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【香港保衛戰當年今日・十七】

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diff --git a/columns.xml b/columns.xml index e0746472..4e1b6d0b 100644 --- a/columns.xml +++ b/columns.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2023-12-08T10:34:34+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.35 © MMXXIII理解宋朝・王安石【1】皇帝守则2023-11-04T12:00:00+08:002023-11-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/understand-the-song-dynasty-wang-anshi-1-emperors-code<p>在广州东北三百多里的深山中,藏着大宋朝的国家宝藏。</p> +Jekyll2023-12-12T17:51:43+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.35 © MMXXIII理解宋朝・王安石【1】皇帝守则2023-11-04T12:00:00+08:002023-11-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/understand-the-song-dynasty-wang-anshi-1-emperors-code<p>在广州东北三百多里的深山中,藏着大宋朝的国家宝藏。</p> <!--more--> diff --git a/feed.xml b/feed.xml index c64871bf..b85c0dff 100644 --- a/feed.xml +++ b/feed.xml @@ -1 +1 @@ -Jekyll2023-12-08T10:34:34+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.35 © MMXXIII \ No newline at end of file +Jekyll2023-12-12T17:51:43+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.35 © MMXXIII \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/heros.xml b/heros.xml index eb6b6857..e82c3f75 100644 --- a/heros.xml +++ b/heros.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2023-12-08T10:34:34+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.35 © MMXXIII左翼政治的马氏难题2023-10-19T12:00:00+08:002023-10-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/Anonymous-a1_l-the-machiavellian-dilemma-of-left-wing-politics<p>廿世纪中叶处于冷战风口浪尖的法国,对苏立场成为当时知识分子的分界线。</p> +Jekyll2023-12-12T17:51:43+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.35 © MMXXIII左翼政治的马氏难题2023-10-19T12:00:00+08:002023-10-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/Anonymous-a1_l-the-machiavellian-dilemma-of-left-wing-politics<p>廿世纪中叶处于冷战风口浪尖的法国,对苏立场成为当时知识分子的分界线。</p> <!--more--> diff --git a/hkers.xml b/hkers.xml index 4e55f0c3..9aee780e 100644 --- a/hkers.xml +++ b/hkers.xml @@ -1,4 +1,287 @@ -Jekyll2023-12-08T10:34:34+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.35 © MMXXIIIEight Commonsense Actions2023-11-21T12:00:00+08:002023-11-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/eight-commonsense-actions<p><em>Today, there is a shared sense of vulnerability and a shared resolve across political divides to better protect the United States and the world against the accidental release of biological agents (biosafety), deliberate misuse of biological agents (biosecurity), and naturally occurring spillover of dangerous pathogens.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Biosafety and biosecurity are critically important areas where individual freedom, ethics, scientific progress, and national security converge. As biological research and discovery accelerate at an unprecedented pace, they generate new risks that must be managed responsibly. The CSIS Bipartisan Alliance for Global Health Security’s Working Group on R&amp;D Innovation advocates select, commonsense actions to strengthen U.S. and global biosafety and biosecurity: clarify U.S. policies and policy leadership within the White House; increase financial and diplomatic investments; update the rules around synthetic products and viral discovery work; and invest in research on basic lab protections and the new risks of artificial intelligence. Together, these timely, affordable steps can attract broad political support and promote a safer, more secure, and more innovative global bioeconomy.</em></p> +Jekyll2023-12-12T17:51:43+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.35 © MMXXIIIN. Korea’s Sanctions-Busting2023-11-22T12:00:00+08:002023-11-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/north-koreas-sanctions-busting<p><em>Pyongyang’s alleged decision to close around a quarter of its overseas missions reflects both the evolving sanctions-busting landscape and more concerning rapidly shifting geopolitical realities.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<p>Recently, signs have emerged that North Korea will shrink its diplomatic network. Outposts in Angola, Hong Kong, Spain and Uganda are among “as many as a dozen” missions – a quarter of North Korea’s network of around 50 – that are allegedly slated for closure. As well as assuming more traditional diplomatic functions, North Korea’s missions have played a wider range of roles in support of the country’s national interests, and have grown in importance as Pyongyang struggles with economic isolation and the extensive UN sanctions regime.</p> + +<p>As I outlined in a RUSI report published last year, North Korea’s embassies, consulates, trade offices and representative missions to international organisations – and the diplomats and intelligence officers that reside there – have played key roles in procuring technology for, and funding, Pyongyang’s nuclear, missile and military programmes. The closure of these missions likely reflects both a tactical-level evolution in North Korea’s sanctions-busting efforts as well as shifting geopolitical realities, with more strategic-level implications for the UN sanctions regime.</p> + +<h3 id="from-the-missions-to-the-missiles">From the Missions to the Missiles</h3> + +<p>North Korea’s missions have been key nodes in its sanctions-busting efforts, providing the skeleton of a near-global presence that has been used extensively to undertake and support operations. These sanctions-busting roles have fallen into three main categories. First, the missions and the diplomats stationed there are involved in revenue-raising and – given that the revenue raised likely benefits North Korea’s weapons programmes – “proliferation financing”.</p> + +<p>This has included trade in sanctioned commodities, with diplomats supporting sanctioned coal and vanadium exports. Diplomats have also run overseas businesses and raised revenue by leasing diplomatic real estate or even by abusing diplomatic alcohol allowances. One of the most prevalent revenue-raising activities for North Korea has been arms sales. Representatives of North Korea’s arms-dealing entities have frequently been accredited as diplomats.</p> + +<p>Second, Pyongyang’s diplomats have acted as buyers, procuring a wide range of sanctioned goods for import to North Korea. Most concerningly, embassies and diplomatic networks have long procured technology for the country’s weapons programmes, with the embassies in Beijing, Berlin and Moscow being particularly active in this regard. In Moscow, a member of the Office of the Commercial Counsellor – a diplomat named O Yong Ho – sought to procure a range of goods for North Korea’s missile programmes, including aramid fibre, manufacturing equipment, a spinning nozzle, chemicals and stainless steel used in missile fuel production and the construction of submarine hulls. In 2018, a senior German intelligence official noted that the embassy in Berlin had been repeatedly used to acquire missile and nuclear-related technologies, many of which were so-called dual-use technologies of utility in civil and weapons programmes.</p> + +<p>Diplomats have also been involved in the procurement of intangible technologies – sensitive knowledge, information and even weapons designs. In 2011, representatives from North Korea’s Belarus Trade Office were caught in a sting operation seeking sensitive missile-related information in Ukraine. Additionally, in 2019, O Yong Ho procured CAD drawings for a Russian cruise missile. Diplomatic procurement efforts also involve much more benign goods – sanctioned luxury items and other commodities – which are scarce in North Korea and help maintain the court economy.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">North Korea’s missions have been key nodes in its sanctions-busting efforts, providing the skeleton of a near-global presence that has been used to undertake and support operations</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>Third, the missions and their occupants have provided support to North Korea’s overseas business networks through providing use of bank accounts, hosting banking representatives, moving funds and even providing logistical support. As the UN Panel of Experts that monitors North Korea sanctions implementation noted in a 2017 report, Pyongyang’s missions “open accounts that, in effect, perform the services that a financial institution would”. Elsewhere, diplomats have smuggled gold and precious metals as a means of moving funds. Missions have also been closely connected to North Korea’s shipping networks.</p> + +<h3 id="missions-slated-for-closure">Missions Slated for Closure</h3> + +<p>Personnel based at two of the missions slated for closure – those in Angola and Uganda –have been heavily involved in sanctioned activities. More recently, North Korea’s relationship with Angola – which dates to the early 1970s – has seen the embassy in Luanda host Pyongyang’s arms dealers. Two diplomats, who were concurrently acting as representatives of North Korean arms dealer Green Pine Associated Corporation, travelled from Angola to Sri Lanka multiple times to discuss Pyongyang’s refurbishment of naval patrol vessels between 2014 and 2016. One of these Green Pine representatives concurrently negotiated contracts, sourced parts and oversaw the refurbishment of the Angolan navy’s own patrol boats. North Korean business in the country also went beyond military equipment. The UN-sanctioned entity Mansudae Overseas Projects undertook 56 construction projects in Angola up until 2015, including the mausoleum that holds the remains of the country’s first president.</p> + +<p>According to the UN Panel, a Military Attaché and diplomats based at the embassy in Kampala, Uganda, oversaw North Korean training of Ugandan air force pilots, technicians and police between 2017 and 2018. Showcasing how North Korean diplomats operate transnationally, the Attaché – a Colonel in the Korean People’s Army – was described in correspondence as the representative of the North Korean armed forces in “Uganda and East Africa” and offered neighbouring South Sudan “Presidential Guard and special forces training” and “tank crew training” while based in Kampala.</p> + +<p>There is less evidence of sanctions-busting activities by the North Korean Consulate in Hong Kong, a third mission which currently looks slated for closure. However, the axis between the city and Macau has seen significant North Korean connections over the years. North Korea long sought to open a trade office in Hong Kong and to commence Air Koryo flights to the city while it was under British rule and prior to the Consulate opening in 1998. More recently, as research by RUSI’s OSIA research group has noted, Hong Kong and businesses there have been a crucial node in the networks undertaking illegal oil shipments to North Korea. The role of Hong Kong businesses in selling high-end chips as part of Russia’s illicit supply chains for military electronics also suggests that North Korea could usefully shop in the city.</p> + +<h3 id="adaptation-in-north-koreas-networks">Adaptation in North Korea’s Networks</h3> + +<p>Given the range of sanctions-busting activities that North Korean embassies have conducted, the closure of as many as a dozen missions at once is surprising. These steps come as Pyongyang is reopening to the world following nearly three years of Covid-19-induced border closures. They showcase adaptation in North Korea’s sanctions-busting networks in real time – a result of several shaping factors.</p> + +<p>The decision may have a cost-saving rationale. North Korea’s missions are allegedly self-financing, raising hard currency to cover their own operations and sending all surpluses back to Pyongyang. Perhaps these specific missions are not as profitable as they once were. Indeed, both the Angolan and Ugandan governments have taken steps to reduce their connections to North Korea since the mid-2010s. In early 2020, Angola repatriated almost 300 North Korean workers, many of them working in the medical sector. Uganda allegedly cut military ties with Pyongyang around 2016, but subsequent reports suggest cooperation continued past that date.</p> + +<p>Other diplomatic missions and actors can likely pick up the slack when these missions close, and potentially in a more cost-effective way. Nearby remaining missions may be designated by Pyongyang to provide coverage for business activities in these jurisdictions, just as the mission in Rome will provide diplomatic coverage in Spain following the closure of the mission in Madrid. North Korea’s diplomatic arms dealers in Africa already operate across borders, and representatives may be tasked to widen their remit.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The open violation of the sanctions on Pyongyang by Russia could have a serious knock-on effect for the sanctions regime more broadly</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>Other actors – those without diplomatic accreditation – may also pick up the slack. Indeed, diplomats may have a declining importance in North Korea’s sanctions-busting. Previously, as states around the world became hostile to North Korean business activities, diplomatic networks became more important. Diplomats had several “competitive advantages” over private individuals, largely stemming from the immunities and privileges afforded by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Diplomats cannot be arrested, and diplomatic properties and vehicles cannot be searched.</p> + +<p>However, efforts to recognise and address diplomatic sanctions-busting have intensified since 2016. Despite far-from-universal sanctions implementation, North Korea’s missions now likely attract interest from South Korean, Western and other intelligence agencies around the world. The use of local or third-country nationals, or indeed third-country passports obtained by North Koreans, could provide Pyongyang with less obvious means of conducting business than using diplomatic cover.</p> + +<p>Concurrently, newer sanctions-busting opportunities are likely more profitable than those facilitated by the missions. Although Pyongyang is not in a position to be picky over its revenue streams, the $1.7 billion of cryptocurrency stolen by North Korea-linked hackers in 2022, and the millions that can be gained remotely through IT outsourcing, likely far eclipse the amounts that can be generated by small-scale arms sales or construction contracts in sub-Saharan Africa.</p> + +<p>Indeed, recent geopolitical shifts may also provide more bountiful opportunities. North Korea’s normalising relationship with Russia, its alleged transfer of hundreds of containers of weaponry to support Moscow’s war in Ukraine, and the potential for other commercial opportunities may see North Korea’s diplomacy and energy more focused on this relationship. The open violation of the sanctions on Pyongyang by Russia – a UN Security Council permanent member which voted for the measures – could have a serious knock-on effect for the sanctions regime more broadly and its implementation around the world.</p> + +<h3 id="tactical-adaptation-and-strategic-gloom">Tactical Adaptation and Strategic Gloom</h3> + +<p>Beyond their overt diplomatic function, North Korea’s missions and diplomats are persistent participants in – and coordinators holding together – the dark sanctions-busting economy that has kept the Kim regime afloat through almost two decades of sanctions.</p> + +<p>North Korea’s closure of many its missions reflects both tactical and strategic-level developments. The closures represent the tactical adaptation of North Korea’s networks, with the missions in question likely not as profitable as they used to be, and with new and more “remote-working” sanctions-busting operations perhaps proving more lucrative.</p> + +<p>However, strategic-level developments – notably Russia’s willingness to re-engage with North Korea – also help to account for Pyongyang’s declining need for these assets. The economic benefits of Russia’s arms purchases and broader re-engagement could far surpass the meagre revenue that can be raised through the missions slated for closure. Concerningly, this shift – and North Korea’s changing diplomatic priorities – also reflects a gloomy outlook for the UN sanctions regime.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Daniel Salisbury</strong> is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is currently undertaking a three-year research project on arms embargos as part of a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship.</p>Daniel SalisburyPyongyang’s alleged decision to close around a quarter of its overseas missions reflects both the evolving sanctions-busting landscape and more concerning rapidly shifting geopolitical realities.“Sewage Of The Cold War”2023-11-21T12:00:00+08:002023-11-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/sewage-of-the-cold-war<p><em>Although China’s views on NATO have fluctuated since the early days of the Cold War, Beijing’s recent statements on the alliance have sharpened.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>This report argues that they amount to a “rhetorical attack” on the alliance’s legitimacy that can potentially undermine trust among its Asia-Pacific partners and, more broadly, confidence in Western ideas of collective security. The report offers recommendations for investments NATO should make in understanding, tracking, and countering Chinese narratives about the alliance.</em></p> + +<h3 id="summary">Summary</h3> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Sino-NATO relations have oscillated between adversary and ally.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Since 2019, Beijing’s communications on NATO have sharpened in ways that amount to a rhetorical attack on the alliance. This shift has coincided with intensified Sino-US competition, Chinese concerns about multilateral security associations in Asia, and closer Sino-Russia relations.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>China’s recent critiques of NATO contend that the organization is an obsolete artifact of the Cold War and a belligerent force that undermines regional peace and stability. China’s rhetoric also portrays NATO’s partnerships as an illegitimate intrusion into the Asia-Pacific region.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Although the audience for China’s narrative on NATO may be as much domestic as foreign, if the message is not countered, it could undermine the alliance’s efforts to sustain and develop Indo-Pacific partnerships and erode support for alliances with the United States more generally.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>NATO should, therefore, make proportionate investments to equip itself with mechanisms for monitoring, analyzing, and responding to China’s rhetorical attacks.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> + +<p>Relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and NATO — the military alliance of 31 European and North American nations initially formed to defend against Soviet aggression — have dropped to their lowest point since the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. Simultaneously, the combination of intensified Sino-US competition, increased NATO attention to the PRC, Chinese concerns about multilateral security associations in Asia, and closer Sino-Russia relations have made Chinese attitudes toward NATO more relevant than ever. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the PRC’s communications on NATO have sharpened in ways that amount to a rhetorical attack on the alliance’s legitimacy. And with this rhetoric becoming increasingly hostile, it has the potential to undermine NATO partnerships and relationships not just in the Euro-Atlantic but also in the Indo-Pacific. This suggests a greater need to invest in countering negative narratives to the extent that they can potentially hurt the alliance — with priority given to specific messages and audiences and to relationships with partners in the Asia-Pacific region.</p> + +<p>The PRC’s ambitions and policies — particularly those viewed as “challenges” to the interests, security, and values of the NATO alliance in its 2022 Strategic Concept — are attracting much attention. But what the PRC says about NATO also deserves thoughtful consideration. Although Sino-NATO relations have fluctuated, alternating between opposition and alignment since early in the Cold War, Beijing’s harsh narratives on NATO have recently become more pronounced. On the eve of the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, an editorial in the Global Times, a daily tabloid affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party, used vivid language to warn against closer NATO relations with Asia-Pacific partners: “It’s an extremely unwise choice for any Asia-Pacific country and is bound to damage that country’s strategic trust with China, inevitably leading to consequences. . . . The sewage of the Cold War cannot be allowed to flow into the Pacific Ocean.”</p> + +<p>NATO should seek to understand, track, and counter such PRC narratives about the alliance for several reasons: first, these narratives can damage perceptions of NATO by its members and its partners, especially Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea (also known informally as the Asia-Pacific Four, or AP4); second, undermining trust in NATO is a proxy for undermining the principles of collective self-defense and collective security that underpin international security more widely; and third, for the United States and its bilateral allies in the Asia-Pacific region, attacks on NATO are an indirect way of attacking any alliance with the United States.</p> + +<p>This report examines the PRC’s attitudes toward NATO over time, with a focus on the 2020–2021 period following the debut of NATO’s official statements on the PRC and the periods following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the release of NATO’s Strategic Concept (which articulates a new position on China). The report reviews Chinese perceptions of NATO and identifies the main themes of contemporary Chinese discourse on the alliance. It then considers the intended audiences of PRC hostile narratives before turning to the strengths and vulnerabilities of NATO vis-à-vis these narratives. The report concludes with practical recommendations for the alliance.</p> + +<h3 id="sino-nato-relations-over-time">Sino-NATO Relations over Time</h3> + +<p>Since 1949, Sino-NATO relations have fluctuated “between adversary to ally and back again.” Five distinct periods can be identified. After the initial period of early Cold War antipathy, a second period, beginning in 1972, saw China making “an active diplomatic effort to persuade Western European leaders to strengthen NATO” as a way of drawing Soviet strength away from its borders.</p> + +<p>However, the third period saw NATO cast in a new and dangerous light when a NATO bomb struck China’s embassy in Belgrade during the air campaign of the 1999 Kosovo war, resulting in the deaths of three Chinese nationals. The unfortunate accident had a strong, formative effect on the reputation of NATO in China that persists to this day. Official registration of protest over the bombing was accompanied by state-sanctioned expressions of anger against NATO — involving days of street demonstrations in several major Chinese cities — and the issuance of a rare government statement. On the day of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a PRC foreign ministry spokesperson told reporters that “NATO still owes the Chinese people a debt of blood.”</p> + +<p>The fourth period, following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and NATO’s mission to Afghanistan, was relatively benign despite the PRC’s opposition to NATO expansion and the Balkan interventions. The Afghanistan mission brought NATO to China’s borders, yet Beijing appeared to view the mission positively, whether out of genuine optimism that it would address the threat of Islamist terrorism or as a way of casting some legitimacy on its own counter-terrorism policies in its far western regions. In testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in April 2012, China expert Christina Lin pointed to a series of positive exchanges:</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>In 2002, the Chinese ambassador in Brussels visited NATO headquarters with then SecGen Lord Robertson and explored ways for engagements, particularly in Afghanistan. . . . Following the visit of the Director General of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to NATO Headquarters in 2007, the political dialogue on [the] senior staff level [took] place on a rather regular basis. In May 2007, NATO Military Committee Chairman General Ray Henault expressed that in addition to political relations, NATO wants to establish direct ‘military-to-military’ relations with Chinese armed forces and shake off the embassy-bombing shadow.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>In 2008, the People’s Liberation Army Navy began cooperating with NATO navies on counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. And in 2011, the Global Times — known for its hawkish views on Chinese foreign policy — published a positive opinion piece about cooperation between NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.</p> + +<p>The fifth (and current) period of Sino-NATO relations began in 2019. During this period, Beijing’s attitude toward NATO seems to have been formed in considerable part by the deterioration in both US-China and Europe-China relations over the preceding few years. The first time the significance of China’s rise appeared in an official NATO statement was in December 2019; the London Declaration, issued at the NATO Leaders Meeting, stated that Beijing’s “growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges.” Almost a year later, a report entitled “NATO 2030: United for a New Era,” produced by an independent panel of experts appointed by the NATO secretary general, identified China as a “systemic rival” and recommended that NATO “continue efforts to build resilience and counter cyber attacks and disinformation that originate in China.” At their June 2021 summit meeting in Brussels, alliance leaders reiterated and expanded on earlier statements: “China’s growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance. . . . China’s stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security.”</p> + +<p>Perhaps the biggest perceived affront to China has been its treatment in NATO’s Strategic Concept, a long-term strategy and planning document that was revised significantly in 2022 from its previous 2010 version. The document more clearly puts China and NATO in opposing positions: “The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our [NATO’s] interests, security and values.” The PRC is mainly covered in paragraphs 13 and 14. Paragraph 13 defines the problem:</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>The PRC employs a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up. The PRC’s malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target Allies and harm Alliance security. The PRC seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains. It uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence. It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains. The deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>Paragraph 14 lists the actions NATO plans to take:</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>We remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance’s security interests. We will work together responsibly, as Allies, to address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security and ensure NATO’s enduring ability to guarantee the defence and security of Allies. We will boost our shared awareness, enhance our resilience and preparedness, and protect against the PRC’s coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance. We will stand up for our shared values and the rules-based international order, including freedom of navigation.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>All of this said, regardless of the period of relations, Chinese and NATO interests have at times aligned, proving that the relationship is not inherently antagonistic. Nor have China and NATO necessarily paid significant attention to one another over time. Aside from the Belgrade bombing, as Filip Šebok and Richard Q. Turcsányi noted in a paper for the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, NATO hardly featured in the PRC’s official communications until recently: “There were only 18 direct mentions of NATO in regular press conferences of [the] Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 2002 and 2020 — compared to 21 mentions of the Czech Republic, over 200 of Germany, and almost 5,000 of the US.”</p> + +<h3 id="chinas-perceptions-and-discourse">China’s Perceptions and Discourse</h3> + +<p>Before analyzing what China has been saying about NATO in the last several years, it is worth exploring some of the perceptions behind Beijing’s rhetoric. According to a summary of a 2021 dialogue organized by the US-based Center for Strategic Decision Research and the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (closely affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army), Chinese perceptions could be roughly summarized as follows:</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>NATO is a Cold War organization that needs a threat to survive, and China is a convenient scapegoat. China’s military modernization gives NATO a pretext for higher military spending.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The United States dominates NATO and seeks to use it to turn Europeans, who are politically divided and militarily uneven, against China and to transition NATO from a regional to a global alliance.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Western initiatives are nothing but attempts to prevent China’s rise in terms of strategic capability. The United States has been criticizing China and applying double standards on its development of new hypersonic missiles, intermediate missiles, stealth aircraft, battlefield robotics, and cyber and space weapons, even as the United States and its allies are developing the same capabilities.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The West’s claims of security vulnerabilities and Chinese state interference are invoked for protectionist reasons and to give Western companies an unfair market advantage.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The United States and its allies are violating principles of state sovereignty and non-interference by condemning China and imposing sanctions on it for its internal behavior in, for example, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>China’s rise, along with the emergence of other major powers, means that the Western-dominated multilateral system is obsolete and Western power will be reduced. Unwilling to accept this, the West has tried to revitalize the G-7 (an economic and political forum for advanced countries) by adding Australia, India, South Africa, and South Korea; and tries to use the Quad (a strategic security dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) and NATO global outreach to contain China’s legitimate rise. This effort is destabilizing global politics by dividing the world into new Cold War blocs.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<p>These perceptions both underlie PRC discourse on NATO and reflect the broad thrust of PRC foreign and security policy — which essentially opposes a US-led order that appears bent on containing China and instead seeks a new world order that facilitates acceptance of and respect for China’s leadership status.</p> + +<h3 id="obsolescence-belligerence-illegitimacy">Obsolescence, Belligerence, Illegitimacy</h3> + +<p>China’s underlying perceptions and declared foreign policy ambitions have coalesced in an overarching narrative that can be roughly summed up as follows: Although China is the future (ergo the West is the past), American primacy is threatened by China’s inevitable rise, and so the United States uses all means at its disposal — including alliances like NATO — to hype a China threat and contain China’s rise. In determining how to respond to this broad narrative, it helps to break down the elements of China’s messaging and discourse on NATO into three main categories: obsolescence, belligerence, and illegitimacy.</p> + +<h4 id="obsolescence-cold-war-thinking">OBSOLESCENCE: COLD WAR THINKING</h4> + +<p>The PRC’s narrative of Western decline serves to support the domestic legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and gain external acceptance for China’s overseas power projection. In Beijing’s view, NATO is an emblem of Western decline and is attached to outmoded concepts and institutions, including, for example, so-called Cold War thinking. As Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian put it in April 2022, “NATO was born out of the Cold War and should have long become a past tense.” This interweaving of NATO with established PRC foreign policy narratives became even more evident in the remarks made by China’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Zhang Jun. At a UN Security Council briefing on Ukraine in June 2022, Zhang stated, “The Cold War ended a long time ago, It is necessary for NATO to reconsider its own positioning and its responsibilities, completely abandon the Cold-War mentality that is based on bloc confrontation, and strive to build a balanced, effective, and sustainable European security framework in line with the principle of indivisible security.”</p> + +<p>Beijing views obsolete thinking as afflicting NATO’s whole conceptual mindset, which, in turn, shapes its approach to China. In remarks in June 2022, the spokesperson of the Chinese mission to the European Union stated that “NATO’s so-called Strategic Concept, filled with Cold war thinking and ideological bias, is maliciously attacking and smearing China. We firmly oppose it.”</p> + +<p>These examples suggest that China objects to NATO’s perceived embodiment of two institutional and structural aspects of Cold War thinking: bloc formation and confrontation. The theme of illegitimate collective defense alliances and minilaterals (small groups of countries collaborating to achieve shared goals) is connected to the broader Chinese discourse on resisting attempts to contain the PRC. Beijing’s statements on the international order emphasize the centrality of the UN Security Council and imply that multilateral alliances based on the right of collective self-defense somehow lack legitimacy, despite the fact that Article 51 of the UN charter specifically validates the right of collective defense. As noted by the spokesperson of China’s mission to the EU, “NATO claims itself to be a defensive organization that upholds the rules-based international order, but it has bypassed the UN Security Council and waged wars against sovereign states, creating huge casualties and leaving tens of millions displaced.”</p> + +<p>Also implying a Western attachment to obsolete thinking, the PRC has talked of a needed evolution of security concepts from “absolute” security to “indivisible” security. In April 2022, General Secretary Xi Jinping highlighted the concept of indivisible security — the idea that no country should strengthen its own security at the expense of others — as a distinguishing feature in his proposed Global Security Initiative: “We should uphold the principle of indivisibility of security, build a balanced, effective and sustainable security architecture, and oppose the building of national security on the basis of insecurity in other countries.” According to the official concept paper published in February 2023, the initiative “aims to eliminate the root causes of international conflicts, improve global security governance, encourage joint international efforts to bring more stability and certainty to a volatile and changing era, and promote durable peace and development in the world.”</p> + +<p>Beijing is essentially touting a superior security order that will supersede the current, US-led order. Again, China asserts that, as an institution founded on collective defense, NATO has not been heeding the principle underlying the concept of indivisible security. (The Kremlin, incidentally, has also promoted this principle in the context of earlier European security cooperation agreements.) In remarks made on separate occasions, spokesperson Zhao and UN ambassador Zhang have issued the following warnings:</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>NATO must immediately . . . renounce its blind faith in military might and misguided practice of seeking absolute security, halt the dangerous attempt to destabilize Europe and the Asia-Pacific, and act in the interest of security and stability in Europe and beyond.</p> +</blockquote> + +<blockquote> + <p>The Ukraine crisis has once again sounded alarm for the world. Security is indivisible. A blind faith in the position of strength, the expansion of military alliance, and the pursuit of one’s own security at the expense of the insecurity of other countries will inevitably lead to security dilemmas.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>The wider global economic disruption to energy, food, and fertilizer prices resulting from Russia’s war against Ukraine created another opportunity for the PRC to portray “United States-led Western countries” (in other words, NATO members) as irresponsible in pursuing their own security at the expense of others. A June 2022 article in the China Daily, owned by the Chinese Communist Party, contended that “United States-led Western countries were more busy sending shipments of lethal weapons to Ukraine and have imposed sanctions on Russia, risking the prolonged continuation of the conflict but leaving the world to foot the bill. Food prices have reached an all-time high, as Russian and Ukrainian grain exports are hindered by port disruptions and Western sanctions.”</p> + +<p>In response to consolidation of the European security order around NATO membership, Beijing seems intent on undermining alliance solidarity by implying that membership or partnership with NATO is somehow incompatible with good relations with the PRC. In a statement following the announcement of Finland’s decision to apply for NATO membership, spokesperson Zhao hinted at the damage NATO membership can cause countries’ bilateral relations with the PRC: “Finland’s application to NATO will bring new factor to bilateral ties with China.”</p> + +<h4 id="belligerence-stirring-up-trouble">BELLIGERENCE: STIRRING UP TROUBLE</h4> + +<p>In the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Sino-Russian rapprochement began to change NATO’s attitude toward the PRC; at the same time, Beijing’s and Moscow’s narratives about NATO began to converge. On February 4, 2022, in a joint statement released when President Vladimir Putin was visiting Beijing, China and Russia signaled their opposition to further NATO expansion. Over the summer of 2022, the PRC’s messaging about the war emphasized elements of its critical stance toward NATO; moreover, its messages aligned with the Russian narrative that Washington was “the initiator and main instigator of the Ukrainian crisis.”</p> + +<p>In late June, inclusion of the AP4 countries in the NATO summit in Madrid prompted the PRC to portray the alliance as a source of danger for Asian security and as evidence of a developing Asian NATO. At a UN Security Council briefing on June 28, Zhang stated, “We firmly oppose certain elements clamoring for NATO’s involvement in the Asia Pacific, or an Asia Pacific version of NATO on the back of military alliances. The long-outdated Cold War script must never be re-enacted in the Asia Pacific. The kind of turmoil and conflict that are affecting parts of the world must not be allowed to happen in the Asia Pacific.”</p> + +<p>In a related statement, the PRC highlighted the long peace the Asia-Pacific region has experienced since the end of the Indo-China conflicts in the late 1970s and implied that Asian problems should be addressed by Asian actors. At a press conference on June 30, Zhao asserted, “The Asia-Pacific is one of the most peaceful and stable regions in the world and a promising land for cooperation and development. Any attempt to undermine its peace and stability and sabotage regional solidarity and cooperation will be unanimously rejected by the people in China and the rest of the Asia-Pacific.”</p> + +<p>By contrasting NATO’s supposed inherently aggressive character (and associating that with insecurity in Europe) with the idealized peace of Asia, China was subtly reinforcing its centrality in the region and making the case that NATO’s interest in the Indo-Pacific or Asia-Pacific represents a threat to regional security. Also in late June, the spokesperson of the Chinese mission to the EU said, “The Strategic Concept claims that other countries pose challenges, but it is NATO that is creating problems around the world. . . . Who’s challenging global security and undermining world peace? Are there any wars or conflicts over the years where NATO is not involved?”</p> + +<h4 id="illegitimacy-bloc-formation-and-intrusion">ILLEGITIMACY: BLOC FORMATION AND INTRUSION</h4> + +<p>China’s main attack on NATO’s legitimacy is based on structural and geographic objections. The structural critique implies that blocs or even collective security alliances are inherently contrary to a just, democratic, and stable international order. The geographic critique implies that NATO is overstepping its bounds and entering a region where it has no right to be. Both lines are sometimes used in combination, as the spokesperson of the Chinese mission to the EU did when saying, “NATO claims that its defense zone will not go beyond the North Atlantic, but it has flexed its muscle in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years and sought to stir up bloc confrontation here, as it has done in Europe.”</p> + +<p>NATO’s current interest in the Indo-Pacific makes it a convenient emblem of a trend emerging in the Asian security structure that worries China: defense minilateralism. Until recently, the US-led security order in the region took a hub-and-spoke form, with an array of bilateral alliances connecting the United States to Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. However, these alliances have started to be overlaid with a latticework of new minilateral structures, some linking groups of Asian nations and others linking Asian, European, and North American countries. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to a speech by Secretary of State Antony Blinken in June 2022 with the following statement:</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>The US administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy is self-contradictory: the US claims to promote the region’s “freedom and openness” as its goal, while in reality co-opting with allies to forge a “five-four-three-two-one” formation made up of the Five Eyes, the Quad, AUKUS, bilateral alliances and IPEF, forming exclusive “small circles” and forcing countries in the region to take sides. AUKUS helps Australia build nuclear-powered submarines and develops hypersonic weapons, pushing up the risk for a regional arms race. Under the pretext of fighting illegal fishing and keeping supply chains resilient, the Quad has vigorously pursued military cooperation and intelligence sharing. The US has also encouraged NATO’s involvement in the Asia-Pacific. These are all attempts to materialize an “Asia-Pacific version of NATO” and promote “integrated deterrence” against China.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>The PRC’s lumping together of other groupings and NATO seems aimed at delegitimizing not just collective security in the strict sense but any association of defense cooperation or collaboration, in particular those led by or including the United States. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release from February 2023 on the potential of political settlement of the Ukraine crisis asserted that “the security of a region should not be achieved by strengthening or expanding military blocs.” Beijing has even claimed that the United States wants to use NATO for “harming Europe.” The implication is that countries that ally with the United States are somehow either vassals or allowing themselves to be brainwashed or both. Perhaps because China perceives a lack of agency among smaller states, Beijing presumes what it sees as its own regional leadership would be an acceptable alternative to so-called US hegemony.</p> + +<p>The PRC insinuates geographic illegitimacy by arguing that an organization based on North Atlantic security is an alien intruder in the Asian region. The fact that the PRC held military exercises alongside Russia in the Euro-Atlantic in recent years, in the Mediterranean in 2015, and the Baltic region in 2017 has not prevented Beijing from criticizing NATO for “inserting itself” in Asia-Pacific affairs. As Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Wang Wenbin asserted, “NATO, a military organisation in the North Atlantic, has in recent years come to the Asia-Pacific region to throw its weight around and stir up conflicts. . . . NATO has messed up Europe. Is it now trying to mess up the Asia-Pacific and even the world?”</p> + +<p>The warning is not just directed at NATO itself, but also at NATO’s partners and others in the region. The Global Times editorial published just before NATO leaders met in Madrid in July 2022 made this abundantly clear. In addition to warning that “catering to NATO’s Asia-Pacificization is tantamount to inviting wolves into the house,” the editorial declared that doing so was “bound to damage [countries’] strategic trust with China.”</p> + +<p>Beijing’s narrative logic — which connects interference by non-Asians in regional security with the deliberate stirring up of tensions and propensity for war — reached its high point in the implication of an Asian NATO: China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted, “The US pushes NATO to insert itself in Asia-Pacific affairs, fan the ‘China threat’ narrative in the bloc’s new strategic concept, and include in its Madrid Summit such US allies in the Asia-Pacific as Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia, in a bid to build an ‘Asia-Pacific version of NATO,’ which would disrupt security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.” The use of scare quotes around “Asia-Pacific version of NATO” serves not only to cast doubt on the idea itself but also to give a misleading impression as to its origin. Neither NATO nor the United States has expressed an ambition to create an Asian NATO; in fact, they have made many statements to the contrary, clearly indicating that no such move is desired or intended. The idea of an Asian NATO is almost exclusively one that emanates, unconsciously or by design, from Chinese discourse.</p> + +<h3 id="chinas-audiences">China’s Audiences</h3> + +<p>Estimating the danger that PRC narratives pose to NATO requires some understanding of the target audiences. This section identifies audiences from Beijing’s likely perspective, assesses the effects on these audiences from NATO’s likely perspective, and weighs the importance of these effects.</p> + +<h4 id="speaking-to-those-at-home-and-abroad">SPEAKING TO THOSE AT HOME AND ABROAD</h4> + +<p>The wider world is not necessarily the PRC’s primary audience. Research suggests that the domestic audience is more important for China. As Šebok and Turcsányi stated in their NATO background paper, “Chinese actors try to follow its leaders’ instructions and wishes, and the Party overall is motivated by a desire to increase legitimacy vis-à-vis the Chinese domestic audience. These factors are increasingly contributing to the uncompromising posture of Chinese diplomacy abroad.” This is consistent with the larger pattern of PRC security policy and resource allocation, which suggests that internal threats to state security and the position of the PRC are higher priorities than foreign threats to the country. The message that outside powers are containing China and ganging up to prevent its rise is becoming more salient as internal questions inevitably arise about how many of China’s economic difficulties might be the result of choices by the current Communist Party leadership.</p> + +<p>The second audience is likely China’s partners, particularly Russia. Despite the negative impact Russia’s war has had on PRC interests (including food price inflation and exposing double standards on questions of national sovereignty), Beijing remains reluctant to appear as an unreliable friend. For Russia, there are potential benefits from reciprocal support on issues where their interests align. Writing presciently two decades ago, international security expert Richard Weitz observed that</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>from Moscow’s perspective, periodically joining Beijing to denounce U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation elicits, at minimal cost, Chinese declarations against NATO enlargement and other Western policies the Russian government opposes. The appearance of an embryonic Russian-Chinese united front toward Japan also encourages Tokyo to moderate its claims of sovereignty over the Russian-occupied southern islands of the Kurile chain — Habomai, Shikotan, Etorofu, and Kunashiri, known in Japan as the “Northern Territories.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>Considering Japan has been, as Weitz notes, the target of three treaties between Moscow and Beijing (in 1896, 1924, and 1950), it must be discomforting for Tokyo to observe how “Chinese officials have expressed renewed support for Russia’s position on the Kurile issue.” Russia and Japan both claim sovereignty over the southern chain of the Kuril Islands. Moscow seized them during World War II, but Tokyo views them as Japan’s “Northern Territories.” Given Russia’s current weakened state due to the war with Ukraine and China’s support, Japan may be concerned about Chinese influence over any Moscow-Tokyo negotiations. Ironically, the more Sino-Russian relations align, the clearer it becomes for Asian and Euro-Atlantic partners that they share common security interests.</p> + +<p>The remaining international audience is probably next in terms of importance, particularly the broad segment sometimes described as the “Global South” or the “new nonaligned.” China claims moral leadership over this group of countries (albeit a role contested by India) and seeks to cultivate in this group a worldview that supports its strategic preferences on points such as countering American hegemony. Recent analysis suggests that Beijing invests heavily in messaging to African audiences and Arabic- and Spanish-speaking audiences, and the efforts have been relatively successful.</p> + +<h4 id="where-chinas-audiences-and-natos-interests-intersect">WHERE CHINA’S AUDIENCES AND NATO’S INTERESTS INTERSECT</h4> + +<p>Although the PRC seems to be giving more attention recently to reaching audiences abroad, when it comes to Euro-Atlantic audiences, its current approach to communications does not appear to be doing much to prevent a general trend of rising suspicion and hostility toward China. From NATO’s perspective, this wider world — particularly those regions where NATO seeks to sustain or develop its global partnerships — is the more important audience. It is when those partnerships happen to be in the Asia-Pacific that PRC narratives seem to come into the most direct conflict with NATO interests. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao has warned, albeit in reference to European enlargement, that “we advise relevant countries to exercise caution when developing relations with NATO.”</p> + +<p>This message may be aimed at impacting support for existing frameworks like the AP4, but also at impeding potentially wider NATO partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region. Some commentators suggest that “what China is really addressing is Southeast Asia and the broader region, and ASEAN [the Association of Southeast Asian Nations] in particular.” India’s preference for nonalignment may not be conducive to implementing the recommendation of the NATO 2030 report that “NATO should begin internal discussions about a possible future partnership with India,” but sooner or later, a NATO more oriented to the challenge of China will naturally look to partner in some form with India.</p> + +<p>From NATO’s perspective, the international audiences most relevant are likely existing and potential Indo-Pacific partners, especially segments of their public and elite who are sympathetic to the anti-imperialistic, anti-Western, and anti-American elements of PRC narratives. These audiences’ opinions have the potential to limit or reduce the willingness of states in the region to work with NATO and its partners.</p> + +<p>The question of how much impact PRC narratives have had to date on regional attitudes toward NATO is hard to judge, not least because it is difficult to find relevant studies or tracking efforts. For NATO policymakers concerned about Asia-Pacific partnerships, this might be a blind spot worth looking into.</p> + +<h3 id="natos-vulnerability">NATO’s Vulnerability</h3> + +<p>An obvious NATO vulnerability with respect to PRC narratives is the diversity of views on China within the alliance. NATO allies were able to agree on language about China in the 2022 Strategic Concept, but as the 2022 US National Security Strategy acknowledges, “Allies and partners may have distinct perspectives on the PRC.” For instance, President Joe Biden has repeatedly voiced the United States’ commitment to defending Taiwan if it is attacked, but no other NATO ally has come close to saying this. Also, while the National Security Strategy stresses the need for supply chains that are less dependent on Chinese industry, German chancellor Olaf Scholz conveyed a different message by visiting China with a group of business leaders in November 2022 — the first G-7 leader to visit the country in three years.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, France has long expressed its wish “to champion a third path in the Indo-Pacific.” In September 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron said, “We must also assert Europe’s independence in the confrontation between China and the United States. . . . We are not willing to have a strategy of confrontation with China in the Indo-Pacific. . . . We do not believe that alliances that have been established to deal with certain opposing interests should extend to the Indo-Pacific.” (Like German chancellor Scholz, President Macron also visited China, in April 2023, with a contingent of business leaders.) The French National Strategic Review 2022 makes it clear that “France is working to strengthen the European pillar of the [NATO] Alliance in a pragmatic approach to its role, which rules out an extension to other geographical areas and in particular the Indo-Pacific.”</p> + +<p>In sum, these different viewpoints indicate a lack of cohesion on China policy among NATO members; and this makes it easier for the PRC to argue that the United States is driving allies into opposition with China against the will and interests of policymakers or sections of their societies who would naturally prefer cooperative relations with Beijing.</p> + +<p>It is unclear whether NATO gives adequate attention to the power of PRC narratives, despite the recommendation of the NATO 2030 report to “enhance its understanding of China’s capabilities, activities, and intentions that affect Euro-Atlantic security, with a clear-eyed understanding of risk, threat, and opportunity.” If NATO officials monitor Chinese discourse, the outputs are not publicized. Any desire to shape narratives in the region does not appear to be matched by funding or capabilities. NATO communication seems to be mostly aimed at internal audiences, with only limited material designed for and directed at Asian partner audiences, let alone Chinese audiences. Although the inclusion of China in NATO’s Strategic Concept is significant, some observers may have expected a more pointed or operationally focused treatment of the PRC. Indeed, little remains of the practical proposals put forward in the NATO 2030 report. This makes one question whether the alliance has been too slow to act on the recommendation that “NATO must devote much more time, political resources, and action to the security challenges posed by China.”</p> + +<p>NATO’s communication in response to the PRC’s actions toward existing or potential NATO partners is not always consistent. As the scholar Jeffrey Michaels noted, NATO has expressed support for partners like Japan and South Korea with regard to their troubles with China and North Korea, but NATO “remained silent” when soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army killed Indian soldiers on their Himalayan frontier in 2020. A NATO communications policy might consider how such instances offer an opportunity to more proactively counter PRC narratives.</p> + +<p>Understandably, at this moment, NATO investment in strategic communications concentrates on Russia. However, it does not appear that the balance of strategic communications resources has been adjusted to make progress on the NATO 2030 report’s recommendations related to the PRC and to respond to the increasing alignment between Moscow and Beijing.</p> + +<h3 id="limitations-of-chinas-narratives">Limitations of China’s Narratives</h3> + +<p>PRC narratives about NATO have their limitations and vulnerabilities, too. Despite the suggestion in the Global Times editorial that “Washington’s strategic will is increasingly coercing and is kidnapping NATO,” the lengthening list of problems in PRC-Europe relations — the causes for which are independent of the US-PRC relationship — make Beijing’s narrative that NATO is merely a tool of American control over Europe harder to sustain. This is evidenced by the demise of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. After the EU imposed sanctions on China over the human rights abuses in the Xinjiang region in China’s northwest in March 2021, Beijing imposed sanctions on EU bodies, European Parliament members, and even think tank researchers.</p> + +<p>The PRC’s barely muted backing of Putin’s war in Ukraine has only clarified the dangers of Chinese foreign policy for Europeans. Beijing’s moves to cement the Sino-Russian bond have a retro look that appears to contradict the taunt that America and NATO are the ones mired in a “Cold War mentality.” The more PRC messages attack NATO, the more they remind their audiences that Beijing is aligned with Moscow. Beijing and Moscow’s “without limits” friendship and the PRC’s consistent parroting of Kremlin talking points throughout the conflict have damaged China’s relations with many countries in the EU. And the PRC’s refusal to condemn the invasion has surely called into question its commitment to the principles of noninterference, peaceful settlement of disputes, and respect for national sovereignty.</p> + +<p>As Ukraine succeeded in pushing back against Russia’s “special military operation” later in 2022, Beijing’s closeness to Moscow exposed some of the flaws in the logic of China’s strategic communications on NATO. China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s flagrant violation of national sovereignty may be a liability in terms of Beijing’s attempts to pose as a champion of peace and international law and UN Charter principles. As Putin switched strategy from regime change to forcible annexation, siding with Russia continued to put the PRC in an ever-diminishing minority in the UN General Assembly, as demonstrated by the October 12 vote on Russia’s annexation of parts of Ukraine — 143 members voted to condemn, 5 voted against, and 35 abstained (including China). If Russia’s war runs into further difficulties, Beijing’s embarrassment is likely to increase. Meanwhile, if NATO allies continue to appear to be alleviating the causes of worldwide repercussions of the war (price rises and shortages of food, fuel, and fertilizer), China will find it increasingly hard to convince the world that it can offer a superior model of security.</p> + +<h3 id="thinking-ahead-and-recommendations">Thinking Ahead and Recommendations</h3> + +<p>NATO’s Strategic Concept expresses concern about the resilience of its allies against PRC actions that could undermine the coherence and strength of their societies, economies, and democratic institutions. NATO’s recent research suggests that the most efficient long-term strategy for dealing with PRC narratives “is to bolster the societal resilience of NATO member states and concentrate on shaping their own strategic narratives, which must transcend mere reactions to Chinese actions and offer alternative positive visions.” While the idea of offering alternative positive visions is sound, the alliance should look beyond the resilience of allies and take steps to better understand and, if necessary, neutralize sources of damage to the alliance inflicted via NATO’s partners and partnerships. The success of the Chinese narrative that the inherent right of collective self-defense and the organizations that uphold that right are illegitimate would represent not just a defeat for the principles NATO stands for but also a more general danger for global peace and stability.</p> + +<p>In addition, NATO should pay close attention to the effects of PRC narratives on the perceptions of Chinese citizens. Failure to do so would be shortsighted. It is not self-evident that the perceptions of the Chinese audience are either accurately represented by the messages of the PRC or beyond the influence of outside actors, including NATO’s own strategic communications. Although Sino-NATO relations are at a low today, channels for influence are not entirely foreclosed. On September 22, 2022, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg discussed Russia’s war against Ukraine during talks with Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting in New York. In February 2023, talks between NATO and PRC counterparts restarted after a pause that seemed to have been caused mainly by COVID-related restrictions. Chinese leadership can and will change eventually. NATO should take a long view and use the channels it still has with Chinese officials — and perhaps in a more limited way with ordinary Chinese people — to prepare for a day when the pendulum swings back in a positive direction.</p> + +<p>When it comes to external messages, PRC narratives smear NATO largely as a means of blackening the reputation of the United States and undermining strategically inconvenient norms like the inherent right to collective self-defense, including by China’s neighbors but also by countries in the Global South. The following recommendations therefore focus on that wider audience, where NATO has more immediate interests and influence.</p> + +<ol> + <li> + <p>NATO should commission a mechanism for analysis, with support from Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic specialists, to estimate the level of threat emanating from Russian and PRC strategic communications in order to guide the allocation of resources toward countering narratives that undermine or attack NATO in each case. The mechanism should dynamically track trends in PRC strategic communications related to NATO. The scope of tracking should go beyond covering the objectives and methods of PRC narratives by measuring the impact and results of PRC communications, based on differentiated audience analysis. Cooperation between the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and nascent counterparts in Asian partner nations may be leveraged to support such a mechanism. Collection of relevant information could be facilitated not just by NATO’s strategic partners in the region, such as the AP4, but also by other friends and partners whose populations are also important targets of influence (for example, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>After gaining a better understanding through the above measures, NATO should develop a strategic communications strategy that covers the Indo-Pacific, in consultation with the AP4 and other regional partners.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>NATO should explore efforts to influence opinion in China about the alliance.</p> + </li> +</ol> + +<p>While proposing a NATO communications policy for Asia is beyond the scope of this report, it is possible to suggest some messages that NATO should consider communicating to China and the region more broadly. Some are predicated on a determination of what the alliance wants to accomplish in the Indo-Pacific. The alliance’s objective in the region has not been clearly spelled out. Unlike the European Union and several Euro-Atlantic and Asian nations (for example, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, South Korea, and Japan), NATO has only produced a two-paragraph China policy (in the 2022 Strategic Concept), not an Indo-Pacific strategy.</p> + +<p>Notwithstanding the lack of an overarching strategy document, one major theme of a NATO communications strategy for the Indo-Pacific would likely be upholding the inherent right of states to collective self-defense. This right is a particularly important element of protection for smaller states against aggressive hegemony. Notably, this right exists for all states, not just UN members. It is logical that larger or stronger states seeking to intimidate and bully smaller states would try to attack this right or criticize states that are attempting to activate it by forming alliances or looser political or security associations. Steps should be taken to ensure that Russia and China do not succeed in drawing support to the argument that indivisible security effectively delegitimizes moves to put the right into practice.</p> + +<p>The PRC’s painting of “ganging up” or bloc formation as unnatural and illegitimate aims to discredit a long-standing right under international law that predates the UN Charter. This suggests a hegemonic mindset, which is ironic, considering one of China’s lines of attack against NATO is that it is a thinly veiled hegemonic project by the United States. When it comes to the Asian audience, themes of anti-hegemony and the sovereign equality of small states to larger states enjoy popular support, particularly among populations raised on a postcolonial narrative of national liberation.</p> + +<p>Finally, it may be possible to flip the PRC’s narratives by talking about the alliance more from the experience and perspective of smaller allies — for whom the right of collective self-defense offers the best protection against a large and periodically predatory neighbor. In particular, flipping the narrative about NATO might work best if the message about why the alliance continues to exist and why it seeks common cause with partners around the globe comes from more recent members, such as the Baltic states and central European nations, instead of the larger, longer- term allies.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Philip Shetler-Jones</strong> is a senior research fellow at the International Security Studies Department of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, where he focuses on geopolitical relations in the Indo-Pacific region. Previously, he served as an officer in the UK Royal Marine Commandos; held positions at the United Nations and the European Union; and consulted for NATO, the Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe, the UK Ministry of Defence, and Chatham House.</p>Philip Shetler-JonesAlthough China’s views on NATO have fluctuated since the early days of the Cold War, Beijing’s recent statements on the alliance have sharpened.Eight Commonsense Actions2023-11-21T12:00:00+08:002023-11-21T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/eight-commonsense-actions<p><em>Today, there is a shared sense of vulnerability and a shared resolve across political divides to better protect the United States and the world against the accidental release of biological agents (biosafety), deliberate misuse of biological agents (biosecurity), and naturally occurring spillover of dangerous pathogens.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Biosafety and biosecurity are critically important areas where individual freedom, ethics, scientific progress, and national security converge. As biological research and discovery accelerate at an unprecedented pace, they generate new risks that must be managed responsibly. The CSIS Bipartisan Alliance for Global Health Security’s Working Group on R&amp;D Innovation advocates select, commonsense actions to strengthen U.S. and global biosafety and biosecurity: clarify U.S. policies and policy leadership within the White House; increase financial and diplomatic investments; update the rules around synthetic products and viral discovery work; and invest in research on basic lab protections and the new risks of artificial intelligence. Together, these timely, affordable steps can attract broad political support and promote a safer, more secure, and more innovative global bioeconomy.</em></p> <p>Biosafety and biosecurity have become more urgent U.S. priorities in the post-Covid era, tied to U.S. national security interests. They have been visibly elevated in U.S. security doctrines, structured around the risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that arise at home and abroad.</p> @@ -769,9014 +1052,8676 @@ <p><strong>Romina Bandura</strong> is a senior fellow with the Project on Prosperity and Development and the Project on U.S. Leadership in Development at CSIS. Her current research focuses on the future of work in developing countries and the United States’ economic engagement in the developing world. She has also conducted extensive research on enhancing the reach and impact of the Multilateral Development Bank system.</p> -<p><strong>Austin Hardman</strong> is a research assistant for the Project on Prosperity and Development (PPD) at CSIS. In this role, he supports the team’s research agenda, business development opportunities, and event coordination.</p>Romina Bandura and Austin HardmanAs demand for minerals increases to achieve an energy transition, companies, regulators, and end users will need to assess the entire mine-to-market value chain to ensure that all firms are incentivized to adhere to best practices.Countering Small UAS2023-11-14T12:00:00+08:002023-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/countering-small-uncrewed-aerial-systems<p><em>This report examines the threat of small drones on the modern battlefield, and the various kinetic and non-kinetic defenses available to defeat them.</em></p> +<p><strong>Austin Hardman</strong> is a research assistant for the Project on Prosperity and Development (PPD) at CSIS. In this role, he supports the team’s research agenda, business development opportunities, and event coordination.</p>Romina Bandura and Austin HardmanAs demand for minerals increases to achieve an energy transition, companies, regulators, and end users will need to assess the entire mine-to-market value chain to ensure that all firms are incentivized to adhere to best practices.Red Lines And Red Crosses2023-11-14T12:00:00+08:002023-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/red-lines-and-red-crosses<p><em>International law fails to protect healthcare facilities in armed conflict. They need specific protection from harm.</em></p> <excerpt /> -<h3 id="key-findings">Key Findings</h3> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>For years, air defense has been the domain of specialized units and niche capabilities under conditions of air superiority. That era is no more, and the entire joint force must now look up. Small uncrewed aerial systems (sUAS) pose a significant threat, exhibiting multi-mission capabilities, minimal signatures, wide proliferation, low costs, and ground force utility. The common use of sUAS today amplifies other trends in modern warfare, including further complicating the airspace, saturating battlefields with more reconnaissance and strike assets, and expanding support for precision strike complexes. Their introduction is comparable to that of mortars and anti-tank missiles in the degree for which they have and will continue to push ground forces to adapt their tactics, techniques, and procedures.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The mission and capabilities to counter sUAS (C-sUAS) should be shared across numerous unit types, including air defense, maneuver, support, and sustainment. The high demand and low density of air defense formations requires that air defenders and non-specialists work together as part of a combined arms for air defense (CAFAD) approach. The central question today, however, is the specific division of labor among the air defense and non-air defense units, as well as the authorities delegated to these groups. In general, C-sUAS planners have borrowed the distinction between “area” and “point” defense whereby traditional air defenders manage larger systems such as high-energy lasers and long-range kinetic interceptors for area defense, while maneuver forces use point defenses such as guns, nets, and handheld platforms.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>U.S. C-sUAS acquisition processes require updating to keep pace with evolving threats. The Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO) was stood up to coordinate C-sUAS doctrine, organization, and training across the joint force. Congressional and Department of Defense (DoD) leadership should consider modifications to JCO’s authorities and relation to service acquisition agencies to improve the requirements process and acquisition timelines.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Air defense has multiple meanings and connotations, especially in terms of service-specific terminology. As a mission, air defense destroys, nullifies, or reduces the effectiveness of enemy attacks by aerial platforms. Defined organizationally, it connotes force structure responsibilities, such as the Army’s Air Defense Artillery branch, or specific units manned, trained, and equipped to detect, track, and defeat aerial threats in specified sectors or altitudes. Because sUAS represent a distributed challenge to the entire joint force, C-sUAS operations cannot be confined to a single unit or specialization. C-sUAS developers, planners, and operators must overcome organizational silos.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>A variety of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities are available to defeat sUAS. Over the past several years, the DoD has fielded a range of electronic attack and kinetic systems in support of joint and service urgent needs requests. Each of these tools have unique strengths and weaknesses in regard to survivability, range, magazine capacity, combat identification, and defended area.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The institutionalization and propagation of C-sUAS capability will require developments across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). Training and capacity requirements will take priority over capability improvements over the next few years. New doctrine should specify the division of labor between air defense and non-air defense specialists, as well as the specific sensors, command and control, and effectors that they can operate. The policy, strategy, budget, and programmatic decisions made at this stage will carry enormous consequences for the field.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - -<p>Over the past decade, sUAS have become a core capability on the modern battlefield. Many are commercially sourced, easy to deploy, hard to detect, and highly proliferated. State and nonstate actors alike use them around the world in major conflicts, gray zone and criminal activities, and targeted killings. Technological advances in sUAS optics and sensor miniaturization have made them increasingly versatile as a primary reconnaissance tool, including for targeting for larger artillery and missile strikes. sUAS will continue to present a serious threat to military targets and civilian population centers.</p> - -<p>Numerous studies have highlighted the sUAS threat. A few have reviewed C-sUAS platforms and capabilities. Yet to date, there appears to be no public-facing report that assesses C-sUAS history, strategy, and programs, across the DOTMLPF. This report tries to fill that gap from the perspective of the U.S. military.</p> - -<p>The C-sUAS mission is a challenging one. The threat is cheap and plentiful, whereas defenses are still emerging and bring significantly higher costs. Attribution can be difficult, complicating deterrence through retaliation. It remains unclear whether the active defense solutions currently in development will become programs of record; if investments in time, money, and personnel will continue to support this mission; and how well the multiple services involved can coordinate on developing and deploying their active defenses. While the U.S. Army is the lead service for developing joint doctrine, requirements, materiel, and training, the C-sUAS mission is not and must not be limited to one service, branch, or specialization. It is a concern for the entire joint force.</p> - -<p>Air defense has continually evolved to meet new threats and challenges, from surveillance balloons to bomber aircraft to ballistic and cruise missiles. The threats have gotten smaller, harder to detect, and more sophisticated over time. At numerous moments along the way, a given threat will be deemed unstoppable — until, of course, defenses evolve to prove that assumption incorrect. C-sUAS represents the next chapter for the evolution of the air defense mission.</p> - -<p>Fortunately, the DoD today recognizes the importance of C-sUAS. Nearly a decade ago, ISIS militants began using commercial quadcopters effectively in battle. In January 2020, the DoD established the JCO to rapidly prototype, test, demonstrate, and field new defenses. More recently, the Biden administration’s 2022 Missile Defense Review included C-UAS as a component of the defense against “missile-related” threats.</p> +<p>If there is one thing that the whole world could be said to have agreed on and united around, surely it is International Humanitarian Law (IHL), as encapsulated in the Geneva Conventions. They were signed by every single state, a feat only replicated a handful of times, mostly around another world-unifying issue: climate change. Even the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Chemical Weapons Convention have not reached that milestone.</p> -<p>With doctrine, organizations, materiel, training, and other issues under debate today, the United States and its allies face a critical period with sUAS and C-sUAS. High levels of sUAS proliferation, little to no regulatory oversight, and improved capabilities, technologies, and integration all converge to create an environment in which the U.S. military must respond to a rapidly evolving threat. Contributors to these conversations must understand the threat and its likely evolution, the defenses available and in development today, and the principles that should guide their application. For better or worse, the policies and institutions developed today will last for years to come.</p> +<p>Yet, despite this universal rejection of attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure – especially, in the context of this Commentary, hospitals and healthcare workers – they occur daily. The World Health Organization monitors the extent of the problem, and at the time of writing, its dashboard stands at 855 attacks in 18 countries this year. This is almost certainly a gross underestimate, and only paints a broad-brush picture – while documenting 1,180 such attacks in Ukraine since January 2022, it does not convey that 190 of those facilities were completely destroyed. The vast majority of these attacks are intentional. During a period of analysis of attacks in Syria, 22% of all infrastructure damaged was healthcare-related, compared with only 3% for schools. This has led some to assert that the Red Cross is now the “Dread Cross” – a target rather than a protection – and that protecting hospitals requires a different approach.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6ElHChK.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Drone Evolution.</strong> Source: U.S. Army and Wikimedia Commons.</em></p> +<p>An important question is whether this is a problem for the international community at all. After all, the Geneva Conventions do not rule out an attack on a hospital. The law itself is simple – hospitals are protected – but this is caveated by “provided they are not military objectives”. The Conventions do not define all the circumstances in which hospitals lose their protection, but the International Committee of the Red Cross commentaries give illustrations: combatants setting up a firing position there; storing ammunition; sheltering troops; or using it as a “human shield”. This last is especially problematic. It is the nature of hospitals, when surrounded by fighting, to occupy a liminal space; they serve the health needs of anyone in need. Critically, they also have no power to reject combatants – so they can lose their protection because of an action over which they have no agency. This is something that current legal frameworks struggle to manage. Even when there are prosecutions, they are rarely successful. Indeed, some argue that focusing on accountability for war crimes through International Criminal Law may even be weakening some elements of the harder-to-prove IHL.</p> -<h4 id="research-scope-and-objectives">Research Scope and Objectives</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Indeed, some argue that focusing on accountability for war crimes through International Criminal Law may even be weakening some elements of the harder-to-prove International Humanitarian Law</code></em></strong></p> -<p>This report discusses current C-sUAS defenses used to detect and defeat small drones. It serves as a guide for understanding and evaluating C-sUAS solutions, both to inform policymakers by providing principles for future developments in this field, and to inform the public on a key defense issue for which there is a gap in the open-source literature. The report explores the trade-offs among various C-sUAS sensor and effector types but does not advocate for any particular solution set. It also does not address sUAS counterproliferation and regulation efforts, offensive “left-of-launch” strikes, camouflage, deception, signature management, nor other topics related to but not centered on active defense. Furthermore, it does not address specific operational or tactical issues, such as UAS notification procedures or how U.S. personnel should coordinate intercept engagements with allies. These processes are better addressed by U.S. military leaders as they update their related doctrine and standard operating procedures.</p> +<p>Consider also the realities of military necessity. Close quarters fighting to rid a hospital of a prepared enemy force will be extremely challenging and costs many soldiers’ lives. It may significantly slow an advance (that may itself be time critical). It may allow the enemy to escape, regroup and attack elsewhere. These specific dangers may be overcome by a heavy bombardment that simply destroys the facility – but they are not the only relevant risks. The tactical advantage of an overwhelming attack comes with long-term operational and strategic costs that may be far greater.</p> -<p>The study focuses closely on C-sUAS for the DoD, as primarily operated by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. There are several other U.S. stakeholders in this field, including the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Aviation Administration. The C-sUAS requirements, regulations, and resources differ among these groups.</p> +<p>The commander may legally strike the hospital that has lost its protection only if the military advantage achieved will outweigh the expected collateral damage. But how well-informed are commanders about the extent of that collateral damage? They know of course that it will involve civilian casualties, as hospitals in conflict-affected areas are typically overcrowded with the most vulnerable sections of society, seeking either treatment or refuge. There will also be the staff tending to them. These represent the direct harm of the attack. But is that it? Hospitals take years to build, require enormous resources to stock, and replacement staff for those who have been killed, injured or driven away by the violence take time to train or recruit. The health economy loses a critical node and so, for years after, those who seek care may not be able to access it effectively. People will sicken and die from perfectly treatable conditions, for lack of ongoing management of their long-term health conditions and for loss of capacity to treat their new ones. This is the indirect harm and it is vast; for every one killed by the attack itself, at least 11 die of these indirect harms. The groups most affected by both are the children, women, elderly and ill – the same groups least able to flee to access healthcare elsewhere.</p> -<p>This report uses the broad definition of air defense, which is to detect, track, and defeat aerial threats. It does not use the U.S. military’s organizational-specific definition of air defense as Air Defense Artillery or other groups specifically trained and equipped to detect, track, and defeat sophisticated air threats in large, specified sectors. sUAS break down the military’s typical distinction between air defense and force protection through their small size, wide proliferation, and flight patterns. C-sUAS will be a necessary part of both air defense and force protection, although there will be differing levels of operational expertise between trained air defenders and other military personnel.</p> +<p>There are other costs that are harder to quantify, but militarily may be even more apposite. It could conceivably be the best military solution, if the objective is to win the war, but it makes no sense at all if the objective is to win the peace. Victory achieved by destroying the capacity or will of the enemy to continue the fight only brings negative peace: the absence of fighting. It rarely lasts, because the capacity and will to fight can be regrown. As US counterinsurgency doctrine notes, “Kill[ing] 5 insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of 50 more, and loss of local support”. The rubble of a hospital is guaranteed to alienate the population, engendering a lasting sense of grievance that will fuel the will to fight again. Positive peace, where the factions share a sense of social justice such that neither wants nor needs to fight, is far more likely to persist. Access to healthcare is a key component of positive peace. If the commander knew that cumulative harms and grievance resulting from the hospital attack would also inspire their enemy to rise up again in five years and attack them even harder, would they still call in an airstrike? Or would they take the harder option and target the enemy at close quarters?</p> -<p>The report has three sections. The first section aims to provide a brief analysis of the sUAS threat. It highlights common missions and capabilities through operational case studies and examines why sUAS have proliferated so quickly in recent years.</p> +<p>Can you still bomb a hospital, while somehow mitigating these problems? We often hear that IHL-compliant warnings are given to evacuate areas before they are attacked. The reality is that this is a normally a facade. A UK hospital, such as the one in which the author works, could undoubtedly be evacuated completely – for example if there was a major fire – but patients would come to harm. New patients would die waiting for ambulances, as frontline vehicles were diverted to moving existing patients. The frail or critically ill may well die from interruption of their care. The entire regional health system would have to slash routine and emergency care to cope, which would severely degrade it for weeks or months. And all of this in a stable, developed, interoperable health system. If it were the only functioning hospital in a region, where would the patients go? If the ambulance system were weak and overwhelmed by conflict casualties, who would move them? For a significant number, these notifications will simply give advance warning of their death – either in the hospital, or without adequate care nearby. No one should ever believe that you can bomb a hospital in a way that does not have extensive, enduring impacts on the population served by it.</p> -<p>The second section reviews the ways and means to detect and defeat sUAS. This technology backgrounder broadly covers the sensors, C2, and effectors available today. This section reviews platforms that the DoD is pursuing and confirms the feasibility of C-sUAS technologies.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Nor is this simply about influencing tactical decision-making. Degrading the health of a population has international consequences too</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The third and final section lays out the U.S. C-sUAS development path from urgent need, to refinement, to institutionalization. As C-sUAS becomes institutionalized, there are opportunities and potential pitfalls across the DOTMLPF. The C-sUAS enterprise still faces unresolved questions regarding political authorities for C-sUAS stakeholders, personnel responsibilities, and acquisition policies to enable rapid development and procurement.</p> +<p>Nor is this simply about influencing tactical decision-making. Degrading the health of a population has international consequences too. People who are unsafe and cannot access basic services will try to move. Mass refugee flows negatively impact health and stability in surrounding countries and so are generally detrimental to the interests of the wider international community.</p> -<h3 id="the-suas-threat">The sUAS Threat</h3> +<p>Ironically, it may be the approach of the international community that lies at the root of this problem. Evaluation of the ICRC Healthcare in Danger project suggests progress against its objectives of engagement, preparation and legislation; this is not a failure of advocacy on the part of such organisations. Nor is it (generally) the result of malfunctioning munitions, or human error. As then Médecins Sans Frontières International President Joanne Liu told the UN Security Council in 2016:</p> -<p><em>sUAS pose a significant threat due to their multi-mission capabilities, minimal signatures, wide proliferation, low costs, and ground force utility.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>On the third of May, this council unanimously passed Resolution 2286. You, the Council Members, pledged to protect civilians and the medical services they need to survive. You passed the resolution in the wake of the obliteration of Al Quds Hospital, in Aleppo by the Syrian government and its allies … Five months later, the resolution has plainly failed to change anything on the ground. This failure reflects a lack of political will.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>In late December 2022, Russia launched a massive assault against Ukrainian infrastructure targeting multiple key regions including Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, and Odesa. The first wave of attacks was conducted with cheap Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones. Ukrainian air force officials believe Russia used the drones to overwhelm air defenses before sending cruise missiles in a second wave of attacks. These attacks left several regions without power, including major cities such as Lviv and Kyiv. This incident was just one among many in a months-long strike campaign targeting Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure in the hopes of demoralizing the public and leaving them without heating during the winter months.</p> +<p>Accepting international laws that allow commanders to determine military necessity for themselves, using ill-informed collateral risk assessments to decide what is subjectively proportionate, may be facilitating attacks on healthcare rather than stopping them. Increasingly it seems more likely to be used as a framework for the subsequent justification of an attack, than as a protection to prevent one.</p> -<p>Today, sUAS are widely recognized as a ubiquitous, mature, and lethal part of the modern aerial threat spectrum. Their use in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is just one of many cases that have occurred over the past decade. Operators can attack adversaries with sUAS by dropping bombs or using the drone as a loitering munition in “kamikaze” suicide attacks. They can also conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions to collect information on an adversary’s position or activities. Modern sUAS sensors and data links can connect to larger kill chains or be used to find and fix targets for artillery and other precision-guided munitions. sUAS can conduct these missions while being difficult to detect and defeat with current air defenses.</p> +<p>So as conflicts affecting healthcare rage in 18 countries this year, what can be done to break this pattern? First, the international community can acknowledge the reality: healthcare is openly attacked during wars, and IHL does not currently offer meaningful protection to hospitals in high intensity conflict. Then it can ask how that can be changed. Perhaps the clue to one simple measure lies in the Chemical Weapons Convention, itself so close to complete international agreement. There are some weapons that must not be used. An additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions could, at the stroke of a pen, simply preclude the use of explosive weapons on hospitals. Hospitals could still be targeted if there was military necessity – and their use as command posts or ammunition dumps could still justify that – but it would have to be done by small arms, and line of sight. It would be bloody, but it would be the blood of combatants, not civilians. The infrastructure would remain, to treat the population afterwards. The staff will be alive to undertake their duties. Perhaps most importantly, it would not harden the will of the entire population against the attackers; it would leave space for lasting peace, rather than sowing the seeds of the next generation of conflict.</p> -<p>Modern air and missile defenses are ill-suited to counter low-flying, slow, and small UAS. Following U.S. divestment from short-range air defense in the 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. military has been challenged to respond to enemy sUAS. Other states have faced similar issues. In 2016, Israel fired two $3 million PAC-2 interceptors and scrambled a fighter aircraft in a failed attempt to shoot down a sUAS from Syria that had violated Israeli airspace. In its conflict with Yemen’s Houthis, Saudi Arabia used fighter aircraft to patrol the border and shoot down drones worth a few hundred dollars with $2 million air-to-air missiles. These responses are enormously costly and wasteful over longer military campaigns.