔，而后者则留在了萨里，这笔钱被用来为海盗谋福利（修理城墙、资助远征等），而不是用来养肥某个遥远的苏丹。萨里与萨第安人、隐者阿亚希和他的臣民以及阿拉维王朝等的战争都依靠着那10%，这既是海盗独立的象征，也是海盗独立的代价。萨利既不像“Libertatia”（见下文）或其他现实中的海盗乌托邦那样无政府主义，也不像共产主义，但它比任何欧洲国家都更有特色。它的总督和议会是选举产生的，如果他们不能代表人民的利益，那么每年都可能被罢免。每个有能力乘船的人都有机会获得财富。即使是“战俘”也可以作为叛逆者获得自由和财富。至于加入共和国的职业海盗，我们再次看到，虽然他们失去了真正的海盗行为的纯粹自主权，但他们获得了一个家、一个社会、一个可以依靠的收入来源、一个市场和一个享受财富的地方——所有海盗可能缺乏和最渴望的东西。显然，为了获得这一切，减薪是值得的。 + +拉巴特-萨里的布赖格河口是一个港口，由一个地势险恶的沙洲保护着，它阻止了敌人的船只和有深龙骨的欧洲海军舰队靠近岸边进行有效的炮击，但这一特点也在某些方面限制了海盗们。首先，他们的船只——即使是“圆船”——也必须是小型的、吃水浅的，这使得长期巡航变得困难。他们在被追捕时逃到港口，可能会被低潮阻挡，在离家不远的地方被俘，这种情况曾发生过几次。但是，无论萨里人的船只有什么不足——比如说，没有足够的储物空间，也没有足够的吨位来负担大量的重炮——他们都在速度和机动性上得到了弥补，而且他们的船长也有很高超的航海技术。此外，穆斯林航海家熟悉（甚至可以说是发明了）星盘这样的科学设备，不再依赖死记硬背或沿海的战术。军官和船员们都以非常少的供给和条件差的住所勉强度日。因此，海盗的活动范围比预期的要大；对冰岛的袭击是一个例外，但即使是英吉利海峡也是不安全的（曾有一艘萨里巡逻船在泰晤士河口被俘）。 + +在17世纪，冬季仍然是商船、海盗，甚至是海军的淡季。海盗们遵循一种季节性模式，每年至少有三四个月在萨里的家中度过，处理政治或爱情事务、婚姻生活或四处放荡、周游或贸易、修理和造船，甚至可能根据他们的意愿和要求进行苏菲主义的实践。 + +到了春天，通常是在5月，海盗会在舰队中寻找一个位置，舰队可能由（在我们这个时期）40或60艘小船组成。Coindreau描绘如下： + +> 大约一半的船队将向北航行，可能前往伊比利亚半岛附近利润丰厚的猎场，另一半将向南转向加那利群岛和亚速尔群岛，他们将潜伏在那里等待西班牙和葡萄牙带着黄金货物从新世界返回的庞大船队中的落伍者。出于一般的巡航目的，两艘或三艘船只会一起航行；如果俘获了船只，可以派一艘船护送它回萨里，而其他船只则继续在海浪中徘徊。每艘船都没有足够的boucan（熏烤牛肉）给养[在伊斯帕尼奥拉岛上的海盗们都是为船只准备boucan或熏肉干的猎人]和粗麦粉，可以维持最多两个月。如果船只需要重新补给或维修，他们可能会在几个摩洛哥沿海城镇中的任何一个停靠（至少是在这些城镇还未被欧洲列强控制的时期），如得土安、马莫拉、费达拉、艾宰穆尔或萨菲。有时，一些舰队穿过直布罗陀海峡，袭击地中海沿岸的西班牙和法国航运甚至是海岸，但这里通常也被认为是阿尔及尔、突尼斯和的黎波里的活动场所。但其他巴巴里海盗很少能像萨里海盗那样深入大西洋。1625年，他们从英国普利茅斯带走了很多俘虏；1626年，他们在威尔士海岸俘获五艘船；1627年，他们抵达冰岛，洗劫了雷克雅未克市，那里虽然战利品稀少，但金发的俘虏无疑在奴隶市场很受欢迎。大量活动集中在英格兰和爱尔兰之间的水域，我们因而可以假设海盗们利用爱尔兰南部和西部一些偏远的非法走私港口作为友好港口。在纽芬兰河岸，萨里船队在两年的时间内俘获了40多艘渔船，1624年，十几艘左右的萨里渔船出现在阿卡迪亚或新斯科舍海岸。1637年英国舰队来到萨里，其目的是赎回在纽芬兰被俘虏的英国船只上贫穷的渔民。 + +人们很难想象典型的萨里海盗或是任何明智的海盗会有暴力倾向，甚至会特别残忍。卡斯特里斯伯爵这样说：“他们宁愿猎物解除武装并与之和平相处，也不愿冒险获得战斗的荣耀。”（Coindreau，1948：133）说17世纪是“残忍的”，或者说19世纪或20世纪之前的任何一个世纪都是“残忍的”，这是历史学家的陈词滥调。一旦把现代欧美沙文主义从这些言论中剥离出来，我们就会发现“当时”和“现在”之间存在着明显的差异。现代社会通过技术手段在行为和对行为的感知之间进行调解，成功地压制了自己的残酷意识。我们召唤并陶醉在暴力的画面中，这种方式对布赖格共和国最卑鄙的暴徒来说似乎也是完全邪恶的，我们以完全相同的脱离实体和疏离的方式制造死亡和毁灭：按下按钮。而在17世纪，尽管火炮技术有所进步，但大多数生死斗争都必须在肉搏战中决定，使用的技术与青铜时代相比并没有先进多少。事实上，一位容易轻信的欧洲旅行者威廉·莱姆普里尔（William Lempriere）在拍卖会上被一位幽默的“本土线人”说服，海盗的主要战术是向其他船只投掷石块，这对他来说似乎很合理，尽管有点原始。[Lempriere，1791]一些海盗，如爱德华·罗和黑胡子，从一个非常精确的临床角度来看，似乎是海上虐待狂。毫无疑问，这桩事业吸引了一些此类海盗。但事实是，战斗是危险的，也是艰苦的工作。海盗们对战利品感兴趣，而不是“荣耀”（法国人可能会这样认为）或“男子气概”（英国人可能会这样认为）；只要他们赢了，他们会很高兴被认为是“胆小鬼和恶霸”。因此，他们首先会使用诡计和伪装，最后才拿出燧石和弯刀。海盗行为可以被视为不工作心态的极端例子：在摩尔人咖啡馆闲逛五到六个月，然后在美丽的蓝海上乘坐夏季游轮，花上几个小时的努力，嘿，Presto！（变魔术般迅速而轻松地做完某事时所说），又一年的无所事事已经得到了保障。如果海盗们不懒惰，他们可能是鞋匠、领头矿工或渔夫，但就像老电影中的匪徒一样，他们认为“工作是为弱者准备的”，并利用一切权宜之计来避免。正如佩雷·丹所说，“海盗们追逐任何基督教商人时，都会相信自己是强大的；因为如果不是因为他们享有几对几的优势，或是一支大舰队对一支小舰队的优势，他们很少发动攻击，这些臭名昭著的海盗确实是胆小鬼，在没有巨大优势的情况下，他们从不出战。”[Coindreau，1948：134] + +当然，每艘海盗船都会携带精美的各国国旗和三角旗，并会首先试图向英国船只讲英语，或向西班牙船只讲西班牙语；他们自己的旗帜，印着月亮上的人，无疑很少见到。[萨里旗使用了伊斯兰新月形，但添加了人脸的图像，似乎以纹章的精确性象征着叛逆者的信条。这让人想起圣殿骑士崇拜巴弗灭的头像的传说，而摩尔人的头像是玫瑰十字会炼金术的象征；有趣的是，一些现代基督教原教旨主义者认为月中人是一种撒旦的象征。]至于与阿尔及利亚海盗交换旗帜的技巧在前面已经被描述过了。 + +亨利·梅因沃宁在他的回忆录中提到，萨里的漫游者们会在黎明时将所有的帆都扬起，并派人在高处巡视以寻找可能的猎物。一旦发现后，就会对潜在的受害者进行详细的检视和讨论：商人还是海军舰艇？太大而无法解决，还是太小而无法解决？采取什么策略，展开什么旗帜？诸如此类。 + +在决定了行动如何实施之后，海盗们希望几声炮响能让敌人的船长保持理性（特别是他的船有保险的话！），并立即投降。如果没有，他们将不得不登船。“这是一件可怕的事情，”佩雷·丹说，“看看他们是如何狂热地攻击一艘船。他们一窝蜂地登上船舱，袖子卷到肘部，手里拿着弯刀，一起大声吵闹，以消磨受害者的勇气。”海盗们希望这种威胁的表演和疯狂的尖叫能起到作用，实战是最后的手段，也是最不受欢迎的战术。 + +无论船只是否载有任何价值的货物，其船员和乘客都构成了一个有保障的收入来源。“仅从1618年到1626年，就有6000名基督徒被俘，并被赎回，而战利品的价值超过1500万英镑。在1629年至1639年的十年间，摩里斯科海关共登记了2500万或2600万杜卡特。”[Caille，1949：224]1626年，“近2000名可怜的海员在巴巴里的萨里仍是最悲惨的俘虏，他们的妻子向白金汉公爵提交了一份请愿书。”这些可怜的丈夫们“正遭受着难以言喻的痛苦和折磨，他们几乎被迫改变了他们的基督教信仰。”[Norris，1990：66]拯救2,000个灵魂免于变成土耳其人的代价，即使对一个公爵来说也很可能太高了。在伊斯兰律法中，“（神圣）战争的俘虏”不应被视为与“奴隶”同一类别，但在某些方面他们的地位更差。奴隶毕竟在法律上有独特的权利，但俘虏只是战利品。萨里通过赎回和出售人口来为其自由提供资金，这在我们眼里自然会玷污这种自由，但我们应该犹豫是否将我们的现代情感代入到萨里。马耳他骑士团实行同样的经济政策，但却没有享受到原生的民主自由——英国海军“鼓舞”了不情愿的新兵，使其成为实际的奴隶。无论如何，由于摩洛哥水手已经放弃了使用船桨驱动的大帆船，他们的俘虏中很少有人会像成千上万的人（如米格尔·德·塞万提斯，或美国早期罗德岛的无政府主义者威廉·哈里斯）[威尔逊，1993]那样，在阿尔及利亚，马耳他或西班牙的船只上作为“大帆船奴隶”受苦。 + +> 被判入狱的人，首先要把脸、眉毛和头剃光（因为对基督徒来说没有比这更屈辱的了）。然后，被剥去腰带（就像罪犯要被鞭打时那样），被锁在坐席上，他们坐在那里划船，五个人排成一排；一个土耳其人在他们中间的走廊上转悠，尽管他们使劲地眼睛像要都快迸出来了，但他仍在喊道：“干活，干活，你们这些基督徒。”尽管没有人需要为偷懒而挨打，但他们赤裸的背部仍在流血，像水流般流淌。——摘自《土耳其人统治下阿尔及尔囚犯的哀鸣》（1624）[Norris，1990：66] + +笛福用更现实的语言描述了鲁滨逊·克鲁索作为萨里俘虏的生活，而不是那些游历欧洲，用异国情调的酷刑和强奸故事来陶冶观众的募捐狂热分子，他们所讲的甚至在当时也经常被怀疑是“黄色新闻”。萨里没有像美国那样有广阔的耕地来使用奴隶，也没有任何工业来雇用强迫劳动的非熟练工。俘虏主要是商品，而且与商品一样，规则是，你破坏了它，你就买下它。没有人会为一具尸体支付赎金。 + +因此，海盗的首要任务是确定俘虏的身份，或至少确定他们的品质，这在获取战利品后就会立即开始。会说他们语言的叛逆者会审问他们，用诡计而不是酷刑来获取细节。叛徒们对手有着浓厚的兴趣：贵族或商人柔软的手，普通水手长满老茧的手，某些行业和工艺的特殊标志和畸形，识字的标记性墨迹，他们甚至能确定健康、命运和性格的占卜线。某些被俘的人，因为太穷而无法得到赎金，但拥有宝贵的技能，如果他们投靠土耳其，就会得到自由——装甲师、冶金师、造船师等等都受到高度重视，而识字的人可能会成为航海抄写员（每个船有一个，负责阅读被俘船只的舱单和日志），甚至在议会、一些商那里人或领事处担任文员。 + +一位来自戈尔韦的年轻爱尔兰人名叫理查德·乔伊斯（或乔伊斯），1675年移民到西印度群岛时被阿尔及利亚的海盗抓住，在阿尔及尔被囚禁了14年。他到达那里后 + +> 他被一个富有的土耳其人买下，这个土耳其人从事金匠的职业，他发现他的奴隶...很好相处，而且很聪明，就指导他的手艺，他很快就成了行家。摩尔人一听说他被释放[即乔伊斯被赎回]，就立即对他说，如果他愿意留下，就把他唯一的女儿嫁给他，并把他的一半财产给他，但所有这些，连同其他诱人的有利提议都被乔伊斯都坚决地拒绝了。回到戈尔韦后，他结了婚，做起了金匠的生意，并取得了相当大的成功，在依靠丰厚的财产独立后，他得以从克伦威尔的一名老军官沃利上校那里购买了拉洪的地产... + +[J. Hardiman，1820]根据戈尔韦的传说，乔伊斯成功的秘诀是他在阿尔及尔根据摩尔人的符号设计的戒指，一个由双手捧着的带皇冠的心（有时还有一朵玫瑰）——著名的克拉达戒指，爱情和友谊的象征，几乎和三叶草一样成为爱尔兰的象征。 + +乔伊斯并不是唯一一个因在被囚禁期间从事或甚至掌握某种手艺而发家的巴巴里俘虏。[关于这一点和其他迷人的传说（例如，第一枚克拉达戒指是一只鹰掉在一个年轻女孩的腿上的！），请参阅理查德·乔伊斯的后裔Gcily Joyce撰写的令人愉快的业余历史，《克拉达戒指故事》，1990] + +法国俘虏热尔曼·莫埃特（Germaine Mouette）写了一份罕见的第一手交易记录，“1670年12月16日在海上被俘，在万圣节被卖出，总价值360埃居。”他的主人有四个，其中一个实际上拥有他。其他三人各自拥有莫伊特六分之一的股份，他被卖掉后马上就离开了fondouk[或bagno，奴隶区][即其他三人从第一个所有者手中购买了子股份]。 + +年龄最大的是政府官员穆罕默德·马拉科希（MuhammadAl-Marrakohi），第二个是羊毛和石油商人穆罕默德·利伯斯（MohammadLiebus），第三个是犹太人拉比·亚明（RabbiYamin）。马拉科希把奴隶带回家，他的妻子给了莫埃特加蜂蜜的白面包和黄油，以及一些大马士革枣和葡萄干。然后，他被送回fondouk，在那里，他接待了犹太人的来访，这位犹太人隆重地向他致意，并承诺如果他的家人愿意支付四位房主要求的赎金，他将获得自由。如果他不立即写信给法国要求这笔钱，他会被棍棒殴打，然后被扔到坑里直到死去。莫埃特立刻答应了，但他决定撒谎，假装自己不过是一个鞋匠的兄弟，因此这位为犹太人担任翻译的叛逆者宣布，出售这名奴隶不会有任何利润。第二天，莫特被送到了第三个主人，羊毛和石油商人那里，他的妻子和岳母很同情这个俘虏。起初，他们让他去磨小麦，但当这项工作被证明太累时，他们让他给商人的小儿子作伴。 + +当善良的妻子看到男孩对莫埃特越来越着迷时，她给了他更多的面包和黄油、蜂蜜和水果，并从他的腿上取下了他被迫戴的25磅重的链子。她恳求他改信，娶她的侄女。[莫埃特用“世界上最温柔、最动人的话”向这位女士倾诉，最终比以前更受欢迎，从而摆脱了这种局面。] + +莫埃特在那里呆了一年，没有受太多苦，这要感谢他所谓的贫穷。但最后第四位主人，现任的卡斯巴总督，变得不耐烦了。他主张自己对莫埃特的所有权，并带他去马厩工作。这位奴隶现在只能吃黑面包了，与其他俘虏和可怜的阿拉伯人一起挤在狭小又嘈杂的住所。州长再次要求1000埃居的赎金，但莫埃特仍然坚持自己的贫穷，因此被派去与正在修复城堡城墙的泥瓦匠一起工作。其他工人虐待他并残酷殴打他——这些激励他筹集赎金，并最终重获自由。[Penz，1944：13-14] + +与救赎论修士和其他宣传者流传的可怕的囚禁故事相比，莫埃特先生的故事具有真实性：很明显，囚徒的命运不是野餐，而是有起有落，甚至有可能的救赎或逃跑之路。因此，理查德·乔伊斯的传奇故事似乎也很可信；因此我们也可以理解，对于乔伊斯和莫埃特这样的俘虏来说，皈依伊斯兰教的可能性是多么诱人。这些摩尔人的“侄女”就是其中之一！那些拥有（几乎）不可抗拒的爱情魔力的东方女性！ + + +### 海盗乌托邦 + +因此，在我们跟随海盗的日历走过社交季节——冬天——之后，我们回到了春天，渴望再次出发在公海上漫游。我不能说这些关于叛逆者文化的零散图像组成了任何假设或理论，甚至是一个非常连贯的画面。我们当然不得不比“真正的”历史学家更多地利用我们的想象力，在一个摇摇欲坠的概括性框架上建立许多假设，并加入一丝幻想（哪个海盗学家能够抵制幻想？）。我只能说至少在这个程度上，我已经满足了自己的好奇心。像叛逆者文化这样的东西可能存在；它的所有成分都存在，而且是连续的，是同步的。此外，这种文化在我们可以称之为它的一件伟大的艺术品——布赖格的摩尔人海盗共和国就是很好的间接证据。这样一个原创的概念似乎建立在只能被称为“文化”的起源的深度、社会学上的复杂性、以及被称为（和自称）不同的自我等等基础上。黑手党自称“我们的东西”；海盗们把他们的“东西”称为“萨里共和国”——不仅仅是一个海盗聚集地或安全港湾，而是一个海盗乌托邦，一个有规划的海盗社会结构。也许在萨里出现了一种佛朗哥语，就像在阿尔及尔一样，虽然我们没有证据。但萨里有它自己的符号和机构、关系和思想、商品和人民的语言，它们显然凝聚成了某种可识别的社会实体。流亡者——无论是犹太人、摩里斯科人还是欧洲流氓——创造了一种跨文化的协同效应（在摩尔人的背景下），它可以被认定为一种新的综合体，而不仅仅是各种风格的混杂。在我们的结论中，我们将尝试把这种文化分析为一种转换的模式，一种字面上的跨文化冒险，一种翻译的模式。 + +作为这一分析的第一步，将萨里三分共和国的政治结构与其他政治结构进行比较可能会很有趣。我想到了两个显而易见的对比对象：第一，其他巴巴里国家，特别是阿尔及尔；第二，世界上其他地方的“海盗乌托邦”。 + +我们已经注意到，尽管阿尔及尔从未真正从奥斯曼苏丹那里获得独立，但它设法在奥卡克议会的喊叫声、海盗的船长议会的纵容、奥斯曼帝国官僚的懦弱，以及——如果一切都失败了——“暗杀式民主”中为自己构筑了一种奇怪的自由。布赖格共和国的立法机构几乎可以肯定是以阿尔及利亚的船长议会为蓝本的——事实上，有时这两个机构甚至可能共享成员。但在萨里，“船长议会”作为一个议会单独统治，没有像阿尔及尔那样的其他权力分享机构。很明显，萨里的御前议会，甚至说御前议会，在组织上比阿尔及利亚的模式更加民主。海军司令和议会的14或16名船长都是选举产生，任期一年。随后进行官僚机构的任命——海关和税务局、港口官员、和平的保卫者（人们可能会猜测，这不是一个非常有效的群体）等——但有一个明确和明显的意图，即防止政治权力僵化或甚至稳定到相当的程度。显然，安达卢西亚人和海盗们喜欢保持事情的流动性，甚至到了动荡的程度。至少在拉巴特和卡斯巴，所有建立真正控制权的尝试都会立即遭到暴力作为回击。 + +我们是否可以推测，这种控制权对海盗们来说意味着更多的东西而不仅仅是一个实现利润最大化的机会？事实上，他们的“永久革命”口号真的与任何严肃的原始资本主义设计和野心相容？君主制（最好是腐败的君主制）不是更能满足简单的财政扩张的目的吗？整个布赖格现象难道没有什么不切实际的东西吗？除了威尼斯或荷兰的寡头共和国以及阿尔及尔的船长议会可能例外，海盗们的民主实验缺乏任何现实世界的试验模型。他们可能知道Uskoks，这些海盗居住在南斯拉夫海岸外的岛屿上，主要针对穆斯林和威尼斯人的船只，似乎有一种平等的部落形式的政府。[Bracewell，1992] + +但是，共和制的想法在当时非常流行——到1640年，随着英国、美国和法国的革命，共和制将出现在欧美历史上。所有这些都是在萨里共和国之前发生的，这只是历史的偶然吗？或者我们应该把历史顺序改写为：萨里、英国、美国、法国？萨里、英国、美国、法国？也许这是一个令人尴尬的想法。摩尔人海盗和皈依伊斯兰教的叛逆者是民主的隐秘祖先。我们最好不要继续追究。 + +17世纪末和18世纪初，在世界其他地方出现了一些独立的“海盗乌托邦”。其中最著名的是伊斯帕尼奥拉岛，海盗们在那里建立了自己短暂的高度无政府社会；马达加斯加的Libertatia；同样在马达加斯加的Ranter’s Bay；以及巴哈马的拿骚，最后一个古典的海盗乌托邦。 + +大多数历史学家都没有注意到海盗的陆地飞地的重要性，只是将其视为出航之间的休息场所。海盗社会的概念在大多数历史理论中都是矛盾的，无论是马克思主义还是其他理论，但伊斯帕尼奥拉（现圣多明各）的海盗正是这样一个社会。在16世纪末或17世纪初，伊斯帕尼奥拉岛是一片“禁区”；原住民人口减少了，没有任何欧洲势力实现有效的控制。船只失事的水手、逃兵、逃跑的奴隶和农奴（“Maroons”，避居西印度群岛及圭亚那山中的黑人）以及其他流浪者开始在伊斯帕尼奥拉岛发现自己，摆脱了各种统治并能够作为猎人谋生。野牛和野猪，即那些建立殖民地失败后遗留的畜群的后代，与野生猎物一起在森林中漫步。Boucan或熏肉干（从本地加勒比人那里学到的技术）可以用于与过往船只交换其他商品。在这里诞生了“海岸兄弟会”，他们相当清楚自己的自由，并组织起来（以最低限度的平等主义）来保护它。后来他们又在托尔图加和新普罗维登斯建立了社区。海盗们只是逐渐转而从事海盗活动，而当他们这样做时，他们根据“条款”或船舶章程结成联盟，其中一些条款被埃克梅林（唯一亲眼目睹海盗“黄金时代”的记录者）所引用。这些条款几乎是现存的唯一真实的海盗文件。他们通常通过选举产生所有的官员，除了船舶军需官以及其他“艺术家”，如水手、厨师或乐师。船长也是由选举产生，其收入仅为船员份额的1.5倍或2倍。体罚是非法的，即使是军官和士兵之间的分歧也会在“鼓槌法庭”上解决，或通过《决斗法》解决。有时，一些沉闷严肃的威尔士海盗（如“黑巴特”罗伯茨）会插入一个条款，禁止妇女和男孩上船，但多数人不会。酒类从未被禁止过。海盗船是真正的共和国，每艘船（或舰队）都是独立的浮动民主国家。 + +早期的海盗在森林中过着田园诗般的生活，这种生活的特点是非常极端的贫穷和富足并存、残酷和慷慨并存，并以乘坐漏水的独木舟和临时装备好的单桅船出海的绝望冒险为标志。海盗的生活方式具有明显的吸引力：种族间的和谐、阶级团结、不受政府约束、冒险和可能获得的荣耀。其他地区的尝试也应运而生。伯利兹最早是由海盗们定居的。牙买加的皇家港镇成为他们的跳板；其闹鬼的废墟在1692年整个淹没它的大海之下仍然可以看到。但是，即使在这一具有神圣意义的宁静之前，海盗的生活也已经走到了尽头。大胆，幸运而又才华横溢的亨利·摩根成为了海盗的领导，在1671年组织了惊人的海盗入侵巴拿马的行动——然后接受了赦免，同时被英国任命为总督和高级法官，之后回到了他的老家，成为他的老战友的刽子手。这当然是一个时代的结束；幸存的海盗们（buccaneer）在失去永久的陆地基地后，成为海盗（pirate）。 + +但“黄金时代”的梦想仍在继续：伊斯帕尼奥拉岛的田园风光既是一个最初的神话，也是一个政治目标。从现在开始，只要海盗们有机会，他们就会尝试建立永久性或半永久性的陆地飞地。飞地的理想的条件包括靠近海路、友好的原住民（和原住民妇女）、隐蔽和远离所有欧洲权力的法令和现实、宜人的热带气候，也许还要有一个可以挥霍他们的战利品的贸易站或酒馆。他们愿意在战斗中接受临时的领导，但在岸上，他们更喜欢绝对的自由，即使以暴力为代价。在追求战利品的过程中，他们愿意以激进的民主作为组织原则而出生入死；但在享受战利品的过程中，他们坚持无政府状态。一些岸上飞地只不过是一个隐蔽的港口，一个可以冲刷船体的海滩，以及一汪干净的泉水。另一些则是像皇家港或巴尔的摩这样险恶的小港口，由托马斯·克鲁克这样“体面”的骗子经营，他们只是海盗行为的寄生者。但其他飞地真的只能被称为有意向的社区——毕竟它们是有意愿的，而且是公用的，因此可以理所当然地被视为海盗乌托邦。 + +17世纪初，海盗活动的主要地点从加勒比海转移到了印度洋。欧洲已经开始建立与“近东”和印度的殖民主义-帝国主义关系，但仍有大量的领土“未被征服”。事实证明，马达加斯加是开辟飞地的最佳地点，它位于通往阿拉伯和麦加的伊斯兰朝圣海路上，非常方便。著名的艾弗里船长留下了一个传说，他在从印度去朝圣的路上撞上了莫卧儿帝国的单桅帆船，“赢得”了一颗鸡蛋大小的钻石，并“娶”了一位莫卧儿公主；据说这颗钻石和其他珠宝被埋在波士顿港附近的某个地方，至今未被找到。其他的海盗都是不愿意回到美国或欧洲，而马达加斯加看起来很有希望。伊斯兰教和基督教都没有渗透到这个巨大的岛屿，这里遍地都是部落、异教徒，甚至是“数以百计的本土‘王国的巨石’”。[Mohen，1990：55-58，关于马达加斯加的巨石习俗。]一些部落，以及一些妇女被证明渴望与海盗结盟。这里气候很理想，一些贸易站也开设了起来，海盗乌托邦的概念也被恢复了。在某些情况下，个别冒险家可能会“娶国王的女儿”或以其他方式渗入当地社会；在其他情况下，一群海盗会在靠近一个友好部落的地方建立他们自己的村庄定居，并制定他们自己的社会规则。 + +其中一个乌托邦是在“兰特湾”建立的——正如C.Hill指出的那样，这个地名在一定程度上支持了这样的假设，即激进的反传统教派可能在海盗中找到了追随者。[Hill，1985]根据丹尼尔·笛福的《海盗之王》（1720），艾弗里船长本人在马达加斯加定居了一段时间，成为一名“假国王”。Hill指出，“笛福强调艾弗里定居的自由主义方面。在一个自由的国家，就像我们一样，每个人都可以自由地去他们想去的地方。”[同上，p178]另一个马达加斯加定居点是由诺斯船长和他的船员建立的。但毫无疑问，最有趣和最著名的马达加斯加乌托邦——肯定也是最有特色的乌托邦——是“Libertatia”,自由女神（或Libertalia）。 + +我们关于自由女神及其创始人米松船长的唯一资料来源是丹尼尔·笛福以“查尔斯·约翰逊船长”的笔名写的一本书《海盗通史》（1724-28）。它不是一部虚构的作品，其中大量内容可以得到档案材料的验证，但它显然是一部通俗作品，长于趣味和刺激性，短于文献。笛福声称他关于自由女神的所有信息都来自于他手中的一份“传教士的手稿”。 + +根据笛福的说法，手稿讲述了这样一个故事。米松是一个古老的普罗旺斯家庭的最小的儿子，15岁时离开家到昂热的军事学院学习，然后自愿去一艘法国在地中海的战舰服役。在罗马休假时，他遇到了一位名叫卡拉乔利的“淫荡的”多米尼加牧师，后者已经抛弃了信仰，决定与米松一起出海。在与海盗的战斗中，两人都因其勇敢而脱颖而出。卡拉乔利逐渐劝说米松皈依无神论和共产主义，或者说皈依“完美自然神论”。 + +然后，在与一艘英国船的战斗中，法国船长和军官被杀。卡拉乔利提名米松担任船长，两人都向船员发表了长篇大论，说明他们的革命计划（并提到亚历山大大帝、英国的亨利四世和七世以及“穆罕默德”，作为灵感的来源）。他们劝说船员们建立一个“新的海洋共和国”。“每个人都生而自由，他有权得到支撑他生存的东西，就和和他所呼吸的空气一样。”水手长马修·勒通德（Mathew le Tonder）建议悬挂黑旗（所谓的Jolly Roger）作为他们的标志，但卡拉乔利反对，说“他们不是海盗，而是决心实现上帝和大自然赋予他们的自由的人”。他提到了“人民的权利和自由”，“砸碎暴政的枷锁”，“压迫和贫穷的苦难”。“海盗是没有原则的人，过着放荡不羁的生活；但他们的生命是勇敢的、公正的和清白的。”他们选择了一个印有“为了上帝和自由”格言的白色旗帜作为他们的标志。（所有这些听起来更像是自然神论，而不是“无神论”，但在18世纪早期，这两个词几乎还是可以互换的）。 + +米松和船员们发动了一系列对船只的成功攻击，他们只拿需要的东西作为战利品，然后就把船放走。骑士精神和仁慈的情结与勇气和暴力交替出现。在非洲海岸，他们抓住了一个荷兰奴隶主；米松向船员们发表了长篇大论，认为“用我们自己的同类做交易，在神圣的正义面前是不可能被接受的。任何人都没有权力拥有另一个人的自由；而那些声称对神性有更多了解的人却把人像野兽一样卖掉；这证明他们的宗教不过是一种耻辱！”米松接着说，他们”没有除去束缚在自己脖子上的奴隶制度，并坚称自己有奴役他人的自由”，他敦促水手们接受非洲人作为船员伙伴——他们的确这样做了。 + +过了一段时间，他们在印度洋的约翰娜岛定居下来，米松在那里娶了“当地黑女王”的女儿，船员们也都找到了妻子。几年来，米松继续发表演讲，抢劫船只，偶尔——在形势所迫的情况下——屠杀他的敌人。正如拜伦勋爵所言，米松“是有史以来最温和的抢劫过船只或割喉的人”。[Gosse，1924：218] + +米松现在决定在社区中开展一项冒险，将他的人转移到马达加斯加。根据Course（1966）的说法，自由女神位于该岛东北端的迭戈-苏亚雷斯港或安齐拉纳附近。在这里，他们开始构建一个纯粹的社会主义社会，其中私有财产被废除，所有的财富都存放在一个共同的国库里。海盗们的地块之间没有树篱隔开。他们建造了码头和防御工事，并派两艘新船“童年号”和“自由号”去绘制海岸线。他们还建一个会议厅，米松被选为“领主”，任期三年。当选的议会每年举行一次会议，没有议会的批准，任何重要的事务都不能进行。法律被印刷并分发给众人，因为“他们中有一些人是印刷商和制版商”。英国海盗图船长是舰队司令，卡拉乔利是国务卿，议会由最有能力的海盗组成，“不分国家和肤色”。他们发明了一种新的语言，它是法语、英语、荷兰语、葡萄牙语等的混合体。这个进步的政权并没有满足少数极端激进分子（包括图船长）的要求，他们脱离出来并建立了自己的定居点，以纯粹的无政府主义为基础——没有法律，没有官员。在若干年内（《手稿》对时间顺序的描述似乎很模糊），海盗乌托邦蓬勃发展。当它最终失败时，并不是因为内在的矛盾，而是因为外部的侵略：他们遭到一个不友好的原住民部落的袭击，定居者们乘船出海离开，随后被一场奇怪的飓风摧毁。 + +笛福本人生活在海盗活动的最后一个全盛时期，他的大部分信息来源于对被囚禁在伦敦的海盗的采访。如果仅仅从新闻小册子和绞刑架民谣中，他的许多读者都会对17世纪末和18世纪初的海盗行为了解很多。然而，就我所知，没有一个当代读者质疑过米松船长的故事的真实性，尽管笛福关于米松的两章读起来像是卢梭或拜伦的作品！（他们都还没有出生）。（这两个人都还没有出生）——虽然自由女神的政治结构在某些方面比美国革命（1776年）或法国（1793年）——甚至俄国（1917年）的政治结构都要激进得多——尽管如此，1728年没有人对“约翰逊船长”吹毛求疵，也没有人指责他凭空捏造米松的故事。这个材料之所以被相信，大概是因为它本身是可信的。当然，也有很多人相信莱缪尔·格列佛和闵希豪森男爵；人们无法根据普遍的信仰证明任何事情；尽管如此，米松船长的故事在1972年之前一直被视为事实。 + +这一年，曼努埃尔·肖恩（Manuel Schonhorn）编写了新版《通史》(1972)。在这部作品的导言中，他主要从两个方面大力抨击了米松船长的真实性。首先，是反面的证据：没有确凿的档案材料存在（当然，它可能已经消失了）。然而，更具破坏性的是图船长的问题。关于图船长的档案和历史材料很多，他的存在是毋庸置疑的，但这些材料显示，图不可能在马达加斯加呆足够长的时间来扮演他在自由女神故事中的角色。在此基础上，人们得出结论，米松的故事是一个虚构的故事，是一种《鲁滨逊漂流记》式的骗局，它被嵌入到其他历史（或多或少有历史）文本中。这个骗局的目的是为了用作激进的辉格党宣传品。没有“米松船长”存在过。自由女神是一个字面意义上的乌托邦：它是“不存在的”! + +我们必须承认，图船长的问题使米松的故事在某种程度上成为神话；然而，我认为米松不存在的裁定是被迫做出的，而且过于急躁。我们应该考虑其他几种合乎逻辑的可能性：（a）米松存在，手稿也存在，但手稿包含关于图船长的错误信息。笛福不加批判地接受了这些信息；（b）手稿存在并描述了真实的事件，但笛福自己出于自己的原因编造了有关图船长的情节（包括“无政府主义”的分裂），也许是为了充实过于稀少的叙述。（c）手稿从未存在，也没有任何叫米松或卡拉乔利的人——但一些像自由女神这样的实验确实发生在马达加斯加，而且被笛福简易地虚构了出来（《鲁滨逊漂流记》有一个真实的模型，就是亚历山大·塞尔柯克，一个真正的弃船幸存者）。“约翰逊”被添加了一个真正的海盗的名字，即图船长，以提高文本的真实性，但他没有意识到，他这样做是在给未来的历史学家下套。这些假说都无法在图氏问题的基础上得到证明或反驳。因此，修订派的驳斥假说——完全虚构——也必须保持未证实的状态。我们不应允许仅仅是揭穿真相的热情迫使我们放弃一个革命英雄或一个真正的乌托邦的坚实历史性。[例如，Burroughs，1981，序言；Law，1980]。兰特湾是足够真实的，由海盗的“混血儿”在马达加斯加开辟的“王国”也是如此。[Deschamps，1949，特别是第215-229页]。海盗是真实存在的，巴哈马拿骚的野生船员也是真实存在的（包括黑胡子和“棉布杰克”莱克汉姆及他的两位海盗妻子安妮·波妮和玛丽·里德），他们在17世纪初曾繁荣过几年。自由女神可能是真实的，也应该是真实的；这一点对船长的崇拜者来说就足够了。克里斯托弗·希尔就拒绝接受米松是纯粹的虚构。希尔指出，尽管笛福年轻时是个嚣张的激进分子，但到了1720年代，他已经成为一个雇佣文人，是资产阶级财富价值观的支持者。“这就是他对自由女神的描述的公正性如此显著的原因。如果他编造了整件事，这将令人惊讶，如果他一直在听老水手的故事，看到有可能利用自由女神来批评资本主义社会中冒犯他的方面，那就更不用说了。”[同上，p.179] + +然而，为了论证为假从而假设《通史》的米松部分至少和《鲁滨逊漂流记》一样是虚构的，就会出现一个有趣的问题。笛福似乎对萨里共和国有相当多的了解。在《鲁滨逊漂流记》的前几章中，主人公被“萨里流浪者”抓住，然后被带到摩洛哥卖掉。就像圣文森特·德·保罗和莫埃特一样，鲁滨逊发现他的摩尔人主人并不是一个坏蛋：他为这个英国水手提供了一个通过皈依伊斯兰教来摆脱奴役的机会。然而，克鲁索决定尝试逃跑，并最终成功地偷到了一艘小船。与他同行的是一个年轻漂亮的摩里斯科男孩，他与他没有共同语言——这显然预示着心爱的伙伴星期五的到来。笛福似乎可以把萨里作为虚构自由女神的部分来源。 + +然而，这种比较不能拉得太长。萨里无疑比阿尔及尔、突尼斯和的黎波里等巴巴里海岸国家更自由，但它的结构肯定比任何一个纯粹的海盗乌托邦要传统得多。萨里的海盗们显然决定了接受共和制的政府形式（和10%的税收），以便在（希望如此）永久的基础上保障他们的自由；萨里模式可以被看作是一种妥协的产物。 + +他们似乎是有意识地这样做的，尽管他们除了对欧洲阶级压迫的憎恨和伊斯兰教的信仰（至少是接受）之外没有任何意识形态/知识框架。伊斯兰教的所谓“民主”方面可能促进了萨里的独特实验的出现，但不能完全说明问题（因为其他地方的伊斯兰政府都是君主制）。新教的极端主义（否认所有世俗的 “神秘”或政府）可能是一个因素，但还不足以使叛逆者叛教。没有任何来自萨里的文本，我们不可能说得很肯定——但看起来，布赖格共和国可能是安达卢西亚摩里斯科人和欧洲叛逆者的自行创造，并（也许）受到某些苏菲派的启发——这是一种真正的自发的政治天才行为。 + +当叛逆者消失后，他们没有留下任何“问题”——没有明显的永久痕迹来证明他们的存在。在马达加斯加，海盗的“混血儿”创造了一种新的文化，但在北非，皈依者和他们的后裔只是被吸收到普通人群中。他们对欧洲文明的影响似乎是零，甚至比零还要少：就像那些让自己蒙羞的亲戚一样，他们没有被提及——不仅仅是被遗忘，而且是被故意遗忘。尽管他们进行了几个世纪的圣战，但在将伊斯兰王国的边界向西方推进方面，他们没有任何作为。他们没有创造任何独特的艺术形式，也没有留下一页“文学”。除了一些名字，一些残酷的轶事...其余的都消失了。尽管他们的存在——数以千计的17世纪欧洲人皈依伊斯兰教——完全是一种反常的神秘，但他们几乎没有得到分析性或解释性历史学家的关注；他们没有引起宗教史学家的好奇；他们已经被淡化到无足轻重，以至于几乎不可见了。 + +海盗、叛教者、叛徒、堕落者、异教徒——这样一个可怕的组合可能会产生什么积极的意义？我们必须简单地承认这只是对变态的迷恋吗？毕竟，这构成了海盗学者的真正动机，尽管所有的抗议都是令人震惊的道德愤慨，不是吗？更何况是妓女学家呢？ + +为了回答这个反对意见，我只想指出（正如我在其他地方所坚持的那样，例如Wilson，1991，导言），异端是一种文化转移的手段。当一种文化的宗教渗透到另一种文化时，它经常（至少最初）以“异端”的形式渗透；直到后来，东正教当局才来进行整顿，让他们服从命令。因此，比如说，早期凯尔特基督教吸收了大量德鲁伊教，因而在罗马被视为“异端”。在这个过程中，不仅基督教文化被引入爱尔兰，凯尔特文化也（更隐秘地）被引入基督教，或者更确切地说，被引入欧洲基督教文化。一种文化转移发生了，这种跨文化的协同作用产生了一些新的东西，比如《凯尔经》。摩尔人时代的西班牙代表着一种基于伊斯兰、犹太教和基督教传统三方相互转移的文化，尤其是在炼金术（或诗歌！）等“异端”领域。炼金术作为一种“异端邪说”，通过伊斯兰教将希腊科学传入了文艺复兴的基督教世界。诸如此类，不一而足。 + +叛教可以被视为“异端”的特例。就叛逆者而言，文化转移的一个非常明显的领域是航海技术。我们可以假设，叛逆者不仅向伊斯兰国家引进了“圆船”和先进冶金技术，还可能向欧洲海员介绍了伊斯兰航海数学和星盘等设备。“东”和“西”之间的渗透边界在摩尔人的西班牙最为明显，在那里，相互渗透最终产生了哥伦布；毫无疑问，这一过程一直持续到17世纪。我们应该小心，不要将这种技术转移解释为不包含任何精神意义——请记住，这位来自士麦那的犹太船长因其航海技能而被视为巫师。这位水手的职业是个谜，而且（就像沙漠游牧民族一样）是一个可疑的正统人士。 + +我们推测，17世纪的水手们分享的不仅仅是一艘船只的秘密，他们可能也分享了某些秘密思想：例如，民主的思想，或者就此而言，精神自由的思想，摆脱“基督教文明”及其所有苦难的自由。如果亲伊斯兰的观念在受过教育的泥瓦匠中传播，为什么不也在“贫穷水手的共济会”中传播呢？一艘船又一艘船在窃窃私语中流传着一个谣言，这是一个关于巴巴里海岸的故事，那里的财富和“摩尔人的侄女”将由足够勇敢的人获得，这些人是少数敢于背叛基督教的自由灵魂。如果我们没有这种“阴谋”的书面记录，我们也可能会问，口头和非文化（亚）文化中会产生了什么文件？我们不需要文本，因为我们有证据证明，在数千次宗教皈依这一令人费解的历史事实中存在阴谋，这不仅是自愿的，而且是有强烈意愿的的；事实上，我们有大规模叛教的证据。 + +这里有一个例子，不仅证明了异端邪说作为文化传播的手段，而且还证明了（甚至更有趣的是）异端邪说作为社会抵抗的手段。正是在这里（正如我已经暗示的那样），我找到了叛逆者和他们失去的世界的“意义”。诚然，海盗的这种理论或“愿景”一定会被怀疑是我自己特定主观性的延伸，甚至是“浪漫”的延伸。但没有任何主观性是完全独特的。如果我大胆解释了叛逆者的经历，那是因为在某种意义上我认识到了这一点。每一部历史在某种程度上都包含着一部“当下的历史”（正如福柯所说），也许更进一步地说，一部自我的历史。但“每一段历史”并不能因此被视为缺乏“客观性”，或仅仅是主观和浪漫的。 + +我想我认识叛逆者，因为不知何故他们也“在场”。当卡扎菲和爱尔兰共和军被指控勾结和走私军火时，提及凯尔特人和北非人之间古老的亚特兰蒂斯联系是否会产生误导？ + +正如17世纪的欧洲共识会谴责这种阴谋是叛国和叛教，我们的现代媒体也将其视为“恐怖主义”。我们不习惯从恐怖分子的角度看历史，也就是说，从道德斗争和革命性剥夺的角度看历史。在我们现代的共识中，杀人和偷窃（战争和税收）的道德权利只属于国家；更具体地说，是理性的、世俗的企业国家。那些非理性到相信宗教（或革命）作为在世界上采取行动的理由的人是“危险的狂热分子”。显然，自17世纪以来，变化不大。一方面，我们有社会；另一方面，还有抵抗。 + +17世纪没有世俗意识形态。无论是国家还是个人，都没有办法通过以科学、社会学、经济学、“自然权利”或“辩证唯物主义”的哲学诉求来为自己的行为辩护。几乎所有的社会建构都以宗教价值观为基础，或者（至少）以宗教语言表达。至于基督教君主-帝国主义的意识形态——或伊斯兰海盗的意识形态——我们可以自由地将两者解释为仅仅是装点门面、虚伪的言辞、纯粹的虚伪，甚至是幻觉；但这是为了将历史简化为一种强奸和掠夺的心理，而没有任何思想和意图。“思想”对“历史”的影响仍然是一个问题，甚至是神秘的，尤其是当我们将模糊的复杂性实体化为类别甚至是绝对性时；但这并不意味着我们不能对思想或历史说任何有意义的话。至少我们必须承认思想有历史。 + +历史倾向于认为叛逆者的故事毫无意义，仅仅是欧洲文化一帆风顺和不可避免地走向世界统治的过程中的一个小插曲。海盗们没有受过教育、贫穷、被边缘化，因此（人们认为）他们不可能有真正的想法或意图。他们被视为无足轻重的粒子，被异国的非理性的怪圈或漩涡从历史的主流中卷走。成千上万的人皈依他者的信仰毫无意义；几个世纪以来对欧洲基督教霸权的抵抗毫无意义。 + +在我读过的关于这个问题的文章中，没有一篇提到有意的和抵抗的可能性，更没有提到“海盗乌托邦”的概念。伊斯兰教的“积极影子”这一概念是我为了试图理解叛教之谜而临时构建的范畴；没有任何历史学家（据我所知）提出过玫瑰十字会和启蒙运动的知识分子对伊斯兰教的喜爱与叛逆者的怪异现象之间的联系。没有人把他们皈依伊斯兰教解释为一种终极形式的喧嚣主义，甚至解释为一种逃离（和报复）经济和性苦难文明的手段，而这种文明是奠基于在奴隶制、压迫和精英特权之上的自鸣得意的基督教。作为自我表达的叛教——作为阶级表达的集体叛教——作为一种原无产阶级“先锋队”的叛逆者——这样的概念在本书之外是不存在的——甚至我对把它们作为古怪的假说来推进也感到犹豫。“先锋队”失败了，“叛逆者”消失了，他们刚展开的抵抗文化也随之消失了。但他们的经验并非毫无意义，他们也不应该被埋没和遗忘。应该有人向他们的叛乱热情，以及他们在摩洛哥布赖格河畔的“临时自治区”致敬。让这本书作为他们的纪念碑；并通过它让叛逆者重新进入文明的不安的梦境中。 diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2003-10-06-PeterLambornWilson-a1_r-roses-and-nightingales.md b/_collections/_heros/2003-10-06-PeterLambornWilson-a1_r-roses-and-nightingales.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3aeb64a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_heros/2003-10-06-PeterLambornWilson-a1_r-roses-and-nightingales.md @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +--- +layout: post +title: "玫瑰与夜莺" +author: "Peter Lamborn Wilson" +date: 2003-10-06 12:00:00 +0800 +image: https://i.imgur.com/nKCs593.jpg +image_caption: "在伊朗寻找传统无治主义" +description: "作者将苏菲主义的边缘元素与一种文化倾向联系起来，尽管民族主义现代化、欧洲帝国主义渗透程度加深以及政府镇压不断升级，但这种文化倾向仍然顽强地存在。在调查过程中，作者认为发现了前伊朗波斯的遗迹和丰富的非正统伊斯兰教（和前伊斯兰教）实践。无论是当时还是现在，苏菲派为追求狂喜而对禁欲主义和放荡不羁的情感极端的探索，都让那些恪守严格的伊斯兰教义和其他僵化的法律和秩序机构感到震惊。——道格·格雷夫斯" +position: right +--- + +_“你为什么要访问我国？”他不断问。_ + +_“嗯，你看，我对苏菲主义感兴趣...”我太累了，无法编造什么。_ + +_“苏菲主义！？你知道什么是苏菲主义吗？”_ + +_“我知道得够多了，想知道更多。我在印度遇到一些苏菲教徒告诉我去伊朗。所以...”_ + + + +那是1971年。在印度和巴基斯坦走了两年的嬉皮士之路，在阿富汗度过了一个贫穷的冬天，在奎达（巴基斯坦俾路支省首府）吸了几个月的鸦片，接着又得了严重的、令人产生幻觉的肠道疟疾，我在伊朗领事眼里一定不是很体面。 + +领事馆是一个位于奎达一个沉闷的新郊区的混凝土盒子，除了我和领事之外，似乎空无一人，领事是一个穿着西装的小个子酸儒，除了让我个人生活困难之外，他似乎无事可做。他在询问我，为什么他不简单地给我签发14天的过境签证，而不是我想要的标准的旅游三个月签证。他似乎怀疑我有问题。最近，我被赶出了印度和阿富汗。显然，领事认为我是一个没有财富的流浪者，这对他来说是相当敏锐的。 + +_领事在我眼前蜕变成了一个完全不同的人：他一下子变成了一个有修养、有诗意的灵魂，被不公平地、莫名其妙地寄放在俾路支省的这个空荡荡的水泥盒子里。他没有屈服。他喜笑颜开：“这真是太棒了！你必须让我给你尽可能多的签证，”他开始摸索着盖章和戳记，“一年，可以延期，是吗？”_ + +_“嗯...但是...”_ + +_“你必须留在我的国家，直到你学会一切。请答应我！”_ + +虽然我从未了解过领事国家的“一切”，甚至没有了解过苏菲主义，但我确实在那里度过了七年，或多或少，所以我现在的问题是一个选择问题；在这本小小的回忆录中，什么该删掉，什么该放进去。我遵循领事不屈的主题所提出的一条松散的线索，即他从官僚到人的奇怪转变。我这样做的动机来自于这样一种可能性，即在未来几年里，美国将没有人讨论波斯文化的这些方面。伊朗将被归入邪恶的伪话语和“新闻”的空洞想象中。波斯人文主义（正如伊克巴尔所称）将被遗忘、否认，甚至背叛——正是因为它不属于意识形态和“文化冲突”的领域，而是属于“日常生活”和灵魂的平凡甚至无法表达的美。 + + +### 音乐、茶和玻璃杯 + +一个奇怪的巧合是，只有在一个“发展中国家”才可能出现的，当时对古典音乐进行传统和创造性保护的最强大力量是伊朗国家电视台。相比之下，德黑兰电台代表了一种可爱但不纯洁的新传统主义，它甚至跑到了小提琴和钢琴的实验中，我喜欢波斯钢琴音乐，它总是让我想起什叶派墓祠和其他19世纪末公共建筑的镜面马赛克建筑。就像钢琴（大部分是直立的）一样，欧洲的镜子被大篷车运到伊朗，自然有很多镜子在途中坏了。 + +瓷砖马赛克工匠们用骆驼驮着碎片，创造了一种粗俗但闪烁的混合形式，在这种形式中，整个穹顶和天井都变成了闪闪发光的冰钻照明。纯粹主义者讨厌这种东西。钢琴被重新调成波斯模式，并像杜冷丁一样演奏，没有踏板，只用四个手指。另一个比较：在整个亚洲，传统的刺绣技术因脚踏式辛格缝纫机的引入而获得了创造性的爆发。现代技术（与资本密不可分）迟早会窒息并摧毁传统工艺，但最初的接触往往是一种刺激，并催生了充满活力的混合体。 + +尽管如此，电视音乐家们都是严格但有创造性的纯粹主义者，1970年代见证了优秀波斯音乐的小型文艺复兴：由非常年轻的爱好者和非常老的演奏家演奏，他们被新浪潮和电视预算从遗忘中拯救出来。设拉子音乐节是其中心之一。我花了很多时间与电视台的“伊朗传统音乐保护和传播中心”主任达里什·萨夫瓦特博士交谈。在设拉子的一个晚上，萨夫瓦特博士告诉我一个有趣的故事。我已经知道它的大部分内容，因为娜斯罗拉·普亚瓦迪和我在《爱的国王》中写过它，这是我们对尼玛托拉希苏菲教团的历史和诗歌的研究，是尼玛托拉·瓦利国王的精神后裔。1792年，这些苦行僧之一在克尔曼殉难；他的苏菲名字叫穆斯塔克·阿里·沙阿，他是一个尼德祖布，一个完全沉浸在神性狂喜中的苏菲“疯子”。他也是一位传奇的音乐家，会弹奏中亚的小三弦琵琶sehtar（印度西塔琴的祖先）。有一天，穆斯塔克在疯狂中为附近清真寺的祈祷召唤（阿赞）伴奏，这一亵渎行为引起了一位偏执的毛拉的清规戒律的愤怒。毛拉号召满堂的人用石头砸穆斯塔克·阿里·沙阿，他和他的一个弟子一起被砸死了。萨夫瓦特博士给我讲了一遍这个故事，但他并没有在书上读到过这个故事。他年轻时从一位老音乐家朋友那里听说的，他的祖父在1792年5月19日确实在克尔曼，并目睹了穆斯塔克的死亡。 + +20世纪70年代的Ni’matollahi教团仍然非常支持音乐（尽管他们在实际的苏菲实践中从未使用过乐器）。每年有几次快乐的节日，如先知或阿里的生日，德黑兰市中心的尼玛托拉希卡尼卡[或“精神中心”]会组织一个jashn，或音乐节。贾瓦德·努尔巴赫什博士是该教团的教主或谢赫，他的弟子和朋友中有许多音乐家，他们都乐意在他的聚会上表演。来自德黑兰各阶层和各地区的数千人（包括妇女和儿童）都会参加，每个人都会得到一份免费的米饭和肉的热餐，以及他们能吃到的所有茶和糖果，还有几个小时的优秀传统音乐。压轴戏总是由一群来自库尔德斯坦的狂野的卡迪里苦行僧提供，他们用戏剧性的颂歌和敲击的鼓声将人群唤醒，使之陷入疯狂。努尔巴赫什博士告诉我们，在库尔德斯坦的家里，他们会在音乐之后做出一些力所能及的举动，比如把刀子插进脸颊或吃灯泡。“但在我的Khaniqah里，我不允许任何这样的事情发生，”他眼神闪烁地说道，“如果你想看那种巫术，你就得去萨南达吉。” + +于是，我们当然就去了。 + +在伊朗人之后，库尔德人是一道亮丽的风景线，他们都（除了毛拉）采用了西式服装，其结果通常是反美学的。库尔德人的穿着是库尔德式的：大流苏头巾，紧身士兵夹克，宽松的裤子，马靴，还有枪，如果他们能逃脱的话。妇女们穿着几十种或几十种深色的、丰富的、饱和的、天鹅绒般的分层花纹衬裙，看起来像黑色的郁金香；有些人在脸上纹上蓝色的印记，然后揭开盖子走。 + +在萨南达季，我和我的朋友们——我们都是为德黑兰英文日报工作的美国记者，都对苏菲主义着迷，遇到了努尔巴赫什博士的联系人，他是一位88岁的老先生，住在卡迪里教堂附近的一座小房子里。他邀请我们进屋喝茶，并给我们看了一张他穿着军装的老照片，他的肩膀上挂着一条非常巨大的活蛇。“你是来看我们吃玻璃的，我的年轻朋友？啊，这不算什么。一个人甚至不需要进入恍惚状态就可以玩这种把戏。我给你们看！” + +他打了个响指，他的小孙子端来一个银质托盘，上面放着一个灯泡。老兵一边说着咒语，一边用手指把它掰开，然后开始舀起碎片，把它们塞进嘴里，嘎吱嘎吱地响。吞下。当我们目瞪口呆地看着他时，他眨了眨眼睛，把托盘递给我们：“你们想自己试试吗？” + +那天晚上在卡尼卡（在围绕着沙发或餐布的地板上吃了一顿羊肉和茶的大餐后），我们确实目睹了力量的壮举，包括烤脸颊、吃电、处理蝎子、咬灯泡——所有这些动作（在真正令人振奋的齐克尔之后）都没有任何损伤或可见的疤痕。后来我多次访问萨南达季，我不得不承认这些把戏很快就显得相当普通（尽管我自己从未尝试过）。但我再也没有看到过我们这位小个子老兵朋友的壮举。在通过狂舞和旋转来实现哈尔或精神恍惚之后，他突然以极快的速度跑过整个房间（至少说是一个网球场的长度）；像火箭一样把自己头朝下发射到空中，把头骨撞到远处的墙上，然后跳下来，站起来，在接下来的一个小时里不停地旋转、跳舞和狂喜地唱歌。我相信就是这个人告诉我们，巴格达的卡迪里苏菲教团的大谢赫能够砍掉他的弟子的头，作为入教仪式的一部分，然后换上他们，没有任何伤害。在看到这位老军人亲自表演后，我倾向于相信这一点，虽然我承认后来我又开始怀疑了。但这是个不错的故事。 + + +### 苏菲主义。伊斯兰教的“传统无治主义”？ + +逊尼派伊斯兰教“建立”在五大支柱之上。统一的忏悔，对先知和天使的信仰，祈祷，朝圣，以及贫民税。除此以外，什叶派还增加了第六个支柱。社会正义。什叶派通常是作为一个没有国家权力的宗教而存在的，传统上是作为对逊尼派的潜在反叛的来源。但随着时间的推移，“正义支柱”被赋予了更广泛的解释。已故的阿里·沙里亚提（Ali Shariati）是一位被伊朗国王的秘密警察暗杀的激进毛拉，他使许多伊朗人皈依了什叶派社会主义的概念。沙里亚提的小册子揭示了马克思主义人文主义与对阿里和侯赛因作为反抗国家压迫的反叛者的崇敬的奇妙融合。今天伊朗的官方革命国家什叶派已经采取了另一个方向，不是社会主义，也不是特别激进。但社会正义的什叶派和革命之间的联系是相当牢固的历史和现实的，而且总是能够再生的。伊朗一般被描述为90%的正统什叶派，这可能是事实。 + +但苦行僧和异教徒所起的作用比这种统计数字所显示的要大。在“肥胖”的伊朗人里面，一个“瘦弱”的苦行僧经常为自我表达和自由而斗争。当然，苏菲是非常虔诚的，但苦行僧（即使没有外在的迹象和做法）也允许对所有沉闷的顺从主义、阶级窒息、清教徒主义、过于正式的礼仪和菲利宾式的共识美学进行嘲笑。在现代波斯语中，darvishi这个形容词意味着这种态度和品味的整个综合体，甚至不一定与任何苏菲赞美有关。它的意思是“悠闲”、“酷”、非正式和放松（“不穿衣服吃饭，我们会很darvishi”）；还有“时髦”和波希米亚的意思。在我看来，苦行僧和奇怪的教派（太多了，甚至无法在这篇文章中列出）对波斯文化甚至广义上的“政治”提供了相当重要的东西——可以称之为“传统无治主义”。 + +在过去（比如说，直到19世纪中期），伊朗苦行僧坚持一种古老的生活方式，与印度的印度教萨都斯人的生活方式非常相似。长发（或剃光头）、打补丁的斗篷、乞讨碗（用椰壳做的）和仪式用的斧头（也可用于切菜）、独特的帽子或塔伊（“皇冠”）；无休止的漫游、音乐和舞蹈，有时喝酒和吸食大麻，对正统的要求持无所谓的态度；瑜珈禁欲主义和放荡不羁，以及狂喜的爱神学。Ni’matollahi教团曾是这种苦行僧的先锋，但强大的毛拉（其中一位被称为苏菲·库什或“苏菲杀手”）对他们进行了严厉的镇压，甚至因异端而被处决（如穆斯塔克·阿里·沙赫），这使激进的苦行僧逐渐转入地下。在内部，他们保留了反清教的信念，但在外部，他们符合正统的什叶派。一些谢赫甚至穿着深色的长袍，戴着雪白的头巾，装扮成毛拉。 + +野生的卡兰达里式的苏菲主义可能比伊斯兰教更早，它可以追溯到印度-伊朗的古代，甚至可以追溯到最早的印度和伊朗经文（《吠陀》和《雅什》）中的共同萨满教文化。致幻植物（称为Soma或Haoma）在这种宗教中肯定发挥了核心作用。首先，正统的婆罗门教和琐罗亚斯德教，以及后来的伊斯兰教，都把这些植物的力量推到了“异端”的外部黑暗中，或者“忘记”了它们，或者把它们变成了隐喻，就像许多平庸的苏菲诗歌中没有味道的“酒”。 + +但苦行僧主义抵制变化。在等级森严的亚洲世界里，有一套僵化的继承身份，苦行僧的生活总是提供了一条出路，一种传统的波希米亚主义，不完全被权威认可，但至少被认为是一个可行的身份。难怪嬉皮士们会立即倾向于与这些“有1000年历史的beatniks”为伍，他们有着同样的零工作伦理，对麻醉剂和幻觉的偏爱。在印度，我发现有很多苦行僧和萨德教徒，但在伊朗，他们大多已经消失了，至少在外表上。唯一有补丁的斗篷属于一个叫Khaksariyya或“尘头”的教团（就像在爱人门口的尘土中跪拜，或在哀悼时将尘土扔在头上的形象）。在设拉子，我在他们的一个名为“七体”的美丽花园中的卡尼卡里参加了开斋仪式，他们在那里诵读哈菲兹，然后熄灭灯光，在黑暗中哭泣。披着补丁的哈克萨里苦行僧偶尔仍会四处乞讨或出售对抗邪眼的香火（esphand又名叙利亚芸香，摄入后会产生强烈的致幻作用；也可用于制作红色染料的fezzes）。我知道伊斯法罕有一家茶馆，员工都是哈克萨里苦行僧，领班是他们的谢赫，他背诵史诗《沙赫纳赫》的所有部分，就像一个人的戏剧。哈克萨里教团与一个奇怪的库尔德教派有联系，这个教派被称为“真理之民”（与苏菲殉道者哈拉伊所宣称的神名相同）。这不是一个苏菲教派，而是一种民间宗教，是前拜火教异教徒、极端什叶派、苦行僧苏菲教，或许还有摩尼教的混合体。Ahl-i Haqq的一个分支实际上崇拜撒旦，吃猪肉，喝葡萄酒；我的几个朋友曾到他们的偏远山谷旅行，发现他们相当热情好客。正统的“阿赫拉哈克”在德黑兰建立了一个Jamkhaneh或聚会所，由一个有魅力的shaykh，即著名的音乐家和sehtar大师Ustad Elahi主持。许多德黑兰的音乐家都被他吸引为弟子，一些西方人也是如此，包括我的朋友、法国民族音乐学家Jean During。Ustad Elahi的儿子用法语和英语写过书。 + +有些苏菲是很Darvishi的，比如Ni’matollahi教团的Safi Ali Shahi分支，他们在德黑兰拥有一个非常漂亮的khaniqah（有花园和瓦片圆顶）。他们中的许多人是德黑兰电台的专业音乐家，他们中的一些人（人们这样说）吸食鸦片。有一次我在他们的花园里参加了一场时尚的葬礼，因为苦行僧们把花园租给了这种场合。其他苏菲教徒为此批评他们，把他们看成是懒汉。无论如何，不是所有的苏菲都是达维希。 + +过去，苏菲主义偶尔会把它的“传统无治主义”发挥到对不公正的武装起义，但在近代，它把精力转移到神学和思想解放上，把它的野性运用到更内在的层面。从政治角度解读，苏菲主义为反抗提供了大量的灵感——想想哈菲兹的台词：“用酒染上你的祈祷地毯！”如果从文化角度解读，苏菲主义正是通过抵制传统的“死重”而引发了无数次传统文化的复兴。例如，19世纪末波斯古典音乐的巨大变化——更大的合奏、新的旋律材料、对欧洲影响的实验——都是由苏菲派或深受苏菲文化影响的艺术家完成的。在特定的时间和地点，“激进的宽容”可能被证明是不可能成为政治纲领的，但它总是可以被艺术家内化并外化为艺术。由于“东方”从未真正经历过启蒙运动和工业革命（除非是殖民帝国主义强加的），它在苏菲主义和艺术的“允许的异议”中保留了许多传统的浪漫主义抵抗形式。 + +在巨大的压迫条件下，苦行僧会变成Rndi，也就是说，聪明。伦迪可以在法律的眼皮底下喝酒，而且还能逃过一劫。苦行僧是一个自我照亮的密探，是神秘的僧侣和恶作剧的超现实主义者的奇怪组合。也许这就是古德杰夫发现他的“聪明人”概念的地方，他避开宗教和瑜伽的繁琐道路，像小偷一样溜进天堂，可以说。在民间传说中，“聪明人”成为一个喜剧人物，如著名的穆拉·纳斯罗丁（Mulla Nasroddin），外表是一个傻瓜，但实际上是一个已实现的圣人。 + + +### 伊朗？...还是波斯？ + +通过在印度和伊朗旅行，而不仅仅是阅读它们，我开始欣赏并真正爱上了某些“晚期颓废时期”，这些时期被东方主义者普遍鄙视为美学上的不纯洁，被新一代伊斯兰教偏执者鄙视为宗教上的不纯洁，被亲西方的现代主义者鄙视为中世纪的不纯洁。几乎唯一不鄙视这些晚期颓废时期的人是那些实际上仍然生活在这些时期的人，他们太无知和落后了，没有意识到他们自己的无关性、过时性、政治不正确性和不纯洁。在印度，莫卧儿时代后期的残余仍然为许多人的生活提供了一个幽灵般的忧郁但精致的矩阵。在伊朗，它是卡贾尔时期（巴列维王朝之前的王朝）；这段历史足够新，在20世纪70年代，人们仍然可以通过故事（如萨夫瓦特博士关于穆斯塔克的故事），通过建筑、绘画、音乐、手工艺品、诗歌，甚至食物来触摸它。过去的历史以一种美国人甚至欧洲人无法想象的方式萦绕在人们的脑海中；它的存在足以让人们几乎可以生活在其中。 + +晚期颓废时期吸引我的原因有很多，例如，它们通常相当和平（对战争来说太累了，太淡定了）；它们往往致力于“小幸福”——正如尼采所说，这可能比大幸福更重要，那些总是背叛我们的幸福。也许伟大的原创艺术在这样的时期无法茁壮成长——因为国王和领主再也负担不起——但“小艺术”往往经历一种完美；贵族的品味（以廉价的民间形式）甚至渗透到最低层。我记得在德黑兰的一个深冬的夜晚，当我经过一个建了一半的伪加州办公大楼的骨架时，我看到一个孤独的守夜人在一桶燃烧的垃圾旁取暖；他穿着羊皮大衣，对着雪花朗诵哈菲兹，自娱自乐。 + +“伊朗”是波斯的正式古称，但直到20世纪中期才是官方名称，由礼萨·沙阿（最后一位已故沙阿的父亲）下令将“波斯”改为“伊朗”。他这样做的动机令人怀疑，因为他是纳粹的同情者，而且“伊朗”意味着“雅利安人的土地”——这一改名在许多伊朗人的口中留下了不好的印象。“波斯”这个名字应该代表所有落后的、中世纪的、迷信的、反进步的、晚期的和颓废的东西——这块土地和它的人民中的所有“东方”东西。但这块土地和它的人民（或其中一些人）仍然生活在那个世界里，并且热爱它。 + +我知道我说我也爱它是完全不合法的，也是无法辩解的。我知道我是一个局外人（尽管有时我说服自己不是这样）；我知道我不能“代表他人”，甚至整个代表项目在后现代性的“废墟”中已经变得可疑。我甚至知道，整个嬉皮士的浪漫旅行项目在很大程度上是虚幻的，当然也注定要失败。“后殖民主义话语”已经完美地、痛苦地说明了这一切。然而，可悲的是，我无法忏悔，也无法将我的经历写成无关紧要的、隐性的反应性妄想。 + +新闻中的“伊朗”，一个由穿黑袍的邪恶狂热分子控制的油井和原子反应堆的二维图像...这个“伊朗”比我试图旅行甚至失去自我的“波斯”更真实吗？“玫瑰与夜莺的波斯”如此明智地影响着我的记忆？或者，两者都是同样的真实和不真实？真相肯定要比这种悖论所暗示的更加复杂。但是，由于“伊朗”现在被媒体鼓吹为邪恶轴心国的下一个代言人，我怀疑“波斯”在未来几年中会得到同样多的宣传。因此，“波斯”已经成为“我们失去的世界”的一部分——它的香水味萦绕着，即使它退到了一半想象的过去。它留下的只是一些可能被称为差异的东西。否则，如何定义我们感到正在离开我们的东西？ diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2022-11-18-SYSUStudentCollective-a1_c-survey-study-on-kangle-village.md b/_collections/_heros/2022-11-18-SYSUStudentCollective-a1_c-survey-study-on-kangle-village.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e9068eb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_heros/2022-11-18-SYSUStudentCollective-a1_c-survey-study-on-kangle-village.md @@ -0,0 +1,231 @@ +--- +layout: post +title: "康乐村调研" +author: "广州中山大学学生团队" +date: 2022-11-18 12:00:00 +0800 +image: https://i.imgur.com/kgSbzCP.jpg +image_caption: "《田野后记 | 悬浮的中间状态——广州康乐村的散工们》 2020-2021年切片" +description: "中山大学学生团队转写的这篇调研报告体现了民族志的力量，也印证了出色的社科学术永远与当下相关。这并不是说同学们已经“盖棺定论”地解决了康乐村的问题，而是说他们在2020-21年间调研给我们理解和帮助当下康乐村的情况一个足够明亮的背景，能够迅速理解康乐村民的“悬浮”状态是多么需要进一步地被关注和保护，而他们的“附近”又是多么容易被治理掉。" +position: center +--- + +### 序 + +近期大量康乐村民成为流浪海珠的街友，迎接他们的不是城市的包容而多是粗暴管理和地域歧视。比起文中的调研片段，这些街友甚至无法返乡，三年以来各地层层加码与踢皮球，他们申请返乡的诉求往往也得到来自家乡的一句“你还是别回来了”。希望中山大学的朋友再接再厉，能对“附近”的康乐村持续关注。“附近”不是结构功能主义视野下被假定能无限自我修复的蓄水池，而应该是能照见社会真实，让知识和行动联接而有情有义的地方。 + + + +11月13日，一份印有“广州市海珠区凤阳街凤和经济联合社”公章的《告知书》提到凤和联社将以疫情防控的名义对“自上世纪90年代”以来堪称“来穗务工人员的创业港”康鹭片区展开一个月的“综合治理”，其中最重要的措施是将被称为湖北村的纺织业中心康乐村等城中村的外来务工人员转运和劝返回乡。城中村人口被治理回乡并不是新议题。值得老调重弹的是，城中村除了被指认为“脏乱差”的疫情替罪羊，实质上给城市提供了大量的劳动力和经济文化上的活力，也自有其韧性。但这韧性是有限的，比较《财新》在2020年3月31日的报道《上半年服装旺季将过 广州“湖北村”重启》和2022年11月14日的《广州解除隔离的城中村工人在何处落脚》，我们可以清晰地看到，病毒打断的时间湖北人能努力拾起，而防控强制转运和此前长期封控带来的伤心与无奈难以抵御，需要更多的社会介入和关注。据了解，不少工友流落街头成为街友，在穗社群已被治理，家乡不愿接受，他们已无处可去。 + + +### 按语 + +广州市康乐村以其独特的“短工—计件”模式开展生产，吸纳了大量外来农民工。本文对该模式产生的结构性因素进行探源，并借助“双重脱嵌”理论从微观层次探析散工进入该模式的成因。“传统嵌入”使康乐村散工对该模式的不稳定性产生了权宜性的同意，“制度脱嵌”则导致康乐村散工缺乏走出康乐村这一场域的可能性。两者共同导致康乐村中的散工陷入了一种“悬浮”于康乐村的中间状态。 + +本文的共同写作者们于2020-21年间在康乐村进行了田野调查，在当时的疫情防控条件下，仍可以自由进出康乐村，康乐村的生产虽受到了一定影响，但总体上仍然保持着稳定的运转，本文试图阐释清楚康乐村内部主导性的生产方式，让我们对它的了解不止于新闻或想象中的图景。 + +原封面海报参考至上主义的风格，绿色表示农村，黑色背景表示城市用工制度，绿色的圆形空缺并不与黄色小作坊完全契合，最终悬浮在黑与黄的中间状态。 + + +### 一、康乐村概况 + +康乐村是广州市海珠区下辖的城中村，属海珠区凤阳经济联社管辖。1988年到1996年间，海印桥下的零散毛线、布匹摊转变为中山大学南门对面的零散摊位，中大布匹市场的雏形就此产生。2001年到2004年，政府介入进行整治改造，部分商户搬入村民自建的临时建筑，部分制衣厂转移至邻近的城中村。顺应中大国际轻纺城等的大型专业批发市场的需求，康乐村村民将房屋租赁给制衣厂作为经营用地以增加收入。外来工人为了工作方便，也租住在康乐村、鹭江村中。康乐村兼具生产、居住功能，因此成为“中大商圈”中的重要一环。 + +目前，受中大布匹市场发展的辐射影响，康乐村内部呈服装制造业聚集的态势。在2008年以前，中国纺织业是以出口销售为主导的行业。纺织工业约30%的产品销往国际市场，国内商品的国际市场占有率连续十余年位居全球首位；2007年纺织品服装出口总额1756亿美元，占全国出口总额的14.4%，占国际纺织品服装贸易额的30%。 + +![image1](https://i.imgur.com/wEbYQeV.png) +▲ 2001-2008年中国纺织品出口额与出口总额 + +2008年的金融危机导致了全球市场购买力普遍性下降，部分国家甚至采取贸易保护主义政策，国际纺织品市场的需求萎缩严重。此外，危机引起的汇率变化加大了外向企业的报价风险和汇兑损失，加之能源、原材料、劳动力等生产要素的成本不断上涨，企业利润严重下降。与此同时，国内紧缩的货币政策，也使得大部分小微企业在短时间内资金紧张。以上种种结构性原因，导致了在金融危机当年，中国的纺织服装出口压力增大，出口增速迅速下滑。 + +康乐村内部的纺织服装企业多为单纯的加工贸易企业，对国际市场具有更强的依赖性。因此，康乐村受金融危机的影响非常巨大。在金融危机前，康乐村纺织企业主要从事外贸订单的生产，市场需求的季节性变化很小，基本不存在一般意义上的“淡旺季”区别。此时的企业为了保证生产的稳定性，往往长期雇佣员工，且采取计时工资制。 + +金融危机后，外单减少，康乐村纺织企业将主要市场转入国内，但国内市场有明显的“淡旺季”区别，在每年6、7、8月，以及季节更替的间隙，订单数量急剧减少，许多工厂无法接单生产，没有利润来源，因而也无法负担工人的工资。 + +由此，康乐村的用工模式开始转变，主营国内市场的纺织企业纷纷放弃以往“长工—计时”的用工方式，转而采用“短工—计件”的用工模式。具体而言，就是不在工厂内长期雇佣工人，只有在从批发市场等市场上游部门获取生产订单后，才按照订单所要求的生产种类、生产数量临时雇佣工人。在招工时与工人协商好每天的工作量与工资，并且在工人完成每天的生产任务后立刻结算当天工资。工人和企业之间的联系相当脆弱、不稳定，且完全围绕生产订单展开。 + +虽然金融危机的影响逐渐消退，但是“短工—计件”的用工模式一方面能帮助企业节省工资成本，另一方面让工人能获得更高的工资和更自由的安排，因而逐渐稳定固化成为康乐村内部相当独特的用工模式，这种模式与深圳龙华的“三和大神”相似，但又存在重要的差异，本文将康乐村内这样的纺织工人定义为“散工”，其中绝大多数人都为时间选择自由的“短工”，高薪和自由是康乐村吸引流动人口的名片。 + +![image2](https://i.imgur.com/oapYug9.png) + +#### 赶单制与老板拉工人 + +产品转向国内市场后，康乐村工厂首先面临的问题是——生产订单和劳动力都是根据利润率流动的，主要表现为淡旺季的分明。在此背景下，康乐村劳动力的需求和价格在宏观层面上，呈现出周期性起伏的规律性；在微观层面上，又因各个企业的经营状况，呈现难以预测的不稳定性。不稳定的生产节奏，决定了企业必须结合市场行情和自身状况进行灵活调整，这种“灵活调整”具体表现为“赶单制”的生产策略，并由此催生了“老板拉工人”的招工模式： + +> “这里的经营模式是这样的，所有的工厂几乎都比较小，成本比较低，都是来货了立马招人赶工做。老板可以今天上午找不到人做，下午或者明天再来找人做。24小时都有人在这里聚着等老板招工，晚上十一十二点工厂要制货，也可以招那些愿意晚上制衣的人来立刻做工。”（A6受访者） + +康乐中约南新桥是一座长度不到十米的石桥，它横架于康乐村内的人造排水渠上方。它被康乐村的工人称为“康乐大桥”，每天上午八点，康乐大桥周围就开始聚集前来招工的老板和找工作的工人，老板们往往在大桥以东直到康乐信孚小学这一长达200米的路段招揽工人。 + +在人最多的上午10点，招工的老板和应聘的工人可以把整段马路填满。城管必须在路边用高音喇叭循环播放：“招工请靠边”的提示语，并时常用指挥旗驱赶人群，以便让汽车和三轮车通行。 + +![image3](https://i.imgur.com/Bjc1wi6.jpg) +▲ 康乐村路边招工告示牌 + +在康乐村，长工短工都以计件方式结算工资，且当天结算。在招工过程中，工人和老板会围绕“工种”、“单价”和“数量”进行协商。简单而言，工人不仅要寻找“单价”较高的计件工作，还要找到一个自己擅长的加工工种，这样可以在一天内尽可能多地生产，以期在计件工资的结算中获得更高回报。最后，工人还可能关心工厂订单中的剩余数量，以便确定在往后的几天是否可以继续在这里工作，不必重新把时间花在找工作上。对于技术熟练、“性格好”的工人，老板也会采取“留微信”的方式，在有订单时优先联系他们，而非招揽陌生的工人。 + +“赶单制”所催生的灵活用工不仅使制衣厂能够节省固定成本，实现利益最大化，也给工人带来可观的工资水平。在生产旺季，工人们“一天能挣七八百块钱，一个月能开二十五天工。一年平均下来一个月一到两万块钱（A7受访者）”。有些技术熟练的工人“在别人都不会做的情况下，一天可以一千多块钱，平均一个月三四万。” + +![image4](https://i.imgur.com/TfCoPzo.jpg) +▲ 康乐村主干道夜间景象 + +近年来，康乐村基本杜绝了拖欠工资的现象。这里的老板每个月的收入足够多，不会因为一两万块钱和工人斤斤计较（A7受访者）。对于长工来说，厂里每个月也有固定分发工资的日期，并且在工人进厂前，这些内容都需要和工人讲好（A4受访者）。 + + +### 二、实证材料分析 散工如何进入康乐村？ + +#### 1.劳动技能与社会关系 + +康乐村内企业主要由成衣、配饰、配件、面料、加工、商标、服装压折与包装等行业构成，产业的特殊性决定了对工人的劳动技能要求，散工进入康乐村做工需要一定的“技术成本”。 + +大多数工人在来到康乐村前已经掌握了服装制造的相关技能，并在老家或其他地方有过纺织业的劳动经验： + +> “我做衣服的技术是原本就会的，因为像我们老家基本上一个村里面的基本上都是做服装的。然后我们很早以前就是在深圳那边的大厂里面做。”（A14受访者） + +前置的劳动技能和经验积累，为工人进入康乐村做工提供了基本支持，使得他们在康乐村的劳动力市场中具有一定的优势： + +由于康乐村内大部分工厂是非正式小厂和家庭作坊式的生产方式，资方需要具有高流动性的灵活劳动力，不愿意也没有能力为工人提供劳动技能培训，快节奏的“订单制”经营模式要求高效率和低成本，因此散工自行掌握制衣技术，才能相对顺利进入康乐村获得工作机会。 + +此外，在选择进入康乐村做工之前，工人首先需要面对的是信息问题。以老乡和亲戚为核心的熟人社会关系网络，是使工人们知悉康乐村的重要原因： + +> “这里，我跟你说70后、80后，家里面就是有那个裁缝铺嘛，然后拜师学艺了就学会了。像我们这些90后，有和老乡朋友慢慢这样出来，做着做着也会了，确实有很多人是老乡带过来的。”（A7受访者） + +稳定的社会信任和支持是熟人农村社会的主要特征，从农村进入城市务工的农民工在某种程度上保持了这种惯性，康乐村的散工不仅没有脱嵌于传统社会关系，而且依赖于传统社会关系的支持，以此获得进入康乐村务工的信息条件。 + +![image5](https://i.imgur.com/VxsCfl2.jpg) +▲ 康乐村夜间道路：拉货小哥络绎不绝 + +常见的情况是，在此地务工较长时间的工人，向他们的亲戚或老乡介绍这里的情况，提供信息吸引他们自发进入，或者直接将他们带入康乐村并为他们引荐老板、带着他们在同一工厂做工，还有少数情况是，亲戚成为老板开厂后，连带他们的亲属进入自己的厂里工作： + +> “听老乡说这里工资高、比较自由就过来了。来之后先跟他在一个厂，后来就自己干了。”（A13受访者） + +> “我们亲戚有人做制衣厂嘛，他就叫我们来跟他搞嘛。然后我们就帮他做嘛。”（A18受访者） + +“熟人带熟人”已经成为散工进入康乐村的一个固定模式，熟人社会关系网络为他们获得工作机会，并融入新工作环境提供了稳定有效的支持，一批批工人在熟人社会关系网络中获得信息、被领入康乐村的劳动力市场。 + +#### 2.高薪、自由及其后果 + +同时，相对于需要签订劳动合同的正规工厂，这里几乎不存在被拖欠工资的风险： + +> “这边工资高嘛，而且不拖工资，深圳那些大厂还要拖半个月、一个月工资。”（A23受访者） + +康乐村的工厂拥有着良好的市场条件，中大布匹市场形成了相当成熟的配套，其内部廉价的土地租金，以及宽松的管制环境带来了更大的盈利空间，因而在一定程度上有着较强的工资支付能力，散工在其中可以获得较高的收入。而非正规的计件日结模式，降低了散工承担的老板逃逸欠薪的风险。 + +吸引工人进入康乐村更为重要的原因是，这里有着较为自由的环境。康乐村内大部分制造企业规模较小，采用家庭作坊式的生产方式，以非正规的状态存在，这意味着它们无需接受正规的工商和上级管制，也不存在正式的组织和薪酬制度，但这恰恰成为它吸引劳动力的一大优势——正规化的大厂通常有着严格的组织技术、管理标准和劳动纪律，工人在获得稳定性的同时牺牲的是人身自由，在强劳动控制下，工人承受着巨大的压力。 + +![image6](https://i.imgur.com/03b9vFT.jpg) +▲ 康乐村路边一楼的小作坊 + +但在康乐村里，工人可以拥有自主选择工作、自由安排工作与生活的权利，不必依附于工厂规范和等级制权威，这使得他们从正式工厂退出而进入非正式散工市场。这正如被访者反复强调的： + +> “你一个大工厂进去了基本上你就可能半年就待在里面了。走掉的话可能也会丢点工资什么的。这里最主要一点就是它的自由性、选择性比较好一点，在其他地方可能就没这么好的这种优势。”（A9受访者） + +计件、日结的工资结算制度给予了他们预想之中的高工资，以及更加自由的时间安排：“如果家里有事情，一个电话打来，我可以立即放下手中的工作，买一张高铁票直接回家”（A7受访者）。 + +而较高的收入，使得一些略有积蓄的工人对于工作十分挑剔：“像那些太累、太热，不好干的工作一般不选择去做”（A4受访者）。康乐村短工对这种“想做就做。不想做就玩”的模式逐渐适应与习惯，让其更不愿意到正式工厂做工： + +> “打个比方，我今天累了，就过两天再来做工。像那些大厂你就得见一下主管，报个到，请个假，还要看人脸色，还可能假不给你请下来。”（A6受访者） + +但与自由相伴随的，是康乐村劳动市场中几乎完全缺席的劳动合同和劳动保障： + +> “这里没有那些什么保险的，因为没有合同嘛。我觉得这里的优势就是可以随心所欲，不用让那些正规大厂的老板规定你一个月休几天，几点上下班，甚至管你几点吃饭这样的。就是因为没有这种规定好的合同，这里才能比较自由，不用太被束缚。”（A6受访者） + +> “一般没有保障，没有大伤就不需要处理，有大伤就会有处理。比如说谁把你弄伤了就跟人家赔。如果说你进厂的话，可能他们都会有赔的，不过五险一金这些待遇是没有。”（A10受访者） + +同时，康乐村制衣厂的劳动强度难以想象。在这里，长工与短工的工作时间会有些许差别，两者都分为白班与夜班。 + +![image7](https://i.imgur.com/7Uua68E.jpg) +▲ 康乐村某工厂内部车位 + +对于长工而言，做白班意味着早上九点钟上班，除去吃饭时间，基本上需要工作到晚上十二点；做夜班一般从凌晨三点开始，一直工作到第二天早上十二点左右。 + +对于短工而言，工作时间更加灵活，但出于订单压力、老板要求以及自身的工资需求，工人们基本上需要从早上九点钟工作到晚上十一点才能把工作做完，有时还需要加班到凌晨一二点，而且在康乐村没有周末、节假日，甚至“没有晚上”，这样的劳动强度使工人几乎是被迫采取了“干几天休一天”的策略。 + +> “这里虽然自由，但每个月都要保持好工作的“节奏”，就是几时去做工，做工时一天做多少，都要做到心里有数。（A6受访者）” + +“赶单制”催生的工作模式、工资结算方式、劳动强度与劳动保障，构成了康乐村内部颇具特点的劳动生态，从而塑造了纺织工人独特的劳动状况。 + +出乎一般人意料的是，尽管身处如此不稳定的劳动力市场和高强度的劳动之中，大部分工人在休息时间仅会从事些极为简单的娱乐活动：有些年纪大的工人喜欢在下工后到“康乐大桥”附近坐着聊天，或与朋友一起散步、吃宵夜（A1受访者）。还有一些工人会在“康乐大桥”西侧跳广场舞。 + +总体来说，康乐村纺织工人的娱乐生活较为单调，且大多跟工友、老乡相关，这与他们极不稳定的工作状况和极高的劳动强度形成鲜明反差，也加深了我们对于散工群体何以选择“短工—计件”用工模式的疑惑。 + + +### 三、双重脱嵌：一种悬浮状态 + +#### 1.“传统嵌入”与权宜性的同意 + +在经典的双重脱嵌理论中，农民工既脱嵌于传统乡村，又脱嵌于城市生活，最终在他们聚集的地方“重塑一个非国家的新型场域”,并藉此固守原有清晰的身份认同并在心理上获得安全感。 + +康乐村虽因其管理的特殊性等特点，十分符合“独立场域”的描述，但康乐村的工人却并非像理论描述得那样，是因为不想回到农村才选择进入这里的。相反，与乡村所保持的种种联系，是康乐村工人得以在极不稳定的劳动力市场和较高的劳动强度中“坚持”下去的重要原因。 + +比如，许多短工认为短工的灵活工作安排的优势就在于让他们得以自由地往返于康乐村和老家，更好地照顾家庭中的老人。 + +> “今年五月份，我妈生病了，当时电话打过来的时候，我正在车间里工作，我听到电话之后就打算剩下的那些活不做了，直接叫老板计件算工资，然后我跟我老婆说了一下，两个人就一起坐车回湖南了。”（A7受访者） + +此外，由于制度障碍等原因，康乐村的许多工人选择将孩子留在老家，让爷爷奶奶或者外公外婆抚养： + +> “我们没有户口，很难在这边读那些公立高中。而且把自己的孩子送进这边的幼儿园都要五六万的赞助费。这还是幼儿园，而且五六万还不一定能给你搞得定，最后我想就算了，也没有想孩子要读书一定要第一名什么的，就回老家那边读了。”（A2受访者） + +孩子的读书与家庭开支是他们在康乐村工作的重要原因。许多工人抱着暂居康乐村、尽量多挣钱的心态在康乐村工作： + +> “我们就是趁着孩子还小在家，婆婆还能带几年，在这边能做个一两年吧，等孩子如果说真的长大了的话，我们肯定是还要在老家的。因为婆婆他们嘛也是年纪大了，孩子长大了管不住。”（A14受访者） + +这种心态使他们将高强度的劳动，视为生活中的暂时状态和高工资的合理代价，从而使自己长期处于一种“赶工”的高负荷状态，以取得更高的工资收入来抚养孩子与维持家庭开支。 + +> “这里虽然工资比较高，但是每天工作时间太长了，不适合长期做，比较辛苦，我身体受不了。而且我在这边也没有什么朋友，朋友基本上都是在老家那边。所以我准备年底就回湖南老家了。”（A2受访者） + +工人与远在老家的父母和子女之间的深度联系，以及他们对康乐村工作的暂时性定义，表明他们只是视其为一个工作场所。他们的地域认同与情感归属都在老家，康乐村只是为了讨生活而寻找的一个落脚点。 + +总体而言，康乐村的工人没有脱嵌于原生的家庭关系与传统的社会关系，反而高度嵌入其中，并在此基础上，普遍地认为自己是暂时地“悬浮”于康乐村这个场域。 + +#### 2.“制度脱嵌”与边缘身份的再生产 + +但与此同时，“制度脱嵌”的困局却切实地困扰着他们，这主要体现在被孤立于城市生活、被排斥于正式制度管理两个方面。 + +不同于一些提供劳动合同的工厂，工人们可以在工厂内依靠长期的劳动合作结交朋友、建立社会关系，在康乐村中，“赶工制”的生产方式使得工人们在生产期间几乎没有闲暇的时间可以用于社交： + +> “主要是工作，这边长工根本就没有休息的时间，工作十五个小时了是不是，赶货的时候十六七个小时，做到一两点钟都有。”（A14受访者） + +> “你别看我们现在清闲，做起活来也是很拼命的。一天做十几个小时都很正常。毕竟钱还是难挣的嘛。”（A11受访者） + +同时，短工为主的特殊用工模式，又使得工人在各个工厂之间具有极强的流动性，工人们之间以形成“在地的”社会关系，其社交圈子与进入康乐村以前就形成熟人关系高度重合。更何况，康乐村内基本上都是外来的经商或务工人员，极少广州本地人。这使得工人们基本不可能通过与本地人建立社会关系融入城市生活。 + +![image8](https://i.imgur.com/QCKW3e9.jpg) +▲ 康乐村村路边一楼车位 + +康乐村制度管理的主体多元、内容复杂，主要可以分为居委会负责的房屋住户登记、派出所负责的治安管理、派出所和司法所共同负责的司警联调制度三个方面。本文将主要选取司警联调制度进行阐述，并着重分析该制度如何再生产了康乐村工人的制度脱嵌特点。 + +康乐村内部民事纠纷数量极多，一方面是因为“赶单制”的生产方式和日结的工资结算方式使得康乐村内部经济活动频繁、高强度工作模式与较差的生活条件（社会支持的匮乏、居住环境的恶劣）也使得工人们长时间处于高压力状态，彼此之间容易产生与激化矛盾： + +> “以前一年调解几百宗，数量是整个海珠区的一半。”（康乐村司警联调室调解员B6） + +> “我们这里一天下来平均是八九十（件警情），多的时候是100多宗。……我们这个（派出所）是整个广州市属于事最多的单位了”（凤阳街道派出所S警官B7） + +在此背景下，广州凤阳街所首创了名为“司警联调”的纠纷调解模式（B6受访者），设立司警联调室，整合派出所与司法所的资源，调解康乐村内部以房屋租赁、劳动合同、借债纠纷等内容为主的民事纠纷。 + +在该模式中，调解员在调解时灵活处理，结合实际情况使双方妥协折中寻求和解。从另一个角度说，司警联调制度的灵活性，恰恰体现了它的非正式性和随意性。 + +以司警联调机制中常见的劳资纠纷、合同纠纷为例，按照正式制度，解决此类纠纷的部门应为劳动仲裁部门和工商部门，但由于康乐村内部经济的非正式性，这类路径往往被预先阻塞了： + +> “如果去仲裁的话，也会有很大的问题，因为仲裁部门会让你提供工商执照。你知道康乐村里的多数都是没有正规手续的，去了人家都不管。”（B6受访者） + +另一方面，依靠法律诉讼、劳动仲裁等正式制度解决相关问题，需要承担的时间成本和经济成本，这对围绕“赶单制”组织生产的企业和依靠日结、计件工资的工人而言，都是极其高昂的。 + +因此，灵活的司警联调制度在调解过程中往往先对纠纷双方强调以上几点，告知他们依靠劳动仲裁等正式制度的高昂成本，从而使他们更加愿意接受司警联调模式的调解方案： + +> “这个事情你不服的话也可以去法律部门、仲裁部门，但是时间就长了，对你来说时间上和精神上也是损失。如果老板不服你还要上诉，万一最后工厂跑了你也更烦了。”（B6受访者） + +总体来说，“赶工制”的生产方式使得工人没有条件以市民的身份融入城市，而康乐村经济的非正式性又决定了工人们没有资格以市民身份被管理（其法定权利的实现是不完全的）。这种“制度脱嵌”的状况造成了农民工在城市中的边缘身份，并且通过将工人们牵制在“康乐村”这一场域之中，不断再生产这一身份，使得工人们表面上自愿，实际上是不得不留居于康乐村这一场域中。 + +#### 3.悬浮的中间状态 + +> #### 康乐村散工的真实处境 + +综上所述，与其说工人们生活在广州，不如说他们生活在一个名为“康乐村”的大工厂中，以工作为生活重心。他们一切的生活服务、经济消费、社交网络都通过康乐村这个“大工厂”建立起来。同远在老家的父母孩子之间存在的高度紧密的社会关系同乡关系，使得工人们保持着“传统嵌入”的状态，这种状态使他们将高强度的劳动视为生活中的暂时状态，以及康乐村中较高工资的合理代价，从而为自己长期所处的高负荷赶工状态成功生产出一种权宜性的同意。 + +与此同时，康乐村内部的“赶工制”生产模式占用了工人的社交时间、限制了工人的社交对象，使得工人无法通过“在地化”的社会网络融入广州；更重要的是，康乐村内部特殊的“司警联调”机制以康乐村经济的非正规性为把柄，在很大程度上承担了康乐村内部的制度管理功能，强化了城市中的正式制度与短工群体的隔阂，消解了工人走出康乐村，摆脱边缘身份的可能性，不断再生产工人的“制度脱嵌”状态。 + +以上两者同时出现在康乐村散工群体身上，导致了散工们实际上陷入一种悬浮的中间状态。需要强调的是，我们无意像许多“双重脱嵌”理论的运用者那样，把康乐村的工人描述为一个既无法融入城市又无法回到乡村的迷惘、无望的群体。 + +相反，我们使用的“悬浮的中间态”这一表述，是建立在康乐村散工对自身境况的认知基础上的：他们认为自己具有一定的纺织技术，感到自己是有权利、有能力对工作进行挑选的主体，他们并不抱有融入城市的幻想，而是把“康乐村”这样一个既区别于城市又不同于家乡的特殊场域，当成一个“可以赚钱的、自由的”落脚点，并以一种低卷入的状态悬浮于其中。 + +我们能够观察到的现实是，这种中间状态是由散工群体所处的社会结构，以及他们自身主体性共同塑造的，它也是工人们选择看起来极不稳定、负担极大的“短工—计件”用工模式的重要原因。 From 924d22a8d3b114aaefda653ff33a29ddb950679b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: theagora Date: Sat, 26 Nov 2022 08:25:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 03/12] 0x17 Init commit _columns posts --- ...022-11-05-so-what-to-reflect-on-tragedy.md | 69 +++++++++++++++++++ .../2022-11-07-the-iron-curtain-falls.md | 31 +++++++++ ...-11-14-words-do-not-mean-anything-today.md | 33 +++++++++ 3 files changed, 133 insertions(+) create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2022-11-05-so-what-to-reflect-on-tragedy.md create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2022-11-07-the-iron-curtain-falls.md create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2022-11-14-words-do-not-mean-anything-today.md diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-11-05-so-what-to-reflect-on-tragedy.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-05-so-what-to-reflect-on-tragedy.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b9adefde --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-05-so-what-to-reflect-on-tragedy.md @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : "反思，什么样的反思？" +author: "维舟" +date : 2022-11-05 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/dipd7ws.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "" +--- + +“疫情三年，就是他的一生。”兰州3岁孩子因封控而延误失救之后，有人说了这么一句话，顿时有一种被击中的感觉。 + + + +出了这样的事，谁都难免产生怀疑：到底哪里出了问题？如何才能避免悲剧重演？ + +确实，很多人都在反思。然而，单靠一两个悲剧其实根本不足以触动全社会心态发生变化，因为你留心一下就会发现，不同的人都在按自己的方式进行“反思”，得出不同的结论。 + +第一种反思意见承认，这是防控之下救治工作做得不够细致。11月3日，官方通报表态，将“对此次事故处置过程中暴露出的救助机制不畅通、应急处置能力不强、工作僵化刻板的单位和干部，将依法依规进行严肃处理”。 + +已经有人注意到，现有的两份通报都只各自讲述了“局部的真话”，“但这种局部的真话不仅无助于公众对事件形成完整认知，反而加剧了民众对公信力的不信任”，强调负责管控的各个链条工作人员都有责任完善各自的工作。 + +但这意味着反思防疫本身吗？那可不一定。 + +恰恰相反，这其实是遗憾防疫还做得不够好。我去年初就发现，很多人抱怨的只是防疫工作中的细节问题（比如封城时菜没有及时配到），但并不是质疑清零本身。换句话说，他们不是“不要防疫”，而是“要更好的防疫”，并且相信，完全有可能“既要”和“又要”。 + +第二种意见甚至觉得防疫人员也不必反思，出现这样的事，要怪只能怪这家人自己。经济学家梅新育写了一篇《兰州七里河儿童煤气中毒身亡事件警示家长和各方》，他在复盘经过之后认定：“相关部门及其工作人员反应速度，可供改进的余地即使存在，也远远不能与死者父亲妥某磊决策失误耽误的时间相比。” + +这种思路在国内也有深厚的社会土壤，很多人从小都被这样教育：遇到任何问题，别责怪社会和他人，多从自己身上找找问题。 + +有人说，他坚定支持清零防疫，但上海封城期间也陷入了抑郁，而他调节情绪的办法就是：说服自己，这点苦不算什么，“提醒自己少犯都市青年矫情病”。 + +这确实是不少人真实的心路历程，然而让人感叹的是：本来他们已经触及到了一个临界点，但不仅没醒悟，反倒压抑了自己已被唤醒的真实情感，主动强化了被异化的处境。到头来，对自己受苦的“反思”，其实是为下一次承受更大的苦做好了准备。 + +日本学者桥本健二发现了一个讽刺性的现象：贫困阶层中高达44%的人接受了“自我责任论”，这样，虽然贫富差距的扩大明明不利于自己，但他们却并不反对，而只怪自己不努力。在美国也一样，“最觉得穷人该死的，往往就是穷人自己”。这原本不失为一种自我鞭策的精神，但最终却成了肯定现状、改善其处境最强有力的障碍。 + +不管怎样，这多少还算是有所触动的，第三种人则预先就阻止了反思。有时，他们也承认这是一个悲剧，承认是有问题，但又觉得这“没办法”，没有哪里能做到完美，为了保障更多人的安全，难免总要有一点“小小的牺牲”。在呼和浩特跳楼事件后，有人甚至说：“跳楼不是很正常吗？每年都那么多人跳楼。” + +如果你试图追寻真相，找出问题的根源，那多半会得到这样的回应： + +“你太偏激了。要全面、客观地看：问题确实存在，但也要看到做得好的方面啊！” + +“这样说，对那么多第一线的工作人员是不公平的。” + +“看看美国都死一百万人了，我们这相比起来代价还是小的。” + +很多人因此相信，现在出现的种种问题，只是因为下面的人“把经念歪了”，“经”本身是没问题的。有一篇10万+的文章赞扬广州最近这一论的疫情防控透明、迅速、精准： + +> 如果每座城市都能做到像广州这样，把动态清零贯彻到底，根本就不会让那么多的谣言可以存活。倘若你能做到开诚布公，相信大家不会有任何质疑。 + +作者进而乐观地看到，河南、内蒙古、兰州等地都在纠正“一刀切”，“这说明，他们已经意识到了问题的存在，也开始着手解决。一切，都向着好的方向发展。” + +不论如何，这就是我们当下所面临的真实社会现状。人们已经不假思索地接受了防疫逻辑的大前提，即便出现问题，也只能在经验层面总结（如何在细节上完善、如何自己做好），但对信念体系的质疑则是难以做到的。 + +当然，这绝非当下中国才如此，古往今来，类似的事比比皆是，这种心态的浮现及其顽强存在，正表明社会正在丧失其自我纠错能力。虽然长远来看，这总会过去，但就像约翰·克里在谈到越战时曾说的：“你们如何能够对一个人说，他将是最后一个死于错误的人？” + +所谓“反思”，并不一定需要多复杂抽象的思维能力，对他人处境最朴素、本能的共情就能触发。这看似很简单，在现实中却不容易见到，因为，就像上面这段对话表明的，执行人员有时就像一个机器人，丧失了对他人处境的基本共情。 + +在这种情况下，如果风向不发生变化，那么身处其中的人们心态转变的唯一契机，就是自己也轮到了同样的遭遇。就像《第九区》里那个肆意对待他者的男主角威库斯一样，直到自己沦为异类，才体会到那是什么滋味——当然，那种科幻的场景在现实中并不经常发生，而且这两年的疫情也让人意识到，即便这个科幻故事的结局，其实都是乐观的。 + +真正的反思，首先需要撇开各种话术的遮蔽，恢复我们生而为人的感觉和常识，认识到“我们不应该过这样的日子，正常的社会也不是这样”。在此基础上，讨论如何恢复、重建生活才是可能的。 + +汉娜·阿伦特曾提出“有意识的贱民”（conscious pariah）这一术语，指那些清楚地知道自己被视为异类的边缘群体，但也正是这种独特性赋予了他们某种接近本能的共情能力，因为他们有切身经历，因而能敏感地体会到他人的困境： + +> 这种敏感是对于每个人的尊严的一种病态的夸大，是一种特权阶层从不能感受的激情。就是这种强烈的共情能力造就了贱民的慈悲心。在一个建立于特权、因出身获得的骄傲和由头衔赋予的自大之上的社会中，在理智将人的尊严当作道德的基础很久之前，贱民已经凭直觉发现了广泛的人的尊严。 + +这一点，其实就渗透在中国人的日常用语中——常看到网上有人说：“做个人吧！”“说人话。”这其中隐含的意思无非是说：一个人的言行算不算“正常”，取决于它是否捍卫人的尊严和基本权利。 + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-11-07-the-iron-curtain-falls.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-07-the-iron-curtain-falls.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ef2d68c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-07-the-iron-curtain-falls.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : "铁幕落下" +author: "鹿馬" +date : 2022-11-07 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/zwpwIcN.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "" +--- + +毫无悬念，他连任了。一切已成定局，一切又刚刚开始。 + + + +之所以说毫无悬念，是因为我对“习下李上”这样的传言从来不会信以为真。每到开大会之前，这种宫廷政变传言总会满天飞，总有人觉得体制内某些派系内斗就能改变中国。事实证明，这种事情不会发生，就算发生也无法改变什么。 + +要说比较出乎意料的，可能就是那个驱赶低端人口的北京市委书记蔡奇和实施上海封城的李强进入了常委。还有就是满头白发的老同志被“请”出会场。不过这些连任大会产生的副产品和小花絮，好像和普通人没啥关系。 + +成长在毛时代之后的人们，也就是所谓80，90，00后，他们中一般人对中国政治气候变化迟钝得令人发指。他们觉得那个疯狂年代离他们很远，他们以为改革开放是理所当然，绝对不会认为还能有倒回去的那一天。我曾经也是这样以为的。虽然我也曾是个爱国青年，但从我小时候起就清楚地知道，市场经济比计划经济好，改革开放比闭关锁国好，这都是我们这一代人印象中不证自明的道理，我们往往对老一辈人对政治的过度敏感嗤之以鼻，还嘲笑他们思想落伍了。 + +所以，当打破任期制，供销社，集体食堂，延安整风，红旗渠，人民经济...这些关键词提示着人们要变天了，他们还是继续保持极强的钝感。不论是极端粉红还是反贼，之前总迁怒于岁月静好派，指责他们不主动关心时事，但在后二十大的中国，恐怕想要岁月静好都会是件奢侈的事情。这要放在毛时代，那时的人绝对不会认为这些释放出的信号与自己无关，早就在考虑下一波运动要整谁，自己又如何避免被整了。 + +如今要说看得最明白的人，还得是当官儿的。毕竟在里面混了那么多年，自己的身家性命都在里面，糊里糊涂的人早被玩死了。就连基层官员都知道习是要学毛，要往回走，对此他们当然是不乐意的，干的多捞的少，在长者和涛哥的时代油水吃惯了，谁想跟着土包子傻逼呵呵地不忘初心牢记使命砥砺前行呢？不过就是为了活命而已。虽然满腹牢骚，但想想至少比老百姓要强得多，甭管多么困难的时期，啥时候饿到当官的了？ + +总有人怀念过去的美好时代，也总有人觉得明天会更好，这些都是不切实际的幻想。不管过去是否真的美好，一个时代过去了就是过去了。当我们不但不承认它过去了，而且安慰自己明天会更好，又把美好的愿望寄托在未来，未来就会好吗？我不知道。与其对这操蛋的时代抱有什么幻想，不如悲观一点，冷静面对接下来的疯狂宇宙。 + +你问我未来中国会变成怎样，我就直截了当地说结论啦，未来的中国除了通过战争自我毁灭，我看不到任何出路。当然，这可能是对外战争，也可能是所有中国人对所有中国人的战争。前者对外输出暴力然后再集体被外力暴力对待，后者内部互相施暴，不论哪一种，暴力将是这个和谐社会未来的主旋律。你问我根据是什么，我现在也说不清楚，也许是我看历史看得走火入魔了才会有这种出于直觉的判断，理性得出的结论还要等我再好好修炼一下再说。 + +说到最后，我又想起了五年前北京的那个冬天，我永远忘不了让我彻底反思的两件事——红黄蓝幼儿园事件和北京驱赶低端人口。从某种意义上来说，蔡奇书记才是把我叫醒的“启蒙老师”，这两件事，就像祖国母亲抽了我两个大嘴巴，用行动告诉我“你特么只是个屁民而已，懂么？！”如今，蔡书记要更上一层楼，希望他和他的大哥对中国人再多抽几个大嘴巴，再接再厉。 + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-11-14-words-do-not-mean-anything-today.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-14-words-do-not-mean-anything-today.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c21b2da7 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-14-words-do-not-mean-anything-today.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : "鬼拍後尾枕！" +author: "Duncan Lau" +date : 2022-11-14 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/vP842ZG.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "" +--- + +正苦（政府）宣布新一輪的調整社交距離措施，正當人家已全面解禁，這裡依然小修小補的，在玩數字遊戲。例如上一輪放寛，甚麼由四人限聚，擴展至十二人，意義何在？這個四人限聚足足維持了三年，終於肯改動，似乎正苦覺得是一大讓步，市民應該謝主隆恩，但三年來，對仍要每天逼地鐵上下班的人來說，有何分別？ + +部分場所不再「主動」查核「疫苗通行證」（真的特別多名目，點樣主動被動呀？駛唔駛出本字典解讀呢？），於是有記者詢問，既然不用主動做，好似冇乜大作用，會唔會取消「安心出行」？ + +但呢位醫衞局副局長冇正面回應，但佢咁講：「就好似帶身分證出街咁，你入商場或者你去街，你唔會主動拎張身分證出嚟俾人睇，但如果執法嘅人員查你身分證，你要出示到身分證。」 + +嗱，鬼拍後尾枕啦！將「安心出行」同身分證相提並論，你話點會有取消的一日？ + +好多人之前已經講過，香港正苦嘅防疫政策，從來都係四分政治任務，三分報復，二分維穩，一分抗疫！之前重可以話係戲言，講兩句諷刺一下，但幾年落嚟，乜嘢都現晒出嚟，都費事掩飾啲乜嘢。而且大權在手，想點就點，你司法覆核咩，我就行政修例，連上訴都嫌慢。 + +連突首（特首）都講埋紅碼黃碼不會取消，大家要習慣呢種全民監察只會成為常態，再配合埋之前提過的十八區「關愛隊」，George Orwell小說《1984》情節竟然在現實中出現，而且更全面更徹底，不禁令人心寒。 + +另外，城中某地產商大放厥詞，說廣東話已Out，錢途都在大灣區，大家要學好普通話，然後再加一句：再用廣東話就係「戇居」！先不說「戇居」是廣東話，他整篇講話都是用廣東話，整件事係相當有反差同衝突，如果佢係做棟篤笑，咁係有笑點。但係嚟真嘅，就變成示範乜嘢叫做「戇居」！ + +我覺得一個人能夠講多國語言係好事，唯一唔明嘅，係點解學普通話就要放棄廣東話？而且大多數香港人都係用咗廣東話成世，點可能放棄，就算唔俾你講都好難忍到口。而呢條蛋散重舉幾個例，話以前啲錢途响美國，所以大家去學英文，後來變成學日文，呢啲都係事實，佢已經講漏咗韓文，呢十幾年，真係有唔少人去學韓文，不過未必係想搵韓國錢，反而係追韓劇，追星，聽韓國音樂。但係冇人會因為學另一種語言，而完全放棄自己嘅母語嘅，喺咪？更重要一點係，絕大多數人係因為自己想去學而自發去做，如果係有人，特別係長輩，建議你去做，效果肯定相反。教育局一直以來，唔多唔少都想推普通話教學，好多抗拒，就係因為太Hard Sell，唔係自願去做。 + +所以今次事件之所以令人反感，就係佢太過硬銷，而且重要貶低廣東話嚟抬高普通話，食相之難看，令人嘔心。佢重話希望今次係佢最後一次用廣東話發表講話，好明顯係一個錯誤，佢應該今次已經就用普通話講，反正佢只係想講比主子聽，佢用廣東話講，主子聽唔明，咪好嘥料？至於將來用普通話發表，希望到時有人請有人想聽啦。不過，都不妨未雨綢繆開始準備訓練，由而家開始，全用普通話溝通。所以出門時同下人講：「阿邊個，同我安排（或準備）（唔可以用叫啦）一架計程車（或出租汽車）（唔好講的士），我唔可以同人逼公共汽車（唔好叫巴士）。」當然，去到酒樓，唔好叫人部長，伙記，侍應生之類，全部叫服務員啦！嗱，千祈唔好叫人同你落個Order，或者Book張枱聽晚，全部都係廣東話嚟㗎，重有一系列嘅，乜嘢「同我check下個Schedule」，「update咗啲data未呀」，「有冇得Claim㗎？」，「約Uncle Sam去食Lunch」等等，一講出嚟就露底㗎！ + +你可能覺得我好煩，想炳我呢，小心啲，因為廣東話粗口好就口，一唔小心就一串咁出嚟，咁就前功盡廢，鬼拍後尾枕㗎啦。 + +記住用「媽你個B！」啦，祝你好運！ + + \ No newline at end of file From 8c44712ff2e7c4b048fd2890f0011d041a46092a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: theagora Date: Sat, 26 Nov 2022 08:27:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 04/12] 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https://agora0.gitlab.io/pen/0x15 From 76eb0a505ebf6e0a844c231e0ce54edc0a817d45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: hokoi Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 05:01:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 05/12] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x17 Nov.30 --- .../2022-11-18-u-s-china-relations-in-tank.md | 198 ++++++++++++++++++ .../2022-11-22-pyrrhic-victory-for-china.md | 155 ++++++++++++++ .../2022-11-23-capacity-to-conduct-jado.md | 191 +++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 544 insertions(+) create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-11-18-u-s-china-relations-in-tank.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-11-22-pyrrhic-victory-for-china.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-11-23-capacity-to-conduct-jado.md diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-18-u-s-china-relations-in-tank.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-18-u-s-china-relations-in-tank.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8e3aed6e --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-18-u-s-china-relations-in-tank.md @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : U.S.–China Relations In Tank +author: Michael J. Mazarr +date : 2022-11-18 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/aryOv9K.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "U.S.–China Relations in the Tank: A Handbook for an Era of Persistent Confrontation" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_This paper argues that amid escalating U.S.-China tensions, American policymakers are gravely underprepared to manage the episodic crises that form an inevitable part of great power rivalry. Drawing lessons from the Cold War, the author distills six principles to guide crisis management among U.S. policymakers navigating an increasingly crisis-prone U.S.-China relationship._ + + + +With U.S.-China relations already headed toward a more belligerent rivalry, U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022 was bound to cause heartburn in Beijing. China responded with an elaborate show of force around the island: shooting missiles over Taiwan and into Japanese exclusive economic zone (EEZ) waters, firing rocket artillery into the Taiwan Strait, declaring a ring of maritime exclusion zones around Taiwan, and surging over 200 military aircraft and 50 ships into Taiwanese airspace and waters. Many now refer to the event as the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. + +Yet compared to previous confrontations around Taiwan, the United States this time failed to play much of its appointed part. The Biden administration mostly stayed aloof, condemning China’s actions but not dispatching U.S. forces to confront China directly. If there was a crisis, it was largely one-sided, with China posturing and slinging missiles and the United States watching from the sidelines. The resulting U.S. coolness left China thrashing in a performative display that produced condemnations from Japan, Australia, and Europe. + +This U.S. strategy might have been quietly brilliant, inviting China to stamp and roar and drive many countries further into a balancing coalition. The administration may have decided that a belligerent response would have been inappropriate given that it had been the action of a U.S. official that had sparked the crisis. But it remains to be seen if restraint was the right choice. The crisis arguably furnished China with an ability to set a new threshold for military intimidation in the strait and beyond. Some observers worried that U.S. moderation would encourage China to escalate its coercion in the future, a concern fueled in part by commentary in China that seemed to brag about the absence of a more forceful U.S. response. + +One thing seems clear: an era of persistent confrontations in U.S.-China relations has arrived. The escalating rivalry is, unavoidably, a long-term campaign for predominance in which each side makes investments, builds forces, and develops technologies to gain competitive advantage — as symbolized by the set of potent sanctions Washington recently imposed on Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. But it will also take a more perilous form as a series of discrete collisions that demand careful statecraft. Not all these events will be on the scale of the Taiwan Strait Crisis. Some could involve sudden disclosures of Chinese troops at foreign bases, large-scale cyber intrusions of U.S. systems, or proxy conflicts that emerge out of disputes over third parties. But some of the confrontations could be even violent and dangerous, such as outright Chinese military action against islands in the Taiwan Strait, an all-out blockade of Taiwan itself, or even seeming preparations for an invasion. + +In dealing with the Taiwan issue and larger U.S.-China relations, the United States should keep firmly in mind that these are primarily political issues, which demand diplomatic solutions. Attending to the statecraft of the larger relationship is the essential route to avoiding and mitigating crises. But in intense rivalries, crises are likely to emerge despite such efforts. In such an era of persistent clashes, the United States will need criteria to guide its responses — a handbook for managing a series of skirmishes within the larger rivalry. This essay offers an initial down payment on such thinking by drawing lessons from the most recent U.S. experience with managing crises within a larger rivalry: the Cold War. It uses those lessons to suggest six principles for managing confrontations with China. The resulting approach is to get the fundamentals of a systemic competition right and then strike a difficult but necessary balance: respond rapidly and decisively in support of a few vital commitments while resisting the urge to endow lesser clashes with undue significance. + +> #### In such an era of persistent clashes, the United States will need criteria to guide its responses — a handbook for managing a series of skirmishes within the larger rivalry. + + +### DIAGNOSING A RIVALRY: LESSONS AND INSIGHTS FROM THE COLD WAR + +In some critical ways, the emerging rivalry is unlike the Cold War. China is more of an aggrieved rising power determined to recapture its place in world politics than the Soviet Union was at the beginning of the Cold War. China’s economic and technological power is vastly greater, and it may turn out to be more pugnacious in crises — more self-righteous, more overconfident (partly out of a faith in its ability to control crises and limited wars in a mechanistic way), more anxious to use crises to teach punitive lessons, and less willing to negotiate or even communicate during a skirmish if it believes doing so would signal weakness. But there are enough areas of similarity between these two crisis-prone rivalries that the Cold War experience can offer relevant lessons. + +#### LESSON ONE: MAJOR RIVALRIES ARE SYSTEMIC CONTESTS. + +To begin with, the Cold War suggests that principles for managing confrontations should be grounded in a conception of the rivalry’s essential character. If it is a primarily military or imperial contest for strategic points, then the resolution of individual standoffs at such sites may be decisive. The Cold War, however, was not such a contest — it was a competition between systems and their domestic and international bases of power. The dominant center of gravity was domestic economic, social, technological, and cultural dynamism. Societal dynamism is the foundational measure of systemic competitiveness, and the Soviet system failed that test in the Cold War — it could not generate sufficient growth, innovation, or legitimacy. + +The Cold War systemic competition played out in international terms as well, in the struggle for leadership of international markets, institutions, and processes — the ability to set the rules of the international system and become the hub of predominant networks of finance, trade, people, and ideas. In such a systemic contest, power emerges from the production of legitimacy, economic power, and cultural influence that radiates outward and reshapes world politics. Any systemic contest is a struggle to be the dominant gravitational force in world politics. Here, too, the United States prevailed: the primary international institutions became increasingly oriented toward the United States and other leading democracies, which came to embody far greater magnetic power due to their economic dynamism, cultural attraction, military power, and broadly accepted legitimacy. + +Many of the same themes can be detected in the current rivalry between the United States and China. It is certainly a contest of domestic systems: China’s economic dynamism, and the innovation and technological sophistication it has spawned, underlies its ability to challenge the United States. In global terms, China is seeking to gain influence in the United Nations and other international forums, weaken U.S.-led institutions, and build a set of Sino-centric ones, from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China is seeking dominance, and the ability to use others’ dependencies for leverage, in several high-technology sectors. + +This theory of the nature of rivalries carries important lessons for the management of confrontations. Overreacting to individual encounters will usually be a mistake: a rivalry focused on long-term systemic attraction will not be determined by any one clash. In a contest powerfully influenced by attractive power and perceived legitimacy, over-aggressive and belligerent states will tend to undermine their long-term strategic position. They will also do so for classic reasons of strategic overreach: great powers that pour resources into distant clashes of secondary importance end up exhausting themselves and becoming strategically insolvent. + +Yet the Cold War also suggests that gravitational effects and network power depend partly on perception and on others’ confidence in an actor’s power. Cultivating a reputation for strength and reliability is a systemic requirement every bit as important as avoiding overreach. Establishing guardrails on a rival’s progress, through a carefully selected set of inflexible commitments — in the case of the Cold War, the core U.S. alliances in Europe and Asia — can safeguard a baseline level of credibility. And it can provide running room to be more flexible on secondary issues without sparking a collapse of a great power’s global position. + +> #### Overreacting to individual encounters will usually be a mistake: a rivalry focused on long-term systemic attraction will not be determined by any one clash. + +Such flexibility is available because of a related lesson from the Cold War: while a reputation for credible commitments is important, reputation is a contingent factor — not every standoff carries the same reputational weight, and the lessons that friends and rivals take from individual crises will depend on many factors. Iain Henry has documented, for example, in the context of earlier Taiwan Strait crises, that U.S. allies sometimes prefer that the United States not fulfill other commitments if they do not directly enhance the ally’s security. Some U.S. allies and key regional states welcomed pre-Korean War U.S. statements that it would not defend Taiwan, fearing that to do so would drag them into conflict. More recent cases — such as Russia’s reaction to the U.S. failure to enforce a red line on chemical weapons use in Syria — reinforce the point that the credibility lessons others draw from U.S. actions are specific to each case. There is no imperative to show strength in every test of wills. An important lesson of the Cold War, then, is that even a bitter systemic rivalry is not a zero-sum affair. + +#### LESSON TWO: THE AMBITIONS OF A GREAT POWER ARE A WORK IN PROGRESS. + +The Cold War also suggests that any strategy for managing recurring confrontations should rely upon an accurate diagnosis of the rival’s intentions. A China on a global mission of military adventurism would demand a very different series of responses in discrete crises from a China in a defensive crouch, reacting to perceived attacks from the United States. + +U.S. strategy in the Cold War reflected in part an extended, imperfect effort to calculate the real intentions of Soviet leadership. Debates around such issues began with George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” and “X” article, which detected an urge to power in the Russian culture and Soviet system but also real risk aversion, and continued through the argument over the sincerity of reformers of the Gorbachev era. But in retrospect, perhaps the most important lesson was how inchoate Soviet ambitions were — grand and global in rhetorical content but mixed, often half-hearted, and contradictory in application. Far from being set in stone, Soviet intentions were a work in progress, an evolving set of ideas, commitments, and opportunistic grabs unfolding under nebulous long-term doctrines. A key lesson of the Cold War, then, is the potential gap between the ideological, rhetorical, and even strategic proclamations of a great power and its practical ability, or even at times desire, to pursue them. + +A related lesson is that the Soviet intentions and actions, which unfolded during the Cold War, were reactive as much as self-generated. Soviet leaders occasionally glimpsed windows of opportunity based on perceived U.S. or Western weakness. More often, however, their ambitions were driven by concerns about what the United States was doing or might do, or about the dangerous potential of emerging trends. One does not have to fully embrace a comprehensive revisionist account of the Cold War to accept that in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979, the Able Archer nuclear crisis of 1983 and many other cases, Moscow was acting out of reactive alarm rather than calculated revisionist ambitions. Even the Cuban Missile Crisis stemmed primarily from Khrushchev’s worries about a U.S. invasion of Cuba and an unfavorable nuclear balance. + +The concept of emergent rather than fixed national intentions has much in common with the portrait of Germany authored in 1907 by the British civil servant Eyre Crowe. It was obvious, Crowe wrote, that “Germany distinctly aims at playing on the world’s political stage a much larger and more dominant part than she finds allotted to herself under the present distribution of materiel power.” But the issue was whether this reflected a formally outlined agenda or a series of improvisations. It was entirely plausible, he argued, that “the great German design is in reality no more than the expression of a vague, confused, and unpractical statesmanship, not fully realizing its own drift” and that “Germany does not really know what she is driving at.” Crowe concluded that it did not matter much which interpretation was correct: a belligerent Germany fueled by an “erratic, domineering, and often frankly aggressive spirit” was moving in a direction perilous to British interests whether it had a strict plan or not. It had to be opposed. + +In a similar way, the Soviet Union’s ambitions in the Cold War reflected at least as much of an ongoing extemporization under imprecise long-term desires as any consistent long-term plan. This does not mean that the Soviet Union was not aggressive or goal-oriented: Vladislav Zubok has pushed back against excessively revisionist accounts of Soviet intentions, noting that ideology did fuel Soviet foreign policy and that: + +> Stalin’s policy was not one of confusion and defense, but one of cautious expansionism. Various factors intervened to prevent implementation of his policies, but historians should not overlook specific designs and intentions that produced those policies in the first place. Stalin was clever and scheming, and he regarded the Western powers as dangerous rivals. + +The resulting Soviet objectives were in many ways inexact and conceptual, more of a work in progress than a preset plan. Any given Soviet lunge — backing Kim Il-sung’s invasion of South Korea, putting missiles into Cuba, or invading Hungary or Czechoslovakia — was more likely to be a momentary, unplanned scheme or reaction than a cog in an orchestrated machine of conquest. + +Given this emergent, improvisational character of goals and the lack of detailed information about others’ thinking, the Cold War and earlier great power rivalries show the great difficulty of gauging a rival’s true intentions. States uncertain of others’ goals then often engage in worst-case analysis and overreact to specific moves. In the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union frequently misread the true reasons behind specific actions and reacted based on often exaggerated beliefs about each other’s purposes. A classic example was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: the Carter administration saw it as the first step toward military control of the Persian Gulf, when in fact Soviet leaders were desperately trying to prevent the country from slipping out of the Soviet orbit. + +There are many reasons to believe that this basic model applies to China today; it is a state with elaborate goals, but ones without precise form and subject to misunderstanding. China’s international objectives are more of an improvisational work in progress in service of some clear but very broad long-term goals, rather than the working out of a rigid, pre-planned campaign. To be clear, this is not to suggest that the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) lacks ambition: China aspires to modify and even partially dismantle the U.S.-led post-war order and achieve some version of global leadership and deference to its wishes, at least in its own region. Some degree of global control is inextricably linked to the CCP’s core ambition of national rejuvenation. + +China’s goals are therefore formidable and potentially dangerous to U.S. interests. The argument here is only that the detailed requirements for a world that would meet these goals are being worked out over time, and the strategies China uses to obtain them are also emerging through trial and error. Much like Germany in 1907 or the Soviet Union in 1946, China has a broad sense of a desired future — but the shape of its precise components, and what it is prepared to do to achieve them, remain very much a work in progress. And they will emerge through a long-term interaction with its primary perceived antagonist, the United States — not because the United States is responsible for all Chinese belligerence, but because Beijing will respond in part to perceived threats and to actions which appear intended to deny it the achievement of what it regards as legitimate interests. + +This is apparent from the phrases that Chinese officials and scholars have used to depict their goals, which are powerful but also vague and abstract. Statements such as “win-win cooperation” and “a community of common destiny” seem more like assertions of hope and general intent than a commitment to a specific agenda. Hal Brands and Michael Beckley argue that “China doesn’t want to be a superpower — one pole of many in the international system. It wants to be the superpower — the geopolitical sun around which the system revolves,” but even that potent objective could take many forms. They admit that its goals exist more in a “rough consensus” than any “detailed, step-by-step plans” and that it does not require “outright physical dominance” in the manner of some previous imperial powers. + +> #### Much like Germany in 1907 or the Soviet Union in 1946, China has a broad sense of a desired future — but the shape of its precise components, and what it is prepared to do to achieve them, remain very much a work in progress. + +Perhaps the most powerful recent case for an expansive view of China’s ambitions is Rush Doshi’s book The Long Game, which makes the argument that Chinese official sources suggest an almost unlimited thirst for regional hegemony and global predominance. Yet even in his extensive account, most of the phrases attributed to official documents are rather vague: “make new and greater contributions to humanity,” “actively accomplishing something,” “a new type of international relations,” a “community of common destiny,” and other fuzzy exhortations. More pointed and specific demands, such as the suggestion that U.S. alliances must be ruined, tend to come from individual scholars or breast-pounding statements from specific Chinese commentators. In fact, many Chinese sources explicitly reject such terms as “hegemony,” associating it with Western imperial ambitions and claiming China seeks something very different. Some explicitly accept the idea of sharing world power, as Doshi puts it at one point, as “co-equals” with the United States. As Paul Heer put it in a respectful but critical review of Doshi’s book: “What Doshi appears to be overlooking or dismissing here is the possibility that China seeks to escape subordination to the United States, but without presuming that it can, in turn, subordinate the United States: that it expects a central role in global leadership without presuming exclusive global hegemony.” + +Many other sources recognize the loose concepts and definitions inherent in Chinese strategic statements. One recent RAND study concluded that “no official Chinese document that outlines a strategy for managing competition with the United States is known to exist... At most, officials have described Chinese concepts, guiding principles, and proposals for foreign policy, all of which provide important clues as to Chinese intent.” Nadège Rolland argues that Beijing seems intent on some form of recognized primacy but explains that the precise elements of such a vision remain unformed and subject to debate. The vagueness, silence, and variety of opinions in Chinese thinking on strategic objectives suggest to Aaron Friedberg that “analysis of China’s long-term strategy cannot help but rest heavily on inference and speculation.” + +Friedberg is deeply concerned about expansive Chinese ambitions, but he too relies on generic terms to capture China’s intent — seeking “predominance,” “preponderance,” or “hegemony” — while admitting that its “precise definition, and the extent to which” these concepts “can be achieved at acceptable cost at any given moment, remain[s] open to discussion and debate.” At one point he suggests that a more emergent approach to objectives may reflect an essential characteristic of Chinese strategy. Whereas Western strategy tends to be goal-directed, Chinese thinking tends to be “more organic and improvisational and less mechanical and deterministic.” Friedberg also points out that different Chinese officials “may be divided, or even undecided,” about the shape of their objectives. + +Chinese writings also admit constraints on the tools the country might use to gain its desired future. They emphasize avoidance of war with the United States as well as other limits, such as an emphasis on nonmilitary forms of power, and recognize “the importance of having a balanced and nuanced strategy that avoids disastrous missteps.” Chinese strategy recognizes that a stable international environment and a friendly regional environment are essential to national rejuvenation, and Chinese official and unofficial sources stress the need for international legitimacy as a supporting pillar for both domestic legitimacy and the kind of leading global role Beijing seeks — based on the open acceptance of Chinese authority as a force for good, not the grudging tolerance of a resented coercion. Some Chinese sources have described an “ideal security environment” in ways that do not appear to demand hegemony at all. Chinese sources dispute the question of whether the United States would accept subordination to a clearly superior China, and therefore whether China should seek such a future. China sees little need to impose its political system on other countries or to develop a global network of military bases. Most fundamentally, the CCP’s predominant goal is to maintain its own power, and risky international steps that could pose serious threats to its rule will usually trade off against this most essential of objectives. + +Perhaps the most important place to judge the scope of Chinese ambitions as they play out in practice, as opposed to theory, is in its push-and-pull with specific targets of influence. South Korea provides an interesting recent example. When Seoul announced in 2016 an intention to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in cooperation with the United States, China reacted angrily, calling the capability a threat to its nuclear deterrent. When South Korea went ahead with an initial THAAD deployment in 2017, China imposed economic sanctions, which cost South Korea and estimated $8 billion or more. The Moon Jae-in administration in South Korea sought to proceed with a partial deployment while mollifying Beijing, offering a promise of “three nos”: Seoul promised not to deploy more than one THAAD system, not to actively join a U.S. missile defense network, and not to seek a trilateral military alliance with the United States and Japan. + +This result demonstrated some Chinese influence but not an ability to dictate outcomes: China backed off its sanctions even though the initial THAAD system remained in place. Since that time, China’s belligerence has had a significant price. Public opinion in South Korea turned starkly against China. The new president, Yoon Suk Yeol, has declared that the “three nos” do not represent permanent South Korean policy and describes the U.S. alliance as “fundamental” to South Korean security. Chinese diplomacy on this issue has been improvising in service of a general goal — and the outcome does not reflect a linear march toward the future of Chinese regional suzerainty described in the most aggressive statements of its scholars and officials. + +More evidence for the emergent, unplanned nature of Chinese ambitions comes from studies of its primary tool for achieving hegemony — the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As analysts such as Raffaello Pantucci, Alexandros Petersen, Will Doig, and Jonathan Hillman have chronicled, to observe the working out of the BRI on the ground is to see a massive exercise in decentralized initiative and frequent ad-libbing. The overall enterprise does support a broad Chinese hope to play a leading role in world politics, and surely elements of it are planned from Beijing. But the empirical record of its unfolding suggests an accumulating set of emerging programs and ideas rather than a rigid and deterministic program. + +China’s ambitions thus appear to reflect a typical degree of elaborate geopolitical self-image characteristic of rising great powers, infused with China’s particular blend of resentment over past mistreatment and sense of cultural superiority. The United States should not underestimate the intensity, reach, or emotional resonance of those ambitions. On the other hand, the precise scope of a world China could live with remains undefined. “The question of whether they will have to settle for something less than clear-cut preponderance is probably unresolved at this point in the minds of China’s leaders,” Aaron Friedberg concluded. Individual confrontations, much as in the Cold War, can represent many things: a carefully planned step toward regional hegemony, a defensive reaction to a perceived threat, a trial or experiment, or the initiative of one part of the CCP bureaucracy. And along the way, U.S. actions and responses to Chinese behavior will shape Beijing’s perceptions of the degree to which the United States is fundamentally opposed to its core interests, and the sort of world it believes is possible. + + +#### LESSON THREE: THERE IS WISDOM TO MODERATION IN CRISES. + +The Cold War offers a final lesson in the handling of individual U.S.-China clashes. Despite the common idea that containment demanded an immediate answer to every Soviet and Chinese initiative, in fact, Washington succeeded in the Cold War in part precisely because it picked its spots. President Harry Truman rejected demands to escalate the Korean War and accepted an unsatisfying draw. Dwight Eisenhower refused French pleas to join the war in Indochina during the 1954 siege of Dien Bien Phu, rebuffed calls to intervene during Moscow’s invasion of Hungary in 1956, and sought to preserve U.S. geopolitical legitimacy by opposing British and French interventions in Suez that same year. The United States did not commit force to respond to Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or Afghanistan in 1979. It accepted a communist takeover of Cuba and allowed an anti-American theocracy to take root in Iran. In some of these cases, of course, Washington turned to covert regime change operations to pursue its goals, but it avoided the use of force in the initial crisis. + +That dismal parade of nonresponses would seem to be an obvious recipe for failure — allowing a rival to succeed, or accepting U.S. losses, in one crisis and war after another. Yet the United States prevailed because the rivalry ultimately represented a clash of systems, one decided first and foremost by the organic power of the relative societies. The United States did erect a strong floor under the day-to-day competition by committing resolutely to a handfulof treaty commitments and vital interests, notably the defense of Europe, South Korea, and Japan, which placed strict limits on how far Soviet or Chinese success in other crises would cascade. But it prevailed (and survived) as much due to restraint as to belligerence. + +Weathering these collisions required something else as well: a mutual willingness to combine steadfastness with reassurance and compromise during even the worst crises. Both sides showed a recurring ability to respect the most essential interests of the other and to accept that avoiding escalation demanded conciliation. This was the pattern in U.S. restraint in Korea and Vietnam, in the series of crises over Berlin, in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and in many other cases. Managing confrontations was as much about empathy and compromise as it was about power. + +> #### Yet the United States prevailed because the rivalry ultimately represented a clash of systems, one decided f irst and foremost by the organic power of the relative societies. + +Of course, U.S. appreciation for this fact was wildly inconsistent. All too often, U.S. officials misread individual confrontations as the result of Soviet aggressiveness and belligerence rather than fear and desperation. Some of the most dangerous moments in the Cold War flared up when one or both sides exaggerated the stakes of local disputes. This basic misperception cropped up again and again, from the Berlin crises to Afghanistan to perhaps the most famous and perilous example, the 1983 war scare produced by Soviet fears of an imminent U.S. nuclear strike. It was also a product of a related fact about Cold War clashes: despite immense intelligence apparatuses and decades-long personal ties, each side often had only the most rudimentary information about the other’s true thinking. Partly as a result, crisis signaling never worked as well in practice as in game theory. In the chaos of major clashes, signals were misinterpreted or ignored as often as accurately read. + +But U.S. moderation through many Cold War crises also suggests a more reassuring lesson: Soviet imperial objectives were to some degree self-correcting in the responses they provoked from others. Before 1950, for example, the United States was not fully committed to the defense of either South Korea or Taiwan. It was willing, for a time, to assume that Taiwan would be reabsorbed into the new mainland regime. But the Soviet-sponsored invasion of South Korea changed all that, sparking renewed U.S. and allied defense investments and commitments. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 turned out to be strategically disastrous, alienating much of the nonaligned movement and speeding the collapse of domestic support for the Soviet system. The more belligerently aggressive Moscow became, the more it drove countries to seek implicit or explicit security help from the United States and its allies. + +The world is seeing much the same dynamic play out with China today. The more it seeks to intimidate its neighbors and capture influence within the societies of other countries, the more it steals intellectual property and imposes elaborate technology transfer demands on foreign firms, the more Beijing alienates those it is trying to win over. With Europe imposing much stricter controls on technology cooperation, Japan considering a doubling of its defense budget, and countries throughout Asia accelerating networks of security cooperation, China’s most aggressive ambitions may turn out to be, like the Soviet Union’s, a self-correcting threat. This has implications for its goals: China may seek regional hegemony, but if it encounters more visceral opposition with every new step, it will have to recalibrate its objectives over time. + + +### PRINCIPLES FOR MANAGING CONFRONTATIONS + +These sources of insight lead back to the central goal of this essay — to nominate principles for managing an era of persistent altercations within a combative rivalry with China. The Cold War lessons summarized above can help inform these principles. Those lessons highlight the possibility of a rival whose ambitions are substantial but not clearly defined. They warn of the risks of misinterpreting China’s true motives in any crisis and suggest that a long-term systemic rivalry will not be determined by almost any one clash — but they also emphasize the need to draw some clear limits to an aggressive state’s opportunism. They make clear the need to balance strength in any one standoff with the need to remain patient, signal a willingness to compromise — if such a step remains possible in the context of U.S. China Policy — and avoid escalation. And the Cold War experience hints that China’s belligerence will be partly self-correcting and that successive crises can be one tool for shifting the global alignment of power against Beijing. Seven principles for managing confrontations embody these lessons. + +#### PRINCIPLE ONE: ESTABLISH THE BOUNDARIES OF U.S. TOLERANCE. + +The first principle requires identifying the potential confrontations that would justify strong and determined responses, with either military force or a comprehensive nonmilitary campaign of cost imposition. These are the confrontations in which the United States would draw red lines to circumscribe the outer bounds of China’s territorial encroachment, identifying those commitments and interests that will generate a rapid and substantial U.S. military response. Some U.S. experience with China indicates that China does respect firm boundaries when others draw them, suggesting that the strictest red lines would largely be respected (except for Taiwan, discussed below). + +Figure 1 suggests a rough categorization of potential crises along two indices: (1) the degree of U.S. national interests involved, and (2) the precedential importance of an issue in regulating Chinese ambitions. Confrontations that reflect high measures on both indices (the top-right box) would call forth a powerful and direct response. An example would be a massed Chinese maritime coercion campaign to impose Japanese withdrawal from the Senkakus: such a gambit would demand rapid and substantial U.S. military deployments, reaffirmations that any action against Japan would trigger the U.S.-Japan security treaty, and other steps. Once it has identified the issues in this quadrant, the United States would then make unequivocal deterrent threats around them to avoid clashes in the first place. It has begun to do this with actions such as the statement that the Senkakus fall under the U.S.-Japan security treaty and the 2019 clarification that “any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South China Sea would trigger mutual defense obligations under Article IV of our Mutual Defense Treaty.” + +Yet the figure also highlights confrontations in which the United States would have more room for maneuver. The bottom-left corner includes issues that call for ongoing competition rather than risk-taking confrontations; when they flare into momentary public crises — such as the revelation of a specific Chinese human rights abuse or agreement to build a new military base — the United States could react calmly and indirectly. The most challenging quadrant to handle would be the bottom right: forms of Chinese coercion or outright aggression that threaten non-treaty allies, but which could, if successful, turbocharge Chinese ambitions. Here, the United States could potentially rally world opinion, support the beleaguered state in significant ways, or impose punishments on China, but not deploy forces or risk a direct confrontation. + +![image1](https://i.imgur.com/byDcnVA.png) +_▲ __Figure 1: Categorizing Potential Confrontations.__ Source: Author’s research and analysis._ + +This matrix does not distinguish crises based on who initiates confrontation, a crucial factor. The restrained U.S. approach in the recent Taiwan Strait Crisis was probably dictated in part by the role of U.S. actions in creating it. Whether a given crisis arises from U.S. or allied actions, or fully unprovoked Chinese belligerence, will have to be considered when categorizing a given confrontation and the appropriate responses. + +One issue is notably absent from the figure — Taiwan. Much of the debate about U.S. policy really amounts to which cell it belongs in. Many would place it on the right-hand side, as a precedent-setting issue for Chinese ambitions — though some would disagree, suggesting that it is such a unique issue that it holds limited meaning for restraining wider Chinese ambitions. Most of the debate, though, will be about the lower-right versus upper-right cells. Is this an issue that, when crises erupt, the United States should signal a strong and immediate response, including military deployments and threats of escalation? This question is addressed below. + +#### PRINCIPLE TWO: EMPHASIZE UNDERSTANDING AND STRATEGIC EMPATHY. + +A major theme of Cold War crises was how often each side misread the intentions of its rival — and how dangerous such misperceptions could be. In the current rivalry, these risks may be compounded by China’s doctrinal emphasis on moving rapidly, decisively, and violently at the beginning of a crisis or war to seize the strategic advantage. China’s own myopic conviction that its ambitions reflect a rightful demand for fair treatment may make it blind to the ways in which it generates crises, something the United States needs to understand and navigate around. In recent crises, U.S. signals of toughness, based on limited information about Chinese intentions, have arguably created unnecessary risk. And the history of Chinese crisis behavior suggests that, like most great powers, it is most likely to take risk and escalate events when it perceives itself in a domain of losses, under severe pressure, and losing strategic position and credibility. + +It will therefore be essential for senior U.S. officials to put in place wide-ranging sources of information, from inside as well as outside government, and formal analytical products that constantly invite them to put themselves into the mindset of leaders in Beijing. This is easier said than done, and the hints of a new orthodoxy on China are already evident that will make it even tougher. It will demand committed effort from presidents and senior advisers to be sure they are drawing from the widest possible basis of information and interpretations — offices, products, and processes that go well beyond reporting on China to representing its mindset, as well as relationships between U.S. and Chinese officials that provide some basis for correcting misimpressions during future crises. + +#### PRINCIPLE THREE: KEEP FROM GENERATING CRISES OURSELVES, ESPECIALLY WITH UNNECESSARY POLITICAL PROVOCATIONS. + +There will be times when the United States believes it needs to take strong action on some issue in the relationship, actions China will view unfavorably. But Washington should avoid provoking unnecessary confrontations to the greatest degree possible. Partly this is simple resource management: Expending time, diplomatic capital, and military readiness on needless clashes is not good strategy. This imperative is partly about managing Chinese perceptions, avoiding, to the degree still possible (which may be limited), the idea that the United States is determined to challenge China in every opportunity. But it is also partly about sending a signal to third parties that both sides in this rivalry are not equally responsible for its most dangerous moments — that the United States, to the degree possible, seeks stability and China is the author of instability. All of those principles help to set the context for the successful resolution of individual confrontations. + +More broadly, the challenge for the United States is to avoid the central source of instability when dealing with rising, dissatisfied powers — signaling that the only way for them to achieve their rightful place in world politics is through warfare. Accommodating some Chinese aims and ambitions is not only appropriate, it is essential if we are to avoid a bitterly zero-sum contest with an aggrieved and increasingly paranoid great power. + +#### PRINCIPLE FOUR: DEVELOP OPTIONS FOR SHORING UP CREDIBILITY AWAY FROM THE LOCAL CONFRONTATION. + +Any significant clash will raise the age-old issue of credibility and reputation, sparked by fears about the lessons that third parties will draw from U.S. conduct in such standoffs as well as concerns about domestic political costs of inaction. As noted, this concern for reputation can sometimes push great powers to take risks beyond those the interests at stake would seem to support. To avoid being trapped into excessive reactions out of a concern for credibility, the United States should identify indirect ways to shore it up — actions away from the local confrontation that signal U.S. strength and commitment without undertaking costly adventures. Partly this can involve preset options to quietly reset expectations in the wake of crises, including enhanced U.S. military posture, public statements of commitment to friends and allies, arms aid and transfers to partners, and expanded security cooperation activities. It can energize dialogues with U.S. friends and allies on shared steps to bolster collective credibility when a local military response is not judged to be sensible. None of this would involve starting new proxy conflicts or putting U.S. credibility on the line in new places or conflicts. The options would focus on reinforcing existing alliances and commitments to make clear that restraint in one confrontation will not produce a domino effect. + +> #### To avoid being trapped into excessive reactions out of a concern for credibility, the United States should identify indirect ways to shore it up — actions away from the local confrontation that signal U.S. strength and commitment without undertaking costly adventures. + +#### PRINCIPLE FIVE: MULTILATERALIZE CONFRONTATIONS. + +The United States has the great advantage of enjoying the active or tacit support of most key industrial powers, and most countries in Asia, in the effort to constrain the most aggressive forms of Chinese power. Both before and during crises, the United States should continue to seek to recruit collective support for norms and principles; then, when China prompts a clash with belligerent actions, it will face significant global criticism and confront a strong coalition of states insisting that it respect certain norms of conduct. One example is the growing European presence in Asia, in particular, conducting various forms of freedom of navigation demonstrations and security engagements with Asian nations. There is an ample institutional framework for such an effort, starting with the United Nations and running through bilateral and multilateral alliances, minilateral groupings such as the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) initiative, informal groups such as the Quad, and regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The United States will have uneven success in recruiting support in these venues depending on the nature of the crisis, but a major focus now can be to build a strong normative foundation for later support in crises. It would accelerate efforts to ensure that, especially in crises involving true U.S. red lines, China would confront a substantial coalition opposing its belligerence. + +#### PRINCIPLE SIX: USE CONFRONTATIONS AS LEVERS TO SEEK COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE. + +The United States should seek with every event not merely to fulfill its immediate interests but to rally world opinion against Chinese coercive provocations and put into place a gradually increasing deterrent posture in the region. After each crisis, for example, the United States can approach key regional actors, such as the Philippines, and propose slightly improved U.S. force presence and deepened bilateral training and exercise activities. It can try to ensure that each confrontation has some of the echo effect of major Soviet adventures in the Cold War, from Korea to Czechoslovakia to Afghanistan, in stiffening the commitment of other states to respond to the next provocation. To do this, however, the United States will need far better tools of informational statecraft to help shape opinions, especially in the developing world. + +To reap such competitive benefits, the United States should develop concepts and capabilities to ensure that, once a confrontation is underway, the passage of time benefits the United States rather than China. Whether it is a maritime standoff over a set of disputed islands, a partial or complete quarantine of Taiwan, or another clash with the potential to last days, weeks, or even months, the side that accumulates more strength over time will have the advantage. If China believes it can outlast the United States, it will have every incentive to disregard short-term challenges and hold out to prevail. + +#### PRINCIPLE SEVEN: USE EACH CONFRONTATION AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD COMMUNICATION CHANNELS, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, AND NORMS OF CONDUCT. + +The Cold War also highlights the role of mutual understandings in helping to manage the pressure-packed days or weeks of individual crises. A great risk with China today is that the formal crisis management mechanisms that do exist are embryonic, frequently ignored or bypassed, and not developed through mutual practice. Personal relationships between U.S. and Chinese officials are either nonexistent or, with a few exceptions, poorly developed. In some past crises, the absence of rapid U.S. responses to Chinese signals was potentially dangerous. In the wake of every crisis, the United States could approach China with an offer to jointly learn lessons and find ways of avoiding inadvertent escalation in future clashes, including through codified rules of engagement, mechanisms of communication, and informal standards of conduct. This is especially true at senior levels: Chinese habits of centralized decisionmaking and constraints on regular contacts at many levels may leave little room for strengthening rules of engagement from the bottom up. Senior U.S. officials and U.S. presidents should therefore use the aftermath of any crisis as an opportunity to argue for processes and contacts that improve mutual understanding, and mechanisms for easy conversation, at their level. + +> #### A great risk with China today is that the formal crisis management mechanisms that do exist are embryonic, frequently ignored or bypassed, and not developed through mutual practice. + + +### WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE TAIWAN? + +Those principles may work reasonably well for most U.S.-China confrontations, but they may be of less use on the dispute most likely to spark crises: the status of Taiwan. The issue resides in a vague middle ground between the two right-hand cells in Figure 1 — possibly, but not necessarily, justifying inclusion with the clashes that would prompt an immediate and uncompromising U.S. response to Chinese coercive modes. That obscure status is becoming ever more complex and strewn with dilemmas. On the one hand, the case for the U.S. policy of ambiguity remains strong: to promise unqualified defense of the island would provoke China and possibly tempt Taiwan to take actions which would irretrievably inflame the issue. Signaling restraint to extend China’s timeline for achieving its interests, in part by “keeping the possibility of peaceful unification alive” to the degree possible, has been an essential component of maintaining peace. This has meant avoiding symbolic actions that will infuriate Beijing and doing everything possible to reintroduce a degree of patience. + +Sustaining that approach is critical and should be a U.S. policy priority. Yet it cannot be denied that all trends are now running in the direction of more formal U.S. commitments to defend Taiwan. Having watched the horrors of the Ukraine war unfold, the United States may now be far less likely to exercise similar restraint over Taiwan. President Biden has said multiple times that the United States would defend Taiwan, only to have his words walked back. The most recent of these statements implied the United States would fight even if Taiwan declared independence, a clear shift from existing policy. Meanwhile, Congress seems on the verge of passing a Taiwan Policy Act that would represent nothing short of a revolution in U.S. security relations with Taipei. There may now be no going back to the precise forms of mutual restraint around the Taiwan issue that helped produce relative stability for the last 30 years. + +The challenge of dealing with confrontations over Taiwan is further complicated by the fact that they may not represent an outright invasion. More likely is an interim series of crises below that threshold, intended to signal China’s determination and warn the United States, Taiwan, and others off any course that hints at de facto independence. Such moves could include repeated exercises, penetration of Taiwanese airspace, cyberattacks on Taiwan’s civilian and military infrastructure, large-scale political warfare, direct attacks on islands in the strait, attacks on undersea cables carrying internet connectivity to the island, temporary or quasi-permanent blockades of parts of the surrounding waterways, or an energy embargo. Even if Beijing does move toward a full invasion, it would have to undertake many forms of preparation — from months or years of surging defense production to national mobilization to more immediate movement of forces — that would create a crisis of impending war long before the invasion. + +There will be no simple playbook for U.S. responses to such a diverse array of actions, but the principles for managing persistent confrontations suggested above can still provide some guidance. First, the essential foundation for any U.S. approach to future crises should begin with an effort to reaffirm elements of stability to reset the context for future confrontations. If China comes to believe that the United States is inching toward open support for Taiwanese independence, it will have less incentive to restrain the escalatory dynamics of any crisis. It may be too late to resuscitate the comprehensive policy of ambiguity, but Washington can still offer a modified reassurance to Beijing. It can pledge that the One China Policy remains in place, indicate that the United States has no intention to formally recognize an independent Taiwan, and insist that both sides restrain actions that could lead to war. Washington could even publicly signal that a Taiwanese declaration of independence would void any U.S. promises. (In fact the 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy came fairly close to saying all of this.) In return it should request more consistent pledges from Beijing that it remains committed to the peaceful resolution of the issue, as it has long claimed. A mutually agreed series of such statements could move the public position of both sides back from the brink. + +Second, however, and in tension with that effort, the United States now seems compelled to clarify its red lines for future Taiwan crises in ways more explicit than the policy of ambiguity had allowed. It could declare that an unprovoked Chinese attack on Taiwan proper would produce U.S. military involvement of some kind, leaving substantial leeway in terms of what military response it would undertake. It could continue to insist on freedom of navigation in international waters — including international maritime freedom to engage with Taiwan (thus placing a comprehensive Chinese blockade across the U.S. threshold of tolerance). This would amount to placing only the most severe confrontations in the upper-right quadrant of Figure 1, actions that would trigger a U.S. military response in a crisis (such as large-scale military movements). Lesser contingencies — including Chinese cyberattacks, missile flights, violations of Taiwan’s airspace, and even direct attacks on small islands in the strait — would fall into the lower-right quadrant and leave the United States with greater freedom of action in responding. + +Under such an approach, the United States would not reflexively seek to confront any Chinese coercive act around Taiwan. It would not adopt a policy of disrupting any Chinese exercises, flights, or sailings that cross certain territorial lines, unless they dealt with red-line issues. As in the recent strait crisis, it would take a largely hands-off approach unless there were clear actions or indications that China was preparing to violate one of the red-line issues. The approach aims to recreate, in miniature, the essential U.S. approach during the Cold War, combining firm commitment to a small number of essential red lines with flexibility on most other clashes. The result would split the difference on ambiguity, but in ways that do not reflect a major departure from U.S. policy, which has always insisted on a peaceful resolution of the issue and strongly hinted that the United States would respond militarily to an outright invasion. + +Third, before or during a major crisis, the United States could follow other elements of the principles for managing confrontations suggested above. It could recruit statements from other countries insisting that China not use military force as well as expand multilateral exercises, sailings, and security cooperation efforts to make clear that an unprovoked use of force would put Beijing afoul of most of the world economy. For lesser contingencies where it chooses restraint, such as the recent crisis, the United States could undertake parallel actions to demonstrate strength, reassure regional actors, and reaffirm its credibility. It could finally get serious about its information instrument of statecraft and use Chinese belligerence to drive regional and global opinion during future skirmishes. At the same time, it would do everything possible to enhance channels of communication and personal relationships and approach Beijing after each clash to reaffirm key rules of the road. Fourth and finally, this approach has implications for U.S. operational military posture in the region. A relatively calm and contained approach to many confrontations will have much greater credibility if the United States and Taiwan have a stronger persistent, preset ability to impose costs on aggression, rather than having to spend weeks or months flowing forces to the area. This demands, first and foremost, that Taiwan take stronger steps for its own defense. More spending, a true commitment to a more asymmetric emphasis, and a transformation of Taiwan’s reserve forces are minimum necessary steps. For the United States, this approach would call for more submarines; unmanned undersea systems; advanced sensing and targeting systems, including long-range drones; loitering munitions; some number of long-range precision fire systems (including bombers); and demonstrated offensive cyber capabilities. The United States would also need to design the highest-impact forces to be able to rapidly deploy to the region — even onto Taiwan — once it received unambiguous warning that China was assembling forces for a full, unprovoked invasion. + + +### TOWARD A TEMPERATE STRATEGY FOR MANAGING CONFRONTATIONS + +In conceptualizing the emerging U.S.-China rivalry, most U.S. officials and analysts have become accustomed to thinking of the competition as a persistent contest to shape measures of advantage on some grand long-term scorecard. But an equally important set of choices will be episodic — the ways the United States approaches specific crises and confrontations to gain strategic advantage while avoiding conflict. It needs a strategy for managing such clashes as much as it requires a general approach to national competitive advantage. + +If the Cold War offers a blueprint for such a strategy, it suggests that a great power must first get its fundamental socioeconomic engine right and work to set the alignment of world politics to its advantage. To limit the cascading effect of any one loss or compromise, it must lay out a handful of vital commitments on which its commitments are resolute and credible. The U.S. experience with China in recent decades suggests that such explicit line-drawing on the most important issues can have a meaningful effect on Chinese behavior. + +> #### But an equally important set of choices will be episodic — the ways the United States approaches specif ic crises and confrontations to gain strategic advantage while avoiding conflict. It needs a strategy for managing such clashes as much as it requires a general approach to national competitive advantage. + +Having done these things, great powers can then be restrained in most individual crises beyond those issues or allies because they are not going to decide the outcome. Repeatedly in the Cold War, the United States responded to clashes with at least a degree of restraint — in Korea, Dien Bien Phu, Hungary, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. There is every reason to believe the same basic rule will hold in the rivalry with China: the United States cannot be so spring-loaded to respond that it turns every clash into an existential contest of wills. This suggests, on Taiwan and other issues, a challenging but manageable balancing act that combines strengthening the most essential commitments with a determination not to overreact to other issues. + +One risk, at this point, is that the room in the U.S. national security context for compromise, understanding, and sensible accommodation appears to be narrowing rapidly. Especially with the recent announcement of understandable constraints on dealing with China’s semiconductor industry, the United States is giving every indication of viewing the rivalry in increasingly zero-sum terms. This will convince Chinese officials and commentators that their most pessimistic instincts have been correct: the United States has no intention of offering shared leadership of world politics. The policy case for each of these specific actions, such as information technology constraints or arms sales to Taiwan, may be compelling. But the sum of these actions is creating an environment in which Beijing has much less incentive to hold back when a crisis arrives because it thinks its rival is operating according to a zero-sum mindset. + +> #### There is every reason to believe the same basic rule will hold in the rivalry with China: the United States cannot be so spring-loaded to respond that it turns every clash into an existential contest of wills. + +Jessica Chen Weiss recently made an impassioned plea for strategic goals and direction in a U.S. China Policy rapidly being swallowed up by worst-case assumptions and zero-sum thinking. “U.S. politicians and policymakers are becoming so focused on countering China that they risk losing sight of the affirmative interests and values that should underpin U.S. strategy,” she argues. U.S. policy “has struggled to define success” in the overall competition and has become dangerously reactive and, at times, exaggerated. As a result, “Both countries are intent on doing whatever is necessary to demonstrate that any move by the other will not go unmet.” The same dynamic could easily come to characterize the U.S. approach to specific crises. In its approach to the periodic clashes that will increasingly come to characterize this relationship, no less than in the overarching rivalry, the United States needs a positive strategy for success. + +--- + +__Michael J. Mazarr__ is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-22-pyrrhic-victory-for-china.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-22-pyrrhic-victory-for-china.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5157c73e --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-22-pyrrhic-victory-for-china.md @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Pyrrhic Victory For China +author: Jude Blanchette and Gerard DiPippo +date : 2022-11-22 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/NKrRdiE.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "“Reunification” with Taiwan through Force Would Be a Pyrrhic Victory for China" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Many commentators and officials speculate about Beijing’s plans to compel “reunification” with Taiwan. Much of the existing commentary focuses on how or when a Chinese attack on Taiwan could occur, but there is little discussion of the nonmilitary consequences of such a scenario for China and the world. This brief explores the implications of a Chinese attack on Taiwan based on reasonable, albeit speculative, assumptions._ + + + +_When considered more holistically, the implications of an attack on Taiwan would be grim for Beijing, even if Chinese forces “successfully” capture the island. China would probably be diplomatically and economically isolated from key advanced economies, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping would have to tread a narrow path to avoid dire consequences for China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a whole. This analysis helps clarify what could be at stake for the world and reaffirms the importance of deterring Beijing from contemplating such an attack on Taiwan._ + +Speculation has increased over the past several years that Beijing is accelerating plans for an invasion of Taiwan. While there is little doubt that Beijing seeks to fully annex Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China (PRC) one day, questions remain about the timing and methods that China might use to achieve this goal. + +There are several reasons Beijing might undertake a military campaign against Taiwan: + +1. Long-standing territorial and national identity aspirations + +2. Xi’s own personal ambitions and sense of legacy + +3. Addressing a perceived threat to its own security stemming from deepening U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation + +4. Responding to perceived provocations from Taiwan, specifically a formal declaration of de jure and permanent independence from the PRC + +While a great deal of commentary and analysis has explored how the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might undertake a military campaign to annex Taiwan, a critical — yet underemphasized — question remains regarding the types and magnitudes of costs Beijing would pay for such actions. Nearly all discussions of China’s potential invasion of Taiwan ignore the economic and diplomatic costs of such a move, make unrealistic assumptions about what China could achieve (including technological and economic gains), or otherwise minimize the challenges that China would face if an invasion of Taiwan were successful. + +The below analysis is an initial exploration into some of these potential nonmilitary consequences for China. It does not seek to prove or disprove Beijing’s true intentions and timelines toward Taiwan, nor does it claim to know how Chinese leader Xi Jinping is assessing the risks and rewards of an invasion. Rather, it highlights costs that Beijing would likely face if it successfully invaded Taiwan, based on plausible assumptions of how China, Taiwan, the United States, the international community, and global investors would react. + +Specifically, this brief looks at three distinct phases of a possible Chinese attack: + +1. The period leading up to an attack + +2. The period between the initial phase of an attack and the end of major conflict + +3. The period following a successful PLA invasion + +To keep the analysis focused on how a successful invasion by the PLA would impact China’s economic, diplomatic, and political circumstances, this brief intentionally remains nonspecific about the type of attack or invasion it might launch. At a minimum, this analysis assumes that it would include the direct use of lethal force by the PLA’s air, land, and sea capabilities to defeat and subdue Taiwan’s military and to depose the civilian political leadership on the island. It also assumes that the U.S. military would intervene, but its actions would be limited and ultimately unsuccessful in halting the Chinese invasion. And it further assumes that no nuclear weapons would be used. Such assumptions are not predictions of actual outcomes, but rather necessary simplifications adopted so this brief can focus on the issue of costs associated with a relatively smooth path to military victory for Beijing. + +Any conflict in and around Taiwan would entail major economic, financial, diplomatic, and reputational costs for Beijing, both directly and indirectly. Even if China “won” in the military domain and thus accrued additional regional military benefits, its economic and diplomatic position would likely be substantially worse off. Simply put, China would have gained Taiwan but sacrificed its larger ambition of becoming a global and comprehensive superpower. This is the very definition of a Pyrrhic victory: + +- Even absent U.S. intervention, any conflict initiated by the PRC would have immediate and dramatically negative effects on China’s ability to import and export goods, on its domestic financial markets, on business sentiment, and on the exchange rate of its currency. + +- China’s costs would significantly increase if the U.S. military intervenes meaningfully, even if delayed by several days or even weeks. The blunt geographic truth for China is that conflict in the Taiwan Strait would occur directly off the shore of its most economically important and populated provinces. + +- Even supposing Chinese troops could overcome Taiwan’s defenses, they would then occupy an island inhabited by a hostile population with a shattered local economy, including its semiconductor sector, while China itself would face severe economic and diplomatic repercussions. + +This exercise is necessarily speculative and requires many assumptions. Perhaps the most important ones are that Taiwan offers at least some resistance and that U.S. leadership can effectively organize some semblance of an anti-China coalition among advanced economies. In addition, forecasting the effects of major discontinuities requires considerations for societies’ potential reactions under stress rather than under normal conditions. History suggests that major crises can trigger or inspire rapid shifts in consensuses based on reevaluations of national, political, or cultural priorities that can supersede economic logic. + +The United States has compelling strategic reasons for deterring China from attacking Taiwan. This exercise is not intended to suggest that losing Taiwan to the PRC would be a positive outcome for Washington. Rather, the key point is that even in this dire scenario, China would still likely be the country that most suffers diplomatically and economically. + +Estimating the effects of such a conflict with any precision is extremely difficult, in part because there is no analogous historical case upon which to draw. The world’s two largest economies might be at war with each other. Global supply chains are far more integrated now than before World War II — or even World War I, which ended the first era of globalization. The disruptions from the Russia-Ukraine war are not a good proxy because Russia’s economy is far smaller than China’s, the conflict and Western response have not stopped key Russian exports, and Western powers are not directly engaged in combat. + +Nonetheless, this brief concludes that the implications of a PRC attack on Taiwan would be cataclysmic for China, the United States, and the world. Simply put, any attempt to achieve “reunification” through force is likely to fracture global geopolitics and economies far beyond today’s “partial decoupling” trends and preclude any long-term “national rejuvenation” for China’s economy. + + +### Phase One: Pending Chinese Attack on Taiwan + +__Beijing’s preparation for an attack on Taiwan would likely alert foreign governments and investors to the impending conflict, but the signals would not be entirely clear.__ These actions would include measures to mobilize its forces, insulate its economy and financial system, ready its population, and prepare the diplomatic space for a conflict that Chinese leaders might assume will entail enormous costs for the Chinese Communist Party. While Beijing would strive to obscure its intentions in some scenarios, the required military, economic, and political preparations would be at least partially detectable to the international community. Such observable signals might include stockpiling of munitions, a freeze on military demobilizations, and an intensification of bellicose propaganda. + +- __The United States would warn of China’s military intentions, hoping to rally allies and deter Beijing.__ The effectiveness of such warnings would depend on the strength of U.S. leadership, the state of Washington’s diplomatic relations with third countries, and the credibility of U.S. intelligence. Beijing would likely proceed toward an attack in a manner that clouds or frustrates U.S. efforts to assign blame to China, such as by claiming that Taiwan provoked Beijing by crossing red lines or even that Taiwan’s military attacked Chinese territory or a Chinese asset. + +- __Some U.S. allies and partners would join Washington in warning of Beijing’s intentions.__ U.S. allies — most likely including Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom — would coordinate planning for steps that could deter China. However, even among allies, the bar for assuming an attack on Taiwan is imminent would be high. The intensity of allied responses would thus largely depend on the credibility of U.S. intelligence, the strength of U.S. government statements and actions, and Taiwan’s own demonstrations that it took the threat seriously. This would include military preparations and the threat — or perhaps use of — economic sanctions on China to deter military action. On the other hand, the United States and its allies would be wary of acting too drastically, which might escalate the crisis, including by triggering responses from Beijing, precluding off-ramps for China, or damaging the global economy. + +- __Other governments would be slow to respond.__ Some might believe Beijing’s actions are mere saber rattling, as some Western governments did ahead of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine despite clear warnings from Washington. Some leaders would hesitate because they want to avoid taking disruptive emergency measures not yet seen as justified by their uncertain or oblivious polities. Other leaders would try to avoid committing themselves to either side in a conflict. Behind the scenes, Beijing would likely be using all its diplomatic channels to pressure third countries to remain on the sidelines. + +__International firms and investors would need to make important early decisions in an environment of extreme uncertainty.__ Financial markets would be the first to respond, with strong downward pressure on Chinese assets and the renminbi’s exchange rate. Many foreign investors would assume the crisis will harm business sentiment in China and, even if resolved, at least incrementally slow the economy. Direct investors would be slower to respond than portfolio investors. + +- __Because Beijing’s true intentions, including the scope and scale of a possible attack, would not yet be entirely clear, many firms operating in China, Taiwan, or the broader region would adopt a “wait and see” approach.__ Global headquarters would be looking to in-country staff for information and updates — though even staff in China and Taiwan would be struggling to interpret events. Because the costs of shifting supply chains or divesting from China could be substantial, many companies would delay making drastic decisions in the hope that a crisis never materializes. + + +### Phase Two: Period of Conflict + +__A conflict over Taiwan would devastate the global economy, but the costs would be especially high for China.__ The negative economic impact would be felt as soon as hostilities begin. Commercial shipping through the war zone and nearby ports would collapse, supply chains for many goods would seize up, and financial markets would panic — potentially even more so than during the 2008 global financial crisis. Beijing would likely impose emergency economic measures such as even stronger capital controls, selling Chinese assets abroad, stockpiling emergency supplies, suspending critical exports, rationing key imported goods, or restricting foreign travel. Early resistance by Taiwan’s military would compel China to take economically disruptive measures to protect its military assets in its eastern provinces and population centers from air or missile attacks from Taiwan or U.S. forces. Even a minimal level of U.S. military involvement would significantly disrupt this vital region. + + +### Phase One: Pending Chinese Attack on Taiwan + +__Beijing’s preparation for an attack on Taiwan would likely alert foreign governments and investors to the impending conflict, but the signals would not be entirely clear.__ These actions would include measures to mobilize its forces, insulate its economy and financial system, ready its population, and prepare the diplomatic space for a conflict that Chinese leaders might assume will entail enormous costs for the Chinese Communist Party. While Beijing would strive to obscure its intentions in some scenarios, the required military, economic, and political preparations would be at least partially detectable to the international community. Such observable signals might include stockpiling of munitions, a freeze on military demobilizations, and an intensification of bellicose propaganda. + +- __The United States would warn of China’s military intentions, hoping to rally allies and deter Beijing.__ The effectiveness of such warnings would depend on the strength of U.S. leadership, the state of Washington’s diplomatic relations with third countries, and the credibility of U.S. intelligence. Beijing would likely proceed toward an attack in a manner that clouds or frustrates U.S. efforts to assign blame to China, such as by claiming that Taiwan provoked Beijing by crossing red lines or even that Taiwan’s military attacked Chinese territory or a Chinese asset. + +- __Some U.S. allies and partners would join Washington in warning of Beijing’s intentions.__ U.S. allies — most likely including Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom — would coordinate planning for steps that could deter China. However, even among allies, the bar for assuming an attack on Taiwan is imminent would be high. The intensity of allied responses would thus largely depend on the credibility of U.S. intelligence, the strength of U.S. government statements and actions, and Taiwan’s own demonstrations that it took the threat seriously. This would include military preparations and the threat — or perhaps use of — economic sanctions on China to deter military action. On the other hand, the United States and its allies would be wary of acting too drastically, which might escalate the crisis, including by triggering responses from Beijing, precluding off-ramps for China, or damaging the global economy. + +- __Other governments would be slow to respond.__ Some might believe Beijing’s actions are mere saber rattling, as some Western governments did ahead of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine despite clear warnings from Washington. Some leaders would hesitate because they want to avoid taking disruptive emergency measures not yet seen as justified by their uncertain or oblivious polities. Other leaders would try to avoid committing themselves to either side in a conflict. Behind the scenes, Beijing would likely be using all its diplomatic channels to pressure third countries to remain on the sidelines. + +__International firms and investors would need to make important early decisions in an environment of extreme uncertainty.__ Financial markets would be the first to respond, with strong downward pressure on Chinese assets and the renminbi’s exchange rate. Many foreign investors would assume the crisis will harm business sentiment in China and, even if resolved, at least incrementally slow the economy. Direct investors would be slower to respond than portfolio investors. + +- __Because Beijing’s true intentions, including the scope and scale of a possible attack, would not yet be entirely clear, many firms operating in China, Taiwan, or the broader region would adopt a “wait and see” approach.__ Global headquarters would be looking to in-country staff for information and updates — though even staff in China and Taiwan would be struggling to interpret events. Because the costs of shifting supply chains or divesting from China could be substantial, many companies would delay making drastic decisions in the hope that a crisis never materializes. + + +### Phase Two: Period of Conflict + +__A conflict over Taiwan would devastate the global economy, but the costs would be especially high for China.__ The negative economic impact would be felt as soon as hostilities begin. Commercial shipping through the war zone and nearby ports would collapse, supply chains for many goods would seize up, and financial markets would panic — potentially even more so than during the 2008 global financial crisis. Beijing would likely impose emergency economic measures such as even stronger capital controls, selling Chinese assets abroad, stockpiling emergency supplies, suspending critical exports, rationing key imported goods, or restricting foreign travel. Early resistance by Taiwan’s military would compel China to take economically disruptive measures to protect its military assets in its eastern provinces and population centers from air or missile attacks from Taiwan or U.S. forces. Even a minimal level of U.S. military involvement would significantly disrupt this vital region. + +- __The two most important determinants of the war’s intensity and duration — and thus economic impact — would be the degree to which Taiwan resists and whether the United States is engaged militarily. Neither condition is certain, but both are probable.__ To assume Taiwan would not resist, one must have a bleak view of Taiwan’s civil society. To assume the United States would not engage militarily, one needs to at least assume that Beijing’s military operations would be extremely effective and quick while also not targeting U.S. forces in the region. Beijing would have an official pretense for any military action, but unless Taiwan took reckless actions, such as declaring independence, it is unlikely that leaders in Washington and other Western capitals would find them convincing. In the early days of the conflict, global firms and investors would assume that U.S. military intervention and general escalation pose high risks, absent extremely unlikely statements by Washington that explicitly disavow Taiwan. + +- __A 2016 study by the RAND Corporation estimated that a year-long war between the United States and China would reduce China’s GDP by 25–35 percent and U.S. GDP by 5–10 percent.__ However, the study did not examine the implications for global supply chains or estimate effects from sanctions, infrastructure damage, or cyberattacks. Given China’s subsequent economic growth, the economic damage ratios now are probably somewhat more in China’s favor, but the overall costs (considering all factors) could be considerably higher. A war would have an immediate impact on the three Chinese provinces nearest to Taiwan — Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang — which together account for 22 percent of China’s GDP and 17 percent of its population. Damage would not be limited to coastal provinces, however, because interior provinces are part of an intricate network of domestic supply chains. + +- __Most maritime trade and air freight within range of the war zone would be disrupted.__ International shipping and logistics firms would try to reroute traffic around the conflict zone and would avoid entering ports in or near Taiwan. Shipping insurance premiums would surge. Chinese ports accounted for roughly 40 percent of shipping volume among the world’s 100 largest ports in 2020; six of China’s largest ports are near Taiwan and would likely be directly impacted by a Chinese attack. Nearly half of the global container fleet and five-sixths of the largest ships transit through the Taiwan Strait, most of which would be rerouted. A complete disruption of China’s trade would reduce global trade in added value by $2.6 trillion, or 3 percent of world GDP — and this figure, based on peacetime valuations of global supply chains, only captures the first-order effect on trade. In the short term, however, existing inventories of goods or supplies would mitigate the effect on global firms and consumers. + +- __Even in the early stages of a conflict, multinational corporations (MNCs) would face significant pressure to begin unwinding operations in China.__ Managers’ foremost consideration in the hours and days after a Chinese attack would be employee safety, and many foreign MNCs would seek to exfiltrate foreign passport holders. Companies operating near the eastern coastline would likely halt operations even if they encounter no supply chain disruptions. MNCs exporting from or sourcing parts from China might try to shift production or inputs to other locations, although this would be expensive, and there would be competition from other firms doing the same thing with limited alternative capacity. MNCs operating in China for access to its domestic market would be the least likely to try to pull out because direct investments, such as factories and retail locations, are difficult to liquidate in a crisis. Such firms might conclude that even in dire scenarios, the Chinese market would still be enormous — at least after the conflict. However, they would fear the appropriation of their assets by Chinese authorities and the reputational costs in other markets if they remain in a China hostile to the West. + +- __China would face significant capital-flight pressures and a massive selloff of Chinese assets.__ Chinese citizens, companies, and investors — as well as foreign firms — would seek to jump the queue and avoid having their international capital ensnared by Western sanctions. While China already maintains stringent capital controls, the central bank would likely issue additional unofficial “window guidance” to China’s major state banks, directing them to halt outgoing transfers. Unofficial and illicit channels exist for motivated parties, but they are relatively narrow owing to regulators’ efforts to diminish their effectiveness. In addition to selling off onshore Chinese stocks, many investors would also dump their holdings of Chinese stocks listed on overseas exchanges. The exchange rate of the onshore and offshore renminbi would plunge, necessitating heavy interventions by the central bank to arrest the slide. As during other periods of heightened risk, global investors would flee to assets perceived as safe, especially U.S. Treasury securities and U.S. bank deposits. + +The United States would impose at least some economic sanctions on China in any scenario. But if U.S. forces were engaged, the sanctions would be severe, and Washington would probably coordinate with — or even compel — major allies to join such sanctions. U.S. politicians and the public would likely not tolerate continued direct trade or investment with China if U.S. forces suffer even a low number of casualties fighting Chinese forces, although indirect economic linkages would remain. Financial sanctions on major Chinese banks would have a devastating economic impact, including for U.S. firms and consumers. The expected costs of such actions suggest they would only be used in full once a conflict breaks out and the United States becomes militarily involved. If U.S. personnel start dying and the public sees bloody images of China’s attack on Taiwan, Western sentiment would likely turn swiftly and decidedly against China. A Western sanctions coalition could coalesce quickly, as happened after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in part because of lessons learned and coordination mechanisms established in response to the sanctions against Russia. + +- __Major U.S. allies, even if not engaged militarily, would likely support Washington’s efforts to punish China economically.__ While China’s market and supply chains are critical for many international firms, overall, the United States is even more important as a consumer market, investment destination, and financial market. The European Union’s — even just Germany’s — economic and financial ties to the United States are far deeper than those with China. Perhaps more importantly, Europe’s political, cultural, and security ties with the United States would present European leaders with a binary choice they might otherwise hope to avoid. Washington would exert significant pressure on its allies to join its sanctions efforts; if the United States were engaged militarily, those requests might become ultimatums, which Western leaders would need to weigh against the expectation that China’s economic growth and liberalization has peaked. + +![image1](https://i.imgur.com/X4tZ7SD.jpg) +_▲ __EU Economic Ties to the United States Are Deeper Than to China.___ + +__Taiwan’s economy would be shattered and cut off from most trade, losing the ability to export the majority of the world’s semiconductors and microchips.__ Much of its infrastructure would be damaged during combat or from sabotage by local actors, and Taiwan’s ports would be well within the combat zone. This would halt Taiwan’s microchip exports, of which roughly 60 percent go to China as inputs into electronics that are then exported to the rest of the world. + +- __Global supply chains for consumer electronics would be particularly damaged.__ China’s exports of consumer electronics, such as smartphones and laptops, have accounted for nearly 40 percent of the global total since 2014. Because of shipping disruptions and possible suspensions of trade with advanced economies, China’s domestically produced microchips would also probably not be exported. + +![image2](https://i.imgur.com/v6SQdrF.jpg) +_▲ __Key U.S. Allies Have Much Larger GDP Than China___ + + +### Phase Three: The World After + +__Even if the PLA were successful in seizing and holding Taiwan, Beijing would still face enormous economic, diplomatic, and political challenges.__ The only plausible pathway to mitigating these challenges would be for China’s military operations in Taiwan to be quick (to shorten the window Washington has to respond) and clean (to minimize fighting and damage, including civilian casualties in Taiwan), as well as avoid triggering an international backlash, particularly from advanced economies. More realistically, an attack on Taiwan — even a successful one — would result in some level of U.S. military involvement, a direct response from Taiwan’s military and people, and international outrage. + +![image3](https://i.imgur.com/83OVRSJ.jpg) +_▲ __Taiwanese military personnel drove a CM-25 armored vehicle across the street during the Han Kuang military exercise, which simulated China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invading the island on July 27, 2022, in New Taipei City, Taiwan__. Photo: Annabelle Chih/Stringer/GettyImages_ + +- __China would occupy a new but significantly damaged and isolated “special administrative region,” which would face a severe economic contraction and be expensive to subdue, police, and rebuild.__ Chinese military and security forces would contend with a restive population, even assuming local resistance is not prolonged. Reconstruction costs would be high and absorb much of Taiwan’s remaining fiscal capacity. The public on the mainland might object to spending Chinese resources to occupy and rebuild Taiwan, given that the island is nominally more developed than most of the mainland and its people are considered hostile. Chinese leaders probably would have planned for the post-war environment based on optimistic assumptions, in part because experts and planners would have been reluctant to suggest that Taiwan’s population is sincerely opposed to “reunification.” + +- __Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, including the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp (TSMC), would be severely damaged and unable to resume production of cutting-edge microchips.__ Assuming TSMC is not affected during combat or destroyed by saboteurs, its seizure by Chinese forces would only give China a snapshot of its technology in an otherwise fast-moving global industry. Beijing would also need to coopt or compel TSMC’s employees to continue working for the firm. Furthermore, TSMC relies on foreign inputs, including for chip designs and chip-manufacturing equipment. The governments of key advanced economies would likely impose export controls on those inputs, even if this means losing access to leading-edge fabrication capabilities. Foreign firms reliant on TSMC for production would no longer consider its Taiwan facilities reliable even after reconstruction. However, TSMC’s overseas assets might continue operating, assisted by TSMC staff who escape Taiwan and perhaps after being acquired by other firms. + +- __China’s economic and diplomatic relations with advanced economies would significantly deteriorate.__ Western sanctions and export controls on China would probably persist for months or perhaps years after a conflict, even if U.S. military forces are defeated. In Washington, Tokyo, and some European capitals, there would be little to no political appetite to resume normal economic relations with a belligerent China. Both sides would suffer, but China would suffer more. In 2021, the Group of Seven (G7) economies — a reasonable proxy for the U.S. alliance network — had a collective GDP 65 percent larger than China’s, even at purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates favorable to China, and directly absorbed 41 percent of China’s exports. China has little prospect of eliminating its key external economic dependences — technology, commodities, and the U.S. dollar — in the medium term. After a conflict, China would largely maintain access to commodities from emerging markets and developing countries. However, China would struggle to overcome technology export controls and sanctions based on the global dollar network, upon which its remaining trading partners would also remain reliant. + +- __China’s periphery would become increasingly hostile.__ Any Chinese attack on Taiwan would provoke significant anxiety among China’s neighbors. If the United States were perceived to have intervened aggressively, even if ultimately unsuccessfully, U.S. credibility as a security partner would largely remain intact, if somewhat bruised. On the other hand, if U.S. intervention were seen as halfhearted, countries might put less stock in Washington as a security guarantor, and some might develop their own capabilities, including nuclear weapons, to deter China. Either way, China’s aggression would likely galvanize a surge in military spending and pronounced bandwagoning against Beijing by Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India, but also Vietnam and the Philippines. Most other emerging markets or developing countries, however, would probably try to remain neutral. + +- __Annexing Taiwan would likely give Xi Jinping an initial bump in public approval, but the mounting costs of “state-building” would erode overall domestic confidence in the CCP.__ Propaganda organs would seek to contain criticisms of the invasion, but the proximity of the conflict would make it difficult to obscure the likely military casualties. Such efforts would be further undermined by the vast network of overseas Chinese nationals with unfettered access to information on the invasion’s course and consequences. Beijing would probably feel forced to use terror and repression to subdue pockets of resistance (real or imagined) in Taiwan, and reports of such atrocities would inevitably filter through to the mainland population. An invasion of Taiwan and the associated occupation phase would also distract Beijing from addressing China’s pressing domestic agenda and economic headwinds. To take control of the narrative and tamp down on any domestic unrest (again, real or imagined), the CCP would feel compelled to flex all its coercive muscles, and thus China would enter a new and more protracted phase of its police state. + +- __China’s economy would be on a wartime footing, and its hope of achieving high-income status would be severely diminished.__ Beijing would struggle with China’s overburdened fiscal system and state-sector debts amid capital outflows — and could face a systemic financial crisis. MNCs would expect Western sanctions and export controls to persist, while also forecasting far less potential from the Chinese market, and thus would generally maintain lower exposure to China. Foreign MNCs operating in China would fear asset nationalization, and even MNCs who want to remain or reinvest in China would face a Chinese government that scrutinizes companies representing “hostile” Western countries. China’s outbound investments and lending would be constrained. Amid draconian capital controls and a loss of foreign investor confidence in China’s trajectory and reforms, the renminbi would not substantially internationalize. + + +### Conclusion + +The purpose of this initial exercise is to sketch out some of the likely responses to a Chinese attack on Taiwan and the associated political, economic, diplomatic, and strategic consequences Beijing would face. The conclusion reached is stark: China would court disaster if it launched an invasion across the Taiwan Strait. Even under optimistic assumptions about the combat performance of the PLA and the relatively muted or constrained military responses by Taiwan and the United States, there is a precariously narrow path Xi Jinping would need to follow to emerge from the gambit unscathed. Once more realistic assumptions begin to be layered in, the picture becomes dire for the CCP and China as a whole. Equally as significant, any Chinese attack on Taiwan would also have an extraordinary impact on the global economy, especially for U.S. partners and allies in the region. + +The key strategic challenge for the United States remains to ensure Beijing never actively contemplates an attack on Taiwan. While it is likely Beijing broadly understands the costs associated with such an action, the increasing isolation of Chinese leader Xi Jinping and the concomitant rise in groupthink in Beijing’s policymaking circles means that one cannot assume Chinese leaders will continue to conduct a sound cost-benefit analysis. It thus remains critical to find direct and clear ways to communicate to Xi Jinping the costs he would face for undertaking any attack on Taiwan. + +--- + +__Jude Blanchette__ holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C. + +__Gerard DiPippo__ is a senior fellow with the Economics Program at CSIS. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-23-capacity-to-conduct-jado.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-23-capacity-to-conduct-jado.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6cf9a9f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-23-capacity-to-conduct-jado.md @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Capacity To Conduct JADO +author: Justin Bronk and Sam Cranny-Evans +date : 2022-11-23 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/HXSvbul.