</p> +<hr /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Lk80k5D.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Ukrainian Service Member Fires Rifle at Drone.</strong> Position near Bakhmut on March 20, 2023.</em></p> +<p><strong>Si Horne</strong> is the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. An Army Emergency Medicine doctor, he has supported operations in Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and South Sudan as well as serving as the Emergency Medicine lead for the Army.</p>Si HorneInternational law fails to protect healthcare facilities in armed conflict. They need specific protection from harm.On Critical Minerals2023-11-14T12:00:00+08:002023-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/on-critical-minerals<p><em>This paper explores the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction, how rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition will impact these risks, and what options exist for the UK to address these risks.</em></p> -<p>The lack of active C-sUAS opens a gap in modern air defense that combatants around the world are exploiting. There is no substitute. The complement to active C-sUAS — passive defense — is important but insufficient. The United States cannot harden all of its military bases against sUAS, and force distribution is ineffective against the large quantity and low costs of sUAS. The United States and its partners therefore must develop active and integrated defenses to mitigate these risks.</p> +<excerpt /> -<h4 id="defining-suas">Defining sUAS</h4> +<h3 id="executive-summary">Executive Summary</h3> -<p>sUAS are a specific category of drones. This categorization, however, varies across countries and organizations, with two key taxonomies outlined by the United States and NATO. The DoD divides UAS into five categories based on their weight, speed, and altitude ceilings, with the “small” category comprising Groups 1, 2, and 3. Despite its designation as “small,” Group 3 UAS can still be quite large at up to 600 kg. NATO offers a slightly different categorization, with sUAS falling under its Class 1 and 2 categories.</p> +<p>Critical minerals are broadly defined as minerals that are of vital importance for technology, the economy and national security and are also subject to serious risks relating to the security of their supply. This paper uses the term “critical minerals” broadly, focusing on minerals considered to be of high criticality to the UK in particular. It recognises that this is not a fixed list, and that a country’s specific assessment will affect whether a mineral is considered critical.</p> -<p>UAS categorization is further complicated by capability overlap with munitions. For example, the Iranian-made Shahed-136 is generally categorized as a Group 3 UAS, but it often operates as a one-way attack munition. The unique nature of the Shahed-136 thus cannot be simply captured by looking at a categorization that is determined solely on weight, speed, and altitude ceilings. The U.S. Tomahawk missile, specifically Block 4 and 5 variants, likewise blurs the line between UAS and missile. These variants offer loitering capabilities, but due to their one-way strike mission, they are not categorized as a UAS. The UAS spectrum is undoubtedly messy but attempts at distinguishing these threats — like all air threats — are still useful for defenders to quickly characterize capabilities.</p> +<p>A dramatically increased supply of these minerals will be vital for the net zero transition – both in the UK and internationally – and to meet the target to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, set at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Paris Conference in 2015.</p> -<p>This report applies the U.S. classification model of “sUAS” as encompassing Groups 1, 2, and 3.</p> +<p>Yet the extraction of critical minerals poses various environmental and human security risks, many of which pose a threat to the net zero transition, in the UK and globally. This paper explores the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction, how rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition will impact these risks, and what options exist for the UK to address these risks. It identifies key environmental risks as including the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to deforestation, pollution, soil degradation, water scarcity and biodiversity loss. In relation to human security, key risks identified include the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to human rights abuses, labour exploitation, crime, conflict and corruption. Where mining takes place on or near Indigenous lands, both environmental and human security risks are found to disproportionately affect already-disenfranchised communities.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Nyxc0l4.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: U.S. UAS Classification.</strong> Source: Classifications from U.S. Army; images from Russian Ministry of Defense and Wikimedia Commons.</em></p> +<p>While a number of these risks are well established, there is a potential for burgeoning demand for critical minerals to accelerate potential harms. Such harms can occur in situations where rising demand pushes governments to remove or overlook relevant regulations; where new extractive operations open up in countries without mining histories, which lack the infrastructure or capacity to manage the associated risks; where harmful boom–bust cycles of extractive activity occur due to ongoing technological advances; and where a race to secure supplies of critical minerals exacerbates competition and geopolitical tensions.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IuPGWWl.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: NATO UAS Classification.</strong> Source: Classifications from NATO; images from Vulcan UAS, Elbit Systems, Wikimedia Commons, and U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> +<p>If the mining sector fails to address these risks as demand booms, public opinion across source and supply countries might turn against the net zero transition as the harms are perceived to outweigh the benefits. It is crucial that the UK leverages its unique position as an international trade, financial and mining hub to help the international community mitigate the risks posed in this regard.</p> -<p>sUAS have several advantages over larger aircraft, both crewed and uncrewed:</p> +<p>Based on the findings of this research, the authors suggest the following ways forward for consideration by the UK government, many of which are also applicable to other governments in the Global North:</p> -<ol> +<ul> <li> - <p><strong>Lower cost:</strong> sUAS are relatively inexpensive compared to larger aircraft. This is true even when platforms are not quite “consumable” aircraft that operators will only use on a single mission.</p> + <p>Use its role as a mining and financial hub to improve regulation, standards and transparency in relation to investment in critical minerals based on key environmental priorities, for example, through the application of the Taskforce on Nature-Related Financial Disclosures, Science-Based Targets for Nature, Global Reporting Initiative and other similar initiatives, thereby supporting integration of high-quality targeted frameworks into this burgeoning sub-sector. This will reward and enhance uptake of best practice by businesses and support regulation in producer countries globally.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Low training burdens:</strong> sUAS operators can learn their basic tradecraft in hours, and only one person is needed to operate a drone. On the other hand, it takes months to years to train pilots on large aircraft — including uncrewed platforms such as the MQ-9. A single platform may require over 100 personnel for operations and maintenance.</p> + <p>Develop an updated industrial strategy on critical mineral use specifically, to support the strategic acquisition and use of critical minerals and facilitate prioritisation across key industries should a shortage of critical minerals occur. This should be used alongside the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy to ensure that critical minerals are used strategically, particularly in the face of fluctuations in supply.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Minimal infrastructure requirements:</strong> Unlike larger aircraft, sUAS do not require extensive infrastructure to deploy such as long runways, secure and complicated data links, or expensive maintenance equipment.</p> + <p>Given the criticality of the net zero transition and the minerals it requires, review domestic policies to maximise recovery of critical minerals that are already in consumer supply chains, in the form of waste. This would broaden opportunities for critical mineral sourcing aside from extraction via new mines. This should include prioritising the upscaling of the UK’s recycling capacity to facilitate the reuse of critical minerals, mindful of the fact that while recycling alone cannot meet demand for critical minerals, estimates suggest that recycling could meet 10% of global demand, while bringing jobs to the UK in support of the “levelling up” agenda.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Gray zone applications:</strong> Combatants frequently employ sUAS to decrease the perceived political costs and escalation risks resulting from operations and potential shootdowns as compared to larger, inhabited aircraft. The low-cost of sUAS, minimized risk to operators (on the ground rather than in the cockpit), and difficulty of attribution make sUAS a useful tool for gray zone operations.</p> + <p>Work with manufacturers on extended producer responsibility, right to repair and design-to-recycle best practice to move towards a circular economy and ensure that critical minerals are reused and recycled wherever possible, thereby reducing demand. This will help to reduce wastage of critical minerals and decrease pressure on supply chains.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Unique capabilities in modern warfare:</strong> sUAS can perform an increasing number of air missions at lower cost than large, crewed aircraft. Small loitering munitions offer the ability to scan large swaths of territory and quickly strike targets of interest. Medium- and high-altitude long endurance (MALE/HALE) drones will continue to play an important role in counterterrorism missions, but they appear less effective in symmetric, conventional conflicts. Looking to the future, sUAS swarms may also provide a cost-effective means to saturate an adversary’s air defenses.</p> + <p>Support improved consumer requirements for standards around the production of critical minerals. An example of this can be seen in the case of the 2023 EU Regulation on Deforestation-Free Products, which could be adapted for the critical mineral sector in the UK and more widely across the Global North.</p> </li> -</ol> + <li> + <p>Support governments in source countries to develop the infrastructure and capability to manage mining-related risks. This could involve providing development assistance to build capacity to apply regulation and best practice, while supporting initiatives that mainstream biodiversity, conservation and social justice into regulation. Such regulation should improve the development and practice of the mining sector in producer countries, in collaboration with other actors working in this area, such as relevant aid agencies and multilateral development banks.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Consider how to integrate innovative concepts and proposals that call for a paradigm shift in our approach to economic activity, human wellbeing and the natural world. This can be achieved through an approach which prioritises the pursuit of human and ecological wellbeing over material growth, and has the potential to help us better assess, understand and mitigate the environmental and social harms associated with the mining sector and other sectors dependent on natural resources.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>To be sure, sUAS also have critical disadvantages over larger aircraft.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> + +<p>The UK, alongside many other countries, has committed to bringing the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2050. These commitments rely on the transition from an energy sector reliant on fossil fuels to one dominated by net zero or green technologies, particularly renewables. This transition depends on securing reliable supplies of critical minerals.</p> + +<p>The route to doing so is far from clear. To meet global decarbonisation commitments, an unprecedented scaling up of critical mineral production is required. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), by 2040 at least 30 times as much lithium, nickel and other key minerals could be required by the electric car and battery storage industries to meet global climate targets. In terms of rare earth elements (REEs), global demand is expected to expand by 300%–700% by 2040. In this context, demand for many critical minerals is set to outstrip supply, putting net zero targets at risk.</p> + +<p>Increasing extraction of critical minerals is therefore key, but is also set to have wide-ranging implications and present an array of environmental and human security risks of its own. Some of these risks are already recognised, while others are on the horizon. Of crucial relevance is the fact that critical mineral extraction is currently highly concentrated in a handful of countries and regions and that some of the key mineral-rich countries are fragile and conflict-affected states, or those with weak state capacity and high levels of corruption. Effective policies which actively account for these changing dynamics and address these risks are, therefore, crucial.</p> + +<p>From the UK perspective, adequately addressing these risks is essential both to mitigating the harms caused and securing sustainable supply chains, and to safeguarding the UK’s reputation on the global stage. The UK government has branded itself as a “clean energy superpower” and, as a global trade and financial hub, is home to some of the most prominent and profitable mining companies, as well as the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), of which the majority of large-scale mining companies are members. The UK is therefore in a unique position to galvanise action on environmental and human security risks relating to critical mineral extraction and to champion a just global energy transition.</p> + +<p>This paper examines existing and emergent environmental and human security risks associated with accelerating critical mineral extraction, and the options available to address these risks from a UK perspective. Specifically, this paper addresses three research questions:</p> <ol> <li> - <p><strong>Limited payload capacity:</strong> sUAS are unable to carry heavier, more capable sensors or explosives.</p> + <p>What environmental and human security risks are associated with critical mineral extraction?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Limited flight duration and range:</strong> Commercial sUAS can perhaps fly around 8 km at the high end. Military sUAS may feature extended ranges, but they will not approach large aircraft ranges.</p> + <p>How will rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition impact these risks?</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Limited operating conditions:</strong> Compared to larger aircraft or missiles, sUAS are more susceptible to wind and adverse weather conditions, as well as a greater diversity of active defenses. Ukraine, for example, is reportedly losing around 10,000 sUAS per month against Russia.</p> + <p>What options exist for the UK to address these risks?</p> </li> </ol> -<h4 id="suas-missions-and-history">sUAS Missions and History</h4> +<p>The overarching goal is to identify the key environmental and human security risks associated with the net zero transition and provide decision-makers in the mining sector and policy community with the knowledge they need to anticipate and more effectively mitigate these risks.</p> -<p>sUAS can complete the same missions as manned aircraft. Over the past decade, military operators have used sUAS for six primary missions:</p> +<p>It should be noted that there is currently no standard, internationally recognised definition of a critical mineral. Critical minerals are broadly understood as minerals of vital importance for technology, the economy and national security that are also subject to serious risks relating to their security of supply. In the UK, critical minerals are defined according to “economic vulnerability and supply risk”, which are caused by “combinations of factors including but not limited to rapid demand growth, high concentration of supply chains in particular countries, or high levels of price volatility”. Which minerals are defined as critical differs by country and varies over time. The UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy, for example, currently defines a cohort of 18 minerals with high criticality for the UK, as well as outlining a “watchlist” of five minerals deemed to be increasing in criticality. This paper therefore uses the term “critical minerals” broadly, focusing on minerals considered to be of high criticality to the UK in particular. It recognises that there is no fixed list, that minerals considered critical differ according to countries’ specific assessments, and that minerals such as copper and aluminium that are currently not considered critical are also vital for the net zero transition.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Attack operations:</strong> Strikes on people and things with bombs, missiles, or suicide attacks</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance:</strong> Providing “eyes in the sky” for military planning and operations</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Targeting:</strong> Finding and sharing target location with other strike assets, such as artillery</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Battle damage assessment:</strong> Confirming the results of an attack</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Harassment:</strong> Creating confusion and alarm with drone incursions, possibly including small attacks</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Propaganda:</strong> Showing off military platforms and operations to improve military and civilian morale</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h4 id="methodology">Methodology</h4> -<p>Attack operations, ISR, and targeting missions are the most common, as clearly shown in the Russia-Ukraine war. Both sides have used sUAS to search for enemy combatants and either target them directly or pass their location to other strike assets such as artillery to fire upon their position. Ukrainian soldiers have used the U.S. Switchblade and Phoenix Ghost UAS, for example, to directly target Russian tanks and personnel. Early failures in the war also prompted Russia to quickly increase the use of stand-off weaponry, including indigenous and foreign-made sUAS such as the Lancet-3 and Shahed-136, respectively. In general, the Russia-Ukraine war highlights how sUAS have enabled complex, integrated air attack through the wide proliferation of sensors. As others have warned about the modern battlefield, “What can be seen can be hit, and what can be hit can be destroyed.”</p> +<p>The research for this paper was conducted between May and August 2023 and is based on analysis of primary and secondary data, including a rigorous review of open-source literature, semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, and the organisation of a virtual validation workshop.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/0bCZjBn.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Ukrainian Drone Minesweeper.</strong> UAS operators use drones for various missions outside of the six described above. Here a Ukrainian volunteer controls the flight of a drone carrying a metal detector to search for mines near the town of Derhachi, Kharkiv region, on October 1, 2023.</em></p> +<p>First, the authors conducted a review of the literature to assess existing knowledge of the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction. The review covered peer-reviewed academic research, policy briefs, articles and blogs by recognised experts, reports by NGOs, government documents and evaluations. Standard review search strings were used with defined inclusion criteria covering relevance and credibility, with focused searches of Google and Google Scholar conducted using combinations of selected keywords.</p> -<p>Attack operations also include strikes on infrastructure and economic targets. In September 2019, Iran launched 18 sUAS and seven missiles to attack Saudi Arabian oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais. The strike successfully evaded Saudi air defenses, including the U.S. Patriot, German Skyguard, and French Crotale, and struck their targets, leading Saudi Arabia to temporarily cut oil production by around 50 percent. In Ukraine, Russia has launched Iranian-made suicide drones to strike power grids.</p> +<p>Following this, the authors conducted semi-structured interviews with 22 participants from industry associations, government agencies, mining companies, NGOs and other parts of the private sector, as well as investigative journalists and academics, drawing on expert knowledge from a variety of sectors to target gaps identified in the existing literature. Interviewees were based in the UK, the US, Australia, Germany, Denmark, Chile and Sri Lanka, providing international and UK-specific expertise. Interviewees were selected based on their knowledge of the topic, with a snowball sampling method used to identify additional respondents. Questions were tailored to interviewees’ roles, responsibilities and expertise, with the aim of supplementing a lack of detailed published research with first-hand knowledge and experience. All interviews have been anonymised and all data that could lead to the identification of interviewees has been removed. The interview stage formed the foundation of the research, with non-academic literature used to validate and supplement findings from the interviews, where peer-reviewed research was unavailable.</p> -<p>sUAS-based assassination attempts — and successes — have also rocked several countries. In August 2018, a small insurgency group in Venezuela used a bomb-laden drone in a failed assassination attempt against President Nicolás Maduro. In January 2019, the Houthis in Yemen used a Qasef-1 UAS to assassinate senior Yemeni military officials. More recently in November 2021, Iranian-backed militias attempted to assassinate Iraqi prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi after pro-Iran political groups had faced disappointing results in the elections.</p> +<p>Last, findings were presented and analysed at a virtual workshop held on 15 August 2023, attended by 10 representatives of industry associations, government agencies, NGOs and the private sector, as well as investigative journalists and academics. Written feedback was provided by three additional representatives. The workshop was designed to allow discussion of key findings, as a validation exercise to strengthen the rigour of the research.</p> -<p>Harassment and propaganda operations are also common. ISIS fighters made extensive use of commercial quadcopters and fixed-wing drones for surveillance, propaganda, and small but demoralizing tactical strikes. In January 2017, despite having a limited sUAS arsenal, the group formally announced a new drone unit known as “Unmanned Aircraft of the Mujahideen.” In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan used its drone fleet to record video of its strikes against Armenian tanks and soldiers, replaying footage across the country and internationally. Iranian-backed groups have frequently launched sUAS and rocket attacks to harass U.S. embassies, businesses, and military personnel across the Middle East, which has occasionally led to counterattacks and rising escalation concerns.</p> +<h4 id="limitations-and-scope">Limitations and Scope</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QiQp1yk.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 3: Select sUAS Combat Deployments.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>The research design has several limitations. The first relates to the inability, within the available timeframe, to provide a detailed analysis of the risks relating to each individual critical mineral. Second, although interviewees were selected for their extensive experience on the topic, a degree of subjectivity is inevitable. This paper recognises that an interviewee’s understanding of the risks is shaped by their specific expertise, potentially leading them to perceive certain risks as more significant than others. Wherever possible, respondents’ views were corroborated by a published source or other respondent data.</p> -<h4 id="global-proliferation">Global Proliferation</h4> +<p>The third relates to the emerging nature of many of the risks identified, meaning there is limited peer-reviewed research available. Non-academic literature was used to validate and supplement findings from the interviews, where peer-reviewed research was unavailable. Equally, given that primary research for this paper comprises a limited number of semi-structured interviews, the findings can only be viewed as preliminary, with further research needed in the immediate future.</p> -<p>sUAS have spread globally over the past decade due to the technology’s dual use for both military and civilian applications. In addition to the military missions listed in the previous section, sUAS are used in various civilian activities, including filmmaking, law enforcement, emergency response, agriculture, delivery, and the protection of commercial facilities. Once sUAS technology advanced enough to become viable for these use cases, the commercial market boomed, which in turn has further fueled sUAS technology developments, facilitated the rise of commercial drone manufacturers, and created a massive, largely unregulated supply of these aircraft.</p> +<p>Finally, this research focuses specifically on the risks relating to critical mineral extraction. The authors acknowledge that critical mineral processing and Chinese dominance in this area is an important part of the wider discussion on securing net zero supply chains, but examining this is beyond the scope of this paper.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HWK8KYf.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: The Path to sUAS Proliferation.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<h4 id="structure">Structure</h4> -<p>Before the sUAS commercialization boom of the mid-2010s, manufacturers created moderately priced units with relatively rudimentary capabilities. The first remote-controlled drone to incorporate Wi-Fi, Parrot’s A.R. Drone, was released in 2010 and cost a modest $299 but had a battery life of only 12 minutes. Three years later Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI), the current commercial manufacturing titan in China, released its first drone, the Phantom 1, which sold for $379. This model featured an internal GPS but had a flight time of less than 10 minutes and a communication distance of only 1 km. Today, the cost of commercial sUAS has increased, typically ranging from $500 to $10,000, but new models offer significantly improved capabilities. DJI’s bestselling Mavic 3, which costs $2,049, offers 46 minutes of flight time, omnidirectional obstacle sensing, and a transmission range of 15 km at 1080p resolution. The cost-to-flight-time ratio between these DJI models increased by 17.5 percent, but the capabilities provided by the Mavic 3 opened the door to hundreds of commercial and hobbyist applications.</p> +<p>Analysis of the findings is organised into three chapters. Chapter I provides a brief overview of existing and clearly recognised environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction. Chapter II builds on this to explore how changing patterns of demand triggered by the net zero transition are set to impact these risks. Chapter III considers the options available to address these risks from a UK perspective. The conclusion draws together the findings and presents a series of recommendations.</p> -<p>China has since seized the sUAS market, with DJI accounting for over 60 percent of the market share for commercial sUAS in 2021. While market projections for commercial drones vary slightly, there is strong consensus that the market is thriving and shows no signs of slowing down, as exemplified by revenue of $2.7 billion in 2020 and a projected intake of $21.7 billion by 2030.</p> +<h3 id="i-existing-risks-linked-to-critical-mineral-extraction">I. Existing Risks Linked to Critical Mineral Extraction</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2bH8Vrn.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 4: DJI Development.</strong> Source: DJI.</em></p> +<p>The environmental and human security risks linked to critical mineral extraction are not unique in and of themselves, with many associated with wider mining activities. Yet with exponential growth in demand for minerals for the net zero transition and the expected acceleration in critical mineral mining activities, these risks stand to intensify. This chapter provides a brief overview of existing, acknowledged risks linked to critical mineral extraction, which will serve as a foundation for subsequent chapters.</p> -<p>The commercial drone sector has driven technological advances, rather than these advances trickling down from military UAS. This growth has mostly been spurred on by the smartphone industry. Radio-controlled aircraft moved from using petrol engines to electric motors and the lithium batteries used in modern smartphones. With internal combustion engines prone to excessive vibration, electric motors have become increasingly popular, particularly for sUAS. Critically, the extensive lithium battery market has allowed operators to choose battery packs that fit their desired performance, flight time, and endurance without massive price increases. The recent interest in and testing of UAS-compatible lithium-sulfur batteries may offer an even cheaper option in the coming years. The leveraging of existing high-speed cellular networks has also allowed for broader UAS accessibility and lower associated costs. Overall, as one expert aptly explained, “Drones have really been riding the smartphone revolution.”</p> +<h4 id="environmental-risks">Environmental Risks</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YeeeAKp.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Agricultural Drones.</strong> A Kenya Airways employee controls a drone as it spreads fertilizer over a tea farm at Kipkebe Tea Estate in Musereita on October 21, 2022.</em></p> +<p>Critical mineral reserves are often located in remote, high-integrity, biodiversity-rich locations (see Figure 1), with their extraction posing direct risks to the environment. Many of these harms occur at the mine site itself, both through mineral extraction and the development of the required infrastructure to support it. Mining requires land use change, frequently resulting in deforestation and biodiversity loss. Around 1,600 mining operations are in key biodiversity areas and a further 2,000 in protected areas. In the context of critical minerals, 80% of cobalt and 54% of nickel are sourced from areas where biodiversity is at risk. The infrastructure required to support mining activities also presents environmental challenges. Crucially, the construction and maintenance of roads, ports, railway tracks and power lines can impact the wider landscape, often leading to further deforestation and habitat fragmentation. With the growth in demand for critical minerals, these risks could escalate in key locations.</p> -<p>The military sUAS market has similarly increased in size and platform diversity over the last decade. There is limited reporting specifically on sUAS market trends, but the wider military UAS market features many Groups 2 and 3 platforms and shows clear signs of rapid expansion. Between 2011 and 2021, the military UAS market grew by nearly $10 billion, from $1.7 billion to $11.6 billion. As commercial markets and systems proliferated, indigenous military programs also promptly appeared, offering to enhance and counter the new technological capabilities available. An October 2020 study estimated that 102 countries possessed an active drone program compared to an estimated 60 countries in 2010. Additionally, of the reported 171 active military drone models in 2019, roughly 143 were sUAS. Militaries have also successfully harnessed the cheap and easy-to-use format of commercial systems while increasing the reliability and security needed for military operations.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/werslUT.png" alt="image01" /> +<em><strong>Figure 1: Selected Countries and Harms Associated with Mineral Mining for the Net Zero Transition.</strong> Source: Map adapted by the authors from Nat Lowrey, “A Material Transition: Exploring Supply and Demand Solutions for Renewable Energy Minerals”, War on Want, March 2021. Adapted with kind permission from War on Want.</em></p> -<p>The general utility of sUAS reinforce their proliferation. Russia has imported the Iranian Shahed-136 in large numbers to support its operations in Ukraine while also relying on domestic systems such as the Orlan-10. Prior to its operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan procured large numbers of Israeli sUAS, which Azerbaijani operators used effectively against Armenian combatants. Growing normalization of sUAS as tools of war points toward a shifting military landscape in which sUAS will regularly be relied upon in order to achieve mission success.</p> +<p>Sub-Saharan Africa has some of the world’s largest deposits of minerals essential to the net zero transition, including cobalt, graphite, lithium, nickel and REEs. An expanding rate of extraction of these minerals could exacerbate existing environmental problems. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, from 2010–20, the African continent witnessed the greatest annual rate of net forest loss of any region in the world. While some of this is attributed to agriculture and commercial logging, mining also played a key role; a 2022 study showed that mining was a significant direct driver of deforestation in Ghana and an indirect driver of deforestation in Gabon and Zambia. Given that Africa is home to significant reserves of manganese, platinum, cobalt and graphite, increased mining activity for critical minerals risks exacerbating deforestation in the region.</p> -<p>Given the wide commercial and civilian applications of sUAS, international regulatory efforts to stem sUAS proliferation have fallen short. In October 2016, 53 nations, including the United States, issued a joint declaration that attempted to start the process of building a basic framework for international UAS standards, but it failed to spur meaningful action. A framework demanding sUAS buyers and sellers to comply to specific obligations had the potential to hinder exports and create strains with legitimate trading partners. In addition, China’s absence from the declaration inhibited its possibility of success from the start. Having taken control of a significant share of the global UAS market, Beijing was, and continues to be, unlikely to allow any regulation that negatively affects its exports.</p> +<p>Similar risks have been highlighted in other regions. In a prominent example, Indonesia has seen rapid expansion in mining activity targeting nickel and cobalt, which are commonly extracted together. This is negatively impacting both inland tropical forests and coastal mangrove forests – causing particular damage, in view of their high carbon storage capacities. Similar concerns have been raised in relation to critical mineral extraction in the Pacific Islands and Latin America. However, it is important to put these risks into a wider perspective. With any change of land use comes a degree of habitat degradation, with mines currently occupying just 1% of Earth’s land surface, whereas agriculture accounts for 38%.</p> -<p>Even if a regulatory body were established, it is unclear how helpful it would be in removing sUAS from modern battlefields. Clear rules for manufacturers or regulations on military sUAS transfers would not decrease the wide availability of commercial drones or components of these systems, which can easily be adapted for military use even by non-state actors. According to a 2018 West Point report, ISIS displayed overall diversification within its commercial drone supply chain. For the nine quadcopters associated with ISIS operations, engineers built the final units after acquiring various components from seven retailers in five different countries. ISIS’s piecemeal production of UAS is also not an isolated practice. The Houthis in Yemen follow a similar pattern. For example, the Sammad-pattern UAS engine originated in Germany before making its way to Israel, then Iran, and eventually into the hands of Houthi engineers in Yemen. Given this substantial supply of cheap components spread across multiple business sectors, and the ease with which it crosses international borders, increasing regulations around sUAS is unlikely to stem proliferation and use.</p> +<p>However, environmental risks linked to critical mineral and indeed all forms of mining go beyond those related to the direct footprint of a mine site itself. Risks relating to air, water and other forms of pollution are present in all stages of mine development, from pre-feasibility and feasibility to construction, operation, maintenance and closure of any mine. These risks apply in the extraction of critical minerals just as in the extraction of other major metals not currently deemed critical, such as gold, iron ore and copper. Separating the valuable fraction of mined material results in potentially hazardous waste. This includes waste rock, comprising the rocks removed to access the target mineral, and tailings, which are fine-grained waste from the crushing and processing of an ore. Such waste often contains dangerous levels of heavy metals, chemicals and radioactive components, and risks contaminating the local environment during storage or disposal. Other waste materials generated during the extraction process – for example, acidic waste water during lithium extraction (see Box 1) – also present a risk. Here, it is important to emphasise that the risk of pollution extends beyond the lifecycle of the mine, after closure. Mine abandonment, decommission and repurposing also create risks from the release of contaminants into the environment. Indirect environmental risks linked to critical mineral mining also derive from the water-intensive nature of much of this activity, which can lead to water shortages and water table depletion, threatening both species and habitats (see Box 1).</p> -<p>As sUAS continue to develop and improve upon existing capabilities within the civilian and commercial markets, potential applications have continued to grow. There is little chance of putting the genie back in the bottle. The United States and its allies must develop active defenses to address these highly proliferated systems and deploy them as required based on expected risks and vulnerabilities.</p> +<p>Finally, the power used in extracting critical minerals itself contributes to global carbon emissions, although carbon emitted at the extraction stage of the supply chain is likely to be significantly lower than that emitted during the processing stages. Innovation is taking place in this area, with a fully electric mine in operation in Canada and mining companies investing in renewable power to support remote sites.</p> -<h4 id="future-threats">Future Threats</h4> +<p>Understanding these existing environmental risks is vital as critical mineral extraction accelerates to meet global decarbonisation commitments. As explored in Chapter II, the dynamics and context surrounding such extraction activity are likely to change as fluctuating demand for specific minerals reshapes and intensifies many of the risks we face today.</p> -<p>Technological developments over the next few years will further empower sUAS. The rise of artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) is perhaps the most common concern. As the JCO warned in their 2021 report: “The impending integration of artificial intelligence with autonomous sUAS will introduce yet another dramatic change to the character of warfare.” Software is already enabling rapid leaps in UAS autonomy. As one CSIS report explains:</p> +<h4 id="human-rights-abuses">Human Rights Abuses</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>Traditional software is sufficient to deliver a high degree of autonomy for some military applications. For example, the Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI) Harpy is a decades-old uncrewed drone that IAI openly acknowledges is an autonomous weapon. When in autonomous mode, the Harpy loiters over a given region for up to nine hours, waiting to detect electromagnetic emissions consistent with an onboard library of enemy radar, homes in on the emissions source (usually enemy air defense radar), and attacks. No human in the loop is required.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Human security risks associated with the extractive industry are also well established. In the context of critical minerals, these risks are clearly seen in cases such as artisanal cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – a country holding 75% of the world’s currently identified cobalt reserves, 15–20% of which is estimated to be mined artisanally. Here, artisanal cobalt miners face the threat of being beaten, tortured or killed by state and private security services. Poor working conditions present further risks, where artisanal miners work with no or insufficient personal protective equipment, ventilation or healthcare. Child labour is also a concern. Estimates of the number of children working in the DRC’s cobalt sector range from 4,500 to 40,000, some of whom are as young as six. Such child labour ranges from children helping their parents at weekends to those working as indentured servants. Despite attempts to formalise artisanal mining in the DRC, a range of studies highlight the limitations of bureaucratic formalisation in countries such as the DRC, where miners may lack the “resources and skills to participate effectively” in these processes.</p> -<p>As these autonomous capabilities proliferate further, defenders will be forced to pivot away from detect and defeat platforms based on radio frequency (RF).</p> +<p>Beyond the DRC, child labour is reported in numerous other critical mineral extraction operations (see Figure 1), including tantalum supply chains in Mozambique, Burundi and Rwanda. Nickel mining in Guatemala has been linked to cases of murder, sexual violence and forced displacement, while mining for REEs in Myanmar has also been associated with wide-ranging human rights abuses. Abuses are commonly targeted at artisanal miners, labourers and local communities, provoking local-level conflict and community resistance, with resistance at times interrupting critical mineral mining operations’ ability to operate effectively.</p> -<p>Advances in AI/ML may also enable sUAS swarms. These are large, coordinated, and at least semi-autonomous group operations; thus far, there have been few if any attacks that fit this strict definition. Yet even small, human-controlled group attacks have proven capable. The 2019 Houthi attack on two Saudi Aramco oil facilities only employed 10 drones but still degraded business operations for some time. Commercial drone shows have operated with more than 3,000 drones. Once mass drone swarm technology is established, it will be an increasingly difficult threat to intercept. In those cases, the best options for defenders may be “left-of-launch” strikes on C2 nodes and ground control stations associated with the attack.</p> +<p>Further cases of weak enforcement of labour rights in relation to critical mineral mining can be seen in artisanal mining of cobalt and tin, as well as in the mining and processing of nickel. Such risks may be exacerbated as mining moves to previously untapped regions rich in critical minerals, particularly those with a track record of human and labour rights abuses. Saudi Arabia, for example, has untapped critical mineral reserves worth about $1.3 trillion, but a very poor track record in relation to human and labour rights. In January 2023, the UK announced its intention to deepen collaboration on critical minerals with Saudi Arabia, as part of its “plan to build partnerships around these vital resources across the world”. Human rights standards must be a key consideration in any future collaboration, and such partnerships are an opportunity for the UK to engage bilaterally and use its diplomatic and financial position to ensure human rights standards are upheld in critical mineral supply chains.</p> -<p>Adversary sUAS may increasingly communicate through cell towers, making RF-based detect and defeat difficult. Under this environment, defenses would need to differentiate between sUAS communications and regular cellular transmissions. Even if sensors can adapt, RF-based defeat would then need to degrade those communications without disrupting cellular transmissions using those same frequencies. As JCO director Sean Gainey explained in 2022, sUAS operators are “building in redundancy in these systems where if you cut off something, they can fall back on something else.”</p> +<p>As in the case of environmental risks, concerns relating to human rights and labour abuses in the critical minerals sector are not necessarily fundamentally different from those linked to the wider mining sector. However, contextual vulnerabilities – particularly in light of the high demand driving increased mining for critical minerals in areas with weak governance and/or no history of mineral extraction – could raise the risk of human rights abuses and exploitation, as discussed further in Chapter II.</p> -<p>Lastly, U.S. policymakers must also prepare for creative sUAS use in the battlefield. In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, for example, Azerbaijan reportedly modified older aircraft to function uncrewed and used these aircraft to draw fire and locate Armenian air defenses. Russia has used similar tactics in its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Russian operators have also developed tactics such as piloting near buildings to exploit sensor blind spots, launching UAS away from operator locations to avoid counterattacks, and spoofing Ukrainian defenses to falsely register a large number of UAS and ground control stations. UAS operators have enormous freedom of action and can adapt tactics quickly, whereas defenders typically do not have such flexibility.</p> +<h4 id="corruption-crime-and-conflict">Corruption, Crime and Conflict</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1CmCB1k.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Drones in Formation.</strong> South Korea’s military drones fly in formation during a South Korea–U.S. joint military drill at Seungjin Fire Training Field in Pocheon on May 25, 2023.</em></p> +<p>Corruption in the extractive sector is widespread. In 2016, the OECD claimed that one in five cases of transnational bribery were linked to the extractive sector. High-profile cases involving mining and commodities giants such as Glencore illustrate the extent of the issue; in November 2022, for example, Glencore was ordered to pay £281 million in penalties after a Serious Fraud Office investigation revealed it had paid $29 million in bribes for preferential access to oil in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and South Sudan. Meanwhile, in Nigeria alone, an estimated $400 billion in oil revenues has been lost to corruption since 1960.</p> -<h3 id="detecting-and-defeating-suas">Detecting and Defeating sUAS</h3> +<p>Similar trends are emerging in relation to critical minerals. In June 2022, court auditors in the DRC pointed to over $400 million in missing tax advances and loans that state mining company Gecamines said it had paid to the national treasury. Gecamines holds minority stakes in several of the world’s largest copper and cobalt projects, both of which are key minerals for the net zero transition.</p> -<p><em>A variety of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities are available to defeat sUAS. Each of these tools have unique strengths and weaknesses in regard to survivability, range, magazine capacity, combat identification, and defended area.</em></p> +<p>In this context, a range of NGOs have raised the alarm over vulnerabilities to corruption in relation to critical mineral extraction specifically, and the potential for this to derail the energy transition. Key concerns here relate to the location of most current critical mineral reserves in a small number of developing and middle-income states, many characterised by weak governance, high levels of corruption and legacies of fragility and conflict. Here, recent research has flagged the risk of clean energy minerals being used for trade-based money laundering, and the risk that close links between politically exposed persons and commodity trading more broadly could implicate supply chains themselves in conflict finance. Meanwhile, artisanal and small-scale miners are flagged as potentially suffering high levels of exposure, particularly in cross-border mining hotspots. As noted in a 2022 report by Maha Rafi Atal, Stephanie Trapnell and Dieter Zinnbauer, “given the race for newer and more efficient clean energy technologies, there is an ongoing risk that weakly regulated mining is exploited for illicit profit, which may involve not only corruption, but also human trafficking and human rights abuses”.</p> -<p>sUAS pose unique challenges to air defense. They exploit gaps in sensing because they are small and fly low. They also exploit cost asymmetries — they are usually cheap and numerous, while air defense interceptors are not. They even exploit the way air defense is organized by equipping individual combatants to achieve tactical and strategic effects, while the United States and its allies mostly deploy air defense at the company level or higher.</p> +<p>Efforts to tackle corruption must be central to discussions on supply chains, as critical mineral extraction presents a key revenue-generating opportunity for many states, with critical minerals comprising between 4% and 7% of mining revenue. As Liesbet Gregoir and Karel van Acker remind us, corruption, tax avoidance and government effectiveness “influence the potential of benefits returning to local communities”, which can in itself impact community support for mining projects, undermining supply chain security. Given the need to trade with these mineral-rich countries to achieve net zero, tackling corruption in critical mineral supply chains is crucial.</p> -<p>Despite these differences across size, flight, costs, and quantities, the overall air defense kill chain is essentially the same. Air defense — as defined broadly — means detecting and defeating airborne threats flying from surface to space. That process can be illustrated in various ways, as shown in Table 5. The sensors, effectors, and C2 platforms involved in this kill chain all have unique characteristics that determine their effectiveness and where they are deployed, as shown in Table 6.</p> +<p>Wider links to criminality and conflict traverse extractive industries and are well documented in relation to gold and diamond mining, but they also play out in the context of critical minerals. Organised criminal activity around the supply and trafficking of REEs has been reported in China, with authorities seizing multi-tonne consignments of REEs worth millions of dollars that were being illegally smuggled out of the country. In 2022, an AP investigation flagged the role of military-linked militias in human rights abuses linked to REE mining in Myanmar, with militias enforcing control in key areas and demanding a cut of the profits generated. Critical mineral-linked criminality is also prevalent in other regions; in 2022, a Chinese national was jailed in Nigeria after attempting to smuggle 25 tonnes of lithium-containing lepidolite out of the country. Lithium deposits in Mexico have similarly been reported to be at risk of criminal exploitation. Intersecting with critical human rights risks, this activity often leaves local communities at the mercy of profit-chasing criminal groups, enhancing their vulnerability to violence, displacement, extortion and labour exploitation.</p> -<p>The following sections define the sensor, effector, and C2 missions, and explore different C-sUAS modalities, their respective strengths and weaknesses, and example platforms for each.</p> +<p>These points relate closely to risks around conflict financing. Just as gold, diamonds and gemstones are known to have been used to fund armed groups in key source countries globally, critical minerals are similarly associated with such activity. In Africa’s Great Lakes region, prominently, 3T mining (tin, tungsten and tantalum) has been linked to the operations of non-state armed groups and conflict financing, prompting the passage of associated conflict minerals legislation, including the EU’s 2021 Conflict Minerals Regulation. Here, interviewees expressed concern that the critical minerals boom could trigger new forms of localised conflict, especially in the case of extraction via artisanal and small-scale mining.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/liqIcPz.png" alt="image11" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 5: The Air Defense Kill Chain.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>On this point, it is important to note that critical minerals are generally less transportable than gold or diamonds and must be moved at much higher volumes to generate profits, limiting the appeal for many localised armed groups and criminal actors. Despite this, interviewees expressed concern about the risk of local-level conflict and criminal extortion. Meanwhile, the potential for critical minerals to support improved infrastructure and supplement existing revenues in supply countries is unlikely to mitigate in full the potential emergence of a new “resource curse”, unless more is done to address the human and environmental security risks highlighted in this paper, the impacts of which are felt most keenly at a local level. Indeed, localised tensions are known to be exacerbated by encroachment on community territory, human rights violations and environmental degradation associated with critical mineral mining, as seen in relation to lithium mining in Chile and nickel mining in Indonesia.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/A0srXW1.png" alt="image12" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 6: C-sUAS Platform Considerations.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>These corruption, crime and conflict risks are likely to be exacerbated in the context of burgeoning demand for critical minerals and in the global rush to secure supply chains. With mineral-rich countries and mining companies looking to capitalise, this could serve to both deepen the impact of existing human and environmental security risks and jeopardise the transition to net zero as community resistance, local-level conflict and criminality impact the ability of mining companies to operate, undermining reliable supplies. Opportunities to mitigate these risks are discussed further in Chapter III.</p> -<h4 id="sensors">Sensors</h4> +<h4 id="indigenous-rights">Indigenous Rights</h4> -<p>Radar has long been the primary sensor used to detect and track aerial threats. The traditional approach leverages wide-area surveillance radars and highly focused tracking radars to respectively detect and track incoming aircraft and ballistic missiles. Detecting sUAS in this way, however, is hard. As mentioned earlier, sUAS typically fly below typical air defense radar coverage. Perhaps even more problematic is their slow speeds and small profile, which combined creates a very limited radar signature for detection and tracking.</p> +<p>As indicated above, the brunt of many environmental and human security risks related to critical mineral extraction is borne by local communities. Indigenous communities are known to be particularly impacted: a recent study found that 54% of critical mineral mining projects are located on or near Indigenous land. In many cases, this puts Indigenous communities on the frontline of the effects of critical mineral extraction. While consultation is required, the standard of consent is not yet industry standard, with the ICMM specifying that members should “work towards obtaining consent of Indigenous Peoples” rather than requiring that they obtain it. Where resistance occurs, Indigenous Peoples have been subject to abuses including forced displacement, sexual violence, torture and murder. Mining has also been linked to the murder of land and environmental rights defenders in countries such as the Philippines, Mexico, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Ecuador.</p> -<p>This is not to say that active radar does not work against sUAS. Active radar remains one of the predominant means for detecting sUAS at longer ranges as compared to other sensor modalities. Radar is also more capable under adverse weather conditions and less sensitive to countermeasures compared to other sensors. Radars, however, can be large, heavy, and power intensive, thereby reducing mobility unless mounted on a vehicle. They also emit a signature that can be easily detected, making the operator’s location vulnerable to attack. Radars also must be optimized to see smaller objects, thus reducing their detection range.</p> +<p>Even when not directly subject to abuse, Indigenous Peoples face indirect harms. Deforestation for nickel mining in Indonesia risks destroying the way of life of the nomadic O Hongana Manyawa tribe; water depletion from lithium mining in Chile continues to impact Indigenous ways of life; and nickel mining in Guatemala has destroyed natural resources vital to the livelihoods of many Indigenous Peoples. These are just a few examples of how critical mineral extraction is impacting Indigenous communities. With an absence of standards to ensure that Indigenous communities both consent to and benefit from mining activities, both Indigenous rights and land could be sacrificed in the name of the net zero transition. This outcome can be avoided if the risks identified here are properly addressed. Some possible ways forward are outlined in Chapter III.</p> -<p>Another common method to detect sUAS today is electronic surveillance measures, also known as passive radio frequency. This detection method allows defenders to identify the wireless signals used to control the UAS. Some passive RF capabilities show the location of both the sUAS and the operator. As one Department of Homeland Security report explains, C-sUAS may “use libraries of known UAS radio signatures and compare detected signals to those in the library in order to classify or identify UAS.” These sensors listen to sUAS communications via control stations, satellites, cell towers, or drone relays. A key concern with passive RF, however, is that sUAS are moving away from RF control, making current detection and defeat capabilities obsolete.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="box-1-the-lithium-triangle-water-scarcity-and-biodiversity-loss"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 1: The Lithium Triangle, Water Scarcity and Biodiversity Loss</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/3FjZUp7.png" alt="image13" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: RADA Radar.</strong> Source: DRS.</em></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Lithium is a key component in lithium-ion batteries and is widely used in the batteries that power electric vehicles, smart devices, renewable power plants and other key technologies. With net zero targets fuelling skyrocketing demand for lithium, this demand is being met by a surge in extraction in countries such as Chile – the world’s second-largest lithium producer.</code></em></p> -<p>Due to the detection liability of radar, C-sUAS designers often seek to combine RF detection and radars within a single platform. The FS-LIDS (Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft System Integrated Defeat System) is an example of a system supported by the JCO that incorporates both detection methods. The multi-layer detection capabilities of FS-LIDS allow operators to better conduct countermeasures that align with the given target and environment. However, a combination of sensors is not a necessity. EnforceAir is another JCO-supported system that uses RF for both detection and defeat. Nevertheless, sUAS operators can adapt to RF sensors. In July 2022, for example, a British defense firm developed a laser-controlled drone that will be undetectable by current RF sensors. Suicide drones, also known as one-way attack munitions or loitering munitions, may use an onboard inertial navigation system to allow sUAS to operate without alerting RF sensors. Russia has extensively used the Iranian Shahed-136 drone as a loitering munition in attacks on Ukraine.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The “Lithium Triangle” on the borders of Chile, Argentina and Bolivia, for example, is a region rich in lithium deposits. Within this, roughly a quarter of deposits lie beneath the Salar de Atacama salt flats in northern Chile. Often known as the Atacama Desert, this is one of the driest places on earth, with average annual precipitation of 1 mm. Access to water is limited, with available sources vital for local communities and their livelihoods, as well as local flora and fauna. Yet the mining of lithium in this region is increasingly serving to consume, contaminate and divert the scarce water resources available.</code></em></p> -<p>Other sensor modalities include electro-optical (EO), infrared (IR), and acoustic sensors to detect a target by its visual, heat, or sound signatures, respectively. These sensors are helpful in providing additional confirmation of a nearby sUAS threat but are rarely used as a standalone sensor. EO, IR, and acoustic sensors have very limited operational ranges. For example, the EnforceAir’s RF sensor has a radius of approximately 3 km, while the Discovair G2 acoustic sensor has an estimated range of 500 m. Additionally, potential countermeasures are fairly simple, including, for example, flooding a battlefield with noise that degrades acoustic sensor capabilities. For these reasons, EO, IR, and acoustic sensors are often used in combination with active or passive radar to provide a more effective, layered detection capability.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Estimates suggest up to two million litres of saline groundwater (commonly known as brine) are needed to produce one tonne of lithium, with brine extraction the dominant method used – in which brine is extracted, concentrated in large evaporation pools and treated with sodium carbonate. Brine typically has a salt content higher than seawater and is therefore regulated separately from water. Brine is neither potable nor suitable for agricultural use. Beatriz Bustos-Gallardo, Gavin Bridge and Manuel Prieto note that “this distinction allows firms to frame brine pumping as an action independent from freshwater extraction, and claim it has no effect on the hydrogeological or ecological balance of the basin”. Yet research indicates that increased groundwater extraction for the lithium industry has contributed to water deficit in the Salar de Atacama, with the amount of water pumped out of the region increasing by 21% between 2000 and 2015.</code></em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/MXZiIVC.png" alt="image14" /> -<img src="https://i.imgur.com/RArqeqf.png" alt="image15" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 7: C-sUAS Sensor Strengths and Weaknesses.</strong> Source: Characteristics from Department of Homeland Security; images from SRC Technologies, U.S. Department of Defense, Squarehead Technologies, and D-Fend Solutions.</em></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Concerns over the lithium industry’s contribution to water scarcity in the region have exacerbated tensions across local communities already facing the fallout from scarce rainfall and high rates of evaporation due to climate change. Meanwhile, key water sources that remain available for humans, livestock and crop irrigation have been contaminated by waste products of lithium extraction operations. In this context, many communities now rely on tankers delivering water. And while this situation has been triggered by expanding electric vehicle production at a global level, electric vehicles remain a rarity in Chile itself, highlighting the unequal distribution of harms and benefits in relation to critical minerals.</code></em></p> -<h4 id="command-and-control">Command and Control</h4> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Beyond these human impacts, lithium extraction is contributing to damage to the Atacama Desert’s unique biodiversity. The Laguna Santa Rosa Wetland, for example, is shrinking as a result of water scarcity, threatening the area’s 53 endemic species, 17 of which are classified as endangered. Other vulnerable species are also disappearing from the Atacama region, which is experiencing a significant reduction in plant cover, specifically algarrobo trees. Meanwhile, evaporation pools used in the extraction process are highly damaging to many bird species – flamingos in particular are misled by the large bodies of contaminated water.</code></em></p> -<p>Command and control (C2) is a critical element of C-sUAS operations, as it is for all air defense. Broadly speaking, C2 is the “exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.” A fundamental element of C-sUAS C2 is the centralized development of operational procedures that will enable decentralized execution of C-sUAS operations. Execution of the C-sUAS mission, in the near term, will be localized to the threatened asset or unit, and engagement authority will rest with the local commander and possibly junior leaders, who will make decisions based on the predefined rules of engagement. These tasks include integrating sensor data (from sources such as radar, cameras, and direction finders), classifying and identifying incoming threats, and transmitting this information among sensors and shooters to queue up responses. C2 operations require the creation of a common operational picture and share that intelligence with all relevant stakeholders.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To meet global demand for lithium, the companies already operating in the Atacama salt flats have increased their activities, while companies not yet present are also showing interest in the region’s reserves. Chile is, however, in the process of reassessing its relationship with the environment. A new constitution that could have significantly affected the country’s extractive industries was rejected in a referendum in 2022. However, efforts to rewrite the constitution continue, with hopes among some that a new constitution will be accepted this year, which could have consequences for how extractive industries are able to operate in the country.</code></em></p> -<p>While detecting sUAS presents the most commonly identified challenge, as previously discussed, sUAS also present a significant identification challenge. Over the near term, identification will depend more on context or procedures than specific Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems that confirm an sUAS’s affiliation. As a Joint Staff report explains, many U.S. UAS “do not have IFF capability and are similar or identical to threat [UAS].” C-sUAS rules of engagement (ROE) will therefore depend on the operational environment and threat intelligence, with ROE able to tighten or loosen as necessary. Future C-sUAS platforms may feature improved non-cooperative threat recognition capabilities, but for now ROE will determine whether defenders can shoot at incoming sUAS rather than pursue the identification of the object.</p> +<p><em>Main source: Ingrid Garces and Gabriel Alvarez, “Water Mining and Extractivism of the Salar de Atacama, Chile”, WIT Transactions on Ecology and the Environment (Vol. 245, 2020), pp. 189–99.</em></p> -<p>C2 for C-sUAS has improved significantly over the past few years, becoming increasingly open and interoperable. In July 2020, the DoD designated the Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2) system as the interim C2 system for C-sUAS. The FAAD C2 system provides a single integrated air picture that combines a suite of sensors, effectors, and other C2 systems given operational requirements. JCO director Sean Gainey noted the superiority of the FAAD C2 compared to alternatives, specifically noting its fire control capabilities. The rapidly evolving C-sUAS threat requires C2 development to build upon FAAD C2’s successes. The ultimate goal, in the eyes of Gainey and the JCO writ large, is to create an “open architecture standard based C2 system” that can be configured according to specific threat analysis.</p> +<h3 id="ii-elevated-demand-and-rising-risks">II. Elevated Demand and Rising Risks</h3> -<p>The current functions of FAAD C2 thus reveal the baseline of JCO C2 development. Currently FAAD C2 is hosted on a SRNC-17 laptop computer and Dell 7212 tablet computer, emphasizing the need for portable command functions. The extensive integration with sensors and communication systems also highlights the need for mature joint operation potential. FAAD C2 is deployed and integrated with 25 sensors, including AN/MPG-64 Sentinel and Ku-band Radio Frequency System (KuRFS) radars, and five communications systems, including Link 16 and Joint Range Extension Application Protocol.</p> +<p>As highlighted in Chapter I, some of the key human and environmental security risks relating to critical mineral extraction align closely with those associated with the extractives sector at large. However, the forecasted boom in demand presents particular risks – many of which are under-acknowledged and understudied, and which will require specific mitigations. Indeed, as countries accelerate efforts to reach net zero, a massive uplift in critical mineral mining will be required to meet skyrocketing demand. Critical mineral demand for the production of electric vehicles, for example, is expected to increase almost 300 times between 2020 and 2050, to meet the IEA net zero scenario.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/90FhqAk.png" alt="image16" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: The LIDS Family.</strong> The LIDS family of systems uses a range of passive and active sensors to detect, track, and identify UAS and non-hostile aircraft. Source: U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center.</em></p> +<p>In recognition of this, key consumer countries have been working to refine their strategic approach to securing critical mineral supply chains. These efforts can be seen in the US Critical Materials Strategy, the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy and the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, among others. However, few of these strategies adequately account for the particular environmental and human security risks likely to be presented as critical mineral extraction is scaled up. Nor has there been extensive research focused on the emergent risks across source countries in the face of unprecedented global demand. This chapter draws on both the limited existing literature and data from semi-structured interviews to harness current cross-sectoral knowledge on what can be anticipated in this regard.</p> -<h4 id="effectors">Effectors</h4> +<h4 id="fast-tracking-and-corner-cutting">Fast-Tracking and Corner-Cutting</h4> -<p>The DoD has developed a variety of kinetic, directed energy, and RF-based defenses against sUAS. These tools all come with their own strengths and weaknesses. As is constantly repeated in the C-sUAS community, there is no “silver bullet” effector to defeat these threats.</p> +<p>Interviewees flagged that corner-cutting in the process of authorising mine permits is a key issue. This issue is especially acute given unprecedented demand – and the resulting competition likely to be created between countries seeking rapidly to secure supplies. Where such corner-cutting takes place, this will likely see an erosion of processes designed to limit the damage done by mining, including community engagement, the securing of prior informed consent that is given freely, and the undertaking of comprehensive social and environmental impact assessments.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TVlS7Uy.png" alt="image17" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 8: Example C-sUAS Effectors by Defeat Mechanism and Basing.</strong> Note: Many systems listed here feature multiple deployment configurations and effectors. This table is illustrative and not comprehensive, intended to show the range of C-sUAS on the market. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>Currently, it takes between 10 and 20 years, depending on the context, to undertake the relevant assessments and obtain approvals required for a new mine. However, given the need for the energy transition to occur at speed, there is incentive for governments and companies to accelerate the process, which may motivate corner-cutting. The incentives to cut corners are likely to be higher in countries with high levels of corruption and low levels of government capacity, where the mine development process will be subject to lower levels of regulatory oversight. At a local level, corner-cutting is highly likely to exacerbate the human and environmental security risks outlined above, with local communities forced to absorb potential negative impacts resulting from time pressures on the energy transition.</p> -<p>Kinetic defenses include guns, nets, ropes, collision drones, missiles with proximity-fuse warheads, as well as more creative solutions such as falcons and strings of streamers to tangle propellers. Kinetic defenses typically employ mature technologies, offer the highest probability of kill for any single UAS, and allow significant range of intercept. Their weaknesses include vulnerability to sUAS swarms, given their focus on defeating individual drones. They also may be inappropriate for use in populated areas where intercept shrapnel may fall on people or property.</p> +<p>In some contexts, these pressures – combined with burgeoning critical mineral demand – may also motivate governments to remove some of the “red tape” that provides important protections for the environment, communities and workers, to increase production and attract investment. Such fast-tracking is already taking place, with incentives provided and regulatory requirements relaxed in countries such as the US, Australia, Brazil, Peru, the Philippines and South Africa.</p> -<p>The DoD has invested in several kinetic effectors. The Coyote system is one of the primary interim solutions today. There are several extant configurations which may be characterized as a missile or drone, with a jet-engine to accelerate the system out of its launcher, and fins that support its loitering capability. The original Coyote entered demonstration testing in 2016 and employed a kinetic effect through collision or the nearby explosion of the unit’s warhead. According to its FY 2024 budget, the Army procured over 1,200 Coyote interceptors between 2022 and 2023.</p> +<p>In the US, for example, the Thacker Pass lithium mine in Nevada is one of a number of critical mineral mines fast-tracked through approval processes in light of the “strategic” value of the support provided both to economic recovery and the expanding lithium-ion battery market. Its development has occurred despite the objections of Native American tribes, who claimed that they had not been properly consulted during the approval process, and who went on to launch legal action to challenge the mine’s approval.</p> -<p>The United States has steadily improved upon C-sUAS cost asymmetries. Given the proliferation of suicide drones such as the Iranian Shahed-136, which costs roughly $20,000–50,000 per unit, using missile interceptors that cost two to eight times as much is deeply inefficient. Instead, there has been a rise of cheaper alternatives such as anti-aircraft guns for C-sUAS, commonly known as “flak.” Ukraine, for example, has procured Germany’s Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, which can shoot down sUAS with a range of around 5 km, as well as the older Soviet ZU-23 anti-aircraft gun. The DoD has also invested in an anti-drone “strings of streamers” system and is pushing the system into a program of record. These older, simpler technologies have proven effective against sUAS threats.</p> +<p>In Indonesia, the government’s efforts to increase foreign investment – including in nickel mining and processing – have had stark consequences. Specifically, in 2022, after more than two years of constitutional and legal challenges, the government of Joko Widodo passed the controversial Omnibus Law, revising over 70 existing laws, with the aim of removing red tape, improving the investment climate and creating jobs. The law has been extensively criticised for weakening protection for workers and the environment; of specific interest for this paper is the law’s requirement that only investments considered high risk must conduct an environmental impact study, replacing wider requirements under previous legislation.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lqETAoX.png" alt="image18" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Coyote Testing.</strong> Source: Raytheon.</em></p> +<p>The move is likely to exacerbate existing environmental and human security issues relating to critical minerals. While Indonesian nickel production doubled between 2020 and 2022 and has continued to rise since, numerous cases have been reported of workers losing their lives and suffering serious health conditions, with thousands of hectares of rainforest destroyed and water and land polluted, at great cost to local communities and Indigenous populations. The Indonesian case highlights some of the risks associated with the critical mineral boom, with such dynamics likely to play out in many more cases as demand continues to increase. Ultimately, there is a risk of fast-tracking mines, cutting regulatory corners and removing red tape occurring at the cost of workers, local communities and the environment.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4L0qBZ1.png" alt="image19" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 10: Leonidas Pod HPM.</strong> Source: Epirus.</em></p> +<h4 id="exploring-new-mineral-rich-regions">Exploring New Mineral-Rich Regions</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CCuI1ii.png" alt="image20" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 11: Leonidas Ground-Based HPM.</strong> Source: Epirus, Inc.</em></p> +<p>Many of these concerns surrounding fast-tracking and corner-cutting are likely to be exacerbated in regions with unexplored critical mineral reserves, particularly in locations with no history of mineral mining. Such areas without previous experience of mining activity are likely to have lower levels of infrastructure, human population and activity in general, and are likely to have higher ecological integrity. Once a given mineral becomes more valuable, a higher incentive to build key infrastructure to extract that mineral is likely to have a significant impact on previously intact ecosystems.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CbqXyz8.png" alt="image21" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 12: Dronebuster Training at the Baghdad Embassy Compound in Iraq.</strong> Source: U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> +<p>Meanwhile, in these locations, the minimal presence of industry to date is likely to be matched with underdeveloped governance and regulatory frameworks for mining activity. In the absence of mandatory social and environmental impact assessments, requirements to undertake community engagement or seek a social licence to operate, the likelihood of environmental and human security risks occurring rises. Increasing global demand for critical minerals intensifies these concerns, incentivising fast-paced mineral exploration and the identification of new reserves in countries without histories of large-scale mining or in areas beyond national jurisdiction (see Box 2).</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jns5dsC.png" alt="image22" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 13: L–MADIS Training.</strong> Source: U.S. Marine Corps.</em></p> +<p>In 2012, for example, discoveries of mineral deposits in Malawi – a country with minimal prior history of mining – made it Africa’s largest source of REEs at that time. Those discoveries then mandated a rapid updating of the country’s Mining Act, a need to establish wider legal and institutional frameworks and, in the words of the then Minister of Natural Resources, Energy and Environment Cassim Chilumpha, a “crash program to train mining engineers, legal experts in mining and other related fields in the sector”. With many of the mines recently becoming operational, the contribution of mining to Malawi’s GDP is projected to increase from 1% to 6% by the end of 2023. Yet during the exploration phase and establishment of the mines and related infrastructure, the government has faced criticism for forcibly evicting villagers from their homes and for risking food and water security. Corruption has meant that Malawi has struggled to effectively address these issues, resulting in a situation where some local communities have denounced the mining sector and the lack of consultation, amid warnings that the country’s mining boom “will not necessarily translate into benefits for affected communities”.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IQBUOVw.png" alt="image23" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 14: High-Energy Laser Weapon Testing.</strong> Source: U.S. Air Force.</em></p> +<p>Concerns surrounding the Malawian experience extend to other countries in Africa, with low levels of exploration meaning that the full potential of the continent’s REEs reserves remains undetermined. As in the case of Malawi, there is concern over the initiation of potential extraction activities – of REEs and other critical minerals – in countries with high levels of corruption, weak governance and limited state capacity, where environmental protections and labour rights are likely to be weak or poorly enforced. Similar concern has been raised over the Middle East’s vast, undeveloped critical mineral resources, and the poor environmental and human rights record of many countries in that region. In locations with limited infrastructure, meanwhile, interviewees flagged further risks associated with the rapid development of infrastructure in new mining regions, noting the potential to facilitate the incursion of new licit and illicit industries, triggering further potential social and environmental harms.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/636C7g5.png" alt="image24" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 9: C-sUAS Effector Modality Strengths and Weaknesses.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project, images from Anduril and U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> +<h4 id="boom-and-bust">Boom and Bust</h4> -<p>The DoD has invested significantly in directed energy (DE) weapons, including on high-energy laser (HEL) and high-power microwave (HPM) systems capable of defeating sUAS. Lasers are cheap per shot, have large (so-called “unlimited”) magazines, and operate at the speed of light. However, they are technologically immature, expensive to build relative to other solutions, and offer limited line-of-sight ranges. In 2014, the U.S. Navy fielded the first operational directed energy weapon, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS), aboard the USS Ponce (LPD-15). The ODIN and HELIOS systems are in development today. A variety of specifically anti-drone laser systems are now being developed as well, including the Athena and HELWS MRZR.</p> +<p>Beyond those risks attributed to sudden mining booms in newly identified critical mineral-rich regions, there is growing concern around the implications of boom–bust cycles arising from the net zero transition. In the face of a sustained drive to advance green technologies and reduce the demand these exert on critical mineral supplies, future technological innovations and circular economies could rapidly and unexpectedly reduce demand for certain minerals.</p> -<p>HPMs are another effector type. They are cheap per shot fired, technologically mature, and particularly effective against sUAS swarms with their potentially wide area of effect. However, future sUAS may harden against HPMs, although this would significantly raise their development costs and potentially lead to engineering difficulties.</p> +<p>Beyond the inevitable disruption caused by a rapid scaling up and down of demand, interviewees emphasised the potential consequences in contexts where there is a lack of experience in properly closing mines at both the government and industry levels, with sudden, poorly managed mine closures presenting a range of environmental and human security risks. At the environmental level, storage of tailings (the waste products of mining and mineral processing) requires management long after a mine has ceased operating and, if not managed correctly, can have devastating environmental consequences. The 2015 Samarco Dam failure demonstrated the potential impact of the failure of tailings disposal dams. The incident resulted in a “tidal wave” of mining waste washing across the Brazilian landscape in what is considered Brazil’s worst environmental disaster. Although relating to iron ore – rather than critical minerals – the case illustrates the potential dangers arising should extraction activities unexpectedly wind down and tailings storage be mismanaged. Meanwhile, the adequate rehabilitation of mine sites, including reversal of the land use change that occurs with the establishment of a mine, is also a concern in the case of rapid boom–bust cycles. There are few examples globally of mine sites having been appropriately rehabilitated. That said, the majority of modern large-scale mines remain in operation, and mining companies increasingly have to provide financial assurance for mine rehabilitation to prevent mines being abandoned in the case of bankruptcy or similar events.</p> -<p>The Army plans to equip the Leonidas as its primary HPM for indirect fires protection. Unlike other C-sUAS defenses that disable one drone at a time, Leonidas was engineered to kill swarms of Group 1 and 2 UAS, as demonstrated in several U.S. Army test events. The Army’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) recently awarded a $66.1 million contract for Leonidas prototypes. Although HPMs have traditionally been based on larger platforms because of their large energy requirements, new technological developments are allowing for expanded basing options. The Leonidas Pod, for example, is a mobile, compact drone-based prototype that builds upon the ground-based system to offer relatively cheap, air-based C-sUAS.</p> +<p>At the human security level, beyond the health risks associated with scenarios such as those outlined above, there is also the question of social rehabilitation. Mining companies’ social licence to operate often rests on the benefits that mining activities purport to bring to local communities in the form of revenue and improved infrastructure. Historically, in a range of cases, closures of mines have led to communities abandoning settlements, leaving “ghost towns” in their wake. Although there are few examples relating to critical minerals specifically, the collapse of the diamond mining industry in the town of Kolmanskop in Namibia and the closure of platinum mining in Atok, Limpopo in South Africa are two wider examples.</p> -<p>Directed energy can be an effective C-sUAS tool. However, DE systems may encounter operational difficulties in complex and heavily congested environments, given the potential collateral damage to friendly forces and assets. Environmental factors such as poor weather or smoke in the atmosphere can also degrade their efficacy. Furthermore, training requirements for directed energy platforms may be intensive. As one analyst explains, an operator’s limited interaction time with an incoming UAS threat means that they must be well trained to deploy it effectively.</p> +<h4 id="increasing-geopolitical-competition">Increasing Geopolitical Competition</h4> -<p>The last defeat modality is RF, through jamming or spoofing the drone’s communications link. Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing — misleading its GPS — means that the operator can tell the drone that north is south, and west is east. Jamming, conversely, means disrupting communications between the drone and its operator and is simpler to perform. Although RF-based defenses are powerful, operators must be aware of environmental effects potentially impacting nearby commercial or otherwise friendly aircraft. RF-based defenses also do not affect autonomous or otherwise non-communicative UAS. Lastly, spoofing and jamming require defensive emissions, which may increase the risk that an adversary can geolocate defensive positions.</p> +<p>Many of the aforementioned issues risk exacerbating the geopolitical tensions associated with the critical minerals boom. Indeed, some commentators have warned of the potential for critical minerals to spark a “new arms race” or a “new Cold War”, especially given the role of the defence sector in driving critical mineral demand and, notably, the US decision to use wartime powers to secure critical mineral supply chains. The 1950 Defense Production Act gives the US president the power to “shape national defense preparedness programs and to take appropriate steps to maintain and enhance the domestic industrial base”. The act was expanded in 2022 by President Joe Biden to support production of net zero technologies, and again in 2023 to facilitate funding for projects related to the production of minerals such as lithium, REEs and tantalum.</p> -<p>RF-based defenses have become increasingly popular over the last decade and operate as fixed, mounted, and handheld systems. In June 2020, six of eight systems selected to represent the JCO’s interim C-sUAS capabilities utilized RF defeat: FS-LIDS, L-MADIS, CORIAN, NINJA, MEDUSA, and Dronebuster. The Dronebuster is a handheld line-of-sight system weighing roughly four pounds, which allows for easy infantry and squad-level usage. Jamming capabilities also vary depending on the system; the Dronebuster Block 3 offers 45 minutes of jamming, whereas the updated Dronebuster SNA offers three hours of continuous jamming.</p> +<p>Competition over critical minerals could also exacerbate tensions between great powers in the context of China’s dominant role in a range of critical mineral supply chains. While China’s dominance in the context of critical mineral processing is outside the scope of this paper, it is important to note that China also has significant critical mineral reserves, which are subject to the same risks as those highlighted in this paper. China is the largest importer of lithium, nickel, cobalt and manganese, has significant reserves of lead, selenium, tellurium, tin, zinc, graphite, lithium and titanium, and dominates lithium battery production. The country also dominates REE supply chains, accounting for 70% of global rare earth ore extraction and 90% of rare earth ore processing, following decades of state investment, export controls, cheap labour and low environmental standards.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Y5ZZ2HB.png" alt="image25" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 10: Select C-sUAS Operations.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>In this context, the US and its allies are increasingly looking to secure their own supplies to minimise potential supply chain vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, an international environment characterised by growing contestation over critical minerals, among other factors, could see mineral-rich source countries rendered increasingly vulnerable to great power meddling. Such a scenario – whether real or imagined – has already played out in Bolivia in 2019, when former president Evo Morales accused the US of orchestrating a coup to ensure access to Bolivia’s lithium reserves. Investigative journalism website Declassified has made similar allegations against the UK.</p> -<h4 id="a-diverse-solution-set">A Diverse Solution Set</h4> +<p>Yet the likelihood of intensified great power competition over critical minerals is debated. Some commentators cite critical minerals’ relative abundance and recyclability, and the fact that, unlike with oil and gas, a break in constant supply is unlikely to spark immediate crisis. In this context, critical mineral competition is arguably unlikely, alone, to act as an impetus for all-out war. However, this does not rule out intensified competition, tension and violence at the local level – a scenario potentially amplified by the unequal burden of critical mineral demand from the Global North and countries such as China on source countries in the Global South, and the resultant environmental and social impacts on communities largely concentrated there.</p> -<p>There are many different types of sensors, effectors, C2, and basing options for the C-sUAS mission. There is no single mix-and-match that serves as a universal solution to defeat sUAS threats. Rather, investment in a wide variety of sensors, effectors, and basing options is essential to ensure that the U.S. military is equipped to address the diverse set of threats posed by UAS. As JCO director Sean Gainey has explained, “There must be layers of systems to address the threat of UAS. It has to be a system of systems. It is a holistic approach.”</p> +<p>In this context of geopolitical competition it is important to note that the UK’s position has been weakened since leaving the EU. UK allies – such as the US and EU – are competing with both hostile states and allied states for access to critical minerals. The UK may struggle to leverage negotiating power following withdrawal from the EU and more work is needed to establish how the UK will address these geopolitical concerns.</p> -<p>Sensors and effectors of various sorts have their own unique strengths and weaknesses. Kinetic effectors may be more reliable to take down any individual UAS threat — especially those that are bigger and faster. Non-kinetic effectors such as HPMs, on the other hand, can more effectively counter large UAS swarms.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="box-2-deep-sea-mining-case-study"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 2: Deep-Sea Mining Case Study</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Trade-offs likewise impact sensors. Active radar allows operators to detect threats at greater ranges but may give away their positions. Passive RF sensors allow operators to remain stealthy and are therefore the better option for dismounted, forward-deployed units. Yet passive RF sensors cannot detect pre-programmed UAS that do not communicate with their operator, which is becoming more prevalent on the battlefield. One-way attack drones, for example, have become common in Russian attacks against Ukrainian civil infrastructure. Overinvestment in one defense modality may leave defenders vulnerable in certain attack scenarios.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Over millennia, deposits of critical minerals such as manganese, nickel and cobalt have built up in nodules on the ocean floor, thousands of metres below sea level. Deep-sea mining, proponents argue, is a means of sourcing critical minerals “responsibly, ethically, and with a minimal emissions load on the planet”, reducing the need for land-based mining and enabling countries such as the US to decrease their dependence on imported minerals. However, others caution that deep-sea mining may risk the destruction of deep-sea ecosystems (of which we have little understanding), and cause widespread pollution, the decimation of fish stocks and the disruption of deep-sea carbon storage. The lack of scientific data on the harms and benefits has prompted several countries to call for a moratorium on deep-sea mining.</code></em></p> -<p>The need for diversity is likewise true in basing options. The right solution for a fixed site is different than that of a maneuver unit. A mobile defender may forsake having a range of effectors to remain small, light, and nimble so that they can shoot on the move. Fixed-site defenders, however, face adversaries that can plan sophisticated, large-scale attacks at various altitudes using a variety of missiles and UAS. Their defenses therefore require longer-range radars and effectors. Again, there is no one-size-fits-all material solution.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Crucially, deep-sea mining would largely take place in international waters, raising crucial legislative and regulatory questions. While the International Seabed Authority (ISA) will ultimately decide whether deep-sea mining goes ahead, decision-making has been delayed until 2025 after Costa Rica, Chile and France insisted that no permits be granted until a stronger regulatory landscape had been established. In the meantime, the ISA has issued contracts for exploratory work; as of November 2022, China held five of the 30 contracts issued.</code></em></p> -<h3 id="the-current-path">The Current Path</h3> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Should such activity go ahead, this “new potential extractive frontier” could have major geopolitical ramifications. China appears to be leading the race: as well as holding the greatest number of deep-sea mining exploration contracts, it has made funding for research in this area a national security and economic priority. Other issues arise from the fact that the US is not an ISA member state and is currently engaged in drafting parallel legislation. As well as limiting the US’s ability to influence global policy on deep-sea mining, this position also potentially disincentivises other countries to comply with theISA.</code></em></p> -<p><em>As senior leaders institutionalize the C-sUAS enterprise across the DOTMLPF, they must address critical gaps in training and personnel requirements.</em></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Deep-sea mining in international waters throws up other issues of relevance, at times involving overlaps with other key areas, such as fisheries. Norway, for example, plans to deep-sea mine an area the size of Germany on its continental shelf, most of which lies outside Norway’s exclusive economic zone, potentially infringing UK fishing rights. Key parts of the seafood industry have called for a pause in deep-sea mining plans, as recent research has established that tropical tuna fishing grounds in the Pacific are likely to overlap with areas licensed for deep-sea mining. This, in turn, could impact coastal communities reliant on fishing, resulting in loss of livelihoods and community displacement, among other harmful impacts.</code></em></p> -<p>U.S. efforts to develop effective C-sUAS operators and platforms can be loosely categorized in three stages: urgent need, refinement, and institutionalization. The United States is entering the third stage today, which will be the most difficult. It will require buy-in from the military services and clarity of roles throughout the defense establishment. The following sections define these stages, provide a historical overview of U.S. activities, and review what the United States must do to achieve institutionalization in the C-sUAS enterprise.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">More broadly, fundamental questions relevant to the ISA’s 2025 decision remain unanswered. As yet, the consequences of deep-sea mining of critical minerals for marine biodiversity and ecosystems are unquantified, while responsibility and payment of any compensation is yet to be determined. Additionally, as with much terrestrial mining, the equitable sharing of the benefits of such mining in international waters is far from uaranteed.</code></em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eyLA6p3.png" alt="image26" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 11: Air and Missile Threat Matrix.</strong> Source: U.S. Army.</em></p> +<h3 id="iii-the-road-ahead">III. The Road Ahead</h3> -<h4 id="urgent-need">Urgent Need</h4> +<p>With the world’s attention on the net zero transition and with critical minerals playing a pivotal role in this transition, the international community – and the UK as a key financial and mining hub – has a unique opportunity to address the environmental and human security risks arising. As many of the risks identified are not unique to critical mineral mining, there are already a range of known options available. However, the rapid acceleration of critical mineral extraction could intensify existing challenges, necessitating a fundamental rethink of how to apply interventions and embrace emerging options in this space. This chapter uses both the limited available literature on this topic and data drawn from semi-structured interviews designed to gather insights from across a range of sectors, to consider the options available.</p> -<p>The U.S. response to C-sUAS has transpired in three stages. The first was urgent need. In 2016, ISIS captured large swaths of territory in both Iraq and Syria. They were among the first non-state actors to use small commercial quadcopters, which they employed effectively in battles against U.S.-supported Iraqi forces. There were few C-sUAS defenses in theater or readily deployable at the time. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) leadership issued an urgent requirement for defenses, prompting the DoD to quickly transfer a variety of commercial off-the-shelf C-sUAS platforms.</p> +<h4 id="a-governance-rethink">A Governance Rethink</h4> -<p>In 2016, the United States lacked cheaper, efficient effectors to use against cheap and plentiful sUAS. This lack was a consequence of wide divestment in Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) by the Army and Marine Corps in the 1990s and early 2000s. Both services were focused on the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan and Iraq and therefore chose to cut Air Defense Artillery (ADA) units in favor of more mission-critical maneuver forces. Military leadership believed that the U.S. Air Force would provide sufficient defensive counterair capabilities to maintain air superiority and protect ground forces. Military leadership did not consider the threat of UAS and cruise missiles as viable, near-term threats to U.S. military operations. This trend was not uniquely American; most NATO nations also weakened their air defense capabilities over the last two decades.</p> +<p>In considering options to mitigate the environmental and human security risks outlined in this paper, interviewees stressed that a vast and complex regulatory landscape exists for mining companies, with country-level regulation often out of date and therefore lagging far behind best practice. Mining in the US, for example, is regulated by an 1872 mining law, despite new technological advancements and improved awareness of mining’s impacts. Outdated laws related to mineral extraction often fail to address the complexities and scale of modern-day mining and related harms, leaving mining companies to navigate a complex regulatory landscape.</p> -<p>Yet with the new threat clearly in sight, Congress has quickly committed funds to procure defenses. This step is highlighted by a significant surge in the DoD’s FY 2017–FY 2019 procurement and research, development, testing, and evaluation spending for C-sUAS. While the DoD achieved an interim solution in months, it fully satisfied the C-sUAS Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) two years later in FY 2019. The initial JUON effort successfully committed defenses to provide an “interim standalone capability” to defend 89 CENTCOM sites against Groups 1 and 2 UAS.</p> +<p>Numerous guidelines exist detailing best practice for companies and countries in relation to prior informed consent that is freely given, environmental protection, transparency and traceability, community engagement and other elements of due diligence designed to mitigate environmental and social harms. However, the majority of these standards are voluntary, meaning that they are inconsistently and often inadequately adopted across the sector. Both large-scale and smaller mining companies often do not apply best practice, as financial considerations are often prioritised. This situation is especially likely where mining occurs in countries with a weak regulatory environment.</p> -<p>Given the active threat to U.S. allied forces, the selection of defense systems was understandably fast paced. According to Barry J. Pike in 2018, then program executive officer for missiles and space, the C-sUAS budget was placed “in the same office as our Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar project because they do know how to go fast. . . . Within 60 days a requirement was generated and within another 60 days, we had materiel in theatre. . . . We fielded more than 270 different kinds of systems [for C-sUAS].” A consequence of this quick delivery, however, was the minimal effort placed on the typical acquisition processes for programs of record and the DOTMLPF process. The massive quantity of C-sUAS platforms was deemed necessary at the time but would require the next stage in the C-sUAS response to consolidate these programs into a manageable portfolio.</p> +<p>A concerted effort is needed to address this regulatory shortfall. First, best practice, such as International Finance Corporation Performance Standard 6 and practice aligned with science-based targets for nature (SBTN), should, as much as possible, be reflected in national regulations in relevant source countries. Second, improved consumer requirements are needed for standards around the production of critical minerals (as in the case of the 2023 EU Regulation on Deforestation-Free Products). Third, capacity of producer countries must be improved to apply regulation and best practice, with technical assistance provided to this end. Development assistance should also be provided to mineral-rich jurisdictions to establish appropriate in-country regulations and build capacity to implement such regulation effectively. An example of an impactful technical assistance initiative working to improve the mainstreaming of biodiversity into development and infrastructure practice can be seen in the Conservation, Mitigation and Biodiversity Offsets (COMBO) programme, with more initiatives of this type required.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/liVRhk2.png" alt="image27" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 15: Iranian-Made Kamikaze Drone.</strong> Remnants of Iranian-made kamikaze drone used by Houthi forces against Saudi Arabia.</em></p> +<p>Improved practice and outcomes following mine development are likely to be stronger if these initiatives are led by governments and civil society, with sectoral initiatives often not aiming for the highest standards, given the need to integrate the views of many parts of industry. Business must be consulted, but should not necessarily be the sole source of information. The mining sector does, however, have an important role to play in applying regulation to achieve positive outcomes, particularly through initiatives such as the ICMM and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). These bodies have helped catalyse best practice across the industry and engage mining companies and other stakeholders to address the risks associated with the extractive sector. Innovations in mining also demonstrate the possibilities for progress, such as fully electric mines and the sequestration of carbon in tailings, but governments need to identify opportunities to support this work, rather than allowing the initiatives to remain voluntary. The investor community, meanwhile, has a crucial role to play, through initiatives such as the Taskforce on Nature-Related Financial Disclosures (TNFD), and should set targets and report against them to ensure positive outcomes following mine development.</p> -<h4 id="refinement">Refinement</h4> +<h4 id="the-role-of-the-uk">The Role of the UK</h4> -<p>The second stage in the U.S. response was one of refinement, during which the United States developed a more focused C-sUAS portfolio that was operationally effective and logistically sustainable. It included a diversity of sensors and effectors to cover the full threat spectrum. To fulfill this mission, in November 2019, the U.S. secretary of defense designated the Army as the lead service for C-sUAS; soon thereafter, the Army created the JCO to lead this effort. The JCO also helps the Army think through deployment strategies and align resources for C-sUAS. Recent budget justifications highlight this phase shift. The FY 2022 budget request noted the C-sUAS transition from a JUON to formal programming, with requirements specified under the Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum 078-20. Also in FY 2022, the Army expanded the threat to include Group 3 UAS and designated a unique line-item number for C-sUAS. This move marked a symbolic emphasis on C-sUAS as a standalone program.</p> +<p>The UK can play an important role in leading many of these efforts. The UK government has branded itself as a “clean energy superpower” and a leader in “the race towards net zero”, alongside a range of biodiversity commitments. The UK is also uniquely positioned to facilitate action in this area given its role as a global trade, commodities and financial hub. Beyond this, the country is a mining hub, with many of the most prominent and profitable mining companies registered in the UK, and it is also home to industry organisations such as the ICMM.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tboBblc.png" alt="image28" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 16: C-sUAS Milestones.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>The UK government should use its unique position in this field to convene regulatory and wider stakeholder communities, ensuring cross-sector buy-in, for example, through the TNFD and SBTN and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). The UK should also use its financial and diplomatic position to enter bilateral partnership discussions with governments, while using its convening power to bring stakeholders together to identify and apply meaningful multilateral solutions. The Forest, Agriculture and Commodity Trade (FACT) dialogue, for example, could act as a model for bringing together countries to discuss how to address critical mineral-related risks, recognising the global scale of the challenge and the need for involvement from supply and demand countries across both the Global North and the Global South. In these ways, the UK can impactfully support integration of high-quality targeted frameworks into this burgeoning sub-sector of mining. While the mining industry is aware of the need to make fundamental changes, and certain companies have made significant progress in key areas, industry-wide change is unlikely unless governments, consumers and investors across society demand it.</p> -<h4 id="institutionalization">Institutionalization</h4> +<p>Given the criticality of the net zero transition and the minerals it requires, the UK – along with other consumer countries – should also review domestic policies to maximise recovery of critical minerals that are already in consumer supply chains (even as waste). This would reduce waste and improve resilience in supply chains through the creation of an internal market. Interviewees criticised the UK’s current approach as being one of pursuing key net zero milestones in the wrong order, highlighting that the UK currently has a Critical Minerals Strategy but no targeted industrial strategy relating specifically to this area, effectively rendering the former strategy toothless. They also emphasised that there has been limited progress on ensuring that the Critical Minerals Strategy promotes environmental, social and governance standards, with individuals at the verification workshop calling for the government to urgently prioritise and take action on this. Establishing industry priorities in this space before securing critical mineral supply chains will be key to ensuring that critical minerals are used strategically, particularly in the face of fluctuations in supply. This may be done by establishing which industries should be prioritised in times of shortage: for example, energy, healthcare and transport.</p> -<p>The third and final stage is institutionalization, during which the United States must fill critical gaps across the DOTMLPF construct. The central question here is about how to apply air defense principles and institutionalize these capabilities to non-air defenders. The challenge is developing DOTMLPF solutions across the force to air defense and non-air defense units alike.</p> +<p>Broadening opportunities for sourcing, aside from extraction via new mines, should also be a future priority. Critical mineral recycling and extended producer responsibility would help minimise many of the risks discussed in this paper, and help in moving towards a circular economy. Currently, 0.5% of lithium and 0.2% of REEs are recycled globally, rising to 32% for cobalt and 60% for nickel. While recycling is not a short-term solution, as time is needed to build the necessary infrastructure, scientists estimate that with optimum recycling the US could meet 30%–40% of anticipated demand for critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel and graphite through recycling. The IEA estimates that recycling could meet 10% of global demand – with the benefits of recycling much higher for countries that have already embraced clean energy technologies. Given the pressures that increased demand will put on critical mineral supply chains in the coming years, investment in the necessary recycling infrastructure should be prioritised.</p> -<p>The military services will play a larger role in the institutionalization phase. Questions remain as to whether they will accept systems supported by the JCO or develop their own unique platforms more suited for their specific needs, as well as how such needs will be prioritized against other service needs. Major policy, strategy, budget, and programmatic decisions will be made that will carry enormous consequences for the field.</p> +<p>Disposable e-cigarettes (vapes) highlight the need for forward-thinking, circular-economy-driven policies. The UK currently throws away 1.3 million disposable vapes every week, amounting to more than 65 million a year. The vapes that currently go to landfill each year contain lithium-ion batteries that contain enough lithium, if recycled, to produce 1,200 electric vehicle batteries. The IEA has warned of lithium shortages as soon as 2025, with lithium recycling a key avenue to securing supplies. While the recycling of lithium could currently only take place on a small scale, its value as an industry would grow exponentially as more lithium stock enters the economy. Given the potential of lithium recycling from products such as disposable vapes and the UK’s projected future lithium needs, policymakers should prioritise establishing infrastructure for critical mineral recycling, and recycling more broadly. To date, domestic progress has been slow. However, the UK’s first industrial-scale lithium-ion battery recycling facility received clearance to operate in 2023 with a forecasted processing capacity of up to 22,000 tonnes of lithium-ion batteries per year. Yet more needs to be done to reform waste management processes that do not maximise wider opportunities to recover critical minerals. Extended producer responsibility would also help prevent waste at the scale seen in the case of disposable vapes.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BhP0kFp.png" alt="image29" /> -<img src="https://i.imgur.com/l9ZyhZs.png" alt="image30" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 12: DOTMLPF Plans and Potential Pitfalls.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense; DOTMLPF definitions from U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> +<p>The UK has regulations in place to encourage recovery, reuse and recycling of electrical and electronic equipment (EEE) and will consult on this in relation to critical minerals in 2023, as well as carrying out an assessment to consider the “circularity of critical minerals in the UK today as a baseline for future work”. However, other work in this area has recently been delayed, such as the extended producer responsibility scheme for packaging, with new rules to ensure packaging producers pay for the cost of recycling their packaging deferred from October 2024 to 2025. Experience of this type raises concerns that proactive steps to support the recycling and reuse of critical minerals could face the same hurdles. Meanwhile, disposable vape producers have already been criticised for not complying with EEE regulations, highlighting the ease with which manufacturers of other critical mineral-based products might avoid compliance.</p> -<p><strong>DOCTRINE</strong></p> +<p>Given the urgency of the net zero transition, the government should prioritise and fast-track relevant policy initiatives, looking at all options to upscale the UK’s recycling capabilities. At the same time, it should work with manufacturers on extended producer responsibility, the right to repair and design-to-recycle best practice to ensure that critical minerals are reused and recycled wherever possible. The government should also work with manufacturers to reduce the critical mineral footprint in products, using the power of taxation where possible. Car manufacturers, for example, are increasing production of electric SUVs but these need larger batteries, and therefore more minerals and energy, than smaller electric vehicles. In response to this, Norway recently began taxing electric vehicles over a certain weight, a move designed to motivate car manufacturers to be more efficient with their mineral usage. These measures would all serve to reduce demand for critical minerals, thereby helping to secure supply for the industries that most need them. As well as helping to secure critical mineral supply chains, improved domestic recycling has the potential to create jobs and support UK economic growth.</p> -<p>C-sUAS doctrine has improved significantly over the last decade. The DoD began developing C-sUAS tactics, techniques, and procedures over the late 2010s as the sUAS threat proliferated. The Army released three central documents during this period. The first was the 2016 Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-01.8, Techniques for Combined Arms for Air Defense. ATP 3-01.8 provides guidance on how combined arms forces can protect themselves from air attacks, including UAS threats.</p> +<h4 id="social-awareness-and-public-engagement">Social Awareness and Public Engagement</h4> -<p>The second central doctrine publication was the 2017 ATP 3-01.81, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques. This report provides defense planning, training guidance, and regional threat preparations for sUAS threats. It highlights basic issues such as identifying specific UAS threats and potential responses based on the operational environment, enemy capabilities, and tactics. It also offers some specific combined arms unit training recommendations.</p> +<p>To drive many of the necessary changes, attention to societal-level narratives is also required. Currently, the discourse on the renewable energy sector that critical minerals fuel is supportive: in 2022, polling published by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy showed that 88% of people in the UK support using renewable energy. Meanwhile, polling data by Ipsos and the Centre for Climate Change and Social Transformations showed that in October 2022, the majority of people in the UK continued to support most net zero policies, including electric vehicle subsidies, among others.</p> -<p>The third major doctrine publication was the 2020 Army Field Manual (FM) 3-01, U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations. FM 3-01 incorporates details on the specific UAS threats and C-UAS techniques and offers some of the clearest guidance on countering sUAS to date. The report provides air defenders with established rules of engagement, along with guidance on the specific altitude, speed, and actions needed to determine whether a UAS is indeed a threat. Defensive measures are also explained down to the force level and divided by type, such as maneuver, aviation, special operating forces, field artillery, and intelligence (see Table 13). This clarified roles and responsibilities among the branches.</p> +<p>However, as this paper has highlighted, critical mineral mining is associated with a number of environmental and human security risks. If these are left unmitigated, it could reduce support for the net zero transition both domestically and internationally. Given the benefits that critical minerals can bring to both net zero goals and local economies, interviewees stressed that efforts to garner widespread societal support are fundamental. The empowerment of local communities where mining is taking place and, more widely, of consumers of technology containing critical minerals are both key to ensuring public support for critical mineral mining, and can help facilitate a just transition to net zero.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cAWOVuN.png" alt="image31" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 13: Army C-sUAS Doctrine.</strong> Source: U.S. Army.</em></p> +<p>Community engagement and trust building are key to ensuring mining companies’ social licence to operate and that local communities are partners and beneficiaries of the mineral extraction process. This paper has highlighted the local harms that can occur. However, there are a few examples of mining companies actively prioritising community engagement and ensuring meaningful community oversight of mining activity and the associated benefits.</p> -<p>The primary concern is that doctrine is not often shared, embraced, or applied appropriately in operations or materiel development. One possible factor contributing to these issues is the lack of joint doctrine. Recognizing this underdevelopment, the 2018 Joint Publication (JP) 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, called for more detailed UAS procedures on joint threat detection, identification, and engagement. Since then, however, progress has been slow. For example, in its section on C-sUAS, the 2021 update to JP 3-30 Joint Air Operations, only noted the complexities of defeating sUAS and the need to distinguish between friendly and enemy sUAS. It failed to provide the kind of detail laid out in Army doctrine. Furthermore, now that the JCO has down-selected its primary C-sUAS sensors, C2, and effectors, a new joint publication could include specific C-sUAS platforms and operations to provide more clarity to service members.</p> +<p>Mining company Cameco, for example, engaged the English River First Nation (ERFN) in Canada as a partner in a uranium mining project and undertook several years of discussions before a collaborative agreement was signed in 2013 to formalise ERFN’s share of the mine’s benefits. The agreement set out Cameco’s obligations to workforce and business development, community investment and engagement and environmental stewardship, and committed to regular communications between the two parties to ensure mutual benefit, thereby sustaining “high levels of trust” built on “transparency and collaboration”.</p> -<p>The DoD must invest in future thinking to keep doctrine fresh as new challenges arise. This requires investing in internal and external leadership across the C-sUAS enterprise. The JCO — or another central authority — can coordinate and invest in this work and disseminate its findings. This may be done through joint military-academic dialogues, wargames, conflict simulations, and open-source intelligence collection and analysis on sUAS technologies and operations. The joint efforts of the military, academia, and defense industry can support the further evolution of doctrine at the pace required.</p> +<p>Similarly, lithium mining company Sales de Jujuy has been praised for “fostering mutually beneficial and understanding partnerships with localities” in Argentina and the Alaskan Red Dog Mine has brought “lasting and significant” benefits to local Indigenous communities, though these are “modest” in the context of the mine’s overall operations and profit.</p> -<p><strong>ORGANIZATION</strong></p> +<p>The impact of community engagement and trust building can also be seen in the UK context. Cornish Lithium has proactively engaged with the local community, organising community engagement events and Q&amp;A sessions and launching a community fund to contribute to local clubs, charities and activity groups. This has helped to secure broad support, although concerns about the environmental impact and the potential for wealth from Cornwall’s lithium to be amassed elsewhere remain. In contrast, Cornish Tin Limited’s plans to explore for and extract tin, lithium, tungsten and other metals from the Wheal Vor tin mine have met local opposition, with a local newspaper noting that “there has yet to be a full public meeting where [locals’] questions can be put to Cornish Tin”. According to the British Geological Survey, areas of the UK from the Highlands to southwest England have the right geology for critical mineral mining, including of lithium. Meanwhile, the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy puts emphasis on growing domestic capabilities along the supply chain, which includes domestic mining. Garnering community support for onshore mining through community engagement is, therefore, crucial.</p> -<p>The primary task of the military services is to organize, train, equip, and provide forces to the combatant commanders. In light of this goal, how will the services organize units or forces to perform the C-sUAS mission? Will the force structure for dedicated air defense forces within each service increase or will mission responsibility for the current forces merely expand? Will the services define a partitioning of mission responsibility between dedicated air defense forces and all other units and equip each accordingly?</p> +<p>While examples of mining companies actively engaging with communities are encouraging, this kind of best practice remains largely voluntary and is not the industry norm across companies or geographies. For this reason, governments should demand best practice on community engagement from companies operating in their territory, with the Global North supporting supply countries in the Global South to demand the same.</p> -<p>Clearly, the C-sUAS mission mandates an increase in dedicated air defense force structure across the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force, but the mission also requires an all-of-force approach to defeating the UAS threat. Dedicated and non-dedicated air defense units must be prepared to perform active defense tasks and apply passive defense techniques to counter the UAS threat. The allocation of C-sUAS capability should align to mission responsibility, and the complexity of the materiel solutions, given the operational context they are applied in, should inform whether the capability requires a dedicated air defense crew or a non-dedicated operator. The concept of a CAFAD approach, across all services, should not be lost as the DoD organizes for this mission set.</p> +<p>Another key element is community empowerment to demand the local distribution of benefits. The potential for success in this area can be seen in the case of the Shetland Community Benefit Fund, an independent cooperative of local communities which is actively engaging with renewable energy companies to ensure that Shetland’s communities “benefit from commercial renewable energy developments in the islands”. Similarly, Community Power Cornwall calls for “the ownership and integration of renewable energy technologies into everyday lives and settings”, and develops community-owned renewable energy installations.</p> -<p>Likewise, given the breadth and scope of the UAS challenge, the DoD should not lose sight of the fact that a single office to coordinate and guide development of C-sUAS capabilities might be of value. Since January 2020, the JCO has served as the central C-sUAS coordinator in the DoD, focused on establishing joint training, developing joint doctrine, and synchronizing joint materiel development. Because there is no one-size-fits-all for C-sUAS across the services, the JCO has promoted service-specific materiel and policy development while still working to reduce disparate and redundant investment, as is its mission. As a result, the DoD avoided investing in a larger number of platforms, greater redundancy among existing platforms, and increased maintenance, training, and logistics.</p> +<p>This, in turn, links to the need for better public understanding and education on mining more broadly. Public awareness of the risks associated with critical mineral mining is key to driving progress on the consumer and investor requirements that are ultimately how a sector – and the governments that regulate the sector in producer countries – will be motivated to make change. Greater public understanding will empower communities to engage with the mining industry in an informed manner. Additionally, public understanding of the importance of critical minerals for the net zero transition will help to boost support for mining projects and reduce demand by ensuring consumers are more mindful about products that contain critical minerals. Equally, such understanding is likely to increase support for circular economy measures to reduce demand, such as design-to-recycle and the right to repair.</p> -<p>Yet the consensus model for C-sUAS may need to evolve over time. The current requirement for wide, cross-service consensus over C-sUAS investment could inhibit future transformation of the air defense enterprise to meet the threat. In the spectrum between development led by an all-powerful JCO on one end, and the Army and Marine Corps completely in charge of their own disparate plans on the other, today’s acquisition enterprise may lean too far toward the latter camp. Congress and DoD leadership should reexamine JCO authorities and relation to service acquisition agencies to improve the requirements process and acquisition timelines. This could mean empowering the JCO with an authority requirement recognized by the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) that is broad enough to be effective for immediate C-sUAS needs. This would need to be done, however, in coordination with service leadership to satisfy unique service requirements and avoid overlapping too much with other requirement generation bodies, such as the Army Futures Command Air and Missile Defense Cross-Functional Team (AMD CFT), which perhaps could focus more on longer-term C-sUAS requirements.</p> +<p>Facilitating forums at which mining companies and local communities engage should be a UK priority, to ensure the economic and social viability of plans to mine critical minerals domestically. Internationally, cross-sector, multi-stakeholder coalitions can help to empower local communities whose views are often overlooked in the interests of mining companies, while promoting best practice across the critical mineral mining sector. Examples of this already exist, such as the Fair Cobalt Alliance and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which can act as models to replicate.</p> -<p>Outside of acquisition authorities, an empowered JCO might also lead C-sUAS coordination among the United States and its allies. The U.S. military spends significant resources to train and integrate its air defenses with allies and partners. These efforts have made joint operations safer and more effective in many theaters. In the C-sUAS arena, however, sales and joint partnerships are slow, and allies appear to rely mostly on RF sense and defeat platforms. Few NATO allies, for example, have invested in active defenses and instead appear to rely on passive defense, counterattacks, and general deterrence. As U.S. partners recognize the increasing sUAS threat — especially in light of Russia-Ukraine fighting today — the JCO can engage in dialogue and workshops to support U.S. exports, co-development, and joint training opportunities.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Dk84IOk.png" alt="image32" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 17: JCO Demonstration at Yuma Proving Ground.</strong> Industry and military officials attended the first JCO demonstration in April 2021 at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, where the focus was on low-collateral effects interceptors (LCEI) systems.</em></p> +<p>Critical minerals are essential for the net zero transition and for meeting the target set at the UNFCCC Paris Conference in 2015 to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Because of this, demand for these minerals is set to grow rapidly: the IEA projects that up to 28 million tonnes of minerals for green technology will be needed in 2040 – a significant increase from the 7 million tonnes currently mined each year.</p> -<p><strong>TRAINING</strong></p> +<p>While their potential benefit is significant, this paper has explored the risks associated with critical minerals mining, covering both environmental and human security. At an environmental level, the paper finds key risks to include the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to deforestation, water scarcity, soil erosion, pollution and biodiversity loss. In relation to human security, key risks include the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to human rights abuses and labour exploitation, crime, corruption and conflict. These issues often intersect, with the biggest impact often felt by local communities, including Indigenous communities on or near whose land mineral reserves may be located.</p> -<p>Training is an urgent need across the joint force. The need for C-sUAS is on course to become ubiquitous for fixed and maneuver formations, necessitating a wide distribution and variety of training. As the JCO has affirmed, air defense specialists will continue to manage UAS threats for Groups 3 through 5, but the DoD should prepare all units to counter Groups 1 and 2. Commanders at all levels should incorporate C-sUAS in training exercises. Basic training must be simple enough to teach in a short window but comprehensive enough to cover this threat spectrum.</p> +<p>While many of these risks are already established, this paper highlights the potential for skyrocketing demand for critical minerals to accelerate these harms. This may occur where burgeoning demand incentivises governments to remove or overlook relevant regulations; mandates the opening up of new mining frontiers in countries without histories of extractive operations that lack the infrastructure or capacity to manage the associated risks; exacerbates boom–bust cycles of extractive activity; and increases geopolitical competition.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="us-army-master-sergeant">U.S. Army master sergeant</h4> - <p>“You’re giving us $10 billion worth of capabilities and $10 of training.”</p> -</blockquote> +<p>These risks have very real consequences for the communities and environment they impact. However, the international community – and the UK as a key financial, trade and mining hub – has a range of opportunities to address the risks and minimise the damage associated with critical mineral extraction for the net zero transition. With the world’s attention on the energy transition, there is a prime opportunity to rethink the current approach and embrace emerging opportunities. Some of these opportunities are not novel in and of themselves but they do require a concerted, strengthened effort to achieve.</p> -<p>There are currently four Joint Knowledge Online training modules that cover basic C-sUAS awareness, system familiarization, installation of C-sUAS activities, and C-sUAS tactics, techniques, and procedures. These short, functional training courses are useful for familiarizing military personnel with sUAS threats and basic countermeasures.</p> +<p>Given the high-level focus of this research, this paper does not seek to make context-specific recommendations to address the challenges ahead. However, drawing on research findings, it offers the following overarching recommendations for potential ways forward for key stakeholders to consider. These recommendations are tailored to the UK specifically, in light of the country’s unique positioning to facilitate action in this area, as an international trade and financial hub and a mining hub in which many of the most prominent mining companies are registered. To effectively leverage this position to ensure a just transition to net zero and ensure that the actions and investments required attract long-term public legitimacy, the UK government should consider the benefits of the following, many of which are also applicable to other countries in the Global North:</p> -<p>A more comprehensive training program currently takes place at the C-sUAS Academy in Yuma, Arizona. It offers a two-week course, set to expand into a three-week class by FY 2025. The class is offered across the services and U.S. government, including Secret Service agents. The Army also administers a “master trainer” course specifically for sUAS. Conducted at the Maneuver Center of Excellence in Fort Moore, Georgia, the training course certifies students with Group 1 UAS through a clear program of instruction which includes training on ground control stations, mission planning, simulations, orientation flights, and proficiency flight evaluations. The upcoming Joint C-sUAS University (JCU) at the Fires Center of Excellence in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, discussed further in the “Facilities” subsection below, may consider building upon both training courses.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Use its role as a mining and financial hub to improve regulation, standards and transparency in relation to investment in critical minerals based on key environmental priorities, for example, through the application of the TNFD, the SBTN, the GRI and similar initiatives, thereby supporting integration of high-quality targeted frameworks into this burgeoning sub-sector. This will reward and enhance uptake of best practice by businesses and support regulation in producer countries globally.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Develop an updated industrial strategy for critical mineral use specifically, to support the strategic acquisition and use of critical minerals and facilitate prioritisation across key industries should a shortage of critical minerals occur. This should be used alongside the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy to ensure that critical minerals are used strategically, particularly in the face of fluctuations in supply.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Given the criticality of the net zero transition and the minerals it requires, review domestic policies to maximise recovery of critical minerals that are already in consumer supply chains, in the form of waste. This would broaden opportunities for critical mineral sourcing aside from extraction via new mines. This should include prioritising the upscaling of the UK’s recycling capacity to facilitate the reuse of critical minerals, mindful of the fact that while recycling alone cannot meet demand for critical minerals, estimates suggest that recycling could meet 10% of global demand, while bringing jobs to the UK in support of the “levelling up” agenda.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Work with manufacturers on extended producer responsibility, right to repair and design-to-recycle best practice to move towards a circular economy and ensure that critical minerals are reused and recycled wherever possible, thereby reducing demand. This will help to reduce wastage of critical minerals and decrease pressure on supply chains.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Support improved consumer requirements for standards around the production of critical minerals. An example of this can be seen in the case of the 2023 EU Regulation on Deforestation-Free Products, which could be adapted for the critical mineral sector in the UK and more widely across the Global North.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Support governments in source countries to develop the infrastructure and capability to manage mining-related risks, providing development assistance to build capacity to apply regulation and best practice, while supporting initiatives that mainstream biodiversity, conservation and social justice into regulation which improves the development and practice of the mining sector in producer countries in collaboration with other actors working in this area, such as relevant aid agencies and multilateral development banks.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Consider how to integrate innovative concepts and proposals that call for a paradigm shift in our approach to economic activity, human wellbeing and the natural world – such as natural capital assessments through which we can better understand, measure and value human interdependencies with nature, and plan more sustainable management of natural resources – and wellbeing economics. This can be achieved through an approach which prioritises pursuit of human and ecological wellbeing over material growth and has the potential to help us better assess, understand and mitigate the environmental and social harms associated with the mining sector and other sectors dependent on natural resources.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>In FY 2024, the JCU will offer two courses — an operator and a planner course — each lasting two weeks. The operator course will provide service members with an additional skill identifier and consist of threat analysis, service specific engagement, and layered defense, with a capstone in detecting and defeating adversary drones. The planner course will consist of layered defense, coordination of airspace, joint strategic management, and C-sUAS planning and system integration, with a capstone in planning and executing a Course of Action (COA) to detect and defeat red air threats (single/swarming).</p> +<hr /> -<p>The DoD and JCO have prioritized training in recent years. Since April 2021, the JCO, RCCTO, and services have hosted industry demonstrations twice a year to “evaluate emerging technologies that close gaps, inform requirements, and promote innovation.” This joins the service-focused exercises which have increasingly incorporated C-sUAS, as shown in the table below.</p> +<p><strong>Genevieve Kotarska</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Organised Crime and Policing team at RUSI. Her research focuses on the community-level impacts of organised crime and terrorism and illicit trades such as drug, firearms and people trafficking.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/b8FojWd.png" alt="image33" /> -<img src="https://i.imgur.com/43kg8Mq.png" alt="image34" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 14: Major U.S. C-sUAS Training and Development.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p><strong>Lauren Young</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Organised Crime and Policing team at RUSI with expertise in wildlife crime and conservation.</p>Genevieve Kotarska and Lauren YoungThis paper explores the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction, how rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition will impact these risks, and what options exist for the UK to address these risks.Countering Small UAS2023-11-14T12:00:00+08:002023-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/countering-small-uncrewed-aerial-systems<p><em>This report examines the threat of small drones on the modern battlefield, and the various kinetic and non-kinetic defenses available to defeat them.</em></p> -<p>Lessons from the field — especially in Ukraine — highlight how quickly the sUAS threat and tactics are evolving in real time. The lack of designated training ranges that have standing C-sUAS authorities to operate within CONUS airspace hinders the ability of DoD to train on new equipment and stress test the validity of new TTPs. Resources such as the Joint C-UAS Center of Excellence and the Joint C-UAS University (JCU) are being stood up to address such gaps in training knowledge across the joint force and act as a clearing house for C-sUAS TTPs. Ultimately, range location issues and reduced live training opportunities will hinder efforts to build readiness, particularly for directed energy systems.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p><em>Materiel</em></p> +<h3 id="key-findings">Key Findings</h3> -<p>C-sUAS materiel development was addressed in Chapter 2 of this report. In short, materiel development should feature a diverse solution set informed by formation requirements for fixed or mobile defenses. Today’s platforms focus primarily on fixed requirements, as requested by CENTCOM and available at the time. Yet as the maneuver force sees the need for C-sUAS across regions, the DoD will need to shift focus toward mobile and maneuver capabilities.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>For years, air defense has been the domain of specialized units and niche capabilities under conditions of air superiority. That era is no more, and the entire joint force must now look up. Small uncrewed aerial systems (sUAS) pose a significant threat, exhibiting multi-mission capabilities, minimal signatures, wide proliferation, low costs, and ground force utility. The common use of sUAS today amplifies other trends in modern warfare, including further complicating the airspace, saturating battlefields with more reconnaissance and strike assets, and expanding support for precision strike complexes. Their introduction is comparable to that of mortars and anti-tank missiles in the degree for which they have and will continue to push ground forces to adapt their tactics, techniques, and procedures.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The mission and capabilities to counter sUAS (C-sUAS) should be shared across numerous unit types, including air defense, maneuver, support, and sustainment. The high demand and low density of air defense formations requires that air defenders and non-specialists work together as part of a combined arms for air defense (CAFAD) approach. The central question today, however, is the specific division of labor among the air defense and non-air defense units, as well as the authorities delegated to these groups. In general, C-sUAS planners have borrowed the distinction between “area” and “point” defense whereby traditional air defenders manage larger systems such as high-energy lasers and long-range kinetic interceptors for area defense, while maneuver forces use point defenses such as guns, nets, and handheld platforms.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>U.S. C-sUAS acquisition processes require updating to keep pace with evolving threats. The Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO) was stood up to coordinate C-sUAS doctrine, organization, and training across the joint force. Congressional and Department of Defense (DoD) leadership should consider modifications to JCO’s authorities and relation to service acquisition agencies to improve the requirements process and acquisition timelines.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Air defense has multiple meanings and connotations, especially in terms of service-specific terminology. As a mission, air defense destroys, nullifies, or reduces the effectiveness of enemy attacks by aerial platforms. Defined organizationally, it connotes force structure responsibilities, such as the Army’s Air Defense Artillery branch, or specific units manned, trained, and equipped to detect, track, and defeat aerial threats in specified sectors or altitudes. Because sUAS represent a distributed challenge to the entire joint force, C-sUAS operations cannot be confined to a single unit or specialization. C-sUAS developers, planners, and operators must overcome organizational silos.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A variety of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities are available to defeat sUAS. Over the past several years, the DoD has fielded a range of electronic attack and kinetic systems in support of joint and service urgent needs requests. Each of these tools have unique strengths and weaknesses in regard to survivability, range, magazine capacity, combat identification, and defended area.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The institutionalization and propagation of C-sUAS capability will require developments across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). Training and capacity requirements will take priority over capability improvements over the next few years. New doctrine should specify the division of labor between air defense and non-air defense specialists, as well as the specific sensors, command and control, and effectors that they can operate. The policy, strategy, budget, and programmatic decisions made at this stage will carry enormous consequences for the field.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><em>Leadership and Education</em></p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>Professional leadership development — from squad leaders to flag officers — must be a priority to ensure doctrine and training are effectively implemented. C-sUAS leaders across air defense, maneuver, support, and sustainment teams will help drive operational planning and training across the force and at the various echelons they lead. These leaders can also help identify and respond to sUAS development trends and adversary capabilities and construct new TTPs in line with emerging technologies. The DoD is building C-sUAS leaders through the several training programs listed above in the “Training” section.</p> +<p>Over the past decade, sUAS have become a core capability on the modern battlefield. Many are commercially sourced, easy to deploy, hard to detect, and highly proliferated. State and nonstate actors alike use them around the world in major conflicts, gray zone and criminal activities, and targeted killings. Technological advances in sUAS optics and sensor miniaturization have made them increasingly versatile as a primary reconnaissance tool, including for targeting for larger artillery and missile strikes. sUAS will continue to present a serious threat to military targets and civilian population centers.</p> -<p><em>Personnel</em></p> +<p>Numerous studies have highlighted the sUAS threat. A few have reviewed C-sUAS platforms and capabilities. Yet to date, there appears to be no public-facing report that assesses C-sUAS history, strategy, and programs, across the DOTMLPF. This report tries to fill that gap from the perspective of the U.S. military.</p> -<p>The C-sUAS mission must be shared across air defense and all other combat, combat support, and combat service support activities. The high demand and low density of air defense formations requires that air defenders and non-specialists work together as part of a CAFAD approach. The central question today, however, is the specific division of labor among the air defense and non-air defense units. Table 15 below lays out three models to illustrate the terms of this debate. On one end is the “Specialized” model, in which the C-sUAS mission is largely taken on by air defenders. On the other end, the “Universal” model posits a framework in which all units are trained for C-sUAS. The “Specialized” and “Universal” models are extremes for illustrative purposes — no one advocates for these purist frameworks. U.S. defense officials are developing an appropriate middle path, labeled here as “Hybrid,” which will incorporate elements from both sides. The degree of specialization versus universalization, however, remains to be determined.</p> +<p>The C-sUAS mission is a challenging one. The threat is cheap and plentiful, whereas defenses are still emerging and bring significantly higher costs. Attribution can be difficult, complicating deterrence through retaliation. It remains unclear whether the active defense solutions currently in development will become programs of record; if investments in time, money, and personnel will continue to support this mission; and how well the multiple services involved can coordinate on developing and deploying their active defenses. While the U.S. Army is the lead service for developing joint doctrine, requirements, materiel, and training, the C-sUAS mission is not and must not be limited to one service, branch, or specialization. It is a concern for the entire joint force.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yftfLmJ.png" alt="image35" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 15: C-sUAS Operator Frameworks.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> +<p>Air defense has continually evolved to meet new threats and challenges, from surveillance balloons to bomber aircraft to ballistic and cruise missiles. The threats have gotten smaller, harder to detect, and more sophisticated over time. At numerous moments along the way, a given threat will be deemed unstoppable — until, of course, defenses evolve to prove that assumption incorrect. C-sUAS represents the next chapter for the evolution of the air defense mission.</p> -<p>Under the hybrid model, C-sUAS planners have borrowed the distinction between “area” and “point” defense whereby air defenders manage larger systems such as high-energy lasers and long-range kinetic interceptors for “area” defense, while other forces use “point” defenses such as guns, nets, and handheld platforms. Maneuver and forward-deployed forces should be able to detect and classify Groups 1 and 2 and, if unable to intercept themselves, at least “relay alert information on locations, altitudes, and time” critical to ground force protection and the possible defeat of enemy UAS. The JCO’s investments suggest an emphasis on CAFAD. Handheld jammers, targeting enhancers, the smart shooter, and other smaller platforms have left this pathway open for the joint force across all units.</p> +<p>Fortunately, the DoD today recognizes the importance of C-sUAS. Nearly a decade ago, ISIS militants began using commercial quadcopters effectively in battle. In January 2020, the DoD established the JCO to rapidly prototype, test, demonstrate, and field new defenses. More recently, the Biden administration’s 2022 Missile Defense Review included C-UAS as a component of the defense against “missile-related” threats.</p> -<p>The hybrid model posits that the C-sUAS mission in non-ADA units is a force protection task, akin to chemical defense operations. All personnel have a responsibility to perform self-protection chemical defense tasks, and select personnel are trained to employ chemical defense equipment, such as chemical detection kits or alarms. Under the C-sUAS construct, all personnel must be able to engage an sUAS with their assigned or unit organic weapons, and select personnel will be trained to employ C-sUAS weapons.</p> +<p>With doctrine, organizations, materiel, training, and other issues under debate today, the United States and its allies face a critical period with sUAS and C-sUAS. High levels of sUAS proliferation, little to no regulatory oversight, and improved capabilities, technologies, and integration all converge to create an environment in which the U.S. military must respond to a rapidly evolving threat. Contributors to these conversations must understand the threat and its likely evolution, the defenses available and in development today, and the principles that should guide their application. For better or worse, the policies and institutions developed today will last for years to come.</p> -<p>Questions over specific platforms, specializations, and authorities, however, are still up for debate. Should the infantry operate M-LIDS as a divisional level asset, or should this type of platform be forward deployed at the company level? How much training does a soldier need to fire a Coyote missile? Should the Army significantly expand SHORAD units as the Marine Corps has done by tripling the size of the Low Altitude Air Defense Marines community? And how can ground forces deconflict with the Air Force and allied air forces in a timely, effective manner? The DoD needs to answer these questions to fully institutionalize the C-sUAS enterprise. Doing so will allow staff to better understand how C-sUAS formations will work across services and branches, as well as how to plan against sUAS threats.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6ElHChK.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Drone Evolution.</strong> Source: U.S. Army and Wikimedia Commons.</em></p> -<p><em>Facilities</em></p> +<h4 id="research-scope-and-objectives">Research Scope and Objectives</h4> -<p>The Army’s plans for facility development are underway. Previous C-sUAS training operations were conducted out of Yuma Proving Ground and lasted roughly two weeks. Despite this training and other branch-specific programs, the JCO found a lack of institutionalized C-UAS training, with one senior Air Force officer noting, “There are currently no joint linkages or commonality to counter UAS training across the department. . . . The average soldier, airman, or Marine lacks adequate counter UAS training.” To improve the military’s C-sUAS capabilities and create a permanent training installation, the Fires Center of Excellence in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, is building a Joint C-sUAS University (JCU), which is scheduled to reach initial operation in the first quarter of FY 2024. The academy will provide a common core program of instruction, joint TTPs, and updated doctrine.113 The center will also provide the C-sUAS community with additional space and equipment to conduct research, test, and train.</p> +<p>This report discusses current C-sUAS defenses used to detect and defeat small drones. It serves as a guide for understanding and evaluating C-sUAS solutions, both to inform policymakers by providing principles for future developments in this field, and to inform the public on a key defense issue for which there is a gap in the open-source literature. The report explores the trade-offs among various C-sUAS sensor and effector types but does not advocate for any particular solution set. It also does not address sUAS counterproliferation and regulation efforts, offensive “left-of-launch” strikes, camouflage, deception, signature management, nor other topics related to but not centered on active defense. Furthermore, it does not address specific operational or tactical issues, such as UAS notification procedures or how U.S. personnel should coordinate intercept engagements with allies. These processes are better addressed by U.S. military leaders as they update their related doctrine and standard operating procedures.</p> -<p>The JCU’s location at Fort Sill is understandable but suggests a larger role for air defenders over the maneuver force for C-sUAS training. Will this truly be a joint center for all branches, or will the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) at Fort Moore, Georgia, develop its own C-sUAS doctrine to inform mobile and maneuver C-sUAS requirements? Furthermore, while most C-sUAS specialists will likely be Army soldiers, the Army-centric location may also discourage Marines from joining. These concerns can be managed as long as the JCU recruits from across the services and branches upon its opening in FY 2024.</p> +<p>The study focuses closely on C-sUAS for the DoD, as primarily operated by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. There are several other U.S. stakeholders in this field, including the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Aviation Administration. The C-sUAS requirements, regulations, and resources differ among these groups.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wDZ4BJA.png" alt="image36" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 18: Preparing RQ-7B Shadow for Flight.</strong> Oklahoma Army National Guard soldiers and contractors prepare an RQ-7B Shadow for flight at Fort Sill. Source: U.S. Army.</em></p> +<p>This report uses the broad definition of air defense, which is to detect, track, and defeat aerial threats. It does not use the U.S. military’s organizational-specific definition of air defense as Air Defense Artillery or other groups specifically trained and equipped to detect, track, and defeat sophisticated air threats in large, specified sectors. sUAS break down the military’s typical distinction between air defense and force protection through their small size, wide proliferation, and flight patterns. C-sUAS will be a necessary part of both air defense and force protection, although there will be differing levels of operational expertise between trained air defenders and other military personnel.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>The report has three sections. The first section aims to provide a brief analysis of the sUAS threat. It highlights common missions and capabilities through operational case studies and examines why sUAS have proliferated so quickly in recent years.</p> -<p>The sUAS threat is here to stay. These systems offer multi-mission capabilities, at low cost, and with minimal signatures. They are widely available through commercial industry and their utility has been demonstrated in numerous conflicts around the world, from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, to Azerbaijan and Armenia’s conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, to the Yemen civil war. Given these factors, sUAS technology will continue to evolve and proliferate.</p> +<p>The second section reviews the ways and means to detect and defeat sUAS. This technology backgrounder broadly covers the sensors, C2, and effectors available today. This section reviews platforms that the DoD is pursuing and confirms the feasibility of C-sUAS technologies.</p> -<p>As such, C-sUAS has become a critical part of modern air defense. That criticality, however, does not mean that the joint force is ready for the challenge. Today’s air and missile defense systems and structures were not designed to counter numerous, low-flying, small uncrewed systems. sUAS exploit gaps in sensor coverage and cost asymmetries against expensive interceptors. The belief that aerial threats would be countered by U.S. air forces or the ballistic missile defense force may have been true at one point, but drone technology evolved far faster than most thought possible. The U.S. divestment of SHORAD left the DoD without tools and personnel that may have more easily adapted to the sUAS threat, although the proliferation and sophistication seen today calls for more than the SHORAD of yesteryear.</p> +<p>The third and final section lays out the U.S. C-sUAS development path from urgent need, to refinement, to institutionalization. As C-sUAS becomes institutionalized, there are opportunities and potential pitfalls across the DOTMLPF. The C-sUAS enterprise still faces unresolved questions regarding political authorities for C-sUAS stakeholders, personnel responsibilities, and acquisition policies to enable rapid development and procurement.</p> -<p>Fortunately, there is a diverse mix of sensors, effectors, and C2 systems that can detect, track, identify, and defeat sUAS. The DoD is investing in a variety of kinetic, electronic, and RF-based defenses to counter sUAS threats. These tools have their respective strengths and weaknesses affecting such factors as survivability, range, magazine capacity, combat identification, and total defended area. Defense budgets here are limited, but the JCO has down-selected across a wide array of C-sUAS platforms to improve economies of scale in production, logistics, and training.</p> +<h3 id="the-suas-threat">The sUAS Threat</h3> -<p>The institutionalization of C-sUAS will require developments across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. Capability development remains necessary for the long term, but as the JCO has emphasized, the urgent need today is for training and capacity. New doctrine should specify the division of labor between air defense and non-air defense specialists, as well as the specific sensors, C2, and effectors that they can operate. C-sUAS leaders will need to tackle these and various other challenges, with their decisions today shaping the field for years to come.</p> +<p><em>sUAS pose a significant threat due to their multi-mission capabilities, minimal signatures, wide proliferation, low costs, and ground force utility.</em></p> -<hr /> +<p>In late December 2022, Russia launched a massive assault against Ukrainian infrastructure targeting multiple key regions including Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, and Odesa. The first wave of attacks was conducted with cheap Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones. Ukrainian air force officials believe Russia used the drones to overwhelm air defenses before sending cruise missiles in a second wave of attacks. These attacks left several regions without power, including major cities such as Lviv and Kyiv. This incident was just one among many in a months-long strike campaign targeting Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure in the hopes of demoralizing the public and leaving them without heating during the winter months.</p> -<p><strong>Shaan Shaikh</strong> is a fellow with the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he focuses on missile proliferation, unmanned aerial systems, air defense, and non-state actors. He is also managing editor of the CSIS website Missile Threat, an online clearinghouse for information and analysis on missile and missile defense systems. Prior to joining CSIS, he worked at the U.S. Department of Defense and the Syria Institute. He is currently a graduate student at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and received his BA from Tufts University.</p> +<p>Today, sUAS are widely recognized as a ubiquitous, mature, and lethal part of the modern aerial threat spectrum. Their use in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is just one of many cases that have occurred over the past decade. Operators can attack adversaries with sUAS by dropping bombs or using the drone as a loitering munition in “kamikaze” suicide attacks. They can also conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions to collect information on an adversary’s position or activities. Modern sUAS sensors and data links can connect to larger kill chains or be used to find and fix targets for artillery and other precision-guided munitions. sUAS can conduct these missions while being difficult to detect and defeat with current air defenses.</p> -<p><strong>Thomas Karako</strong> is a senior fellow with the International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at CSIS, where he arrived in 2014. His research focuses on national security, missile defense, nuclear deterrence, and public law. In 2010–2011, he was an American Political Science Association congressional fellow, working with the professional staff of the House Armed Services Committee and the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces on U.S. strategic forces policy, nonproliferation, and NATO. Dr. Karako is also currently a fellow with the Institute for Politics and Strategy of Carnegie Mellon University.</p> - -<p><strong>Michelle McLoughlin</strong> is a former intern with the CSIS Missile Defense Project. She is currently a graduate student at American University’s School of International Service and holds a BA in international relations from the University of San Diego.</p>Shaan Shaikh, et al.This report examines the threat of small drones on the modern battlefield, and the various kinetic and non-kinetic defenses available to defeat them.And You Are?2023-11-14T12:00:00+08:002023-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/and-you-are<p><em>British military exercise, Salisbury Plain Training Area, England, 2016: Our convoy set off from its departure point in the dead of night.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>The six vehicles, carrying soldiers and air defense missile launchers, made their way slowly through wooded areas, across fields, and down rural tracks, looking to avoid detection by the enemy. Progress was slow. Vehicles got bogged down on more than one occasion, and we struggled to navigate using night vision equipment whilst trying to relate paper maps to the silhouettes of hills and trees. After several hours, we arrived at the battlegroup headquarters to which we were assigned. I headed into the building that had been requisitioned as the operations room. I approached the battle captain and introduced myself, but it quickly became apparent that we were not expected nor were we particularly welcome. There ensued an uphill battle for our capability to be understood, protected, and deployed appropriately in order to prevent the position being destroyed by enemy aircraft. Relationships had to be built, favors pulled, and compromises reached to make any progress.</em></p> - -<p>Armed forces are divided entities by design. They are first split by domain — land, air, sea. The army, navy, and air force are then divided again by function. The enterprise is built on having separate capabilities such as armor, infantry, artillery, signallers, logisticians, and engineers all come together in times of conflict. Units are further dislocated by space, spread around a country and overseas. As a result, forces often do not “know themselves” as well as they should. Moreover, human frailties such as accidents and losses exacerbate the problem.</p> - -<p>As our exercise showed, internal organizational friction reduces operational effectiveness and is often invisible in measures of force readiness. The British Army provides a particularly stark example where these functional divisions are exacerbated by historical norms and fissures. Other forces can learn from our experience, using rigorous and regular collective training to reduce the impact of friction.</p> - -<h3 id="finding-friction">Finding Friction</h3> - -<p>Analysis of military capability often focuses on headline metrics: numbers of tanks, howitzers, and soldiers. The strength of armies is often portrayed as a function of their size, with some minor modifications for the modernity of the systems at play. Forces the world over hold parades, flyovers, and demonstrations to show off this metric to allies and adversaries alike. This was certainly the case regarding Russia prior to February 2022. But the war in Ukraine demonstrated the importance of other considerations, such as the will to fight and the ability of commanders to combine capabilities and sequence them appropriately in time and space. However, there are also more ambiguous frictions that can prevent forces from reaching their potential. As shown in the anecdote above, which took place in a real training exercise, organizational realities must be considered when attempting to analyze the true abilities of a fighting force.</p> - -<p>Many commentators were surprised by the Russian armed forces’ apparent inability to seize key objectives in Ukraine after the invasion in 2022. Subsequent examination has revealed that a layer of friction existed below the normal threshold of analysis — Russian soldiers had been using out-of-date maps as well as inadequate food and antiquated rifles. Moreover, command and control was confused, information was kept from soldiers, and orders failed to account for developments on the ground. Such revelations were seized upon by Western analysts and practitioners as evidence that the Russian war machine was a laughing stock. However, such hubris is unwise, and forces should take time to inflect to ensure they do not suffer from a similar sort of rot.</p> - -<h3 id="do-i-know-you">Do I Know You?</h3> - -<p>The British Army, like most military forces, moves its personnel around the country regularly. Each force does this differently, but it is common for soldiers and officers to change positions every two to three years. This may be upon promotion, or on a more general rotation. As a result, there is a constant churn of personnel through units and formation headquarters. Some people will have been there for two years, others two months, and some two days. Sometimes it is unavoidable for whole command teams to depart at once, although this is avoided where possible. Consequently, expertise in planning and executing missions waxes and wanes.</p> - -<p>Indeed, while armies will have centralized, accepted planning processes, individual formations often put their own spin on things, producing their own templates and products. As a result, on arrival in a formation, new personnel will have to learn how to slot in. It is not uncommon for formations to hold an annual series of “crawl, walk, run” planning exercises to bring new staff up to speed with its processes. Ideally, these align with readiness timelines, but conflict may well fail to respect neat operational readiness mechanisms, especially when resources are scarce as they are in many NATO militaries.</p> - -<p>In the United Kingdom, related units are often not located together. It may surprise nonpractitioners to learn that in many cases, units that are expected to deploy together, often at very short notice, are not based together and indeed are sometimes separated by hundreds of miles. As a result, there is an immediate barrier to building relationships and working together. Time spent together builds familiarity. It should not be underestimated how much easier it is to work with people you have a rapport with. This becomes even more critical in times of high pressure and fatigue.</p> - -<p>When commanders may not know some of the people in their staff, this immediately leads to a reduction in performance. Moreover, familiarity with capabilities may be lacking. Battlegroup commanders may be given a fire group of air defense missile launchers having never laid eyes on them before and may not know the first thing about their use. It is then up to a young troop commander to bridge the gap in understanding. In some cases, this is easy. In others, the battalion commander may be reluctant to take advice from an unknown junior officer, or even fail to realize they are in the headquarters at all.</p> - -<p>Military tribalism may also be deleterious to performance. Military forces are broken down into units with different capabilities that are often defined by their historic and lived experience. Different parts of the force often have their own colloquialisms. Some soldiers look down on those who do not have a particular qualification badge or who have not served with a particular unit and even have specific deprecatory terms for outsiders. In operational theaters, these problems become more acute as formations change shape as time moves on. Operational realities such as casualties or demands for capabilities with higher priority elsewhere will keep formations in flux, further exacerbating the issue.</p> - -<h3 id="accidents-happen">Accidents Happen</h3> - -<p>Other frictions exist as well. Whilst some might seem minor, they form part of the complex picture that affects how forces perform on the battlefield. For example, despite lots of training and attempts at mitigation, soldiers crash their vehicles an awful lot, both in exercises and on operations. This, in fact, is one of the highest causes of casualties in military forces worldwide. Operating heavy machinery in convoys in the dark or conducting complex maneuvers in urban and wooded areas is hard — really hard. Vehicles get stuck, make a wrong turn, and in the worst cases overturn or collide with a friendly vehicle.</p> - -<p>Soldiers also lose things as well as themselves. Weapons, night vision equipment, and even vehicles go missing. Operational imperatives will determine how much time is spent trying to recover them. These sorts of frictions are not accounted for in most planning cycles. This friction also captures last-minute demands on soldiers, including the simple act of battling the military bureaucracy to reach an outcome. Military forces are a mix of analogue and digital processes, in which archaic structures are wrestling with modernity. Obtaining a vehicle, rations, or place to train can be so complex and protracted as to be impracticable among a host of competing priorities.</p> - -<p>When added together, the totality of these seemingly minor frictions means that the capability of a military to defeat an enemy is much more nuanced than might be reflected by numbers or the latest technology. A complex cocktail of personal relationships, ability, and willingness contributes to the effectiveness of a force in the field.</p> - -<h3 id="what-to-do-about-it">What to Do About It?</h3> - -<p>The solution? Train. Train lots, and train well. Aside from delivering on operations, the second most important task for armies and the other services is to prepare and train for those operations. British military training takes place at a number of levels. First, soldiers must be able to administer themselves in the field and be able to fire their personal weapon accurately and use basic communications equipment. Second, they must be able to operate their core equipment, which might be a vehicle, heavy weapon, missile system, or radar. Third, they need to operate that equipment in concert with other capabilities in pursuit of an aim or objective. This collective training is difficult and expensive to execute effectively, but is absolutely critical to achieving commonality. Units may also be stuck performing other duties such as vehicle maintenance and distracted by an assortment of other demands, from online training to hosting visitors to filling out paperwork.</p> - -<p>William F. Owen, editor of Military Strategy magazine, argues that formations should train in the field for 90 days a year. Currently, however formations might be lucky to get 30 days of combined training in a year. And often, that combined training is also an assessment of some sort, which can detract from being able to take time to fully integrate and assimilate the various personnel and capabilities involved.</p> - -<p>There are, as ever, frictions associated with such an aim. Some specialist units are passed between larger formations as there are not enough to go around. This means they could potentially end up spending a much longer time in the field, which would have ramifications on morale and retention. Prioritizing their time between supporting formations, their own force development, and time to recuperate requires a pragmatic approach by commanders. Inverting the normal practice of specialists travelling to the associated formation and instead being visited by them to share knowledge would reduce the burden on the minority. This also substantiates the point made previously about being unable to forge strong relationships. However, the intent is a good one. Time spent together builds familiarity with capabilities, which in turn means more favorability — those capabilities will be employed effectively and in concert with the rest of the formation offering competitive advantage.</p> - -<p>Issues surrounding the locations of units, and how far they are from the formations they work with, are more difficult. Bases have finite capacities and may simply be unable to house the totality of those who would deploy with them. Sometimes there are infrastructure limitations as to what can be stored where — for example, not every base has the requisite facilities to store sensitive items like missiles. What’s more, armies often try to balance their presence around the country to help with recruitment and enable people to stay where their families are based. Likewise, the problem of career movement is difficult to solve. British career structures are built upon movement and promotion, moving from jobs requiring different skill sets with different profiles. Staying in one place can count against people when trying to achieve the next rank if a high-profile job exists elsewhere.</p> - -<h3 id="remaining-challenges">Remaining Challenges</h3> - -<p>Dealing with the subject of internal organizational friction is problematic on two fronts. First, it is difficult to quantify. It is nuanced and uneven across forces. There is no firm methodology by which to analyze a commander’s grasp on all the capabilities under their command, nor how good the relationships are between the battalion’s core and its attachments. Commanders do get put through their paces on validation exercises, but the marking criteria concern objectives like bridge crossings and assaults. Moreover, many exercises today are simulated, which further dilutes interactions between individuals.</p> - -<p>Second, the topic does not make for good reading. Forces like to assume that soldiers are professional enough to put aside any personal or professional differences in order to complete an objective. This is often true, but not always. It is hard for a commander to admit that some of their soldiers are rude to other troops because they wear a different badge or have not completed a certain qualification. However ridiculous it seems, some readers will find this awfully familiar, and some will be guilty of it themselves.</p> - -<p>This makes it all the more important to remember that, when assessing the readiness of a military, what you cannot see is of great importance. While some of this invisible friction is baked into military culture, time spent physically training together can dramatically reduce it. Combined arms training, which builds relationships, trust, and skills, will transfer directly into operational advantage.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Patrick Hinton</strong> is a serving regular officer in the British Army’s Royal Artillery. He has experience working with ground based air defence systems and remotely piloted air systems. He has also worked in the personnel space. Since joining the Army in 2014, his career has consisted of a number of appointments at regimental duty including Troop Command, Executive Officer, and Adjutant. He was the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow in the Military Sciences Research Group at RUSI until the end of August 2023.</p>Patrick HintonBritish military exercise, Salisbury Plain Training Area, England, 2016: Our convoy set off from its departure point in the dead of night.Track and Disrupt2023-11-10T12:00:00+08:002023-11-10T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/track-and-disrupt<p><em>Efforts to align third countries with sanctions against Russia will only succeed when the private networks facilitating circumvention are understood and countered.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>Sanctions regimes have continued to expand in scope since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, aiming to asphyxiate Russia’s financial and military capabilities to wage war. The EU alone has passed 11 packages to date, each building on the last. These packages are paired with efforts to restrict circumvention, along with a forthcoming EU directive criminalising sanctions evasion.</p> - -<p>The unprecedented sanctions against Russia have highlighted the importance of third countries – those countries that are neither the target of sanctions nor adopters of sanctions against Russia/Belarus (and thus are not legally bound by sanctions). Such third countries make up a majority of the world and are therefore an important factor in determining whether sanctions are ultimately effective. Put simply, if third countries provide circumvention routes or substitutes for the goods and services that sanctions aim to curtail, then the sanctions will be weakened or fail.</p> - -<p>The trade in dual-use goods is one of five categories of sanctions evasion and avoidance covered by recent analysis undertaken by RUSI as part of the Serious and Organised Crime Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) programme, and provides a particularly salient example of the role of third countries. Numerous reports have publicised cases of manufacturers deliberately or inadvertently shipping important military and technological components from sanctions-imposing countries to intermediaries in third countries that then ship them onward to military end-users in Russia and Belarus.</p> - -<h3 id="tracking-sanctions-evasion-networks-in-third-countries">Tracking Sanctions-Evasion Networks in Third Countries</h3> - -<p>Our recent SOC ACE report categorised five types of sanctions evasion critical to funding and supplying Russia’s military-industrial complex: financial services, company incorporation, dual-use and military goods, exports of sanctioned Russian commodities, and oil smuggling. All of these operate primarily in the private sector and rely on third countries’ lax enforcement of – or deliberate refusal to implement –sanctions.</p> - -<p>In the case of countries not imposing sanctions, many commentators have bemoaned the whack-a-mole problem: company incorporation is so easy that sanctioning a person or a company will just cause another to appear in its place. Behind all of these seemingly random companies, however, is a Russian or affiliated individual(s) directing a network, often associated with Russia’s Federal Security Service. In many cases, investigators have identified links between the Russian military-industrial complex and newly incorporated companies with low public profiles – and these wider networks are often based in or linked to manufacturers, banks and other businesses in sanctions-imposing countries.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">If third countries provide circumvention routes or substitutes for the goods and services that sanctions aim to curtail, then the sanctions will be weakened or fail</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>These thousands of companies are often not random or spontaneous creations, but directed by the Russian military-industrial base. They consist of networks of individuals and companies directing this support and supply business, along with intermediary companies and the shipping and logistics firms that facilitate the circumvention trade. Gathering the data necessary to map these networks is critical, as is understanding which government stakeholders are linked to these networks, in order to support diplomatic engagement to disrupt this trade in third countries.</p> - -<p>Some third countries are already introducing their own control systems to monitor the re-export of goods to Russia, such as Kazakhstan’s online tool to track the entire supply chain “from border to border”. However, governments and private businesses in these countries would benefit from this specific data collection and mapping approach to mitigate their exposure to opaque sanctions evasion networks and thus avoid getting caught in the crosshairs of US or EU sanctions.</p> - -<h3 id="building-capacity-in-allied-countries">Building Capacity in Allied Countries</h3> - -<p>Notwithstanding the role of third countries, allied countries that have imposed sanctions also contribute to circumvention. Many of the microelectronic components still feeding Russia’s military systems are Western-made yet continue to reach Russia, mostly due to a combination of a lack of enforcement capacity and the deliberate obfuscation of end-users through third-party intermediaries by the global networks supplying Russia.</p> - -<p>Over 30 countries representing more than half the global economy have announced sanctions and export controls targeting Russia, but the findings of the RUSI-led European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet) point to a series of challenges that sanctions-imposing countries consistently face.</p> - -<p>Prior to February 2022, many members of the sanctions coalition had very limited exposure to sanctions, and they are now scrambling to overhaul their national frameworks. In the EU, several member states are trying to determine the competent authorities and their responsibilities towards what is repeatedly called the “unprecedented” scale of sanctions against Russia. Both private- and public-sector actors have struggled to implement and enforce the sanctions, meaning that even countries with strong political will struggle to detect and interrupt sanctions evasion that might involve – or even start in – their own jurisdiction.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Truly disrupting third-country sanctions circumvention requires a better understanding of the wider networks enabling this activity</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>With unclear responsibilities, scarce resources and a lack of expertise, private-sector operators face an uphill battle to tackle the already intricate task of detecting and countering circumvention, muddled by the involvement of complex multi-jurisdictional schemes often involving third countries.