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Building the Capacity to Conduct Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO)" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_With limited resources and a host of urgent force modernisation and regeneration requirements, the UK’s short-to-medium investments in multidomain integration/Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO)-type capabilities will need to be incremental._ + + + +The Ministry of Defence has made ‘multidomain integration’ (MDI) a conceptual cornerstone of UK military doctrine. In 2020 it released a Joint Concept Note (JCN 1/20) which set out an ambitious vision wherein the full capabilities of each service across all five domains would be able to function ‘as a seamlessly integrated force [that] must also be fused across government and interoperable with principal allies’. JCN 1/20 sets out multiple different areas where seamless integration will apparently be necessary across the joint force and wider government in order to be competitive in future conflicts. However, the same document admits that ‘there is no fixed route to a known MDI destination, so this concept provides a headmark to allow us to explore and develop our MDI ambition’. In other words, the UK currently has a conceptual aim, but no concrete plan for how to transform the force structure and processes that it currently has into ones that can undertake MDI. + +A key contextual factor in the UK’s MDI ambitions is a desire to retain conceptual and technical alignment with the US. Under the banner of Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), the US military is attempting to transform the way in which it wages war, to better meet the threat posed by an increasingly powerful and assertive People’s Republic of China. Each of the US armed services has ambitious programmes underway to revolutionise the way their assets exchange and use data, to heavily automate command-and-control processes, and to normalise real-time cooperative engagements across the joint force. The UK and other NATO allies are under pressure to follow the US lead at least to some degree, not least due to the need to retain interoperability with US forces as part of a warfighting coalition. While the Pentagon recognises the political importance of retaining operational interoperability with allies, this objective takes second place behind the perceived imperative to radically improve American high-end capabilities against a rising Chinese threat in the Indo-Pacific. Given this, allies such as the UK need to understand the emerging American reforms in detail and plan investment to ensure that crucial integration points across the joint force remain technically and doctrinally compatible. + + +### Executive Summary + +There is a widely held quasi-philosophical position across the UK, the US and the armed forces of other nations that future wars will be decided by whichever side can best manage and share data seamlessly across all force elements. The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) is doctrinally and conceptually committed to a vision of the future force in which seamless cross-domain connectivity and integration is the norm. + +However, this high-level vision does not translate neatly into programme deliverables and prioritisation decisions. With limited resources and a host of urgent force modernisation and regeneration requirements, the UK’s short-to-medium investments in multidomain integration (MDI)/Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO)-type capabilities will need to be incremental, compared with the huge Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) programme underway in the US. + +One potentially useful model for the UK is the US Navy’s Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air (NIFC-CA) programme, which has achieved an unprecedented level of real-time integration between surface warships, airborne assets and weapons in flight by focusing initially on connecting a limited number of core platforms essential to one mission set. To achieve similar results, the MoD will need to carefully prioritise early MDI investment tranches towards seamlessly connecting the assets that will gain the most combat effectiveness from the capability to share real-time situational awareness and conduct joint engagements with one another. + +Selecting priority mission sets and using them as an analytical lens offers one way to identify the platforms and force elements where targeted investment in advanced cross-domain data sharing and third-party targeting capabilities would add the most tangible value in an operational context. The vignettes examined in this paper suggest that, in general, focusing on connecting key sensor assets such as F-35, E-7A and special operations forces teams, with long-range precision fires and integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) capabilities such as guided multiple launch rocket systems and Type 45, appears likely to significantly enhance combat effectiveness in challenging scenarios such as suppression of enemy air defence systems/destruction of enemy air defences (SEAD/DEAD) and IAMD, where the current force structure would struggle. + +It is also worth noting that a necessary aspect of prioritisation is choosing which assets across the joint force do not currently need to be connected by an all-singing, all-dancing data sharing and automated command-and-control solution. Over-ambition coupled with a lack of focus in such a complex and interdependent effort involving all the armed services and Strategic Command is a recipe for programme failure. + + +### Introduction + +THE MINISTRY OF Defence (MoD) has made ‘multidomain integration’ (MDI) a conceptual cornerstone of UK military doctrine. In 2020 it released a Joint Concept Note (JCN 1/20) which set out an ambitious vision wherein the full capabilities of each service across all five domains would be able to function ‘as a seamlessly integrated force [that] must also be fused across government and interoperable with principal allies’. JCN 1/20 sets out multiple different areas where seamless integration will apparently be necessary across the joint force and wider government in order to be competitive in future conflicts. However, the same document admits that ‘there is no fixed route to a known MDI destination, so this concept provides a headmark to allow us to explore and develop our MDI ambition’. In other words, the UK currently has a conceptual aim, but no concrete plan for how to transform the force structure and processesthat it currently has into ones that can undertake MDI. + +A key contextual factor in the UK’s MDI ambitions is a desire to retain conceptual and technical alignment with the US. Under the banner of Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), the US military is attempting to transform the way in which it wages war, to better meet the threat posed by an increasingly powerful and assertive People’s Republic of China. Each of the US armed services has ambitious programmes underway to revolutionise the way their assets exchange and use data, to heavily automate command-and-control (C2) processes, and to normalise real-time cooperative engagements across the joint force. The UK and other NATO allies are under pressure to follow the US lead at least to some degree, not least due to the need to retain interoperability with US forces as part of a warfighting coalition. While the Pentagon recognises the political importance of retaining operational interoperability with allies, this objective takes second place behind the perceived imperative to radically improve American high-end capabilities against a rising Chinese threat in the Indo-Pacific. Given this, allies such as the UK need to understand the emerging American reforms in detail and plan investment to ensure that crucial integration points across the joint force remain technically and doctrinally compatible. + +Chapter I of this paper demonstrates the scope of the US Department of Defense (DoD)’s ambitions for creating a fully fledged JADO capacity across the entire joint force, via its new Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) architecture. It briefly explains how the US Army’s Project Convergence, the US Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) and the US Navy’s Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air (NIFC-CA) and Project Overmatch programmes fit into the wider JADC2 effort. + +Chapters II to IV use vignettes to examine which elements of the UK’s future joint force might benefit most from JADC2-style connectivity across three specific mission sets. The conclusion explores the implied priorities and considerations for the MoD in pursuing its doctrinal aim of MDI through a capacity to conduct JADO. + +It is important to note at the start that the scale and scope of the Chinese military threat in the Indo-Pacific, which is driving JADO ambitions in the US DoD, is of a different nature and magnitude to that faced by European NATO members. This has several important implications for what JADO will mean for the UK and its European NATO partner nations. + +First, unless European NATO members wish to simply purchase JADC2-compliant off-the-shelf platforms, network architectures and weapons systems from the US, they will have to incorporate JADC2 compliance and compatibility into their own existing and future platforms and C2 systems. If they do not, over time they will lose operational interoperability with the US as the latter moves to ever more tightly integrated and automated data sharing, targeting and C2 arrangements to facilitate JADO. + +Second, both off-the-shelf procurement of JADC2-compliant equipment and modernisation of hardware, software and communications suites on existing platforms will necessarily take place at a much slower pace in Europe than in the US due to limited funding and other competing priorities. For the UK, regenerating the platforms required to deliver a warfighting division, purchasing sufficient munitions and funding adequate training and exercise activity is already overstressing the budget available – especially in light of the refusal of the government to commit to any increases in Defence spending beyond maintaining 2% of GDP in the Budget Autumn Statement. As such, a comprehensive modernisation programme to make the whole UK Joint Force JADC2 compliant or otherwise capable of JADO-type activities is highly unlikely to be affordable for the foreseeable future. + +Third, Defence in the UK (and in other European NATO member states) has limited programmatic capacity to staff and manage large capital programmes simultaneously. In the UK in autumn 2022 a major increase in the Defence budget was promised by then Prime Minister Liz Truss as a result of the invasion of Ukraine. However, this increase was not confirmed in the Budget statement on 17 November. The Chancellor at the time acknowledged the need for increased defence spending, but deferred a decision until the Integrated Review had been amended in light of the war in Ukraine. + +Prioritisation will, therefore, be critical to enable the UK to make efficient use of initial MDI investment tranches and to avoid decision paralysis in the face of the scale of the challenge. Chapters II, III and IV of this paper provide mission-centric vignettes to explore where the greatest potential combat effectiveness gains might be achieved by early investments to unlock JADO-style capabilities between specific UK platforms. The vignettes comprise: a campaign to suppress enemy air defence systems (SEAD) in Eastern Europe; the provision of IAMD to a forward-deployed UK force in the Middle East; and a contested freedom of navigation operation (FONOP). These were chosen as tasks that UK forces may be called upon to conduct, and also because they span the spectrum of conflict from high-intensity warfighting against a peer nation to potentially contested shows of presence during competition. The vignette approach was chosen to demonstrate that tying MDI/JADO questions to mission-focused output metrics can help policymakers move beyond necessary but broad and convoluted conceptual and doctrine discussions and towards identifying practical investment priorities. In addition to suggesting where significant value might be gained, even concise mission-focused vignettes can also shed light on where investment in cross-domain real-time data sharing is not likely to lead to transformative increases in effectiveness. + +#### What are Joint All-Domain Operations? + +ADO is a conceptual framework which has been created by the US DoD to describe its goal of integrated military operations across the domains of land, air, sea, space and the electromagnetic spectrum. The working US DoD definition of JADO is ‘actions by the joint force in multiple domains integrated in planning and synchronised in execution, at speed and scale needed to gain advantage and accomplish the mission’. The aim is to deliver integrated effects against an opponent across the phases of inter-state cooperation, competition and armed conflict. + +In other words, JADO is not a programme as such, but rather a guiding vision of the sort of operations the US armed forces are to be capable of undertaking in a future conflict. The intent is that by operating in this way, US forces will be able to create multiple simultaneous dilemmas for an enemy which cannot all be solved, and which compel hostile troops and commanders to make difficult or impossible trade-offs. A critical component of this vision is the simplification and acceleration of current decision-making processes, moving from planning cycles measured in days to hours or even minutes. In some respects, this represents a simple desire to speed up the Observe Orient Decide Act loops which govern military decision-making at all levels. This has led some to suggest that there is little to differentiate JADO from earlier operational concepts.10 As a top-down set of guiding principles, JADO is also very similar to the vision laid out by the UK’s own MDI concept note. + +However, the US has a practical strategy which the DoD is pursuing to enable – called JADC2. The working definition of JADC2 in the DoD is ‘the warfighting capability to sense, make sense, and act at all levels and phases of war, across all functional areas, domains, and with partners, to deliver information advantage at the speed of relevance’. In more simple terms, JADC2 is a strategy which aims to connect all the sensors across the US Air Force, Navy, Army and Marine Corps into a single and highly automated network. Its primary function is to provide a new kind of joint decision-making and disseminating tool for commanders to enable them to plan, orchestrate and execute JADO. This vision of JADC2 is, to put it mildly, an extremely complex and ambitious undertaking. However, a unified decision-making tool is not the limit of the ambitions for JADC2 across the DoD. + +For many, JADC2 is also a way to develop a highly automated ‘any-sensor, any-shooter’ network that will process and disseminate data between all the platforms within a joint force, and automatically allocate fire missions and other non-kinetic tasks to the optimal unit or platform at any given time. In this vision, the key output of JADC2 would be a version of a combat cloud or an Internet of Things, which has been described as an application enabled by modern digital communications networks to interface with connected sensors and shooters in a similar fashion to the Uber ride-hailing app. In this vision, a ‘shooter’ does not know or need to know where the target track that they have been automatically allocated was gathered from, and nor would the original source of that target data need to know which ‘shooters’ were available to prosecute the target when they sent the request for fires. Instead, the system would optimise the matching of detected target tracks and weapons solutions automatically. + +This would represent a major shift from network-centric warfare to data-centric warfare. It requires a C2 system that can be platform-agnostic and capable of taking data from any sensor and supplying firing and targeting solutions to any available effector systems. It is critical to understand what this entails; most networked systems are designed to receive data from a specific sensor. For example, an air defence system is designed to receive target acquisition and tracking data from its own bespoke radars, whose data is formatted for that system’s fire control and battle management systems. The concept of JADC2 holds that the overarching battle management system and C2 network supporting multidomain operations should be able to rapidly receive, interpret, weight and assign actions in response to any data it receives and distribute it in a format that is usable by any other asset or weapons system connected to the network. + + +### I. Where is JADO Now? + +The concept of JADO is being explored through a series of experiments led by the US services that are designed to examine how it can be realised under the aegis of JADC2. JADC2 is both an approach and a procurement effort; it requires the US services to establish common data standards so that information can be shared seamlessly between them, as well as the procurement of new communications architectures that allow that information to be shared. However, it also requires a change in C2 culture with greater thought given to the synchronised, optimal allocation of resources, force positioning and decision-making. There are already several technical efforts underway within each service, which sit underneath the overall JADC2 effort. + +The US Air Force is essentially the lead service on JADC2, with its primary efforts in this regard being channelled into its ABMS programme. ABMS is being developed in line with the Joint Warfighting Concept that will shape the doctrines created by the US services to define their role in JADO. JADC2 is the system that will enable US commanders to connect any sensor system to any effector. It is notionally a joint effort, although US Air Force officials have stressed that the technologies developed by the Army and Navy are designed to dovetail into the ABMS. In addition to integrating C2 efforts from across the US armed forces, JADC2 is also expected to integrate the US nuclear arsenal into the same network of sensors and effectors, although details on that effort are classified. + +ABMS itself was originally intended to replace the E-3 AWACS before it was expanded to become a programme that will procure equipment and software, as well as implement new C2 and data policies. The US Air Force’s experiments within ABMS have demonstrated the ability to transmit data from Army and Navy radars to F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning fighter aircraft; it has been used in defence of US space assets and to engage cruise missiles. The US Air Force has also demonstrated the use of a KC-46 Pegasus tanker aircraft as a communications node that was used to relay information from fourth- to fifth-generation aircraft. The KC-46 application of the ABMS programme has become the first material step, taking it from a purely experimental standing to an in-service capability. + +The US Army has launched Project Convergence, which is seeking to test the ability of national-level intelligence assets to coordinate and direct long-range fires with the assistance of AI. Project Convergence was established by the US Army Futures Command to test a single use case; a sensor-to-shooter link to enhance and test the ability of in-service systems to pass data between themselves. Its first iteration in 2020 proved that sensor-to-shooter time could be reduced from an average of 14 minutes to a few seconds. However, it also revealed that many of the systems in service with the US armed forces could not pass data to each other in compatible forms, leading to the realisation that the network that facilitates the flow of information is the centre of gravity as far as JADO is concerned. Project Convergence has since expanded to seven use cases and the establishment of the Joint Systems Integration Lab, which is charged with practising the movement of data between systems. Its work has been deemed vital to realising JADC2. + +The US Army’s technical contribution in the land domain is the Integrated Tactical Network (ITN), which has experimented with 4G and 5G and hybrid cloud architectures to support mounted and dismounted operations, including the movement of large data sets with low latency. The US Army has also moved its integrated air and missile defence (IADS) Battle Command System (IBCS) into low-rate initial production. The system enables assets from multiple domains to be integrated into a single air defence network. When provided with a suitable relay and datalink translation node (in this case an ‘EMC2’ network bridge on a U-2), IBCS has been used to coordinate an engagement between F-35 and the Army Field Artillery Tactical Data System. In the land domain at least, experimentation with JADO has made clear that passing data between systems in a usable form is the primary challenge to be overcome and emphasises that this is the centre of gravity around which the success of the project will turn. + +The US Navy is focused on Project Overmatch, a secretive effort about which little is known except for the intention to introduce an AI-enabled network architecture and facilitate distributed operations through manned–unmanned teaming. Project Overmatch builds on the progress already made under the NIFC-CA programme, which was developed as an advanced version of what was initially termed ‘cooperative engagement capability’ (CEC) whereby aircraft and surface ships could share target track information and guide each other’s weapons in flight. In its fully operational state the NIFC-CA architecture currently connects surface combatant ships equipped with Aegis Baseline 9 or a later version of the powerful Aegis air and missile defence system to the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler fast jets, and E-2D Advanced Hawkeye AWACS aircraft of the carrier air group (CAG). Its primary function is to create a fused recognised air picture which is fed by all the radars on ships and in the air back to the operations centre on the aircraft carrier itself. This allows a huge increase in the effective resolution and coverage of the whole fleet’s radar coverage. It is especially effective at increasing detection ranges against small or stealthy targets such as advanced anti-ship missiles and fifth-generation fighter aircraft due to the ability to exploit the dispersed positions of the various contributing radar sensors for multi-static triangulation. As a secondary function, NIFC-CA was designed to enable assets in the task group to designate targets for and guide each other’s missile systems. + +The way in which the US Navy developed NIFC-CA is potentially highly instructive for the UK and other Allied nations looking to invest in similar capabilities in their own forces. Rather than making NIFC-CA into a major acquisition programme of record, the US Navy inserted common network connectivity and data standards into the requirements within the major acquisition/modernisation programmes for specific platforms that were judged most critical for a specific mission – in this case counter-air and missile defence. The mission hinged most critically on the forward sensors on the E-2C/D Hawkeye AWACS, the later cancelled Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and the SM-3 and SM-6 ‘shooters’ used by the Aegis combat system onboard US guided missile destroyers and cruisers. Therefore, these systems were prioritised in terms of investment in unlocking shared situational awareness and third-party targeting capabilities. + +Since NIFC-CA was not a major acquisition platform for a poorly defined future connectivity goal, but rather a budgetarily small programme with the power to insert requirements into pre-existing equipment acquisition or modernisation programmes, it did not fall foul of any of a series of major budget cuts over the decade of primary development. Even when JLENS was cancelled, this did not endanger NIFC-CA as a whole. Furthermore, once the cooperative engagement capabilities and combined situational awareness enabled by NIFC-CA in its early form had been demonstrated, it was easier to both justify the funding for and articulate the requirements needed to integrate other platforms, such as F-35C. Consequently, NIFC-CA is currently delivering real-time shared situational awareness and cooperative engagement capabilities between US Navy vessels, aircraft and weapons far in excess of what has yet been achieved by more ambitious but less well-defined US Air Force programmes, such as ABMS. The more ambitious Project Overmatch builds on the progress already made by the US Navy with an incremental and mission-specific approach to unlocking increased combat effectiveness through cross-domain connectivity. + +Compared with this sort of operational capability, tangible UK progress in making JADO-style capabilities a practical reality remains largely experimental. The MoD has specified a guiding ambition to develop the capability to conduct MDI in doctrine and strategy publications such as JCN 1/20, and the Integrated Operating Concept. However, most practical investment is currently being undertaken by experimental establishments within each service. One example is the RAF’s Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO), which has taken a somewhat different approach from the US to the problem of joint force connectivity. + +Instead of looking to build connectivity through feeds and common applications to link platforms or services, the RCO has focused initially on creating a common data environment called Nexus. The idea behind Nexus is to provide a virtual environment which acts as a Defence-owned portal where other platforms, networks, sensors and applications can both request and feed in data, according to published integration standards. Nexus concentrates on metadata so that applications and platforms alike can see what and who is doing what and where (at varying classifications) across the network, without having to off-board data wholesale as a standard procedure. This keeps baseline bandwidth demands low, and ensures that when a connected user specifically requests detailed data, there is sufficient capacity to pass it through the network along paths which have already been defined using the basic metadata. The RCO conducted flight trials with a hand-carried Nexus portal and a virtual communications hub application called Raven in 2021 on a Voyager tanker, and demonstrated the ability to pull data from satellite communications and a range of other sources into a common operating picture in real time. + +While the creation of such a virtual data indexing and exchange medium is a significant step, it remains to be seen if it can be scaled up to meet the requirements of the whole force. It also does not by itself solve the problem of how to generate sufficiently low-latency real-time connectivity between joint force assets to enable third-party weapons cueing or guidance. Therefore, Nexus does not fill the same niche for the UK as NIFC-CA does for the US Navy or ABMS does for the US Air Force. + + +### II. Vignette 1: SEAD in Eastern Europe + +Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February 2022, the once-theoretical spectre of a confrontation with Russian conventional forces in Eastern Europe has gone from the highest-risk/lowest-likelihood scenario at the top of NATO threat estimates to an unavoidable priority for future force planning. + +The performance of the Russian aerospace forces’ fixed-wing and rotary assets during the initial two months of the war was notably poor – Russia failed to destroy the Ukrainian air force, or exert significant influence on the battles on the ground. This was, in large part, due to its inability to conduct effective suppression/destruction of enemy air defences (SEAD/DEAD). Ukraine’s continued ability to operate its various mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems forced Russian aircraft to operate at very low altitude to take advantage of radar-horizon limitations and terrain for cover, but this left them vulnerable to anti-aircraft artillery and man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) fire. The majority of combat air losses on both sides during the first phase of the war have been caused by SAMs and MANPADS – with the latter posing a threat precisely because the presence of the former forces both sides to operate at very low level. + +This should prompt renewed prioritisation of SEAD/DEAD capability for NATO air forces, since at present only the US Air Force can field credible answers to the sorts of mobile SAM tactics used by both sides in Ukraine. Therefore, the first vignette in this paper examines where targeted investment in JADO-style capabilities within the UK’s joint force might add greatest benefit during a SEAD/DEAD operation against Russian forces in a geographically constrained flashpoint confrontation in Eastern Europe. + +The UK and its allies would face three primary operational challenges during any SEAD/DEAD operation. The first would be detecting, identifying, mapping and then targeting the key long-range sensors, SAM systems and command nodes which provide the overall coordination for an IADS and allow it to threaten assets at long ranges. The second would be detecting, suppressing and then destroying the more numerous medium- and short-range mobile SAM batteries and systems which move with enemy ground forces. 45 The third challenge would be achieving sufficient effect against these two categories of targets (and their crews) to enable air superiority to be achieved, without taking unacceptable attrition in airframes or running out of critical munitions in the process. Any enemy air superiority assets would also need to be tracked and engaged if they attempted to engage UK or allied SEAD/DEAD assets, although NATO proficiency in the offensive/defensive counter-air mission set is already sufficient to provide a level of overmatch against any likely aerial adversary. + +Time pressure is also likely to be a major factor, since the UK and most other Western nations depend heavily on the firepower and ISR delivered by air forces to allow their relatively small ground and maritime forces to achieve success against enemies able to field greater mass and firepower. Therefore, there would be heavy time pressure to achieve SEAD/DEAD results so that close air support and airborne ISR aircraft could be used freely within the area of operations. To work out where the greatest benefits might be gained from investment to allow joint, cooperative real-time engagements in such an operation, it is first necessary to identify the critical sensor and shooter platforms across the joint force. + +Fortunately, the potentially critical assets within the UK’s joint force are relatively easy to identify for any SEAD/DEAD campaign. For the first challenge of detecting, identifying and mapping the key long-range sensors and C2 nodes, standoff signals intelligence (SIGINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT) and radar-surveillance platforms – most obviously the RC-135W Airseeker and the new E-7A Wedgetail – would be critical in the run-up to any operation. However, once combat starts these aircraft would need to operate from beyond the reach of the long-range S-400 or S-300V4 SAM systems within a Russian IADS. This is because of their large signature, need to operate at high altitudes where long-range SAMs are most effective, and limited self-protection or evasion capabilities. Furthermore, many SIGINT and ELINT intercepts require significant processing and analysis before they can be fully exploited to help map an IADS and so incorporating an asset such as RC-135W into a JADC2-style real-time data sharing and targeting architecture might add only relatively marginal value compared to current processes. E-7A Wedgetail, by contrast, will be taking over from the E-3D Sentry as a key airborne battlespace management and C2 node within whatever new architectures are designed for combat air and joint forces use. As such, despite its likely position several hundred kilometres from the front lines during combat operations, it will remain a key communications relay and C2 node during active SEAD/DEAD operations, especially as a connective node between the air component and other elements of the force. Therefore, the E-7A is an example of where investing in radical improvements in the ability to exchange data in real time with forward sensors and long-range fires assets across all domains is likely to result in significant efficiency gains for the whole force. + +Once combat operations begin, the most critical sensor nodes will be those that can detect, identify and track high-value enemy sensors, SAMs and C2 nodes from inside the threat range they pose. Obvious candidates within the UK’s current order of battle include the F-35B Lightning II and infiltrated special operations forces (SOF) teams. Both have the potential capability to get relatively close to threat systems covertly and can carry sophisticated sensors. The F-35’s sensor suite is particularly well suited to both hunting key nodes within an IADS and enabling more routine SEAD/DEAD efforts against mobile SAM systems in an ongoing campaign. This is because its sensors and software allow even a single aircraft to rapidly triangulate the position of a hostile SAM radar in flight more effectively than a whole flight of previous-generation ‘Wild Weasel’ F-16CJs with dedicated SEAD sensors. + +Both the F-35 and SOF teams have limited capabilities for direct kinetic attacks due to their relatively small numbers within the overall UK force structure, the need to husband limited munitions carriage capacity for key targets, and the need to avoid detection while deep in hostile territory. In other words, there is a significant mismatch between the ISTAR capabilities and the level of lethality which these assets can project into a hostile IADS when working alone. Therefore, in a SEAD/DEAD context, both F-35B and infiltrated SOF teams are likely to represent key UK sources of real-time situational awareness about key IADS targets, and also force elements whose lethality and survivability would be greatly increased by the ability to call in long-range firepower from other assets in real time. + +To assess which potential ‘shooters’ would bring the most benefit from JADC2-style connectivity with these forward sensors in a SEAD/DEAD operation, the first question is which platforms are likely to be able to deploy standoff weapons from sufficient range? Shooters must be able to threaten targets without unacceptable risk to sustainably leverage the situational awareness generated by the F-35Bs, SOF teams or other forward sensors for increased lethality. Within the UK joint force there are limited potential options, which makes prioritisation for investments in JADO-style cooperative engagement capabilities easier. + +One clear candidate would be the guided multiple launch rocket systems (GMLRS) which currently provide the British Army’s long-range artillery firepower. GMLRS can fire rockets out to 70 km with submunition warheads that make each one lethal against lightly armoured vehicles across a spread pattern on impact. If the British Army’s GMLRS were equipped with such munitions, they would potentially be ideal for use against SAM batteries in the field. Furthermore, the UK has signalled its intention to procure the precision strike missile (PrSM) for its GMLRS launchers, which would provide a long-range precision strike capability of 499 km. PrSM has also been tested with a multi-mode seeker that would enable the missile to track and engage radars, which is expected to be included in the Spiral 1 upgrade of the missiles. + +Other options could include Royal Navy surface or submerged vessels firing Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs), or RAF Typhoons with Storm Shadow cruise missiles. However, due to their high cost and consequently limited inventory capacity, large cruise missiles such as Storm Shadow and TLAMs are likely to be reserved for high-value targets during a SEAD/DEAD mission such as long-range target acquisition radars, command centres and command vehicles. Therefore, they might benefit from real-time target data from penetrating ISTAR assets during the initial phases of any campaign, but would be less critical during the later DEAD phases, where the primary targets are likely to be mobile medium- and short-range SAM batteries. Against these targets, less costly and shorter-ranged munitions would be needed for viable mass of fires to be achieved. Therefore, likely candidates would be RAF Typhoons with SPEAR 3 (if it were purchased for the Typhoon Force), conventional Army AS90 or other 155-mm artillery batteries within range of SAM systems near the enemy front lines, and possibly AH-64E Apache gunships equipped with Hellfire or JAGM missiles. The point is that potential priorities for investment if SEAD/DEAD is chosen as a policy-relevant mission can be identified relatively easily by assessing where lethality would be most significantly increased through tactical real-time sensor-shooter integration across domains, compared to more traditional joint operations integrated at the operational or campaign level. + +Aside from increased lethality, another aspect to potentially consider is which platforms would benefit most in terms of survivability from JADC2-style connectivity during a SEAD/DEAD operation. This is more difficult to define than lethality enhancement, since the survivability of any given platform is based more on contextual factors, including the risk appetite of both the attacking and defending force and the tactics each employ. However, a basic starting point would be to note that in a SEAD/DEAD operation the assets that might see increased survivability from JADC2-style connectivity are those which will be expected to operate within the missile engagement zone (MEZ) of enemy SAM systems (and possibly aircraft). + +During the competition phase, before kinetic warfare begins, ISTAR assets conducting mapping of the IADS and airspace monitoring may well be operating within the MEZ of long-range enemy SAMs. The same may be true of tanker aircraft conducting aerial refuelling for both ISTAR and combat air patrol orbits close to adversary territory. If they perceive a direct conflict as inevitable or desirable, the adversary might attempt to open hostilities by conducting long-range SAM launches at these high-value enablers while they are within range. Given the lack of agility and limited self-defence options available to airliner-derived platforms, the ability to receive the earliest possible warning of hostile missile launches from any available sensor is critical to increasing their odds of survival. The Voyager MRTT in particular will be a key part of any air operation due to the critical nature of aerial refuelling capabilities for all fast jet and most ISTAR operations. Once shooting starts, tanker orbits will be pushed significantly further back from potential threats, which will keep them safer but means that each fuel offload grants less time on-mission for combat air assets. The centrality of the Voyager MRTT to almost all significant RAF air operations, and its consequent ubiquitous presence in the battlespace, is why it has already been chosen for airborne trials of the new Nexus common data platform and Raven communications node. + +To enhance the survivability of key assets such as the Voyager MRTT, the most valuable airborne connection in a SEAD context is likely to be the F-35, since its electro-optical/infra-red surveillance suite can detect, classify and track missile and rocket launchers from hundreds of kilometres away in any direction around the aircraft. Ground-based long-range missile defence radars such as the MPQ-65 and AN/TPY-2 used by allied Patriot and THAAD batteries could also provide advance warning to airborne assets of long-range SAM launches due to their high flight apexes and consequent similarity to ballistic missiles. As will be seen in Vignette 2, these missile defence assets are also likely to benefit in situational awareness terms from being linked via such enablers to forward air assets for their own mission sets. Orbital missile launch detection and tracking capabilities would also be a potentially useful source of launch warning information if they were able to process the signatures of long-range SAMs and relay warnings in real time. + +This vignette is not intended to imply that SEAD/DEAD is necessarily one of the critical missions against which initial UK investments in enabling practical JADO-style capability should be judged. Rather, it is intended to illustrate that considering how the existing and projected force structure would need to be employed against a notional mission set can guide analysis towards the assets that would likely give the greatest return on investment in improved connectivity across domains. In the case of the SEAD/DEAD mission, even a superficial examination of the force structure suggests that necessarily limited early investment could deliver significant increases in combat effectiveness without needing to achieve whole force transformation along the lines of American JADO efforts. The UK has a small number of assets that could be tasked with covertly penetrating defended areas, and which can carry potent sensors, but have limited organic firepower. It also has a limited range of assets that can deploy long-range firepower capabilities but which are reliant on off-board targeting information to hit elusive targets from a safe distance in a high-intensity scenario. Therefore, connecting these two sets of capabilities would be a natural place to invest in delivering an initial real-time cross-domain connectivity programme for the UK if SEAD/DEAD is assessed as an important mission set. The survivability of critical enabler nodes, such as tankers, which lack organic self-defence and evasion capabilities, could also potentially be significantly enhanced by being connected to force elements able to provide early warning of enemy long-range missile launches. They would likely also be present in theatre anyway due to their key roles. Therefore, they might also make logical sense as a priority for early upgrades to enhance their real-time connectivity with other force elements. + +In summary, a brief examination of the critical assets for a notional SEAD/DEAD campaign suggests that if this mission were chosen as a key planning task, the MoD could usefully prioritise initial MDI/JADO-style cross-domain connectivity investment towards penetrating assets, long-range precision fires capabilities and large enabler aircraft. + + +### III. Vignette 2: Integrated Air and Missile Defence + +This vignette examines a notional scenario where the UK is required to provide an element of an IAMD capability for a European force that has been forward deployed to the Middle East in an uncertain political climate with an evolving insurgency led by a regional actor. Across current and future deployments of this type, the threat to British and allied troops deployed on the ground is likely to be increasingly significant and sophisticated. In any political environment where tolerance of casualty risk is limited, having a credible IAMD solution for forward deployed forces is likely to be increasingly essential for operational viability. However, providing IAMD to forward deployed forces is a complex challenge. + +The threat environment has developed considerably over the past decade due to the democratisation of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) and the proliferation of larger remotely piloted aerial systems (RPAS) that can be used as munitions in their own right and also to rapidly cue in long-range fires with precision. Whereas past forces would have to contend only with an opponent’s air force and incoming rocket artillery, a European force deployed anywhere in the world today will likely face threats from armed sUAS and RPAS, as were encountered by Russian forces deployed to Khmeimim Airbase in 2018. + +More complex missile threats have also proliferated. Houthi attacks against critical national infrastructure in Saudi Arabia have often come from different directions simultaneously, and been conducted across a wide geographical area, forcing the available Saudi air defences to be dispersed, thus diminishing their efficacy. Iran itself has demonstrated the ability to conduct attacks against American bases; the 2020 ballistic missile strikes against the Al Asad air base in western Iraq are the most prominent demonstrations of this capability. Sixteen ballistic missiles were fired at the base in retaliation for the assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, 11 of them – each carrying a 1,000-lb warhead – hit the base, causing extensive damage. + +Consequently, the future threat environment for UK forces deployed to the region is likely to be characterised by a mix of massed sUAS and loitering munitions, as well as higher-end cruise and ballistic missiles, used together in such a way as to increase the complexity of the IAMD challenge. Given this, more traditional siloed deployments of air and missile defence systems, such as Phalanx-B to guard Camp Victory in Iraq from rockets, artillery and mortar rounds, or Patriot PAC-3 batteries to reduce the threat to Eastern European allies from short-range ballistic missiles in 2022, are likely to be insufficient. No one system can efficiently or effectively cover the threat spectrum adequately. It follows that enhancing the ability of UK systems to connect to a common recognised air picture, and the ability to link together and cross-cue different sensors and effectors for layered effects, is likely to offer the best means to increase combat effectiveness for IAMD coverage. + +The primary challenge in any IAMD scenario remains the detection and tracking of incoming threats, and so protecting a UK deployment in the Middle East against the sorts of potential threats outlined would require the provision of persistent omni-directional air situational awareness across all the likely incoming threat altitudes, ranges and speed bands. This is an extremely difficult requirement to meet within the UK’s current order of battle, but in principle it requires the ability to combine the outputs from as many of the available ground-, maritime- and air-based radars and other sensors as possible into a common situational awareness picture. Obvious candidates within the existing force structure include the Giraffe Agile Multi-Beam radar that forms a core part of the British Army’s Sky Sabre medium-range air defence system, the Multi-role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) radar mounted on the RAF’s new E-7A Wedgetail AWACS aircraft, the Sampson radar on any Type 45 destroyers operating in littoral waters nearby, and the smaller radars carried by counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) solutions such as Drone Dome or ORCUS. + +The fact that the IAMD threat encompasses such a broad range of target sizes, speeds and ranges means that operational effectiveness is likely to be disproportionately improved if systems optimised to cover different threat bands and altitudes can be linked together to create a combined situational awareness picture in real time. For threats coming in at close to ground level, sUAS and loitering munitions are likely to be a particularly challenging problem set, since these systems often have a low radar cross section and very small electro-optical/infra-red signature, and can travel extremely slowly. These properties, together with clutter from uneven ground, vegetation and buildings, make them particularly difficult to track and engage with traditional air defence radar systems. The UK has a limited ability to counter these threats in the form of its Drone Dome system procured from Rafael Advanced Defense Systems in 2018, which is designed to target sUAS using soft-kill effects. Additionally, the RAF has developed the ORCUS C-UAS system with Leonardo, which also employs soft-kill effects to defeat sUAS, although only four are expected to be delivered. Complex threats such as cruise missiles and RPAS can be countered by the Army’s Sky Sabre, which provides a detection range of 120 km and an engagement range of 25 km. It is claimed to be capable of hitting a target the size of a tennis ball travelling at the speed of sound. Importantly, Sky Sabre is already capable of sharing data with Royal Navy and RAF assets in theatre via the Link 16 tactical datalink. Building on these foundations, an obvious priority candidate for investment in automated, real-time cross-domain connectivity in an IAMD context would be the RAF’s new E-7A Wedgetail. It not only carries a high-resolution MESA radar that can contribute a look-down view of low-flying targets at far greater ranges than land-based radars but is also the standard Link 16 network gateway that would already be expected to interface between airborne and ground-based IAMD assets to build a common recognised air picture. + +In terms of ‘shooters’, the list of UK systems that can be considered for integration is currently quite short but in need of expansion to properly cover the wide range of potential threats. They include: Drone Dome and ORCUS for C-UAS effects; Starstreak and its vehicle-mounted high-velocity missile variant for short-range air defence; Sky Sabre for medium-range air defence; and the Royal Navy’s ship-borne CAMM short-range and Aster 15 and 30 medium-/long-range missiles as part of the Type 45 Destroyer’s Sea Viper air defence system. The ability to integrate high-end land-based capabilities such as Patriot PAC-3 or THAAD fielded by allies and partner nations would significantly increase potential effectiveness from both a ‘shooter’ and a ‘sensor’ point of view. In addition, any IAMD C2 network must incorporate high-fidelity data about friendly and civilian air operations in the airspace in question. Without an accurate, common and comprehensive recognised air picture it is very challenging to manage IAMD engagements safely and effectively. This requirement for deconfliction is another reason why E-7A, as the single best ‘source of truth’ within the air component about the aerial battlespace, would be a high-gain priority for any efforts to enhance IAMD effectiveness through JADC2-style connectivity. + +The UK already has a somewhat developed capability that can be used to integrate sensors and effectors from multiple domains into a single IAMD. The SkyKeeper system from Lockheed Martin UK has been developed and refined to meet the Land Environment Air Picture Provision (LEAPP) capability requirement. A contract for its upgrade and service life extension was awarded in January 2022, which will improve the capabilities of the truck-mounted system and extend its service life to 2029. SkyKeeper can integrate C-UAS, counter-rocket and mortar (C-RAM) and conventional air defence assets into a single recognised air picture for the operators of each system. In the future, the system is claimed to have significant growth potential for use as a battlespace C2 network, which would allow incoming threats to be identified and then allocated to the most suitable of a potentially wide variety of shooters such as C-RAM, Sky Sabre or C-UAS effectors. The current SkyKeeper version unveiled in 2019 can receive data feeds from most sensors and transmit target tracking data using common data links such as Link 16 from air assets and Link 11 from naval assets. Lockheed Martin UK also claims that it can integrate the wide-area sense and detect sights of Ajax into the system, and can also integrate data from the F-35 Lightning II into the network if required. This would be a significant expansion of the current LEAPP requirement set, but illustrates that there are already networking solutions in place with UK forces that could potentially be used as building blocks for increasing the real-time integration of sensors and potentially shooters from across the joint force in an IAMD context. + +The vital importance of a high-fidelity common recognised air picture, and the multifaceted nature of the potential threats ranging from sUAS to salvoes of ballistic and cruise missiles that might face UK forces deployed in the Middle East make the priorities clear for early investments in JADC2-style cross-domain connectivity if IAMD is identified as a priority mission set for the future joint force. Significant increases in effectiveness and operational flexibility could be expected if existing network and C2 capabilities such as LEAPP that currently focus on connecting systems in a single domain could be expanded or linked to allow routine real-time data exchange with airborne sensor nodes such as the E-7A Wedgetail, F-35 and Crowsnest. + +In reality, enabling full-spectrum IAMD coverage in a theatre as complex as the Middle East with capabilities currently in the UK inventory is unlikely to be possible. Seamless data sharing with allied ground-based capabilities such as Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD, as well as E-3A/F/G AWACS, would be necessary for deconfliction purposes but would also be a high priority due to the potential improvements to mutual sensor and shooter coverage. + + +### IV. Vignette 3: Contested Freedom of Navigation Operations + +The Royal Navy conducted a potentially opposed FONOP in June 2021 when HMS Defender sailed close to the Russian-occupied territory of Crimea in the Black Sea. During this operation, Defender was harassed by Russian attack aircraft and gunboats and locked up by shore-based radar systems. The Royal Navy has also conducted FONOPs in the South China Sea close to artificial reefs built by the People’s Liberation Army Navy to create illegal bastions of territory claims and area-denial system coverage. The US Navy frequently conducts FONOPs, and they are seen by many NATO nations as a crucial politico-military tool to assert rights of access to the global commons against aggressive attempts to change borders or interdict sea lines of communication (SLOCs) by force. With Russia committed to long-term confrontation with the West following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and China continuing its policies of attempting to change the status quo in both the South and East China seas, FONOPs are likely to remain an important tool for Western policymakers in the coming years. + +However, the continuing development and proliferation of highly capable anti-ship missiles, submarines and more novel potential threats, such as swarms of sUAS and loitering munitions, will all ensure that even major surface action groups will face considerable danger during contested FONOPs at times of heightened tension. The US Navy’s NIFC-CA architecture was developed precisely to enhance the survivability and lethality of naval task forces against high-end threats in a warfighting context by greatly improving the situational awareness and weapon effectiveness of the destroyers and aircraft against incoming threats. At a less ambitious scale, it is worth examining where similar automated C2 and data-sharing functions between platforms would add most value for the UK in the context of FONOPs to defend access to contested SLOCs. + +In a similar fashion to the preparatory stages of a SEAD/DEAD campaign, the first challenge in reducing the risk to a planned FONOP would be to try to detect, identify and then track the locations of the primary anti-ship threats in the contested maritime area. These will generally comprise coastal defence cruise missiles and the ground-based and possibly airborne radars that provide them with target information, as well as, potentially, missile-carrying small-boat swarms, sUAS and in the case of larger powers possibly aircraft and submarines. The nature of the threat in each geographic context will determine the scope and feasibility of mitigation and (if necessary) defence or deterrence measures to ensure a FONOP can be conducted successfully. However, in all cases a thorough understanding of enemy force dispositions and capabilities will be essential. Without such an understanding it is impossible to adequately protect a vessel conducting FONOPs during periods of high tension. + +The second challenge will be to ensure that the ship or task group is provided with as many credible defence and/or retaliatory options as possible to deter hostile action by denial and/or punishment respectively. The third will be ensuring adequate connectivity between the ship conducting the FONOP, any supporting assets, and higher command levels who can provide rapid guidance on changing political circumstances, rules of engagement or orders throughout the period of vulnerability. This may be very difficult given that an adversary is likely to make liberal use of electronic warfare to interfere with the sensors and communications of the ship and any supporting elements, as such actions signal displeasure and create windows of kinetic vulnerability without the escalation implications of kinetic force. + +Intelligence collection assets being used to ascertain the localised threat nature and location of key adversary capabilities are unlikely to be a major priority for integration if they will be conducting their missions well in advance of the FONOP in question. By its nature, the side conducting a FONOP generally has a significant degree of control over the timing of the passage through the contested waterway. Therefore, increasing the ability to pull information off ISR assets in real time through greatly increased connectivity is unlikely to provide more than a marginal increase in the efficiency of such preparatory activity compared to current practices. On the other hand, on the day of the FONOP itself, as the ship(s) in question sail towards the contested area, the ability to provide real-time connectivity between supporting ISR assets and the surface action group could add significant value. ISR assets such as P-8 Poseidon or RC-135W Rivet Joint may be able to detect any changes in the movement patterns and electronic emissions of adversary ground-based and maritime threat systems which could signal intent to conduct an attack. The faster this information can be relayed to the task group, the more effective any defensive and/or retaliatory measures can be made, and the greater the deterrent effect on an adversary. + +During the FONOP transit itself, the ship’s onboard radar systems would provide the primary source of defensive situational awareness, alongside the sensors of any embarked aviation – such as the MX15 sensor ball and SeaSpray AESA radar mounted on the Royal Navy’s Wildcat HMA.2 helicopters. The outputs from these sensors are theoretically already supposed to be well integrated via the Merlin Mk2 Crowsnest system which (if present) would also provide another source of wide area radar surveillance to spot incoming threats. These systems should, on their own, provide excellent radar coverage of both the aerial and surface threat picture during the hours of the transit itself. However, the interception of incoming missile threats would still rely on the radar picture from the ship’s own sensors, which restricts the range at which such engagements can be conducted against sea-skimming threats. Sufficiently high-resolution/low-latency data sharing between airborne sensors (including F-35B, if in theatre) and the Type 45 to enable third-party missile guidance for Aster 30 could enable the ship to engage incoming threats beyond the radar horizon of its own sensor coverage. Against supersonic or hypersonic threats this would significantly enhance the odds of a successful defensive engagement and might also allow the launcher to be targeted rapidly with naval gunfire or TLAMs to prevent further hostile launches. This is precisely what NIFC-CA allows for the US Navy. However, the Royal Navy lacks a long-range missile capability comparable to the US SM-3 and SM-6 series, and aside from the F-35B’s radar, the available airborne radars, which include Crowsnest and SeaSpray, may lack the technical capacity to provide missile guidance even if furnished with a sufficiently advanced ability to share data with both ship and missile in flight. + +In principle, NIFC-CA or JADC2-style connectivity with airborne assets with high-end sensors offers the opportunity to enhance the guidance quality and effective range against sea-skimming or surface threats for the missiles carried by Royal Navy ships during a contested FONOP. This would not only offer the potential for lower risk against a given threat but also lower the political escalation risk during an actual engagement – since the number of munitions fired can prove the symbolic difference between a skirmish and a major confrontation at the geopolitical level. + +The same can be said of both the precision and need for any retaliatory strikes against shore-based or maritime attackers. From an escalation-control point of view, the ability to intercept incoming threats is preferable to needing to go after the enemy launch site/vehicle, if possible, but where the latter is desirable or necessary, it is better to use fewer missiles to accomplish the task. Therefore, there are potential efficiencies to be gained from investment in JADC2-style connectivity for the likely force package the UK might deploy for a contested FONOP. However, they are marginal compared to the potentially dramatic combat effectiveness gains identified if initial investment were focused on priority areas in the context of an IAMD or SEAD/DEAD mission set. + + +### Conclusion + +This paper is intended to illustrate that a mission-facing approach could help UK policymakers identify the most relevant and potentially easiest capabilities across the force to concentrate on integrating in the early tranches of necessarily sequential MDI/JADO-type transformation efforts. Currently, there is a widely held quasi-philosophical position across the UK, the US and the armed forces of other nations that future wars will be decided by whichever side can best manage and share data seamlessly across all force elements. The UK’s Joint Concept Note 1/20 makes clear that the MoD is committed to a vision of the future force in which seamless cross-domain connectivity and integration is the norm. However, this high-level vision does not translate neatly into programme deliverables and prioritisation decisions within stretched budgets and limited programme management capacity. Even ambitious transformation projects have to start somewhere, and well-targeted initial investments in integrating a limited number of key capabilities across the domains could deliver significant enhancements to whole-force combat effectiveness + +The US Navy’s approach, with its NIFC-CA programme model, offers a potentially useful model for the UK to pursue JADC2-type connectivity across the force in more manageable and easily defined blocks. Rather than attempting root-and-branch change across the whole force simultaneously, the US Navy created an unprecedented level of real-time integration between surface warships, airborne assets and weapons in flight by focusing initially on connecting the core platforms essential to a given mission, and then building on the progress made once initial investment had yielded real-world results. + +For the UK, the lessons are clear: + +- The MoD, and Strategic Command as the integrating authority, need to prioritise early investment in real-time data sharing and combined C2 capabilities between the platforms and systems likely to deliver the greatest improvement in combat effectiveness for the force in specific key mission sets. + +- Mission-specific analysis can be used to identify which force elements would make most sense to concentrate early investment tranches on, by providing a framework through which to examine if and where advanced cross-domain data sharing and third-party targeting capabilities between specific platforms would add the most tangible value in an operational context. + +- In general, even a superficial analysis of kinetic mission sets such as the ones provided in this paper suggests that enhanced data sharing and third-party targeting capabilities linking key sensor assets, such as F-35, E-7A and SOF teams, with long-range precision fires and IAMD capabilities like GMLRS and Type 45, could greatly enhance combat effectiveness in challenging scenarios where the current force structure would struggle. + +It is also worth noting that analysis of some mission sets may suggest that for many force elements the potential combat effectiveness gains from currently deliverable JADC2-style integration would offer significantly less in terms of return on investment in the near term than other options for that funding. This should not be seen as a bad thing since careful prioritisation is undoubtedly necessary across defence, given limited budgets, personnel headroom and programme management capacity. Therefore, choosing which assets across the joint force do not yet need to be connected by an all-singing, all-dancing network and automated C2 solution is perhaps just as important as identifying what assets ought to be connected with all possible speed. + +The future of defence may eventually include something akin to the vision laid out in Joint Concept Note 1/20 and other top-level strategy documents; a completely connected joint force, fully integrated in real-time not only across all domains but also across government departments. However, there is a huge gulf between this ambition and the current state of the joint force. With limited resources and a host of urgent force modernisation and regeneration requirements, the UK’s short-to-medium investments in MDI/JADO-type capabilities will need to be incremental and focus on seamlessly connecting and integrating the assets that will see the greatest combat effectiveness increase from the capability to share real-time situational awareness and conduct joint engagements. + +--- + +__Justin Bronk__ is Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology in the Military Sciences team at RUSI. His areas of expertise include the modern combat air environment, Russian and Chinese ground-based air defences and fast jet capabilities, unmanned combat aerial vehicles and novel weapons technology. Justin is Editor of the RUSI Defence Systems online journal, and a member of the Editorial Board of the Weapons and Equipment journal of the Central Scientific Research Institute of Arms and Military Equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He has a PhD in Defence Studies from Kings College London. + +__Sam Cranny-Evans__ is Research Analyst for C4ISR in the Military Sciences team at RUSI. Sam joined RUSI in October 2021 having spent five years at the Janes Information Group, where he finished as a lead analyst in land warfare platforms. His research has included the development and modernisation of China’s People’s Liberation Army, artillery tactics in Ukraine and Russia’s concepts of escalation management. Sam has a degree in War Studies from the University of Kent. From eb93fbc87e4a09984769eade5e1ccf5d3134d2ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: theagora Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2022 00:35:50 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 06/12] 0x17 Add _columns posts, Dec.06 --- ...ssian-invasion-of-ukraine-november-2022.md | 60 ++++++++ ...yo-rally-in-solidarity-of-a4-revolution.md | 141 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 201 insertions(+) create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2022-12-03-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-november-2022.md create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2022-12-04-tokyo-rally-in-solidarity-of-a4-revolution.md diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-12-03-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-november-2022.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-12-03-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-november-2022.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4dda5d44 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-12-03-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-november-2022.md @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : "俄乌战争・十一月战局" +author: "当代张敬轩" +date : 2022-12-03 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/xMw6kB1.png +#image_caption: "（2022年11月1日—11月30日）" +description: "俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略战争，目的是把作为德、法等帝国主义国家附属国的乌克兰的全部或局部重新纳入俄罗斯帝国主义的控制下，乃至于进一步变成殖民地。" +--- + +十一月俄乌战局，战场上最主要事件就是俄军11月9日—12日从赫尔松及整个第聂伯河西岸赫尔松州大撤退。 + + + +### 一、本月战局进展 + +#### 1、赫尔松方向 + +2022年9—10月，乌军发动巴拉克列亚—库皮扬斯克、利曼、北赫尔松等三次进攻战役以来，俄军部署于赫尔松州第聂伯河以西的守军处境相当困难，其后勤线一直处于乌军远程炮兵精确火力打击的封锁之下，却因为政治因素（9月的“公投”后赫尔松州理论上已是俄联邦“本土”，其首府赫尔松市更是本次侵略战争以来俄军占领的唯一州府城市）而迟迟不能撤退，还需要在占领区对人民群众展开宣抚活动，导致大量人力物力被丢入这个无底洞而遭到无谓的消耗。 + +单纯从军事上讲，从第聂伯河西岸撤退肯定是上策，但是放弃赫尔松还是严重的政治事件，如果真的撤军必然导致俄帝威信进一步下降。因此，连塞尔维亚的武契奇都误认为冬季会发生赫尔松大决战，还将之比喻为斯大林格勒。不过侵乌俄军总指挥苏洛维金大将最终在11月初成功说服普京采取军事上合理的措施，即从第聂伯河西岸展开总撤退。11月9日，苏洛维金大将对外暗示了撤退决定，并宣称其已得到国防部长绍伊古批准。 + +在此之前，苏洛维金大将自上任以来就不断从赫尔松市等第聂伯河西岸转移人口（迄今已经迁走11.5万人）、财富、物资还有文物之类东西。也有观察家认为俄军至11月初已经在第聂伯河的东岸完成了三道新防线，可以利用它们大大节约兵力。通过这些措施，苏洛维金大将为最后的总撤退做好了军事上的准备，同时还借此进行了战略欺骗，使得乌军误以为俄军的目标是轻装上阵在西岸进行战略决战。同时，俄联邦在决定从西岸撤军后，也在政治上为撤军进行了准备，例如展开了新闻统制，并除掉了可能反对撤退的当地傀儡政权乌奸头目：傀儡政权伪州长弗拉基米尔.萨尔多在8月份进入俄联邦本土“治病”，虽然辟谣了死讯，但迄今未归；代理萨尔多职务的赫尔松州傀儡政权副州长基里尔.斯特列穆索夫则在11月死于“车祸”，老牌傀儡政客古巴列夫在赫尔松州任职的妻子古巴列娃也在总撤退期间遭到俄军逮捕拘禁。 + +11月9日，俄军主力开始撤退，当天放弃重镇斯尼古尔利夫卡。乌军此前已决策通过后勤绞杀战挤走俄军，加之畏惧俄军诱敌深入，所以在情况不明之下并未以大队紧追，而是派遣特种部队前出侦察，当天收复斯尼古尔利夫卡。 + +11月10日，乌军确认俄军已经开始总撤退，分兵多路展开追击：在赫尔松州西北部，乌军推进20多公里，拿下许多定居点后，停留在新卡夫卡以北20多公里的战线上；在赫尔松市正面，乌军推进至赫尔松市郊区，特种部队已进入赫尔松市区。 + +11月11日，乌军于当地时间中午进入赫尔松市区，至傍晚基本全部控制市区。留在赫尔松的市民表示欢迎（亲俄者自然已经跑光）。至当日日终，除新卡霍夫卡大坝区域和M14高速公路过第聂伯河大桥所在的安东涅夫卡镇两处桥头堡尚在俄军殿后部队之手之外，整个赫尔松州第聂伯河西岸地区已全部为乌军占领。 + +11月12日，俄军殿后部队最终撤出上述两处桥头堡，乌军完全收复赫尔松州第聂伯河以西地区。在赫尔松撤退过程中，俄军损失很小。因此，从军事上看来，赫尔松撤退无疑是成功的；然而，政治上失败却是明显的，这意味着放弃“俄联邦本土一个州的首府”。说难听点，就俄罗斯国内法来说，乌军现在已经打下了俄罗斯一个省会。不过，卡德罗夫、普里戈津等俄联邦目前掌权的军政人物均表态支持撤退。看来，统治集团在9月的军事灾难后已经完成了一轮洗牌，目前暂时能维持团结。 + +在这次战役中，乌军收复了大约4000平方公里的领土。 + +#### 2、顿巴斯方向 + +乌军和俄军本月继续在顿巴斯方向上对峙，双方进展很小。在北卢甘斯克方向，乌军继续向斯瓦托沃、克列缅亚发动进攻，但未能取得大的突破。在顿涅茨克方向，俄军继续向巴赫穆特（阿尔焦姆斯克）、阿夫季耶夫卡等乌军控制前线要塞城市发动进攻，然而除了在郊区夺取一两个居民点外没有什么进展。 + +在扎波罗热州，乌军发动一次战役进攻，但被俄军挫败，未能取得突破。 + +#### 3、俄军战略轰炸 + +本月，俄军继续以陆海空三基精确制导导弹和无人机，对乌方电力系统、供暖系统、供水系统等民用基础设施进行战略轰炸。烈度一般保持在每天20—50枚导弹的水平。11月15日，俄军曾对乌克兰中西部展开较大规模的导弹袭击，乌军展开拦截，交战中一度有爆炸物落入波兰境内造成2人死亡，但北约以“大概率系乌军防空导弹拦截失误落入波兰境内”为由大事化小。此后，俄军的长期战略轰炸一度起到较大作用，11月23日，一度导致“乌克兰全境停电”。此后，乌克兰虽然迅速恢复了基辅等大城市的电力，但直到两三天后才陆续恢复各地的电力，且依然严格限制为每天仅送电数小时的程度，显示俄军的战略空袭多少产生效果。不过，因为乌克兰在苏联解体后经济持续萧条，导致发电能力长期过剩，俄军并不能够彻底摧毁乌克兰的发电能力，主要是对其送电节点展开打击。乌方面对战略轰炸，一面引入西方武器、加强人民防空训练，一面减少对集中供电的依赖、对电网展开去中心化，取得一定的成果，仍继续坚持对抗俄军。目前，俄军除S300导弹储备充足外，其他各种精确制导武器的消耗都比较严重，虽然努力强化生产，但大部分导弹的库存均已不足战前的50%，所以战略空袭的可持续性本身也存在疑问。 + + +### 二、战争现状 + +目前，俄军通过放弃赫尔松缩短了战线，加强了防御，大幅强化了战线的稳定性。不过，乌军也通过收复赫尔松进一步提高了士气，同时也解放出大量兵力可以参加新的大规模进攻战役。开战以来，俄乌双方的损失均很惨重：11月初，根据美军参谋长联席会议主席米利的说法，乌军损失已超过10万人；另据乌方所谓每损失5人就有1人阵亡的说法，乌军仅阵亡就超过2万人。俄军方面，BBC统计俄军讣告显示，俄军至11月18日已阵亡超过9000人；同期，顿涅茨克傀儡政权报告阵亡约4000人；如此推测可知，俄军、傀儡军及雇佣军的阵亡也在15000人以上，总损失在7.5—10万人。可见，目前乌军阵亡、损失仍大大超过俄军及其仆从，但并无数量级的差异。此外，俄军至9月21日为止的大约7个月间仅阵亡6000人，自“局部动员”以来仅2个月阵亡官兵的数量相当于过去7个月一半，显示俄军素质大幅度下降，同时也因傀儡军骨干伤亡殆尽而不得不更多承担一线作战任务、提高了伤亡。尽管俄乌双方的损失都如此严重，然而，双方经过动员后依然有足够兵力继续战争，而平民在战争中已有超过3万人死亡（大部分在马里乌波尔）。 + +本月，美国的中期选举结束，民主党的成绩比预期要好，基本上保住了参议院、在众议院也仅落后9席、在州长选举中获胜的州也增加了。共和党中反对援助乌克兰的特朗普派受到挫折。因此，美国对乌克兰当局的援助力度短期内不会有很大下降。欧盟也对乌克兰当局展开了新一轮的援助。 + + +### 三、战争趋势 + +因为战争在短期内不可能停止，所以冬季战局也就拉开了帷幕。冬季交战对于双方的后勤是更大的考验，准备更充足的一方无疑会取得更大的优势。另一方面，乌军若不能有效利用这个冬季，俄军在来年春天就有可能重新夺回战争的主动权。到那时，战争就可能变得更加复杂。 + +[![image1](https://i.imgur.com/uj1LKUq.png)](https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/588921270) +▲ 原载《知乎》链接。 + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-12-04-tokyo-rally-in-solidarity-of-a4-revolution.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-12-04-tokyo-rally-in-solidarity-of-a4-revolution.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..395b70e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-12-04-tokyo-rally-in-solidarity-of-a4-revolution.md @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : "东京集会声援白纸运动" +author: "鹿馬" +date : 2022-12-04 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/LVnw2Dn.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "" +--- + +乌鲁木齐火灾引发的“白纸运动”在中国各地开花，海外各地华人也都组织了悼念和声援活动。我有幸见证了东京集会。 + + + +![image1](https://i.imgur.com/JNBPGjY.jpg) +▲ 悼念区的鲜花和女生小提琴演奏《Do You Hear the People Sing?》 + +我没有想到会有这么多人，特别是这么多中国大陆人能够来到现场参与这个活动。虽然现场飘扬的旗帜五花八门，有中华民国国旗、光复香港时代革命、港英旗、西藏的雪山狮子旗、东突厥斯坦的蓝色星月旗，甚至还有我闻所未闻的诸夏分离主义的“大蜀民国”旗。用小粉红的话说，这场集会可谓是“五毒俱全”，都是境外敌对势力，但是真的是这样吗？ + +如果你只看打出的旗帜，你可能会想当然地觉得又是这些传统意义上的“境外势力”搞的抗议活动，然而当我真的走到人群当中，我可以很清楚地知道不是这样的——自发参与的中国大陆人绝对是这场集会的大多数。他们虽然没有统一的旗帜，但是他们有的手拿白纸，有的在白纸上还写上标语，也有“蛤丝”（调侃江泽民的网友），有“国粉”（中国大陆的中华民国派），他们毫不掩饰掩饰地表达出要自由，不要独裁，不要皇帝。 + +![image2](https://i.imgur.com/kV1Wyci.jpg) +▲ 集会区域人多到看不到尽头 + +![image3](https://i.imgur.com/MSUIKuo.jpg) +▲ 恰逢长者去世，有蛤丝前来报到 + +![image4](https://i.imgur.com/OUFqDoO.jpg) +▲ 集会人士手持反极权海报纸牌 + +在这里，传统意义上的“境外势力”和来自中国大陆的“新境外势力”在自由的旗帜下聚集在了一起，虽然诉求不同，但是大家没有割席。在四通桥事件和白纸革命之前，此情此景是不可想象的——“共产党下台，习近平下台”，“要自由”，以及四通桥上的横幅标语成了在场最大的公约数。 + + +### 既然互联网无法表达，那就上街吧！ + +这场集会的另一个值得注意的点，就是它提供了一个大家自由表达的机会，人们可以轮流在人群中发表演讲，有的人讲道理，有的人喊口号，有的人讲述自己的过往遭遇和心路历程。人们聚在这里，通过表达理念和情感，让在场的每个人知道，我们不是孤单的，我们不是异类，我们虽有不同的生活环境和家庭背景，人生经历有所不同，但我们都热爱自由，都愿意关心他人处境，都没有觉得别人的遭遇事不关己。 + +![image5](https://i.imgur.com/wXReVDX.jpg) +▲ 人生中第一张选票 + +前阵我在后二十大时代之杂谈（二）用爬行回应荒谬的时代一文中讲到学生们聚在一起在地上爬这种看似怪异的行为，背后实际上是人在追求对找到同伴和自我表达两种本能的满足。举起白纸的学生们，乌鲁木齐中路的上海市民们，亮马河畔的北京市民们，他们并不是吃饱了撑的没事干，他们走上街头的动机既有为他人发声就是为自己发声的理性的考虑，也遵从表达自我与找到伙伴的本能——只有自由表达和找到同伴的需求得到满足，人们的政治抑郁才能被治愈，无力感带来的沮丧才能够被治愈。 + +另外，由于简体中文互联网的审查，导致不符合官方意识形态的思想无法自由传播，所谓反贼们很难在网上形成社群，这就更凸显出线下群聚的重要性。到了线下，才知道有这么多和自己有相似想法的人，同时还能倾听不同族群的不同诉求，这里不再是只有官方意识形态的场域。在这里有香港的朋友，有台湾的朋友，还有被妖魔化的西藏和新疆维吾尔族的朋友，在这里我们的互相倾听对方，不再把他们当成避之而不及的X独分子。 + +接下来，我想截取我印象深刻的发言者的瞬间记录下来，他们并不是活动的发起者，很多人都是人生中第一次参与这样的活动，他们的发言或许并没有很充分的准备，甚至有的人激动到颤抖，连话都说不出来，但他们自由表达的行为本身给了我很大的触动和勇气。 + +`注：1.有些发言我无法复原发言者的原话，只能凭我的记忆补全大概意思。2.由于现场环境嘈杂部分内容可能会有所出入。3.出于安全考虑，本文不会出现演讲者的图片和影像资料。` + +#### ウイグル人に自由を！ + +一位来自乌鲁木齐的维吾尔族女生。 + +她的家人们被强制收容进了再教育营，2017年至今无法联系到自己的家人。她高喊：ウイグル人に自由を！（给维吾尔人自由），在场人群也跟随其口号高喊：ウイグル人に自由を！ + +在场的汉族人是大多数，但不会把她看作和自己不相干的人，更不会因为集会中出现东突厥斯坦的旗帜就不同情其遭遇。 + +当她发言完毕，人群中有人高喊：我们与维吾尔人站在一起！ + +#### 来自新疆汉人的悲愤 + +来自一位新疆汉族女生和一位新疆汉族男生的发言。他们都来自于新疆的汉族公职人员家庭。 + +“我觉得我有必要为新疆还在被封控的人发声，为了乌鲁木齐人，上海人，全国的人发声，中国需要自由！”，女生呼喊道。 + +她向我们诉说了作为新疆人童年时看到坦克上街的恐惧；作为新疆汉人一面要面对恐怖袭击的恐惧，一面还要忍受政府更多对自由的剥夺，忍受比中国内地还要严酷的网络封锁。 + +新疆男生说到：“我们连百度云都用不了！”。（由百度提供的备受审查的云端储存服务）人群中有人调侃地喊道：“那还怎么看片啊！”（这里的片指AV，百度云常用于获取资源） + +这位男生还说到，他家人供职于医疗系统，之前给再教育营里维吾尔人做检查的时候会检查他们的肚子里有没有异物，因为有人会吃铁自杀。 + +#### 我们的行动就是我们的选票！ + +一位回答了我们来这里集会有什么用的发言者。 + +“我来这里之前就邀请了我的朋友和同学，也跟我的家人朋友说过，他们问了我一个很相似的问题：你到这里来有什么用！？你跟大家群情激愤，回去之后你继续过你的日子，第二天也没有任何改变。” + +“我要告诉大家，不是的！如果有人问你，你站出来有什么用，你告诉他：这就是我的选票！你花出去的每一分钱，说出去的每一句话，你在电脑上手机上打出的每一个所谓反动的字，都是你的选票！” + +“我们在用脚投票！民主需要投票，但是投票不只有选票一种方式，我们以我们的双脚来到这里发声，这就是我们的选票！民主万岁！” + +#### 用母语喊出自由 + +来自一位内蒙古的蒙古族小哥的汉蒙双语发言。 + +他告诉我们中国政府的所谓双语教学，就是要逐步灭绝蒙古人的语言，本质上是一种强制同化政策。 + +他悲愤地控诉道：“我们曾经上课都会学习蒙古语，用蒙古语授课，但是后来中央罢免了支持民族文化教育的官员，开始用汉语授课，美其名曰双语教育，但到后来蒙古语课都要被挤出课堂，很多小孩子已经变得不会说蒙古语！” + +当他用汉语发言过后，又开始用用蒙古语发言，现场能够听懂的人或许不多，但我相信人们理解他为什么要这样做——喊出自己的母语，这是他的抗议。 + +最后，他用蒙古语高喊自由，现场的人们也跟随他的发音呼喊起来。我们虽然不懂蒙古语，但那一刻，人们知道为蒙古族人争取自由也是为我们争取自由，我们面对相同的压迫根源。 + +#### 谁曾经不是小粉红？ + +来自一位自称曾经是小粉红的男生的发言。 + +“不仅国内的人，就连像我们这样在国外的人，也要因为我们的祖国而心惊胆颤。一百多年前大清朝的时候我们都不用这么害怕，一百多年后国家强大了，我们反而更要害怕我们的祖国了！” + +“两年前我就是个小粉红，我骂香港人，我骂台湾人。” + +人群中有人高喊高喊：“我也是！” + +“大家不要怕，大家从此和他们站在一起，向他们道歉，我们一起抗争一起战斗！” + +#### 人民需要自由，这是最坏的时代！ + +“我们为什么站在这里？因为我们相信自由，相信民主，相信真理！如果我们在这个过程中付出代价，这都是我们心甘情愿的！我们不惧怕这些！” + +“你有权利发声的时候你不发声，你把权利让给公权力，到时候你发觉，我怎么变成别人的奴隶，那个时候你就后悔去吧！不要把发声的权利让给别人，不做奴隶做主人！” + +“大家不要放弃抗争，如果你们周围的人不愿意参加进来，这没有关系，你告诉他我们不用一下达到很大的目标，就从小事做起。” + +“最后我想一引用一个我喜欢的歌手，叫李志，他有一首歌的歌词叫人民不需要自由这是最好的年代，但我想说，人民需要自由这是最坏的年代！” + +#### 当我们主动走出来，也就理解了香港人为什么抗争 + +来自一位曾因转发“不当言论”国内父母被叫去喝茶朋友的发言。 + +“我在国内自己的空间，问徐州铁链女到底怎么样了，可是3月8号那一天，网警找到我在国内的家人，找他们去喝茶，我害怕。可是今天我还是站出来了。” + +“我站在这里想告诉所有人，不要害怕，我们是有力量的，我们和维吾尔人站在一起，和新疆人站在一起，和2019年香港抗争的人站在一起。我们曾经有不同的想法，可能曾经觉得那些人是被煽动。可是我们今天第一次主动走出来，那我们被煽动了吗，有人给你们钱吗？哪来的境外势力？月球吗？”（此处是引用北京抗议民众在街头反驳境外势力煽动论的原话：哪来的境外势力？月球吗？） + +这时人群有人回应：我们就是境外势力！ + +“我们都有同样的想法，就是我们要自由，我们要人权。” + +#### 哪怕是一头猪被关在猪圈里它都知道要跑！ + +来自一位经历当地政府养老金项目暴雷，见证了身边的人维权上访被维稳的女生的发言。 + +“我们不是孤独的！只是我们的嘴被堵了起来。现在我们有机会在这里喊出我们的需求，我们需要的是让独裁政府下台！让习近平下台！让他们感到害怕，让他们明白人民的力量，我们可以推翻他们！” + +“我一直不能理解国内的一些人到现在都在支持中国政府，为什么！？明明一直在圈养着他们，没有自由，嘴被堵住，行动被束缚，连家门都出不了还要维护中国政府！哪怕是一头猪被关在猪圈里它都知道要跑！” + +“我希望我们国内的朋友醒过来，中国政府只是把我们关在猪圈里养而已，我们应该推翻他们，而不是支持他们。习近平下台！共产党下台！我们需要拆掉围栏，我们需要自由！不自由，毋宁死！” + +### 最后 + +千言万语汇成一句话，想对现场声援的人们说：谢谢你们给了我勇气。 + + \ No newline at end of file From 46682c76576ad4a4e2e1a7cd5238f3ed017f7df3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: hokoi Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2022 06:47:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 07/12] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x17 Dec.06 --- .../_hkers/2022-12-02-ai-and-the-arctic.md | 82 ++++++++++++++++ ...-12-03-isis-to-generate-forces-in-syria.md | 44 +++++++++ ...2022-12-03-risks-of-premature-ceasefire.md | 98 +++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 224 insertions(+) create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-12-02-ai-and-the-arctic.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-12-03-isis-to-generate-forces-in-syria.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-12-03-risks-of-premature-ceasefire.md diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-02-ai-and-the-arctic.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-02-ai-and-the-arctic.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0ec828c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-02-ai-and-the-arctic.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : AI And The Arctic +author: Colin Wall, et al. +date : 2022-12-02 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/KPWflab.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Maps of the Arctic are misleading. The vastness of the region is not fully captured in two dimensions: the Arctic Circle spreads across roughly 14.5 million square kilometers, a greater area than any country save Russia._ _This fact is not only trivia; it has serious implications for the well-being of the communities who live there, the militaries who monitor it, and the scientists who seek to better predict the coming global impacts of climate change. To perform their functions well, each of these actors seeks tools to compensate for or overcome these vast distances, as well as the harsh environment that makes sustained presence in the Arctic so challenging. Increasingly, these communities — some of which have been in the Arctic for decades, and others for centuries — are coming to understand that artificial intelligence may be essential to monitor the region and predict changes within it._ + +In this edition of Northern Connections, the authors tackle the implications of this new tool for national security and climate research. Both pieces illustrate how governments, scientists, and Indigenous communities can use artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) to better understand key Arctic problem sets, particularly those that involve parsing either a massive amount of data or complex and shifting future scenarios. At the same time, both note that AI/ML, while holding immense potential, remains not entirely proven. In some cases, a lack of funding hinders a robust deployment of AI/ML; in others, it must compete with more established and orthodox methodologies. + +In the first essay, Lieutenant Commander Michael Bielby of the Canadian Armed Forces lays out Canada’s incipient efforts to use AI/ML for its domain awareness mission in the far north. He explains the unique physical challenges of the region and the insufficiency of using only crewed resources to monitor it, given the finiteness of those assets and the vast distances involved. Passive and active sensors are the means to compensate for this reality, but as Lt. Commander Bielby notes, this creates a new problem: a “deluge” of data where it is not always possible for human operators to distinguish quickly (enough) between what might be an adversary vessel and what might simply be natural debris. He argues that AI/ML may well be the answer to this riddle. + +The second contributor is Dr. Lillian “Doc” Alessa, an Arctic and intelligence expert and a member of the National Climate Assessment Team. Dr. Alessa interrogates the applicability of AI/ML for researching the thaw of Arctic permafrost, which underlies 25 percent of the Northern Hemisphere. The rate at which climate change causes this permafrost to melt has serious consequences for not only local Arctic communities, but the entire world. Dr. Alessa argues that, especially if paired with the knowledge of those local communities, AI-generated models will allow policymakers to better understand permafrost thaw as well as test different scenarios of melting against various tactics for intervention or adaptation. + + +## Military Implications: Artificial Intelligence in the Arctic + +> #### Michael Bielby + +![image1](https://i.imgur.com/DnJyWd4.jpg) +_▲ JONATHAN NACKSTRAND_ + +A responsibility of every state is to exercise its sovereignty through the protection of its defined territory from intrusions by foreign states. For that to happen, the state must understand what is happening within those physical spaces. It must have domain awareness. For a number of reasons, this becomes extremely challenging in far northern regions. In recent years, Canada and other Arctic states are increasingly considering how to develop and deploy AI/ML tools to address this domain awareness challenge. + +Approximately 40 percent of Canada’s land mass, roughly 3.5 million km2, lies north of 60° north latitude. As with most inhabited Arctic regions in North America, Europe, and Russia, it is scarcely populated — in Canada’s case, fewer than 120,000 people, or less than one person per approximately 26 km2. Understandably, it is very difficult to generate the requisite level of domain awareness necessary for the state to exercise sovereignty in this remote territory. The obvious solution is to start generating that awareness before state actors can breach territorial boundaries — in other words, to detect them at sea. + +This introduces a whole new problem set, as Canada’s exclusive economic zone north of 60° encompasses approximately 4 million km2. The economic and logistical feasibility of monitoring such a vast area using crewed resources would be taxing enough, but the task of generating maritime domain awareness becomes financially and logistically untenable when considering the inhospitable climate of the Canadian north, a lack of suitable extant infrastructure, and the fact that infrastructure development projects are plagued by supply chain issues and a shortened building season. To further exacerbate the issue, the finite crewed resources suitable to conduct this mission are also required to deliver similar strategic effects on overseas missions. As such, the only viable option, at this time, for Canada becomes the employment of space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (SB-ISR) capabilities. + +Given the various factors that complicate maritime activity in northern waters — such as sea state (high sea states result in sea spray and accumulation of ice on the upper decks in sub-zero temperatures, which can affect ship stability and potentially result in a ship sinking or capsizing), icebergs, and the varying constructions of vessels plying those waters — no single SB-ISR sensor type is a panacea. An active sensor may detect the signal return off an object (e.g., metal reflect signals better than fiberglass) but cannot necessarily differentiate between a ship and a bergy bit, and passive sensors can be defeated simply by turning off an emitter. Therefore, a mix of active and passive sensors ensures a greater probability of detecting contacts. However, in solving one problem, another is created: multiple sensor feeds create massive amounts of positional data. The result is that Arctic operators drown in the deluge of data from SB-ISR sensors while starving for domain awareness. + +If the deluge of data is framed as a big data issue, there are four variables to consider: volume, variety, velocity, and veracity. Maritime positional data from various sensor feeds for the approaches to North America and the Arctic exceeds tens of millions of reports daily (volume), is received in a variety of structured and unstructured reporting formats (variety), and arrives continuously (velocity). System operators are not able to keep up with the velocity of the data flow from SB-ISR sensors while performing the necessary quality-control functions (veracity) while also monitoring for anomalous behavior as bad actors attempt to exploit various interstitial gray areas. + +The only way to correlate the volume and variety of data at the velocity in which it is received is through the adoption of AI/ML. This technology will not only solve the operators’ problems but, at machine-to-machine speeds, will be able to cross-cue additional sensors based on the data received, thereby improving the probability of achieving positive identification and subsequent domain awareness. + +The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is still somewhat of a newcomer to the adoption and implementation of AI/ML to support maritime domain awareness. However, the Royal Canadian Navy’s Innovation Team recently trialed an advanced maritime domain awareness software that uses AI/ML to detect surface vessel traffic acting unusually. In addition, the Royal Canadian Air Force, as the CAF Functional Authority for space, has factored AI/ML requirements into many of the SB-ISR projects currently under way. Given the complexities of the approval process for CAF projects, the implementation of many of these solutions is still a few years off. + +In the interim, the CAF’s most effective AI/ML mitigating strategy has been the reinvigoration of multinational partnerships, such as the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, and the (re)establishment of information-sharing agreements among allied nations and partner departments within the Canadian government. Once the data is shared, recipients can process it and notify the broader operational community of any indications and warnings of anomalous behavior. Within national chains of command, or in accordance with extant multinational treaties, this then allows platforms such as aircraft, ships, and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) to be tasked to conduct ISR missions against specific targets. This is a more efficient use of limited resources for known high-value targets and for missions of national importance. However, the weakness in this strategy is revealed in situations where the military is dealing with contacts that have not been positively identified and whose value is unknown. In such cases, the competition against other national interests and departmental priorities for the allocation of scarce resources makes it difficult to justify ISR missions. This is why this multinational approach, while useful, remains an interim solution at best. + +The more that countries depend on SB-ISR in the vast and remote high north to aid in the exercising of sovereignty, the more likely Arctic operators are to drown in a deluge of big data. In the long term, investing in the development of robust AI/ML capabilities that can be employed in the region is the only way for Arctic states to turn big data into domain awareness and ensure their sovereignty is protected. + + +## Artificial Intelligence and Permafrost + +> #### Lillian “Doc” Alessa + +![image2](https://i.imgur.com/EwIRQD9.jpg) +_▲ GABRIEL BOUYS_ + +Even though the population of the Arctic is only around 4 million people, the region has global significance due to its strategic geography, exploitable natural resources, and rapid rate of climate and environmental change (CEC). It also contains permafrost, which is ground that remains below 0°C for two or more consecutive years, making it frozen and a largely stable foundation for the active layer, which supports above-ground flora, fauna, and built infrastructure. + +Continuous (deep) and discontinuous (shallow) permafrost comprises a full 25 percent of the Northern Hemisphere, and current estimates suggest that between 30 and 85 percent of current subsurface permafrost will thaw within a century, depending on global temperature increases. While permafrost thaw is often thought of as a future phenomenon, it has been changing rapidly for roughly the past 40 years. The effects can be readily seen in natural terrain and built infrastructure, where degradation is ultimately placing at risk roughly $15.5 billion in civil infrastructure in the United States alone, much of which supports the defense enterprise. Furthermore, given that permafrost covers approximately 65 percent of the Russian Arctic, it is necessary to understand, with exquisite precision, where and when changes to Russia’s infrastructure will result in opportunities to gain strategic advantage by improving the Department of Defense’s own resilience to a highly variable operating environment. Understanding the complex dynamics of permafrost thaw and its effects on strategic activities such as defense and security requires leveraging all available tools, particularly AI/ML. + +This idea bucks a deep-seated tradition in Arctic research, where field research is synonymous with the golden era of exploration. However, field research places significant burdens on local communities and funding agencies, which incur high costs for increasingly low returns on investments. Especially when combined with the deep pools of local and place-based knowledge of Indigenous peoples, new tools such as AI/ML are a better means to improve U.S. and allied resilience to climate change. + +However, the concept of resilience in Arctic defense is poorly articulated. It is a term often overused and thrown around in strategic intents and policies, holding different meanings for different interest groups. Here it is defined as the ability of three types of integrated systems — (1) social (people, including their cultures and perceptions); (2) ecological (the natural environments in which they live); and (3) technological (the tools and structures used by human organizations) — to maintain desired functions despite climate change. To be achieved, Arctic resilience in this context must include the social elements of cultures and human behavior. Given the many variables and their complicated interactions, it is more critical than ever that social and societal systems be incorporated into permafrost science. + +AI/ML promises to yield the needed insights in time to be proactive and adapt successfully to the unprecedented rate of CEC. A holy grail for permafrost researchers, geopolitical strategists, and military planners alike is the development of data-driven scenarios within which it is possible to forecast potential early warnings of threats and opportunities to guide proactive interventions. AI/ML permits the user to take known interactions of variables (i.e., rule sets) within academic disciplines and apply them to a range of scenarios at landscape and regional scales as an integrated system. Working within these scenarios, AI/ML can process data to visualize the consequences and trade-offs of different CEC conditions and types of interventions at the local scale. Extending this to permafrost and defense, AI/ML creates knowledge of where and when a strategic advantage may be gained and by whom as CEC affects different types of infrastructure and ecological processes. For example, permafrost underlies the majority of Russia’s Arctic coastline and infrastructure in the region. Using AI/ML to model these effects accelerates the ability to accurately gauge, for example, which military bases will be at risk and what the consequences are to the United States and its partners and allies, which can lead to better precision in defense planning and diplomacy. + +AI/ML can be used in this context only because extensive funding over the past 30 years has yielded rule sets for permafrost physics, soil biology, and behavior of built environments that are highly precise. This means AI/ML worlds can be used to scale down to individual structures, which can rapidly improve the way infrastructure, logistics, and operations are designed. However, knowledge of how humans will react to such changes is lacking, such as how communities could be held at risk by and respond to the loss of freshwater resources. AI/ML offers a readily available laboratory to run scenarios and understand trade-offs far more quickly, cost effectively, and safely than could ever be accomplished in the past. Its value is increased when it is used as a tool that enhances engagements with diverse human communities. Since it allows multiple variables to run simultaneously, and since these series can be adjusted and amended in real time by human stakeholders and rights-holders, it also helps eliminate much of the uncertainty that policymakers and decisionmakers dislike. For example, it can be used to better identify key water sources and the systems that need to be in place to either protect them or mitigate their loss, in order to ensure their resilience for future use. In short, knowing the likely effects of permafrost on key resources allows affected communities to articulate consequences, trade-offs, and their approaches to dealing with them. + +It is important to note that AI/ML does not provide answers or solutions, it merely enables the humans tackling these challenges to ask better questions, refine understandings, and then ask the harder questions together. This cycle has traditionally taken months or years but can be done within hours via AI/ML-assisted research. Indeed, the key to addressing the many unknowns of a rapidly changing Arctic and the roadmap to resilience in defense and security is asking the right questions. Using AI/ML offers the freedom to think and do things differently by envisioning scenarios of plausible futures where a diverse range of adaptation interventions can be examined — in collaboration with the people, especially local actors, who will have to carry them out. + +This latter point underlines yet another benefit of leveraging AI/ML: this process of refining questions simultaneously enhances partnerships. In fact, one of the most critical factors in using AI/ML effectively is close collaboration with rights-holders and stakeholders — ideally at the same time — whether they be local communities or military planners. Models that are not aligned with the perceptions and knowledge that exist at local scales induce higher uncertainties in outcomes. In other words, using AI/ML to understand the consequences of changes in permafrost and develop the interventions to build resilience relies as much on human behaviors as it does on engineering. AI/ML is a key tool to bring the end users, operators, and stakeholders directly into the data-driven scenarios where human perceptions, decisionmaking, and reactions can be incorporated in real time, something that cannot be achieved outside of AI/ML-built worlds. + +Despite the overwhelming evidence that human behaviors and social dynamics are powerful determinants of resilience outcomes, disciplinary approaches in engineering, human factors (i.e., human-machine teaming), and ecology heavily dominate Arctic permafrost research. Alone, these will not deliver the level of adaptation needed to address CEC in the Arctic because adaptation is itself a human endeavor, which requires the integration of the social sciences. + +This adaptation can be accomplished by leveraging the analytic power of AI/ML to integrate the authoritative data available in hand, in order to identify critical gaps in knowledge, training, and preparedness and gain a more precise understanding of resilience. Approaching permafrost in the Arctic as an engineering problem will not lead to resilience if social dynamics are not central to analyses. AI/ML has often been criticized as something that removes humans from the loop, but it is only through engagement with partners — those who must deal with the consequences of changing permafrost, especially the loss of freshwater systems — that it is possible to develop accurate scenarios where decisions can be made and the effects of those decisions can be seen more quickly. Approaching permafrost thaw in the Arctic through AI/ML-assisted scenarios built and amended by stakeholders will result in more effective policies and the acquisition of technologies that are tailored to specific adaptations. For example, instead of trying to move water over long distances, something that requires an enormous amount of fuel, water storage systems can be engineered specific to the locale in which permafrost is changing. Innovation is often met with resistance even at the highest levels, but a growing number of practitioners — including colleagues across academia, Arctic communities, the U.S. government, and partners from the Five Eyes and NATO alliances — recognize the need to shift the approach to science and encourage the use of AI-related tools such as agent-based modeling. + +AI/ML is clearly a useful tool for permafrost research in the Arctic, and other nations are beating the United States to it. Leveraging it may even lead to ideas for novel applications relevant for questions of Arctic geopolitics, such as Russia’s militarization of the region. Without AI/ML, the United States may not gain insights at the speed of need, and research will remain slow and expensive, yielding models that are less useful to the U.S. defense enterprise and the stakeholders and partners in the Arctic on whom the United States relies. Leveraging AI/ML allows the mess of reality, in all its glorious diversity, to be incorporated into a structured set of analyses and scenarios that are only possible with advanced computational tools. It is the means by which the inputs from diverse stakeholders, whether the defense enterprise or an Indigenous corporation, can be fully included in establishing and maintaining adaptation actions that collectively ensure resilience in a rapidly changing Arctic. + +--- + +__Colin Wall__ is an associate fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he provides research and analysis on NATO, European security, and the Arctic. + +__Michael Bielby__ is the space mission assurance and integration officer, 3 Canadian Space Division, in the Canadian Armed Forces. + +__Lillian “Doc” Alessa__ is an internationally recognized Arctic and intelligence expert specializing in defense and security issues who regularly serves the U.S. government in leadership roles focused on advancing resilience to climate and environmental change. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-03-isis-to-generate-forces-in-syria.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-03-isis-to-generate-forces-in-syria.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..785b1613 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-03-isis-to-generate-forces-in-syria.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : ISIS Generating Forces In Syria +author: Brian Carter +date : 2022-12-03 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/UGy5lgb.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "ISIS Will Leverage Improved Attack Capabilities to Generate Forces in Syria" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Turkish military activity in Syria will accelerate the strengthening of the ISIS in Iraq and al Sham._ _The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced on November 23 that it would stop counter-ISIS operations in northeastern Syria so that it could address the Turkish threat, decreasing counterterrorism pressure on ISIS. ISIS is gradually increasing its attack capabilities in northeastern Syria and will use these capabilities to continue freeing imprisoned members and absorbing expertise and personnel in preparation for a larger resurgence. The group will attempt to exploit weaknesses in US-supported SDF counterinsurgency efforts to create sanctuaries. ISIS will use new sanctuaries to mount larger and more sophisticated attacks to degrade the SDF._ + +__The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham is increasing its attack capabilities in northeastern Syria.__ ISIS has increased its use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), a capability that requires robust logistics. ISIS’s VBIED use surged during two recent periods, indicating that the group’s attack capabilities are strengthening. The first surge occurred between September 2021 and January 2022. ISIS used five VBIEDs — two of them successful — during this period. The first surge also points to an increase in capability compared to early 2021, when ISIS only mounted motorcycle-borne improvised explosive device (MBIED) attacks in northeast Syria. The second surge occurred in September 2022. ISIS built at least four VBIEDs and one MBIED — employing one VBIED and one MBIED successfully — during the second surge. The group’s ability to construct a similar number of VBIEDs in a shorter time frame indicates a capability increase compared to the first surge. + +ISIS likely used freed fighters and redeployed some preexisting cells to conduct its VBIED surges. ISIS moved fighters from the Syrian desert back to Iraq and northeastern Syria in 2021, contributing to the first VBIED surge in September 2021. ISIS’s January 2022 al Sina’a prison attack freed at least 300 fighters. This prison break likely increased organizational capacity, allowing ISIS to begin a second VBIED surge in September 2022. ISIS also appointed a new Iraqi-born emir in the central Syrian desert in 2022 who was freed during the al Sina’a prison break. The need to reintegrate freed fighters into ISIS’s organizational structure in northeastern Syria may explain the time lag between the prison break and the September VBIED surge. ISIS will continue its effort to free sympathizers and fighters. The group’s attack attempt against al Hol internally displaced people (IDP) camp in September 2022 likely sought to free cells and sympathizers, though a successful attack would also have propaganda value by freeing ISIS families and protecting women. + +![image1](https://i.imgur.com/bCY23xS.png) +_▲ __Figure 1. ISIS VBIED Surges, 2021–22.__ Source: Brian Carter._ + +__ISIS’s predecessor, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), used VBIED capabilities to free imprisoned fighters and improve the quality of its attack cells.__ AQI prison breaks in 2012 strengthened the group’s capabilities in Iraq. AQI prison breaks likely led to its ability to conduct major VBIED “waves” targeting Iraqi population centers in 2012–13. ISIS today is weaker than AQI was in 2012–13, but ISIS is likely using prison breaks to resuscitate some capabilities. Recent prison breaks and smaller escapes likely improve ISIS’s capabilities by providing experienced fighters for the group. + +Syria in 2022 is less permissive for ISIS than Iraq was in 2011–13. AQI was capable of repeated spectacular attacks targeting civilians in Iraqi cities. AQI used 30 VBIEDs on one day in July 2012, a number far beyond ISIS’s current capabilities in Syria. ISIS does not have the freedom of movement or access to funding required to conduct VBIED attacks at AQI’s 2012–13 rate. ISIS also does not have the same organizational capacity AQI had in 2013. AQI had “reconstituted as a military force” with a “force-level planning cell” that could “task VBIEDs to support a complex, specialized operation” by 2013, while ISIS is a “low-level insurgency” in 2022. There is also greater counterterrorism pressure on ISIS in 2022 compared to that on AQI in 2011–13. The SDF receives greater US support than did Iraq during 2011–13, and the SDF may be more effective than the Iraqi Security Forces were between 2011–13. US special operations forces and air support limited the ISIS prison break at al Sina’a in January 2022. Tribes continue to facilitate US and SDF counterterrorism operations by providing intelligence, despite the risks posed to them by ISIS. + +ISIS will likely pursue a similar strategy to the one that enabled its predecessor’s resurgence in Iraq in 2011, despite a less permissive environment in Syria today. ISIS is at a very early stage in its resurgence, and it will likely pursue its strategy at a slower rate than AQI did after 2008. AQI sowed division between the government and local population in Sunni areas of Iraq in 2011–13 by targeting tribal “awakening” fighters who successfully rolled back Iraqi counterterrorism gains against al Qaeda in Iraq between 2007 and 2011. ISIS is emulating this effort by attempting to turn SDF-controlled territory into “areas of fear and terror” by assassinating members of the SDF and its allies “at will” to create panic. ISIS is also using Syria’s desert as a sanctuary where it can rebuild its capabilities, similar to AQI use of rural areas in Iraq after 2008. + +__ISIS’s increased logistical and operational capacity will allow it to intensify its efforts to target detention facilities.__ ISIS’s IED manufacturing sites and major weapons depots ISIS possesses a logistical apparatus that will allow it to conduct further attacks against detention facilities or other high-value targets. ISIS is likely also capable of generating intelligence using SDF and local informants to facilitate attacks and prison breaks. The SDF’s capture of a major weapons depot near Tel Hamis in September 2022 could temporarily stop some attacks, but VBIED attacks are likely to resume unless the SDF arrests the VBIED cell and its more permanent assets, such as manufacturing facilities. + +__The SDF’s counter-ISIS operations and new security measures around detention facilities have not removed the threat ISIS poses to these facilities.__ The SDF’s failure to secure areas surrounding prisons in northeastern Syria will allow ISIS to continue attack attempts aimed at freeing prisoners. The SDF did move “approximately half” of ISIS detainees to “more secure facilities.” The Defense Intelligence Agency, however, reported in May 2022 that many of the same vulnerabilities that enabled the January 2022 al Sina’a prison attack persist at the prison. ISIS VBIED and sleeper cells likely remain active near major detention sites, such as al Hol IDP Camp and al Sina’a prison. ISIS used sleeper cells and VBIEDs staged nearby to conduct the al Sina’a attack in January 2022. These cells fixed SDF forces in place and prevented SDF units from responding to the al Sina’a attack, increasing the ability of ISIS fighters to escape. In Raqqa, ISIS sleeper cells are likely intentionally “lying low” to avoid US and SDF pressure. The group attempted two prison breaks in Raqqa in fall 2022, and it could use sleeper cells to launch future attempts. + +__The SDF will prioritize confronting Turkish military activity over counter-ISIS operations.__ Turkey is targeting the SDF with air strikes and threatening a ground incursion in northern Syria. Another Turkish incursion will distract the SDF and cause the SDF to decrease its counterterrorism pressure on ISIS. The SDF’s spokesperson said the group could not deter Turkish attacks and fight ISIS simultaneously and stopped counter-ISIS operations on November 23, though the SDF resumed joint patrols with US forces on December 2. Lifting SDF counterterrorism pressure will provide an opening for ISIS to prepare attacks against key facilities, such as al Hol IDP camp. A Turkish air strike on November 23 near al Hol targeted an SDF base. The air strike did not target al Hol itself, but air strikes against SDF security near al Hol distracts SDF forces tasked with securing al Hol’s surroundings. This could allow ISIS to exploit opportunities to target high-value facilities such as al Hol or other prisons in northeastern Syria. + +Even without a significant Turkish incursion, ISIS will take advantage of the SDF’s counterproductive counterterrorism approach. The current SDF approach relies on mass arrests, counterterrorism raids, and destruction of property. These tactics contribute to popular grievances, which are key to a renewed insurgency. ISIS can recruit through detention centers after mass arrests and encourage retaliation against the SDF for counterterrorism raids and property destruction. ISIS is often able to maintain its presence in areas subject to SDF raids and arrests. ISIS reportedly “owns the night” in areas of northeast Syria and threatens to kill SDF employees for their cooperation with the SDF. The SDF’s approach actively worsens core grievances among the local communities, such as reconstruction and a lack of services. + +ISIS could undermine the SDF by sowing division between Arab communities and the SDF in northeastern Syria. The group will aim to expand from desert sanctuaries and attempt to create support zones by assassinating and intimidating SDF civilian and military employees, tribal dignitaries, and other local civilians.[1] The SDF’s counterterrorism approach is overly reliant on mass arrests, while its fails to protect its employees and civilian populations. These shortcomings could drive local communities to support ISIS and provide sanctuary to the group. Poor security and governance already created tension between the SDF and local communities in 2020. + +![image2](https://i.imgur.com/P6Wovlu.png) +_▲ __Figure 2. ISIS Intimidation and Executions North of the Euphrates River, from September 1 to December 1, 2022.__ Source: Brian Carter._ + +Division between the SDF and locals will allow ISIS to use its presence in northeastern Syria to limit the SDF’s freedom of movement and gradually reimpose its governance in areas of northeastern Syria. ISIS has successfully fixed the SDF in place during certain operations, such as the al Sina’a prison break. Increased ISIS capabilities could make a similar effort more successful in the future. Fixing the SDF in place or isolating specific bases could cause the SDF to vacate some areas if SDF reinforcements cannot protect outposts or smaller bases in ISIS attack zones. SDF bases and outposts allow the SDF to protect the surrounding areas. The SDF may also become less capable of targeting ISIS cells as local communities lose faith in the SDF’s security. Local activists in Deir Ezzor said SDF raids sometimes target innocent civilians due to faulty intelligence. Decreased SDF presence and capability would allow ISIS to reimpose its governance gradually in some areas. + +ISIS could strengthen quickly should conditions change, causing Syria to become more permissive for ISIS. The SDF remains reliant on US intelligence support to enable operations, though SDF intelligence collection and exploitation is improving. A US withdrawal could decrease the SDF’s effectiveness by ending US intelligence and logistical support. ISIS could use decreased pressure to strengthen capabilities such as VBIED manufacturing and local recruitment. These capabilities would allow ISIS to mount sophisticated attacks against SDF military positions and detention sites. ISIS is capable of generating funds through smuggling and forced zakat collection. The group could expand these efforts further if competing priorities distract the SDF. Finally, increased ISIS intelligence collection and exploitation may allow ISIS to assassinate and intimidate local leaders to cooperate with ISIS, to the detriment of the SDF. + +__The death of ISIS’s leader in mid-October is unlikely to change ISIS’s trajectory in northeastern Syria.__ Local Syrian armed groups killed ISIS’s leader in southern Syria on October 17. The al Sina’a prison break in January 2022 was likely the last major operation planned by ISIS’s overall leader. ISIS’s emir in northeastern Syria likely has both the authority and resources required to plan and conduct complex attacks against high-value targets in northeastern Syria. An Iraqi militant freed from al Sina’a in January 2022 leads ISIS in the central Syrian desert. His time in al Sina’a indicates he may have significant experience within ISIS before 2019 and may be able to assist planning efforts. ISIS cells in the central Syrian desert likely support ISIS activity in northeastern Syria. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-03-risks-of-premature-ceasefire.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-03-risks-of-premature-ceasefire.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..78a48262 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-03-risks-of-premature-ceasefire.md @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Risks Of Premature Ceasefire +author: Frederick W. Kagan +date : 2022-12-03 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/iaJ9k8g.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "The Long-Term Risks of a Premature Ceasefire in Ukraine" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_The wise-seeming counsel of seeking compromise with Russia at a point of high leverage for Ukraine is a dangerous folly now._ _It merely puts off and makes even more dangerous the risks we fear today. It might make sense to buy time in this way if time favored us. But it does not — time favors our adversaries. Accepting risk now to reduce the risk of worse disaster in the future is the wisest and most prudent course of action for the US, NATO, and Ukraine._ + +The West faces a choice: it can accept the short-term risks of continuing to support Ukraine’s effort to achieve a sustainable and enduring resolution to the current Russian invasion, or it can push for a premature cessation of hostilities that greatly increases the likelihood of renewed Russian aggression on terms far more favorable to Moscow. + +The path forward should be clear — the West must prioritize reducing Russia’s ability to renew a war that the Kremlin is more likely to win and that would carry the same escalation risks as the current war by helping Ukraine use its position of relative advantage now to set conditions to deter future conflict. + +The US has a vital national security interest in averting future Russian attacks on Ukraine. Russian invasions of Ukraine inevitably harm and endanger Europe and NATO, put the US commitment to defend its NATO allies on the table, and entail the risk of conventional or nuclear escalation. America and its Western allies and partners should not accept, let alone push for, a temporary cessation of hostilities in Ukraine that increases the likelihood of a renewed Russian invasion in future years. This consideration must drive decisions about when to seek negotiated compromises and what conditions to encourage Ukraine to accept. + +US interests in ending the current war on terms that minimize the risk of future Russian invasion can be fully separated from the moral and humanitarian considerations that motivate many people to support Ukraine. American interests flow from the NATO alliance and the obligations it imposes on the US as well as to the close and vital economic interdependence of the US with Europe. Europe and NATO will be profoundly affected by a future Russian invasion of Ukraine as they have been by this one, and the US will face the same imperative to support its allies in the future as it does today. American policymakers today must focus on the imperative of resolving the current conflict in ways that do not set conditions for renewed war for our own interests, not just Ukraine’s. + +The likely durability of a cessation of hostilities rests on three fundamental questions: + +- Will Russia’s objectives with respect to Ukraine, other former Soviet states, NATO, and the US change? + +- Will the future correlation of forces favor Ukraine once the fighting stops? + +- Will Western support for Ukraine remain firm? + + The answer to all three questions if hostilities were suspended soon is “no.” Russia’s objectives are not likely to change in the foreseeable future and must be taken as a given. The correlation of forces will begin to move away from favoring Kyiv toward favoring Moscow as soon as the fighting stops, and Western support for Ukraine will almost inevitably begin to fall. Ukraine’s position today is such that a drop in Western support and the shift in the correlation of forces will significantly increase the likelihood of a renewed Russian invasion.  + +A stable and sustainable cessation of hostilities can occur only if the West helps Ukraine use its current momentum to secure a sufficiently advantageous position from which it will be able to effectively deter a future Russian attack even as the correlation of forces changes and Western support falls. The imperative of seeking to avert a future war in Ukraine thus requires continuing to help Ukraine fight to make necessary military gains and secure necessary reconstruction assistance rather than seeking to freeze war prematurely. + +Putin’s objective in launching the invasions of 2014 and then 2022 was the destruction of an independent, pro-Western Ukrainian state. His aims have increased over that period rather than moderating. His initial complaints in 2014 revolved around Ukraine’s orientation toward the West and away from Russia. Eight years later, he and his subordinates are engaged in a full-throated denial of the validity of a Ukrainian ethnicity or independent Ukrainian state. The Kremlin has clung to its demands despite battlefield defeats and its rhetoric has only become more extreme as Ukraine has turned the tide of the war against Russia. + +It is extremely unlikely that Putin would accept any reasonable compromise terms because of the domestic price he would likely pay for having obtained relatively little at such a great cost. Putin and those around him are also driving his maximalist position on Ukraine deep into the Kremlin’s ideology and trying to imbue the Russian population with it. There is no evidence to suggest that Putin or any Putinist successor will abandon his maximalist objectives toward Ukraine, even if he or a successor is willing to accept a temporary cessation of hostilities. + +The planning assumption regarding Putin’s and Russia’s objectives toward Ukraine must be that they will remain unchanged — Russia will continue to seek to subjugate Ukraine to its control fully and completely by one means or another. + +We must learn the right lesson from the period of the Minsk II Accords from 2014 to 2022. France and Germany, with US support, engaged Russia as a theoretically neutral and non-belligerent mediator in a conflict begun by a Russian invasion. They imposed on Ukraine a set of commitments that amounted to partial surrender of Kyiv’s sovereignty while demanding no formal commitments directly from Russia. They accepted the fiction that Russian proxies in Ukraine were independent of Moscow and pressed Ukraine to uphold its commitments even as the proxies continually violated theirs — and never held Moscow explicitly to account for the actions of proxies that were acting on Russia’s orders and with Russia’s direct support.  + +The accords imposed a settlement that was extremely favorable to Russia. They specifically required Ukraine to grant the Russian-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk autonomy while at the same time allowing them to participate fully in the Ukrainian political process. Such a move would have created permanent Russian levers to manipulate the Ukrainian political system throughout the country while depriving Kyiv of the ability to control Russian and Russian proxy activities in the Russian-occupied areas. The accords did not require Russia to withdraw its forces from the areas it occupied because they did not recognize that Russia had forces in those areas — even though it clearly did. The theory of the case of those in the West who supported these accords was twofold — first, that “peace” in the form of an incredibly violent and constantly-violated ceasefire was better than open warfare, and second, that the “Minsk process” would somehow, ultimately, mollify Putin and bring him to accept a new status quo highly favorable to Russia permanently. Above all the Western backers of the Minsk II Process thought that Putin was focused only or at least primarily on eastern Ukraine, whereas in fact he continued to seek to regain effective control of the entire country. + +The assumptions underlying the Minsk II Process have been utterly and completely invalidated. Russia’s proxies deliberately ensured that they never met their commitments under the accords and so made it almost impossible for Ukraine to meet its commitments. The proxies were not out of Russia’s control — they were pursuing Putin’s aims. Because Putin was never satisfied with Minsk II — he wanted more, and he used his proxies to try to renegotiate the accords by force. When that effort failed, he invaded. + +The burden on those who would argue that any agreement between Russia and Ukraine today would not follow a similar path toward renewed Russian invasion is enormous. It is almost impossible, in fact, to see how one could persuasively make such an argument given Russian actions and rhetoric over nearly all of Putin’s tenure. + +We must instead accept as a planning assumption that Putin will continue to try to renegotiate by force any limited compromise agreement made now, up to and including through renewed Russian full-scale invasion if and when he or his successor decides that circumstances are propitious. + +That consideration then raises the question of the likely trajectory of the correlation of forces between Russia and Ukraine. Some advocates of negotiations now point to the fact that Ukrainian leverage at the moment is high because of Kyiv’s battlefield successes and Western support, on the one hand, and Russia’s struggles and relative isolation, on the other. If negotiations conducted at a moment of high leverage could yield a permanent resolution of conflict, then such an approach can make sense. But if, as in the present case, a negotiated settlement can only be expected to generate a temporary respite, then this approach makes sense only if we can expect the future correlation of forces to favor Ukraine. + +That consideration, in turn, requires a closer examination of the factors that have given Ukraine relatively high leverage at the moment. The key factors are the rallying of Ukrainians behind a full mobilization for war and high levels of Western support, on the one hand, and the catastrophically bad performance of the Russian military and Russian defense industry on the other. None of those factors is likely to change in the next six-to-twelve months if the fighting continues. All of them are likely to change rapidly and to Ukraine’s disadvantage once a ceasefire takes hold. + +Ukrainians remain willing to support full national mobilization because they are fighting a war for the survival of their state and people. They know that if they stop fighting, Russian troops will drive deeper into their country and inflict horrors on them, ultimately overthrowing their government and subjugating them. But full mobilization is extraordinarily painful. It will be unsustainable once the immediate threat of defeat is removed. Ukraine will have to demobilize partially and attempt to rebuild, greatly reducing its combat power. The Ukrainian government will be under pressure to do sustain a strong enough military to defend against future Russian invasion and reconstruct a vibrant and prosperous economy. Ukraine is not wealthy enough to do both of those things well, particularly if it must lose much of the territory Russia currently occupies, so it will likely suboptimize both. It will likely seek to stabilize a smaller but higher-quality military while satisfying the economic demands of its people. Ukraine’s organic military capacity will thus drop significantly following a ceasefire, possibly increasing again gradually as more sustainable military practices take hold. + +If Ukraine’s current military power-driven leverage is temporarily high because of full mobilization, Russia’s is temporarily low because of the series of stupid decisions made by Putin and his generals before and during this war. Putin did not mobilize for this war. He did not put Russia’s defense industry on a war footing. He did not prepare his people for war. He did not even prepare his military for war. Once his initial assumptions about the ease of this invasion were falsified he took many months to order the reserve mobilization he should have ordered at once. But he ordered even that mobilization without adequate preparation or warning, and it, too, became a mess.  + +Russian forces would have benefitted enormously from a months-long cessation of hostilities or even relaxation of the demand for offensive operations. Any such protracted operational or strategic pause would have given them time to reorganize, refit, and prepare for renewed offensive operations on much better terms. Putin gave them no such time, instead whipping his generals to constant offensives that simply ground the remaining combat power of the Russian military into dust. Putin did not allow his military to concentrate the mobilized reservists into coherent units that could be massed to achieve decisive battlefield effects, but instead demanded that they be hurled into combat piecemeal and unprepared, frittering away yet another opportunity to regain the initiative. All these dynamics continue to this day — the Russian military is consuming combat power as fast as it can be generated and is trying to draw on a defense industrial base only slowly and haltingly creaking into gear and badly hampered by international sanctions. + +The net effect of Putin’s bad decisions has been to reduce Russia’s effective combat power to a level far below what Russia could in principle generate. Russia’s military weakness is thus very likely temporary. As soon as the fighting stops the Russian military can begin to reconstitute itself. Lessons can be learned. Bad organization can be rectified. Its defense industry can start to come online and replace essential kit, especially if sanctions are lifted even partially — and it is very hard to imagine Putin accepting any ceasefire that does not include some significant sanctions relief. Conscription and training systems can be improved. Russia can start to generate the kind of military power its population, industrial base, and military organization have the potential to produce. + +A protracted ceasefire will thus likely allow Russia to restore the correlation of forces between itself and Ukraine that is the natural result of the countries’ relative sizes and economic capacities — in other words, Russia will likely regain its inherent military advantages over Ukraine in the years following a ceasefire. + +Western support to Ukraine is the key factor in this equation. Russia can regain military superiority over Ukraine, but it cannot establish military superiority over Ukraine backed by the West. So the final question is this: Will Western support for Ukraine increase, decrease, or remain the same following a ceasefire? The answer is obvious: it will decrease. + +Western support today is driven partly by Russian actions and partly by the heroic and effective resistance of Ukrainians in the face of initially overwhelming military odds and then the atrocities Russian forces continue to commit. The Russian military continues offensive operations to conquer Ukrainian territory. It uses brutal tactics against the Ukrainian military and is conducting war crimes on a scale amounting to crimes against humanity. It is deliberately targeting Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure while conducting ethnic cleansing operations using genocidal rhetoric. Russia has created a massive humanitarian and refugee crisis that obviously demands urgent responses. At the same time Ukrainian forces have fought back bravely and brilliantly, defeating the Russian drive on Kyiv, liberating Kharkiv in a stunning and rapid counteroffensive, and most recently pushing Russian troops out of western Kherson. These factors more than any others have kept Western support for Ukraine strong and created a political environment in most Western states that makes abandoning Ukraine highly unpopular. + +Those dynamics will begin to change rapidly once the fighting stops. Attention will turn to reconstruction, which is inherently far less popular. Reconstruction is also inherently political and will focus attention on Ukrainian domestic politics and the natural and historic limitations of Ukrainian governance effectiveness. Domestic tensions within Ukraine will naturally grow as various groups argue for differential distributions of reconstruction aid and more normal politics returns with all its strife and messiness. Russia’s inherent skill in manipulating the information space, overwhelmed during the fighting by Russia’s failures and brutality, will begin to shape perceptions more effectively once more. The current veneer of near-universal support for Ukraine will vanish, and arguments about how and even whether to continue to support Ukraine will become much more prominent throughout the West. Both military and economic aid to Ukraine will certainly decrease. + +Within a few years of the cessation of hostilities, therefore, the following conditions are extremely likely to hold: + +- Ukrainian military power will be lower than it is now + +- Russian military power will be greater than it is now and rising + +- Western military support for Ukraine will be lower + +- Western economic support for Ukraine will be insufficient and dropping + +- General Western enthusiasm for supporting Ukraine will be lower + +- Internal Ukrainian cohesion will be lower + +- Russia’s aims toward Ukraine and the US will remain unchanged + +Western leaders and Ukrainians should not simply accept these forecasts as givens, of course. Western political leaders should fight hard to sustain Western support for Ukraine, continuing to make the real and urgent case for defending the West’s interests by helping Ukraine rebuild and deter future Russian invasions. Ukrainians should also fight to rebuild as cohesive a state and society as they can, as well as to sustain the strongest defense posture possible in their post-conflict economic and social conditions. But a sober forecast based on normal historical trends and patterns requires assuming that such efforts will be at best partially acceptable, and future policy should be based on pessimistic sobriety rather than hopeful optimism. + +One obvious conclusion follows from these observations: Any territory Ukraine does not retake now will likely be lost to it indefinitely. The de facto borders of Ukraine at a ceasefire in the near term will be the maximum territorial extent of the Ukrainian state for the foreseeable future. + +We must also recognize that the risks of escalation driving the current push to press Ukraine to make concessions will be just as real whenever Russia renews the attack. Russia will always be a nuclear power. It will always be able to attack NATO with conventional or nuclear forces. Those facts will not be changed by a ceasefire now. If Putin or his successor concludes after a few years of rebuilding that he can try to conquer Ukraine again, NATO will face exactly the same risks then that some are now seeking to avoid by driving Kyiv to concessions. Those concessions will only have made the renewed invasion and return of escalation risks more likely while weakening Ukraine’s ability to deter and defeat another massive attack. + +The most important conclusion to draw from all these reflections, however, is this: Ukraine’s power and Western support for Ukraine is at or near its peak and can remain there only as long as fighting continues and Ukraine continues to make gains. Both will likely begin to drop rapidly once fighting is halted or conditions of real stalemate descend. Russia’s diminishing power and influence, on the other hand, will likely begin to rise when active combat stops. Success for Ukraine and the West lies in ensuring that Ukraine has secured territorial gains, military capabilities, and economic and reconstruction support while it is at or near its peak that are all great enough to deter a recovering Russia from restarting the war even as Ukraine’s power and Western support drop. + +Ukraine should not cash in the leverage it might have now to secure a temporary cessation of hostilities that will leave it in a far more vulnerable condition that will invite future Russian aggression, therefore. Kyiv and its Western supporters, rather, should reinforce Ukraine’s current advantages to consolidate Ukraine’s position during the fighting so that Ukraine — and peace — can survive the inevitable erosion of Kyiv’s current advantages after the conflict’s end. + +--- + +__Frederick W. Kagan__ is the director of the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). From 0721be865e3278e71eefeb686df286ed59d63070 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: theagora Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2022 04:27:10 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 08/12] 0x17 Add _columns posts, Dec.09 --- .../2022-11-22-ethics-on-the-rocks.md | 43 ++++++ ...2022-11-30-chinas-mass-revolt-where-now.md | 119 +++++++++++++++++ ...12-02-people-no-need-of-a-man-the-great.md | 92 +++++++++++++ .../2022-12-05-no-fear-is-the-very-victory.md | 124 ++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 378 insertions(+) create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2022-11-22-ethics-on-the-rocks.md create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2022-11-30-chinas-mass-revolt-where-now.md create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2022-12-02-people-no-need-of-a-man-the-great.md create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2022-12-05-no-fear-is-the-very-victory.md diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-11-22-ethics-on-the-rocks.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-22-ethics-on-the-rocks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..84ef9f04 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-22-ethics-on-the-rocks.md @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : "伦理的败坏" +author: "齐泽克" +date : 2022-11-22 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/vpjnlNA.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "" +--- + +世界正处于一场文化战争之中，左翼和右翼都在放弃以前被视为理所当然的长期规范和原则。当偏执右派陷入暴力堕落时，“觉醒”左派的反应只会让情况变得更糟。 + + + +伦理的进步会带来一种好的教条主义。正常、健康的社会不会去争论能不能接受强奸和酷刑，因为公众会“教条地”认为它们不可接受。同样，一个社会的领导人大谈“合法的强奸”——就像美国一名前共和党参议员曾经做的那样——或可以容忍的酷刑也是一个清晰的信号，它表明这个社会伦理败坏了，之前不可想象的行为可能很快就会冒出来。 + +想想今天的俄罗斯。在本月开始流传的一个未经验证的视频中，一名曾为与克里姆林宫有关系的瓦格纳集团效力的前雇佣兵被控跳反——回过头来“打俄罗斯人”——随后，一名身份不明的袭击者用一把大锤砸向该雇佣兵的头部。在被要求对这个以“复仇之锤”为题发布的视频置评的时候，瓦格纳集团的创始人和普京的密友叶夫根尼·普里戈任(Yevgeny Prigozhin)回答说：“狗就该这么死”。就像许多人已经观察到的那样，现在，俄罗斯的行为和当年的ISIS一模一样。 + +或者，想想俄罗斯越来越亲近的盟友伊朗。在那里，据报道，他们强迫因抗议政权而入狱的少女嫁给狱警然后强奸她，原因是按法律规定，他们不能处决身为处女的未成年人。 + +又或者，想想以色列。它骄傲地把自己呈现为自由民主国家，哪怕它已经变得和它周围的其他一些原教旨主义宗教国家越来越像。这个变化的最新证据是最近的一则新闻，伊塔马尔·本-格维尔(Itamar Ben-Gvir)将加入内塔尼亚胡的新政府。在进入政界前，本-格维尔以在起居室挂以色列裔美国恐怖分子巴鲁克·古德斯坦(Baruch Goldstein)的像而著称。后者1994年在希伯伦对正在礼拜的巴勒斯坦穆斯林发动恐怖袭击，造成29人死亡，125人受伤。 + +内塔尼亚胡曾是以色列连任时期最长的总理，直到2021年6月被赶下台。他完全参与了伦理的败坏。2019年，《以色列时报》报道说，他“在[以色列]政府发布报告称极右翼是欧陆犹太人面临的最大威胁后，呼吁打击欧洲新兴的穆斯林和左翼反犹主义”。为什么内塔尼亚胡不提极右翼反犹主义？因为他靠的就是极右翼。西方的新右翼可能在国内反犹，但他们同时也坚定地支持以色列，把以色列视为抵抗穆斯林入侵的最后屏障。 + +不幸的是，所有这些都还只是故事的一面。伦理的败坏在“觉醒”的左翼那里也愈演愈烈。在提倡允许所有形式的性和族群认同——除了一种——的同时，他们变的越来越威权主义，越来越不宽容。根据社会学家杜安·罗塞尔(Duane Rousselle)的总结，新的“取消文化”是“不要一只要多的时代的种族主义”。传统的种族主义诽谤的是对大“一”统构成威胁的入侵者，觉醒的左翼则想对所有还没有完全放弃“一”的旧性别、性和族群范畴的人做同样的事情。现在，所有的性向和性别认同都是可以接受的，除非你是性别认同与出生时的生理性别相符的白人男性。这个顺性别群体的成员被要求为其所是——为“欣然接纳自我”——而愧疚，而其他所有人（甚至顺性别的女性）则被鼓励想怎么来就怎么来。 + +在现实世界的各种荒诞情节中，这个“新的觉醒秩序”越来越清晰可见。就在这个月，宾州葛底斯堡学院的性别与性资源中心计划赞助一个学生组织的，面向所有“厌倦了顺性白男”的活动。该活动计划让参加活动的人“来画来写”他们在“欣然接纳自我”的白男那里受到的挫折。在一片哗然和种族主义的控诉声中，该活动已经被推迟了。 + +觉醒的非二元流动性与不宽容和排斥吊诡地走到了一起。在巴黎，著名的高师正在就一个提议展开讨论，即要不要建一个专供选择混合/多重性别认同的人使用的宿舍走廊，以排斥顺性男。提议的规定十分严格，不符合标准的人甚至不能踏入走廊。而且，当然了，这样的规定将为甚至更加严格的限制开路。如果有足够多的个体以甚至更加狭隘的方式（即叠加更多“先进”的范畴）来定义自己的认同，那么，他们大概也能要求有专属于自己的走廊。 + +值得强调的是，这个提议有以下三个特征：第一，它不只排斥顺性别男性，也排斥顺性别女性；第二，它依据的不是什么客观的分裂标准，而仅仅是主观的自我指定；第三，它要求在分类上做进一步的细分。最后一点至关重要，因为它说明了所有这些对可塑性、选择和多样性的强调是怎样最终走向一种新的种族隔离（即一个有固定的、本质化的认同构成的网络）的。 + +因此，觉醒主义提供了一个典型案例，研究它有助于我们理解允许是怎样变成禁止的：在一个觉醒的体制下，我们永远不知道我们中的一些人会不会、在什么时候因为自己说过或做过的某件事情（因为标准很模糊），或仅仅是因为自己生来就属于被禁止的范畴而被取消。 + +觉醒的左翼经常号称自己反对新形式的野蛮，但事实完全相反，他们充分参与这种野蛮并推动和实践一种无反讽的压迫话语。虽然他们倡导多元主义、鼓励差异，但就他们致力于强加任意的排斥（即动不动就取消这、取消那，而以前，在宽容、自由的社会中，这种专横的做法一直被认为是不可接受的），他们的主观阐述立场——他们说话的地方——是威权的，不容许任何讨论。 + +虽说如此，我们应该牢记，这种乱象在很大程度上仅限于狭小的学界（和像新闻那样的行业），而社会的其他领域，则更多地是在朝相反的（好的）方向变化。比如说，本月美国12名共和党参议员和共和党多数一起投票支持把同性伴侣结婚的权利写入法律。 + +取消文化，和它隐含的偏执，是一种绝望且明显适得其反的努力，它试图补偿长期以来性少数遭受的真实的暴力和不宽容。但它所做的，却是退入一个文化的堡垒，一个伪“安全空间”，其在话语上的狂热，只起到使多数更加抵抗它的作用。 + +[Slavoj Zizek, “Ethics on the Rocks”, Project Syndicate, Nov 22, 2022.](https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ethical-decay-right-wing-violence-hate-left-wing-woke-cancel-culture-by-slavoj-zizek-2022-11) + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-11-30-chinas-mass-revolt-where-now.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-30-chinas-mass-revolt-where-now.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..67dfa297 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-30-chinas-mass-revolt-where-now.md @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : "中国群众运动何去何从？" +author: "李甬／Vincent Kolo" +date : 2022-11-30 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/sf7WlUE.png +image_caption: "2022年11月26日晚间，南京传媒学院学生自发聚集悼念11月24日乌鲁木齐大火中遇难者，标志“白纸革命”爆发。" +description: "在本文撰写之时，警察正在中国各大城市集结，以图尽力平息最近的抗议浪潮。" +--- + +抗议在各大学持续。即将到来的周末，全国各城市或将出现新一波街头抗议。过去几天席卷中国的示威是30年来对中共独裁统治、及现在对新加冕“习皇帝”最严峻的挑战。 + + + +在经历了3年令人窒息且残酷不仁的“清零”控制和封锁之后，群众已经到了崩溃边缘。虽然清零政策和周四在新疆发生的致命火灾是抗议的导火线，但当前的抗议浪潮远不仅是关于反对封城（尽管这个问题很重要）。 + +全国80多所大学的抗议中，学生们高喊“不自由毋宁死”——这正是1989年斗争的口号，尽管许多中国青年对此并不知情。争取民主权利和终结独裁统治的诉求，加上对于中共疯狂、顽固、不科学的作法的愤怒，两者结合了起来。 + +过去一周，每日通报新冠肺炎确诊数已达到创纪录的40,000多人。虽然与许多西方国家疫情高峰期的水平相比，这数字仍然很低，但政权采取更严厉的封城政策，因为其过去坚持清零政策的成功，现在已经骑虎难下了。 + +中共独裁政权盲目地遵循失败的战略，而习近平的个人角色加强了这一战略：一方面，他在中共内部权力斗争中使用“清零”作为武器，迫使地方政府“表忠”；另一方面，他借此政策大规模提升独裁政权监视和控制社会的能力。 + +习近平的清零政策轻忽疫苗接种，而是侧重于密集的大规模检测、接触者追踪、隔离和残酷的强制封锁。有100万中国人——包括本文其中一名作者的家人——现在被关在隔离中心（也就是方舱），这些地方被广泛描述为“比监狱还糟糕”。据每周提供最新消息的野村证券称，目前有50座城市处于某种形式的封锁状态，这一数字创下纪录，而这些城市占了约四分之一的中国人口。 + +现在的一个重大改变，即转向世界其他大部分国家政府采取的“与病毒共存”政策，恐将使中国资源不足的医疗部门不堪重负，并导致数十万人死亡。彭博行业研究（Bloomberg Intelligence）最近的一项研究显示，中国每10万人只有4张重症监护室（ICU）病床，这一指标远低于发达国家。现在在这件事上进行180度大转弯，对习近平来说也是一次丢面子的个人挫败，因为“清零”被视为他的招牌政策。因此，正如彭博社专栏作家马尔克斯（Clara Ferreira Marques）所指出，习近平身为独裁者，发现自己陷入了政治上的“被动强制”——此处使用了国际象棋术语，意思是玩家被迫采取行动，但任一选择都会使情况变得更糟。 + + +### 警讯 + +社会爆炸的警讯已经十分明显。10月，全球最大的iPhone工厂（富士康）在郑州的数千名工人发起了大规模抗议，这对群众意识产生了巨大影响。尽管网络审查人员尽了最大努力屏蔽相关新闻，这些场面还是在社交媒体上被大家广泛观看。乌鲁木齐是最近一波史无前例的抗议活动的爆发地，这座城市已处于令人痛苦的100天封锁，伴随着食品和药品短缺——几乎所有的封锁措施都是如此。 + +封锁引发了难以想像的心理健康危机。早在2020年，一项全国调查就发现，近35%的受访者正在处理因大流行而导致的心理困扰。今年，卫生部拒绝公布自杀统计数据。 + +许多现在爆发了自发的反封锁和反政府抗议的大学已经经历了好几波封锁浪潮，学生们被困在宿舍里数周之久，抱怨缺乏包括卫生用品在内的一切。卡塔尔世界杯足球赛的开赛在中国也带来了震撼。没有戴口罩或可见的疫情限制的大量人群聚集的情景，促使一些人问道“他们跟我们生活在同一个星球上吗？” + +中国一名同志如此描述整个情况：“从我社交范围所见，除了少数官僚和年轻公务员对事态不予置评，几乎所有人都坚定站在抗议者一边——包括平常那些’沉默的大多数’。” + +“这场风暴中值得注意的是，对于习近平的不满成为重点，公众不再把怒火烧向地方官员或者政权内部其他人物，而是直指习近平本人。” + + +### 乌鲁木齐丧生的10人 + +11月26至27日，公众对清零政策积聚的愤怒情绪终于爆发，全国各地民众聚集要求解除封锁，甚至主动拆除和摧毁路障和检测设施，攻击挡路的防疫人员和警察。截至11月27日，全国至少有85所大学的学生举行抗议，人数从数十人到数百人不等。 + +11月24日，新疆首府乌鲁木齐市维吾尔人社区的一栋公寓楼发生火灾，引发了这一抗议事件。乌鲁木齐是一个80%人口为汉族的城市。尽管中共多年来恶毒地利用种族主义宣传维吾尔人是“恐怖分子”，我们还是看到汉族和维吾尔人表现出自发的团结，而这具有重要意义。 + +火势本身并不大，但由于为加强封锁而竖立了隔离栅栏，因此消防车无法及时赶到灭火。疑似受害人因房门和逃生通道被锁而无法逃脱。在被网络审查人员删除之前，人们尖叫着要求开门的视频片段在网上广泛流传。 + +火灾中有10人丧生，他们都是维吾尔人，但一些网络报导称实际死亡人数要再多。中共官员后来推卸责任，称路是通的、是居民不跑。这进一步激起了公众的愤怒，当晚，大量乌鲁木齐市民，包括汉族和维族人，冲破防疫屏障，游行到市政府办公室抗议。 + +由于接连不断的次生灾难导致人命死亡，反抗的种子已在人们的心中种下。这包括贵州省发生的导致27名被强行送往偏远检疫中心的乘客死亡的公交车事故，以及无数人因提交不出核酸检测阴性结果，而被拒绝入院治疗最终死亡的悲剧。 + +近几周，郑州、广州等地的民众和工人纷纷冲破防疫屏障，与警方对峙。在重庆，一段年轻人在警戒线前高喊“不自由毋宁死”的视频引起了很多人的共鸣。乌鲁木齐的抗议在两天内掀起波及全国的浪潮，点燃了在非人道和偏执的清零政策下积聚的愤怒和不满，但情绪更为强烈。习近平强硬的防疫政策也让数百万人认知到令人窒息、残酷镇压的独裁统治的现实。这也告诉大家，中国政权准备多长时间实施如此的镇压和监视。 + + +### “共产党下台！” + +11月26日晚，上海市民冲破疫情封锁线，沿着以乌鲁木齐命名的乌鲁木齐中路游行，悼念火灾遇难者，表达愤慨。几天后，警方拆除了乌鲁木齐中路的所有路牌，而这是他们避免更多抗议的其中一个应对方式。上海群众一齐高呼“共产党下台！”“习近平下台！”他们还阻拦警车，并奋力解救被警察逮捕的示威者。示威活动持续到11月27日白天和晚上，人们要求释放被捕的抗议者。除上海外，北京、南京、广州、成都、武汉等城市也爆发大规模抗议。 + +自1989年以来，中国从未出现过如此大规模的运动。目前的抗议还没有到当年那个程度，但我们必须观察事情会如何发展。中国的经济和社会危机在许多方面甚至比当年还要严重。当前的抗议来自多个社会阶层：郑州和广州的农民工、学生、维吾尔族等少数民族，以及许多站在示威前线的年轻女性。正在展开的政治意识中有许多不同的元素，但这已经从反对封城，进化为提出民主诉求、反对镇压、要求终结独裁和罢免习近平的政治诉求。 + +在乌鲁木齐，当地政府在火灾发生后立即改变立场，宣布该市已“基本实现社会面基本清零目标”，因此正在放松管控，但人们继续走上街头表达不满。其他许多地方政府也采取了类似的立场，匆忙宣布解除封锁并进行一些浮于表面的改变。 + +这是中共平息抗议的典型手段——先是给根“胡萝卜”（即让步），然后再挥舞镇压和逮捕的“大棒”。对于类似乌鲁木齐那样政府一夜间实现“社会面清零”的说辞，民众在社交媒体上普遍表示怀疑。中共政权出名的一点劣迹，便是利用“虚假”承诺和让步愚弄大众。它通过宣布将关闭污染行业来平息环保抗议，只是为了在眼前的动荡平息后才允许高污染产业继续开工。在广东乌坎村，中共当局承诺举办有限度的地方选举，以平息反对征地和腐败的抗议。选举被操控，然后镇压开始，抗议当中的许多领导人物现在不是在囚就是流亡。“他们给了我们一张100万美元的支票”，一名乌坎活动人士后来说，“但它跳票了”。 + +在这波抗议浪潮中，汉人和维吾尔人展现了团结一致的一面，克服了中共的分裂策略。在乌鲁木齐，汉人被路过的维吾尔人鼓掌拥抱，在街头张贴横幅悼念周四火灾中的遇难者，这一幕令人心潮澎湃。中国的一些资深评论员将这种情况描述为自2009年新疆七五事件（致命的各民族间暴乱和大屠杀）以来前所未有的情况。 + + +### 诉求为何？ + +在大学校园里，众多学生团结起来。11月27日，在北京清华大学，数百名学生举着白纸抗议，高呼“民主、法治、言论自由”和“无产阶级万岁”，还唱着国际歌。 + +与早先的抗议不同，当前的抗议浪潮显示出转向更明确地反对独裁统治；很难得的是，直接反对中共和习近平的口号被广泛采用。同样，这是自1989年以来的第一次。10月的四通桥事件，当时一个独自行动的抗议者彭立发在北京市中心悬挂标语反对独裁统治的横幅，显然影响到了今天提出的许多诉求。虽然在大多数国家，个人抗议不会产生如此巨大的影响，但在中国，所有独立组织、政治和民主权利都被禁止，其效果惊人。 + +在我们关于四通桥抗议的声明中（《中国：“新坦克人”抗议引发热烈回响》，中国劳工论坛，10月17日），我们认知到抗议带来的影响，并对于横幅上的许多口号表示赞同，同时解释道，这样不足以充分或明确挑战中共独裁统治，而且一些诉求——比如“要改革”——不幸地强化了对于中共独裁、或其某些精英派系有能力进行改革并提供民主让步的幻想。 + +中共独裁永远不会主导实现向任何形式的民主的渐进过渡。有人寄希望于中共的宪法，但它不会提供任何民主机制来监督或罢免领导人。向全国人民代表大会或中共极权国家机器的其他机关提出要求，我们也不会赢得任何胜利。1989年，重新召开全国人大的呼吁，最终结果也仅是分化并消散了群众斗争。 + +中共一再证明这是一个错误的幻想。中共曾经承诺在香港允许有限的民主权利，但这些都被收回并粉碎。如果中共不能容忍在香港相对独立的实体内存在一种有限、只做半套的资产阶级“民主”，那么他们肯定不能容忍在中国落实这样的资产阶级“民主”。 + +马克思主义者和中国劳工论坛通过我们的文章解释道，历史上没有哪个专制制度是通过“改革”而走入历史的。主要由罢工浪潮和工人运动的果断介入来领导的群众斗争，一直是成功击败独裁政权和赢得民主权利的关键因素。尽管抗争者英勇奋战，2019年香港运动走向失败，以及随后遭遇镇压，显示没有“改革”独裁政权的可能性、运动不能半途而废、独裁统治必然会设法维持全面控制。 + +对习近平个人认同的清零政策的广泛愤怒，进一步加剧了对于中共独裁政权的反对情绪。对于刚刚开启第三任期的习近平来说，抗议的如此爆发无疑是一种屈辱和重挫。在中共二十大上习近平称帝之际，我们预测，“无论结果如何，都不会从根本上改变中共政权的前景，并只会走向最大的风暴。”（《中国：习近平的二十大总结了五年的政治灾难》，中国劳工论坛，10月17日） + +这些情况与伊朗起义有很多相似之处。在这两个案例中，一起残忍的事件引发了一场全国性的抗议运动，反对整个政权的政治诉求开始浮现。不同民族群众之间团结一致的场景令人印象深刻，也本能地克服了恶毒的种族主义和民族主义宣传。