</p> +<p>Modern air and missile defenses are ill-suited to counter low-flying, slow, and small UAS. Following U.S. divestment from short-range air defense in the 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. military has been challenged to respond to enemy sUAS. Other states have faced similar issues. In 2016, Israel fired two $3 million PAC-2 interceptors and scrambled a fighter aircraft in a failed attempt to shoot down a sUAS from Syria that had violated Israeli airspace. In its conflict with Yemen’s Houthis, Saudi Arabia used fighter aircraft to patrol the border and shoot down drones worth a few hundred dollars with $2 million air-to-air missiles. These responses are enormously costly and wasteful over longer military campaigns.</p> -<p>The coalition of sanctions-imposing countries could also be strengthened by more consistent intelligence-sharing to disrupt cross-border global sanctions evasion networks, and by improved harmonisation in the interpretation of sanctions (including among EU member states). This leads to cases where authorities from different member states disagree on whether measures should be taken against an entity that one or the other understands to be in breach of sanctions. Moreover, the violation and circumvention of sanctions is not criminalised in all members of the sanctions coalition – notably in EU member states. This means that even if these practices are already taking place within their jurisdiction, authorities cannot initiate investigations and disrupt the networks involved. The upcoming EU directive to criminalise these practices will aim to remedy this, but this adjustment is long overdue.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Lk80k5D.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Ukrainian Service Member Fires Rifle at Drone.</strong> Position near Bakhmut on March 20, 2023.</em></p> -<h3 id="disrupting-global-sanctions-evasion-networks">Disrupting Global Sanctions-Evasion Networks</h3> +<p>The lack of active C-sUAS opens a gap in modern air defense that combatants around the world are exploiting. There is no substitute. The complement to active C-sUAS — passive defense — is important but insufficient. The United States cannot harden all of its military bases against sUAS, and force distribution is ineffective against the large quantity and low costs of sUAS. The United States and its partners therefore must develop active and integrated defenses to mitigate these risks.</p> -<p>Truly disrupting third-country sanctions circumvention requires a better understanding of the wider networks enabling this activity, from banks and corporate service providers to shipping and logistics networks. Taking this wider view will likely generate new levers for pressure, including cutting the financial ties of the enablers supporting this trade. Further, applying a network focus should also reveal links between private-sector actors and the governments of third countries.</p> +<h4 id="defining-suas">Defining sUAS</h4> -<p>In sum, efforts to tackle evasion should combine diplomatic engagement with third countries, focused on a network-centric approach, with a tightening of domestic efforts to disrupt sanctions circumvention at source. It is thus key that sanctions-imposing countries harmonise and improve their national frameworks as well, including better coordination and information-sharing across the coalition. Sanctions-evasion networks operate as global enterprises, and sanctions-imposing countries must do the same to render them ineffective.</p> +<p>sUAS are a specific category of drones. This categorization, however, varies across countries and organizations, with two key taxonomies outlined by the United States and NATO. The DoD divides UAS into five categories based on their weight, speed, and altitude ceilings, with the “small” category comprising Groups 1, 2, and 3. Despite its designation as “small,” Group 3 UAS can still be quite large at up to 600 kg. NATO offers a slightly different categorization, with sUAS falling under its Class 1 and 2 categories.</p> -<hr /> +<p>UAS categorization is further complicated by capability overlap with munitions. For example, the Iranian-made Shahed-136 is generally categorized as a Group 3 UAS, but it often operates as a one-way attack munition. The unique nature of the Shahed-136 thus cannot be simply captured by looking at a categorization that is determined solely on weight, speed, and altitude ceilings. The U.S. Tomahawk missile, specifically Block 4 and 5 variants, likewise blurs the line between UAS and missile. These variants offer loitering capabilities, but due to their one-way strike mission, they are not categorized as a UAS. The UAS spectrum is undoubtedly messy but attempts at distinguishing these threats — like all air threats — are still useful for defenders to quickly characterize capabilities.</p> -<p><strong>Olivia Allison</strong> is currently working as an independent consultant, following a role as a Senior Managing Director at the boutique investigations consultancy K2 Integrity. She has more than 15 years’ experience carrying out complex, international investigations and supporting the development of integrity and governance for state-owned companies, international companies, and international financial institutions (IFIs).</p> +<p>This report applies the U.S. classification model of “sUAS” as encompassing Groups 1, 2, and 3.</p> -<p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Analyst at the Centre for Financial Crime &amp; Security Studies at RUSI, focusing on sanctions and counter threat finance. He is part of Project CRAAFT (Collaboration, Research and Analysis Against Financing of Terrorism) and Euro SIFMANet (European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network).</p>Olivia Allison and Gonzalo SaizEfforts to align third countries with sanctions against Russia will only succeed when the private networks facilitating circumvention are understood and countered.The Securitisation Of Energy2023-11-09T12:00:00+08:002023-11-09T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-securitisation-of-energy<p><em>Understanding how Russia constructs its energy security and foreign policies is essential to anticipating how it might behave in international forums, particularly on challenging issues such as environmental and energy security.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Nyxc0l4.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: U.S. UAS Classification.</strong> Source: Classifications from U.S. Army; images from Russian Ministry of Defense and Wikimedia Commons.</em></p> -<excerpt /> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IuPGWWl.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: NATO UAS Classification.</strong> Source: Classifications from NATO; images from Vulcan UAS, Elbit Systems, Wikimedia Commons, and U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> -<p>This paper examines how Russia’s energy policy has interacted with its foreign and defence policies since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The key findings are:</p> +<p>sUAS have several advantages over larger aircraft, both crewed and uncrewed:</p> -<ul> +<ol> <li> - <p>Russia perceives any restriction of its access to and exploitation of oil and gas markets both within Russia and abroad as a serious security threat. Restriction could either be through international sanctions that prevent Russia from accessing deep-water oil deposits, or the international climate change agenda that calls for a reduction on oil and gas production.</p> + <p><strong>Lower cost:</strong> sUAS are relatively inexpensive compared to larger aircraft. This is true even when platforms are not quite “consumable” aircraft that operators will only use on a single mission.</p> </li> <li> - <p>As a major oil and gas producer, Russia considers the hydrocarbons industry to be a key part of its political economy and therefore its national security. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s role as an energy provider – or sense of international responsibility to its clients – was thought to keep some of its behaviour in check, even as Russia had in the past wielded its energy supplies to extract political concessions from some of its former Soviet neighbours. Ultimately, Russia’s security goals in Ukraine overtook any of this responsibility, which has framed much of the debate around Russia’s future as a declining energy power in Europe.</p> + <p><strong>Low training burdens:</strong> sUAS operators can learn their basic tradecraft in hours, and only one person is needed to operate a drone. On the other hand, it takes months to years to train pilots on large aircraft — including uncrewed platforms such as the MQ-9. A single platform may require over 100 personnel for operations and maintenance.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Russia’s understanding of energy security is bound up in the country’s sovereignty, and with strategic competition with other states over resources. Ensuring security of demand and continued access to resources are part of Russia’s national security framework and even its national identity.</p> + <p><strong>Minimal infrastructure requirements:</strong> Unlike larger aircraft, sUAS do not require extensive infrastructure to deploy such as long runways, secure and complicated data links, or expensive maintenance equipment.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The war has increased the urgency for Russia to seek out alternative alliances and structures with China and Iran. In recent years, Russia has established its own energy forums with partners such as Saudi Arabia and some African states – work which has become more pressing since the war began and Russia’s energy relations with the West have been significantly reduced.</p> + <p><strong>Gray zone applications:</strong> Combatants frequently employ sUAS to decrease the perceived political costs and escalation risks resulting from operations and potential shootdowns as compared to larger, inhabited aircraft. The low-cost of sUAS, minimized risk to operators (on the ground rather than in the cockpit), and difficulty of attribution make sUAS a useful tool for gray zone operations.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Russia claims that the West is seeking to undermine it through its dominance of energy resources, and that international forums, such as the UN, are prejudiced against Russia’s national interests. Russia also conflates energy with politicking, maintaining that Western efforts to cap its production prices or curtail nuclear energy use are part of a campaign to undermine Russian values and assert a neoliberal agenda.</p> + <p><strong>Unique capabilities in modern warfare:</strong> sUAS can perform an increasing number of air missions at lower cost than large, crewed aircraft. Small loitering munitions offer the ability to scan large swaths of territory and quickly strike targets of interest. Medium- and high-altitude long endurance (MALE/HALE) drones will continue to play an important role in counterterrorism missions, but they appear less effective in symmetric, conventional conflicts. Looking to the future, sUAS swarms may also provide a cost-effective means to saturate an adversary’s air defenses.</p> </li> +</ol> + +<p>To be sure, sUAS also have critical disadvantages over larger aircraft.</p> + +<ol> <li> - <p>The war has intensified Moscow’s need to identify new export destinations, with rail and pipeline networks that were previously in train accelerated. But to do so, particularly towards the Indo-Pacific region, Russia must link up its oil and gas reserves with maritime and rail infrastructure. This includes new terminals along the Northern Sea Route that can process liquefied natural gas, coal and oil and updating port infrastructure, as well as new ice-class vessels for exports.</p> + <p><strong>Limited payload capacity:</strong> sUAS are unable to carry heavier, more capable sensors or explosives.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Investments in the North–South Corridor via Iran have also gained traction since the war began, particularly to export oil and deliver on some of the practical elements of Russia’s foreign policy, by bringing Iran and India closer to its economic network. Russia has also identified specific development zones in the Arctic that are rich in hydrocarbons or have access to the sea.</p> + <p><strong>Limited flight duration and range:</strong> Commercial sUAS can perhaps fly around 8 km at the high end. Military sUAS may feature extended ranges, but they will not approach large aircraft ranges.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Prior to the war, Gazprom’s monopoly in Europe had been unchallenged, but this is not the case in Asia, where it faces rival Novatek – this infighting may impact Russia’s ability to expand its energy plans in China. The Power of Siberia 2 pipeline contract with China, as yet to be signed, would give Gazprom a future role in Asia.</p> + <p><strong>Limited operating conditions:</strong> Compared to larger aircraft or missiles, sUAS are more susceptible to wind and adverse weather conditions, as well as a greater diversity of active defenses. Ukraine, for example, is reportedly losing around 10,000 sUAS per month against Russia.</p> </li> +</ol> + +<h4 id="suas-missions-and-history">sUAS Missions and History</h4> + +<p>sUAS can complete the same missions as manned aircraft. Over the past decade, military operators have used sUAS for six primary missions:</p> + +<ul> <li> - <p>Russia tends to use international platforms like the UN to further its own national interests or ensure it has a stake in the conversation, rather than in pursuit of a common cause. Since the war began, Russia’s ability to interact with other (especially Western) states has been restricted.</p> + <p><strong>Attack operations:</strong> Strikes on people and things with bombs, missiles, or suicide attacks</p> </li> <li> - <p>Since the war began, Russia and Saudi Arabia’s coordination through OPEC+ has been more pressing. Riyadh has not aligned itself with the Western consensus on Ukraine, nor has it introduced sanctions on Russia. But the war has caused a decline in global energy prices, and there are frictions between Russia and Saudi Arabia over Russia’s refusal to publish its oil export figures. Riyadh suspects that Moscow continues to export significant volumes of oil despite their price agreements, but the former has not criticised this and, since the war began, has invested in Russian companies like Gazprom.</p> + <p><strong>Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance:</strong> Providing “eyes in the sky” for military planning and operations</p> </li> <li> - <p>Russia is highly affected by climate change, but also banks on its status as a commodities producer to retain its international position. This inconsistency informs its strategic policymaking on the environment, as well as its behaviour in international forums related to climate change. Moscow often objects to international climate change efforts because it prioritises Russia’s national security, not the security implications that can stem from climate issues. While climate change can affect Russia’s national security, it is described as an issue that threatens Russia’s economic development, requiring technological or practical solutions, not adjustment to the extractive industries. Russia also views warming Arctic seas as more of an opportunity to improve access to shipping lanes than a crisis.</p> + <p><strong>Targeting:</strong> Finding and sharing target location with other strike assets, such as artillery</p> </li> <li> - <p>Russia views the Western-led climate change movement as an agenda seeking to undermine Russia and its interests in the extractive industries. Moscow’s installing of former intelligence officials in posts concerned with environmental security highlights the crossover in the Kremlin’s mindset between the environment and national security.</p> + <p><strong>Battle damage assessment:</strong> Confirming the results of an attack</p> </li> <li> - <p>Since the war, many environmental links between Russia and the West have been severed. Moreover, there is little international oversight of Russia’s major drilling projects or their environmental impact, and legislation that restricts ecological activism has been tightened. Most Western-led NGOs dedicated to the environment have been shut down.</p> + <p><strong>Harassment:</strong> Creating confusion and alarm with drone incursions, possibly including small attacks</p> </li> <li> - <p>Ultimately, even if the UK can decouple from Russian oil, the complex and global nature of international energy markets means Russia’s behaviour as a hydrocarbon superpower can still impact the UK’s energy security. Russia views external attempts to cap oil prices as a dangerous precedent that could be extended to other areas of the Russian economy and Russian values. This indicates that Moscow interprets international economic and pragmatic decisions as a direct attack on Russian sovereignty.</p> + <p><strong>Propaganda:</strong> Showing off military platforms and operations to improve military and civilian morale</p> </li> </ul> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Attack operations, ISR, and targeting missions are the most common, as clearly shown in the Russia-Ukraine war. Both sides have used sUAS to search for enemy combatants and either target them directly or pass their location to other strike assets such as artillery to fire upon their position. Ukrainian soldiers have used the U.S. Switchblade and Phoenix Ghost UAS, for example, to directly target Russian tanks and personnel. Early failures in the war also prompted Russia to quickly increase the use of stand-off weaponry, including indigenous and foreign-made sUAS such as the Lancet-3 and Shahed-136, respectively. In general, the Russia-Ukraine war highlights how sUAS have enabled complex, integrated air attack through the wide proliferation of sensors. As others have warned about the modern battlefield, “What can be seen can be hit, and what can be hit can be destroyed.”</p> -<p>This paper analyses Russia’s energy policy and the way this interacts with the country’s foreign and defence policies. The paper is part of RUSI’s UK National Security and the Net Zero Transition project and is published alongside a paper that focuses on the links between Saudi Arabia’s energy policy and its foreign and security policy behaviour. Together, these two papers analyse how Russia and Saudi Arabia – which aside from the US are the world’s leading oil exporters – approach their roles as energy superpowers, how their energy-related decision-making has evolved since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and how their foreign policies and conduct in international forums, including on climate change and other major global issues, will continue to have global implications.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/0bCZjBn.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Ukrainian Drone Minesweeper.</strong> UAS operators use drones for various missions outside of the six described above. Here a Ukrainian volunteer controls the flight of a drone carrying a metal detector to search for mines near the town of Derhachi, Kharkiv region, on October 1, 2023.</em></p> -<p>As oil and gas prices were already elevated in 2021 following the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia was able to exploit them in Europe in order to drive up prices before it invaded Ukraine. This returned the link between energy and geopolitics, and in particular the question of energy security, to the fore. The war has demonstrated that energy and geopolitics cannot be separated, and has increased the need to determine how major fossil fuel producers think about their international roles.</p> +<p>Attack operations also include strikes on infrastructure and economic targets. In September 2019, Iran launched 18 sUAS and seven missiles to attack Saudi Arabian oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais. The strike successfully evaded Saudi air defenses, including the U.S. Patriot, German Skyguard, and French Crotale, and struck their targets, leading Saudi Arabia to temporarily cut oil production by around 50 percent. In Ukraine, Russia has launched Iranian-made suicide drones to strike power grids.</p> -<p>While there are many definitions of energy security, for the purposes of this paper, energy security of states is considered to be both a practical issue of supply access and pricing, and a geopolitical issue that relates to foreign policy behaviour in the energy sector. For states that are net importers of energy, as the UK and most of Europe are, security of oil and gas supply is often equated with diversification. This includes diversification away from fossil fuels, an increasingly potent driver of energy policy across Europe. But while hydrocarbons are required to generate electricity and to fuel industries, diversification of supply also means securing access to oil and gas from sufficiently diverse sources that no single disruption leads to sudden shortages or price disruption.</p> +<p>sUAS-based assassination attempts — and successes — have also rocked several countries. In August 2018, a small insurgency group in Venezuela used a bomb-laden drone in a failed assassination attempt against President Nicolás Maduro. In January 2019, the Houthis in Yemen used a Qasef-1 UAS to assassinate senior Yemeni military officials. More recently in November 2021, Iranian-backed militias attempted to assassinate Iraqi prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi after pro-Iran political groups had faced disappointing results in the elections.</p> -<p>Before the Ukraine war, some European states relied, to varying degrees, on imports from Russia, one of the world’s top oil and gas producers and exporters. The war has prompted many European states to reduce and ideally end imports from Russia by 2027 in order to deprive Moscow of revenue and reduce Russia’s leverage over Europe. While the EU has made some progress on this, reductions in gas volumes in particular were also due in part to the Kremlin’s actions, including Moscow’s suspension of gas via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, and a March 2022 presidential decree that demanded payment for gas in roubles from countries involved in the EU’s “unfriendly actions” towards Russia.</p> +<p>Harassment and propaganda operations are also common. ISIS fighters made extensive use of commercial quadcopters and fixed-wing drones for surveillance, propaganda, and small but demoralizing tactical strikes. In January 2017, despite having a limited sUAS arsenal, the group formally announced a new drone unit known as “Unmanned Aircraft of the Mujahideen.” In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan used its drone fleet to record video of its strikes against Armenian tanks and soldiers, replaying footage across the country and internationally. Iranian-backed groups have frequently launched sUAS and rocket attacks to harass U.S. embassies, businesses, and military personnel across the Middle East, which has occasionally led to counterattacks and rising escalation concerns.</p> -<p>The UK has been comparatively less affected by this dynamic; in 2021, only 9% of the UK’s oil and 4% of its gas imports came from Russia, and by January 2023 this had been brought to zero. But while replacing Russian supply was not the UK’s key concern, due to its reliance on natural gas, it was hit just as hard as its European partners by the surge in oil and gas prices sparked by the war. The UK is exposed not just to disruptions to the flows of the oil and gas that it imports directly, but also to the global flows of hydrocarbons.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QiQp1yk.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 3: Select sUAS Combat Deployments.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>As the war continues into its second year, although oil prices have somewhat stabilised, there has been a renewed focus by the West on the behaviour of the members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), most notably Saudi Arabia, and a group of major producers, including Russia, that have aligned their oil policies with those of OPEC since 2016 through the OPEC+ framework. Every decision by the grouping to adjust production quotas, especially the significant cuts announced in October 2022 and June 2023, has been scrutinised by Western analysts for its economic and political motives.</p> +<h4 id="global-proliferation">Global Proliferation</h4> -<p>Moreover, the serious fracturing of the relationship between Russia and the West as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has meant that Russia’s behaviour as a major hydrocarbon producer, both in its export dealings and more generally in international forums for discussing these issues, has been particularly difficult to engage with. This is particularly the case where, as in Russia, governments control the energy industry. As a major emitter of greenhouse gases, Russia’s behaviour around climate change issues adds another dimension to this.</p> +<p>sUAS have spread globally over the past decade due to the technology’s dual use for both military and civilian applications. In addition to the military missions listed in the previous section, sUAS are used in various civilian activities, including filmmaking, law enforcement, emergency response, agriculture, delivery, and the protection of commercial facilities. Once sUAS technology advanced enough to become viable for these use cases, the commercial market boomed, which in turn has further fueled sUAS technology developments, facilitated the rise of commercial drone manufacturers, and created a massive, largely unregulated supply of these aircraft.</p> -<p>Given the importance of understanding how major producers behave, this paper examines how Russia sees and exercises the international roles afforded to it by its energy resources. The paper analyses three key issues: how hydrocarbons and their export relate to Russia’s perceptions of itself and its place in the world; the extent to which Russia’s energy policies are securitised and how they are linked to Russia’s domestic and foreign policies; and how Russia relates its status as a hydrocarbon exporter to notions of environmental security and international climate action efforts. As the paper will show, Russian definitions and understanding of environmental security and where this presents a national security threat widely diverge from Western understandings. Moscow tends to frame risks stemming from climate change, such as flooding, as something to be countered by technological or financial solutions, rather than addressing core issues, such as Russia’s continued extraction of hydrocarbons, as contributions to the initial problem.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HWK8KYf.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: The Path to sUAS Proliferation.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>Understanding how Russia constructs its energy security and foreign policies is therefore essential to anticipating how it might behave in international forums, particularly on challenging issues such as environmental and energy security, and where some of Moscow’s red lines might be.</p> +<p>Before the sUAS commercialization boom of the mid-2010s, manufacturers created moderately priced units with relatively rudimentary capabilities. The first remote-controlled drone to incorporate Wi-Fi, Parrot’s A.R. Drone, was released in 2010 and cost a modest $299 but had a battery life of only 12 minutes. Three years later Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI), the current commercial manufacturing titan in China, released its first drone, the Phantom 1, which sold for $379. This model featured an internal GPS but had a flight time of less than 10 minutes and a communication distance of only 1 km. Today, the cost of commercial sUAS has increased, typically ranging from $500 to $10,000, but new models offer significantly improved capabilities. DJI’s bestselling Mavic 3, which costs $2,049, offers 46 minutes of flight time, omnidirectional obstacle sensing, and a transmission range of 15 km at 1080p resolution. The cost-to-flight-time ratio between these DJI models increased by 17.5 percent, but the capabilities provided by the Mavic 3 opened the door to hundreds of commercial and hobbyist applications.</p> -<h4 id="methodology-and-structure">Methodology and Structure</h4> +<p>China has since seized the sUAS market, with DJI accounting for over 60 percent of the market share for commercial sUAS in 2021. While market projections for commercial drones vary slightly, there is strong consensus that the market is thriving and shows no signs of slowing down, as exemplified by revenue of $2.7 billion in 2020 and a projected intake of $21.7 billion by 2030.</p> -<p>The paper is divided into three chapters. The first focuses on Russia’s foreign policy decision-making in energy since it invaded Ukraine, and some of the factional disagreements between powerful energy companies which impact the Kremlin’s ability to put forth a coherent energy strategy. The second chapter discusses Russia’s engagement in OPEC+, highlighting its marriage of convenience with Saudi Arabia around oil prices and the future trajectory of this bilateral cooperation. The third chapter examines Russia’s approach to environmental security and discusses the divergences of opinion between Russia and the West over how to approach the threat of climate change.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2bH8Vrn.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 4: DJI Development.</strong> Source: DJI.</em></p> -<p>This paper is based on a review of open-source journals, books and public statements from officials in Russia, using local-language sources where possible, to piece together Russia’s current and historical views on energy security, focusing on the 2022 invasion but also grounding the analysis in recent historical literature. In addition, the paper offers a targeted review of Russia’s energy strategies and other important official documents such as its national security and Arctic strategies, as well as documents that govern its environmental policies and its engagement with the hydrocarbons industry, in order to understand better the gaps between Russia’s official foreign policy documents and its actions.</p> +<p>The commercial drone sector has driven technological advances, rather than these advances trickling down from military UAS. This growth has mostly been spurred on by the smartphone industry. Radio-controlled aircraft moved from using petrol engines to electric motors and the lithium batteries used in modern smartphones. With internal combustion engines prone to excessive vibration, electric motors have become increasingly popular, particularly for sUAS. Critically, the extensive lithium battery market has allowed operators to choose battery packs that fit their desired performance, flight time, and endurance without massive price increases. The recent interest in and testing of UAS-compatible lithium-sulfur batteries may offer an even cheaper option in the coming years. The leveraging of existing high-speed cellular networks has also allowed for broader UAS accessibility and lower associated costs. Overall, as one expert aptly explained, “Drones have really been riding the smartphone revolution.”</p> -<h3 id="i-russia-reimagining-the-globe">I. Russia: Reimagining the Globe</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YeeeAKp.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Agricultural Drones.</strong> A Kenya Airways employee controls a drone as it spreads fertilizer over a tea farm at Kipkebe Tea Estate in Musereita on October 21, 2022.</em></p> -<p>For Russia, its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the impact of that invasion on global prices have accelerated the competition between it and the West over traditional oil and gas markets, a process that has been under way for more than a decade. It is less the changing oil prices themselves and more the potential restriction of Russia’s access to and exploitation of these markets – both domestically within Russia and abroad, variously through instruments such as international sanctions that prevent Russia from accessing deep-water oil deposits, or the international climate change agenda that calls for a reduction in oil and gas production – that Russia views as a serious security threat. This securitisation of energy policies is the lens through which Russia’s own energy policymaking is seen from Moscow.</p> +<p>The military sUAS market has similarly increased in size and platform diversity over the last decade. There is limited reporting specifically on sUAS market trends, but the wider military UAS market features many Groups 2 and 3 platforms and shows clear signs of rapid expansion. Between 2011 and 2021, the military UAS market grew by nearly $10 billion, from $1.7 billion to $11.6 billion. As commercial markets and systems proliferated, indigenous military programs also promptly appeared, offering to enhance and counter the new technological capabilities available. An October 2020 study estimated that 102 countries possessed an active drone program compared to an estimated 60 countries in 2010. Additionally, of the reported 171 active military drone models in 2019, roughly 143 were sUAS. Militaries have also successfully harnessed the cheap and easy-to-use format of commercial systems while increasing the reliability and security needed for military operations.</p> -<p>Russia is a major oil and gas producer, with its oil output in 2021 making up 14% of the world’s total supply. In 2021, its revenues from oil and natural gas made up 45% of its annual budget. Its energy companies are also major employers within Russia, supporting the livelihoods of over two million people, and the importance of these industries is enshrined in Russian law. According to a 2008 law, key industries such as defence and oil and gas are considered by the Kremlin to be “strategic sectors” – cornerstones of the economy upon which Russia’s political economy and therefore its national security rests. Foreign investment in these sectors is heavily restricted, extra state scrutiny is exerted over them, and they are prioritised at the expense of other, less lucrative sectors such as healthcare and education.</p> +<p>The general utility of sUAS reinforce their proliferation. Russia has imported the Iranian Shahed-136 in large numbers to support its operations in Ukraine while also relying on domestic systems such as the Orlan-10. Prior to its operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan procured large numbers of Israeli sUAS, which Azerbaijani operators used effectively against Armenian combatants. Growing normalization of sUAS as tools of war points toward a shifting military landscape in which sUAS will regularly be relied upon in order to achieve mission success.</p> -<p>Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Western view of Russia’s role as an energy provider was a rather paradoxical mixture of business pragmatism and political interventionism. Before the 2022 invasion, Russia’s status as a major petro-state and its consequent sense of responsibility to its clients, particularly in Europe, were viewed by some Western analysts as one of the guarantors that could keep Russia’s international behaviour in check – but there was also broad acknowledgement that Russia was capable of and had used its supplies to extract political concessions from former Soviet neighbours such as Georgia (in 2006) and Ukraine (in 2009). In the end, Russia’s security goals in Ukraine overtook any desire for Russia to cast itself as a reliable energy supplier, and this has framed much of the current debate around Russia’s future as a declining energy power in Europe. However, what this has overlooked from a policy (rather than an energy) perspective is that for Moscow, energy supply is only part of the security picture.</p> +<p>Given the wide commercial and civilian applications of sUAS, international regulatory efforts to stem sUAS proliferation have fallen short. In October 2016, 53 nations, including the United States, issued a joint declaration that attempted to start the process of building a basic framework for international UAS standards, but it failed to spur meaningful action. A framework demanding sUAS buyers and sellers to comply to specific obligations had the potential to hinder exports and create strains with legitimate trading partners. In addition, China’s absence from the declaration inhibited its possibility of success from the start. Having taken control of a significant share of the global UAS market, Beijing was, and continues to be, unlikely to allow any regulation that negatively affects its exports.</p> -<h4 id="moscows-securitisation-of-energy--ensuring-russian-sovereignty">Moscow’s Securitisation of Energy – Ensuring Russian Sovereignty</h4> +<p>Even if a regulatory body were established, it is unclear how helpful it would be in removing sUAS from modern battlefields. Clear rules for manufacturers or regulations on military sUAS transfers would not decrease the wide availability of commercial drones or components of these systems, which can easily be adapted for military use even by non-state actors. According to a 2018 West Point report, ISIS displayed overall diversification within its commercial drone supply chain. For the nine quadcopters associated with ISIS operations, engineers built the final units after acquiring various components from seven retailers in five different countries. ISIS’s piecemeal production of UAS is also not an isolated practice. The Houthis in Yemen follow a similar pattern. For example, the Sammad-pattern UAS engine originated in Germany before making its way to Israel, then Iran, and eventually into the hands of Houthi engineers in Yemen. Given this substantial supply of cheap components spread across multiple business sectors, and the ease with which it crosses international borders, increasing regulations around sUAS is unlikely to stem proliferation and use.</p> -<p>Most states view energy security as a serious issue; many governments have influence over their nations’ energy sectors and in a lot of these, the energy sector tends to be dominated by large projects and the relatively small number of companies controlling them. What makes Russia’s approach to energy security particularly Russian is the way that energy and the country’s very sovereignty are bound up with strategic competition with other countries over resources.</p> +<p>As sUAS continue to develop and improve upon existing capabilities within the civilian and commercial markets, potential applications have continued to grow. There is little chance of putting the genie back in the bottle. The United States and its allies must develop active defenses to address these highly proliferated systems and deploy them as required based on expected risks and vulnerabilities.</p> -<p>Security of demand and continued access to oil and gas markets are key tenets of Russia’s national security framework, and of its national identity. Moscow’s perception of itself as a great power is largely based on a combination of its military might, its nuclear capabilities and its continued ability to produce and export significant volumes of natural resources. Although President Putin has not specifically referred to Russia as an “energy superpower”, it is clear Moscow views its prominence on the international stage and its ability (or as Moscow sees it, its right) to have a significant stake in foreign affairs as bound up with its natural resource wealth.</p> +<h4 id="future-threats">Future Threats</h4> -<p>From the Kremlin’s perspective, attempts to stymie Russia’s continued role as a natural resource producer – be it through sanctions or competition with other states over access to resources in the Arctic – are all a serious threat to Russia’s existence. Sanctions introduced on Russia’s hydrocarbons industry by Europe, the US and other allies since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 tended to target technology related to Arctic, deep-water exploration and onshore tight oil extraction, but ultimately they had little impact on Russia’s onshore deposits in western and eastern Siberia, which make up the bulk of its production in the short term.</p> +<p>Technological developments over the next few years will further empower sUAS. The rise of artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) is perhaps the most common concern. As the JCO warned in their 2021 report: “The impending integration of artificial intelligence with autonomous sUAS will introduce yet another dramatic change to the character of warfare.” Software is already enabling rapid leaps in UAS autonomy. As one CSIS report explains:</p> -<p>Against this backdrop, and particularly since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has embarked on a strategic and practical reorientation of both its trade and foreign policy alliances. This reorientation sees Russia reimagining the globe and Moscow’s place within it.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Traditional software is sufficient to deliver a high degree of autonomy for some military applications. For example, the Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI) Harpy is a decades-old uncrewed drone that IAI openly acknowledges is an autonomous weapon. When in autonomous mode, the Harpy loiters over a given region for up to nine hours, waiting to detect electromagnetic emissions consistent with an onboard library of enemy radar, homes in on the emissions source (usually enemy air defense radar), and attacks. No human in the loop is required.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Russia’s latest foreign policy strategy – its first major policy document published since the war began – envisages Russia and its allies China and India united at the centre of a grand Greater Eurasian Partnership, pitted against the hegemonic (and allegedly declining) West. This perception frames Moscow as being at the heart of decision-making, with nascent relationships with middle powers such as Iran forming an important economic basis of the alliance. Although much has been made of the significant gap between Russia’s strategic planning and its practical ability to deliver on these goals, what this perception does show is Russia’s intention to restructure the globe on its own terms and to place Moscow at the hub of global decision-making. This is important, because it clearly delineates who and what Russia sees as a threat to its sovereignty. Its foreign policy document makes clear that it respects the sovereignty of powers such as India and China, while remaining mistrustful of and distant from the so-called “Anglo-Saxon world”, a derisive and archaic term that Moscow uses to refer to the UK and some other European states. However, it is not clear that China and India buy into Moscow’s version of the world, especially with framings that conceptualise Russia as the driver and leader of their international positions.</p> +<p>As these autonomous capabilities proliferate further, defenders will be forced to pivot away from detect and defeat platforms based on radio frequency (RF).</p> -<p>Russia’s foreign policy approach pivots its vision towards a new alliance arrayed directly against the “collective West” (in Russia’s mindset, mostly made up of the EU, NATO member states and the US), which is depicted as a failed example of imposed democracy. This clash of civilisations that Russia is articulating is laying the groundwork for serious frictions between the West, Russia and the rest of Russia’s allies, particularly over energy and access to available resources.</p> +<p>Advances in AI/ML may also enable sUAS swarms. These are large, coordinated, and at least semi-autonomous group operations; thus far, there have been few if any attacks that fit this strict definition. Yet even small, human-controlled group attacks have proven capable. The 2019 Houthi attack on two Saudi Aramco oil facilities only employed 10 drones but still degraded business operations for some time. Commercial drone shows have operated with more than 3,000 drones. Once mass drone swarm technology is established, it will be an increasingly difficult threat to intercept. In those cases, the best options for defenders may be “left-of-launch” strikes on C2 nodes and ground control stations associated with the attack.</p> -<p>The war has also exacerbated a growing tendency on the part of Russia to seek out alternative structures such as BRICS – an economic grouping consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in order to promote its way of looking at the world. In this vein, since 2017, Russia has established its own energy forums with trusted partners – including Saudi Arabia and many African states – with the aim of reframing energy issues on its own terms. One such forum, in 2022, was notable for its assertion that Europe’s longstanding policy of moving away from Russian gas was a failed attempt to weaken Russia, linked to the energy crisis – with no acknowledgement of Russia’s own role in that crisis.</p> +<p>Adversary sUAS may increasingly communicate through cell towers, making RF-based detect and defeat difficult. Under this environment, defenses would need to differentiate between sUAS communications and regular cellular transmissions. Even if sensors can adapt, RF-based defeat would then need to degrade those communications without disrupting cellular transmissions using those same frequencies. As JCO director Sean Gainey explained in 2022, sUAS operators are “building in redundancy in these systems where if you cut off something, they can fall back on something else.”</p> -<p>Russia’s perception is that the West is seeking to undermine Russia through its dominance of energy resources, and that international forums such as the UN Security Council are prejudiced against Russia and its national interests. There is also a widespread belief among the Kremlin leadership that certain efforts by the West – for example, to cap oil production prices or curtail the use of nuclear energy, or for the US to deliver gas to Europe in order to replace Russia – are part of an attempt to undermine Russian traditional values and exert a neoliberal political agenda. Moscow’s understanding of the West’s actions in the energy sector has been framed in increasingly negative terms over the past decade, reflecting not only the highly securitised way in which Moscow views any external intervention in what it perceives to be its energy affairs, but also its own misconceptions about the West. It also reflects that Moscow has little concept of the importance of climate change issues in shaping global energy policies and prefers to frame climate change as a Western conspiracy designed to undermine Russia’s interests.</p> +<p>Lastly, U.S. policymakers must also prepare for creative sUAS use in the battlefield. In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, for example, Azerbaijan reportedly modified older aircraft to function uncrewed and used these aircraft to draw fire and locate Armenian air defenses. Russia has used similar tactics in its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Russian operators have also developed tactics such as piloting near buildings to exploit sensor blind spots, launching UAS away from operator locations to avoid counterattacks, and spoofing Ukrainian defenses to falsely register a large number of UAS and ground control stations. UAS operators have enormous freedom of action and can adapt tactics quickly, whereas defenders typically do not have such flexibility.</p> -<p>While many of these foreign policy relationships were in train before the war, Russia’s invasion has accelerated Moscow’s need to identify new energy export destinations and to reduce its reliance on imported foreign technology. Although Russia’s so-called “pivot to the East” has already been a long-term trend for at least the past decade, with some rail and pipeline infrastructure build to support it, the programme has recently been accelerated because Russia has few other options. To do this, however, Russia must link up its oil and gas reserves with its maritime and rail infrastructure in order to reorientate its export structures and maintain its own energy security. Whether realistic or not, Putin maintained in mid-2022 that by 2025, Russia intends for 80% of its energy industry’s equipment to be domestically manufactured, to ensure that oil production remains high and to reduce external sanctions risks.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1CmCB1k.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Drones in Formation.</strong> South Korea’s military drones fly in formation during a South Korea–U.S. joint military drill at Seungjin Fire Training Field in Pocheon on May 25, 2023.</em></p> -<p>Some of these plans for domestic reliance, and new ways of seeing the globe, are evident from Russia’s other strategic planning documents that govern the energy sector, some of which were written before the war.</p> +<h3 id="detecting-and-defeating-suas">Detecting and Defeating sUAS</h3> -<h4 id="moscows-shifting-self-perception">Moscow’s Shifting Self-Perception</h4> +<p><em>A variety of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities are available to defeat sUAS. Each of these tools have unique strengths and weaknesses in regard to survivability, range, magazine capacity, combat identification, and defended area.</em></p> -<p>This shift in Moscow’s approach to energy security can be seen from two of the most important documents that govern the country’s energy sector: its Energy Strategy (ES) and its National Security Strategy (NSS).</p> +<p>sUAS pose unique challenges to air defense. They exploit gaps in sensing because they are small and fly low. They also exploit cost asymmetries — they are usually cheap and numerous, while air defense interceptors are not. They even exploit the way air defense is organized by equipping individual combatants to achieve tactical and strategic effects, while the United States and its allies mostly deploy air defense at the company level or higher.</p> -<p>Russia’s previous NSSs had only briefly mentioned energy in an environmental context, but in the 2021 strategy, the most recent, it is noted as something that permeates all aspects of security and Russian life: ensuring heating, as something to be protected alongside the defence industries and nuclear power plants, and as a major factor in Russia’s economic security. The increasing securitisation of energy means that Russia views external attempts at reform, as well as geopolitical competition over important energy markets, as a threat to Russia’s sovereignty, and will respond with what it views as appropriate force.</p> +<p>Despite these differences across size, flight, costs, and quantities, the overall air defense kill chain is essentially the same. Air defense — as defined broadly — means detecting and defeating airborne threats flying from surface to space. That process can be illustrated in various ways, as shown in Table 5. The sensors, effectors, and C2 platforms involved in this kill chain all have unique characteristics that determine their effectiveness and where they are deployed, as shown in Table 6.</p> -<p>Russia’s current ES (ES-35) was approved in 2020 by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and runs up to 2035. Irrespective of its sparse mention in the NSS, Moscow has long viewed energy as a part of its national security, given the significant contribution of hydrocarbons to the federal budget, and the ES-35 makes it clear that any restriction on Russia’s production and sale of oil, gas and coal would be considered a security threat. The ES-35 is a strategy for safeguarding the oil and gas industry, and there is little attempt to diversify away from reliance on fossil fuels. Extraction and exports are priorities – the strategy aims to launch five major oil projects in the Arctic and 21 projects to extract raw materials such as gold and coal, alongside a significant increase in resource production from liquefied natural gas (LNG), which Russia aims to increase from 8.6 million tonnes in 2018 to 91 million tonnes by 2035. The boost to LNG production will necessitate an increase in infrastructure to support it, which the ES-35 outlines for the Russian Arctic and Far Eastern regions; these plans are supported and governed by other strategic documents.</p> +<p>The following sections define the sensor, effector, and C2 missions, and explore different C-sUAS modalities, their respective strengths and weaknesses, and example platforms for each.</p> -<p>There have been three key developments since the war began that have demonstrated most clearly Russia’s changing view of itself and its place in the world as an energy producer and supplier. First, in August 2022, Prime Minister Mishustin approved an updated plan for the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a trade route that runs across the top of the Russian Arctic. Among other measures, the plans include construction of three new terminals to process LNG, oil and coal, as well as updating existing port infrastructure in the Far East to accommodate an increase in capacity. With plans to construct new ice-class vessels capable of traversing the NSR, not only is Russia preparing to increase the production and export of raw materials, but it is also attempting to better link up its land and maritime infrastructure, and is using this physical infrastructure to assert its dominance over the maritime domain.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/liqIcPz.png" alt="image11" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 5: The Air Defense Kill Chain.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>But as ever with many of Russia’s so-called “mega-projects”, there are few feasibility studies available to determine whether investing in these often-politicised projects will ultimately add value to the Russian economy, or even whether ports will be able to accept sufficient planned increases in traffic to make investments worthwhile. Indeed, following a South Korean feasibility study on expanding Russia’s small Far Eastern Slavyanka port in 2018, ultimately the project never came to pass and, since the war began, many foreign investment projects have been halted. Other considerations relating to major projects like these, such as environmental impacts or the effect on local Indigenous populations, are rarely taken into account.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/A0srXW1.png" alt="image12" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 6: C-sUAS Platform Considerations.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>Second, as part of the development of the NSR, Russia is pursuing important infrastructure projects with allies such as Iran to resurrect the North–South Corridor. This is a railway development project linking Russia to the Indian Ocean via Iran that has been repeatedly shelved over the past two decades, but which has gained new impetus since the war. Plans include linking up ports along the NSR with land and sea routes south of Russia across the Caspian Sea to northern parts of Iran, a grandiose project of a kind that, as the history of Soviet-style planning has evidenced, rarely delivers on its objectives. While it is still incomplete and there are numerous political and infrastructure obstacles to overcome, the North–South Corridor is nevertheless part of Russia’s longer-term plan to export goods, including its oil, through these new land and sea networks. There is substantive investment in it already: as of 2022, Russia had committed $13 billion to different projects as part of the scheme. The North–South Corridor links up roads, rail and maritime infrastructure across multiple countries, and is an attempt by Moscow to deliver on some of the practical elements of its planned foreign policy, bringing countries such as India and Iran more closely into Russia’s economic network.</p> +<h4 id="sensors">Sensors</h4> -<p>A third key aspect of Russia’s reimagining of the globe that has been accelerated since the war began can be seen in its Arctic strategy up to 2035, and in Moscow’s changing perception of the NSR. Unlike its predecessors, the current strategy has identified specific development zones – which will receive greater Kremlin attention and financing – that are either rich in mineral resources such as hydrocarbons, or have access to the sea. This highlights Russia’s dual priorities of resource extraction and export in the Arctic, and is a further example of its strategic linkages between the land and maritime domains. Amid a downturn in relations with the West, over the past few years, there has been a noticeable shift in perceptions of the NSR within Russia, from viewing it as a potential international route capable of linking up Europe and Asia to instead seeing it as a useful route specifically for Russian companies to deliver energy resources to their own global markets. This refocusing on ensuring Russia’s dominance of sea routes is likely a precursor to further attempts to exert control over the maritime domain, with likely a concomitant increase in Russia’s projection of sovereignty over parts of the NSR that are considered international waters.</p> +<p>Radar has long been the primary sensor used to detect and track aerial threats. The traditional approach leverages wide-area surveillance radars and highly focused tracking radars to respectively detect and track incoming aircraft and ballistic missiles. Detecting sUAS in this way, however, is hard. As mentioned earlier, sUAS typically fly below typical air defense radar coverage. Perhaps even more problematic is their slow speeds and small profile, which combined creates a very limited radar signature for detection and tracking.</p> -<h4 id="how-united-is-russias-energy-decision-making">How United is Russia’s Energy Decision-Making?</h4> +<p>This is not to say that active radar does not work against sUAS. Active radar remains one of the predominant means for detecting sUAS at longer ranges as compared to other sensor modalities. Radar is also more capable under adverse weather conditions and less sensitive to countermeasures compared to other sensors. Radars, however, can be large, heavy, and power intensive, thereby reducing mobility unless mounted on a vehicle. They also emit a signature that can be easily detected, making the operator’s location vulnerable to attack. Radars also must be optimized to see smaller objects, thus reducing their detection range.</p> -<p>Russia’s ability to use its position as a major oil and gas supplier on the international stage in exchange for influence, political concessions or access to other resources, or to project its regime survival, is often viewed – both by Moscow and the West – as its most effective foreign policy asset. But while Russia’s energy diplomacy tends to be viewed as a political tool it can wield at will, Russia’s energy strategy is dominated by often-competing approaches, which means that it has occasionally been forced into cooperation with foreign partners to ensure that it retains its position as global producer. As its energy relationship with the West declines, Russia will likely be obliged to cooperate with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, which does not necessarily put it in a position of strength.</p> +<p>Another common method to detect sUAS today is electronic surveillance measures, also known as passive radio frequency. This detection method allows defenders to identify the wireless signals used to control the UAS. Some passive RF capabilities show the location of both the sUAS and the operator. As one Department of Homeland Security report explains, C-sUAS may “use libraries of known UAS radio signatures and compare detected signals to those in the library in order to classify or identify UAS.” These sensors listen to sUAS communications via control stations, satellites, cell towers, or drone relays. A key concern with passive RF, however, is that sUAS are moving away from RF control, making current detection and defeat capabilities obsolete.</p> -<p>There are multiple competing interests within Russia’s energy sector, with conflicts between the country’s official strategies and the vested interests of individuals and their coteries who are driving these industries forward, and this makes Russia’s energy approach inherently flawed.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/3FjZUp7.png" alt="image13" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: RADA Radar.</strong> Source: DRS.</em></p> -<p>Russia’s energy market is dominated by Gazprom (headed by Alexei Miller) and Rosneft (under Igor Sechin), two major oil and gas producers that are in turn technically overseen by the Kremlin. These industries are subject to a series of vested interests that include personal financial concerns, political demands and corrupt practices, all of which make it challenging to determine Russia’s true energy “strategy”. Gazprom is also a sprawling and influential conglomerate that includes financing (through Gazprombank), oil (Gazprom Neft is Russia’s fourth-largest oil company) and the media (Gazprom-Media owns several television channels). These companies employ a relatively large segment of Russian society, with just under half a million people as of 2019.</p> +<p>Due to the detection liability of radar, C-sUAS designers often seek to combine RF detection and radars within a single platform. The FS-LIDS (Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft System Integrated Defeat System) is an example of a system supported by the JCO that incorporates both detection methods. The multi-layer detection capabilities of FS-LIDS allow operators to better conduct countermeasures that align with the given target and environment. However, a combination of sensors is not a necessity. EnforceAir is another JCO-supported system that uses RF for both detection and defeat. Nevertheless, sUAS operators can adapt to RF sensors. In July 2022, for example, a British defense firm developed a laser-controlled drone that will be undetectable by current RF sensors. Suicide drones, also known as one-way attack munitions or loitering munitions, may use an onboard inertial navigation system to allow sUAS to operate without alerting RF sensors. Russia has extensively used the Iranian Shahed-136 drone as a loitering munition in attacks on Ukraine.</p> -<p>Companies like Gazprom and Rosneft are under state control, but operationally, they both function without significant government interference, as long as this does not directly contradict stated Kremlin foreign or domestic policy goals. Rosneft and Gazprom have also successfully resisted some directives from the Kremlin – government plans in 2013 to try to privatise the oil and gas industry were met with strong pushback from Gazprom, Rosneft and others, such as major bank Sberbank, until they were eventually halted. That said, there is also an important degree of self-censorship within Gazprom and Rosneft, which still tend to act within the Kremlin’s agenda without being compelled to do so.</p> +<p>Other sensor modalities include electro-optical (EO), infrared (IR), and acoustic sensors to detect a target by its visual, heat, or sound signatures, respectively. These sensors are helpful in providing additional confirmation of a nearby sUAS threat but are rarely used as a standalone sensor. EO, IR, and acoustic sensors have very limited operational ranges. For example, the EnforceAir’s RF sensor has a radius of approximately 3 km, while the Discovair G2 acoustic sensor has an estimated range of 500 m. Additionally, potential countermeasures are fairly simple, including, for example, flooding a battlefield with noise that degrades acoustic sensor capabilities. For these reasons, EO, IR, and acoustic sensors are often used in combination with active or passive radar to provide a more effective, layered detection capability.</p> -<p>Despite its relative operational autonomy, in a strategic sense, Gazprom has for years been at the heart of many of Russia’s foreign policy strategies, especially in Europe, where dependency on Russian gas was of political significance, via the (now defunct) Nord Stream pipelines. But while Gazprom’s monopoly has been relatively unchallenged in Europe, this is not so in Russia’s dealings with Asia. There, Gazprom’s greatest rival is the privately owned Novatek, which is absorbing significant amounts of market share amid Russia’s energy reorientation to China, through the Yamal LNG project. Novatek and Rosneft were permitted by the Russian government to participate in LNG exports in 2013, with the view that Gazprom’s monopoly was holding Russia back from becoming a major player in the gas sector.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/MXZiIVC.png" alt="image14" /> +<img src="https://i.imgur.com/RArqeqf.png" alt="image15" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 7: C-sUAS Sensor Strengths and Weaknesses.</strong> Source: Characteristics from Department of Homeland Security; images from SRC Technologies, U.S. Department of Defense, Squarehead Technologies, and D-Fend Solutions.</em></p> -<p>New trade deals with China such as the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, discussed amid much fanfare between Putin and President Xi Jinping in March 2023 (but as yet unsigned), give Gazprom a nascent role in Asia, although construction of that pipeline would not begin until 2024 at the earliest, and would not come online until 2029, even if it were to run to schedule. Since 2014, Rosneft has also sought to challenge Gazprom’s monopoly and gain access to the Power of Siberia pipeline, and has been inching into the gas market over the past decade by acquiring the rights to develop its own gas deposits in Russia. In 2023, Putin appeared to have agreed to Rosneft’s demand, maintaining that its gas reserves from its fields in Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk could be used to supply the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, and instructing Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak to act as arbiter between Gazprom and Rosneft as they worked out the details. As Europe moves away from its reliance on Russian energy, Gazprom may well be forced into ever-greater direct competition with other companies such as Novatek and Rosneft for market share.</p> +<h4 id="command-and-control">Command and Control</h4> -<p>Competition between Sechin and Miller – with Putin acting as the ultimate arbiter – makes it a challenge for Russia’s energy industry to make long-term plans, with political interference and self-interest often trumping financial expedience. Occasionally, their arguments spill over into the public domain, such as over which company contributes more taxes to the federal budget. Rivalry between Gazprom and Rosneft can be occasionally disruptive and can stymie progress on major projects. The two companies were embroiled in widely publicised litigation proceedings against each other in 2015–16, over Rosneft’s attempts to gain access to the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas project in the Far East, an appeal which Gazprom ultimately lost in the Supreme Court. However, competition like this tends to be more about defending turf than about actual views on Russia’s foreign policy or national interests, which are still inherently decided at the Kremlin level.</p> +<p>Command and control (C2) is a critical element of C-sUAS operations, as it is for all air defense. Broadly speaking, C2 is the “exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.” A fundamental element of C-sUAS C2 is the centralized development of operational procedures that will enable decentralized execution of C-sUAS operations. Execution of the C-sUAS mission, in the near term, will be localized to the threatened asset or unit, and engagement authority will rest with the local commander and possibly junior leaders, who will make decisions based on the predefined rules of engagement. These tasks include integrating sensor data (from sources such as radar, cameras, and direction finders), classifying and identifying incoming threats, and transmitting this information among sensors and shooters to queue up responses. C2 operations require the creation of a common operational picture and share that intelligence with all relevant stakeholders.</p> -<p>Given these features of Putin’s decision-making process, Russia’s energy policy approach has never been particularly coherent, and there have always been groups that prioritise how much money can be extracted from Russia’s natural resources, juxtaposed with internal critics of Russia’s sprawling infrastructure projects – such as expensive symbolic bridges – whose economic returns are negligible and which tend to serve political goals. While important foreign policy decisions remain the purview of the Kremlin, infighting within the oil and gas industry has repercussions for Russia’s efficiency and ability to project its image as an extractives “superpower” abroad. This is a longstanding issue that was a challenge for the Kremlin prior to the war, but as competition over new markets in the Indo-Pacific region grows, internal competition between Russia’s energy companies is also likely to increase.</p> +<p>While detecting sUAS presents the most commonly identified challenge, as previously discussed, sUAS also present a significant identification challenge. Over the near term, identification will depend more on context or procedures than specific Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems that confirm an sUAS’s affiliation. As a Joint Staff report explains, many U.S. UAS “do not have IFF capability and are similar or identical to threat [UAS].” C-sUAS rules of engagement (ROE) will therefore depend on the operational environment and threat intelligence, with ROE able to tighten or loosen as necessary. Future C-sUAS platforms may feature improved non-cooperative threat recognition capabilities, but for now ROE will determine whether defenders can shoot at incoming sUAS rather than pursue the identification of the object.</p> -<h3 id="ii-russias-involvement-in-opec">II. Russia’s Involvement in OPEC+</h3> +<p>C2 for C-sUAS has improved significantly over the past few years, becoming increasingly open and interoperable. In July 2020, the DoD designated the Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2) system as the interim C2 system for C-sUAS. The FAAD C2 system provides a single integrated air picture that combines a suite of sensors, effectors, and other C2 systems given operational requirements. JCO director Sean Gainey noted the superiority of the FAAD C2 compared to alternatives, specifically noting its fire control capabilities. The rapidly evolving C-sUAS threat requires C2 development to build upon FAAD C2’s successes. The ultimate goal, in the eyes of Gainey and the JCO writ large, is to create an “open architecture standard based C2 system” that can be configured according to specific threat analysis.</p> -<p>Russia tends to use international platforms either as a means to further its own national interests or to ensure that it has a stake in the conversation, rather than in pursuit of a common cause. Since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s ability to interact with other, particularly Western, states in multinational forums has been increasingly restricted, and an international arrest warrant for Putin has posed another logistical challenge to face-to-face engagement. Russia’s behaviour in the OPEC+ grouping, which is designed to influence global oil pricing, is still in service of its national interests, but must be carefully balanced with its desire to maintain a strong bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia – the two countries in combination sell 20% of oil used globally.</p> +<p>The current functions of FAAD C2 thus reveal the baseline of JCO C2 development. Currently FAAD C2 is hosted on a SRNC-17 laptop computer and Dell 7212 tablet computer, emphasizing the need for portable command functions. The extensive integration with sensors and communication systems also highlights the need for mature joint operation potential. FAAD C2 is deployed and integrated with 25 sensors, including AN/MPG-64 Sentinel and Ku-band Radio Frequency System (KuRFS) radars, and five communications systems, including Link 16 and Joint Range Extension Application Protocol.</p> -<p>Russia and Saudi Arabia’s energy policies – and by extension their foreign policies – are often conflated due to their shared leadership of the OPEC+ grouping. Yet the Russian–Saudi partnership is more of a marriage of convenience than an expression of a wider strategic alignment. The basis of the relationship is that both countries support the stabilisation of oil prices while simultaneously ensuring high export revenues.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/90FhqAk.png" alt="image16" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: The LIDS Family.</strong> The LIDS family of systems uses a range of passive and active sensors to detect, track, and identify UAS and non-hostile aircraft. Source: U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center.</em></p> -<p>In this vein, OPEC+ was formed in 2016 in response to the disruption of the global oil market caused by the US shale revolution. By increasing the number of countries coordinating their production levels, the cartel was able to influence the supply side of the market and stabilise international oil prices – but the potential brittleness of the alliance was demonstrated in the price war between Moscow and Riyadh in March and April 2020. As the global economy shut down with the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, leading oil prices to fall, Russia refused to go along with Saudi-proposed production cuts, seeing an opportunity to deal a blow to the US shale industry. Saudi Arabia, though also not necessarily opposed to hurting shale producers, ramped up production in order to deliberately push down prices even further and thereby forced Moscow to relent.</p> +<h4 id="effectors">Effectors</h4> -<p>Officially, OPEC+ coordination has been less contentious since February 2022. Russia has some leverage over Iran (an OPEC member), which Saudi Arabia lacks, and Saudi Arabia’s insistence on continuing to work with Russia in the grouping despite protestations from the US and elsewhere can be seen as an indication of how much more importance Riyadh apportions to its ability to influence the oil market (especially at a time of heightened volatility) than to maintaining a harmonious rapport with Washington. Moscow also recognises that collaboration with Riyadh will be critical to ensure supply management, even as it continues to delay production cuts.</p> +<p>The DoD has developed a variety of kinetic, directed energy, and RF-based defenses against sUAS. These tools all come with their own strengths and weaknesses. As is constantly repeated in the C-sUAS community, there is no “silver bullet” effector to defeat these threats.</p> -<p>Russia’s relationship with Saudi Arabia has become more of a pressing issue since the onset of the Ukraine war. Riyadh has chosen not to align itself with the Western consensus on the war and has not introduced sanctions on Russia, nor condemned the war. The announcement at the August 2023 BRICS summit that Saudi Arabia would be joining the grouping – with some caveats – could boost the economic potential of the bloc and offer a further channel to deepen bilateral ties, including offering new sources of sanctions evasion for Russia. There is also nascent bilateral cooperation over joint investment funds to support Russian agriculture and oil production equipment, and few high-profile projects have been announced, although the Saudi side has been much less vocal about its willingness to invest within Russia.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/TVlS7Uy.png" alt="image17" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 8: Example C-sUAS Effectors by Defeat Mechanism and Basing.</strong> Note: Many systems listed here feature multiple deployment configurations and effectors. This table is illustrative and not comprehensive, intended to show the range of C-sUAS on the market. Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has altered its position on the OPEC grouping somewhat. In search of clients and new export markets for its oil, Russia has been prepared to accept lower prices to sell its oil and maintain production, offering cut-price deals to its allies China and India in a bid to drum up funds for the war. There are also frictions over Russia’s secrecy around its figures – it does not disclose how many barrels of oil it exports, and Saudi Arabia is suspicious that Russia has continued to export significant volumes, undercutting former price agreements.</p> +<p>Kinetic defenses include guns, nets, ropes, collision drones, missiles with proximity-fuse warheads, as well as more creative solutions such as falcons and strings of streamers to tangle propellers. Kinetic defenses typically employ mature technologies, offer the highest probability of kill for any single UAS, and allow significant range of intercept. Their weaknesses include vulnerability to sUAS swarms, given their focus on defeating individual drones. They also may be inappropriate for use in populated areas where intercept shrapnel may fall on people or property.</p> -<p>For now, Saudi Arabia has not criticised Russia’s decisions to sell at a discount or publicly spoken out against its data secrecy, given the two countries’ common interest in maintaining oil prices at a level that can shore up their state budgets. Russia also has significant reason to keep the Kingdom on side – major Saudi companies invested more than $500 million in Gazprom, Rosneft and major oil producer Lukoil just after the war began and Western sanctions were introduced. Since the onset of the war, however, Russia has been on the back foot; it has few major international players it can call on as partners, and the relationship with Riyadh, which may start to demand more of Russia, is an important one.</p> +<p>The DoD has invested in several kinetic effectors. The Coyote system is one of the primary interim solutions today. There are several extant configurations which may be characterized as a missile or drone, with a jet-engine to accelerate the system out of its launcher, and fins that support its loitering capability. The original Coyote entered demonstration testing in 2016 and employed a kinetic effect through collision or the nearby explosion of the unit’s warhead. According to its FY 2024 budget, the Army procured over 1,200 Coyote interceptors between 2022 and 2023.</p> -<h3 id="iii-russias-environmental-paradox">III. Russia’s Environmental Paradox</h3> +<p>The United States has steadily improved upon C-sUAS cost asymmetries. Given the proliferation of suicide drones such as the Iranian Shahed-136, which costs roughly $20,000–50,000 per unit, using missile interceptors that cost two to eight times as much is deeply inefficient. Instead, there has been a rise of cheaper alternatives such as anti-aircraft guns for C-sUAS, commonly known as “flak.” Ukraine, for example, has procured Germany’s Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, which can shoot down sUAS with a range of around 5 km, as well as the older Soviet ZU-23 anti-aircraft gun. The DoD has also invested in an anti-drone “strings of streamers” system and is pushing the system into a program of record. These older, simpler technologies have proven effective against sUAS threats.</p> -<p>One of Russia’s many strategic paradoxes is that it is a country highly affected by climate change, but banks on its status as a producer of commodities to retain its international position. This inconsistency informs its strategic policymaking on the environment, and its behaviour in international forums around climate change.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lqETAoX.png" alt="image18" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Coyote Testing.</strong> Source: Raytheon.</em></p> -<p>The Kremlin has never been particularly concerned by environmental security, and many of its actions have been reactive to environmental disasters that occur on its territory, rather than preventative. The ES-35 specifically frames international climate change policies as a hindrance to Russia’s own energy security development, even if it simultaneously acknowledges the theoretical importance of reducing carbon emissions. Similar inconsistencies can be found in Russia’s Arctic strategy, which notes the security threat of warming seas such as flooding in coastal areas and the melting of permafrost, but still pushes high production of fossil fuels and the mining of extractives. Globally, Russia is the fourth-largest greenhouse gas emitter, after China, the US and India, and is responsible for 7% of the world’s CO2 emissions. Nevertheless, Putin has been derisive about Europe’s green energy approach, maintaining that the energy crisis in Europe is in fact due to Europe’s investment in wind farms that cannot make up for a reduction in fossil fuels.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4L0qBZ1.png" alt="image19" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 10: Leonidas Pod HPM.</strong> Source: Epirus.</em></p> -<p>In international forums, Russia often objects to proposals to improve global environmental security. While this can appear bullish and self-interested, it is also partly due to different understandings of security: Russia’s longstanding concept of environmental security prioritises the security of the nation as the key concern, rather than the security implications that can stem from environmental problems, and includes a collective historical view that the natural environment holds no intrinsic value in its own right. Climate change is seen as something that affects Russia’s national security (including defence), but it is framed in strategic documents as a threat to Russia’s economic development that calls for practical solutions, rather than any adjustment to the extractive industries. Russia also tends to approach issues such as warming Arctic seas not as a crisis but as an economic opportunity that will improve access to new shipping lanes and offer a boost to the Russian export industry. Some Russian academics have disputed this prevailing analysis, maintaining that the impact of climate change in the country will probably not be a net positive overall, but their views are unlikely to be influential in altering the Kremlin’s longstanding policies.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CCuI1ii.png" alt="image20" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 11: Leonidas Ground-Based HPM.</strong> Source: Epirus, Inc.</em></p> -<p>Russia has tried to separate environmental security into two issues: the first is the economic damage to the country caused by climate change that Russia aims to mitigate, chiefly through technological interventions or improved investment, while the second is what Russia perceives as a Western-led agenda, under the guise of environmental activism, to undermine Russian institutions. Russia has suggested at the UN Security Council that environmental security issues are a ruse for external military interventions in countries rich in natural resources (perhaps referring to the African continent) and has framed this as a threat to Russia’s interests in the extractive industries. Ultimately, Russia views most international attempts to warn against the dangers of climate change and fossil fuel reliance as a further threat to Russian sovereignty.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CbqXyz8.png" alt="image21" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 12: Dronebuster Training at the Baghdad Embassy Compound in Iraq.</strong> Source: U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> -<p>Within Russia, important figures traditionally from the defence or security services have increasingly been appointed to lead on environmental issues. In 2016, Sergei Ivanov, a former minister of defence (2001–07) and KGB officer in the Foreign Intelligence Service, was appointed the president’s special representative on the environment and transport. Ivanov oversees environmental protection, as well as the development of the Far Eastern regions and streamlining infrastructure to support businesses; he is also an important member of Russia’s powerful Security Council and a longstanding Putin ally. While his precise role is unclear, his positioning indicates the crossover in the Kremlin’s mindset between the environment and national security.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/jns5dsC.png" alt="image22" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 13: L–MADIS Training.</strong> Source: U.S. Marine Corps.</em></p> -<p>In terms of its foreign policy, Moscow’s securitisation of the environment means that it is rarely cooperative on internationally led climate change issues. On the UN Security Council, Russia pays lip service to climate action but favours the status quo, tending to use the platform to ensure that it has a place at the table and to promote its economic (extractives) interests, rather than with a view to safeguarding the environment. In principle, Russia is a signatory to UN-led efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but the Kremlin does not publish figures about its oil and gas production rates and only offers broad public statements about production cuts, which makes it a challenge to determine how compliant (or not) it may be. It has also been criticised internationally for its gutting of environmental policies that would have otherwise worked to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, by refusing to introduce quotas or penalties on greenhouse gas emitters.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/IQBUOVw.png" alt="image23" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 14: High-Energy Laser Weapon Testing.</strong> Source: U.S. Air Force.</em></p> -<p>This approach is unlikely to change, largely due to the presence of powerful business lobbying groups who work on behalf of the oil and gas industry, such as the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Rossiskiy soyuz promyshlennikov i predprinimateley, RSPP), whose coordination council is co-chaired by Putin’s youngest daughter, giving the RSPP a direct line to the Kremlin. The RSPP extensively lobbies against any proposed bills that could reduce the oil and gas industry’s ability to extract resources in environmentally protected areas, and it is rarely opposed by the Kremlin.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/636C7g5.png" alt="image24" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 9: C-sUAS Effector Modality Strengths and Weaknesses.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project, images from Anduril and U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> -<p>Perhaps most concerningly, since the onset of the war, many environmental links between Russia and the West have been severed, and there is little international oversight of major drilling projects in Russia and the permanent impact that these could have on protected environments, especially in more isolated parts of the Russian Arctic. Legislation within Russia that restricts ecological activism has also tightened since the war, reflective of a broader repressive legal environment targeting institutions with a perceived Western-led agenda. For example, in March 2023, the Worldwide Fund for Nature was branded as a “foreign agent” – this inclusion on the foreign agents list by Russia’s Federal Security Service comes with an implication of espionage and suggests that the organisation receives funding from murky sources abroad, seeking to undermine Russia. Many organisations on the list have ceased to function under pressure from the security services, and as a result there is a risk that there will be even less external oversight of resource extraction.</p> +<p>The DoD has invested significantly in directed energy (DE) weapons, including on high-energy laser (HEL) and high-power microwave (HPM) systems capable of defeating sUAS. Lasers are cheap per shot, have large (so-called “unlimited”) magazines, and operate at the speed of light. However, they are technologically immature, expensive to build relative to other solutions, and offer limited line-of-sight ranges. In 2014, the U.S. Navy fielded the first operational directed energy weapon, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS), aboard the USS Ponce (LPD-15). The ODIN and HELIOS systems are in development today. A variety of specifically anti-drone laser systems are now being developed as well, including the Athena and HELWS MRZR.</p> -<p>Russia’s understanding of threats to the environment has close links to its understanding of threats to its hydrocarbons industry, as well as to the personal interests of the ruling elites (including Putin) and the central role that energy resources play in Russia’s international policies, all of which are bound up with ideas of Russian sovereignty. Any attempts by the international community to further an agenda that restricts Russia’s continued extraction of hydrocarbons, its export of them to new and existing markets, and the construction of infrastructure on land and at sea to support this, are framed as part of a security threat to which Moscow will respond harshly.</p> +<p>HPMs are another effector type. They are cheap per shot fired, technologically mature, and particularly effective against sUAS swarms with their potentially wide area of effect. However, future sUAS may harden against HPMs, although this would significantly raise their development costs and potentially lead to engineering difficulties.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion-where-moscows-red-lines-are">Conclusion: Where Moscow’s Red Lines are</h3> +<p>The Army plans to equip the Leonidas as its primary HPM for indirect fires protection. Unlike other C-sUAS defenses that disable one drone at a time, Leonidas was engineered to kill swarms of Group 1 and 2 UAS, as demonstrated in several U.S. Army test events. The Army’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) recently awarded a $66.1 million contract for Leonidas prototypes. Although HPMs have traditionally been based on larger platforms because of their large energy requirements, new technological developments are allowing for expanded basing options. The Leonidas Pod, for example, is a mobile, compact drone-based prototype that builds upon the ground-based system to offer relatively cheap, air-based C-sUAS.</p> -<p>Given Russia’s ability to have an impact on global oil and gas prices, the UK and its European allies will need to try to understand, react to and – where possible – influence the way in which Russia approaches its role in energy markets and in international forums. Even if the UK were to entirely decouple from Russian oil, the complex and global nature of international energy markets means that Russia’s behaviour as a hydrocarbon superpower still has the ability to substantially alter the UK’s energy security. Although diplomatic relations with countries such as Russia may have been all but severed, Russia’s actions matter, whether through decisions on oil production, its global positioning and attempts to reconfigure the world order, or its divergent understandings of what energy and environmental security mean.</p> +<p>Directed energy can be an effective C-sUAS tool. However, DE systems may encounter operational difficulties in complex and heavily congested environments, given the potential collateral damage to friendly forces and assets. Environmental factors such as poor weather or smoke in the atmosphere can also degrade their efficacy. Furthermore, training requirements for directed energy platforms may be intensive. As one analyst explains, an operator’s limited interaction time with an incoming UAS threat means that they must be well trained to deploy it effectively.</p> -<p>Russia’s approach since the onset of the Ukraine war has been to expand its foreign policy partnerships with allies such as China, India and Iran; to invest in the land and maritime infrastructure to support its political goals as well as its extractive efforts; and to seek alternative clients for its oil and gas, while maintaining high production. While its energy strategy may be at times incoherent and pulled in multiple directions due to the many vested interests involved, there is a clear sense of some of Moscow’s red lines when it comes to its understanding of energy security and its intent to maintain the extraction and export of hydrocarbons to fuel its economy. Just as debates around oil price caps and moves to reduce carbon emissions are seen as an unwelcome Western intervention, similarly, attempts by the international community to involve Russia in the climate change debate are viewed by Moscow as another security threat to Russia’s sovereignty, and an attempt to impose Western values on a country now forging its own path eastwards.</p> +<p>The last defeat modality is RF, through jamming or spoofing the drone’s communications link. Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing — misleading its GPS — means that the operator can tell the drone that north is south, and west is east. Jamming, conversely, means disrupting communications between the drone and its operator and is simpler to perform. Although RF-based defenses are powerful, operators must be aware of environmental effects potentially impacting nearby commercial or otherwise friendly aircraft. RF-based defenses also do not affect autonomous or otherwise non-communicative UAS. Lastly, spoofing and jamming require defensive emissions, which may increase the risk that an adversary can geolocate defensive positions.</p> -<p>Moreover, Russia and Saudi Arabia – and other oil producers – regard Western enthusiasm to impose energy-related sanctions on Russia, particularly the price cap, as a dangerous precedent for political intervention in the oil market. Putin himself has been vocal about the limitations of the cap, maintaining that there is a risk of mission creep (i.e., that oil price caps could be extended to other sectors of the Russian economy, and indeed to any other country in the world), and has framed this as another attempt by the West to undermine the Russian economy and its “values”. This is a further indication of how Moscow continues to view what other countries frame as economic and pragmatic decisions as a direct attack on Russian sovereignty, and it means that Moscow’s responses to these proposals are likely to appear disproportionate or couched in national security terms.</p> +<p>RF-based defenses have become increasingly popular over the last decade and operate as fixed, mounted, and handheld systems. In June 2020, six of eight systems selected to represent the JCO’s interim C-sUAS capabilities utilized RF defeat: FS-LIDS, L-MADIS, CORIAN, NINJA, MEDUSA, and Dronebuster. The Dronebuster is a handheld line-of-sight system weighing roughly four pounds, which allows for easy infantry and squad-level usage. Jamming capabilities also vary depending on the system; the Dronebuster Block 3 offers 45 minutes of jamming, whereas the updated Dronebuster SNA offers three hours of continuous jamming.</p> -<p>Ultimately, Russia is pursuing a fundamentally revisionist international project to reconfigure the global order on its own terms, and it is willing to deploy the political capital and revenues derived from its hydrocarbon might to further this project. For there to be any united action around climate change, the UK and Europe must pay closer attention to the foreign and security policies of major hydrocarbon producers like Russia, in order to understand the roots of some of the international implications resulting from their actions.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Y5ZZ2HB.png" alt="image25" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 10: Select C-sUAS Operations.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<hr /> +<h4 id="a-diverse-solution-set">A Diverse Solution Set</h4> -<p><strong>Emily Ferris</strong> is a Research Fellow in the International Security Studies department at RUSI, specialising in Russian domestic politics. Emily has a particular interest in Russia’s military and civilian infrastructure including its railways, road and port systems, and the role this plays in advancing Russia’s political ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as deployed in conflict zones such as Ukraine. She also researches domestic political administrations in Russia’s Far East, and Russia’s military and political relationship with Belarus.</p>Emily FerrisUnderstanding how Russia constructs its energy security and foreign policies is essential to anticipating how it might behave in international forums, particularly on challenging issues such as environmental and energy security.Principles For UK–CN Strategy2023-11-08T12:00:00+08:002023-11-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/principles-for-uk-china-strategy<p><em>China poses an “epoch-defining and systemic challenge with implications for almost every area of government policy and the everyday lives of British people”, according to the UK’s March 2023 Integrated Review Refresh.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>While stopping short of labelling China a “threat”, this is a marked shift from the “golden era” of UK–China relations heralded during Xi Jinping’s 2015 visit to the UK.</em></p> +<p>There are many different types of sensors, effectors, C2, and basing options for the C-sUAS mission. There is no single mix-and-match that serves as a universal solution to defeat sUAS threats. Rather, investment in a wide variety of sensors, effectors, and basing options is essential to ensure that the U.S. military is equipped to address the diverse set of threats posed by UAS. As JCO director Sean Gainey has explained, “There must be layers of systems to address the threat of UAS. It has to be a system of systems. It is a holistic approach.”</p> -<p>Such a shift in assessment requires a commensurate response. This Policy Brief reviews the government’s response to China to date and examines criticisms of its approach, including calls to publish an “unclassified version of its China Strategy”. Rather than detail specific policy recommendations or argue in broad-brush terms for a more hawkish or dovish stance, the brief proposes six principles for a more dynamic and broadly based – and so more effective – China strategy. It argues that, while publishing a strategy document may aid communication, there are more important things to be done.</p> +<p>Sensors and effectors of various sorts have their own unique strengths and weaknesses. Kinetic effectors may be more reliable to take down any individual UAS threat — especially those that are bigger and faster. Non-kinetic effectors such as HPMs, on the other hand, can more effectively counter large UAS swarms.</p> -<h3 id="changes-after-the-golden-era">Changes After the “Golden Era”</h3> +<p>Trade-offs likewise impact sensors. Active radar allows operators to detect threats at greater ranges but may give away their positions. Passive RF sensors allow operators to remain stealthy and are therefore the better option for dismounted, forward-deployed units. Yet passive RF sensors cannot detect pre-programmed UAS that do not communicate with their operator, which is becoming more prevalent on the battlefield. One-way attack drones, for example, have become common in Russian attacks against Ukrainian civil infrastructure. Overinvestment in one defense modality may leave defenders vulnerable in certain attack scenarios.</p> -<p>Much has changed since 2015. Notwithstanding current travails, China’s economy has grown by nearly 50% in real terms and accounts for a larger share of global trade. The country’s ambitions in new technologies have become more widely understood and borne some fruit, notably in renewable energy and electric vehicles. President Xi has focused on self-reliance at home, emphasising national security and the leading role of the Chinese Communist Party, while becoming more active on the world stage. Last year, NATO concluded that China’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values”. The US’s ambassador to China, Nicholas Burns, said last year that US–China relations might be at their “lowest moment” since Nixon’s 1972 China visit. Tensions over Taiwan have risen sharply.</p> +<p>The need for diversity is likewise true in basing options. The right solution for a fixed site is different than that of a maneuver unit. A mobile defender may forsake having a range of effectors to remain small, light, and nimble so that they can shoot on the move. Fixed-site defenders, however, face adversaries that can plan sophisticated, large-scale attacks at various altitudes using a variety of missiles and UAS. Their defenses therefore require longer-range radars and effectors. Again, there is no one-size-fits-all material solution.</p> -<p>Throughout this, trade with China has grown. In the 12 months to March 2023, China was the UK’s fourth-largest trading partner, though the UK ran a £38 billion trade deficit. 1 Questions of security and values, always present in the China policy debate, have however come strongly to the fore. China’s imposition and subsequent interpretation of the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law have caused widespread outrage. Detailed reporting of China’s human rights abuses against the Xinjiang Uyghurs gained media attention and stirred parliamentary debate and opposition. The government has identified China as a significant source of cyber attacks on UK interests, with increased activity and disinformation campaigns during the Covid-19 pandemic. The recent China report from Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) concluded that “China’s size, ambition and capability have enabled it to successfully penetrate every sector of the UK’s economy”. Additionally, China’s initial slow Covid response and its refusal to allow a full WHO investigation have damaged trust. Its stance on Ukraine has further sharpened concerns. And, while the UK has been the leading destination for Chinese direct investment into Europe since 2000, activity has recently fallen away sharply.</p> +<h3 id="the-current-path">The Current Path</h3> -<h3 id="policy-changes">Policy Changes</h3> +<p><em>As senior leaders institutionalize the C-sUAS enterprise across the DOTMLPF, they must address critical gaps in training and personnel requirements.</em></p> -<p>The UK government has taken action on numerous fronts. In 2020, the Johnson-led government reversed the decision to allow the purchase of Huawei’s 5G technology following a reassessment of security risks and political pressure from the Trump administration. Chinese involvement in the UK’s nuclear power programme came under renewed scrutiny, leading to a buyout of China’s interest in the Sizewell C project. The Hong Kong British National (Overseas) visa scheme has enabled close to 130,000 Hong Kong nationals to move to the UK. The 2021 National Security and Investment Act introduced a tighter screening process for foreign investment into key sectors. The 2023 National Security Act established a Foreign Influence Registration Scheme. This year also saw announcements of a Critical Minerals Strategy refresh, the National Protective Security Authority and an Economic Deterrence Initiative. Nonetheless, when security is not an issue, the UK remains “open for business from China”. There are also policies, urged by some backbench MPs, that the government has not pursued. It has not declared Chinese actions in Xinjiang to be a genocide and has not followed the US in sanctioning Hong Kong officials.</p> +<p>U.S. efforts to develop effective C-sUAS operators and platforms can be loosely categorized in three stages: urgent need, refinement, and institutionalization. The United States is entering the third stage today, which will be the most difficult. It will require buy-in from the military services and clarity of roles throughout the defense establishment. The following sections define these stages, provide a historical overview of U.S. activities, and review what the United States must do to achieve institutionalization in the C-sUAS enterprise.</p> -<p>Consistent with the Integrated Review’s “tilt to the Indo-Pacific”, the UK has been active in the region. A carrier strike group was deployed there in 2021 for the first time since 1997, and will return in 2025. The UK is the first non-regional member of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement. It has been active in helping formulate stronger G7 and NATO positions on China, and has shaped and joined new minilateral partnerships including the AUKUS agreement, the Global Combat Air Programme and the Mineral Security Partnership. The sanctioning of Xinjiang officials was announced in coordination with the US, Canada and the EU.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/eyLA6p3.png" alt="image26" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 11: Air and Missile Threat Matrix.</strong> Source: U.S. Army.</em></p> -<h3 id="is-this-a-strategy">Is This a Strategy?</h3> +<h4 id="urgent-need">Urgent Need</h4> -<p>Throughout all this, many have called on the government to publish a China strategy. In 2019, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) called for “a single, detailed public document defining the UK’s China strategy … [to] be published by the end of 2020”. In 2021, the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee entitled its report “The UK and China’s Security and Trade Relationship: A Strategic Void”.</p> +<p>The U.S. response to C-sUAS has transpired in three stages. The first was urgent need. In 2016, ISIS captured large swaths of territory in both Iraq and Syria. They were among the first non-state actors to use small commercial quadcopters, which they employed effectively in battles against U.S.-supported Iraqi forces. There were few C-sUAS defenses in theater or readily deployable at the time. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) leadership issued an urgent requirement for defenses, prompting the DoD to quickly transfer a variety of commercial off-the-shelf C-sUAS platforms.</p> -<p>This year has seen progress. The Refresh summarised the UK’s approach to China with three pillars: Protect/Align/Engage:</p> +<p>In 2016, the United States lacked cheaper, efficient effectors to use against cheap and plentiful sUAS. This lack was a consequence of wide divestment in Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) by the Army and Marine Corps in the 1990s and early 2000s. Both services were focused on the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan and Iraq and therefore chose to cut Air Defense Artillery (ADA) units in favor of more mission-critical maneuver forces. Military leadership believed that the U.S. Air Force would provide sufficient defensive counterair capabilities to maintain air superiority and protect ground forces. Military leadership did not consider the threat of UAS and cruise missiles as viable, near-term threats to U.S. military operations. This trend was not uniquely American; most NATO nations also weakened their air defense capabilities over the last two decades.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Protect the UK through enhancing security measures in critical national infrastructure, supply chains, democratic freedoms and science and technology.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Align with “core allies and a broader group of partners” to deepen cooperation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Engage with China directly and multilaterally so as to “where possible cooperate on global challenges” and secure a “positive trade and investment relationship”, while “avoiding dependencies … and protecting our national security”.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Yet with the new threat clearly in sight, Congress has quickly committed funds to procure defenses. This step is highlighted by a significant surge in the DoD’s FY 2017–FY 2019 procurement and research, development, testing, and evaluation spending for C-sUAS. While the DoD achieved an interim solution in months, it fully satisfied the C-sUAS Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) two years later in FY 2019. The initial JUON effort successfully committed defenses to provide an “interim standalone capability” to defend 89 CENTCOM sites against Groups 1 and 2 UAS.</p> -<p>In April, Foreign Secretary James Cleverly expanded on this in a speech, “Our Position on China”, arguing that “we must engage with China where necessary and be unflinchingly realistic about its authoritarianism”. Cleverly’s August visit to Beijing drew on the same position. The prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has described the approach as “robust pragmatism”, while also calling China “the biggest challenge of our age to global security and prosperity” after the May G7 meeting.</p> +<p>Given the active threat to U.S. allied forces, the selection of defense systems was understandably fast paced. According to Barry J. Pike in 2018, then program executive officer for missiles and space, the C-sUAS budget was placed “in the same office as our Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar project because they do know how to go fast. . . . Within 60 days a requirement was generated and within another 60 days, we had materiel in theatre. . . . We fielded more than 270 different kinds of systems [for C-sUAS].” A consequence of this quick delivery, however, was the minimal effort placed on the typical acquisition processes for programs of record and the DOTMLPF process. The massive quantity of C-sUAS platforms was deemed necessary at the time but would require the next stage in the C-sUAS response to consolidate these programs into a manageable portfolio.</p> -<p>No detailed China paper has been published, however – nothing similar to Germany’s recently published China strategy. In August, the FAC called again for an “unclassified China strategy”. Charles Parton, a long-time China analyst, has described the lack of a clearly communicated China strategy as the “panda in the room”.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/liVRhk2.png" alt="image27" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 15: Iranian-Made Kamikaze Drone.</strong> Remnants of Iranian-made kamikaze drone used by Houthi forces against Saudi Arabia.</em></p> -<h3 id="pressures-for-greater-clarity">Pressures for Greater Clarity</h3> +<h4 id="refinement">Refinement</h4> -<p>The government’s approach can be criticised from three angles. First, that the “three pillars” strategy does not amount to an appropriate or even coherent course of action. Second, that it lacks specifics and glosses over trade-offs. Third, that publishing a detailed China strategy brings benefits greater than any associated costs.</p> +<p>The second stage in the U.S. response was one of refinement, during which the United States developed a more focused C-sUAS portfolio that was operationally effective and logistically sustainable. It included a diversity of sensors and effectors to cover the full threat spectrum. To fulfill this mission, in November 2019, the U.S. secretary of defense designated the Army as the lead service for C-sUAS; soon thereafter, the Army created the JCO to lead this effort. The JCO also helps the Army think through deployment strategies and align resources for C-sUAS. Recent budget justifications highlight this phase shift. The FY 2022 budget request noted the C-sUAS transition from a JUON to formal programming, with requirements specified under the Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum 078-20. Also in FY 2022, the Army expanded the threat to include Group 3 UAS and designated a unique line-item number for C-sUAS. This move marked a symbolic emphasis on C-sUAS as a standalone program.</p> -<p>Protect/Align/Engage implicitly rejects alternative strategies of large-scale decoupling or unquestioning engagement. Some simply disagree with this approach, seeing it as riddled with contradictions. A three-pillar framing is not, however, unique to the UK. It reflects the “complicated and sophisticated” nature of relations with the world’s second-largest economy. The US speaks of “invest, align, compete”, following US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s earlier description of the US–China relationship as “competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, adversarial when it must be”. The EU has described China as a negotiating partner, economic competitor and systemic rival. China also mostly pursues a similar approach, while at times strategically choosing to reject it. In 2021, foreign minister Wang Yi stated that “China–U.S. cooperation on climate change cannot be divorced from the overall situation of China–U.S. relations”. With Australia and Lithuania, China has linked disagreements on Taiwan and Covid-19 with economic relations. The UK does also need a response to such situations.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/tboBblc.png" alt="image28" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 16: C-sUAS Milestones.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>The lack of focus on trade-offs is a more compelling criticism. The approach smacks of “cakeism”, promising to secure all the benefits and address all the negatives that China presents, while ducking value judgements and tough choices on priorities.</p> +<h4 id="institutionalization">Institutionalization</h4> -<p>For instance, the UK is to engage China on climate matters, and China leads in renewable energy. So what is the stance on sourcing solar panels from Xinjiang given well-documented reports of forced labour and its likely presence in UK supply chains? Does reliance on China reflect successful engagement, an unacceptable breach of our values, or a security risk? Universities benefit financially and intellectually from Chinese students and research collaborations, while facing risks of revenue dependence, challenge to academic freedoms and leakage of sensitive research. How should the UK navigate this? University leaders need better guidance based on the government’s assessment of trade-offs and priorities.</p> +<p>The third and final stage is institutionalization, during which the United States must fill critical gaps across the DOTMLPF construct. The central question here is about how to apply air defense principles and institutionalize these capabilities to non-air defenders. The challenge is developing DOTMLPF solutions across the force to air defense and non-air defense units alike.</p> -<p>Finally, a more detailed China strategy could be published, but the benefits need to exceed the costs. The ISC’s China report states that as of 2019, “the National Security Council (NSC) owns and creates [government] policy on China”, which is then set out in a six-pillar “China Framework”. Even the names of three of these pillars are redacted. The related China National Strategy Implementation Group seeks to avoid a “binary prosperity vs. security” approach. So trade-offs are considered, but there is no external communication of how this is done.</p> +<p>The military services will play a larger role in the institutionalization phase. Questions remain as to whether they will accept systems supported by the JCO or develop their own unique platforms more suited for their specific needs, as well as how such needs will be prioritized against other service needs. Major policy, strategy, budget, and programmatic decisions will be made that will carry enormous consequences for the field.</p> -<p>Publishing would provide a better basis for debate, challenge and holding the government to account, and also provide clearer guidance to those making China-related decisions. The only previous China policy paper, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s “The UK and China: A Framework for Engagement” (2009), stated that “this document is intended to begin a broader conversation”.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BhP0kFp.png" alt="image29" /> +<img src="https://i.imgur.com/l9ZyhZs.png" alt="image30" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 12: DOTMLPF Plans and Potential Pitfalls.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense; DOTMLPF definitions from U.S. Department of Defense.</em></p> -<p>The argument is finely balanced, however. By their nature, elements of the China strategy need to remain confidential, not least from Beijing. Discussion and challenge of a redacted strategy paper can skew debate. Any published paper serves more to communicate a narrative than to describe a government’s full strategy. And decision-makers often need more sector-specific guidance than a single paper can communicate. A published strategy paper is no panacea.</p> +<p><strong>DOCTRINE</strong></p> -<h3 id="six-principles-for-a-more-dynamic-and-effective-ukchina-strategy">Six Principles for a More Dynamic and Effective UK–China Strategy</h3> +<p>C-sUAS doctrine has improved significantly over the last decade. The DoD began developing C-sUAS tactics, techniques, and procedures over the late 2010s as the sUAS threat proliferated. The Army released three central documents during this period. The first was the 2016 Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-01.8, Techniques for Combined Arms for Air Defense. ATP 3-01.8 provides guidance on how combined arms forces can protect themselves from air attacks, including UAS threats.</p> -<p>Implementation of the right China strategy, itself made up of a myriad of China-related decisions, is more important than a single paper. Keeping in mind the following six principles will help formulate a more dynamic and effective China strategy for the UK.</p> +<p>The second central doctrine publication was the 2017 ATP 3-01.81, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques. This report provides defense planning, training guidance, and regional threat preparations for sUAS threats. It highlights basic issues such as identifying specific UAS threats and potential responses based on the operational environment, enemy capabilities, and tactics. It also offers some specific combined arms unit training recommendations.</p> -<h4 id="1-strategy-should-be-more-than-a-document">1. Strategy should be more than a document.</h4> +<p>The third major doctrine publication was the 2020 Army Field Manual (FM) 3-01, U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations. FM 3-01 incorporates details on the specific UAS threats and C-UAS techniques and offers some of the clearest guidance on countering sUAS to date. The report provides air defenders with established rules of engagement, along with guidance on the specific altitude, speed, and actions needed to determine whether a UAS is indeed a threat. Defensive measures are also explained down to the force level and divided by type, such as maneuver, aviation, special operating forces, field artillery, and intelligence (see Table 13). This clarified roles and responsibilities among the branches.</p> -<p>“Strategy” is a popular word, yet one used by different people with different meanings. At heart, it is about making choices to achieve defined objectives or outcomes and then putting in place the required resources to realise them. Roger Martin, a leading business strategy academic, writes that “strategy is choice. Strategy is not a long planning document”. While those implementing need to understand the strategy, no company publishes its strategy in full on its website. Nor does any country. Important elements are confidential, shared on a need-to-know basis.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cAWOVuN.png" alt="image31" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 13: Army C-sUAS Doctrine.</strong> Source: U.S. Army.</em></p> -<p>Strategy is dynamic and iterative, rather than static and one-time. It considers and addresses multiple, changing contingencies. In today’s world, decisions are made in changing, uncertain circumstances based on imperfect information. China and the UK’s allies alike react and adapt to the choices made by others.</p> +<p>The primary concern is that doctrine is not often shared, embraced, or applied appropriately in operations or materiel development. One possible factor contributing to these issues is the lack of joint doctrine. Recognizing this underdevelopment, the 2018 Joint Publication (JP) 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, called for more detailed UAS procedures on joint threat detection, identification, and engagement. Since then, however, progress has been slow. For example, in its section on C-sUAS, the 2021 update to JP 3-30 Joint Air Operations, only noted the complexities of defeating sUAS and the need to distinguish between friendly and enemy sUAS. It failed to provide the kind of detail laid out in Army doctrine. Furthermore, now that the JCO has down-selected its primary C-sUAS sensors, C2, and effectors, a new joint publication could include specific C-sUAS platforms and operations to provide more clarity to service members.</p> -<p>This means that a detailed set of actions, decided centrally, fixed and then communicated to others to implement, is unlikely to succeed. Rather, many different people need to make decisions that together amount to a strategy. This is, in the words of management scholar Henry Mintzberg, “emergent strategy”. At times, this can be hard to distinguish from a contradictory “muddling through” and no overall strategy. This does not, however, make the approach any less valid. Determining which elements of the China strategy should be centrally determined – and which not – is an important matter of judgement.</p> +<p>The DoD must invest in future thinking to keep doctrine fresh as new challenges arise. This requires investing in internal and external leadership across the C-sUAS enterprise. The JCO — or another central authority — can coordinate and invest in this work and disseminate its findings. This may be done through joint military-academic dialogues, wargames, conflict simulations, and open-source intelligence collection and analysis on sUAS technologies and operations. The joint efforts of the military, academia, and defense industry can support the further evolution of doctrine at the pace required.</p> -<h4 id="2-strategy-should-be-explicit-about-whose-behaviours-need-to-change--or-stay-the-same--in-order-to-bring-about-specific-outcomes">2. Strategy should be explicit about whose behaviours need to change – or stay the same – in order to bring about specific outcomes.</h4> +<p><strong>ORGANIZATION</strong></p> -<p>Good strategy is clear on both desired outcomes and the behaviours – continuing or changed – needed to bring them about. The current UK government seeks “a positive trade and investment relationship” with China. But it is does not explain what this statement really means, or what needs to happen for this to occur. By contrast, the 2009 China “Framework for Engagement” did contain very detailed targeted outcomes. However, this document contained few specifics about how they might be achieved. The current UK–China strategy would benefit from greater clarity on both aspects.</p> +<p>The primary task of the military services is to organize, train, equip, and provide forces to the combatant commanders. In light of this goal, how will the services organize units or forces to perform the C-sUAS mission? Will the force structure for dedicated air defense forces within each service increase or will mission responsibility for the current forces merely expand? Will the services define a partitioning of mission responsibility between dedicated air defense forces and all other units and equip each accordingly?</p> -<p>It is much easier for the UK government to affect behaviours at home than in China, or even in “like-minded countries”. A China strategy must take much of what China does as a given. It should then determine how best to change what happens in the UK, while taking account of how China (and others) might act in response. Government can change behaviours at home by banning or mandating certain activities, or by changing incentives and providing better information to those who then decide for themselves. Which approach makes sense, and where, is at the heart of a clear China strategy. Clearer communication of the government’s perspective on this would allow others to make better decisions on China matters.</p> +<p>Clearly, the C-sUAS mission mandates an increase in dedicated air defense force structure across the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force, but the mission also requires an all-of-force approach to defeating the UAS threat. Dedicated and non-dedicated air defense units must be prepared to perform active defense tasks and apply passive defense techniques to counter the UAS threat. The allocation of C-sUAS capability should align to mission responsibility, and the complexity of the materiel solutions, given the operational context they are applied in, should inform whether the capability requires a dedicated air defense crew or a non-dedicated operator. The concept of a CAFAD approach, across all services, should not be lost as the DoD organizes for this mission set.</p> -<p>For Lawrence Freedman, strategy is the “art of creating power”. China’s economy is five times larger than the UK’s, and its population 20 times as large. The Integrated Review recognises that if the UK is to influence the choices of Chinese decision-makers, it needs to gain scale through working with others – hence recent extensive collaboration through the G7, NATO and other fora. Here too, however, the UK’s ability to change behaviour is shaped by what others choose. US policy plays an especially critical role, both regarding its own stance on China and its appetite to act in coordination with allies or alone. If US policy becomes significantly more or less hawkish, the options for the UK’s China strategy also shift: US policy on Taiwan shapes any role that the UK might play. China’s reaction to the UK’s choices also depends partly on how the British approach compares with those of other major countries. French President Emmanuel Macron’s April visit to Beijing yielded commercial contracts, while Rishi Sunak has yet to meet President Xi.</p> +<p>Likewise, given the breadth and scope of the UAS challenge, the DoD should not lose sight of the fact that a single office to coordinate and guide development of C-sUAS capabilities might be of value. Since January 2020, the JCO has served as the central C-sUAS coordinator in the DoD, focused on establishing joint training, developing joint doctrine, and synchronizing joint materiel development. Because there is no one-size-fits-all for C-sUAS across the services, the JCO has promoted service-specific materiel and policy development while still working to reduce disparate and redundant investment, as is its mission. As a result, the DoD avoided investing in a larger number of platforms, greater redundancy among existing platforms, and increased maintenance, training, and logistics.</p> -<h4 id="3-a-china-strategy-is-for-the-whole-uk-not-just-for-government">3. A China strategy is for the whole UK, not just for government.</h4> +<p>Yet the consensus model for C-sUAS may need to evolve over time. The current requirement for wide, cross-service consensus over C-sUAS investment could inhibit future transformation of the air defense enterprise to meet the threat. In the spectrum between development led by an all-powerful JCO on one end, and the Army and Marine Corps completely in charge of their own disparate plans on the other, today’s acquisition enterprise may lean too far toward the latter camp. Congress and DoD leadership should reexamine JCO authorities and relation to service acquisition agencies to improve the requirements process and acquisition timelines. This could mean empowering the JCO with an authority requirement recognized by the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) that is broad enough to be effective for immediate C-sUAS needs. This would need to be done, however, in coordination with service leadership to satisfy unique service requirements and avoid overlapping too much with other requirement generation bodies, such as the Army Futures Command Air and Missile Defense Cross-Functional Team (AMD CFT), which perhaps could focus more on longer-term C-sUAS requirements.</p> -<p>In developing the strategy, the simple term “UK China strategy” merits unpacking and definition. It is about more than the bilateral relationship. Abroad, the UK encounters China in its relations with every country and in multilateral organisations. At home, China is not just a matter for government. Thousands, perhaps, millions, of people take decisions where China plays a role – from supplier selection to deciding how to protect open academic discussion in universities. Equally, while China is important, it is not everything: there are many other topics that matter to the UK. Still, many major decisions have an important China component without being decisions “about China”.</p> +<p>Outside of acquisition authorities, an empowered JCO might also lead C-sUAS coordination among the United States and its allies. The U.S. military spends significant resources to train and integrate its air defenses with allies and partners. These efforts have made joint operations safer and more effective in many theaters. In the C-sUAS arena, however, sales and joint partnerships are slow, and allies appear to rely mostly on RF sense and defeat platforms. Few NATO allies, for example, have invested in active defenses and instead appear to rely on passive defense, counterattacks, and general deterrence. As U.S. partners recognize the increasing sUAS threat — especially in light of Russia-Ukraine fighting today — the JCO can engage in dialogue and workshops to support U.S. exports, co-development, and joint training opportunities.</p> -<p>This breadth is important because China is often described as taking a “whole-of-state” approach to its affairs, whereby the Party’s dominant role removes any meaningful distinction between government and private actors. The ISC report discusses the security risks that this poses to British interests. In its most extreme formulation, the term significantly overestimates the Party’s coordination and cohesion across a country of 1.4 billion people, but the risks cannot be ignored.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Dk84IOk.png" alt="image32" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 17: JCO Demonstration at Yuma Proving Ground.</strong> Industry and military officials attended the first JCO demonstration in April 2021 at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, where the focus was on low-collateral effects interceptors (LCEI) systems.</em></p> -<p>The UK must formulate an appropriate response that meets the challenge, while preserving our distinctive democratic strengths and diversity of opinion, not seeking to ape the controlling approach of the Chinese party-state. The UK government itself needs a “whole-of-government” approach that consistently integrates considerations of economics, security and values into decision-making. But also needed is a China strategy for the UK as a whole, which clarifies where government should make and mandate China-related decisions, and where others are better placed to do so.</p> +<p><strong>TRAINING</strong></p> -<h4 id="4-those-who-make-the-decisions-need-to-be-well-informed">4. Those who make the decisions need to be well-informed.</h4> +<p>Training is an urgent need across the joint force. The need for C-sUAS is on course to become ubiquitous for fixed and maneuver formations, necessitating a wide distribution and variety of training. As the JCO has affirmed, air defense specialists will continue to manage UAS threats for Groups 3 through 5, but the DoD should prepare all units to counter Groups 1 and 2. Commanders at all levels should incorporate C-sUAS in training exercises. Basic training must be simple enough to teach in a short window but comprehensive enough to cover this threat spectrum.</p> -<p>The UK will make better decisions on China when those making the decisions know more about China, about how it sees the world, about others’ experience of dealing with China, and about how China in turn reacts. China is unfamiliar, opaque, multifaceted and fast-changing. Good decisions draw on knowledge and experience rather than on misconceptions, guesswork and stereotypes. Yet a 2021 Higher Education Policy Institute report highlighted that there is a “lack of knowledge and understanding [about China] that would enable actors in the private and public spheres to craft the answers that are needed”. The Integrated Review committed to “invest in enhanced China-facing capabilities, through which we will develop a better understanding of China and its people”.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="us-army-master-sergeant">U.S. Army master sergeant</h4> + <p>“You’re giving us $10 billion worth of capabilities and $10 of training.”</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Three aspects merit greater attention. Firstly, there is a need to define the scope and nature of “China capabilities” that would help different decision-makers in and out of government. This should include practical experience, such as contract negotiations, as much as academic and policy knowledge. Second, many, if not most, people who make decisions with a China dimension will not be, and will not need to be, China experts. They must, however, know enough to make good decisions and be able to access expert knowledge as needed. The government can help facilitate this access. Finally, there is scope to draw more systematically on the experience of others. The Chinese diaspora in the UK offers a broad range of useful perspectives. The UK can learn more from how other countries manage their own complex China relationships, such as Japan and Australia.</p> +<p>There are currently four Joint Knowledge Online training modules that cover basic C-sUAS awareness, system familiarization, installation of C-sUAS activities, and C-sUAS tactics, techniques, and procedures. These short, functional training courses are useful for familiarizing military personnel with sUAS threats and basic countermeasures.</p> -<h4 id="5-strategy-without-resourcing-and-implementation-is-just-wish-making">5. Strategy without resourcing and implementation is just wish-making.</h4> +<p>A more comprehensive training program currently takes place at the C-sUAS Academy in Yuma, Arizona. It offers a two-week course, set to expand into a three-week class by FY 2025. The class is offered across the services and U.S. government, including Secret Service agents. The Army also administers a “master trainer” course specifically for sUAS. Conducted at the Maneuver Center of Excellence in Fort Moore, Georgia, the training course certifies students with Group 1 UAS through a clear program of instruction which includes training on ground control stations, mission planning, simulations, orientation flights, and proficiency flight evaluations. The upcoming Joint C-sUAS University (JCU) at the Fires Center of Excellence in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, discussed further in the “Facilities” subsection below, may consider building upon both training courses.</p> -<p>Strategies often fail. Plans are written but not implemented. Successful strategies require objectives grounded in reality, supported with the right resourcing and organisational structures; clear responsibilities and accountabilities; incentives and sanctions to encourage action; and durable leadership commitment that adapts in the face of changing circumstances.</p> +<p>In FY 2024, the JCU will offer two courses — an operator and a planner course — each lasting two weeks. The operator course will provide service members with an additional skill identifier and consist of threat analysis, service specific engagement, and layered defense, with a capstone in detecting and defeating adversary drones. The planner course will consist of layered defense, coordination of airspace, joint strategic management, and C-sUAS planning and system integration, with a capstone in planning and executing a Course of Action (COA) to detect and defeat red air threats (single/swarming).</p> -<p>For the UK in relation to China, these conditions do not currently appear to be in place. The ISC China report found that “the slow speed at which strategies, and policies, are developed and implemented … leaves a lot to be desired”. It also rightly highlighted the need for longer-term planning and resource commitments. This in turn requires sufficient cross-party consensus for commitments to last through changes of government.</p> +<p>The DoD and JCO have prioritized training in recent years. Since April 2021, the JCO, RCCTO, and services have hosted industry demonstrations twice a year to “evaluate emerging technologies that close gaps, inform requirements, and promote innovation.” This joins the service-focused exercises which have increasingly incorporated C-sUAS, as shown in the table below.</p> -<p>Resourcing for China has increased. In March, the government announced a doubling in 2024/25 of funding for its China Capabilities Programme. Richard Moore, head of the Secret Intelligence Service, recently stated that “we now devote more resources to China than anywhere else, reflecting China’s increasing global significance”. This is likely not enough, though limited public information makes it hard to judge. Indeed, there are good strategic arguments for not revealing publicly the resource levels behind some initiatives.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/b8FojWd.png" alt="image33" /> +<img src="https://i.imgur.com/43kg8Mq.png" alt="image34" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 14: Major U.S. C-sUAS Training and Development.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<p>However, it is not a question of money alone. Improving coordination, communication and alignment across government remains a big task. This is as much as question of leadership focus and organisational effectiveness as resource levels per se.</p> +<p>Lessons from the field — especially in Ukraine — highlight how quickly the sUAS threat and tactics are evolving in real time. The lack of designated training ranges that have standing C-sUAS authorities to operate within CONUS airspace hinders the ability of DoD to train on new equipment and stress test the validity of new TTPs. Resources such as the Joint C-UAS Center of Excellence and the Joint C-UAS University (JCU) are being stood up to address such gaps in training knowledge across the joint force and act as a clearing house for C-sUAS TTPs. Ultimately, range location issues and reduced live training opportunities will hinder efforts to build readiness, particularly for directed energy systems.</p> -<p>Internationally, too, increased resources are needed. China is much more active on the global stage, putting increased time and effort into advancing its agenda in multilateral institutions and offering financial support to countries in the Global South in particular. There is increased contention and competition. Here, cooperation with others allows for burden-sharing, whether in addressing China’s efforts in the UN to redefine human rights or the implications of increased financial development assistance in the Pacific Islands. But more resources – both time and money – are needed if strategy is to be more than rhetoric.</p> +<p><em>Materiel</em></p> -<h4 id="6-strategy-requires-learning-and-adaptation">6. Strategy requires learning and adaptation.</h4> +<p>C-sUAS materiel development was addressed in Chapter 2 of this report. In short, materiel development should feature a diverse solution set informed by formation requirements for fixed or mobile defenses. Today’s platforms focus primarily on fixed requirements, as requested by CENTCOM and available at the time. Yet as the maneuver force sees the need for C-sUAS across regions, the DoD will need to shift focus toward mobile and maneuver capabilities.</p> -<p>Strategy is not static. Broad objectives may remain constant, but prioritisation, detailed outcomes and how to achieve them will change. Strategy will also change, based on which policies work and which do not. As such, any detailed China strategy paper may quickly date. Strategy must learn and adapt rapidly to changed assessments and circumstances. It must these days consider a China with strong digital capabilities, but large structural economic problems, in a world of AI, rather than a high-growth China excelling in physical infrastructure.</p> +<p><em>Leadership and Education</em></p> -<p>Much of this learning will inevitably happen behind closed doors. However, external review and reflection – in parliament, in expert groups and in the broader community – is important too. A published China strategy can help anchor this debate, but it must not become a fixed baseline pursued for its own sake while the world changes.</p> +<p>Professional leadership development — from squad leaders to flag officers — must be a priority to ensure doctrine and training are effectively implemented. C-sUAS leaders across air defense, maneuver, support, and sustainment teams will help drive operational planning and training across the force and at the various echelons they lead. These leaders can also help identify and respond to sUAS development trends and adversary capabilities and construct new TTPs in line with emerging technologies. The DoD is building C-sUAS leaders through the several training programs listed above in the “Training” section.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p><em>Personnel</em></p> -<p>China indeed has “implications for almost every area of government policy and the everyday lives of British people”. While the government has made substantial progress on its approach to this challenge, more needs to be done.</p> +<p>The C-sUAS mission must be shared across air defense and all other combat, combat support, and combat service support activities. The high demand and low density of air defense formations requires that air defenders and non-specialists work together as part of a CAFAD approach. The central question today, however, is the specific division of labor among the air defense and non-air defense units. Table 15 below lays out three models to illustrate the terms of this debate. On one end is the “Specialized” model, in which the C-sUAS mission is largely taken on by air defenders. On the other end, the “Universal” model posits a framework in which all units are trained for C-sUAS. The “Specialized” and “Universal” models are extremes for illustrative purposes — no one advocates for these purist frameworks. U.S. defense officials are developing an appropriate middle path, labeled here as “Hybrid,” which will incorporate elements from both sides. The degree of specialization versus universalization, however, remains to be determined.</p> -<p>What matters more than having a strategy paper is a host of decisions in different domains, followed by resourcing, implementation and review. Reasonable people can disagree on what being “clear-eyed” about China means in practice. This is not the work of government alone, even where China pursues its own “whole-of-state” approach. Across the UK, better awareness is needed, both of the opportunities and the risks that China presents. This will allow people to strike the right balance between risk and return – and also determine where, on certain matters of security and values, there is no balance to be struck, and economic benefits must take a backseat. But without increased resources – both time and money – a better China strategy will remain an expression of hope rather than reality.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yftfLmJ.png" alt="image35" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 15: C-sUAS Operator Frameworks.</strong> Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.</em></p> -<hr /> +<p>Under the hybrid model, C-sUAS planners have borrowed the distinction between “area” and “point” defense whereby air defenders manage larger systems such as high-energy lasers and long-range kinetic interceptors for “area” defense, while other forces use “point” defenses such as guns, nets, and handheld platforms. Maneuver and forward-deployed forces should be able to detect and classify Groups 1 and 2 and, if unable to intercept themselves, at least “relay alert information on locations, altitudes, and time” critical to ground force protection and the possible defeat of enemy UAS. The JCO’s investments suggest an emphasis on CAFAD. Handheld jammers, targeting enhancers, the smart shooter, and other smaller platforms have left this pathway open for the joint force across all units.</p> -<p><strong>Andrew Cainey</strong> is a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI and the founding director of the UK National Committee on China. He has lived and worked for most of the past twenty-five years in China, Korea and Singapore advising businesses and governments, having first visited China in 1981. His particular areas of focus relate to China’s development, its growing role and influence across Asia and globally and the intersection of economic prosperity, technology and national security.</p>Andrew CaineyChina poses an “epoch-defining and systemic challenge with implications for almost every area of government policy and the everyday lives of British people”, according to the UK’s March 2023 Integrated Review Refresh.Written Evidence2023-11-07T12:00:00+08:002023-11-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/written-evidence<p><em>The Russian invasion of Ukraine increased the European Union’s (EU) ambitions in security in defence as well as member states’ appetite for EU-led solutions in this field.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Specifically, the war unveiled the role of the European Commission as a policy entrepreneur which is enhancing its competences in security and defence through the usage of a “market-security nexus”. As defence cooperation gets increasingly framed by the EU in terms of economic efficiency and resilience, it might be difficult for London to ignore the gravitational pull of EU market and legislation in the long term. However, EU efforts in regulating the defence market are still nascent, and there are still both room and value for the UK to engage in this process. This submission is divided into three sections addressing the Terms of Reference (ToRs) 1, 3 and 5, respectively. Lastly, it concludes with a policy recommendations section suggesting specific avenues for defence cooperation within existing EU frameworks.</em></p> +<p>The hybrid model posits that the C-sUAS mission in non-ADA units is a force protection task, akin to chemical defense operations. All personnel have a responsibility to perform self-protection chemical defense tasks, and select personnel are trained to employ chemical defense equipment, such as chemical detection kits or alarms. Under the C-sUAS construct, all personnel must be able to engage an sUAS with their assigned or unit organic weapons, and select personnel will be trained to employ C-sUAS weapons.</p> -<h3 id="section-1">Section 1</h3> +<p>Questions over specific platforms, specializations, and authorities, however, are still up for debate. Should the infantry operate M-LIDS as a divisional level asset, or should this type of platform be forward deployed at the company level? How much training does a soldier need to fire a Coyote missile? Should the Army significantly expand SHORAD units as the Marine Corps has done by tripling the size of the Low Altitude Air Defense Marines community? And how can ground forces deconflict with the Air Force and allied air forces in a timely, effective manner? The DoD needs to answer these questions to fully institutionalize the C-sUAS enterprise. Doing so will allow staff to better understand how C-sUAS formations will work across services and branches, as well as how to plan against sUAS threats.</p> -<h4 id="11-to-what-extent-does-the-eus-response-represent-a-departure-from-its-previous-approach-to-foreign-and-security-policy-is-this-likely-to-be-a-durable-shift">1.1 To what extent does the EU’s response represent a departure from its previous approach to foreign and security policy? Is this likely to be a durable shift?</h4> +<p><em>Facilities</em></p> -<p>The Russian invasion of Ukraine seemed to have prompted a “whatever it takes” moment in EU defence, with novel initiatives particularly at the defence industrial level, a remit supranational institutions have historically struggled to regulate. The war urged the Commission to mobilise a new bureaucracy to advance proposals on how to utilise the EU’s defence industrial tools in the context of war. This effort culminated in:</p> +<p>The Army’s plans for facility development are underway. Previous C-sUAS training operations were conducted out of Yuma Proving Ground and lasted roughly two weeks. Despite this training and other branch-specific programs, the JCO found a lack of institutionalized C-UAS training, with one senior Air Force officer noting, “There are currently no joint linkages or commonality to counter UAS training across the department. . . . The average soldier, airman, or Marine lacks adequate counter UAS training.” To improve the military’s C-sUAS capabilities and create a permanent training installation, the Fires Center of Excellence in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, is building a Joint C-sUAS University (JCU), which is scheduled to reach initial operation in the first quarter of FY 2024. The academy will provide a common core program of instruction, joint TTPs, and updated doctrine.113 The center will also provide the C-sUAS community with additional space and equipment to conduct research, test, and train.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>The provision of military assistance via the European Peace Facility (EPF) and consequent growth of this instrument from €5.7 billion in 2021 to €12 billion in June 2023. The funds have been employed to repay EU member states for their contributions of weaponry to Ukraine and to collectively procure one million rounds of ammunition for Ukraine.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In June of 2023, the Council and the Parliament achieved an initial accord on the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), a €300 million initiative designed to encourage member states to collaboratively acquire urgently required military equipment.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>In July of 2023, the EU formally endorsed the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), a €500 million program aimed at assisting companies in increasing their capacity for producing ammunition.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The JCU’s location at Fort Sill is understandable but suggests a larger role for air defenders over the maneuver force for C-sUAS training. Will this truly be a joint center for all branches, or will the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) at Fort Moore, Georgia, develop its own C-sUAS doctrine to inform mobile and maneuver C-sUAS requirements? Furthermore, while most C-sUAS specialists will likely be Army soldiers, the Army-centric location may also discourage Marines from joining. These concerns can be managed as long as the JCU recruits from across the services and branches upon its opening in FY 2024.</p> -<p>It is true that by advancing these initiatives the EU broke with past taboos and challenged the notion of Normative Power Europe (the oxymoronic use of the European Peace Facility as a weapons supply tool is a case in point). However, the pursuit of an enhanced role in the defence industrial field has been done consistently with what the EU does best: harnessing its regulatory and budgetary powers to increase Member States’ coordination in times of crisis. The European Commission is well-known for its policy activism and for framing issues towards its field of competencies. Thus, while it is certainly a novelty to observe this extent of EU action at the defence industrial level, the modalities through which increased supranational action was achieved in this remit are consistent with the EU’s modus operandi.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wDZ4BJA.png" alt="image36" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 18: Preparing RQ-7B Shadow for Flight.</strong> Oklahoma Army National Guard soldiers and contractors prepare an RQ-7B Shadow for flight at Fort Sill. Source: U.S. Army.</em></p> -<p>A market power by design, the EU’s value proposition for the European defence after the invasion of Ukraine has mostly been a financial one. However, albeit noteworthy, financial incentives might not be enough to get European member states to cooperate on a more regular and frictionless basis in a policy domain characterised by competition and protectionism. Even if states concede to financial incentives and decide to cooperate, international arms collaboration means that the problem is shared but not necessarily reduced: the pie may become bigger, but the problem of who gets the largest slice persists. A financial incentives-based approach should not be dismissed, but a parallel conversation is needed. One which discusses the governance structures that can best accommodate multinational endeavours in the inherently competitive European defence industrial base. This conversation should recognise that defence partnerships should be built on states’ core strengths, organised along two dimensions: industrial and technological expertise, and value for money. This mere focus on “financial carrots” might lead to a less durable shift than originally expected, and European ambitions on joint procurement of capabilities might soon reach a stalling point.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>In terms of member states’ consensus on how to respond to future crises, it is important to note that the invasion of Ukraine was perceived as an existential matter for the EU. Consequently, one must be cautiously optimistic in expecting the same level of coherence in other foreign policy and security issues. Unequivocal US support and leadership as well as moral clarity about right and wrong in the Ukrainian context were also key enablers for a cohesive European response. However, not all foreign policy challenges present these characteristics. In fact, most of them don’t. See, for instance, the recent war in Gaza which left member-states deeply divided on how best to respond.</p> +<p>The sUAS threat is here to stay. These systems offer multi-mission capabilities, at low cost, and with minimal signatures. They are widely available through commercial industry and their utility has been demonstrated in numerous conflicts around the world, from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, to Azerbaijan and Armenia’s conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, to the Yemen civil war. Given these factors, sUAS technology will continue to evolve and proliferate.</p> -<h4 id="12-what-implications-if-any-does-the-eus-response-to-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-have-for-the-uk-eu-relationship-in-foreign-defence-and-security-policy">1.2 What implications, if any, does the EU’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine have for the UK-EU relationship in foreign, defence and security policy?</h4> +<p>As such, C-sUAS has become a critical part of modern air defense. That criticality, however, does not mean that the joint force is ready for the challenge. Today’s air and missile defense systems and structures were not designed to counter numerous, low-flying, small uncrewed systems. sUAS exploit gaps in sensor coverage and cost asymmetries against expensive interceptors. The belief that aerial threats would be countered by U.S. air forces or the ballistic missile defense force may have been true at one point, but drone technology evolved far faster than most thought possible. The U.S. divestment of SHORAD left the DoD without tools and personnel that may have more easily adapted to the sUAS threat, although the proliferation and sophistication seen today calls for more than the SHORAD of yesteryear.</p> -<p>As explained above, the Russian invasion of Ukraine increased the EU’s ambitions in security in defence as well as member states’ appetite for EU-led solutions in this field. Since the Lisbon Treaty, there has been a debate about the shift towards more national or less European-oriented foreign and security policies in Europe. Recent developments, however, suggest a potential new phase resembling a process where Brussels gains more influence in this policy domain. The Commission has taken on the role of a policy entrepreneur, aiming to boost its political aspirations and significance. Specifically, it has seized on the opportunity of advancing EU policy in the area of common defence procurement. Yet, it has only done so with the express consent and direct tasking of the European Council. This dynamic is essential to understand the new policy developments, which are guided by both the supranational and intergovernmental levels.</p> +<p>Fortunately, there is a diverse mix of sensors, effectors, and C2 systems that can detect, track, identify, and defeat sUAS. The DoD is investing in a variety of kinetic, electronic, and RF-based defenses to counter sUAS threats. These tools have their respective strengths and weaknesses affecting such factors as survivability, range, magazine capacity, combat identification, and total defended area. Defense budgets here are limited, but the JCO has down-selected across a wide array of C-sUAS platforms to improve economies of scale in production, logistics, and training.</p> -<p>Thus, it is true that the supranational level gained unprecedented importance the security and defence field, but this relevance was granted and tasked by the member states. As a result, the supranational and intergovernmental levels will continue to operate in tandem, one serving the other when necessary. Consensus will remain difficult to achieve vis-à-vis challenges that are perceived as less existential, and member states will resort to more or less “usage of Europe” according to the scale and perceived importance of the security challenge. Therefore, it is likely for a “Europe of different speed” scenario to materialise, with the Commission building coalitions and cooperating with member states that share its integrative approach. This could translate into pan-European defence projects scaling down and leaving room for smaller groupings and “coalitions of the willing”. Selectivity and differentiation can be introduced into existing institutional structures or patterns of cooperation in order to overcome political hurdles, bring about greater efficiencies, or accommodate diversity. This would have positive implications for the UK, as it could potentially entail more agile frameworks of cooperation and a new approach to like-minded non-EU partners.</p> +<p>The institutionalization of C-sUAS will require developments across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. Capability development remains necessary for the long term, but as the JCO has emphasized, the urgent need today is for training and capacity. New doctrine should specify the division of labor between air defense and non-air defense specialists, as well as the specific sensors, C2, and effectors that they can operate. C-sUAS leaders will need to tackle these and various other challenges, with their decisions today shaping the field for years to come.</p> -<p>So far, the war did not substantially change how the EU approaches and categorises its third-country partners. The EU Strategic Compass has a promising rhetoric in its partnerships chapter. Yet, besides merely listing who the key partners are, the document falls short in operationalising each specific partnership and in detailing how each partner is instrumental to achieve the EU’s foreign policy objectives. Each partnership should involve a tailor-made component to ensure that each is best suited to achieving a specific goal. Yet, the EU has long been reluctant to tailor its partnership agreements. Instead, it has generally favoured deals that are scalable and applicable to sets of countries rather than to individual states. This is because of several reasons such as the risk of the creating of in- and out-groups and a resulting decline in intra-EU cohesion; lowest-common-denominator problems in integration as member states opt-out of specific policies; moral hazard as laggards fall further behind; vulnerability to the interests of non-EU members alongside legitimacy problems in third countries; and increased complexity within the EU system.</p> +<hr /> -<p>A prolonged conflict in Ukraine and new complex security challenges are likely to change this approach. The EU and its member states must establish mutually beneficial connections with nations upon which they rely strategically or wish to establish strategic interdependence. However, this time, reliance solely on market forces is insufficient: deliberate choices must be made regarding new and unavoidable dependencies, not simply accepting those imposed by market forces or competing entities. European leaders must tactically structure their partnerships to strengthen their ability to make decisions and foster stronger bonds among partners, both within and beyond their borders. This new process of partnering will see the UK as the most natural ally.</p> +<p><strong>Shaan Shaikh</strong> is a fellow with the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he focuses on missile proliferation, unmanned aerial systems, air defense, and non-state actors. He is also managing editor of the CSIS website Missile Threat, an online clearinghouse for information and analysis on missile and missile defense systems. Prior to joining CSIS, he worked at the U.S. Department of Defense and the Syria Institute. He is currently a graduate student at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and received his BA from Tufts University.</p> -<h3 id="section-2">Section 2</h3> +<p><strong>Thomas Karako</strong> is a senior fellow with the International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at CSIS, where he arrived in 2014. His research focuses on national security, missile defense, nuclear deterrence, and public law. In 2010–2011, he was an American Political Science Association congressional fellow, working with the professional staff of the House Armed Services Committee and the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces on U.S. strategic forces policy, nonproliferation, and NATO. Dr. Karako is also currently a fellow with the Institute for Politics and Strategy of Carnegie Mellon University.</p> -<h4 id="21-is-there-a-need-for-greater-coordination-and-cooperation-between-the-eu-and-the-uk-on-defence-policy-if-so-what-sorts-of-cooperation-should-be-prioritised">2.1 Is there a need for greater coordination and cooperation between the EU and the UK on defence policy? If so, what sorts of cooperation should be prioritised?</h4> +<p><strong>Michelle McLoughlin</strong> is a former intern with the CSIS Missile Defense Project. She is currently a graduate student at American University’s School of International Service and holds a BA in international relations from the University of San Diego.</p>Shaan Shaikh, et al.This report examines the threat of small drones on the modern battlefield, and the various kinetic and non-kinetic defenses available to defeat them.And You Are?2023-11-14T12:00:00+08:002023-11-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/and-you-are<p><em>British military exercise, Salisbury Plain Training Area, England, 2016: Our convoy set off from its departure point in the dead of night.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>The six vehicles, carrying soldiers and air defense missile launchers, made their way slowly through wooded areas, across fields, and down rural tracks, looking to avoid detection by the enemy. Progress was slow. Vehicles got bogged down on more than one occasion, and we struggled to navigate using night vision equipment whilst trying to relate paper maps to the silhouettes of hills and trees. After several hours, we arrived at the battlegroup headquarters to which we were assigned. I headed into the building that had been requisitioned as the operations room. I approached the battle captain and introduced myself, but it quickly became apparent that we were not expected nor were we particularly welcome. There ensued an uphill battle for our capability to be understood, protected, and deployed appropriately in order to prevent the position being destroyed by enemy aircraft. Relationships had to be built, favors pulled, and compromises reached to make any progress.</em></p> -<p>British participation in European defence matters to the EU because of London’s historical security commitment to the region and its twin status as one of Europe’s two major military powers as well as its most advanced weapons manufacturer. Similarly, the EU’s increased regulation of the defence market as well as making more funding available at the supranational level (particularly for R&amp;D, where the UK is lagging behind) should prompt an interest from the UK in being part of the conversation. Thus, increased cooperation is indeed desirable from both sides.</p> +<p>Armed forces are divided entities by design. They are first split by domain — land, air, sea. The army, navy, and air force are then divided again by function. The enterprise is built on having separate capabilities such as armor, infantry, artillery, signallers, logisticians, and engineers all come together in times of conflict. Units are further dislocated by space, spread around a country and overseas. As a result, forces often do not “know themselves” as well as they should. Moreover, human frailties such as accidents and losses exacerbate the problem.</p> -<p>However, cooperation for the sake of cooperation has rarely proved successful and there are still a set of restrictions for non-EU countries wishing to join EU-led defence initiatives. The level of integration with the EU Single Market decides the viability of defence cooperation with the EU initiatives such as the European Defence Fund (EDF), ASAP and EDIRPA and most initiatives. Thus, the UK should prioritise cooperation under institutions and frameworks that are less underpinned by a “play as you pay” rationale. Namely:</p> +<p>As our exercise showed, internal organizational friction reduces operational effectiveness and is often invisible in measures of force readiness. The British Army provides a particularly stark example where these functional divisions are exacerbated by historical norms and fissures. Other forces can learn from our experience, using rigorous and regular collective training to reduce the impact of friction.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>European Defence Agency (EDA): Conditions for third party involvement with the EDA are outlined in Article 23 of the Council Decision establishing the Agency. These rules allow for interaction, project partnerships, and voluntary personnel contributions, but they do not confer voting rights or automatic invitation to any meeting, in particular steering board meetings. Third country involvement with the EDA is also unlikely to automatically favour permanent access into the European defence ecosystem. When it comes to liaising with third parties, the primary role of the EDA is getting third states in line with what member states are doing. Driven by the principles of added value, mutual benefit and reciprocity, the EDA simply matches states’ capabilities there where possible and necessary. In this sense, the Administrative Arrangements signed with the EDA are to be understood as a license to unlock ad-hoc, project-based cooperation rather than an unrestricted entry ticket to the EU defence theme park. However, given the importance of the EDA as an information exchange platform, involvement with this agency can contribute to the strengthening of ties between participating actors.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>European Peace Facility (EPF): This is an off-budget instrument that supports military and defence actions in the pursuit of CSDP objectives. For now, the EPF is outside the general budget, yet it functions in parallel to the EU’s multiannual financial framework (MFF 2021-2027). This allowed member states to establish a total budget for the EPF over a seven-year period, as well as agreeing on yearly spending limits. By tying the EPF to negotiations for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), member states determined the financial allocations for the EPF within a larger discussion on how much they wanted to allocate to EU external actions overall. Previous experience with the Athena Mechanism (which served as a precursor to the EPF, along with the African Peace Facility) suggested that arrangements for participation from non-EU countries could be arranged. In fact, it would be unwise for the EU to prohibit contributions from like-minded countries, especially those with whom it has established agreements. Under the financial rules outlined in the Council Decision for Athena, non-EU countries (such as those in the EEA, Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Chile, Mexico) were indeed permitted to participate in the mechanism, though without voting rights in its decision-making process. The European Peace Facility operates under similar principles but allows third countries to have a say in ensuring that their voluntary contributions are utilised according to agreed upon terms. Article 30 of the EPF Council Decision states that contributions from third parties require prior approval from the Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC). The EPF’s own committee can then authorize the administrative handling of the financial contribution, which may be designated for specific actions or operations. The specific purpose of the voluntary contribution is outlined in the administrative arrangement with the respective third party. The administrator of the Facility Committee is responsible for ensuring that the management of voluntary contributions adheres to the relevant administrative arrangements. They are obligated to provide each contributor, either directly or through the applicable operation commander, with pertinent information regarding the handling of the voluntary contribution as outlined in the relevant administrative arrangement. This allows a third country to monitor how its financial contribution is utilised. This is key for the UK and presents a good mechanism for a more transactional, ad-hoc and supervised engagement.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>PESCO: In the field of security and defence, scholarship has singled out PESCO as a framework embodying high levels of differentiation in its very design. PESCO exhibits not only selectivity in membership but also project-based clustering and patterns of differentiated cooperation that result in external differentiation through the engagement of third countries, differentiation in the relationship with third countries, and a complex division of labour vis-à-vis non-EU institutions, including NATO, and the European Intervention Initiative (EI2). As a result, PESCO provides the best framework for the UK to cherry pick the level of integration of the project, the number of partners and the type of activities. When it comes to cooperation formats, history shows that the most successful cooperative-development programmes have few partners and a clear leader, thus the UK should look at PESCO projects that have these characteristics.</p> +<h3 id="finding-friction">Finding Friction</h3> - <p>Third party involvement with PESCO starts with a formal request initiated by the third country applicant. Importantly, the request should be initiated by a country’s government and not by its legal entity, or defence company, as is the case with EDF. The request should be submitted to the coordinator(s) of the PESCO project in question (i.e. to the member states, not to an EU institution). It needs to contain detailed information on the reasons for participating in the project and the scope and form of the proposed participation. Finally, the request must substantiate the fulfilment of a set of conditions, laid out in Article 3 of the Conclusions.</p> +<p>Analysis of military capability often focuses on headline metrics: numbers of tanks, howitzers, and soldiers. The strength of armies is often portrayed as a function of their size, with some minor modifications for the modernity of the systems at play. Forces the world over hold parades, flyovers, and demonstrations to show off this metric to allies and adversaries alike. This was certainly the case regarding Russia prior to February 2022. But the war in Ukraine demonstrated the importance of other considerations, such as the will to fight and the ability of commanders to combine capabilities and sequence them appropriately in time and space. However, there are also more ambiguous frictions that can prevent forces from reaching their potential. As shown in the anecdote above, which took place in a real training exercise, organizational realities must be considered when attempting to analyze the true abilities of a fighting force.</p> - <p>They consist of four key requirements. Firstly, the third country must share the values on which the EU is founded as well as the overall objectives of the Union’s CFSP laid out in article 21(2) TEU. Secondly, it must provide substantial added value to the PESCO project in question. Here, substantial value is loosely defined by the EU, thereby providing significant room for manoeuvre for the applicants to make their case. As a rule of thumb, the applicant’s contribution to the project must be complementary to those offered by the rest of the participating member states, for example by providing technical expertise or additional capabilities including operational or financial support. The EU does not set any specific threshold or measurement for complementarity. Thirdly, it is important that the third state’s participation does not imply the creation of dependencies for the EU. This point is particularly contentious when it comes to allowing participation from powerful third countries such as the US, but it is advantageous for smaller states with niche capabilities. Lastly, the applicant state must have a Security of Information Agreement with the EU and an Administrative Arrangement with EDA. The third country’s application making these arguments will then be assessed by the project’s participating members who will unanimously decide on whether or not to include the third country. Once the participating members have approved the request, they will inform the High Representative and the European Council of its decision. Only following the Council’s green light, can an invitation to join the project be made to the third state. If the invitation is accepted, an Administrative Arrangement is negotiated outlining contributions and modes of engagement. A template for such an administrative arrangement between project members and third states can be found on the last page of the Council Decision establishing conditions for third-party involvement in PESCO.</p> +<p>Many commentators were surprised by the Russian armed forces’ apparent inability to seize key objectives in Ukraine after the invasion in 2022. Subsequent examination has revealed that a layer of friction existed below the normal threshold of analysis — Russian soldiers had been using out-of-date maps as well as inadequate food and antiquated rifles. Moreover, command and control was confused, information was kept from soldiers, and orders failed to account for developments on the ground. Such revelations were seized upon by Western analysts and practitioners as evidence that the Russian war machine was a laughing stock. However, such hubris is unwise, and forces should take time to inflect to ensure they do not suffer from a similar sort of rot.</p> - <p>Much of the detail on third country participation will be in an Administrative Agreement, thus leaving an important element of uncertainty. This also includes specific rules regarding the project’s intellectual property. As a general rule, the PESCO consortium retains full control of all the project’s intellectual property, but it seems plausible that specific rules could be formulated in the agreement. One last interesting aspect is that the Decision specifies a separate set of rules for countries (i.e., third-party states) and defence industry companies (i.e., third-party entities) in the modality of joining PESCO projects. For now, the main difference is that third-party states have been eligible to join since the conclusion of the agreement (November 2020), whereas companies must wait until 2026. Lastly, the entanglement between PESCO and the EDF needs to be addressed and, specifically, the controversies around the EDF’s PESCO bonus. EDF regulation maintains that an action developed in the context of a PESCO project can benefit from a funding increase of an additional 10%. This, however, is only valid for EU member states or associated countries. Under no circumstances can a third country succeed in using PESCO participation as a shortcut to access EDF money.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Bilateral and minilateral cooperation outside EU structures: Conscious of the challenges of collaborative projects, European states have continued to collaborate along bilateral and minilateral lines. The proliferation of such arrangements has often been seen as one of the underlying causes behind the fragmentation and duplication of European defence efforts. However, there is limited appreciation of the conductive power of these modes of engagement, and of how the existence of lower-level, smaller-format collaborations can then spill over to the multilateral level. For instance, when the EU established PESCO in 2017, much of the project-based clustering was based on existing bilateral and minilateral defence initiatives between states outside the supranational umbrella, which were then incorporated into the EU’s defence and security architecture. As such, these more ad-hoc types of cooperation should not necessarily be seen as antagonising to multilateral efforts happening at the EU or NATO levels.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h3 id="do-i-know-you">Do I Know You?</h3> -<h4 id="22-the-communiqué-issued-following-the-nato-heads-of-state-and-government-summit-in-july-2023-stated-that-for-the-strategic-partnership-between-nato-and-the-eu-non-eu-allies-fullest-involvement-in-eu-defence-efforts-is-essential-and-looked-forward-to-mutual-steps-representing-tangible-progress-in-this-area-to-support-a-strengthened-strategic-partnership-as-a-non-eu-member-of-nato-what-steps-if-any-should-the-uk-take-to-give-effect-to-this">2.2 The communiqué issued following the NATO Heads of State and Government summit in July 2023 stated that for “the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in EU defence efforts is essential” and looked forward to “mutual steps, representing tangible progress, in this area to support a strengthened strategic partnership”. As a non-EU Member of NATO what steps, if any, should the UK take to give effect to this?</h4> +<p>The British Army, like most military forces, moves its personnel around the country regularly. Each force does this differently, but it is common for soldiers and officers to change positions every two to three years. This may be upon promotion, or on a more general rotation. As a result, there is a constant churn of personnel through units and formation headquarters. Some people will have been there for two years, others two months, and some two days. Sometimes it is unavoidable for whole command teams to depart at once, although this is avoided where possible. Consequently, expertise in planning and executing missions waxes and wanes.</p> -<p>The UK should recognise that EU defence initiatives are designed to contribute to transatlantic burden- sharing and that they are not envisaged as competing with NATO. The UK should continue to engage in those EU projects that are particularly important to the Alliance. It has already done so, though to a limited extent. Joining PESCO’s Military Mobility project is a glaring example. Improving military mobility in Europe has long been one of the flagship areas for EU–NATO cooperation. Indeed, it represents one of those spaces in which the EU and NATO complement each other. Namely, while NATO is able to plan and calculate the military’s needs for transport across Europe, the EU has the legal and regulatory weight to streamline processes as well as available funds and programmes on cross-border mobility. PESCO’s military mobility project epitomises a case where EU action supports NATO efforts and, as such, London’s decision to join was perfectly aligned with UK government policy. As a NATO but non-EU member the UK should continue to prioritise initiatives that are in support of the Alliance. Participation in such projects should be easier to sell domestically, can serve as an initial steppingstone to normalise the relationship, and might have a conductive power towards further engagement.</p> +<p>Indeed, while armies will have centralized, accepted planning processes, individual formations often put their own spin on things, producing their own templates and products. As a result, on arrival in a formation, new personnel will have to learn how to slot in. It is not uncommon for formations to hold an annual series of “crawl, walk, run” planning exercises to bring new staff up to speed with its processes. Ideally, these align with readiness timelines, but conflict may well fail to respect neat operational readiness mechanisms, especially when resources are scarce as they are in many NATO militaries.</p> -<h3 id="section-3">Section 3</h3> +<p>In the United Kingdom, related units are often not located together. It may surprise nonpractitioners to learn that in many cases, units that are expected to deploy together, often at very short notice, are not based together and indeed are sometimes separated by hundreds of miles. As a result, there is an immediate barrier to building relationships and working together. Time spent together builds familiarity. It should not be underestimated how much easier it is to work with people you have a rapport with. This becomes even more critical in times of high pressure and fatigue.</p> -<h4 id="31-some-experts-have-identified-a-more-geopolitical-eu-that-is-more-assertive-in-its-role-as-a-foreign-policy-and-security-actor-following-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-do-you-agree-with-this-assessment-if-so-what-implications-does-it-have-for-the-uk">3.1 Some experts have identified a more “geopolitical” EU that is more assertive in its role as a foreign policy and security actor following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Do you agree with this assessment? If so, what implications does it have for the UK?</h4> +<p>When commanders may not know some of the people in their staff, this immediately leads to a reduction in performance. Moreover, familiarity with capabilities may be lacking. Battlegroup commanders may be given a fire group of air defense missile launchers having never laid eyes on them before and may not know the first thing about their use. It is then up to a young troop commander to bridge the gap in understanding. In some cases, this is easy. In others, the battalion commander may be reluctant to take advice from an unknown junior officer, or even fail to realize they are in the headquarters at all.</p> -<p>The EU suffers from the legacy of separating the exclusive competence for the EU to act in the sphere of trade from the more limited competence to develop a foreign policy. This stark separation has been slowly eroding since the EU Global Strategy of 2016, and the war in Ukraine has accelerated this process. Specifically, the war (and the pandemic before it) sped up the emergence of the Commission as a geopolitical actor and the securitisation of those areas that fall under EU competencies to a greater extent than defence such as, for instance, energy, economic security and supply chain resilience.</p> +<p>Military tribalism may also be deleterious to performance. Military forces are broken down into units with different capabilities that are often defined by their historic and lived experience. Different parts of the force often have their own colloquialisms. Some soldiers look down on those who do not have a particular qualification badge or who have not served with a particular unit and even have specific deprecatory terms for outsiders. In operational theaters, these problems become more acute as formations change shape as time moves on. Operational realities such as casualties or demands for capabilities with higher priority elsewhere will keep formations in flux, further exacerbating the issue.</p> -<p>The Single Market experience continues to permeate every aspect of EU policymaking and, since the beginning of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Commission has tried to enhance its competences within the traditional intergovernmental policy domain of security and defence through the usage of a “market-security nexus”. The sustained war in Ukraine exposed a European industrial resilience problem, and joint defence procurement became to be understood as crucial in making a decisive impact on the future competitiveness of Community industries in the internal market. By framing a traditional intergovernmental problem through a market resilience lens, the Commission managed to get members states to seek supranational solutions and to accept innovative proposals. For instance, the Commission’s shift in approach and understanding of Article 41.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) can be considered quite ground-breaking. Until recently, the idea of using the Union budget for defence procurement was unimaginable. The Commission is therefore using crises to act as a policy entrepreneur to further enhance its political ambitions and to suggest innovative solutions.</p> +<h3 id="accidents-happen">Accidents Happen</h3> -<p>This dynamic has important implications for the UK. As defence cooperation gets increasingly perceived through the lenses of economic efficiency and resilience, it might be difficult for London to ignore the gravitational pull of EU market and legislation. The enhanced role of the Commission in security and defence is likely to increase the EU’s capacity to shape behaviour externally through “milieu shaping”. As a result, it is important for the UK to be involved in the restructuring of the European defence market. In fact, for nations or companies that didn’t participate in this process from the beginning, joining later would pose significant difficulties.</p> +<p>Other frictions exist as well. Whilst some might seem minor, they form part of the complex picture that affects how forces perform on the battlefield. For example, despite lots of training and attempts at mitigation, soldiers crash their vehicles an awful lot, both in exercises and on operations. This, in fact, is one of the highest causes of casualties in military forces worldwide. Operating heavy machinery in convoys in the dark or conducting complex maneuvers in urban and wooded areas is hard — really hard. Vehicles get stuck, make a wrong turn, and in the worst cases overturn or collide with a friendly vehicle.</p> -<h3 id="section-4-recommendations">Section 4: Recommendations</h3> +<p>Soldiers also lose things as well as themselves. Weapons, night vision equipment, and even vehicles go missing. Operational imperatives will determine how much time is spent trying to recover them. These sorts of frictions are not accounted for in most planning cycles. This friction also captures last-minute demands on soldiers, including the simple act of battling the military bureaucracy to reach an outcome. Military forces are a mix of analogue and digital processes, in which archaic structures are wrestling with modernity. Obtaining a vehicle, rations, or place to train can be so complex and protracted as to be impracticable among a host of competing priorities.</p> -<p>The UK and the EU are natural partners and, as highlighted throughout this contribution, there is mutual benefit in further cooperation. As EU member states delegate more authority to the supranational level in the field of security and defence, it might get increasingly difficult for the UK to ignore the gravitational pull of the EU in the process of the restructuring of the European defence market. However, this process has only just started and there is value for the UK to engage in it relatively early on. When it comes to the modalities for such engagement, the ball is largely in the UK’s court. British policymakers should recognise that closer post-Brexit cooperation with EU institutions is an iterative process, and therefore subject to change as lessons are being learnt and as the context evolves. Ultimately, scalability and proportionality infuse the EU’s approach to partnerships. As such, EU eagerness to effectively explore and legally spell out advanced forms of security cooperation with the UK will much depend on the latter’s willingness to commit itself to cooperation in the first place. Opportunities exist:</p> +<p>When added together, the totality of these seemingly minor frictions means that the capability of a military to defeat an enemy is much more nuanced than might be reflected by numbers or the latest technology. A complex cocktail of personal relationships, ability, and willingness contributes to the effectiveness of a force in the field.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>The first step for bringing more coherence to UK-EU cooperation would be signing an Administrative Arrangement with the EDA. As studies have shown, the latter scenario could facilitate increased interaction between representatives from the UK and the EU, potentially creating opportunities for greater involvement of Britain in EU initiatives where the EDA plays a part. There is no “one size fits all” Administrative Arrangement for third countries, and each one is negotiated separately and on an ad hoc basis. Specifically, the agreement will stipulate rights and responsibilities for the UK as well as introducing a review mechanism to periodically assess whether the UK is meeting those obligations. It is important to demystify it, however. Signing an Administrative Arrangement with the EU is not a political step towards strengthening relationships with the bloc. It should be understood as a licence to unlock ad hoc, project-based cooperation that is intended to fully respect the signatory’s national sovereignty.