此外，2019年香港爆发了围绕新逃犯条例议题的群众运动，几周内抗议就远超出了逃犯条例修订这个议题，因为一波又一波的街头抗议将抗争者的诉求集中在争取民主权利和终结国家镇压上。 + + +### 香港运动提供的教训 + +今天中国抗议的一个显著特征是，许多人公开表达“我们应该支持香港”的遗憾情绪。这表明意识开始赶上形势需要的过程。香港运动失败的原因给中国的斗争提供了重要的教训：它不缺人数也不缺战斗性，但缺乏群众组织（特别是工人组织）来使得斗争挺过许多意想不到的变局、政府打压和不实信息而存续。它孤立于单独一个城市，因此没法击败中共独裁。自由主义意识形态在香港斗争中的主导地位，泛民反对派政党破产的妥协策略，以及香港本土派更加极端的内向心态，最终作茧自缚。 + +一种仅依靠自发性和网络平台的反组织思想也阻碍了香港斗争，因为当面对一个拥有庞大资源的、无情的国家机器时，需要规划、战略、制定明确的纲领以及对取代如今社会和政府制度的蓝图有所认知，这需要组织——工人组织和学生会、基层抗议委员会，以及至关重要的工人阶级政党（而这个政党需要明确的争取民主权利与社会主义的纲领）。 + +后者表明中共独裁统治与中国资本主义密不可分。中国共产党其实可谓全球最大规模的工业和金融公司，拥有自己的军队和警察部队。对资产阶级民主的幻想，通常（而且也许不可避免地）会在每一次反独裁斗争中占据一席之地，而这需要用明确的警告来回击——就像我们在香港斗争中所做的那样——赢得民主权利的唯一途径就是与资本主义果断决裂，因为这是中共独裁统治所依赖的制度。 + +面对这一重大危机，习近平一如既往地从人们的视线中消失，但我们不能低估中共冷血镇压的决心和凶猛程度。中共不会轻易接受群众的诉求，哪怕是要求部分地改变防疫政策——中共怕这会鼓舞士气，引发连锁反应，从而引发更多的群众斗争。中共更不会同意在中国这样的环境下实现哪怕非常有限的民主改革，因为当今中国庞大的规模和深刻的社会和经济问题，也会在实现民主改革后摧毁中共的独裁统治。 + +与世界其他地方一样，工人阶级是中国关键的社会力量，他们已经是抗议的一个重要因素，但是没有任何形式的组织，甚至没有工会来争取其工作条件。工人阶级应首先在工作场所组织起来，然后在整个社会中组织起来，这是反对镇压、独裁和资本主义的成功运动的自然且唯一的原动力。 + +为了成为当前抗议浪潮的领导，工人们必须号召罢工，同时呼吁学生跟随。如果总罢工与通过罢工委员会、新的独立工会和支持民主社会主义的新的群众性工人政党这些组织联系起来，那么总罢工将是反对习近平独裁统治的最有力武器。 + + +### 我们主张： + +- 停止清零，停止镇压抗争 + +- 行动升级，建立独立学生会与工会，发动罢课罢工 + +- 要言论自由、罢工权、组织权，不要审查与监控 + +- 要劳工自由，不要996，要八小时工作制，要生活工资 + +- 要性别自由，不要父权要女权，不要家庭压迫，不要再有铁笼女 + +- 要跨族群团结斗争，支持港台疆藏自决权 + +- 中共不能自我改革，打倒习近平、打倒独裁、打倒资本主义 + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-12-02-people-no-need-of-a-man-the-great.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-12-02-people-no-need-of-a-man-the-great.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b943b7a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-12-02-people-no-need-of-a-man-the-great.md @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : "人民不需要伟人" +author: "笑蜀" +date : 2022-12-02 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/wUegPWl.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "" +--- + +人民不需要伟人 + +伟人在高高的天上 + +从高高的天上俯瞰众生 + +众生都是蝼蚁 + +伟人眼里没有具体的人 + + +⠀ + +人民不需要伟人 + +高高的天上何来人间烟火 + +何来锅碗瓢盆 + +伟人都是超凡脱俗 + +很难与普通人共情 + +普通人的小日子对他都是浮云 + +⠀ + +人民不需要伟人 + +伟人必有伟大工程 + +伟大工程才能让他青史留名 + +伟大工程会制造多少孟姜女 + +但孟姜女的眼泪今天已哭不倒长城 + +巍峨的长城并不能抵御敌骑 + +只会徒然将世界隔离 + +桎梏每个人的心灵 + +⠀ + +那么人民需要什么 + +就像鸟儿只需要天空 + +就像鱼儿只需要大海 + +人民只需要自由 + +自由才会放飞无数的精灵 + +无数的精灵彼此相约，生生不息 + +就会汇成最美妙的交响 + +宇宙间最壮丽的风景 + +⠀ + +上帝面前众生平等 + +所有的伟人都是装逼 + +所有的伟人都是伪神 + +永别了伟人 + +永别了伪神 + +把他们统统抛在身后 + +他们就会是地平线上渺茫的黑影 + +挡不住春风万丈 + +挡不住天地清明 + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-12-05-no-fear-is-the-very-victory.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-12-05-no-fear-is-the-very-victory.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e917c160 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-12-05-no-fear-is-the-very-victory.md @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : "不再恐惧，就是胜利" +author: "阿七" +date : 2022-12-05 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/BbyKaOI.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "11月27日晚，大量市民在广州海珠广场响应白纸运动。" +--- + +进入11月，广州越来越多人被拉到方舱集中隔离。随着各种疫情防控措施加码，中山大学附近城中村爆发激烈抗议。 + + + +11月24日，新疆乌鲁木齐火灾造成10人死亡。11月26日，全国多个城市出现了举白纸抗议的行动。11月27日，海珠广场上，也出现了举白纸抗议的人群。根据多名在场者的描述，警察用“手牵手围人墙”的方式，包围了三、四十名抗议者，而人墙外聚集的声援者，则有上百人。 + +最终，蜡烛被熄灭，鲜花被拿走，但那些曾经在这个夜晚走上街头的年轻人，不应该被忘记。抗议发生三天之后，11月30日广州多区宣布解除临时管控。 + +那个抗议的夜晚，是谁出现在了广场上？Ta们是怎么看待这场行动的？ + + +### 一、行动中，你印象深刻的人和事？ + +依轩：11月27日那天，我是和朋友一起出发的。我们六七点就出门了。但因为我们已经有一段时间没有做核酸了，担心出去之后回不了小区，所以先出门做了核酸。我觉得很滑稽，我们去一个呼吁不做核酸的抗议，但我们先去做了核酸。 + +我们到了海珠桥那边，来来回回走了两三次都没有见到什么人，我们想是来早了还是说这个活动办不成了？后来到八九点吧，还是没有看到有人行动，但是桥上的警察开始变多了。桥的两边各有十几个警察。 + +后来，我们在桥上遇到了三个人。他们穿着风衣，打扮很酷。看到Ta们的时候，我想起了“六四”纪录片里面的人。我们其实互相不认识，但我们眼神对视，就确认了对方。刚开始我还觉得空气凝固了比较尴尬，主动问海报是不是他们做的。他们其中一个人反问我是什么海报。后来回头一看，才发现有一个警察就在我们后面。 + +我们一起走到了桥的另外一边，就是海珠广场那边。当时就看到那边有人开始聚集了。有一些人在围观，其中有人和聚集的人发生口角。我不太能听懂粤语。我记得有男生用粤语，气势很足地说“那你赶紧回去啦”。 + +现场聚集的几乎都是年轻人。当时唱国际歌，我们不会唱，一开始我还以为是唱国歌，结果唱了一两句发现调对不上。 + +我并没有察觉警察是怎么把我们围起来的。但我感觉警察是有策略的，而我们就没有什么具体计划。当发现被警察围起来后，有人就去交涉。大家的主要原则是：要走就一起走，因为一开始有警察说要我们分批走。另外，就是我们需要警察对我们有承诺，不能食言，要他们的警号、名字。 + +警察一开始要求我们放下白纸离开，我们没有答应。但最后我们都妥协了，觉得应该表达的也表达了，警察那边也说意见收到了。我们也不想发生冲突，就慢慢地都离开了。 + +费晴：我是和依轩一起去的。刚到的时候，我们在江边看到卖唱的两个小哥，他们穿着外卖骑手的衣服，唱了一首《一无所有》。我想起了天安门事件。当时感觉听到他们唱歌也满足了。 + +当我们发现了一开始举白纸的十几个人的时候，我留意到一位男生在警察面前演讲，他说“这种生活过了三年，你们还要过吗”，然后大家一起喊“不要”。当时给我的感觉很震撼。 + +我那天有特别留意现场的人面貌，大部分都是年轻人，看起来不少人是艺术生的样子。我联想起那天白天，在清华紫荆园门口，一开始有几个女生先举起了白纸，当时就有男生在议论他们，又有人乱喊她这样做“要保研”什么的。 + +我察觉到警察的策略，他们想尽量把人疏散开，独立包围起来，好像把人群分开了几个圈子。不过我也觉得他们应该也没有处理过这样的情况，一直都没有说什么话，我留意到大多数都是辅警。 + +婉子：我现在回忆起来都是一些好笑的画面。刚开始有蛮多市民围观，其中就有人说“没在香港看到，在这里看到了”。有一个30多岁的男的在给别人打视频电话，并大声的说：“你们看看”。一开始聚集了十几二十人，在喊“不要围观，要加入”。然后，这个大哥就说：“不加入，我就看看。” + +另外就是当时被警察围起来以后，有人给女朋友打电话说“今晚可能出不去了”。他一副要交代身后事的样子。我记得他说了一句话：“活了20年，我从来没有被警察围起来过，究竟是为什么”。还有一个细节，我朋友出门前说怕冷，特意烧了一壶热水带上。可没想到，广州的11月夜晚，我们在现场都感到要热死了。 + +![image1](https://i.imgur.com/XlZV5V2.jpg) +▲ 11月27日晚，广州警察策略性地包围了手举白纸的民众。 + + +### 二、被警察包围以后，你感到害怕吗？ + +费晴：很平静，没有很大情绪波动。后面警察一直让我们分批离开，我们不肯。僵持了好一会儿。在那个时候，我问朋友“后悔了吗”，她直接回答我：“没有后悔”。我主要是一直观察周围的情况，听周围的人说话。我自己还记录下来了一些精彩的对话。 + +我记得当时大家当时一起喊口号。喊了：不要核酸要吃饭！不要围观要加入！不要躺平要上班！不要躺平要上学！一开始也有人用粤语喊“自由万岁”。 + +大家还一起唱了《社会主义好》、《国际歌》、《光辉岁月》、《真的爱你》。 + +依轩：没有特别紧张。当警察把我们都围起来的时候，我有点激动，我就跑上前举着白纸，说了一句我想说的话。“有武器的是你们，我们手上只有白纸，你们怕什么？”。当时因为警察把我们围起来以后，太挤了很闷，我就没有戴口罩，然后被拍了下来。这个后来有些害怕。 + +但当时人挺多，我也不怕什么。最大的担心就是第二天还能不能正常上班。因为被警察围住以后，我们僵持了挺久。警察不开口说话，我们之中也没有意见领袖去跟他们交涉。我更多是忐忑吧。后面我也看到有人累了，蹲了下来。 + +那天晚上回到家还挺兴奋的，觉得见证了一些东西。我是凌晨四、五点才入睡的。我和朋友回到家以后一起聊到了两点多。后面我躺在床上了，还不停地刷推特。我闭上眼睛，耳朵周边似乎响起现场的一些声音。第二天我一整天都很难集中注意力。我会想起海珠广场，惦记着抗争这个事。我会想最后这个行动会怎么收场。 + +婉子：全程感觉还好。人蛮多的，没有什么特别害怕的感觉。当谈判僵持住的时候，我会感觉今晚不一定能（从包围圈）出去，想到今晚可能会被带走。但我想即使被带走，也是被问话。我知道我外面的朋友会比较担心我们。 + +当时被围起来的时候，好像有人说自己生日，然后大家就唱起了生日歌。我们有一起喊口号，叫警察放人，也有喊“人民警察为人民”。 + +但有些恐惧是无法避免的。当时结束以后，我们走出来遇到有年轻人说要跟我们聊一下，他们问我们是怎么知道这次活动的。我当时很敏感，反问他是怎么知道的。我其实不太能在现场跟陌生人（哪怕他也参与了这场行动）发生连接。现场也有便衣警察，当然大部分便衣警察我们一眼看出来，他们会拿着手机放在胸前拍摄。我有朋友在其他地方参与过抗争的运动，Ta会跟现场的人交换联系方式。但我不敢这样做，会有所戒备。 + +![image2](https://i.imgur.com/NBEBEZZ.jpg) +▲ 11月27日晚，广州警察与白纸抗争者在海珠广场。 + + +### 三、当前防疫政策对你有什么影响，你是怎么看的？ + +依轩：我老家那边几乎都是平房，房子之间密度很低。但是那边的防疫要求跟广州这边差不多，非常严格。一座小小的城市，一旦有疫情所有人都出不去。我妹妹在寄宿学校，如果有疫情发生了，学校还要家里人连夜把学生接回去，在家上网课。她明年就要中考，我很担心她受影响。 + +我妈妈很听话，很配合政府防疫。她听说政府会派菜，都不去抢购。但其实最后也没有派菜，幸好自己还是能买到的。 + +我自己会常常感觉不知道怎么办，担心未来的情况。广州疫情防控下，我居家办公有三周了。我在家时常感到难过。 + +费晴：我很久没有做核酸了。我在家两个月，我的码从绿变黄，从黄变绿，我都没有管过它。之前我一直在家里，他们就是毫无理由地把我的码变黄了。对我而言，现在这样的防疫政策让我更加抑郁、焦虑了。我本身就很宅，整体对我的影响似乎不是很大。但是当我刷到各种的信息，我会感到难受。但我觉得那天参加完活动，我感觉有所宣泄、释放。 + +婉子：我自己其实受影响很少，我到目前为止都没有封过。我生活中基本没有抢东西，要存东西的情况。我受到疫情防控的影响比起大部分人要少很多。更多时候是我要被迫取消行程，或者去什么地方都要扫码让人感到不爽。 + +可能很多人觉得这次行动一开始是因为对乌鲁木齐火灾悼念。可能很多人参与也是出于不满防疫政策。但我去到现场，感觉到更多人参与这样的行动，是想表达对体制的不满。 + +那天晚上广州番禺XX村有发生一些抗议事件，我知道有几位伙伴去了现场。那天晚上在海珠广场，我也见到他们了。当时现场响起一些红歌的时候，也会有人发起嘘声。我觉得这些都是一种体现，是因为人们对体制有不满意。至少我和朋友去到那里，也不仅仅是反对防疫政策的原因。 + +![image3](https://i.imgur.com/BnTLHgG.png) +▲ 11月30日，经过广州市民连日对防疫封控的抗争，广州多个行政区宣布解封。图为广州人民路解封状况。 + + +### 四、网上有人骂行动的人是废青，质疑行动有境外势力，你怎么看待这些说法，你又怎么看这场行动？ + +费晴：面对那些言论，我也没有很大欲望去反驳。当然，我知道他们说的是错的。哪里有什么组织？我倒是希望有人来策划组织一下具体安排。 + +我自己想过举白纸，但看到别人不去的话，我不敢去。我觉得一个人的力量很有限，如果有人发起，我会去参与，但要我出头的话，我不会。参与这次行动，是让人很有力量感的。我朋友圈里面有人发了一条内容，我印象还很深刻：“战栗着面对那个庞然大物，挺住，越过临界点，你就产生了抗体，取得了对恐惧的免疫。这就是胜利……” + +依轩：我已经主动屏蔽了一些信息。我害怕被网暴，把我的隐私信息、家人信息被公开地贴出来，这样的话我觉得很恐怖了。其他就没什么。 + +我那天晚上发了朋友圈，其实没有说什么内容，只是表达了我在现场。有一个以前的同学看到了就评论了不少反讽的话。我跟他聊了几句，但真的没办法聊下去。我会觉得他也挺值得同情的，他接触不了更多的信息，所以有了现在那样的看法。我提醒自己以后发朋友圈还是要进行朋友圈分组。 + +我觉得这次行动挺成功的。我们没有发生冲突，我们也没有喊颠覆政权的口号，不会给人留下什么把柄。我们也明确提出了“不要核酸，不要封控”的诉求。我们打车回家，跟司机简单聊了一下，司机也会响应说“是啊，是啊”。 + +当然，我现在没有想过做特别激进的事情。安全对我来说还是比较重要的。我还是很担心未来，我家里也没什么背景。现在阶段希望自己变得强大。我也要为家里人着想，要去存款。我想走出这个地方，去见识一下外面的世界，当然我只是出去一下。 + +哲学家吉恩·夏普写了一本《非暴力抗争手册》。我最近挺想看一下的，可能会给我们的行动一些启发。我也想邀请我的朋友们一起看。我相信再黑暗，在只有夹缝，光还是会照进来的。 + +婉子：对于这个活动，去之前我没有什么期待。我还以为那个海报没什么传播，不会有人去。但去到现场，脑海里面想到其它地方的情况，心里面会有一种莫名其妙的希望。我感觉这个行动在全国各地，遍地开花。我会从中看到一些希望的曙光。我完全想不到，在中国，我可以参与那么大规模的，全国各地的行动。 + +现场的时候蛮有意思的。一开始有一些反对行动的声音出现，现场有人用更凶的方式去骂回去。我当时很蛮震惊的，怎么说的话可以那么激烈。但就是这样，这也让我感觉那像是我们的阵地，我们想说的话声音反而是更占主导的一方。这种感觉还挺神奇的。虽然有些骂人的话，但我听起来还是挺爽的。 + +现在看来，我对这次活动的态度是有一点矛盾的。我去之前没有抱有期待。我认为有这次行动就是意料之外，它本身就是一个惊喜。但是当它发生之后，我开始对它抱有期待。我在后面也有在想，广州这边不太可能有后续的行动，因为更多人还是抱着响应其它地方的行动过来的，没有更加确定、明确的诉求。 + +最后警察打开通道让我们离开的时候，我一瞬间有点恍惚，“我们就这样走了吗？”，我感觉一下子就这样结束了。 + +（本文有选编；受访者使用化名。） + + \ No newline at end of file From 813cf3912df5eb76c09d97934afc28aca58bbd2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: hokoi Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 01:54:28 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 09/12] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x17 Dec.14 --- ...022-11-30-conventional-warfight-lessons.md | 537 ++++++++ ...22-12-08-broader-transatlantic-security.md | 1169 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 1706 insertions(+) create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-11-30-conventional-warfight-lessons.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-12-08-broader-transatlantic-security.md diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-30-conventional-warfight-lessons.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-30-conventional-warfight-lessons.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fc51dd03 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-30-conventional-warfight-lessons.md @@ -0,0 +1,537 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Conventional Warfight Lessons +author: Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, et al. +date : 2022-11-30 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/2ceXn6W.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_The full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has provided an invaluable opportunity to assess the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) and the implications of a range of capabilities for modern warfare._ _Many publicly made judgements on these issues have lacked supporting data or insight into Ukrainian operational planning and decision-making. To ensure that those drawing lessons from the conflict do so from a solid foundation, this report seeks to outline key lessons, based on the operational data accumulated by the Ukrainian General Staff, from the fighting between February and July 2022. As the underlying source material for much of this report cannot yet be made public, this should be understood as testimony rather than as an academic study. Given the requirements for operational security, it is necessarily incomplete._ + +Russia planned to invade Ukraine over a 10-day period and thereafter occupy the country to enable annexation by August 2022. The Russian plan presupposed that speed, and the use of deception to keep Ukrainian forces away from Kyiv, could enable the rapid seizure of the capital. The Russian deception plan largely succeeded, and the Russians achieved a 12:1 force ratio advantage north of Kyiv. The very operational security that enabled the successful deception, however, also led Russian forces to be unprepared at the tactical level to execute the plan effectively. The Russian plan’s greatest deficiency was the lack of reversionary courses of action. As a result, when speed failed to produce the desired results, Russian forces found their positions steadily degraded as Ukraine mobilised. Despite these setbacks, Russia refocused on Donbas and, since Ukraine had largely expended its ammunition supply, proved successful in subsequent operations, slowed by the determination – rather than the capabilities – of Ukrainian troops. From April, the West became Ukraine’s strategic depth, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) only robbed Russia of the initiative once long-range fires brought Russian logistics under threat. + +The tactical competence of the Russian military proved significantly inferior compared with the expectations of many observers based within and outside Ukraine and Russia. Nevertheless, Russian weapons systems proved largely effective, and those units with a higher level of experience demonstrated that the AFRF have considerable military potential, even if deficiencies in training and the context of how they were employed meant that the Russian military failed to meet that potential. Factoring in the idiosyncrasies of the Russian campaign, there are five key areas that should be monitored to judge whether the Russian military is making progress in resolving its structural and cultural deficiencies. These areas should be used to inform assessments of Russian combat power in the future. + +1. The AFRF currently operate with a hierarchy of jointery in which the priorities of the land component are paramount, and the military as a whole is subordinate to the special services. This creates sub-optimal employment of other branches. + +2. The AFRF force-generation model is flawed. It proposes the creation of amalgamated combined arms formations in wartime but lacks the strength of junior leadership to knit these units together. + +3. There is a culture of reinforcing failure unless orders are changed at higher levels. This appears less evident in the Russian Aerospace Forces than in the Ground Forces and Navy. + +4. The AFRF are culturally vulnerable to deception because they lack the ability to rapidly fuse information, are culturally averse to providing those who are executing orders with the context to exercise judgement, and incentivise a dishonest reporting culture. + +5. The AFRF’s capabilities and formations are prone to fratricide. Electronic warfare (EW) systems and other capabilities rarely deconflict, while processes for identifying friend from foe and establishing control measures are inadequate. The result is that capabilities that should magnify one another’s effects must be employed sequentially. + +Beyond assessments of the Russian armed forces, there are significant lessons to be drawn from the conflict for the British and other NATO militaries. The foremost of these are: + +In due course, it will be possible to extend this study to cover the later phase of the war when Ukraine moved on to offensive operations. As the UAF expend significant ammunition, however, and now depend on their international partners for equipment, it is important that those partners draw the appropriate lessons from the war so far, not least so that they can prepare themselves to deter future threats and to best support Ukraine. Ukraine’s victory is possible, but it requires significant heavy fighting. With appropriate support, Ukraine can prevail. + +- There is no sanctuary in modern warfare. The enemy can strike throughout operational depth. Survivability depends on dispersing ammunitions stocks, command and control, maintenance areas and aircraft. Ukraine successfully evaded Russia’s initial wave of strikes by dispersing its arsenals, aircraft and air defences. Conversely, the Russians succeeded in engaging 75% of static defence sites in the first 48 hours of the war. Nor is setting up a headquarters in a civilian building sufficient to make it survivable. The British Army must consider the vulnerability of higher-echelon enablement. The RAF must consider how many deployable spares kits it has to enable dispersion of its fleets. + +- Warfighting demands large initial stockpiles and significant slack capacity. Despite the prominence of anti-tank guided weapons in the public narrative, Ukraine blunted Russia’s attempt to seize Kyiv using massed fires from two artillery brigades. The difference in numbers between Russian and Ukrainian artillery was not as significant at the beginning of the conflict, with just over a 2:1 advantage: 2,433 barrel artillery systems against 1,176; and 3,547 multiple-launch rocket systems against 1,680. Ukraine maintained artillery parity for the first month and a half and then began to run low on munitions so that, by June, the AFRF had a 10:1 advantage in volume of fire. Evidently, no country in NATO, other than the US, has sufficient initial weapons stocks for warfighting or the industrial capacity to sustain largescale operations. This must be rectified if deterrence is to be credible and is equally a problem for the RAF and Royal Navy. + +- Uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) and counter-UAS (CUAS) are essential across all branches and at all echelons. Although critical to competitiveness by providing situational awareness, 90% of UAS employed are lost. For the most part, UAS must be cheap and attritable. For land forces, they must be organic to units for the purposes of both situational awareness and target acquisition. The primary means of CUAS is EW. Another critical tactical requirement is to be alerted to the presence of UAS. For the Royal Navy, CUAS is critical for protecting vessels operating beyond the protection of a task force. For the RAF, the provision of look-down sensing to locate UAS to contribute to air defence is critical. This allows defensive resources to be prioritised on the right axes. + +- The force must fight for the right to precision. Precision is not only vastly more efficient in the effects it delivers but also allows the force to reduce its logistics tail and thereby makes it more survivable. Precision weapons, however, are scarce and can be defeated by EW. To enable kill chains to function at the speed of relevance, EW for attack, protection and direction finding is a critical element of modern combined arms operations. Sequencing fires to disrupt EW and create windows of opportunity for precision effects is critical and creates training requirements. In modern warfare, the electromagnetic spectrum is unlikely to be denied, but it is continually disrupted, and forces must endeavour to gain advantage within it. + +- For land forces, the pervasive ISTAR on the modern battlefield and the layering of multiple sensors at the tactical level make concealment exceedingly difficult to sustain. Survivability is often afforded by being sufficiently dispersed to become an uneconomical target, by moving quickly enough to disrupt the enemy’s kill chain and thereby evade engagement, or by entering hardened structures. Shell scrapes and hasty defences can increase immediate survivability but also risk the force becoming fixed by fire while precision fires and specialist munitions do not leave these positions survivable. Forces instead should prioritise concentrating effects while only concentrating mass under favourable conditions – with an ability to offer mutual support beyond line of sight – and should give precedence to mobility as a critical component of their survivability. + + +### Introduction + +Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has seen the return of conventional warfighting to Europe. This has provided an unparalleled opportunity to assess Russia’s military capabilities and the impacts of a range of modern weapons on the battlefield. Ensuring that the correct lessons are drawn from the conflict is vital in two key respects: for Ukraine, if it is to receive appropriate military support from its international partners; and for NATO members, if they are to ensure they are militarily capable of deterring aggression in the future. + +Debates about the relative merits of armour, anti-armour weapons, electronic warfare (EW) and airpower have been fierce among external observers of the conflict. Most of these debates, however, have lacked any grounding in data. Much of the discourse surrounding the war has drawn on fragmentary online videos that show specific activities detached from a wider tactical or operational context. A great many definitive statements have been made about Russian capabilities based on the propaganda material produced by both sides. There are partial public datasets regarding Russian losses, but there is almost no detailed information on Ukrainian dispositions, actions, decision-making or setbacks. There is, therefore, a high risk that false lessons will be drawn from the war. Given that Ukraine now depends on its international partners for its strategic depth in training and materiel, a reasonable understanding of what transpired and the actual demands of modern combat in the Ukrainian theatre is necessary. + +Prior to August 2022, when Ukraine was on the defensive against a large-scale and determined Russian offensive, operational security demanded that the Ukrainian government minimise the available information on its forces, dispositions and tactics. This is still the case with the preparation and conduct of offensive operations by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF), their preparations to counter newly mobilised Russian units and the effects of Russia’s renewed strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. How Ukraine denied Russia its initial theory of victory and how the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) reprioritised to offensive operations in Donbas are now sufficiently historical to allow for a more open discussion of events. This report is an account of the pre-war plans of both Russia and Ukraine, the course of the initial phases of the war between February and July 2022, an overview of what has been learned about the AFRF, and an assessment of the implications for NATO and specifically the UK military. + +This report is methodologically problematic. It draws on the operational data accumulated by the General Staff of the UAF during the conflict, which was made available to the authors. A significant proportion of this data cannot be made public but was used to inform the conclusions of this report. A good example is Ukrainian losses, which are factored into the conclusions reached as regards the relative effectiveness of tactics and capabilities but cannot be disclosed as they remain operationally sensitive. Other data that is cited was sometimes obtained through methods and sources of collection that are sensitive. The authors have considered the data in the context of its method of collection and the corresponding confidence in its accuracy. However, these judgements cannot be discussed in the report because the nature of the underlying sources for this data remains classified. For this reason, this report should not be considered a work of academic scholarship and it does not use citations. Rather, it should be considered as testimony based on personal observations of the authors. This includes the direct participation in strategic and operational decision-making during the war by two of the authors: Lieutenant General Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi and Oleksandr V Danylyuk. It also includes extensive interactions and consultations with Ukrainian military and intelligence personnel at all levels and the observation of tactical activities by Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, who worked in Ukraine in January, February, April, June, August and October 2022. Although this report is methodologically imperfect, the speed at which Ukraine’s partners must make decisions on procurement, training and capability development to ensure their own preparedness means that it was felt to be more useful to publish an imperfect study than wait for the evidence to be publishable long after its relevance to decision-makers had passed. + +It is also important to clarify what is and is not considered in this report. The work is intended to properly frame the international understanding of the conventional military aspects of the conflict. It therefore focuses on areas that deserve attention. It is too short to be a comprehensive study of what transpired throughout the conflict. The conclusions are limited to the consideration of conventional operations and do not seek to assess the extensive unconventional campaign waged by Russia against Ukraine. That said, unconventional operations are necessarily described insofar as they provide context for conventional force employment, but conclusions on the lessons to be learned regarding unconventional operations from the war are to be the subject of a separate and adjacent study. It is also important to reiterate that this report does not cover events after July 2022 when the UAF began undertaking offensive operations; these activities have produced additional lessons that are important for a broader appreciation of the challenges on the modern battlefield, even though they are regrettably inappropriate to publicly disclose at this time. + +This report has five chapters. Chapter I outlines Russia’s invasion plan as set out in captured copies of the orders issued to a range of Russian units. Given the criticality of unconventional operations in this plan, and the impact of these activities on the posture and tasks assigned to Russia’s conventional forces, the chapter necessarily describes these in some detail. Since there was exhaustive discussion of the size and capabilities of Russia’s conventional forces around Ukraine prior to the conflict, these details are only described in terms of the alignment of Russian forces to operational groups. + +Chapter II sets out Ukraine’s capabilities, assumptions and starting positions at the beginning of the war. One of the major problems with public analysis of the conflict has been the lack of awareness of the capabilities of the UAF. For example, the public obsession with anti-tank guided weapons (ATGWs) largely ignored the large number of main battle tanks fielded by the UAF at the beginning of the conflict. This chapter, therefore, seeks to partly explain what Ukraine could field at the start of the war, as well as how Ukraine planned to defend itself. + +Chapter III covers the course of the first three phases of the invasion, from 24 February to the beginning of July 2022. It is largely narrative but focuses on the command decisions and key factors that shaped the success or failure of specific tasks undertaken by both Russian and Ukrainian forces. The chapter tries to also explain the concepts of operation employed by the AFRF. + +Chapter IV details observations regarding the performance of the AFRF. Rather than describing Russia’s strengths and shortcomings in context, this chapter endeavours to identify wider cultural and structural challenges for its military that can be tracked to judge whether Russian military performance is improving. + +Chapter V provides a summary of relevant lessons for the British military seeking to refine its capabilities, training and organisation to be prepared for high-intensity warfare in the years to come. + +The report concludes with recommendations for policymakers. First, consumption rates of munitions, materiel and systems during high-intensity warfighting will be high, and stockpiles are critical to conventional defence being credible; second, national policies, permissions and industrial processes must be adaptable enough to allow change at the speed of relevance; and third, getting the correct mix of and synergies between new and legacy systems is essential to effective modernisation. + + +### I. Russia’s Planning and Preparations + +Russia’s strategic objective in its invasion of Ukraine was the subjugation of the Ukrainian state. This plan was formulated first and foremost by Russia’s special services and a core group within the presidential administration, supported by senior officials in the Ministry of Defence. As such, it is necessary to briefly outline the wider context from which the orders to Russia’s conventional forces were derived. + +Russia’s military build-up against Ukraine began in March 2021 when large numbers of conventional troops were added to existing forces along Ukraine’s borders. This build-up performed three functions. First, it put pressure on Western governments to re-engage in the Minsk II negotiations to encourage Kyiv to make concessions and thereby avert a conflict. Second, it pre-positioned military equipment around Ukraine that would allow for a more rapid build-up of forces when the time came for the invasion. Third, it provided an opportunity for Moscow to assess the reaction of Ukraine’s international partners. + +Ukraine’s international partners dismissed the threat in spring 2021 because they did not observe the necessary enablers deployed with the Russian formations nor the necessary political shaping of the information environment in Russia to support an invasion. They were correct on both counts – the build-up turned out to be a mobilisation exercise. However, the lesson for the Kremlin was that the enablers could be brought to the formations faster than Ukraine’s partners could bring military capabilities: if these were the indicators that would cause international partners to react, they would do so too late. The Kremlin’s confidence that it could invade Ukraine without significant international interference was an important reason for undertaking the full-scale invasion. + +In July 2021, the 9th Section of the 5th Service of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) was enlarged into a directorate and tasked with planning for the occupation of Ukraine. As part of this preparation, the FSB drew on extensive surveys carried out in Ukraine. These surveys painted a picture of a largely politically apathetic Ukrainian society that distrusted its leaders, was primarily concerned about the economy and thought an escalation of the war between Russia and Ukraine was unlikely. Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin had personally articulated in an essay in July 2021 his belief that the people of Ukraine viewed Russians favourably and believed they were part of a shared civilisation, cruelly divided by historical political mistakes. The barrier, in his view, to correcting these mistakes was the government in Kyiv, which he accused of being a puppet to external powers hostile to Russia. The Russian military leadership was also confident that it would defeat the UAF after more than a decade of modernisation. Assurances from General Valery Gerasimov on Russia’s military capabilities played a key role in shaping the confidence of Russia’s special services in their plan. As Gerasimov told international interlocutors on the outbreak of the war, ‘I command the second most powerful Army in the world’. Separately Gerasimov told British counterparts that Russia had achieved conventional military parity with the US. + +The conception of the Russian invasion therefore was developed around several key assumptions: + +- Speed was critical to success to render the response of the international community irrelevant. + +- The removal of Ukraine’s leaders would remove the barrier for pro-Russian Ukrainians to vocalise support for the occupation. + +- Controlling heating, electricity and finance would be an effective means of controlling the apathetic majority of the Ukrainian population. + +- The Russian military could defeat the Ukrainian military on the battlefield. + +From these assumptions, the FSB, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, Gerasimov and elements within the presidential administration developed their plan to achieve Putin’s strategic goal. The key military-strategic tasks for the Russian military and security forces were to: + +- Degrade Ukraine’s ability to defend itself by destroying its air, maritime and air-defence forces. + +- Defeat Ukrainian Ground Forces by fixing them in Donbas. + +- Diffuse Ukraine’s will and capacity to resist by eliminating Ukraine’s political and military leadership and occupying critical centres of political and economic power. + +- Deceive the Ukrainian government as to the time, location, scope and scale of Russia’s invasion. + +There was a tension in this plan between the aim of diffusing Ukraine’s political unity and deceiving Ukraine as to the intent. The former would have required a sustained shaping phase preceding the invasion. The latter demanded speed. It appears that Russian planners succumbed to optimism bias as to the dislocating effect that speed itself could achieve in diffusing Ukraine’s will to resist and therefore opted to undertake a shock and awe campaign with little preliminary shaping. + +Russia planned to commence the invasion with a massive missile and airstrike campaign against Ukraine’s air defences, command and control (C2) infrastructure, airfields and ammunition storage depots. This campaign would not target critical infrastructure such as power stations and railways, because these were vital to Russia’s plans for occupying the country. The elimination of Ukraine’s political leadership would primarily be a task for Russia’s special services. Another line of effort, allocated to Russia’s special forces and air-assault troops, was to capture Ukraine’s power stations, airfields, water supplies, central bank and parliament. The intelligence community of Ukraine believes that Russia also planned to use Belarusian airborne units to capture the Rivne and Khmelnytsky nuclear power plants. + +To enable these operations, Russia’s Ground Forces were to simultaneously advance under several groups of forces to clear and occupy administrative centres on the left (eastern) bank of the Dnipro River, along with Kyiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa. Russian groups of forces were built around the military district command posts, with the name of the group of forces corresponding to the military district commanding the direction. This can cause some confusion as the military district names correspond with their geographical position in Russia, but do not correspond with their relative position in Ukraine. The northern axis was the main effort, focused on the encirclement and capture of Kyiv. For this purpose, the Russians formed two groups of forces commanded from the Eastern Military District Command Post. One group was formed in the Gomel region of Belarus and used the tactical sign ‘V’ with orders to attack Kyiv along the right (western) bank of the Dnipro River. The second group was formed in the Bryansk region of Russia and used the tactical sign ‘O’ with orders to surround Kyiv from the left (eastern) bank. The Southern Military District Command Post commanded units with the tactical symbol ‘Z in a square’, ordered to attack from occupied Crimea to establish control over the North Crimean Water Canal, Energodar and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, surround Mariupol, take control of the bridges over the Dnipro and advance along the right bank to Voznesensk with the aim of seizing the South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant. The Western Military District Command Post commanded groups of forces projected from Kursk, Belgorod and Voronezh using the tactical symbol ‘Z’ and tasked with encircling the Ukrainian troops in Donbas along the Lozova–Gulyapole line or the Barvinkovo–Velika Novosilka line. Such an encirclement, combined with fixing operations along the line of control using conscripts from occupied Luhansk and Donetsk, was intended to cut off about 50% of the UAF (see Figure 1). + +![image1](https://i.imgur.com/4b41HF2.png) +_▲ __Figure 1: Original Russian Axes of Advance.__ Source: Author generated._ + +Ground forces were assigned sectors and tasks down to the level of the battalion tactical group. For mechanised forces, the intent was often to rapidly occupy and thereafter isolate and screen key objectives. On the axis from Gomel to Kyiv, for example, the force was divided into a screening force that was to establish positions facing west to cut off Kyiv from western Ukraine, and units responsible for pushing into the city. Very little consideration appears to have been given to Ukrainian reserves or the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). The assertion in Russian planning that Ukraine could generate only 40,000 additional troops appears to be premised on the anticipated speed of the operation rather than an appreciation of Ukraine’s capacity for mobilisation. This emphasis on speed led to units being ordered to advance in administrative column by road and to attempt to bypass any initial resistance. The assumption was that by D+10, Russian units would transition to stabilisation operations. The synchronisation matrix of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District), for example, captured near Kyiv in March 2022, stated that by D+10 the force would ‘proceed to the blocking and destruction of individual scattered units of the Armed Forces and the remnants of nationalist resistance units’. + +A final grouping of Russian forces comprised the amphibious component and dispositions of the Black Sea Fleet. Two amphibious task groups were created with the intention of conducting landings ahead of advancing Russian ground forces on the Kherson–Mykolaiv–Odesa axis. These were to go in after the initial invasion, preceding the Ground Forces to seize key intersections and chokepoints to enable the rapid onwards movement of troops along the coast after Mykolaiv. In addition to this task, the Black Sea Fleet was to support the massive strike campaign by launching Kalibr cruise missiles throughout the depth of Ukraine, and isolate the theatre by blockading the Ukrainian coast. + +After D+10, the role of Russia’s conventional forces was to transition to a supporting function to Russia’s special services, responsible for establishing occupation administrations on the territories. Since these activities were critical to the Russian theory of victory in the operation, it is important to outline these plans to appropriately contextualise the role of the conventional force. The assumption appears to have been that Ukrainian government officials would either flee or be captured as a result of the speed of the invasion. It was also anticipated that shock would prevent the immediate mobilisation of the population, and that protests and other civil resistance could be managed through the targeted disintegration of Ukrainian civil society. To manage these protests Russian forces would be supported by Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) and riot control units. Meanwhile the FSB was tasked with capturing local officials. The Russian counterintelligence regime on the occupied territories had compiled lists that divided Ukrainians into four categories: + +- Those to be physically liquidated. + +- Those in need of suppression and intimidation. + +- Those considered neutral who could be induced to collaborate. + +- Those prepared to collaborate. + +For those in the top category, the FSB had conducted wargames with detachments of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) to conduct kill-or-capture missions. In many cases, the purpose of capture was to put individuals involved in the 2014 Revolution of Dignity (often referred to as the Maidan Revolution) on trial to be executed. Although initial lists of persons in the second category existed, the approach was to be more methodical, with the registration of the population through door-to-door sweeps and the use of filtration camps to establish counterintelligence files on large portions of the population in the occupied territories. Filtration would be used to intimidate people, to determine whether they needed to be displaced into Russia, and to lay the groundwork for records to monitor and disrupt resistance networks. Over time, Russia would bring teachers and other officials from Russia itself to engage in the re-education of Ukrainians. + +The intended method of political control had both a regional and national component. The regional component comprised the coerced cooperation of regional governors and local authorities. The national component involved the murder of Ukraine’s executive branch and the capture of parliament. The pro-Russian faction within the parliament would be encouraged to form a Movement for Peace, which other parliamentarians would be encouraged and coerced to support. This Movement for Peace would ban resistance in the name of preserving peace. Regions that resisted could thereafter be cut off from electricity, water and finance from the central bank, following motions through this parliamentary body. Ukraine’s nuclear power plants served three purposes therefore in the invasion plan: to function as reliable shelters for Russia’s troops and military personnel, equipment, command posts and ammunition depots; to gain control over Ukraine’s energy system, because nuclear power plants are responsible for generating more than 60% of Ukraine’s electricity; and to provide the option to obtain leverage for blackmailing European countries with the risk of radiation pollution as a result of possible accidents at nuclear power plants if they attempted to intervene. + +In addition, the seizure of nuclear power plants and scientific facilities engaged in nuclear energy research in Kharkiv and Kyiv was an important element of Russia’s planned war propaganda. While justifying military aggression against Ukraine, Russian propaganda actively spread disinformation among its own population about the alleged threat Ukraine posed to Russia. Along with the narrative about the alleged presence of ‘American Pentagon biolaboratories’ in Ukraine, which were developing biological weapons, Russian propagandists and officials actively spread information about the alleged intention of Ukraine to restore nuclear weapons, which it gave up in 1994 in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the US and the UK as part of the Budapest Memorandum. + +The goals of the Russian invasion were not only ‘denazification’, the destruction of national sovereignty and the banning of Ukrainian identity and ‘demilitarisation’, the destruction and banning of the UAF and the export to Russia of enterprises of the defence industrial complex of Ukraine, but also ‘denuclearisation’, the capture of nuclear power plants and their transfer to the direct management of Rosatom. + +Russian forces massed on the Ukrainian border in autumn 2021 received orders to the effect that they would be away from their barracks for nine months. These orders, issued approximately three to four months before the invasion, demonstrate that the Russian government anticipated having Ukraine under complete control by summer 2022. + +The Russian plans for the invasion of Ukraine were detailed and offered solutions to most of the practical problems that Russia would face in occupying Ukraine. If competently executed, these plans could have succeeded. As shall be seen later in this report, they came much closer to doing so than is widely appreciated. Although the assumption that there would be minimal resistance was incorrect, the occupation of southern Ukraine demonstrates that speed did offer a realistic path to asserting control over territory, even without popular support. Furthermore, despite the resistance of the Ukrainian armed forces, Russia had the combat power at the beginning of the war to overcome many Ukrainian formations. Beyond the shortcomings in the execution of the plan and the poor performance of Russian combat units, there are fundamental aspects of the plan that must be understood to appreciate the peculiarities of Russia’s operations in Ukraine in the first phase of the war. + +These plans were drawn up by a very small group of officials and the intent was directed by Putin. Many officials executing elements of the preparation were unaware of the wider intent. Russian military personnel – even up to deputy heads of branches within the Russian General Staff – were unaware of the intention to invade and occupy Ukraine until days before the invasion, and tactical military units did not receive orders until hours before they entered Ukraine. While this helped to achieve operational surprise – which was no doubt the intent – the tiny pool of personnel involved contributed to a range of false assumptions that appear never to have been challenged. That the Russians overstretched in terms of the number of axes embarked upon, the small size of the force employed for many tasks, and the failure to develop appropriate contingencies is indicative of many contributing technical judgements to the planning not having been fully briefed about the overall context. No independent red teaming appears to have taken place. Instead, the plan itself – while theoretically plausible – compounded optimism bias in each of its stages and, most tellingly, offered no reversionary courses of action, indicated no decision points to determine whether conventional forces should adjust their posture nor envisaged any outcome other than its own success. Neither did the plan account for the needs of those tasked with implementing it, nor afford any agency to Ukraine. The FSB’s inaccurate assessment of the reaction of Ukrainian society is much less consequential in how the plan actually unfolded than the fact that there is no evidence in the Russian planning that anyone had asked what would occur if any of its key assumptions were wrong. + + +### II. Ukraine’s Planning and Preparations + +To properly understand what transpired in the opening phases of the conflict, the preparations made by the UAF since 2014 need to be appreciated. Many claims about the impact of Western military-technical assistance – for example – are problematic because they do not contextualise these systems alongside the existing capabilities of the UAF. Appreciating the scale of the conventional fight is important if the right lessons are to be drawn from the fighting. Once the structure and capabilities of the UAF are understood, the posture and dispositions of the force in February 2022 can be discussed in context. + +#### Manoeuvre Brigades, Special Forces and Territorial Defence + +The structure and condition of Ukraine’s infantry and manoeuvre forces is worth considering, less in terms of their technical capabilities than in terms of their mindset, cohesion and C2. To begin, the Ukrainian Ground Forces had been in constant combat since 2014. Such combat may have been low intensity, but with more than 90 Ukrainian soldiers killed by Russian forces in 2021, it nevertheless required soldiers to take their tasks seriously and to prepare for escalation. For officers who rotated through the Joint Forces Operations (JFO) area, they had months to walk the ground, prepare positions and build an intimate understanding of the battlefield. The conversation throughout the UAF was what they would do in the event of a Russian escalation. Putting aside operational-level planning, even down to the level of platoon, the experience of junior officers and soldiers was to observe – for months – Russian positions that posed a threat to them and their comrades. These units had made extensive plans among themselves as to how they would defeat these positions in the event of war. + +Furthermore, at the operational level, it was understood throughout the UAF that Russia may renew its assault on Ukraine. In 2014, the Russian military had tried to seize the country, only to pull back. Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service and other parts of the Russian government had urged a more deliberate aggression against Ukraine in 2015. The possibility, therefore, had been at the forefront of the minds of UAF officers. Wargames and exercises at formation level envisaged a defence against the full capabilities of the Russian military. Ukrainian units were confident that at the tactical level they would be better trained and better prepared than their adversaries. The persistent concern among commanders was the impact of artillery on their freedom to manoeuvre and, crucially, on their lines of supply. This problem was exacerbated by the shortage of personnel. With 10 brigades covering the entire line of contact in the JFO, a brigade frontage at the start of the war was around 20 km. This left a limited reserve and depended on a manoeuvre defence to counterattack against breaches in the line. Each brigade started the war with around 10 days of ammunition, but there was limited confidence – given the threat from artillery – that more would reach the lines if the Russians committed all their capabilities to this axis. Nevertheless, having observed the treatment of Ukrainians in the occupied territories after 2014, Ukrainian forces were also highly motivated in preventing more of the country falling into Russian hands and morale among the troops was therefore high. + +![image2](https://i.imgur.com/lkmpCSq.png) +_▲ __Figure 2: The Line of Contact.__ Source: [Frederick W Kagan and Mason Clark, ‘Russia-Ukraine Warning Update: Russian Military Operations in Southeastern Ukraine Imminent’, Institute for the Study of War, 21 February 2022](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-ukraine-warning-update-russian-military-operations-southeastern-ukraine-imminent)._ + +Retaining a sufficient force was a challenge from 2014. The main problem was pay. Although pay had been increased, it did not keep pace with inflation, nor was it competitive with pay in the private sector. Combined with the use of short-term contracts, this contributed to a high turnover of personnel. Prior to 24 February 2022, this created serious problems for the UAF. It not only meant that many units had a shortage of specialists such as communicators, but also that the Ministry of Defence was having to expend disproportionate resources to train new specialists who would rarely be retained in the force. There was a benefit to this situation, however. Ukrainian reservists and wider society contained a very large number of people who had military experience and were trained to perform specialist tasks. One of the major errors in Russian planning for the invasion was its assessment of the number of reservists Ukraine could mobilise. + +There were also several brigades and units where retention was less problematic, and these constituted highly experienced formations. Among these units were the seven brigades of the Air Assault Forces, and the Special Operations Forces consisting of two regiments and two special operations centres. In addition, there were the Special Units of Ukraine’s Special Services, including the 10th Special Unit of the Main Intelligence Directorate, Special Unit Alpha within the Security Service of Ukraine, the Special Forces of the National Guard, State Border Service and the Foreign Intelligence Service, responsible for operations deep behind enemy lines. + +The creation of the TDF was an attempt to capitalise on the depth of Ukraine’s reserves and the will of the population to create mass and therefore resilience. Established as a unified entity in January 2022, the TDF were conceptually promising, and over time have proven a valuable means of creating new combat units that can be trained to support the armed forces. However, even pre-existing Territorial Defence units were created far too close to the invasion to be well established and effective at the beginning of the war. It is important to understand that for the Ukrainian government, Russia’s campaign against the country was continued for almost a decade and the cost of maintaining large territorial defence structures versus their immediate military utility made investment in such a structure a challenge for the UAF. + +Because the TDF were only established in 2022, they lacked heavy weapons, or the C2 mechanisms to use them. They also had a limited command structure. While the value of the TDF has steadily increased – progressing from rear-area security to ground holding to contributing manoeuvre brigades to offensive operations – at the beginning of the conflict the lack of integrated C2 for these units made them an impediment in many cases. This is not the fault of the TDF personnel who mobilised to defend Ukraine, but simply reflects that trying to mobilise and coordinate such a large body of personnel with just over a month to establish chains of command and to distribute the necessary communications and training imposed a limit on how effectively they could be integrated into the armed forces. As of 24 February, therefore, the UAF had a limited body of experienced and professional manoeuvre brigades and had to make difficult decisions as to where to prioritise their deployment. They also had a large pool of tactically competent reserves, and a larger pool of willing civilian volunteers, but limited stocks of equipment to provision them. The critical question therefore was whether the professional body of the UAF could hold for long enough for a wider mobilisation to bolster Ukraine’s defences in the event of war. + +#### Artillery + +In addition to its manoeuvre forces, Ukraine had systematically attempted to strengthen the combat support for its forces after 2014, recognising the significant fires capabilities of the AFRF. In the eight years of fighting before 2022, artillery had accounted for around 90% of casualties. + +Prior to the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, President Viktor Yanukovych’s pro-Russian government carried out a systematic reduction of missile and artillery troops. Thus, by the time of the Russian invasion of Crimea, the Ukrainian Ground Forces fielded one missile brigade armed with 9K79-1 ‘Tochka-U’ tactical missile complexes, two artillery brigades equipped with 152-mm self-propelled and towed howitzers ‘MSTA-S’ and ‘MSTA-B’, 152-mm self-propelled and towed guns ‘Hyacinth-S’ and ‘Hyacinth-B’, and 203-mm self-propelled guns ‘Pion’. They also fielded three artillery regiments, armed with 220-mm ‘Uragan’ and 300-mm ‘Smerch’ multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). In addition, artillery units of mechanised and tank brigades used 152-mm and 122-mm artillery installations ‘Akatsiya’ and ‘Gvozdika’, as well as 122-mm MLRS ‘Grad’. The units of the Airborne Assault Troops had neither their own artillery nor tanks. + +Since March 2014, Ukraine has focused on recovering its artillery capabilities. As a result, five new artillery brigades and a separate artillery regiment of the Ground Forces were created, as well as one artillery brigade and a separate artillery regiment of the Navy. The 19th Separate Missile Brigade regenerated two additional battalions with tactical missile complex ‘Tochka-U’. All new combined arms brigades in the Ground Forces, as well as all brigades of the marines, received their own brigade artillery groups. By 2019, the number of artillery battalions had doubled. As of February 2022, the Missile Forces and Artillery (RViA) of the UAF had 10 brigades and one regiment as part of the Ground Forces, as well as one brigade and one regiment as part of the Navy. The UAF had 1,176 barrel artillery systems, of which 742 were 152-mm calibre systems, 421 were 122-mm howitzers, and 13 units were 203-mm systems. The RViA also fielded 1,680 MLRS of all calibres, as well as about 40 tactical missile systems ‘Tochka-U’. In terms of the number of artillery systems, Ukraine fielded the largest artillery force in Europe after Russia. The difference in numbers between Russian and Ukrainian artillery was not so significant at the beginning of the conflict: 2,433 barrel artillery systems against 1,176, and 3,547 MLRS against 1,680. + +The UAF had ammunition to support these systems in high-intensity warfighting for just over six weeks. Ammunition had been depleted by regular explosions at Ukrainian arsenals as a result of Russian sabotage. From 2014 to 2018, there were six such explosions, which destroyed more than 210,000 tonnes of ammunition, a large part of which were 152-mm shells and rockets for MLRS. For comparison, during the five years of the war in Donbas, the UAF spent about 70,000 tons of ammunition in total. + +The development of Ukrainian artillery was not limited to increasing the number of artillery systems and units. A lot of effort was also put into qualitative improvement. Since 2015, all battalions began to receive UAVs ‘Furia’, ‘Leleka’, PD-1 and others, which significantly increased their ISR capabilities. US radars AN/TPQ-36, designed to determine the coordinates of enemy artillery, were transferred to Ukraine as part of US military-technical assistance and strengthened the capabilities for conducting counter-battery fire. The use of the ‘Kropyva’ combat control system – Ukrainian intelligent mapping software – saw an 80% reduction in the deployment time for artillery units. Simultaneously, the amount of time to destroy an unplanned target was reduced by two-thirds, and the time to open counter-battery fire by 90%. Special attention was paid to personnel training. Every year, the armed forces conducted more than 35 field brigade tactical exercises and more than 200 field battalion tactical exercises for artillery. Thus, Ukrainian defence plans aimed at using manoeuvre forces to fix and canalise attackers to enable their destruction by concentrated artillery fire. + +#### Armour + +The role and significance of armour in the conflict must be underpinned by an understanding of the tactical evolution of its employment over the past eight years and the scale at which armour is fielded by the UAF. Counting the two regular and four reserve tank brigades, tank units of mechanised and mountain brigades, as well as brigades of marines and air-assault troops, the UAF fielded about 30 tank battalions at the start of the conflict. A significant part of these tank units was formed between 2014 and 2018, for which 500 tanks were delivered to the UAF. The total number of Ukrainian main battle tanks at the time of the invasion was about 900. For comparison, the Russian armed forces had 2,800 combat-ready tanks in their invasion force, and Russian proxies in Donbas fielded about 400. + +Traditional tank doctrine would see its employment in the direct fire zone. However, during the years of the war in Donbas, the tankers of the UAF changed traditional approaches and developed techniques for indirect fire. For this task, high-explosive fragmentation projectiles are usually used. This requires the use of special guidance devices – an azimuth pointer and a side level. The use of modern technologies, in the form of graphic and calculation complexes, developed in Ukraine with the function of automated transmission of information to other tanks participating in the combat mission, made it possible to achieve high accuracy at distances of up to 10 km and reduced the time for calculating fire corrections to a few seconds. This technique blurs the line between tanks and artillery. The value of this technique is that it allows tanks to concentrate fire over a wide area while they can manoeuvre without the protection and screening needed by artillery pieces. Ukraine therefore planned to use armour as mobile reserves supporting its formations, capable of offering blunting fire against enemy movements and to support counterattacks if conditions permitted. + +Even though Ukraine produces BM ‘Oplot’ and T-84U, the lack of necessary funds forced the UAF to refrain from purchasing new tanks, and they instead chose to modernise their existing fleet. It was calculated that three or even four battalions of modernised tanks could be obtained for the funds required to purchase one battalion of new tanks. The 1st Tank Brigade was armed with T-64B and T-64BM ‘Bulat’ main battle tanks, which are modernised Soviet T-64 tanks. Modernised T-64s are equipped with digital radios, new internal communication and navigation systems, sighting systems with thermal imaging cameras, modified dynamic protection and other necessary options. The T-64BM ‘Bulat’ weapon system also includes the Ukrainian-made TAKO-621 tank missile system, enabling engagement of armoured vehicles, fortifications, helicopters and other targets at a distance of up to 5,000 m using Kombat guided missiles. In addition, the UAF have modernised T-72 and modernised gas turbine T-80BVs, which, due to their higher speed and manoeuvrability, are used by airborne assault troops and marines. + +Although the UAF fielded a considerable tank fleet, this does not alter the fact that Russian tanks at the beginning of the war generally had better protection and sighting systems and were able to engage targets from a greater distance. For short-range engagements, these differences in protection and sensor performance were less relevant but offered significant technical advantages to Russia in mid-range engagements. + +#### Anti-Tank Capabilities + +The heavy emphasis in international commentary on anti-tank guided weapons (ATGWs) and especially those provided through military-technical assistance, means that it is vital to appreciate the volume of these capabilities and how they were distributed across the UAF to properly contextualise their impact on the fighting. At the beginning of February 2022, the armed forces received about 150 Javelin ATGW launchers with 1,000–1,200 missiles, 2,000 NLAW, as well as a large number of rocket-propelled anti-tank grenade launchers. Since Ukraine’s partners at that time were persuaded that, in the most optimistic scenarios, hostilities would be centred on street battles in the largest cities, the anti-tank weapons transferred were intended for close combat. + +Ukrainian anti-tank capabilities were not limited to Western-provided ATGWs, however. After 2014, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine purchased at least 650 launchers for anti-tank missile systems ‘Stugna-P’ and ‘Korsar’ and about 7,000 missiles for them, 150 tower systems for armoured vehicles with dual anti-tank missiles and 900 missiles for them, and 1,600 guided missiles ‘Cobra’ and ‘Kombat’ for tank missile systems. Thus, the anti-tank capabilities of the UAF at the beginning of February 2022 amounted to around 950 ATGW launchers (Javelin, ‘Stugna-P’, ‘Corsar’, ‘Barrier’) and about 9,100 missiles. To this should be added short-ranged systems such as NLAW, Kobra/Kombat missiles, as well as more than a thousand Fagot and Metis ATGWs and several thousand missiles for them. + +It is also important to appreciate the characteristics of some of these systems, which determined how they were employed. ‘Stugna-P’, developed and manufactured at the Ukrainian state-owned enterprise KB ‘Luch’, is a more powerful equivalent of the Russian ‘Kornet’. The range of both complexes is the same – about 5,100 m – but the armour penetration of ‘Stugna-P’ is better. In addition, among the advantages of ‘Stugna-P’ is a quasi-top attack, a thermal sight that can be used at night at a distance of up to 3,000 m, as well as the ability to remotely control the launcher with a cable several dozen metres long, which significantly increases the survivability of operators on the battlefield. This class of ATGW is highly valuable for defensive operations because it allows for armour to be engaged at the ranges within which Russian armour seeks to conduct ATGW launches against defensive positions. This prevents the enemy establishing a safe overwatch position to support infantry advances. + +The distribution of these ATGWs was shaped by their relative training burden. Despite its effectiveness, Stugna-P and other wire-guided systems required considerable training time for operators to use the system effectively. This restricted these systems to being used by Ukraine’s existing ground forces. After 2014, a lot of attention had been paid to the training of anti-tank crews in the armed forces, and the School of Anti-Tank Artillery was created at the 184th Training Centre of the National Academy of Ground Forces. It took 30 days to prepare crews arriving from military units to properly employ Stugna-P. + +Javelin, by contrast, was much easier to employ, requiring days to train crews, while personnel could be trained to use NLAW in hours. Because of the wide range of additional uses of the Javelin CLU – such as ISR – these systems were prioritised for Ukrainian special forces and other specialist troops. NLAW, by contrast, was distributed widely to ground-holding units. Although Western training on these systems was excellent, the rapid delivery of training to new units often overlooked maintenance of the weapons – especially for maintaining batteries – and, as a result, there was a widespread problem early in the conflict with Western-supplied ATGWs being unusable when distributed to units. Over time, the appropriate instructions were disseminated to address this problem. The tactical employment of ATGWs by the UAF prior to the conflict was largely aimed at fixing or blunting enemy armoured manoeuvre and for use in raiding by light forces because of the speed with which units with these systems could displace. There were too few missiles, however, for these to be the primary means of attriting enemy forces. + +#### Air-Defence Capabilities + +One of the most consequential causes of the international underestimation of Ukraine’s military prospects prior to the conflict arose from a simultaneous overestimation of Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) capabilities and a corresponding lack of familiarity with Ukrainian air-defence capabilities. It is therefore important to understand how Ukrainian air defences were organised and equipped at the beginning of the war. + +Since the Russian aggression in 2014, developing the air-defence capabilities of Ukraine has been a constant priority of its government. The radio engineering troops, tasked with warning of an air attack, reorganised after 2014 to ensure they could detect targets at 300–400 km, and direct fighters and anti-aircraft missile troops against them. At the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the radio engineering forces of Ukraine consisted of four brigades, whose units maintained continuous radar coverage along the state border and ensured monitoring of the airspace of Ukraine. Their coverage over the Black Sea was less extensive. These units fielded 35D6M and 80K6 radars from KP ‘NVC’ ‘Iskra’, P-18 ‘Malakhit’ from HC ‘Ukrspetstechnika’, ‘Burshtyn-1800’ from NPP ‘Aerotechnika-MLT’, and other equipment. + +The modernised 3D radar station 35D6M, which is also used as a surveillance radar for the S-300 anti-aircraft missile complex, is much more powerful than the outdated Soviet 19Zh6. The 35D6M radar can detect up to 300 air targets simultaneously at 360 km, while the 19Zh6 detects only 32 targets at 150 km. In addition, the Ukrainian radar has a higher accuracy in determining the coordinates, improved trajectory processing parameters and a new cooling system that significantly increases the service life of the klystrons. 35D6M also requires significantly less time to fully deploy or collapse the station, which increases its survivability. These developments had not been fully appreciated by the VKS prior to the invasion, leading to tactical errors in the employment of radio-electronic attack. + +The appearance in the UAF of the 80K6 ‘Phoenix’ radar, as well as previous versions of this system, including the 79K6 ‘Pelikan’, allowed the remote operation of the S-300PT(PS) anti-aircraft missile systems. This radar can be deployed in 15 minutes after going static, allowing for tactical redeployment. After 2014, the armed forces also received about 50 mobile ‘Malachite’ radars, which is a Ukrainian modification of the Soviet P-18MU ‘Terek’ radar. ‘Malakhit’ can detect targets moving at a speed of up to 1,000 m/s and tracking up to 256 targets at a distance of up to 400 km. In addition, this system can detect small and inconspicuous targets. + +Even though the war in Donbas was mostly land based, many military-political centres and industrial and energy facilities demanded air defence, which could not be limited only to detecting threats. Five nuclear plants, six dams of the Dnipro Cascade Hydroelectric Power Plant and two dams of the Dniester Cascade, and more than 10 enterprises and facilities of the chemical industry required constant cover by the anti-aircraft missile forces of the UAF, limiting protection for its manoeuvre forces. Since 2015, Ukraine has focused on restoring and increasing its combat capabilities. As of 2016, the anti-aircraft missile forces consisted of five anti-aircraft missile brigades and seven anti-aircraft missile regiments comprising 60 air-defence divisions. A Ukrainian air-defence division holds the equipment of a Western battery along with organic C2 and sustainment capabilities, thereby performing a battlefield task closer to that of a battalion. Overall, the UAF held 35 S-300PS/PT divisions, nine S-125 divisions, three S-300B divisions and 15 divisions of the Buk-M1 air-defence system. + +Another critical component of the air-defence capabilities of the UAF was the extensive employment of man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) across all units. The saturation of MANPADS in Ukrainian units, bolstered by those that were received as military-technical assistance before the Russian invasion, became an important element of countering Russian dominance in the air. MANPADS were complementary to the air-defence missile complexes because the latter forced enemy aviation to engage at low altitudes, where in turn they fell into the zone of impact of MANPADS. After 2014, Ukraine paid considerable attention to extending the lifespan and modernisation of its own MANPADS. The most common MANPADS in the UAF were the modernised ‘Igla-1’, which were distributed as organic elements to its units. Some were held in the Anti-Aircraft Missile Forces as mobile groups intended to provide protection for air-defence divisions as they displaced. A major problem with this distribution was the lack of access to the common air picture among those MANPADS teams not subordinated to the anti-aircraft missile forces at the beginning of the conflict. + +#### Aircraft + +Ukrainian fighter aircraft were also an important component of the national air-defence system. As of 24 February 2022, the Ukrainian Air Force had about 50 MiG-29 fighters in service with the 40th Tactical Aviation Brigade in Vasylkiv and the 114th Tactical Aviation Brigade in Ivano-Frankivsk, as well as about 32 Su-27 fighters operated by the 831st tactical aviation brigade in Myrhorod and the 39th in Ozerny. The air force also flew Su-24 and Su-25 aircraft. After 2014, significant efforts were put into repairing fighters and a large proportion of the fleet was modernised. Although this left the air force with a higher proportion of available fighters, from a technical point of view it was overmatched by the combat aircraft of the VKS in almost every regard. Russian aircraft could generally see and shoot further while their countermeasures were effective against Ukrainian air-to-air munitions. + +Despite the technical overmatch of the VKS, the training conducted by the air force prior to 24 February played a role in ensuring its survivability. An important element of the training was working out the survivability of units through the ability to disperse aircraft from the main airfields to operational ones. Special attention was also paid to the training of maintenance crews, their ability to carry out pre-flight preparation of aircraft in field conditions, and a full set of measures necessary for the performance of maintenance and routine repair of aircraft damaged during hostilities. + +Because Ukrainian pilots understood the technical limitations of their aircraft, and the fearsome capabilities of Russian anti-aircraft systems, they had trained extensively for low-level flight over Ukrainian territory and were highly familiar with the exploitation of terrain to evade radar detection. Finally, as with other technical specialisms in the air force, Ukraine had struggled to retain pilots prior to 24 February, but consequently had a very large reserve of trained pilots. The critical limitation for the air force was airframes and their serviceability, not trained crews. + +#### Maritime Defence Capabilities + +The Ukrainian Navy was the least well equipped of the branches of service at the beginning of the war. Nevertheless, noting the economic impact of Russia’s control of the Sea of Azov, the navy had pursued modernisation since 2014 and had made important progress in expanding its capabilities. The first phase of naval modernisation was intended to be completed by 2025 and provided for the establishment of control over the territorial waters of Ukraine, maintaining coverage out to 40 nautical miles from the coast. For this purpose, the navy had to acquire the capabilities necessary for timely detection, identification and defeat of the enemy in this zone. The first step was to restore and modernise the system of ISR of the surface situation, including through the integration of capabilities available in other government agencies. In this context, it is particularly important to note the purchase of the multifunctional radar complex ‘Mineral-U’, created by the Ukrainian State Scientific Research Institute of Radar Systems Quantum-Radiolocation. ‘Mineral-U’ is designed for detection in active and passive modes and classification of surface targets at up to 500–600 km. It is mounted on a truck platform, is highly mobile and adapted for close interaction with the anti-ship missile complex ‘Neptune’, which became widely known after the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva on 13 April 2022. + +Developed by the Ukrainian design bureau ‘Luch’, the coastal mobile missile complex RK-360 ‘Neptune’ was an important component of the navy’s modernisation, along with the development of coastal artillery, the provision of mine-blocking actions and the conduct of radio-electronic warfare. With a range of up to 280 km, manoeuvrability and sea-skimming capabilities, the Neptune can be considered a critical element of the overall Ukrainian maritime defence strategy. The first battalion of Neptune complexes was to be received in April 2022. The Russian aggression forced the accelerated transfer of systems but did not allow the full use of the capabilities of the complex in the first weeks of the invasion, as the crew still needed some time for final preparation. A serious challenge for the navy was also the lack of a sufficient number of missiles for the complexes. However, Ukraine’s receipt of Harpoon anti-ship missile systems as part of Western military-technical assistance, which are very similar to the Neptune, solved this problem and provided confidence in the ability of the navy to deter Russia in the northwestern part of the Black Sea. + +#### Assessments and Dispositions + +Having given an overview of the capabilities of the UAF in some critical areas prior to the invasion, it becomes possible to properly outline the resources available and thus prioritisation decisions that underpinned their dispositions prior to 24 February. The General Staff of the UAF had conducted extensive exercises and wargames to assess how to orchestrate the defence of the country against a wide range of contingencies. Despite having identified methods for defending all relevant axes, however, the limited number of available units without full mobilisation meant that the weighting of units had to be driven by an assessment of enemy intent. It is also important to emphasise that the economic impact of full mobilisation made this very difficult for the Ukrainian government in the face of a sustained threat that could delay major attacks for a long time. + +Until days before the full-scale Russian invasion, the intelligence community of Ukraine broadly assessed that the most dangerous enemy course of action was a high-intensity offensive against Donbas in late February 2022, with the Russians using the destruction of the Ukrainian forces in the JFO area as a means of destabilising the Ukrainian state. The most likely enemy course of action was assessed to be a prolonged period of political destabilisation to create favourable conditions for a military offensive in the early summer, with the main effort being against Donbas. + +Several factors contributed to the assessment that Donbas would be the main effort, despite extensive warnings from Ukraine’s international partners that Kyiv would be the enemy’s main effort. First, an assessment of Russian forces north of Kyiv concluded that they lacked sufficient troops to effectively isolate and seize the city. The offensive was therefore viewed as a diversionary deployment, aimed at drawing and fixing Ukrainian forces away from Donbas. As the terrain north of Kyiv was highly unfavourable for a major attack, it was assessed that Russia’s attempt to draw Ukraine to concentrate on this axis would make Kyiv disproportionately vulnerable from the east. Second, interception of communications and observation of the Russian units on the Gomel axis confirmed that the personnel did not believe they were going to war and were not prepared for major combat operations. The disconnect between strategic-level discussion that emphasised the threat to Kyiv – shared with Ukraine by Western partners – with this tactical picture, supported the belief that there was a strategic influence campaign that did not reflect the tactical preparations being made by Russian units. In this sense, it is worth emphasising that the Russian deception plan was largely successful through the information security measures taken, but that the impact on the combat effectiveness of Russian troops through a failure to brief them with sufficient time to prepare came at considerable cost. + +The defence of Kyiv was seen as a necessary contingency for the UAF to plan against and, as the conflict came closer, the threat to this axis was perceived to have increased. Nevertheless, since Donbas was anticipated to be the main axis, over 10 combat brigades, constituting around half of the manoeuvre forces of the UAF, were kept in the JFO area. + +In addition to Donbas, Ukraine held forces around Kharkiv, Dnipro, Sumy and Odesa, a manoeuvre brigade and two artillery brigades in Kyiv, and units in training areas. There were no major formations committed forwards on the Gomel axis. Nor were there any major units committed to defend the approach from Crimea, even though this was specified in the national defence plan. The reasons for this are currently subject to an investigation. TDF were nascent, only had light weapons and were not yet fully integrated into the military command. Ukraine’s defence plans therefore aimed at a high-intensity defence in the direction of Donbas lasting six weeks, giving time for full-scale mobilisation of the reserves. + +A major threat, identified before the conflict, relevant to the defence of Kyiv or Donbas, was Russia’s long-range strike arsenal. As a result, beginning one week prior to the invasion and accelerated 72 hours before, munitions stockpiles were dispersed from the main arsenals. Aircraft and air-defence systems were also dispersed hours before the invasion. As it became apparent that the Gomel axis was the enemy’s main effort and that another group of forces would strike through Chernihiv, a redeployment of Ukrainian forces was ordered approximately seven hours prior to the invasion. This took considerable time. The result was that many Ukrainian units were not at their assigned defensive positions when the invasion began and, especially on the northern axes, were not in prepared positions. Redeployments from the southern axis towards Kyiv also left fewer troops to hold the coast. Ukrainian units found themselves in a meeting engagement with the enemy. The critical point here is that the war started with the AFRF holding the initiative at the operational level but with their tactical units surprised by what they were being ordered to do. The UAF found themselves surprised at the operational level but with tactical units which had been psychologically and practically preparing for this fight for eight years. The interaction between these variables would be decisive in determining the outcome of the first 72 hours of fighting. + + +### III. The Invasion + +Having assessed the plans and dispositions of the opposing forces, this chapter outlines what occurred during the initial phases of the war. + +#### Shock and Mutual Surprise: D+0–3 + +The invasion began with a massive fire-strike campaign across Ukraine. The strikes were preceded by the widespread application of electronic attack to disrupt and damage defensive radar and air-defence installations, along with the extensive use of aerial decoys to saturate the defences. This was followed by the employment of cruise and ballistic missiles launched from sea-, air-, and ground-based launch systems. In addition, Russian aircraft penetrated Ukrainian airspace to strike tactical targets. The Russian High Value Target list quite logically included industrial facilities, fuel and energy storage facilities, air-defence sites, C2 infrastructure, ammunition storage points and troop assembly areas, as consistent with Russian doctrine. It was noted that during the first two weeks, Ukrainian transport infrastructure was not targeted, except when it was required by a tactical situation. + +There are some peculiarities to the order and effectiveness of this initial Russian fires campaign. For example, while the Russians had accurately mapped a large number of military sites, there were very few engagements against tactical groupings of forces, with the preponderance of strikes being at maximum depth and then working backwards towards Ukraine’s tactical echelons. As the tactical elements were the most mobile, however, this sequencing maximised the time available for tactical elements to displace. Furthermore, the Russian lists appeared to be linear and unresponsive to updated information. Many strikes were struck that had not been military positions for years. Moreover, against moving targets, new detections would apparently be added to the target list, without removing the previous reported location, so that dynamic strikes were often delivered too late. Furthermore, the number of munitions assigned to each target appeared to bear little correlation to the size of the target, suggesting limited familiarity with the effects of these classes of munitions among Russian planners. The result was that within the first 48 hours, approximately 75% of stationary Ukrainian Air Defence sites were engaged. At the same time, the estimated percentage for mobile air-defence sites was only about 10%. + +The effectiveness of the Russian strikes was greater than the number of platforms destroyed, however. Given the orders to redeploy Ukrainian forces, the damage and disruption to C2, the unexpected concentration on the Gomel axis, and the forced displacement of systems, many Ukrainian systems were alive, but uncoordinated for the initial 24 hours. A significant proportion of the air-defence infrastructure survived but was not in a position to conduct a coordinated defence. Instead, it largely delivered pop-up attacks against Russian forces. This suppression effect meant that for the first phase of the war, the success rate of interceptions of Russian cruise missiles, for example, was around 12–18%. Given that this rose to 40–60% in the second phase of the conflict, the effect of both the scale of the Russian strikes and the impact of dislocation on the effectiveness of the defence can be seen. + +Russian successes were disproportionately weighted to certain axes. The majority of available air-defence coverage for the southern coast around Kherson and Mykolaiv, for example, was destroyed or suppressed. Two air-defence sites responsible for screening the Dnipro River from the north were also destroyed, opening a gap in the defences which enabled the conduct of an air assault against Hostomel from Belarus. In addition to the dislocation caused by missile strikes, Russian aircraft flew sorties to strike specified targets along the axes of advance for their respective groups of forces. This further dislocated the positions of the air-defence forces. + +An important element of the Russian plan to disorganise Ukraine’s military C2 system was also to neutralise the top military leadership of the UAF. Thus, in the first days of the invasion, a large number of Ukrainian generals received personal messages from Russian military leaders urging them to surrender and assuring them that Russia did not intend to do any harm to Ukraine. Messages of similar content, but sent from anonymous numbers, were received by almost all colonels and other senior officers of the UAF. The strategic importance of this campaign is evidenced by the fact that on the second day of the invasion, Putin publicly appealed to the Ukrainian military to not resist the Russian invasion. This failed campaign also highlights the poor assessment of the psychology of the Ukrainian military by the Russian special services. + +A critical weakness of the Russian strike campaign was battle damage assessment. First, the Russian military appears to have presumed that if an action had been ordered and carried out then it had succeeded, unless there was direct evidence to the contrary. Evidence of success appears to have disproportionately relied on three data points: confirmation from pilots that they hit their target; confirmation from Russian satellites that a site showed damage; and confirmation from signals intelligence (SIGINT) that Ukrainians reported a strike and damage to their equipment. Russian satellite reconnaissance proved very limited, even though Russian survey space reconnaissance of Ukraine has been conducted since at least 2012, and detailed reconnaissance, in the interests of invasion planning, since mid-2021. A probable reason for this may be the insufficient number of satellites in the orbital grouping of the VKS and the overestimation of their technical capabilities. Indirect confirmation of this explanation is provided by the fact that the AFRF began buying additional satellite images of the territory of Ukraine and individual military facilities on the world market in April 2022. One of the visible failures of satellite intelligence is the inability to detect on time a significant volume of strategic railway movements by the UAF, which, in March 2022 amounted to three–four echelons per day. + +The poor Russian battle damage assessment process made the Russian military highly vulnerable to deception, which has been consistent throughout the conflict. Early strikes on Ukrainian airfields, for example, destroyed many hangars. By photographing this damage and printing the resulting pattern on to sheets, it became possible to clear the rubble and erect covers for aircraft to return to the site, sheltering in positions that the Russians would confirm as destroyed. This led – somewhat amusingly – to the Russians debating whether Ukrainian fighter aircraft were operating from subterranean shelters at several sites. Repeated strikes on dummy air-defence positions also saw a considerable wastage of ammunition, while Ukrainian troops could confirm that sites were destroyed over the radio even when they were still functioning, causing Russian aircraft to ignore air-defence systems in their mission planning. The already-publicly reported use of dummy HIMARS (high mobility artillery rocket system) later in the war to lure Russian fires is indicative of the systematic use of deception to ensure survivability by the UAF, and it has proven widely effective. + +The presumption of success caused the Russian military to take several unjustifiable risks in the disposition of its forces during the first 72 hours of the conflict. Aircraft did not fly with EW pods during the opening phase as they were not deemed necessary following the presumed success of the strike campaign. Similarly, Russian manoeuvre forces were not properly supported by air-defence units and Russian air-defence units were told to presume that aircraft were friendly. This enabled a significant number of ground-attack sorties by the Ukrainian Air Force, including using UAVs such as TB2, against Russian formations, even when they had attached air-defence units. Ukraine suffered aircraft losses in air-to-air engagements, however. + +The penetration of Ukrainian territory by Russian air-assault units on the first day of the invasion deserves special consideration given its significance in the overall plan. Air-assault troops were landed at Hostomel in two waves, each comprising 10 helicopters. These followed the course of the Dnipro River from Belarus to remain below air-defence coverage and successfully reached their objective. In the first wave, two helicopters were shot down at Hostomel by MANPADS. This incident highlights the vulnerability of helicopters to MANPADS as, even under optimal conditions, there is little ability to prevent losses. The assault on Hostomel also highlights why air assault against positions – rather than axes – is extremely dangerous. Upon landing, the Russian VDV came under heavy artillery fire and were subsequently cleared from the airfield by a mechanised counterattack. Similar operations attempted in southern Ukraine and attempts to insert special forces in western Ukraine were unsuccessful for similar reasons. + +The behaviour of Russian Ground Forces during the first three days of the war – which differed considerably from pre-war expectations, from their orders and from doctrine – require some explanation. For reasons of operational security, orders were not distributed until 24 hours before the invasion to most units. As a result, Russian troops lacked ammunition, fuel, food, maps, properly established communications and, most critically, a clear understanding at the tactical level of how their actions fitted into the overall plan. It is not so much the case that tactical Russian commanders are incapable of initiative or mission command, but rather that they lacked the detailed instructions of their commanders’ intent or their role within the wider battle plan to make such decisions. Instead, by the time instructions reached battalion tactical groups (BTGs), what had begun as detailed operational planning descended into orders to reach specific locations within a specified timeframe. Confirming the notion that the conventional military component of the invasion was intended as a supporting demonstration of power rather than the main effort, Russian units were ordered to proceed in administrative column, and to bypass UAF units. Many Russian soldiers arrived in towns without their weapons loaded. They were – for the most part – not anticipating heavy fighting. Furthermore, old maps and a lack of time to coordinate the activity of tactical units led many units to move along the same roads, rapidly becoming intermingled, choking up key junctions and slowing down the rate of advance. + +![image3](https://i.imgur.com/UHichWc.png) +_▲ __Figure 3: Map of Ukraine on 27 February.__ Source: [Mason Clark, George Barros and Kateryna Stepanenko, ‘Russia-Ukraine Warning Update: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 27’, Institute for the Study of War, 27 February 2022](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-ukraine-warning-update-russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27)._ + +The speed and conception of the Russian advance posed grave dangers for the UAF. Russian Ground Forces made rapid progress towards Kyiv from Gomel where there were in any case very few Ukrainian troops. The axis past Chernihiv also posed major challenges as Ukrainian forces were caught between their positions, while the orders to bypass resistance left many Ukrainian units cut off, behind Russian lines. The UAF made three decisions at this stage that proved important. First, a large portion of Ukraine’s special forces and the special units of Ukraine’s Special Services were committed on the Gomel axis. Second, Ukraine mobilised reserve units, which rapidly created new battalions near Kyiv. Third, the UAF mobilised its cadets and the teaching staff of its military academies to force-generate additional infantry battalions. In this way a new group of forces was formed within the opening week of the conflict, supported by the two brigades of artillery held in Kyiv and one mechanised brigade. Even with these efforts, the Russians achieved a 12:1 force ratio advantage on the Gomel axis. Similarly, around Chernihiv, the 1st Tank Brigade found itself encircled and lacking infantry support, necessarily drawing on territorial defence units and reservists to adopt a position of all-round defence. + +In Donbas, the Russian operations to fix the bulk of the UAF proved almost entirely successful. Although the AFRF made little progress against the defensive positions along the line of contact, it proved impossible for Ukrainian troops to be redeployed from this theatre. To the south, the Russian breakout from Crimea proceeded in a manner consistent with the Russian invasion plan, with Melitopol and Kherson seized with minimal fighting and significant progress made in achieving the encirclement of Mariupol to bring the city under a state of siege. Russian progress towards Kharkiv proved entirely contrary to their plan and their forces were repulsed with heavy casualties. Initially Russian special forces entered the city in light vehicles, only to be isolated. When offered an opportunity to surrender, these personnel claimed that the Ukrainian defenders would soon be the ones surrendering once larger combat units arrived. The disparity in preparedness between these special forces’ groups and their conventional supporting units, however, hindered their coordination and the advanced parties were subsequently destroyed, while Russian forces transitioned to a deliberate break-in against the city, supported by widespread artillery strikes. + +From the above, it is important to recognise that the Russians achieved surprise and succeeded in bringing about highly favourable force ratios on their main axes. On the second day of the conflict, there was considerable anxiety in the UAF as to the ability to halt the advance from Gomel. In understanding why the Russians stalled, despite having the means and forces to push through the small Ukrainian units in front of them, it is necessary to consider the psychological state of the Russian troops. These troops were largely moving in administrative formations. They lacked a clear understanding of where they were. Whole towns did not exist when the maps they were using were made. They had not anticipated heavy fighting, nor did they have established communications to report the situation or to receive updated instructions. Ukrainian forces found themselves bypassed and often confronted with columns of unprepared Russian troops. Even without higher instructions, the immediate task was clear to these units, and, at the tactical level, Ukrainian forces therefore retained the tactical initiative. For the 1st Tank Brigade, for example, the first days of fighting saw numerous meeting engagements in forests at around 100–200-m range, where restricted movement limited the Russian ability to bring their mass to bear against a specific tactical situation. Better crew training combined with short-ranged engagements where their armament was competitive, and the faster autoloader on the T-64, allowed Ukrainian tank crews to achieve significant damage against surprised Russian units. Another example of the problem was that Russian units would arrive in towns and begin to try to engage with the civilian population to understand where they were. Their position would be reported and the Russian unit would be engaged with artillery. This contrast between expectations and reality induced panic and caused the abandonment of equipment that was widely observed on social media. + +#### The Battle for Kyiv: D+4–37 + +By D+3, it was apparent to Russian commanders that their plan had gone seriously wrong. It was evident that Ukraine’s air defences were still operational, that the Russian Ground Forces had stalled, and that there was fierce resistance. Moreover, it was apparent that the activities of the special services in Kyiv aimed at neutralising Ukraine’s political leadership – critical to Russia’s theory of victory – were failing as the Security Service of Ukraine identified, isolated and destroyed their infiltrated groups. In fact, as Ukraine mobilised, repositioned its forces, and as its air defences recovered from their initial displacement and surprise, the defence was hardening. There was therefore a need to transition from attempting the coup de main to deliberate combat operations to defeat the UAF. This transition in the Russian posture began on D+3 with a progressive improvement in the enemy’s cohesion over the following month. However, it took considerable time for Russian commanders to understand what was happening, to assert control over their units, or to adapt their tactics. + +The fastest component of the Russian force to adapt was the VKS. From D+3, Russian aircraft began to change their tactics. Rather than flying single sorties to strike pre-designated targets, large strike packages of interceptors and aircraft armed with anti-radiation missiles would form up in an attempt to provoke Ukrainian air defences into illuminating. These would then be suppressed with anti-radiation missiles and hunted by Russian aircraft or helicopters at low level. The latter suffered heavy attrition to MANPADS employing these tactics and the depth of aviation operations gradually diminished. + +The Russian transition to low-level hunting tactics coincided with the steady activation of air-defence complexes to protect Russian armed forces’ manoeuvre formations. At this time, Ukrainian air defences deconflicted from the Ukrainian Air Force’s interdiction missions by time, so that MiG-29s would conduct defensive counter-air sorties in pairs as the air defences displaced. This proved problematic because it was difficult to distribute awareness of these phases to deployed infantry with MANPADS. Both Russian and Ukrainian aircraft were threatened by friendly fire at this time. As a result, the deconfliction of air interdiction from Ukraine’s air defences was changed to a spatial approach, with areas in depth assigned to defensive counter-air patrols and areas to the rear assigned to air-defence forces. For a time, Ukrainian pilots were able to engage their Russian adversaries in air-to-air engagements, although they often found themselves outnumbered 6:2. Nevertheless, Ukrainian aircraft did inflict some losses in these engagements, despite losing several aircraft, reflecting the comparatively low training of most Russian pilots. In the first weeks of the invasion, when Russian forces neglected the need to provide air cover, long Russian convoys were also subjected to air strikes by both Air Force and Army aircraft, including Su-24M/MR bombers, Su-25 attack aircraft, Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters, and Bayraktar TB2 UAVs. + +By D+10, defensive counter-air missions became harder to mount. Russian A50-M orbits ensured that the VKS had ample early warning of Ukrainian air movements. As Russian EW complexes began to be deployed systematically, Ukrainian pilots found that they often had their air-to-ground and air-to-air communications jammed, their navigation equipment suppressed, and their radar knocked out. The use of jamming pods on Russian aircraft also increased. Combined with an intensifying threat from air-defence systems, the Ukrainian Air Force progressively lost access to parts of the occupied territories. Close air support and the use of strike UAS also became impossible over much of the battle space owing to dense EW and air-defence coverage. + +This rapid improvement in the performance and organisation of the VKS is noteworthy because these units were flying from inside Russia’s operational depth and did not therefore suffer from the confusion that was engulfing Russia’s Ground Forces in Ukraine, slowing their adaptation to the circumstances on the ground. Another good indication that the intent of Russian commanders shifted fairly rapidly is the decision by the Russian command not to commit its maritime assault forces, which had been intended to conduct landings between Mykolaiv and Odesa. To conduct the amphibious landing, two amphibious detachments of three large amphibious ships were formed. For the landing in the first wave, units of the 810th Marines Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet and the 336th Marines Brigade of the Baltic Fleet were initially planned. With small breaks, the amphibious forces manoeuvred in the Black Sea until the beginning of April 2022. After the initial reconnaissance landing by Russian special forces in the first days of the invasion with flat-bottomed raiding craft destroyed and heavy casualties, the Russian command determined to refrain from launching this attack. + +For those Russian ground units already in Ukraine, adaptation was slower. It is worth exploring why. The standard Russian approach to the formation of BTGs provided for the allocation of one or two BTGs from the composition of the full-time brigade or regiment. In forming, or more precisely, collecting, even one BTG from the brigade for a short-term military operation, the command tried to appoint the best personnel to its composition and distribute the best weapons and equipment for its mission. By itself, the BTG, in the understanding of the Russian command, was more like a ‘reinforced battalion’. The main difference with such a reinforced battalion compared with a permanent combined arms formation is that approximately half of its personnel, and the unit commanders, largely saw each other up close for the first time in their lives on the amalgamation of the BTG. One can only assume how much the relevant commanders were informed about the level of training, experience and equipment of such a unit. At best, they had to rely on the reports of the commanders of regular units about the readiness of their distributed forces and their capacity to perform tasks. + +In addition to BTGs being units that had not trained together and lacking staff who knew one another, they were also non-uniform in their composition. These deviations did not appear to derive from the tasks they were assigned but instead arose from the equipment available from the units that generated them. Yet, to commanders at higher echelons, the Russian battle management appeared to treat all BTGs as comparable units of action with no tailoring of tasks to their respective capabilities. When military advances are used as a mere demonstration of force this would not have been critical. But once the force tried to transition to fighting, units were now assigned tasks for which they were poorly equipped. As an example, consider the composition of two BTGs, which operated in almost the same area in the east of Ukraine at the end of April 2022. One of them was from the 228th Motor Rifle Regiment of the 90th Armoured Division of the Central Military District (Svatove district): 23 APCs; six tanks; a 122-mm self-propelled artillery battery; three MLRS BM-21 ‘Grad’; up to 40 vehicles; and about 400 personnel. Another was from the composition of the 57th Motor Rifle Brigade of the 5th Army of the Eastern Military District (Rubizhne district): more than 30 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs); 14 tanks; a 122-mm self-propelled artillery battery; a 152-mm self-propelled artillery battery; a MLRS BM-21 ‘Grad’ battery; up to 60 vehicles; and about 800 personnel. + +![image4](https://i.imgur.com/o4dm8Cx.png) +_▲ __Figure 4: Map of Ukraine on 2 April.__ Source: [Mason Clark, George Barros and Karolina Hird, ‘Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 2’, Institute for the Study of War, 2 April 2022](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2)._ + +Confusion as to the location and composition of units combined with significant deviation from their pre-assigned tasks led to paralysis in command decisions and no new statement of intent being provided to tactical commanders to rationalise their own decisions. A combination of a lack of time to exchange encryption keys on radios, the effects of Ukrainian EW, poor training on communications equipment and the reversion to stealing cellular communications from local citizens allowed Ukrainian forces to monitor a significant quantity of Russian tactical communications. For the period of March, most of the radio exchanges of Russian troops at the brigade-BTG level consisted of information about the locations of units and individual elements, and only 10–20% related to combat management. Later, Friendly Force Information Requirements only partially considered the monitoring of the needs of class III and V supply which, in turn, created problems with ready supply and imposed loads on the control networks. This not only saw significant supply problems but also the nature of the traffic enabled Ukrainian forces to accurately target Russian positions. + +The lack of understanding of Russian commanders as to the location or condition of their units and the lack of situational awareness of their tactical commanders near Kyiv and Kherson in March–April 2022 invariably led to the movement of newly arrived units along the same routes, repeated attempts to conduct already-exposed manoeuvres, the use of the same locations for temporary staging, and the overreliance on a small number of main supply routes. Even in the maritime theatre, this sticking to proven routes enabled a strike in early March using BM-21 Grad by the Ukrainian Marines on a Russian patrol boat at sea. Conversely, communication with 1st Tank Brigade was maintained along a small supply road running northwards on the left bank of the Dnipro that the Russians failed to sever, despite having an overwhelming force presence. This speaks to the poor situational awareness and lack of active patrolling by Russian units. The breakdown of communications also prevented units bringing up equipment to resolve a range of unforeseen tactical dilemmas. From an operational point of view, Russian intelligence obviously did not foresee the use of hydrotechnical structures for the improvement of existing natural barriers. An example of this is the slow response by Russian troops to the use of hydraulic structures on the Irpin River, which made it possible to raise the water level by 0.5–0.7 m and turn the small river into a significant obstacle for the Russian troops who were rushing to Kyiv. + +This general confusion among Russia’s Ground Forces gradually eased towards the end of March as senior officers came forward to establish situational awareness. In the meantime, however, on the axes approaching Kyiv, Ukrainian forces had effectively screened the flanks of the Russian force, which was in any case concentrated in too narrow an area for the number of troops pushed forwards. This unfavourable battlefield geometry made it impossible for the Russians to build up significant momentum, as they came under sustained and intense artillery fire throughout the month. By the time Colonel General Chaiko, commanding the Eastern Group of Forces, had re-established a clear picture of the battlespace, he faced a choice to break through Ukrainian lines and sever the roads to the west of Kyiv, or else withdraw. Initially the Russian forces attempted the former course of action. Unable to bring significant artillery or ammunition forward, however, they took massive casualties and, pressed from both flanks, were at risk of encirclement. When it became apparent that the Central Group of Forces was going to fail to invest Kyiv from the left bank, the decision was taken to withdraw from the Gomel axis and recover the troops. + +The Central Group of Forces, attacking via Chernihiv towards Kyiv, and via Sumy, faced a different dilemma. Having bypassed large Ukrainian combat units, while attempting to traverse over 200 km of densely wooded terrain, these forces had dissipated much of their combat power and were suffering heavily in ambushes and meeting engagements. Here the tactical initiative of Ukrainian tactical units and special forces inflicted heavy casualties. Given the use of Chernihiv as a strongpoint in all-round defence, the Central Group of Forces had the choice, once control had been re-established over its combat units, to either concentrate to reduce these positions to its rear, or else to screen these positions and continue towards the original objective, which was Kyiv. + +![image5](https://i.imgur.com/XVGu6PV.png) +_▲ __Figure 5: Map of Kyiv on 21 March.__ Source: Author generated from original map by lesniewski in [Mason Clark, George Barros and Kateryna Stepanenko, ‘Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 21’, Institute for the Study of War, 21 March 2022](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21)._ + +The initial success of the Southern Group of Forces slowed considerably as the combat power of this grouping dissipated across multiple axes. The problems that arose in some of the tactical decision-making among this group of forces can be observed from the lack of intent in orders regarding reversionary courses of action. For example, the Southern Group of Forces only encountered serious resistance on reaching Mykolaiv. As on other axes, the Russians achieved an advantageous force ratio and surprise. Available Ukrainian artillery in this sector was limited. Russian forces had also achieved air superiority. Nevertheless, adhering to the orders to bypass centres of resistance, the Russian units proceeded to try and encircle Mykolaiv to the north. In doing so, they dissipated their combat power, gave the Ukrainian Southern Command time to mobilise and organise more units, and left themselves with an exposed flank. As a result, this position became increasingly untenable, although it would take weeks of bitter fighting before Russian combat units stopped trying to push further west. + +The Southern Group of Forces had much more success in closing off Mariupol. Despite many of the Russian tactical actions in this phase of the war, originating with precise and appropriate instructions from higher command, few of these commands could be properly executed. The advance on Mariupol represents an exception, where the higher operational intention to achieve encirclement was properly carried out. Here there was a skilful implementation of preparatory measures to block the communication routes from Mariupol to Volnovaha at D+8 during the encirclement of Mariupol. This set up conditions for the subsequent siege. + +The destruction of Mariupol – where the Russians had anticipated fierce resistance and were not expecting a rapid surrender by the local authorities – demonstrates the difference that could have been made elsewhere if Russian forces were properly prepared for heavy fighting. Here the model was similar to that used against Grozny in the Second Chechen War: massive employment of fires combined with assault groups to break up defensive positions. The commitment of the 8th Combined Arms Army using BTGs with poor infantry–armour cooperation in the first phase saw significant attrition among Russian units. Nevertheless, Russian forces quickly adapted, forming storm groups of armour and infantry, and creating storm detachments of Chechen troops who proved relatively effective. There were shortcomings in the Ukrainian defence of Mariupol that have since been rectified. The main issue was the establishment of unit boundaries and the division of responsibility between naval, ground and territorial defence forces of the UAF. Russian assault units accurately identified the unit boundaries and were able to exploit these to fracture the defence into several isolated pockets. Given that Russian tactical commanders understood the intent was to seize the city, they were able to effectively implement tactical actions. The longevity of the defence of Mariupol reflects the extraordinary bravery of its defenders. Ukrainian forces not only exceeded the expectations of the Ukrainian General Staff, but also inflicted heavy losses on the Russian attackers. The battlefield geometry, however, of an encirclement deep behind Russian lines, the extensive air defences erected around the city, and the lack of friendly air defences enabled the use of heavy bombers, massive artillery and other means to steadily reduce the defence. Ukraine’s Southern Command has subsequently worked to improve the coordination between Army, TDF and naval units. + +#### Refocusing on Donbas: D+38–91 + +The Russian retreat from Kyiv saw a change in the objectives and strategy of the AFRF. Instead of seeking to seize the capital, Russian forces would endeavour to implement what the UAF had assessed to be their most dangerous course of action from the outset of the conflict: the destruction of the UAF in Donbas; seizure and annexation of Luhansk and Donetsk; and, from this position, force Kyiv to negotiate on unfavourable terms. The focus of Russia’s special services would also shift, from the destabilisation of the Ukrainian government to economic and political warfare against Europe to undermine international support for Ukraine. + +Before describing the nature of the fighting, it is important to take stock of the relative condition of the forces, which were repositioned over the course of April. Russian forces had suffered from massive attrition around Kyiv and had lost a vast quantity of military equipment. Throughout April there was an ongoing debate in the Russian government as to the need for mobilisation. Eventually the decision was made against mobilisation. Alongside attrition, Russian forces were suffering from low morale given their lack of success on most axes. At this point, a peculiar bifurcation occurred in the Russian forces. On the one hand, the higher command was still convinced of the need to fight with the BTG as the preferred unit of action, even if this non-uniform and non-mission-specific grouping differed considerably in capability. Thus, when the offensive against Donbas was undertaken in earnest throughout May 2022, it is estimated that Russian forces were fielding a total of 146 BTGs located around Ukraine, of which 93 were active, 13 were being restored, and 40 were in first- and second-phase reserves. This included the 136 BTGs in the original invasion force and additional units formed from reserves and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) conscripts. + +At the same time, where the Russians had achieved success, they had formed mission-specific groupings, as in Mariupol. The need for non-uniform formations was also driven by several factors concerning human and material resources. Although the Russians were beginning to recruit new contract soldiers and commit Wagner mercenaries and other units, these groupings were largely organised into company-sized units. Heavy casualties among spetsnaz and air-assault units also led to these troops being fielded in company groups more often than battalions. Moreover, although the mobilisation of conscripts in Luhansk and Donetsk had produced around 35,000 troops, heavy casualties in these formations left them highly irregular. Equipment losses also led to the consolidation of capabilities, so that fewer BTGs fielded their assigned batteries of 152-mm howitzers, with these concentrated into artillery tactical groups instead. Over time, as the Russian military came under strain, its organisational principles were diverted into task-specific organisation, usually of brigade groups with several attached independent companies. + +Materiel and personnel pressures were also shaping the disposition of the UAF between the assault on Kyiv and the offensive on Donbas. Ukrainian casualty figures remain classified and cannot be detailed in this report. Nevertheless, after months fighting outnumbered, the very high number of wounded – representing around 80% of casualties on the Ukrainian side, with around 40% of wounded personnel sustaining permanent injuries – left a number of key units heavily depleted. It was also noted at this time that the UAF did not have an established doctrine nor procedures for rotating units from contact. Units in Donbas, for example, had been under attack for more than a month with no reprieve, and it seemed probable that they would now face the full weight of a Russian offensive. Fatigue and concussion from artillery fire were serious issues best resolved through troop rotations. It became imperative to develop techniques to ensure the rapid circulation of troops. Despite these challenges, morale within Ukrainian units remained high, first, because of the failure of the AFRF to place Kyiv under siege, and second, because while a fight in Donbas would be difficult, it was also something that Ukrainian troops had prepared for over several years, offering confidence in their ability to blunt the Russian offensive. + +It is briefly worth flagging here a political factor that shaped, and in some ways constrained, Ukrainian military preparations for the defence of Donbas at this time. The discovery of war crimes perpetrated at scale by Russian forces in occupied territories on the axes approaching Kyiv created a political climate in which the surrender of territory, and especially settlements, became politically unacceptable. Given the disparity in forces, a manoeuvre defence would have been most effective from a purely military point of view, enabling the enemy to be shaped and then cut off through counterattack to maximise its losses. However, the human cost of these tactics on the population, whom the UAF were mobilised to defend, would have been unacceptable. Showing that the Army would hold ground for as long as practicable was therefore not only a political imperative, but also important in underpinning the moral component of the fighting force. This is not to argue that political decisions inappropriately had an impact on military decision-making. Instead, it is one of the ongoing strengths of the Ukrainian state that there remains a healthy civil–military discourse and an ability to balance these critical factors. Nevertheless, this led to tactical dispositions that, from a purely military perspective, may have appeared suboptimal. + +The largest challenge at this stage in the conflict for the UAF was equipment losses and the expenditure of ammunition. Although Western support had been symbolically invaluable in the early stages of the war, the enemy was stopped principally through the employment of Ukrainian arms. Nevertheless, Ukraine had, by this point, exhausted most of its MLRS and heavier-calibre Soviet-era artillery ammunition. By the commencement of the Russian offensive against Donbas, NATO systems were becoming available. However, only small numbers had arrived, while training and support for first- and second-line maintenance was not yet available. For example, many of the M777 howitzers that were delivered became inoperable due to maintenance issues after being misused by crews. Furthermore, there was not yet a structured way for equipment to be provided. Whereas piecemeal deliveries of a wide range of systems was workable for rocket-propelled grenades and other light weapons, it was problematic for heavy weapons such as artillery. With little consolidation of support, Ukraine began to receive a wide variety of equipment types, all of which differed in their maintenance and logistical requirements. The early stages of the offensive on Donbas, therefore, saw the UAF at their most vulnerable from the point of view of equipment. The question was whether materiel support would accelerate sufficiently to meet the imminent threat. While Ukraine managed to maintain artillery parity in the first stage of the war, in the second stage, thanks to the absolute superiority in the volume of ammunition, Russia began to achieve fires dominance. + +The Russian offensive on Donbas proceeded in accordance with the sound logic of operational encirclement through attacks to the north and south of the JFO. Although the overall operational concept was sound, it must be noted that no effort was made to disperse Ukrainian forces on to other axes or otherwise present the UAF with competing imperatives. Thus, while the UAF had a shortage of armaments at this time, they also had a very limited and identifiable area where armaments needed to be concentrated. The protracted defence of the Azovstal steel works – long after the rest of Mariupol had fallen – proved important in slowing the release of forces to simultaneously pressure Donbas from the southern axis and thereby further limited the frontages that the UAF had to cover in the first weeks of the offensive. After initial attempts at an armoured breakthrough failed, the Russian military resorted to manoeuvre by fire. The efficiency of this approach was greatly hindered by the unwillingness of their infantry to make deliberate assaults without massive artillery preparation of the targets. It was not uncommon for a company position of the UAF – occupying a frontage of approximately 3 km – to be subjected to 6,000 rounds per day of fire. At this time, the Russians not only had vastly more ammunition than the UAF but also outranged most Ukrainian artillery and the concentration of EW limited the effectiveness of precision fires. + +With the concentration of effort on Donbas, Russia set up EW complexes with up to 10 complexes per 20 km of frontage. Collectively, these complexes effectively disrupted navigation along the front, and conducted direction finding to direct artillery and electronic attack against Ukrainian aircraft and UAVs. The use of UAVs during this period deserves special consideration. As the war became dominated by artillery duelling, the importance of rapid target acquisition increased. The narrowing of the contested front and concentration of artillery also offered fewer opportunities for human reconnaissance. Both sides used UAVs extensively throughout the conflict. These ranged from commercial and adapted quadcopters at tactical echelons to fixed-wing reconnaissance UAVs such as the Ukrainian SKIF and Russian Orlan-10. The latter two were especially valuable because they could fly at medium altitude, were too cheap to be economical targets for air defences and provided extensive imagery to enable rapid and responsive fires. Both parties also used large medium-altitude long endurance UAVs such as Ukraine’s TB2s and Russia’s Orion for target acquisition, although these platforms were scarcer, more vulnerable, and therefore only committed under favourable conditions. + +Despite the importance of UAVs to remaining competitive, their attrition rates were extremely high. Of all UAVs used by the UAF in the first three phases of the war covered by this study, around 90% were destroyed. The average life expectancy of a quadcopter remained around three flights. The average life expectancy of a fixed-wing UAV was around six flights. Skilled crews who properly pre-programmed the flight path of their UAVs to approach targets shielded by terrain and other features could extend the life of their platforms. However, even when UAVs survived, this did not mean that they were successful in carrying out their missions. UAVs could fail to achieve their missions because the requirements to get them in place – flying without transmitting data, with captured images to be downloaded on recovery, for example – prevented timely target acquisition before the enemy displaced. Furthermore, such a method, while improving survivability, also necessitated the right locations to be preselected for image capture. Many missions failed to find targets because there was no target at the specified location. Alternatively, and more common, was mission failure owing to disruption of a UAV under control through electronic warfare, the dazzling of its sensors or the denial of its navigational systems from determining the accurate location of a target. In other instances, the Russians successfully struck the ground control stations of the UAV. In aggregate, only around a third of UAV missions can be said to have been successful. Here, the Orlan-10 should be singled out in terms of its utility because the cheap platform nevertheless had a high performance and proved difficult to counter, although its inertial navigation makes insufficient account of windage. Even the Russian military, however, found that it did not have enough of these platforms to sustain the loss rate during the battle in Donbas. + +The defeat of precision was critical to unit survival. Defeating precision could be achieved by preventing a launcher from accurately determining its position, even with very small displacements, by preventing the enemy determining the precise location of the target or through direct interference with the mechanism for precision strike. The latter did not always require expensive methods. When Russian reconnaissance troops began to mark Ukrainian defensive positions with laser designators, for example, it was found that having laser warning indicators over strongpoints could alert personnel being targeted, who could then pop smoke grenades to disrupt the accuracy of the strike. This would also blind the defenders, making them vulnerable to assault. Thermal optics, or the targeting of the designating team from another position to relieve the suppression of the targeted post was critical. The experience of the UAF showed that precision artillery was not only disproportionately effective, but also limited the vulnerability of the force by reducing its logistical footprint. Nevertheless, in the early phases of the fighting in Donbas when the UAF had few precision systems, Russian EW reduced the effectiveness of these systems. This disproportionately affected the UAF because the Russians primarily relied on saturation fire from unguided shells. + +Although Russian EW systems were highly effective, there were also noted weaknesses of these complexes. The Russians suffered extensively from these systems having an equally noticeable effect on its own troops. The AFRF have not yet managed to solve this problem, except in the case of some specific platforms such as the Su-34. Furthermore, there were often weaknesses in planning, partly exacerbated by the issue of fratricide. For example, when military communications were suppressed it was often possible to revert to cellular communications channels. Although the Russians have the means to target these communications, the Leer-3 payload carried by an Orlan-10 UAV is hard to synchronise with EW effects that make the use of UAVs exceedingly difficult. Furthermore, although navigational effects disrupted precision, direct jamming against precision systems was rarely effective. It is apparent that the Russians have refined, but done little to develop beyond, Soviet systems and some of their new systems such as the Repellent complex were largely ineffective. + +During this period, the Russians had consolidated much of their artillery into artillery tactical groups and began directing fires from higher headquarters owing to a shortage of trained fire controllers. Russian artillery would tend to operate in batteries a third of their range behind the forward line of own troops (FLOT), with a spacing of 100–150 m between their guns. Missions were usually assigned to the battery, whereas the UAF mostly assign fire missions to guns. Russian units with their own UAVs could deliver highly responsive fires, bringing effect to bear within 3–5 minutes of target detection. For targets that ran through a fire-control headquarters, the Russians continued to add new detections to the bottom of the list and prosecute strikes in order, leading to fire missions taking 20–30 minutes at the tactical level, and around 48 hours at the operational level. Russian artillery would conduct counter-battery fire, but never from the targeted battery. Instead, a targeted battery would immediately displace in the case of MLRS when under fire, or the crews would seek cover until fire lifted and then displace. Counter-battery fire would be assigned to a separate battery. The Russians rarely displaced after firing unless they received fire. This appears to have been because the volume of shells they needed to fire their missions could not be displaced or repositioned quickly, even if the guns could. Given their fires dominance, during this phase, their static approach was not overly costly until longer-range precision systems became available to the UAF, at which point the Russian fires system was severely disrupted. Owing to fire missions being coordinated at a high level, the AFRF at this time also exercised limited discipline in assigning weapons to fire missions but could instead draw on any available weapons system to complete a mission. Thus, Tochka-U were deployed for counter-battery effects. Overall, during the offensive against Donbas, Russian artillery were firing around 20,000 rounds per day, with their peak fire rate surpassing 32,000 rounds on some days. Ukrainian fires rarely exceeded 6,000 rounds a day, reflecting a shortage of both barrels and ammunition. For the offensive on Donbas, the Russians deployed over 1,100 tube artillery pieces with around 80–90 guns usually formed into a group to support the actions of brigade-sized groupings of three to four BTGs. The Russian advantage in artillery during May and June 2022 in Donbas was 12:1. Special attention should be paid to the use of Russian MLRS, including BM-21 Grad, 9K57 Uragan and 9K58 Smerch. Practically all these systems were used at their maximum range; 9K57 and 9K58, in particular, were used at 35–70 km. Despite their doctrinal role, MLRS were used not only on area targets, but also on point targets. + +Despite this overwhelming firepower, the Russians made slow progress. The assault tactics employed by Russian operations evolved over time. Initially there were repeated attempts to make progress using armoured thrusts. A shortage of infantry, and, in particular, of motivated and skilled infantry, led to heavy equipment losses. Thereafter, the Russians resorted to the total saturation of defended areas to compel withdrawal. This created a dilemma for the UAF because if ground was ceded, the Russians would advance, but to prevent it being ceded it was necessary to maintain troops under massive bombardment, with inevitably high casualties. The threat became more acute as the Russians developed more effective means of attack. Rather than uniform BTG manoeuvres, they began to operate in waves. LNR and DNR conscripts would be pushed forwards to skirmish and assault a position, forcing UAF positions to reveal themselves. These would be identified by Russian reconnaissance troops and subjected to precision artillery fire. There would then be a massive artillery bombardment followed by a deliberate assault by more capable troops comprising airborne, spetsnaz or Wagner companies. Notably, spetsnaz during this phase were almost exclusively employed as capable light or sometimes mechanised infantry. Once the UAF withdrew, the Russians would occupy the position with LNR and DNR conscripts and withdraw their more capable forces. This cycle would take one or two days, with the Russians aiming to go firm in the evening to have the night to harden their positions against counterattack. Of course, this process could only ever advance a couple of kilometres per day, and often less, depending on the distance between defence lines. It also incurred heavy Russian casualties, although these were disproportionately concentrated among LNR and DNR conscripts. The Russians also changed their use of armour from thrusts by platoon-sized groups of tanks supported by armoured infantry to using tanks for indirect fire or long-range engagements using barrel-launched ATGMs, copying the preferred approach of the UAF. A lack of training left Russian forces less accurate in applying these methods. + +![image6](https://i.imgur.com/dGP50KJ.png) +_▲ __Figure 6: Map of Kharkiv Region on 16 May.