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The UK should explore further involvement in PESCO beyond the Military Mobility project, which does not entail research and development activities. Participating in a PESCO capability development project could serve as a means for the UK to explore the extent to which third countries can engage in EU capability development initiatives, and to observe how the existing regulations regarding intellectual property and export controls are applied in practice. If the EU demonstrated a willingness to interpret its regulations in a flexible manner, it would open the door for greater UK involvement in both PESCO and, potentially, the EDF. As previous studies suggested, participating in a PESCO capability development project presents an opportunity for the UK to explore the limits of third-party engagement in EU capability development mechanisms. It allows the UK to assess the practical interpretation of existing regulations concerning intellectual property and export controls. If the EU demonstrates flexibility in its rule interpretation, it could open doors for the UK to engage more closely in both PESCO and the EDF. Cooperating under the PESCO umbrella has changed the way member states communicate with each other in addition to providing access to key documents and information and facilitating the creation of personal links among the member states’ representatives. As such, PESCO might represent a valuable socialisation forum as well as being a trust-building exercise.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Lastly, bilateral cooperation with European states remains vital as, for instance, the Lancaster House treaties with France have already demonstrated. The UK will need to address European partners individually as much as collectively.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h3 id="what-to-do-about-it">What to Do About It?</h3> -<hr /> +<p>The solution? Train. Train lots, and train well. Aside from delivering on operations, the second most important task for armies and the other services is to prepare and train for those operations. British military training takes place at a number of levels. First, soldiers must be able to administer themselves in the field and be able to fire their personal weapon accurately and use basic communications equipment. Second, they must be able to operate their core equipment, which might be a vehicle, heavy weapon, missile system, or radar. Third, they need to operate that equipment in concert with other capabilities in pursuit of an aim or objective. This collective training is difficult and expensive to execute effectively, but is absolutely critical to achieving commonality. Units may also be stuck performing other duties such as vehicle maintenance and distracted by an assortment of other demands, from online training to hosting visitors to filling out paperwork.</p> -<p><strong>Isabella Antinozzi</strong> is a Research Analyst in the Defence, Industries and Society Research Group at RUSI.</p>Isabella AntinozziThe Russian invasion of Ukraine increased the European Union’s (EU) ambitions in security in defence as well as member states’ appetite for EU-led solutions in this field.Two Wars, One Denominator2023-11-07T12:00:00+08:002023-11-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/two-wars-one-denominator<p><em>As the war in Gaza distracts the West from its support for Ukraine, Russia is seeking to exploit the situation by positioning itself as a reasonable broker that has the ear of both Israel and Hamas.</em></p> +<p>William F. Owen, editor of Military Strategy magazine, argues that formations should train in the field for 90 days a year. Currently, however formations might be lucky to get 30 days of combined training in a year. And often, that combined training is also an assessment of some sort, which can detract from being able to take time to fully integrate and assimilate the various personnel and capabilities involved.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>There are, as ever, frictions associated with such an aim. Some specialist units are passed between larger formations as there are not enough to go around. This means they could potentially end up spending a much longer time in the field, which would have ramifications on morale and retention. Prioritizing their time between supporting formations, their own force development, and time to recuperate requires a pragmatic approach by commanders. Inverting the normal practice of specialists travelling to the associated formation and instead being visited by them to share knowledge would reduce the burden on the minority. This also substantiates the point made previously about being unable to forge strong relationships. However, the intent is a good one. Time spent together builds familiarity with capabilities, which in turn means more favorability — those capabilities will be employed effectively and in concert with the rest of the formation offering competitive advantage.</p> -<p>The two wars currently dominating the agenda – the Ukraine war and the Israel–Gaza conflict – have one common denominator: Russia. While the causes and aims of the two conflicts are incomparable, Russia has nevertheless sought to ensure that it remains at the heart of the action. But its intentions and management of its different relationships in the Middle East are rather more complex.</p> +<p>Issues surrounding the locations of units, and how far they are from the formations they work with, are more difficult. Bases have finite capacities and may simply be unable to house the totality of those who would deploy with them. Sometimes there are infrastructure limitations as to what can be stored where — for example, not every base has the requisite facilities to store sensitive items like missiles. What’s more, armies often try to balance their presence around the country to help with recruitment and enable people to stay where their families are based. Likewise, the problem of career movement is difficult to solve. British career structures are built upon movement and promotion, moving from jobs requiring different skill sets with different profiles. Staying in one place can count against people when trying to achieve the next rank if a high-profile job exists elsewhere.</p> -<p>While Russia’s ties with Israel have fluctuated over the years, they have strengthened since the Soviet Union’s collapse. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s ambiguous response has strained their relationship. These difficulties were brought to the fore recently on 29 October: in a series of unsettling events, a flight from Tel Aviv landing in the southern Russian city of Makhachkala (Dagestan) was forced to evacuate its passengers due to a rioting mob expressing support for the Palestinian cause and seeking to attack Israelis and Jews.</p> +<h3 id="remaining-challenges">Remaining Challenges</h3> -<p>The Kremlin’s response varied from initial prevarication by the security services (who did not regain control over the airport for several hours), blaming the West for the demonstrations and accusing Ukrainian forces of fomenting the civil unrest (with no evidential links between them), to holding a major meeting to discuss the antisemitic event and promising to detain those responsible. None of this filled either the Jewish community across Russia or Israel with much confidence, and Russia’s attempts to involve itself in Israel’s war are unlikely to be well-received in Jerusalem.</p> +<p>Dealing with the subject of internal organizational friction is problematic on two fronts. First, it is difficult to quantify. It is nuanced and uneven across forces. There is no firm methodology by which to analyze a commander’s grasp on all the capabilities under their command, nor how good the relationships are between the battalion’s core and its attachments. Commanders do get put through their paces on validation exercises, but the marking criteria concern objectives like bridge crossings and assaults. Moreover, many exercises today are simulated, which further dilutes interactions between individuals.</p> -<h3 id="russia-israel-ties">Russia-Israel Ties</h3> +<p>Second, the topic does not make for good reading. Forces like to assume that soldiers are professional enough to put aside any personal or professional differences in order to complete an objective. This is often true, but not always. It is hard for a commander to admit that some of their soldiers are rude to other troops because they wear a different badge or have not completed a certain qualification. However ridiculous it seems, some readers will find this awfully familiar, and some will be guilty of it themselves.</p> -<p>While Russia and Israel’s relationship over Syria and deconfliction in the country’s airspace is part of the bilateral picture, as Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has moved further to the right, Israel has sought to forge alliances with countries that have not been traditional Western allies, including India and Hungary as well as Russia.</p> +<p>This makes it all the more important to remember that, when assessing the readiness of a military, what you cannot see is of great importance. While some of this invisible friction is baked into military culture, time spent physically training together can dramatically reduce it. Combined arms training, which builds relationships, trust, and skills, will transfer directly into operational advantage.</p> -<p>However, upon Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel took an unclear position, raising hackles in both Kyiv and Moscow. Israel did not fall behind the Western consensus and has not sanctioned Russia, but nor has it offered military assistance to Ukraine. Israel did accept several thousand Ukrainian refugees, but there was intense debate within Israel about whether to cap their entry, alongside accusations that the refugees’ social and medical benefits had expired and not been renewed. Israel did offer humanitarian aid to Kyiv, and has nominally professed support for Ukrainian independence. But the Canadian parliament’s lauding in September of a Ukrainian Second World War veteran who served in a Nazi unit prompted criticism from Israel, reinvigorating the debate about Ukraine’s contentious role and attitude towards Jews during the war.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Russia itself has a long history of institutionalised antisemitism, pogroms and demonisation of the Jewish community. Although antisemitism and racially aggravated assaults have never been eradicated from Russian society, President Vladimir Putin has made his position on Russian Jewry clear, and has long lent support to the large Jewish community in Moscow, including the commemoration of Jews killed during the Holocaust. He has been lauded for this by representatives of the Jewish community – particularly Rabbi Berel Lazar, one of two claimants to the title of Chief Rabbi of Moscow.</p> +<p><strong>Patrick Hinton</strong> is a serving regular officer in the British Army’s Royal Artillery. He has experience working with ground based air defence systems and remotely piloted air systems. He has also worked in the personnel space. Since joining the Army in 2014, his career has consisted of a number of appointments at regimental duty including Troop Command, Executive Officer, and Adjutant. He was the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow in the Military Sciences Research Group at RUSI until the end of August 2023.</p>Patrick HintonBritish military exercise, Salisbury Plain Training Area, England, 2016: Our convoy set off from its departure point in the dead of night.Track and Disrupt2023-11-10T12:00:00+08:002023-11-10T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/track-and-disrupt<p><em>Efforts to align third countries with sanctions against Russia will only succeed when the private networks facilitating circumvention are understood and countered.</em></p> -<p>Putin considers the leaders of the Jewish, Christian and Muslim faiths in Russia to be important allies and a broader part of Russia’s identity as a multicultural nation, and meets with them frequently – although his relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church runs much deeper. Lazar has also walked a careful line between advocating for his community and ensuring that Putin remains onside, which has included a degree of neutrality on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and ambiguity around his views of the Russian government’s actions.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The message of Russia-as-peacemaker serves a useful role in the Kremlin’s quest for legitimacy and power projection in the Middle East</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Sanctions regimes have continued to expand in scope since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, aiming to asphyxiate Russia’s financial and military capabilities to wage war. The EU alone has passed 11 packages to date, each building on the last. These packages are paired with efforts to restrict circumvention, along with a forthcoming EU directive criminalising sanctions evasion.</p> -<p>The events in Dagestan have particular resonance for Russia’s Jewish communities, which have an historical connection to the North Caucasus. While only a few hundred families may remain in Dagestan, the local Jewish population – known as the Mountain Jews – used to be spread across trade routes over the entire Caucasus region, including Chechnya, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. With their own distinct language, culture and traditions, thousands of the Mountain Jewish community were killed during the Holocaust, and while some remained, most relocated to Moscow or larger cities after the war, with others emigrating to Israel or the US after 1991.</p> +<p>The unprecedented sanctions against Russia have highlighted the importance of third countries – those countries that are neither the target of sanctions nor adopters of sanctions against Russia/Belarus (and thus are not legally bound by sanctions). Such third countries make up a majority of the world and are therefore an important factor in determining whether sanctions are ultimately effective. Put simply, if third countries provide circumvention routes or substitutes for the goods and services that sanctions aim to curtail, then the sanctions will be weakened or fail.</p> -<p>Since the Israel–Gaza war began, there has been a surge in violent antisemitic demonstrations across Russia’s North Caucasus, demanding the expulsion of local Jews and attacking a Jewish cultural centre. Given the region’s history, the Dagestan riots have been likened to the pogroms of the past, which sought to uproot well-established Jewish communities.</p> +<p>The trade in dual-use goods is one of five categories of sanctions evasion and avoidance covered by recent analysis undertaken by RUSI as part of the Serious and Organised Crime Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) programme, and provides a particularly salient example of the role of third countries. Numerous reports have publicised cases of manufacturers deliberately or inadvertently shipping important military and technological components from sanctions-imposing countries to intermediaries in third countries that then ship them onward to military end-users in Russia and Belarus.</p> -<p>But the messaging from the Kremlin has been unclear. Rabbi Lazar met with Putin to discuss the demonstrations, alongside Patriarch Kirill and the Grand Mufti Tadzhuddin. But the Kremlin’s Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, has criticised as Israel’s warning against its citizens travelling to the North Caucasus as “anti-Russian”, in part to downplay the extent of the riots. It appears that Russia is still trying to play both sides of this conflict.</p> +<h3 id="tracking-sanctions-evasion-networks-in-third-countries">Tracking Sanctions-Evasion Networks in Third Countries</h3> -<h3 id="israels-war-russias-gain">Israel’s War, Russia’s Gain</h3> +<p>Our recent SOC ACE report categorised five types of sanctions evasion critical to funding and supplying Russia’s military-industrial complex: financial services, company incorporation, dual-use and military goods, exports of sanctioned Russian commodities, and oil smuggling. All of these operate primarily in the private sector and rely on third countries’ lax enforcement of – or deliberate refusal to implement –sanctions.</p> -<p>Despite its attempts to involve itself in this war and to present an image of a mediator with the ear of both Israel and Hamas, in truth, Moscow has neither. The narrative, however, is useful for Russia in several key ways.</p> +<p>In the case of countries not imposing sanctions, many commentators have bemoaned the whack-a-mole problem: company incorporation is so easy that sanctioning a person or a company will just cause another to appear in its place. Behind all of these seemingly random companies, however, is a Russian or affiliated individual(s) directing a network, often associated with Russia’s Federal Security Service. In many cases, investigators have identified links between the Russian military-industrial complex and newly incorporated companies with low public profiles – and these wider networks are often based in or linked to manufacturers, banks and other businesses in sanctions-imposing countries.</p> -<p>First, Russia is attempting to position itself as a reasonable broker appealing for calm, which Hamas has lauded. Although few in the West are willing to buy this line, Russia will use its positioning as a future bargaining chip in its war against Ukraine, to demonstrate that it is capable of debate, mediation and politicking. There is also the added bonus for Russia that another war dominating the news cycle has pushed the Russia–Ukraine conflict further down the West’s political agenda.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">If third countries provide circumvention routes or substitutes for the goods and services that sanctions aim to curtail, then the sanctions will be weakened or fail</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Second, the message of Russia-as-peacemaker serves a useful role in the Kremlin’s quest for legitimacy and power projection in the Middle East. In its bid for allies, and to fulfil its foreign policy directives of deepening engagement in the MENA region (what it refers to as the “Islamic world”), Russia is contrasting itself with the “colonial West” and its troubled history of intervention in the region. By wading into Israel’s long-standing conflict with the Palestinians, which Russia has never before successfully mediated, Putin is seeking to carve out a role as an alternative to the US-dominated negotiations between the warring parties. The message is: where the US has tried and failed, Russia will succeed. Putin’s first public statement on the war ascribed blame to the US, maintaining that this was an example of the failure of its Middle East policies.</p> +<p>These thousands of companies are often not random or spontaneous creations, but directed by the Russian military-industrial base. They consist of networks of individuals and companies directing this support and supply business, along with intermediary companies and the shipping and logistics firms that facilitate the circumvention trade. Gathering the data necessary to map these networks is critical, as is understanding which government stakeholders are linked to these networks, in order to support diplomatic engagement to disrupt this trade in third countries.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Russia is not particularly able to influence Hamas, nor is there any credible proof that it has provided funding or arms to it</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Some third countries are already introducing their own control systems to monitor the re-export of goods to Russia, such as Kazakhstan’s online tool to track the entire supply chain “from border to border”. However, governments and private businesses in these countries would benefit from this specific data collection and mapping approach to mitigate their exposure to opaque sanctions evasion networks and thus avoid getting caught in the crosshairs of US or EU sanctions.</p> -<p>Third, Russia has much to gain from the US’s financial distraction by the Israel–Gaza war. The recent US House of Representatives’ agreement to pass $14.3 billion worth of military aid to Israel was dominated by the Republicans, including an increasingly noisy faction that has long argued for the cessation or at least capping of US military aid to Ukraine. In its current format, the bill is likely to be vetoed – President Joe Biden has made clear that he would like to see broader spending on aid packages that include Ukraine, and the Democrats control the Senate – but it points to a broader bipartisan split within the US political system that Russia is keen to take advantage of in order to limit military aid to Ukraine. While Putin is likely anticipating that the US presidential elections in November 2024 will be a watershed moment for the provision of aid to Ukraine, the Israel–Gaza war has offered another unexpected opportunity to vicariously weaken Ukraine.</p> +<h3 id="building-capacity-in-allied-countries">Building Capacity in Allied Countries</h3> -<h3 id="whose-ear-does-russia-have">Whose Ear Does Russia Have?</h3> +<p>Notwithstanding the role of third countries, allied countries that have imposed sanctions also contribute to circumvention. Many of the microelectronic components still feeding Russia’s military systems are Western-made yet continue to reach Russia, mostly due to a combination of a lack of enforcement capacity and the deliberate obfuscation of end-users through third-party intermediaries by the global networks supplying Russia.</p> -<p>In reality, Russia’s ability to impact on the Israel–Gaza conflict is limited. Much has been made of Russia’s hosting of Hamas delegations before and during the war, prompting Israel to summon the Russian ambassador for an explanation.</p> +<p>Over 30 countries representing more than half the global economy have announced sanctions and export controls targeting Russia, but the findings of the RUSI-led European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet) point to a series of challenges that sanctions-imposing countries consistently face.</p> -<p>But Russia is not particularly able to influence Hamas, nor is there any credible proof that it has provided funding or arms to it. Russia during the Soviet period paid lip service to the Palestinian cause and aligned itself nominally with their right to self-determination, but following the collapse of the USSR, it prioritised ties with Israel. It did condemn Hamas’s terrorist attacks throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, but has not designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation, and the group’s victory in Gaza’s 2006 parliamentary elections prompted Russia to recognise it as a political entity. Since 2007, Russia’s own Ministry of Foreign Affairs has held meetings with the Hamas leadership, including hosting the former leader of Hamas’s Politburo, Khaled Meshal, in Moscow.</p> +<p>Prior to February 2022, many members of the sanctions coalition had very limited exposure to sanctions, and they are now scrambling to overhaul their national frameworks. In the EU, several member states are trying to determine the competent authorities and their responsibilities towards what is repeatedly called the “unprecedented” scale of sanctions against Russia. Both private- and public-sector actors have struggled to implement and enforce the sanctions, meaning that even countries with strong political will struggle to detect and interrupt sanctions evasion that might involve – or even start in – their own jurisdiction.</p> -<p>Russia has now claimed that its hosting of Hamas delegations is an opportunity to discuss the hostages – at least eight Russian citizens are thought to be held in Gaza. But this is unlikely to be the focus of the talks, and Hamas’s comments after the meeting suggest that the discussion included broader topics, such as Russia’s political views on Israel. Although there is evidence that at least 16 Russian nationals were killed in the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October, those Russians who have taken up Israeli citizenship (and in Moscow’s thinking effectively left the motherland) are not likely to be viewed as a precious commodity by Moscow. Russia’s disregard for human life (including civilian), as seen from its actions thus far in the Ukraine war and in many of its other campaigns, means the return of a handful of its citizens is unlikely to be the true driving force behind these well-staged meetings.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Truly disrupting third-country sanctions circumvention requires a better understanding of the wider networks enabling this activity</code></em></strong></p> -<p>But Putin has also been deliberate with the choreography. He has not met Hamas leaders in person and has allowed Mikhail Bogdanov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and presidential representative on the Middle East, to take the lead, which at least in Moscow’s eyes puts some creative distance between the Russian and Hamas leaderships. Putin himself has chosen his words carefully, maintaining that while Russia does not proscribe Hamas as a terrorist organisation, that does not mean Russia agrees with its actions. This is unlikely to be because of Moscow’s considered application of terminology – the Russian government readily brands other groups that it considers to be true enemies, such as its domestic opposition, Ukrainian nationalists and the Islamic State, as terrorists. It is more likely that Moscow believes this distinction leaves the door open for it to engage more freely with both Israel and Hamas.</p> +<p>With unclear responsibilities, scarce resources and a lack of expertise, private-sector operators face an uphill battle to tackle the already intricate task of detecting and countering circumvention, muddled by the involvement of complex multi-jurisdictional schemes often involving third countries.</p> -<p>However, Moscow is also aware that terrorism presents a real threat. It has experienced domestic terrorism multiple times before, from insurgency in Chechnya to links in the North Caucasus to the Islamic State, which sought to build its own caliphate in the south of Russia following Russia’s involvement in Syria in 2015. Putin is aware that overly stoking the Israel–Gaza war in favour of either side risks widening the conflict – as has already partly occurred – into a regional war whose spillover could ultimately impact on Russia itself. In Russian, the Middle East is referred to as the blizhny vostok – the Near East – and so Russia will not forget that its geographical proximity to the region makes it vulnerable to any seismic changes.</p> +<p>The coalition of sanctions-imposing countries could also be strengthened by more consistent intelligence-sharing to disrupt cross-border global sanctions evasion networks, and by improved harmonisation in the interpretation of sanctions (including among EU member states). This leads to cases where authorities from different member states disagree on whether measures should be taken against an entity that one or the other understands to be in breach of sanctions. Moreover, the violation and circumvention of sanctions is not criminalised in all members of the sanctions coalition – notably in EU member states. This means that even if these practices are already taking place within their jurisdiction, authorities cannot initiate investigations and disrupt the networks involved. The upcoming EU directive to criminalise these practices will aim to remedy this, but this adjustment is long overdue.</p> -<hr /> +<h3 id="disrupting-global-sanctions-evasion-networks">Disrupting Global Sanctions-Evasion Networks</h3> -<p><strong>Emily Ferris</strong> is a Research Fellow in the International Security Studies department at RUSI, specialising in Russian domestic politics. Emily has a particular interest in Russia’s military and civilian infrastructure including its railways, road and port systems, and the role this plays in advancing Russia’s political ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as deployed in conflict zones such as Ukraine. She also researches domestic political administrations in Russia’s Far East, and Russia’s military and political relationship with Belarus.</p>Emily FerrisAs the war in Gaza distracts the West from its support for Ukraine, Russia is seeking to exploit the situation by positioning itself as a reasonable broker that has the ear of both Israel and Hamas.The Kingdom Of Oil2023-11-07T12:00:00+08:002023-11-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-kingdom-of-oil<p><em>Saudi Arabia is set to remain one of the most influential players in global oil and energy markets. Understanding – and taking seriously – its evolving strategic calculus must therefore be a key task for policymakers in the UK and across Europe as they seek to safeguard their countries’ energy security.</em></p> +<p>Truly disrupting third-country sanctions circumvention requires a better understanding of the wider networks enabling this activity, from banks and corporate service providers to shipping and logistics networks. Taking this wider view will likely generate new levers for pressure, including cutting the financial ties of the enablers supporting this trade. Further, applying a network focus should also reveal links between private-sector actors and the governments of third countries.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>In sum, efforts to tackle evasion should combine diplomatic engagement with third countries, focused on a network-centric approach, with a tightening of domestic efforts to disrupt sanctions circumvention at source. It is thus key that sanctions-imposing countries harmonise and improve their national frameworks as well, including better coordination and information-sharing across the coalition. Sanctions-evasion networks operate as global enterprises, and sanctions-imposing countries must do the same to render them ineffective.</p> -<p>Saudi Arabia is widely regarded as the world’s most important oil exporter. Through its own production and as the de facto leader of OPEC and OPEC+, Saudi Arabia can have more influence over international oil markets than most other producers – even countries that do not directly import Saudi oil are therefore affected by Saudi oil policy. In light of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and as energy security has become a top priority for Western governments, the UK and others across Europe and beyond have turned to Saudi Arabia, calling for it to increase production in order to bring down global oil prices.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Oil revenues have historically fuelled Saudi Arabia’s social contract, and they are now the indispensable source of funding for the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 reform agenda. Although the Saudi Vision 2030 reform agenda ultimately aims at diversifying the Saudi economy, income from oil exports remains the all-important enabler of Saudi Arabia’s political and socioeconomic development in the absence of sufficient foreign direct investment.</p> +<p><strong>Olivia Allison</strong> is currently working as an independent consultant, following a role as a Senior Managing Director at the boutique investigations consultancy K2 Integrity. She has more than 15 years’ experience carrying out complex, international investigations and supporting the development of integrity and governance for state-owned companies, international companies, and international financial institutions (IFIs).</p> -<p>This paper analyses Saudi Arabia’s oil policy and how it interacts with the Kingdom’s domestic and foreign and security policies. The following is a summary of the paper’s findings:</p> +<p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Analyst at the Centre for Financial Crime &amp; Security Studies at RUSI, focusing on sanctions and counter threat finance. He is part of Project CRAAFT (Collaboration, Research and Analysis Against Financing of Terrorism) and Euro SIFMANet (European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network).</p>Olivia Allison and Gonzalo SaizEfforts to align third countries with sanctions against Russia will only succeed when the private networks facilitating circumvention are understood and countered.The Securitisation Of Energy2023-11-09T12:00:00+08:002023-11-09T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-securitisation-of-energy<p><em>Understanding how Russia constructs its energy security and foreign policies is essential to anticipating how it might behave in international forums, particularly on challenging issues such as environmental and energy security.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<p>This paper examines how Russia’s energy policy has interacted with its foreign and defence policies since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The key findings are:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Saudi Arabia’s central role in global oil markets is a key source of the Kingdom’s geopolitical power and importance (in addition to its status as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites). Oil has shaped Saudi Arabia’s foreign relations. Most notably, it has facilitated its bilateral relation with the US. For most of the post-1945 era, Saudi Arabia–US relations have been encapsulated in an oil-for-security pact – Saudi Arabia sought to influence international oil markets in line with US interests, while the US provided the Kingdom with political, defence and security support.</p> + <p>Russia perceives any restriction of its access to and exploitation of oil and gas markets both within Russia and abroad as a serious security threat. Restriction could either be through international sanctions that prevent Russia from accessing deep-water oil deposits, or the international climate change agenda that calls for a reduction on oil and gas production.</p> </li> <li> - <p>In recent years, Saudi Arabia has adopted a “Saudi First” approach. This does not constitute a wholesale overhaul of Saudi oil policy and overall foreign political orientation, but rather reflects a reordering of the Kingdom’s strategic priorities that results in Saudi policies that are less directly aligned with US interests. The “Saudi First” approach is driven by a focus on the Vision 2030 reform agenda; a perception that the US is less willing and able to guarantee the Kingdom’s security; an assessment that the US’s “shale revolution” has made international oil markets more competitive and volatile; and a conclusion that global economic shifts, especially the emergence of China as the most important buyer of Saudi oil, necessitate the building of more extensive relations with non-Western powers.</p> + <p>As a major oil and gas producer, Russia considers the hydrocarbons industry to be a key part of its political economy and therefore its national security. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s role as an energy provider – or sense of international responsibility to its clients – was thought to keep some of its behaviour in check, even as Russia had in the past wielded its energy supplies to extract political concessions from some of its former Soviet neighbours. Ultimately, Russia’s security goals in Ukraine overtook any of this responsibility, which has framed much of the debate around Russia’s future as a declining energy power in Europe.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Saudi Arabia’s partnership with Russia, manifested in the two countries’ joint leadership of OPEC+, is best understood as a marriage of convenience. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, OPEC+ increases its ability to influence international oil markets by extending OPEC’s coordination of production quotas to more producing countries. Riyadh opposes oil-related sanctions on Russia as destabilising interventions in the market. However, Saudi–Russian relations have been far from straightforward, and there is scope for future disagreements to emerge, including over competition for market share in Asia.</p> + <p>Russia’s understanding of energy security is bound up in the country’s sovereignty, and with strategic competition with other states over resources. Ensuring security of demand and continued access to resources are part of Russia’s national security framework and even its national identity.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Both climate change and climate action – specifically pressure for the decarbonisation of the global economy – constitute a major challenge for Saudi Arabia. In recent years, the Kingdom’s approach towards international climate action has shifted from mostly resisting decarbonisation efforts to trying to actively shape the international debate while still advocating for the continued importance of fossil fuels. This also includes beginning attempts to capitalise on potential opportunities in the global energy transition.</p> + <p>The war has increased the urgency for Russia to seek out alternative alliances and structures with China and Iran. In recent years, Russia has established its own energy forums with partners such as Saudi Arabia and some African states – work which has become more pressing since the war began and Russia’s energy relations with the West have been significantly reduced.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Saudi Arabia is set to remain one of the most influential players in global oil and energy markets. Understanding – and taking seriously – its evolving strategic calculus must therefore be a key task for policymakers in the UK and across Europe as they seek to safeguard their countries’ energy security.</p> + <p>Russia claims that the West is seeking to undermine it through its dominance of energy resources, and that international forums, such as the UN, are prejudiced against Russia’s national interests. Russia also conflates energy with politicking, maintaining that Western efforts to cap its production prices or curtail nuclear energy use are part of a campaign to undermine Russian values and assert a neoliberal agenda.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The war has intensified Moscow’s need to identify new export destinations, with rail and pipeline networks that were previously in train accelerated. But to do so, particularly towards the Indo-Pacific region, Russia must link up its oil and gas reserves with maritime and rail infrastructure. This includes new terminals along the Northern Sea Route that can process liquefied natural gas, coal and oil and updating port infrastructure, as well as new ice-class vessels for exports.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Investments in the North–South Corridor via Iran have also gained traction since the war began, particularly to export oil and deliver on some of the practical elements of Russia’s foreign policy, by bringing Iran and India closer to its economic network. Russia has also identified specific development zones in the Arctic that are rich in hydrocarbons or have access to the sea.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Prior to the war, Gazprom’s monopoly in Europe had been unchallenged, but this is not the case in Asia, where it faces rival Novatek – this infighting may impact Russia’s ability to expand its energy plans in China. The Power of Siberia 2 pipeline contract with China, as yet to be signed, would give Gazprom a future role in Asia.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russia tends to use international platforms like the UN to further its own national interests or ensure it has a stake in the conversation, rather than in pursuit of a common cause. Since the war began, Russia’s ability to interact with other (especially Western) states has been restricted.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Since the war began, Russia and Saudi Arabia’s coordination through OPEC+ has been more pressing. Riyadh has not aligned itself with the Western consensus on Ukraine, nor has it introduced sanctions on Russia. But the war has caused a decline in global energy prices, and there are frictions between Russia and Saudi Arabia over Russia’s refusal to publish its oil export figures. Riyadh suspects that Moscow continues to export significant volumes of oil despite their price agreements, but the former has not criticised this and, since the war began, has invested in Russian companies like Gazprom.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russia is highly affected by climate change, but also banks on its status as a commodities producer to retain its international position. This inconsistency informs its strategic policymaking on the environment, as well as its behaviour in international forums related to climate change. Moscow often objects to international climate change efforts because it prioritises Russia’s national security, not the security implications that can stem from climate issues. While climate change can affect Russia’s national security, it is described as an issue that threatens Russia’s economic development, requiring technological or practical solutions, not adjustment to the extractive industries. Russia also views warming Arctic seas as more of an opportunity to improve access to shipping lanes than a crisis.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Russia views the Western-led climate change movement as an agenda seeking to undermine Russia and its interests in the extractive industries. Moscow’s installing of former intelligence officials in posts concerned with environmental security highlights the crossover in the Kremlin’s mindset between the environment and national security.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Since the war, many environmental links between Russia and the West have been severed. Moreover, there is little international oversight of Russia’s major drilling projects or their environmental impact, and legislation that restricts ecological activism has been tightened. Most Western-led NGOs dedicated to the environment have been shut down.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Ultimately, even if the UK can decouple from Russian oil, the complex and global nature of international energy markets means Russia’s behaviour as a hydrocarbon superpower can still impact the UK’s energy security. Russia views external attempts to cap oil prices as a dangerous precedent that could be extended to other areas of the Russian economy and Russian values. This indicates that Moscow interprets international economic and pragmatic decisions as a direct attack on Russian sovereignty.</p> </li> </ul> <h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>In the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the spike in international oil and gas prices that followed, the subject of energy security and the link between energy and geopolitics has jumped to the top of the agenda for governments around the world, including the UK. As part of this shift, policymakers in London, other European capitals and beyond have naturally turned their attention to Saudi Arabia. The question of how much oil Saudi Arabia produces and why – that is, identifying the economic and political drivers behind the country’s oil-related decisions – has become infused with renewed importance.</p> +<p>This paper analyses Russia’s energy policy and the way this interacts with the country’s foreign and defence policies. The paper is part of RUSI’s UK National Security and the Net Zero Transition project and is published alongside a paper that focuses on the links between Saudi Arabia’s energy policy and its foreign and security policy behaviour. Together, these two papers analyse how Russia and Saudi Arabia – which aside from the US are the world’s leading oil exporters – approach their roles as energy superpowers, how their energy-related decision-making has evolved since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and how their foreign policies and conduct in international forums, including on climate change and other major global issues, will continue to have global implications.</p> -<p>This paper analyses Saudi Arabia’s oil policy and how it interacts with the country’s domestic and foreign/security policies. The paper forms part of RUSI’s UK National Security and the Net Zero Transition project and is published alongside a paper that focuses on the linkages between Russia’s energy policies and its foreign/security policy behaviour. Together, the two papers examine how Saudi Arabia and Russia – which, along with the US, are the world’s leading oil exporters, being jointly responsible for around 20% of global production – approach their roles as energy superpowers; how their energy-related decision-making has evolved in recent decades and in light of the Ukraine war; and how their foreign policies and conduct in international forums, including on climate change and other major global issues, will continue to have global implications. It should be noted that this paper was drafted prior to the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, and the subsequent war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza (still ongoing at the time of this paper’s publication). The analysis in the paper is therefore not reflective of the impact of conflict on regional dynamics, or on Saudi Arabia’s oil and foreign policy.</p> +<p>As oil and gas prices were already elevated in 2021 following the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia was able to exploit them in Europe in order to drive up prices before it invaded Ukraine. This returned the link between energy and geopolitics, and in particular the question of energy security, to the fore. The war has demonstrated that energy and geopolitics cannot be separated, and has increased the need to determine how major fossil fuel producers think about their international roles.</p> -<p>Saudi Arabia has rarely been out of the international spotlight in recent years. From the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, to the efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear programme, Saudi Arabia has been a key stakeholder – and active participant – in many of the conflicts and geopolitical issues that have occupied the centre of UK (and European) foreign and security policies over the past decade. The murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government agents in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018 led many Western governments to seek to distance themselves politically from the Kingdom; then-presidential candidate Joe Biden vowed to treat it as a “pariah”. But Russia’s war against Ukraine has not just changed the European and global security environment: it has also contributed to a shift in the debate about Saudi Arabia.</p> +<p>While there are many definitions of energy security, for the purposes of this paper, energy security of states is considered to be both a practical issue of supply access and pricing, and a geopolitical issue that relates to foreign policy behaviour in the energy sector. For states that are net importers of energy, as the UK and most of Europe are, security of oil and gas supply is often equated with diversification. This includes diversification away from fossil fuels, an increasingly potent driver of energy policy across Europe. But while hydrocarbons are required to generate electricity and to fuel industries, diversification of supply also means securing access to oil and gas from sufficiently diverse sources that no single disruption leads to sudden shortages or price disruption.</p> -<p>Since the start of the invasion, Western leaders, including US President Biden, then-prime minister Boris Johnson (and other UK ministers), French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz have travelled to Saudi Arabia for talks with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Energy – specifically, the hope that Saudi Arabia would increase oil production in order to bring down international prices – was a key driver behind this diplomatic re-engagement with Riyadh. Since early 2022, Saudi Arabia’s every move – on oil especially, but also with regard to its ongoing friendly relations with Russia, its efforts to expand ties with China, and its various diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East region – has been scrutinised by policymakers in London and across Europe, as well as in the Western media.</p> +<p>Before the Ukraine war, some European states relied, to varying degrees, on imports from Russia, one of the world’s top oil and gas producers and exporters. The war has prompted many European states to reduce and ideally end imports from Russia by 2027 in order to deprive Moscow of revenue and reduce Russia’s leverage over Europe. While the EU has made some progress on this, reductions in gas volumes in particular were also due in part to the Kremlin’s actions, including Moscow’s suspension of gas via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, and a March 2022 presidential decree that demanded payment for gas in roubles from countries involved in the EU’s “unfriendly actions” towards Russia.</p> -<p>This renewed focus on Saudi oil policy by the UK and its European partners is not only – and for many countries not even primarily – driven by the need or desire to buy more Saudi crude. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a diversification race, as European states scramble to reduce (and ideally end) hydrocarbon imports from Russia in order to deprive Moscow of revenue and reduce its leverage over them. Germany, for example, received 31% of its oil and 60% of its gas from Russia in 2021. The UK was comparatively less affected by this dynamic: in 2021, only 9% of the UK’s oil and 4% of its gas imports came from Russia, and by January 2023 this had been reduced to zero. Saudi oil exports to Europe have increased since February 2022, but much of the gap in European oil supplies has been filled by crude from Norway, the US, West Africa and other Middle Eastern producers.</p> +<p>The UK has been comparatively less affected by this dynamic; in 2021, only 9% of the UK’s oil and 4% of its gas imports came from Russia, and by January 2023 this had been brought to zero. But while replacing Russian supply was not the UK’s key concern, due to its reliance on natural gas, it was hit just as hard as its European partners by the surge in oil and gas prices sparked by the war. The UK is exposed not just to disruptions to the flows of the oil and gas that it imports directly, but also to the global flows of hydrocarbons.</p> -<p>Yet, regardless of how the UK and its European partners replaced imports from Russia, they all felt the impact of the surge in oil and gas prices sparked by Moscow’s war. In the 12 months leading up to the invasion, the price of a barrel of Brent crude oil increased from just over $63 in February 2021 to over $92, driven, among other factors, by the recovery of the world economy from the Covid-19 pandemic. Prices for natural gas were on a similar trajectory. But Russia’s war sent prices soaring even higher – Brent reached $119 per barrel in early June 2022. As the conflict has continued into its second year, oil prices have returned to pre-war levels, but towards the end of 2023 they remained in the $85–$95 range, significantly higher than they were in most of the previous decade. Ultimately, in the context of globalised energy markets, the UK is not only exposed to disruptions to its direct oil imports, but also to flows and prices of hydrocarbons everywhere around the world. And few players have as much influence over the flows of globally traded oil as Saudi Arabia.</p> +<p>As the war continues into its second year, although oil prices have somewhat stabilised, there has been a renewed focus by the West on the behaviour of the members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), most notably Saudi Arabia, and a group of major producers, including Russia, that have aligned their oil policies with those of OPEC since 2016 through the OPEC+ framework. Every decision by the grouping to adjust production quotas, especially the significant cuts announced in October 2022 and June 2023, has been scrutinised by Western analysts for its economic and political motives.</p> -<p>Saudi Arabia is an oil superpower. It holds the second largest proven oil reserves in the world after Venezuela, and its national oil company Saudi Aramco is one of the largest companies in the world – and by far the most profitable. Having established itself as the world’s swing producer, it has invested in maintaining a level of production capacity that has been – and is currently – significantly higher than its actual production, giving it the unique ability to both decrease and increase output.</p> +<p>Moreover, the serious fracturing of the relationship between Russia and the West as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has meant that Russia’s behaviour as a major hydrocarbon producer, both in its export dealings and more generally in international forums for discussing these issues, has been particularly difficult to engage with. This is particularly the case where, as in Russia, governments control the energy industry. As a major emitter of greenhouse gases, Russia’s behaviour around climate change issues adds another dimension to this.</p> -<p>Moreover, besides itself accounting for up to 12 million barrels per day – or roughly 10% – of global production capacity, Saudi Arabia is also the de facto leader of OPEC and co-leader of OPEC+, alongside Russia. OPEC accounted for around 36% of global production in 2022 (and 80.4% of global reserves), while OPEC+, which was formed in 2016 and includes nine other non-OPEC producers besides Russia, accounted for around 59%. OPEC+ decisions to adjust production quotas, including for example the significant cuts announced in October 2022 and June 2023, tend to be understood – by governments and the media around the world – as reflecting, to a significant degree, Saudi Arabia’s decision-making, albeit within the context of bargaining with the grouping’s other members.</p> +<p>Given the importance of understanding how major producers behave, this paper examines how Russia sees and exercises the international roles afforded to it by its energy resources. The paper analyses three key issues: how hydrocarbons and their export relate to Russia’s perceptions of itself and its place in the world; the extent to which Russia’s energy policies are securitised and how they are linked to Russia’s domestic and foreign policies; and how Russia relates its status as a hydrocarbon exporter to notions of environmental security and international climate action efforts. As the paper will show, Russian definitions and understanding of environmental security and where this presents a national security threat widely diverge from Western understandings. Moscow tends to frame risks stemming from climate change, such as flooding, as something to be countered by technological or financial solutions, rather than addressing core issues, such as Russia’s continued extraction of hydrocarbons, as contributions to the initial problem.</p> -<p>In addition to Saudi Arabia’s role in influencing day-to-day global oil prices, the Kingdom’s wider geopolitical posture and behaviour are increasingly a focus for UK and European policymakers. The Kingdom’s regional foreign policy continues to affect regional stability in the Middle East, which, in turn, has implications for UK and European security; and its positioning vis-à-vis the US (and the wider West), Russia and China, and the Global South, are seen as indicators of the posture and direction other countries in the Middle East might adopt in a changing global order. Further, as a hydrocarbon superpower, Saudi Arabia is clearly a major stakeholder in international efforts to combat climate change and decarbonise the global economy.</p> +<p>Understanding how Russia constructs its energy security and foreign policies is therefore essential to anticipating how it might behave in international forums, particularly on challenging issues such as environmental and energy security, and where some of Moscow’s red lines might be.</p> -<h4 id="structure-and-methodology">Structure and Methodology</h4> +<h4 id="methodology-and-structure">Methodology and Structure</h4> -<p>This paper is divided into three chapters. The first examines Saudi Arabia’s relationship with oil, and traces how revenues from crude exports have shaped – and continue to shape – the Kingdom’s social contract, including their envisaged role and importance in the government’s root-and-branch political, economic and social reform agenda, Vision 2030. The second chapter looks at the linkages between oil and Saudi Arabia’s national security and foreign policy, including within the context of OPEC+. The final chapter focuses on how Saudi Arabia is navigating the dual challenges of climate change and climate action.</p> +<p>The paper is divided into three chapters. The first focuses on Russia’s foreign policy decision-making in energy since it invaded Ukraine, and some of the factional disagreements between powerful energy companies which impact the Kremlin’s ability to put forth a coherent energy strategy. The second chapter discusses Russia’s engagement in OPEC+, highlighting its marriage of convenience with Saudi Arabia around oil prices and the future trajectory of this bilateral cooperation. The third chapter examines Russia’s approach to environmental security and discusses the divergences of opinion between Russia and the West over how to approach the threat of climate change.</p> -<p>The paper argues that Saudi Arabia continues to see itself as the crucial stabiliser of the international oil market. However, its leadership’s ambitious political and socioeconomic domestic agenda, along with its perception of the changing international environment (and its vision for the Kingdom’s role therein) has led to a reorganisation of priorities. The outcome of this is a more unapologetically self-interested and less obviously Western-aligned energy and foreign policy.</p> +<p>This paper is based on a review of open-source journals, books and public statements from officials in Russia, using local-language sources where possible, to piece together Russia’s current and historical views on energy security, focusing on the 2022 invasion but also grounding the analysis in recent historical literature. In addition, the paper offers a targeted review of Russia’s energy strategies and other important official documents such as its national security and Arctic strategies, as well as documents that govern its environmental policies and its engagement with the hydrocarbons industry, in order to understand better the gaps between Russia’s official foreign policy documents and its actions.</p> -<p>The paper is primarily based on desk-based research, consulting open source journals, books, statements from Saudi officials and media reporting. It also draws on 15 supplementary interviews conducted by the author, and more informal engagement with subject matter experts and officials in the Gulf, the UK, Europe and the US, including during two visits to Saudi Arabia in 2023.</p> +<h3 id="i-russia-reimagining-the-globe">I. Russia: Reimagining the Globe</h3> -<h3 id="i-a-kingdom-built-on-oil">I. A Kingdom Built on Oil</h3> +<p>For Russia, its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the impact of that invasion on global prices have accelerated the competition between it and the West over traditional oil and gas markets, a process that has been under way for more than a decade. It is less the changing oil prices themselves and more the potential restriction of Russia’s access to and exploitation of these markets – both domestically within Russia and abroad, variously through instruments such as international sanctions that prevent Russia from accessing deep-water oil deposits, or the international climate change agenda that calls for a reduction in oil and gas production – that Russia views as a serious security threat. This securitisation of energy policies is the lens through which Russia’s own energy policymaking is seen from Moscow.</p> -<p>In many ways, Saudi Arabia has been defined by, and was built on, its oil wealth – the country has developed symbiotically with its oil industry, which has fuelled the global economy for most of the past century.</p> +<p>Russia is a major oil and gas producer, with its oil output in 2021 making up 14% of the world’s total supply. In 2021, its revenues from oil and natural gas made up 45% of its annual budget. Its energy companies are also major employers within Russia, supporting the livelihoods of over two million people, and the importance of these industries is enshrined in Russian law. According to a 2008 law, key industries such as defence and oil and gas are considered by the Kremlin to be “strategic sectors” – cornerstones of the economy upon which Russia’s political economy and therefore its national security rests. Foreign investment in these sectors is heavily restricted, extra state scrutiny is exerted over them, and they are prioritised at the expense of other, less lucrative sectors such as healthcare and education.</p> -<p>Initially, it was US oil companies that first struck oil in Saudi Arabia in 1938 and established the country’s oil export infrastructure. Having secured the concession for Saudi oil at a bargain price, these companies also built much of Saudi Arabia’s early infrastructure so as to maintain good relations with the king and his government as the scale of the Kingdom’s resource wealth became more apparent. Through the 1960s and 1970s, however, the Saudi state gradually moved to take control: by 1976 it had taken full ownership of Aramco – the Arabian American Oil Company, established in 1944 by Standard Oil of California (today’s Chevron) and the Texas Company (Texaco, now part of Chevron). In 1988, the state finally created the Saudi Arabian Oil Company to take over all of Aramco’s assets, including its name – by which Saudi Arabia’s national oil company is still known today.</p> +<p>Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Western view of Russia’s role as an energy provider was a rather paradoxical mixture of business pragmatism and political interventionism. Before the 2022 invasion, Russia’s status as a major petro-state and its consequent sense of responsibility to its clients, particularly in Europe, were viewed by some Western analysts as one of the guarantors that could keep Russia’s international behaviour in check – but there was also broad acknowledgement that Russia was capable of and had used its supplies to extract political concessions from former Soviet neighbours such as Georgia (in 2006) and Ukraine (in 2009). In the end, Russia’s security goals in Ukraine overtook any desire for Russia to cast itself as a reliable energy supplier, and this has framed much of the current debate around Russia’s future as a declining energy power in Europe. However, what this has overlooked from a policy (rather than an energy) perspective is that for Moscow, energy supply is only part of the security picture.</p> -<h4 id="oil-islam-and-the-social-contract">Oil, Islam and the Social Contract</h4> +<h4 id="moscows-securitisation-of-energy--ensuring-russian-sovereignty">Moscow’s Securitisation of Energy – Ensuring Russian Sovereignty</h4> -<p>Oil and the revenues from its export are a key foundation for Saudi Arabia’s political and socioeconomic development model and for the social contract between the ruling Al-Saud family and the population. It is the income from oil exports, rather than money raised through taxation, that has paid for the Kingdom’s modern infrastructure, the formation of its state institutions, and the extensive package of services and cradle-to-grave welfare benefits they have traditionally delivered to Saudi citizens. It has also paid for large quantities of modern Western military hardware, and for a foreign policy that has, as one of its main tools, the ability to provide financial and material support to partners and allies in the Middle East region and beyond (discussed in more detail in the next section).</p> +<p>Most states view energy security as a serious issue; many governments have influence over their nations’ energy sectors and in a lot of these, the energy sector tends to be dominated by large projects and the relatively small number of companies controlling them. What makes Russia’s approach to energy security particularly Russian is the way that energy and the country’s very sovereignty are bound up with strategic competition with other countries over resources.</p> -<p>Traditionally, oil has also been an important factor in the relationship between the Saudi government (and general state apparatus) and the Kingdom’s conservative religious establishment. Long before the discovery of oil, Islam was a central source of legitimacy and identity for the Al-Saud and their Kingdom (and its previous iterations). Saudi monarchs have derived power and status from their role as the political masters of Islam’s holiest sites in Mecca and Medina; except for King Khalid (ruled 1975–82), all Saudi monarchs since King Faisal (ruled 1964–75) have assumed the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques as their primary honorific. Domestically, religion provided the ideational link between the ruling family and its subjects, with clerics holding positions as crucial intermediaries. For decades, Saudi domestic politics and foreign policy have both been dominated by competing pressures from this powerful constituency; and from the Kingdom’s integration into a rapidly globalising and, for a long time, US/Western-dominated world. Oil revenues gave the Saudi leadership the means to navigate this space.</p> +<p>Security of demand and continued access to oil and gas markets are key tenets of Russia’s national security framework, and of its national identity. Moscow’s perception of itself as a great power is largely based on a combination of its military might, its nuclear capabilities and its continued ability to produce and export significant volumes of natural resources. Although President Putin has not specifically referred to Russia as an “energy superpower”, it is clear Moscow views its prominence on the international stage and its ability (or as Moscow sees it, its right) to have a significant stake in foreign affairs as bound up with its natural resource wealth.</p> -<p>With the 1973 oil embargo, Saudi Arabia tried to use its oil-based geopolitical weight to affect the great regional cause of the time, the Arab and Palestinian struggle against Israel (which had an obvious religious dimension). Previous embargoes in the contexts of the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1967 Six-Day War had been ineffectual, but the 1973 embargo was accompanied by a 25% cut in OPEC production that sent oil prices skyrocketing. The embargo largely failed to achieve its immediate political objective of curbing Western support for Israel, but it effectively announced Saudi Arabia’s arrival on the global stage as a power to be reckoned with, and one that the US and its Western allies resolved it would be best to maintain close relations with. Domestically, the resulting oil revenue windfall fuelled an urbanisation and modernisation boom.</p> +<p>From the Kremlin’s perspective, attempts to stymie Russia’s continued role as a natural resource producer – be it through sanctions or competition with other states over access to resources in the Arctic – are all a serious threat to Russia’s existence. Sanctions introduced on Russia’s hydrocarbons industry by Europe, the US and other allies since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 tended to target technology related to Arctic, deep-water exploration and onshore tight oil extraction, but ultimately they had little impact on Russia’s onshore deposits in western and eastern Siberia, which make up the bulk of its production in the short term.</p> -<p>But by the 1980s, the dual shocks of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Islamic extremists, both in 1979, led to a course correction. The Saudi leadership doubled down on religious conservatism by diverting oil-derived state funds to be spent in line with the priorities of the clerical establishment. Internationally, Saudi Arabia walked a tightrope between relying on the US and other Western partners for its defence and security needs and taking on the mantle of leadership for the Arab and Islamic worlds (with particular responsibility for related political and religious causes). The Kingdom turned to Washington to protect it from the fallout of the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s and from Iraq’s subsequent expansionist ambitions (which led it to try to annex Kuwait in 1990); and it worked closely with the US to support the mujahedeen in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. But Saudi Arabia also invested heavily in internationally focused Islamic institutions such as the Muslim World League, the University of Madinah and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, all of which were regarded as promoting the conservative views of the Kingdom’s religious establishment.</p> +<p>Against this backdrop, and particularly since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has embarked on a strategic and practical reorientation of both its trade and foreign policy alliances. This reorientation sees Russia reimagining the globe and Moscow’s place within it.</p> -<h4 id="the-vision-2030-revolution">The Vision 2030 Revolution</h4> +<p>Russia’s latest foreign policy strategy – its first major policy document published since the war began – envisages Russia and its allies China and India united at the centre of a grand Greater Eurasian Partnership, pitted against the hegemonic (and allegedly declining) West. This perception frames Moscow as being at the heart of decision-making, with nascent relationships with middle powers such as Iran forming an important economic basis of the alliance. Although much has been made of the significant gap between Russia’s strategic planning and its practical ability to deliver on these goals, what this perception does show is Russia’s intention to restructure the globe on its own terms and to place Moscow at the hub of global decision-making. This is important, because it clearly delineates who and what Russia sees as a threat to its sovereignty. Its foreign policy document makes clear that it respects the sovereignty of powers such as India and China, while remaining mistrustful of and distant from the so-called “Anglo-Saxon world”, a derisive and archaic term that Moscow uses to refer to the UK and some other European states. However, it is not clear that China and India buy into Moscow’s version of the world, especially with framings that conceptualise Russia as the driver and leader of their international positions.</p> -<p>Over the past decade, Saudi Arabia’s approach – including to oil-related decision-making and to how it defines its international role – has changed: subtly in some regards, but more dramatically in others. King Salman (who ascended to the throne in 2015) and especially his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, have made their Vision 2030 the North Star of their domestic and foreign policy. They have radically disempowered the Kingdom’s clerical establishment; declared economic development and diversification to be the primary national objectives; and adopted a more unapologetically self-interested and assertive international posture.</p> +<p>Russia’s foreign policy approach pivots its vision towards a new alliance arrayed directly against the “collective West” (in Russia’s mindset, mostly made up of the EU, NATO member states and the US), which is depicted as a failed example of imposed democracy. This clash of civilisations that Russia is articulating is laying the groundwork for serious frictions between the West, Russia and the rest of Russia’s allies, particularly over energy and access to available resources.</p> -<p>Economic diversification – the idea of reducing the economy’s dependence on oil exports – has long been on the Saudi agenda, at least in theory. In practice, however, very little progress has been made over the decades, with efforts to diversify essentially fluctuating inversely to international oil prices: when prices were low, diversification was in; when prices were high, it dropped down the list of priorities. Vision 2030 appears to have altered this dynamic: a number of path-breaking economic reforms have already been implemented; the government seems to be serious about curbing some aspects of the oil-financed cradle-to-grave welfare state; and there is an intense flurry of activity across the Kingdom to build and invest in new commercial sectors (for example an entertainment industry) and various mega projects (including, most prominently, the Red Sea city NEOM).</p> +<p>The war has also exacerbated a growing tendency on the part of Russia to seek out alternative structures such as BRICS – an economic grouping consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in order to promote its way of looking at the world. In this vein, since 2017, Russia has established its own energy forums with trusted partners – including Saudi Arabia and many African states – with the aim of reframing energy issues on its own terms. One such forum, in 2022, was notable for its assertion that Europe’s longstanding policy of moving away from Russian gas was a failed attempt to weaken Russia, linked to the energy crisis – with no acknowledgement of Russia’s own role in that crisis.</p> -<p>However, all these efforts remain inextricably linked to oil. In the absence of sufficient foreign direct investment, oil revenues are the most important source of funding for everything the government is trying to achieve. Through a set of centralising political reforms, Saudi Aramco and the Saudi oil industry have been put in the service of enabling Vision 2030. Key steps in this regard have included: the creation of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs, chaired by Mohammed bin Salman, to streamline all decision-making related to Vision 2030, which effectively encompasses all domestic and economic policy fields; the sale of almost 2% of Saudi Aramco in an initial public offering in 2019 and the transfers of two 4% stakes in Saudi Aramco to the Kingdom’s Public Investment Fund in 2022 and 2023, respectively; and the restructuring and rebranding of the Ministry of Energy, which oversees Saudi Aramco. In 2019, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources was split up to create the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources. The energy minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, son of the king, half-brother of the Crown Prince and the first member of the royal family in this ministerial position, has worked to give his ministry a new brand identity, stressing that its focus is on energy writ large, rather than oil alone. He has also presided over Saudi Aramco’s expansion to become a more integrated oil company by investing in both upstream production and downstream means of value generation such as refining capacity and petrochemical production.</p> +<p>Russia’s perception is that the West is seeking to undermine Russia through its dominance of energy resources, and that international forums such as the UN Security Council are prejudiced against Russia and its national interests. There is also a widespread belief among the Kremlin leadership that certain efforts by the West – for example, to cap oil production prices or curtail the use of nuclear energy, or for the US to deliver gas to Europe in order to replace Russia – are part of an attempt to undermine Russian traditional values and exert a neoliberal political agenda. Moscow’s understanding of the West’s actions in the energy sector has been framed in increasingly negative terms over the past decade, reflecting not only the highly securitised way in which Moscow views any external intervention in what it perceives to be its energy affairs, but also its own misconceptions about the West. It also reflects that Moscow has little concept of the importance of climate change issues in shaping global energy policies and prefers to frame climate change as a Western conspiracy designed to undermine Russia’s interests.</p> -<p>Economic diversification is the central mantra of Vision 2030, which has itself become the defining feature of Saudi Arabia’s domestic politics and national agenda. To commit to this, Saudi Arabia must maintain oil prices at a relatively high level. In the long run, the government hopes that Vision 2030 – and its successors – can modify or replace the old social contract in the Kingdom. While Islam will remain one of the most important features of Saudi identity, the government has felt confident enough about its modernisation agenda’s attractiveness to the population to dismantle the religious establishment as a political force in the Kingdom. Yet, throughout all of this, the Saudi leadership remains aware that the production and export of oil remains the all-important enabler of their Kingdom’s political and socioeconomic development.</p> +<p>While many of these foreign policy relationships were in train before the war, Russia’s invasion has accelerated Moscow’s need to identify new energy export destinations and to reduce its reliance on imported foreign technology. Although Russia’s so-called “pivot to the East” has already been a long-term trend for at least the past decade, with some rail and pipeline infrastructure build to support it, the programme has recently been accelerated because Russia has few other options. To do this, however, Russia must link up its oil and gas reserves with its maritime and rail infrastructure in order to reorientate its export structures and maintain its own energy security. Whether realistic or not, Putin maintained in mid-2022 that by 2025, Russia intends for 80% of its energy industry’s equipment to be domestically manufactured, to ensure that oil production remains high and to reduce external sanctions risks.</p> -<h3 id="ii-oil-security-and-power">II. Oil, Security and Power</h3> +<p>Some of these plans for domestic reliance, and new ways of seeing the globe, are evident from Russia’s other strategic planning documents that govern the energy sector, some of which were written before the war.</p> -<p>For Saudi Arabia, there has always been a direct connection between its oil industry (and status as a world-leading oil producer) and the country’s national security. As outlined above, oil has been and remains the foundation for the Saudi economy and the social contract between the Saudi state and its people; as such, it is inseparable from domestic political stability and security. In terms of foreign affairs, oil has similarly been at the heart of the Kingdom’s most important bilateral relationships, most obviously the one with the US. At the same time, its oil and derived wealth have also been a key source of Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical weight, influence and power on the global stage.</p> +<h4 id="moscows-shifting-self-perception">Moscow’s Shifting Self-Perception</h4> -<h4 id="the-oil-for-security-era">The Oil-for-Security Era</h4> +<p>This shift in Moscow’s approach to energy security can be seen from two of the most important documents that govern the country’s energy sector: its Energy Strategy (ES) and its National Security Strategy (NSS).</p> -<p>For most of the past century, the link between Saudi Arabia’s oil policy and its foreign, defence and security policy has been most obviously apparent in its relationship with the US. The February 1945 meeting between King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud and US President Franklin D Roosevelt on the USS Quincy, during which the two men forged the oil-for-security bargain around which bilateral relations between Riyadh and Washington have revolved ever since, is part of the folklore of modern Middle East politics. The Carter Doctrine, proclaimed in 1980, made the US’s commitment to the security of the Gulf region – and therefore also to Saudi Arabia – even more explicit, clarifying that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force”. President Jimmy Carter also emphasised that the US would expect “the participation of all those who rely on oil from the Middle East” in these efforts to ensure the uninterrupted flow of hydrocarbons from the Gulf to international markets. Although the Doctrine was initially formulated with the Soviet Union in mind as the threatening “outside force”, the US-led campaign to liberate Kuwait and protect Saudi Arabia from potential further Iraqi aggression in 1990–91 was arguably its most tangible manifestation.</p> +<p>Russia’s previous NSSs had only briefly mentioned energy in an environmental context, but in the 2021 strategy, the most recent, it is noted as something that permeates all aspects of security and Russian life: ensuring heating, as something to be protected alongside the defence industries and nuclear power plants, and as a major factor in Russia’s economic security. The increasing securitisation of energy means that Russia views external attempts at reform, as well as geopolitical competition over important energy markets, as a threat to Russia’s sovereignty, and will respond with what it views as appropriate force.</p> -<p>Saudi Arabia has generally held up its side of the bargain. Except for the US position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which precipitated the 1973 embargo and production cut described earlier, Saudi Arabia was generally committed to accommodating the US’s interest in maintaining the steady flow of affordable oil to fuel the American economy and, ultimately, the global economy. Energy expert Daniel Yergin has described Saudi Arabia as being akin to the “central bank of world oil”. Saudi Arabia was never under the illusion that it alone – or any other producer or consumer – could ultimately control the highly dynamic international oil market. On several occasions, the decisions to adjust production failed to have their intended effect, either because of miscalculation or because of geopolitical and global economic developments that had much greater impact on energy markets. But in principle at least, Saudi Arabia – through its position at the helm of OPEC, and embracing its status as the great swing producer capable of quickly increasing or decreasing its output – sought to contain oil price fluctuations as much as it could.</p> +<p>Russia’s current ES (ES-35) was approved in 2020 by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and runs up to 2035. Irrespective of its sparse mention in the NSS, Moscow has long viewed energy as a part of its national security, given the significant contribution of hydrocarbons to the federal budget, and the ES-35 makes it clear that any restriction on Russia’s production and sale of oil, gas and coal would be considered a security threat. The ES-35 is a strategy for safeguarding the oil and gas industry, and there is little attempt to diversify away from reliance on fossil fuels. Extraction and exports are priorities – the strategy aims to launch five major oil projects in the Arctic and 21 projects to extract raw materials such as gold and coal, alongside a significant increase in resource production from liquefied natural gas (LNG), which Russia aims to increase from 8.6 million tonnes in 2018 to 91 million tonnes by 2035. The boost to LNG production will necessitate an increase in infrastructure to support it, which the ES-35 outlines for the Russian Arctic and Far Eastern regions; these plans are supported and governed by other strategic documents.</p> -<p>These efforts to bring a degree of balance to the international oil market were shaped by more than the desire to retain US favour. Most obviously, Saudi Arabia needed to sell oil to sustain its domestic economy and social contract. That meant, and still means, trying to keep prices high enough to cover its government budget – often referred to as the “break-even price” – and stable enough to allow a degree of planning security. Yet Saudi Arabia also made a conscious effort to prevent prices from climbing too high. Although higher prices would translate to higher revenues for the Saudi state (at least as an immediate consequence), the Kingdom has long urged moderation, lest overly high energy costs slow the global economy and eventually dampen demand or provide additional incentives for the development of alternative energy sources.</p> +<p>There have been three key developments since the war began that have demonstrated most clearly Russia’s changing view of itself and its place in the world as an energy producer and supplier. First, in August 2022, Prime Minister Mishustin approved an updated plan for the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a trade route that runs across the top of the Russian Arctic. Among other measures, the plans include construction of three new terminals to process LNG, oil and coal, as well as updating existing port infrastructure in the Far East to accommodate an increase in capacity. With plans to construct new ice-class vessels capable of traversing the NSR, not only is Russia preparing to increase the production and export of raw materials, but it is also attempting to better link up its land and maritime infrastructure, and is using this physical infrastructure to assert its dominance over the maritime domain.</p> -<p>In sum, Saudi Arabia has traditionally understood its hydrocarbon wealth as giving it special responsibilities that went far beyond those an ordinary state might have to its people, instead extending to the health of the global economy. In this context, it also regarded US commitments to Gulf security as being about more than the preservation of the Kingdom’s own national security. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the oil-for-security bargain was not just a bilateral pact serving the interests of two countries, but a critical component of the post-Second World War global order – with the Kingdom as the world’s pivotal energy provider.</p> +<p>But as ever with many of Russia’s so-called “mega-projects”, there are few feasibility studies available to determine whether investing in these often-politicised projects will ultimately add value to the Russian economy, or even whether ports will be able to accept sufficient planned increases in traffic to make investments worthwhile. Indeed, following a South Korean feasibility study on expanding Russia’s small Far Eastern Slavyanka port in 2018, ultimately the project never came to pass and, since the war began, many foreign investment projects have been halted. Other considerations relating to major projects like these, such as environmental impacts or the effect on local Indigenous populations, are rarely taken into account.</p> -<h4 id="the-emergence-of-a-saudi-first-approach">The Emergence of a “Saudi First” Approach</h4> +<p>Second, as part of the development of the NSR, Russia is pursuing important infrastructure projects with allies such as Iran to resurrect the North–South Corridor. This is a railway development project linking Russia to the Indian Ocean via Iran that has been repeatedly shelved over the past two decades, but which has gained new impetus since the war. Plans include linking up ports along the NSR with land and sea routes south of Russia across the Caspian Sea to northern parts of Iran, a grandiose project of a kind that, as the history of Soviet-style planning has evidenced, rarely delivers on its objectives. While it is still incomplete and there are numerous political and infrastructure obstacles to overcome, the North–South Corridor is nevertheless part of Russia’s longer-term plan to export goods, including its oil, through these new land and sea networks. There is substantive investment in it already: as of 2022, Russia had committed $13 billion to different projects as part of the scheme. The North–South Corridor links up roads, rail and maritime infrastructure across multiple countries, and is an attempt by Moscow to deliver on some of the practical elements of its planned foreign policy, bringing countries such as India and Iran more closely into Russia’s economic network.</p> -<p>In June 2023, after announcing another major production cut, Saudi energy minister Abdulaziz bin Salman declared that the Kingdom and its partners within OPEC and OPEC+ would “do whatever is necessary to bring stability to this market”. He explained that the decision was based on projections of weak global demand in the context of a slow global economy. This was Saudi Arabia playing its traditional role as balancer. The minister and other Saudi leaders made the same arguments to justify the other two recent production cuts, in October 2022 and April 2023. Yet, in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent spike in energy prices, all three announcements attracted vocal criticism. Many observers suggested that the cuts represent a change in Saudi policy, arguing that instead of acting as the pro-Western oil central banker of yesteryear, the Kingdom had adopted a more resource-nationalist “Saudi First” approach aimed at keeping prices elevated, and potentially even favouring OPEC+ member Russia’s interests over those of the US and other Western countries.</p> +<p>A third key aspect of Russia’s reimagining of the globe that has been accelerated since the war began can be seen in its Arctic strategy up to 2035, and in Moscow’s changing perception of the NSR. Unlike its predecessors, the current strategy has identified specific development zones – which will receive greater Kremlin attention and financing – that are either rich in mineral resources such as hydrocarbons, or have access to the sea. This highlights Russia’s dual priorities of resource extraction and export in the Arctic, and is a further example of its strategic linkages between the land and maritime domains. Amid a downturn in relations with the West, over the past few years, there has been a noticeable shift in perceptions of the NSR within Russia, from viewing it as a potential international route capable of linking up Europe and Asia to instead seeing it as a useful route specifically for Russian companies to deliver energy resources to their own global markets. This refocusing on ensuring Russia’s dominance of sea routes is likely a precursor to further attempts to exert control over the maritime domain, with likely a concomitant increase in Russia’s projection of sovereignty over parts of the NSR that are considered international waters.</p> -<p>Assertions that there has been a wholesale overhaul of Saudi oil policy and overall foreign political orientation go too far, but it is true that there has been a change in what the Kingdom regards as its main strategic priorities and how it believes it can best achieve them. The shift in Saudi domestic politics described above, encapsulated in the proclamation of Vision 2030 as the Kingdom’s all-encompassing national development roadmap, also finds expression in how Saudi leaders approach oil export decisions, and in Saudi foreign policy more generally. As noted earlier, the need to fund the long list of socioeconomic reforms and development projects represents a renewed incentive to maximise oil revenues. Whereas in the past Saudi leaders might have looked to find a balance between their financial needs and their strategic alignment with the US, the pursuit of Vision 2030 now trumps all other considerations. From decisions on oil production and the willingness to work closely with Russia to coordinate outputs across OPEC+, through the agreement to normalise relations with Iran under the auspices of China, to the re-engagement with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime – if Saudi Arabia believes that an action serves Vision 2030, it is prepared to act in a way that might prompt criticism or opposition from Washington and elsewhere.</p> +<h4 id="how-united-is-russias-energy-decision-making">How United is Russia’s Energy Decision-Making?</h4> -<p>This approach is shaped by Saudi Arabia’s perception of key trends in the global environment that have serious implications for its national security. Most importantly, Saudi Arabia has lost confidence in the US’s willingness to hold up its side of the old oil-for-security bargain. Saudi Arabia is aware that the US, with its extensive basing infrastructure and thousands of deployed troops, remains the single most powerful military power in the Gulf region. The Kingdom does not believe that any other external power – not China, not Russia – is prepared (or able) to take over the role the US has played in upholding maritime security in the region, and it is still looking to purchase weapons from the US (and European partners) to strengthen its defence capabilities. Yet, from Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the US commitment not just to be present in the region, but to exercise power and to do so in line with the Kingdom’s conception of regional security and stability, has eroded over the past two decades.</p> +<p>Russia’s ability to use its position as a major oil and gas supplier on the international stage in exchange for influence, political concessions or access to other resources, or to project its regime survival, is often viewed – both by Moscow and the West – as its most effective foreign policy asset. But while Russia’s energy diplomacy tends to be viewed as a political tool it can wield at will, Russia’s energy strategy is dominated by often-competing approaches, which means that it has occasionally been forced into cooperation with foreign partners to ensure that it retains its position as global producer. As its energy relationship with the West declines, Russia will likely be obliged to cooperate with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, which does not necessarily put it in a position of strength.</p> -<p>According to Riyadh, the George W Bush administration dismissed Saudi Arabia’s warnings that regime change in Iraq would unleash regional instability; Riyadh also holds that the Obama administration allowed the regional order to unravel further by abandoning the Mubarak regime in Egypt, not intervening decisively against the Assad regime in Syria and ignoring regional concerns in negotiating the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran; finally, Riyadh’s view is that the Biden administration never attempted to hide its dislike of the Kingdom. Even the Trump administration, which had initially appeared to be more responsive to Saudi concerns, did nothing when Iran attacked Saudi Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais on 14 September 2019. This was a watershed moment for Saudi Arabia: from the Kingdom’s perspective, there could hardly be a more obvious reneging on the oil-for-security bargain than a non-response to an attack that took more than 5 million barrels per day – roughly half of Saudi production – offline.</p> +<p>There are multiple competing interests within Russia’s energy sector, with conflicts between the country’s official strategies and the vested interests of individuals and their coteries who are driving these industries forward, and this makes Russia’s energy approach inherently flawed.</p> -<p>As well as being prompted by the changes the Kingdom perceived in its bilateral relations with the US, recent shifts in Saudi Arabia’s oil-related decision-making and foreign policy have also been a response to how the Kingdom has experienced developments in the US’s energy industry over the past decade. From Riyadh’s perspective, the shale oil and gas revolution in the US has dramatically altered the dynamics of international markets, rapidly increasing overall global production capacity (affecting international prices) and turning the US into a net exporter of hydrocarbons (and therefore a competitor for market share). Moreover, the shale revolution has increased price volatility, partly because shale production has shorter timelines than traditional extraction projects, which contributes to more fluctuations in supply levels, and partly because the companies involved in the US oil industry are mostly private entities operating outside the constraints of the kind of production quotas that Saudi Arabia and its fellow OPEC members have long used to exert influence over the global market.</p> +<p>Russia’s energy market is dominated by Gazprom (headed by Alexei Miller) and Rosneft (under Igor Sechin), two major oil and gas producers that are in turn technically overseen by the Kremlin. These industries are subject to a series of vested interests that include personal financial concerns, political demands and corrupt practices, all of which make it challenging to determine Russia’s true energy “strategy”. Gazprom is also a sprawling and influential conglomerate that includes financing (through Gazprombank), oil (Gazprom Neft is Russia’s fourth-largest oil company) and the media (Gazprom-Media owns several television channels). These companies employ a relatively large segment of Russian society, with just under half a million people as of 2019.</p> -<p>In fact, Saudi Arabia has regarded recent US government decision-making related to the management of international energy markets as hypocritical and wilfully destabilising. In its view, Washington has refused to rein in the US oil industry to prevent the oversupply of the market (though this is arguably hardly possible, as the US oil industry is mostly privately owned and therefore not subject to government-set quotas), and then turned to Saudi Arabia to call for production cuts when prices fell so low as to threaten the viability of US oil companies. The most obvious example of the latter pattern was President Trump’s appeal to Saudi Arabia and Russia to end their price war in April 2020. Moreover, Saudi Arabia feels that the actions the US and other Western governments have taken to deal with the increase in prices since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and to try to target Russian energy exports through sanctions, have equated to precisely the kind of politicisation of energy policy that the Kingdom has been accused of. Riyadh regards the substantial release from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserves since February 2022, and the US–European attempt to impose a price cap on Russian oil, as blatant and politically motivated manipulations of the market.</p> +<p>Companies like Gazprom and Rosneft are under state control, but operationally, they both function without significant government interference, as long as this does not directly contradict stated Kremlin foreign or domestic policy goals. Rosneft and Gazprom have also successfully resisted some directives from the Kremlin – government plans in 2013 to try to privatise the oil and gas industry were met with strong pushback from Gazprom, Rosneft and others, such as major bank Sberbank, until they were eventually halted. That said, there is also an important degree of self-censorship within Gazprom and Rosneft, which still tend to act within the Kremlin’s agenda without being compelled to do so.</p> -<p>The overall result, from Saudi Arabia’s perspective, is a more competitive and volatile market in which the Kingdom is still expected to (and indeed wants to) maintain a degree of balance and stability, while others – the US government and US energy companies in particular – take no such responsibility. The decision to expand the coordination of production levels beyond OPEC by creating the OPEC+ grouping with Russia, and Riyadh’s insistence on continuing to work with Moscow after February 2022, despite intense criticism from the West, has been a key element of how Saudi Arabia has tried to respond to these new dynamics. This is discussed in more detail below.</p> +<p>Despite its relative operational autonomy, in a strategic sense, Gazprom has for years been at the heart of many of Russia’s foreign policy strategies, especially in Europe, where dependency on Russian gas was of political significance, via the (now defunct) Nord Stream pipelines. But while Gazprom’s monopoly has been relatively unchallenged in Europe, this is not so in Russia’s dealings with Asia. There, Gazprom’s greatest rival is the privately owned Novatek, which is absorbing significant amounts of market share amid Russia’s energy reorientation to China, through the Yamal LNG project. Novatek and Rosneft were permitted by the Russian government to participate in LNG exports in 2013, with the view that Gazprom’s monopoly was holding Russia back from becoming a major player in the gas sector.</p> -<p>A third, related, key driver of changes in Saudi Arabia’s international positioning, including as an energy producer, is the Kingdom’s understanding of the ongoing shifts in the global political and economic order. Long before the shale revolution in the US, the West’s importance as a customer of Saudi – and Middle Eastern – hydrocarbons had declined significantly; as of 2021, the vast majority of Saudi crude exports went to Asia (250.4 million tonnes, with only 72.8 million tonnes going to non-Asian countries; China alone accounted for 87.6 million tonnes). Renewed European interest in Middle Eastern oil and gas following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has not changed the fact that Saudi Arabia (and most other hydrocarbon producers) continue to see markets in Asia as their main priorities and future growth areas. The Western approach to climate change and the energy transition, discussed in the next section, is an important factor in this calculus. Ultimately, Saudi Arabia judges that while the US and the West are still important, including for its defence and the success of its Vision 2030, it is in the Kingdom’s interest to diversify its international relations, not least by forging closer relations with its most important oil customer, China. In Riyadh’s view, this does not imply that it has to position itself against the US, but it does mean that it is determined to resist pressure to conform with what it regards as an emerging Western with-us-or-against-us attitude vis-à-vis Beijing (or Moscow).</p> +<p>New trade deals with China such as the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, discussed amid much fanfare between Putin and President Xi Jinping in March 2023 (but as yet unsigned), give Gazprom a nascent role in Asia, although construction of that pipeline would not begin until 2024 at the earliest, and would not come online until 2029, even if it were to run to schedule. Since 2014, Rosneft has also sought to challenge Gazprom’s monopoly and gain access to the Power of Siberia pipeline, and has been inching into the gas market over the past decade by acquiring the rights to develop its own gas deposits in Russia. In 2023, Putin appeared to have agreed to Rosneft’s demand, maintaining that its gas reserves from its fields in Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk could be used to supply the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, and instructing Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak to act as arbiter between Gazprom and Rosneft as they worked out the details. As Europe moves away from its reliance on Russian energy, Gazprom may well be forced into ever-greater direct competition with other companies such as Novatek and Rosneft for market share.</p> -<p>The notion that Saudi Arabia has adopted a “Saudi First” approach in recent years is somewhat misleading, in that it suggests that the Kingdom’s foreign policy and decisions on oil exports were previously guided by anything other than what Saudi leaders regarded as their – and their country’s – interests. During the oil-for-security era, Saudi Arabia generally determined that its interests were best served by aligning itself as closely as possible with the US, including in how it exercised its role as an oil exporter committed to stabilising and moderating international prices as much as possible. Indeed, Ibrahim Al-Muhanna, a long-time adviser in the Saudi Ministry of Energy, suggests that Saudi leaders were even prepared to occasionally accommodate requests from US politicians to try to nudge energy prices downwards to help with US election campaigns. Over the past decade, and most obviously since the rise to power of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the proclamation of his Vision 2030, Riyadh’s calculations have changed. The perceived unreliability of the US as a security provider, changes in the global balance of power and the need to fund Vision 2030 are key factors driving an approach that is less US-centric and more focused on maintaining a higher level of prices if possible.</p> +<p>Competition between Sechin and Miller – with Putin acting as the ultimate arbiter – makes it a challenge for Russia’s energy industry to make long-term plans, with political interference and self-interest often trumping financial expedience. Occasionally, their arguments spill over into the public domain, such as over which company contributes more taxes to the federal budget. Rivalry between Gazprom and Rosneft can be occasionally disruptive and can stymie progress on major projects. The two companies were embroiled in widely publicised litigation proceedings against each other in 2015–16, over Rosneft’s attempts to gain access to the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas project in the Far East, an appeal which Gazprom ultimately lost in the Supreme Court. However, competition like this tends to be more about defending turf than about actual views on Russia’s foreign policy or national interests, which are still inherently decided at the Kremlin level.</p> -<h4 id="saudi-arabia-and-the-opec-connection-with-russia">Saudi Arabia and the OPEC+ Connection with Russia</h4> +<p>Given these features of Putin’s decision-making process, Russia’s energy policy approach has never been particularly coherent, and there have always been groups that prioritise how much money can be extracted from Russia’s natural resources, juxtaposed with internal critics of Russia’s sprawling infrastructure projects – such as expensive symbolic bridges – whose economic returns are negligible and which tend to serve political goals. While important foreign policy decisions remain the purview of the Kremlin, infighting within the oil and gas industry has repercussions for Russia’s efficiency and ability to project its image as an extractives “superpower” abroad. This is a longstanding issue that was a challenge for the Kremlin prior to the war, but as competition over new markets in the Indo-Pacific region grows, internal competition between Russia’s energy companies is also likely to increase.</p> -<p>The Saudi–Russian partnership, manifested in the countries’ joint leadership of the OPEC+ grouping, is best understood as a marriage of convenience, rather than an expression of a wider strategic alignment – certainly not one that even approaches the importance of the Kingdom’s relationship with the US, or with China, for that matter. OPEC+ was formed in 2016 in response to the disruption to the global oil market caused by the US shale revolution. By increasing the number of countries coordinating production levels, the members of OPEC+ sought to expand their ability to control the supply side of the market and thereby regain a more substantial ability to influence and stabilise international prices. By themselves, Saudi Arabia and its fellow OPEC members accounted for around 36% of global production; bringing Russia and nine other producers into the fold increased that share to 59%.</p> +<h3 id="ii-russias-involvement-in-opec">II. Russia’s Involvement in OPEC+</h3> -<p>The strategy worked, at least to an extent. OPEC+’s supply-side interventions in themselves were not enough to control international oil prices, but they generally succeeded in reducing market volatility. However, the brittleness of the alliance was demonstrated in the price war between Moscow and Riyadh in March and April 2020. As the global economy shut down with the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, prompting oil prices to fall, Russia – seeing an opportunity to deal a blow to the US shale industry – refused to go along with Saudi-proposed production cuts. Saudi Arabia, though not necessarily opposed to hurting shale producers, opted for a show of force vis-à-vis Russia. It ramped up production to deliberately push prices down even further so as to force Moscow to relent. It took an intervention from the Trump administration in Washington to convince Saudi Arabia and Russia to return to cooperating with one another, ultimately brokering an unprecedented 10 million barrels per day cut by OPEC+ members in April 2020.</p> +<p>Russia tends to use international platforms either as a means to further its own national interests or to ensure that it has a stake in the conversation, rather than in pursuit of a common cause. Since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s ability to interact with other, particularly Western, states in multinational forums has been increasingly restricted, and an international arrest warrant for Putin has posed another logistical challenge to face-to-face engagement. Russia’s behaviour in the OPEC+ grouping, which is designed to influence global oil pricing, is still in service of its national interests, but must be carefully balanced with its desire to maintain a strong bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia – the two countries in combination sell 20% of oil used globally.</p> -<p>In the years since, and thus far unperturbed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, OPEC+ coordination has been much less fractious. Many of the grouping’s members have struggled to fulfil even their reduced production quotas, and there has been persistent speculation that the UAE – after Saudi Arabia and Russia, one of the most important members of the alliance – could consider leaving OPEC in order to more independently and immediately monetise its expanding production capacity. Overall, however, OPEC+ and the Riyadh–Moscow relationship at its apex have held together, even in the face of significant Western political pressure on Saudi Arabia after February 2022. From the Kingdom’s perspective, the expanded supply-side market influence that Russia brings to OPEC+ remains highly valuable; Riyadh may also judge that Moscow can exert a degree of leverage over Iran, an OPEC member with at least the potential capacity to substantially affect global supply even as it remains hamstrung by US sanctions. However, this aspect could become less important to Riyadh, as its own relations with Tehran have become more constructive following the March 2023 Beijing Agreement.</p> +<p>Russia and Saudi Arabia’s energy policies – and by extension their foreign policies – are often conflated due to their shared leadership of the OPEC+ grouping. Yet the Russian–Saudi partnership is more of a marriage of convenience than an expression of a wider strategic alignment. The basis of the relationship is that both countries support the stabilisation of oil prices while simultaneously ensuring high export revenues.</p> -<p>It is also important to note that the Saudi–Russian bilateral relationship extends beyond oil. Ever since King Salman’s unprecedented visit to Russia in 2017, the two countries have worked on expanding economic cooperation more generally, including with discussions about joint investments in Russia’s agriculture and energy sectors, for example – though Saudi Arabia has generally been less vocal about these plans than Russia. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has at least reluctantly appreciated Russia’s return to the Middle East as a security actor over the past decade. It did not like Russia’s intervention on the side of the Assad regime in Syria in 2015, at a time when the Kingdom was still committed to an opposition victory in Damascus, but from Riyadh’s perspective Russia was also prepared to stand by its partners in the region, reliably and consistently oppose all forms of destabilising regime-change efforts in the region, and refrain from criticising the Kingdom; all in marked contrast to the US, whose commitment to regional stability seemed less certain, as discussed above.</p> +<p>In this vein, OPEC+ was formed in 2016 in response to the disruption of the global oil market caused by the US shale revolution. By increasing the number of countries coordinating their production levels, the cartel was able to influence the supply side of the market and stabilise international oil prices – but the potential brittleness of the alliance was demonstrated in the price war between Moscow and Riyadh in March and April 2020. As the global economy shut down with the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, leading oil prices to fall, Russia refused to go along with Saudi-proposed production cuts, seeing an opportunity to deal a blow to the US shale industry. Saudi Arabia, though also not necessarily opposed to hurting shale producers, ramped up production in order to deliberately push down prices even further and thereby forced Moscow to relent.</p> -<p>As Russia’s war against Ukraine goes on, and particularly if Russia’s economy suffers further and its military struggles continue, Saudi Arabia’s belief in the usefulness of the non-energy components of the bilateral relationship could be eroded. Even then, though, energy and the two countries’ shared leadership of OPEC+ remain powerful connectors, as does the fact that Saudi Arabia is uncomfortable with some of the geopolitical developments surrounding the war. As previously mentioned, Riyadh has been vocal in its opposition to some of the Western sanctions on Russia’s energy sector, particularly the attempt to impose a price cap on Russian exports. Saudi Arabia worries that this could set a precedent for politically motivated interventions in global energy markets by buyers of hydrocarbons that could one day affect the exports of other producers too. Indeed, the Kingdom’s unwillingness to pick sides between the West and Russia goes beyond energy – and Russia, for that matter. In an increasingly competitive and polarised global environment, Saudi Arabia is determined not to be forced to choose between West and East, insisting that it will chart its own path in a multipolar – not bipolar – future world order.</p> +<p>Officially, OPEC+ coordination has been less contentious since February 2022. Russia has some leverage over Iran (an OPEC member), which Saudi Arabia lacks, and Saudi Arabia’s insistence on continuing to work with Russia in the grouping despite protestations from the US and elsewhere can be seen as an indication of how much more importance Riyadh apportions to its ability to influence the oil market (especially at a time of heightened volatility) than to maintaining a harmonious rapport with Washington. Moscow also recognises that collaboration with Riyadh will be critical to ensure supply management, even as it continues to delay production cuts.</p> -<p>But Saudi–Russian cooperation within OPEC+ may not continue forever. The 2020 price war showed that Riyadh is prepared to turn against Russia when it sees its own interests threatened. Russia’s expanding market share in Asia, as it sells its crude at discounted prices to major consumers like China and India, could fuel discord, particularly if Saudi Arabia were to see its own market share in Asia – the continent it sees as the centre of gravity for future exports – become affected. For the moment, Saudi Aramco appears to be managing this risk, not least by buying up Russian crude and selling it on (Saudi Aramco is not just the largest oil producer in the world, but also a leading oil trader). Still, the “Saudi First” approach, the primacy of pursuing its own interests, applies just as much to its cooperation with Russia and other OPEC+ members as it does to its response to Western calls for changes to the Kingdom’s policies.</p> +<p>Russia’s relationship with Saudi Arabia has become more of a pressing issue since the onset of the Ukraine war. Riyadh has chosen not to align itself with the Western consensus on the war and has not introduced sanctions on Russia, nor condemned the war. The announcement at the August 2023 BRICS summit that Saudi Arabia would be joining the grouping – with some caveats – could boost the economic potential of the bloc and offer a further channel to deepen bilateral ties, including offering new sources of sanctions evasion for Russia. There is also nascent bilateral cooperation over joint investment funds to support Russian agriculture and oil production equipment, and few high-profile projects have been announced, although the Saudi side has been much less vocal about its willingness to invest within Russia.</p> -<h3 id="iii-between-climate-change-and-climate-action">III. Between Climate Change and Climate Action</h3> +<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has altered its position on the OPEC grouping somewhat. In search of clients and new export markets for its oil, Russia has been prepared to accept lower prices to sell its oil and maintain production, offering cut-price deals to its allies China and India in a bid to drum up funds for the war. There are also frictions over Russia’s secrecy around its figures – it does not disclose how many barrels of oil it exports, and Saudi Arabia is suspicious that Russia has continued to export significant volumes, undercutting former price agreements.</p> -<p>Saudi Arabia’s evolving oil-related decision-making and foreign policy must also be understood in the context of the dual challenge that climate change and climate action pose to the Kingdom. In the past, Saudi Arabia has generally approached the climate debate from a defensive position. Given the centrality of its oil industry to its political and socioeconomic development model, it has, like Russia, long regarded international (and especially Western) calls to decarbonise the world economy and limit – and eventually end – the extraction of fossil fuels as a near-existential threat. Until the diversification of Saudi Arabia’s economy progresses further than it has to date, oil exports will remain strategically indispensable for the Kingdom.</p> +<p>For now, Saudi Arabia has not criticised Russia’s decisions to sell at a discount or publicly spoken out against its data secrecy, given the two countries’ common interest in maintaining oil prices at a level that can shore up their state budgets. Russia also has significant reason to keep the Kingdom on side – major Saudi companies invested more than $500 million in Gazprom, Rosneft and major oil producer Lukoil just after the war began and Western sanctions were introduced. Since the onset of the war, however, Russia has been on the back foot; it has few major international players it can call on as partners, and the relationship with Riyadh, which may start to demand more of Russia, is an important one.</p> -<p>Nevertheless, Riyadh has changed its tone somewhat in recent years. In 2021, it announced 2060 as its target to reach net zero emissions and announced the Saudi Green Initiative and the Middle East Green Initiative to accelerate climate-and sustainability-related development efforts in the Kingdom and the region, respectively. Critical observers have dismissed such announcements as efforts at “greenwashing”, but this analysis is too simplistic. Besides an obvious interest in preserving the future viability of oil as an energy source and its own status as a leading producer, three key factors appear to be shaping Saudi Arabia’s changing position.</p> +<h3 id="iii-russias-environmental-paradox">III. Russia’s Environmental Paradox</h3> -<p>Firstly, there is a growing recognition that climate change poses a significant physical threat to Saudi Arabia itself. Together with the wider Middle East region, the Arabian Peninsula is among the parts of the world where the effects of climate change – particularly rising temperatures and more unpredictable weather patterns, including extreme weather events – have already been acutely felt. Climate change and environmental security may not yet be regarded as being on a par with the threat that anti-hydrocarbon climate action represents, but they are becoming more important in the Kingdom’s calculations.</p> +<p>One of Russia’s many strategic paradoxes is that it is a country highly affected by climate change, but banks on its status as a producer of commodities to retain its international position. This inconsistency informs its strategic policymaking on the environment, and its behaviour in international forums around climate change.</p> -<p>Secondly, over the past decade the Saudi government has grown increasingly aware of the need to rein in unsustainable domestic energy consumption. Improving energy efficiency and investing in renewable energy generation are seen as being necessary to reduce emissions and prevent ever more Saudi oil from being diverted to the domestic market rather than being exported to generate revenues.</p> +<p>The Kremlin has never been particularly concerned by environmental security, and many of its actions have been reactive to environmental disasters that occur on its territory, rather than preventative. The ES-35 specifically frames international climate change policies as a hindrance to Russia’s own energy security development, even if it simultaneously acknowledges the theoretical importance of reducing carbon emissions. Similar inconsistencies can be found in Russia’s Arctic strategy, which notes the security threat of warming seas such as flooding in coastal areas and the melting of permafrost, but still pushes high production of fossil fuels and the mining of extractives. Globally, Russia is the fourth-largest greenhouse gas emitter, after China, the US and India, and is responsible for 7% of the world’s CO2 emissions. Nevertheless, Putin has been derisive about Europe’s green energy approach, maintaining that the energy crisis in Europe is in fact due to Europe’s investment in wind farms that cannot make up for a reduction in fossil fuels.</p> -<p>Finally, Saudi Arabia also sees opportunities in the global energy transition. The feasibility of hydrogen (and its derivatives) becoming a commodity that will eventually be traded like oil may still be unclear, just as the export of solar- and wind-generated electricity remains limited by infrastructure constraints, but Saudi Arabia is confident that if/when technological barriers are overcome it is in a prime position to be a major player in both fields. This belief is reinforced by the self-perception and self-confidence that Saudi Arabia has always been an energy power and therefore “gets” energy – whether derived from hydrocarbons or otherwise.</p> +<p>In international forums, Russia often objects to proposals to improve global environmental security. While this can appear bullish and self-interested, it is also partly due to different understandings of security: Russia’s longstanding concept of environmental security prioritises the security of the nation as the key concern, rather than the security implications that can stem from environmental problems, and includes a collective historical view that the natural environment holds no intrinsic value in its own right. Climate change is seen as something that affects Russia’s national security (including defence), but it is framed in strategic documents as a threat to Russia’s economic development that calls for practical solutions, rather than any adjustment to the extractive industries. Russia also tends to approach issues such as warming Arctic seas not as a crisis but as an economic opportunity that will improve access to new shipping lanes and offer a boost to the Russian export industry. Some Russian academics have disputed this prevailing analysis, maintaining that the impact of climate change in the country will probably not be a net positive overall, but their views are unlikely to be influential in altering the Kremlin’s longstanding policies.</p> -<p>Saudi Arabia has resolved that it must become a more active participant in the international climate debate. How exactly it intends to do so remains to be seen, but the basic contours of its approach are already emerging. Saudi Arabia (and its fellow OPEC oil producers, including COP28 host the UAE) will likely push back against any efforts to make the total phasing out of hydrocarbons an internationally agreed climate action objective. Riyadh will argue for an inclusive approach to the global energy transition that leaves no-one behind, including hydrocarbon exporters; and it will present itself as the producer capable of providing the cheapest and most emission-efficient oil, and as the one that might even eventually produce carbon-free oil once carbon capture and storage, which Saudi Aramco is investing considerable resources in, are achieved. At the same time, Saudi Arabia will also likely expand its hydrogen- and renewables-related efforts, not to curry favour with international audiences but to capitalise on potential economic opportunities. Within the context of the international climate change/climate action debate, Saudi Arabia will remain a defender of hydrocarbons and resist calls for their complete phasing out.</p> +<p>Russia has tried to separate environmental security into two issues: the first is the economic damage to the country caused by climate change that Russia aims to mitigate, chiefly through technological interventions or improved investment, while the second is what Russia perceives as a Western-led agenda, under the guise of environmental activism, to undermine Russian institutions. Russia has suggested at the UN Security Council that environmental security issues are a ruse for external military interventions in countries rich in natural resources (perhaps referring to the African continent) and has framed this as a threat to Russia’s interests in the extractive industries. Ultimately, Russia views most international attempts to warn against the dangers of climate change and fossil fuel reliance as a further threat to Russian sovereignty.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>Within Russia, important figures traditionally from the defence or security services have increasingly been appointed to lead on environmental issues. In 2016, Sergei Ivanov, a former minister of defence (2001–07) and KGB officer in the Foreign Intelligence Service, was appointed the president’s special representative on the environment and transport. Ivanov oversees environmental protection, as well as the development of the Far Eastern regions and streamlining infrastructure to support businesses; he is also an important member of Russia’s powerful Security Council and a longstanding Putin ally. While his precise role is unclear, his positioning indicates the crossover in the Kremlin’s mindset between the environment and national security.</p> -<p>Among Western policymakers and in international media outlets, the notion of “the oil weapon” is arguably more closely associated with Saudi Arabia than with any other country. The 1973 oil embargo has become almost legendary, and many remember the Kingdom’s price war with Russia in March and April 2020. Saudi Arabia’s refusal to ramp up oil production in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and its subsequent decisions to repeatedly cut production, all in the face of loud Western protestations, have fuelled debate about the extent to which Riyadh might use its influence over oil markets in ways that are antithetical to Western interests. Other foreign policy moves, both within the Middle East region and towards engaging more closely with Moscow and Beijing, have spurred further speculation about Saudi Arabia moving away from – and perhaps even against – its traditional Western partners. Yet, as this paper shows, much of this speculation is exaggerated and, if anything, reflects an overly Western-centric assessment that fails to understand how Saudi Arabia sees itself and its position in the changing global environment.</p> +<p>In terms of its foreign policy, Moscow’s securitisation of the environment means that it is rarely cooperative on internationally led climate change issues. On the UN Security Council, Russia pays lip service to climate action but favours the status quo, tending to use the platform to ensure that it has a place at the table and to promote its economic (extractives) interests, rather than with a view to safeguarding the environment. In principle, Russia is a signatory to UN-led efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but the Kremlin does not publish figures about its oil and gas production rates and only offers broad public statements about production cuts, which makes it a challenge to determine how compliant (or not) it may be. It has also been criticised internationally for its gutting of environmental policies that would have otherwise worked to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, by refusing to introduce quotas or penalties on greenhouse gas emitters.</p> -<p>For Saudi Arabia, whose economic fortunes and international status will likely remain inextricably linked to its world-leading oil industry, the health and relative stability of the international oil market is of utmost strategic importance. Its commitment to Vision 2030, the new all-important North Star of the Kingdom’s domestic and foreign policy, means that Saudi Arabia needs to try to keep oil prices at a relatively high level, if at all possible. Within the context of the international climate change/climate action debate, Saudi Arabia will remain a defender of hydrocarbons and resist calls for their complete phase-out. At the same time, it feels that both its economic and security needs require it to diversify its international relations beyond its traditional reliance on the US and the wider West, even if that means forging relations with countries that Washington or European capitals consider to be beyond the pale.</p> +<p>This approach is unlikely to change, largely due to the presence of powerful business lobbying groups who work on behalf of the oil and gas industry, such as the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Rossiskiy soyuz promyshlennikov i predprinimateley, RSPP), whose coordination council is co-chaired by Putin’s youngest daughter, giving the RSPP a direct line to the Kremlin. The RSPP extensively lobbies against any proposed bills that could reduce the oil and gas industry’s ability to extract resources in environmentally protected areas, and it is rarely opposed by the Kremlin.</p> -<p>Yet, with all that said, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, for all its transformational intent, is ultimately the development agenda of a status quo power. The Vision 2030 agenda has been constructed in the context of an international environment in which the international rules-based order is upheld sufficiently to prevent any conflict that would have catastrophic implications for the Saudi or global economies. It is built on the principles of globalisation and requires the Kingdom to build relations with everyone, West and East. Riyadh may try to intervene in the oil market to secure its interests, but is not, and is unlikely to become, a revisionist power – even as it cooperates with revisionists like Russia.</p> +<p>Perhaps most concerningly, since the onset of the war, many environmental links between Russia and the West have been severed, and there is little international oversight of major drilling projects in Russia and the permanent impact that these could have on protected environments, especially in more isolated parts of the Russian Arctic. Legislation within Russia that restricts ecological activism has also tightened since the war, reflective of a broader repressive legal environment targeting institutions with a perceived Western-led agenda. For example, in March 2023, the Worldwide Fund for Nature was branded as a “foreign agent” – this inclusion on the foreign agents list by Russia’s Federal Security Service comes with an implication of espionage and suggests that the organisation receives funding from murky sources abroad, seeking to undermine Russia. Many organisations on the list have ceased to function under pressure from the security services, and as a result there is a risk that there will be even less external oversight of resource extraction.</p> -<p>This has important implications for the UK and its partners in Europe and beyond. Even if the UK were never to import a single barrel of Saudi oil again, the complex and global nature of international energy markets means the behaviour of the hydrocarbon superpower that is Saudi Arabia will substantially impact on the UK’s energy security, including the prices consumers pay to operate their cars or heat their homes. Moreover, the Kingdom’s calculations vis-à-vis its relations with Russia and China will have consequences for the changing global order that the UK too will have to navigate; and Saudi Arabia’s decision-making regarding climate change will significantly shape this global debate and struggle, in which the UK remains committed to playing a leading role.</p> +<p>Russia’s understanding of threats to the environment has close links to its understanding of threats to its hydrocarbons industry, as well as to the personal interests of the ruling elites (including Putin) and the central role that energy resources play in Russia’s international policies, all of which are bound up with ideas of Russian sovereignty. Any attempts by the international community to further an agenda that restricts Russia’s continued extraction of hydrocarbons, its export of them to new and existing markets, and the construction of infrastructure on land and at sea to support this, are framed as part of a security threat to which Moscow will respond harshly.</p> -<p>UK–Saudi relations have deep roots, are multifaceted, and have grown in importance in recent years – according to statements from London. However, to maintain this relationship and perhaps even have some degree of influence on Saudi Arabia in areas that matter to the UK – from energy, through geopolitics, to climate change – policymakers must continuously refine and update their understanding of – and moreover take seriously – Saudi Arabia’s own strategic calculus. For the foreseeable future, the key to this is likely to be how confident the Kingdom feels about the success of its domestic transformation project.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion-where-moscows-red-lines-are">Conclusion: Where Moscow’s Red Lines are</h3> + +<p>Given Russia’s ability to have an impact on global oil and gas prices, the UK and its European allies will need to try to understand, react to and – where possible – influence the way in which Russia approaches its role in energy markets and in international forums. Even if the UK were to entirely decouple from Russian oil, the complex and global nature of international energy markets means that Russia’s behaviour as a hydrocarbon superpower still has the ability to substantially alter the UK’s energy security. Although diplomatic relations with countries such as Russia may have been all but severed, Russia’s actions matter, whether through decisions on oil production, its global positioning and attempts to reconfigure the world order, or its divergent understandings of what energy and environmental security mean.</p> + +<p>Russia’s approach since the onset of the Ukraine war has been to expand its foreign policy partnerships with allies such as China, India and Iran; to invest in the land and maritime infrastructure to support its political goals as well as its extractive efforts; and to seek alternative clients for its oil and gas, while maintaining high production. While its energy strategy may be at times incoherent and pulled in multiple directions due to the many vested interests involved, there is a clear sense of some of Moscow’s red lines when it comes to its understanding of energy security and its intent to maintain the extraction and export of hydrocarbons to fuel its economy. Just as debates around oil price caps and moves to reduce carbon emissions are seen as an unwelcome Western intervention, similarly, attempts by the international community to involve Russia in the climate change debate are viewed by Moscow as another security threat to Russia’s sovereignty, and an attempt to impose Western values on a country now forging its own path eastwards.</p> + +<p>Moreover, Russia and Saudi Arabia – and other oil producers – regard Western enthusiasm to impose energy-related sanctions on Russia, particularly the price cap, as a dangerous precedent for political intervention in the oil market. Putin himself has been vocal about the limitations of the cap, maintaining that there is a risk of mission creep (i.e., that oil price caps could be extended to other sectors of the Russian economy, and indeed to any other country in the world), and has framed this as another attempt by the West to undermine the Russian economy and its “values”. This is a further indication of how Moscow continues to view what other countries frame as economic and pragmatic decisions as a direct attack on Russian sovereignty, and it means that Moscow’s responses to these proposals are likely to appear disproportionate or couched in national security terms.</p> + +<p>Ultimately, Russia is pursuing a fundamentally revisionist international project to reconfigure the global order on its own terms, and it is willing to deploy the political capital and revenues derived from its hydrocarbon might to further this project. For there to be any united action around climate change, the UK and Europe must pay closer attention to the foreign and security policies of major hydrocarbon producers like Russia, in order to understand the roots of some of the international implications resulting from their actions.</p> <hr /> -<p><strong>Tobias Borck</strong> is Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security Studies at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His main research interests include the international relations of the Middle East, and specifically the foreign, defence and security policies of Arab states, particularly the Gulf monarchies, as well as European – especially German and British – engagement with the Middle East.</p>Tobias BorckSaudi Arabia is set to remain one of the most influential players in global oil and energy markets. Understanding – and taking seriously – its evolving strategic calculus must therefore be a key task for policymakers in the UK and across Europe as they seek to safeguard their countries’ energy security.AI-Generated Lies And Truth2023-11-02T12:00:00+08:002023-11-02T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ai-generated-lies-and-truth<p><em>How does the technology aid fake news and narratives – particularly in the run-up to 2024 for elections in many Western democracies?</em></p> +<p><strong>Emily Ferris</strong> is a Research Fellow in the International Security Studies department at RUSI, specialising in Russian domestic politics. Emily has a particular interest in Russia’s military and civilian infrastructure including its railways, road and port systems, and the role this plays in advancing Russia’s political ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as deployed in conflict zones such as Ukraine. She also researches domestic political administrations in Russia’s Far East, and Russia’s military and political relationship with Belarus.</p>Emily FerrisUnderstanding how Russia constructs its energy security and foreign policies is essential to anticipating how it might behave in international forums, particularly on challenging issues such as environmental and energy security.Principles For UK–CN Strategy2023-11-08T12:00:00+08:002023-11-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/principles-for-uk-china-strategy<p><em>China poses an “epoch-defining and systemic challenge with implications for almost every area of government policy and the everyday lives of British people”, according to the UK’s March 2023 Integrated Review Refresh.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>While stopping short of labelling China a “threat”, this is a marked shift from the “golden era” of UK–China relations heralded during Xi Jinping’s 2015 visit to the UK.</em></p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Such a shift in assessment requires a commensurate response. This Policy Brief reviews the government’s response to China to date and examines criticisms of its approach, including calls to publish an “unclassified version of its China Strategy”. Rather than detail specific policy recommendations or argue in broad-brush terms for a more hawkish or dovish stance, the brief proposes six principles for a more dynamic and broadly based – and so more effective – China strategy. It argues that, while publishing a strategy document may aid communication, there are more important things to be done.</p> -<p>In July 2017, researchers at the University of Washington used AI to make a convincing video of former President Barack Obama giving a speech that he never gave. At the time it seemed novel, but perhaps nothing more consequential than a hacker’s parlour trick. Sadly, it heralded rapid advancements in the realm of synthetic media that few could have predicted. AI experts now estimate that nearly 90% of all online media content may be synthetically generated by 2026. For the first time in the history of digital media, realistic fake content is now cheaper and faster to create than reality, and the consequences for national security as well as civil society are simultaneously both alarming and hard to fathom.</p> +<h3 id="changes-after-the-golden-era">Changes After the “Golden Era”</h3> -<p>The real impact that fake content can have is staggering. In May 2023, investor confidence was shaken amid social media-fuelled reports of a potential terrorist attack near the Pentagon, and the US stock market slid considerably. In that case, the image was easy to debunk, and investor confidence rapidly returned. Repeat the event with a more sophisticated set of tools, however, such as a fake presidential speech and a coordinated influence campaign to spread the lie across many social media platforms, and the results could have been far more dramatic than a stock dip. Indeed, synthetic hoaxes are now seen as an important driver of international events. Prior to the Russian reinvasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, the US revealed a Russian plot to spread deepfake content (media created or manipulated synthetically with the help of AI) as a pretext for the invasion.</p> +<p>Much has changed since 2015. Notwithstanding current travails, China’s economy has grown by nearly 50% in real terms and accounts for a larger share of global trade. The country’s ambitions in new technologies have become more widely understood and borne some fruit, notably in renewable energy and electric vehicles. President Xi has focused on self-reliance at home, emphasising national security and the leading role of the Chinese Communist Party, while becoming more active on the world stage. Last year, NATO concluded that China’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values”. The US’s ambassador to China, Nicholas Burns, said last year that US–China relations might be at their “lowest moment” since Nixon’s 1972 China visit. Tensions over Taiwan have risen sharply.</p> -<p>The case of Russia can also be used to illustrate the threat to civil society: that people can believe anything or, caught in the miasma of competing narratives online, simply choose to opt out and believe nothing at all. As journalist Peter Pomerantsev points out in his excellent book Nothing is True and Everything is Possible, authoritarian governments such as Russia increase their power when their citizens are confused and disoriented. In the West, a lack of confidence that anything can be true is a problem for a great many reasons, not least because trust in government is at historic lows at the same time as governments are moving their public-facing communications online, and especially to social media. Consider a public safety scenario in which a governor issues an emergency evacuation order in advance of a powerful hurricane, or a public health official gives a warning about a quickly spreading pandemic. Could these important warnings be identified by a majority of people as belonging to the 10% of truth remaining on the internet, or would they be dismissed by citizens in danger as fake news, a political hoax, or even a prank? What can be done? Rooting out fake news and combatting automated propaganda is an important contribution to societal resilience, but we must look ahead to the next challenges as well.</p> +<p>Throughout this, trade with China has grown. In the 12 months to March 2023, China was the UK’s fourth-largest trading partner, though the UK ran a £38 billion trade deficit. 1 Questions of security and values, always present in the China policy debate, have however come strongly to the fore. China’s imposition and subsequent interpretation of the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law have caused widespread outrage. Detailed reporting of China’s human rights abuses against the Xinjiang Uyghurs gained media attention and stirred parliamentary debate and opposition. The government has identified China as a significant source of cyber attacks on UK interests, with increased activity and disinformation campaigns during the Covid-19 pandemic. The recent China report from Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) concluded that “China’s size, ambition and capability have enabled it to successfully penetrate every sector of the UK’s economy”. Additionally, China’s initial slow Covid response and its refusal to allow a full WHO investigation have damaged trust. Its stance on Ukraine has further sharpened concerns. And, while the UK has been the leading destination for Chinese direct investment into Europe since 2000, activity has recently fallen away sharply.</p> -<p>The current solutions to address mis- and disinformation are not up to the task. We can’t count the number of times we have advised students, policymakers and the general public to combat mis- and disinformation on the internet by thinking critically, being skeptical and not reflexively reposting content without fact checking. That recipe is now incomplete. It is clear that the scale of the problem requires technological solutions too, and organisations around the world are investing in ways to quickly identify fake media. However, as technology continues to progress, this problem will soon be reversed, and the hunt for fake media will need to be replaced with verification of truth. In other words, instead of trying to weed out what is fake, we will need to identify ways to validate a truth among lies. This would involve a radical reframing of both the problem and potential solutions.</p> +<h3 id="policy-changes">Policy Changes</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">For the first time in the history of digital media, realistic fake content is now cheaper and faster to create than reality</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The UK government has taken action on numerous fronts. In 2020, the Johnson-led government reversed the decision to allow the purchase of Huawei’s 5G technology following a reassessment of security risks and political pressure from the Trump administration. Chinese involvement in the UK’s nuclear power programme came under renewed scrutiny, leading to a buyout of China’s interest in the Sizewell C project. The Hong Kong British National (Overseas) visa scheme has enabled close to 130,000 Hong Kong nationals to move to the UK. The 2021 National Security and Investment Act introduced a tighter screening process for foreign investment into key sectors. The 2023 National Security Act established a Foreign Influence Registration Scheme. This year also saw announcements of a Critical Minerals Strategy refresh, the National Protective Security Authority and an Economic Deterrence Initiative. Nonetheless, when security is not an issue, the UK remains “open for business from China”. There are also policies, urged by some backbench MPs, that the government has not pursued. It has not declared Chinese actions in Xinjiang to be a genocide and has not followed the US in sanctioning Hong Kong officials.</p> -<p>Currently, social media platforms (and users themselves) are scrambling to tag and label inauthentic content. Soon this will be akin to using an umbrella to block individual raindrops during a monsoon. TikTok, for instance – like most social media companies – has policies requiring labelling synthetic media, but a recent report from misinformation monitor NewsGuard found the implementation of TikTok’s policy wanting. Likewise, fact-checking organisations are already struggling to keep up with the amount of disinformation online. By 2026, their backlog of digital nonsense will keep them busily debunking falsehoods far into the distant future. Turning the status quo equation on its head means that instead of identifying fake news polluting a stream of otherwise legitimate content, we must realise that the stream will soon be the lies, and the truth will need to be plucked out.</p> +<p>Consistent with the Integrated Review’s “tilt to the Indo-Pacific”, the UK has been active in the region. A carrier strike group was deployed there in 2021 for the first time since 1997, and will return in 2025. The UK is the first non-regional member of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement. It has been active in helping formulate stronger G7 and NATO positions on China, and has shaped and joined new minilateral partnerships including the AUKUS agreement, the Global Combat Air Programme and the Mineral Security Partnership. The sanctioning of Xinjiang officials was announced in coordination with the US, Canada and the EU.</p> -<p>It is worth noting some antecedents. In the early 2000s, tools such as Photoshop allowed individuals to edit photos more quickly, and social media made it easier to reach a wide audience. In 2008, Iran digitally altered a photograph of rocket launchers to remove one that – rather embarrassingly – failed to fire, with the intent of making itself appear more powerful and capable than it really was. Still, Photoshop was not scalable and could not create fake media from scratch. It had to start with a truth. In the past few years, though, critical advances in generative AI (computer algorithms capable of generating new media from text prompts) are increasing the threat of what has been called an information apocalypse. As with all technological advancements, these developments have been rapidly democratised over time. Now anyone can produce their own high-quality disinformation with algorithms that are already freely available online. Through programs such as FaceSwap, it is straightforward to convincingly put a face on another body. There is no putting this genie back in the bottle, and no amount of ethical use manifestos published by developers is going to trammel such technology.</p> +<h3 id="is-this-a-strategy">Is This a Strategy?</h3> -<p>The AI genie continues to amaze, and regulators (much less university professors) simply can’t keep up. Before November 2022, when ChatGPT was released, the idea of a computer writing a college-level essay in seconds would have been seen as science fiction. This was a revolutionary step up from tools that could, at best, fix grammar and punctuation. At the same time, software that could create images from text, such as DALL-E and Midjourney, became available to the public. These image generation tools could, with a simple prompt that required no technical knowledge, create 1,000 hyper-realistic photos before a human could develop one. At first, critics of the technology pointed out inaccuracies in the deepfake content, hoping perhaps in vain that the rationality of the human brain was still superior to the computer. In March 2023, the Washington Post published an article providing readers with tips on how to identify deepfakes. One of the examples was to “look at the hands”, since early generative AI tools struggled with making realistic human hands. That same month, however, another article was published by the same newspaper titled “AI can draw hands now”. Trying to identify deepfakes by looking for visual mistakes is a losing strategy. According to a report published by the NSA, FBI and CISA, attempts to detect deepfakes post-production are a cat-and-mouse game where the manipulator has the upper hand – not to mention that people want to see what they already want to believe, which is the primary reason that “cheap fakes” are just as dangerous as deepfakes. Confirmation bias means that people don’t need much convincing to see what they want to see. The pair are a toxic brew.</p> +<p>Throughout all this, many have called on the government to publish a China strategy. In 2019, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) called for “a single, detailed public document defining the UK’s China strategy … [to] be published by the end of 2020”. In 2021, the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee entitled its report “The UK and China’s Security and Trade Relationship: A Strategic Void”.</p> -<p>According to DeepMedia, a company contracted by the US Department of Defense to help detect synthetic media, the amount of deepfakes has tripled in 2023 compared to 2022. How do people know what to believe and trust? If the deepfake is just as realistic as a photo taken by a professional camera, how do organisations prove authenticity? For each photo taken by a journalist, thousands of equally realistic fakes could be made and distributed. This article aims to highlight that very recent technological advances are leading to a perfect content storm, where lies are far cheaper to produce than truths, but just as convincing. The spread of deepfakes is creating an environment of mistrust. A July 2023 report published by members of Purdue University’s Department of Political Science argued that an increase in the amount of fake content makes it easier for someone to challenge the validity of something that is actually true. They called this the Liar’s Dividend. As media becomes saturated with manipulated images and videos, it becomes harder to identify what is trustworthy. Being able to prove that something is fake loses its value when most of the content is synthetic already. The greater and more critical challenge is validating what is true.</p> +<p>This year has seen progress. The Refresh summarised the UK’s approach to China with three pillars: Protect/Align/Engage:</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As media becomes saturated with manipulated images and videos, it becomes harder to identify what is trustworthy</code></em></strong></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Protect the UK through enhancing security measures in critical national infrastructure, supply chains, democratic freedoms and science and technology.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Align with “core allies and a broader group of partners” to deepen cooperation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Engage with China directly and multilaterally so as to “where possible cooperate on global challenges” and secure a “positive trade and investment relationship”, while “avoiding dependencies … and protecting our national security”.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The problem of labelling media content as trustworthy is complicated. As deepfakes become increasingly sophisticated, it will become nearly impossible for individuals – even those trained to look for peculiarities – to distinguish real from fake. As a result, organisations will need to lean more heavily on technical solutions to label and verify media. Why is it also difficult, though, for computers to tell the difference between a photo taken by a camera and a deepfake created by AI? All digital media is, at a technical level, just a file on a computer. Comprised of 1s and 0s, this file is displayed on a screen to a person. The computer has no notion of fake or real. This problem has many similarities with the art world and the challenge of proving that a painting was made by a famous artist and not a copycat. For every real Picasso, there may be 1,000 replicas. Museums and galleries do not waste their limited resources trying to prove the inauthenticity of the copies, though; they focus on validating and maintaining the truth through a concept called provenance. Provenance is the recorded origin and history required for a piece of art to provide viewers with trust and confidence in its authenticity. Even if the methodologies are different for the digital world, it may prove a useful model for seeking and identifying authenticity instead of forever debunking fakes.</p> +<p>In April, Foreign Secretary James Cleverly expanded on this in a speech, “Our Position on China”, arguing that “we must engage with China where necessary and be unflinchingly realistic about its authoritarianism”. Cleverly’s August visit to Beijing drew on the same position. The prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has described the approach as “robust pragmatism”, while also calling China “the biggest challenge of our age to global security and prosperity” after the May G7 meeting.</p> -<p>The cyber security field already uses capabilities such as encryption and hashing to verify passwords and protect digital communications, but these need to be applied to media in a way that is easily understood and trusted by content consumers with limited technical backgrounds. Organisations such as the Content Authenticity Initiative (CAI) are working to use cryptographic asset hashing to serve as digital provenance online. This project aims to provide a tamper-proof way to validate the origin of images and videos, even while they are shared across social media and news platforms. The CAI aims to meet the technical standards developed by the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity, released in 2022. While these efforts are heading in the right direction, they are not foolproof, and depend heavily on an increased socio-technical understanding of digital media. Additionally, allowing organisations to manage the trustworthiness of media comes with its own concerns. Totalitarian governments will no doubt develop their own “Content Authenticity Initiatives” to self-validate what they want to be believed.</p> +<p>No detailed China paper has been published, however – nothing similar to Germany’s recently published China strategy. In August, the FAC called again for an “unclassified China strategy”. Charles Parton, a long-time China analyst, has described the lack of a clearly communicated China strategy as the “panda in the room”.</p> -<p>Deepfakes are still a young technology. While they have not single-handedly disrupted an election as some might have feared, their use is increasing, and the technology is advancing rapidly. While most deepfakes are currently images or altered videos, the ability to create whole new scenes from a prompt is already here. With the 2024 US presidential election approaching, deepfakes and other “fake news” will likely be on the minds of both candidates and voters. Former CEO of Alphabet Eric Schmidt has warned that mis- and disinformation, through the use of AI in particular, could lead to chaos in the 2024 election. The solution is both technical, by shifting from identifying deepfakes to validating truths, and societal, through technical education and media literacy. For decades, people were taught to trust their senses. Now, seeing and hearing can no longer be believing.</p> +<h3 id="pressures-for-greater-clarity">Pressures for Greater Clarity</h3> -<hr /> +<p>The government’s approach can be criticised from three angles. First, that the “three pillars” strategy does not amount to an appropriate or even coherent course of action. Second, that it lacks specifics and glosses over trade-offs. Third, that publishing a detailed China strategy brings benefits greater than any associated costs.</p> -<p><strong>David Gioe</strong> is a British Academy Global Professor and Visiting Professor of Intelligence and International Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is also an associate professor of history at the US Military Academy and a history fellow for its Army Cyber Institute.</p> +<p>Protect/Align/Engage implicitly rejects alternative strategies of large-scale decoupling or unquestioning engagement. Some simply disagree with this approach, seeing it as riddled with contradictions. A three-pillar framing is not, however, unique to the UK. It reflects the “complicated and sophisticated” nature of relations with the world’s second-largest economy. The US speaks of “invest, align, compete”, following US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s earlier description of the US–China relationship as “competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, adversarial when it must be”. The EU has described China as a negotiating partner, economic competitor and systemic rival. China also mostly pursues a similar approach, while at times strategically choosing to reject it. In 2021, foreign minister Wang Yi stated that “China–U.S. cooperation on climate change cannot be divorced from the overall situation of China–U.S. relations”. With Australia and Lithuania, China has linked disagreements on Taiwan and Covid-19 with economic relations. The UK does also need a response to such situations.</p> -<p><strong>Alexander Molnar</strong> is an Active-Duty US Army cyber officer with multiple overseas deployments, including support to special operations. He holds a BS from the US Military Academy and an MS from the Georgia Institute of Technology.</p>David Gioe and Alexander MolnarHow does the technology aid fake news and narratives – particularly in the run-up to 2024 for elections in many Western democracies?Israel’s Gaza Problem2023-11-01T12:00:00+08:002023-11-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/israels-gaza-problem<p><em>Following the 7 October attack by Hamas, Israel has determined to destroy the terrorist group controlling Gaza once and for all. The question is not just whether or not it will succeed, but what its plan is for the day after.</em></p> +<p>The lack of focus on trade-offs is a more compelling criticism. The approach smacks of “cakeism”, promising to secure all the benefits and address all the negatives that China presents, while ducking value judgements and tough choices on priorities.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>For instance, the UK is to engage China on climate matters, and China leads in renewable energy. So what is the stance on sourcing solar panels from Xinjiang given well-documented reports of forced labour and its likely presence in UK supply chains? Does reliance on China reflect successful engagement, an unacceptable breach of our values, or a security risk? Universities benefit financially and intellectually from Chinese students and research collaborations, while facing risks of revenue dependence, challenge to academic freedoms and leakage of sensitive research. How should the UK navigate this? University leaders need better guidance based on the government’s assessment of trade-offs and priorities.</p> -<p>The 7 October attack by Hamas, the worst act of terrorism against Israel since the state’s founding in 1948, was unprecedented in its scale and scope. With more than 1,400 people killed, most of them civilians, the attack has forced the Israeli political establishment to embrace options – like a ground invasion of Gaza – that were previously viewed as extreme. The Israeli intelligence community will no doubt conduct an after-action review to determine how Hamas could have planned and executed such an operation without being noticed. But at this stage, current operational planning is the priority. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have spent the past three weeks engaging in a ferocious air campaign against targets in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, with 6,000 bombs dropped by the Israeli Air Force in the first six days of the counterattack. Israel’s borders with Gaza are sealed, fuel imports have been cut off and Israeli ground forces are making initial forays toward Gaza City to destroy Hamas’s network of tunnels. Around 360,000 reservists have been sent to the front, Israel’s largest mobilisation since the 1973 Yom Kippur War.</p> +<p>Finally, a more detailed China strategy could be published, but the benefits need to exceed the costs. The ISC’s China report states that as of 2019, “the National Security Council (NSC) owns and creates [government] policy on China”, which is then set out in a six-pillar “China Framework”. Even the names of three of these pillars are redacted. The related China National Strategy Implementation Group seeks to avoid a “binary prosperity vs. security” approach. So trade-offs are considered, but there is no external communication of how this is done.</p> -<p>As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared on 27 October, the IDF aims to “completely defeat the murderous enemy and guarantee our existence”. Lofty objectives indeed – but two obvious questions need to be asked and answered. First, is it possible to destroy Hamas? And second, who governs Gaza after Hamas is routed?</p> +<p>Publishing would provide a better basis for debate, challenge and holding the government to account, and also provide clearer guidance to those making China-related decisions. The only previous China policy paper, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s “The UK and China: A Framework for Engagement” (2009), stated that “this document is intended to begin a broader conversation”.</p> -<h3 id="before-7-october-a-strange-paradigm-between-israel-and-hamas">Before 7 October: A Strange Paradigm Between Israel and Hamas</h3> +<p>The argument is finely balanced, however. By their nature, elements of the China strategy need to remain confidential, not least from Beijing. Discussion and challenge of a redacted strategy paper can skew debate. Any published paper serves more to communicate a narrative than to describe a government’s full strategy. And decision-makers often need more sector-specific guidance than a single paper can communicate. A published strategy paper is no panacea.</p> -<p>Before the 7 October attack, Israel and Hamas had a violent – albeit predictable – arrangement with one another. While Israel’s past wars with Hamas (2008–2009, 2012, 2014 and 2021) were sparked by unique local and regional circumstances, Israel’s objective was always the same: degrade Hamas’s military capacity and restore a sense of deterrence to the Israel–Gaza border region. While Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009) and Operation Protective Edge (2014) included a ground component, Israel largely relied on air power to destroy as much of Hamas’s rocket factories, tunnel network and leadership as it could. Ground engagements inside Gaza lasted for a short period of time; the longest Israeli ground campaign, during Operation Protective Edge, lasted about three weeks.</p> +<h3 id="six-principles-for-a-more-dynamic-and-effective-ukchina-strategy">Six Principles for a More Dynamic and Effective UK–China Strategy</h3> -<p>In the end, all of these wars concluded with Israel and Hamas negotiating a ceasefire through intermediaries. The terms were straightforward: quiet in exchange for quiet. Over time, Israel and Hamas settled into a mutually acceptable informal arrangement, whereby the Israelis would permit certain economic concessions to induce Hamas to maintain calm. Three months after the 2021 Israel–Hamas war ended with yet another ceasefire, Israel agreed to allow Qatar to channel $10 million a month into Gaza through the UN for the benefit of 100,000 Gazan families. Commercial incentives, such as the re-opening of the Abu Karam crossing, the approval of thousands of permits for Gazans to work in Israel and the periodic expansion of the Gaza fishing zone, were used to keep Hamas wedded to the agreement. This carrot came with a stick in the form of airstrikes and economic pressure whenever Palestinian militant groups broke the terms.</p> +<p>Implementation of the right China strategy, itself made up of a myriad of China-related decisions, is more important than a single paper. Keeping in mind the following six principles will help formulate a more dynamic and effective China strategy for the UK.</p> -<p>Israel and Hamas are sworn enemies, yet in a strange way they have also depended on one another. Although the Israelis have refused to deal with Hamas directly, Israeli Prime Ministers Benjamin Netanyahu, Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid have all counted on Hamas to restrain the even more extremist Palestinian groups located in the enclave. Until now, Hamas controlling Gaza and serving as the territory’s de-facto government has been deemed more pliable than disorder. Hamas, in turn, has relied on Israel to ensure that the much-needed cash from Qatar flowed into Gaza and that Palestinians could access the necessary permits to work in Israel.</p> +<h4 id="1-strategy-should-be-more-than-a-document">1. Strategy should be more than a document.</h4> -<h3 id="israel-ditches-the-old-playbook-but-can-it-succeed">Israel Ditches the Old Playbook, but Can It Succeed?</h3> +<p>“Strategy” is a popular word, yet one used by different people with different meanings. At heart, it is about making choices to achieve defined objectives or outcomes and then putting in place the required resources to realise them. Roger Martin, a leading business strategy academic, writes that “strategy is choice. Strategy is not a long planning document”. While those implementing need to understand the strategy, no company publishes its strategy in full on its website. Nor does any country. Important elements are confidential, shared on a need-to-know basis.</p> -<p>The previous arrangements between Israel and Hamas worked well enough – until they didn’t. Whatever mutual understanding the two had is now gone after Hamas’s 7 October attack, which was of such barbarity that resurrecting the old paradigm is no longer possible. Whereas successive Israeli governments were content with degrading Hamas’s military structure to buy a few more years of relative stability, it appears the current government will not accept anything less than Hamas’s eradication. Senior Israeli officials have stressed that the ongoing campaign will be longer, tougher and more comprehensive than those in the past. “Our responsibility now is to enter Gaza, go to the places where Hamas organises, operates, plans and launches”, Israel Defense Forces Chief of the General Staff Herzi Halevi told Haaretz on 15 October. “To hit them severely everywhere, every commander, every operative, and to destroy infrastructure. In one word – to win”.</p> +<p>Strategy is dynamic and iterative, rather than static and one-time. It considers and addresses multiple, changing contingencies. In today’s world, decisions are made in changing, uncertain circumstances based on imperfect information. China and the UK’s allies alike react and adapt to the choices made by others.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Hamas is as much an idea as it is a coherent military entity. Even if Israel manages to destroy the military entity – no sure thing – the idea will survive</code></em></strong></p> +<p>This means that a detailed set of actions, decided centrally, fixed and then communicated to others to implement, is unlikely to succeed. Rather, many different people need to make decisions that together amount to a strategy. This is, in the words of management scholar Henry Mintzberg, “emergent strategy”. At times, this can be hard to distinguish from a contradictory “muddling through” and no overall strategy. This does not, however, make the approach any less valid. Determining which elements of the China strategy should be centrally determined – and which not – is an important matter of judgement.</p> -<p>The billion-dollar question is whether this can be accomplished. Destroying a terrorist organisation isn’t impossible, but it’s a difficult endeavour nonetheless. It’s even more difficult if military force is one’s preferred tool. Data analysis by the Rand Corporation finds that only 7% of terrorist groups since 1968 have been terminated through the use of military force. In contrast, 43% of terrorist groups ended when their members joined the political process (think of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the Irish Republican Army and the African National Congress). While it’s true that Hamas did participate in the Palestinian political process in 2006, winning legislative elections that year, it’s also true that Hamas’s already limited interest in democratic participation likely evaporated when the West and Israel refused to accept the results. Given the current situation, it is hard to imagine that Israel would allow Hamas to become a legitimate political actor, even if the group wanted to transition into electoral politics. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, in the 17th year of a four-year term, would also likely balk at the prospect; the last thing he needs when his approval ratings are in the toilet is more competition.</p> +<h4 id="2-strategy-should-be-explicit-about-whose-behaviours-need-to-change--or-stay-the-same--in-order-to-bring-about-specific-outcomes">2. Strategy should be explicit about whose behaviours need to change – or stay the same – in order to bring about specific outcomes.</h4> -<p>So far, Israel has relied on force. At the time of writing, at least 13 Hamas officials, financiers and security officials have been killed, including Asem Abu Rakaba, a top commander of the 7 October operation. More will inevitably be wiped out in the weeks ahead. But as terrorism researchers have shown, terrorist groups – particularly those with a hierarchal structure – have an ability to replace commanders and leaders quickly. Israel has killed countless Hamas commanders over the last quarter-century, yet the organisation was still able to generate revenue, build an arsenal and perpetrate the worst terrorist attack since 9/11.</p> +<p>Good strategy is clear on both desired outcomes and the behaviours – continuing or changed – needed to bring them about. The current UK government seeks “a positive trade and investment relationship” with China. But it is does not explain what this statement really means, or what needs to happen for this to occur. By contrast, the 2009 China “Framework for Engagement” did contain very detailed targeted outcomes. However, this document contained few specifics about how they might be achieved. The current UK–China strategy would benefit from greater clarity on both aspects.</p> -<p>It should also be noted that Hamas is not just a terrorist group; it’s a social movement embedded in the Palestinian arena. The organisation is as much an idea as it is a coherent military entity. Even if Israel manages to destroy the military entity – no sure thing – the idea will survive. The Israeli military operation, and the thousands of Palestinian civilian casualties that will likely result from fighting in a highly populated area, is likely to generate the next round of recruits for Hamas and other like-minded groups like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.</p> +<p>It is much easier for the UK government to affect behaviours at home than in China, or even in “like-minded countries”. A China strategy must take much of what China does as a given. It should then determine how best to change what happens in the UK, while taking account of how China (and others) might act in response. Government can change behaviours at home by banning or mandating certain activities, or by changing incentives and providing better information to those who then decide for themselves. Which approach makes sense, and where, is at the heart of a clear China strategy. Clearer communication of the government’s perspective on this would allow others to make better decisions on China matters.</p> -<h3 id="does-israel-have-a-day-after-plan">Does Israel Have a “Day After” Plan?</h3> +<p>For Lawrence Freedman, strategy is the “art of creating power”. China’s economy is five times larger than the UK’s, and its population 20 times as large. The Integrated Review recognises that if the UK is to influence the choices of Chinese decision-makers, it needs to gain scale through working with others – hence recent extensive collaboration through the G7, NATO and other fora. Here too, however, the UK’s ability to change behaviour is shaped by what others choose. US policy plays an especially critical role, both regarding its own stance on China and its appetite to act in coordination with allies or alone. If US policy becomes significantly more or less hawkish, the options for the UK’s China strategy also shift: US policy on Taiwan shapes any role that the UK might play. China’s reaction to the UK’s choices also depends partly on how the British approach compares with those of other major countries. French President Emmanuel Macron’s April visit to Beijing yielded commercial contracts, while Rishi Sunak has yet to meet President Xi.</p> -<p>Israel’s military objective is clear: destroy Hamas. What it plans to do after this objective is achieved is open for debate. The options for any post-Hamas governing arrangement in Gaza range from bad to worse. Gaza was in a precarious position before the war began, and is undergoing an even deeper socioeconomic catastrophe today. Roughly one-third of residential buildings have been damaged or destroyed over the last two weeks. More than 80% of Gazans are living in poverty and approximately 62% of Gaza’s youth were unemployed last year, according to UN statistics. Mass power outages are a fact of life, and the healthcare system is plagued by supply shortages.</p> +<h4 id="3-a-china-strategy-is-for-the-whole-uk-not-just-for-government">3. A China strategy is for the whole UK, not just for government.</h4> -<p>Who is going to fix this mess? Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid has suggested bringing in the Palestinian Authority (PA) after hostilities cease. Yet in the 30th year of its existence, the PA has lost the trust of the very people it was meant to govern. The old men running it, Abbas included, are increasingly out of touch with the people they are supposed to represent. They’re viewed at best as a bunch of incompetents, and at worst as enablers of Israel’s occupation. Repeated Israeli raids in the West Bank over the last year, which the PA has been powerless to stop, are clear evidence of Abbas’s ineptitude in the minds of many Palestinians. Some parts of the West Bank – such as the Jenin refugee camp – are no-go areas for the Palestinian security forces and have essentially been handed over to smaller armed groups who hold no allegiance to the traditional Palestinian factions. In March, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that 52% of Palestinians believed the interests of the Palestinian people would be best served by the PA’s dissolution. For those between the ages of 18 and 22, the figure goes up to 59%. If the PA can’t function properly in the limited areas of the West Bank it nominally controls, the probability it would do any better in Gaza – which has been devoid of PA influence since 2007 – is slim to none.</p> +<p>In developing the strategy, the simple term “UK China strategy” merits unpacking and definition. It is about more than the bilateral relationship. Abroad, the UK encounters China in its relations with every country and in multilateral organisations. At home, China is not just a matter for government. Thousands, perhaps, millions, of people take decisions where China plays a role – from supplier selection to deciding how to protect open academic discussion in universities. Equally, while China is important, it is not everything: there are many other topics that matter to the UK. Still, many major decisions have an important China component without being decisions “about China”.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Israel’s military objective is clear: destroy Hamas. What it plans to do after this objective is achieved is open for debate</code></em></strong></p> +<p>This breadth is important because China is often described as taking a “whole-of-state” approach to its affairs, whereby the Party’s dominant role removes any meaningful distinction between government and private actors. The ISC report discusses the security risks that this poses to British interests. In its most extreme formulation, the term significantly overestimates the Party’s coordination and cohesion across a country of 1.4 billion people, but the risks cannot be ignored.</p> -<p>Some have suggested an interim Gaza administration run by the UN and Arab states. On the surface, this sounds plausible. UN agencies are well entrenched in Gaza, having run schools and delivered social services to Gazans since well before Hamas’s takeover in 2007. The Gulf states could help finance the UN’s efforts.</p> +<p>The UK must formulate an appropriate response that meets the challenge, while preserving our distinctive democratic strengths and diversity of opinion, not seeking to ape the controlling approach of the Chinese party-state. The UK government itself needs a “whole-of-government” approach that consistently integrates considerations of economics, security and values into decision-making. But also needed is a China strategy for the UK as a whole, which clarifies where government should make and mandate China-related decisions, and where others are better placed to do so.</p> -<p>Even so, Arab states might not be willing to serve as Gaza’s white knight for a number of reasons. First, Arab leaders don’t want to be portrayed as cleaning up Israel’s mess or making Israel’s job easier in any way, shape or form. Palestinian statehood aspirations may have gone down a few notches on the list of priorities, but Arab governments can’t afford to ignore the issue’s strong salience among their publics. According to the 2022 Arab Opinion Index, organised by the Arab Center Washington DC, 76% of respondents thought the Palestinian cause was a concern for all Arabs, not just Palestinians.</p> +<h4 id="4-those-who-make-the-decisions-need-to-be-well-informed">4. Those who make the decisions need to be well-informed.</h4> -<p>Israel could adopt a strategy of detachment once major combat operations are over by withdrawing its forces; strengthening land, sea and air restrictions over Gaza; and treating the enclave as a security issue. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s vague concept of establishing a “new security reality” for Gaza seems to hint in this direction. Israel, however, has been implementing such a strategy for the last 16 years, while neglecting the substantive political disagreements underlying the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.</p> +<p>The UK will make better decisions on China when those making the decisions know more about China, about how it sees the world, about others’ experience of dealing with China, and about how China in turn reacts. China is unfamiliar, opaque, multifaceted and fast-changing. Good decisions draw on knowledge and experience rather than on misconceptions, guesswork and stereotypes. Yet a 2021 Higher Education Policy Institute report highlighted that there is a “lack of knowledge and understanding [about China] that would enable actors in the private and public spheres to craft the answers that are needed”. The Integrated Review committed to “invest in enhanced China-facing capabilities, through which we will develop a better understanding of China and its people”.</p> -<p>By far the worst option on the table for Israel is a full re-occupation of the enclave, a feat that even Ariel Sharon – one of Israel’s most hardline prime ministers – wasn’t interested in. US President Joe Biden has said an Israeli reoccupation of Gaza would be “a big mistake”. The Israeli government would likely agree; policing 2.3 million Palestinians – the same people forced to flee their homes in part due to Israeli airstrikes – and administering their affairs would be the definition of a thankless task.</p> +<p>Three aspects merit greater attention. Firstly, there is a need to define the scope and nature of “China capabilities” that would help different decision-makers in and out of government. This should include practical experience, such as contract negotiations, as much as academic and policy knowledge. Second, many, if not most, people who make decisions with a China dimension will not be, and will not need to be, China experts. They must, however, know enough to make good decisions and be able to access expert knowledge as needed. The government can help facilitate this access. Finally, there is scope to draw more systematically on the experience of others. The Chinese diaspora in the UK offers a broad range of useful perspectives. The UK can learn more from how other countries manage their own complex China relationships, such as Japan and Australia.</p> -<h3 id="unanswered-questions-linger-as-israel-prepares-for-a-long-war">Unanswered Questions Linger as Israel Prepares for a Long War</h3> +<h4 id="5-strategy-without-resourcing-and-implementation-is-just-wish-making">5. Strategy without resourcing and implementation is just wish-making.</h4> -<p>Much like the US before the war in Afghanistan, Israel is committed to vanquishing its opponents through the force of arms. The US experience in Afghanistan, however, is instructive for Israel. US objectives were clear and measurable early on – destroy Al-Qa’ida and overthrow the Taliban regime – only for the US to slip into the herculean task of building an Afghan state from the ground up. US casualties mounted, about $2 trillion of US taxpayer money was spent, and US troops were put into a position of defending a corruption-plagued Afghan administration that was incapable of governing. With Israel on the verge of mounting its largest ground offensive since the 1982 invasion of Beirut, Israeli policymakers have a responsibility to ask the very same questions US policymakers failed to ask more than two decades ago.</p> +<p>Strategies often fail. Plans are written but not implemented. Successful strategies require objectives grounded in reality, supported with the right resourcing and organisational structures; clear responsibilities and accountabilities; incentives and sanctions to encourage action; and durable leadership commitment that adapts in the face of changing circumstances.</p> -<hr /> +<p>For the UK in relation to China, these conditions do not currently appear to be in place. The ISC China report found that “the slow speed at which strategies, and policies, are developed and implemented … leaves a lot to be desired”. It also rightly highlighted the need for longer-term planning and resource commitments. This in turn requires sufficient cross-party consensus for commitments to last through changes of government.</p> -<p><strong>Daniel R DePetris</strong> is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.</p>Daniel R DePetrisFollowing the 7 October attack by Hamas, Israel has determined to destroy the terrorist group controlling Gaza once and for all. The question is not just whether or not it will succeed, but what its plan is for the day after.The Lost European Vision2023-10-31T12:00:00+08:002023-10-31T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-lost-european-vision<p><em>Drawing insights from defense experts across NATO members, the study highlights the evolving European defense landscape, emphasizing security of supply concerns and the balance between national and EU initiatives. The report underscores pivotal forthcoming decisions in Europe’s defense amidst changing geopolitical dynamics.</em></p> +<p>Resourcing for China has increased. In March, the government announced a doubling in 2024/25 of funding for its China Capabilities Programme. Richard Moore, head of the Secret Intelligence Service, recently stated that “we now devote more resources to China than anywhere else, reflecting China’s increasing global significance”. This is likely not enough, though limited public information makes it hard to judge. Indeed, there are good strategic arguments for not revealing publicly the resource levels behind some initiatives.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>However, it is not a question of money alone. Improving coordination, communication and alignment across government remains a big task. This is as much as question of leadership focus and organisational effectiveness as resource levels per se.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Internationally, too, increased resources are needed. China is much more active on the global stage, putting increased time and effort into advancing its agenda in multilateral institutions and offering financial support to countries in the Global South in particular. There is increased contention and competition. Here, cooperation with others allows for burden-sharing, whether in addressing China’s efforts in the UN to redefine human rights or the implications of increased financial development assistance in the Pacific Islands. But more resources – both time and money – are needed if strategy is to be more than rhetoric.</p> -<p>Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has caused a dramatic shift in the European security landscape, and European defense is now entering a new era. DGAP has initiated a project to provide a comprehensive analysis of the changes in the European defense sector triggered by the Russian attack.</p> +<h4 id="6-strategy-requires-learning-and-adaptation">6. Strategy requires learning and adaptation.