__ Source: [Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird and Frederick W Kagan, ‘Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 16’, Institute for the Study of War, 16 May 2022](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16)._ + +VKS operations during this time also shifted. Although heavy bombing was carried out in Mariupol, the penetration of Ukrainian airspace had declined after the withdrawal from Kyiv, other than with long-range precision fires. The VKS however recommenced the delivery of frontline effects as the offensive in Donbas got under way. This usually saw a fourship of Russian aircraft approach the Ukrainian air-defence zone at medium altitude, applying EW effects or launching anti-radiation missiles if Ukrainian radar illuminated. At the same time, a twoship of aircraft would approach the air-defence zone at very low level and usually conduct strikes with unguided munitions, including indirect rocket attacks after lofting. This technique – also applied by the Ukrainian Air Force and Army Aviation – could be effective in saturating an area target. + +Other than close air support, the VKS’s main effort was in releasing long-range precision fires from inside Russian airspace. Strategic aviation of the VKS comprising Tu-22M3 (Backfire) and Tu-95MS (Bear) long-range bomber aircraft operated as launch platforms for Kh-22/Kh-32 (AS-4 Kitchen) and Kh-55/Kh-555 (AS-15 Kent) from the first days of the war and proved to be effective. The first strikes with the use of air-launched missiles were noted on D+3 and continued throughout the conflict. For the period from February to the beginning of May 2022, approximately 180 Kh-22/32 and Kh-55/555 launches were recorded. Beyond air-launched effects, however, there was a marked difference in the pattern of long-range precision fires from the first phase of the war to the offensive on Donbas. The main portion of strategic, and sometimes operational, fire missions until the beginning of April 2022 was performed by the short-range ballistic missile systems 9M720 and 9M723 Iskander (SS-26 Stone). For the period from February to the beginning of May 2022, more than 200 missile strikes by this system were recorded. Missile strikes were conducted deep into the territory of Ukraine, up to the regions near the border with Poland. More than 160 civilian and military objects were hit. While Ukrainian Air Defences were effective at intercepting cruise missiles throughout the war, 9M720 proved exceedingly difficult to intercept, and 9M723 was almost impossible to manipulate via other means. The situation changed from D+14–16, when the number of SS-26 Stone employments significantly reduced, and at the beginning of April 2022, the Russians shifted from salvo to single strikes. The likely reason for this may be a shortage of missiles, the stocks of which were calculated for a short-term strategic operation. Russian industry has the capacity to manufacture six 9M723s per month. + +During the offensive on Donbas, although long-range precision fires continued, the Russians increasingly relied on obsolete systems. Target types that were struck with 9M720 earlier in the conflict were instead engaged, from April 2022, with the short-range ballistic missile system 9K79 (SS-21 Scarab A). A similar transition occurred with the employment of naval fires. For example, from D+60–65 there was a transition from target types that were previously engaged with Kalibr 3M-14K (SS-N-27 Sizzler), instead being engaged with 3K60 Bal (SSC-6 Sennight) and 3K55 Bastion (SSC-5 Stooge) coastal missile systems. The consequence of this inappropriate employment of munitions was reduced accuracy and, in many cases, the tragic striking of civilian structures. The main operational impact of these strikes on Ukrainian cities was to force Ukrainian air defences to be spread over a wide geographic area, limiting protection of the front. + +The continued threat from strikes originating in the Black Sea further stretched Ukrainian air and missile defences. Although the sinking of the Russian warship Moskva on 13 April 2022 caused the Russian Black Sea Fleet, other than fast attack craft, to move its operations further from the Ukrainian coast, the Russian Navy could still functionally perform two of its defined tasks. It could no longer approach the coast and threaten landings. However, Russian ships and submarines continued to deliver long-range missile strikes against southern and western Ukraine, while the transition from a close to a distant blockade did not fundamentally alter the economic isolation of Ukraine’s ports. + +The volume of fires delivered on the front in Donbas led progressively to the total destruction of defensive positions until they were no longer viable. This led, in mid-June, to the decision to withdraw from Severodonetsk. At this time, the Russian system of war was effectively inflicting casualties and taking ground from the UAF, but it also had several key dependencies and therefore vulnerabilities. The most prominent of these was its sustainment. The supply of fuel for the groupings of the AFRF in Ukraine was more a task of its delivery than a matter of availability. To solve this problem, a historically proven approach was mainly used: the exploitation of railways. The volume of transportation was large. For example, in just the period 1–19 April 2022, and only to the railway station of Rovenki (Luhansk region), 228 railway cisterns with fuel and lubricants (more than 13,600 tonnes) were moved. + +For the supply of ammunition, the Russian command used the classic system provided for by doctrinal documents. Its essence is in a multi-level delivery and distribution from brigade to battalion to company/battery. However, during the strategic operation against Ukraine, the function of the ‘brigade link’ had to be performed by divisional- and army-level logistics units because of the volume of materiel moved. The Russians were forced to reorganise their logistics at D+7 upon realising that the conflict would protract significantly beyond their initial planning assumption. The ammunition supply system was based on two organisational solutions. The first was that the supply of ammunition relied on a network of deployed so-called ‘field artillery depots’. Each of them turned out to be a complex of civilian industrial buildings adapted for the storage of ammunition. Such warehouses usually stored no more than two–three ammunition basic loads for an attached group of troops. One such warehouse could supply ammunition to units within a radius of 30–50 km. The second solution provided for the maximum accumulation of ammunition directly in units (company/battery-battalion/artillery battalion). This stimulated the dispersion of stocks and allowed for autonomy of actions in case of disruption of planned delivery. However, it also increased the probability of the destruction of stocks and reduced the tactical ability of artillery units to shoot-and-scoot, since they had large ammunitions stocks at their positions. + +According to the requirements of Russian doctrine, which is essentially a carbon copy of the Soviet ones, the location of the main support elements and reserves of the divisional and army units is situated at a depth of up to 50 km from the line of contact. It is likely that such a requirement is justified for the conditions of dense operational order of battle with reliable cover of such elements by air defence. The practice of war in Ukraine showed something different – a decentralised operational structure and separate directions for advance. But the Russian command, for reasons not fully understood, continued to follow the doctrinal position unchanged, for more than 60 days. As a result, the specified objects regularly became targets for damage by the long-range MLRS BM-30 Smerch and Tochka-U – fired by the UAF. Only at the end of April 2022 was the concentration of a significant part of the personnel, equipment and materiel moved beyond the 50-km (later 100-km) security zone, based on the maximum range of weapons of the UAF. + +From D+20–30 the Russians began to secure and exploit surviving rail infrastructure in the occupied territories for the transportation of troops and materiel. Understanding the importance of rail transportation, primarily from the point of view of efficiency, the Russian command managed to ensure the unloading of military echelons 30–50 km from the line of contact in most directions. An understandable condition for this was its repair, restoration and protection with the involvement of military units of the Railway Troops of the Russian Armed Forces. For example, since May 2022, as part of the logistical support for the conduct of actions by Russian troops, the MLZH-VF-VT pontoon rail bridge was installed by the 29th Brigade of Railway Troops of the Western Military District near the destroyed rail bridge in Kupyansk (Kharkiv region), across the Oskil River. This was connected to the main railway by the Kupyansk-Vuzlovy–Vovchansk branch. To ensure adequate protection of rail communications, on the southern axes, Russian troops used such exotic means as armoured trains. + +Although the Russian logistics system was chaotic in the first phase of the war, the structural efficiency of the approach ensured consistent supply throughout the offensive on Donbas. However, the dependence on fixed rail infrastructure, the viable distances from the known railheads to the field depots, and the lack of manoeuvrability of units because of their materiel-heavy concept of operations all exposed the force to systemic vulnerabilities. The mapping of depots and unit support areas, once Ukraine obtained long-range precision fires through military-technical assistance, allowed for the systematic targeting of this logistics infrastructure and through this means the denial of the Russian concept of operation. The introduction of HIMARS and M270 firing GMLRS into the UAF therefore can be seen as the point where the Russian offensive on Donbas ended and the war entered a new phase. The character of the summer fighting involves many elements that remain operationally relevant, and, to that end, it is inappropriate to discuss this phase of the war at this stage. In due course, it will be possible to discuss the Ukrainian preparation for offensive operations. Nevertheless, what has been discussed already provides a rich body of data from which lessons can be identified as to the structural strengths and weaknesses of the AFRF and wider lessons about modern combat for NATO forces. These are considered in the following chapters. + + +### IV. Assessing Russian Military Performance in Ukraine + +Before 24 February 2022, Russia’s potential adversaries, through professional respect, assumed that Russian forces would employ their capabilities with a basic level of competence. But the size of their forces, sustained investment, their available firepower and the proficiency with which the AFRF had conducted smaller-scale operations in preceding years led to an overestimation of Russia’s actual military capabilities. There was also an overriding focus on the quantity of equipment, rather than the quality of personnel, their leadership, training and motivations. The general error was to take the best observed Russian performance and set this as the expected standard. This had a pernicious effect on policy by increasing fear of Russian forces among Ukraine’s international partners, which Russia exploited to coerce its adversaries. + +Since 24 February 2022, many observers who have not had direct experience of the conflict have overcorrected for their early analytical errors. There is a perception that the AFRF are systemically incompetent, irredeemably corrupt, that their weapons are ineffective and unreliable, and that the force is incapable of adapting. This narrative is dangerous, both because it is inaccurate, and also because it encourages complacency. Ukraine benefited significantly in its preparations by measuring its readiness against Russia’s potential rather than its actual capabilities. + +The operational data outlined above shows that the Russian military suffered from major errors of judgement made by the Russian leadership, special services and the presidential administration. The force also suffers from structural weaknesses in its force design and training system that created specific operational and tactical frictions. It was also a force designed for ‘active defence’ strategic military operations, not for a large-scale attack on another sovereign country without full wartime mobilisation. Nevertheless, the AFRF have already demonstrated that they are able to learn and adapt. They remain highly lethal, determined to achieve the mission set by their president, and employing highly capable weapons systems. In future assessments of Russian capabilities, careful attention should be paid to the extent that they have corrected some of the systemic weaknesses in their force, which they are unlikely to be able to resolve during the current period of aggression. If they can make progress in resolving these issues, the gap between Russian potential and its capabilities may narrow considerably. This chapter outlines these key identified weaknesses. + +#### Russia Has a Hierarchy of Jointery + +Viewed from the perspective of Russia’s Ground Forces, its military likely appears to be a highly joint organisation. Against Ukraine, the Russian Navy and VKS were both integrated into the campaign plan, adapted as the Russian plan was forced to change, and each contributed to the overall mission. Conversely, it is evident that Russian jointery functions as a hierarchy in which the Navy and VKS are subordinated to the Ground Force’s needs. This was demonstrated in the C2 arrangements during the conflict and the prioritisations of their mission sets. + +Even though the Russians had both airborne command posts in the form of Il-20 Coot aircraft and AWACS orbits provided by A-50M, the coordination of air operations was subordinated to the military district command posts of the Ground Forces rather than the VKS. Rather than running operations from a central combined air-operations centre, coordination of air tasking was managed by ground-based C2 and planned separately by air armies assigned to support each operational group of forces. + +Another aspect of Russia’s air campaign is that the initial targets were prioritised according to the extent that they enabled the Ground Force’s seizure of critical infrastructure. After the Ground Forces began to struggle to make progress, Russian airpower shifted from targeting air-defence sites to win control of the air and instead attempted to provide increasing levels of close air support. The depth of penetration decreased and became tied to the Ground Forces’ axes of advance. Thus, not only C2, but also the logic of prioritisation of air targets, was disproportionately shaped by the tactical challenges faced by the Ground Forces, arguably at the expense of the VKS planning to bring about control of the air. + +For the Russian Navy, the task of blockade may be considered an application of sea power. Beyond this function, however, the Navy’s core tasks were similarly in support of land operations, either to put troops ashore to seize key lines of communication in advance of Ground Forces movements, or to simply provide strike platforms in support of the wider strike campaign, and, in particular, servicing of targets of tactical importance to the Ground Forces moving along Ukraine’s southern coast. The impact on the professionalism and identity of the service from being subordinated to the Ground Forces in this way is hard to measure but must necessarily contribute to the generally low level of seamanship demonstrated by the Moskva, whose radar was stowed when struck. A more effective employment of air and sea power would likely require a greater level of autonomy in planning for the separate branches with the prioritisation of tasks geared towards joint ends rather than subordinate to the logic of land operations. + +#### Russian Force Generation is Not Aligned with its Concepts of Operation + +The Soviet military was structured to fight in regiments, divisions and combined arms armies that also held independent brigades under command. The Russian armed forces have, for over a decade, pursued the concept of a BTG, constituting an all-arms formation with disproportionate enablement. After 2015, it was noted by the Russian General Staff that the BTG construct would not work without the divisional logistics structure sustaining it and, so, brigades and regiments would thereafter generate BTGs which would be supported by the divisional logistics effort and commanded by the associated combined arms army. The BTG would pool the experienced contract troops from the peacetime unit, thereby theoretically increasing the combat power of the forces generated. It would also allow mixed units of conscripts and contractors in peacetime, which was consistent with a training model that saw the upskilling of soldiers conducted in their units. + +Although Russia has attempted, for some time, to shift from a conscript-based force to a fully volunteer force, it has not been able to recruit enough contract soldiers to abandon conscription. Nor has the Russian military adopted a contract structure that retains experienced and educated personnel in positions of junior leadership. This is equivalent to the non-commissioned officer cadre in Western militaries. This makes the BTG construct highly problematic. The battalion staff is insufficient to manage all the enablers that are assigned. Moreover, because this is a composite formation drawing from multiple units and is only generated for operations, there is a lack of familiarity among the personnel in different arms of the BTG. The commander does not know their people. Thus, a small team of sufficiently trained personnel is unable to provide detailed instructions to each of its subordinate elements, but also does not know its subordinates well enough to be able to predict how they will handle brief and incomplete instructions. + +A further problem with the BTG is its ability to absorb losses. An enabled company group – as a unit of action – either succeeds in its task or fails and can thereafter be rotated out if overly attrited. A BTG, however, because of the level of enablement, can become incapable of executing battalion tasks when key enablers are disproportionately attrited, even if many of its components are still useable. As an example, on 22 April 2022, as a result of engagements in the direction of Kurakhove, a BTG of the 136th Motor Rifle Brigade under the 58th Combined Arms Army of the Southern Military District was taken out of battle having lost 240 servicemen killed in action, 11 IFVs, four tanks, three self-propelled guns and three MLRS BM-21 ‘Grad’. Statistically, the BTG lost only up to 30% of its initial combat power, and many of its supporting elements were intact. However, as a unit, it was no longer capable of executing the tasks that it was being assigned. + +The initial response to this challenge introduced even more confusion into Russian operations. The units less affected by attrition within a BTG would be removed and assigned to other BTGs so that a new amalgamated formation with the requisite combat power was created. The result was to further intermingle personnel from different units, once again changing the command team and ensuring that commanders had no familiarity with their subordinates. It also created logistical and communications problems as units were cut across from one chain of command to another, creating frictions with encryption keys and compatibility problems, and ensuring that the calibres and thus the sustainment demands within a given formation changed periodically. A further complication was that, because the BTG structure put the most experienced troops and commanders in the first echelon, attrition was disproportionately among those with the most experience and therefore best able to manage the uncertainty of composite and amalgamated formations. + +These frictions may have been manageable with a higher proportion of junior leaders. Instead, the Russian military found that junior commanders were rapidly promoted to fill the critical staffing requirements at battalion and higher levels, denuding companies of effective leadership and technical skills. As the conflict went on, the disparity between the precision and elegance of issued orders from headquarters and their execution widened considerably. + +Although the weaknesses of the BTG were the most evident, similar issues have bedevilled other Russian branches, most notably the VKS. Ukrainian assessments concluded that given limited flight hours and the practice of training being delivered in units, the VKS entered the conflict with fewer than 100 fully trained and current pilots. Combined with a military culture that assigns the most dangerous missions to the most experienced crews, attrition in the VKS has fallen disproportionately on this cadre, reducing the overall effectiveness of the force and its ability to train new pilots. In negotiations over prisoner exchanges, the AFRF have been eager for the return of experienced pilots. The mobilisation of trainers from their flying schools to frontline formations has also hampered the ability to generate new pilots. The Ukrainian military has noted a rise in both very young and very old pilots in the VKS, with ageing pilots returned to frontline service. This has corresponded with a significant reduction in the scale and complexity of VKS air operations over Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict. It is also a problem that has affected ground crews, for example with the discovery of left-on covers on the sensors of Russian aviation operating over Ukraine, an easily avoided mistake which has a severe impact on effectiveness and should be considered negligence. This suggests challenges in discipline and junior leadership among maintenance crews in the VKS. Another demonstration of this poor discipline in the VKS is the routine stacking of munitions next to aircraft on Russian air bases. + +It is harder to assess the limitations of the Russian Navy in terms of its force-generation model as there are fewer data points. Nevertheless, the alertness and damage-control capabilities on the Moskva suggest similar deficiencies in junior crew leadership may affect the Navy. The key point here is that Russia has built a force-employment concept that is beyond the capacity of its force-generation model to resource with the appropriate expertise. Key indicators for improvements in Russian military capability therefore will be whether it adjusts its force-generation model, or reconceptualises how it task organises for operations. + +#### The Russian Military Has a Tendency to Reinforce Failure + +During the first phase of the war, it was apparent that the course of events described in the orders issued to units diverged significantly from developments on the ground. Nevertheless, units continued to seek to execute their orders long after it had become apparent that assumptions in those orders were wrong. This behaviour has continued throughout the war. The continuous attempts to assault Bakhmut, for example, long after it ceased to be on Russia’s main effort, demonstrate that until an order is countermanded commanders will continue to try to execute their last instruction. In the early phases, during offensive operations, this was best demonstrated around Mykolaiv and Chernihiv. In both cases, Russian units had been ordered to bypass resistance to reach their objectives. The orders made clear that resistance was expected to be light. When this assumption was demonstrated to be false, however, Russian commanders continued to seek to bypass strongpoints, even when it degraded their tactical position, exposed their flanks and diluted their combat power by spreading concentrated forces over a long frontage in contact with Ukrainian troops. + +This should not be mistaken for a lack of flexibility or adaptability in implementing combat tasks. Russian units often rapidly adapt their methods in response to failure. They also demonstrate creativity within their assigned boundaries. In some contexts, the tendency to lean into a course of action poses dangers to the enemy. Much Western military literature discusses ‘cognitive shaping’ and the use of ‘information manoeuvre’ to divert or alter the enemy’s course of action. These are unlikely to be effective against such a military culture. Similarly, if a force intending to divert an offensive into a killing area is insufficiently strong to blunt the enemy, the response to contact may be – and often is – to lean into the confrontation. If the blocking force is not sufficiently large or lacks firepower, it risks being destroyed, even if it inflicts high casualties, rather than stops the assault. + +As a consequence of this tendency, it appears clear that anticipating the enemy’s intent and setting dispositions to optimally respond is more important than trying to shape that intent. If an enemy accelerates through a killing area or recommits to an axis even if its intelligence assessment of resistance was unrealistic, anticipating its assigned axis is the best means of placing killing areas in the right location. Conversely, even if a more favourable or apparently advantageous route presents itself, it is unlikely that the unit will deviate from its axis. Cognitive shaping, therefore, must be aimed at operational commanders, with such decisions rarely being made lower than the combined arms army command post. In delivering such a capability, it is essential to understand the theory of victory and higher intent to which the commander is working. + +A further aspect of Russian orders, which is a significant weakness, is the near absence of reversionary courses of action. If unsuccessful, or if the higher intent is no longer achievable, this leads to requests for clarification being referred upwards. Once decisions are made at higher echelons, the lower echelons can alter their actions quickly. The decision to withdraw from Kyiv, for example, saw a rapid break from contact – with varying levels of order – on both main axes. This was largely executed competently. However, in the interval when higher headquarters seek to formulate a plan, paralysis tends to grip lower echelons if their initial orders do not reflect the position on the ground. + +This approach has probably had the greatest impact in creating a gap between potential and actual capability as regards Russian fires. All reported contacts are treated as true. All fire missions appear to be given equal priority and are prosecuted in the order in which they are received unless an order to prioritise a specific mission comes from higher authority. It seems that those directing fire missions either do not have access to contextual information or are indifferent to it. In any case, observations of Russian pre-planned fires shows that they will strike targets that have moved and subsequently engage the same target in its new position, suggesting a purely chronological prioritisation of activity. + +In the case of the Russian Navy, a similar dynamic can be observed. The orders to initiate amphibious landings were conditions-based as they were in support of ground forces which never reached the point to justify the action. Thus, these were called off before the forces were committed. However, subsequently, when the sinking of the Moskva enabled the Ukrainian Air Force to re-establish control of the air over Snake Island, it was notable that the Russian Navy continued to try to contest this outpost and the surrounding waters with fast attack boats. Lacking air defence, these were destroyed, mainly with TB2, while Snake Island became denied by Ukrainian long-range fires. Still, the Russian Navy sought to reinforce this failure even though control of the island had no functional impact on its ability to blockade Ukraine’s southern coast. They only stopped reinforcing this failure when higher-level orders accepted abandoning the position. The tendency to reinforce failure was less evident in the VKS, which adapted rapidly to battlefield developments and emerging threats in terms of the employment of its capabilities. The VKS did suffer from the same tendency when it came to targeting, however. + +The application of fires without prioritisation is a tendency that should be carefully monitored, except in instances where a battery is directly allocated to a unit, has organic capabilities for target acquisition or is operating under higher command. If the Russians can resolve the cultural tendency to treat all instructions as valid until directly countermanded, and all intelligence as accurate unless contradicted, their capability may rapidly improve, coming closer to what their systems suggest they should be able to execute. + +#### The Russian Military is Culturally Vulnerable to Deception + +A combination of too few experienced tactical commanders and a culture that leans into courses of action without distributing sufficient situational awareness for contextual judgement leads to a force that is systemically vulnerable to deception measures. It is vulnerable to deception for three reasons. First, the tendency to treat information received as true unless there is contradictory information leads to systemic confirmation bias. Second, the force does not encourage honest reporting of failures, while there is a shortage of capabilities for battle damage assessment. Third, Russian systems are largely designed around single missions. Even within an EW or air-defence system, each operator will control a different sensor or function. Operators are trained to examine the specific picture for which they are responsible. Neither in their systems’ design, nor in their culture, is there an effective fusion process. In consequence, although the force often has the information to spot inconsistencies in its sensor picture, it is rarely able to compare its datasets to identify these inconsistencies within an operationally relevant timeframe. + +Deception has succeeded against Russian forces at all echelons and across all three service branches. At the tactical level, the UAF have systematically employed false signals traffic and decoys of prestige systems to misdirect Russian fires. This has almost always succeeded, leading to a vast expenditure of munitions against non-existent targets and a corresponding vulnerability for Russian fires in revealing their positions. Tracking how the Russians were conducting battle damage assessment and thereby assuring the Russian military that all strikes were successful repeatedly led to the loss of Russian aircraft and other capabilities because they proceeded on the assumption that the threat had been eliminated. At the operational level, too, Russian forces have been predictable in allocating resources against telegraphed movements and failing to detect or prepare for concealed movements. This has even taken place when some Russian reporting streams have detected concentrations but have been unable to present a sufficiently convincing case to commanders to win resources. + +The vulnerability of the Russian forces to deception is also a risk for its adversaries. Especially prior to a conflict, the primary aim of a force is often deterrence or shaping. In much NATO discussion of these issues subtle changes in force posture, weapons fits on aircraft, patterns of behaviour and so on are used to try to message varying levels of readiness, preparedness and will. Many of these actions are premised on the assumption that they will be observed by the adversary. From a technical point of view, it is certainly true that the Russians can see these kinds of activities. However, when Ukrainian forces struck the cruiser Moskva in the Black Sea with Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles on 13 April 2022 there was no indication that its radar was operating. This was supposed to be the central ISTAR node for the air defence of the Black Sea Fleet, yet despite being in an active warzone, the ship’s primary sensors were not on. Nor was this an isolated incident. Russian aviation, shot down over Ukraine, has been found on more than one occasion to have its radar in the stowed position, with safety covers over primary sensors. These incidents speak to complacency, poor ground crew training and a lack of mission focus. When considering the issues of process and lack of fusion described above, however, the visibility of these subtle adjustments for Russian operational commanders is at best inconsistent and at worst non-existent. From a deterrence point of view – or for the purposes of shaping decision-making – this is concerning because it suggests that most of the nuance in messaging may be lost. Therefore, while the Russian forces may be vulnerable to deception, the message must be clearly telegraphed. In the context of deterrence, one of the biggest challenges may be preventing the Russians from deceiving themselves. + +In assessing whether the Russians are closing the gap between their potential and actual capabilities, it is important to pay close attention to their discipline in the employment of sensors, the level of fusion achieved between sensors and whether the situational awareness that is needed to provide officers context for information is properly disseminated. If these issues are addressed, there could be a rapid improvement in the performance of the Russian armed forces. Left unaddressed, the Russians, having the potential capabilities but not the necessary awareness, may fight by lashing out at sounds and in response to blows. One can readily trick such an adversary into striking in the wrong direction. But that does not stop it from being a dangerous adversary. + +#### Russian Forces Are Prone to Fratricide + +Fratricide has been a widespread problem for the Russian forces during their invasion of Ukraine. This has been across all systems. Russian air defences have regularly engaged friendly aircraft. When Russian troops deviate from their assigned axes or the timing of their actions becomes desynchronised, they are often bracketed by their own artillery. Russian units in complex terrain have also become embroiled in exchanges of fire between one another’s positions. This speaks to a lack of C2 and control measures during operations. It likely reflects Russian troops largely conducting scripted exercises rather than free-play force-on-force activity where they are used to dealing with the ambiguities that arise on the battlefield. Some Russian units are much better at this. Among line units, however, map-reading and other basic soldiering skills are not well understood, leading to disorientation and therefore a propensity to misidentify sources of fire. Artillery strikes on friendlies have arisen either because units have been detected retreating or redeploying by UAV and presumed hostile based on their direction of travel, or because pre-planned strikes have caught units that have moved slower or faster than dictated by planning. Here, a lack of IFF (identification, friend or foe) procedures is notable. + +Beyond the sub-tactical errors described above, fratricide is a systemic issue between Russian systems. For example, the Khibiny EW pod, mounted to a number of Russian aircraft, automatically detects radars and disrupts them. Unfortunately for the Russians, it tends to also do this to other Russian aircraft. Pairs of Russian strike aircraft mounting this system have therefore had to choose between having a functional radar or EW protection. They have often been ordered to prioritise their radar. This wider issue of confliction between systems, or lack of compatibility between communications equipment, could be managed if units had good situational awareness and a high level of training and reversionary planning in the deconfliction by time or space of their different EW effects. In practice, it leads to a great deal of confusion and mutual disruption. It also offers innumerable – albeit regularly shifting – seams through which effects can breach Russian defences. + +A further fratricidal issue is the culture of reporting within the Russian military. Those who fail are usually replaced or threatened with punishment. Alternatively, for senior officers, failure can lead to a different organisation being given leadership for a specified task. Far from incentivising success, this often leads to dishonest reporting in which the blame for failure is transferred onto others. This scapegoating of colleagues – endemic in the Russian special services but also in the military – obscures the actual operational problems that must be solved. These only become apparent when they can no longer be concealed, slowing the learning of lessons, but also leading to predictable and predicted vulnerabilities not being addressed. + +The issue of fratricide therefore may be studied in three respects as a measure of progress in the development of the Russian Armed Forces. First, there must be an assessment as to the level of effort in future Russian systems to deconflict their effects. Second, there is the question of free-play exercises and testing deconfliction in a dynamic environment to build the necessary skills to avoid fratricide. Third, there is the cultural issue of an honest reporting culture. Without incentives to resolve these issues, it is likely that the Russian military will continue to employ effects that cause its troops harm. + +A final point on fratricide is the attitude of the Russian military generally, and of its officer corps in particular, to people – its own and civilians. The widespread war crimes by Russian troops throughout the conflict have been widely documented. But it should also be noted that many Russian officers do not invest time in looking after their personnel or caring for their welfare. The culture of hazing in the Russian military arguably creates strong disincentives for junior officers to become involved in the everyday lives of their subordinates. This stems from a general cultural approach that does not place a great deal of value on human life. For senior Russian officers who spent their time as junior officers in the Soviet Union there is still a mindset of seeing people as an inexhaustible resource to be expended. But that is not Russia today. Russia has a finite number of available military personnel. This culture of not valuing individuals is a form of institutional fratricide. Although it leads Russian troops to take a great deal of punishment without surrendering on the battlefield – there is an expectation and acceptance of suffering – it also leads to low morale, poor unit cohesion and troops who lack the team spirit to effectively conduct sub-tactical manoeuvre. Given Russia’s ageing population and its limited base for recruits, progress in its approach to its human capital is another important metric for assessing whether the Russian armed forces can improve their capabilities after this conflict. + + +### V. Lessons Identified for the British Military + +The Ukrainian military – as outlined in the second chapter of this report – differed considerably in its size, capabilities, structure and culture compared with NATO forces. There are some threats that proved exceedingly difficult for the UAF that would not pose a threat to NATO armies. For example, NATO would not face the same technological disadvantages in the air against Russian aircraft or be unable to contest Russia’s distant blockade. Conversely, there are areas where the UAF are considerably more capable than the forces of many NATO states. Another feature of identifying lessons for future conflict is that some of the weaknesses identified in the previous chapter as regards Russia’s armed forces may be resolved following this conflict. This chapter, therefore, focuses on those aspects that are considered likely constants and applicable to a range of adversaries. This chapter is also specifically aimed at identifying relevant lessons for the British military in relation to how it is currently projected to develop until 2030, although many of the observations have application across NATO members. For other armies, slightly different lessons may apply. + +#### There Is No Sanctuary + +The first clear lesson from the war in Ukraine is that the enemy can conduct strikes on targets throughout its adversary’s operational depth with long-range precision fires. Moreover, in target states, the Russians have proven able to retain networks of agents in place to observe key targets and to update their command on the movement of troops and stores. The integration of human intelligence (HUMINT) into Russian long-range precision-fires kill chains is critical. Given that Ukraine has also retained this capability, despite the exigencies of the counterintelligence regime on the occupied territories, it seems unlikely that states can plan on the assumption that they can conceal key sites, or the movement of materiel, from the enemy. The Russians have missed targets because of self-imposed frictions in their kill chains, usually striking too late rather than not at all. Their misses have not been for want of intelligence. The effect of these munitions on targets when they strike them is sufficient to destroy most military objects other than deep subterranean or heavily hardened structures. Non-hardened structures are also targetable by loitering munitions, whose accuracy and affordability make them a persistent and pervasive threat. + +For the UAF, it was found that the ability to conduct dispersed operations was critical to survivability. Without this capability – to disperse and maintain aircraft in the field for a limited period, while periodically returning to main bases when repairs allowed – it is likely that the Ukrainian Air Force would not have survived the opening days of the conflict. Furthermore, dependence on single critical pieces of infrastructure for C2 is not only risky if they are struck, but also risks encouraging escalatory behaviour by the adversary. For the RAF it appears that a critical question for its survivability is the number of deployable maintenance kits available for its aircraft and the capacity to use secondary and tertiary airfields to disrupt enemy planning. This challenge is especially important in future concepts as aircraft become more dependent on software. + +The Ukrainian Ground Forces similarly found that long-range precision strikes were used against their stockpiles, against training establishments and against maintenance facilities when these were identified. Maintenance facilities had to be situated a long way from the front and dispersed, not because distance assured protection, but because increasing the space over which the enemy had to search for them improved survivability. Ukrainian war stocks survived because they could be rapidly displaced and dispersed. Russian materiel has remained highly vulnerable to long-range fires. The reduction in the logistical tail and therefore reduced vulnerability of precision systems is perhaps as important as their effect in terms of their superiority to non-precision fires. The historical approach of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and 3 UK Division of erecting tented cities – command posts with a large physical footprint – is non-viable in wartime on the modern battlefield. These sites will be identified and struck. Moreover, as the Russians have found to their detriment, concentrated command posts inside requisitioned civilian buildings are similarly vulnerable to long-range precision fires unless all staff retain rigid communications discipline. Even here, the HUMINT threat means that locations should be moved frequently and key components of a staff dispersed. The capacity to access staff work remotely means that it is not strictly necessary to concentrate all headquarters components in close physical proximity to one another. + +The implications of pervasive strike capabilities are different for the Royal Navy because naval operations are in continual motion and therefore do not suffer from the same vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, the war in Ukraine has seen a vast expenditure of anti-ship munitions fired from the air, sea and land. These have mainly been fired against ground targets and in this role have had reduced accuracy. Technical examination of these munitions – and how and why they struck the wrong ground targets – demonstrates that they would be highly effective at sea, however. The volume of long-range anti-ship missiles the Russians can bring to bear means the fleet must not set patterns and work strenuously to break the targeting kill chain. Conceptually, the true problem for the Royal Navy lies in multi-domain concepts. In a constrained sea, in close proximity to the shore, or in sea space canalised by mines, the vulnerability to such fires increases exponentially. While sea power can deliver significant if non-decisive effects on an adversary from afar, if it is to affect the fight in other domains it must come closer. Much UK Commando Force thinking about ship-to-shore manoeuvre for raiding currently emphasises the exploitation of clutter in the littoral environment and the noise of civilian shipping. Ukraine demonstrates that once mines are in play during a major conflict, this clutter rapidly evaporates. Arguably a major conceptual gap has emerged in UK military thinking between the Royal Navy, with blue-water capabilities, and the rest of the force, with its emphasis on multi-domain integration. The conflict in Ukraine demonstrates that this is a conceptual gap to which the UK joint force needs an answer. + +For the most part, the Russian missile systems are reliable and accurate. Cruise missiles can be intercepted, but the Russians routinely adapted flight routes for every mission and such missiles were observed to make up to 80 changes of course on their way to a target. It is not economical for any state to maintain coverage across the requisite frontage to be able to defend all targets with a sufficient density of air defences to guarantee defence against these systems. Russian ballistic missiles meanwhile – notably Iskander 9M723 – fly in a quasi-ballistic trajectory, launch six decoys that significantly alter their radar cross section and targetability, and retain a directional link to satellite-based navigation during the terminal phase, in addition to multiple redundant layers of navigation, that mean it is highly uneconomical to deploy interceptors to defeat these threats against all possible targets. + +There has been a lot of attention given to Russia’s depleted stocks as regards these capabilities, given the rate of expenditure in Ukraine. This is an issue. Moreover, Russia cannot rapidly produce these missiles. It is estimated that it can fabricate around 100 Kalibr missiles per year, for example, and this may come at the expense of other munitions because many Russian munitions have common key modules that act as bottlenecks in the production of multiple systems. For Iskander 9M723, the Russians have been able to maintain a production line of six per month during the war in Ukraine. + +Nevertheless, given that this arsenal has proven effective during the war, it can be assumed that its replenishment will be a priority for the Russian military. With China and Iran both relying heavily on similar complexes, and the proliferation of knowledge on how to achieve precision with these weapons, it must also be assumed that a convergence in systems design between these states will create economies of scale. Ironically the loss of military equipment may also encourage the Russian military to consolidate around fewer platforms, further increasing the capacity to prioritise resources. This lesson from the conflict regarding the threat that British forces must prepare for is pertinent to both the future as regards Russia and adversaries in other theatres. + +#### Warfighting Demands Significant Slack Capacity + +The professionalism of the British military and the competence of units is high. Ukrainian troops have found British training invaluable. British weapons have also proven highly effective on the battlefield. High morale, skilled soldiering and significant corporate experience are of limited value in high-intensity warfare without ammunition, however. It is abundantly clear that the British military is woefully deficient in its stockpiles across domains. At the height of the fighting in Donbas, Russia was using more ammunition in two days than the entire British military has in stock. At Ukrainian rates of consumption, British stockpiles would potentially last a week. Of course, given that the UAF fielded more than 10 times as many operational artillery pieces as the British Army at the beginning of the conflict, it might take more than a week for the British Army to expend all its available ammunition. All this demonstrates, however, is that the British Army lacks the firepower to deliver the kind of blunting effect that the UAF achieved north of Kyiv. The oft-cited refrain of the UK Ministry of Defence that these deficiencies are not a problem because the UK fights alongside NATO allies would be more credible if the situation were much better among any of the UK’s European allies. It is not, except in Finland. Nor – as Ukrainian troops discovered to their surprise – are ammunition, charge bags and other essential consumables consistent between NATO artillery systems; there is an inadequate capacity to draw on one another’s stocks. + +The deficiencies are not limited to tube artillery. Air defence – whether air- or sea-launched, or ground-based – is similarly entirely inadequate. Ukraine has practical experience using British MANPADS. They are highly effective. Although Ukraine lacks experience with Sky Sabre, Sea Viper, Meteor or Aster missiles, the effectiveness of these systems has been widely demonstrated. Nevertheless, a cursory study of procurement data and, for the land environment, an examination of the units available for air defence, shows that there is insufficient depth of munitions for any of these systems to be credible in high-intensity conflict. The survivability of Ukrainian units has demanded organic MANPADS to be available at all echelons and across all arms. Even with 60 dedicated Air Defence divisions, Ukraine has struggled to provide air defence to its manoeuvre forces, its critical national infrastructure and population centres. It has had to prioritise between them. It is worth briefly noting that there is a point at which munitions become overly complex, expensive and slow to produce so that the value of their increased performance comes with diminishing returns. + +Ukraine’s survival initially depended on its own large stockpiles of Soviet-calibre munitions. Now, Ukraine is almost entirely dependent on NATO supplies. It is evident, however, that manufacturing capacity in many NATO states cannot meet the needs of its members in the event of a major conflict. Establishing production lines and assuring access to key materials such as explosive energetics takes time. Beyond merely holding sufficient stockpiles and spares, therefore, it is also abundantly clear that NATO countries – including the UK – must work out a value-for-money proposition that allows defence industry to maintain slack capacity to be ramped up in the event of conflict. + +One area where the British Army at present appears particularly strong is in its maintaining large training establishments disproportionate to the size of the force. The British Army maintains dedicated training schools for many of its military specialisms, which all require permanent staff and instructors. As demonstrated by the large-scale training to Ukrainian troops – carried out in parallel to the ongoing training of British forces – there is considerable slack capacity in this system. While this is a disproportionate cost on a small army in peacetime, its importance during any major conflict should not be underappreciated. Even assuming that British forces remain highly survivable, the rate of injury combined with the very small overall size of the British armed forces must see troop levels in frontline units decline in any major war. + +The UK must therefore be able to train a second echelon. Ukraine mobilised its instructors from training establishments early in the conflict and this has contributed to difficulties in training additional forces. Russia has suffered even more from this problem because it delivers a significant proportion of training in-unit, which is not possible for units that are deployed. The British Army, therefore, must not squander its resilience in training capacity for the sake of efficiencies in the short term. Given that the RAF and Royal Navy have pushed their training establishments towards externally contracted solutions, the scalability and adaptability of these structures in wartime should be critically examined. The air war over Ukraine has demonstrated a rapid action–reaction cycle between offence and defence that has required significant adaptation of tactics and methods. For the Royal Navy and the RAF it is vital that simulators and externally contracted training solutions enable rapid adaptation of tactics and parameters in conflict, lest trainees become forced to learn obsolete tactics as a result of the training tools available rather than operational requirements. + +Another area where slack capacity is invaluable is logistics and maintenance. As explained earlier, the UAF suffered from a high rate of turnover of key specialists during peacetime. This, however, proved invaluable in war. The British military currently lacks logistical capacity for its existing forces, let alone in a situation where more forces would need to be mobilised, or where the UK was seeking to sustain a multinational formation over which it had command. The critical point is less whether logistics units can be retained in the force, but rather whether better recruitment of logistics personnel in which they receive training that certifies them for civilian work can create a depth of reserves with associated liability to underpin the sustainment of both the existing force and additional mobilised units in wartime. + +It is also important to appropriately establish which platforms, whether because of their ubiquitous utility, or the inherent vulnerability of their tasks, demand mass. Some, such as pontoon bridging, mortars and UAS must be available at scale. A large number of troops are required to know how to use these tools. While there are minimum characteristics of such devices for them to perform their assigned task, the rate of consumption of these capabilities demands that they are ruthlessly simplified and rationalised so that they can be produced at scale and cheaply. Identifying where such consumables demand complexity and striving for standardisation of complex components, even if other elements of a system may have variations, is vital for achieving sufficient economies of scale. Again, there is a challenge for industry because this demands a great deal of work up front on design, but a very narrow margin of return on each manufactured object. Developing an appropriate value-for-money framework to have industrial capacity in such areas is similarly critical. + +#### UAS and CUAS Must Be Available Across All Branches and Echelons + +A key lesson from the war is that UAS and CUAS must be available at all branches of the force. It is also evident that the UK and other NATO members have made mistakes in how they categorise UAS, generate the capability in the force and have governance for their employment. + +Because NATO forces were early adopters of UAS, they have inherited the legacy of earlier generations of system. Early UAS were expensive, complex and often difficult to fly. Thus, specific units were established to be trained to use UAS and considerable investment was put into making the platforms better. Furthermore, because NATO forces have used UAS in an environment where even small numbers of casualties were politically significant, the emphasis has been skewed towards force protection. Since UAS were flying objects, they should be managed as such. In the UK this places permission for launching UAS under the responsibility of the Military Aviation Authority. On NATO exercises careful attention is paid to airspace deconfliction, so that helicopters and UAS, for example, do not find themselves in the same airspace and at risk of collision. + +While the evolution of the system of governance for UAS has proceeded logically and the structures around their use made sense when they were formulated, they have produced forces poorly suited for the operating environment, as observed in Ukraine and elsewhere. For pilots and other elements of the force, the expectation that UAS can be excluded from airspace is not viable. There will be many enemy UAS in the airspace. Training to manage this flight risk, therefore, is critical; training in an airspace without this hazard simply transfers risk from training to operations. In any case, given the need for troops to manage their electromagnetic signature and the impact of jamming, tactical echelons cannot guarantee getting information about their flight plans back to higher headquarters. Nevertheless, they will need eyes in the sky to retain situational awareness and to remain competitive. Requiring higher-echelon approval will make the employment of UAS uncompetitively slow. Requiring units to follow the procedures for aircraft in launching UAS also means that it is inordinately expensive to train UAS operators and this too becomes a constraint on their employment that means tactical units will not have enough pilots to keep up the required number of orbits to be competitive. For the UK, the implication is that UAS need to be classified as munitions rather than aircraft. At present, there are fewer administrative restrictions for the Royal Artillery to fire live 155-mm howitzer munitions over civilian roads than for them to fly a UAS over the same airspace to monitor what they are hitting. This must be changed, and it requires changes to policy, rather than simply expecting units to make the administrative burden of employing UAS manageable. + +UAS should be split into three broad categories for land forces. The first are rotary-type UAS able to manoeuvre close to the ground and in complex terrain, fielded across all manoeuvre formations for the purposes of route proving, reconnaissance, situational awareness, target acquisition, fire correction, and a wide range of other tasks. The second are fixed-wing UAS able to fly at medium altitude into operational depth and perform a single task, whether that be target acquisition or direct effects. Where multiple effects are required, this can be achieved by flying complexes of multiple UAS of this type. These should be used by units able to affect what they find, either reconnaissance units or artillery. Both the first and second category of UAS must be cheap and available in quantity. The third category comprises platforms carrying higher-echelon sensors. In Ukraine, this includes the TB-2, which was most useful as a maritime patrol platform. Platforms such as Watchkeeper and Protector fall into this category, best employed behind the FLOT and tasked with standoff sensing. It must be understood that employing these scarce assets depends on shaping, or else they will be rapidly attrited. + +UAS were also found to be highly useful for air and naval forces in Ukraine. The ability to put sensors aloft for a protracted period without the need for a wrap to recover pilots or the burden of life support on the platform greatly extended the range at which maritime patrolling could be conducted and the risks that could be taken to gain situational awareness. The lack of loitering munitions able to target air-defence radars has been noted as a critical deficiency in the UAF that would have enabled much more aggressive air operations. Flying at around 50–100 ft and using terrain, Ukrainian pilots have been able to get within around 15–30 km of targets. Although Western aircraft are much more capable, Russian surface-to-air missile (SAM) complexes remain highly lethal and would likely drive aircraft low. The Ukrainian Air Force found that the suppressive effect of HARMs (high-speed anti-radiation missiles) launched against Russian radar was short. Loitering munitions, by contrast, can remain in place and thereby create multiple dilemmas for SAM operators that could significantly increase the window within which aircraft could penetrate the Russian missile-engagement zone. + +Countering UAS has proven no less important across all domains. For land forces, tactical sub-units must first have a means of detecting the presence of hostile UAS. Frontages must be covered by the means of defeating enemy UAS. Defeating UAS does not mean kinetically destroying them. It simply means denying the UAS the ability to achieve its mission. This could be done through the dazzling of sensors, or denial of navigation or control. The most efficient protection against UAS is EW and ensuring that electronic attack and electronic protection is available at all echelons. + +Again, the British Army has under-resourced this capability. Having two EW signal regiments and assigning their capability to operational tasks leaves most of the force unprotected. It is also important to note that electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) fratricide and C2 are both major challenges of widespread EW employment. The UAF have suffered from battalion staffs who are not sufficiently familiar with EW capabilities to synchronise and manage these tools. The Russian military has suffered even more from this problem. The availability of these troops on exercise and an understanding across units as to how to work with their EW support is vital, especially to avoid EW personnel knocking down friendly UAS, or UAS being launched when the EMS has not been shaped to enable their employment. + +There is, nevertheless, a need for kinetic defeat of some kinds of UAS, especially those penetrating operational depth to conduct target acquisition or loitering munitions. It is highly inefficient to have dedicated CUAS batteries in addition to air-defence batteries. Nevertheless, the munitions that air and missile defence batteries employ do not make CUAS missions economical. The answer must be the provision of intermediate munitions that can draw on the common air picture and guidance available to air-defence units but without the cost associated with munitions that must catch and defeat more complex targets. Point defence for critical sites is also an enduring requirement given the ability for long-range UAS to fly below the radar horizon on complex pre-programmed routes and thereby reach static targets in operational depth. + +For the RAF, the issue of CUAS is foremost one of integration. Given that loitering munitions targeting airfields, critical national infrastructure and other targets are exceedingly small and low flying, elevated sensors such as the AESA radar of the F-35 are ideal for detecting these targets. At the same time, the allocation of F-35s against such targets would be an entirely inappropriate use of the platform. The RAF therefore should either ensure that it has an economical means of supplying wide-area surveillance for tracking these threats or that it can offboard track data from combat air patrols to ground CUAS systems. Given that CUAS systems are often short ranged, these would not usually be priority recipients of such data, but ensuring access to that data will be important if the RAF wishes to avoid having assets drawn to suboptimal taskings. + +The Royal Navy also faces a CUAS challenge. UAS can be used on maritime patrolling to locate and monitor task forces in a more efficient manner than aircraft, while they are also less economical to engage. Conceptually this is not a novel threat. Of much greater concern is that as the Royal Navy seeks to project power into littoral environments, targets such as ship-to-shore connectors, fast attack boats and other vessels lacking air defence become highly vulnerable to armed UAVs. If the threat from anti-ship cruise missiles drives the main task force out to sea, the ability to operate in the littoral demands that fast attack craft have a means of detecting and countering UAS. The UAF have had considerable success against Russian fast attack craft with TB2. As countries such as Iran increase their investment in strike-capable UAVs, the ability for fast craft to operate within this threat is important beyond contests with Russia. + +#### Fighting for the Right to Precision + +As indicated in the discussion of UAS above, the experience in Ukraine clarifies some of the critical effects of a contested EMS. Military discourse has – for several years – focused on the problem of EMS denial. Its denial was a major challenge for the UAF in 2014 and 2015. Measures were taken to make the force more resilient. The 2022 invasion therefore provides a better canvas to assess the impact of EW on militaries with appropriately resilient systems, and tactics, techniques and procedures. The effect is not EMS denial. Limitations of power, the tactical necessity to manage signatures and the consequences of EMS fratricide all mean that even forces with large EW capabilities cannot achieve blanket denial across large geographic areas for a sustained period. Denial can be achieved for a short period, or across a limited geographic area. Targeted denial can be delivered for a sustained period over a wide area. However, any kind of targeted denial of bands of the EMS can be evaded through altering frequencies or bearers. The result is that EMS interference and disruption is continual, but denial is limited. + +This does not mean that contesting the EMS is less of a priority. Left uncontested, EW slows kill chains, increases confusion and, perhaps most importantly, degrades precision. The inability to determine accurate locations, let alone transmit timely data on target locations, or for munitions to achieve precise impacts against targets, all risk a force losing competitiveness against an opponent. Precision munitions not only inflict disproportionately more damage to the enemy but significantly reduce friendly vulnerabilities in the rear by shrinking the logistics footprint. Precision depends on a functioning kill chain, however. To assure that kill chain and to ensure that the munitions function properly, it is essential to actively contest the EMS. The layering of EW and kinetic attacks is vital to ensure that limited stocks of high-end weapons deliver the effects required. For example, an attempt to deliver precision effects against a target can be disrupted through interference with navigation frequencies so that precise target acquisition is denied. Here, the use of an EW baseline to identify the location of the source of this interference can enable non-precision fires to force the EW platform to displace, thereby opening a window in which the coordinates for an accurate precision strike can be obtained. + +Initially, Ukraine distributed EW capabilities across its groups of forces to provide organic support on key axes. It was rapidly discovered that there was insufficient training in units to properly employ these troops. For that reason, the UAF have formed a Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities Command, enabling end-to-end management of capability development, electronic-payload preparation and delivery, as well as force protection and direction finding. Although a more centralised approach to the allocation of EW assets has been adopted, it remains necessary to have these capabilities available on all active fronts. The three basic tasks of EW troops are reconnaissance (direction finding), protection and electronic attack. It is necessary for EW troops to understand the fires plan and scheme of manoeuvre, and to have access to the synchronisation matrix of other arms in a force so that they can distribute capabilities to optimally support the other branches. + +Another aspect of contesting the EMS is pattern recognition in enemy cyber and electromagnetic activities, and the provision of advice on where there are seams in the enemy system that can be exploited. For example, wide-area jamming of navigational systems likely means that the enemy is not postured to conduct accurate fire missions. The lifting of this may indicate that UAS are about to be launched or that a fire mission is about to commence from a sector. However, this also means that friendly UAS committed to that sector can – for a time – accurately determine the location of the targets such as batteries that are fixed by virtue of their preparing to fire. Similarly, if enemy EW protection is strong, targeting the sources of emission will cause EW platforms to displace, revealing gaps in protection that can be exploited to deliver effects. All these effects, however, are limited in duration and require the necessary capabilities to all be available so that the window of opportunity can be exploited once it is identified. Understanding that EW may drive, as well as be a tool applied by, planning is key. + +For the British military EW is primarily available from the air and at sea, with limited numbers of specialists available for ground forces. Although Russian capabilities are quite effective in dividing air and ground components, with their air defences also drawing air forces into mission sets that will struggle to complement ground force activity, it is reasonable to assume that the British military could plan on using air assets for electronic attack. Naval EW support is harder to envisage because of the distance at which navies must operate from the land to remain survivable. Air-based electronic attack does not offer electronic protection, however. It is evident that there is a need for EW defence to be widely available for all manoeuvre elements. This includes deception. The British Army has had success in exercises through the emplacement of false command posts and other EW decoys. Russian and Ukrainian forces have also successfully employed these techniques. While units might be able to organically use such measures to improve their survivability, deception in the EMS also offers a valuable means of drawing out and then striking enemy prestige systems, especially those capable of delivering precision fires. Lining up the assets to take advantage of such a lure necessitates drawing on kinetic capabilities and their synchronisation of availability with EW capabilities. There is thus a need for planners – often at quite a junior level – to understand this game of cat and mouse and to be able to assign personnel to enable it. Attriting enemy precision capabilities or EW assets is critical in fighting for the right to precision. Whichever side can secure better access to the EMS is likely to retain significant tactical advantages that accumulate over time. + +Activity contesting the EMS requires regular emissions. Operations also create significant EMS signatures even among disciplined forces. A force that sees the EMS as something to be feared, with its sole aim being the limitation of its signature, is likely to introduce so much friction into its operations that it cedes initiative and advantage to the enemy through self-imposed constraints. Avoiding this means that a force exposes itself to greater risk of targeting. Mitigating that risk requires an understanding of the force’s own signature across the force – not just among the specialist EW community – and comfort on planning actions that prevent the enemy’s detections creating timely and reliable information for targeting. Understanding the EMS is also important because in an active contest, EW troops cannot guarantee sustained protection. The enemy may successfully bring about windows of opportunity where it has an advantage in the EMS and can therefore bring precision effects to bear. Understanding the indicators for these conditions among manoeuvre force commanders is important if they are to take the appropriate countermeasures to ensure the survivability of their forces. + +Although the importance of EW to air and maritime operations is significant, the war in Ukraine offers limited lessons for the RAF and Royal Navy in this context because Ukraine’s air and naval capabilities are too technologically inferior to Russia’s to provide a comparable problem set. + +#### Disperse, Dig Deep or Move Fast + +The concept of dispersion has been at the forefront of British Army discussion since 2015. In general, the importance of dispersion was vindicated by the data from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian infantry companies tend to disperse across a 3-km frontage. Greater concentration often decreases the survivability of units because it begins to make the use of precision munitions and the allocation of ISTAR assets economical in terms of the effect delivered per munition. One important consequence of dispersion is that it increases the tactical commander’s span of control. When combined with the multiple enablers necessary for a formation to be competitive, it is evident that a battalion commander in this conflict is often dealing with a comparable frontage to that traditionally occupied by a brigade, with similar effects in terms of their ability to maintain a physical presence among their troops. Since battalion staffs are not staffed like brigades – and would not be survivable if they were – there is considerable strain placed on company and battalion commanders. The British Army, which tends to put senior personnel within their rank into command positions, is in a reasonable position to handle this challenge. Nevertheless, developing C2 tools to allow beyond-line-of-sight C2 in sub-units is critical. Another challenge for dispersed forces, especially if they must echelon through one another, is identifying friend from foe. Ukrainian troops have tended to sacrifice camouflage for clear identification (using coloured bands) for their manoeuvre forces, relying on speed rather than concealment for survivability. + +Although dispersion has proven critical to survivability against indirect fire, it also risks individual positions becoming isolated against enemy forces if they choose to concentrate. In concentrating, the enemy likely accepts higher rates of attrition, but that does not necessarily prevent ground from being taken. On both the attack and defence, the UAF have found that localised actions using reserves are critical to the reinforcement of sectors under pressure and thus to ground holding or building momentum. This ability for dispersed elements to echelon through one another to rapidly flank and defeat enemy concentrations has also been important in offensive operations. To do this, however, requires that the force concentrates, as survivability is afforded principally by mobility. If the period of concentration is sufficiently short and the target sufficiently mobile, it is difficult for the enemy to bring effective fires to bear on the right location. If these actions coincide with EW and other effects that extend the enemy’s kill chain, the window of opportunity for concentration at the appropriate point can be extended. Troops must remain mobile if under observation or they will come under highly effective fire. Even Ukrainian Special Operations Forces found that if they went static having penetrated the enemy, they risked being detected by UAS traversing the battlespace to the front and engaged with indirect fire. + +The importance of speed as the best means of protection is also evident in the employment of air-assault operations. Russia successfully penetrated deep inside Ukraine’s air defences precisely because it was able to open a window of opportunity in which the speed of insertion was critical. Ultimately Russia inserted too few personnel too deep for them to be reinforced. Ukraine has also employed aviation assault to cut ground lines of communication ahead of an advance. This too had to be done rapidly, exploiting gaps in enemy air defences. The prospect of pattern setting through second waves or resupply to these troops, however, is bleak, risking ambush for aviation en route or being caught on the ground by artillery. The feasible depth for such operations therefore is very limited. If under observation from UAS, troops ultimately have two options: having defeated the UAS they must either displace or move into hardened cover. + +The need for hardened cover has been demonstrated throughout this conflict. Shell scrapes and other hasty procedures may improve the survivability of a unit against the opening salvo, but this salvo also risks fixing the unit in cover that is insufficiently protected. Once fixed, the enemy can transition to airburst or thermobaric munitions and thereby kill the target in place. In essence, troops should avoid making administrative stops in the indirect fire zone. If these are essential, shell scrapes may be justified. Mobility is the preferred means of improving survivability in this context. However, if troops are to remain in a position for any length of time, positions must be hardened and have overhead protection. Urban settlements, which often have cellars and other subterranean infrastructure, are optimal defensive points because these positions can be reinforced but begin as a sound basis for shelters. In the open, defensive positions should be dug underground. Both thermal sheeting and overhead cover are very important. Trenches in open ground are too easily targeted so they should be dug along treelines and other areas where there is overhead cover, thereby obscuring where in a trench there are entrances to hardened positions. Hardening positions – including entrances to trench structures – also requires the establishment of UAS detection and laser detection with countermeasures, such as smoke grenades. For any force required to hold vital ground, which is therefore restricted in its ability to displace and manoeuvre, excavation equipment should be available to rapidly emplace hardened defences. + + +### Conclusion + +The war in Ukraine is far from over. Although the Russian military is now on the defensive and withdrawing in multiple directions, there is not yet an indication that its hostile intent against Ukraine nor its efforts to undermine the West economically and politically have subsided. Although the massive sacrifices of the UAF have inflicted serious and widespread damage to the Russian capacity for offensive operations, Ukraine’s international partners need to fully appreciate the scale of the conflict, the adversary’s capabilities and the cause of their deficiencies to assess whether the Russians are effectively adapting when they try to recover from their recent setbacks. + +This report has aimed to properly frame events in Ukraine by outlining Ukrainian decision-making, capabilities and intent, to clarify the scale of operations, and to distinguish between the consequences of Russia’s deficient planning and mistaken decisions compared with the structural and systemic weaknesses of its forces. The shortcomings of this report are that it does not deal in detail with Ukrainian losses nor does it assess the relative effectiveness of Ukraine’s tactics and performance. It also does not cover the second part of the conflict. For reasons of operational security, these issues will need to be discussed at a suitable point in the future. However, the authors have ensured that what is set out in this report’s conclusions is not contradicted by non-public data. It is hoped that this report has therefore provided a sound basis from which to identify critical lessons from the fighting. + +Rather than offer a summary of the many detailed and specific observations made in this report, it is worth instead summarising three critical points that policymakers should draw from the conflict if they are to ensure that their national security is built on sound foundations. + +First, the war in Ukraine has demonstrated that consumption rates in high-intensity warfighting remain extraordinarily high and that resilience demands a capacity to build new units, produce spare parts and ammunition, and have sufficient stockpiles to remain competitive in the opening phases of fighting. At present, it is evident that NATO members other than the US are not in a strong position on these fronts. + +Second, the UAF were competitive against their adversaries not because of superior equipment in the early phases of the war but because they were adaptable – especially at the tactical level – and rapidly innovated new capabilities and concepts of employment to address specific areas of vulnerability where the Russians had achieved overmatch. For NATO countries, the critical question therefore is not whether a specific weapons system gives advantage, desirable though this is, but whether a country’s policies, permissions and industrial processes enable the rapid development, experimentation, refinement, acquisition at scale and employment of new systems and tactics. Do personnel at all levels have the permissions to contribute their expertise? Do tactical formations have the capability to procure and test equipment properly? Or is defence procurement a glacial process that is detached from the development of tactics, techniques and procedures? A state in the latter position is unlikely to adapt at the speed of relevance. + +Third, there has been abundant debate over whether the war proves the utility or obsolescence of various military systems: loitering munitions versus artillery, or ATGWs versus tanks. These debates are largely nugatory. Legacy systems, from T-64 tanks to BM-21 Grad MLRS have proven instrumental in Ukraine’s survival. That does not mean, however, that historical concepts of employment for these systems remain advisable. The key priority is to understand how new capabilities not only offer opportunity in and of themselves, but also enable and magnify the effects deliverable by legacy systems. Perhaps most important is to appreciate how the correct employment of exquisite capabilities can magnify the impact of cheap and crude equipment. It is evident that to exploit these opportunities, changes to orders of battle, C2 and novel employment may be necessary. The grouping of armour as a reserve, to be committed under propitious circumstances, for example, may make more sense than its distribution into the leading edge of offensive manoeuvre forces. It is also entirely plausible that the synergies between old and new capabilities shift the balance of requirements for the next generation of armoured platforms. But the enduring utility of these tools is not diminished by these changes. In modernising, therefore, forces need to examine how old and new form novel combinations of fighting systems, rather than treating modernisation as a process of deciding what should be procured and what should be discarded. + +And finally, for all the new capabilities on the battlefield, the war in Ukraine has been marked by the usual miscalculations, uncertainties and human failings. For Ukraine, victory is essential but can only be achieved with the ongoing support of its international partners. + +--- + +__Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi__ was born in 1973 in Dnipro, Ukraine. After graduating from the Military Engineer and Space Academy in St Petersburg, he was assigned as the platoon leader of an anti-tank guided missile battery, before serving as a company commander, Chief Reconnaissance Officer, assistant to the Chief Artillery Officer, and Chief of Staff of an airmobile battalion in the 95th Separate Airmobile Brigade in Zhytomyr, Ukraine. In 2006, he graduated from the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. From February 2007 to September 2009 he was Chief of Staff, 95th Separate Airmobile Brigade, and in 2009–10 he was the Commander of the Ukrainian national contingent of the Joint Ukrainian-Polish battalion in KFOR, Kosovo. After completion of his tour of duty in Kosovo, he continued his service as Chief of Staff, 95th Separate Airmobile Brigade. His last assignment was as Commander of 95th Separate Airmobile Brigade from December 2013 to December 2014, after which he was promoted to Major General. From 15 December 2014 he was assigned as the Airborne Forces Commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Promoted to Lieutenant General, he became Commander of the Joint Forces Operations area. Today he serves as First Deputy Chairman of the Committee of the Supreme Council of Ukraine on National Security, Defense and Intelligence. He has been awarded with state awards, including the Golden Star (with the Hero of Ukraine status), Danylo Halytskiy Award ІІІ class, and Bohdan Khmelnytskiy Award III class, as well as Military Distinguished Service Medal І and ІІ classes, and the Military Virtue Medal. In 2012, he was also awarded with personal arms by the minister of defence of Ukraine. + +__Jack Watling__ is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI. Jack works closely with the British military on the development of concepts of operation, and assessments of the future operating environment, and conducts operational analysis of contemporary conflicts. Jack’s PhD examined the evolution of Britain’s policy responses to civil war in the early 20 th century. He has worked extensively on Ukraine, Iraq, Yemen, Mali, Rwanda, and further afield. Jack is a Global Fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC. + +__Oleksandr V Danylyuk__ served as the Special Adviser to the head of Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service, and as an adviser to Ukraine’s Minister of Defence. He currently heads the Centre for Defence Reforms and is a coordinator of the NATO–Ukraine intergovernmental platform for early detection and countering hybrid threats. Oleksandr is an Associate Fellow at RUSI. + +__Nick Reynolds__ is the Research Analyst for Land Warfare at RUSI. His research interests include land power, wargaming and simulation. Prior to joining RUSI, he worked for Constellis. He holds a BA in War Studies and an MA in Conflict, Security and Development from King’s College London. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-08-broader-transatlantic-security.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-08-broader-transatlantic-security.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6645a175 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-08-broader-transatlantic-security.md @@ -0,0 +1,1169 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Broader Transatlantic Security +author: Max Bergmann, Andrew Lohsen, et al. +date : 2022-12-08 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/RY9BgdC.png +#image_caption: "" +description: "Understanding the Broader Transatlantic Security Implications of Greater Sino-Russian Military Alignment" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_The leadership of both China and Russia recognize that they have a shared goal of working together to challenge the Western-dominated world order that is structured to constrain their long-term strategic goals. However, there still remain impediments that prevent this cooperative relationship from morphing into a wholehearted alliance._ _This report examines the writings of Chinese and Russian strategic thinkers to explore Sino-Russian cooperation across four main areas: arms sales and technology transfers, military exercises, space and cyber warfare, and hybrid tactics. The core sources used for this report have never before been translated into English._ + +Strategic thinkers in both countries recognize that while Russia currently faces increasing diplomatic isolation and economic stagnation, China’s global position and strength continues to grow. This widening gulf between the economic and technological capabilities of each country will increase the inequality in their relationship and in turn impact its bilateral dynamic. While Russia used to be the more advanced partner in terms of arms sales and technology transfers, China’s rapid development in these areas has put the two partners on more of an equal footing. China and Russia have increased their engagement in the realm of joint military exercises, and this collaboration is expected to continue. Regarding their work together on issues connected to space and cyber, engagement is more limited and is focused more on technical cooperation and joint diplomatic efforts to oppose perceived moves by the United States to militarize space. While China and Russia each recognize the importance of hybrid warfare in contemporary geopolitics, for now they lack a shared strategy of how best to counter Western hybrid capabilities. + +Looking forward, the fallout from Russia’s war in Ukraine threatens the long-term ability of the Kremlin to carry its weight in its partnership with Beijing. On the other hand, Russian efforts to react to Western-led economic sanctions and support for Ukraine could provide the Chinese leadership with an important guide as to how their own country could resist Western pressure during a crisis in the Indo-Pacific region. + + +### Executive Summary + +> #### Max Bergmann and Andrew Lohsen + +In early February 2022, Presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia and Xi Jinping of China met in person for the first time in two years for bilateral talks in advance of the Winter Olympics in Beijing. The summit concluded with a joint statement in which the leaders announced a partnership “with no forbidden areas of cooperation.” This was a pivotal moment in the Sino-Russian relationship. Coming amid heightened tensions between Moscow and the West triggered by Russia’s buildup of military forces along the Ukrainian border, the detailed statement demonstrated a joint commitment to building a stronger bilateral partnership. The meeting affirmed that not only do Putin and Xi both perceive the prevailing global order as Western-dominated and designed to constrain their ability to pursue their strategic interests, they also have a shared desire to challenge the existing global order. It demonstrated their mutual understanding that each country had something to gain from the other in the effort to move the world toward multipolarity. + +Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which began only 20 days after the summit, immediately put to the test the proclamation that there were “no limits” to the Sino-Russian partnership. Yet, while Western officials may have hoped that the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty would drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing, such expectations so far have proven overly optimistic. China has neither provided extensive military aid nor indicated a broad willingness to help Russia circumvent sanctions, but its leaders have refused to condemn Russia’s actions and instead blame the United States and the West for the war due to their enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance in disregard of Russia’s security concerns. Moreover, bilateral trade has intensified as Russia pivots away from European markets, and the countries continue to engage in joint military exercises. + +Leaders of both Russia and China have also made confident statements regarding the robustness of their countries’ partnership. Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi remarked in July that bilateral relations were characterized by their “strong resilience and strategic determination” amid uncertain geopolitical conditions, while his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov indicated that cooperation with China would not be subject to “external interference.” In short, the overall framework of the relationship as an anti-Western partnership remains intact, and the two countries continue to find opportunities for cooperation. + +The military sphere provides fertile ground for Russia and China to strengthen their relationship. Bilateral military ties have grown substantially since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its proxy war in eastern Ukraine set it on a trajectory of confrontation with — and isolation from — the West. Cooperation has occurred along several vectors; for example, arms sales between the countries involve increasingly sensitive and complex technologies, the tempo and scope of military exercises has increased, and the two countries are collaborating on satellite navigation, which has substantial military applications. + +In recent years, Western analysts have closely examined Sino-Russian military cooperation in an effort to understand the factors that either perpetuate or limit the alignment of their strategic competitors. Yet, the perspectives of strategic thinkers from within Russia and China are often missing from the conversation, despite their obvious analytical value. To bridge this gap, CSIS has curated and translated strategically important primary-source materials from China and Russia to ascertain how strategic thinkers in each country expect bilateral military cooperation to develop in the coming years. These documents, which have been analyzed by leading defense and foreign policy specialists in the United States and Europe, contribute to a more complete understanding of China and Russia’s intentions, actions, and capabilities with regard to military cooperation. This knowledge is essential for defense officials and policymakers in Washington, Brussels, and other European capitals to develop realistic forecasts and create more effective plans to manage the implications of the alignment of these two geopolitical actors. + +To obtain a wide-ranging view of how Russian and Chinese thinkers expect the bilateral military relationship to develop, CSIS has selected four areas of cooperation for close examination: arms sales and technology transfers, military exercises, space and cyber warfare, and hybrid tactics (such as influence operations). Translations of the Russian- and Chinese-language documents commenting upon cooperation in these areas are published on the website of the CSIS Interpret: China project, an online, interactive digital platform that uses previously untranslated primary source material to drive in-depth discussions and debates on strategic topics relating to U.S.-China relations and the broader topic of China’s rise. + +#### Notable Findings + +Across the four areas of cooperation, Russian and Chinese strategic thinkers recognize the importance of joint activities to advance the shared geopolitical goal of challenging Western hegemony in global affairs. The authors of the source documents cited in this project perceive that the “strategic triangle” their countries form with the United States is out of balance, and the significant advantage enjoyed by the United States and its allies in terms of force, technology, and the ability to set “the rules of the game” through international norms and legal frameworks is the main driver of global instability. Framing competition with the United States in zero-sum terms, the strategic communities in Russia and China suggest that eroding the West’s dominant position is necessary to create a more just and sustainable global order defined by the parity of major powers. In this context, bilateral cooperation is advantageous not only for its practical benefits (e.g., access to advanced technology, capacity development) but also for the signal that it sends to the West: each country is dissatisfied with the status quo and intends to change it. They apparently hope that the United States will eventually heed this message and demonstrate “respect” through self-deterrence (e.g., not responding to provocative messaging or actions by Russia or China in areas where they claim to have privileged interests, and thus gradually ceding their self-declared spheres of influence). + +Several of the Russian and Chinese authors highlight the importance of using military cooperation to improve mutual trust and, by extension, strengthen the underpinnings of the Sino-Russian alignment. They also share an awareness of inequality within the relationship, with China continuing to develop its defense industrial capacity, advanced technological capabilities, and economic base to boost its major power status at a time when Russia is experiencing stagnation and seems headed for a prolonged period of decline. As China continues to develop, it will have less need for the expertise that Russia currently provides, but Russia will continue to require Chinese resources — especially if its diplomatic and economic isolation continues. To Russian and Chinese thinkers, the growing imbalance within the relationship does not necessarily mean cooperation will come to a halt; as long as Russian and Chinese leaders believe that the United States is trying to weaken or contain them as geopolitical competitors, there is something to be gained from further joint activities. Yet, the nature of the relationship is bound to change. Russia seems destined to play a supporting role to China should the “strategic triangle” transform into bipolar confrontation between China and the West — an outcome that some Russian authors struggle to accept. However, considering the key trends unique to each of the four aforementioned aspects of military cooperation, it would be premature to relegate Russia to “junior partner” status too quickly. + +- __Arms sales and technology transfers:__ Both strategic communities recognize that the advancement of China’s defense industry has reduced the need to import military equipment from Russia, and accordingly, the commercial importance of arms sales has waned. As Chinese production capabilities catch up with Russia in certain areas and exceed it in others, what used to be a one-sided relationship is now on roughly equal footing. Although historical cases of Chinese reverse engineering and intellectual property theft — along with China’s potential to challenge Russia for primacy on the global arms market — have contributed to mistrust, each state desires greater access to technology to compete more effectively with the West. As such, strategic thinkers expect cooperation to continue and even deepen in the coming years as the two countries engage in the joint development of advanced systems (e.g., missile defense). The relatively equal standing of Russia and China in the field of arms sales and technology transfers — celebrated by Chinese thinkers in particular — may be fleeting, however, as both communities recognize that China is unlikely to share its most advanced technologies with Russia once it outpaces its former patron. + +- __Military exercises:__ The pace and complexity of joint exercises has increased steadily over the past decade, and both strategic communities expect Russia and China to maintain robust cooperation in this sphere. This is primarily driven by the need to send a message to the West about the growing military strength of their partnership. Strategic thinkers in both countries see military exercises as being particularly important for deterrence signaling in the Asia-Pacific region, where intensified strategic competition with Western powers appears inevitable. There is a shared recognition that military exercises are critical to trust building, as the two militaries become more familiar with the strengths, weaknesses, and capacities of the other’s equipment. Russian authors tend to be more sanguine about the practical military benefits of these exercises, claiming, for example, that they have resulted in the increased interoperability of forces but offering little evidence to back their claims. While their assessments may have shifted since Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Chinese writers recognize that they have much to learn from the Russian military, which has more recent experience conducting large-scale warfare, confronting adversaries trained by the West and equipped with Western arms, and competing with the United States in general. + +- __Space and cyber:__ Open-source materials analyzing Russian and Chinese space cooperation tend to concentrate on two areas of activity: technical cooperation and diplomacy. The recent growth of China’s domestic space industry and healthy levels of funding for research suggest that Beijing is rapidly heading toward self-sufficiency when it comes to conducting space missions. Meanwhile, Russia’s status as a space-faring nation, recognized by Russian and Chinese authors as central to its sense of national pride, appears tenuous due to shrinking budgets, restrictions on imports, and aging equipment and personnel. The ambition of some technical cooperation programs, including plans to build a lunar research station together, appear out of sync with Russia’s ability to deliver, and it may only be a matter of time before Russia’s fears of being left behind in the space race are realized. Nonetheless, according to the authors of the source materials, there are still areas where Russia and China stand to benefit from cooperation, including diplomatic efforts to counter what they perceive as U.S. attempts to militarize space. (The potential for jointly developing counter-space capabilities is largely unexplored, despite comments by some authors that the West was triggering an arms race in space.) Chinese and Russian authors also appreciate the importance of developing alternatives to the West’s attempts to set rules in international fora on activities in space, seeing this as an imperative to retain sovereignty. They apply similar logic to cyberspace governance. + +- __Hybrid warfare:__ In stark contrast to Western perceptions, strategic thinkers in both countries believe that the concept of hybrid warfare originated in the United States as a means to undermine U.S. competitors. As such, experts from both China and Russia believe they must learn from the West and develop appropriate countermeasures to defend themselves against this threat. This defensive framing portends growing cooperation between Russia and China, but it is unclear whether the strategic communities of these countries have developed a shared language that would guide their response to the perceived maliciousness of the West. Chinese thinkers surveyed in this report distinguish between hybrid warfare, which attempts to create controlled chaos on the periphery of great powers as a means to balance their influence, and gray zone competition, which establishes narratives to justify the pursuit of certain aims. Understanding how to apply these distinct but complementary approaches is critical to the survival of rising powers in competition with the West. Russian scholars, meanwhile, emphasize the need to prepare the country for “mental war” — a form of total war in which states aim to destroy the foundation of each other’s strategic cultures. In this respect, protecting one’s information space becomes paramount; otherwise, states risk the erosion of the “core idea” underpinning their civilization. With regard to cooperation, strategic thinkers in Russia and China see regional organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping as a possible way to coordinate mutual activities to defend against Western hybrid aggression. They also focus on developing stronger information security measures and piloting new frameworks for cyberspace governance in hopes of mitigating the West’s perceived advantage in the information space. + +Most of the source material for this report was gathered prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — a transformative and disruptive event that challenges many of the key assumptions laid out in the texts. In the following chapters, Western authors reviewing these source materials recognize the potential for the war to cause both positive and negative changes to the course to cooperation. Writing about military exercises, one expert noted that the Russian and Chinese strategic communities “made their predictions based on the implicit assumption that joint exercises would continue on their current trajectory” and cautioned that continuity is not a given. This warning could well apply to cooperation in other spheres. + +The war in Ukraine poses contradictory implications for the course of Sino-Russian alignment. Russia’s poor performance on the battlefield — particularly in the early days of the invasion — has raised questions about the quality of Russian military technology and the Kremlin’s ability to pursue its strategic aims effectively. Due to wide-ranging Western sanctions, Russia is cut off from critical supply chains and funding sources, and it is ostracized in certain international fora. These factors could lead Beijing to reassess the nature of its ties with Russia. On the other hand, Russia’s experience in attempting to counter and overcome these impacts could prove valuable to Beijing as it girds itself for increased confrontation with the West in the Asia-Pacific region. In this case, the war in Ukraine could contribute to deeper cooperation between Russia and China. + +Beijing may sustain reputational damage from partnering with Moscow at a time when Russia has trampled upon international norms and principles, including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in the affairs of foreign states. However, the overall contours of strategic competition with the West as part of a “strategic triangle” have not changed, and Beijing may find itself in a stronger position to set the terms of the relationship to a partner with few other friends. + +_Disclaimer regarding translations:_ The source materials selected for this report were taken from Russian and Chinese news outlets and academic journals. The translated texts have been published in an appendix to this report in accordance with relevant copyright protections. Authors were provided with advance copies of the translations that were subsequently edited for clarity and coherence. CSIS has made an effort to address any inconsistencies, but in some cases, quotes selected by authors may not match the precise wording in the final translations. CSIS affirms that any discrepancies that remain are of a minor (semantic) nature rather than a substantive one. + + +### Russian Views on Sino-Russian Military-Technical Cooperation + +> #### Cecilie Sendstad and Una Hakvåg + +In 2014, when relations with the West deteriorated significantly due to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its undeclared proxy war in eastern Ukraine, Russia accelerated its pivot to Asia. This pivot affected all areas of Sino-Russian bilateral cooperation, but it was particularly noticeable in the arms trade, where a softening of Russian export restrictions allowed for a revitalization of military-technological cooperation. + +In February 2022, only weeks before Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, the Russian and Chinese presidents stated that their relationship had never been better and that it knew “no limits.” Despite this proclamation, members of the Russian security community are much more modest in their assessments of the partnership than their leaders, usually describing it as an “armed friendship” or a “partnership with limitations.” The dominant view among Russian military experts is that Sino-Russian military-technological cooperation is mainly military-political in character, motivated by the countries’ common opposition to what they perceive as the United States’ global hegemony. Mutual distrust and diverging local and regional interests make it seem less likely that China and Russia’s military-technological cooperation will turn into an alliance any time soon. + +#### Sino-Russian Military Cooperation: Past and Present + +Russian military experts consider arms trade the cornerstone of modern Sino-Russian security cooperation. When China was banned from importing Western military equipment after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, Russia became the country’s main source for advanced equipment. During the 1990s, China imported approximately 30 percent of all Russian arms exports, illustrated in Figure 1. At the same time, the Russian defense budget deteriorated in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, and the Russian defense industry became dependent upon export earnings for survival. + +![image1](https://i.imgur.com/ejVr2pI.png) +_▲ __Figure 1: Delivery of Russian Arms Exports, 1992–2021.__ Note: Trend indicator value (TIV) measures capability rather than financial value. Source: Data from [“SIPRI Arms Transfers Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute](https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers)._ + +Starting in the mid-2000s, Chinese interest in Russian military technology fell as its own defense industrial capabilities rose. The rapid advancement of China’s domestic arms industry in recent years has narrowed bilateral cooperation on arms sales to the extent that China is now only interested in cooperating with Russia in the fields where Russia retains advantages and can offer world-leading technology. A countervailing influence on the relationship is that Russia has tended to refrain from exporting its most advanced military technology. For many years, security concerns led Russia to adopt a more restrictive export policy toward China than toward its other major military-technological partner, India. However, a shift in Russia’s policy was observed in 2015 when Russia agreed to sell China some of its most advanced military equipment, namely the Su-35 combat aircraft and S-400 air defense systems. Since 2015, China has purchased more newly developed equipment than any other importer of Russian arms. + +Russian military experts attribute the change in policy partly to the increased technological capabilities of the Chinese defense industry — which has made Beijing disinclined to purchase Russia’s second-best equipment — and partly to Russia’s weakened trade position following the fallout with the West. They assess that refusing to share technology with China will protect the Russian defense industry’s market position only in the short run. As Figure 2 shows, China has spent more than Russia on defense for more than 20 years. China is already ahead of Russia when it comes to fourth-generation technologies, electronics, composites, advanced materials, and shipbuilding. It is likely only a matter of time before China also catches up with Russia in the fields of air defense and aviation engine technologies. One Russian military expert considers it possible that the Chinese defense industry may start serial production of fifth-generation fighters before Russia. + +![image2](https://i.imgur.com/nyvFWZp.png) +_▲ __Figure 2: The World’s Defense Expenditures, 2020.__ Source: Data from [“SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute](https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex)._ + +As a consequence of the shift in policy, China’s share of Russian exported capabilities has increased, as illustrated in Figure 1. It should be noted, however, that the “amount of capabilities” does not reflect financial value, and the delivery years may be imprecise. This can be discerned by comparing capability exports with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) financial value of arms transfers database, which shows that the value of Russian arms exports was stable in 2012–2019. + +Although China has once again become an important market for Russian arms exports, the arms trade with China is no longer important to Russia for economic reasons, as the structure of Sino-Russian trade has changed over the last decades. Machinery and equipment, which made up a third of Russia’s exports to China in the 1990s, has fallen to the low single digits, while the share of hydrocarbons has significantly increased. Nevertheless, exports may still be important for companies within the Russian defense industry, if it allows them to maintain a wide spectrum of production lines. + +#### Prospects for Future Cooperation + +In the view of the Russian strategic community, the revitalization of Sino-Russian arms trade and military-technological cooperation since 2014 is important mainly for geopolitical reasons. The driver of bilateral cooperation is perceived to be their common opposition to U.S. geopolitical interests and their similar vision of a future multipolar world. Since the relationship is based on mutualism, rather than ideology, future cooperation depends on the extent to which each of the parties can offer something that allows the other to achieve its objectives. The Chinese defense industry has not yet caught up with Russian producers of air defense systems, radar equipment, submarine technology, and aircraft engines. China is therefore likely to remain interested in cooperation with Russia in these fields. China has also shown interest in the new Russian Burak-M buoy for submarines. + +_In the view of the Russian strategic community, the revitalization of Sino-Russian arms trade and military-technological cooperation since 2014 is important mainly for geopolitical reasons. The driver of bilateral cooperation is perceived to be their common opposition to U.S. geopolitical interests and their similar vision of a future multipolar world._ + +Meanwhile, Russia is becoming increasingly interested in Chinese technology. Limitations on the import of Western components have led to delays in the development of many of the new generation Russian weapon systems, including the upgraded fourth-generation fighter MiG-35, the fifth-generation fighter Sukhoi Su-57, and the main battle tank T-14 Armata. In addition to establishing import substitution programs, Russia most likely will seek to replace some Western technological components with Chinese equivalents. The Russian strategic community sees prospects for further cooperation particularly in the field of automated control systems and robotics. Russia has also imported unpiloted aerial vehicles, Haval off-road vehicles, and naval diesel engines from China. + +Recently, Russia and China have shown an interest in cooperating on the development of strategic armaments, including joint work on China’s new missile launch detection system. The system, which is based on Russian Tundra satellites and Voronezh ground-based radar stations, was reported to be close to completion in 2020. Since both Russian and Chinese strategic capabilities are intended mainly to deter the United States and its allies, the Russian strategic community sees cooperation in this field as financially and technologically beneficial, while posing minimal national security risks. As for now, Russian and Chinese missile defense capabilities are not integrated, but Vassily Kashin, a Russian expert on China’s military-industrial complex, believes integration is a possible next step. Integration would be mutually beneficial, he argues, since it gives both countries a longer warning time in the event of a ballistic missile launch by the United States. Other possible strategic cooperation projects include hypersonic technology and the construction of nuclear submarines. + +#### Lack of Trust Still Limits Technological Transfers + +Despite political assurances of a partnership that knows no limits, the Russian strategic community assesses that Sino-Russian military-technological cooperation continues to suffer from a lack of trust. Although the Russian strategic community has generally been open to the possibility of exporting military hardware to China, budding cooperation on arms sales has introduced significant security concerns. + +First, conservative members of the security community have raised fears that China would seek to expand into Russian territory or its areas of interest and that access to Russian weapons would help it achieve this goal. Although the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Russia’s Far East is currently considered far less likely than it was 15 years ago, new concerns have emerged in recent years about China’s interests in the Arctic and its military presence in Central Asia. Some Russian military experts also worry that China could exploit bilateral military-technological cooperation to contain Russia in the case of a future clash of interests in the Asia-Pacific region. + +Second, some experts and officials are concerned that China could outperform Russia in the global arms trade by exporting copied matériel at a lower cost to markets traditionally served by Russia. Within the Russian strategic community, China is perceived as highly competitive, using its economic advantage to gain access to Russia’s most advanced technology while protecting its own. In September 2020, editors of the industry’s leading newspaper, Military-Industrial Courier, warned that the arms trade with China was unlikely to result in Russia gaining new technological know-how, yet Russian arms producers would be pressured to give away their own expertise. They further cautioned that, by pursuing a policy of replacing Western components in its weapons with Chinese parts, Russia is merely transferring its dependency on one foreign power to another. In the editors’ view, Russia would be better served by developing its own defense industry than by seeking closer cooperation with China. + +The latter assessments reflect the ambivalent attitude of Russian experts regarding the increased capability of the Chinese defense industry. On one hand, Russian experts are generally impressed with China’s achievements and frequently credit Russia for the quick modernization of the Chinese military. According to one assessment, it was due to Russian assistance that the Chinese military machine “made a leap forward by one or two generations of military equipment in most areas.” On the other hand, Russian experts claim that China’s modern fighter planes are the result of reverse engineering of Russia’s Su-27. The Sukhoi case and other perceived Chinese infringements of intellectual property rights have fostered a deep mistrust of China among members of the Russian strategic community and have led to predictions of new infringements in the future. + +#### Implications for NATO Operations and Transatlantic Security + +While Russia’s rationale for enhancing military-technological cooperation with China in the 1990s and 2000s was the need for income, it has now evolved to include access to technology. Collaboration gives the two partners access to technology that they would not get independently. China’s imports of the S-400 air defense system and Su-35S fighter could give it an advantage in controlling the airspace above Taiwan. A technologically advanced People’s Liberation Army could pose military challenges for the United States in the Pacific region, forcing Washington to turn its focus more firmly toward Asia while leaving the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with the primary responsibility of protecting Europe. + +Starting from 2015, bilateral cooperation was also expanded to include joint military exercises. In recent years, China has participated in Russia’s strategic exercises, and the countries have carried out joint naval maneuvers in the East and South China Seas, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Baltic Sea, as well as joint air patrols over the Sea of Japan. As a result, the two militaries have become more compatible and synchronized in weapon systems as well as in communications, tactics, and military doctrine. As pointed out above, the Russian strategic community nevertheless assesses that the military significance of Sino-Russian military cooperation should not be overestimated. Critical voices have argued that bilateral military ties are less deep and comprehensive than Sino-Pakistani cooperation, for instance, noting the limited scale of Sino-Russian joint exercises, the lack of joint programs for equipment repair, and the small number of joint technology development projects. While the possible integration of Russian and Chinese early warning systems could strengthen each country’s deterrence capabilities, Dmitri Trenin points out that the system itself poses a limited threat to transatlantic security and could actually improve global strategic stability. + +Sino-Russian cooperation also limits the impact of Western sanctions on the Russian arms industry and ensures Russia’s access to technologies that it is no longer able to obtain from the West. For example, imports of Chinese electronic components and engines make it possible for Russia to complete designs that it lacks the inputs or ability to produce itself. Few, if any, nations other than China have sufficient economic leverage to deter Western economic statecraft, which means that Beijing is unlikely to abandon its arms trade with Russia in the near term. However, the disruptive potential of Western sanctions on Russia’s arms industry should not be underestimated. In 2017, the United States imposed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which states that any country that has significant transactions with Iran, North Korea, or Russia could be sanctioned by the United States. This has hindered some countries’ willingness to trade arms with Russia. Since the law took effect, Egypt, Indonesia, and Algeria withdrew from plans to buy the Su-35S fighter jet. The tense political climate following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may further dampen the enthusiasm of potential buyers who are averse to testing the willingness of the United States to enforce secondary sanctions. In March 2022, for example, India canceled its orders of MiG-29 aircraft, helicopters, and anti-tank weapons. + +Unfortunately for Russia, while a partnership with China might extend a lifeline to its defense industry, it is unlikely to revitalize it, as Russian strategic thinkers doubt that China would find it beneficial to share its most advanced technology with Russia. It also remains unclear whether the relationship is strong enough to overcome the dramatic measures imposed on Russia since its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. New sanctions imposed by the West are much more severe than the previous iterations, and large reductions of EU imports of Russian gas and oil will have consequences for Russian GDP and public income. Consequently, the Russian state and its defense industry may become even more dependent upon China for their future development. + +The Russian strategic community assesses that China is a prudent partner, pursuing its own foreign policy interests that only partly coincide with Russia’s. The limits to their partnership are evident in terms of the two countries’ relations with Ukraine. Russian experts on China acknowledge that China has interests on both sides of the war. As one scholar summarizes: “China supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine, calls on the parties to conclude peace as soon as possible, does not plan to sever economic and political ties with neither Western countries nor Ukraine, but is also sharing Russia’s concerns about NATO expansion and will not join the sanctions against Moscow.” While some Russian experts assume that China will support the Russian economy in practice if not in words, others assess that China will try to use the situation to strengthen its economic presence in Russia. + +Although Russian experts generally approve of Russia’s “pivot to China,” they admit that China is economically stronger and that Russia falls under a certain dependence. As long as China has stronger economic muscles and continues to close the gap in military technology, it will be much more likely for Russia to have to adapt to Chinese foreign policy goals than the other way around. + + +### Sino-Russian Military-Technological Cooperation +__From Capability Gaps to Technology Partnership?__ + +> #### Meia Nouwens + +#### Introduction + +The Sino-Russian relationship has grown increasingly close in recent years, though it still falls short of a formal alliance. In addition to military-political and military-operational cooperation, bilateral cooperation on military technology through arms sales and limited joint development projects has increased as China’s defense technological and industrial bases have modernized. The partnership, according to Chinese analysts, has moved from one in which China imported Russian weapons and platforms to one that is of greater equality between the two countries. While Chinese analysts point to like-minded geopolitical justifications for heightened cooperation in areas of military technology, they also acknowledge ongoing tensions and a lack of trust between the two countries that will prevent further deepening of the relationship. The bilateral military-technical cooperation between China and Russia should be of concern for the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO). China’s policy of military-civil fusion gives it access to industrial secrets and technological innovation from national economies within the NATO alliance through illicit means — such as industrial espionage — as well as through legal means, such as joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, foreign direct investment, and research and development (R&D) collaboration. This information could potentially be shared with Russia, with Russia also reciprocating. However, persistent political distrust between Russia and China could mean that each country will continue to reserve its most strategic capabilities, as well as information gained from sensitive espionage efforts, for national use only. Further research should be directed at whether this may change depending on how the Russian economy fares following the sanctions imposed on it as a result of its invasion of Ukraine. + +#### Context of the Deepening Sino-Russian Political and Military Relationship + +Deepening Sino-Russian ties in the area of arms sales and technology transfers fall within the wider context of an overall deepening bilateral relationship between the two countries. On February 4, 2022, Russia and China publicized a joint statement on their common positions with regards to the world order and their “limitless” bilateral strategic partnership. The statement seems to have marked the formalization of a new phase in their relationship, though many of the points covered in the document were already present in their existing bilateral relationship. Even following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stated that “China is willing to work with Russia to take China-Russian ties to a higher level in a new era.” According to some Chinese academics, the bilateral relationship has turned a corner; whereas China was once heavily dependent on the Soviet Union, it has gradually developed a partnership of relative equals with the Russian Federation, each with its own strengths and weaknesses. The relationship has moved from a period in which the two sides recognized each other as friendly countries in the early 1990s to a comprehensive strategic partnership in the second decade of the twenty-first century. + +Chinese views of the Sino-Russian partnership are often also framed within the larger context of common strategic interests and competition with the United States. Hou Aijun from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, for example, states that since the 1990s, both China and Russia have acted as stabilizing forces and geopolitical balancing factors in a world order that is unjust and excludes the Global South, and which is “constantly eroded and destroyed” by a revisionist United States seeking to stave off its inevitable decline. + +Despite the strong sentiment of deep partnership between Russia and China, such as that expressed by Hou, Chinese academics acknowledge that the bilateral relationship is not truly “limitless.” Hou, for example, explains that areas of mistrust include border security, differences in each other’s political systems, historical grievances, and China’s economic expansion into Central Asia. Some thinkers, like Zhang Deguang, former secretary general of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, have highlighted areas of concern about Russia’s future trajectory in international relations, although Zhang was generally optimistic despite Russia’s shortcomings. + +Science and technology diplomacy has been a significant part of the bilateral relationship since before the fall of the Soviet Union, and against the backdrop of U.S.-China technological competition, it serves China’s geopolitical goal of becoming a global technological leader. According to Luo Hui, former director of the Innovation Strategy Research Institute of the China Association for Science and Technology, science and technology diplomacy helps advance China’s overall innovation strategy while also fulfilling larger diplomatic goals. However, Chinese thinkers ascribe Russia’s pursuit of technological cooperation to public diplomacy efforts to “increase mutual understanding between people.” + +#### Chinese Views of Deepening Military-Technological Relationship + +Military-technological cooperation between China and Russia also dates back to the Soviet era, starting in the 1950s with secondments of Soviet experts to job placements in China and the signing of cooperation agreements on issues such as nuclear energy and weapons technologies. Although China today no longer relies on Russia as its primary source of military weapons and platforms procurement following China’s advancement in science and technology and the modernization of its own defense technological and industrial base, Chinese academics still point to Russia’s “profound accumulation of basic scientific research” in areas such as materials science, mathematics, physics, aerospace, power efficiency, polar exploration, space science, and others. + +According to Li Shuyin, director and researcher with the European Military Research Office of the Department of Foreign Military Studies at the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, Chinese and Russian military-technological cooperation forms part of their “three-in-one” relationship, which also encompasses military-political and military-operational aspects. The military-political relationship is based on regular meetings between heads of state, as well as mechanisms for regular meetings at the defense ministerial level and general staff strategic consultations. The military-operational relationship is founded on regular joint exercises, such as the “Peace Mission” series, which seek to build cooperation and mutual trust between each country’s armed forces. Lastly, arms sales, technology transfers, and (to a lesser extent) R&D collaboration form the “core of China-Russia military cooperation.” This aspect of the relationship has significant historical roots that have shaped modern bilateral ties. China was an important destination for Russian weapons in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as during the Western arms embargo that followed China’s crackdown on protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Despite the rapid modernization of China’s defense industry, in 2021, the country remained Russia’s second-largest destination for arms exports, following India. + +The military-technological relationship is governed by the Intergovernmental Commission on Military-Technological Cooperation, which meets yearly and focuses on the procurement of various technologies from each country. In 2015, it was reported the Chinese side was focused on purchases of modern warplanes, ships, and new land equipment, while the Russian side was focused on air and missile defense systems. Chinese arms transfers from Russia also include, in some instances, production licenses, as was considered for the Su aircraft series. + +These imports have served the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in multiple ways. They are politically symbolic of support in Moscow and Beijing for the deepening bilateral relationship, while also providing opportunities for China’s defense industry to learn about specific aspects of Russian technology to integrate into its own capabilities, such as thrust vector control in Russian aircraft engines. + +The practical benefit to the PLA from these types of imports should not be underestimated, nor should arms imports be conflated with trust within the relationship, for reasons outlined further below. Similar to the science and technology partnership, Chinese academics characterize the bilateral military-technological relationship as serving national interests and, ultimately, the country’s strategic goals. As Li Shuyin states: “From China’s point of view, learning from others and introducing and drawing on relatively mature foreign military-technological achievements can, in a relatively short amount of time, raise China’s level of defense modernization, especially in naval and air force weapons modernization, effectively curb hegemonism and power politics, reduce the security pressures it faces, and prevent the infiltration of international terrorist forces.” + +Li Shuyin argues that arms sales have been an important source of funding and foreign currency for the Russian military-industrial complex. Accordingly, as both sides perceive that they are benefiting from their partnership in the field of military-technological cooperation, analysts expect this relationship to continue into the future. + +The nature of this cooperation, however, is transforming from one-sided procurement to equal learning. Just as the general science and technological cooperative relationship has moved on from being characterized primarily by China acquiring knowledge from the Soviet Union (and then Russia), so too has the military-technological relationship. Li Shuyin points to the links between Chinese national sentiment and the historical relationship between China and the Soviet Union, stating that the “Soviet Union’s deep-rooted chauvinism led it to regard itself as the major party and the major power,” which allowed it to determine the nature and amount of military cooperation with China at any time. China’s economic and technological rise has allowed it to assert its equality within the relationship more confidently and to push back against this perceived Russian chauvinism. + +Indeed, the relationship has also evolved as the innovative potential of each defense industrial complex has strengthened. Authors like Li Dapeng, from the Naval Engineering University, already argued in 2015 that “the context of Sino-Russian military-technological cooperation should shift from focusing on procurement of weapons systems, equipment and components to focusing on cooperative R&D and joint manufacturing.” + +Nevertheless, Chinese analysts also point to obstacles in the deepening of defense technological cooperation between Russia and China. Li Dapeng indirectly references concerns in Russia about Chinese reverse engineering of Russian weapons, stating that “some Chinese-made weapons have similarities with Russian-made weapons in technical genes.” In one relevant case, Moscow suspended the production of the second batch of J-11A/SU-27SK fighters following Beijing’s alleged violation of the coproduction agreement with Russia. Given that Russia is a major player in the global arms trade, China’s relative advantage in terms of manufacturing capacity and production costs could pose problems for Moscow if Beijing ramps up production of its variants of Russia-derived weapons for export. As Li Dapeng notes, Russia’s concern about losing market share as Chinese exports become more cost-effective is a “major obstacle to deepening and expanding Sino-Russian military-technological cooperation.” The modernization of China’s defense industrial base and economic power has afforded Beijing the capacity to manufacture weapons and platforms for export or transfer at subsidized prices. + +Looking ahead, arms sales volumes are likely to decline in the future, as China’s defense industry becomes more capable, efficient, and competitive. China and Russia may continue to cooperate instead on the joint development of emerging and disruptive technologies, or on a missile early warning system — technologies that fit into China’s military modernization goals of catching up and overtaking the United States militarily. However, as a result of the war in Ukraine, Chinese military-technological cooperation with Russia becomes more complicated, as it puts Beijing at risk of being targeted with secondary sanctions. Furthermore, Russia’s tech industry is experiencing brain drain as a result of the invasion, which may complicate the two countries’ cooperation in the field of emerging and disruptive technology. + +Modern Sino-Russian military cooperation is based on mutual self-interest, which includes tilting regional and global balances of strategic power in favor of Moscow and Beijing. While geopolitics will play a major role in the propelling this relationship forward, they also generate certain disruptions. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its actions in the early months of the war are exemplary of the potential drawbacks of a “relationship with no limits,” as Beijing has been forced to carefully craft a balanced position to not criticize Russia while also upholding its self-declared principles of non-interference and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty. + +As with the greater political-military relationship, Sino-Russian cooperation is guided primarily by mutual trust, which according to Li Shuyin remains insufficient. Li Shuyin notes that geopolitics contributes to the lack of trust between the two countries, as “some people in China . . . voice dissatisfaction with the obvious disparity in the sale of weapons and equipment to China and India, maintaining that this runs counter to the China-Russia strategic partnership of coordination.” + +#### Implications for NATO and Transatlantic Security + +The evolution of cooperation between China and Russia in defense technological terms from a supplier-client state relationship to one of greater technological and scientific equality means that NATO faces a potentially stronger bloc. China and Russia have already moved to cooperate on R&D in areas of emerging technology with defense applications, such as artificial intelligence. The overall alignment of each side’s interests for geopolitical and financial reasons signals that there is little prospect to drive a wedge between Beijing and Moscow in their effort to deepen defense technological engagement. NATO thus potentially faces an adversary and systemic competitor who can combine significant resources in areas of technological R&D. + +_The evolution of cooperation between China and Russia in defense technological terms from a supplier-client state relationship to one of greater technological and scientific equality means that NATO faces a potentially stronger bloc._ + +The implication of this changing relationship is also cause for concern regarding NATO’s own defense innovation strengths in the future. China’s efforts to integrate foreign innovation into its defense technological and industrial base go beyond the Sino-Russian relationship. Indeed, existing research has shown that Chinese military institutions continue to engage with foreign academic and research institutions to develop sensitive technologies with military applications and to improve the skills of Chinese military researchers in relevant techniques and processes. If Russia and China’s military-technological cooperation deepens in the area of R&D, then NATO ally-originating innovation could also transfer via China to Russia’s military industrial complex, thereby enhancing Russian defense capabilities and weakening the alliance’s technological edge. + +However, as Chinese analysts have also pointed out, military-technological cooperation within the bilateral Sino-Russian relationship is not without its obstacles. Lack of mutual trust still plagues the relationship; from a Chinese perspective, it prevents further deepening of the existing relationship. It is therefore unclear whether the reported collaboration on R&D for weapons and capabilities will continue to provide significant strategic value to either military in the long term. Lastly, the question of how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will impact Sino-Russian defense technological cooperation remains inconclusive. + + +### Russia-China Joint Military Exercises +__The View from Russia__ + +> #### Paul Schwartz + +Russian-Chinese joint military exercises have expanded dramatically since the two countries held their first Peace Mission exercise in 2004, and they are of growing concern in the Western analytical community. This article reviews four recent papers written by Russian military experts which offer fresh insights on these joint exercises from the Russian perspective. The experts agree that Russia-China joint exercises are expanding in scope, scale, and intensity, and they provide new details on just how they are expanding. They highlight recent trends such as the increase in holding larger strategic exercises on each other’s territory, the addition of joint air patrols, and the likelihood of future joint air and naval deployments. They also discuss Russia’s growing interest in using joint exercises to assess Chinese innovations, and (less persuasively) the growing emphasis on interoperability in joint exercises. In the process, the authors offer additional particulars on the expanding scope of joint exercises to include inter alia mountain and winter warfare and combined air-ground assault. + +The authors also highlight the importance of messaging in joint exercises, which are often designed expressly to demonstrate the two countries’ growing military power and the strength of their strategic partnership. In doing so, the authors seem intent on reinforcing the messaging effect by overstating the psychological impact of joint exercises on the West, thus departing to some extent from objective analysis. The authors also highlight that joint exercises are contributing to a growing military convergence. While they agree that the two countries are not currently in an alliance, they emphasize that military relations have expanded and now exceed the bounds of a “normal” relationship. Collectively, the authors’ views are fairly representative of the Russian security community, although they also offer insights of their own on joint exercises. While the papers are not wholly objective — overstating the importance of interoperability, for example, as well as the potential for joint operations against the West — they offer valuable details on the nature and objectives of joint exercises and on the views (and hopes) of the Russian analytical community regarding their future direction. + +#### Nature and Trajectory of Russia-China Joint Military Exercises + +The Russian strategic community has commented extensively on the continuing expansion of Russia-China joint military exercises, which have increased markedly in terms of their scope, scale, and frequency and through the addition of new exercise series. Russian experts tend to view these trends as further evidence of a growing military convergence between the two countries. The Russian authors covered in this paper are no exception, although they each highlight different dimensions to illustrate this trend. + +Vladimir Vinokurov, professor at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and vice president of the League of Military Diplomats, reports that Russia and China held two major joint exercises in just a three-month span in 2019: the first in July followed by the Tsentr strategic exercises in September. He notes that these were viewed as regular, routine events, indicating that joint exercises are growing in both scale and frequency. This is further evidence of what he sees as a general strengthening of connections in the military sphere. Alexander Yermakov, an independent military analyst and member of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), likewise highlights the growing frequency of joint exercises, pointing to the recent Zapad/Interaction-2021 strategic multi-country exercises held in August 2021 followed just one month later by Peace Mission counterterrorism exercises held in September. Coming in such close proximity, these exercises reflect a deepening of cooperation between the two sides in the sphere of defense. + +Yermakov notes that joint exercises are increasing not only in frequency but in scale: for instance, Zapad/Interaction-2021 involved 13,000 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops, 200 armored vehicles, 90 artillery pieces, a Russian motorized rifle unit, and more than 100 planes and helicopters. A recent RIA Novosti article on Russia-China military relations adds that joint exercises are now held at sea, on land, and in the air, having expanded to encompass all of the principal military domains. More ominously, this article also notes that recent joint exercises are placing greater emphasis on joint repulsion of enemy attacks, citing the West as the likely target of these efforts. The article then quotes Vasiliy Kashin, director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics, who argues that joint exercises are becoming more advanced and more high-tech as well. As further evidence, the article points to the recent flurry of joint exercises such as the Vostok-2018 and Tsentr-2019 strategic exercises held in Russia and the Joint Sea naval exercises held in the Baltic and South China Seas. + +Vinokurov and Ruslan Polonchuk, a military expert at the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), both highlight the recent joint air patrols conducted over disputed waters in the East China Sea. They contend that joint air patrols represent an expansion of Russian-Chinese joint exercises to include joint deployments. By joint deployments, they are likely referring to a range of potential activities that the two sides could undertake, including combined air and naval patrols, port visits, search and rescue operations, and other joint peacetime activities. Vinokurov indicates that these are likely to become a routine part of the Russia-China joint exercise program, since they demonstrate the two countries’ readiness for further collaboration in this area. Going forward, Polonchuk believes that joint activities will expand even further to include joint naval “show-the-flag” deployments. + +Polonchuk also highlights the recent expansion of Russia-China joint naval exercises to include new participants — most notably Iran — as another important development. He argues that joint naval maneuvers with Iran demonstrated a growing coordination on joint maritime activities between the three countries with a distinctly anti-American character, coming as they did amid escalating tensions between the United States and Iran. + +The group of experts cited above indicate that joint exercises are becoming more important for both China and Russia. Polonchuk notes, for example, that joint exercises have increased in importance over the last several years, while arms sales between the two sides have declined, indicating that joint exercises may eventually become the main line of effort in Russia-China military affairs. The PLA’s willingness to continue joint exercises with Russia despite Covid-19 risks was cited separately as evidence of their growing importance to China. Yeramakov marks the recent trend to appoint high-ranking military commanders to lead joint exercises as further evidence of their increasing importance. As an example, he cites the appointment of Li Zuochen, a member of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Central Military Commission, to command Chinese forces during Zapad/Interaction-2021. + +The authors all agree that the recent expansion of Russia-China joint exercises is contributing to a growing strategic partnership between the two countries, a trend that is likely to continue. The RIA Novosti article views this as part of a larger trend toward increased defense cooperation, which has now reached a “level unprecedented over the past half-century.” It further claims that joint exercises are so ingrained that they have now become a “tradition” — a novel though not unreasonable way of characterizing joint exercises, given their growing scope, scale, and frequency. In any event, all of these factors imply that joint exercises are likely to continue on their current trajectory, with important implications for the West. + +The authors are correct that joint exercises are expanding as the two countries have continued to add new series of exercises. They are also correct in highlighting that joint exercises are increasing in scope, scale, and frequency. The authors go further, offering valuable insights on just how joint exercises are expanding, all of which warrants further attention. For example, Polonchuk could well be correct in projecting an increase in joint deployments, which offer yet another way for the two sides to engage in joint military activities at low cost and to achieve political and military effects, with important implications for Asia-Pacific and transatlantic security. + +The authors are also quite correct that joint exercises are a critical component of the Russia-China strategic partnership, complementing arms sales, key leader engagements, and defense research and development as the main forms of military cooperation. As joint exercises have developed, each country has become the other’s most important joint exercise partner. Joint exercises in turn reflect a growing convergence at the strategic level, with Moscow and Beijing now aligned on the most important issues facing them in the international arena. This includes a shared desire to limit U.S. power and to usher in a multipolar world order. In the military sphere, this convergence is reflected in their joint opposition to U.S. missile defense, prompt global strike, and the militarization of space. + +Viewed in this light, joint military exercises are part of a larger combined effort by Russia and China to improve their respective military capabilities and expand their influence, while simultaneously signaling their displeasure with U.S. and Western policies. + +#### Military Objectives of Joint Exercises + +The authors of these four papers also emphasize that military exercises are an effective means to build experience and to promote knowledge transfer. As an example, Vinokurov discusses the recent Tsentr 2019 exercises held in central Russia, where Russian and Chinese bombers practiced joint interdiction of opposing ground forces, exposing the two sides to their respective methods of attack. The RIA Novosti article highlights the use of joint exercises to develop certain specialized capabilities. As examples, it discusses two recent joint exercises in which Russian and Chinese forces practiced winter and alpine combat operations. It then quotes Kashin, who notes that joint exercises are becoming more advanced and more high-tech, while focusing increasingly on operations of the kind needed to confront an advanced foreign adversary, which he says could only be the United States. + +Polonchuk agrees, even though he asserts that China is benefiting militarily more than Russia from such exercises, a view shared by most Western analysts. He notes, for example, that the Joint Sea naval exercises have been especially important for the PLA Navy, since they are designed to focus more on tasks facing the PRC, while exposing the PLA Navy to the methods used by the more experienced Russian navy. Polonchuk likewise points out that China is using Peace Mission exercises to prepare the PLA for counterterrorist actions in Central Asia, which he notes could be used against the PRC’s indigenous Uighur population. + +Interestingly, Polonchuk argues that this trend is changing, and that combined military exercises are becoming more balanced, or more “multi-vectored” as he puts it. Whereas before, they were used mainly as a means for the PLA to learn from the more experienced Russian military, joint exercises are increasingly benefiting both sides. He notes, for example, that Russian ground forces gained important insights from their exposure to Chinese motorized rifle units during recent joint exercises. Based on this, he advocates for the two to hold additional joint exercises involving motorized rifle units so they can hone their skills in urban combat. He also suggests that Russian forces hold additional joint exercises on Chinese ranges as they did during Zapad/Interaction-2021, both to gain more exposure to the PLA’s new theater command system and to weigh its pros and cons. + +Yermakov concurs, claiming that Zapad/Interaction-2021, held in China, “showed a definitively new stage in the cooperative military preparations of both nations,” with Russian units exercising for the first time using Chinese systems — especially the PLA’s new wheeled armored vehicle, a system for which there is no current analog in the Russian military. Yermakov notes that “the careful study and use of Chinese technology in maneuvers made up the innovative aspect of this drill.” Moreover, he notes that the study of Chinese experimental weapons by the army was extremely useful and should therefore be continued. + +Two papers commented on the growing emphasis on interoperability in recent joint military exercises, a subject that has attracted a good deal of Western attention as well. Kashin contends, for example, that joint exercises are focused increasingly on interoperability, which enhances the potential for joint operations against a major foreign adversary. He provides little support for this claim, however. Yermakov likewise highlights the new levels of military integration achieved during Zapad/Interaction-2021, which he cites as the main innovation of these exercises. Specifically, he notes that the two sides established a joint headquarters, with a unified command and control system to guide operations, which enabled them to carry out coordinated air strikes and joint helicopter-borne assaults. However, Yermakov seems to carry his argument a bit too far by implying that, as a result, Russian-Chinese joint exercises now exhibit a demonstrable level of mutual cooperation comparable to that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), although he cites a Chinese source to convey this point. + +Russian military experts tend to give greater weight to the military benefits of joint PRC exercises than do many Western analysts, who are more prone to believe that such exercises are carried out primarily for their messaging effects, with less emphasis on their military benefits. Western analysts have pointed out, for example, that Russia-China joint exercises have in some cases been carefully scripted, and at times conducted in parallel in what were essentially separate side-by-side exercises. They also tend to believe that the Chinese military benefits more from joint exercises than its Russian counterpart, by allowing the PLA to learn from the more experienced Russian armed forces. + +Western analysts also tend to be more skeptical of claims of increased interoperability in Russia-China joint exercises, finding it hard to take them seriously in light of the extremely low likelihood that the two countries would actually engage in joint operations. Such views are reinforced by exaggerated claims such as the one cited by Yermakov, as there is virtually no evidence that Russia and China have anything close to the kind of joint command and control systems and interoperability standards employed by NATO. + +#### Political and Messaging Effects of Joint Exercises + +Consistent with the views of the Russian security community, the authors of the four articles under discussion also recognize that Russia-China joint exercises have an important messaging component, one that benefits both countries by demonstrating the growing military strength of their strategic partnership, even though such messages are not always directed toward the West. The authors stress that achieving strategic and political effects remains an important driver for joint exercises. Polonchuk, for example, notes that the PLA uses joint exercises to demonstrate its growing ability to combat both traditional and nontraditional threats. He also indicates that Peace Mission exercises have had a stabilizing effect on the situation in Central Asia by reassuring the countries in the region of Russian and Chinese support. + +The authors all tend to agree, however, that one of the primary purposes of joint exercises is to send a message to the West about the growing strength of Russian-Chinese military relations. Polonchuk argues, for example, that holding joint naval drills in locations outside of one or both sides’ traditional operating areas — such as the Baltic Sea, in the case of China — displays the growing military power of the two countries for Western audiences. Likewise, Vinokurov notes that the recent joint air patrols over the East China Sea “elicited an unpleasant reaction from U.S. allies” by demonstrating the growing military collaboration between Russia and China. + +Polonchuk concurs, citing joint air patrols as an important tool for achieving long-term political goals in the Asia-Pacific region, although he does not specify what these goals are. The RIA Novosti articles goes even further, arguing that joint exercises are used to convey to potential adversaries the two countries’ growing ability to counter common enemies. Going forward, Polonchuk believes that Moscow and Beijing will continue to pursue one-time events (i.e., joint exercises and deployments) that have strong signaling effects but carry a low probability of causing unwanted escalation. + +Finally, it should be noted that the authors often use their own papers as vehicles to reinforce the messaging effects of joint military exercises. To avoid attribution, however, they often use the rhetorical device of citing Western or Chinese sources when discussing the growing threat from Russia-China military relations. Thus, while these papers contain much useful information, they should not be considered wholly objective in their characterization of Sino-Russian joint exercises, which are used to some extent to amplify the signaling effects of the actual joint exercises. + +As an example, Vinokurov cites a recent New York Times article to claim indirectly that the “the West . . . is particularly disturbed by the military-technical cooperation (MTC) of Russia and China.” He takes pains to show that the West has good reason to be concerned by discussing the many recent measures taken by Russian and China to strengthen cooperation in the security sphere, including new joint agreements, summit meetings, and of course joint exercises. He concludes by citing U.S. Fleet Admiral Philip S. Davidson — then commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet — who said that Russia continues to be an existential threat to the United States and that by the middle of the next decade the United States could lose its leading edge to China. + +It should also be noted that the Russian security community tends to play up the implications of Russia-China joint exercises beyond their actual effects. Russian analysts often suggest by various means that Moscow and Beijing will increase their counterbalancing efforts toward the West should relations between Russia, China, and the West deteriorate further. They also imply that at some point joint exercises could expand to include serious preparations for joint military operations against the West. In the view of most Western analysts, however, such claims tend to lack credibility given the two countries’ demonstrated unwillingness to become entangled in each other’s principal security disputes. + +#### Implications of Joint Exercises for Russia-China Relations + +The Russian security community tends to agree that joint exercises are contributing to a growing military convergence between Russia and China, which is driven primarily by their increasing confrontation with the West. The authors of these articles likewise acknowledge that joint exercises are contributing to a growing strategic partnership between Russia and China, though none of the authors believe that an outright military alliance is imminent. The four authors differ, however, regarding the degree to which current military relations are already approaching an alliance. + +Polonchuk concedes that Russian-Chinese military relations cannot be considered a military alliance either in theory or in practice, mainly because an alliance would be counterproductive. Today, for example, the Kremlin is in a position to mediate tensions between China and India, but this would no longer be possible if Russia and China were in a true alliance. Yet, he implies that recent joint naval exercises between Russia, China, and Iran should be considered a show of solidarity amid escalating tensions between the United States and Iran. + +Yermakov asserts that the two countries are far from being involved in a true military alliance, and are not working toward one either, although he offers no explanation for why this is the case. At the same time, he notes correctly that the frequent and complex military drills held by both countries should put to rest recurring claims in the West that conflict between Russia and China is inevitable due to persistent mistrust. Kashin points out that joint exercises have helped to build trust between the two sides, noting for example that Russian and Chinese soldiers and officers have grown well acquainted with each other through recent joint exercises. He adds that this growing awareness of each other’s military capabilities “allows them to feel confident, separate myths from reality, [and] understand what capabilities they are actually developing.” + +Vinokurov appears more optimistic about the possibility of alliance. He notes that China and Russia have developed their connections to the level of mutual partnership and strategic cooperation, and that joint military activities now “exceed the bounds of normal military cooperation.”37 This he attributes to the two countries’ deteriorating relations with the United States. He argues, however, that talk of an alliance is premature, mainly because China is not yet ready for one — perhaps implying indirectly that Russia is more open to an alliance, although he falls short of stating this outright. Interestingly, he claims that President Xi himself recently ruled out an alliance with Russia during a speech before the PRC Central Committee. At the same time, Vinokurov claims that the national security of Moscow and Beijing are now understood as a common interest. As a consequence, they can be expected to “react effectively to [counter] new or well-established threats.” Thus, faced with the growing threat from the United States, at some point further military rapprochement if not an outright alliance would become inevitable. + +The RIA Novosti article carries this argument the furthest, implying that the two already have an alliance of sorts. According to this article, “although the countries do not intend in principle to enter into a formal military alliance, it is sometimes referred to as an ‘undeclared’ one.” While conceding that joint exercises are not directed against third countries, at the same time, it discusses Russia and China’s “growing ability to rebuff a common threat,” while contending that the recent increase in joint strategic exercises is intended to work out “the [repulsion] of potential aggression.” + +The authors’ views on the potential for an outright military alliance are characteristic of Russian discourse in this area, but they should be taken with a grain of salt. While the Russian security community rightly believes that strategic relations between Russia and China are growing and that countering U.S. interests remains an important driver, it mostly recognizes that the two sides are unlikely to forge an actual alliance anytime soon absent further deterioration of their relations with the West. Thus, talk of an impending or outright military alliance with real mutual defense commitments should be considered mainly as a messaging exercise. + +It is worth adding that these diverging views on the contribution of joint exercises to a growing military partnership between Russia and China are quite typical for both the Russian and Western analytical communities. They reflect ongoing debates within both communities about how best to characterize Russia-China relations and where they are ultimately heading. Despite the increasing levels of defense cooperation between the two countries, military relations still fall well short of an outright alliance. For example, Moscow and Beijing have not agreed to collective defense commitments, and there is little prospect that they will do so. There is likewise little prospect that the two would conduct joint military operations anytime soon, with the possible exception of Central Asia where they could conceivably act jointly to combat an armed terrorist threat. + +_While the Russian security community rightly believes that strategic relations between Russia and China are growing and that countering U.S. interests remains an important driver, it mostly recognizes that the two sides are unlikely to forge an actual alliance anytime soon absent further deterioration of their relations with the West._ + +Put simply, neither country has any desire to become embroiled in key disputes involving the other. Russia has no interest, for example, of becoming embroiled in a future conflict with the United States over Taiwan. China likewise has no desire of being drawn into an armed conflict with the West, for instance over Ukraine. Nor do the two countries rely on each other for extended deterrence, since both are quite capable of deterring attacks on their homelands. Based on this, the likelihood of an alliance remains low. + +At the same time, as Vinokurov points out, military relations between Russia and China have grown beyond the “bounds of normal military cooperation,” indicating quite correctly that the two countries have grown much closer both strategically and militarily than is typical of a purely transactional relationship. Instead, military cooperation has broadened and deepened, and has become increasingly become institutionalized as both sides have continued to benefit from joint activities. Military relations are complementary, helping to strengthen the armed forces and defense industries of both countries if often in different ways. This continuing ambiguity has made it difficult for analysts in both Russia and the West to characterize Russia-China military relations and to say definitively where they are heading. + +#### Conclusion + +The four articles reviewed in this paper, which are fairly representative of the Russian security community, offer fresh perspectives on Russia-China joint military exercises, even though much of what they say is already familiar to Western scholars. Most Western analysts would agree with the authors that joint exercises between the two countries are expanding. However, their papers offer deeper insights on just how they are expanding and what that portends for the future. Based on their findings, for example, they have argued persuasively that we should expect to see more joint deployments, including joint naval deployments and deployments in the transatlantic region, to highlight the growing reach of Russian and Chinese military power. They have also argued quite plausibly that we can expect joint exercises to become more balanced and more strategic in their focus, including an increase in joint exercises held on Russian and Chinese territory. They also argue quite reasonably that we can expect to see more exercises involving third parties, such as Iran. The recent joint naval exercises involving Russia, China, and South Africa are a good case in point. + +The authors’ predictions about the future direction of Russia-China joint exercises also seem quite sound, at least based on the conditions in effect when these papers were first written. At the time, joint exercises appeared poised to continue at high levels and to expand even further, and the authors have made good arguments on just how they would do so. The authors have also focused quite appropriately on the importance of messaging in joint exercises to achieve political effects, which will continue to drive and shape joint exercises. Discussions of the military benefits of joint exercises are also quite useful in highlighting aspects of joint exercises that have received less attention in the West, such as the incorporation of aerial interdiction and winter warfare. The authors have also argued persuasively that exercises are becoming more strategic while taking on greater importance for both sides, even though they have tended to overstate the importance of interoperability and the likelihood of joint operations against the West. + +Notably, the authors made their predictions based on the implicit assumption that joint exercises would continue on their current trajectory. This is no longer a given, however, since the four articles discussed here were all written prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. The events in Ukraine have a high likelihood of altering the course of Russia-China joint military exercises, if not necessarily in ways that one might expect. In the short run, Russia is likely to remain too distracted by the Ukraine conflict to sustain joint exercises with China at pre-conflict levels. In addition, the continuing drain on Russian resources, including loss of equipment and personnel, will make it more difficult for Moscow to free up forces to participate in military drills with China, although this will likely impact large-scale joint ground force exercises more than others. + +Despite such limitations, given their military and political importance joint exercises are almost certain to continue, although they are likely to be channeled into areas less affected by the Ukraine conflict — such as counterterrorism, joint naval exercises, and table-top exercises. Based on the PRC’s continuing focus on its maritime territorial disputes and its reluctance to become embroiled in the ongoing Ukraine conflict, we could very well see an increase in joint naval exercises and joint air patrols in the Western Pacific. In this regard, the recent joint air patrols held by the two sides in May 2022 over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea are a good indication of the direction future cooperation may take. + +In the long run, the impact on joint exercises is more uncertain. It would be easy to conclude that China would have less interest in exercising with a Russian military that has failed to perform that effectively in Ukraine. While this is possible, countervailing factors make this outcome less likely. First, for all its faults, the Russian military has acquired a great deal of hard-earned combat experience in Ukraine, especially in high-end combat operations. Even though Russian forces have suffered a number of major reverses, they have also had notable successes in Ukraine, especially in the south and increasingly in the Donbas region as well. + +What makes Russia’s combat experience in Ukraine especially valuable is the fact that it has been acquired against an adversary that has received extensive training and equipment from the United States and its allies. When added to its recent military experience in Syria, the low-scale war it waged in Ukraine from 2014 until February 2022, and its 2008 campaign in Georgia, Russia will have much to offer China regarding the latest U.S./NATO weapons and tactics. These lessons would be especially valuable for the PRC, a country that has not engaged in serious armed conflict since its 1979 campaign in Vietnam. + +Moreover, there are few countries outside of Russia that could serve as an effective partner for China for conducting complex joint military exercises. No other country willing to exercise with China has anywhere near the kinds of military capabilities and experience held by the Russia military. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the very military challenges that Russia has encountered in Ukraine — so clearly linked to the vigorous Western military backing received by Ukraine — represent a common security challenge for both Russia and China. Developing realistic military solutions to counter future direct or proxy confrontations with the West as informed by the Ukraine conflict will provide a strong incentive for Russia and China to maintain or even expand their current level of defense cooperation, with joint exercises likely to play an important role. + + +### Chinese Strategic Views on Joint Military Exercises with Russia +__Drivers, Trends, and Implications__ + +> #### Brian Hart and Bonny Lin + +#### Introduction + +Recent years have witnessed a considerable strengthening of relations between China and Russia. Chinese president Xi Jinping’s decision to meet with Russian president Vladimir Putin and issue a historic joint statement in February 2022 — just weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine — was widely seen as a signal that China is doubling down on the China-Russia relationship. Beijing’s subsequent refusal to criticize Russia’s invasion further solidified this view in the United States and its allies and partners. + +Military cooperation through joint exercises has been an important driver behind the strengthening of the China-Russia bilateral relationship. Unlike Russian arms sales to China, which have waxed and waned in importance over the years, China-Russia joint military exercises have remained a robust area of military cooperation. Between 2003 and 2021, the two countries participated in over 60 military exercises, including both bilateral and multilateral exercises. The overwhelming majority of these were held since 2013. Early signs indicate that Beijing and Moscow are continuing to prioritize joint exercises, even in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: the two countries participated in a joint aerial patrol over the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, and the Western Pacific just three months after the start of the invasion. + +Several different factors drive China’s participation in joint exercises with Russia. First, Chinese strategists consider joint exercises a unique means for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to gain overseas operational experience. In the early years of China-Russia joint exercises, the PLA focused on learning from the more experienced Russian military, but it has increasingly positioned itself to gain experience as an equal — or even more senior — partner. Second, authoritative Chinese writings make clear that, despite officials’ claims that exercises are not aimed at “third parties,” Beijing considers joint exercises with Russia to be an important tool of deterrence vis-à-vis the United States and its allies and partners. In recent years, the two sides have timed and positioned their exercises in response to specific geopolitical developments to maximize signaling power. Third, exercises provide a means of collectively shaping security dynamics within the region, especially through exercises linked to the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Chinese thinkers specifically see opportunities to use multilateral SCO exercises with Russia to improve China’s image among regional countries and reassure China’s neighbors about Beijing’s willingness to play a supportive role in the region. Finally, Chinese experts repeatedly point out that joint exercises with Russia play an important role in strengthening and sustaining the broader bilateral relationship. + +This chapter examines each of these elements, with a focus on analyzing recent texts and statements from authoritative sources and Chinese analysts. It concludes with an examination of broader implications and potential trends that may emerge within China-Russia joint military exercises, especially in the wake of Russia’s war in Ukraine. + +#### Gaining Military Experience + +For China, which has not engaged in a large-scale military conflict in more than four decades, military exercises with Russia are a unique opportunity to gain military experience. Science of Military Strategy, an authoritative textbook published by China’s National Defense University, details the benefits of joint exercises to China’s broader military modernization efforts. It notes that, through joint exercises, the PLA “can not only understand the geographical conditions or sea conditions of overseas mission areas, but also accumulate troop training experience, cultivate joint operations awareness, and improve the organization and command capabilities of command agencies.” + +Conducting joint exercises with Russia enables the PLA to gain experience in operating in areas far beyond China’s borders. In 2015, the two countries participated in joint naval drills in the Mediterranean Sea focused on navigation safety, at-sea replenishment, escort missions, and live fire exercises. China and Russia had previously held naval exercises in the waters of the Pacific but had not ventured as far as the Mediterranean. + +Joint exercises also offer the PLA opportunities to gain operational experience in a growing variety of domains. The first several exercises between China and Russia were largely land-based and focused on counterterrorism operations. However, recent years have seen China and Russia significantly widen the aperture of their exercises. The two countries held their first joint naval exercise in 2012 and have conducted several since. In October 2021, China and Russia conducted their first joint naval patrol, which Zhang Junshe, a senior research fellow at the Naval Research Academy, described as being of “vital importance” for practicing real-world drills. China and Russia also expanded their cooperation into conducting joint aerial patrols over the Western Pacific Ocean. The first of these came in 2019, with three additional patrols in 2020, 2021, and 2022. + +Chinese experts do not consider joint exercises to be vanity projects; they describe the exercises as having substantive value. An article in the Chinese military magazine Tanks and Armored Vehicles describes joint exercises with Russia as “highly practical” and featuring “joint planning, joint operational synergy, long-range delivery capabilities and military firepower strikes, and integrated joint command systems and joint logistical support capabilities.” Chinese experts also frequently emphasize the benefits that the PLA can reap by learning from the Russian military’s decades of experience competing with the United States and its allies. + +However, this dynamic is evolving as the PLA’s capabilities grow and as China widens its lead over Russia in terms of overall national power. Instead of focusing on how China can learn from Russia, Chinese commentators now often emphasize that both sides can benefit from military exercises, with Russia learning from operating with China’s more modernized forces. For example, a 2016 commentary notes that the Russian naval fleet is largely comprised of outdated Soviet-era vessels and equipment, while Chinese vessels have largely been built in the twenty-first century. Another Chinese expert argues that Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) “are only suitable for the kind of battlefield in East Ukraine that does not emphasize movement warfare, and are easily defeated on high-intensity battlefields by advanced adversaries like the U.S. military.” This analysis concludes, “[Chinese] composite battalions have significantly surpassed the Russians in terms of weapons and equipment performance,” but it acknowledges Russian BTGs have the advantage of being battle-tested, while Chinese battalions do not. + +Even more significantly, China has begun to flip the status quo by taking on a leading role in exercises while Russia participates from a more junior position. The “Zapad/Interaction-2021” exercise (also known in Chinese as “Western-Joint 2021”) was the first major example of this. Official PLA media described it as the first time that Russian forces participated in exercises held entirely in China and led by the PLA, and that Russian forces used Chinese weaponry. Li Shuyin, a researcher at the Academy of Military Sciences and an expert on Russian military issues, emphasized the uniqueness of Zapad/Interaction-2021, describing it as “a change of roles” and an opportunity to create a joint exercise “brand” mainly focused on China’s military. + +#### Deterring the United States and Its Allies + +Another emerging trend in China-Russia joint exercises is an increased willingness to use the exercises in a more provocative manner to signal to third parties. Chinese officials and state-run media sources have frequently asserted that joint exercises with Russia are for bilateral purposes and not aimed at third parties. In the runup to the first China-Russia bilateral exercise, Peace Mission 2005, China’s then-defense minister Cao Gangchuan stated that military cooperation (including joint exercises) “is not targeted at any third party,” and instead it “serves the interest of regional and world peace.” China’s Ministry of National Defense spokesman Wu Qian made very similar statements about a recent May 2022 joint air patrol, emphasizing the patrol “did not target any third party, and has nothing to do with the current international and regional situations.” + +Yet, authoritative sources indicate the opposite is true. China’s Science of Military Strategy includes an entire section on the role of military exercises within its chapter on strategic deterrence. The 2020 version of the textbook states: + +> Military exercises against specific threats are not only effective methods of military training but also an important way to implement strategic deterrence . . . The exercise not only demonstrates the Chinese army’s combat capabilities to adversaries, but also causes doubts, making them uncertain about our intentions and making it difficult to determine whether we are conducting routine training, maintaining close diplomatic relations, or taking the opportunity to move into actual combat operations, thereby causing psychological panic and conduct a deterrent effect. + +Chinese experts and commentators also frequently contradict official statements. Qin An, director of the China Institute of Cyberspace Strategy and a frequent commentator on foreign policy issues, notes that large-scale exercises with Russia showcase the countries’ “determination and will” and play a role in deterring adversaries. He specifically highlights the “strategic significance” of the exercises in warning the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and France. + +The use of joint exercises as a tool for deterrent signaling to third parties is by no means a new phenomenon. What is new is the bolder and more direct way that Beijing and Moscow are willing to use exercises to send signals. Amid negotiations over the first China-Russia bilateral exercise (Peace Mission 2005), Beijing sought to hold the exercise in Fujian Province, the closest mainland Chinese province to Taiwan. Russia pushed back in fear of escalation and being pulled into a Taiwan Strait conflict, and the two sides eventually settled on holding exercises in Shandong Province, well to the north of Taiwan. + +_The use of joint exercises as a tool for deterrent signaling to third parties is by no means a new phenomenon. What is new is the bolder and more direct way that Beijing and Moscow are willing to use exercises to send signals._ + +Amid growing tensions with the United States and its allies, China and Russia have demonstrated their willingness to use joint exercises in more targeted ways in response to specific geopolitical developments. Just two months after the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that invalidated China’s claims over much of the South China Sea, China and Russia launched Joint Sea 2016, a naval military exercise, in the South China Sea. Both countries stated this exercise was not directed at a third country, but the uniqueness of the exercise and its timing were widely seen as a response to the tribunal’s ruling; Joint Sea 2016 remains the only naval exercise the two countries have held in the South China Sea. + +More recently, in May 2022, China and Russia conducted a joint aerial patrol over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea that coincided with a summit of the leaders of the Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue (Quad) in Tokyo. The patrol — which included four Chinese H-6 bombers, two Russian Tu-95 bombers, and one Russian Il-20 electronic intelligence aircraft — passed through the air defense identification zones of Japan and South Korea, leading both countries to scramble their own planes. Chinese officials maintain this was a regular exercise that has taken place every year since 2019. However, the timing of the patrol, coupled with the fact that all three previous aerial patrols were held in the second half of the year, made it clear the exercises were directed at the Quad summit. The patrol was also the first joint exercise since Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and was therefore widely seen as a symbol of Beijing’s continued alignment with Russia. + +#### Shoring Up Regional Stability and Security + +A third major driver for China is a desire to use joint exercises with Russia to shape security dynamics within China and along its periphery. This includes deterring perceived terrorist or separatist threats and reassuring neighboring countries of Chinese and Russian intentions and capabilities. + +In addition to deterring the United States and its allies, China and Russia both seek to use joint exercises to deter perceived internal and external threats from terrorism and separatism. Beijing and Moscow share similar threat assessments that the United States and its allies aim to encircle and isolate China and Russia and undermine them by provoking “color revolutions.” China is particularly worried about the possibility of instability or separatist activity spilling over from Central and South Asia into its western Xinjiang and Tibet regions. + +The SCO is an important part of Beijing’s efforts to counter these perceived threats. China’s Science of Military Strategy predicts that counterterrorism will continually grow in importance for China, and it notes that strengthening SCO-related counterterrorism exercises will be a key factor in responding to the threat. From Beijing’s perspective, large and complex exercises with Russia (and other SCO countries) help to prepare China and partner countries to deal with these issues while also deterring would-be terrorist or separatist groups that might threaten stability. + +On top of this, bilateral and multilateral exercises with Russia play a role in shaping perceptions within governments in the region. First and foremost, they aim to help convince neighboring countries that China and Russia have both the capability and the will to address threats to security and stability in the region. Joint exercises simultaneously aim to ease worries in neighboring countries about Beijing’s intentions. China’s Science of Military Strategy emphasizes that China must go to lengths to ensure that it adheres to international laws, norms, and procedures in conducting exercises with regional partners, since doing so increases those countries’ perceptions that China respects them and their interests. In this light, joint exercises are viewed by China as not just a practical means of enhancing operational capabilities but also an important tool for peripheral diplomacy. + +#### Supporting the Broader China-Russia Relationship + +As one Chinese commentary puts it, joint exercises are “the most sensitive activity two countries can partake in.” Thus, they naturally play an important role in building trust between the Chinese and Russian strategic communities and strengthening the broader China-Russia bilateral relationship. + +While Chinese and Russian leaders have repeatedly stressed that they share a strong relationship, there is nevertheless a considerable amount of distrust between them. In particular, Moscow harbors concerns about Chinese theft of Russian intellectual property (IP) with respect to military technologies and worries that China may ultimately seek to capitalize on its IP thefts to compete with Russia in the global arms market. + +Joint military exercises can overcome some distrust by facilitating exchanges at multiple levels between the Chinese and Russian military and strategic communities. Recent joint exercises such as Zapad/Interaction-2021 witnessed the two militaries not just jointly conducting exercises but actively collaborating in planning and commanding the exercises. Exercises also afford opportunities for the two countries’ military leaders to meet and publicly demonstrate high-level cooperation. Following major military exercises in 2018, Central Military Commission vice chairman Zhang Youxia and Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu met for talks in Beijing. In a statement following the meeting, Zhang commented that the “China–Russia comprehensive strategic coordination partnership has reached an all-time high.” + +Exercises also enable China and Russia to increase trust and transparency by demonstrating their military equipment to each other, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of their forces. Several important Chinese platforms participated in the Zapad/Interaction-2021, including the KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft, J-20 and J-16 fighters, Y-20 transport planes, and surveillance and combat drones. All in all, official Chinese media note that more than 80 percent of the Chinese equipment used in the exercise was new, giving Russia a close-up look at some of China’s most advanced systems. Russia has taken this a step further by intentionally using certain equipment, such as the advanced S-400 surface-to-air missile system, in exercises with China with the hopes of selling those items to the PLA. In this way, exercises play an important part in building trust and transparency within the broader bilateral relationship, but they also directly facilitate other forms of military-to-military cooperation, such as arms sales and high-level exchanges. + +It is important to note, however, that there are limitations at play. One issue is the language barrier that exists between their militaries. Unlike North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, which typically conduct exercises in a shared language (English), China and Russia communicate using their respective languages. The PLA has insisted this is a non-issue and that “soldiers from the two countries could communicate with body language, simple English and even eye contact.” There have also been reports of Chinese officers learning Russian for certain joint military exercises. However, during the Zapad/Interaction-2021 exercises, the two countries used a bilingual command information system to ensure that both sides were able to fully understand commands. + +#### Implications and Potential Emerging Trends + +Joint military exercises remain an important and enduring element of the China-Russia relationship. Analysts of both China and Russia should continue monitoring China-Russia exercises for new and emergent trends. This is especially important in light of Russia’s war in Ukraine — the impacts of which continue to ripple around the world. So far, there is no evidence that the war has had any specific effect on joint exercises. The timing and nature of the May 2022 joint aerial patrol suggest that, for now, the two sides are compartmentalizing the war so as not to disrupt exercises. + +It is possible, however, that the war could have consequences for China-Russia joint exercises in the medium to long term. The Russian military has performed remarkably poorly in Ukraine — even after revising its initial disastrous approach to focus on more limited aims — and the war has proven costly and deadly for Russia. If Beijing assesses Russia’s performance in Ukraine to be bad enough, that could compel China to rethink the educational and training value of joint exercises with Russia. It may even lead China to question the overall value of its strategic ties with Russia. In the long term, a deeply weakened and overstretched Russian military could compound this by lacking the capacity to carry out large-scale exercises with any frequency. In one scenario, this may lead China and Russia to pivot toward narrower, smaller-scale exercises that are focused less on operational benefits and more on political signaling — like the recent aerial patrols. In another scenario, the two sides could continue with their existing pace and scale of exercises, but with China more consistently leading as the senior military partner. + +Finally, it is worth noting that China and Russia may face an increasingly competitive environment with respect to military exercises in the Asia-Pacific region as European countries step up their military and security presence there. In 2021, the United Kingdom sent a carrier strike group to the region for the first time since 1997. The deployment saw Royal Navy vessels participating in multilateral exercises in the Philippine Sea, alongside U.S., Japanese, Canadian, Dutch, and New Zealand naval forces. The war in Ukraine could unexpectedly catalyze Europe’s turn to the Asia-Pacific region: when NATO foreign ministers met in April 2022 to address the war in Ukraine, they also voiced calls to counter Russian aggression in the Asia-Pacific by partnering with regional countries on issues including cybersecurity, emerging technologies, and maritime security (among others). + +An increased European presence in the region — on top of the already large U.S. and allied presence — would be an unwelcome development for Beijing and Moscow and could ultimately impact China-Russia joint exercises in the area going forward. If exercises become more politically focused and both countries are facing what they view to be a more hostile and competitive environment, it is possible they could ramp up the frequency of exercises to demonstrate their joint resolve and unity in the face of perceived threats — assuming that Russia has the capacity. If both countries continue to deepen their strategic relationship and partnership, they may also be open to engaging in exercises in areas that they may have previously deemed too sensitive, such as those closer to Taiwan. + + +### Sino-Russian Space Cooperation and What It Means for the United States + +> #### Robert Samuel Wilson + +#### Introduction + +In late February 2022, during the first week of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Russian space agency Roscosmos made several announcements that weakened space relations with the United States and European countries. The agency canceled a launch of British commercial satellites unless certain conditions were met, including the UK government’s financial withdrawal from the company. It also announced it was suspending cooperation with European partners in organizing space launches from French Guinea. Dmitry Rogozin, the head of the agency, said that the United States could no longer participate in a planned Russian mission to Venus. + +As indicated by statements from Rogozin and the agency, the rapid deterioration of relations with the West since February 2022 has accelerated a trend of increased Sino-Russian collaboration in space. Instead of partnering with the United States, Rogozin ordered his team to coordinate with Beijing for deep space missions. When discussing sanctions from Western countries that would target supplies of microelectronics necessary for spacecraft, he also emphasized Russia’s relationship with China. + +For the United States, this intensifying cooperation poses several challenges. Heightened Russian and Chinese space collaboration could enable U.S. strategic competitors to achieve more capable and integrated space systems and could complicate agreements on space security issues. However, the development is not all negative. Like the United States, China has pursued international space partnerships in recent years. Given Russia’s reduced standing in the world as a result of its war in Ukraine, Beijing’s growing partnership with Moscow could make it harder for China to recruit other countries to collaborate. This dynamic could eventually push China away from Russia, opening possibilities for more negotiations on space security issues between Washington and Beijing. In short, the space relationship between Russia and China could take different turns, which could present challenges and opportunities for the United States. + +#### Russia and China’s Space Collaboration + +Russian and Chinese space collaboration falls into two categories: (1) technology and capability development and (2) space diplomacy. While some of the joint space diplomatic efforts date back at least to the early 2000s, much of the technology and capability development collaboration has been more recent. + +#### Technology and Capability Development + +Russia and China’s cooperation on space technology and capabilities has grown partly out of necessity. U.S. and Russian scholars and experts attribute this increasing cooperation, at least in part, to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Prior to that, the United States and Russia had enjoyed an effective and expansive space partnership, highlighted in 1993 when President Bill Clinton invited Russia to join the International Space Station (ISS) program as a full partner. Although the countries remained partners on the ISS after the Crimea invasion, their broader space relationship has suffered. Reduced U.S.-Russian space collaboration created an opening for China, which the United States had excluded from the ISS and from other joint civil space activity. Since 2014, space cooperation between Russia and China has, according to Russian space experts, “further expanded and deepened, forming a China-Russia space cooperation relationship with space technology, space science, and space equipment intertwined.” The technical collaboration has made sense: China has ample resources and has been willing to engage extensively with Russia, and Russia has 70 years of experience and expertise to offer Beijing’s rapidly developing space program. + +An early area for cooperation was on navigation satellites. Both Russia and China have global navigation satellite systems: GLONASS (Russian) and BeiDou (Chinese). In 2014, the two countries established a senior-level committee on “strategic cooperation in satellite navigation.” The committee formed working groups that covered compatibility and interoperability, augmentation and station construction, monitoring and assessment, and joint applications. In 2019, the two countries jointly developed a multi-frequency radio chip designed to support both satellite constellations. In the same year, Russia passed a law establishing cooperation between Russia and China on using GLONASS and BeiDou for peaceful purposes. In 2021, the Russian space agency announced that Russia would start placing GLONASS ground stations in China, while China would start placing BeiDou ground stations in Russia. This cooperation reflects increasing partnership on capabilities that are important for both civil and military applications. + +Another area where Russia and China have collaborated recently is deep space. In March 2021, the two countries signed a historic agreement to build a base on the moon together. They have also signed agreements to create a joint lunar and deep space data center with hubs in both Russia and China, and they plan to cooperate on each other’s missions to survey the lunar south pole. As some Russian thinkers argue, Russia’s deepening links with China in this area may be driven by a desire to not get left behind technologically as other powers pay closer attention to space beyond geosynchronous Earth orbit for scientific and military purposes. This collaboration is also striking because space exploration has historically been an area in which Russia and the United States have collaborated. + +This Sino-Russian space partnership could also be extending to strategic military capabilities. Both Russian and Chinese outlets have reported that Russia is helping China develop a space-based missile warning system. Currently, only the United States and Russia have space-based missile warning systems, although other countries have expressed interest in developing their own. + +These are just some examples of burgeoning Russian and Chinese space cooperation. In August 2017, Russia and China signed a five-year agreement to continue collaborating in space from 2018 to 2022. In a 2019 meeting on space cooperation, they reaffirmed support for mutual endeavors in remote sensing, rocket engines and launch vehicles, and low-orbit satellite communications systems. The two countries reportedly are nearing another five-year agreement, to be signed in 2023, to outline their commitment to continue working together in space. + +#### Space Diplomacy + +Another way in which Russia and China have cooperated on space issues is through diplomacy. In 2002, the two countries submitted a joint working paper focused on preventing the deployment of weapons in space to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament. The working paper served as the basis for a draft treaty that Russia and China introduced in 2008 called the “Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects,” commonly known as PPWT. In 2014, Russia reintroduced a revised version of PPWT. Due to objections from the United States and other countries, these proposals have not made progress in the United Nations. + +It is hard to imagine that PPWT could ever turn into an international agreement. The aim of the proposal is to prohibit weapons from being deployed in space but not to ban weapons that could target objects in space. The treaty would omit any restriction on ground-based anti-satellite weapons, which both Russia and China have tested in the last two decades and which are often characterized as the most likely kinetic threat to space systems. Further, prohibiting weapons in space is difficult to verify because virtually anything in space could be used as a weapon. Space robots can refuel spacecraft to extend a satellite’s life — or tear the solar panels off to kill it. Lasers can provide rapid and secure communications — or destroy sensors and other delicate satellite systems. More generally, given the speeds with which objects travel in space, something as small as five centimeters in diameter could produce an amount of energy comparable to being hit by a bus. Given these limitations, the United States and other countries will likely remain unpersuaded by PPWT. + +Although it will likely never become a treaty, PPWT has become a political tool for Russia and China. In 2014, 125 countries voted for PPWT; in contrast, only three countries voted with the United States against it. Both Russia and China point to the proposal as evidence that they support peaceful purposes of outer space in contrast with the United States, which they accuse of “weaponizing” space. They have used the treaty and their rhetoric to deflect from their own activities. After Russia’s anti-satellite weapon test in November 2021, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov called on the United States to negotiate over PPWT, a document that “Russia and China are proposing to prevent this arms race and which the U.S. cannot accept.” In May 2021, China’s space policies drew criticism because a Chinese rocket body was falling uncontrollably back to Earth, which could have caused damage depending on where it crashed. Asked about the measures China was taking to deal with the falling rocket, a Chinese spokesperson responded: “As a principle, China is committed to the peaceful use of outer space and believes we should conduct international cooperation in this area.” Of course, a commitment to peaceful uses of outer space has little to do with inappropriate disposal of a space launch vehicle that then comes hurtling back to Earth. In both these cases, PPWT and a supposed commitment to peaceful purposes of outer space provided Russia and China a rhetorical means to deflect. + +#### Implications for Transatlantic Security + +Increasing Sino-Russian space cooperation has concerning implications for transatlantic security. It means these U.S. competitors are becoming more capable and integrated. It also makes it harder for the United States and its allies to negotiate with either country. + +A clear complication for the United States of Sino-Russian space cooperation is that China benefits from Russia’s expertise, and Russia benefits from China’s resources. Another complication is that this technical cooperation could lead to more integrated capabilities that could be used in war. If a war extended to space, both countries could interpret an attack on the same asset as an attack on both countries. Perhaps most worryingly, this integration could also progress to the countries collaborating on counter-space. “Defense planners need to look for indications that suggest Russia and China are moving toward cooperation in the counter-space field out of a growing fear of U.S. dominance in space,” writes Jeffrey Edmonds of the Center for Naval Analyses, warning that joint Russian-Chinese counter-space exercises “should not be discounted.” + +The Sino-Russian diplomatic front means that finding compromise may require convincing both countries collectively rather than convincing each one individually. Further, part of why PPWT has generated international support is that both powers have been committed to it, and in turn this international support may make both countries more likely to dismiss alternatives to PPWT — even if those alternatives are in their interest. One such alternative was introduced by the United Kingdom: a 2021 UN resolution to establish an open-ended working group that would “make recommendations on possible norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors relating to threats by States to space systems.” The resolution passed in a 163-8 vote, with nine abstentions. Those opposed were Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Syria. Given that they are both space powers, Russia and China would benefit from participating in such an effort; it would seem to be in everyone’s interest to consider issues like the types of behaviors that may be perceived as threatening if not accompanied by advance notice and protocols that could be put in place to lessen the likelihood of unintentional conflict. + +Russia and China’s concerted diplomacy also leads them to defend each other’s worst actions. Russia’s 2021 anti-satellite test is a case in point. The test created thousands of pieces of debris, much of which remains in orbit; the presence of the debris degrades the operating environment for all space actors. Because the United States has the most satellites in orbit, such degradation creates a higher likelihood that one of its assets could be affected. It is also particularly harmful for China, which has the second most satellites in orbit. In fact, in January 2022, a Chinese satellite was reported to have experienced a near miss with a piece of debris created by Russia’s test. But even in this instance, China refrained from publicly blaming its partner. + +#### Evolving Dynamic + +The space dynamic between Russia, China, and the United States — which has changed considerably in recent years — could change further because of Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine. According to some Russian space experts, Russia’s interest in close collaboration with China on space issues is likely to remain strong. The partnership has brought Russia more resources for space ventures and more support for arms control proposals targeted at the United States. Any rupture in this partnership could undermine Russia’s goal of remaining a leading space nation and weaken its space diplomatic agenda. What remains less clear is how, if at all, Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine will affect how China views this partnership. + +Arguably, the desire to continue along a course of cooperation with China is driven in part by necessity. Sanctions levied against Russian companies are bound to limit Russia’s capacity to provide commercial space services — which some Russian thinkers considered as a way to sustain Russia’s space program in the long term — and the already low level of state funding for space ventures could attenuate further as Russia’s economy contracts. In this context, funding from China — and to a lesser extent, other countries with nascent space programs — is crucial for Russia to meet its space ambitions. + +_What remains less clear is how, if at all, Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine will affect how China views this partnership._ + +For China, there is a considerable downside to further integration with Russia’s space efforts. China is actively pursuing space partnerships and wants to be recognized as a world leader in space. It has space research cooperative agreements with Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, France, and Malaysia, among other countries. Such partnerships offer important advantages, including being able to spread the cost of operating in space or the cost of developing a capability. Also, in a crisis or war, a country may be less likely to attack a spacecraft that could be owned by or supporting multiple countries than a spacecraft that is owned by and supporting only one country. Because of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, countries and companies are severing ties with Russia. As a result, the more China integrates with Russia in space — the more the two countries are perceived as inseparable — the harder it may be for China to recruit new partners. + +In the wake of the Ukraine crisis, China could follow the precedent set in 2014. When Russia annexed Crimea, China seized the opportunity, establishing more technical cooperation with Russia on space and filling the void left by the United States and others. Because integration with Russia could weaken China’s ability to become a global leader in space, however, China could distance itself from Russia instead. China may not need as much technical assistance as it did in 2014, and Russia’s standing in the world is much lower now than it was then. Along these lines, Todd Harrison, then the director for the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said: “China seems to be very tactical and pragmatic with the agreements that they make, and I don’t know that Russia has that much to offer anymore, especially after this [invasion of Ukraine]. . . . And there’s a lot of baggage that’s going to come with partnering with Russia from now on.” + +If China did reduce its space cooperation with Russia, that could offer an opportunity for more dialogue with the United States. This is not going to lessen all tensions between the two countries, but it could create some meaningful discussions on space. Newsweek reported in December 2021 that the Biden administration is considering approaching China on bilateral space arms control. Less ambitious measures could be valuable as well. With the amount of activity in space increasing dramatically, the need for mundane principles and rules — along the lines of maritime right-of-way rules — is becoming more important, particularly between the two countries with the most assets in orbit. + +#### Conclusion + +The United States should pay close attention to the space relationship between Russia and China. A tighter connection will pose considerable challenges, such as potential adversaries developing more sophisticated and integrated systems and maintaining a diplomatic front that impedes efforts to establish norms, rules, and principles on space behavior. A more detached relationship could create auspicious circumstances for bilateral negotiation between China and the United States. The United States would benefit from considering the options and consequences that come with these different scenarios. + + +### China-Russia Cooperation in Space +__The Reality behind the Speeches__ + +> #### Marc Julienne + +China-Russia cooperation in space has been increasing for the past two decades. This cooperation accelerated after the Crimea crisis in 2014 and culminated with the announcement in 2021 of the joint construction of the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). Yet, behind the hype around the countries’ “rock-solid friendship,” the reality of this bilateral cooperation is more complex. Space cooperation is very strong when it comes to diplomacy, but it has proven to be limited in technical terms. Overall, the ambitious space partnership touted by China and Russia may well be exaggerated, considering three factors: Russian space budgets have been declining for years; the war in Ukraine will most likely undermine Russia’s budget and technical means for space even further; and China and Russia have persisting mistrust that tends to slow down any real, integrated technical cooperation. + +Mainly based on Chinese sources, this paper intends to assess the bilateral partnership in space from a Chinese perspective, going through the historical background, the current cooperation programs, and the two countries’ common front in space diplomacy. + +#### The History of China-Russia Cooperation in Space + +As in many other domains of the China-Russia bilateral relationship, there are two distinctive phases of cooperation: before and after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. + +After a decade of intense scientific and technical cooperation in the 1950s, all cooperation abruptly ceased as a result of the Sino-Soviet split in 1960. It was not until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 that both countries embraced a fresh start. In 1992, they signed the intergovernmental “Agreement about the Cooperation on Research and Peaceful use of Outer Space,” which was followed by a similar protocol signed between the China National Space Agency (CNSA) and the Russian Space Agency (now known as the Federal Space Agency, or Roscosmos) in 1994. A cooperation agreement on piloted spaceflight was signed in 1996, just four years after China launched its piloted space program. This represented a much more concrete step compared to the two previous agreements. It allowed China to benefit from Russia’s assistance for the development of its own spacecraft — the Shenzhou — based on the Soyuz design, as well as space suits and training for Chinese taikonauts. This cooperation enabled China to conduct four unmanned flight tests of the Shenzhou spacecraft between 1999 and 2003 and its first manned mission, Shenzhou-5, in October 2003. + +The trend of closer cooperation in space continued throughout the 2000s and early 2010s. In 2000, the two countries brought their space dialogue to a more regular basis with the establishment of the China-Russia Space Cooperation Sub-Committee, held during the annual meetings of their prime ministers. In 2007, they signed an agreement on the joint exploration of Mars, with China being a minor contributor. The Russian Fobos-Grunt mission consisted of a sample return from the Martian moon Phobos; it was supposed to carry a Chinese probe (Yinghuo-1) into Mars’s orbit, but it failed shortly after launch in November 2011. + +While bilateral cooperation developed effectively from the 1990s to the 2010s, it remained a mostly commercially oriented relationship, wherein Russia sold technology and know-how to China within certain limits. As He Qisong and Ye Nishan from the East China University of Political Science and Law in Shanghai noted in an August 2021 paper, China-Russia space cooperation “lacked depth” before 2014 and did not match the level of the political engagement officially declared by the two sides; it existed merely at a “superficial level” (浅层次). + +The main reason for limited cooperation at the time was Russia’s lack of will to engage in a close partnership with China. Moscow simply did not want China to progress too quickly and eventually catch up and outperform Russia. Wang Ye and Zhou Yuan, from the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT), write that “the Russian government became increasingly cautious about cooperating with China’s space program, mainly for fear of creating a formidable space competitor, and also for the fear of angering the United States, the most important space partner at the time.” A December 2006 public statement by the then-head of Roscosmos, Anatoly Perminov, confirmed this assessment: “Russia will cooperate with China on space projects but will not transfer sensitive technologies that could enable Beijing to become a rival in a future space race.” + +Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 marked a major turn in Russia’s overall relationship with China. Moscow found itself isolated diplomatically and faced a wave of sanctions from Western countries as well as from Japan, which were directed in part against its space industry. Moscow then turned to Beijing for political and economic support — albeit at the cost of several concessions, like the transfer of technology in sensitive sectors, including weaponry and space. + +China had a significant interest in collaborating more closely with Russia, as the Wolf Amendment passed by the U.S. Congress in 2011 excluded China from any project involving NASA (including the International Space Station), and the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) prohibited any export or reexport of U.S. space technology or components to China. As the Russian space industry found itself targeted by sanctions after 2014 and Russia-U.S. space cooperation was drastically undermined, Moscow had an incentive to seek deeper cooperation with China. + +#### Contemporary Space Cooperation: Great Announcements but Limited Technical Cooperation + +After the Crimea crisis, the two countries pushed forward their cooperation in space in the fields of global navigation satellite systems, lunar exploration, and military space systems. + +BEIDOU-GLONASS SATELLITE NAVIGATION SYSTEMS COORDINATION + +In January 2014, Moscow and Beijing established the Russia-China Project Committee on Important Strategic Cooperation in Satellite Navigation, which convenes annually to study the integration potential of BeiDou and GLONASS constellations. The committee is divided into four working groups: compatibility and interoperability, enhanced system and station construction, monitoring and evaluation, and joint application. This led to the signature by Prime Ministers Li Keqiang and Dimitry Medvedev in November 2018 of the Cooperation Agreement on the Peaceful Use of BeiDou and GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite Systems, which aimed to guide joint work on the compatibility (ability to use one system or another) and interoperability (ability to use both systems at the same time, providing better accuracy) of the two systems. + +In late 2021, the two countries adopted the “2021–2025 China-Russia Roadmap for Cooperation in Satellite Navigation” to further advance their joint work in this field. According to the road map, each country is expected to deploy BeiDou and GLONASS ground stations in the other country. Roscosmos announced that Russian ground stations would be located in Shanghai, Urumqi (northwestern Xinjiang region), and Changchun (northeastern Jilin Province), while Chinese ground stations would be placed at Obninsk (near Moscow), Irkutsk (Baikal Lake area), and Petropavlovsk-Kamtchatski (Kamchatka Peninsula). A further step toward the integration of Russian and Chinese satellite constellations took place with the signature of the Cooperation Agreement on Time Interoperability of BeiDou and GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite Systems, which occurred on the sidelines of the bilateral summit between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin in Beijing on February 4, 2022. + +Despite guiding a range of joint Sino-Russian activities in space, few details are available on the 2021–2025 roadmap. It remains unclear how the two countries will overcome the important technical obstacles to achieve full interoperability between the two constellations. Nevertheless, if successfully achieved, the interoperability between BeiDou and GLONASS would allow better performance and a wider range (GLONASS covering higher northern regions and BeiDou lower southern regions), which could have an effect on each country’s military capabilities, as it would improve missile guidance and positioning for troops, military vehicles, and aircraft. + +MOON EXPLORATION: THE ILRS PROJECT + +The most emblematic aspect of space cooperation between China and Russia is exploration of the moon, under the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) project. The two countries have discussed the possibility of cooperation in this area for more than 15 years, but it materialized only in March 2021 with the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Construction of the ILRS. The project is highly ambitious, consisting of lunar-orbit and lunar-based facilities for a manned mission, with the first modules to be launched in the early 2030s. + +While the project has attracted significant attention, an analysis of available official documentation on the ILRS reveals certain important inconsistencies. First, the plan provided by the CNSA and Roscosmos to the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) in August 2021 schedules five lunar missions (two Chinese, three Russian) by 2025. This sounds rather ambitious, considering the state of Russian space industry and budget — and the fact that Russia’s last moon mission, Luna 24, took place in 1976. Nonetheless, during a visit to the Vostochny Cosmodrome in April 2022, Putin reaffirmed that he would “restore the moon program” and that “by the third quarter [of this year] the Luna-25 mission must be complete” (although it was initially planned for 2016). This may prove to be a challenge for Russia, considering the global geopolitical context and the sanctions against it. + +Second, according to the plan, the first ILRS module (launched by a Chinese rocket) is expected to land on the moon in the early 2030s. All following modules (ILRS-2 through ILRS-5) will be launched alternatively by Russian and Chinese launchers by 2035. Among these five ILRS missions, the emphasis is put on lunar surface facilities, but little is said about the circumlunar space station, which would be instrumental to developing facilities on the surface of the moon and would need to be constructed in advance of them. + +Both sides claim that they will cooperate on all aspects of the program, including the coordination of scientific and technical research, development, design, modeling, testing, validation, assembly of the ILRS component parts, and the launching and operation of the facilities. However, it remains unclear what specific tasks and technology each side is going to provide or how much funding each side is ready to dedicate. This raises questions about the sustainability of the program if one of the stakeholders is unable to fulfill its commitments. + +Despite these unresolved issues, in late December 2021, Roscosmos announced that China and Russia would sign in 2022 a new space cooperation program for 2023–2027, which should include further details on the plan to develop the ILRS by 2035. However, the war in Ukraine will most likely impact both the ILRS project schedule and the overall nature of bilateral cooperation in space, at least in the short to medium term. + +One might wonder why China and Russia did not start by cooperating on an Earth orbit joint space laboratory before aiming at the moon. Both countries have experience and ongoing or future projects in this field. Moreover, it could have been a more easily achievable project and could have had a nearer completion date. There are several potential explanations. First, it seems that both China and Russia want to have their own independent space laboratory. Second, China wants to demonstrate that it is capable of building a space station by itself. Third, Russia may also want to maintain a degree of autonomy in space, and this is one of the few areas where it can still do so. Nevertheless, both sides have expressed willingness to cooperate in this field. In June 2021, Dimitry Rogozin revealed that talks with China are ongoing to send Russian cosmonauts onboard the Chinese Tiangong station. + +CHINA-RUSSIA MILITARY COOPERATION IN SPACE + +Moscow and Beijing claim to be improving their military space cooperation, though it is difficult to assess its depth and nature. One component is the information exchange mechanism provided by the 2009 Agreement on Mutual Notification of Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Vehicle Launches. By preventing miscalculation, this agreement favors mutual trust and security between the two countries. It was extended for 10 years in December 2020. + +China and Russia claim to cooperate in two very strategic and sensitive domains: anti-ballistic missiles and early warning systems. During the annual conference of the Valdai Discussion Club in October 2019, Putin revealed that Russia was helping China to build an early warning ballistic system, which would “fundamentally enhance the defense capability of China.” It is also well known that both militaries conducted joint exercises on computer-simulated ballistic missile interception in 2016, 2017, and 2019. While this is consistent with the fact that Russia has provided China with ballistic missile defense software, it remains uncertain whether Moscow would go as far as to help China develop an early warning satellite constellation or ground-based radars. + +Altogether, from where the space dialogue started in the 1990s until today, the discourse and announcements by Russian and Chinese leaders on their flourishing cooperation does not yet match the reality of their technical collaboration, nor does it reflect their ability to commit to their joint programs. + +#### Space Diplomacy: China-Russia Alignment against the United States + +In contrast to technical and scientific cooperation, space diplomacy is a field where close cooperation between China and Russia has been taking place since the end of the Cold War. Chinese experts on space emphasize this aspect of their cooperation with Russia more than they do the technical side. He and Ye’s August 2021 article, “An analysis of space cooperation between China and Russia,” devotes only 4 of its 24 pages to technical cooperation, while the rest tackles the issues of space diplomacy, space law, and the geopolitics of space. In their view, China-Russia cooperation in space is the result of improving political bilateral relations and, most importantly, changing geopolitical challenges in space, with “the U.S. strategy of space hegemony” at the top of them. The main goal of China and Russia would be to “maintain the multipolarity of space and the overall stability of the China-U.S.-Russia triangular space relationship.” + +The first threat China and Russia want to address is “the weaponization of space and an arms race in outer space.” The two countries blame the United States for a series of actions that they consider undermining security and stability, both in outer space and on Earth. The U.S. withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2001 and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 are cited as examples of such actions. They also condemn Washington for the development of ABM systems and their proliferation, space-based early warning sensors, and space-based missile interceptors, which they characterize as deeply destabilizing. + +Against this backdrop, Russia and China have been very active within multilateral forums such as the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the Conference on Disarmament, and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) to promote resolutions and treaties against the weaponization of outer space. The main initiative in this field is the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), which was first submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in 2008, where it was blocked by the U.S. delegation. + +At the UNGA, Russia and China submit annual resolutions on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, transparency, and confidence-building measures in outer space, no first placement (NFP) of weapons in outer space, and further practical measures for the prevention of a space arms race. These resolutions are generally adopted with a large majority but are nonbinding. + +The second main point of opposition that Russia and China have against the U.S. role in space is the exploitation of extraterrestrial resources, especially on the moon. They fear that the United States is seeking de facto sovereignty over the moon and other celestial bodies. He and Ye analyze that the U.S. government has adopted a four-step approach to this end. The first step was to grant ownership rights to “nongovernmental” (i.e., commercial) entities to exploit space resources through the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015. The second was to change the legal status of the moon and other celestial bodies through the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2018, which provides that “outer space shall not be considered a global commons.” The third step, according to He and Ye, was President Trump’s executive order on April 6, 2020, that rejected the Moon Agreement of 1979 (which the United States did not sign) as a customary law and confirmed that the United States does not view space as a global commons. The fourth step was the introduction of the bilateral Artemis Accords in 2020, which set a new U.S.-led framework for moon exploration. For He and Ye, these accords “constitute a ‘space version of NATO’ in an attempt to seize lunar sovereignty.” + +For Chinese experts, however, the exploitation of extraterrestrial resources does not seem to be as important as the weaponization of space. In fact, some scholars, including international law professor Ma Chengyuan from China University of Political Science and Law, are rather understanding of the U.S. position, pointing to loopholes in international law on the question of exploitation of extraterrestrial resources. They also acknowledge that formulating a new treaty in the next few years is unrealistic, considering the expected opposition from countries that lack the ability to exploit such resources. This rather soft approach on resource exploitation was also reflected by the lack of any mention of this issue in the China-Russia joint statement of February 4, 2022 — whereas the document devoted two full paragraphs to the prevention of weaponizing outer space. This can be explained by the fact that both China and the United States are well aware that counting on international law is a dead end to legally exploit space resources. In this sense, the U.S. unilateral approach to lunar exploitation is an example that is likely to be replicated by China and Russia. + +#### Three Key Takeaways + +PERSISTING MISTRUST BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA + +Behind what China presents as a “rock-solid friendship,” it is worth keeping in mind that Sino-Russian relations are not without divergences. The relationship is often described in official discourse as “at its best in history.” However, as Yang Cheng, professor at the Shanghai International Studies University and a specialist on China-Russia relations, notes: “‘the best’ does not mean that there are no flaws in the cooperation.” Considering the rocky history of bilateral ties in the Soviet era, the relationship has indeed improved significantly, but it is still far from an alliance. It is closer to tactical solidarity than mutual trust, and in the field of space, it is closer to a diplomatic alignment than full scientific and technical integration. + +There is an increasing imbalance between China and Russia that gives Beijing an advantage over Moscow. This feeling of superiority — and sometimes disdain — shows through Chinese experts’ analysis. He and Ye, for instance, underline that “the lack of funding for the development of Russia’s space industry, and the aging and loss of scientific and technical personnel, including in the space field, have further led to the slow development of Russia’s space technology and industry, and even to difficulties in maintaining satellite ground facilities. The progress of space projects, especially large-scale ones, is lagging behind expectations, or even seriously behind.” + +_There is an increasing imbalance between China and Russia that gives Beijing an advantage over Moscow. This feeling of superiority — and sometimes disdain — shows through Chinese experts’ analysis._ + +Consequently, He and Ye note, the number of Russian satellites in orbit has not increased by much in the past few years (about 8 more satellites a year), while the number of U.S. and Chinese satellites has risen drastically (about 266 and 47 more satellites a year, respectively). Li Ziguo and Li Yan, both researchers at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), also note that “according to the Global Innovation Index reports released by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in recent years, China’s world ranking has continued to rise, from 29th in 2015 to 14th in 2020,” while Russia had been hovering at the 45th place between 2015 and 2019 before downgrading to 47th out of 131 countries in 2020. However, they lucidly recognize Russian excellence in basic science (six Fields Medals and five Nobel Prizes in Physics since 1991), and consider that, with limited access to Western technologies, “deepening the scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries is an inevitable choice.” + +In addition to this feeling of superiority, China also has doubts about its Russian partner. One major doubt is about Moscow’s will and means to fulfill its commitments with China. Chinese experts note that since Russia is unable to implement its own national space program, cooperative projects with China are all the more uncertain. Beijing is also aware that its space partnership with Russia depends on the state of the cooperation between Moscow and Washington; any improvement in Russia’s cooperation with Washington would mean a distancing from Beijing. Finally, Russia also cooperates with India in space. Indeed, as an emerging space power, India is very interested in Russia’s know-how, and it is an attractive partner for Russia in turn. As illustrated by the December 2021 joint statement by Putin and Narendra Modi, the two sides have committed to cooperate in human spaceflight and satellite navigation, which may represent a source of concern for China. + +THE IMPACT OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE + +As the 2014 Crimea crisis accelerated overall cooperation between China and Russia — including in space — one may wonder about the potential consequences of the war in Ukraine for the future of the bilateral partnership. Will it open a new phase of deepening cooperation, or will it slow it down? + +Either way, Russia will become even more dependent on China if it wants to stay in the space race, and China will have another useful lever to impose on the orientations and the scope of the partnership. Despite the Chinese narrative of “win-win cooperation” in space, and despite the fact that Chinese experts present bilateral cooperation as “highly complementary,” one should expect that Russian cooperation with China will mostly fuel the latter’s space program and ambitions, rather than the other way around. + +On the other hand, the war in Ukraine may also put a stop to China-Russia cooperation in space, and to the ILRS project more specifically. Russia’s space industry was already in a dire situation before the war, and now it is in a critical position after new waves of sanctions and being cut off from cooperation with Western space powers. + +THE NEED FOR MULTILATERALISM AND STRONGER WESTERN ALTERNATIVES IN SPACE + +The Sino-Russian rapprochement in space geopolitics has taken advantage of the vacuum left by the United States and other space powers in international forums. While the joint PPWT proposal is far from acceptable due to its many loopholes (e.g., the lack of definition of a weapon in outer space, the exclusion of ground-based anti-space weapons, and the absence of a control mechanism), no alternative was offered by Western countries to develop an international legislative framework to address the weaponization of space. The sole exception is the European Union International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, which was submitted in 2010 but remains in limbo today. The lack of counterproposal to the PPWT fuels Moscow and Beijing’s narrative of the United States’ unilateral weaponization of outer space — a view that is widely supported at the UNGA. + +In fact, the United States is indeed taking a unilateral path — by adopting federal laws on celestial bodies. This approach undermines international law and multilateralism. Denying space as a global commons, in a time when the importance of protecting the environment — including in outer space — is matter of survival, is a dangerously anachronistic approach. This perspective encourages the perception of outer space as a “new frontier” to conquer and colonize, which legitimizes the unregulated space race. It harms multilateralism and threatens the preservation of peace and stability in outer space and on Earth. To meet the challenges brought by the Sino-Russian rapprochement in space affairs, an approach that emphasizes more transatlantic coordination and multilateralism is far more likely to succeed than the current unilateral framework embraced by the United States. + + +### The Global Hybrid War and the Role of China in Russian Strategic Thinking + +> #### Katri Pynnöniemi + +The concept of “global hybrid war” is a vision of future global war led by the United States and its allies primarily against Russia, but in a later phase also targeting China. As defined by Alexandr Bartosh, a corresponding member of the Academy of Military Science and the most visible advocate of the hybrid war concept in Russia, the global hybrid war is a protracted, multilevel military conflict between civilizations. The term “hybrid” refers to the simultaneous and coordinated use of military and non-military (e.g., economic, financial, technological, or informational) means of warfare. In general, this type of war is about control of natural resources, spheres of political influence, and competition over technological leadership in the greater Eurasian region, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. In a narrower sense, argues Bartosh, the global hybrid war aims to achieve the “liquidation of the Russian statehood, its disintegration and external control of the country.” In his view, the next targets after Russia will be China and India, the two geopolitical contenders that would remain on the sidelines of the conflict between Russia and the West. Bartosh argues that “Russia and its allies should carefully study global hybrid warfare and develop corresponding offensive and defensive strategies in the interests of ensuring national and international security.” But what does this suggestion for closer cooperation in the hybrid sphere mean in practical terms? + +The set of questions explored in this article considers China’s role in this arrangement. For example, if the global hybrid war is ultimately a conflict between civilizations, as Bartosh suggests, does this imply a potential conflict between Russia and China as well? Or is this difficult question omitted, and cooperation is legitimized on the basis of traditional great power interests? Recently, Russian scholars have put an emphasis on “mental war” fought against “real” sovereign states, but what role do alliances play in counteracting this type of aggression? Is Russia alone in this struggle, or could China play a role in helping Russia to defend its culture, values, and traditions? An analysis of the material reveals that cooperation with China is framed positively, yet vaguely, leaving many questions still open. Before turning to a more detailed analysis of Sino-Russian cooperation in this area, it is necessary to explore the concept of global hybrid warfare and its place in Russia’s strategic thinking. + +#### The Hybrid War as a Code Word for the Kremlin’s Worldview + +With the ongoing transformation of Russia’s political environment toward a more authoritarian — even totalitarian — system, it is possible to argue that the concept of global hybrid war has evolved into a “floating signifier” similar to the concept of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet period. In his work on the history of Soviet cybernetics, Slava Gerovitch shows how Soviet science was flooded with these code words — a kind of newspeak that “blended description with evaluation,” where the meaning of each code word could “shift and change according to context and usage.” However, code words did not acquire their meaning at random; Soviet ideological language had a specific structure whereby certain phenomena or actions were assigned a strong positive or negative value. Cultural theorist Mikhail Epstein conceptualized such words as ideologemes (i.e., a fundamental unit of ideology) that “were not simply words, but concealed judgements that take the form of words.” The Soviet ideological language consisted of three different types of ideologemes (contrastive, conversive, and correlative pairs of words) that, taken together, formed a model of “Soviet Marxist ideolanguage.” The essence of the ideological language, as Epstein shows, was not to exchange information, but to control thinking and action in the Soviet politics. The Soviet regime not only defined the correct use of ideolanguage but also played it against all opponents, and thus acquired full control of the political space. + +The hypothesis developed here is that the concept of hybrid war — and other code words related to it — is used like Soviet-era ideologemes to shape perceptions about external and internal threats toward Russia. In this context, it is possible to identify pairs of words that carry positive meaning (denoting what Russia does) and negative meaning (actions by the West). + +| Negative | Positive | +| :-- | :-- | +| Hybrid war | Active defense | +| Unipolar | Multipolar | +| Western cosmopolitanism | Russian (Chinese) civilization | +| Colony (formal sovereignty8) | Sovereign power (real sovereignty) | + +In contrast to the Soviet ideological language, the meaning of these contemporary word pairs is based not on a specific school of thought but on a combination of political realism (great powers have a right to rule over others), strategic culture (Russia’s imperial legacy and self-perception of exceptionalism), and what one influential analyst deemed the “Barbarossa mentality” (Russia’s traditional fear of encirclement and expectation of decisive surprise attack). + +Against this background, the debate on hybrid warfare offers a context whereby Russian scholars and authorities can elaborate ideas and shape expectations on their country’s future as a “real” sovereign power. It considers Russia’s internal political and economic weaknesses and the assumption that foreign powers are building their capabilities to further weaken Russia. This seems counterintuitive, taking into account Russia’s attempted and successful jailing, repressions, and assassinations of dissenters and its hostile operations against foreign countries. However, in the Russian view, these operations (if they are acknowledged at all) are part of the country’s “active defense” against attempts by foreign powers to subjugate Russia. + +_Against this background, the debate on hybrid warfare offers a context whereby Russian scholars and authorities can elaborate ideas and shape expectations on their country’s future as a “real” sovereign power._ + +#### What Is the Role of China in Global Hybrid Warfare? + +As already indicated, the Russian debate on hybrid war operationalizes the sovereignty-versus-subordination dichotomy and places it in the context of global competition between the United States, China, and Russia. In an article published in 2017, Bartosh underlines how the scale of hybrid warfare encompasses not just particular countries but the entire system of international security: + +> The growing scale of hybrid warfare waged against Russia makes this type of interstate geopolitical confrontation one of the most acute threats to national and international security. Moreover, the use of a complex of hybrid threats as an instrument of external pressure to create instability within the state is no longer just a threat to national security but a powerful destabilizing factor for the entire system of international security. + +In articles written after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Bartosh argues that “hybrid war is evolving into a ‘multi-dimensional inter-civilizational military conflict,’” which he calls the “global hybrid war.” Here, Bartosh draws from Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” argumentation when he asserts that + +> modern conflicts are moving from the classical linear paradigm to a new type of non-linear wars. The highest form of modern war is “the war of civilizations, that is, the war of the meanings of their existence.” The winner in the war of meanings does not win space or even the right to dispose of the resources of the defeated state, but wins the right to determine its future. + +Here Bartosh echoes Russian official parlance that distinguishes between states with “real” sovereignty and states that are only “formally” sovereign — meaning that, in reality, they are proxies of a hegemonic power. Currently, the Kremlin uses this dichotomy primarily to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty (representing the country as a U.S. proxy). However, it also reveals an important aspect of the Kremlin worldview, according to which only the strong (“real”) states survive. Given Russia’s inherent political instability (e.g., the problem of succession), the Kremlin cannot attain the level of security it expects from “real sovereign” countries. This feeling of weakness might explain its interest in “mental warfare” and “mental security” as a new trend in contemporary warfare. + +According to Bartosh, the two main instruments of the global hybrid war are proxy wars and color revolutions. The term proxy war is mainly used to frame Russia’s war in Ukraine (like any local conflict in Russia’s vicinity) as a conflict between the United States and Russia. Meanwhile, color revolution refers to political instability (e.g., in Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Venezuela) created by external actors that ultimately aims to weaken Russia’s position within its sphere of influence. With this framing, Russia is represented as the victim of hostilities, and the countermeasures it deploys are justified. + +According to Russian thinkers, China appears in this arrangement as the next potential “target” of the West due to its rising status as a major power. It is also seen as Russia’s strategic partner. Russia’s relations with China are explained with reference to similarities in their “strategic culture,” such as “the general interest of the two powers in defense projects and the prevention of a major military conflict.” This idea is far from claiming any civilizational affinity between the two countries. Instead, Sino-Russian cooperation is framed in terms of national interest and great power competition. Bartosh defines relations between the United States, Russia, and China as an increasingly unstable triangle, formed by three pairs of relations: the U.S.-China and subsequent U.S.-Russia rivalries and the Sino-Russian cooperation framework. Although the West is identified as the main source of instability and chaos due to the United States’ desire to maintain its hegemonic position, Bartosh does not consider Sino-Russian cooperation inevitable. In October 2019, he writes that + +> it is unlikely that, in today’s uncertain and chaotic international environment and in the face of its deteriorating relations with the United States, China would be interested in weakening Russia. Rather, on the contrary, an important factor in ensuring the national security of both states should be their mutual interest in each state’s stable and sustainable development. The stakes in the geopolitical confrontation between the three powers are extremely high, and we should not rule out the possibility that the United States may initiate sophisticated maneuvers to split the partnership between Moscow and Beijing. The objective of Russian politicians, diplomats, and the military should be to find a worthy response. + +As noted above, Russia’s cooperation with China is framed as part of “a long-term strategy for a joint struggle” against the West. The affirmation of Sino-Russian partnership by presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping in February 2022 echoes this sentiment and makes the case for increased cooperation in countering interference by outside forces. In 2019 — preceding the joint statement — Bartosh identified counteraction against hybrid aggression “as one of the steps to deepen the relations between China and Russia.” Another Russian scholar, Alexander Isaev, went further in 2018, when he argued that “there has been a serious breakthrough in Russian–Chinese relations.” According to Isaev, this applies especially to thematic dialogues between different government agencies that ultimately “may contribute to the creation in the future of a special platform that would prevent any threat of risks in cyberspace.” The February 2022 joint statement includes many references to increased cooperation within the United Nations and bilaterally in the cyber sphere, which could be interpreted as confirmation of Isaev’s earlier argument. + +Interestingly, in 2017, Bartosh advocated for coordinated counteraction against hybrid threats in the context of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The broad scope of collaboration could include “strengthened cooperation, and coordination in terms of situational awareness, strategic communications, cybersecurity, crisis prevention, and response to counter hybrid threats,” he writes. Bartosh underlines the importance of the cooperation by arguing: “We should submit this as a priority project on adapting the defense capabilities of Russia, the CSTO, the CIS, and the SCO and ensuring response to any hybrid threats against any of the countries or coalitions.” However, he does not develop these ideas further; instead, he calls for the more efficient use of Russia’s internal administrative and intellectual resources. His main concerns seem to be linked to insufficient doctrinal development (e.g., creating a model of hybrid warfare) and problems with inter-agency cooperation. + +#### The Limits of Sino-Russian Cooperation + +“Global hybrid war” can be thought of as a code word that has multiple meanings depending on the context. Although it does not carry the weight that “Marxism-Leninism” did in Soviet ideology, certain resemblances to Soviet ideological language help explain how this concept is being used in the current context. The notion of global hybrid war reveals core assumptions regarding global politics and the perception of threats toward Russia’s national interests and security. In other words, it offers a general explanation for recurring tensions and conflicts between Russia and the West, along with the perception of enmity — or even hostility — of Western actors toward Russia. + +The role of China in this arrangement is clear, although few details on possible Sino-Russian cooperation were outlined by the authors of the materials reviewed for this chapter. China is represented as Russia’s strategic partner and the West’s potential “next target.” An interpretation of China as a potential next target places Russia at the center of the ongoing power struggle, thereby upgrading the country’s importance on the global stage. Although Russian authors frame the “global hybrid war” as a conflict between civilizations, they do not elaborate on cultural-strategic similarities between Russia and China, but rather frame the conflict in traditional security and political terms. For example, the concept of strategic culture is defined very broadly, as an attribute of Russia’s (and China’s) alleged defensive posture and the subsequent prioritization of preventing military conflicts (so-called active defense). Counteraction against hybrid threats is listed as one of the potential areas of cooperation between China and Russia. In the material studied for this chapter, the authors identify specific agencies (Ministries of Defense and Military Academies of both countries) and areas (e.g., cyber security or strategic communications) where that cooperation could take place, but they do not elaborate on possible obstacles. The recurring emphasis on improving Russia’s own capabilities in the hybrid sphere can be interpreted as a sign that Russian thinkers have low expectations for what Sino-Russian cooperation can achieve. + +An interesting detail that might also outline the limits of Sino-Russian cooperation is the emphasis among Russian military scholars on “mental warfare.” The concept of mental warfare carries with it an idea of total war aimed at the complete paralysis of the target country and the destruction of its political and moral will to resist conquest by a foreign power. Consequently, with the subjugation of national culture, values, and traditions, a country’s sovereignty is liquidated, and it becomes a colony or otherwise ceases to exist. In the Russian literature on mental warfare analyzed for this article, it is assumed that each country has its own “core idea”: a set of moral-ethical values and traditions, the destruction of which would lead to the loss of real sovereignty. Advocates of the mental warfare concept call for both preventative actions against presumed Western hostilities (“active defense”) and the securitization of Russia’s domestic sphere — its development in terms of Russian cultural-political traditions. Although this type of development does not exclude cooperation with foreign partners in the technological sphere (e.g., the adaptation of Chinese cyber security models into the Russian context), the center of gravity in mental warfare is Russia’s cultural-political cohesion and its ability to secure its own “real” sovereignty. Thus, it is plausible to suggest that the traditional realist view of state sovereignty also limits Russia’s potential for alliance formation in the future. + + +### How Does the Chinese Strategic Community Envision Cooperation with Russia on Hybrid and Gray Zone Tactics? + +> #### Alessio Patalano + +#### Introduction + +The publication of the joint Sino-Russian statement on February 4, 2022, raised the level of the two countries’ commitment to developing bilateral ties. The statement built upon an existing trend of increased cooperation in recent years, which had been further formalized in 2019 during the meeting between Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. The joint statement specifically indicated that Sino-Russian cooperation had now no forbidden areas. Its wording suggested nonetheless that Xi was setting a framework that would first and foremost serve his long-term ambitions for China’s process of rejuvenation. This implies that the scope of cooperation going forward — including in areas such as hybrid and gray zone tactics — is likely to be informed by Chinese ambitions and objectives over Russian ones. + +As such, cooperation between China and Russia is likely to remain strategic and focused on advancing the two countries’ quest for international relevance, if not primacy as great powers. In particular, while assessments about the underlying strength of the relationship vary, developments in bilateral exercises conducted in 2021 — demonstrating greater Sino-Russian command integration — and the conduct of joint patrol activities, especially in East Asia, confirm that the military relationship is growing closer. In particular, in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing is the senior partner in this evolving relationship. Indeed, very recently China and Russia held their annual joint exercise in the region, and this despite resource-based pressure on Russia deriving from the ongoing invasion of Ukraine. These developments pose two important questions: What do recent changes in Sino-Russian military ties mean for cooperation regarding the use of hybrid and gray zone tactics, and conversely, how will hybrid and gray zone tactics help create opportunities to further advance cooperation? + +From a Chinese perspective, the answer to this line of questioning is significant, and the outcome of the war in Ukraine will inevitably affect it. Much to Chinese surprise, Russian performance in the early stages of the invasion has failed to meet Beijing’s initial expectations. As well-informed foreign observers have noted, for Beijing, Russian military operations in the opening stages of the war were inconsistent with the country’s military doctrine. In particular, the Chinese leadership has likely taken note of Russia’s failure to accurately assess potential Ukrainian opposition, not to mention the lack of adequate preparation in terms of information operations and the wider cognitive dimensions of the war. This, in turn, might lead the Chinese leadership to reconsider whether and to what extent “some limits” to cooperation on hybrid tactics are desirable, if not necessary. + +While the degree of cooperation between Russia and China will be affected by the outcome of the unfolding war, it is nonetheless possible to assess two relevant aspects of this question in the interim. First, it is possible to review how Chinese writers on strategy conceptualize hybrid tactics, and to what extent — if at all — they draw a distinction between hybrid and gray zone operations. Second, it is also possible to assess the extent to which such an understanding creates clear areas of opportunity in terms of cooperation with Russia. + +#### Hybrid Warfare and Gray Zones as Geopolitical Competition + +The sample of Chinese writers surveyed in this project presents “hybrid warfare” and “gray zone” competition as two different, albeit complementary, tools of geopolitical competition among states. In particular, Han Aiyong, an associate professor at the Institute of International Strategic Studies of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Party School, pointed out that “hybrid warfare is essentially closer to a competitive means by which great powers use indirect, low-intensity conflict to seek geopolitical advantage.” By contrast, the same author suggested that competition in the gray zone focuses more on cognitive forms of conflict, with “psychological warfare, media warfare, legal warfare, economic coercion, and even diplomatic warfare . . . intended to create psychological and physical imbalances by exploiting the internal ills of competitors’ economic and social development, and to create ideological confusion and even social unrest in their favor.” + +Within this conceptual framework, hybrid and gray zone tactics represent two sides of the same coin. The key difference is that hybrid tactics are designed to address the conduct of limited proxy wars, whereas gray zone tactics oversee the conduct of non-kinetic operations directly against an enemy or competitor. Such preliminary observations come with two caveats, however. First, the notions of “hybrid warfare” and “gray zone” competition are foreign ideas imported into Russian and Chinese strategic thinking, making clear reference to their original development in the United States. Second, both concepts are presented as methods through which great powers engage in competition with each other — and specifically, how the United States engages with competitors such as Russia and China. + +In the main body of English-language literature, however, the notions of “hybrid” and “gray zone” forms of competition are used to capture a distinctive set of Russian and Chinese behaviors. For instance, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) vocabulary, the former term refers to forms of Russian sub-threshold coercive actions drawing upon the integration of different tools of statecraft (e.g., military, diplomatic, economic, as well as information and legal). Insofar as gray zone activities are concerned, English-language literature tends to emphasize how this concept is helpful in specifically identifying Chinese actions that are seemingly designed to remain beneath the threshold of open war. Except for very limited attempts at reconciling this intellectual separation, in the English-language literature, hybrid tactics are the prerogative of the Russian state, while the gray zone is that of China. However, this distinction finds no correlation in the Chinese presentation of these concepts. + +By contrast, the Chinese approach to the understanding of “hybrid” and “gray zone” forms of conflict is based on the assumption that international relations are a persistent struggle — in other words, that they are a zero-sum interaction. As a result, Chinese authors regard these methods of competition as desirable — or even necessary — ways to enable the shaping of the international order in a fashion that is favorable to authoritarian regimes like China and Russia. This idea can be clearly inferred by the Chinese claim that the United States and its allies have developed these concepts to undermine strategic competitors in the first place, with specific attention to China and Russia. Thus, China should be able to master and respond to these forms of behavior. In one sense, however, such an intellectual approach, gauging a strong Leninist thinking, implies that China is already “at war” and that hybrid and gray area conflicts are inherent to this state of affairs. + +According to the Chinese scholarship reviewed in this project, hybrid forms of conflict are designed to avoid direct confrontation among major powers. They target strategically important state actors that can either expand or maintain the reach and influence of any major power. In this respect, however, the authors draw a clear distinction about the intent behind the use of hybrid tactics. The intent behind U.S. “hybrid wars” is “offensive” and “globalist,” as the application of these tactics is designed to support and expand the country’s influence at the expense of strategic competitors like China or Russia. Russian hybrid tactics are instead defensive in nature, informed by a more limited aim of preserving Russia’s influence. Relatedly, hybrid wars, because they take actions at the periphery of major power competition, would seem to make low-intensity conflict a reality in the contemporary world. Chinese writers seem to expect low-intensity conflicts to be a component of major power competition. + +Indeed, from this perspective, a Chinese writer observes that + +> the competitive logic of hybrid warfare is to create a “controllable” chaos or crisis and then to shape a favorable strategic posture by rebuilding peace and restoring order. This suggests that the ability to respond to major international crises and national governance has become a key element of great power competition. + +According to this conceptualization, the Chinese government’s tolerance for conflict is high because it is assumed that it can be kept at acceptable levels. In part, this is acceptable because the core actions are taking place away from a major power’s territory. The same author also added that in a hybrid context, new technologies and “non-contact” forms of competition — notably conflict in digital information spaces, which includes both conflict to disrupt or manipulate network systems and conflict conducted through social media — add to the possibilities and potential of the “controlled chaos” created by hybrid tactics. In other words, these new tools allow for a more integrated and wider-ranging capacity for the conduct of hybrid wars. By the same token, new technologies also increase the likelihood of hybrid tactics being employed. + +Gray zone competition shares with hybrid tactics a heightened importance of integrating and synergizing different levers of national power. Similarly, both put considerable emphasis on the advantages of non-kinetic tools for the pursuit of competition. On the other hand, gray zone competition also has two features that make it very distinct from hybrid tactics. First, its core focus rests on the creation and management — both in defensive and offensive ways — of plausible legal and political narratives to enable the pursuit of specific courses of action. Indeed, legal narratives are a significant aspect of gray zone competition in that they relate to the advantageous use of established rules and norms to constrain, shape, and sanction behavior in the pursuit of national objectives. Within this context, competition in gray areas is about manipulating and exploiting ambiguities in international frameworks to craft a favorable narrative, while discrediting or undermining those set forth by competitors. From a Chinese perspective, therefore, gray zone conflict would seemingly fall first and foremost within the realm of psychological, political, and legal warfare — a key feature of Chinese strategic thinking about war and conflict. + +The second distinctive aspect of gray area competition concerns the development of political narratives that specifically reinforce — or at least do not undermine — Beijing’s moral standing. In gray zone conflict, the core aim is to gain an advantage by justifying one’s actions. This is not meant solely to paralyze or limit responses to these actions; it is also meant to erode wider support that might be given to one’s competitors. This sheds new light on how Chinese writers view the utility of Beijing’s participation in multilateral institutions: they consider Chinese efforts to increase influence in these organizations as a way to guide the development of the organizations’ internal mechanisms and approaches in ways that favor Beijing’s preferences. This creates another clear distinction between gray zone activities and the objectives behind the mobilization of legal narratives in a “hybrid” conflict. As the same Chinese author remarks: + +> The pursuit of ambiguity in the gray zone is the use of the ambiguous space of rules and the international law system to justify one’s own behavior. Hybrid warfare, on the other hand, is to find a soft restraint on violence by established rules between the regulations of traditional and non-traditional warfare. + +Chinese authors seem to understand the concept of hybrid tactics as involving competition for influence in states of strategic relevance in a competitive global environment, whereas gray zone competition may focus more directly on the competing powers themselves. Within this context, competition in the gray zone is intended to create psychological and physical imbalances by exploiting the domestic and internal challenges of a major power. The idea is to weaken the competitor from within through political confusion and social unrest. The significance of such a conceptualization of gray zone competition rests also in the inference that, for Chinese authors, this type of competition is actively conducted against China, thus reinforcing their zero-sum understanding of international relations. + +#### Resilience against Destabilization as Cooperation + +This intellectual framework suggests that Sino-Russia cooperation in hybrid and gray zone tactics is likely to focus on the double objectives of creating greater resilience at home and maintaining, if not increasing, influence in states of key strategic value overseas. The methods for such cooperation are likely to include a degree of coordination on military activities; yet, new technologies — such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence — and their potential application in shaping public audiences’ perceptions are also likely to become a primary area of Sino-Russian cooperation. Chinese authors, at least, view this type of cooperation as particularly desirable. + +_This intellectual framework suggests that Sino-Russia cooperation in hybrid and gray zone tactics is likely to focus on the double objectives of creating greater resilience at home and maintaining, if not increasing, influence in states of key strategic value overseas._ + +Indeed, Chinese authors view the use of social media and information networks as essential to enhance the effect of information dissemination to create favorable international public opinion and to affect the psychological conditions of public audiences in competing countries. These tools can also be very helpful in support of other political, economic, and military means of conflict in the conduct of hybrid wars. Within this context, technology is considered an invaluable tool to reduce gaps between developing and advanced powers — and, crucially, a way to afford precision in the targeting of audiences. + +Chinese experts seem keen to prioritize Sino-Russian cooperation to address the risks of political destabilization abroad and at home. In particular, one author focused on the challenge of “color revolutions,” defined as Western-sponsored attempts at destabilizing countries with the ambition to promote regime change. The same author identified states along the periphery of Russia and China as the first targets of a wider attempt at directly undermining Moscow and Beijing. In the Chinese view, purported attempts at regime change in North Africa and Central Asia, as well as presumed Western support for “separatist activities” in places like Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong, reinforce the need for Russia and China to cooperate closely. A perceived increase in the “violence” of these movements — as the case of the 2019 protests in Hong Kong highlights — also adds to such a need. + +Geographically, Sino-Russian cooperation on hybrid and gray zone tactics should focus on enhancing public perceptions of Moscow and Beijing among other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Cooperation should cover political, economic, and cultural aspects, with the aim of strengthening political trust and a perceived sense of friendship. Chinese authors are convinced that dedicated cultural exchange activities that reward cultural differences but reinforce an emotional link to China and Russia should be coordinated with political and economic initiatives. For these Chinese authors, improving public perceptions of Russia and China also includes cultivating ties with elites in CIS and SCO countries. However, they note that strategic competitors like the United States might try to cultivate ties with Russian and Chinese elites in turn, with the aim of undermining the two countries’ governments. As a result, Chinese authors emphasize the need for bilateral cooperation to minimize the risk of domestic corruption. Their solution is to promote cooperation to achieve greater monitoring of domestic elites and senior officials, while also seeking to promote positive incentives to ensure loyalty — or at the very least obedience — to the system. + +In the realm of military affairs, Chinese scholars view joint exercises as a potential hybrid tool to counter the risk of “color revolutions.” Exercises are not hybrid tactics per se; yet, Chinese authors stress the political value of them as a hybrid tactic. One major example in this context is the joint exercise Unbreakable Brotherhood 2020, conducted at a time of acute instability in Belarus. The exercise was a response to perceived NATO provocations in the country and was intended to both strengthen ties with the regime in Belarus and enhance the cohesiveness within domestic audiences around the importance of supporting the Belarus authorities. Chinese specialists, therefore, regard exercises as potential hybrid tactics insofar as their desired effects are designed to shape, manipulate, and counter Western actions in the Russian and Chinese peripheries. Especially in the context of the SCO, the Chinese aim is to strengthen the combined Sino-Russian capacity for conducting exercises so that they can be used on short notice if needed. + +Within the literature surveyed for this project, governance in cyberspace is another area of prime relevance in Sino-Russian cooperation. In this domain too, Chinese authors perceive a clear sense of challenge mounted by Western power — notably the United States. The Western approach to cyber governance fundamentally undermines the Russian and Chinese approaches to sovereignty in this domain. From their perspective, cooperation should aim at promoting the Sino-Russian view that respect for sovereignty should guide developments in governance. In this context, Sino-Russian cooperation is important for shaping support within multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, and regional organizations such as the SCO, for a specific understanding of governance in cyberspace. Through these organizations, China and Russia can promote mechanisms to safeguard national laws and combat cybercrime as they see fit, while developing shared technical solutions and wider collaboration with other emerging powers to widen their influence. Unsurprisingly, cooperation assumes that in Russia and China private companies and the state work with each other, with business accepting subordination to national authorities in a fashion consistent with the ambitions of the Chinese civil-military fusion doctrine. + +#### Conclusion: Hybrid and Gray Zone Tactics as War by Other Means? + +Chinese scholars envision cooperation with Russia as an inherent part of Beijing’s ascent on the international stage. In a world that is understood to be antagonistic toward China, with the United States perceived as engaging in the use of hybrid and gray zone tactics to destabilize and weaken Russia and China, these tactics are seen as necessary for China to survive and grow as a major power. The Chinese approach to international affairs as a struggle for survival invites three broad conclusions. + +First, notwithstanding conceptual differences, among Chinese scholars both hybrid and gray zone tactics are about asymmetric forms of competition. The intellectual distinction in English-language literature — between hybridity as a form of conduct that pertains to Russia and gray zone as a form of competition relevant to understanding Chinese behavior — is not reflected in the Chinese literature. For them, the key distinction would seem to be that hybrid tactics involve higher levels of tolerance in terms of military engagement and destruction, while gray zone tactics put more stress on non-kinetic means. Further, gray zone tactics are directly applied against an opposing major power, whereas hybrid tactics apply to countries of strategic value in which low-intensity wars are acceptable. For Chinese scholars, gray zone tactics are clearly a priority area of cooperation. They view hybrid tactics, on the other hand, as a space of cooperation specially meant to prevent the loss of influence in areas of strategic significance in the CIS and SCO contexts. + +Second, new technologies and their impact on the structures, perceptions, and political stability of societies are an invaluable addition to the pursuit of asymmetry in hybrid and gray zone tactics. Cyberspace, internet networks, and social media are crucial means to manipulate, destabilize, and weaken other major powers, directly or by seeking to undermine their influence. In this respect, Chinese authors consider the improvement of China’s international image as a key area of gray zone cooperation, together with aggressive actions to politically destabilize competing major powers. Cooperation in developing the means to degrade — and, if necessary, destroy — the physical infrastructure enabling a competing major power’s cyber activities seemingly falls within the category of hybrid tactics. Against this background, the establishment of plausible legal and political narratives as a way to maintain or develop positive perceptions of China and Russia are also more “active” ways to take advantage of these means. + +Third, Chinese thinking about hybrid and gray zone tactics creates a predisposition for pursuing greater resilience against tactics of a similar nature from being deployed against Beijing and Moscow. For Chinese observers, destabilization and regime change are fundamental risks against which both Russia and China need to shield themselves. + +Taken altogether, these conclusions suggest that, while doubts remain over the extent of Chinese cooperation with Russia after the latter’s invasion of Ukraine, the content and perceived needs of this relationship are understood in similar terms by Moscow and Beijing. In fact, Chinese scholars view the political world as one of struggle — one in which hybrid and gray zone tactics may very well provide an asymmetric edge to tilt the scales of the international order in China’s favor toward a more authoritarian balance. + + +### Appendix + +_The following documents made up the core source base of this project. The original Chinese and Russian texts have been translated into English, edited, and excerpted below. Citations for the full-length original documents are provided._ + +#### Russian Documents on Sino-Russian Arms Sales and Technology Transfers + +Alexander Gabuev and Vasily Kashin, Вооруженная дружба: как Россия и Китай торгуют оружием [[Armed Friendship: How Russia and China Trade Arms, Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, November 2, 2017](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_Gabuev_Kashin_web.pdf)]. + +Editor’s note: The now-closed Carnegie Moscow Center is an affiliate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. + +- Main Conclusions: In the 1990s, Chinese orders ensured the survival of the Russian defense industry (which had suffered from the collapse of the USSR) and preserved its global competitiveness. In turn, after Western sanctions were imposed in 1989, Russia became the main source of advanced weapons for China. Thanks to Russian-Chinese military-technical cooperation, China was able to radically transform its armed forces into a modern military machine. The leaders of the Russian military-industrial complex (MIC) understood that the weapons sold to China would eventually be copied. Nevertheless, Moscow exported weapons to China in an effort to preserve the defense industry and earn money to build new-generation weapons systems. The country’s military and political leadership blocked deliveries of the most sensitive systems, which could ensure a rapid breakthrough of the Chinese military-industrial complex and undermine the competitiveness of Russian arms manufacturers. On the whole, this approach turned out to be justified. In the mid-2000s, the supply of weapons from Russia to China noticeably decreased. The reasons were the saturation of the Chinese market, the progress of the military-industrial complex in the PRC itself, and the increased concerns of the Russian leadership about Chinese copying and potential competition in the markets of third countries. Some Russian leaders have expressed fears about the growth of Chinese military capabilities near Russia’s Siberian and far eastern borders. Military-technical cooperation between Russia and China resumed growth in the 2010s, but a major breakthrough occurred in 2014. After the sharp deterioration in relations with the West, the Russian leadership conducted a systematic assessment of the risks of partnership with the PRC, including in the field of military-technical cooperation. Moscow concluded that the risks of cooperation with China were much lower than was commonly believed. The Chinese military industrial complex is less and less dependent on the unlicensed copying of Russian equipment and more and more reliant on its own developments. Fears of “Chinese invasion east of the Urals” have also turned out to be exaggerated. In these circumstances, Moscow has decided to sell such advanced systems as S-400 air defense systems and Su-35 fighter jets. Military-technical cooperation does not play a significant role in the trade between the two countries, accounting for no more than 5 percent of trade turnover. For the Russian military-industrial complex, arms sales to China are no longer a vital necessity, although China remains one of its most important export markets. However, the military-industrial complex plays an important political role, ensuring the strategic depth of the Russian-Chinese partnership. Russia still maintains serious advantages over China in a number of military production sectors. These are the creation of air defense equipment and some types of radar equipment, aircraft engine construction, underwater shipbuilding, and so on. However, in other areas China is now ahead of Russia, especially in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles. Overall, for the Chinese armed forces, buying weapons from Russia is a reliable way to quickly increase their military power (particularly given the possible escalation of conflicts in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait). The Ukrainian crisis, the cessation of Russia’s military cooperation with the West, and Western sanctions against Russian arms manufacturers have increased Moscow’s interest in importing Chinese military technology and equipment. There are isolated examples of the purchase of Chinese military technology for the needs of the Russian Armed Forces, but this phenomenon has not yet become large-scale. + +- The crisis around Ukraine, which broke out in early 2014, marked the beginning of a new stage in Russia’s relations with the outside world. In the face of U.S. and EU sanctions, Moscow began to deepen its partnership with China, the largest country that did not publicly condemn Russia for its actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine and did not join the sanctions regime. By that time, the political relations between Moscow and Beijing already had the official status of a strategic partnership, and since 2010, China had become Russia’s largest trading partner after the European Union. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian crisis has raised cooperation between the two largest powers in Eurasia to a new level. One of the most important elements of this partnership was the development and deepening of military-technical cooperation (MTC). + +- For the first time, Moscow conducted a comprehensive study of the potential risks that a deeper partnership with China could entail, including in the field of military-technical cooperation. The results of the analysis convinced the Kremlin that the risks of such cooperation had previously been exaggerated. + +- Despite the relatively small volume of transactions in monetary terms (about US$3 billion per year), the Russian-Chinese military-technical cooperation is of great importance for both sides. Although today Russia’s defense industry is not as dependent on Chinese purchases as it used to be, China remains a major export market for the Russian defense industry, and demand from the PLA has spurred the interest of other buyers. For Beijing, the Russian defense industry is the quickest way to obtain systems that can strengthen the PLA’s advantage at strategic points where military tensions between China and U.S. allies are possible. Finally, cooperation in such a sensitive area as arms serves as an important factor in strengthening the Moscow-Beijing political axis at a time when the parties are not seeking a formal military alliance. + +- The importance for the Soviet Union of resuming military-technical cooperation with China is demonstrated by the following fact: China, which used to be one of Moscow’s main rivals, was the first foreign buyer of the most advanced Soviet aircraft, while its traditional allies settled for the less advanced MiG-29. The memoirs of Chinese military leaders published in recent years indicate that the Chinese were given fairly broad access to see Soviet military innovations. Moscow even had preliminary talks with Beijing about the possibility of supplying an aircraft carrier and carrier-based aircraft. Apparently, the Soviets assumed that close ties with China would be necessary for successful development after the end of the Cold War, and they were willing to use military technology exports to strengthen relations with Beijing. The Russian Federation thus became only a natural extension of this line. + +- Increased military contacts and reduced tensions in border areas contributed to the gradual removal of obstacles to the export of increasingly sophisticated military equipment to China and the transfer of Russian technology there. Opposition to such cooperation on the part of the Russian military gradually weakened in the 1990s. China’s interest in military cooperation with Russia increased sharply in the late 1980s due to China’s restricted access to Western sources of military and dual-use technologies. + +- The combination of these factors led to the fact that after the collapse of the USSR, the Russian leadership immediately began to create the legal basis and organizational infrastructure for military-technical cooperation with China. + +- An important feature of the military-technical cooperation of Russia and China was the rather strict formal requirements of the Chinese side to the secrecy of transactions, even in cases where the secrecy was clearly meaningless and even absurd. As a result, Russian and Chinese officials often refuse to discuss projects in the field of military-technical cooperation, even when the whole world knows about them. + +- China’s attitude towards military issues changed radically under the influence of the war in the Persian Gulf (1990–1991), when the United States and its allies defeated and expelled the Iraqi army from Kuwait with minimal losses and in a short period of time. Saddam Hussein’s army of 1990, apart from its rich military experience, was far superior to the PLA in technical equipment. The war demonstrated the growing role of new types of weapons and military equipment, in the development of which China lagged particularly behind: electronic warfare systems, technical reconnaissance, guided weapons, air defense systems, etc. China’s military leadership had to deeply rethink new trends in military affairs and the country’s military construction priorities. + +- The Chinese side was well aware of the complexities of the Russian situation. Significant purchases of new weapons for the Russian general-purpose forces were curtailed in 1992–1993 and resumed only after 2008–2009. The Russian military-industrial complex survived on exports, and amid the global decline in military spending in the 1990s, the Chinese and Indian markets were the main targets. Thus, when negotiating with Russia, the Chinese had enormous market power and used it successfully. + +- The first major deals reflected China’s priorities in ensuring its defense capabilities and were primarily related to combat aircraft and aviation weapons. China felt the weakest in this area. + +- Thus, the story of Russian supplies of Su fighters to China may be viewed as a success. Russia was able to preserve and partly even modernize a critical part of its own military-industrial complex during the difficult period, while the damage caused by the Chinese violation of Russian intellectual property rights was not too great and was limited to the Chinese market. + +- Moreover, the evolution of Russia’s foreign policy and deterioration of Russia’s economy in the 1990s have appreciably affected the expansion and deepening of military cooperation with China. The poor state of MIC enterprises forced the managers of specific factories, as well as captains of Russia’s defense industry, to lobby more and more actively for the development of ties with China. The end of optimism about relations with the West that was characteristic of the first years of Russia’s foreign policy is also important. + +- As a result, the Russian-Chinese military-technical cooperation in the 1990s covered almost all areas of arms and military equipment production for general-purpose forces. The result was a frontal rearmament of the entire Chinese military machine, which, with Russian help, made a leap forward by one or two generations of military equipment in most areas. This process was generally ignored in the United States and other Western countries, which assessed the Russian industry too negatively, exaggerating the depth of its decline, and were particularly arrogant of China’s efforts to modernize its military-industrial complex. + +- On the whole, due to cooperation with Russia, in the 1990s to early 2000s China was able to radically upgrade PLA and receive considerably more modern armed forces which are better suited for combat operations in the twenty-first century. At the same time, military-technical cooperation with Moscow enabled Beijing to significantly enhance the potential of its own military-industrial complex through the purchase of licenses, unlicensed copying of equipment, as well as training by Russian specialists. + +- In the mid-2000s, there was stagnation in Russian-Chinese military-technical cooperation. + +- This situation is explained by a whole complex of reasons affecting China, Russia, and relations between Moscow and Beijing. First of all, for the Russian military-industrial complex, exports to China are no longer a vital necessity. Having retained key defense enterprises in the 1990s, Russia began to plan a largescale rearmament of its own armed forces as early as the mid-2000s. + +- he importance of the Chinese market for the domestic military-industrial complex was declining not only due to the growth of effective demand for Russian military equipment on the part of the Russian Armed Forces; it was also facilitated by the diversification of arms exports. + +- Finally, rising hydrocarbon prices and a significant inflow of petrodollars into the Russian treasury provided Moscow with additional financial resources. The state had no trouble covering its social obligations and expanding them with the help of oil and gas revenues. It was now possible to be more selective about other sources of income, including arms exports to China. In addition, the role of military-technical cooperation for the stability of relations between Moscow and Beijing, which had been one of the pillars of the Russia-China partnership in the 1990s, began to diminish. + +- Amid the rapid growth of mutual trade, the share of military-technical cooperation in its structure was decreasing, making arms trade one of the many elements of cooperation rather than the basis of bilateral economic relations. + +- Moscow has paid much more attention to risk analysis. The Russian side was increasingly concerned, first, about the problem of the scale of unlicensed copying of the equipment received from Russia, and second, about the potential of future competition from the Chinese military-industrial complex in the newly acquired markets, especially in North Africa and Latin America. + +- Despite the final resolution of the border issue with China in 2004–2006, the Russian leadership rekindled discussions on the possibility of Chinese economic, demographic and, in the distant future, military expansion into the sparsely populated contiguous areas of the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia. + +- The potential connection between the restriction of export of advanced weapons systems to China and Moscow’s concern over the PLA’s intentions is also confirmed by the informal statements of the leaders of the Russian military industrial complex. These discussions apparently resulted in the decision not to rush to sell to China the latest systems, like S-400 air defense systems or Su-35 fighters, but to insist on the most favorable (and not necessarily acceptable to China) terms. The absence of a deal at that time was better than a deal that did not satisfy Moscow’s growing demands for bilateral military-technical cooperation. In China, there was also a complex of reasons that, in the middle and second half of the 2000s, temporarily reduced Beijing’s interest in purchasing Russian equipment. After the programs of licensed production of Su-27SK fighters ended in 2003–2004 and the main supplies of Su-30MKK fighters ended, China began to gradually reduce the import of Russian weapons. This was the result of the increased self-confidence of the captains of the Chinese military-industrial complex, who made obviously unrealistic promises to their leadership. + +- A gradual recovery in the volume of military-technical cooperation was recorded in the early 2010s, when the Chinese side was forced to admit the limited capabilities of its industry and its dependence on Russia for some critical components. Moscow also became more optimistic about the prospects for profitable cooperation with China, partly as a result of the economic crisis, which once again raised the issue of diversifying the sources of budget revenues. However, the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 had a decisive influence on the deepening of Russia-China military-technical cooperation at the present stage. + +- It was the Ukrainian events that accelerated Russia’s “pivot to the East”: after the introduction of sanctions, Moscow began to intensively search for opportunities to increase ties with its Asian partners in order to compensate for the reduced volume of loans and investments due to sanctions, as well as to provide access to technology. The only obvious candidate for the role of a “friend in need” was Beijing. China was the only major economy that did not impose sanctions on Russia. + +- Recognizing the need to strengthen its partnership with China, in the spring of 2014 various Russian agencies analyzed the potential risks of cooperation with China. Before rushing to embrace Beijing, Moscow wanted to understand the limits of the giant neighbor’s safe participation in the Russian economy. + +- In particular, the analysis of the situation with the Chinese presence beyond the Urals showed that Russia should not be afraid of China’s “creeping demographic expansion” into vacant territories. + +- Moscow has come to the conclusion that the perceptions in the Russian media, the expert community, and some of the authorities about the dangers of Chinese migration to the Russian Far East proved to be overly alarmist, and that the scenario of the future “annexation” of Russian territories by China according to the “Crimean scenario” was completely unrealistic. In addition, the Russian leadership has gained a more adequate understanding of the internal transformation of the Chinese economy: the aging population, a shrinking workforce, and a policy to reduce the consumption of natural resources. + +- Clearly aware of the problems that Chinese arms manufacturers face and will face, Moscow came to the conclusion that in the long term China will become less dependent on the Russian military industry and that, as the Chinese defense industry develops without Russian participation through direct sales of equipment, transfer of licenses and possibly joint arms development, in the future Russian opportunities to make money in the Chinese arms market will become increasingly limited. + +- This change in approach was evidenced by a program interview with Rosoboronexport CEO Anatoly Isaikin in April 2015 in the Kommersant newspaper, in which, among other things, the contract for the sale of S-400 air defense systems to China was announced. In response to a reporter’s question about whether Russian enterprises are not afraid to enter into cooperation with PRC enterprises, Isaikin replied: “I believe that if we work in China’s interests, we also work in our own interests.” + +- As a result of this analysis, Moscow’s attitude to the development of military cooperation with China has changed to a more open one. Selling advanced weapons to China became part of the strategy of rapprochement with Beijing in response to the systemic crisis in relations with the West. + +- Moscow agreed to more actively help China build up its military power and capabilities in light of the PLA’s tasks in the Pacific (of course, not disinterestedly), expecting in return that China would help Russia more easily survive the most acute period of confrontation with the West through investments and loans, as well as the necessary technology (also not for free). On the whole, this approach worked. Of course, China did not help Russia on a large scale for a whole complex of reasons, among them the consequences of the anti-corruption campaign in China, which paralyzed the decision-making process at many state enterprises; the drop in commodity prices; and the slowdown of the Chinese economy itself. In addition, PRC companies operating in global markets have been attentive to Western sanctions. However, despite this, Beijing has made several important investments in projects prioritized by Russian president Vladimir Putin, as well as providing a number of Russian companies with access to cheap financing. The most significant symbolic gesture of support from Beijing was the participation of Chinese companies in the construction of a power bridge to Crimea, despite Western sanctions. In the field of military-technical cooperation, major shifts took place in the fall of 2014, shortly after the U.S. and EU sectoral sanctions came into effect. Moscow and Beijing completed years of negotiations on the supply of four divisions of Russia’s latest S-400 air defense system. + +- According to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, the volume of military goods and services sold to China in 2016 exceeded USD $3 billion, and the total portfolio of Chinese orders is about USD $8 billion. + +- Having made serious progress in independent development and system integration of complex equipment, the Chinese continue to suffer from disproportionate development of various components of their huge military industrial complex and lag behind many suppliers of critical materials and components. Russia fills these gaps by carrying out both relevant R&D and supply in China’s interests. Today, cooperation is primarily not a small number of large arms supply contracts, but dozens or hundreds of small agreements, hardly identifiable by the media. The Ukrainian crisis, the cessation of Russia’s military cooperation with the West, and sanctions against Russian arms manufacturers have led not only to an increase in Russian arms supplies to China, but also to an increase in Russian interest in imports of Chinese technology and military equipment. + +- In some areas of military equipment production, China is already ahead of Russia. Unmanned aerial vehicles are a typical example. + +- Based on the results of two years after the Ukrainian crisis, we can say that the deepening of military-technical cooperation between Russia and China is evident. This is evidenced not only by structural shifts in cooperation, but also by its increased volume. + +- Russia retains serious advantages over China in many areas of military production due to significant state investments, which have resumed since the late 2000s. This is true of air defense equipment, aircraft engines, a number of types of radar technology, submarine shipbuilding, and so on. However, there are also areas where Russia has begun to lag behind. + +- The S-400 air defense systems and Su-35 fighters sold by Moscow could in the future significantly enhance the PLA’s combat capabilities in critical areas in the Pacific, where China increasingly needs to demonstrate its deterrence capability against the United States and its allies, or where there is a risk of limited military confrontation. + +- The task of curtailing Russian-Chinese military-technical cooperation is impossible; the United States and Japan can only try to correct the course of the Russian Federation, inducing Russia to refuse to expand cooperation to other sensitive areas like space technology or missile warning systems. However, given the recent tightening of anti-Russian sanctions by the U.S. Congress, the opportunities for Washington and Tokyo to play in this field are limited, and therefore they can only closely monitor the development of military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. + +Ruslan Polonchuk, “Товарищество пока на доверии: Военно-техническое сотрудничество России и Китая требует совершенствования” [[A Partnership Based on Trust So Far: Military-technical cooperation between Russia and China needs improvement, Военно-промышленный Kурьер Military-Industrial Courier, February 16, 2021](https://vpk-news.ru/articles/60886)]. + +- An analysis of Chinese military and technical publications shows that Beijing positively evaluates the opportunities for a progressive increase in bilateral military-technical cooperation in the medium term. + +- At the same time, in practice Beijing is striving to gradually abandon the purchase of large quantities of Russian arms and military equipment and to transfer bilateral military-technical cooperation to a qualitatively new level. + +- In general, China’s leadership officially has no doubts about the importance of further deepening military-technical cooperation with Russia. At the same time, as Russia’s economic potential grows in the long term, contradictions may arise in Russian-Chinese relations due to the mutual desire to expand their spheres of interests in the Asia-Pacific region and in Central Asia. Such a scenario could lead China to contain Russia, including in the field of military-technical cooperation. + +- However, Russia faces a difficult choice: provide China with advanced technologies, realizing that they are likely to be copied, or refuse to sell weapons, knowing that Chinese defense industry enterprises will develop comparable systems on their own in the near future. The former strategy of Russian arms exports, which consisted of selling “secondary” technologies, is no longer viable. China’s military industry has sufficiently caught up with Russia’s, so now the Chinese are interested only in the most modern weapons we have. + +- It seems expedient to further diversify Russian-Chinese military-technical cooperation and supplement it with the joint development of technologies. + +#### Chinese Documents on Sino-Russian Arms Sales and Technology Transfers + +Li Shuyin, “对中俄军事合作的历史考察与思考” [[Investigation and consideration of the history of China-Russia military cooperation, Academic Journal of Russian Studies, no. 3 (2016): 5–8](https://elsxk.hlju.edu.cn/info/1054/1543.htm)]. + +- The growing maturity of Sino-Russian state relations and the deepening of political mutual trust between the two countries provide the political prerequisites for carrying out military cooperation. China’s growing economic strength and urgent need for defense modernization, as well as Russia’s still strong military and technological capabilities, provide the practical requirements and technical prerequisites for bilateral military cooperation, allowing both countries to complement each other’s strengths and weaknesses. In addition, the similarity of their military establishments provides facilitative conditions for military cooperation between the two countries. In the current international security situation, both countries face security pressures to deal with various traditional and nontraditional threats, and they have common interests in opposing hegemony, maintaining world and regional peace, combating the “three evils,” and safeguarding their national interests. This pursuit of security in turn provides internal momentum for the deepening of military cooperation between China and Russia, giving it long-lasting vitality and impetus. On this foundation, China and Russia have now formed a “three-in-one” — military-political, military-technical, and military-operational — military cooperation relationship. + +- Due to the arms embargo imposed on China by the European Union and the United States, Russia has now become China’s most important source of advanced military equipment, and as a result, China has also become the second-largest export destination of Russian weapons after India. According to Russian media estimates, arms exports to China account for an average of 20 percent of Russia’s total exports, and in individual years account for 40 to 50 percent of all Russian arms exports. To ensure that military-technical cooperation goes smoothly, China and Russia have established the Intergovernmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation, which meets annually in the two countries on a rotating basis. Currently, China-Russia military-technical cooperation is focused on China’s purchase of modern warplanes, ships, new land equipment, and air and missile defense weapons from the Russian side. According to public reports in Russian and Chinese media, China has become the world’s largest user of the Su series of combat aircraft. Between 1990 and 2005, Russia sold China nearly 200 combat aircraft of various types, 12 battalions of C-300 anti-aircraft missiles, a number of Tor missile systems, four Hyundai-class destroyers, and 12 Sovremenny-class destroyers. China was the largest importer of Russian weapons until 2006, when India replaced it. According to the Russian newspaper Red Star, the two sides signed a USD $5 billion arms contract in September 2005, under which Russia would supply, over a three-year period, Su-30MKK multi-purpose fighters, Kilo 636 diesel-electric submarines, 956 and modified 956 Sovremenny-class destroyers, and S-300PMU air defense missile systems. More importantly, China has purchased production licenses for Su series fighters, flamethrowers, and other military products. In addition, China and Russia have cooperated in the aerospace field, jointly carrying out scientific research and experimental design work. Recently, the two countries’ defense ministries have been negotiating the export of Russian Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 air defense missiles to China. Since 2014, with the intensification of Western economic sanctions against Russia, Sino-Russian military cooperation has become increasingly complementary, ushering in a “golden age” of China-Russia military-technical cooperation. On November 26, 2015, at a regular press conference of China’s Ministry of Defense, spokesperson Wu Qian said that China and Russia had achieved “milestones” in cooperation projects for Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 anti-missile systems. + +- As an important component of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership of coordination, China Russia military cooperation will maintain strong development momentum for a considerable time to come. From China’s point of view, learning from others and introducing and drawing on relatively mature foreign military-technological achievements can, in a relatively short amount of time, raise China’s level of defense modernization, especially naval and air force weapons modernization, effectively curb hegemonism and power politics, reduce the security pressures it faces, and prevent the infiltration of international terrorist forces. As a country that both possesses relatively advanced military technology and weapons and enjoys the right to sell and transfer military technology on its own, Russia has naturally become China’s first choice for military cooperation. From Russia’s point of view, strengthening cooperation with China in the military field is also of strategic importance. Facing serious threats on its western and southern fronts, Russia is bound to seek strategic mutual trust between Russia and China and strengthen China-Russia military cooperation. + +- As the level of mutual trust between China and Russia continues to rise, China-Russia military-technical cooperation is moving to the highest stage — joint development of high-tech weapons and equipment — and Russia has even begun buying military products from the Chinese side. China has now started to provide the Russian side electronic components for aerospace, diesel engines for ships, and seaborne supply systems for ocean-going supply ships. [Additionally,] the subject of cooperation will be more sensitive. This is reflected in China and Russia sending their most advanced technical equipment to participate in the “Peace Mission” and “Joint Sea” joint military exercises, as well as in the continuous development of China-Russia military-technical cooperation toward the field of key and sophisticated weapons, especially in the increasingly strong trend toward joint development of modern equipment. Examples include cooperation in nuclear submarine design and manufacturing, space, and missile attack warning. In short, China-Russia military cooperation will be higher-level, deeper in content, and more profitable. + +- It cannot be denied that some problems still exist in the field of China-Russia military cooperation. The first is that mutual trust between the two sides remains insufficient. In Russia, some people who start out from a Cold War “China threat” mentality maintain that military cooperation with China, especially military-technical cooperation, will have a negative impact on Russia’s long-term security, and that Russia should “hold back a few tricks” from China. Some people in China, on the other hand, voice dissatisfaction with the obvious disparity in the sale of weapons and equipment to China and India, maintaining that this runs counter to the China-Russia strategic partnership of coordination. The second is that improvement is still needed in the specific modalities of military-technical cooperation. For a long time, China-Russia military-technical cooperation has mainly been a buyer-seller relationship with China buying and Russia selling. China hopes to change this kind of cooperative relationship dominated by buying and selling into one of technology exchange and cooperation, with joint research and development and mutual benefits, in order to effectively raise the level of China’s military modernization equipment and maintain national security. Russia, for its part, has frequently criticized China’s imitation of Russian-made weapons. Since 2000, along with the rapid advancement of China’s military technology, its advanced weapons development capabilities have grown increasingly strong. Breakthroughs have been achieved in some fields and key technologies, and the defense industry is now able to meet the nation’s needs for weapons and equipment updating, upgrading, and modernization. Therefore, in the field of military-technical cooperation, there will be a greater shift toward purchasing key technologies and sophisticated weaponry, and the emergence of a new situation in which China even exports equipment to Russia is not to be ruled out. The third problem is that a competitive relationship between China and Russia will form in the arms export market in the future. As Chinese-made weapons continue to go global and the two countries’ weapons and equipment become more “homogeneous” in terms of design concepts, use characteristics, and prices, Russia fears that China will crowd out Russian weapons from the market, thus affecting Russian exports of advanced military technology to China. + +- In the history of Sino-Soviet relations, the disparity in power between the two militaries objectively caused an asymmetry in bilateral relations and an imbalance in military cooperation, while the Soviet Union’s deep-rooted chauvinism led it to regard itself as the major party and the major power, positioning military cooperation between the two sides as a relationship of guiding and being guided, giving and receiving, repeatedly disrespecting the interests of the other side and imposing itself on others, threatening to cancel military aid at every turn, and seriously hurting the feelings of the Chinese people. + +- The “extended family” style of military cooperation relationship that draws ideological boundaries and transcends normal national interests is doomed to be short-lived and will eventually harm the relationship between the two countries due to its high degree of political sensitivity. The fundamental reason why China and the Soviet Union turned from alliance to confrontation in the 1950s and 1960s was the dislocation between ideology and actual national interests. + +- The current military cooperation between China and Russia is subordinate to and serves the modernization of the Chinese military, creating a safe surrounding environment for defending national interests during a time of important strategic opportunity, but it also conforms to Russia’s strategic need to stabilize its neighborhood and ensure the global balance of strategic power, as well as the idea of using arms sales to drive economic development. Consequently, military cooperation will become an important factor in promoting the healthy development of bilateral relations and maintaining regional and world stability. + +- This proves that placing the emphasis on foreign technical assistance or the purchase of foreign weapons inevitably results in the dependence of China’s national defense undertakings. Fundamentally enhancing military strength, on the other hand, requires instead the selective and focused introduction of key foreign equipment and technologies while adhering to self-reliance. + +#### Russian Documents on Sino-Russian Military Exercises + +Vladimir Vinokurov, “Глобальное совместное патрулирование Россия – Китай: стратегическое взаимодействие или военно-политический союз?” [[Global Cooperative Patrol: Russia & China: Strategic Cooperation or a Military-Political Alliance? Military-Industrial Courier, September 30, 2019](https://vpk-news.ru/articles/52737)]. + +- In September, the deputy chairman of the Central Military Committee of the PRC, Zhang Yuxia, and Russian minister of defense, Sergei Shoigu, signed an agreement on the further strengthening of cooperation. According to information from the Committee of the Federation Council on the defense and security of the Russian Federation, the agreement may include the exchange of technology and the Chinese use of elements of the Russian Federation’s anti-aircraft defense systems in the Far East, which testifies to a high level of mutual trust. In the White Book of defense published by Beijing on July 24, it is written that military cooperation with Russia has developed to a high level and plays a significant role in supporting global strategic stability. It is also highlighted that military cooperation is not directed against any third party and will include air, land, and sea forces. Beginning in 2012, officers in both armies have conducted eight rounds of strategic consultations. In 2017, Russia and China organized their first collective naval maneuvers in the Baltic Sea. In 2018, a formation of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army participated in the “Vostok” strategic exercises. In April–May of the same year “Naval Interaction (Joint Sea)” took place in the region of Qingdao. + +- On July 23, the Russian and Chinese Air forces carried out their first cooperation air patrol with long range aircraft over the water around Japan and the East China Sea, eliciting an unpleasant reaction from military allies of the United States in the Far East and in other regions of the world. Western experts viewed these actions not as just a regular routine exercise, but as a kind of demonstration of Russian and Chinese readiness for further military collaboration. + +- Based on official statements by China’s top leaders, they adhere to a policy of non-alignment, exclude military alliances with anyone, oppose the use of force, and favor a peaceful resolution of disputed issues. So, presenting to the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PRC and high-ranking officials with a speech on the country’s foreign politics, Xi Jinping declared that China would not enter a military block with Russia or any other country. This would tie Beijing’s hands. China would expand its influence in the world and form a network of allies on all continents through soft power. + +- A military alliance between two such powerful countries would change the entire strategic position of the world. This disturbance is caused not only by the above-mentioned actions in the military and military-technical spheres, but by the fact that the two countries hold identical or similar positions in the majority of international problems and demonstrate them collectively on the world stage. + +- These and certain other factors provide a context for the development of mutually beneficial relations between these countries in the interest of mutual opposition to the threats and challenges of modernity and the strengthening of the world order. The question of a military alliance is evidently not entirely imaginary. + +- However, conversations on the creation of an official military-political union are premature. This is entirely understandable. Such unions, not to mention states, are not historically threatening to anyone, conducted only in anticipation of extreme circumstances, and created with defense in mind. In other words, the activities of Moscow and Beijing in this sphere will depend largely on the activities of the West and its allies. + +Ruslan Polonchuk, “Военное сотрудничество России и Китая” [[Russia and China’s Military Cooperation, Ethnosocium and Multinational Society 1 (2021): 95–105](https://www.elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=44888630)]. + +- In 2015–2020, Russia and China continued their military-technical policy. Russia and China continued meetings between top military officials. At the same time, the focus of cooperation between Moscow and Beijing was distinctly “anti-American.” One of the most important areas of military cooperation during this period was joint Russian-Chinese military exercises. Strategic command and staff exercises (SSCE) were held regularly from 2015 to 2020. One of the most ambitious maneuvers was “Vostok-2018,” with the participation of Chinese servicemen. The SSCE was organized under the personal leadership of Russian defense minister Army General S.K. Shoigu. At five ranges and water areas in the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan, and the Bering Sea, 300,000 servicemen, more than 1,000 aircraft, 36,000 tanks, and up to 80 ships and support vessels participated. According to the Defense Ministry of China, China sent about 1,600 soldiers, more than 300 vehicles, and 30 aircraft and helicopters for the exercise “Vostok-2018,” and then the same the following year for “Center-2019” as well. About 100 servicemen of the PLA and 18 vehicles were involved in the “Caucasus 2020” SSCE. The naval exercises known as “Maritime Cooperation” are planned and coordinated by the PLA Command with the specific political tasks facing the PRC in mind. Joint naval maneuvers have been held annually since 2015 in the South China Sea and the Baltic Sea. According to PLA commanders, the varied geography of the exercises is a way to mark the growing military power of the two countries. The Chinese and Russian navies have also been involved in the exercises. In December 2019, China, Russia, and Iran jointly conducted a three-day naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman. The maneuvers were held to demonstrate a high level of coordination of joint maritime activities amid escalating tensions between the United States and Iran. The naval exercises were aimed at two main tasks: to demonstrate the increased capabilities of the PLA to combat traditional and non-traditional threats and to obtain information on the training methods and specifics of the Russian Navy. Anti-terrorist exercises have become a topical area for strengthening military ties with Russia in the fight against international terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism, both on a bilateral basis and within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The anti-terrorist exercise “Peace Mission” of the Armed Forces of the SCO member countries has received considerable attention. According to Chinese commanders, this exercise has a stabilizing effect on the regional situation and prepares the country’s armed forces for counterterrorist actions in the territory of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. In October 2019, Novosibirsk Oblast hosted the “Cooperation-2019” exercise of anti-terrorist units of the Russian Federal Guard Service and People’s Armed Militia of the People’s Republic of China, where joint actions against international terrorist groups were practiced. The peculiarity of anti-terrorist exercises of Russia and China is that they practiced interaction between battalion-tactical groups, while Sino-Pakistani and Sino-Thai exercises of similar orientation involve units of marines and PLA Airborne Forces numbering from 150 to 250 servicemen. Joint air patrols in the Asia-Pacific region by Chinese and Russian bombers are becoming a new tool for achieving long-term political goals in the region. At the end of December 2020, the Russian Air Force and PLA Air Force conducted the second joint air patrol by long-range aircraft. The air group, consisting of two strategic bombers TU-95 MS (Russia) and four H-6K (PRC), carried out air patrols over the waters of the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea. During the patrols, the aviation strictly adhered to international law without violating the airspace of foreign states. The computer-based missile defense (BMD) “Aerospace Security” exercise is seen by the Chinese leadership as a response to the U.S. deployment of the THAAD missile defense system in South Korea. According to Beijing, their main purpose is to demonstrate to regional rivals the high level of relations with Russia. The peculiarity of the Russian-Chinese exercises, which began in 2017, is the use of computer simulations of the missile defense system of the two countries. Let’s specify that the work in real conditions is not possible because of the high level of secrecy and prohibition of access to the facilities of the national missile defense systems. Engineering and design problems at this stage make it impossible for Chinese engineers to develop their own missile defense system, which is confirmed by the unrelenting interest of Chinese specialists in Russian S-400 and S-500 systems, which could eventually form the basis of a Chinese missile defense system. + +- As for Russian-Chinese military-political cooperation, we should note the multi-vector orientation of the ongoing military exercises. In accordance with the requirements of modern military art, it seems advisable to continue to conduct joint maneuvers of motorized infantry units, which would help military personnel to master the skills of combat in urban areas. At the same time, it would be most appropriate to conduct them at PRC ranges, in order to get acquainted in practice with the pros and cons of the theater command system created in 2016 in the PRC according to the U.S. model. Given the rapid development of PLA naval forces, it is possible to organize Russian-Chinese naval patrols to jointly carry out flag demonstration tasks in peacetime. + +Vasiliy Kashin and Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, “Совместная оборона. Против кого дружат военные России и Китая” [[Joint Defense. Russian and Chinese militaries are friends against whom?, RIA Novosti, July 2021](https://ria.ru/20210705/oborona-1739958628.html)]. + +> Military experts emphasize that although the possibility of a military conflict with NATO countries is extremely unlikely, it exists. Therefore, neighboring states need to work out the reflection of potential aggression. “Any such maneuvers are designed to work out the real situation. We have to watch the reaction of the West, especially the Pentagon, but not bow our heads to them and ask their permission,” says Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, former head of the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation of the Defense Ministry. In the early 2000s, the joint exercises were declared to be anti-terrorist, but now they have taken on a high-tech, advanced nature, Vasily Kashin, director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics, reminded. “Obviously, they are aimed at transferring experience and increasing interoperability when confronting a major foreign adversary, which can only be the United States,” he believes. In this sense, Moscow and Beijing are certainly pushing back on the American factor, but it is not the only one. “There is, for example, a factor of concern about stability in Central Asia and the desire to maintain military ties to ensure transparency of mutual trust in defense. In addition, in the course of exercises and exchange of delegations, our and Chinese military get a huge amount of knowledge about each other, and, unlike the United States, our Ministry of Defense does not publish its assessments of Chinese military power. However, they stand high on the level of awareness thanks to such wide connections, it allows them to feel confident, separate myths from reality, understand what capabilities they are actually developing,” the expert adds. + +Alexander Yermakov, “Учения и интеграция военных групп: Как Россия и Китай готовятся к защите от НАТО” [[Exercises and Military Group Integration: How Russia and China Prepare to Defend Against NATO, Eurasia Expert, October 13, 2021](https://eurasia.expert/kak-rossiya-i-kitay-gotovyatsya-k-zashchite-ot-nato)]. + +- The Russo-Chinese military drill “Zapad/Interaction-2021,” held in the Ninxia Hui Autonomous Region in the northern part of the PRC, showed a definitively new stage in the cooperative military preparations for both nations. + +- First, Russian soldiers underwent an express course in the use of new Chinese wheeled armored cars: the heavy wheeled infantry ZBL-08 and the ZTL-11 mobile assault gun (in the Chinese classification — the contemporary Western convention refers to them as “Wheeled Tanks.”) Both are comparatively new machines without direct Russian or Soviet predecessors, which would make their introduction especially useful. + +- At the present moment, the Russian army has no contemporary armored vehicles, let alone a unified family as the moment demands. The BTR-80/82 is a vehicle with roots in the Cold War, with entirely different goals. This situation should soon begin to change: following a drill in the beginning of the Army-2021 exhibition, the development of the Bumerang family of armored vehicles was announced. + +- However, from a political and educational point of view, the most important thing in these drills was achieving a new level of integration in these countries’ military action. A cooperation staff was formed which guided the activity of soldiers through a single guiding information system. Following orders passed through this system, Russian paratroopers and Chinese servicemen carried out landings from Chinese helicopters (admittedly Russian-produced) and seized important objectives held by hypothetical “terrorists”, and the Russian SU-30SM enacted practice bombing runs on orders from the Chinese military. + +- Naturally both parties are far from being involved in a military alliance, and they are not working towards one: despite the best attempts of both sides of the Russo-Chinese friendship, the U.S. State Department does not hold the most benevolent policy towards these countries. However the increasingly frequent and complex military drills by both countries, such as the one described here (and for China, this is the first drill with foreign soldiers since the beginning of the pandemic), testifies to the intention of these parties to demonstrate that there is no chance of realizing the fantasies of a gang of analysts from the 1990s about an “inescapable conflict” or “the impossibility of close integration because of their fundamental distrust for one another.” + +#### Chinese Documents on Sino-Russian Military Exercises + +“中俄联演 — 演习有何亮点看点？军事专家为你深入解读” [[Sino-Russian joint exercise — What are the highlights of the exercise? Military experts give you an in-depth interpretation, The Paper, August 10, 2021](https://m.thepaper.cn/baijiahao_13973728)]. + +- What are the highlights of the Zapad/Interaction-2021 military exercise? How will the Chinese and Russian military forces carry out joint combat operations? China Media Group reporter Wang Ruitao held an exclusive interview at Qintongxia Contract Tactical Training Base with Li Shuyin, a researcher at the Academy of Military Sciences and expert on Russian military affairs, who was observing the military exercise on site. + +- Qingtongxia Training Base is located in the foothills of the Helan Mountains in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. The terrain consists mainly of the Gobi Desert and hilly ground, with an elevation variation that is largely within 30 meters. It could be described as gentle slopes and level ground. It is a training base representative of combat in Gobi Desert and cold plateau conditions. It is suitable for simulating land where terrorists hide and operate. The climate here is similar to Central Asia; both are dry, with little rain. This makes this base highly suitable for training for desert and plateau combat operations such as anti-terrorist operations and special operations. + +- Starting with the Peace Mission exercise held by China and Russia in 2005, there have been 16 years of exercises held under the Sino-Russian bilateral framework. The current one, I feel, differs from previous exercises such as the Peace Mission and Joint Sea exercises, in the following areas. First, a change in roles. Instead of a Russian-led strategic exercise which to participate in them Chinese army had to leave Chinese territory, it is an exercise led by China on Chinese territory. The main objective of this exercise is to demonstrate the joint combat characteristics of the Chinese military, particularly the improvements to the joint combat capabilities of our military forces since the national defense and military force reforms. At the same time, this is an effort to create a joint exercise “brand” mainly focused on our military. Second, a change in approach. In previous joint exercises, the Chinese and Russian sides would plan independently and organize independent groups under the same combat plan, largely demonstrating the relatively independent operations of each side under a single combat plan and in the same battlefield environment. This joint exercise, in contrast, has achieved combined planning, mixed formations, and joint training. Third, changes in content. From the perspective of training subjects, there is more joint content, and it is more practical. It presents systemic qualities. + +- “Unity” has always been a keyword in Sino-Russian joint exercises. By performing a comparative analysis vis-à-vis the previous few exercises, we can see that there has been further improvement in the level of unity in this exercise. I feel that the way to measure the level of unity in the two countries’ joint exercises is to look at their planning and command. In this exercise, a term that we often use is “combined planning.” First of all, a Russian military command branch center was established under joint command, and we developed a unified, Chinese-Russian bilingual joint information system. By building a Chinese-Russian joint command information system, we can more effectively achieve video and data links and communication with the Russian army, allowing us to share data and situation information, while unifying combat rules and laying a good foundation for joint operations by the two armies. + +- This training content enables us to experience the improvement in Chinese military training skills and the new breakthroughs in warfare. There have also been new breakthroughs in joint command combat capabilities. By relying on network information systems, the participating officers and soldiers build command links that operate more smoothly. + +- First, this exercise amply embodies the high level of friendly Sino-Russian cooperation and embodies friendship and trust between the two militaries, unconstrained by time or place and unaffected by the pandemic. We know that this exercise was held against a background of a coronavirus pandemic that is continuing to spread and that is becoming more complex. There are many major activities that have been delayed or canceled — yet normalized, institutionalized Sino-Russian joint exercises not only have not been interrupted but are still continuously undergoing quality improvements and innovations. This demonstrates that the comprehensive Sino-Russian strategic collaborative partnership and the friendly relationship between the two militaries are continuously ascending to higher stages. In addition, this exercise demonstrates to the whole world the firm resolve of the Chinese and Russian militaries to uphold world peace and regional stability. China and Russia have always worked together to construct a fairer, more reasonable international order. As responsible powers, China and Russia are demonstrating to the world their resolve to continue to be defenders and upholders of regional peace and stability, while also providing a fright to those terroristic forces that wait for opportunities to manufacture terror incidents and disturb regional stability — and to the supporters behind such forces. + +Jian Feng, “‘营战斗群战术’与中俄军演” [[‘Battalion Battle Group Tactics’ and Russian-Chinese Military Exercises, Tanks and Armored Vehicles, September 2021](https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-TKZJ202117006.htm)]. + +- Military cooperation, including military exercises, is an important part of state relations and is the easiest way for outsiders to observe whether two countries are “allies.” From the participation of the J-20 to the amazingly open weapons interoperability, the concluded China-Russia Zapad/Interaction-2021 strategic exercise presented many new points, highlighting the orderly and in-depth military cooperation between China and Russia in the new era and conveying to the outside world in a highly complex form that “China and Russia are not allies but are better than allies.” However, while the strategic significance of this high-level joint military exercise has been the subject of numerous analytical articles in various media, there are very few voices interpreting it from a purely military operational perspective. In fact, this joint Chinese-Russian military exercise was highly practical. The exercises included joint planning, joint operational synergy, long-range delivery capabilities and military firepower strikes, and integrated joint command systems and joint logistical support capabilities. In particular, the two armies exhibited a greater degree of pragmatism in their participation in each other’s strategic exercises, where they were mixed and where they planned together to test the capabilities of troop reconnaissance, early warnings, and electronic information attacks. This article is a detailed review of the “dry goods” of the Chinese-Russian military exercise, using “battalion tactical group (BTG) tactics” as the starting point. + +- Interestingly, in addition to the United States and China, the Russian military is also exploring the construction of similar “synthetic battalions” and is likely to be carrying out battlefield practice in such places as Syria and eastern Ukraine. These practical experiences will be invaluable to the PLA in exploring the tactical use of synthetic battalions and making further adjustments to their construction. Although Chinese forces were invited to participate in Russia’s East 2018, Central 2019, and Caucasus 2020 strategic exercises, this indicates that the cooperation between Russian and Chinese armies in the field of joint exercises has entered a new stage and reached a new level. It also means that the PLA will enter a new level of understanding of Russian “BTG tactics.” + +- The tactics of Russian BTGs, which have been refined on the battlefield, are not only evident in past Chinese-Russian joint military exercises but also in some unusual changes in the China-Russia Joint Western 2021 strategic exercise. + +- In fact, the China-Russia Joint Western 2021 strategic exercise can be considered, to some extent, as “an experiment in supporting three to four battalion-sized tactical groups with tactical-level fire support and security forces in a high-intensity but limited-purpose battlefield confrontation.” The relevance of this model is precisely that these are the shortcomings of Russian BTG tactics that have been revealed in actual combat. + +- Although these new BTGs have demonstrated a relatively high level of combat capability during their involvement in Ukraine and Syria and have changed the stereotypical and conservative image of the Russian military, they are only suitable for the kind of battlefield in East Ukraine that does not emphasize movement warfare, and they are easily defeated on high-intensity battlefields by advanced adversaries like the U.S. military. They are prone to be paralyzed by advanced adversaries like the U.S. Army in high-intensity battlefields by knocking out their nodes. Although our synthetic battalions have significantly surpassed the Russians in terms of weapons and equipment performance and even possess many weapons and equipment that the Russians do not, their digitization and informatization capabilities are close to those of the U.S. military, and their command and combat systems are very similar to those of the U.S. military, [but] it is difficult to verify their tactical rationality because they have not been hardened by combat. Considering that both militaries need to deal with high-intensity ground warfare and even face a common strategic competitor, the China-Russian Joint Western 2021 strategic exercise provides an opportunity for the two militaries to learn from each other’s strengths and complement each other’s weaknesses. + +- Military exercises are the most sensitive activity in the relationship between two countries, and mutual participation in internal strategic exercises is the highest level of military cooperation. In recent years, the PLA has been advancing at a rapid pace that is visible to the naked eye. Synthetic battalions have become the main combat force of the PLA’s ground forces, integrating many advantages such as miniaturization, versatility, streamlining, and modularity, [while] highlighting the concepts of information dominance, system support, elite combat, and joint victory. + +- However, this new quality of combat capability still requires the lubrication of actual battlefield experience to realize its military competitive value more effectively. That is why it was significant to exchange in-depth tactical “experiences” with the Russian Army through the China-Russia Joint Western 2021 strategic exercise, which is also an excellent reflection of the fact that “there is no limit, no forbidden zone, no upper limit” for Chinese-Russian strategic cooperation. + +#### Russian Documents on Sino-Russian Cooperation in Space and Cyber + +Yuri V. Morozov, Пути нейтрализации угроз России в рамках стратегического тре угольника «РФ—США—КНР» [[Ways to Neutralize Threats to Russia in the Framework of the Strategic Triangle of ‘Russia-USA-China’, Moscow: Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2020: 384](https://www.ifes-ras.ru/files/abook_file/book-2020-morozov.pdf)]. + +- Relations between China and Russia in the space industry have intensified sharply in recent years. The two powers have their own rockets and launch sites, are building their own satellites, and are planning an interplanetary expedition, but without joint cooperation, neither Moscow nor Beijing will be able to solve a number of problems. + +- The space program has become a top priority for China: its budget and ambition leave no doubt that Beijing intends to significantly strengthen its position in the space industry over the next 10 years. + +- The secret of success is large financial injections, persistence, and Russian technology, which helped the Chinese space program to make a significant leap in the 1990s. + +- Cooperation between Russia and China in the space industry is based on two documents: an intergovernmental agreement of December 18, 1992, and an interagency agreement of March 25, 1994. Since the early 2000s, the parties have promoted the idea of joint research and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, but for a long time there was no talk about a breakthrough cooperation. The situation began to change in 2014, when after the reunification of Crimea with Russia, the United States vetoed the supply of high-tech products; a ban was also imposed on the electronic component base that was used in satellite construction. The space industry had some reserves, but it was necessary to look for a complete substitute for U.S. products in the short term. A suitable replacement was found in China. + +- In 2018, Russia and China discussed the possibility of creating a joint space station. However, N. Eismont of the Institute of Space Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences notes that space exploration cannot be a purely national task. According to him, the Chinese side, which plans to start building a multi-module space station in the next few years, is interested in the Russian experience of long-term space flights and construction of large space objects. In addition, Beijing lacks a number of important technologies and is ready to offer its partnership to Moscow in exchange for them. + +- Thus, in a sense, due to the U.S. position, China is in a kind of isolation. For many years now, the United States has been doing everything possible to prevent the development of science and technology in China. + +- This is why China is looking for other partners, and the result of this search, to a large extent, is the cooperation that the Russian Federation is developing/offering. + +- On the whole, the space sector [of cooperation] was [following] the general trend of development of Russian-Chinese relations, which began to sharply improve after the sanctions against Russia were imposed by Europe and the United States. China is extremely interested in buying Russian RD180 engines, which could be used in Chinese rocket production, while Russia is interested in supplying Chinese space radio-electronics. + +- Both sides have shown considerable interest in such cooperation. In summer 2016, the governments of Russia and China signed an agreement on measures to protect technologies in the exploration and use of outer space: in other words, the Chinese side will not be able to engage in unlicensed copying of Russian products. This was the main condition that Moscow put forward for the beginning of substantive negotiations. + +- In fact, the logic of this decision is simple: with a huge number of opponents and lack of like-minded people, it is necessary to be friends with China. All the more so because in the conditions of economic recession, when industry funding is constantly being sequestered, it is almost impossible for Russia to implement projects like the lunar or Mars missions on its own. The success of China’s space program raises the legal question of whether it will compete with Russia. After all, Russia’s position in space is not only one of the undeniable reasons of national pride, but also a significant source of income. + +- However, according to V. Kashin, a leading researcher of the Institute of Air Force Development of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Russians do not consider the Chinese as competitors. + +- “There are no concerns about being squeezed out of the commercial launch sector. Production costs in China are already higher than in our country. At the same time, salaries in dollar terms in the Chinese rocket industry are several times higher. This became especially obvious after the devaluation of the ruble.” A. Ionin, a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Cosmonautics named after A.A. Tsiolkovsky, believes that the Chinese are simply not interested in the commercial cosmonautics market. “They have too many national tasks, and commercial launches are not the main priority here. China does not need the money.” In addition, China is still under U.S. sanctions, and this prevents it from reaching the most profitable customers from Europe and North America. + +Viktoriya A. Denisenko and Nikolay A. Malchushkin, “Перспективы российско-китайского сотрудничества в космической отрасли в 2020-е годы” [[Prospects for Russian-Chinese Cooperation in the Space Sector in the 2020s, Blagoveshchenskii State Pedagogical University, 2020](https://www.elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=44055870)]. + +Editor’s Note: This article is not written by leading Russian scholars; however, the authors cover strategic goals and challenges and provide a useful framework for understanding the negative and positive outcomes of Russian-Chinese cooperation in space (or lack thereof). + +- Current trends in the world aerospace field allow us to speak about the beginning of a new space race. The key feature of the increased interest in exploration of extraterrestrial spaces is a significant expansion of private sector capabilities in the field of design and launch of transport and manned spacecraft — we are talking primarily about large non-state corporations of this industry (for example, the “Space Exploration Technologies Corporation” of American entrepreneur Elon Musk, “Blue Origin” of American billionaire Jeffrey Bezos, or “Boeing,” the transnational aviation giant). + +- For the Russian Federation, maintaining and expanding its existing position in the space industry is one of the highest priorities at the moment. The significance of the issue lies not only in the need for Russia to retain its status as a space power, which it inherited together with the technical potential of the Soviet Union as the legal successor of the latter. The developed world’s close attention to near-Earth space and other planets for the purposes of scientific study and possible militarization determines the desire of Russia to at least prevent a technological lag in space exploration, and at most claim equal participation in the use of extraterrestrial resources. The complicated geopolitical situation that developed in the mid-2010s forces Russia to strengthen cooperation in the space sphere with its strategic partners, among which the People’s Republic of China has traditionally occupied a key position recently. + +- For China, which in many ways faces similar foreign policy realities as Russia, space is also of great value. The space program of the “Celestial Empire,” despite its relatively short existence, has already demonstrated significant success in the field of space robotics and communication technologies. + +- Consequently, China naturally faces the question of whether it should maintain cooperation with Russia in the aerospace industry. + +- China has a significant material and resource base for the implementation of the space program. + +- At present, however, China fully covers the technological needs for the design and modernization of the rocket fleet with its own production; development of a reusable spacecraft (the “Shenlong”) is underway. + +- External and internal destabilizing factors have no significant impact on the implementation of China’s space projects. The COVID-19 epidemic, which began in China in late 2019, has not prevented CASC from conducting four rocket launches since the beginning of 2020. In terms of foreign policy, China’s space ambitions also meet little resistance from Western countries, especially the United States, due to the latter’s increased attention to Mars exploration. If the current conditions remain unchanged, it is safe to say that China is highly likely to achieve its goals of launching its own space station and landing taikonauts on the lunar surface. As for Russia, the foundation of the Russian space industry was laid during the Soviet Union, and by the beginning of the 2020s, Russia managed to be firmly entrenched in the top three space powers of the world. + +- The level of technical development of the Russian space industry meets the requirements for maintaining a position in outer space. + +- Turning to the most urgent problems of Russian cosmonautics, we emphasize that in recent years there has been a negative trend towards stagnation in the rate of rocket launches relative to other leading space powers. + +- In addition to preserving the number of launches, a significant problem at present is the pronounced costliness of the industry and the corruption of related enterprises. + +- Taking into account the growing competition on the part of private U.S. corporations, it is possible that in the future Russian rockets will be unprofitable to operate. + +- To determine the prospects for Russian-Chinese cooperation, let us review current joint space arrangements. In September 2019, at a regular meeting of the heads of the governments of Russia and China, Roscosmos CEO Dmitry Rogozin and CNSA head Zhang Kejian agreed to cooperate in the creation of a data center for lunar projects and deep space, as well as in the coordination of the “LunaResource-1” space mission in 2022 and “Chang’e-7” in 2023. A year earlier, there had been talks about bilateral participation in the creation of a Chinese orbital station, and in November 2017, Russian and Chinese state corporations signed a program of cooperation in the space field for 2018–2022. Despite the largely declarative nature of these statements, there is a clear trend towards strengthening the partnership between Russia and China, which is due to the aggressive external environment and long-term cooperation in this industry. What are the possible scenarios for the development of cooperation between Russia and China in the foreseeable future? Despite a declared commitment to a productive dialogue, the rapid technological growth of the Celestial Empire in rocket and space exploration is obvious, and its ambitions to explore other planets and outer space question the necessity of involving other countries, including Russia. An important factor is the role of external powers that also are aiming to maintain a presence in space: the United States and India, which is actively developing its own space program. + +Vasily Kashin, “Россия и Китай ответят на создание космических войск США – эксперт,” [[Russia and China Answer to the Creation of Space Forces by the USA – Expert, Eurasia Expert, September 2020](https://eurasia.expert/rossiya-i-kitay-otvetyat-na-sozdanie-kosmicheskikh-voysk-ssha/)]. + +- Outer space has already become a military platform. Space systems are now necessary for a number of key weapon systems, in particular munitions with satellite guidance and unmanned aerial vehicles with long flight times. These weapons systems do not live without space at all, but all the rest also depend on space to some degree. Accordingly, ensuring the operation of the entire space infrastructure, including space-based communications, positioning, and reconnaissance assets, becomes a priority issue. The development of means to combat space objects is also becoming a priority. + +- The United States has lost much of its former military superiority in many other areas, but so far no one can match them in space. Trump’s decision to create a separate kind of military force is designed to maximize U.S. superiority and achieve overwhelming dominance in space. Other countries, including China and Russia, will have to respond to it to some degree, and so there will be an arms race in space. The placement of weapons in space will not necessarily come immediately. It may not happen for a long time. + +- China is building up its forces very strongly now, and it is the number two power in the world (Russia is number three) in terms of satellite constellations. + +- Space is becoming increasingly important precisely because of the development of new types of weapons: drones, satellite-guided precision munitions, and space reconnaissance systems. In the Cold War era, these means were much more primitive and had longer reaction times, but now you have the opportunity to take them to another level. An important factor in the future will be the development of artificial intelligence technologies, which will allow a new level of processing of space reconnaissance data, dramatically increase its effectiveness, and possibly change the approaches to nuclear deterrence. + +- Space remains primarily in the military [domain]. All this piloted space flight is ornamentation, while military space operations are on a different scale. + +- For prestige reasons, China is promoting the development of science, and we are lagging behind here. We have no resources, and there is only a weak organizational capability. We are able to solve some military tasks, but we cannot compete with China. + +- We have cooperation, of course. The golden age was in the 1990s and 2000s, when China’s manned program and many other programs rose largely due to Russian technology. Now the Chinese are already sensing their own strength and “advancement,” and maybe their need for cooperation with us is no longer so high, although it continues. At the dawn of the crisis and the aggravation of relations with the West in 2014, when we were cut off from the supply of components, there was talk that we would supply new types of powerful rocket engines to China, and that the Chinese would help us establish production of electronic parts and components for space. It is not clear where that went — apparently it hasn’t worked out yet, but these are usually long negotiations. We will see more and more closure of these cooperation programs, because the U.S. sanctions pressure on Russia and China is growing. However, cooperation will continue. + +- The main goal is to create the information infrastructure that enables the use of weapons on Earth. That is, it is the provision of reconnaissance and positioning resources, without which the effective use of high-precision weapons is impossible. Accordingly, the use of high-precision weapons spurs the development of space systems, and new capabilities of space systems, in turn, lead to new high-precision weapons. In the future, demand will increase further by the development of robotic complexes and systems and the further development of unmanned systems. + +- Accordingly, the other side will have an even greater need, first, to interfere with satellite positioning and communication systems and reconnaissance, and second, to be able to shoot down these satellites. This will all develop at an increasing rate for the foreseeable future. An additional factor that affects the arms race in space is the development of missile defense systems, since ground-based missiles for hitting targets are a side effect of the development of missile defense. They are often just a variant of a missile defense application that sometimes needs some small change in software. And, because, again, missile defense is developing at a high rate in several countries, we will see an increase in the number of threats to satellites and, therefore, attempts to protect them. At some point, we will also see the placement of weapons in space, but that probably won’t be the first thing that will happen. + +- It is a priority for China to push science forward, because their main field of competition with the United States is in science and technology. Through this, China greatly increases its national prestige, because they are already the second country in the world in the field of space research. Since their investments and potential are growing, they have a chance of someday standing on an equal footing and competing for primacy. In many ways, this reproduces the picture of the Cold War. + +#### Chinese Documents on Sino-Russian Cooperation in Space and Cyber + +He Qisong and Ye Nishan, “中国与俄罗斯太空合作分析” [[Analysis of Space Cooperation between China and Russia, Russian Studies Journal, no. 4, August 2021](https://r.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?filename=ELSY202104008&dbcode=CFJD&dbname=CFJDTEMP)]. + +- Against this overall background, bilateral space cooperation has gradually intensified and is a concrete expression of the improvement and upgrading of relations between the two countries. In order to preserve space security, national security, and the stability of the international strategic landscape, China and Russia maintain close cooperation on space diplomacy, the objective being to create an external environment conducive to national development. When it comes to space technology cooperation, geopolitical factors play an important role. The space development dynamics of China and Russia, as well as the U.S. strategy of space hegemony (including space weaponization policies and practices), are the key variables in space technology cooperation between the two sides. The expansion and deepening of China-Russia space cooperation dovetails with the development of political relations between the two countries in response to changes in space geopolitics and also has an impact on the shaping of space geopolitics. + +- From an overall perspective, China-Russia space technology cooperation since the end of the Cold War can be roughly divided into two stages, with the Ukraine crisis in 2014 as the dividing line. The first stage was one of shallow cooperation, mainly in the form of a bilateral “buying and selling relationship.” After the Ukraine crisis, space cooperation between the two countries further expanded and deepened, forming a China-Russia space cooperation relationship with space technology, space science, and space equipment intertwined. In 1970, China successfully launched the “Dongfanghong-1” satellite, thus entering the space club. Although this achievement was the result of China’s self-reliance and hard work, it should not be overlooked that China’s move into space also benefited from the assistance of the Soviet Union: China’s launch vehicle technology originated from Soviet assistance in ballistic missile technology, and the Soviet Union trained a number of young scientists and engineers for the development of China’s aerospace endeavors. + +- With the resolution of border issues between China and Russia in the 1990s, bilateral relations were gradually improved and enhanced, and space cooperation could be realized. The 1992 agreement on intergovernmental space cooperation between China and Russia and the 1994 cooperation agreement between the space ministries of the two countries were the beginnings of bilateral space cooperation. + +- Bilateral space cooperation after the Cold War began in the manned spaceflight field. After China established its manned space program, Russia provided the reference for China’s design of the Shenzhou series of spacecraft. The Russian side not only supplied China with spacesuits but also trained Chinese astronauts and provided technical support for their first spaceflight activities. + +- Until 2006, the two countries generally cooperated in three areas: satellites, space science, and basic components. In 2007, the two countries signed a cooperation agreement on the joint exploration of Mars — with the Russian Mars probe “Phobos-Grunt” (Фобос-Грунт) to carry the Chinese probe “Yinghuo-1,” and the Russian space-based observatory to be used for joint deep space exploration — but the project was scrubbed due to the failure of the Russian launch. + +- Before 2014, however, China-Russia space technology cooperation still lagged behind the two countries’ political engagement. After the Ukraine crisis in 2014, space cooperation between the two sides entered a new phase in which cooperation not only expanded in breadth but also increased in depth. Cooperation on positioning and navigation satellites was the starting point of the new phase of cooperation between the two countries. The United States and other Western countries imposed sanctions on Russia under the pretext of the Ukraine crisis, including a ban on the export to Russia of satellite-borne electronic equipment, which is precisely one of Russia’s shortcomings. + +- During President Putin’s visit to China in 2016, the Russian and Chinese governments signed an agreement on the protection of intellectual property rights in the field of space technology, clearing away legal barriers to the development of in-depth cooperation in space technology between the two countries. In September 2017, the two countries finalized the Outline of China-Russia Space Cooperation for 2018–2022, which includes projects on lunar and deep space development, rocket engine and satellite-borne electronic equipment transactions, etc. This is the first five-year agreement between the two countries. It is within this framework that the two countries have realized the vision of cooperation agreed upon several years ago: the purchase of Russian RD-180 rocket engines by China and the export of satellite electronics to Russia. The two countries also held negotiations in 2018 on the joint production of RD-180 rocket engines. A key point in the implementation of the five-year outline of space cooperation is to take substantial steps in lunar and other deep-space exploration fields. After the United States and other Western countries closed the door to cooperation with it, Russia has clearly strengthened its willingness to engage in lunar exploration with China, looking to make up for its failure to go to the moon during the Cold War era with a successful lunar landing. + +- In 2018, the two countries discussed the possibility of cooperation in lunar research and deep space exploration, and in 2019 they signed an agreement to establish a data center for lunar and deep space exploration to share relevant information, including on the moon and Mars. . . . This is a historic agreement. + +- China and Russia have also taken important steps in cooperation involving the space security field. If the above-mentioned cooperation in space is limited to the peaceful use of space, cooperation between the two countries in the anti-missile and missile early warning system fields is cooperation on space security. Following cyber anti-missile exercises in 2016 and 2017, President Putin announced at a meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club in October 2019 that Russia is helping China build a missile early warning system, which will significantly increase China’s defense capabilities. Only Russia and the United States currently possess missile early warning systems, which include both space-based and ground-based systems. Russia’s assistance on China’s construction of a missile early warning system, whether by helping China develop space-based sensors, building ground-based radar systems, or sharing software and information for space-based and ground-based warning systems, will enhance China’s anti-missile capabilities and sky monitoring capabilities. In addition, in December 2020, China and Russia extended their agreement on mutual notification of missile launches. Given the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the global arms control regime suffering another setback, the continued strengthening of China-Russia cooperation and coordination on mutual notification of ballistic missiles and on-launch vehicles contributes to global strategic stability and security. If in the previous phase of China-Russia space cooperation the two countries only cooperated at a superficial level, the recent phase of space cooperation between the two sides has significantly expanded and deepened. It not only includes the sale of components but has also deepened into cooperation in space technology and space science and further expanded into the field of space security. China-Russia space cooperation has thus taken substantial steps. As China’s space technology continues to make strides, large-scale space projects — including the BeiDou system and deep space exploration on the moon and Mars — are advancing steadily and making great achievements, while Russia is under sanctions from the United States and other Western countries and its space budget is restricted. This has affected the progress of space projects, making Russia change its past “strong” posture and negotiate with China on an equal footing, which in turn reflects the win-win nature of cooperation. + +- While one can say that the above China-Russia space technology cooperation is divided into two phases, before and after [the 2014 Ukraine crisis], space diplomacy cooperation between the two countries has maintained a close posture ever since the end of the Cold War, because space is tightly linked to international security and national security. As is well known, the advent of the space age was closely tied to the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race. Space is the “eyes and ears” of strategic nuclear forces and is an extremely important aid in strategic deterrence. With the development of space technology, satellites not only became information platforms that provide services and facilitation for military operations — such as communications, weather, and navigation — but also firepower platforms or firepower delivery platforms. As a result, satellites became military force “multipliers” and “enablers,” and a space dominance doctrine also emerged. + +- Under circumstances where diplomatic efforts were unable to curb the U.S. weaponization of space, some countries had to take countermeasures, developing and stockpiling anti-satellite weapons, and thus opening the curtain on a new round of the space arms race. Space-based and ground-based kinetic anti-satellite weapons, directed energy anti-satellite weapons, and cyber and radio frequency anti-satellite weapons have emerged or will soon emerge. Given the irreplaceable role of space and its technologies for economic and social development, the weaponization of space not only threatens the safety of satellites operating in orbit but also has serious negative effects on economic development and social welfare. Furthermore, the increasingly close integration of space with the command and control systems of a country’s military leads to potentially huge threats to national security. More importantly, the integration of space and nuclear strategic forces, along with the weaponization of space, can have serious and potentially disruptive effects on international strategic balance and stability. In short, the weaponization of space is a threat to world peace and can also cause enormous damage to economic development and social welfare. To strengthen national security and promote economic development, as well as to maintain international security, China and Russia cooperate with each other in summit diplomacy and in multilateral processes, taking practical actions to prevent the arms race in space and the weaponization of space. + +- When the United States moved to implement theater missile defense systems and a national missile defense system, China and Russia judged that the United States was likely to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, and therefore called on the United States to comply with it. The November 1998 Joint Statement on Sino-Russian Relations at the Turn of the Century, the December 1999 Sino-Russian Joint Statement, and the July 2000 Joint Statement on Anti-Ballistic Missile Issues all emphasized that the ABM Treaty is a cornerstone of international strategic stability, and that the U.S. development of a national missile defense system and construction of ABM systems would have destructive effects. + +- More importantly, the United States has not only expanded its ABM system in spite of the international community’s opposition, but it has also deployed the “Shore-based Aegis” system and the “SAD” system in Europe and Asia, and further developed and stockpiled space weapons, sharply increasing the threat that space will be weaponized and turned into a zone of military confrontation. + +- In June 2019, the heads of state of China and Russia once again expressed their concerns and worries. Calling on all countries to work to ban the weaponization of space, they said that U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty undermines strategic stability and triggers an arms race; the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and especially “the development of its strategic anti-missile systems, and its plans to deploy them in different regions of the world and in space, continue to have serious negative repercussions for international and regional strategic balance, and security stability,” and “the real prospect of an arms race in space, and its evolution into a frontier of military conflict, threaten strategic stability.” + +- In fact, the originator of the weaponization of space in the post-Cold War era was the United States, and the goal of preventing an arms race in space and controlling space armaments can only be truly achieved by reaching a legally binding international treaty with the United States prohibiting the weaponization of space. + +- Bilateral relations have made a qualitative leap, and a new type of Sino relations has been established that is “non-Russian aligned, nonconfrontational, and not targeted at third parties,” and political friendship and trust have laid a firm foundation for in-depth cooperation between the two countries in various fields. China-Russia space technology cooperation is the result of the deepening development of relations between China and Russia, whether that cooperation is in space equipment (e.g., rockets, satellite-borne electronics), joint technology research (e.g., space materials), data cooperation (e.g., deep space exploration information), or technical and policy cooperation involving space security. It is a concrete manifestation of the close relationship between the two countries. The expansion and deepening of once nonexistent space cooperation between the two countries also resulted from the respective space development dynamics of China and Russia, while the United States has been a key variable as well. + +- In particular, at times of great achievements in China’s manned spaceflight, BeiDou system, and lunar exploration projects, or when they were about to make great achievements or afterwards, Russia significantly slowed down the process of space cooperation with China. “This kind of cooperation was modest in scale in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and this momentum has waned since then.” + +- The difficulty in advancing such cooperation lay partly in the fact that Russia and China had yet to sign an agreement on the protection of intellectual property rights in space fields, but the real reason was that Russia considered itself technologically advanced in space and feared that “serious” cooperation with China would develop China into a competitor. + +- As is well known, launch vehicle engines are indeed the core technical components of missiles. Russia banned the export of RD-180 rocket engines to China on the grounds that doing so would violate the Missile Technology Control Regime. Russia let the engines be sold to the United States, however, and even after being subjected to U.S. sanctions, it did not use the mechanism mentioned above to initiate counter-sanctions. This once again showed that Russia did not want to promote the improvement of Chinese space technology through cooperation and turn China into a competitor. On the one hand, in the first phase Russia generally considered its space technology superior to China’s, so cooperation in space was a “gift” to China. On the other hand, with the development of Chinese space technology, including manned spaceflight, Russia was wary of cooperation because it feared that China would overtake it. + +- In addition to the existence of a significant portion of pro-Western forces within Russia and the sowing of discord between Russia and China by the United States and the West, from a power transfer point of view, Russia’s decline from Soviet-era superpower to one of the world’s top powers resulted in a significant psychological disconnect, and feelings about China’s rise were complicated. Therefore, in the first phase of China-Russia space cooperation, Russia did not have a sincere desire to cooperate with China. At that time, Russia preferred to cooperate with the West. + +- Moreover, although Russia extended an olive branch of space cooperation to China to promote Sino-Russian relations and alleviate the strategic pressure exerted on it by the United States, the European Union, and NATO, it feared that cooperation between the two countries would promote China’s technological progress in space, thereby diminishing its voice in Sino-Russian relations. + +- Because of the technological gap, the degree of Russian-Chinese space cooperation was not as high as Russian-U.S. space cooperation, so Russian-Chinese space cooperation was limited to a buying and selling relationship for some time. More importantly, Russia’s fear that China’s rise would impinge upon its political and economic interests led to further conservatism in China-Russia cooperation in science and technology. + +- The crisis in Ukraine — and especially the annexation of Crimea by Russia — led the West to impose tougher sanctions on Russia, once again demonstrating that the West fundamentally distrusts Russia and still sees Russia as a security threat, especially with Biden having called Putin a “killer.” + +- Under the influence of Western sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic, the lack of funding for the development of Russia’s space industry and the aging and loss of S&T personnel — including in the space field — have combined to further slow the development of Russia’s space technology and industry, and there are even difficulties in maintaining satellite ground facilities. + +- At the same time, development of China’s space industry has been rapid, especially in the twenty-first century, and China’s space technology has become increasingly sophisticated. + +- The development of China’s space technology and industry and the advancement of its space program have propelled China’s rapid space power development. Russia’s space technology, industry, and program have progressed more slowly, and the pace of its development has been far below China’s. China’s leap in space technology has led to a relatively substantial reduction in Russia’s overall space advantage, and its sense of superiority has fallen along with it. While Russia still has certain advantages, by expanding and deepening cooperation with China and mutually complementing advantages with China in the fields of deep space exploration and navigation satellites Russia can exchange its advantages for technologies and equipment it does not have, based on the principle of reciprocity. Therefore, Russia decided to cooperate in the field of positioning and navigation satellites, which was a breakthrough in space cooperation with China. In this second stage, Russia is cooperating with China in space technology on an equal footing, with almost no sense of superiority, and it has provided China with missile early warning system technology while China has given Russia corresponding assistance in space technology. + +- Nevertheless, in the process of China-Russia space cooperation, there are three aspects that indeed surpass the geopolitical considerations between China and Russia, and this is beyond doubt. First, China-Russia space cooperation promotes the development of space technology in both countries and plays an important role in forming a stable China-U.S.-Russia triangular relationship in space, which is in the interests of both countries. . . . Secondly, the two countries’ close cooperation on launch vehicle engines and global navigation systems, and their commitment to cooperation on an international lunar station, etc., will not only contribute to the joint progress of Russian and Chinese space technology but will also help in building strategic stability and a balanced landscape in space, in making space a common heritage of all mankind, and in striving to put into practice the principles and purposes of the peaceful uses of space as established in the preamble and Article I of the Outer Space Treaty. And thirdly, space cooperation between the two countries will be conducive to the development of the space production chains of both sides. + +- At the same time, they can also give full play to their comparative advantages in the space field, expand and extend production chains, form a new division of labor system, drive the development of technology overall, and enhance their ability to resist Western sanctions. + +- Space cooperation between China and Russia has enhanced mutual political trust between the two countries and further deepened their strategic partnership. + +- Cooperation between the two countries on space diplomacy will further consolidate and deepen the strategic partnership. China and Russia alike face strategic pressure from U.S. antimissile systems and space weapons, and the two countries have cooperated with each other at the United Nations, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and the Conference on Disarmament, making ceaseless efforts to prevent an arms race in space and contribute to the maintenance of global strategic stability, as well as making arduous efforts to build a fair and just space governance system. + +- China-Russia space cooperation is the result of space geopolitics, and space cooperation between the two countries will likewise reshape space geopolitics. It will contribute to the relative stability of the space order, specifically by contributing to the multipolarity of space; prevent celestial bodies such as the moon from being enclosed by the United States and other countries; and prevent the weaponization of space, which will have an important impact on the formation of the future rules of space governance and the shaping of the future space landscape. The key to maintaining a multipolar space hinges on a relatively stable China-U.S.-Russia space triangle. + +- However, with the outbreak of the [2014] crisis in Ukraine, and especially since the Trump administration took office, the space landscape has taken on an asymmetrical character, with an almost entirely one-sided tilt toward the United States. + +- This trend is detrimental to the stability of the space landscape. With the expansion and deepening of China-Russia space cooperation, there is bound to be rapid development of mutual cooperation between their research institutes and enterprises, whether in state-led space projects or in commercial space projects, and the number of state-owned satellites and commercial satellite constellations launched by the two countries will certainly increase a great deal, narrowing the gap with the United States. + +- In view of the attempts of the United States and other Western countries to seek sovereignty over celestial bodies under the pretext of deep space exploration and planetary resource development, China and Russia have repeatedly signed agreements on deep space exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies, jointly exploring and landing on the moon, establishing their own lunar bases, and setting up a joint lunar research station open to the world. This indicates to the world that any attempt by any country to use advanced technology to enclose the moon and Mars will be strongly opposed by China and Russia, which are determined to preserve the status and properties of the moon and other celestial bodies as a global commons and the common heritage of all mankind. + +- The weaponization of space by the United States and its allies in NATO and elsewhere is undoubtedly causing damage to the peaceful use of space, as well as to global strategic stability and balance. + +- In fact, China and Russia possess some degree of antisatellite capability, and they have held joint cyber anti-missile exercises as a direct response to the United States’ weaponization of space and refusal to conclude an international treaty banning the weaponization of space. Although the two countries’ space cooperation does not directly involve anti-satellite content, cooperation in the field of space technology, which is dual-use technology, has a strong connotations of a military alliance in space. + +- In addition, President Putin announced in 2019 that Russia is helping China build a missile early warning system. This was a strong signal that the two countries are cooperating substantively in the military space field, enhancing the defense partnership between Russia and China, and potentially forming a joint Sino-Russian anti-missile system. The possibility of Russia exporting to China S-500 anti-missile systems with anti-space weapon capabilities in the event of a deteriorating space situation is not ruled out, nor is the possibility of China-Russia cooperation in anti-space technology. According to U.S. reports, China and Russia have different anti-missile capabilities and technologies, with Russia’s space-based co-orbital “nesting doll” anti-satellite technology and China’s mid-range anti-missile technology and antisatellite technology each having its own advantages. Cooperation between China and Russia on anti-satellite technology could be a nightmare for U.S. satellites. Until there is a treaty banning the weaponization of space, China-Russia space cooperation, especially military cooperation in space, is a strong cornerstone for preventing space from being weaponized and turned into a battlefield. The highly developed Sino-Russian military relationship is a key factor in promoting global strategic stability, and it has played an important role in maintaining global and regional stability. + +- With the imbalance in Chinese, U.S., and Russian space power, neither China nor Russia alone can stop the United States from pursuing its stated strategies and policies. + +- China-Russia space cooperation, especially the establishment of a joint lunar research station, is a concrete attempt to implement the concept of global governance of ”negotiation, joint construction, and sharing” and to build a community of human destiny in space, and it is also a way for China to provide Chinese solutions and Chinese wisdom for changing space governance. As to whether the above goals can be achieved, or whether there will be one pole in space led by the United States and another pole with China and Russia jointly, depends to some extent on Russia. + +#### Russian Documents on Sino-Russian Understandings of Hybrid Warfare + +Alexandr Bartosh, “Китай и Россию сближает угроза гибридной войны: Медведь и панда на службе миру” [[China and Russia Are Brought Closer by the Threat of a Hybrid War: Bear and Panda in the Service of the World, Military-Industrial Courier, October 22, 2019](https://vpk-news.ru/articles/53176)]. + +- The correlation between the concepts of “cultural focus” and “strategic culture” is an important subject for another study. Let me merely point out the closeness of the cultural focuses of Russia and China, which reflects the general interest of the two powers in defense projects and the prevention of a major military conflict. An important step in strengthening the strategic partnership was the decision of the Russian Federation to deploy a Missile Defense Alarm System (MIDAS) in the PRC. Until now, only the United States and Russia had such a system. Now, China will join them. The decision testifies to the real depth of Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation and the degree of trust between Moscow and Beijing. The latter will have at its disposal a complex of special technical means for detecting ballistic missiles, calculating their trajectory, and transmitting information to the command center, which is then reported as an attack on the state with the use of missile weapons, prompting an urgent decision on the response. There are also other steps to deepen the relations, particularly in terms of the development of measures to counter any hybrid aggression from the United States and the West as a whole, which may aim at both our countries. In this context, it would be interesting to study the approaches of Russia and China to confronting a hybrid war and a “color revolution.” + +- The opinions of authoritative Russian experts on hybrid warfare can be summarized as follows: the term is of Western origin. The theory of hybrid warfare, which was developed in the West, is now being tested all over the world. Its essence lies in the complex use of hard and soft power tools, in erasing the differences between war and peace, which is an important feature of the conflicts of the twenty-first century. . . . Hybrid warfare is characterized by high adaptability to the conditions in which it is prepared and conducted; a continuity and connection with “color revolutions”; and multidimensional struggle in the military, informational, economic, political, socio-cultural, and other fields. + +- According to the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov. . . . Our response is based on active defense, which relies on theoretical studies and substantiation of a set of measures primarily aimed at the preventive neutralization of threats. + +- Today, the type of interstate confrontation studied by Sun Tzu is what we call “hybrid warfare.” The Chinese strategist formulated its conceptual essence: to achieve victory over the enemy without fighting it, by avoiding direct military clashes with enemy armies. He argued that the best war is waged this way: first, by breaking the plans of the enemy; second, by breaking their alliances; and only then, by breaking their troops. For millennia, the essence of Chinese technologies to “live and survive” has been the desire to achieve the necessary results with as little effort and material costs as possible. + +- The technologies of the “color revolution” that Sun Tzu spoke about naturally interact with the hybrid warfare strategy. According to his plan, the main objective of a geopolitical attack during wars should, in fact, be the ruling elite of the enemy state — the ruler himself, his inner circle, and the military leaders, who must be actively influenced by various means — so as to “outplay them with a plan” and thus “prevent them from winning.” Geopolitical adversaries are trying to assign the authorship of the hybrid warfare strategy to Russia and China, arguing that today the all-encompassing integral strategy of geopolitical struggle — hybrid warfare and “color revolution” — are used by China in its competitive struggle with the United States. + +- Nonetheless, it is the United States and its satellites that have long been trying to break up Russia and China, relying on the “fifth column” and other subversive technologies. + +- Confrontation in the public mind is an important element of hybrid warfare. + +- With the support of the armed forces, attack and defense are carried out in areas such as social media-based public opinion, electronic means of dissemination of information, psychology, and cyberattacks. Overwhelming advantage is then achieved through the use of a large number of precision weapons in military operations. + +- Thus, the assessments of hybrid warfare strategies made by Russian and Chinese experts are very similar. From a political point of view, it is important to have a common understanding that the initiators of hybrid warfare and “color revolutions” against geopolitical competitors have been invariably the United States and Western countries. Any recognition of a single source of threats to the national security of Russia and China should serve as a unifying factor in developing a strategy for joint countermeasures. + +- To summarize, we should note that, for Russia’s relations with China in the context of the geopolitical confrontation with the United States and the West, it seems to be extremely important that we take into account one of the distinguishing features of the Chinese logic of thinking, which has shaped its national strategic culture. Its essence is that “a unity may split in two forces, but changes would follow through a combination of not two but three forces.” Thus, by the Chinese logic, one has to find and attract a third force in the face of a clear confrontation between two sides. + +- It is unlikely that, in today’s uncertain and chaotic international environment and in the face of its deteriorating relations with the United States, China would be interested in weakening Russia. Rather, on the contrary, an important factor in ensuring the national security of both states should be their mutual interest in each state’s stable and sustainable development. The stakes in the geopolitical confrontation between the three powers are extremely high, and we should not rule out the possibility that the United States may initiate sophisticated maneuvers to split the partnership between Moscow and Beijing. The objective of Russian politicians, diplomats, and the military should be to find a worthy response. + +Viktor Murakhovsky, “Безопасность страны как фундамент развития” [[National Security as a Foundation for National Development, interview with Andrei Ilnitsky, Homeland’s Arsenal Journal, 51, no. 1, March 30, 2021](https://arsenal-otechestva.ru/article/1414-bezopasnost-strany-kak-fundament-razvitiya)]. + +- However, under the influence of various currents of Western ideology, Russian society distressingly and increasingly crumbled from within. Today, we can see that part of both the Russian elite and society is ready to lean on currently fashionable Western ideological trends and lifestyles. Americans do not differentiate between informational, psychological, cyber operations, and electronic warfare, considering them as an equitable domain of a joint battle space in multidomain operations along with space, air, land, and water. + +- The West, led by the United States, has unleashed an information-hybrid war against Russia. Its task is to overstrain Russia, to knock us off our targets, to unbalance the situation. + +- All this creates a new type of warfare. While in a classical war, the goal is to destroy the opponent’s manpower, in today’s cyberwars, the goal is to destroy the opponent’s infrastructure. In fact, the goal of the new warfare is to destroy the opponent’s identity and to change the mental and civilizational basis of the opponent’s society. I would call this type of warfare mental. Furthermore, if the manpower and infrastructure can at least be restored, the evolution of identity is an irreversible process, especially if the consequences of such mental warfare emerge only gradually — and only by skipping at least a generation, when it is too late to do anything. + +- And the main weapon here is the World Wide Web; so, whoever owns it and provides its content has a strategic advantage. Unfortunately, we must admit that in this case the advantage is not ours. + +- Taking into account the merging of manipulative and cyber-strike means, followed by their gradual legalization as tools of influence against competitors and potential adversaries during peacetime, we urgently need to clarify the role that the Russian Armed Forces should play in such a setting. + +- Digital platforms and artificial intelligence technologies can also be actively used in the desovereignization of Russia by creating gaps in national security. + +- Experts know that, in the information war, there is only one tactic for victory — an offensive. So, to repel any aggressive attacks on our country, we should bring down the opponent’s agenda and seize the initiative. Now, should we then completely break off the cooperation with the West? + +- Of course, no! We need a dialogue. The dialogue should not be just for the sake of a dialogue but from the platform of national interests, an example of which Putin gave at the Davos Club when he outlined our vision of the ways and scenarios of world development. I think and hope that, in the near future, “red lines” will be drawn on the geopolitical field, with the mapping of the landmarks of Russia’s national interests, which no one will be allowed to cross. + +- Here are just a few of the most important countermeasures: Internet sovereignty [and] strict blocking of the activities of foreign social media for spreading any information about unauthorized rallies and for any provocation of a protest. + +- The West, led by the United States, avoids a direct military confrontation with Russia, as Russia is capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on them. The concept of a rapid global strike and the U.S. National Defense Strategy frankly states that the “hot war” should be preceded or completely replaced by the so-called proxy or hybrid war. + +- If Russia “does not change the minds” of our opponents, does not counteract or frustrate the aggressive plans of the United States and NATO, it will lose the initiative and be forced to maintain a passive defense in extremely unfavorable conditions. Inaction actually dooms our country to existence under the agenda imposed by Americans and their agents of influence. And this categorically does not correspond to Russia’s sovereign choice. Unfortunately, in Russia, the expert analytical support of the national security policy is far from optimal. We have not yet created an effective system corresponding to the new hybrid challenges. And the existing institutional and semantic field is broken down by departments and disciplines, which has left it unbalanced. We do not have an integrative center for development and decision making in national security, and we haven’t established a network of expert analytical institutions (think tanks) working and competing under a common government strategy. + +Alexandr Bartosh, “Стратегии сдерживания и принуждения как инструменты дипломатии XXI века” [[Deterrence and Coercion Strategies as Instruments of 21st Century Diplomacy, Scientific Research Center for Problems of National Security, April 2022](https://nic-pnb.ru/analytics/strategii-sderzhivaniya-i-prinuzhdeniya-kak-instrumenty-diplomatii-xxi-veka/)]. + +- The main task is to take measures to protect the space of our vital interests, primarily in the territories of our neighbors, many of which have been turned into theaters of a hybrid war against Russia. It is necessary to develop a strategy for a long-term confrontation in each direction, to look for a strong ally-partner to counter, who is ready to make a significant contribution to the implementation of a long-term strategy for joint struggle. + +- Under these conditions, an important place should be given to maintaining, improving, and building up our intelligence potential, along with its mining and analytical structures, which are capable of carrying out systematic work to preempt enemy actions with the timely detection of non-traditional threats and the preparation of operational recommendations for their neutralization. The potential of forces and means of counterintelligence, special information structures, a well-established mechanism of military-civilian interaction and means of territorial defense should be able to guarantee the internal security of the entire country. + +- It is important to consider that the sources of advantage on the battlefield will shift from traditional factors, such as the size of forces and the level of weapons, to factors such as increased efficiency in obtaining and processing intelligence information based on modern forces and means as well as the computing power used in analysis, ensuring the security of strategic management systems. + +Alexandr Bartosh, “Разведка России в противостоянии гибридным угрозам” [[The Role of Russian Intelligence in Countering Hybrid Wars, Independent Military Digest, June 2017](https://nvo.ng.ru/nvo/2017-10-06/1_968_scouting.html)]. + +> Together with the CSTO, CIS, and SCO allies, we should take steps to update and coordinate our capabilities of implementing preventive strategic communication and optimize our use of monitoring to counter hybrid threats, including any indicators that enable quick predictions and recognition of any threatening situations in the administrative, political, socio-economic and cultural, and ideological areas. A priority area of our joint activities together with the CSTO, the CIS, and the SCO should be to ensure our ability to reveal and fend off any threats of color revolutions in a timely fashion and to work ahead of the curve. To this end, within the framework of our joint strategy, we should develop plans to prepare for repelling any threat, introduce information exchange methods for allies and partners, and take joint steps to combat the financing of color revolutions. We should submit this as a priority project: adapting the defense capabilities of Russia, the CSTO, the CIS, and the SCO, and ensuring a response to any hybrid threats against any of the countries or coalitions. We should explore military responses to hybrid threats by developing an appropriate regulatory framework through dialog, strengthened cooperation, and coordination in terms of situational awareness, strategic communications, cybersecurity, crisis prevention, and response to countering hybrid threats. + +Alexandr Bartosh, “Стратегии сдерживания и принуждения как инструменты дипломатии XXI века” [[Deterrence and Coercion Strategies as Instruments of 21st Century Diplomacy, Scientific Research Center for Problems of National Security, April 2022](https://nic-pnb.ru/analytics/strategii-sderzhivani-ya-i-prinuzhdeniya-kak-instrumenty-diplomatii-xxi-veka/)]. + +- As for Russian–Chinese relations, we can attest to the advancement in their bilateral and multilateral interactions. Russia and China have developed a working mechanism for cooperation in the fields of information technology and cybersecurity. Their main working areas are: activities of the Russian–Chinese Subcommittee on Communications and Information Technologies (these concern the diversification of high-tech technology supply channels, including data storage systems and telecommunication equipment; the strengthening of network security; the improvement of management efficiency; and the development of the global information space); . . . interactions within the UN, SCO, and BRICS; . . . cooperation between the defense departments of the Russian Federation and China; . . . [and] dialogs and interactions among experts. . . . An important element in this mechanism has been the Russian–Chinese Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Ensuring International Information Security, signed in May 2015, which defines the areas of interaction in the information and digital areas. According to the document, countries will jointly respond to the most acute threats to international information security, while opposing any uses of information and communication technologies that may assist in any terrorist acts and/or interfere with internal affairs, undermine sovereignty or political stability, or incite ethnic or religious hatred, etc. This agreement has been of fundamental importance for the countries’ bilateral relations, despite its framework nature. + +- Meanwhile, the process of solving any practical issues of cybersecurity, even within the SCO framework, has been quite complicated and confusing, despite the continual contacts and the existing agreement on cooperation between the countries. Cyber incidents have happened even between full members of the Organization. + +- The need to extend confidence-building measures to cyberspace are also dictated by the current state of affairs within the SCO, the RIC, and in the areas where the interests of the Eurasian countries, trying to build a new type of relations, generally intersect. However, achieving mutual trust in cyberspace has been one of the most difficult problems. + +- Nonetheless, there has been some progress in this direction. The defense departments of the Russian Federation and China have taken certain practical measures. These include, for example, staff network exercises. In December 2017, Russia and China held their second joint computer-aided command-and-staff missile defense exercise, Aerospace Security 2017. The first such exercises were held in May 2016 by the Central Research Institute of the Aerospace Defense Troops of the Russian Ministry of Defense. And in the summer of 2017, information appeared in the media about the study of technical capabilities for creating a joint Russian–Chinese technological platform for repelling cyber threats and reducing risks in the information space. + +- Nonetheless, there has been a serious breakthrough in Russian–Chinese relations. Today, the partners have created favorable conditions for further thematic dialogs through diplomatic, military, and other channels, and for exchanging information and communication technology products. All this may contribute to the creation in the future of a special platform that would prevent any threat of risks in cyberspace. The sphere of information and digital interaction between the parties has been gradually expanding. It involves the participation in the global management of the information environment, while observing one’s own interests and understanding that one’s partner has similar aspirations. The countries have also been working on creating the conditions for cooperation in the technological sphere and in the development and creation of modern technical means for counteracting and repelling cyber threats. Thus, despite the extreme complexity and inconsistency of the international conditions, Russia and China have managed to build positive cooperative interactions in the digital sphere and to accumulate constructive experiences. + +#### Chinese Documents on Sino-Russian Understandings of Hybrid Warfare + +Han Aiyong, “大国地缘政治竞争的新嬗变——以混合战争和灰色地带为例” [[The New Transmutation of Geopolitical Competition among Great Powers – The Example of Hybrid Warfare and Gray Areas, Teaching and Research Journal, 2022, original version 2019](https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDAUTO&filename=JWDP202202007)]. + +- In terms of targeting, hybrid warfare does not seek a head-to-head conflict between the great powers, but rather focuses on how to win hearts and minds. More specifically, U.S. hybrid warfare serves the need to preserve global hegemony, and its logic is offensive and globalist. Russian hybrid warfare, on the other hand, is used to restore Russia’s glory as a Eurasian power, and its logic is defensive and Eurasian. Both point to two key fringes: strategic pivot countries and the periphery of the great powers. The competition for strategic pivot states is intended to maintain and expand the international political influence of the great powers. + +- It can be seen that hybrid warfare has a distinct political attribute of serving the needs of great power competition; that is, it does not seek head-to-head confrontation between the great powers, but rather acquires geopolitical advantages by means of proxy wars or proxy destruction. + +- As a means of great power competition, the impact of hybrid warfare on the competitive process is extremely obvious. First, the violent nature of hybrid warfare and the competition for the peripheral zones of the great powers and strategic pivot areas are making indirect low-intensity conflicts between the great powers a reality. Second, the combined use of various instruments in hybrid warfare has forced the great powers to pay more attention to the way they use their forces and their composition while strengthening their armed forces. Third, the competitive logic of hybrid warfare is to create a “controllable” chaos or crisis and then to shape a favorable strategic posture by rebuilding peace and restoring order. This suggests that the ability to respond to major international crises and national governance has become a key element of great power competition. + +- The U.S. National Security Advisory Council summarizes gray-zone tactics into 10 categories: cyber and information warfare, covert operations, special forces, support for insurgent or terrorist activities, financing of nongovernmental actors, assistance to irregular forces, economic pressure, manipulation and undermining of democratic institutions, deliberate ambiguous actions, and explicit or implicit threats of force. + +- The most basic connotation of hybrid warfare also refers to the combined use of various means of destruction. The second aspect is the combined use of unconventional and conventional tools. A common tactic in gray-zone competition is the use of historical narratives, civilian intervention, fait accompli, psychological warfare, legal warfare, and other unconventional tools, which are coordinated with conventional tools such as alliance building, forward force presence, economic sanctions, and support for opposition forces to form a combined competitive force. + +- The geographic areas where great powers engage in geopolitical competition are usually on the periphery of another great power — that is, the strategic pivot areas and the periphery of the great powers — and in this respect, hybrid warfare, gray zones, and traditional great power competition are not dissimilar. The new twist, however, is that the great powers are increasingly focused on using “color revolutions,” cyberattacks, and narrative reshaping to induce changes within their rivals in their favor. For example, the “color revolution” as a hybrid warfare tandem configuration is an effort to magnify a certain imbalance in the field of economic and social development within the competitor country, support internal opposition and its base of activity — the fifth column, agents of foreign powers, and other forces — to create, when complemented by external forces, systemic crisis events within the competitor country. . . . This then creates the conditions for the use of coercive means to eventually destroy the legitimacy of the government’s actions or even overthrow it. This suggests a shift in the focus of the strategy of the great powers on the periphery of competition toward internal governance and the winning of hearts and minds. + +- The rise of hybrid warfare and gray zones also poses new challenges and requirements for building national capacity to respond to international crises. Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy in the Ukraine crisis has put NATO’s proudly strong response mechanism into widespread question and caused NATO to be highly alarmed. This suggests that strong military forces alone cannot effectively respond to new crisis patterns and that maximizing the effectiveness of force use depends not only on the force itself but also on the coordination between force components to create maximum synergy. + +- The new transmutation of geopolitical competition among the great powers has brought inspiration to China. It shows that the means of competition are becoming more integrated, the process of competition is becoming increasingly blurred, and although the focus of competition revolves around the international order, the essence of competition is a struggle over the strength and weakness of national governance capacity. This has at least three implications for China’s response to the increasingly fierce geopolitical competition among the great powers. + +- _One is to adhere to multilateralism and to mosaic international behavior and international interests in multilateral mechanisms as much as possible_. . . . At the regional level, China can reduce the concerns of its neighbors about China’s rise by embedding its international behavior and international interests in multilateral mechanisms and by using the construction and smooth operation of these mechanisms to realize its own preferences. + +- _Second, it is necessary to establish a systemic concept to deal with the geopolitical competition among the great powers_. . . . As China’s power grows and its international influence expands, it is especially important to fully estimate the possible international and regional spillover effects of domestic policies and to have the necessary response plans. In terms of timing, it is important to integrate current and future interests, to look to the future, and to reserve sufficient space for rules of action after national rejuvenation. In terms of concrete operations, while focusing on building hard and soft power it is also necessary to pay more attention to the organization and structure of forces and the coordinated use of various forces, so that they can demonstrate more flexible and coordinated response capabilities when dealing with emergencies. + +- _Third, the fundamental strategy to deal with the geopolitical competition among the great powers lies in “doing our own thing.”_ Although geopolitical competition among the great powers is an international phenomenon, it is fundamentally a competition between the strengths and weaknesses of internal governance capabilities of states. This is evident from the use of hybrid warfare and gray zones as a means of competition, focusing on creating psychological and physical chaos within competitors to gain a competitive advantage. + +Wang Chensheng, “中俄协作网络空间治理的基础与路径分析” [[Reflections on the Joint Prevention of ‘Color Revolutions’ in Russia and China, Eurasian Humanities Studies, 2022](https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2018&filename=GJXW201709003)]. + +- The term “color revolutions” originally referred specifically to the regime changes that occurred in CIS countries at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In the countries where “color revolutions” occurred, the opposition, with the support of Western countries, took advantage of the presidential and parliamentary elections to demonstrate against the government, using flowers, patterns, or clothing of a certain color as symbols in order to force the government leaders to step down and establish a pro-Western regime based on Western values. + +- It should be said that the “color revolutions” around the peripheral regions of Russia and China are only “pre-game warm-ups,” and that Russia and China are the ultimate targets of the “color revolutions” carried out by the United States and other Western countries. + +- In recent years, as the United States and other Western countries have successfully implemented “color revolutions” in Central Asia and other regions, the circle of “color revolutions” against China and Russia has been quietly tightened. While actively promoting it externally, the United States and other Western countries are also trying to find a breakthrough in China and Russia, frequently meddling in the internal affairs of the two countries and staging despicable plays to subvert legitimate regimes in China and Russia. In addition, Biden has issued several tough statements against China and Russia since he took office. All these signs indicate that the threat of “color revolutions” in China and Russia is growing, and it is urgent for the two countries to cooperate to prevent “color revolutions.” + +- The United States and other Western countries, in collusion with reactionary separatists inside and outside of China, have openly fabricated and provoked China’s internal social problems in an attempt to dismantle China from within by means of “color revolutions.” Whether in the separatist activities of “Xinjiang independence” and “Tibet independence,” or in the Occupy Central rallies and “legislative amendment fiasco” in Hong Kon the West is behind them all. + +- In recent years, Russia has witnessed several large-scale demonstrations against President Vladimir Putin. Although it cannot be ruled out that some of these demonstrations do express some legitimate political demands of the people, the real situation is that the United States wants to use the social contradictions in Russia to fan the flames and maliciously intensify the conflict between the people and the government. + +- Secondly, “color revolutions” tend to involve younger people. Compared to the traditional “color revolution” in which middle-aged people were the main force, the participants of the “color revolution” in recent years tend to be younger and younger, and students have become the vanguard of the “color revolution”. . . . Not only is the use of social media by the opposition much cheaper and more efficient, the instantaneous nature of social media messages is also more insidious and difficult to combat. + +- One new development that we must pay particular attention to in terms of the threat of a “color revolution” against Russia and China is the arrival of Democrat Joe Biden in the White House in early 2021. Compared to his predecessor, Donald Trump, the possibility of a “color revolution” in the United States under Biden’s leadership has increased significantly, and the threat of a “color revolution” against Russia and China, as the main core targets, has increased. + +- As Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, “the more turbulent the world becomes, the more resolute Chinese-Russian cooperation will be.” China and Russia will build a model of strategic mutual trust, firmly support one another in defending their core vital interests, jointly oppose “color revolutions,” combat all kinds of disinformation, and safeguard the autonomy and security of each regime. + +- Chinese and Russian media must strengthen cooperation and effectively carry out international public opinion guidance and public opinion struggles. At present, the dominance of international public opinion is firmly held by Western countries led by the United States. . . . Faced with the powerful public opinion offensive of the West, China and Russia should not simply defend themselves and respond passively but should also make joint statements, take the initiative, and actively engage in a war of international public opinion with the West. + +- The SCO and CSTO are both regional security organizations, and maintaining regional security and stability is a common goal for both. At present, most of the SCO and CSTO member states are common members of both organizations, and most of them are countries at high risk of “color revolutions.” Therefore, it is very important for the two to cooperate in dealing with “color revolutions.” + +- The two organizations should intensify their military exercises to jointly respond to external interventions. During the political crisis in Belarus in 2020, the opposition fled abroad after the failure of the planned “color revolution” only to receive strong support from Western countries, with plans to launch another campaign to seize power from abroad. For example, the leader of the Belarusian opposition, Tikhanovskaya, who fled to Poland, was given an official residence in the capital as a “presidential palace in exile,” while Lithuania helped her set up an opposition coordination committee in the Lithuanian capital. In addition, Europe and the United States have pressured Belarusian authorities to overthrow Lukashenko’s regime through verbal intimidation, threats of sanctions, and leading NATO troops up to the Belarusian border. In the face of dual pressure from the domestic opposition and the external military, the government in power is usually unable to cope. For this reason, the two organizations should focus on strengthening military exercises with emphasis on emergency response in case of intervention by external forces in member states so that member states will have the strength to resist “color revolution” attempts in the face of external intervention. For example, shortly after the outbreak of the Belarusian crisis, the CSTO held the Indestructible Brotherhood 2020 joint military exercise in Belarus in response to NATO’s provocations on the Belarusian border. In the future, the SCO should also strengthen the organization of targeted military exercises in similar emergency situations to prevent external forces from violently interfering in the internal affairs of the organization’s member states. At the same time, the two organizations can attempt to conduct cross-organizational military exercises to jointly defend peace and tranquility in Eurasia. + +- The two organizations should strengthen exchanges and communication between member states and work together to deal with the threat of “color revolutions.” The SCO and CSTO should conduct security dialogues on the topic of “color revolutions” so that countries can share and exchange information within the organization, conduct risk assessments of “color revolutions” in relevant countries, and then formulate countermeasures to mitigate risks as swiftly as possible. Specifically, member states can be organized to exchange experiences on coping with “color revolutions.” For example, Russia has rich experience in dealing with “color revolutions;” in recent years, Russia has not only successfully thwarted several “color revolutions” against its own country but also accumulated a wealth of practical experience in the process of responding to “color revolutions” in CIS countries, with an impressive capacity for maintaining national interests and strategic security in crisis management. In addition, Russia has adopted legislative control over foreign NGOs and news media, as well as strict legal management of parades and assemblies (Jiang Li, 2015: 13). Russia can teach and share the above experience with members of the two organizations. As an important member of the SCO, China can share with other member states its experience in handling the Hong Kong issue in recent years. As the saying goes, preparedness ensures success, unpreparedness spells failure. Only in this way can we address “the weakest link” and can the overall capacity of member states to deal with “color revolutions” be improved. + +Shan Xiaoying, “关于中俄共同防范“颜色革命”的思考” [[An Analysis of the Foundation and Approach of Sino-Russian Cooperation in Cyberspace Governance, Chinese Journal of Journalism and Communications, 2017](https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2022&filename=OYRW202201004)]. + +- A more important basis for collaboration is that both governments share the same perception of “cyber sovereignty” and prefer a government-led “multilateralism” mechanism of cyberspace governance. + +- On the issue of the attributes of cyberspace, the United States and other information powers consider cyberspace to be a “public domain” and therefore deny or hold an ambiguous attitude toward “cyber sovereignty.” In contrast, China and Russia consider cyberspace as a new domain of national sovereignty and an extension of national sovereignty in cyberspace and thus insist that “cyber sovereignty” is as sacrosanct as national territory. In December 2012, Russia proposed the initiative of “cyber sovereignty” at the United Nations International Telecommunication Union. China’s New National Security Law clarifies the concept of “sovereignty in cyberspace” through legislation. While there is international controversy over “cyber sovereignty,” it is undeniable that the infrastructure and equipment of the internet, the information that flows through it, and the people who use it are all closely linked to traditional states. + +- In addition, China and Russia face a great crisis in the field of information network technology and security, and both have a strong desire to guarantee national cybersecurity and participate in global cyberspace governance. As emerging countries, China and Russia have advantages in certain cutting-edge technologies, though there are still gaps in their independent research and development capabilities in core technologies, key equipment, and operating systems for information networks compared with information powerhouses such as the United States. Moreover, as the independent controllability of cybersecurity is weak, the hidden dangers of their cybersecurity are also more prominent. + +- Both China and Russia have outstanding problems with cybersecurity, and thus the two sides can ensure future cybersecurity by promoting the international cybersecurity regime, strengthening technical exchanges between the two countries, and joint law enforcement and other forms of cooperation. + +- The Russian and Chinese governments should also strengthen exchanges and cooperation on cybersecurity technologies, improve the ability of both countries to prevent cybercrimes and information attacks, effectively improve the ability of both countries to guarantee cybersecurity, and work together for the goal of building autonomous and controllable cyber systems. + +- For example, the Russian government strongly supports the research and development of domestic information security technologies and products and insists on independent innovation. After years of efforts, it has developed its own unique advantages. The Russian companies Kaspersky and Dr.Web have not only taken the lead in the world in terms of market share of antivirus software but also provided strong support to the Russian government in terms of information security. Dr.Web is the Russian Ministry of Defense’s designated information security partner. Russia’s chip design technology is unique and has reached the world’s leading level. Russia is also working on developing its own operating system. In turn, China has accelerated the process of developing localization of network information products since 2014 and has also made significant achievements, such as the production of computer servers, with three domestic vendors in the top five server markets. . . . However, breakthroughs have not yet been achieved in the field of core hardware technologies such as chips. + +- China and Russia are already cooperating in information security, and Kaspersky Lab has been cooperating with our government enterprises for many years. In the future, if we can further strengthen S&T cooperation in the field of information and cyberspace, as well as jointly carry out research and development of information and communication technologies including increasing the exchange of information and training of personnel between the two sides, it will certainly be beneficial for both sides to improve the construction of cyberspace security. + +- At the early stage of the development of the internet, the United States had absolute dominance over the governance of cyberspace due to its technological leadership. With the development of the internet in various countries, especially in a large number of developing countries, there is a demand to construct a fairer and more just cyberspace that is more in line with the common interests of all countries. The game of cyberspace governance is gradually unfolding, and the prominence of cybersecurity issues has intensified the intensity of this game. Some say this is the era of warring states in cyberspace governance, while others say that cyberspace governance is fragmenting. It is obvious that this is an era when the established system is gradually broken and a new system is being formed, and the game is quite intense and full of challenges, but also provides opportunities for emerging countries such as China and Russia. + +--- + +__Max Bergmann__ is the director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS he was a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focused on Europe, Russia, and U.S. security cooperation. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then secretary of state John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. + +__Andrew Lohsen__ is a former fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS. Prior to joining CSIS in August 2021, Lohsen served as a monitoring officer and political analyst with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. Previously, he coordinated counter-nuclear-smuggling outreach and training engagements in the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia on behalf of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at the U.S. Department of State. + +__Una Hakvåg__ is a research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment’s Russia research group. She holds a MA degree in European and American studies with a specialization in Russian area studies from the University of Oslo. + +__Cecilie Sendstad__ is a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment’s defense economics research group. She was research manager for the cost analysis research program in 2017–2021. She has authored numerous published studies on Russian and Norwegian defense-economic issues and has also conducted research on defense acquisitions, life-cycle costing, and long-term defense planning for the Norwegian Ministry of Defense. + +__Meia Nouwens__ is a senior fellow for Chinese defense policy and military modernization at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Meia’s expertise lies in Chinese cross-service defense analysis, China’s defense industry and innovation, and China’s regional strategic affairs and international relations. She is a co-lead of the China Security Project with the Mercator Institute for China Studies and leads IISS research on China’s Digital Silk Road. Prior to commencing at IISS, she worked for the European External Action Service as a policy officer in Taipei and as a trade analyst in the European Union’s delegation to New Zealand. She has previously worked in private-sector consulting firms and international organizations on topics of foreign policy, security, and defense. + +__Paul Schwartz__ is a non-resident senior associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS. He is an expert on the Russian military and its defense and security policy, with a special emphasis on Russian defense technology programs, its defense industrial base, Russian arms export programs, and the future development of Russia’s military capabilities. He has written extensively on these topics, including several recent articles on the Ukraine crisis, Russia’s alleged Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty violations, Sino-Russian defense cooperation, Russia’s military modernization programs, and the capabilities of selected Russian weapon systems. He is also a frequent speaker on Russian military and defense policy and is regularly consulted on such matters by members of the media. + +__Brian Hart__ is a fellow with the China Power Project at CSIS, where he researches the evolving nature of Chinese power. His particular research interests include Chinese foreign and security policy, Chinese military modernization, and U.S.-China technological competition. Prior to joining the China Power Project, he conducted research on Chinese politics and foreign policy for the Project 2049 Institute, the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Trivium China. + +__Bonny Lin__ is a senior fellow for Asian security and director of the China Power Project at CSIS. Previously, she was the acting associate director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE and a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, where she analyzed different aspects of U.S. competition with China, including U.S.-China competition for influence in the Indo-Pacific and China’s use of gray zone tactics against U.S. allies and partners. Her research advised senior leaders in the Department of Defense, including military leaders at U.S. Pacific Air Forces and U.S. Army Pacific. Dr. Lin also served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2015 to 2018, where she was director for Taiwan, country director for China, and senior adviser for China. + +__Robert Samuel Wilson__ is a senior policy analyst for the Center for Space Policy and Strategy at the Aerospace Corporation. In this role, he is responsible for leading work on the nexus of commercial and national security space, comparative space, and missile issues. Wilson has authored papers covering the technical characteristics of the broader missile environment, the convergence of commercial and national security space, the everyday uses of space systems, the impact of Brexit on the UK space sector, Japan’s shift toward a focus on space security, the U.S. hypersonic missile debate, the importance of international space partnerships, and space traffic management. + +__Marc Julienne__ is head of China research within the Centre for Asian Studies of the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI). He mainly focuses on China’s foreign, security, and defense policy, as well as on domestic affairs. He has a PhD in political science and international relations from the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations (INALCO) in Paris. Previously, Julienne was a research fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) in Paris for four years. + +__Katri Pynnöniemi__ is an assistant professor at the University of Helsinki (Aleksanteri Institute) and holds the Mannerheim Chair of Russian Security Studies. The joint professorship between the University of Helsinki and the National Defense University was established in August 2017. Previously she has worked as a senior researcher at the Finnish Institute for International Affairs. Pynnöniemi’s responsibilities include development of research on Russian security policy at the University of Helsinki and at the National Defense University. + +__Alessio Patalano__ is a professor of war and strategy in East Asia. Professor Patalano specializes in maritime strategy and doctrine, Japanese military history and strategy, East Asian Security, and Italian defense policy. From 2006 to 2015, he was visiting professor in strategy at the Italian Naval War College (ISMM), Venice. From 4d9657f5d1e4db6f79a4d0f03e04cfb846c428ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: hokoi Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2022 01:38:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 10/12] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x17 Dec.18 --- ...2-12-09-collective-resilience-in-europe.md | 123 ++++ .../2022-12-11-salafi-jihadi-in-africa.md | 577 ++++++++++++++++++ .../2022-12-13-tech-supply-chain-to-russia.md | 168 +++++ 3 files changed, 868 insertions(+) create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-12-09-collective-resilience-in-europe.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-12-11-salafi-jihadi-in-africa.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-12-13-tech-supply-chain-to-russia.md diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-09-collective-resilience-in-europe.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-09-collective-resilience-in-europe.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0da23b88 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-09-collective-resilience-in-europe.md @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Collective Resilience In Europe +author: Anna M. Dowd and Cynthia R. Cook +date : 2022-12-09 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/tV3X62D.png +#image_caption: "" +description: "Bolstering Collective Resilience in Europe" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Russia’s invasion of Ukraine puts the necessity for European resilience into sharper focus and argues for a new framing of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) approach to resilience._ _While resilience is primarily a national responsibility that needs political commitment, investment, supporting policies and institutions, and prioritization, there is a strong case for resilience to become a collective imperative as well as a domestic one. Resilience should be reconceptualized as the individual and collective capacity to withstand, fight through, and quickly recover from disruption caused by military and non-military threats to Euro-Atlantic security from authoritarian actors and strategic competitors as well as global challenges. It merits a top priority in NATO and national planning, significant investment in building Europe’s credible resilience posture, and new approaches to amplifying allies’ combined capacity to tackle shared challenges and threats as well as increasing vigilance amid heightened tensions. Creating a NATO Resilience Planning Process akin to the NATO Defence Planning Process will be instrumental in harmonizing and integrating national resilience plans, strategies, and capabilities to marshal NATO’s strong collective response. In addition, a high-level resilience task force should be created to identify multidimensional resilience lessons from Ukraine across the spectrum of conventional, hybrid, and societal threats, as well as to make recommendations for future policies and investments that will bolster European resilience._ + + +### European Resilience in Light of Russia’s War in Ukraine + +Russia’s war in Ukraine has been the trigger for a reshaping of European self-defense. Confronted with the immediate danger Russia represents, European nations have begun rethinking national security objectives and commitments, reinforcing military strength, and providing political and financial support as well as an unprecedented supply of advanced weapons to Ukraine. Finland and Sweden have applied for NATO membership, after decades (in the case of Finland) or even centuries (for Sweden) of neutrality. Denmark has lifted its 30-year opt-out from the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. Germany is planning to beef up its defense spending and modernize its forces after years of underspending and neglect. Poland is making unparalleled investments in its defense capabilities, doubling its army from 150,000 to 300,000 soldiers and championing military aid to Ukraine. And Ukraine itself has been granted official EU candidate nation status and applied for accelerated NATO accession. In effect, a common threat has served to unite NATO and the European Union in a way that previous debates about developing a common security policy had not. Epitomized by German chancellor Olaf Scholz’s characterization of this development as “Zeitenwende” — a historic turning point — in his address to the Bundestag’s emergency session on February 27, this resurgence of traditional security threats brings defense collaboration to the top of the political agenda in Europe. + +The reshaping of European self-defense thus creates an opportunity for innovation that goes beyond measuring nations’ investments into their capabilities and forces. While European nations have individual policies about their defense forces and resources, there are many benefits that accrue from identifying, considering, and building on interdependencies and interconnectedness. Deepening collaboration between like-minded nations can provide credible military options and faster decisionmaking to respond to a wide range of contingencies, both in peacetime and at times of crisis or conflict. + +Many of these interdependencies align with questions about resilience. The concept of resilience — incorporating military capacity, civil preparedness, and emergency planning — was central to the Cold War narrative as a first line of defense against the Soviet Union. Moored into Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, it committed allies to “separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, . . . maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” + +Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, concerns about resilience took a back seat to other issues. They have a new salience today. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine joins the Covid-19 pandemic, intensified geostrategic competition with China, technological advancement, and climate change to underscore the need to better prepare for disruption, pervasive instability, strategic shocks, emerging vulnerabilities, and persistent threats. By their very nature, those overwhelming systemic challenges are far greater than any nation can address on its own and involve interests vital to the security and well-being of all European and North American allies. Moreover, as Ganesh Sitaraman observed in his 2020 Foreign Affairs essay, “what unites those seemingly disparate threats is that each is not so much a battle to be won as a challenge to be weathered.” Enduring them requires constant adaptation and agility, as well as the ability to understand shortfalls and vulnerabilities and the willingness and means to address them head-on. And while not free of cost, it is well worth the effort. + +The current crisis makes a clear case for building and bolstering resilience in peacetime and coordinating resources, capabilities, supply chains, and logistics across the alliance. Allocating adequate resources to enhancing the ability to absorb strategic shocks can make a crucial difference in winning a war before it begins. Thus, resilience — while primarily a national responsibility that requires political commitment, investment, supporting organization, and prioritization — must become a collective imperative, especially since many resilience challenges cross national borders. The 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) advances a focus on resilience and collaboration with allies and partners to deter aggression and promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Moreover, the NDS broadens the concept of NATO collective security commitment to include — on top of conventional deterrence and defense — working alongside allies to build resilience. + +This signals a major shift toward embracing resilience as essential to amplifying the combined capacity of allied nations to tackle shared challenges and threats. Consequently, resilience cannot be solely defined as a function of society’s ability to resist and recover from shocks as it is set forth by NATO in current documents. Rather, reflecting the North Atlantic Treaty obligations and the prevailing threat landscape, resilience should be conceptualized as the alliance members’ individual and collective capacity to withstand, fight through, and quickly recover from disruption caused by military and non-military threats to Euro-Atlantic security from authoritarian actors and strategic competitors as well as global challenges. + + +### Existing NATO Resilience Efforts + +The war in Ukraine has brought into sharper focus the fact that military resilience overlaps with broader societal resilience requirements. It has highlighted the pressing need to address these wider interdependencies and identify vulnerabilities to disruption that can have cascading effects across societies and economies. In his October 2020 speech, NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg observed that “having a strong military is fundamental to our security, but our military cannot be strong if our societies are weak.” Ukraine’s heroic fight underscores that a robust national resistance strategy based on a whole-of-society ability to signal strength to the adversary while augmenting the effects of posture can make a crucial difference in responding to acute crises and threats. + +There is existing groundwork for pursuing new thinking about resilience. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its increasingly aggressive tactics shattered the 1989 vision offered by President George H.W. Bush of a Europe “whole, free, and at peace” facing little threat of a conventional attack. After two decades of shifting its role from collective deterrence and territorial defense against the Soviet Union to undertaking crisis management operations outside its traditional operational theater, NATO was confronted with Russia’s heightened threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. And it was woefully underprepared to handle a crisis unfolding on its doorstep. + +In response, the alliance embarked on reinforcing its posture. A growing number of allies also began to recognize resilience as essential to developing effective deterrence and reassurance measures, which can be part of a comprehensive security strategy as well as instrumental to tackling mounting societal vulnerabilities. At the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, the alliance’s Heads of State and Government noted that “civil preparedness is a central pillar of Allies’ resilience and a critical enabler for Alliance collective defense.” To improve civil preparedness, allies agreed on seven NATO baseline requirements (see text box) for national resilience that serve also as a framework to support the effective enablement of NATO forces to ensure the collective defense and security of all allies. These are centered around continuity of government, essential services to the population, and civil support to the military that must be maintained in times of crisis. In addition, at the 2021 Brussels summit, allies endorsed the Strengthened Resilience Commitment and Proposal 3 for improved resilience under the NATO 2030 Agenda. This acted as an acknowledgment that safeguarding the alliance’s societies, populations, and shared values requires a new and broader understanding of the importance of national and collective resilience as well as civil preparedness. To address specific challenges, allies agreed to intensify efforts to secure and diversify supply chains, ensure the resilience of critical infrastructure and key industries, and direct attention to the impact of natural hazards compounded by climate change. + +> #### Seven NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience + +1. Assured continuity of government and critical government services: for instance the ability to make decisions, communicate them and enforce them in a crisis; + +2. Resilient energy supplies: back-up plans and power grids, internally and across borders; + +3. Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people, and to de-conflict these movements from NATO’s military deployments; + +4. Resilient food and water resources: ensuring these supplies are safe from disruption or sabotage; + +5. Ability to deal with mass casualties and disruptive health crises: ensuring that civilian health systems can cope and that sufficient medical supplies are stocked and secure; + +6. Resilient civil communications systems: ensuring that telecommunications and cyber networks function even under crisis conditions, with sufficient back-up capacity; + +7. Resilient transport systems: ensuring that NATO forces can move across Alliance territory rapidly and that civilian services can rely on transportation networks, even in a crisis. + +> Source: [“Resilience, civil preparedness and Article 3,” NATO, September 20, 2022](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm). + +Resilience was also prominently featured in the discussions leading to the adoption of the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept, which serves as blueprint that will profoundly shape how NATO and its allies think about addressing security challenges for a decade to come. Some experts argued that building comprehensive resilience to disruptive threats to allied societies should be added as a core task for the alliance — alongside collective defense, cooperative security, and crisis management. The new Strategic Concept agreed upon by the NATO Heads of State and Government at the Madrid summit in June 2022 acknowledges resilience as a key issue for the alliance. Although it falls short of explicitly designating it as a fourth core task, it highlights the need to “pursue a more robust, integrated, and coherent approach to building national and alliance-wide resilience.” The Strategic Concept also notes that resilience is critical to tackling both military and non-military threats. + + +### Establishing a NATO Resilience Planning Process + +The breadth of these efforts at the highest political levels of the alliance is an indicator of the nations’ and NATO’s understanding of the importance of resilience. However, these mostly top-down policy-focused statements lack robust implementation plans to achieve a desired strategic and operational intent. + +NATO has developed an initial set of evaluation criteria to facilitate national resilience self-assessment efforts, and it has been appraising the state of the alliance’s resilience every two years since 2018. However, many shortfalls remain. The inability to effectively tackle the persistent challenges of increasingly contested logistics, vulnerable transport infrastructure, dependence on Russian gas supplies, and the emergence of cyber and hybrid threats points to the stressors across the alliance. Left unaddressed, these challenges will almost certainly result in weakening NATO’s response to unfolding crises. + +NATO is therefore confronted with the urgent task of operationalizing collective resilience objectives and enacting nationally developed goals as well as robust follow-through mechanisms to assess, review, and monitor progress. Recent decisions to voluntarily share data on national policies and plans are encouraging, but their nonmandatory and discretionary nature makes it difficult to identify existing national resilience shortfalls and generate a comprehensive and complete picture of the stress points that can undermine shared resilience. Moreover, the majority of NATO allies do not have resilience plans, nor do they have resilience organization in place. The fragmented and uneven nature of resilience building efforts, policies, investments, and activities across the alliance shows that these priorities need to be aligned in a more integrated manner — and tailored to specific threats and challenges — in order to combine and coordinate allies’ strengths to maximum effect. + +> NATO is therefore confronted with the urgent task of operationalizing collective resilience objectives and enacting nationally developed goals as well as robust follow-through mechanisms to assess, review, and monitor progress. + +There is a system in place that can be used as a model for new resilience policies. The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) works to “provide a framework within which national and Alliance defence planning activities can be harmonised to enable Allies to provide the required forces and capabilities in the most effective way.” However, if incorporated directly into NDPP — a complex and already overstretched process encompassing 14 different defense planning domains — resilience will always take a back seat and not receive the attention it requires. Moreover, the problem set and the expertise needed to address resilience requirements are different. Therefore the development of a new NATO Resilience Planning Process following the NDPP methodology would be much more effective in harmonizing and integrating national resilience plans, strategies, and capabilities to marshal NATO’s strong and collective resilience posture. A key goal of the NATO Resilience Planning Process would be to ensure that the new process can drive both national and collective resilience requirements and help achieve more effective unity of effort. As planning for resilience, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, goes beyond the realm of defense budgets, standing up a distinct — yet familiar — framework will help convert political will into tangible commitments and increased resilience capabilities. Alliance-wide resilience planning will be vital in helping to influence national behaviors and allocate adequate resources by incorporating NATO resilience guidelines into national strategies. + +Initially, the NATO Resilience Planning Process could hew closely to the NDPP’s five-step approach. + +#### STEP 1: ESTABLISH POLITICAL GUIDANCE AND SET PRIORITIES + +The first step is to incorporate resilience questions into top-level political guidance documents, which NATO produces every four years. The political guidance derives from higher-level strategic policy and is a single cohesive framework that lays out the overall aims and objectives that the alliance must meet in the next five to ten years. Future political guidance documents — including the upcoming 2023 political guidance — should include specific objectives for resilience. Along with the operational level of ambition (defined as the number, scale, and nature of the operations that the alliance should be able to conduct in the future, along with the capability requirements needed to support them and the associated priorities and timelines), it should include a resilience level of ambition. + +#### STEP 2: DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS TO MEET NATO RESILIENCE LEVEL OF AMBITION + +Analytic work will be necessary for developing and defining a consolidated list of minimum resilience requirements. This should be the full set of resilience capabilities and assets that NATO needs if it is to support the effective enablement of its forces to ensure the collective defense and security of all allies. Juxtaposing these requirements with existing or already planned capabilities (national, multinational, or common-funded) will be instrumental in identifying resilience shortfalls across the alliance. This should include baseline national requirements and recommendations for cross-cutting layered resilience across national borders. The requirements should be updated every four years, following the recommendations in the political guidance documents. + +#### STEP 3: APPORTION RESILIENCE REQUIREMENTS AND SET TARGETS + +This next step starts the implementation process by defining specific goals. These minimum resilience requirement targets should have associated priorities and timelines and should allow for innovative solutions rather than requiring specific approaches. They can be allocated to allies either individually, multinationally, or collectively, and they should follow the principles of fair burden sharing and reasonable challenge to determine the contributions of individual nations. The NATO resource committee can decide which resilience investments are eligible for common funding so as to provide additional support for the goals. + +#### STEP 4: FACILITATE IMPLEMENTATION + +This framework will provide a new context for resilience activities. Investments in capabilities like energy and cybersecurity are not new to the allies, but connecting them into an overarching capability framework will require new approaches to implementation and measurement. This will be most effective if NATO can provide continuous assistance to allies in implementing the targets. This can include facilitating multinational initiatives and streamlining NATO efforts to help nations address priority resilience shortfalls and share best practices. NATO may need to invest in a new central resilience organization to support national efforts. + +#### STEP 5: REVIEW RESULTS AND OFFER ADDITIONAL SUPPORT WHERE NEEDED + +Setting clear goals should facilitate periodic assessments of how NATO’s resilience objectives, ambitions, and targets are being met. The goals of this assessment can include identifying shortfalls, which may mean that new strategies or support structures will be needed — and that allies will require financial support to overcome these shortfalls. However, a periodic assessment could also offer a pathway for seeking out success stories and useful insights on a regular basis, lessons that will then be able to be rolled out to other nations. + + +### Additional Resources and Strategies Needed for Implementation + +As Step 4 suggests, facilitating implementation will require support structures, both at the NATO level and at the national level. Allies will need to invest in NATO’s capacity to provide a platform for political consultation and collective action on resilience, support resilience efforts on an alliance level, and strengthen national capabilities, especially when it comes to smaller states. The recently established NATO Resilience Committee is one approach. Chaired by the assistant secretary general for defense policy and planning and reporting directly to the North Atlantic Council, the committee should be further strengthened and given a clear mandate to provide strategic and policy advice and planning guidance, as well as coherence for resilience activities across NATO. But NATO committees often face system- and process-level constraints that limit their ability to act with authority. To overcome these, NATO needs empowered senior leadership and champions from both senior military and civilian officials to give resilience issues greater visibility and accountability and drive forward progress, including identifying and naming a senior official with the specific responsibility and authority to oversee and ensure coherence between civilian and military collective resilience efforts. Senior national officials for resilience, who met for the first time on November 16, 2022, should focus on coordinating interagency efforts at national levels and on developing concrete deliverables for NATO and allies. Moreover, clearly defining collective objectives that the alliance must pursue to strengthen resilience will be key to ensuring tangible and timely progress — and this needs to happen before the NATO Vilnius summit next July. + +A next step would be to ensure that NATO can draw on national resilience capabilities in crisis situations and create a rapid response capability or crisis center focused on resilience support in emergency situations or contingencies. NATO has existing models for this, including a NATO rapid reaction team designed to fight cyberattacks. It also recently sent counter hybrid warfare support teams to both Lithuania and Montenegro. The creation of policies to support the creation of similar resilience-focused crisis response teams that could be deployed within 24 hours would speed recovery from disruption. This resilience rapid response capability should be exercised regularly to develop and ensure efficacy, with the goal of becoming part of Europe’s deterrence posture. + +As these efforts span multiple domains and involve cross-cutting issues, improved civil-military coordination amid increasing demands on NATO forces and the civil sector in times of crises to ensure uninterrupted provision of vital services is key. While NATO continues to cope with day-to day resilience challenges, such as cyberattacks or acts of sabotage against critical infrastructure, it is time to also lay the foundation for a longer-term resilience strategy. This will allow NATO to be more proactive and better prepared to more effectively build enduring resilience, rather than focusing on being reactive to crises. In addition, embedding military resilience in the broader context of collective resilience will be vital to absorb the full range of future threats. In order to help ensure greater coherence across military and civilian dimension of resilience, more synergies are needed with the military concepts that set the direction for NATO’s ongoing adaptation: the Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area, which focuses on force employment to deter and defend today, and the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept, which outlines a vision to guide the alliance’s long-term warfare development. In particular, NATO should further leverage efforts undertaken by the Allied Command Transformation to develop the notion of layered resilience, as part of the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept. Encompassing logistics, warfighting capability, perseverance, military infrastructure, situational awareness, command and control, and response planning, layered resilience underscores the interconnected nature of military and civilian resilience. Both are necessary — and mutually reinforcing — to build the ability to withstand immediate shocks and disruptions over long periods of time. + +Russia’s attack on Ukraine has led to the largest war in Europe since 1945. This conflict is the most recent and most relevant operation of its kind, and it possesses an unprecedented potential to develop useful lessons for building resilience against further Russian aggression and gray zone coercion. However, this will not happen without sustained, deliberate, and focused effort. To ensure that it is done effectively, the North Atlantic Council should stand up a high-level resilience task force to identify preliminary resilience lessons from Ukraine across the spectrum of conventional, hybrid, and societal threats, as well as to make recommendations for future policies and investments that can bolster European resilience. Alternatively, the United States could take the lead on creating such a task force with the goal of bolstering European resilience and strengthening NATO’s ability to respond to crises, allowing the United States to take more of a “reinsurer” role under Article 3 rather than acting as a first line of defense. The FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, currently in deliberations, could be the opportunity to initiate such a task force. + +A serious implementation concern is always funding. New policies and organizational structures are never free. However, developing the required policies and structures for increased resilience represents a marginal cost when compared to national efforts already in place or required by NATO guidance. While NATO HQ and International Staff funding can be contentious, at the end of the day, NATO nations get value from their investments. Resilience is too important a task to be absorbed by existing staff and processes, and NATO members must be prepared to allocate the marginal resources needed to support efforts to strengthen resilience. New capital investments in ensuring operational resilience will be the greater cost — but NATO has shown that it is willing to make investments to support its priorities, including the recent standup of a €1 billion innovation fund. The Defense Investment Pledge (DIP), adopted by NATO leaders in 2014, framed the political narrative on transatlantic burden sharing and committed allies to spending at least 2 percent of GDP on defense within the next decade. At the Madrid summit, allies decided to build on that pledge to ensure that increased national defense spending and NATO common funding would be “commensurate with the challenges of a more contested security order.” One question for NATO to decide as an alliance within the next year is to what extent subsequent commitments beyond 2024 should reflect resilience. Investing in resilience should be a priority and resilience expenditures should be in addition to other commitments, and this may require the development of a robust methodology to determine national contributions to collective resilience. This also spotlights an opportunity to shift the political narrative from transatlantic burden sharing to a more unified alliance prepared to share the responsibilities and risks flowing from a volatile security environment. + +Addressing Russia’s threat requires not only refocusing allied nations’ capabilities and military readiness but also reframing collective resilience as something centered around the same principles as collective defense — which “binds its members together, committing them to protect each other and setting a spirit of solidarity within the alliance.” Thus, building capacity along Europe’s eastern flank and further strengthening resilience would benefit from the creation of a NATO Resilience Fund. Such a fund, established to directly support the resilience capacity of the most vulnerable allies and priority partner nations, would also significantly contribute to reinforcing deterrence, including deterrence in the face of Russian threat. As the European Union is increasingly acting in a complementary role to NATO’s security objectives, improved cooperation between EU institutions and NATO will help enhance the efficacy of resilience initiatives in Europe. Identifying concrete steps and effective synergies — especially between NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience and the European Union’s critical entities resilience directive — as well as continuing work within a formal structured dialogue on resilience and civil preparedness will further increase the coherence of efforts in an already constrained environment. + +Cost-effective and creative ideas can come from many places, and many solutions are likely to be offered by and sourced from industry, especially as many resilience assets are owned by the private sector. Setting up a NATO-industry resilience partnership early will ensure that the government requirement-setting process benefits from a clear understanding of current capabilities, knowledge of industry trends, and access to private sector resources. + + +### Conclusion + +As observed by General Christopher G. Cavoli, NATO’s supreme allied commander, Europe, the Ukraine crisis has demonstrated that these complex and interrelated challenges demand “whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, whole-of-alliance efforts.” NATO as an alliance and its member nations have the rare opportunity to learn from a serious conflict with a persistent adversary in their own backyard. Focusing on lessons learned is a strategic imperative, both for planning for future warfighting operations and for understanding how and where to invest in resilience to ensure that allies can “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack,” as called for in Article 3. The need to respond to multiple contingencies at short notice, while building up the ability to withstand and recover quickly from disruptions, has become the new normal amid strategic competition. This newfound urgency to act decisively — not in the distant future but in the next few years — requires not only political will but also sustained commitment and considerable resources, as well as improved coordination at national and alliance levels. + +Given the pronounced imbalance between high-level political statements and current resilience posture, a robust, coherent, and purpose-driven process is needed to achieve the strategic and operational intent of decisions taken at NATO summits and ministerial meetings. Collective resilience is not only a function of burden sharing. It entails high levels of responsibility and risk sharing, and it deserves a distinct approach. Creating a NATO Resilience Planning Process will be instrumental in harmonizing and integrating national resilience plans, strategies, and capabilities to marshal NATO’s strong collective response. Following the model of the NATO Defense Planning Process will allow the new approach to align with an accepted strategy that has organizational support, which will help smooth the path to effective implementation. + +A comprehensive approach to resilience must also embrace additional resources and strategies, notably development of clearly defined objectives, creation of a rapid response capability, improved civil-military coordination, and robust investment. Implementation should include the establishment of a high-level resilience task force overseen by a new senior official with the specific responsibility and authority to ensure coherence between civilian and military collective resilience efforts. As Russia and other strategic competitors continue to aggressively exploit vulnerabilities, a lack of appropriate urgency in bolstering collective resilience in Europe will imperil the alliance’s ability to effectively address the looming threats. + +--- + +__Anna M. Dowd__ is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., who previously served at NATO, the European Union Institute for Security Studies, the European Defense Agency, and the Polish Ministry of Defense. + +__Cynthia R. Cook__ is the director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-11-salafi-jihadi-in-africa.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-11-salafi-jihadi-in-africa.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e21b0e64 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-11-salafi-jihadi-in-africa.md @@ -0,0 +1,577 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Salafi-Jihadi In Africa +author: Emily Estelle Perez +date : 2022-12-11 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/IzliWAE.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "The Underestimated Insurgency, Continued: Salafi-Jihadi Capabilities and Opportunities in Africa" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Salafi-jihadi groups linked to al Qaeda and the Islamic State are spreading and strengthening in Africa. This phenomenon has immediately and severely affected thousands of Africans subjected to violence. The growing Salafi-jihadi base in Africa also supports a global movement waging war on the US and many of its allies._ + + + +_African groups may become more direct participants in global jihad as they develop capabilities that they can use overseas. Every Salafi-jihadi group that has attacked transnationally began with a local focus; past examples show that groups can rapidly pivot to transnational attack plotting when circumstances shift. As African Salafi-jihadi groups continue to develop more advanced military and nonmilitary capabilities, they stand to provide even greater benefits to the global Salafi-jihadi movement in terms of recruits, money, propaganda, innovation, leadership, and safe havens._ + +_This report considers the capabilities, resources, and opportunities that can be used to assess the relative strength of a Salafi-jihadi group in terms of its sophistication, effectiveness, and resilience. This framework aims to facilitate comparing groups at different stages of development, tracking changes in their capacity over time._ + +_The analysis in this report points to a necessary rethink in US policy to counter the Salafi-jihadi movement. The United States’ counterterrorism policy is missing the opening to stop Salafi-jihadi insurgencies from forming and becoming entrenched. Policymakers should reform US foreign assistance and expand intelligence coverage to prioritize conflict prevention and resolution. A long-term solution requires reducing the overall level of capability, resourcing, and opportunity available to the Salafi-jihadi movement._ + +> #### Selected Salafi-Jihadi Activity in Africa, 2012–22 + +- Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its allies took over northern Mali in 2012. + +- Al Shabaab attacked Kenya’s Westgate Mall in 2013. + +- Boko Haram kidnapped hundreds of schoolgirls in 2014. + +- Islamic State gunmen attacked Tunisian tourist sites in 2014 and 2015. + +- The Islamic State seized Sirte, Libya, in 2015. + +- Al Shabaab attacked Kenya’s Garissa University in 2015. + +- Islamic State militants downed a Russian passenger jet in Egypt in 2015. + +- Islamic State–linked fighters ambushed American servicemen in Niger in 2017. + +- Intensifying militant activity caused mass displacement in Burkina Faso in 2018. + +- The Islamic State announced affiliates in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique in 2019. + +- Authorities disrupted an al Shabaab plot targeting commercial airliners in 2019. + +- Al Shabaab attacked a US military position in Kenya in 2020. + +Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are rising in Africa. The Salafi-jihadi movement has long-standing connections to the continent, exemplified by the participation of North African mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s and al Qaeda’s operations in East Africa in the 1990s. The global crackdown on al Qaeda’s networks in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks compounded setbacks for the movement, briefly reversing its progress on the continent. + +But the past decade has been a period of clear expansion marked by the exponential growth of rank-and-file membership and increases in the number of active Salafi-jihadi organizations and their territorial reach in Africa. (See the sidebar.) This phenomenon has immediately and severely affected thousands of Africans subjected to violence. But not only Africans have a stake in beating back this jihadist expansion. The growing Salafi-jihadi base in Africa supports a global movement waging war on the US and many of its allies. + +Several Salafi-jihadi groups in sub-Saharan Africa are advancing as Western countries shift focus away from counterterrorism concerns and toward geostrategic competition. Al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s East African affiliate, seized the opportunity to reestablish itself in south-central Somalia after US troops withdrew in January 2021 and again threatens Mogadishu’s security, despite the US military’s reentry to the country in May 2022. Al Qaeda–linked groups in the Sahel are capitalizing on a rash of coups, deteriorating security, and reduced counterterrorism pressure to embed themselves further in a growing swath of terrain. The Islamic State affiliate in Nigeria is expanding its operations into areas of greater concern to the Nigerian government. Salafi-jihadi groups across West Africa have tapped into illicit trafficking networks, deepening a symbiosis between terrorism and crime. Even in North Africa, where military and policing campaigns significantly degraded Salafi-jihadi groups in recent years, governance and security trends — particularly in Libya and Tunisia — signal opportunities for militants to regroup. + +Expanding Salafi-jihadi militancy in Africa harms not only the militants’ direct victims but also those affected by related conflicts and humanitarian crises. Salafi-jihadi expansion also contributes to persistent instability that compounds state weakness. Antiliberal and antidemocratic actors can draw opportunity and justification from this weakness and the presence of jihadist terror threats. Long-running jihadist insurgencies and disruptive terror campaigns undermine economic growth in some of the continent’s poorest countries and disrupt global markets, including oil and gas. Instability, poor governance, and high security costs also threaten the advancement of cornerstone countries — those that will disproportionately affect the continent’s trajectory — including Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. + +The effects of Salafi-jihadi expansion in Africa reach beyond national and regional borders. African bases and affiliates help sustain the global Salafi-jihadi movement. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State’s African affiliates are more than just rebranded local insurgencies. Even newly pledged affiliates can derive concrete benefits from their participation in regional and global jihadi networks. As African Salafi-jihadi groups continue to develop more advanced military and nonmilitary capabilities, they stand to provide even greater benefits to the global movement in terms of recruits, money, propaganda, innovation, leadership, and safe havens. + +The trigger point for Western policymakers to act is a transnational terror threat from one of these Salafi-jihadi groups. Yet though Africa-based groups are responsible for many attacks on limited Western interests in Africa, only a fraction of transnational terror attacks trace back to them. Islamic State attacks in Germany in 2016 and the UK in 2017 originated with external attack plotters in Libya. Al Shabaab has attempted to target international aviation in recent years, with a bomb attempt on a plane leaving Mogadishu in 2016 and an early-stage 9/11-style attack disrupted in the Philippines in 2019. + +What national security strategies tend to overlook is that the maturation of African Salafi-jihadi groups will lead to an increased transnational terror threat. Local and global jihad are indelibly linked. Attack cells — the small groups of individuals involved in a terror attack — are small, but they rely on a threat node with a larger footprint. The threat node’s larger set of capabilities comes from Salafi-jihadi insurgent organizations’ regional support bases. + +These regional bases also allow threat nodes to reconstitute, meaning that counterterrorism gains against particular plotters, attacks, and infrastructure are typically temporary, especially when there is a well-developed underpinning organization. Salafijihadi havens provide capabilities and resources, including “recruitment and inter-theater movement; funding; communication; counter-intelligence; media support; vetting, training, and indoctrination; weapons design expertise; and intelligence and planning.” Local and regional insurgencies provide destinations for foreign fighters and propaganda fodder for global Salafi-jihadi organizations. Entrenched jihadist insurgencies with governing capabilities are also preparing future recruits by indoctrinating a generation of children. + +US counterterrorism policies focus on eliminating threat nodes over removing regional support bases. These policies and accompanying legal authorities are structured around either actors’ present intent and active plotting or their past culpability for attacks. Identifying and destroying discrete terror networks is necessary to address present threats but fails to prevent new terror threats from emerging. The existence of a larger Salafi-jihadi base — the loose network of individuals, groups, and organizations united by a common cause — allows external attack plotting and facilitation networks to regenerate continually. The expansion of Salafi-jihadi insurgencies also creates new opportunities for terror networks to form. + +African groups may become more direct participants in global jihad as they develop capabilities that they can use overseas. Every Salafi-jihadi group that has attacked transnationally began with a local focus; past examples show that groups can rapidly pivot to transnational attack plotting when circumstances shift. Not every Salafi-jihadi group will inevitably pursue or enable global terror campaigns. Some may calculate that eschewing such attacks better serves their efforts to achieve local dominance. Certainly, groups that originate within the Salafi-jihadi movement but disavow global terror deserve further study. But past patterns show that ideological, bureaucratic, and organizational factors, including intra-jihadist competition, push local groups toward pursuing transnational attacks directly or supporting externally focused attack networks. + + +### Assessing Salafi-Jihadi Capabilities, Resources, and Opportunities + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/FZAzQzX.png) +_▲ __Figure 1. Salafi-Jihadi Groups in Africa.__ Source: Author._ + +The tables in this report consider capabilities, resources, and opportunities that can be used to assess the relative strength of a Salafi-jihadi group in terms of its sophistication, effectiveness, and resilience. (See Figure 1.) These tables incorporate military and technical skills but recognize that assessments of militant groups’ strength often overvalue these “hard” metrics. The tables therefore also consider “softer” skills, including governance capabilities and organizational qualities, that affect groups’ ability to recover from hardships. This framework aims to facilitate comparing groups at different stages of development and track changes in groups’ capabilities, resources, and opportunities over time. Any effective policy for degrading the global Salafi-jihadi movement will require blocking or reducing groups’ overall capabilities and access to resources and opportunities. + + +### Salafi-Jihadi Capabilities, Resources, and Opportunities: Governance + +![image02](https://i.imgur.com/tsNBHzV.png) +_▲ __Table 1. Salafi-Jihadi Capabilities, Resources, and Opportunities: Governance.__ Note: Colors indicate the level of a group’s capabilities or its access to resources and opportunities. The color-coding indicates the level of skill or access, from red (highest threat level) to orange, yellow (moderate threat level), and green (lowest threat level). * “AQIM” in these tables refers to AQIM activity in Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia. AQIM activity in the Sahel is considered as part of JNIM. ** “JNIM and Allies” refers to groups that are part of JNIM and those that cooperate with it, including AQIM in the Sahel and Ansar al Islam in Burkina Faso. “ISCAP-DRC” refers to Islamic State Central Africa Province–Democratic Republic of Congo. See Appendix A for a further explanation of group definitions and labeling. See Appendix B for the criteria and thresholds used to assess groups’ capabilities and resources. Source: Author’s analysis using cited materials._ + +These factors assess a group’s interaction with its audience, particularly the local population but also potential recruits regionally and globally. (See Table 1.) These criteria consider a group’s capacity to bend a population to its will by either force or persuasion and the local conditions that create opportunities for armed groups to influence communities. This analysis is a rough proxy for criteria that are difficult to judge, including popular sentiment and other hyperlocal dynamics, which should be studied for a deeper understanding of Salafi-jihadi groups’ effectiveness across local contexts. The factors are provision of social services, exercise of social control, effective use of propaganda, exploitation of local networks, and mobilization of the population. + + +### Salafi-Jihadi Capabilities, Resources, and Opportunities: Military and Technical + +![image03](https://i.imgur.com/itMdy8y.png) +_▲ __Table 2. Salafi-Jihadi Capabilities, Resources, and Opportunities: Military and Technical.__ Note: Colors indicate the level of a group’s capabilities or its access to resources and opportunities. The color-coding indicates the level of skill or access from red (highest threat level) to orange, yellow (moderate threat level), and green (lowest threat level). See Appendix B for the criteria and thresholds used to assess groups’ capabilities and resources. Source: Author’s analysis using cited materials._ + +These factors analyze an armed group’s ability to build, acquire, and use tools for making war. (See Table 2). They consider conventional and unconventional military effectiveness and terror attack capability, ranging from local to transnational. The factors are bomb making, access to weapons systems, sophisticated tactics, local force projection, regional force projection, global terror attack capability, presence of elite units, access to resources, and access to a permissive environment. + + +### Salafi-Jihadi Capabilities, Resources, and Opportunities: Organizational + +![image04](https://i.imgur.com/sVcJtCA.png) +_▲ __Table 3. Salafi-Jihadi Capabilities, Resources, and Opportunities: Organizational.__ Note: Colors indicate the level of a group’s capabilities or its access to resources and opportunities. The color-coding indicates the level of skill or access from red (highest threat level) to orange, yellow (moderate threat level), and green (lowest threat level). See Appendix B for the criteria and thresholds used to assess groups’ capabilities and resources. Source: Author’s analysis using cited materials._ + +These factors consider a group’s ability to coordinate people toward its goals by managing its internal processes and its interactions with other organizations. (See Table 3.) These criteria also consider groups’ contributions to the broader Salafi-jihadi movement. The factors are the ability to generate force, resilience and adaptability, the ability to integrate with and amplify Salafi-jihadi networks, and interaction with competitors and the presence of infighting. + + +### Capabilities Won and Lost + +The below narratives consider the trajectories of several African Salafi-jihadi groups that have gained and lost capabilities. The narratives explore different categories of capability: governance, military and technical, and organizational. They consider how these capabilities affect each other and contribute to the groups’ overall resilience and effectiveness. + +__Al Qaeda Plays Politics in the Sahel.__ The Salafi-jihadi expansion in the Sahel demonstrates the importance of adaptation to a local social context. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged from Algeria’s 1991–2002 civil war, and its leaders have largely been Algerians focused on North African affairs. Yet this group leveraged its foothold in southern Algeria to set off a chain of jihadist activity in the Sahel that, a decade later, has spread all the way to the Gulf of Guinea. + +AQIM came to the Sahel because of the opportunities that region presented. The group took up lucrative kidnapping-for-ransom efforts in southern Algeria and over time embedded itself in cross-border human networks, including through intermarriage. This attenuation to local dynamics and Malian security forces’ inability to apply consistent pressure allowed AQIM to establish a consistent presence in northern Mali, though not to overtly control terrain. (See Figure 2.) + +![image05](https://i.imgur.com/RIWP78Y.png) +_▲ __Figure 2. AQIM Areas of Operations.__ Note: Overlap in operations reflects overlap in goals and leadership. MUJWA stands for Movement for Unity and Jihad and West Africa, a now-defunct AQIM-linked group. Source: [Andreas Hagen, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Leaders and Their Networks,” Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, March 27, 2014](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/al-qaeda-in-the-islamic-maghreb-leaders-and-their-networks)._ + +AQIM rapidly increased its influence in northern Mali by tapping into elite Tuareg networks. AQIM and its partner, the Tuareg-majority militant group Ansar al Din, outcompeted a less-organized non-jihadi group to take lead of the rebellion that controlled northern Mali. (See Figure 3.) Organization and governance provision helped AQIM and Ansar al Din overtake their rivals before implementing a hard-line interpretation of shari’a. (See Figure 4.) + +![image06](https://i.imgur.com/pe6I0Oi.png) +_▲ __Figure 3. AQIM’s Support for Ansar al Din.__ Note: MUJWA stands for Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa. Source: [Andreas Hagen, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Leaders and Their Networks,” Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, March 27, 2014](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/al-qaeda-in-the-islamic-maghreb-leaders-and-their-networks)._ + +![image07](https://i.imgur.com/XQ44VTp.png) +_▲ __Figure 4. Ansar al Din and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa Southward Advance from March 30, 2012, to January 10, 2013.__ Note: MUJAO is the French-language acronym for the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa. Source: [Alix Halloran and Katherine Zimmerman, “Warning from the Sahel: Al Qaeda’s Resurgent Threat,” Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, September 1, 2016](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/warning-from-the-sahel-al-qaedas-resurgent-threat). Halloran and Zimmerman’s analysis uses data from RFI, BBC, Reuters, and Al Jazeera._ + +AQIM and its allies have continued to embed themselves in the Sahel’s social fabric by taking advantage of weak competitors and adapting to local conditions. Salafi-jihadi militants, despite their violence, have cultivated a reputation for being less corrupt than local or national authorities. + +AQIM’s longevity also stems from organizational and ideological flexibility across a diverse jihadist network. The Salafi-jihadi ecosystem in the Sahel is characterized by a high degree of fragmentation, but these internal squabbles have largely not undermined the movement and its goals. Several factions split off in the early 2010s due to frustrations with leadership, including limited opportunities for non-Arab militants. But the Salafi-jihadi network in the Sahel seems to have largely overcome this challenge through a franchising model in which ideological ties integrate armed groups aligned to multiple ethnicities. + +Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen’s (JNIM) 2017 formation underscores this dynamic. JNIM formed through a merger that brought together several AQIM-linked groups, including the Tuareg-majority Ansar al Din and the Fulani-majority Macina Liberation Front (MLF). JNIM’s federation model enables its subgroups to operate where they are most effective. The MLF has led JNIM’s expansion through central Mali and into Burkina Faso. (See Figures 5 and 6.) + +![image08](https://i.imgur.com/YsOpCnR.png) +_▲ __Figure 5. Location of Fulani and Tuareg Groups.__ Source: [Alix Halloran and Katherine Zimmerman, “Warning from the Sahel: Al Qaeda’s Resurgent Threat,” Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, September 1, 2016](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/warning-from-the-sahel-al-qaedas-resurgent-threat). Halloran and Zimmerman’s analysis uses data from National Geographic, SIL International, and Geopolitical Atlas._ + +![image09](https://i.imgur.com/XZxZqhD.png) +_▲ __Figure 6. AQIM’s Resurgence in the Sahel from January 1, 2012, to May 31, 2016.__ Source: [Alix Halloran and Katherine Zimmerman, “Warning from the Sahel: Al Qaeda’s Resurgent Threat,” Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, September 1, 2016](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/warning-from-the-sahel-al-qaedas-resurgent-threat)._ + +The MLF has introduced a more grassroots model of engaging with local populations, in contrast to AQIM’s initial entry through Tuareg elites. The MLF practices a combination of coercion and negotiation to develop de facto control relationships with villages. The Fulani population in central Mali includes many pastoralists often marginalized by state structures and in conflict with other communities. The MLF has merged Fulani grievances with a narrative of religious legitimacy to cast itself as the population’s defender. (See Figure 7.) The MLF’s success in its pressure-and-governance campaign has also yielded military benefits, bringing it within striking distance of Mali’s capital and facilitating attacks on strategic Malian military positions. + +![image10](https://i.imgur.com/24Cny5G.png) +_▲ __Figure 7. AQIM’s Integration with West African Ethnic Groups.__ Note: The MNLA is the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad. ANSIPRJ is the National Alliance for the Protection of Peul (Fulani) Identity and Restoration of Justice. Source: [Alix Halloran and Katherine Zimmerman, “Warning from the Sahel: Al Qaeda’s Resurgent Threat,” Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, September 1, 2016](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/warning-from-the-sahel-al-qaedas-resurgent-threat)._ + +JNIM has weathered a challenge from an Islamic State affiliate in the Sahel. Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), which originated as an AQIM splinter group, has challenged JNIM in some areas, including in attracting defectors. ISGS is likely not a serious threat to JNIM’s overall dominance in large areas of Mali and Burkina Faso, however. (See Figure 8). JNIM and ISGS have vacillated between cooperation, conflict, and deconfliction, and they will likely carve out separate spheres of influence over the long term. ISGS’s presence allows JNIM to present itself as comparatively moderate. JNIM fighters, likely from the MLF, may now be partnering with non-jihadist forces against ISGS. JNIM will likely suffer some short-term losses but will cement its ties to local communities — and its base for fighting against the Malian government — in the long term. + +![image11](https://i.imgur.com/g0WDc5L.png) +_▲ __Figure 8. Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel.__ Source: [Brian Carter, “Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel,” Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, September 30, 2022](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-areas-of-operation-in-the-sahel)._ + +JNIM’s governance proposal is perhaps best described as solving the problem it helped create. The group strikes security agreements with communities in Mali and Burkina Faso, granting truces or providing security while requiring residents to accept the group’s interpretation and implementation of shari’a. The deals, accepted by community leaders desperate to stop displacement and violence, reflect exhaustion with years of violence perpetrated by jihadists, state security forces, local militias, and foreign forces. + +Much of JNIM’s progress is owed to its adversaries’ shortcomings, including a Malian state that has an absent, if not abusive, relationship with many communities in northern and central Mali. Mali’s recent coups and its government’s hiring of Russian Wagner Group mercenaries have only intensified negative relationships between security forces and populations in central Mali. + +JNIM’s application of governance skills and military strategy will allow it to solidify its position as the de facto governing entity across large areas of Mali and Burkina Faso. JNIM — and al Qaeda — will consider this success against the “near enemy” a major victory for the movement. JNIM media has drawn parallels between the 2021 French withdrawal from Mali and the 2021 US withdrawal from Afghanistan, placing JNIM within an al Qaeda strategic narrative that prioritizes long-term insurgencies to remove external forces and topple local “apostate” governments. In an August 2021 video, the group’s leader called for Muslims to rise up and attack France, Israel, Russia, and the US. + +These threats do not indicate that JNIM will immediately plot or facilitate external attacks, but they demonstrate the group’s ideological predisposition to support such operations. JNIM has not followed the model of the former al Qaeda–linked group Hayat Tahrir al Sham in Syria, which disavowed external terror attack plotting. JNIM’s expansion in the Sahel not only delivers another victory to al Qaeda’s model for jihadist takeovers but also perpetuates the Salafi-jihadi transnational terror threat by providing havens and a growing pool of funding and recruits. + +__The Islamic State in Libya Loses the Governance Game.__ The Islamic State’s branch in Libya rose rapidly thanks to external support and the chaotic conditions of Libya’s civil war. But the group also collapsed quickly, in part because it failed to root itself into the local community and align itself with popular grievances. + +IS-Libya rose rapidly in 2014 and 2015, capitalizing on the Libyan Salafi-jihadi networks that had reemerged as the Libyan state disintegrated. The Islamic State provided crucial expertise and startup funding, including senior leaders with wartime experience in Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State highlighted IS-Libya as its priority outpost beyond its core terrain, particularly as the group consolidated control of Sirte — Muammar Qaddafi’s hometown and a city largely abandoned between the front lines of Libya’s civil war. + +IS-Libya developed an advanced military capability, including the capacity to build and use multiple suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. Islamic State media highlighted its governance project in the city. IS-Libya attracted significant numbers of foreign fighters, including many from neighboring Tunisia and an unprecedented mobilization of militants from sub-Saharan Africa. IS-Libya also supported external attack planners. The group facilitated the Berlin Christmas market attack in 2016 and the Manchester Arena bombing in 2017. (See Figure 9.) + +![image12](https://i.imgur.com/Cgk8BmA.png) +_▲ __Figure 9. ISIS Libya Network, 2017.__ Source: [Emily Estelle, “A Strategy for Success in Libya,” Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, November 8, 2017](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/a-strategy-for-success-in-libya)._ + +However, IS-Libya’s high public profile and appearance of strength belied weaknesses in its organization and ability to exert control and influence. The group’s multiple outposts in Libya gradually crumbled when rival armed groups — including some linked to al Qaeda — mobilized against it. IS-Libya’s crown jewel, Sirte, slipped from its fingers, first because it struggled to provide for civilians and eventually its fighters there and second because the group expanded too far westward, inciting the military campaign that would oust it from the city. IS-Libya’s lack of ties to the local population left its remnants vulnerable in desert camps far from populated areas, making it vulnerable to follow-on strikes that decimated its forces. (See Figure 10.) + +![image13](https://i.imgur.com/pxfKZnE.png) +_▲ __Figure 10. Fighting Forces in Libya as of December 2017.__ Note: This map shows the Islamic State area of operations in Libya a year after its retreat from Sirte. Source: [Erin Neale and Emily Estelle, “Fighting Forces in Libya: December 2017,” Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, December 8, 2017](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/fighting-forces-in-libya-december-2017)._ + +IS-Libya today is a rump group in a remote area, still lacking governance capabilities and organizational backing. It retains explosive attack capabilities but is not waging a consistent insurgency, instead launching intermittent attacks on security forces. (See Figure 11.) Its trajectory demonstrates the limits of pursuing a territorial insurgency that draws too much support from external organizations and a global narrative. IS-Libya is not defunct, however, and continues to play an amplifying role by providing trainers to militants in West Africa. + +![image14](https://i.imgur.com/v2HcvJO.png) +_▲ __Figure 11. Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in Libya.__ Source: [Kathryn Tyson, “Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in Libya,” Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, October 12, 2022](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-areas-of-operation-in-libya)._ + +__Al Shabaab in Somalia Builds Skills over Years.__ Al Shabaab’s greatest asset may be time. The group has persisted thanks to a combination of its own strategy and innovation and its adversaries’ failure to sustain an effective effort against it. This persistence has allowed the group to entwine itself into Somalia’s political economy. Al Shabaab has also increased its military and technical skills and its organizational sophistication. + +Al Shabaab developed out of Somalia’s civil war and has benefited and survived thanks to its ability to exploit a fragmented Somali society. The militant wing of the Islamic Courts Union that took over Somalia in the early 2000s, al Shabaab capitalized on the 2006 Ethiopian intervention to garner popular support. (See Figure 12.) This support waned when the intervention ended, but al Shabaab weathered the transition, largely because Somalia’s fractious political environment did not yield an effective alternative or sufficient armed force. + +![image15](https://i.imgur.com/9kRE97k.png) +_▲ __Figure 12. Somalia: Islamist Areas of Control and Influence, 2010.__ Source: [Katherine Zimmerman, “Somalia Conflict Maps: Islamist and Political,” Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, May 31, 2010](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/somalia-conflict-maps-islamist-and-political)._ + +Al Shabaab adapted to military setbacks. It successfully transitioned to a rural insurgency after losing control of major cities in 2011 and 2012. (See Figure 13.) This setback may have ironically preserved the al Shabaab insurgency by relieving from it the potentially delegitimizing challenge of needing to govern densely populated areas. + +![image16](https://i.imgur.com/sXVvzBP.png) +_▲ __Figure 13. Somalia: The Retreat of al Shabaab, 2012.__ Source: [Political Geography Now, “Somalia: The Retreat of al Shabaab,” October 9, 2012](https://www.polgeonow.com/2012/10/somalia-retreat-of-al-shabaab.html)._ + +Al Shabaab has also weathered particularly fractious internal dynamics. Internecine squabbles and even significant defections have not destroyed the group, but rather they have concentrated control with its most hard-line leaders. The group has thus far demonstrated the capability to crush dissent and suppress rivals, notably the Islamic State. The current Somali government’s efforts to include al Shabaab defectors in government may challenge al Shabaab in certain regions, but there is not yet evidence of growing internal divisions. + +Al Shabaab has deeply enmeshed itself in the Somali economy, particularly in south and south-central Somalia. The group makes as much revenue as the Somali federal government — enough to surpass AQIM as al Qaeda’s richest affiliate. Al Shabaab’s many moneymaking endeavors include the black-market charcoal trade, widespread extortion of Somali businesses, and taxation of the populations it controls. Al Shabaab also manipulates humanitarian aid in famine-hit Somalia, sometimes blocking distribution but other times stealing and redistributing supplies. (See Figure 14). + +![image17](https://i.imgur.com/j6oy49T.png) +_▲ __Figure 14. Al Shabaab’s Humanitarian Response, March–August 2017.__ Source: [Brian Carpowich, “Map Update #2: Al Shabaab’s Humanitarian Response,” Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, September 5, 2017](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/map-update-2-al-shabaabs-humanitarian-response)._ + +Al Shabaab’s access to relatively secure havens and its now decade-long fighting experience have created ample opportunity for it to increase its military and technical capability over time. (See Figure 15.) It has gained expertise from the al Qaeda network, particularly al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, based in nearby Yemen. Iraq may have been the source for al Shabaab’s development of armor-piercing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in 2011. + +![image18](https://i.imgur.com/VJue0In.png) +_▲ __Figure 15. Al Shabaab Area of Operations.__ Source: [Liam Karr, “Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations,” Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, September 15, 2022](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/al-shabaabs-area-of-operations)._ + +Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula’s expertise likely supported al Shabaab’s 2016 use of a laptop bomb in a botched attempt to destroy a passenger airplane leaving Mogadishu. Al Shabaab has also adapted to gain access to explosive power to support its military campaigns. It has increasingly relied on manufacturing its own homemade explosives from industrial precursors, instead of scavenging explosives, since 2017. Further, al Shabaab has demonstrated the capability to integrate IED attacks into complex military operations. The group, like other Salafi-jihadi groups on the continent and elsewhere, has begun to adopt drones for surveillance purposes. + +Al Shabaab maintains specialized units to conduct regional terror attacks and pursue transnational operations. Elite al Shabaab units focus on internal security and external operations, including infamous attacks in Kenya such as the 2013 Westgate Mall attack, the 2015 Garissa University attack, and the 2019 DusitD2 hotel attack. The planner of the Camp Simba attack in 2020, al Shabaab’s first on a US military installation in Kenya, also coordinated an external attack network. (See Figure 16.) The group has shown more ambition in recent years, including dispatching members to pilot training in the early stages of planning a 9/11-style attack. + +![image19](https://i.imgur.com/cB0Ml0a.png) +_▲ __Figure 16. Major al Shabaab Attacks in Kenya, 2013–20.__ Source: Author. Created with Datawrapper._ + +Al Shabaab and IS-Somalia both support Salafi-jihadi networks across East Africa. Fighters who became part of the current Islamic State–linked insurgency in Mozambique trained in Somalia, for example. IS-Somalia, though contained in Somalia by al Shabaab, serves as a coordination unit for Islamic State affiliates in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Mozambique. + +__The Islamic State in Nigeria Learns from Its Network.__ Salafi-jihadi militants in Nigeria have transformed from a brutal but localized threat into a potential regional and global threat as they have become increasingly enmeshed in the Islamic State’s network. + +The group known as Boko Haram started on the margins of the global Salafi-jihadi movement. Al Qaeda expressed interest in a relationship, but personal and ideological conflicts prevented Boko Haram from officially joining. Boko Haram’s leader from 2009 to 2021, Abubakr Shekau, broke with al Qaeda’s teaching on several key issues, most importantly by defining any Muslim who did not support Boko Haram as a lawful target. (See Figure 17.) + +![image20](https://i.imgur.com/A2BmWZF.png) +_▲ __Figure 17. Boko Haram Activity in Nigeria, 2013.__ Source: [Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v. “Boko Haram,” accessed November 20, 2022](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Boko-Haram)._ + +Shekau’s ideological divergences with al Qaeda and his brutality helped set up a relationship with the Islamic State. Islamic State leaders, focused on building their global network, supported Boko Haram’s mass kidnapping of schoolgirls in 2014 and the group’s focus on holding territory and immediately implementing shari’a. The Islamic State’s objectives aligned with Shekau’s search for legitimacy and possibly other Boko Haram leaders’ desire to moderate him. Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in March 2015, becoming the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP). + +Joining the Islamic State accelerated organizational changes in ISWAP and gave the group funding and training from the Islamic State network. Recognizing Shekau’s ungovernability, Islamic State central backed an effort to oust him. ISWAP then rebranded to bolster its popular support, including announcing a focus on military — not civilian — targets. The Islamic State also provided money and capabilities directly, including giving more than a million dollars in 2017 and linking ISWAP to a network of trainers and IS officials operating predominantly in Libya through northern and western Africa. Islamic State leaders directly engage in ISWAP leadership affairs, including at least one potential instance of backing the murder of an ISWAP official. + +ISWAP has continued to draw legitimacy and some concrete benefits from its Islamic State membership, even as the Islamic State has weakened in its core terrain and likely lost the ability to give significant cash transfusions to its African branches. ISWAP received training on small-arms tactics that improved its military effectiveness. The group has also begun using drones for surveillance thanks to training from the Islamic State network. + +The Islamic State in turn uses ISWAP — which is still the largest, deadliest, and most active among its African affiliates — to bolster its self-reported statistics when many other affiliates and the core group are relatively less active. (See Figure 18.) Islamic State media frequently highlights ISWAP in its major publications. An Islamic State periodical even called for hijra (migration) to Africa, reflecting its greater focus on this theater as a key part of the group’s future. + +![image21](https://i.imgur.com/KG2mhqu.png) +_▲ __Figure 18. Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Lake Chad Basin.__ Source: [Liam Karr, “Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Lake Chad Basin,” Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, November 29, 2022](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-areas-of-operation-in-the-lake-chad-basin)._ + +Islamic State in Tunisia: Tied to Regional Circumstances. The rise and decline of the Islamic State in Tunisia demonstrates the potential fragility of Salafi-jihadi insurgencies that rely heavily on external support and cross-border havens. This case is also a warning, because Tunisia continues to suffer from many of the dynamics that yielded significant Islamic State recruitment, indicating that latent terror networks likely remain a potent threat. + +The Arab Spring period created an opportunity for jihadi experimentation and innovation in Tunisia. Ansar al Shari’a in Tunisia, an al Qaeda associate, capitalized on the mobilization of society during and after the revolution to convert itself from a covert network to a social movement. The Syrian civil war also proved a potent mobilizer, with nearly 30,000 Tunisians attempting to travel to Syria and several thousand succeeding. + +The Islamic State’s infrastructure in Syria, and particularly in Libya, proved effective for exporting violence back to Tunisia. The Islamic State was particularly effective at targeting Tunisian tourism, with major attacks in 2014 and 2015 that cratered the Tunisian tourism industry. (See Figure 19.) + +![image22](https://i.imgur.com/azpu3NW.png) +_▲ __Figure 19. AQIM and ISIS in Tunisia: Latent Threats.__ Source: [Alexa Santry and Emily Estelle, “AQIM and ISIS in Tunisia: Latent Threats,” Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, December 15, 2017](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/aqim-and-isis-in-tunisia-latent-threats)._ + +The Islamic State’s assault on Tunisia peaked in 2016 with an incident that underscored the group’s ambitions and shortcomings. A large contingent of militants based in northwestern Libya attempted a cross-border assault to seize the Tunisian town of Ben Guerdane. (See Figure 20.) The assault failed, however, reflecting several changes that made Tunisia a less permissible environment for a major Islamic State campaign. + +![image23](https://i.imgur.com/iyiJ4Ri.png) +_▲ __Figure 20. Major Islamic State Attacks in Tunisia, 2015–16.__ Source: Author. Created with Datawrapper._ + +First, Tunisian military and security forces had become more effective, thanks to government and foreign partner initiatives since 2015. The local population resisted the Islamic State assault — to the group’s surprise — and received backup from security forces. The Ben Guerdane attack also catalyzed another surge of Western foreign military aid. Tunisia has also significantly hardened its border with Libya. + +Second, the Islamic State had begun to lose its secure haven in Libya. A month before the Ben Guerdane attack, a US air strike killed a major Tunisian Islamic State leader in northwestern Libya, near the Tunisian border. Local power brokers soon decided to oust the Islamic State presence from the area, denying the group the base it had used to coordinate prior attacks in Tunisia. The Islamic State’s position in Libya continued to split throughout 2016, culminating in the group’s loss of its primary foothold in Sirte. While the Islamic State still has a presence in remote southwestern Libya, it lacks access to populated areas and accessible cross-border routes into Tunisia. + +The Islamic State is no longer visible as an organized group in Tunisia. It likely has remnants in remote areas in the country’s interior, where insurgents are often based, and there are indications of terror and radicalization networks in the more populated coastal areas. The group has not conducted a major attack in years, however. + +And yet Tunisia still faces a serious latent threat. The underlying grievances that fed the Islamic State’s recruitment drive in the country have not resolved and may even worsen, given current economic woes and political crackdowns. Tunisia also faces the challenge of foreign fighters returning from Libya and Syria and a large, radicalized prison population. IS-Tunisia thus likely has the human resources it needs to reactivate, particularly if the Tunisian state destabilizes. + + +### Takeaways: The Local Context for Jihad + +This analysis describes a set of circumstances from which Salafi-jihadi groups draw potential energy that they can use to react to setbacks or exploit opportunities. US policy largely treats these groups as threats to partner countries only because their demonstrated capabilities do not yet threaten the US homeland. But this view misunderstands the interdependence between the local and global contexts for jihad. + +The persistence and spread of regional Salafi-jihadi insurgencies sustains global networks and repeatedly erodes or even reverses the effects of counterterrorism interventions, which focus on removing groups’ military capabilities. Counterterrorism operations aimed at eliminating threat nodes are similarly reactive and will not prevent “locally focused” Salafi-jihadi groups from turning their capabilities and resources toward transnational goals as opportunities arise. The groups that pose the most serious long-term threat are adaptable organizations that embed in local contexts and can capitalize on changing conditions. + +__Adaptability.__ The groups that have strengthened over time are adaptive, learning organizations that can shift in response to setbacks and opportunities. One version of adaptability that successful groups practice is shifting between a “territorial” and “semi-territorial” presence. Al Shabaab in Somalia and AQIM in Mali both survived military losses in the early 2010s by shifting from overt territorial control to rural insurgency, a transformation that allowed them to entrench themselves into economic networks and prepare to capitalize on moments of state weakness. + +Salafi-jihadi groups have demonstrated a wide range of adaptations, including deploying strategic ambiguity and plausible deniability to avoid attracting a Western counterterrorism response. Highly adaptable groups are more likely to survive and gain the capabilities and resources to become a regional or even global threat — particularly if they demonstrate an ability to balance localized political dynamics while maintaining a relationship with transnational jihadist networks. + +__Embeddedness.__ Local dynamics — and militants’ attenuation to them — primarily determine a group’s trajectory. Groups that receive heavy support from a global jihadist outfit, such as IS-Libya or IS-Tunisia, may struggle to recover from setbacks if they lack a robust local support base. Groups that are more rooted in local armed conflicts can benefit from targeted infusions of expertise and money to increase their effectiveness in military operations and strategic communications, as demonstrated by the Islamic State’s support for its West and Central Africa Provinces. + +The most dangerous group is therefore one that is primarily oriented on its local governance objective and has demonstrated skill at exploiting the local context but can simultaneously absorb high-end capabilities from the global network. Among current African groups, al Shabaab most emulates this model, given its enduring haven and access to expertise from within the al Qaeda network. + +__Opportunism.__ Salafi-jihadi insurgencies form when governance and security gaps are already present. They benefit from and sometimes accelerate these conditions but do not initiate them. Likewise, the greatest opportunities for jihadists to succeed come from collapsing governance and security conditions, not groups’ own huge leaps in capability or ambition. For example, ISWAP has expanded its area of operations outside its core areas in northeastern Nigeria by taking advantage of the destabilization of the northwest and proliferation of non-state armed actors there. This adaptation indicates that ISWAP is building its capability to threaten the Nigerian capital while counterbalancing military pressure in its main havens, in northeastern Nigeria. + +Communal violence, civil wars, violent uprisings, and any other major destabilizing incident creates an opportunity for jihadist expansion wherever insurgencies are already established or jihadist networks are latent. Heavy-handed security responses intended to quell or crush unrest also feed the grievances that fuel Salafi-jihadi insurgencies. + + +### Policy Implications and Recommendations + +This analysis points to a necessary rethink in US policy to counter the Salafi-jihadi movement. The United States’ counterterrorism policy and the counterterrorism policies of its allies and partners are missing the opening to stop Salafi-jihadi insurgencies from forming and becoming entrenched. At worst, bad counterterrorism policies — particularly when militaries and vigilantes conduct human rights abuses — hasten jihadist entrenchment by allowing groups to install themselves as security providers and defenders of vulnerable populations. + +Counterterrorism properly understood refers to both largely kinetic efforts to destroy the parts of groups that plan and execute external terror attacks and homeland security defenses to disrupt active terror plots. Counterterrorism is a necessary part of the national security tool kit for countering extant or emerging threat nodes, but it is not a substitute for removing the group’s base of support. Military campaigns may be disproportionately effective in cases in which the Salafi-jihadi support base is limited, as in the case of IS-Libya and IS-Tunisia’s Libya-based contingent. But when Salafi-jihadi insurgencies are more embedded, military-forward counterterrorism efforts at best temporarily suppress militant activity and at worst cause popular backlash on which militants can capitalize. + +The heavily kinetic counterterrorism tool kit cannot defeat Salafi-jihadi insurgencies because it does not fill the governance gaps that allowed for jihadist entrenchment in the first place. And counterterrorism is inherently reactive — responding to a threat after that threat has already formed. + +The US should instead focus on policies to prevent Salafi-jihadi groups from taking root. Orienting an interagency focus on this goal requires transforming foreign assistance to emphasize “conflict prevention, stabilization, and peace building.” A key challenge is mobilizing conflict prevention and governance-building resources into the areas most at risk, which are often peripherals prone to conflict and lacking positive or effective ties to the state. + +The US has prioritized providing military training and support for anti-Salafi-jihadi forces. More attention must be placed on improving these actors’ ability to outcompete Salafi-jihadi groups through governance — for example, through providing impartial dispute-resolution mechanisms and overseeing implementation of basic social services and aid distribution. Surging governance and aid to areas affected by violence is especially important to preempt Salafi-jihadi groups from taking root or re-forming after losses. + +US agencies should make institutional changes, including accepting a higher degree of calculated risk to diplomatic and military personnel pursuing their missions. Proactive policy also requires streamlining and coordinating US assistance across multiple agencies to avoid fatal delays in which much money is spent but no action taken until a jihadist insurgency has already destabilized the at-risk region in question. + +Policymakers have an opportunity in motion to pursue these changes, if senior officials are willing to back real change. The 2019 Global Fragility Act (GFA) initiates a framework for an integrated and prevention-focused approach to countering state fragility, with the goal of closing off opportunities to not only Salafi-jihadi groups but also other malign actors, including criminal actors and state adversaries and their proxies. The US government has already selected countries for GFA plans, including Libya, Mozambique, and five coastal West African countries. The primary risk is that these plans will relabel existing initiatives and fail to implement the integration that the GFA seeks. + +There are also challenges in implementation. The GFA aims to create new flexible and long-term funding mechanisms, but its implementers warn of impediments to their ability to move money quickly to launch programs before conditions deteriorate beyond prevention. The GFA presents an opportunity to implement US lessons learned from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars; senior officials should not let this opportunity pass. + +A policy focused on closing space to adversaries, including the Salafi-jihadi movement, requires a serious focus on increasing US diplomatic capability beyond what the GFA alone can deliver. Countering fragility targets areas not yet or not currently afflicted by an entrenched Salafi-jihadi insurgency, and it is worthwhile, particularly because many countries in Africa are in this at-risk stage. But counter-fragility approaches come too late for the countries that are already fighting long-running wars with al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates, such as Somalia and Mali. + +US policy so far has focused on supporting and training partner militaries, with mixed results because of the weaknesses of the Somali and Malian states. In Somalia, the renewed US deployment has bolstered a Somali offensive against al Shabaab that is the most promising push against the group in years. There has not been a complementary increase in US diplomatic energy, however, which is necessary to support the Somali government through the long-term challenge of outcompeting al Shabaab governance. + +The US needs to reframe its involvement in these counterterrorism fights to prioritize conflict resolution and diplomacy, with military engagement subordinated to this larger goal. Likewise, the US should accept risk on short-term military victories — with mitigations in place — for the sake of bringing necessary pressure to bear on regimes that need to reform their approach. Only resolving the conflicts and their underlying grievances will create conditions for the long-term defeat of entrenched Salafi-jihadi insurgencies. + +Policymakers also need to recognize the significant overlap of counterterrorism, counter-fragility efforts, and the geostrategic competition problem sets. Fragile environments create opportunities for state and non-state actors alike. The presence of Salafi-jihadis in particular creates cover for malign actors pursuing other goals. For example, the Wagner Group’s deployments in Africa can be seen as a sanctions evasion scheme and regime preservation-for-hire often cloaked in the language of counterterrorism. + +The US is seeking stronger partnerships in Africa to counter the expansion of Russian and particularly Chinese influence there. US presence and relationships are crucial to having the partnerships and positions necessary to compete over time, and engaging on countering the Salafi-jihadi movement is both an independent goal and a way to sustain and enhance the US position on the continent. European security also cannot be divorced from African security; humanitarian crises and conflicts in Africa, as well as jihadist and criminal activity, affect European security and political cohesion. + +The US government faces an obvious prioritization challenge because it lacks the resources and bandwidth to counter fragility everywhere. Policymakers should therefore improve US analytical capabilities to facilitate prioritization and early recognition. New Salafi-jihadi groups do not form and existing groups do not embark on dangerous trajectories without notice, and their development does not pose a particularly difficult analytical puzzle. Rather, the US intelligence community faces a challenge of collection, processing, and synthesis. Analysts working on Africa and other non-priority areas are spread thin and often responsible for covering many countries and regions simultaneously, a trend that the prioritization of East Asia and the Russian invasion of Ukraine will only exacerbate. + +Classified collection assets, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), are limited, and the huge amount of available open-source information goes underutilized due to bandwidth constraints, linguistic limitations, and institutional cultures favoring classified sourcing. Senior leaders should dedicate resources and shift incentives to encourage the intelligence community to maintain an ongoing picture of potential threats in fragile environments. A broader, deeper, and more sustained approach to collection and analysis will help the US government identify threshold-crossing jihadist insurgencies and gain awareness of — and the ability to counter — the actions of geopolitical competitors. + +Transforming US policy to deny resources and opportunities to the Salafi-jihadi movement will take time, and Salafi-jihadi groups are already reaching new thresholds of capability in many cases. US officials should therefore identify and pursue mitigations while the larger policy transformation occurs. These mitigations should include investing in the collection and analysis of intelligence on the Salafi-jihadi movement. This is primarily a resource question, particularly as high-demand intelligence assets are shifted to other regions. + +Congress should prioritize increasing the US military and intelligence communities’ acquisition of ISR assets to meet this demand. Increased investments in human intelligence and open-source and language capabilities are necessary to avoid strategic surprise. Increased focus on diplomatic engagement in at-risk countries will also improve the intelligence picture. Sustaining this intelligence picture should also feed robust crisis-response planning for future state collapses, including expected periods of increased instability during governmental transition. This planning should include working with partner countries to secure critical infrastructure and materials in the event of instability and a Salafi-jihadi surge. + +The stakes are too high for US policymakers to ignore African security, no matter how much they may want to. The Salafi-jihadi movement is a virulent movement that is not declining and will likely enter a new phase marked by increased global terror attacks. It will overlap in fragile areas and strategic terrain with geostrategic competition, particularly in East Africa and increasingly along the West African Atlantic coast. The growth of illiberal movements, including the Salafi-jihadi movement and autocratic and illiberal regimes, threatens the US-led world order that undergirds US power and prosperity. The US must be forward-thinking, not reactive, in Africa and recognize that failing to partner with Africans in a more secure and prosperous future will harm US security in the coming decades. A status quo, wait-and-see approach will fail. + + +## Appendix A. Salafi-Jihadi Group Reference Guide + +This appendix defines the groups named in the report, in the order in which they appear in the tables. + +__Islamic State Algeria Province (IS-Algeria).__ The Islamic State recognized this wilayah (province) in Algeria in 2014. Security pressure has rendered this group largely defunct since 2017. + +__Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).__ AQIM originated in 1998 during the Algerian civil war. It took on its current name when it affiliated with al Qaeda in 2006. The tables in this report use “AQIM” to refer to the North African components of the group, including AQIM activity in Algeria and AQIM-linked groups in Libya and Tunisia, including the Uqba ibn Nafa’a Brigade. AQIM and its affiliates are also active in the Sahel. The tables use “JNIM and allies” to denote AQIM and AQIM-linked organizations in the Sahel. + +__Islamic State in Tunisia (IS-Tunisia).__ IS-Tunisia refers to the network of Islamic State members and sympathizers in Tunisia. The Islamic State never declared an official wilayah in Tunisia but produces media about Islamic State–linked activity in Tunisia. + +__Islamic State Libya Province (IS-Libya).__ IS-Libya refers to the Islamic State’s Libya Province. The Islamic State declared three Libya provinces — Tarablus (Tripoli), Barqah (Cyrenaica), and Fezzan — in 2014. The Islamic State shifted to referring to thegroup as its Libya Province in 2019. + +__Islamic State Sinai Province (IS-Sinai).__ IS-Sinai is a former al Qaeda affiliate active in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula since 2011. It pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in 2014. + +__Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (al Shabaab).__ Al Shabaab is al Qaeda’s primary affiliate in East Africa. It is based in Somalia but also active in Kenya and has attacked in Ethiopia and Uganda. The group formed as an armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union in the mid-2000s. Al Qaeda recognized al Shabaab as an affiliate in 2012. + +__Islamic State Somalia Province (IS-Somalia).__ IS-Somalia is an al Shabaab splinter group that pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015. Islamic State leadership accepted this pledge in 2017. IS-Somalia operates primarily in Puntland in northern Somalia. + +__Islamic State Central Africa Province–Democratic Republic of Congo (ISCAP-DRC).__ The Islamic State announced its Central Africa Province in 2019, incorporating Salafi-jihadi insurgent groups active in the DRC and Mozambique. These groups operated independently, despite their shared name. The DRC branch of ISCAP developed from the Allied Democratic Forces, an insurgent group that originated in Uganda in the early 1990s and has been based in the DRC since 1995. + +__Islamic State Mozambique Province (IS-Mozambique).__ IS-Mozambique is active in northern Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province. It officially joined the Islamic State as part of the Central Africa Province in 2019. The Islamic State began referring to IS-Mozambique separately from ISCAP-DRC in May 2022. + +__Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) and Allies.__ JNIM is AQIM’s affiliate in the Sahel and the successor of AQIM’s networks that became prominent in Mali in 2012. It formed in 2017 from a merger of several AQIM-linked groups: AQIM’s Sahara Emirate, Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, and the Macina Liberation Front (MLF). “Allies” refers to smaller brigades active within JNIM’s orbit and Ansar al Islam, a Burkina Faso–based group that cooperates with JNIM. JNIM is active in Mali and Burkina Faso. + +__Islamic State Sahel Province, or Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).__ ISGS is a commonly used name for the Islamic State’s affiliate in the Sahel. The group’s founder, the prior leader of a splinter group that had broken from AQIM, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015. The Islamic State formally accepted this pledge in 2019, recognizing the group under the umbrella of its Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), though the Sahel branch continued to function independently. The Islamic State recognized ISGS as an independent unit, the Islamic State Sahel Province, in 2022. ISGS operates in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. + +__Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’at Ahl al Sunna lil Da’wa wal Jihad (Boko Haram).__ Boko Haram formed as a religious movement in northeastern Nigeria and transitioned to an armed uprising in 2009. The group pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015, changing its name to ISWAP. A subsequent schism divided the group. ISWAP largely overtook the rump Boko Haram in 2021. ISWAP and the Boko Haram remnants operate in northern Nigeria, particularly the northeast, and border regions of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. + +__Jama’at Ansar al Muslimeen fi Bilad al Sudan (Ansaru).__ Ansaru is an al Qaeda–aligned group that splintered from Boko Haram in 2012. Ansaru resumed attacks in northwestern Nigeria in 2020 after a multi-year dormancy. + + +## Appendix B. Matrix Definitions + +This appendix defines criteria for assessing Salafi-jihadi groups’ capabilities and access to opportunities and resources. + + +### Governance Factors + +These factors assess a group’s interaction with its audience, particularly the local population but also potential recruits regionally and globally. These criteria consider a group’s capacity to bend a population to its will by either force or persuasion and the local conditions that create opportunities for armed groups to influence communities. This analysis is a rough proxy for criteria that are difficult to judge, including popular sentiment and other hyperlocal dynamics, which should be studied for a deeper understanding of Salafi-jihadi groups’ effectiveness across local contexts. + +__Provide Social Services.__ This factor assesses a group’s ability to deliver services to a target population. Groups are categorized according to the highest level of service they provide, even if they also provide fewer or no services in other parts of their area of operations. + +- Red: The group functions as the de facto state through direct rule. It provides services such as health care, education, dispute resolution, and security. It conducts large-scale, organized taxation. + +- Orange: The group functions as a de facto state in combination with local authorities. It provides services and enforces some rules. + +- Yellow: The group provides intermittent services, such as dispute resolution, justice, and some rule setting. It may have set up internal governance structures serving its members. + +- Green: The group provides no services. + +__Exercise Social Control.__ This factor assesses a group’s ability to control the behavior of a target population. Groups are categorized according to the highest level of control they exert, even if they exert a lesser level of control or influence in other parts of their area of operations. + +- Red: The group is capable of declaring and enforcing modes of living unilaterally in some areas, including public executions and other mandatory events. It rapidly quells dissent. + +- Orange: The group has a looser control structure and may exert influence through preexisting local organizations and leadership networks. It can change some modes of living through a combination of force and negotiation. The group may tolerate or negotiate some dissent. + +- Yellow: The group engages in intermittent engagements to shape a population’s behavior, including preaching and violence such as kidnapping or assassination. It may extract taxes. Rival governing structures and security forces contest the group’s ability to exercise social control. + +- Green: The group is not in regular contact with communities. + +__Effective Propaganda.__ This factor assesses a group’s ability to spread its message and cause effects through distributing media. + +- Red: The group or its partners distribute high-quality media that reaches global and local audiences. This media may have inspired attacks in locations outside its area of operations or attracted foreign fighters. + +- Orange: The group or its partners distribute high-quality media for a local audience, including videos. The group features in jihadist propaganda outside its local area. + +- Yellow: The group or its partners distribute low-quality media for a local audience. Global jihadist outlets cover its activities. + +- Green: The group distributes no media. Global jihadist outlets may mention it irregularly. + +__Exploitation of Local Networks.__ This factor assesses a group’s ability to suppress or exploit local political and security networks toward its objectives. + +- Red: The group can suppress and deter rivals. There is no significant rival for providing security or governance inside its control or support zones. The group is integrated into human networks and the local economy. It does not need to collaborate with non–ideologically aligned groups at a large scale. + +- Orange: The group is taking steps to integrate with the local community, including intermarriage and alliance formation. It may work to undermine rivals by stoking or participating in communal conflict or aligning itself with particular populations. It may cooperate with other armed groups, including non–ideologically aligned groups. + +- Yellow: As a territorial insurgency, the group can deny access to terrain and prey on local populations but does not integrate with local networks and operates in remote areas. Alternately, as a clandestine network,103 the group can maintain covert terror cells and safe houses in populated areas. + +- Green: The group has largely hostile encounters with the local population and can only exist in a remote area without state power. The population may perceive it as foreign. + +__Mobilization of Population.__ This factor considers the level of grievance that elements of the population hold against either state authorities or other segments of the population. This analysis assumes that a degree of population mobilization and poor governance is a requirement for the survival of a Salafi-jihadi insurgency, particularly one that seeks to hold terrain. This factor approximates popular mobilization by combining three criteria defined in The Underestimated Insurgency: African States at Risk for Salafi-Jihadi Insurgencies. + +_Use of Conflict._ This criterion refers to the prevalence of conflict as a means to resolve political disputes. It considers the national level, including civil war, armed takeovers of government, and the projected risk of mass killing in which the state is the perpetrator or is unable or unwilling to prevent mass conflict. + +- Red: Civil war or internal military conflict is ongoing or occurred in the past six months, a military coup occurred in the past six months, or mass killing is assessed as ongoing or at increasing risk of happening. + +- Orange: Civil war or internal military conflict or coup occurred in the past year or period of expected civil war averted in the past six months. + +- Yellow: Civil war or internal military conflict or coup occurred in the past two years or period of expected civil war averted in the past year. + +- Green: Not applicable. + +_Abusive Security Forces._ This criterion approximates harmful security force behavior toward civilians by comparing current reporting on human rights abuses. + +- Red: Security forces regularly abuse civilians and prisoners (e.g., summary executions and collective punishment) with overt or tacit government support. + +- Orange: There are intermittent security force abuses (e.g., violently dispersing protesters). + +- Yellow: There is abusive use of detention but less tendency to use violence against civilians. Security forces fail to respond to protect civilians. + +- Green: Security forces generally work professionally and in the population’s interest. + +_Intergroup Grievances._ This criterion approximates the level of hostility between population groups using the “group grievance” indicator from the Fragile States Index 2022. + +- Red: 7.5–10.0. + +- Orange: 5.0–7.4. + +- Yellow: 2.5–4.9. + +- Green: 0–2.4. + + +### Military and Technical Factors + +These factors analyze an armed group’s ability to build, acquire, and use tools for making war. They consider both conventional and unconventional military effectiveness and terror attack capability ranging from local to transnational. + +__Bomb Making.__ Improvised explosive device (IED) development is one indicator of a group’s growing lethality. This factor is important for assessing not only the development of a group’s terror attack capabilities but also its asymmetric military capabilities. Salafi-jihadi militants regularly use explosives to increase the effectiveness of their ground assaults in lieu of conventional weaponry. Drivable suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) require technical skill and relatively long logistical chains to make, and groups use them to augment conventional attacks and conduct targeted bombings. + +- Red: The group builds IEDs locally, including drivable SVBIEDs. A known master bomb maker may be present. There may be evidence of research and development for weapons of mass destruction, demonstrated success at technical innovation, and use of SVBIED waves and major explosives as part of a coordinated military offensive or defensive operation. + +- Orange: The group builds IEDs locally, possibly including drivable and up-armored SVBIEDs, or there may be evidence of training or studying from a master bomb maker or demonstrated attempts to innovate. + +- Yellow: The group employs remote-detonated or other immobile IEDs; uses found explosives, land mines, and suicide vests; or has demonstrated capability at the “red” or “orange” level more than three years ago. + +- Green: The group does not use explosive devices. + +__Access to Weapons Systems.__ This factor indicates a group’s access to and ability to use weapons systems effectively. + +- Red: The group modifies drones to drop explosives or has confirmed or is likely to access man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADs). + +- Orange: The group demonstrated access to weapons systems at the “red” level more than three years ago. It may have access to MANPADs. + +- Yellow: The group uses commercial drones for surveillance. It has used rockets, mortars, or other heavy fires in the past three years. + +- Green: The group uses small arms only. + +__Sophisticated Tactics.__ This factor approximates the group’s level of military sophistication as a ground force. Groups may develop more advanced tactics with time — for example, combining skilled-fire teams with vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) to breach hard targets. Sophisticated tactics in theater also potentially indicate a latent transnational terror attack capability. The 2015 Islamic State Paris attack is an example of trained fighters from specialized military units adapting their skills for terror attacks. + +- Red: The group uses VBIEDs and drones to support large-scale infantry operations. It may have effectively exported tactical teams to another country. + +- Orange: The group conducts complex attacks combining explosives and tactical teams to breach hard targets or coordinate attacks with multiple VBIEDs and other increasingly complex attacks, such as secondary bombings targeting first responders and geographically separated attacks on hard targets. + +- Yellow: The group conducts simultaneous small-arms attacks. + +- Green: The group is not using sophisticated tactics. + +__Local Force Projection (Within Country).__ This factor indicates a group’s ability to conduct military operations and terror attacks beyond its immediate area of operations within a country. + +- Red: The group can sustain ground offensives in multiple distinct geographic areas, or it credibly threatens population centers of high priority to the state. + +- Orange: The group can wage a ground insurgency in one area and conduct intermittent terror attacks or raids in other areas, or it can sustain operations across a large geographic area. + +- Yellow: The group can conduct brief simultaneous attacks in geographically separate locations, has demonstrated a recent but now suppressed capability to sustain attacks in multiple locations, or can sustain a terror network while under pressure in its primary area of operations. + +- Green: The group is constrained to a local area, and any terror networks it maintains in other areas are largely dormant. + +__Regional Force Projection (Cross Border).__ This factor indicates a group’s ability to conduct terror attacks and conventional military operations across international borders. + +- Red: The group sustains a consistent insurgency across an international border or has expanded across international borders and established new enduring bases. + +- Orange: The group makes cross-border incursions or runs terror networks in neighboring countries from its primary area of operations. + +- Yellow: The group uses smuggling routes or support zones in a border region and has not attacked in a neighboring country in the past three years. + +- Green: The group’s activities are confined to a single country. + +__Global Terror Attack Capability.__ This factor indicates whether a group is capable of transnational terror attacks beyond its immediate country or region. + +- Red: The group has conducted or directly facilitated an attack outside its region on an international or transnational target in the past three years, or more than one successful individual attacker has credited the group for inspiration. + +- Orange: The group has actively attempted one or more attacks outside its region, including advanced plots interdicted in early stages, or an individual attacker has credited the group for inspiration. + +- Yellow: The group or individuals connected to it have attempted poorly designed attacks abroad, or the group conducted or directly facilitated one or more transnational terror attacks more than three years ago. + +- Green: The group has not been connected to any attacks abroad. + +__Elite Units.__ This factor considers the presence of military units to carry out more specialized and sensitive tasks. + +- Red: The group has one or more units focused on external terror attacks either regionally or transnationally. + +- Orange: The group has one or more units focused on specialized functions such as counterintelligence, innovation and weapons development, or training, including either training foreign fighters for other conflicts or dispatching trainers to other groups. + +- Yellow: The group has a unit with special attack capabilities in either conventional fighting or terror attacks. + +- Green: The group has no specialized units. + +__Resources.__ This factor considers the group’s ability to access resources to sustain or enhance its efforts. + +- Red: The group has a tax base and access to or dominance of economic networks. It likely has excess funds for operational planning or supporting other groups. + +- Orange: The group has access to economic networks, or it may receive funds from other Salafi-jihadi groups or financiers. + +- Yellow: The group’s economic resources are likely limited but sufficient for survival and baseline recruitment. + +- Green: The group is isolated and struggles to access sufficient resources to sustain its membership. + +__Permissive Environment.__ This factor considers the group’s access to areas with ineffective security forces and havens outside state control. It also considers recent man-made or natural crises that create a window of vulnerability for all or part of the population. This factor approximates whether an environment is permissive by combining three criteria defined in _The Underestimated Insurgency: African States at Risk for Salafi-Jihadi Insurgencies_. + +_Ineffective Security Forces._ This criterion uses a measure of a country’s monopoly on the use of force as a proxy for security force capability. These data are from 2020. Where indicated, the author has adjusted the assessment to 2022 to account for overt changes in the use of force in the country. + +- Red: Monopoly on use of force ranking in the range of 0–2.5. + +- Orange: 2.6–5.0. + +- Yellow: 5.1–7.5. + +- Green: 7.6–10.0. + +_Uncontrolled Areas._ This criterion considers the degree to which a state controls the territory in its borders. It also considers the relative importance of that territory and the state’s degree of access to it. + +- Red: Terrain actively controlled by a force hostile to the government. + +- Orange: Populated terrain with limited access for government forces and personnel, with government and insurgent forces contesting control of that terrain. + +- Yellow: Sparsely populated terrain outside government control and ongoing intercommunal conflicts that the government cannot or chooses not to intervene in. + +- Green: Not applicable. + +_Vulnerability Window._ This criterion refers to a recent change in position or security for all or part of the population, including armed conflict, mass political unrest, natural disasters, and humanitarian crises. This criterion also considers influxes of refugees and migrants as potentially destabilizing incidents. + +- Red: Man-made or natural crisis in the past six months. + +- Orange: Man-made or natural crisis in the past year or forecast crisis with medium-high confidence. + +- Yellow: Man-made or natural crisis in the past two years or forecast crisis with low-medium confidence. + +- Green: Not applicable. + + +### Organizational Factors + +These factors consider a group’s ability to coordinate people toward its goals, both by managing its internal processes and through its interactions with other organizations. These criteria also consider groups’ contributions to the broader Salafi-jihadi movement. + +__Force Generation.__ This factor considers a group’s ability to build and regenerate a fighting force. + +- Red: The group has training camps, possibly with foreign recruits, and there is evidence of growing membership. + +- Orange: Limited information indicates that the group may have training camps, foreign recruits, or growing membership. + +- Yellow: The group’s size is steady, there is no significant indication of membership growing or decreasing, or there is insufficient data to judge group size. + +- Green: The group is losing members to arrests, attacks, or defections, or the group suffered significant losses in recent years and does not appear to be recovering. + +__Resilience or Adaptability.__ This factor considers whether a group has overcome a major military setback or adapted in response to pressure. + +- Red: The group has overcome a setback, such as the loss of terrain or its initial leaders, and returned at a level equal to or above preceding the setback. + +- Orange: The group lost capability in its initial area of operations but shifted elsewhere, or it has sustained a territorial insurgency under significant military pressure. + +- Yellow: The group has lost military capability but sustains as a terror attack network, or it encountered pressure and significantly reduced its area of operations. + +- Green: The group has not yet come under pressure, or it has become dormant for at least a year after coming under pressure. + +__Network Integration and Amplification.__ This factor considers whether a group effectively draws on or contributes to larger Salafi-jihadi networks. + +- Red: The group sends fighters to other groups and helps start or seed new Salafi-jihadi franchises. + +- Orange: The group sends trainers, media expertise, and weapons experts to other groups; receives foreign fighters for training; or plays a coordinating role for other groups. + +- Yellow: The group receives training, delegations, media coordination or amplification, and money or weapons from other groups. It may have changed its name or formal affiliation or rhetoric. + +- Green: The group may receive superficial media attention from Salafi-jihadi publications but otherwise receives no support from other groups. + +__Competitors and Infighting.__ This factor considers the role of intergroup relations. Competition between Salafi-jihadi groups can be destructive and constrain a group’s ability to pursue its governance and military goals, but it can also empower more radical factions and encourage defections between groups. + +- Red: The group is collaborating or deconflicting with Salafi-jihadi rivals against shared adversaries. + +- Orange: The group has a local Salafi-jihadi rival but is either successfully repressing or absorbing its rival or increasing its overall rate and scale of attacks. + +- Yellow: The group is dedicating some energy to quelling infighting but has not split, or it has no local Salafi-jihadi rivals or apparent infighting. + +- Green: The group is primarily preoccupied with infighting, including targeting spies and defectors, or it is suppressed by rival Salafi-jihadi groups. + +___ + +__Emily Estelle Perez__ is a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and the research manager of AEI’s Critical Threats Project, which provides open-source intelligence analysis on the Salafi-jihadi movement and Iran. She studies al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and associated Salafi-jihadi groups in Africa, and she specializes in security and related dynamics in East Africa, Libya, and the Sahel. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-13-tech-supply-chain-to-russia.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-13-tech-supply-chain-to-russia.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9e48ba83 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-13-tech-supply-chain-to-russia.md @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Tech Supply Chain To Russia +author: Steve Stecklow, et al. +date : 2022-12-13 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/YIFBlMx.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "A REUTERS SPECIAL REPORT: The supply chain that keeps tech flowing to Russia" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_In March this year, a new firm appeared in Turkey’s corporate registry. Azu International Ltd Sti described itself as a wholesale trader of IT products, and a week later began shipping U.S. computer parts to Russia._ + + + +Business was brisk, Russian customs records show. The United States and the EU had recently restricted sales of sensitive technology to Russia because of its Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine, and many Western tech companies had suspended all dealings with Moscow. + +Co-founded by Gokturk Agvaz, a Turkish businessman, Azu International stepped in to help fill the supply gap. Over the next seven months, the company exported at least $20 million worth of components to Russia, including chips made by U.S. manufacturers, according to Russian customs records. + +![image1](https://i.imgur.com/jJTpdwI.jpg) +_▲ The LinkedIn profile of Gokturk Agvaz, Azu International’s co-founder. Agvaz recently sold his stake._ + +Azu International’s rapidly growing business didn’t come from a standing start, Reuters reporting shows: Agvaz manages a wholesaler of IT products in Germany called Smart Impex GmbH. Before the invasion, Russian custom records show that the German company shipped American and other products to a Moscow customer that recently has imported goods from Azu International. + +Reached at his office near Cologne in October, Agvaz told Reuters that Smart Impex stopped exporting to Russia to comply with EU trade restrictions but sells to Turkey, a non-EU country that doesn’t enforce most of the West’s sanctions against Moscow. “We cannot export to Russia, we cannot sell to Russia, and that’s why we just sell to Turkey,” he said. Asked about Azu International’s sales to Russia, he replied, “This is a business secret of ours.” + +Contacted again shortly before publication, Agvaz said Smart Impex “observes all export restrictions and manufacturer bans” and “has not circumvented Western sanctions against Russia.” He said he couldn’t answer questions about Azu International. Turkish corporate records show he sold his 50% interest in the Istanbul company on Nov. 30 to his co-founder, Huma Gulum Ulucan. She couldn’t be reached for comment. + +Azu International is an example of how supply channels to Russia have remained open despite Western export restrictions and manufacturer bans. At least $2.6 billion of computer and other electronic components flowed into Russia in the seven months to Oct. 31, Russian customs records show. At least $777 million of these products were made by Western firms whose chips have been found in Russian weapons systems: America’s Intel Corp, Advanced Micro Devices Inc (AMD), Texas Instruments Inc and Analog Devices Inc., and Germany’s Infineon AG. + +![image2](https://i.imgur.com/6OTBJFg.jpg) +_▲ Azu International, founded in March of this year, describes itself as a wholesale trader in IT products. Its offices are inside this business center in Istanbul._ + +A joint investigation by Reuters and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a London-based defense think tank, details for the first time the global supply chain that continues to feed Russia with Western computer components and other electronics. The investigation into this trade identified a galaxy of obscure importers and exporters, like Azu International, and found that shipments of semiconductors and other technology continue to arrive in Russia from Hong Kong, Turkey and other trading hubs. + +One Russian importer, OOO Fortap, based in St. Petersburg, was set up by a Russian businessman in April and has since imported at least $138 million worth of electronics, including U.S. computer parts, according to Russian customs records. They show that one of Fortap’s biggest suppliers is a Turkish company, Bion Group Ltd Sti, a former textile trader that recently expanded into wholesale electronics. Bion’s general manager declined to comment. + +Another Russian importer, OOO Titan-Micro, registered an address that’s a house in a forest on the northern edge of Moscow. It, too, has imported Western computer components since the invasion, according to the customs records. + +Some of the suppliers – including firms in Hong Kong and Turkey – have ties to Russian nationals, according to a review of company filings. + +![image3](https://i.imgur.com/zR1MGCZ.jpg) +_▲ Logos of firms whose products have been shipped to Russia._ + +The customs records – which Reuters purchased from three commercial providers – don’t identify the precise type of semiconductors and other electronic products, nor do they show what happens to the components once they arrive in Russia. Reuters reported in August that Western companies’ mass-produced chips, in many cases not subject to export restrictions, have shown up inside missiles and weapons systems the Russian military has deployed in Ukraine. + +Reuters provided to Intel, AMD, Texas Instruments, Analog Devices and Infineon data from Russian customs records that detail shipments of their products that have arrived in Russia in recent months. Reuters excluded data between Feb. 25 and March 31 to account for shipments that might have been in transit before the invasion or before the manufacturers’ announced suspensions. + +A spokesperson for Intel said the company is taking the findings “very seriously and we are looking into the matter.” The spokesperson said Intel adheres to all sanctions and export controls against Russia and “has a clear policy that its distributors and customers must comply with all export requirements and international laws as well.” + +Similarly, a spokesperson for AMD said the firm “strictly complies” with all export regulations and has suspended sales and support for its products in Russia. “That includes requiring all AMD customers and authorized distributors” to stop selling AMD products into Russia. + +Infineon, too, said that after the invasion, it “instructed all distribution partners globally to prevent deliveries and to implement robust measures that will prevent any diversion of Infineon products or services contrary to the sanctions.” + +![image4](https://i.imgur.com/fn2VQ0k.jpg) +_▲ A Texas Instruments chip, dated 1988, is seen on the circuit board of a Russian 9M727 missile. The missile was recovered from the battlefield in Ukraine._ + +Texas Instruments said it has not shipped to Russia since the end of February. Analog Devices didn’t respond to requests for comment. + +A spokesperson for the U.S. Department of Commerce said, “Since the start of the invasion, Russia’s access to semiconductors from all sources has been slashed by nearly 70 percent thanks to the actions of the unprecedented 38 nation coalition that has come together to respond to (Russian President Vladimir) Putin’s aggression. It is no surprise that Russia is working hard to circumvent controls.” + +But the Reuters review of Russian customs data found that since the invasion, the declared value of semiconductor imports by Russia has, in fact, risen sharply. The spokesperson said the Commerce Department had analyzed different data and therefore couldn’t comment on Reuters findings. + +Putin’s office and Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade didn’t respond to requests seeking comment for this article. + +![image5](https://i.imgur.com/5IiQGlz.png) +_▲ __Exports of Intel products to Russia.__ Source: Russian Customs Records._ + + +### Stacks of boxes + +Among the firms shipping Western technology to Russia is a Hong Kong- registered company called Pixel Devices Ltd. A Reuters journalist who visited Pixel Devices’ office in a Hong Kong business tower found a small room with cardboard boxes stacked to the ceiling, and no employees. There was little sign that the company has shipped at least $210 million in electronics to Russia since April 1, including at least $50 million in Intel and AMD products through Oct. 31, according to Russian customs records. + +Company records show that Pixel Devices was incorporated in 2017 by a Hong Kong firm called Bigfish Investments Ltd, controlled by Kirill Nosov, a Hong Kong resident with a Russian passport. Nosov told Reuters in an email that he helped set up the firm but doesn’t work for it and isn’t in a position to comment about its activities. + +Pixel Devices’ current owner is a Singapore company, Asia Global Neolink Pte Ltd, which in turn is owned by a Seychelles company called White Wings Ltd, according to Hong Kong and Singapore company records. Pixel Devices’ only director at present is Pere Roura Cano, a Spaniard, who is also listed as a director of Asia Global Neolink and runs an aviation club in Catalonia. Reached by telephone in Spain, Roura Cano confirmed that Pixel Devices has been shipping semiconductors and other products to Russia. + +> “We ourselves increase the risks of sanctions by publicly reporting on who will carry what and from where … Such publicity attracts unnecessary attention.” +> #### Evgeny Krivosheev, F+ tech’s head of production and development + +“I’m beginning with these people and I’m not sure what goods are moving,” he said. “I cannot inform you more; it’s our private activity.” + +Pixel Devices’ website, www.pixel-devices.com, was originally registered in 2017 with a web-services firm in St. Petersburg, according to internet intelligence firm DomainTools. The website states that Pixel Devices’ “Components & Subassemblies” division serves businesses in diversified sectors including military and aerospace. In response to questions from Reuters, Pixel Devices said it doesn’t sell products to the military sector and prohibits its customers from reselling to defense companies. It said some of the information on the website is “quite outdated.” + +Pixel Devices said it has been supplying IT equipment to Russia for several years and “it is possible” that it shipped Intel and AMD products this year “as part of long-term contracts.” It said it acquires its products from manufacturers or their resellers and doesn’t supply components “that violate any binding policies imposed on the company by its partners, vendors, or distributors.” Intel and AMD told Reuters that Pixel Devices isn’t an authorized distributor of their products. + +![image6](https://i.imgur.com/Pfz1rkB.png) +_▲ A screenshot of an English version of KompLiga’s website, compliga.ru. The firm, a supplier of IT products, is in St. Petersburg._ + +Pixel Devices said it couldn’t confirm the accuracy of the values found by Reuters of the company’s exports of electronics to Russia; it didn’t provide its own figures. It also noted that export restrictions aren’t universal and there isn’t a complete ban on the export of IT equipment to Russia. The company said it doesn’t sell to entities controlled by sanctioned individuals. + +Pixel Devices also said it’s not surprising that no one was in Pixel Devices’ office recently because most employees work remotely or in warehouse operations. + +Russian customs records show that Pixel Devices’ main client in Russia is a company in St. Petersburg called OOO KompLiga. Its website, states that the firm can supply a wide range of IT products and parts. According to the customs records, since April 1, KompLiga has imported at least $181 million worth of electronics, almost exclusively from Pixel Devices. + +KompLiga’s general manager, Aleksandr Kotelnikov, told Reuters he was reluctant to provide details on how his company manages to continue procuring Western electronic components. “I’d rather not disclose details about my company’s work so as not to tip off rivals and give them a helping hand in their hard work,” Kotelnikov wrote in an email. + + +### “Iron curtain” + +Not every Russian company is reluctant to discuss how to deal with export restrictions. A Moscow-based logistics firm, OOO Novelco, has been advising Russian businesses on how to continue importing foreign goods. + +In September, Novelco organized a seminar in Moscow for its clients on “how to find alternative ways to deliver goods” to Russia. In a 45-minute presentation entitled “Foreign trade tactics and strategies to compensate for sanctions,” Novelco’s chief executive, Grigory Grigoriev, urged companies to stockpile products and develop diversified pools of suppliers from more than one country. + +One Novelco executive offered a tip for clients tempted to use the Chinese territory of Macau as a shipping point to Russia: “We do not recommend sending cargo through this airport, despite the attractive rates, as there are enormous waiting times, cancellations.” + +To resolve shipping problems, he and other Novelco executives have recommended on the company’s YouTube channel using lessons learned during the pandemic, such as transporting goods through third countries, rather than directly from a supplier. + +In interviews with Russian media and in a series of posts on LinkedIn, Grigoriev described recent trade restrictions on Russia as tantamount to erecting an “iron curtain” around his country. + +![image7](https://i.imgur.com/rDbXXsk.jpg) +_▲ A video presentation by the CEO of Novelco, a Russian logistics firm, offering advice on how to cope with sanctions._ + +Grigoriev said in one LinkedIn post that Novelco had set up an affiliate in Istanbul and has been shipping goods to Russia from Turkey, which doesn’t enforce all U.S. and EU Russian trade restrictions. Once merchandise arrives in Turkey, “shipments are processed for re-export and cargo can follow to Russia by air, sea, road and rail transport,” Grigoriev said in the post. + +In March, Grigoriev registered in Istanbul a company called Smart Trading Ltd Sti, Turkish corporate records show. Since then, the company has shipped at least $660,000 worth of products made by U.S. semiconductor makers, according to Russian customs records. + +Some other Russian firms believe it is unwise to discuss publicly how to handle trade restrictions. + +In an August blog post, a senior executive at F+ tech, a Russian IT equipment manufacturer that relies on many imported components, said the business of procuring foreign parts requires discretion. + +“We ourselves increase the risks of sanctions by publicly reporting on who will carry what and from where,” Evgeny Krivosheev, F+ tech’s head of production and development, wrote in a blog post, which was published by Russian business daily Vedomosti and on the company’s website. “Such publicity attracts unnecessary attention.” + +A spokesperson for Krivosheev’s company said the executive wasn’t speaking about any particular firm. + + +### EU shipments + +Many recent shipments of Western computer parts to Russia have arrived from China and other countries that haven’t joined the United States and the EU in restricting exports to Russia. + +But there are some exceptions, Reuters found. Customs records show shipments of Analog Devices and other U.S. components directly from the EU. + +Elmec Trade Oü, an electronic-components wholesaler based in the Estonian capital Tallinn, shipped at least $17 million worth of goods to Russia between April 1 and Oct. 31, according to Russian customs records. These included chips made by Analog Devices and other U.S. manufacturers, the records show. + +Elmec Trade’s general manager, Aleksandr Fomenko, told Reuters that his company buys its products through official channels, follows all legal requirements and complies with all sanctions and export restrictions. + +Asked how his company could continue to export Analog Devices and other Western chips months after the manufacturers announced they had suspended sales to Russia, he said that “the majority” were orders placed last year. The shipments were delayed because of pandemic-related transit disruptions, he said. Analog Devices didn’t respond to requests for comment. + +A spokesperson for the European Commission didn’t respond to questions about Elmec Trade. In general, the spokesperson said, “The EU takes circumvention very seriously, as it is a practice that can undermine the effectiveness of EU sanctions.” The spokesperson noted that the 27-member bloc has been encouraging other countries to align with EU measures adopted against Russia. + +![image8](https://i.imgur.com/puGPSop.jpg) +_▲ Ukraine’s military displays sections of Russian missiles that didn’t explode on impact._ + + +### Eleventh floor + +The U.S. government has placed export restrictions on scores of companies to try to stop the flow of sensitive high-tech components to Russia. But the probe by Reuters and RUSI found that there appears to be an active roster of substitute players ready to replace such entities. + +Take the case of AO GK Radiant, a Moscow-based distributor of computer chips and other electronic parts that celebrated its thirtieth anniversary in June. It states on its website that its objective is to provide Russian clients with “the best solutions from global manufacturers.” + +Indeed, Russian customs records show for years the company had imported millions of dollars worth of Western-designed chips. + +But in July 2021, the U.S. Department of Commerce added the company to its trade restrictions list, alleging that it was “involved in the procurement of U.S.-origin electronic components likely in furtherance of Russian military programs.” + +Russian customs records show that GK Radiant’s imports have since plummeted. The company’s founder, Andrei Kuznetsov, declined to comment. + +The company’s head office remains on the eleventh floor of a building at 65 Profsoyuznaya Street in Moscow. There also appears to be another importer of Western computer components operating on the same floor. It’s called Titan-Micro. + +![image9](https://i.imgur.com/w5KzpA0.jpg) +_▲ The house in northern Moscow where IT electronics distributor OOO Titan-Micro is registered._ + +Russian customs records show that Titan-Micro began importing Analog Devices and other electronic components in November 2021, nine months after it was established. Titan-Micro has since imported at least $12.7 million in parts, including $9.9 million worth since April 2022. It has used some of the same suppliers as GK Radiant, including Sinno Electronics Co Ltd, a Chinese company that was placed under export restrictions by the U.S. Department of Commerce in June for allegedly providing support to Russia’s defense sector. Sinno Electronics didn’t respond to a request for comment. + +The address for Titan-Micro listed in Russian corporate records leads to a wooden house, deep inside a birch forest in northern Moscow, with no apparent sign of business activity. + +The company’s general manager, Nadejda Shevchenko, hung up when Reuters reached her by phone. But a Titan-Micro employee, who declined to give his name, later said employees weren’t working at the wooden house, but on the 11th floor of the business center at 65 Profsoyuznaya Street. + +That’s where GK Radiant also operates. From 3b5fdb14268b91d900a1708887ba23af8675451e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: theagora Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2022 01:20:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 11/12] 0x17 Add _columns posts, Dec.22 --- .../_columns/2022-11-17-china-2007-2010.md | 150 ++++++++++++++++++ ...2-11-29-a4-revolution-when-heaven-burns.md | 48 ++++++ ...22-12-06-your-mother-is-not-your-mother.md | 59 +++++++ 3 files changed, 257 insertions(+) create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2022-11-17-china-2007-2010.md create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2022-11-29-a4-revolution-when-heaven-burns.md create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2022-12-06-your-mother-is-not-your-mother.md diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-11-17-china-2007-2010.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-17-china-2007-2010.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..794acd4e --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-17-china-2007-2010.md @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : "中國2007-2010" +author: "李易安" +date : 2022-11-17 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/NaPrm3K.jpg +image_caption: "外省車輛進京許可證。北京，2007年" +description: "" +--- + +2007年從香港坐「京九直通車」去北京，是我此生第一次在中國自助旅行。彼時兩岸沒有定期直航，往來仍不方便，一切都好新奇。 + + + +在北京時，我常常想起小時候讀過的一本兒童遊記，裡頭記述著一個台灣小孩80年代第一次去北京的經歷。印象很深刻，那個作者寫道，「我們只要開口一說『北平』，當地人就會問，『台灣來的吧？』」 + +那趟北京之後，便對中國深深著迷。 + +直到大學畢業之前，我幾乎每個寒暑假都會往中國跑，每到一個城市，就會和豆瓣上的中國網友見面，以一個外來者的視角和身份，體驗了那個年代中國知識分子的才氣、躁動和樂觀。 + +這時候的中國，就像一個超大型的工地──尤其是北京，整座城市都在為奧運會趕工妝點，前門、大柵欄一帶拆得如火如荼。 + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/pyEdZuL.jpg) +▲ 北京西直門車站，2007年。這個車站是京包線的起點；新的「北京北站」站體完工之後，這座舊車站便成了古蹟。 + +![image02](https://i.imgur.com/buCDOuX.jpg) +▲ 北京盧溝橋上的石獅，2007年。 + +![image03](https://i.imgur.com/dgPmLuw.jpg) +▲ 北京，2007年。利群烤鴨當年很有名，很受外國人歡迎。附近的胡同拆到一半，只剩下利群烤鴨一幢老屋鶴立雞群。 + +![image04](https://i.imgur.com/XkoEQcO.jpg) +▲ 北京，2007年。前門棕樹斜街的胡同。 + +![image05](https://i.imgur.com/TEiKSsn.jpg) +▲ 安徽歙縣，2007年。 + +![image06](https://i.imgur.com/5ObfOS9.jpg) +▲ 安徽歙縣，2007年。 + +![image07](https://i.imgur.com/F5glwg2.jpg) +▲ 新疆吐魯番，2007年。 + +![image08](https://i.imgur.com/Dd1YhuL.jpg) +▲ 新疆喀什，2007年。這片街區，後來聽說拆了一些。 + +![image09](https://i.imgur.com/LameN49.jpg) +▲ 新疆喀什，2007年。 + +再到了2010年，我來到北京交換學生一個學期。 + +當時台灣並不承認中國高教的學分，因此多數時間，我不是在校園裡找尋被學生擠爆的課室、蹭進去旁聽，就是和農民工一齊鑽進「綠皮車」的硬座車廂出京去蹓躂。 + +反正結果差不多，都不見得有位子坐。 + +看著照片，彷彿都還能聞到那時中國的氣味──那是一股混合了塑料味、汗臭、菸味，有時候還摻點煤炭味的神奇氣味。 + +當時遇到的大部分人，都覺得這個國家、自己的人生，正在變得愈來愈好，面對外來的一切事物（包括我這個台灣人），也都充滿了好奇。 + +![image10](https://i.imgur.com/KbTDbXx.jpg) +▲ 北京大學36號宿舍樓旁。 + +![image11](https://i.imgur.com/8qSvwsV.jpg) +▲ 上海徐匯區。 + +![image12](https://i.imgur.com/XvYgCW1.jpg) +▲ 上海車站，即將停駛的「上海－北京」綠皮列車。 + +![image13](https://i.imgur.com/kjznClw.jpg) +▲ 河北承德。 + +![image14](https://i.imgur.com/YC60Kr3.jpg) +▲ 遼寧瀋陽，一間餐廳裡的神龕與茅台。 + +![image15](https://i.imgur.com/3cxVeF5.jpg) +▲ 往吉林通化的火車上。 + +當時中國的鐵路常常超負載運行，幾乎每班車都是爆滿狀態──在我的經驗裡，只有東北的火車是例外，往往沒什麼乘客。或許是因為，東北過去曾是中國鐵路線最綿密的地區，也可能因為改革開放之後，東北的人口便一直嚴重外流。 + +![image16](https://i.imgur.com/irRx8rD.jpg) +▲ 吉林延邊朝鮮族自治區。 + +![image17](https://i.imgur.com/wq0j2bX.jpg) +▲ 吉林集安，河對岸就是朝鮮（北韓）。 + +![image18](https://i.imgur.com/0CGLBll.jpg) +▲ 山西大同。 + +![image19](https://i.imgur.com/yCueYG4.jpg) +▲ 山西大同。 + +![image20](https://i.imgur.com/C1xEZON.jpg) +▲ 山西大同。 + +![image21](https://i.imgur.com/0qfC4J7.jpg) +▲ 山西大同。 + +![image22](https://i.imgur.com/kfetfIf.jpg) +▲ 往寧夏銀川的綠皮車。 + +![image23](https://i.imgur.com/NMBKIm9.jpg) +▲ 去銀川的列車上，坐我旁邊的小男孩。他是我此生第一個速寫模特兒。 + +![image24](https://i.imgur.com/lq0spO9.jpg) +▲ 青海西寧。 + +![image25](https://i.imgur.com/oIIkEj8.jpg) +▲ 青海西寧。 + +![image26](https://i.imgur.com/BMQyyv1.jpg) +▲ 青海西寧。 + +![image27](https://i.imgur.com/UUZRggT.jpg) +▲ 西藏拉薩。 + +![image28](https://i.imgur.com/TUCkhPN.jpg) +▲ 西藏拉薩。 + +![image29](https://i.imgur.com/Su75NS2.jpg) +▲ 西藏拉薩。 + +![image30](https://i.imgur.com/gjkGuIL.jpg) +▲ 西藏拉薩近郊。 + +![image31](https://i.imgur.com/KhCgYpc.jpg) +▲ 西藏，往日喀則路上。 + +台灣人被視同外國人，進入西藏必須辦理「入藏證」。不過當年的入藏證聽說比今日好辦，只要參加旅行團就辦得下來，參團前後的時間，依然可以在拉薩周邊自由行動。 + +![image32](https://i.imgur.com/K0b0H1V.jpg) +▲ 西藏日喀則附近。 + +![image33](https://i.imgur.com/7fptEoa.jpg) +▲ 西藏日喀則附近。 + +![image34](https://i.imgur.com/vIvTIf9.jpg) +▲ 珠穆朗瑪峰。 + +![image35](https://i.imgur.com/PwmWFZv.jpg) +▲ 四川成都。 + +![image36](https://i.imgur.com/N5g3HY1.jpg) +▲ 廣東湛江，颱風過後。 + +![image37](https://i.imgur.com/BBAw9xl.jpg) +▲ 廣州沙面，台灣銀行舊址。 + +這個「台灣銀行」嚴格說起來，不是現在的台灣銀行，而是「日本的台灣銀行」，而沙面是當時廣州的租界，所以有很多外國銀行、商號。 + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-11-29-a4-revolution-when-heaven-burns.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-29-a4-revolution-when-heaven-burns.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..58b7a818 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-29-a4-revolution-when-heaven-burns.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : "白紙革命《天與地》" +author: "LandscapeReader" +date : 2022-11-29 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/ueuadXO.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "" +--- + +《天與地》是一部“不以哭泣為哭泣”的電視劇，是關於革命、青春與搖滾樂的童話。劇中的幾位中年人，已經消磨年輕時的熱情，成為腐敗的中年人。但音樂又讓他們找回熱血，讓所有人暫時放下對立。 + + + +### 主題曲《年少無知》歌词 + +> #### 林若宁 词 +> #### 黄贯中 曲 + +> 年少多好　頑劣多好 不甘安於封建制度裏 迷信上街真理會達到 + +> 旗幟高舉　羣眾聲討 不惜犧牲一切去上訴 權貴的想法太俗套 + +> 只可惜生活是一堆挫折 只可惜生命是必須妥協 + +> 年少多好　貧困多好 一蚊積蓄足以快樂到 廉價結他抒發我暴躁 + +> 財富得到　年歲不保 捐輸不必講究有回報 人世間總會有異數 + +> 只可惜生活是一聲發泄 只可惜生命是一聲抱歉　怕追到 + +> 如果　命運能選擇 十字街口你我踏出的每步更瀟灑 + +> 如果　活着能坦白 舊日所相信價值不必接受時代的糟蹋 + +> 年少多好　朋友多好 一番爭執不會有被告 遊戲競爭不會記入腦 + +> 年歲增長　無法修補 青春的詩總會老　時間多恐怖 + +> 如果　命運能選擇 十字街口你我踏出的每步無用困惑 + +> 如果　活着能坦白 舊日所相信價值今天發現還未老 + +> 如果　命運能演習 現實中不致接納一生每步殘酷抉擇 + +> 留守　過去的想法 我會否好像這樣生於世上無目的鞭撻 + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-12-06-your-mother-is-not-your-mother.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-12-06-your-mother-is-not-your-mother.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3da08753 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-12-06-your-mother-is-not-your-mother.md @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : "你妈不是你妈" +author: "滕彪" +date : 2022-12-06 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/hfCDFQ2.png +image_caption: "“白纸运动”实况发布者“李老师不是你老师”推特帐号截图" +description: "" +--- + +A：你和你妈长得不太像，血型也不一样，你妈不是你妈。 + +B：这是《出生医学证明》。 + +A：假的，现在什么东西不能造假？你爸的同学的同事的儿媳妇，就是这家医院副院长的表妹。 + +B：…… + + + +A ：怎么知道这不是同名的其他人呢？全国叫司马岚琪的有1700多个，按概率，生日一样的也有四个。2001年2月29日《针尖县海狮周报》上，你妈的名字是司马岚祺，显然和出生证上你妈的名字不一样啊。司马岚琪和司马岚祺能是一个人吗？ + +B： …… + +A：科学上说，孩子和母亲的血型虽然可以不一样，但血型造假不是很容易了吗？你的性格、兴趣、职业跟你妈完全不一样，怎么解释？想证明你妈是你妈，去做DNA亲子鉴定啊！你连科学都不信吗？你如果不敢到我指定的方大铁锤子医院做鉴定，就是心虚。 + +B：…… + +A：什么？2001年2月没有29号？你们这帮科学盲。听说过薛定谔的猫吗？听说过开普勒第三定律吗？太阳系内所有行星公转周期的平方同行星轨道半长径的立方之比为一常数。……还有，那些说你和你妈长得像的人是不是都瞎了？ + +B：…… + +A： 如果你妈是你妈，为什么2005年2月29号她和你哥哥一起参加了记者会，没有带你去？ + +B：…… + +A ：你妈在电影学院的学历也涉嫌造假。再说了，电影学院里的男女关系谁不知道咋回事啊？看看这张照片，和你妈一起这男的，怎么证明他们不是那种关系？没有那种关系能在一起吗？什么？电影剧照？怎么可能？公映的电影里，拍摄角度就不一样。再说了，拍戏假戏真做的还少吗？ + +B：…… + +A：著名汉学家肥课纽子（Phay Knewz）也认为你妈学历造假，虽然你妈不是你妈。当然如果你妈不是你妈，她学历造不造假也跟你没关系了。 + +B：…… + +A：从开始到现在你只回复了一次，默认了吧？没法反驳了吧？有种你去法院告我呀？你不告，不正说明我说对了吗？不但你妈不是你妈，你爸也不是你爸。 + +B：…… + +A：其实连你也不是你。为什么到处都搜索不到你三年前的信息？你背后是个团队吧？否则怎么突然变得比我更有名？怎么会有那么多人帮你说话？都拿了你的钱吧？钱是美国中情局的吧？如果不是，为什么中情局不出来否认？你能证明你没收过中情局的钱吗？他们从来就用现金交易，而且还要中间转手。萨马兰奇就是其中一个转手人，否则萨马兰奇和司马岚琪，名字难道是巧合吗？ + +B：…… + +A：你的文章其实也不是你写的，根本就是有人代笔。你能证明是你自己写的吗？怎么证明作者不是和你同名同姓的另一个人？别拿什么手稿来唬我，别人写好了你抄一遍，这把戏谁不会啊？你敢来我这里测试一下吗？我出个命题作文，找评委来判断一下？评委你我各找5个？不敢来是吧？因为你就是写不了。 + +B：…… + +A：我已经通过关系弄到了你的很多私人信息，先公布一小部分，还有别的，先不发。二十多年来，敢接我招的就没几个！不敢接招的当然都是骗子；敢接招的最后也被我证明了是骗子。不是骗子的人怎么会被我盯上？你这极品人渣…… + + \ No newline at end of file From 67a4517d384056cb7af64812740357e60d4c4381 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: hokoi Date: Fri, 23 Dec 2022 03:10:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 12/12] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x17 Dec.23 --- .../2022-12-14-low-orbit-high-stakes.md | 206 ++++++++++++++++++ .../2022-12-14-russias-adaptation-game.md | 144 ++++++++++++ ...22-12-15-us-australia-philippines-triad.md | 142 ++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 492 insertions(+) create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-12-14-low-orbit-high-stakes.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-12-14-russias-adaptation-game.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-12-15-us-australia-philippines-triad.md diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-14-low-orbit-high-stakes.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-14-low-orbit-high-stakes.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..80e1ecd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-14-low-orbit-high-stakes.md @@ -0,0 +1,206 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Low Orbit, High Stakes +author: Makena Young and Akhil Thadani +date : 2022-12-14 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/L7Ax8N6.jpg +image_caption: "Numerous communication satellites in the low Earth orbit relay broadband for the surface." +description: "Low Orbit, High Stakes: All-In on the LEO Broadband Competition" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_The competition to provide broadband from low Earth orbit (LEO) is one of the most important, least appreciated geostrategic developments underway._ _Policymakers in Washington have yet to consider the economic and strategic implications of LEO satellite constellations, which promise to dramatically improve coverage in underserved markets and bring more of the world online. In addition to reaping vast commercial rewards, nations with leading LEO broadband providers could enjoy increased resiliency in their communications, accuracy in positioning services, and even enhanced early warning capabilities._ + +_An elite group of companies, primarily from the United States and Europe, are on the cutting edge of these efforts. But China has its own plans for LEO broadband, deep pockets of state funding to pursue those ambitions, and political ties to leverage through its Belt and Road Initiative. As the LEO broadband competition intensifies, policymakers need an accessible guide to these developments and recommendations for advancing U.S. interests._ + + +### Introduction + +As of November 2022, just over 63 percent of the 8 billion people in the world use the internet — leaving about 3 billion people (and potential customers) unconnected. To bridge this digital divide, governments and private commercial companies are investing in initiatives to build space-based broadband internet. If successful, these efforts have the potential to quickly connect people around the globe, as well as change the space environment itself. Several countries are launching national initiatives to establish low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations and capture large portions of a burgeoning market, unleashing extensive private- or state-backed resources to do so. + +Competition to provide broadband services from satellites is not new. The 1990s saw a similar commercial broadband internet boom that resulted in little success. Companies such as Teledesic, Celestri, Globalstar, Odyssey, and Iridium all proposed large satellite-communications (SATCOM) constellations in LEO, but almost all ended in bankruptcy by the early 2000s. As similar ambitions emerge 30 years later, will the new generation of LEO-based satellite broadband succeed? Today the barrier to entry to orbit has significantly decreased as technology, materials, and launch capabilities have become cheaper and more widely available. International competition to build, launch, and operate a low-cost and low-latency system that spans the globe is fierce, as the demand for fast, reliable, and affordable internet services continues to expand. As of 2022, only one operator, Starlink, is providing LEO-based service on the open market. High capital investment and extensive initial infrastructure requirements have slowed the commercialization of LEO broadband. However, this is set to change. Satellite broadband revenues have already increased by 1.1 percent in 2021, and global subscribers jumped by 11 percent — up to 3 million people — since the year prior. The global SATCOM market is estimated to grow to $40 billion by 2030, largely driven by LEO-based ventures. + +Establishing a LEO constellation — a network of LEO-based satellites necessary for continuous global broadband delivery — involves substantial upfront investment, specialized technical know-how, and the ability to navigate a complex regulatory landscape. As international competition in LEO communications intensifies, it is imperative that the U.S. government creates an enabling (yet robust) regulatory environment for U.S.-based ventures to thrive at home and abroad. The government can also support U.S. companies, as well as the development of norms and standards, in key international coordinating bodies. + +Today, the United States profits significantly — economically, militarily, and in global norms and standards setting — from its dominance in global networks, capturing 38 percent of industry revenue in 2021. There have been significant investments in a U.S.-serviced space-based internet, to include U.S commercial endeavors and separate proposed Department of Defense (DOD) efforts. However, allies and competitors alike are launching their own ventures in an increasingly contentious market: Telesat LightSpeed is based in Canada, and the newly merged Eutelsat/OneWeb is supported by both private funders in India and the UK government. Perhaps the greatest U.S. competitor in the race to global connectivity through satellite broadband is China. It has proposed a 13,000-satellite constellation in LEO to serve residential and business needs in the Chinese market, as well as to underdeveloped internet markets across the globe. Leveraging its state-owned enterprises (SOEs), public funding, and political and economic ties won through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China poses a real threat to U.S. dominance in this market. + +Policymakers in Washington and many allied nations now appreciate the risks that Chinese vendors pose in 5G networks, undersea cables, and other vital communications links. But they have yet to consider the economic and strategic implications of LEO satellite constellations, which promise to deliver quality and continuous coverage in underserved markets and bring more of the world online. In addition to reaping vast commercial rewards, nations with leading LEO broadband providers could enjoy increased economic benefits, resiliency, greater control over international communications networks, more accuracy in positioning services, enhanced early-warning capabilities, and potentially even greater intelligence access. + +The following analysis examines the competition for satellite broadband, focusing on the interests of the United States and China. Beginning with a description of proposed satellite network constellations and their effects on the space environment, the paper will then examine U.S. interests in space, China’s planned satellite broadband efforts (and the competitive environment that may build), and the risks of operating large constellations in low Earth orbit. Finally, the authors will conclude with recommendations for specific actors, with an emphasis on U.S. government agencies. + + +### The State of Commercial LEO Broadband + +#### Advantages of Low Earth Orbit + +Satellites are typically launched into one of three popular orbits: LEO at 160 to 2,000 kilometers (99 to 1243 miles), medium Earth orbit (MEO) at 2,000 to 35,786 kilometers (1243 to 22,236 miles), or geosynchronous orbit (GEO) at up to 42,164 kilometers (26,199 miles). All three orbits have varying advantages and challenges for satellites operating within them. For example, a constellation in GEO can have global coverage with only three satellites because of its distance from the Earth’s surface; GEO is popular for communications for this reason. However, because the satellites are so far away from Earth there is a longer period of latency — i.e., the time it takes for the signal to route to a satellite in GEO and back down to Earth. + +![image1](https://i.imgur.com/iVNOr0x.png) +_▲ __Figure 1: Popular Earth Orbits.__ Source: [Thomas G. Roberts, “Popular Orbits 101,” CSIS, Aerospace Security, November 30, 2017](https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/earth-orbit-101/)._ + +The new generation of satellite internet suppliers are placing satellites in LEO instead of the traditional GEO for a multitude of reasons. Satellites launched into LEO are typically smaller and lighter than those in GEO, meaning that less fuel is required, and companies can place more satellites in orbit per launch for lower costs. Additionally, since LEO satellites are in relatively close proximity to Earth — between 160 and 2,000 kilometers (99 and 1243 miles) above the surface — user terminals can detect multiple satellites at once and connect with greater accuracy. Because LEO satellites are in constant motion, each satellite can only service a relatively small area on Earth at any given moment, so a large constellation of satellites is necessary to provide continuous global coverage. + +Communications from LEO also experience a lower latency than satellites in GEO because they are so much closer to the Earth’s surface. LEO satellite operators tout that a web page can be opened around eight times faster when using LEO satellites than when using a traditional SATCOM system at GEO, something that has become more important to consumers who want to interact online in near-real time. This means that satellite internet needs to be capable of supporting high-throughput applications such as streaming, video conferencing, and real-time gaming. At the time of publication, LEO broadband constellations are capable of download speeds up to 250 megabits per second (Mbps), upload speeds of 30 Mbps, and latency of 25 milliseconds. This can be compared to cable internet, which in the United States can reach download speeds of up to 500 Mbps and upload speeds of 50 Mbps, with 100 milliseconds of latency. As more satellites are added to each constellation, these numbers will continue to improve for each respective provider. For nonstationary customers, such as airline travelers or maritime shipping vessels, LEO’s continuous coverage enables quicker and more reliable broadband than is currently provided through GEO- and MEO-based services. + + +### Bridging the Digital Divide through LEO + +Broadband has proven to be a critical enabler for global “trade, employment, learning, leisure, and communications.” Access to the rapidly growing digital economy, which comprises roughly 15.5 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), can be transformational for previously unconnected and underdeveloped regions. The World Bank estimates that a 10 percent increase in broadband access can cause a 1.38 percent jump in GDP among low- and middle-income countries. Particularly in remote, hard-to-reach areas where building dedicated ground infrastructure is too expensive or simply not possible, LEO systems can provide quality internet connectivity to populations that are unreliably served by legacy technology. In the case of outages or gaps in service, such as during conflict or natural disaster, LEO constellations can boost the resiliency of communications networks and help fill the gaps in global connectivity. + +For rural households across the globe, 63 percent of which do not have access to the internet as of 2020, satellite internet may be the only option for connectivity. Unlike other terrestrial forms of internet delivery, satellite terminals — receivers for space-based signals — require only a mostly unobstructed view of the sky and an electric connection. Current broadband services such as fiber optic cables, digital subscriber lines (DSL), or copper-based cable internet require extensive infrastructure (e.g., underground cable ducts or network tower construction) to become operational. The minimal and lower-cost ground-infrastructure requirements of satellite-based internet, coupled with LEO’s ability to provide broadband of a superior quality than other forms of satellite broadband (i.e., higher data rates with lower latency) makes LEO an extremely compelling solution for bridging gaps in the digital divide. Yet while there is great potential for space-based broadband, companies will need to improve quality, reliability, and affordability in order to meaningfully expand coverage. + +Though the barriers to entry and sustained operation are high, several operators throughout North America, Europe, and Asia are moving forward with LEO broadband plans. In the United States, SpaceX’s Starlink, Amazon’s Project Kuiper, and Boeing are expected to be top competitors in the market. In January 2015, Elon Musk, SpaceX’s CEO, first announced a $10-billion space internet plan. This service, now known as Starlink, would reportedly come online after five years and would be a revenue stream for SpaceX to pursue founding a city on Mars. As of November 2022, Starlink has launched over 3,500 satellites, all on SpaceX launch vehicles, and offers coverage in more than 50 markets across North America, South America, Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. + +Amazon’s Project Kuiper constellation has been in progress since 2019 and is expected to launch its first prototype satellites in early 2023, with the full constellation being implemented over the following five-year period. Named for the Kuiper Belt, a band of icy celestial bodies just beyond Neptune’s orbit, Kuiper is meant to be available to residential customers as well as an anchor for Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud computing. According to its operating license granted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), half of Kuiper’s 1,618 satellite constellation must be launched by 2026, and the full constellation by 2029. In April 2022, Amazon announced landmark launch agreements with Arianespace, Blue Origin, and United Launch Alliance (ULA) for a total of 83 launches of Kuiper satellites over a period of five years. + +Companies such as Verizon and T-Mobile are testing telecommunications integration with LEO satellites to create more robust fifth-generation (5G) wireless services. This added competition from traditional terrestrial broadband providers will likely drive down prices in previously monopolized markets. In October 2021, Verizon and Project Kuiper announced a collaboration that would enable Project Kuiper satellites to “deliver backhaul solutions to extend Verizon’s 4G/LTE and 5G data networks, connecting rural and remote communities in the U.S.” In August 2022, SpaceX and T-Mobile announced a similar agreement that would enable next-generation Starlink satellites (to be launched in 2023) to communicate with cell phones consumers already own, theoretically eliminating dead zones in the T-Mobile cellular network. Customers could then call, text, and possibly stream videos without connection to a cell tower. + +Boeing has been publicly discussing investing in satellite internet since 2015, hoping to substantially increase internet capability while driving down the cost of satellite networks. After it failed to gain FCC approval for a 3,000-satellite LEO broadband constellation in 2017, an updated plan for a 147-satellite constellation was approved in 2021. This “V-band Constellation,” as it is called in its FCC application, would provide internet and communication services to the United States and its territories before expanding globally. The 147 satellites are to be broken down into LEO and GEO segments, with 132 satellites orbiting at 1,056 kilometers (656 miles) and 15 additional satellites orbiting between 27,355 and 44,221 kilometers (16,998 and 27,478 miles). According to its operating license granted by the FCC, half of the constellation must be launched by November 2027, and the rest by November 2030. + +Telesat, established by the Canadian parliament in 1969, has continued to operate domestic satellite communications networks in the years since, even after the company officially separated from the Canadian government in 2008. Telesat announced its Lightspeed LEO constellation in 2016, creating a network of 188 satellites orbiting at 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) above Earth. Lightspeed does not aim to be a consumer broadband company but will instead market to cruise ships, airlines, and rural municipalities. + +The largest publicly known plan for satellite broadband in Asia comes from China. Following the disintegration of two broadband constellation projects, China applied to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to operate a 12,992-satellite fleet in LEO in 2020. In early 2022, the local government of Shanghai entered into a strategic cooperation agreement with state-funded SatNet; in return for unknown support, SatNet will establish a space hub for the production of satellites and reusable launch vehicles in Shanghai. Additional details about the constellation have not been made public, but SatNet is to be a critical part of China’s political goal of being a leader in advanced technology across the globe. + +Already, several would-be LEO operators have been forced to scale back their ambitions, declare bankruptcy, or seek drastic measures to keep afloat. UK-based LEO broadband start-up OneWeb filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2020, only eight years after it was founded. Narrowly managing to escape default, the company received funding from the UK government and Bharti International, a large Indian conglomerate. Despite being one of the few firms close to bringing a product to market, having launched 66 percent (428 satellites) of its first constellation fleet and having received FCC permission to provide service in the United States, OneWeb struggled to attract the levels of investment it needed to stay afloat. In July 2022, the company merged with Eutelsat, a GEO satellite operator backed by French and Chinese funders, to bridge its growing financial gap. + +A similar merger is expected to be finalized between U.S.-based GEO satellite operator ViaSat and UK-based satellite operator Inmarsat to deploy a constellation of 150 LEO satellites to join Inmarsat’s already established GEO network. This constellation, named Orchestra, will provide increased cybersecurity to government customers, integrate with 5G services, and improve the network’s latency, resiliency, and speed. + +#### LEO Economics + +Today, the LEO satellite internet industry is heavily concentrated among a few private sector companies and government-backed or -owned ventures. The high capital expenditure requirements for launching, maintaining, and manufacturing LEO constellations, along with the competition over finite spectrum resources and near-Earth orbital space contribute to the market having only a few major players. LEO constellations are expensive in both resources and time. Establishing a satellite constellation capable of global coverage — necessary for continuous broadband service in any one location — is a long-term endeavor. Furthermore, licensing and regulatory requirements are extensive and highly variable across different countries, leading to greater uncertainty and high compliance costs. Investing in LEO broadband is a long-term venture with many uncertainties and risks. + +However, the business case for LEO broadband is strong. Global demand for connectivity remains high — and so does the demand for low latency and quality service. Rural areas are a key potential consumer base for satellite-broadband operators, and the quality promised by LEO-based constellations make them a favored avenue to satisfy demand. In the United States alone, 28 percent of rural households (roughly 4.8 million Americans) remain unconnected — but a MossAdams study reports that both subscribership and average revenue per user in U.S. rural areas are also on the rise. Other key consumer bases for LEO-based services include business-to-business (B2B) applications, nonstationary customers such as airlines and shipping conglomerates, and developing economies. Some LEO providers, Telesat and OneWeb included, are focusing entirely on B2B applications. + +Another difficulty for the LEO broadband business case is that it requires substantial and costly infrastructure: hardware and software for satellites, ground stations, secure launch vehicles, and space situational awareness (SSA), just to name a few. Every segment needs to successfully work together and provide a high-quality product for the business to draw in customers and make a return on investment. Because of the growing desire for worldwide connectivity, experts assess that a strong and growing market will reach a 20 percent compound annual growth rate by 2030. + +Following the establishment of a LEO-based constellation, companies will be able to offer a range of services beyond simple connectivity, such as cloud computing, entertainment streaming, remote internet of things (IoT) applications, and government and military uses. Once high initial barriers to connectivity are satisfied, extending service offerings involves relatively low marginal costs. Indeed, operators are already exploring LEO-constellation applications beyond direct broadband delivery. + +Private sector investment in space companies exceeded $10 billion in 2021, 60 to 70 percent of which is now directed into LEO-related ventures. Venture capitalists, encouraged by decreasing launch costs and the development of commercially viable applications, have also turned their attention toward space firms operating in LEO. While investment is increasing, current levels may not be enough to sustain a crowded industry due to the long-term nature of the LEO broadband enterprise. + +Building and operating large LEO constellations are incredibly complex and expensive, and today the industry is primarily driven by large companies with vast monetary reserves or by SOEs, a paradigm reinforced by structural and policy challenges. McKinsey estimates a $5 to $10 billion price tag for deploying an operational LEO satellite constellation. On top of that, recurring operating and maintenance costs are predicted to run companies $1 to $2 billion per year. In October 2022, Elon Musk said that the cost of the Starlink operation in Ukraine — including providing terminals and maintaining satellites and ground stations, among other expenditures — would reach $100 million by the end of the year. Though extenuating circumstances are driving this estimate up to much higher-than-average national operating costs, it is an example of the large funding necessary to maintain a successful and operational network in a time of crisis. High barriers to entry have resulted in the need for continuous and substantial investment financing for the industry. + +LEO constellations have the potential to reshape global networks, both those in orbit and on the ground. While reliant on the placement of numerous ground stations to extend service, the development of optical intersatellite links — communication channels that allow satellites within the same constellation to transfer data seamlessly between one another — will (when operational) further reduce the need for expensive ground infrastructure. Despite these advancements, one of the largest barriers to wide commercial adoption of LEO broadband services remains affordability. While end-user terminals allow communities to bypass the large infrastructure needs of traditional broadband delivery, production costs range anywhere from $1,000 for a home-use terminal to $10,000 for an airborne terminal (another potential market), making them prohibitively expensive for most customers in developing economies. Industry experts estimate the price of home terminals will be cut in half by the 2030s, with Amazon’s Project Kuiper already reporting terminal production costs will be under $500 per unit. Still, LEO satellite terminals are estimated to be approximately three times more expensive than GEO satellite terminals and seven times more expensive than traditional internet routers. Companies are likely to highly subsidize current and future terminals to incentivize adoption. + +The high capital expenditures of manufacturing, launching, and maintaining a satellite constellation and its constituent parts require providers to charge high prices to recuperate these substantial early-stage investments. However, the average revenue per user in most developing markets is not currently high enough for companies to sustain operations. Instead, it is likely that select households will adopt and pay for these services, potentially driving the price down for expansion to underserved populations. Lack of access to broadband is heavily correlated with poverty, and the companies that can quickly decrease costs and meaningfully expand access to underserved populations could capture significant portions of the market share. + + +### China’s Space Broadband Vision + +China’s space sector has historically been dominated by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). As an SOE, CASC, along with its many subsidiaries, is tasked with the “research, design, manufacture, test and launch of ” all space-based activities. Only over the past 10 years has there been a slow emergence of space firms not solely government-owned or -operated. Document 60, a policy directive issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2014, unlocked a small portion of the space sector to private financing and created the first Chinese commercial space companies. A 2016 white paper called for increased “cooperation with private investors” on space, signaling a more relaxed approach to the restricted sector. It wasn’t until 2019 that an NDRC directive opened the majority of China’s nascent space economy to private investors at home and abroad. With broader permissions than allowed by Document 60, this directive prompted a significant shift in China’s space and satellite communications sector. That year, the country surpassed all but the United States in the number of space start-ups receiving funding, as well as in the amount of funding received, drawing 16 percent of total global investment in these ventures. + +The resulting flood of capital led to a boom in Chinese space start-ups. As the sector matures, so will China’s capacity to grow and operationalize its space-based assets. According to an unclassified U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report, China doubled the number of satellites it has in orbit from 250 to 499 between 2019 and 2021. Accelerated by strong and well-communicated political will, that number is expected to grow quickly moving forward. Chinese auto manufacturer Geely, for example, is employing its deep manufacturing expertise to build a factory capable of producing 500 satellites per year by 2025. According to Euroconsult, more than $1.9 billion was invested into China’s commercial space companies between 2014 and 2020, half of which came from private capital. + +China’s space sector and commercial capabilities have seen dramatic changes over the past 10 years. Bolstered by state resources and China’s extensive Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative, Chinese LEO operators are well placed to provide service to a global market and pose a significant competitive threat to U.S. strategic and economic interests. Beijing start-up GalaxySpace launched several operational satellites in March 2022 that will eventually form a larger, multiconstellation, interconnected Chinese “National Network” of LEO communications, Earth observation, and navigation satellites. GalaxySpace intends to develop an integrated satellite/terrestrial 5G network via a 1,000-satellite constellation. ITU spectrum applications in 2020 show plans for an additional Chinese constellation consisting of 12,992 satellites, indicative of aims to develop a national network. Public ITU documents suggest this constellation, referred to as GuoWang or StarNet, will consist of two subconstellations capable of global broadband delivery. + +China’s attempt to deploy a national LEO broadband constellation enjoys significant support from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 2020, China’s NDRC added satellite internet to its list of priority “new infrastructures,” signaling increased investment and support for the burgeoning commercial sector. Adopted in 2021, China’s 14th Five-Year Plan explicitly outlined the goal of establishing “a space infrastructure system for communication, navigation and remote sensing with global coverage and efficient operation.” + +By allocating and directing resources toward competing enterprises, some of which are government-backed, China is developing a space sector capable of producing the infrastructure and expertise to support its vision for a national space-based internet. Shepherded by major CCP policy announcements and signals, the country’s LEO communications market has trended toward consolidation over the past two years. Investment, flowing hotly since the sector opened in 2019, is beginning to cool and concentrate on fewer firms. In April 2021, China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the body responsible for oversight of China’s biggest SOEs, created China SatNet to manage the GuoWang constellation, blurring the lines between it being a government- or commercial-led service. SASAC’s direct creation and administration of SatNet places the company on the same level as China’s three national telecommunication companies, as well as the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) and CASC. Elevating SatNet to the level of the country’s most important SOEs likely grants the organization significant autonomy and expanded state support. + +CASIC and CASC have each launched experimental satellites for their own LEO constellations — Hongyun and Hongyan, respectively — that aim to provide connectivity to China’s remote regions and to select maritime and air-travel customers. There is a significant chance that plans for both constellations will be absorbed by SatNet’s GuoWang. + +#### China’s Competitive Advantage + +By leveraging the country’s SOEs and its existing efforts under the DSR initiative, China could become an extremely robust competitor. China SatNet, along with CASIC’s and CASC’s LEO communications ventures, enjoys nearly unrestricted funding, municipal government support, and significant regulatory leeway. + +![image2](https://i.imgur.com/R5E7vB0.png) +_▲ __Figure 2: Timeline of Select Chinese Policies on LEO Broadband.__ Source: Authors’ research and analysis._ + +Following directives from the central government, municipal actors are heavily incentivized to invest in designated “strategic” sectors. For example, the city of Wuhan has committed to developing a local 100 billion yuan ($15.7 billion) space industry by 2025. In a bid to host the Chinese “valley of satellites,” Wuhan is offering millions in concessional financing to space companies. The city’s pledges, however, pale in comparison to those of China’s richer coastal regions. Taking advantage of this sentiment, SatNet executives have traveled to multiple cities in China attempting to court local leaders, receive regulatory concessions, and link SatNet with existing domestic industrial bases. The same day that Shanghai announced a flurry of new initiatives to grow the city’s space sector, local leaders signed a cooperation agreement with SatNet. Chongqing, host to the majority of CASC’s LEO Hongyan operations, has also signed a codevelopment agreement with SatNet for a new satellite industrial base. + +Economic concessions at home are bolstered by China’s foreign engagement through the DSR and the Belt and Road Space Information Corridor, part of the broader BRI. China’s 2021 white paper on space referenced the Belt and Road Space Information Corridor as a key avenue through which to “strengthen cooperation on the application of . . . communication satellites.” Since 2016, China has signed over 117 space cooperation agreements and 19 memorandums of understanding with at least 37 foreign governments to share space-related infrastructure and build ground stations. + +Given China’s successful strategy of exporting terrestrial infrastructure through the DSR — up to 70 percent of 4G network infrastructure across Africa was built by Huawei — these agreements and engagements may significantly help the country achieve its aspiration of hosting a globally adopted LEO broadband service. With its heavy economic presence in many BRI countries, China is positioned to negotiate regulatory concessions for its national LEO system while discouraging the adoption of U.S. commercial services. A combination of diplomatic maneuvering, the bundling of hard infrastructure and digital services, and attractive pricing will likely make it difficult to compete with Chinese companies for market share in BRI countries. + +Dominance in foreign markets comes with benefits beyond economic gains. China’s heavy information and communication technology (ICT) presence in BRI countries creates path dependencies, spreads techno-authoritarian norms and standards, grows China’s voice in international governance and standards bodies, and strengthens China’s power over global networks. The successful proliferation of Chinese LEO broadband service could similarly boost China’s presence in foreign terrestrial networks, providing Beijing with greater control over international data flows and granting it extensive intelligence and coercive powers. China’s open push for civil-military integration suggests built-in dual-use capabilities in overseas BRI infrastructure. A planning document published by the State Council in 2016 reiterated China’s ambitions to establish satellite communications systems, linking them to the “development of military-civil fusion, in order to obtain global service capabilities as fast as possible.” + +Because of the role that LEO constellations will potentially play in communications networks, countries that permit Chinese ground stations and grant the country landing rights may find it less costly to continue adopting Chinese ICT technology. This digital dependency is fostered through exorbitant replacement costs and a reliance on a small set of vendors, often SOEs, that rate low on interoperability. High levels of dependency on Chinese-built and -operated digital infrastructure may lead to the default adoption of Chinese-crafted norms, standards, and data governance practices. Tanzania, a close BRI partner country, has modeled a subset of its data and cybersecurity laws after Beijing’s example leading to more restrictions on country’s social media landscape and information flows. Such adoption and regulatory alignment in turn reduces regulatory compliance costs for purchasing other Chinese-origin ICT technology. For countries such as Pakistan and Egypt, whose entire suite of digital infrastructure heavily features Chinese assets — from submarine cables and terrestrial fiber optic lines to 5G networks and satellite ground stations — the choice to integrate Chinese LEO broadband into existing network stacks will be a relatively easy one. + + +### Security Implications for the United States + +Today, the United States holds an advantage in the competition over LEO broadband, as just under 50 percent of new companies seeking to operate in LEO originate in the country. But as China continues to further its ambitions for its own LEO broadband network, which may fall somewhere in the gray zone between commercial and governmental, the United States could lose its competitive edge. Furthermore, agreements through the DSR and the BRI could help China make inroads as the LEO broadband provider of choice in countries in Asia, South America, and Africa that do not currently have widespread internet infrastructure but do have good relationships with China. This could make burgeoning broadband markets reliant on Chinese services, leaving less room for U.S. manufacturers to provide service. + +China has also been known to block certain websites for citizens using domestic internet sources; Western applications such as Google Maps are not available on Chinese-built phones and networks, and often domestic apps can only be accessed by divulging privacy information or verifying one’s identity. If SatNet’s GuoWang constellation becomes the dominant broadband supplier, users could be blocked from accessing entire sections of the internet or expose personal and identifying data to network operators. This could further exacerbate the suppression or censorship of information in countries where there is already a widespread information vacuum or civil unrest. An infamous case of Chinese intelligence using BRI-built networks involves the African Union. Although officials have denied the allegations, for five years the African Union headquarters — paid, built, and wired by China — would send daily transmissions of confidential data to Beijing. Conversely, open connectivity can support citizens who need accessible information and communication channels, particularly in times of civil unrest when citizens need access to unrestricted, reliable services. + +Establishing efficient and affordable broadband services based in LEO is not only a priority for privately funded industry but also for the U.S. military. From relaying massive amounts of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data to detecting and tracking missiles to providing command, control, and communications for units in austere locations across the globe, the U.S. military’s demand for SATCOM continues to grow. The DOD has been working to build its own satellite broadband networks, the most public of which is the National Defense Space Architecture (NDSA) being designed by the Space Development Agency. The NDSA will consist of several layers of military constellations in LEO, each focusing on different aspects to enhance military connectivity, sensing, and communication. + +In addition to developing domestic military capability, the U.S. Space Force has shown interest in leveraging commercial services to increase the resiliency of military broadband networks and communications. The Space Force is currently working on a design to build a “space data backbone,” a service that will be able to integrate military, commercial, civil, and possibly allied networks. This access would follow a “fee for service” model wherein the Space Force would pay a fixed price to use a particular bandwidth over a fixed amount of time. + +Not only will the U.S. military depend on advanced LEO broadband constellations for its own network operations, but LEO broadband is already being used — and targeted — on the battlefield in Ukraine. The Starlink terminals SpaceX sent have been used by the Ukrainian military and people alike, connecting a country whose other operating forms of communication were hacked and jammed in the initial days of the conflict — though SpaceX has had to devote additional funding and resources to protect the signals from attack. + +#### LEO Broadband Licensing + +Over the past two years alone, the FCC has received applications for over 64,000 new satellites. For perspective, there are only 6,800 functioning satellites in orbit as of November 2022. Regulatory agencies with jurisdiction over space and space-related activities are struggling to keep pace with private sector growth in managing these constellations, a task that is correspondingly growing in difficulty. The rise of commercial space-based operations more broadly has forced new paradigms on a sector previously dominated by government and defense ventures, highlighting the need for updated regulation and an increase in capacity for the regulatory review process. + +Licensing requirements include allocating limited spectrum among a host of global actors, granting launch permissions, coordinating with international bodies, and managing orbital capacity and debris. In the United States, no single agency is responsible for overseeing these requirements; regulatory authority and review are unevenly split among the FCC, the DOD, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. While not all the listed agencies are involved in regulating LEO broadband constellations in particular, coordination among agencies can be difficult, and shifting regulatory responsibilities slows progress and exacerbates issues resulting from varying levels of proficiency on space-related matters. + +The FCC regulates the frequencies that satellite constellations can use and, as such, is often the first stop for companies looking to begin operations. The commission, which has historically auctioned spectrum licenses on a first-come, first-served basis, is considering updating its auction rules for LEO-based satellite operators to ensure that operators licensed in earlier rounds have their spectrum access protected. The FCC, through its mandate to issue licenses “if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby,” has often gone beyond the direct regulation of spectrum use. The agency made headlines after it denied one operator a license for the launch of small satellites (11 x 11 x 2.8 cm) due to concerns the satellites would be too small for adequate tracking and SSA. Unable to keep pace with a rapidly evolving industry, the commission is planning to reorganize, potentially creating a new Space Bureau and an Office of International Affairs. + +To further complicate licensing for LEO constellations, satellite operators are not only regulated by their own governments but by global entities as well. Though approval for the design and launch of communications constellations first comes from the licensing authority of the corresponding government (e.g., the FCC in the United States), the only international regulatory body that approves satellites before launch is the ITU, part of the United Nations. The ITU — which includes two different member groups, composed of 193 countries and 900 private sector companies — is responsible for managing “the international coordination, notification and recording of the specific radio frequencies transmitted and received by satellites.” Because spectrum is a limited resource, the ITU process aims to establish impartial access while also limiting interference that may occur between satellite systems. Due to availability and other technical considerations, operators need to share certain spectrum bands with one another. The process for allocating spectrum is therefore extremely competitive. Representatives of the ITU member states license satellite systems, then file descriptions of the projects with the union, which shares the descriptions and findings with other member states. Prelaunch filings are made so that harmful interference between proposed projects can be resolved bilaterally between member states. Satellite filings are also required to be used within seven years from the date of the request or else the reserved spectrum is released. + +Because of the global nature of space, regulators also need to consider emerging and conflicting interests between U.S. firms and foreign competitors and between market incumbents and entrants. One of the largest bottlenecks to market dominance in LEO broadband is licensing: “The most difficult aspect of building a [low Earth orbit] broadband system is acquiring the spectrum, not building and launching satellites,” according to Quilty Analytics. For U.S. companies that compete against foreign firms facing different national regulatory structures, requirements, and enforcement capabilities, comparatively stringent domestic requirements are costly and dampen U.S. firms’ first-mover advantage. Additionally, regulations regarding landing rights, ground stations and related infrastructure, and market access vary significantly by country. + +High compliance costs notwithstanding, competition from national telecommunication companies and domestic LEO ventures in host countries is fierce. Domestic companies looking to defend their market share often lobby their governments to implement protectionist policies masquerading as regulatory requirements. For example, SpaceX’s attempt to expand Starlink service into India was strongly opposed by OneWeb, a firm with substantial investment from Indian conglomerate Bharti Enterprises. Eventually, SpaceX’s attempts to secure the necessary licenses stalled, and the company had to halt presales in the region. Some countries forbid foreign ownership over telecommunications infrastructure outright, forcing entrants to set up joint ventures with domestic firms or open locally owned and operated companies as a prerequisite for market access. Conversely, the FCC Satellite Division often grants permission for U.S. market access to commercial satellites licensed by other countries. There is a risk that asymmetric requirements between U.S. license holders and foreign-licensed companies with permission to operate in the United States may create an uneven playing field. + +Meanwhile, staff shortages, a more complicated operating environment, multiple processing rounds, and poorly defined deadlines have elongated license approval timelines for satellite licenses. Since LEO constellations involve many rapidly evolving technologies, by the time licenses are granted, the subjects of those licenses risk becoming obsolete. The pace of development in related technology often means that licenses, once granted, must be updated to reflect new advancements. This, in turn, slows down government review. Long licensing timelines across the entire space sector delay the process of bringing a product to market, resulting in market uncertainty and lower profit projections that dampen sector growth. Navigating an onerous regulatory process — while also facing narrow profit margins and unforgiving business models of LEO broadband systems — can make it impossible for all but the largest, most well-resourced companies to obtain licenses. + + +### Managing Large LEO Constellations + +#### Risks and Operator Mitigation + +As increased opportunities emerge in LEO, so do the risks — not only due to international competition but also due to the unforgiving space environment itself. The space domain is becoming more diverse, disruptive, disordered, and dangerous as more countries and companies begin to operate there. When looking at proposed LEO broadband networks, risks can include — but are not limited to — on-orbit collisions in space, disruptions to astronomy missions, and political discord between nations. + +One of the greatest risks associated with the launch of large constellations is to the space environment itself; an increase in the number of satellites in orbit increases the potential for collisions. As of November 7, 2022, there have been about 14,450 satellites launched into Earth orbit. About 9,610 of these satellites are still in space — of which 6,800 are still functioning. Government-conducted destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) tests have significantly contributed to debris creation, and upper-stage rocket bodies left in orbit have fragmented into thousands of large debris objects. These activities have created over 27,000 pieces of trackable debris being monitored by DOD’s Space Surveillance Network — not including pieces that are too small to detect. These high-velocity pieces of “space junk” make operating in the space environment more dangerous, and the possibility of a collision increases the more objects enter orbit. SpaceX alone has requested FCC authorization for another 30,000 satellites (it has received authorization for 7,500 of the 30,000 as of December 2022). OneWeb, Amazon, Telesat, and China SatNet constellation plans are similarly in the thousands. Together, proposed LEO broadband constellations could potentially add over 90,000 satellites into Earth orbit, vastly changing the operational domain. In April 2021, reports surfaced that SpaceX and OneWeb had an alleged close approach between their respective satellites. There was no collision, and both companies have differing opinions on the risk their satellites faced. However, a significant increase in satellites orbiting in LEO could restrict additional space activities, including impacting future human spaceflight and launch schedules. + +Starlink satellites have SSA capabilities on board and can perform avoidance maneuvers autonomously based on the satellite’s knowledge of its current position and information about potential close approaches. These capabilities have already proven to be necessary; Starlink satellites have reportedly had to maneuver over 1,700 times to avoid orbital debris from Russia’s 2021 ASAT test. + +Although no satellites from the Project Kuiper constellation are currently in orbit, space safety and sustainability have been emphasized throughout Amazon’s design process. Project Kuiper satellites will have active propulsion systems on board and be programmed to perform avoidance maneuvers if the risk of collision is estimated to be more than 1 in 100,000. Additionally, the constellation’s low altitude will increase the ability for satellites to be deorbited faster and more reliably. Kuiper satellites are scheduled to actively deorbit within one year of a completed mission and, if this fails, will naturally deorbit within 10 years. Satellites will have be held to a tight orbital tolerance, the distance in which a satellite can move in orbit, of within 7 kilometers (4.3 miles) to avoid overlapping with other large LEO systems. + +OneWeb also has an SSA component via an agreement with LeoLabs to incorporate its Collision Avoidance service. This agreement adds another layer of operational safety to OneWeb satellites, allowing the on-orbit systems to receive real-time data regarding the location of space debris and other satellites. This LeoLabs service is also used by SpaceX and the Earth imaging company Planet, which operates a 200-satellite Earth-observation fleet. In addition to the LeoLabs software, OneWeb satellites incorporate sustainable components, such as grappling fixtures and a magnetic docking plate so they can be deorbited or serviced in an active debris removal mission if necessary. Because the satellites were designed in France, the fleet also is ready to comply with the France Space Operation Act, which mandates that all LEO satellite operators deorbit satellites at the close of their operational activity. In October 2022, Iridium, OneWeb, and SpaceX released a set of “Satellite Orbital Safety Best Practices” through the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics to “guide and improve cooperative operations in space.” + +![image3](https://i.imgur.com/TX9QjW2.png) +_▲ __Figure 3: Current and Future Projection of Active Satellites in Orbit.__ Source: [“Space Debris by the Numbers,” European Space Agency, updated November 7, 2022](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers); Authors’ analysis._ + +Another risk to the space environment is the potential for satellites to interfere with astronomical observations. Astronomers have raised concerns that Starlink satellites have disrupted night-sky observations, blocking or interrupting telescope images, with the potential for further disruptions as more satellites from additional operators are launched into orbit. Environmental groups in France have been so vocal about this subject — as well as the pollution caused by launches — that Starlink’s permit to operate in the country was temporarily overturned. Starlink competitor ViaSat has also criticized the vast Starlink fleet’s obstructions to astronomy and has filed court documents to stop it from launching more satellites based on environmental grounds, though this has not been successful. + +Responding to concerns, both Telesat and SpaceX have been working with the astronomy community to decrease the reflectivity of their satellites. Telesat CEO Dan Goldberg reported that its satellites would be kept to a smaller constellation and will orbit at a higher altitude to ensure Telesat is a responsible user of the space domain. SpaceX has published details on the work it has undertaken to mitigate impacts to astronomy and has signed coordination agreements with the National Science Foundation to further collaborate on solutions. Changes to both the design and operation of the Starlink constellation have resulted in improvements to the brightness of satellites, mitigating the effect on astronomical observations. Amazon is also working with the National Science Foundation and the American Astronomical Society to incorporate astronomers’ concerns into current prototype plans. According to an interview with the company, Project Kuiper is limiting the number of satellites in its constellation and choosing an operating altitude with an eye toward sustainability and convenience, in keeping with best practices recommended by astronomers and industry. However, there is no permanent solution for astronomers using Earth-based telescopes. This challenge highlights a significant gap in the international regulatory system for space, as one country’s approvals of constellations can affect people all over the world. + +Outside the space domain itself, intense broadband competition also carries a political dimension. A researcher in a Chinese peer-reviewed journal wrote about the threat Starlink’s spread posed to Chinese assets, that the country should “adopt a combination of soft and hard kill methods to disable some of the Starlink satellites and destroy the constellation’s operating system.” Though the paper was taken down shortly after publishing, this sentiment is not unique in China. An opinion piece published in the Chinese military’s official news site, China Military Online, wrote about Starlink’s “unchecked expansion” and alleged it had an “ambition to use it [the system] for military purposes” that should alarm governments worldwide. There has been no documented concern from Chinese media about the threats a domestic constellation may also pose to global space assets. + +The trajectories of Starlink’s satellites have continued to draw political attention, most vocally from China. In two separate events in July 2020 and October 2021, Chinese officials claimed Starlink satellites came so close to the Tiangong space station that astronauts had to shelter in place. Chinese officials issued a complaint to the United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, to which the United States replied on January 28, 2022, refuting claims that Starlink satellites endangered the crewed space station and that the satellites involved “did not meet the threshold of established emergency collision criteria.” While this issue has not been formally concluded, it is a potent reminder that the accurate tracking of space objects will be crucial in supporting or disputing similar claims in the future. Additionally, China does not currently publish the Tiangong space station’s planned maneuvers, unlike the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) does with the International Space Station, which could facilitate operator planning and coordination. This incident underscores the importance of having open avenues of communication as well as shared standards and data among all operators in the space domain. + +LEO systems have the potential to play a role in geopolitical competition with other competitors as well. A large shift in the geopolitical relationship between the United States and Russia, the two longest-standing space powers, took place after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. OneWeb had a launch of 36 satellites planned for March 4, 2022, from the Russian-operated Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, just a week after the invasion of Ukraine. Operations at Baikonur were immediately halted in late February, impacting the satellites OneWeb had sent to be launched by a Soyuz rocket. As of November 2022, the 36 satellites remain in Russia and have not been returned to OneWeb, which reported a $229 million loss after the incident. Looking for another provider, OneWeb turned to SpaceX, which operates competitor Starlink, to continue satellite launches to complete OneWeb’s constellation. This is not the first time SpaceX has launched satellites for a competitor: its Falcon 9 rockets launched upgrades for an Iridium communications constellation until 2019. + +After Ukrainian officials issued a plea on Twitter at the onset of the Russian invasion of the country, Elon Musk pledged tens of thousands of Starlink user terminals to aid in connectivity around the country in March 2022. Furthermore, The New York Times reported that Ukrainian forces were using Starlink terminals to send targeting information to artillery and communicate with reconnaissance drones. Starlink’s involvement in the conflict opens the door to questions about commercial companies’ involvement in zones of geopolitical conflict and what risks this poses to their assets. Days after civilian Starlink services were established in Ukraine, Musk reported on Twitter that Russian forces had jammed user-terminal access. He further stated that the company had pushed out software updates to its assets to harden them against further attacks. The additional connections involved in operating a large LEO constellation increase the system’s vulnerability to cyberattacks or even jamming. Cyber connections need to be hardened and encryption increased to ensure communications are safe and not tampered with. However, this would likely come at a higher cost and add latency to the network. Commercial companies should be aware of what this risk management would cost and adapt their security if more instances of malware attacks are made public. Because commercial LEO broadband companies may be operational in conflict zones or support national-security missions, their systems will likely continue to be targets for electronic warfare or cyberattacks. + +#### Policy Recommendations + +The strength of U.S. private sector companies has led to cost reductions in launch services and satellite manufacturing and rapidly increased the pace of innovation in the space domain, all of which have led to the successful reemergence of space-based broadband operators. SpaceX is the first company to commercialize its LEO broadband constellation, allowing U.S. actors to take the lead in setting emerging standards, norms, and best practices. However, foreign competitors are close behind. U.S. government agencies can support and encourage — or, at a minimum, not hinder — commercial activity, uphold sustainability requirements for an increasingly congested orbit, and facilitate U.S. commercial growth, particularly in the broadband internet domain. + +A common thread is that regulatory clarity, speed, and reform at the FCC will have an enormous impact as commercial competition intensifies. As the FCC continues to play the dominant role in regulating satellite communications, it should take care to strike the appropriate balance between burdensome regulation and market development. Providing additional clarity and establishing defined approval timelines, adhering to deadlines on public comment periods, and opening communication channels with commercial companies submitting licensing requests are a few ways it can achieve this goal. + +To help address these issues, the FCC announced in November 2022 that it would open a new space bureau under its current International Bureau to improve commercial marketplace relations. The chairwoman of the FCC, Jessica Rosenworcel, conceded that the agency had not kept up with the rapid changes in the commercial space domain and stated that this office will “support the United States leadership and the emerging space economy, promote long term technical capacity to address satellite policies[,] and improve our coordination with other agencies on these issues.” At the time of publication, there is no timeline in place for this office to be fully functional, but assembling it should be a priority so that it can establish interagency communication and commercial market coordination as more companies launch their constellations. + +Additionally, the FCC can increase coordination with international governing bodies. The regulations to which competing broadband companies are subject to can vary greatly, and U.S. companies may be held to unique standards that others in orbit are not. While the FCC and other regulatory bodies must maintain integrity in the regulatory process, it will only become more critical to coordinate with international partners to establish shared standards for operation in the space domain. The ITU could be a key partner for the United States and FCC in promoting common international norms and standards regarding shared spectrum. This can discourage dishonesty from actors with unclear motives in reserving spectrum and help identify deceptive actions by large actors. + +As the Department of Commerce becomes more involved in the space domain, its SSA mission area will continue to increase in importance and affect every aspect of space. Increased SSA capabilities can include tracking even smaller debris, and current capabilities can successfully monitor objects 10 centimeters or larger, which would help create a more accurate picture of the operating environment for satellite operators around the globe. Ensuring that SSA data is widely accessible and that different tracking organizations’ standards are similar can provide clarity and consistency for an increasingly congested domain. Because broadband operators of LEO constellations will have larger numbers of satellites than ever before, accurate SSA will be integral to the successful and sustainable operation of these networks. + +The U.S. government should also emphasize interacting with the international community to establish shared norms of operation for space systems in orbit, starting with operators in LEO. By creating widely adopted rules of operation, the United States can be a leader in the domain and make it easier to identify abnormal, potentially nefarious behavior. Global operating standards can also emphasize space sustainability, protecting various orbital regimes from space debris and ensuring that others will still be able to use the domain in years to come. These norms could potentially expand to include reciprocal regulations, which would make it easier for satellite operators to operate in multiple countries at once. International regulatory agencies could even work together to simplify license applications, potentially even creating a joint license application where one application could be used to apply to many countries at once. This could simplify standards for commercial companies and shift the speed at which licenses are approved. + +Finally, U.S. leaders should aim to increase soft power across the globe by working with commercial companies that can successfully operate broadband internet constellations and incorporate connectivity. The United States has a strong record of projecting soft power through space exploration, namely through NASA programs that have captivated the globe for decades. NASA has over 700 international agreements with more than 100 countries around the world, allowing the United States to maintain strong relationships with foreign governments through civil space agencies at times when collaboration may not be possible in other parts of government. The emergence of a strong U.S. commercial space sector that offers individual services extends the country’s possible reach — but it could lose this strategic soft power if China is able to leverage its current BRI networks to implement SatNet in developing regions. + + +### Conclusion + +Today the United States profits significantly from its dominance in global networks, and U.S.-based commercial satellite networks have a significant head start. But as the race for space-based communication networks intensifies, it is important that the United States government enact policies and incentives to keep U.S. companies competitive internationally. Even once firms have accumulated the vast capital and expertise required for entry into the LEO broadband market, they face high compliance costs and uncertainty in navigating multilevel regulatory regimes. Licensing requirements persist through domestic, foreign, and international processes, which are at times opaque, unaligned, and unevenly applied, as regulators may not be keeping pace with industry’s rate of innovation. Striking the right balance between appropriate regulation and market development is a perennial problem, one that should be reckoned with in real time. + +Growing competition in the race to establish space-based broadband networks carries many risks to a rapidly growing space domain. These include environmental, technical, and political risks, not to mention the challenge posed by looming international competition from China. Beijing has its own plans for a national LEO broadband network that benefits from extensive state funding and the political support gained through its BRI. Leveraging its heavy economic presence in a large portion of BRI countries, China is positioned to negotiate regulatory concessions for its LEO system while discouraging the adoption of U.S. commercial services. A combination of diplomatic maneuvering, the bundling of hard infrastructure and digital services, and attractive pricing will likely make it difficult to compete with Chinese companies for market share in BRI countries. + +Conversely, U.S. companies often face protectionist barriers and a complex regulatory landscape when looking to expand into foreign markets. Requirements regarding landing rights, ground stations and related infrastructure, and market access vary significantly by country. Future regulatory changes need to consider competition between domestic market incumbents and new entrants as well. As U.S. government agencies begin to regulate the thousands of SATCOM satellites that will be launched into LEO in the next five to ten years, they will need to establish shared norms of operation for on-orbit space systems, more clearly convey licensing standards and practices, and communicate heavily with both domestic commercial companies and the international community. + +--- + +__Makena Young__ is an associate fellow with the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Her research interests include international collaboration and space security. Prior to joining CSIS, Ms. Young worked for the Federal Aviation Administration as an aerospace engineer, focusing on automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast certification and integration in small aircraft. She holds a BS in aeronautical and astronautical engineering from Purdue University with minors in international relations and environmental engineering. + +__Akhil Thadani__ is a research associate with the Project on AI Governance and Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS. He provides research and program support on a range of issues impacted by Asia’s evolving connectivity landscape, including trade, digital infrastructure, geostrategy, and China’s Belt and Road initiative. Prior to joining CSIS, he was a research assistant with the Security and Political Economy Lab at the University of Southern California and interned with the CSIS Economics Program, the Eurasia Group’s Geostrategy team, and the U.S. House Judiciary Committee. He received his BS in political science from Texas A&M University. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-14-russias-adaptation-game.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-14-russias-adaptation-game.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1192c2ca --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-14-russias-adaptation-game.md @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Russia’s Adaptation Game +author: Max Bergmann, et al. +date : 2022-12-14 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/YZtwdcw.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Russia’s Adaptation Game: Deciphering the Kremlin’s “Humanitarian Policy”" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine has prompted an unprecedented wave of Western sanctions, leaving Moscow increasingly isolated from various regional and international platforms._ _This, in turn, has impacted the Kremlin’s foreign policy thinking and diplomatic toolbox, exemplified by its “humanitarian policy,” a new decree based on the concept of the “Russian World” that President Putin signed into law in September 2022. The document provides Moscow with a newly codified justification to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states, specifically those of the former Soviet Union, should it decide that the rights of local Russian-speaking groups are violated in any significant way. This brief analyzes the Kremlin’s new decree, considering the complex geopolitical context contributing to the release of the document, as well as Russia’s ability to defend the idea of the “Russian World” in the post-Soviet bloc._ + + +### INTRODUCTION + +On September 5, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin signed a decree on the “Concept of Humanitarian Policy of the Russian Federation Abroad.” The document, which runs over 30 pages, is presented by the Kremlin as an “indispensable” part of Russia’s national security strategy and foreign policy toolbox. + +At first glance, the new policy, coming six months after Moscow’s brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, seems detached from reality. It describes the Russian Federation as a multinational and multireligious country that aspires to maintain peace and stability in the world. “This has absolutely nothing to do with the reality — the catastrophe into which Russia is plunging itself,” notes Elena Sorokina, a journalist with the Russian-language branch of Radio Liberty. + +Yet the Kremlin’s decision to roll out this new policy is directly tied to the war, as it seeks to send a threatening signal to Russia’s neighbors. The decree articulates what Moscow considers one of the driving forces behind its foreign policy decisions: the concept of the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir). The document states that as the current “world order” attempts to politicize culture — and thus pressure “specific governments and individuals” — one of the core goals of Russia’s “humanitarian policy” should be to preserve and promote the values intrinsic to Russkiy Mir. Crucially, this concept is the latest justification for Russian intervention in neighboring countries. The decree provides an additional pretext for interfering in sovereign territories of the former Soviet Union, notably in Georgia, Moldova, and the Baltics, to protect the rights of local Russian-speaking groups. + +By codifying the right of the Russian state to intercede for Russian speakers in its near abroad based on an ill-defined set of cultural criteria, Moscow’s newly minted humanitarian policy provides an evergreen casus belli that Russia can invoke against its neighbors. Yet though it attempts to demonstrate Russia’s strength to former Soviet states, the decree is borne out of weakness. + +The “special military operation” in Ukraine is putting great strain on Russia’s economy, limiting the country’s capacity to engage with, and thus exert influence on, its post-Soviet neighbors. In this context, the humanitarian policy should be seen as an effort by the Kremlin to put countries within its sphere of influence on notice. Despite its troubles in Ukraine, including military losses, Moscow is signaling that it has not lost sight of its post-Soviet neighbors and reserves the right to intervene should they seek to exploit Russia’s current weakness. Having failed at its efforts to trigger regime change in Kyiv or gain any traction in claiming Russia was engaged in the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine, the Kremlin is using the publication of its humanitarian policy as a new addition to its means of legitimizing the war — one that is narrower in its implications for Ukraine but potentially broader in its impact on the post-Soviet space. + +> By codifying the right of the Russian state to intercede for Russian speakers in its near abroad based on an ill-defined set of cultural criteria, Moscow’s newly minted humanitarian policy provides an evergreen casus belli that Russia can invoke against its neighbors. + +The following sections of the brief evaluate this policy document in greater detail, analyzing the troubling geopolitical context within which it was produced, as well as the reinvigorated concept of the Russian World and its possible effects on the post-Soviet bloc. + + +### THE GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT BEHIND RUSSIA’S HUMANITARIAN POLICY + +The release of the humanitarian policy follows a series of earlier diplomatic victories and recent battlefield setbacks for Russia in 2022. This context is critical to understanding Moscow’s rationale in issuing the document. + +The Kremlin entered 2022 in a position of relative geopolitical strength. Across Russia’s post-Soviet periphery, it appeared to be the preeminent regional actor. In Belarus, Russian president Vladmir Putin’s long-held desire to further integrate the Lukashenko regime into the Russian-led Union State was continuing apace. In the Baltic states, local governments continued to express concern about the influence of Russian media and business interests over domestic Russian-speaking populations. In Georgia, the ruling Georgian Dream party continued to take a conciliatory approach in its dealings with Moscow. Elsewhere in the Caucasus, Russia had successfully brokered a ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020, further entrenching Russia’s diplomatic and military presence within the region. Most importantly, the Kremlin’s proxies in eastern Ukraine continued their frozen conflict with Kyiv, trapping Ukraine in an ongoing border dispute that had de facto disqualified the country indefinitely from membership in either the European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). + +Russia’s position as a formidable regional power was further solidified in Central Asia in January 2022. Popular uprisings against the Kazakh government forced President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to reach out to his Russian counterpart for assistance. Tokayev’s plea and concern about another liberal “color revolution” prompted Putin to intervene militarily. Moscow swiftly deployed 2,000 soldiers, mostly Russian, to Kazakhstan, claiming that the troops represented the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) — a Eurasian intergovernmental military alliance led by Russia. The intervention succeeded in quelling the street protests, including the civil unrest in Kazakhstan’s largest city, Almaty, ultimately helping the Tokayev government reestablish control over the country. As Bayram Balci, a researcher at Sciences Po, later argued, the Kazakh crisis was so easily quelled by Moscow that it reinforced the Kremlin’s belief that former Soviet states, especially in Eurasia, were dependent on Russian power and could therefore never pursue an independent foreign policy. By assisting the Tokayev government, “Russia has demonstrated to the Kazakh elites and all other partners of Kazakhstan that without Russia the country could have sunk into the abyss.” + +Similar Russian assertions of regional hegemony were expressed by Putin in his infamous speech on February 24, 2022, declaring the start of the “special military operation” in Ukraine. Addressing the nation and the world, the Russian president claimed that Moscow had long ago accepted “the new geopolitical reality after the dissolution of the USSR” and always treated the former Soviet republics with respect and consideration. This was most recently “proven by the assistance we provided to Kazakhstan when it faced tragic events and a challenge in terms of its statehood and integrity” [emphasis added]. However, according to Putin, what Moscow would never be able to accept and tolerate was NATO’s continuous eastward expansion into Russia’s “historical lands” — especially in Ukraine, where a threatening “anti-Russia” was taking shape. Crucially, Putin contended, Moscow had to intervene in Ukraine to save millions of people with strong cultural affinity to Russia from an alleged genocide spearheaded by the central government in Kyiv but “fully controlled from the outside” (i.e., the West). + +The events that unfolded in January and February showcase two controversial, yet strongly intertwined, concepts underpinning the Kremlin’s foreign policy. On the one hand, Russia is represented as a guarantor of peace, integrity, and stability in its near abroad, as proven by its prompt resolution of the Kazakh crisis, support for the Lukashenko regime in Belarus, and deft mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. On the other hand, Moscow tolerates the “statehood and integrity” of the post-Soviet states only as long as they do not seek greater political autonomy from the Kremlin. And when certain territorial entities seek a separate path that is closer to Moscow, the Kremlin has no qualms undermining the sovereignty of its neighbors, as demonstrated by its ongoing support for separatist factions in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, as well as its ongoing pressure on the Baltic states. + +But if Moscow felt itself in a position of strength before the launch of its February invasion, its continuing military setbacks, the implementation of aggressive Western sanctions, and the increasing consolidation of the Ukrainian state and national identity have forced realists within the Kremlin to reassess the country’s international position and articulate new justifications for its actions. This is the context needed to understand the release of Russia’s humanitarian policy. Published six months into Moscow’s war of aggression against Kyiv, the document articulates how the Kremlin has adjusted its foreign policy thinking to match the shifting geopolitical landscape in Russia’s near abroad. + +Putin first highlighted the importance of creating such a document in mid-April, when he met with the permanent members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. The meeting followed two major military setbacks in Ukraine: a forced retreat from the Kyiv-adjacent town of Bucha on April 1, which unveiled brutal killings of civilians by Russian forces, and the sinking of Russia’s Black Sea missile cruiser Moskva after a successful Ukrainian offensive on April 13. While it is difficult to infer whether these events had any direct impact on Putin’s decision to have the humanitarian policy drafted, it is certain that these incidents significantly affected the Kremlin’s regional and international standing, showcasing Russia as a brutal, yet declining, global power. It was within this heightened and troublesome geopolitical context that Putin convened his Security Council and argued for the creation of Russia’s humanitarian policy, which would be consistent with the country’s “national interests in the near, medium, and more distant future.” + + +### RUSSKIY MIR: “A COMMUNITY THAT GOES FAR BEYOND RUSSIA” + +Evidently, one of Moscow’s chief national interests that the humanitarian policy seeks to revive is the concept of Russkiy Mir. While Russian World is not explicitly defined in the document, the term itself is far from new. It was initially coined in Russian political circles in the late 1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the country’s subsequent quest for a national identity, and revolved around the idea that Moscow had a sacred duty to defend the culture, language, and rights of all Russian speakers across the world, particularly in the former Soviet Union. According to Heather Ashby, the senior program officer for the Center for Russia and Europe at the U.S. Institute of Peace, such a “broader conceptualization of ‘Russianness’,” expanding into other sovereign territories, was a natural outcome of the Soviet collapse, which left some 25 million ethnic Russians outside of Russia’s territorial borders: “Living in a country that had long been a multinational empire, it was difficult for many Russians to accept that many of their ethnic brethren now lived in foreign countries.” + +Indeed, the concept of the Russian World fit into a broader trend of Russian thinkers and policymakers grappling with the future role of the new Russian Federation. Researchers and writers such as Charles Clover have documented the ideological development of the post-Soviet Russian right, exploring the myriad ways this movement has embedded itself within, influenced, and been instrumentally co-opted by the Putin regime. More specifically, this doctrine of Russia’s moral, linguistic, and cultural supremacy in the post-Soviet bloc has been viewed by the Putin administration as “a guiding notion,” complementing and strengthening “the Kremlin’s belief that it possesses — and should continue to maintain through cultural, economic, political, and military ties — legitimate spheres of influence across the former Soviet Union.” + +Putin has expressed similar sentiments numerous times in the past, most notably in April 2007, when he said during an address to the Federal Assembly, “The Russian language not only preserves an entire layer of truly global achievements but is also the living space for the many millions of people in the Russian-speaking world, a community that goes far beyond Russia itself.” In June 2007, Putin signed a decree creating the Russkiy Mir Foundation to promote Russian language and culture regionally and internationally. Today, the foundation claims that Russian World includes not only members of the Russian diaspora, but also anyone who speaks Russian and has developed “an appreciation for Russia and its rich cultural heritage.” + +Yet the revival and further elevation of the concept of Russkiy Mir in the humanitarian policy can be seen as an effort by the Kremlin to establish a cultural separation with the West by emphasizing Russian civilization’s distinctiveness. The policy comes against the backdrop of Moscow’s rising economic and diplomatic isolation, which in turn further elevates the status of the Russian World, as the decree provides a legal platform to the Kremlin to declare Russia culturally and politically superior to its near abroad. This language of defensive cultural posturing can be interpreted as part of Moscow’s reaction to the war and need to justify its invasion of Ukraine. In addition, it is also a response to the perceived threat of Western-backed “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet space; these supposedly foreign interventions by Western powers are believed to be executed by local actors pushing an anti-Russian message that is just as much about culture as it is about political institutions. The rhetorical construction of a linguistically and socially homogenous Russkiy Mir gives the Kremlin an ideological justification to intervene in Russia’s near abroad, one that can be invoked in the face of international criticism. It also sends a warning to the West: since the Kremlin wrongly perceives “color revolutions” as something done by the West to undermine Russia, Moscow is similarly signaling it can respond in kind. + +> Yet the revival and further elevation of the concept of Russkiy Mir in the humanitarian policy can be seen as an effort by the Kremlin to establish a cultural separation with the West by emphasizing Russian civilization’s distinctiveness. + +This is why, amid Russia’s continued invasion of Ukraine and the perceived efforts of certain Western actors to “cancel” the celebration of Russian culture internationally, analysts should continue to expect Russian leaders and state-backed news outlets to lean into the language of cultural grievance. + + +### THE DOCTRINE OF INTERFERENCE + +The document claims that one of the core principles of the Russian World, in addition to advancing Russian culture and language through “soft power,” is “noninterference in internal affairs of other states.” + +Moscow has repeatedly used the now-infamous doctrine of noninterference to appeal to authoritarian governments across East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. The decree stresses the importance of deepening traditional, cultural ties with countries in these regions, singling out China and India in particular. Russia’s isolation from Europe since the war in Ukraine has accelerated the Kremlin’s own geopolitical reorientation. Putin has frequently echoed these sentiments in his speeches, signaling his intention to “pivot to the East” not only with Russian gas and oil, but also culturally and politically. Two days after signing the humanitarian policy, the president reaffirmed his intentions during a speech at the Eastern Economic Forum, held in the city of Vladivostok with the aim of driving foreign investment in Russia’s easternmost region. He referred to the countries of the Asia-Pacific region as the new cultural, economic, and technological hegemons, contributing to the shift “toward a multipolar world” and thus challenging an “obsolete” Western-led rules-based order. + +However, even if Moscow has upheld the principle of noninterference in its relations with Beijing and New Delhi, the opposite is true about the Kremlin’s intentions toward countries perceived as part of the Russian World. As mentioned above, the Putin administration respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the post-Soviet nations as long as they do not question and dispute Russia’s leading cultural, political, and economic posture in the region. This contradiction in Moscow’s thinking is embedded in the humanitarian policy. The document prioritizes the advancement of bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the Kremlin and the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a regional intergovernmental organization bringing Russia together with eight neighboring countries from Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus. The decree maintains that one of the central goals of Russia’s humanitarian policy will be to create “a unified cultural, educational, and informational environment” and strengthen the “historically entrenched” position of the Russian language in the CIS. Although the CIS countries cumulatively have nine different official languages, the decree only acknowledges and promotes the culture and language of Russia. + +Furthermore, while there is no mention of Ukraine in the humanitarian policy, clause 94 of the document stresses that the Kremlin will maintain close diplomatic ties with the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic — statelet names that Putin excluded from the decree on October 17, following sham referendums held in late September that led to the proclamation of these territories as official parts of the Russian Federation. The updated version of clause 94 now only mentions two breakaway and internationally unrecognized territories: Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Moscow acknowledged as “independent states” after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. The decree emphasizes the strengthening of diplomatic ties between the Russian Federation and these South Caucasian “republics.” + +Importantly, clause 62 of the decree pledges to protect the rights and interests of Russian compatriots living abroad and to assist them in “the preservation of the all-Russian cultural identity.” At the same time, clause 95 warns that the Kremlin will carefully observe the “protection of the rights of Russian-speakers” in the post-Soviet states of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Georgia, which will impact Russia’s foreign policy decisions vis-à-vis these nations. + + +### SHOULD THE SINGLED-OUT BE CONCERNED? + +While clauses 62 and 95 do not seem menacing at first glance, their subtext surely is. Singling out the post-Soviet states that are either in NATO and the European Union, in the case of the Baltic countries, or have pro-Western aspirations, in the case of Moldova and Georgia, is by no means an accident. Instead, it is a clear reaction to the drastically changing security environment in Russia’s “historical lands,” which the Kremlin believes have become hostile parts of Russkiy Mir. + +Moscow had been basing its right to protect Russian speakers from continued oppression and discrimination in foreign countries, including Ukraine, on the United Nations’ principle of “responsibility to protect.” From now on, however, it can use the language of the humanitarian policy, specifically clause 62, to justify Russia’s interference in the domestic affairs of other post-Soviet states — presenting it as a sign of the Kremlin’s unwavering commitment to the safety and security of all Russian-speaking communities residing abroad. + +Since the start of the invasion, thousands of Russians opposing Putin’s war have fled the Russian Federation, attempting to find safe havens in the neighboring countries of post-Soviet Eurasia and even the European Union. According to Kirill Krivosheev, a journalist with Russia’s Kommersant newspaper, the immediate problems created by Russian expatriates in these countries are “somewhat more mundane,” including a shortage of places and increased rent and consumer prices. Most Russians fleeing the regime do not seek to create or contribute to heightened political tensions between the Kremlin and the governments of the former Soviet countries. However, Krivosheev also notes that “given Putin’s penchant for launching wars with the purported aim of protecting ethnic Russians . . . the idea that tomorrow he may decide to ‘protect’ those Russians who have escaped his grip no longer seems entirely outlandish.” In this context, the humanitarian policy can also be viewed as a means for Moscow to justify aggressive intelligence operations in its near abroad because the Russian émigrés, even if they oppose the regime and the war, are still part of the Kremlin’s Russkiy Mir. + +__Baltic States:__ Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, three Baltic nations with a combined population of approximately 6 million people, have sizeable Russian-speaking communities. About 25 percent of Estonia’s population of 1.3 million and Latvia’s population of 1.9 million self-identify as ethnic Russians. This number is smaller, yet still significant, in Lithuania, where 15 percent of the 2.8 million citizens belong to the local Russian-speaking minority. + +Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Baltic states have been unanimous in their efforts to curtail Moscow’s influence over ethnic Russians in their respective countries, from banning Russian and Belarusian television channels and online media outlets to demolishing Communist-era monuments. The three nations have also not been cowed by the release of the humanitarian policy. On September 7, the heads of the governments came to a joint decision to restrict entry indefinitely from Russia and Belarus for virtually all Russian citizens with EU visas. “What we have seen in the last couple of weeks and months, is that the number of border crossings by Russian citizens holding Schengen visas have dramatically increased. This is becoming a public security issue, this is also an issue of a moral and political nature,” declared Latvian minister for foreign affairs Edgars Rinkēvičs. + +The Baltic states have remained similarly adamant in their decision to keep borders closed even for those Russian citizens who are running away from the partial military mobilization announced by Putin on September 21. Top diplomats have asserted that “being drafted into the army is not enough” to grant asylum to the fleeing Russians, claiming that they would still pose a significant threat to the national security of their respective nations, as well as to Euro-Atlantic stability more broadly. However, as Western European nations such as Germany and France continue to push back on efforts to block the entry into the European Union of Russians fleeing mobilization, it remains unclear to what extent the decisions of the Baltic states will affect the ability of these émigrés to seek shelter in Europe. In fact, despite facing opposition from the Baltic nations, the European Union received more than 100,000 Russian citizens in the weeks immediately following the announcement of partial mobilization. + +Andrei Kolesnikov, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argues that the travel ban on Russian citizens imposed by EU and NATO members Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania plays into President Putin’s narrative that the West uses Moscow’s “historical territories and people close to us living there” to cultivate hatred against Russia and Russians. Independent media outlets are already reporting that a rising number of Russians in these countries “are left feeling they may be losing their place in the society.” To prevent such ethnic tensions from escalating even further, Estonian president Alar Karis has called for mutual respect and sensitivity, acknowledging that “some residents of our country do have a different historical understanding,” as they “have not been taught an ideologically unbiased history of Estonia, Europe and the world.” However, considering the Kremlin’s history of malign influence operations in the Baltic states, these countries will have to ensure that their strong opposition to the Kremlin does not simultaneously alienate their own Russian-speaking minorities and thus create a vulnerability that Moscow could exploit. + +__Moldova:__ Moldova is actively distancing itself from Russia. Yet the country is in a difficult political and security situation, as it still has up to 1,500 Russian troops present in the Moscow-backed breakaway region of Transnistria. Additionally, while ethnic Russians account for 6 percent of the country’s overall population, their share in Transnistria reaches 30 percent. + +In early March 2022, Moldova applied for EU membership, seeking to cement its Westward turn. However, this was soon followed by a series of “terrorist incidents” in Transnistria, which the local de facto authorities promptly attributed to Kyiv. The central government introduced a state of emergency in the country but also stressed the importance of a diplomatic resolution of the conflict with Transnistria — which, through Moldova, maintains much stronger trade relations with the European Union than with Russia. More specifically, as a result of the 2014 Association Agreement between the European Union and Moldova, Transnistria now trades with 20 EU member states; 70 percent of its exports, including textile materials and steel products, end up in the European market. By contrast, exports to Russia experienced a steady decline, with a sharp fall from “$909 million between 2007 and 2010 to $232 million between 2015 and 2018.” Therefore, despite Transnistria’s intention to gain independence from Moldova, the local authorities seem to understand that the region’s “economic lifeline,” especially against the backdrop of a politically and economically isolated Russia, lies in its links to Brussels and Chisinau rather than to Moscow. + +The central authorities in Moldova also understand the changing geopolitical context and its effects on domestic policymaking. On August 27, Moldovan Independence Day, President Maia Sandu told citizens celebrating at the Great National Assembly Square in Chisinau that “Russia’s unjust war against Ukraine clearly shows us the price of freedom. . . . The war will end, and we will be able to get out of these crises stronger, more resilient.” Similar sentiments were shared by the Moldovan minister of foreign affairs and European integration in late September, strongly condemning the Kremlin’s move to hold sham referendums in Ukraine’s Donbas region. + +However, while Moldova’s pro-Western aspirations are on the rise, so is the Kremlin’s fear of losing yet another member of its Russian World. Putin believes that Russia is currently fighting not against Ukraine but “actually the entire military machine of the collective West,” which has been “nurturing the hatred of Russia for decades” across the former Soviet Union. Reflecting the president’s attitude, the humanitarian policy attempts to warn newly minted EU candidate Moldova of Moscow’s self-granted ability to protect Russian speakers in Transnistria and beyond. + +__Georgia:__ It would be extremely difficult for Moscow to openly intervene in the domestic affairs of the Baltic NATO member states or even Moldova, sandwiched between Ukraine and NATO member Romania. Georgia, however, is a much easier target. According to the Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI), a local nongovernmental organization, up to 50,000 citizens of Russia were staying in Georgia between March and June 2022. This figure has grown significantly since September 21, as more than 53,000 Russians crossed the Russo-Georgian border following Putin’s order on partial military mobilization. + +Besides escaping the army and the war, Russian citizens travel to Georgia to circumvent the ongoing Western economic sanctions on technology and consumer goods and Russian businesses. Based on data from Transparency International, Russian émigrés have registered about 6,400 companies in Georgia since the start of the war in Ukraine. Most of the Russians settling in Georgia are encouraged by the existing visa regime, which enables them to stay in the country visa-free for up to a year. Even though several opposition parties have argued in favor of introducing visas for Russian citizens fleeing to Georgia, the ruling Georgian Dream party has disregarded the opposition’s plea as a “xenophobic” campaign aimed at dragging Tbilisi into an armed conflict with Moscow. + +Yet public opinion polls show that up to 60 percent of Georgians are concerned about the advancement of a pro-Kremlin agenda in their country and expect Russian military aggression in the near future. Despite — or perhaps because of — this, the majority of Georgians remain highly supportive of Georgia’s EU (82 percent) and NATO (71 percent) aspirations, as well as of the Ukrainians fighting against Russian aggression (98 percent). + +In a 2016 commentary, Igor Zevelev, then a visiting fellow with the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program, claimed that the Russian diaspora in the South Caucasus “is relatively small, aging, and continues to shrink. It is not mobilized and thus cannot become an instrument of Russian foreign policy.” Today, however, Georgia faces a drastically different demographic picture, as the country of 3.7 million keeps accepting thousands of Russian expatriates daily. As time goes on, analysts will need to track the increased economic influence Russian workers and investors will have on the Georgian economy and what percentage of the Russian émigrés will seek long-term residency in their new home. As the Russian presence in Georgia becomes both more pronounced and influential, clause 95 in Moscow’s new humanitarian policy will continue to make the Georgian public wary. In the past several weeks, the exact text from the decree has been continuously circulated throughout Georgian media. + +Despite significant public concern, the government has not yet commented on Moscow’s self-proclaimed right to intervene should it one day decide Russian speakers are oppressed in any way in Georgia. Conveniently, and unsurprisingly, such a “humanitarian” act could coincide with a spike in the Kremlin’s fears that Tbilisi has become too comfortable with its Euro-Atlantic partners. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already raised its concerns regarding the joint Tbilisi-NATO military exercises that took place in Georgia in September 2022, stating that the West’s continuous efforts to “draw” Tbilisi into NATO present a national security threat to Russia and jeopardize peace and stability in the South Caucasus at large. + +__Kazakhstan:__ Even though the humanitarian policy does not list Kazakhstan as one of the five former Soviet states where Moscow pledges to observe the rights of local Russian-speaking groups, the Kremlin might revisit its approach as Russia’s influence in Central Asia starts to weaken. In stark contrast to January 2022, when it seemed that the Kremlin’s grip on the Tokayev government was as tight as ever, Putin’s Kazakh counterpart has become less transparent about where his political loyalties might lie. + +Tokayev was one of the first leaders within the CSTO to refuse to send troops to assist the Kremlin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine. More importantly, in a July phone call with European Council president Charles Michel, the Kazakh president expressed the country’s readiness to cooperate with the European Union on developing alternative delivery routes for oil and natural gas, including the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route — a direct affront to Moscow’s efforts to choke off European energy supplies and break the political will for the current sanctions regime. However, following Tokayev’s call with Michel, a Russian court temporarily closed down the Russo-Kazakh Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s oil terminal in Russia. This move served as a warning for the Tokayev administration not to intervene in Moscow’s energy war with the West and a reminder that the Kremlin can still influence Kazakhstan’s foreign policy decisions. + +Importantly, in its dealings with Russia, Kazakhstan has to factor in the thousands of Russian émigrés currently present in the country. Already, around 70,000 of them have received Kazakh ID numbers to open bank accounts and look for jobs, indicating that many Russians might be seeking a longer-term residence in this Central Asian republic. In the meantime, according to The Economist, the Kremlin “is already irked by the lack of cheerleading for its war from its supposed allies in the region,” including Kazakhstan. Therefore, as in Georgia, Moscow might use the humanitarian policy and presence of Russian speakers in Kazakhstan to check the country’s pro-Europe plans. + + +### CONCLUSION + +The Kremlin’s new policy document outlines a pretext for future aggression against the post-Soviet states seeking greater political autonomy and a more liberal future. However, Russia currently finds itself in a severely weakened geopolitical position. As the Russian military is challenged in Ukraine and the economic and diplomatic effects of international sanctions become more pronounced, questions regarding Moscow’s actual capacity to uphold promises made in the humanitarian policy will become unavoidable. + +Already, experts claim that the long-held perception of the Kremlin’s authority as a mediator of conflicts and a guarantor of peace and security in the broader region is cracking. According to Jeffrey Mankoff, a senior associate with CSIS, “As Moscow bleeds in Ukraine, it is losing the ability to manipulate the other post-imperial conflicts that litter its borderlands.” Proving this point are renewed border clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in Central Asia. These tensions have signaled Russia’s inability to effectively involve itself in several simultaneous conflicts in the region and have thus impacted Moscow’s standing in a larger post-Soviet Eurasia. + +Considering these changing geopolitical dynamics within the Kremlin’s supposed sphere of influence, it might seem easy to dismiss the threatening language of the humanitarian policy. However, such an increasingly prominent idea of Russian weakness in the Russian World could make the Putin regime even more desperate to exert its influence and therefore willing to take even greater risks in its efforts to claim post-Soviet hegemony. As Zaur Shiriyev, an analyst at Crisis Group, states, “There are no illusions in the region about Russia’s power. . . . No one wants to antagonize Russia.” + +Indeed, besides Ukraine, Russian troops and military equipment are currently present in different contested territories across the former Soviet Union, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow continues to exert significant economic and political influence over Belarus, providing multimillion-dollar loans to the Lukashenko regime and using the country as a staging area for the Russian military. Furthermore, the Putin administration still enjoys sufficient economic and political influence across the countries of Central Asia, which continue to rely on Russia’s security assistance, remittance inflows, and export routes. Finally, in the case of the Baltic states, despite the efforts of local authorities to battle Moscow’s propaganda at home, news has emerged about a large-scale Russian disinformation campaign aimed at mimicking reputable European media outlets to disseminate pro-Kremlin interpretations of the Ukraine war across the European Union. Considering Moscow’s entrenched position among Russian minority groups in the Baltic states, such disinformation campaigns could further intensify tensions between the local governments and Russian-speaking communities. + +It is true that current Western sanctions continue to erode Moscow’s economic and geopolitical lifelines, limiting its ability to exert power in the broader region. Still, a politically and economically weakened Russia has managed to ignite and manipulate various ethnic tensions and conflicts in the post-Soviet era. Today, the Putin regime wants the world to know that despite sanctions, Russia’s capacity to control its sphere of influence should not be underestimated. + +The release of the humanitarian policy serves exactly this purpose. By signing the decree into law, the Kremlin has made it crystal clear that it is buttressing the concept of Russkiy Mir — its nationalist narrative about Russia’s cultural, linguistic, and moral supremacy in the former Soviet Union. Already, the Security Council of the Russian Federation is discussing drafting a new language policy commensurate with the stated goals of the humanitarian policy, namely preservation and promotion of the Russian language against the backdrop of the ongoing “Westernization” of the world. According to Oleg Khramov, deputy secretary of the Security Council, creation of such a decree is necessary to “prevent further Latinization of the Russian society and preserve civilizational sovereignty” [emphasis added]. + +> Today, the Putin regime wants the world to know that despite sanctions, Russia’s capacity to control its spheres of influence should not be underestimated. + +Thus, the humanitarian policy is part of a continuing effort by the Kremlin to claim that Russia is culturally distinct and separate from the West, furthering its view that the two are inevitable adversaries. Adding a cultural dimension to this conflict is also intended to help mobilize the Russian public and stoke nationalism against the West in support of a costly and possibly ruinous war in Ukraine. + +Today, Putin’s Russia still has enough stamina to fight for its near abroad. The Kremlin is not yet backing off — indeed, it is doubling down. Accordingly, the West should be wary of Moscow’s revanchist tendencies in the post-Soviet bloc and remain on the alert for more trouble ahead. + +--- + +__Max Bergmann__ is the director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. + +__Tina Dolbaia__ is a research associate with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. + +__Nick Fenton__ is a program coordinator and research assistant with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-15-us-australia-philippines-triad.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-15-us-australia-philippines-triad.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b2c5ab80 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-12-15-us-australia-philippines-triad.md @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : U.S.-Australia-Philippines Triad +author: Gregory B. Poling and Andreyka Natalegawa +date : 2022-12-15 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/8BBPi5f.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Building a U.S.-Australia-Philippines Triad" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific vary dramatically in terms of reliability, capability, and clarity of strategic rationale. The two oldest U.S. security alliances in the region — with the Philippines and Australia — illustrate this clearly._ _The U.S. alliance with Australia has never been stronger. By contrast, the United States’ alliance with the Philippines has barely survived a period of deep uncertainty and remains fragile and underdeveloped, posing significant challenges and risks to U.S. defense strategy and interests. It is increasingly urgent that the United States and Australia shore up the strategic foundations of their partnerships with the Philippines, highlight the mutual benefits of working together, and assess the role that trilateral cooperation should play in regional security._ + + +### Introduction + +As outlined in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS), the United States is engaged in long-term strategic competition with China that is playing out with particular intensity in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing seeks to undermine the U.S. alliance system and displace the United States as the preeminent power in the region. Given China’s clear strategic intent, the focus in the NDS on strengthening alliances is well placed, but U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific vary dramatically in terms of reliability, capability, and clarity of strategic rationale. The two oldest U.S. security alliances in the region — with the Philippines and Australia — illustrate this clearly. The U.S. alliance with Australia has never been stronger. The two are developing new defense capabilities, building interoperability, and increasingly working together as a networked security architecture. The Australia-United Kingdom-United States pact, or AUKUS, is just the latest sign of this increasingly robust partnership. + +By contrast, the United States’ alliance with the Philippines has barely survived a period of deep uncertainty under the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte. While Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr.’s administration has signaled that it will prioritize the Philippines’ relationship with the United States, the alliance remains fragile and underdeveloped, posing significant challenges and risks to U.S. defense strategy and interests. However, this alliance remains critically important for the United States, both for the benefits the United States derives from bilateral cooperation in peacetime and for the role the alliance plays in U.S. defense planning above or just below the threshold of conflict. If China succeeds in peeling the Philippines away from the United States, it will profoundly weaken the strategic position of the United States, Australia, and other allies within the broader Indo-Pacific. + +It is increasingly urgent that the United States and Australia shore up the strategic foundations of their partnerships with the Philippines, highlight the mutual benefits of working together, and assess the role that trilateral cooperation should play in regional security. Furthermore, defense policymakers in the United States and Australia need to better understand Philippine strategic assessments and threat perceptions to inform assumptions about the role the Philippines would play in the event of conflict with China, including in a Taiwan contingency. How do Filipino and Australian strategic planners view China? How can the United States and its allies respond to — and deter — Chinese gray zone activities? What are the implications of a Taiwan contingency on regional stability, and how would Manila and Canberra respond to such a crisis? Under what circumstances would the Philippines allow access for U.S. and allied forces flowing into the region in the event of an emerging conflict? + +In order to answer these questions, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) convened a trilateral U.S.-Australia-Philippines track 2 strategic dialogue in August 2022 in Manila, Philippines. The dialogue was intended to provide a platform for U.S., Australian, and Filipino experts and practitioners to discuss practical issues of alliance coordination, share insights regarding each country’s respective strategic outlooks, and consider the ways in which the security triangle could be operationalized in a time of conflict. CSIS concluded the dialogue by hosting a tabletop exercise involving a complex near-future crisis in the South China Sea. + +Discussion at the dialogue largely spanned four key themes: the need to assess and align strategic outlooks and threat perceptions in Washington, Manila, and Canberra; the challenges associated with Chinese gray zone activities and potential pathways toward enhancing resilience; the growing need for all three countries to consider how a Taiwan contingency would not only impact alliance obligations, but also affect their own respective national security priorities; and the current limited ability of the security triangle to respond to a South China Sea crisis. + +The dialogue informed the findings and recommendations in this brief, although all opinions are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the dialogue participants. + + +### The U.S.-Australia-Philippines Security Triangle + +The U.S.-Philippines alliance has experienced an upswing since then-president Rodrigo Duterte’s decision to recall the abrogation of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 2021. Early signs demonstrate that the Marcos Jr. administration is generally less skeptical of the United States than its predecessor and views the alliance as a top priority. President Biden’s meeting with President Marcos Jr. in New York in September 2022 represents a positive step forward — as well as the first time a sitting Philippine president visited the United States since the late president Benigno Aquino III attended the Sunnylands summit in 2016 — with the United States affirming its commitment to the defense of the Philippines. Whether these trends continue and the alliance undergoes much-needed modernization will ultimately depend on it continuing to receive high-level political and military attention from both sides. Implementation of the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) remains years behind schedule, the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ modernization plans need a considerable increase in support, and the long-term viability of the alliance rests on a number of agreements and new institutions currently under discussion. + +The U.S.-Australia alliance has also experienced a surge in activity in recent years. Canberra and Washington have seen increased alignment on strategic outlooks, as evidenced by enhanced U.S. rotational access to Australian facilities, collaboration through the Quad, and the AUKUS pact. The transition to a Labor government led by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in May 2022 has further opened the door to enhanced cooperation with the United States, including in relation to the Biden administration’s stated focus on issues like climate change. Albanese has also cast himself as a foreign policy–oriented premier, attending the Quad summit in Tokyo immediately after being sworn in and directing his cabinet to embark on a series of diplomatic tours to affirm Australia’s position in the region. + +Australia’s growing role in the Indo-Pacific underscores the need for Canberra and Washington to collaborate more closely in engaging with other alliance partners, including the Philippines. Australia is uniquely suited to this role as it is the only country other than the United States to have a Status of Forces Agreement with the Philippines. As a result, Australia and the Philippines enjoy a significant degree of security cooperation, including the presence of Australian mobile training teams on the ground undertaking capacity-building work on counterterrorism, urban warfare, maritime security, and other fronts. Yet, despite the wide array of ongoing bilateral activities and the significant potential for enhanced Australia-Philippines cooperation, high-level discussion on the merits of the partnership remains limited and has only just begun to emerge in Australian policy circles. + + +### Strategic Outlooks and Threat Perceptions + +Shared challenges faced by Manila, Washington, and Canberra necessitate a review of strategic outlooks and threat perceptions in all three capitals, along with an examination of the extent to which Philippine, U.S., and Australian assumptions about these alliances and partnerships cohere amid strategic competition with China. The 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy made clear the Biden administration’s intent to strengthen the United States’ long-term position in, and commitment to, the Indo-Pacific. Congress remains steadfast in its bipartisan support for shoring up U.S. alliances to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific and counter China’s advances in the region. Thus, in the face of continued reservations about U.S. staying power in the region and a challenging strategic environment in Europe and the Middle East, Washington has signaled that its commitment to the Indo-Pacific remains robust. + +Australia’s presence at the forefront of Beijing’s coercive activities in the Indo-Pacific has significantly sharpened strategic outlooks toward China in recent years. Opinion polling demonstrates that a majority of the Australian public now views China as a security threat. The Australian political and security establishment, mirroring the public, has largely reached consensus on its views of China, even as the governing Labor Party and the opposition Liberal-National Coalition disagree over tactics and tone in foreign policy. Australia’s experience with China’s coercive activities and its long-standing history of alignment with the United States in times of conflict mean that Canberra is an essential partner for Washington in countering challenges to the regional order. + +Strategic outlooks in Manila, by contrast, remain in transition. The shift from a decades-long focus on internal threats to a more maritime-oriented external defense doctrine is underway. But this shift is constrained by limited state resources and colored by concerns about U.S. credibility, made especially salient by the huge disparity in power between the two allies and the economic necessity to balance engagement and confrontation in China policy. + +In contrast to Australian views on China, which have largely sharpened in recent years, there is no singular view of China policy in the Philippines. The state and military bureaucracy, public opinion, and business interests are broadly pro-American and suspicious of Beijing — and becoming more so in the wake of China’s increasing coercion. But they remain divided on how to respond to that coercion. An influential minority within the political and business elite continues to view the U.S.-Philippines alliance as a destabilizing factor that could upend Manila’s ties with Beijing and lead the Philippines into unwanted conflict. That minority continues to use the narrative of U.S. failure and ambiguity during the Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012 to insist that, when push comes to shove, the United States will not stand with its ally. The power of this line of argument has been diminished by the increasing clarity of U.S. declaratory policy and closer alliance coordination over the last decade, but it is unlikely to disappear entirely any time soon. Moreover, views on China in the Philippines are divided across geographic lines, with some subnational actors in places like Mindanao and northern Luzon increasingly reliant on Chinese investment and people-to-people ties. + +Divergences in Philippine and Australian threat perceptions are compounded by differences in capacity to respond to Chinese coercion and other material and non-material factors. As an advanced economy, Australia has been better able to absorb economic coercion, and its military capabilities mean that it is ultimately better equipped than the Philippines to respond to gray zone challenges. Furthermore, Australia’s status as a mature democracy means that it is generally less tolerant of authoritarian practices and challenges to the regional order, more resilient to misinformation and influence operations, and more likely to view a China-dominated order as a threat to Australia’s interests and worldview. + +Over the past year, changes in government in both Canberra and Manila have reshaped Australian and Philippine strategic outlooks. As noted above, the Australian political establishment has largely reached consensus in their views on China, though the new Labor government has opted to strike what it views as a more delicate tone in approaching Beijing and regional partners. While President Marcos Jr. has generally taken a stronger position toward Beijing than his predecessor and sought to deepen relations with the United States, his focus on economic recovery and attracting foreign investment makes it likely that he will try to balance this with outreach to China, to say nothing of the Marcos family’s own long-standing ties with the Chinese business community. However, no matter what Marcos Jr.’s own perspectives toward China may be, it is likely that the Philippine foreign policy and security establishment will ultimately constrain the president’s ability to make any extreme overtures toward Beijing. + +Changing dynamics in the regional security landscape have also shifted strategic outlooks in the three capitals, including challenges associated with China’s nuclear buildup and other proliferation risks. Yet, while both Washington and Canberra have increasingly voiced concern regarding the threat of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan contingency or other crises, issues related to nuclear buildup and proliferation remain underdiscussed and understudied in Manila. To the extent that public discourse in the Philippines focuses on nuclear risks, this discourse largely centers on evincing concern around narratives that AUKUS could negatively impact nonproliferation in the region — even while Philippine views on the pact are largely positive relative to those of its immediate neighbors. Manila generally views China’s nuclear ambitions and the threat of nuclear escalation as a less critical issue relative to other, more immediate threats posed by Beijing in the maritime, cyber, and information domains. + +Despite clear opportunities for Australia and the Philippines to deepen cooperation, neither capital has prioritized its partnership with the other at the level one would expect given the increasing convergence in their strategic outlooks and the logic of closer coordination. In contrast to the U.S. government, Canberra has not historically given the Philippines as much priority in its regional strategy as Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, or especially Indonesia. In the Philippines, meanwhile, high-level discourse on non-U.S. partnerships tends to focus on Japan and South Korea. Filipinos evince warm feelings toward Australia in public opinion polls and the military maintains significant on-the-ground cooperation, but those ties are rarely top of mind. + +> Canberra has not historically given the Philippines as much priority in its regional strategy as Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, or especially Indonesia. In the Philippines, meanwhile, high-level discourse on non-U.S. partnerships tends to focus on Japan and South Korea. + +Ultimately, Philippine and Australian strategic outlooks will be shaped by overall views toward the United States and U.S. credibility as a guarantor of regional stability and security. While support for the U.S.-Australia alliance is at an all-time high, this largely reflects anxieties about the threat posed by China, rather than a vote of confidence in the reliability of the United States. And despite these concerns, neither Australia nor the Philippines have a plan B in the event of waning U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific, as only the United States currently has the weight needed to balance China. + + +### Enhancing Resilience against Gray Zone Challenges + +China has leveraged an extensive tool kit of coercive measures in the region, including activities that fall in the gray zone short of conflict — weaponizing investments in critical infrastructure and using economic coercion, employing influence operations and disinformation campaigns, and deploying maritime militia and coast guard vessels in Philippine waters. Coupled with a general increase in China’s risk tolerance, these levers of influence have granted Beijing a wide range of policy options and approaches that enhance the risks associated with sub-conflict disputes. + +In the South China Sea, Beijing’s island-building campaign and its deployment of law enforcement and maritime militia vessels have significantly altered the strategic landscape, allowing Beijing to harass oil and gas operations and restrict Philippine resupply vessels’ access to the isolated Filipino Marines stationed aboard the BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal. The broad span of China’s gray zone activities points to the need for an “all of the above” approach that encompasses both military and diplomatic solutions to deterring Chinese behavior. But successful responses to gray zone activities will ultimately be contingent on whether the United States, Australia, and the Philippines are able to determine what specific approaches would credibly deter Chinese aggression, let alone whether there are activities that the United States and its allies simply cannot deter. Responses to Chinese gray zone activities could encompass both offensive and defensive measures, particularly in the informational realm. This could include declassifying intelligence relevant to Chinese coercive behavior (in a manner similar to U.S. declassification of information related to Russian activities prior to and during the invasion of Ukraine), while also focusing on enhancing domestic military capabilities and resilience. + +Efforts to respond to gray zone activities will be complicated by the extent to which the Philippines remains vulnerable to Chinese influence operations and elite capture. This includes ongoing narratives regarding China’s overwhelming economic dominance in the Philippines. Whether they are overstated or not, these narratives of economic dominance and political influence speak to the success of China’s information operations. + +> The broad span of China’s gray zone activities points to the need for an “all of the above” approach that encompasses both military and diplomatic solutions to deterring Chinese behavior. + +Meanwhile, enhancing domestic resilience includes the continued modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including procurement of BrahMos cruise missile systems or other similar platforms. Such weapons systems would effectively allow the Philippines to raise China’s short-term costs in a time of conflict, mirroring Vietnam’s approach to military modernization in recent decades. This approach has focused on the acquisition of a small but capable number of advanced surface, undersea, and air platforms paired with asymmetric strike capabilities to ensure that it can give China a “bloody nose” in any contest. + + +### Implications of a Taiwan Contingency + +Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in early August, as well as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and perceived parallels between that conflict and China’s behavior in the Indo-Pacific, have helped sharpen the region’s focus on the prospect of a Taiwan contingency. + +The Philippines’ proximity to Taiwan means that simple geography, to say nothing of the alliance with the United States, could drag Manila into a Taiwan contingency. This in turn highlights the need for Filipino strategic thinkers to consider the potential impacts of such a conflict. Much in the same way that South Vietnamese refugee ships fled to Subic Bay during the fall of Saigon, a cross-strait contingency could lead to Taiwanese vessels evacuating to the Philippines. With northern Luzon less than 200 miles from Taiwan, and the Batanes Islands even closer, a refugee crisis seems inevitable in the case of a Taiwan contingency. + +The Philippines has nearly 200,000 overseas foreign workers based in Taiwan, and their evacuation — likely impossible in the face of an outright invasion of the island — would be a top priority if conflict were to break out across the Taiwan Strait. The Philippines also has a much smaller, but still sizeable, number of overseas foreign workers in mainland China, and even more in Hong Kong. This raises the possibility that those workers could become political leverage for Beijing in a time of conflict and limit the Philippines’ flexibility in responding to a Taiwan contingency. The direction of public sentiment in such a crisis — whether demanding intervention on behalf of those Filipinos in Taiwan or restraint in the name of those in China — is difficult to predict. Much would depend on the details and scale of the crisis, including the number of Filipinos killed. + +The proximity of Philippine territory to Taiwan also makes it an attractive staging point for U.S. intervention and a possible target for Chinese retaliation. Both the United States and the Philippines have increasingly recognized that Washington would expect access and support in any crisis endangering the lives of U.S. service members. Most Filipino strategic thinkers recognize that is part of the price of a more “equal” alliance with the United States that both the Duterte and Marcos governments have sought. To this end, if the Philippine government wants the United States to increase security assistance and stay committed to defending Filipino lives in the contested South China Sea, then Manila must meet matching obligations. U.S. forces will require greater access to the country to rotate forces and pre-position equipment to credibly project power over both the South China Sea and Taiwan. The extent to which the Philippine strategic community has internalized the implications of reciprocity — meaning that the Philippines has obligations to the United States under Articles II, IV, and V of the Mutual Defense Treaty, not just vice versa — is unclear. The security establishment appears more cognizant of these than the wider political and academic community. + +Candid, ongoing, and at times difficult, discussions on alliance obligations and their role in a Taiwan contingency between the United States and the Philippines at the track 1.5 and track 2 levels mirror the talks currently underway between the two governments as part of the ongoing process of alliance modernization. At the 9th U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Strategic Dialogue last year, interlocuters from the Biden and Duterte administrations set forth a roadmap for modernizing the alliance. They agreed to negotiate their first set of joint defense guidelines and a military information-sharing agreement, launch a new maritime security dialogue, increase U.S. capacity-building support to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and implement the long-delayed 2014 EDCA. + +EDCA allows the United States to gain access to five predetermined Philippine military sites to fund upgrades, pre-position equipment, and engage in joint training and operations. In addition to implementing the agreement at those five sites, the allies are seeking to expand it to additional locations, which has fueled speculation that new sites would include facilities in northern Luzon, less than 200 miles from Taiwan. Moreover, ongoing discussion on the risks associated with a Taiwan contingency has raised expectations that the United States would look to the Philippines to, among other things, help monitor the Bashi Channel and prevent any undetected Chinese breakout from the first island chain in a crisis scenario. + +Meanwhile, Australia has met rising concern over a Taiwan contingency by increasing funding for high-end capabilities and other deterrent responses — as have Japan, South Korea, and other partners. But Australian public opinion and strategic thinking toward Taiwan generally come from a low base of knowledge, viewed more through the prism of U.S. alliance obligations rather than a clear articulation of what Taiwan — and the defense of Taiwan — means for Australian national security interests. And few, if any, of Australia’s recent strategy documents — including the 2020 Defence Strategic Update — explicitly reference Taiwan. + +Similarly, with regard to the Philippines, it remains generally unclear the extent to which the Marcos Jr. administration has focused on thinking through how a Taiwan contingency would impact the country. To this end, both Australia and the Philippines need to take major steps toward articulating why Taiwan matters to their foreign policy and national security interests outside of the narrow prism of their U.S. alliance commitments. + + +### The U.S.-Australia-Philippines Security Triangle in a South China Sea Crisis +Given current force posture, weak alliance coordination, and political uncertainties, the U.S.-Australia-Philippines security triangle would face considerable challenges in responding to a South China Sea contingency. In particular, the Philippines’ ability to respond to a gray zone challenge in the South China Sea will depend on Manila’s ability to break through excessive internal debate and bureaucratic red tape. This includes ongoing debates on when to view a gray zone challenge as a national security crisis to be overcome or a foreign policy issue to be managed, and when to declare a national emergency and explicitly invoke the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States. Public opinion will also play a key role in shaping Philippine responses to a gray zone crisis, as public opinion, traditional media, and social media have taken an increasingly central role in the Philippine policy discourse. + +For the United States and Australia, a lack of considered preplanning or of a prearranged playbook between allies for responding to a gray zone crisis remains a significant hurdle. Absent the expansion of EDCA sites in the near term, the United States will lack the ability to quickly move assets into the region in response to a crisis scenario, ultimately forcing Washington and its allies into a reactive, rather than proactive, posture. Meanwhile, Australia’s role in a South China Sea crisis will ultimately be limited by the lack of a direct alliance with the Philippines. Limited preplanning across all sides of the security triangle is in turn compounded by a general lack of discussion on rules of engagement in a gray zone contingency and a lack of clarity on whether Manila would be willing to stomach the initiation of conflict, or if it would prefer to stop short of that. + +> Absent the expansion of EDCA sites in the near term, the United States will lack the ability to quickly move assets into the region in response to a crisis scenario, ultimately forcing Washington and its allies into a reactive, rather than proactive, posture. + + +### Key Findings and Recommendations + +__Finding:__ An increasingly complex threat environment points to the need for continued and robust dialogue between the United States and partners in the Philippines and Australia. High-level discussion in Manila policy circles on the threat associated with nuclear escalation and proliferation remains underdeveloped, and these risks are generally underestimated relative to challenges in other domains. + +- Recommendation 1: Washington should seek more opportunities for high-level track 1.5 and track 2 dialogues with Manila and Canberra. Dialogues held in the trilateral context would grant a degree of political cover to discuss issues that might otherwise be sensitive in the bilateral context. Such dialogues would help build a broader coalition of support for not only each country’s respective relations with the United States but relations between U.S. allies. + +- Recommendation 2: The United States should seek out more opportunities for high-level track 1 and track 1.5 dialogues between Washington and counterparts in Manila on nuclear issues. Dialogues could be held in the bilateral or trilateral format, and they would allow the Philippine policy community to internalize and take part in the discussions on nuclear deterrence and risk reduction within the U.S. alliance network. + +__Finding:__ At present, the United States lacks the ground-based air assets or ground-based missiles to be able to respond effectively to a South China Sea contingency, while the Philippines’ military modernization remains sluggish. + +- Recommendation 3: The United States should not only move swiftly to fully implement EDCA and expand it to include other bases but also encourage the Philippines to continue its process of military modernization, including the procurement of BrahMos anti-ship missiles, unmanned platforms, and other asymmetric strike capabilities. + +__Finding:__ Australia’s presence and engagement with Southeast Asia has traditionally been anchored in its closest neighbor, Indonesia. But the Philippines’ unique status — including its role in the U.S. alliance network, its own robust ties with Canberra, and its position at the front lines of China’s coercive activities — means that firming up relations with Manila will be critical for Australia moving forward. + +- Recommendation 4: Canberra needs to invest time and political capital into shoring up relations with Manila, particularly in the context of the upcoming Defence Strategic Review. The United States should use its bilateral dialogues with Australia to encourage it to do so, and it should seek to bring Australian officials into the mechanisms of the U.S.-Philippines alliance (such as the annual Mutual Defense Board-Security Engagement Board meetings) as observers. + +__Finding:__ China’s maritime militia poses a potent threat to the ability of Southeast Asian nations, including the Philippines, to exercise their sovereign rights in the waterways of the South China Sea. + +- Recommendation 5: In line with the Quad’s Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, the United States and Australia should continue to invest in the remote sensing capabilities of its Southeast Asian and Pacific partners, allowing regional states better visibility into activities occurring in their waters. The United States, Australia, and like-minded partners like Japan should also explore avenues for unmanned data collection in the South China Sea in partnership with the Philippines. Fifth Fleet’s Task Force 59 in Bahrain offers a good model that could be pursued by Seventh Fleet from the Philippines. The United States should publicly clarify that it would treat militia vessels that intentionally endanger the lives of U.S. or allied personnel as armed combatants, and that any attack on Philippine troops or vessels by militia falls within the scope of Articles IV and V of the Mutual Defense Treaty. + +__Finding:__ The BRP Sierra Madre is the most vulnerable Philippine facility in the South China Sea, with resupply missions facing frequent interference by Chinese militia and coast guard forces. This makes it the most likely site for military escalation in the South China Sea at present. It is also the only Philippine outpost whose legal status within the context of the alliance is crystal clear: it is an underwater feature within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and China can make no claim upon it. Loss of control over the feature would be severely damaging to the Philippines politically and strategically, not to mention to the credibility of the U.S.-Philippines alliance. + +- Recommendation 6: The United States and the Philippines should focus on contingency planning for a Second Thomas Shoal crisis, including a U.S. commitment to help resupply the garrison if needed in case of a blockade. The United States should help the Philippines assess the structural integrity of the Sierra Madre and repair or replace it to ensure permanent control over the feature by Manila. + +__Finding:__ The United States currently shares sensitive information with the Philippines through a Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), which is set to expire in March 2023. Without a replacement, information sharing and alliance coordination will be severely hampered. + +- Recommendation 7: The United States and Philippines should conclude a permanent General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Negotiations for a GSOMIA are underway and were flagged as a priority at the annual Bilateral Strategic Dialogue last year. That high-level focus from military and political leaders, if maintained, should be enough to break through the sticking points in negotiations. + +__Finding:__ China maintains significant diplomatic and economic largesse in Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific. In particular, Beijing has embarked on a campaign of subnational diplomacy in both Australia and the Philippines, undermining their respective national governments’ ability to formulate a coherent and unified China strategy. + +- Recommendation 8: The United States should redouble its efforts toward engaging with local and subnational stakeholders — whether through diplomatic, economic, or military-to-military channels — focusing on outlying regions of the Philippines vulnerable to China’s economic heft. The State Department’s recent appointment of Ambassador Nina Hachigian — formerly U.S. ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations — as special representative for subnational diplomacy is a welcome step in the right direction. The United States must continue to build on this momentum and establish comprehensive interagency mechanisms for focusing time, attention, and resources to local and subnational stakeholders that may be disconnected or disenfranchised from the Manila and Canberra elite. This should include the reopening of the U.S. consulate in Cebu and the exploration of new consulates in Davao and Ilocos Norte, both of which already host Chinese consulates. + +__Finding:__ China’s island-building activities in the South China Sea not only impact the military and strategic balance in Southeast Asia, but also pose risk to the health of the marine ecosystem. + +- Recommendation 9: The United States, Australia, and other regional partners should collaborate on scientific efforts focused on understanding and publicizing the risks associated with China’s activities in regional waters and their potential impact on Southeast Asian fisheries and marine resources. + +--- + +__Gregory B. Poling__ directs the Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he is also a senior fellow. + +__Andreyka Natalegawa__ is an associate fellow for the CSIS Southeast Asia Program.