</h4> -<p>During the first phase of the project, carried out in cooperation with the Friedrich-Naumann-Foun-dation, the analysis concentrated on changes in the perception of the defense environment and their implications for the future military order and defense cooperation.</p> +<p>Strategy is not static. Broad objectives may remain constant, but prioritisation, detailed outcomes and how to achieve them will change. Strategy will also change, based on which policies work and which do not. As such, any detailed China strategy paper may quickly date. Strategy must learn and adapt rapidly to changed assessments and circumstances. It must these days consider a China with strong digital capabilities, but large structural economic problems, in a world of AI, rather than a high-growth China excelling in physical infrastructure.</p> -<p>The second phase of the EDINA (European Defense in A New Age) project focuses on the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) in the new era of European defense. It highlights the impact of the Russian aggression on Europe’s defense industry and analyzes the structural drivers and constraints that influence the future trajectory of the continent’s industrial base.</p> +<p>Much of this learning will inevitably happen behind closed doors. However, external review and reflection – in parliament, in expert groups and in the broader community – is important too. A published China strategy can help anchor this debate, but it must not become a fixed baseline pursued for its own sake while the world changes.</p> -<p>The data base was generated in a similar way to the first phase of the EDINA project. In May and July 2023, DGAP brought together defense experts from European NATO members (Germany, France, United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Greece, Türkiye, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Lithuania, Bulgaria) for two workshops (physical and online) to discuss the current situation and future development of the EDTIB. Prior to the workshops, the experts were asked to prepare country reports as their input to the discussions. The reports allowed to sketch out the industrial landscape in Europe and provided valuable insights into different positions on defense industrial cooperation, dependencies, and structural problems regarding the EDTIB. The reports were based on the following questionnaire:</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> + +<p>China indeed has “implications for almost every area of government policy and the everyday lives of British people”. While the government has made substantial progress on its approach to this challenge, more needs to be done.</p> + +<p>What matters more than having a strategy paper is a host of decisions in different domains, followed by resourcing, implementation and review. Reasonable people can disagree on what being “clear-eyed” about China means in practice. This is not the work of government alone, even where China pursues its own “whole-of-state” approach. Across the UK, better awareness is needed, both of the opportunities and the risks that China presents. This will allow people to strike the right balance between risk and return – and also determine where, on certain matters of security and values, there is no balance to be struck, and economic benefits must take a backseat. But without increased resources – both time and money – a better China strategy will remain an expression of hope rather than reality.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Andrew Cainey</strong> is a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI and the founding director of the UK National Committee on China. He has lived and worked for most of the past twenty-five years in China, Korea and Singapore advising businesses and governments, having first visited China in 1981. His particular areas of focus relate to China’s development, its growing role and influence across Asia and globally and the intersection of economic prosperity, technology and national security.</p>Andrew CaineyChina poses an “epoch-defining and systemic challenge with implications for almost every area of government policy and the everyday lives of British people”, according to the UK’s March 2023 Integrated Review Refresh.Written Evidence2023-11-07T12:00:00+08:002023-11-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/written-evidence<p><em>The Russian invasion of Ukraine increased the European Union’s (EU) ambitions in security in defence as well as member states’ appetite for EU-led solutions in this field.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Specifically, the war unveiled the role of the European Commission as a policy entrepreneur which is enhancing its competences in security and defence through the usage of a “market-security nexus”. As defence cooperation gets increasingly framed by the EU in terms of economic efficiency and resilience, it might be difficult for London to ignore the gravitational pull of EU market and legislation in the long term. However, EU efforts in regulating the defence market are still nascent, and there are still both room and value for the UK to engage in this process. This submission is divided into three sections addressing the Terms of Reference (ToRs) 1, 3 and 5, respectively. Lastly, it concludes with a policy recommendations section suggesting specific avenues for defence cooperation within existing EU frameworks.</em></p> + +<h3 id="section-1">Section 1</h3> + +<h4 id="11-to-what-extent-does-the-eus-response-represent-a-departure-from-its-previous-approach-to-foreign-and-security-policy-is-this-likely-to-be-a-durable-shift">1.1 To what extent does the EU’s response represent a departure from its previous approach to foreign and security policy? Is this likely to be a durable shift?</h4> + +<p>The Russian invasion of Ukraine seemed to have prompted a “whatever it takes” moment in EU defence, with novel initiatives particularly at the defence industrial level, a remit supranational institutions have historically struggled to regulate. The war urged the Commission to mobilise a new bureaucracy to advance proposals on how to utilise the EU’s defence industrial tools in the context of war. This effort culminated in:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Industries/ RTO: What are current strengths in production and technologies (top 5-7 companies, revenue, employees, current major projects (timelines), role in the supply chain/product portfolio, cooperation partners, involvement in European projects)?</p> + <p>The provision of military assistance via the European Peace Facility (EPF) and consequent growth of this instrument from €5.7 billion in 2021 to €12 billion in June 2023. The funds have been employed to repay EU member states for their contributions of weaponry to Ukraine and to collectively procure one million rounds of ammunition for Ukraine.</p> </li> <li> - <p>How does your country assess the impact of cooperation, dependencies (import/export) and competition among Europeans but also vis-à-vis the United States and Asia on the future ability of the armaments sector to deliver needed output (quantity/quality)?</p> + <p>In June of 2023, the Council and the Parliament achieved an initial accord on the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), a €300 million initiative designed to encourage member states to collaboratively acquire urgently required military equipment.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Future Avenues: How will the national DTIB evolve over the next decade? What are important trigger points for such a development?</p> + <p>In July of 2023, the EU formally endorsed the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), a €500 million program aimed at assisting companies in increasing their capacity for producing ammunition.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>After the workshop, the authors had the opportunity to update their reports in the light of the discussions. For this publication, they were then slightly edited to meet grammatical and spelling standards. Any opinions expressed in the reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).</p> +<p>It is true that by advancing these initiatives the EU broke with past taboos and challenged the notion of Normative Power Europe (the oxymoronic use of the European Peace Facility as a weapons supply tool is a case in point). However, the pursuit of an enhanced role in the defence industrial field has been done consistently with what the EU does best: harnessing its regulatory and budgetary powers to increase Member States’ coordination in times of crisis. The European Commission is well-known for its policy activism and for framing issues towards its field of competencies. Thus, while it is certainly a novelty to observe this extent of EU action at the defence industrial level, the modalities through which increased supranational action was achieved in this remit are consistent with the EU’s modus operandi.</p> -<p>This project report starts with a presentation of key findings from the workshop and country reports. This section also presents the research team’s analysis of the current situation, a forecast of likely developments, and suggestions for measures to be taken to push the EDTIB forward. This executive summary is followed by the country reports.</p> +<p>A market power by design, the EU’s value proposition for the European defence after the invasion of Ukraine has mostly been a financial one. However, albeit noteworthy, financial incentives might not be enough to get European member states to cooperate on a more regular and frictionless basis in a policy domain characterised by competition and protectionism. Even if states concede to financial incentives and decide to cooperate, international arms collaboration means that the problem is shared but not necessarily reduced: the pie may become bigger, but the problem of who gets the largest slice persists. A financial incentives-based approach should not be dismissed, but a parallel conversation is needed. One which discusses the governance structures that can best accommodate multinational endeavours in the inherently competitive European defence industrial base. This conversation should recognise that defence partnerships should be built on states’ core strengths, organised along two dimensions: industrial and technological expertise, and value for money. This mere focus on “financial carrots” might lead to a less durable shift than originally expected, and European ambitions on joint procurement of capabilities might soon reach a stalling point.</p> -<h3 id="executive-summary">Executive Summary</h3> +<p>In terms of member states’ consensus on how to respond to future crises, it is important to note that the invasion of Ukraine was perceived as an existential matter for the EU. Consequently, one must be cautiously optimistic in expecting the same level of coherence in other foreign policy and security issues. Unequivocal US support and leadership as well as moral clarity about right and wrong in the Ukrainian context were also key enablers for a cohesive European response. However, not all foreign policy challenges present these characteristics. In fact, most of them don’t. See, for instance, the recent war in Gaza which left member-states deeply divided on how best to respond.</p> -<p>Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022 marks the beginning of a new era in European security, and Europe’s response to the Russian aggression will shape the development of the European defense technological and industrial base (EDTIB) for decades to come. At the same time, there are important economic and political factors influencing the continent’s defense industrial development. Against this background, this report outlines the most likely development scenario for the European industrial base. It also describes the options open to European governments and the EU to maintain a highly capable defense industry and address current shortcomings.</p> +<h4 id="12-what-implications-if-any-does-the-eus-response-to-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-have-for-the-uk-eu-relationship-in-foreign-defence-and-security-policy">1.2 What implications, if any, does the EU’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine have for the UK-EU relationship in foreign, defence and security policy?</h4> -<h4 id="a-snapshot-of-the-european-defense-landscape">A Snapshot of the European Defense Landscape</h4> +<p>As explained above, the Russian invasion of Ukraine increased the EU’s ambitions in security in defence as well as member states’ appetite for EU-led solutions in this field. Since the Lisbon Treaty, there has been a debate about the shift towards more national or less European-oriented foreign and security policies in Europe. Recent developments, however, suggest a potential new phase resembling a process where Brussels gains more influence in this policy domain. The Commission has taken on the role of a policy entrepreneur, aiming to boost its political aspirations and significance. Specifically, it has seized on the opportunity of advancing EU policy in the area of common defence procurement. Yet, it has only done so with the express consent and direct tasking of the European Council. This dynamic is essential to understand the new policy developments, which are guided by both the supranational and intergovernmental levels.</p> -<p>Europe’s defense industry produces the full range of conventional capabilities needed by its armed forces. However, this capacity comes with significant dependencies: On the one hand, given the many years of insufficient national demand, manufacturers have become increasingly dependent on exports to countries outside of the EU and NATO to maintain their skills and production lines. On the other hand, the economization of defense, meaning a growing pressure on prices, has created significant import dependencies on raw materials and key components like semi-conductors. Both elements are now coming under scrutiny as security of supply is becoming a key concern for European nations and their armed forces.</p> +<p>Thus, it is true that the supranational level gained unprecedented importance the security and defence field, but this relevance was granted and tasked by the member states. As a result, the supranational and intergovernmental levels will continue to operate in tandem, one serving the other when necessary. Consensus will remain difficult to achieve vis-à-vis challenges that are perceived as less existential, and member states will resort to more or less “usage of Europe” according to the scale and perceived importance of the security challenge. Therefore, it is likely for a “Europe of different speed” scenario to materialise, with the Commission building coalitions and cooperating with member states that share its integrative approach. This could translate into pan-European defence projects scaling down and leaving room for smaller groupings and “coalitions of the willing”. Selectivity and differentiation can be introduced into existing institutional structures or patterns of cooperation in order to overcome political hurdles, bring about greater efficiencies, or accommodate diversity. This would have positive implications for the UK, as it could potentially entail more agile frameworks of cooperation and a new approach to like-minded non-EU partners.</p> -<p>The EDTIB reaches far beyond the EU and its member states. Despite EU initiatives like the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF), and lately the European Peace Facility, the lion share of defense industrial investment undertaken by EU member states takes place outside the EU framework. Also, countries outside the EU – the United Kingdom as a defense industrial heavy weight as well as Norway and Türkiye – add significantly to the landscape, be it through cooperation or competition. At the same time, non-European companies have become part of the continent’s defense industrial ecosystem by contributing components or whole systems. This applies especially to the US industry but is also true for manufacturers for instance from South Korea.</p> +<p>So far, the war did not substantially change how the EU approaches and categorises its third-country partners. The EU Strategic Compass has a promising rhetoric in its partnerships chapter. Yet, besides merely listing who the key partners are, the document falls short in operationalising each specific partnership and in detailing how each partner is instrumental to achieve the EU’s foreign policy objectives. Each partnership should involve a tailor-made component to ensure that each is best suited to achieving a specific goal. Yet, the EU has long been reluctant to tailor its partnership agreements. Instead, it has generally favoured deals that are scalable and applicable to sets of countries rather than to individual states. This is because of several reasons such as the risk of the creating of in- and out-groups and a resulting decline in intra-EU cohesion; lowest-common-denominator problems in integration as member states opt-out of specific policies; moral hazard as laggards fall further behind; vulnerability to the interests of non-EU members alongside legitimacy problems in third countries; and increased complexity within the EU system.</p> -<p>Moreover, despite more than two decades of working toward closer cooperation in development and procurement within the EU, the EDTIB is still shaped by national choices taken decades ago – especially in the aftermath of the Cold War. These decisions were not primarily driven by defense considerations but influenced by broader domestic economic policies and philosophies, including on state ownership of defense companies. Thus, every country has its own story regarding its defense industrial base and ambitions. Eastern and central European countries had to address an extra challenge: Integration into NATO meant that their industries had to adapt to new standards for equipment and interoperability. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, they also lost their supply basis and economic links. As a result, many companies ceased production or concentrated on the maintenance of legacy equipment or exports to former Soviet states and export destinations of Soviet-made weapon systems.</p> +<p>A prolonged conflict in Ukraine and new complex security challenges are likely to change this approach. The EU and its member states must establish mutually beneficial connections with nations upon which they rely strategically or wish to establish strategic interdependence. However, this time, reliance solely on market forces is insufficient: deliberate choices must be made regarding new and unavoidable dependencies, not simply accepting those imposed by market forces or competing entities. European leaders must tactically structure their partnerships to strengthen their ability to make decisions and foster stronger bonds among partners, both within and beyond their borders. This new process of partnering will see the UK as the most natural ally.</p> -<p>This brief look at recent history underlines the importance of the upcoming decisions for the EDTIB. Europe is entering a new historical phase. The Russian war of aggression is the key impulse that has put security of supply for the armed forces at the top of the political agenda. European countries, whether big or small, now realize the cost of their dependence on global supply chains. Their governments share an aspiration to generate security of supply nationally. But their understanding of what that entails differs significantly. In some cases, countries limit their definition of the supplies they consider essential at the national level to fairly basic elements like ammunition and maintenance. In other cases, governments strive to keep their country’s technological edge regarding components or entire weapon systems. On a broader scale, the choices to be made indicate that the armed forces may require a new mix of quantity and quality.</p> +<h3 id="section-2">Section 2</h3> -<p>Clearly, not every aspiration and every demand can be supplied nationally, resulting in a trade-off bet-ween ambition and feasibility that could open a path to cooperation. Current practice seems to reflect a pragmatic approach: While countries see their national basis as an indispensable core of their defense efforts, they also maintain their engagement in EU or multinational cooperation. Whether this is a legacy practice or a conscious choice will become clear when economic and financial pressures force tougher decisions on the future path of the defense industrial base.</p> +<h4 id="21-is-there-a-need-for-greater-coordination-and-cooperation-between-the-eu-and-the-uk-on-defence-policy-if-so-what-sorts-of-cooperation-should-be-prioritised">2.1 Is there a need for greater coordination and cooperation between the EU and the UK on defence policy? If so, what sorts of cooperation should be prioritised?</h4> -<h4 id="the-start-of-a-new-era">The Start of a New Era</h4> +<p>British participation in European defence matters to the EU because of London’s historical security commitment to the region and its twin status as one of Europe’s two major military powers as well as its most advanced weapons manufacturer. Similarly, the EU’s increased regulation of the defence market as well as making more funding available at the supranational level (particularly for R&amp;D, where the UK is lagging behind) should prompt an interest from the UK in being part of the conversation. Thus, increased cooperation is indeed desirable from both sides.</p> -<p>There are three main factors that will shape the development of the EDTIB in this new era: The first is the transformation of the security environment, in particular through the dramatic changes brought about by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Governments’ responses to the war have a direct impact on the defense industry and shape the expectations of companies in the sector. The second element consists of the economic interests of states and major defense companies. Both types of actors shape markets, trade, and production chains through their preferences. As preferences have not significantly changed, neither has the general direction of the EDTIB. As a result, economic preferences act as structural barriers to the fundamental change that the development of the security factors would call for. Third, there are the political visions of European integration, both in defense and in overall politics. They should be seen as an underlying long-term factor. The near absence of a discourse about more EU cooperation among EU member states seems to indicate that there is not much appetite to give the EU a larger role.</p> +<p>However, cooperation for the sake of cooperation has rarely proved successful and there are still a set of restrictions for non-EU countries wishing to join EU-led defence initiatives. The level of integration with the EU Single Market decides the viability of defence cooperation with the EU initiatives such as the European Defence Fund (EDF), ASAP and EDIRPA and most initiatives. Thus, the UK should prioritise cooperation under institutions and frameworks that are less underpinned by a “play as you pay” rationale. Namely:</p> -<p><strong>Security Concerns as a Momentum for Change</strong></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>European Defence Agency (EDA): Conditions for third party involvement with the EDA are outlined in Article 23 of the Council Decision establishing the Agency. These rules allow for interaction, project partnerships, and voluntary personnel contributions, but they do not confer voting rights or automatic invitation to any meeting, in particular steering board meetings. Third country involvement with the EDA is also unlikely to automatically favour permanent access into the European defence ecosystem. When it comes to liaising with third parties, the primary role of the EDA is getting third states in line with what member states are doing. Driven by the principles of added value, mutual benefit and reciprocity, the EDA simply matches states’ capabilities there where possible and necessary. In this sense, the Administrative Arrangements signed with the EDA are to be understood as a license to unlock ad-hoc, project-based cooperation rather than an unrestricted entry ticket to the EU defence theme park. However, given the importance of the EDA as an information exchange platform, involvement with this agency can contribute to the strengthening of ties between participating actors.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>European Peace Facility (EPF): This is an off-budget instrument that supports military and defence actions in the pursuit of CSDP objectives. For now, the EPF is outside the general budget, yet it functions in parallel to the EU’s multiannual financial framework (MFF 2021-2027). This allowed member states to establish a total budget for the EPF over a seven-year period, as well as agreeing on yearly spending limits. By tying the EPF to negotiations for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), member states determined the financial allocations for the EPF within a larger discussion on how much they wanted to allocate to EU external actions overall. Previous experience with the Athena Mechanism (which served as a precursor to the EPF, along with the African Peace Facility) suggested that arrangements for participation from non-EU countries could be arranged. In fact, it would be unwise for the EU to prohibit contributions from like-minded countries, especially those with whom it has established agreements. Under the financial rules outlined in the Council Decision for Athena, non-EU countries (such as those in the EEA, Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Chile, Mexico) were indeed permitted to participate in the mechanism, though without voting rights in its decision-making process. The European Peace Facility operates under similar principles but allows third countries to have a say in ensuring that their voluntary contributions are utilised according to agreed upon terms. Article 30 of the EPF Council Decision states that contributions from third parties require prior approval from the Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC). The EPF’s own committee can then authorize the administrative handling of the financial contribution, which may be designated for specific actions or operations. The specific purpose of the voluntary contribution is outlined in the administrative arrangement with the respective third party. The administrator of the Facility Committee is responsible for ensuring that the management of voluntary contributions adheres to the relevant administrative arrangements. They are obligated to provide each contributor, either directly or through the applicable operation commander, with pertinent information regarding the handling of the voluntary contribution as outlined in the relevant administrative arrangement. This allows a third country to monitor how its financial contribution is utilised. This is key for the UK and presents a good mechanism for a more transactional, ad-hoc and supervised engagement.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>PESCO: In the field of security and defence, scholarship has singled out PESCO as a framework embodying high levels of differentiation in its very design. PESCO exhibits not only selectivity in membership but also project-based clustering and patterns of differentiated cooperation that result in external differentiation through the engagement of third countries, differentiation in the relationship with third countries, and a complex division of labour vis-à-vis non-EU institutions, including NATO, and the European Intervention Initiative (EI2). As a result, PESCO provides the best framework for the UK to cherry pick the level of integration of the project, the number of partners and the type of activities. When it comes to cooperation formats, history shows that the most successful cooperative-development programmes have few partners and a clear leader, thus the UK should look at PESCO projects that have these characteristics.</p> -<p>The current situation of Europe’s defense industries is primarily shaped by Russia’s war in Ukraine. The conflict has brought security interests to the forefront of politicians’ minds when considering defense decisions.</p> + <p>Third party involvement with PESCO starts with a formal request initiated by the third country applicant. Importantly, the request should be initiated by a country’s government and not by its legal entity, or defence company, as is the case with EDF. The request should be submitted to the coordinator(s) of the PESCO project in question (i.e. to the member states, not to an EU institution). It needs to contain detailed information on the reasons for participating in the project and the scope and form of the proposed participation. Finally, the request must substantiate the fulfilment of a set of conditions, laid out in Article 3 of the Conclusions.</p> -<p>Arguably the most important consequence affecting the EDTIB is a significant increase in demand for military equipment. On the one hand, this is due to the massive amount of armaments that Europe is delivering to Ukraine (already worth more than €36 billion, including deliveries from EU institutions). As many countries do not have large reserves of materiel and ammunition, stocks depleted by deliveries to Ukraine need to be replenished. On the other hand, many European governments have realized that their past efforts were not sufficient to ensure a credible deterrence posture. Decades of austerity and underfunding have left major European players with “bonsai armies” that are no longer able to defend their territories in the event of a Russian attack. This leaves Europe extremely vulnerable. European governments are now making efforts to reverse this trend and close existing capability gaps. Several major modernization programs have been launched, and major procurement decisions have been taken, such as Germany’s purchase of F-35 fighter jets from the United States. To underpin this new level of ambition, many countries have significantly increased their defense spending. Poland’s increase of the GDP share devoted to defense to four percent and Germany’s creation of a €100 billion special fund stand out.</p> + <p>They consist of four key requirements. Firstly, the third country must share the values on which the EU is founded as well as the overall objectives of the Union’s CFSP laid out in article 21(2) TEU. Secondly, it must provide substantial added value to the PESCO project in question. Here, substantial value is loosely defined by the EU, thereby providing significant room for manoeuvre for the applicants to make their case. As a rule of thumb, the applicant’s contribution to the project must be complementary to those offered by the rest of the participating member states, for example by providing technical expertise or additional capabilities including operational or financial support. The EU does not set any specific threshold or measurement for complementarity. Thirdly, it is important that the third state’s participation does not imply the creation of dependencies for the EU. This point is particularly contentious when it comes to allowing participation from powerful third countries such as the US, but it is advantageous for smaller states with niche capabilities. Lastly, the applicant state must have a Security of Information Agreement with the EU and an Administrative Arrangement with EDA. The third country’s application making these arguments will then be assessed by the project’s participating members who will unanimously decide on whether or not to include the third country. Once the participating members have approved the request, they will inform the High Representative and the European Council of its decision. Only following the Council’s green light, can an invitation to join the project be made to the third state. If the invitation is accepted, an Administrative Arrangement is negotiated outlining contributions and modes of engagement. A template for such an administrative arrangement between project members and third states can be found on the last page of the Council Decision establishing conditions for third-party involvement in PESCO.</p> -<p>As a result, the overall size of the market has increased and is set to increase further. European governments now all agree that Ukraine will need support for the foreseeable future, as there appears to be little hope for peace any time soon. With security concerns undiminished, defense will continue to be a high priority across the continent, creating an energizing momentum for European defense contractors.</p> + <p>Much of the detail on third country participation will be in an Administrative Agreement, thus leaving an important element of uncertainty. This also includes specific rules regarding the project’s intellectual property. As a general rule, the PESCO consortium retains full control of all the project’s intellectual property, but it seems plausible that specific rules could be formulated in the agreement. One last interesting aspect is that the Decision specifies a separate set of rules for countries (i.e., third-party states) and defence industry companies (i.e., third-party entities) in the modality of joining PESCO projects. For now, the main difference is that third-party states have been eligible to join since the conclusion of the agreement (November 2020), whereas companies must wait until 2026. Lastly, the entanglement between PESCO and the EDF needs to be addressed and, specifically, the controversies around the EDF’s PESCO bonus. EDF regulation maintains that an action developed in the context of a PESCO project can benefit from a funding increase of an additional 10%. This, however, is only valid for EU member states or associated countries. Under no circumstances can a third country succeed in using PESCO participation as a shortcut to access EDF money.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Bilateral and minilateral cooperation outside EU structures: Conscious of the challenges of collaborative projects, European states have continued to collaborate along bilateral and minilateral lines. The proliferation of such arrangements has often been seen as one of the underlying causes behind the fragmentation and duplication of European defence efforts. However, there is limited appreciation of the conductive power of these modes of engagement, and of how the existence of lower-level, smaller-format collaborations can then spill over to the multilateral level. For instance, when the EU established PESCO in 2017, much of the project-based clustering was based on existing bilateral and minilateral defence initiatives between states outside the supranational umbrella, which were then incorporated into the EU’s defence and security architecture. As such, these more ad-hoc types of cooperation should not necessarily be seen as antagonising to multilateral efforts happening at the EU or NATO levels.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Currently, however, the EDTIB is not able to meet wartime demands. It successfully adapted to decades of peace, maintaining high profits despite relatively low levels of defense spending, but it lost the capacity to scale up production for wartime needs. Traditional European manufacturers will be able to partially absorb the new demand by establishing new production capacities, but this will not be sufficient either in terms of volume or of speed. Hence, third countries will benefit. Although the United States is an obvious alternative for supplies and US companies are certain to secure more contracts from Europe, American industry experiences similar bottleneck problems due to high demand.</p> +<h4 id="22-the-communiqué-issued-following-the-nato-heads-of-state-and-government-summit-in-july-2023-stated-that-for-the-strategic-partnership-between-nato-and-the-eu-non-eu-allies-fullest-involvement-in-eu-defence-efforts-is-essential-and-looked-forward-to-mutual-steps-representing-tangible-progress-in-this-area-to-support-a-strengthened-strategic-partnership-as-a-non-eu-member-of-nato-what-steps-if-any-should-the-uk-take-to-give-effect-to-this">2.2 The communiqué issued following the NATO Heads of State and Government summit in July 2023 stated that for “the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in EU defence efforts is essential” and looked forward to “mutual steps, representing tangible progress, in this area to support a strengthened strategic partnership”. As a non-EU Member of NATO what steps, if any, should the UK take to give effect to this?</h4> -<p>Other players such as South Korea and Türkiye are ready to step in. South Korea has recently won major contracts from Poland for K2 battle tanks and artillery ammunition and is establishing partnerships with other European countries as well (e.g., Romania). Türkiye also looks prepared to take on a greater role. Its Bayraktar drones have proved their worth in several conflicts, including the war in Ukraine. The Turkish DTIB has benefitted from high levels of domestic defense spending, which has allowed the sector to modernize and grow. Several Turkish companies appear ready to become serious competitors to their western and northern European peers.</p> +<p>The UK should recognise that EU defence initiatives are designed to contribute to transatlantic burden- sharing and that they are not envisaged as competing with NATO. The UK should continue to engage in those EU projects that are particularly important to the Alliance. It has already done so, though to a limited extent. Joining PESCO’s Military Mobility project is a glaring example. Improving military mobility in Europe has long been one of the flagship areas for EU–NATO cooperation. Indeed, it represents one of those spaces in which the EU and NATO complement each other. Namely, while NATO is able to plan and calculate the military’s needs for transport across Europe, the EU has the legal and regulatory weight to streamline processes as well as available funds and programmes on cross-border mobility. PESCO’s military mobility project epitomises a case where EU action supports NATO efforts and, as such, London’s decision to join was perfectly aligned with UK government policy. As a NATO but non-EU member the UK should continue to prioritise initiatives that are in support of the Alliance. Participation in such projects should be easier to sell domestically, can serve as an initial steppingstone to normalise the relationship, and might have a conductive power towards further engagement.</p> -<p>The war in Ukraine and the threat of further Russian aggression have given new urgency to efforts to fill capability gaps. Governments are prioritizing speed in new procurement programs. As a result, imports and off-the-shelf procurement are becoming more important. Since this usually means buying from non-European third countries (rather than setting up joint European development programs), there is a new momentum for European defense industrial cooperation. Even strong supporters of European cooperation have opted for imports, as demonstrated by Germany’s decision to buy F-35 fighters as nuclear carriers. This has caused friction in Franco-German relations, with France, a strong supporter of European cooperation, expressing disappointment over the German decision.</p> +<h3 id="section-3">Section 3</h3> -<p>In central and eastern Europe, defense industry partnerships and purchasing decisions are driven by the desire to keep the United States as the main regional security guarantor, which means that central and eastern European states prefer to buy American rather than European. This is facilitated by the fact that eastern European industries rarely play a role in major European development or procurement programs. As a result, central and eastern European countries do not benefit economically from buying European materiel or from engaging in joint development. Their tendency toward purchasing US equipment could be reinforced as security pressures remain high, speed in deliveries seem more important than ever, and NATO’s position as the bedrock of European security is strengthened.</p> +<h4 id="31-some-experts-have-identified-a-more-geopolitical-eu-that-is-more-assertive-in-its-role-as-a-foreign-policy-and-security-actor-following-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-do-you-agree-with-this-assessment-if-so-what-implications-does-it-have-for-the-uk">3.1 Some experts have identified a more “geopolitical” EU that is more assertive in its role as a foreign policy and security actor following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Do you agree with this assessment? If so, what implications does it have for the UK?</h4> -<p>The outbreak of a major war in Europe also has consequences for the force structure of European militaries. There is a new focus on quantity. Major wars require more mass and deeper reserves and stocks than the external interventions that were the focus of the last two decades. Does this mean that Europe will focus less on innovation and that the EDTIB could fall behind in terms of technology? So far, this looks unlikely. Militaries and governments have defined requirements, and therefore innovation, years in advance, which means that for the next generation of systems, the innovation that industry needs to deliver has already been determined. Europe currently anticipates the production of cutting-edge technologies. However, there is a growing gap between current procurement plans and newly expressed demand in terms of volume. A new balance needs to be struck between mass production of current state of the art systems and high-end platforms designed to be built in smaller numbers.</p> +<p>The EU suffers from the legacy of separating the exclusive competence for the EU to act in the sphere of trade from the more limited competence to develop a foreign policy. This stark separation has been slowly eroding since the EU Global Strategy of 2016, and the war in Ukraine has accelerated this process. Specifically, the war (and the pandemic before it) sped up the emergence of the Commission as a geopolitical actor and the securitisation of those areas that fall under EU competencies to a greater extent than defence such as, for instance, energy, economic security and supply chain resilience.</p> -<p>Governments are increasingly aware of the importance of ensuring security of supply. Their ambition spans from spare parts and maintenance via components to entire platforms. As a result, central and eastern European countries are investing in building up their domestic industries to become more independent. While smaller industries (e.g., in Bulgaria and Romania) are trying to secure a share of the maintenance business, others aim to participate in the manufacturing process itself and benefit from technology transfers. Poland is a good example of a government with both the ambition and the funds to develop a strong industrial base. Poland and similarly ambitious players with sufficient financial resources will be able to continue their growth path and play a greater role in the EDTIB. But while they can become more independent from imports, including from their European partners, it is unlikely that they will turn into serious competitors to Europe’s top producers.</p> +<p>The Single Market experience continues to permeate every aspect of EU policymaking and, since the beginning of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Commission has tried to enhance its competences within the traditional intergovernmental policy domain of security and defence through the usage of a “market-security nexus”. The sustained war in Ukraine exposed a European industrial resilience problem, and joint defence procurement became to be understood as crucial in making a decisive impact on the future competitiveness of Community industries in the internal market. By framing a traditional intergovernmental problem through a market resilience lens, the Commission managed to get members states to seek supranational solutions and to accept innovative proposals. For instance, the Commission’s shift in approach and understanding of Article 41.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) can be considered quite ground-breaking. Until recently, the idea of using the Union budget for defence procurement was unimaginable. The Commission is therefore using crises to act as a policy entrepreneur to further enhance its political ambitions and to suggest innovative solutions.</p> -<p>A key issue for the future EDTIB is the sustainability of the increase in defense spending. Building a defense technological and industrial base capable of meeting the new level of ambition requires a sustained high level of defense spending to keep funds from being diverted to other government functions in the event of an economic downturn or a reappraisal of policy priorities. Most European governments seem to understand that defense spending must be sustainable to produce results. They are not only willing to maintain their budgets at the current high level but also envisage further increases in the near future. With security pressures expected to remain high, defense will remain a priority across the continent. As a result, the defense market will continue to grow.</p> +<p>This dynamic has important implications for the UK. As defence cooperation gets increasingly perceived through the lenses of economic efficiency and resilience, it might be difficult for London to ignore the gravitational pull of EU market and legislation. The enhanced role of the Commission in security and defence is likely to increase the EU’s capacity to shape behaviour externally through “milieu shaping”. As a result, it is important for the UK to be involved in the restructuring of the European defence market. In fact, for nations or companies that didn’t participate in this process from the beginning, joining later would pose significant difficulties.</p> -<p><strong>Economic Interests as a Barrier to Change</strong></p> +<h3 id="section-4-recommendations">Section 4: Recommendations</h3> -<p>Although security considerations currently drive the general direction of defense policy in Europe, there are economic trends and considerations that strongly influence the development of the EDTIB. In peacetime, they were arguably more dominant, but even now, no government will take decisions that go against its economic and industrial interests, which are to nurture national arms producers. Any analysis of the defense sector therefore needs to take the industry’s political economy into account. Governments may claim that they are acting in the spirit of European integration or that their motives are exclusively security related, but that is rarely the case. All, even small countries, have bold ambitions for using the additional money and demand to boost their national DTIBs. All envisage to evolve from the current size and product portfolio of the national companies to the next level. Moreover, all countries assessed are keen to boost exports, based on strategies drawn up by the government or the industrial players. They either want to enter foreign markets or expand their role there.</p> +<p>The UK and the EU are natural partners and, as highlighted throughout this contribution, there is mutual benefit in further cooperation. As EU member states delegate more authority to the supranational level in the field of security and defence, it might get increasingly difficult for the UK to ignore the gravitational pull of the EU in the process of the restructuring of the European defence market. However, this process has only just started and there is value for the UK to engage in it relatively early on. When it comes to the modalities for such engagement, the ball is largely in the UK’s court. British policymakers should recognise that closer post-Brexit cooperation with EU institutions is an iterative process, and therefore subject to change as lessons are being learnt and as the context evolves. Ultimately, scalability and proportionality infuse the EU’s approach to partnerships. As such, EU eagerness to effectively explore and legally spell out advanced forms of security cooperation with the UK will much depend on the latter’s willingness to commit itself to cooperation in the first place. Opportunities exist:</p> -<p>What differs is the character of these industries, especially the role they play in the production chain. A striking feature of the EDTIB is the heterogeneity of the national industries it comprises. They can be categorized into four different spheres: core industries, traditional mid-sized industries, rising stars, and industries at the periphery.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>The first step for bringing more coherence to UK-EU cooperation would be signing an Administrative Arrangement with the EDA. As studies have shown, the latter scenario could facilitate increased interaction between representatives from the UK and the EU, potentially creating opportunities for greater involvement of Britain in EU initiatives where the EDA plays a part. There is no “one size fits all” Administrative Arrangement for third countries, and each one is negotiated separately and on an ad hoc basis. Specifically, the agreement will stipulate rights and responsibilities for the UK as well as introducing a review mechanism to periodically assess whether the UK is meeting those obligations. It is important to demystify it, however. Signing an Administrative Arrangement with the EU is not a political step towards strengthening relationships with the bloc. It should be understood as a licence to unlock ad hoc, project-based cooperation that is intended to fully respect the signatory’s national sovereignty.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The UK should explore further involvement in PESCO beyond the Military Mobility project, which does not entail research and development activities. Participating in a PESCO capability development project could serve as a means for the UK to explore the extent to which third countries can engage in EU capability development initiatives, and to observe how the existing regulations regarding intellectual property and export controls are applied in practice. If the EU demonstrated a willingness to interpret its regulations in a flexible manner, it would open the door for greater UK involvement in both PESCO and, potentially, the EDF. As previous studies suggested, participating in a PESCO capability development project presents an opportunity for the UK to explore the limits of third-party engagement in EU capability development mechanisms. It allows the UK to assess the practical interpretation of existing regulations concerning intellectual property and export controls. If the EU demonstrates flexibility in its rule interpretation, it could open doors for the UK to engage more closely in both PESCO and the EDF. Cooperating under the PESCO umbrella has changed the way member states communicate with each other in addition to providing access to key documents and information and facilitating the creation of personal links among the member states’ representatives. As such, PESCO might represent a valuable socialisation forum as well as being a trust-building exercise.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Lastly, bilateral cooperation with European states remains vital as, for instance, the Lancaster House treaties with France have already demonstrated. The UK will need to address European partners individually as much as collectively.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The European defense industrial core is situated in western Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK), where strong industrial bases capable of producing almost the entire portfolio of weapon systems across all domains have been developed and maintained. Their industries are the largest in Europe, producing technologically advanced products that are highly competitive. While all of them also have a strong export profile, a high proportion of the equipment they produce gets purchased by the armed forces of their home countries. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK are home to several of the top 100 defense companies. All the major pan-European defense companies are at least partly owned by stakeholders from these countries, and direct state involvement is not uncommon. The core countries also lead major European development programs such as Eurofighter, A400M, Tornado, and more recently Tempest and FCAS. With the exception of the UK, all are strong supporters of EU initiatives such as PESCO and the EDF.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Countries such as Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, and Greece are home to some traditional mid-sized industries. They participate in European joint development programs for complex weapon systems without being able to lead them – the naval sector gradually becoming an exception. These countries are heavily dependent on imports from both Europe and the United States.</p> +<p><strong>Isabella Antinozzi</strong> is a Research Analyst in the Defence, Industries and Society Research Group at RUSI.</p>Isabella AntinozziThe Russian invasion of Ukraine increased the European Union’s (EU) ambitions in security in defence as well as member states’ appetite for EU-led solutions in this field.Two Wars, One Denominator2023-11-07T12:00:00+08:002023-11-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/two-wars-one-denominator<p><em>As the war in Gaza distracts the West from its support for Ukraine, Russia is seeking to exploit the situation by positioning itself as a reasonable broker that has the ear of both Israel and Hamas.</em></p> -<p>Some smaller manufacturers (or traditionally less important producers for the EDTIB) have embarked on ambitious growth trajectories. Companies in Poland and Türkiye have already achieved remarkable technological developments that set them apart from their regional peers. Türkiye’s industry, in particular, has undergone a major transformation in recent years. Turkish companies have achieved a leading position in the UAV market and moved to the forefront of technology in sectors that include turbojet engines and ballistic missiles. By some measures, Hungary can also be counted into this group, as there is considerable momentum with top tier producers opening facilities in the central European state. These countries are rising stars and can be expected to play a greater role in the future of the EDTIB.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Finally, there are countries with only small or niche industries. They constitute the periphery. This group consists mainly of former Warsaw Pact countries such as Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, and Bulgaria. While they can be competitive in niche sectors, their companies lack the overall technological edge to compete with the European core (let alone the United States). They have few or no system integrators. Most companies focus on component production and maintenance.</p> +<p>The two wars currently dominating the agenda – the Ukraine war and the Israel–Gaza conflict – have one common denominator: Russia. While the causes and aims of the two conflicts are incomparable, Russia has nevertheless sought to ensure that it remains at the heart of the action. But its intentions and management of its different relationships in the Middle East are rather more complex.</p> -<p>After the end of the Cold War, the state-owned industries of the periphery were partly privatized. As demand for standard Warsaw Pact components plummeted, they underwent a period of transition and reform which significantly weakened their DTIBs. NATO integration was another challenge, as many companies were unable to produce according to NATO standards and therefore could not be integrated into European supply chains. This means that in the periphery, the modernization of domestic armed forces does not necessarily lead to new orders for national DTIBs.</p> +<p>While Russia’s ties with Israel have fluctuated over the years, they have strengthened since the Soviet Union’s collapse. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s ambiguous response has strained their relationship. These difficulties were brought to the fore recently on 29 October: in a series of unsettling events, a flight from Tel Aviv landing in the southern Russian city of Makhachkala (Dagestan) was forced to evacuate its passengers due to a rioting mob expressing support for the Palestinian cause and seeking to attack Israelis and Jews.</p> -<p>The differences in industrial portfolios translate into different approaches to industrial policy and procurement. Two approaches can be identified: a capability-driven approach and an industry-driven approach. The dividing line runs, broadly speaking, between western and eastern Europe, and between the core and traditional mid-sized industries on the one side and the rising stars and the periphery on the other. This is due to fundamental differences which are unlikely to change much over the coming decades.</p> +<p>The Kremlin’s response varied from initial prevarication by the security services (who did not regain control over the airport for several hours), blaming the West for the demonstrations and accusing Ukrainian forces of fomenting the civil unrest (with no evidential links between them), to holding a major meeting to discuss the antisemitic event and promising to detain those responsible. None of this filled either the Jewish community across Russia or Israel with much confidence, and Russia’s attempts to involve itself in Israel’s war are unlikely to be well-received in Jerusalem.</p> -<p>Central and eastern European states tend to emphasize capability development over industrial interests (capability-driven approach) to address the security pressure resulting from their geographical proximity to Russia. Of course, they also take their domestic industrial base into account when establishing industrial partnerships. They will attempt to secure small work shares for their domestic companies, especially in maintenance (to be able to operate independently), and seek to benefit from technology transfers. All in all, however, they prioritize operational readiness and capability development over industrial gains. In terms of cooperation, they favor US products over participation in European development projects, which are notorious for cost overruns and delays. Third-country imports and off-the-shelf purchases (which often go hand in hand) are seen as less costly and more efficient than European co-development.</p> +<h3 id="russia-israel-ties">Russia-Israel Ties</h3> -<p>This tendency is reinforced by the fact that their industries are not in a position to contribute significantly to European projects. In some cases, they were even actively excluded from such projects as when Poland’s request to participate in the MGCS was rejected by Germany and France. As a result, rising star and peripheral countries see little or no economic benefit in participating in major European development programs. They are increasingly open to forging new partnerships with non-European producers such as South Korea if these promise rapid delivery and participation in maintenance (and sometimes even production).</p> +<p>While Russia and Israel’s relationship over Syria and deconfliction in the country’s airspace is part of the bilateral picture, as Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has moved further to the right, Israel has sought to forge alliances with countries that have not been traditional Western allies, including India and Hungary as well as Russia.</p> -<p>Western and northern European core countries and countries with a traditional mid-sized industry take a different approach. When they take purchasing decisions, they accord at least the same priority, of not more, to the interests of their domestic industries than to their military needs. Governments try to get their domestic producers involved as much as possible when awarding contracts. As a result, their industries focus more on producing high-end systems that are competitive on the world market than on operational readiness.</p> +<p>However, upon Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel took an unclear position, raising hackles in both Kyiv and Moscow. Israel did not fall behind the Western consensus and has not sanctioned Russia, but nor has it offered military assistance to Ukraine. Israel did accept several thousand Ukrainian refugees, but there was intense debate within Israel about whether to cap their entry, alongside accusations that the refugees’ social and medical benefits had expired and not been renewed. Israel did offer humanitarian aid to Kyiv, and has nominally professed support for Ukrainian independence. But the Canadian parliament’s lauding in September of a Ukrainian Second World War veteran who served in a Nazi unit prompted criticism from Israel, reinvigorating the debate about Ukraine’s contentious role and attitude towards Jews during the war.</p> -<p>At the same time, governments realize that the technological complexity of modern armaments systems means that a purely national production is no longer possible. In this situation, western and northern European countries (especially the industrial core) prefer joint European development programs to non-European imports because the former benefit their domestic producers more. This approach is very much in line with the concept of European strategic autonomy, which basically calls for all major platforms to be produced by European companies in Europe.</p> +<p>Russia itself has a long history of institutionalised antisemitism, pogroms and demonisation of the Jewish community. Although antisemitism and racially aggravated assaults have never been eradicated from Russian society, President Vladimir Putin has made his position on Russian Jewry clear, and has long lent support to the large Jewish community in Moscow, including the commemoration of Jews killed during the Holocaust. He has been lauded for this by representatives of the Jewish community – particularly Rabbi Berel Lazar, one of two claimants to the title of Chief Rabbi of Moscow.</p> -<p>Yet that same rationale does not make joint projects run smoothly. Even when working together, core countries are wary of their economic competitors both inside and outside Europe. This causes problems of co-ordination in European development programs and can lead to the exclusion of potential competitors and the duplication of projects just to ensure a greater share of work for domestic companies (as in the case of Tempest and FCAS).</p> +<p>Putin considers the leaders of the Jewish, Christian and Muslim faiths in Russia to be important allies and a broader part of Russia’s identity as a multicultural nation, and meets with them frequently – although his relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church runs much deeper. Lazar has also walked a careful line between advocating for his community and ensuring that Putin remains onside, which has included a degree of neutrality on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and ambiguity around his views of the Russian government’s actions.</p> -<p>The core (and thus the EDTIB in general) is also marked by an element of risk aversion on the part of large companies, which is turning into an obstacle to innovation. There is not enough private investment to provide funds for research and development (R&amp;D). In contrast to other sectors of the economy, innovation in defense is largely state-funded, which makes companies reluctant to use their own funds, as they know that eventually the government will pay for technological development.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The message of Russia-as-peacemaker serves a useful role in the Kremlin’s quest for legitimacy and power projection in the Middle East</code></em></strong></p> -<p>In addition, major arms producers have been reluctant to ramp up production following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In part, this can be explained by ambivalent signals from governments about the sustainability of long-term financing. If companies are uncertain whether an investment will pay off in the medium and long term, they will be reluctant to make it. However, such investments would be crucial for production to meet wartime demand even if not all production capacity is used in peacetime. There seems to be a conflict between the security interests of states (i.e., creating enough capacity to ramp up production in wartime) and the economic interests of firms (avoiding overcapacity to maximize profits).</p> +<p>The events in Dagestan have particular resonance for Russia’s Jewish communities, which have an historical connection to the North Caucasus. While only a few hundred families may remain in Dagestan, the local Jewish population – known as the Mountain Jews – used to be spread across trade routes over the entire Caucasus region, including Chechnya, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. With their own distinct language, culture and traditions, thousands of the Mountain Jewish community were killed during the Holocaust, and while some remained, most relocated to Moscow or larger cities after the war, with others emigrating to Israel or the US after 1991.</p> -<p><strong>The Absence of Political Visions</strong></p> +<p>Since the Israel–Gaza war began, there has been a surge in violent antisemitic demonstrations across Russia’s North Caucasus, demanding the expulsion of local Jews and attacking a Jewish cultural centre. Given the region’s history, the Dagestan riots have been likened to the pogroms of the past, which sought to uproot well-established Jewish communities.</p> -<p>Political visions are key to the long-term future of the EDTIB because they create coherence with regard to key design features, such as procurement and cooperation strategies. Even more importantly, they help generate a coherent idea of the vision that a European industry should serve and therefore the shape it should take.</p> +<p>But the messaging from the Kremlin has been unclear. Rabbi Lazar met with Putin to discuss the demonstrations, alongside Patriarch Kirill and the Grand Mufti Tadzhuddin. But the Kremlin’s Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, has criticised as Israel’s warning against its citizens travelling to the North Caucasus as “anti-Russian”, in part to downplay the extent of the riots. It appears that Russia is still trying to play both sides of this conflict.</p> -<p>The most influential vision of the last decade has been that of European strategic autonomy. The concept was prominently introduced through the EU’s Global Strategy, in which the EU outlined its ambition to become a more credible security and defense actor. A key element of strategic autonomy is the development of an integrated European defense industrial base capable of producing major weapon systems in Europe. According to this concept, the EDTIB should be able to provide European armed forces with all the weapons they need without having to rely on the United States or other third countries. In short, EU countries should buy European equipment from European producers. In domains where EU countries currently lack capabilities, they should set up joint development programs. The proponents of strategic autonomy see a self-sufficient EDTIB as vital to strengthening Europe’s security of supply and thus boosting its geopolitical weight in systemic competition.</p> +<h3 id="israels-war-russias-gain">Israel’s War, Russia’s Gain</h3> -<p>However, the pursuit of strategic autonomy is by no means an undisputed vision. First, there is a debate about which countries the EU should cooperate with. Some governments, including those that are part of the core, wish to allow third countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States to participate in EU-funded programs. Others want to restrict access to EU funds to the European continent and EU countries.</p> +<p>Despite its attempts to involve itself in this war and to present an image of a mediator with the ear of both Israel and Hamas, in truth, Moscow has neither. The narrative, however, is useful for Russia in several key ways.</p> -<p>Second, many peripheral and rising countries within the EU do not consider European strategic autonomy a priority, mainly because they do not see the benefit of it. On the contrary, they suspect that core countries with industries at the cutting edge of technology are pursuing their own interests under the guise of a supposedly impartial vision. As it happens, the strongest supporters of the concept of European strategic autonomy are the countries best positioned to benefit economically from European development projects.</p> +<p>First, Russia is attempting to position itself as a reasonable broker appealing for calm, which Hamas has lauded. Although few in the West are willing to buy this line, Russia will use its positioning as a future bargaining chip in its war against Ukraine, to demonstrate that it is capable of debate, mediation and politicking. There is also the added bonus for Russia that another war dominating the news cycle has pushed the Russia–Ukraine conflict further down the West’s political agenda.</p> -<p>Another factor weighing against the concept of strategic autonomy concerns the difficulties associated with joint European development programs in the past. Projects such as the NH90 helicopter, the A400M aircraft, or the Eurofighter were notorious for cost overruns, delays, and a failure to deliver the initially promised benefits in terms of economies of scale and military interoperability.</p> +<p>Second, the message of Russia-as-peacemaker serves a useful role in the Kremlin’s quest for legitimacy and power projection in the Middle East. In its bid for allies, and to fulfil its foreign policy directives of deepening engagement in the MENA region (what it refers to as the “Islamic world”), Russia is contrasting itself with the “colonial West” and its troubled history of intervention in the region. By wading into Israel’s long-standing conflict with the Palestinians, which Russia has never before successfully mediated, Putin is seeking to carve out a role as an alternative to the US-dominated negotiations between the warring parties. The message is: where the US has tried and failed, Russia will succeed. Putin’s first public statement on the war ascribed blame to the US, maintaining that this was an example of the failure of its Middle East policies.</p> -<p>Finally, attitudes regarding the future of European integration differ within Europe. Countries such as Poland, Hungary, and the UK are keen to uphold their national autonomy, which also has implications for the defense sector.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Russia is not particularly able to influence Hamas, nor is there any credible proof that it has provided funding or arms to it</code></em></strong></p> -<p>As a result, there is no consistent common vision or idea of what the EDTIB should look like in terms of regional distribution, production portfolio, rules for exports, or cooperation partners. Nor is there any consensus on how much Europe should import or which degree of autonomy it should aim to achieve.</p> +<p>Third, Russia has much to gain from the US’s financial distraction by the Israel–Gaza war. The recent US House of Representatives’ agreement to pass $14.3 billion worth of military aid to Israel was dominated by the Republicans, including an increasingly noisy faction that has long argued for the cessation or at least capping of US military aid to Ukraine. In its current format, the bill is likely to be vetoed – President Joe Biden has made clear that he would like to see broader spending on aid packages that include Ukraine, and the Democrats control the Senate – but it points to a broader bipartisan split within the US political system that Russia is keen to take advantage of in order to limit military aid to Ukraine. While Putin is likely anticipating that the US presidential elections in November 2024 will be a watershed moment for the provision of aid to Ukraine, the Israel–Gaza war has offered another unexpected opportunity to vicariously weaken Ukraine.</p> -<p>This does not mean, however, that there is no common ground. The EU has established a number of instruments for facilitating joint arms development that are widely regarded as successful, notably the EDF. Although these instruments lack clarity, coherence, and compatibility with NATO processes, most governments agree that such EU policies will be crucial for the future development of the EDTIB.</p> +<h3 id="whose-ear-does-russia-have">Whose Ear Does Russia Have?</h3> -<h4 id="how-will-the-edtib-develop">How Will the EDTIB Develop?</h4> - -<p>The analysis presented above suggests that absent major political initiatives, there will be no major changes to the basic design of the EDTIB in the new era of European defense. Instead, business will be conducted as usual. That is, the European core will continue to produce state-of-the-art capabilities that provide a degree of political and operational autonomy from the United States. The periphery will seek to reduce its dependence, including on its European allies, while maintaining an ambivalent attitude toward European cooperation and European strategic autonomy.</p> +<p>In reality, Russia’s ability to impact on the Israel–Gaza conflict is limited. Much has been made of Russia’s hosting of Hamas delegations before and during the war, prompting Israel to summon the Russian ambassador for an explanation.</p> -<p>Although the increase in budgets may revive parts of the defense sector and generate some momentum for defense companies, there are few signs of improved coherence and coordination. Currently, there is no momentum for closer defense industrial cooperation in Europe, nor do waves of consolidation seem likely in the foreseeable future. While small-scale mergers are possible, there appears to be nothing major on the horizon. The overall industrial structure will remain unchanged.</p> +<p>But Russia is not particularly able to influence Hamas, nor is there any credible proof that it has provided funding or arms to it. Russia during the Soviet period paid lip service to the Palestinian cause and aligned itself nominally with their right to self-determination, but following the collapse of the USSR, it prioritised ties with Israel. It did condemn Hamas’s terrorist attacks throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, but has not designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation, and the group’s victory in Gaza’s 2006 parliamentary elections prompted Russia to recognise it as a political entity. Since 2007, Russia’s own Ministry of Foreign Affairs has held meetings with the Hamas leadership, including hosting the former leader of Hamas’s Politburo, Khaled Meshal, in Moscow.</p> -<p>Regional and economic divides will persist, as will the wide differences over sourcing and cooperation. However, there will be opportunities for more ad-hoc, country-to-country, and sectoral cooperation formats such as the European Sky Shield initiative. But there will be no grand design, no coherent European vision of how to coordinate and drive the EDTIB.</p> +<p>Russia has now claimed that its hosting of Hamas delegations is an opportunity to discuss the hostages – at least eight Russian citizens are thought to be held in Gaza. But this is unlikely to be the focus of the talks, and Hamas’s comments after the meeting suggest that the discussion included broader topics, such as Russia’s political views on Israel. Although there is evidence that at least 16 Russian nationals were killed in the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October, those Russians who have taken up Israeli citizenship (and in Moscow’s thinking effectively left the motherland) are not likely to be viewed as a precious commodity by Moscow. Russia’s disregard for human life (including civilian), as seen from its actions thus far in the Ukraine war and in many of its other campaigns, means the return of a handful of its citizens is unlikely to be the true driving force behind these well-staged meetings.</p> -<p>The sources of change are the rising stars and the non-European suppliers. The main players to watch are South Korea, Poland, and Türkiye. The United States is a traditional European supplier already. Its share in Europe may increase but without larger industrial relevance to the American DTIB.</p> +<p>But Putin has also been deliberate with the choreography. He has not met Hamas leaders in person and has allowed Mikhail Bogdanov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and presidential representative on the Middle East, to take the lead, which at least in Moscow’s eyes puts some creative distance between the Russian and Hamas leaderships. Putin himself has chosen his words carefully, maintaining that while Russia does not proscribe Hamas as a terrorist organisation, that does not mean Russia agrees with its actions. This is unlikely to be because of Moscow’s considered application of terminology – the Russian government readily brands other groups that it considers to be true enemies, such as its domestic opposition, Ukrainian nationalists and the Islamic State, as terrorists. It is more likely that Moscow believes this distinction leaves the door open for it to engage more freely with both Israel and Hamas.</p> -<p>Some mid-sized and smaller European players will continue to grow and increase their role. But there will be no major shift in the industrial balance of power. The industrial core will continue to determine the development of the EDTIB. The fundamental power asymmetry will remain, with all its consequences for European cooperation and coordination.</p> +<p>However, Moscow is also aware that terrorism presents a real threat. It has experienced domestic terrorism multiple times before, from insurgency in Chechnya to links in the North Caucasus to the Islamic State, which sought to build its own caliphate in the south of Russia following Russia’s involvement in Syria in 2015. Putin is aware that overly stoking the Israel–Gaza war in favour of either side risks widening the conflict – as has already partly occurred – into a regional war whose spillover could ultimately impact on Russia itself. In Russian, the Middle East is referred to as the blizhny vostok – the Near East – and so Russia will not forget that its geographical proximity to the region makes it vulnerable to any seismic changes.</p> -<p>What are the game changers that could shift this trajectory? If European countries were to agree large multilateral programs with sufficient funding to generate major technological advances, new champions and pan-European companies could emerge, which would transform the industrial landscape. Another game changer could be a reform of EU policies to harmonize existing instruments and shape a consistent development path for the EDTIB.</p> +<hr /> -<h4 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h4> +<p><strong>Emily Ferris</strong> is a Research Fellow in the International Security Studies department at RUSI, specialising in Russian domestic politics. Emily has a particular interest in Russia’s military and civilian infrastructure including its railways, road and port systems, and the role this plays in advancing Russia’s political ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as deployed in conflict zones such as Ukraine. She also researches domestic political administrations in Russia’s Far East, and Russia’s military and political relationship with Belarus.</p>Emily FerrisAs the war in Gaza distracts the West from its support for Ukraine, Russia is seeking to exploit the situation by positioning itself as a reasonable broker that has the ear of both Israel and Hamas.The Kingdom Of Oil2023-11-07T12:00:00+08:002023-11-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-kingdom-of-oil<p><em>Saudi Arabia is set to remain one of the most influential players in global oil and energy markets. Understanding – and taking seriously – its evolving strategic calculus must therefore be a key task for policymakers in the UK and across Europe as they seek to safeguard their countries’ energy security.</em></p> -<p>Given the most likely scenario for the future development of the EDTIB, what can the EU and member state governments do to influence the trajectory of the defense sector and produce a better outcome? The following section sets out which actions can be taken to make the EDTIB more coherent and capable.</p> +<excerpt /> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Regard the EDTIB as a strategic asset: Europe needs to equip the EDTIB to meet both its short and long-term needs. It should regard the EDTIB as a strategic asset, which includes finding answers to questions such as:</p> +<p>Saudi Arabia is widely regarded as the world’s most important oil exporter. Through its own production and as the de facto leader of OPEC and OPEC+, Saudi Arabia can have more influence over international oil markets than most other producers – even countries that do not directly import Saudi oil are therefore affected by Saudi oil policy. In light of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and as energy security has become a top priority for Western governments, the UK and others across Europe and beyond have turned to Saudi Arabia, calling for it to increase production in order to bring down global oil prices.</p> - <ul> - <li> - <p>How can “bonsai industries” be rebuilt to meet European demand?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>What can governments do to enhance the development of defense technologies and avoid being overtaken by competitors such as China?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How can governments make the best use of a wide range of instruments, including political control over the sector? Since the defense industry is vital for national and European security, there is no doubt that political intervention in the market and the exercise of political control over market players can be justified.</p> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li> - <p>Establish a mechanism for building up stocks: In response to the current shortage of ammunition and materiel, European government should pass legally binding requirements to ensure that the EDTIB has sufficient depth in terms of industrial capacity to be able to equip European militaries in a war scenario. They should also provide for sufficient reserves of ammunition and other critical goods. The design of such a system could be inspired by Cold War arrangements.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Secure funding: To stay at the cutting edge of technology, the EU and its member states must make the necessary funding available, particularly for R&amp;D. This means that funding must be sustainable, which will also attract more private investment. Governments need to be able to credibly tell defense companies that the current increases in defense spending and the new level of ambition for European defense are more than a blip. Doing so would send a message to shareholders and owners that investing into the development of new weaponry carries a low risk and that investments will pay off.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Set up major European development programs: Involving as many European countries as possible in major multilateral development programs is the most effective way to boost the technological development of the EDTIB. Such programs ensure that sufficient financial resources are pooled to produce the high-end capabilities needed to remain competitive. At the same time, they create economies of scale and increase interoperability, which is a decisive military advantage.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Develop a strategy to deal with third countries: As third countries become more important as arms suppliers, European governments should develop a common approach toward them. To this end, they need to decide:</p> +<p>Oil revenues have historically fuelled Saudi Arabia’s social contract, and they are now the indispensable source of funding for the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 reform agenda. Although the Saudi Vision 2030 reform agenda ultimately aims at diversifying the Saudi economy, income from oil exports remains the all-important enabler of Saudi Arabia’s political and socioeconomic development in the absence of sufficient foreign direct investment.</p> - <ul> - <li> - <p>Who should be allowed to participate in EDF and PESCO projects and thus benefit from EU funds? This concerns primarily the United Kingdom and the United States but potentially also Indo-Pacific partners such as Australia or Japan.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How much should US companies operating in Europe be allowed to contribute to European projects? What share would make it possible for them to add value without compromising European autonomy?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How should Europe deal with Türkiye and South Korea? As partners? As competitors? Each categorization has different policy implications.</p> - </li> - </ul> - </li> - <li> - <p>Europe must also find solutions to the underlying problems of the EDTIB’s economic structure and the lack of a common political vision. A first step would be a comprehensive review of EU policies to assess which have proved useful and which have not. An important issue for discussion would be to reexamine the European Commission’s approach to competition and consolidation in the defense sector. Before the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022, consolidation was seen as beneficial because it reduced overcapacity, pooled technological knowledge, and created synergies. Some effects, however, have proved problematic. As players left the market or merged and overcapacity was reduced, the EDTIB was unable to ramp up production quickly enough to meet current demand. This shows that a certain amount of industrial overcapacity is probably necessary to be able to scale up production in a war scenario.</p> +<p>This paper analyses Saudi Arabia’s oil policy and how it interacts with the Kingdom’s domestic and foreign and security policies. The following is a summary of the paper’s findings:</p> - <p>Another side-effect of consolidation is the concentration of market power in the hands of a small number of European system integrators. In some sectors, this has led to quasi-oligopolistic market structures, with all the negative effects associated with such a concentration of economic power. Paradoxically, the EU’s emphasis on competition has in some cases led to a reduction in competition as consolidation increased.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Align EU and NATO defense industrial frameworks: A better fit is needed between NATO instruments, such as the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and NATO standards, and the EU industrial framework and, more generally, the EDTIB, to reduce duplication and create synergies. This is one of the few aspects on which there is almost complete consensus among European governments. Eastern European countries in particular stress that EU initiatives should not be realized at the expense of NATO frameworks.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Reduce regional imbalances: A major structural obstacle to greater coherence and coordination in the EDTIB consists of regional imbalances between core countries on the one side and mid-sized countries and the periphery on the other side in terms of industrial capacity and technological advantage. The EU – and especially the industrial core – must find ways to make participation in joint European development programs attractive to central and eastern European countries. This will most likely mean the transfer of knowledge and some part of the production. Such a step requires a willingness on the part of core governments and companies to support industrial development in central and eastern Europe even at the expense of some of their domestic profits. This is the price to be paid for greater coherence, coordination, and involvement of peripheral and mid-sized industries. A good starting point could be to use the additional funds becoming available from rising defense budgets to build production facilities in mid-sized and peripheral countries and integrate them into European supply chains.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Establish a secondary market for used and modernized equipment: Smaller countries with fewer financial resources are calling for the establishment of a secondary market to help modernize their armed forces and meet NATO standards in a cost-effective manner.</p> - </li> +<ul> <li> - <p>Address structural dependencies: Europe has become dependent on imports of raw materials, alloys, and components such as semiconductors, mainly from Asia. Given the systemic competition between Western countries and China, security of supply will be a key issue. Europe’s dependence should be addressed.</p> + <p>Saudi Arabia’s central role in global oil markets is a key source of the Kingdom’s geopolitical power and importance (in addition to its status as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites). Oil has shaped Saudi Arabia’s foreign relations. Most notably, it has facilitated its bilateral relation with the US. For most of the post-1945 era, Saudi Arabia–US relations have been encapsulated in an oil-for-security pact – Saudi Arabia sought to influence international oil markets in line with US interests, while the US provided the Kingdom with political, defence and security support.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Deal with other challenges and structural barriers at the national level:</p> + <p>In recent years, Saudi Arabia has adopted a “Saudi First” approach. This does not constitute a wholesale overhaul of Saudi oil policy and overall foreign political orientation, but rather reflects a reordering of the Kingdom’s strategic priorities that results in Saudi policies that are less directly aligned with US interests. The “Saudi First” approach is driven by a focus on the Vision 2030 reform agenda; a perception that the US is less willing and able to guarantee the Kingdom’s security; an assessment that the US’s “shale revolution” has made international oil markets more competitive and volatile; and a conclusion that global economic shifts, especially the emergence of China as the most important buyer of Saudi oil, necessitate the building of more extensive relations with non-Western powers.</p> </li> -</ol> - -<ul> <li> - <p>Reduce Bureaucracy: Slow and complex procurement processes are a major obstacle in countries across Europe. Eliminating some of the influence of vested interests on the production process will help to speed up procurement decisions. As procurement processes differ from country to country, this is mostly a task for national governments.</p> + <p>Saudi Arabia’s partnership with Russia, manifested in the two countries’ joint leadership of OPEC+, is best understood as a marriage of convenience. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, OPEC+ increases its ability to influence international oil markets by extending OPEC’s coordination of production quotas to more producing countries. Riyadh opposes oil-related sanctions on Russia as destabilising interventions in the market. However, Saudi–Russian relations have been far from straightforward, and there is scope for future disagreements to emerge, including over competition for market share in Asia.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Create the necessary legal environment and defense ecosystem: Some eastern European states have laws which ban the government from supporting and guiding the development of their domestic DTIBs. Yet the production of high-end capabilities requires a comprehensive defense ecosystem with a highly skilled workforce and a sophisticated R&amp;D network, including public research centers. Building such a network across Europe and enabling smaller countries to participate will be crucial.</p> + <p>Both climate change and climate action – specifically pressure for the decarbonisation of the global economy – constitute a major challenge for Saudi Arabia. In recent years, the Kingdom’s approach towards international climate action has shifted from mostly resisting decarbonisation efforts to trying to actively shape the international debate while still advocating for the continued importance of fossil fuels. This also includes beginning attempts to capitalise on potential opportunities in the global energy transition.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Stabilize funding: Another challenge is the lack of binding long-term fiscal legislation that guarantees funding on a multi-year basis. Spain, Italy, and Germany are major players that lack multi-year budget allocations. Companies are discouraged from investing because they cannot be certain that sufficient funds will be available to complete a project. Defense budgets must be approved annually, which means they are subject to change every year. This contradicts the logic of large procurement and development programs which tend to run for several years.</p> + <p>Saudi Arabia is set to remain one of the most influential players in global oil and energy markets. Understanding – and taking seriously – its evolving strategic calculus must therefore be a key task for policymakers in the UK and across Europe as they seek to safeguard their countries’ energy security.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>For the future of Europe’s defense technological and industrial base, it is crucial that the additional public resources invested in defense translate into higher operational readiness of the armed forces and more industrial capacity. This analysis suggests that major reforms are needed to advance the development of the European defense sector. With new funds available, there may be a window of opportunity for change – not necessarily for a fundamental transformation of the sector but certainly to address some of the shortcomings of today’s EDTIB.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<hr /> +<p>In the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the spike in international oil and gas prices that followed, the subject of energy security and the link between energy and geopolitics has jumped to the top of the agenda for governments around the world, including the UK. As part of this shift, policymakers in London, other European capitals and beyond have naturally turned their attention to Saudi Arabia. The question of how much oil Saudi Arabia produces and why – that is, identifying the economic and political drivers behind the country’s oil-related decisions – has become infused with renewed importance.</p> -<p><strong>Christian Mölling</strong> is deputy director of the DGAP Research Institute and head of the Center for Security and Defense.</p> +<p>This paper analyses Saudi Arabia’s oil policy and how it interacts with the country’s domestic and foreign/security policies. The paper forms part of RUSI’s UK National Security and the Net Zero Transition project and is published alongside a paper that focuses on the linkages between Russia’s energy policies and its foreign/security policy behaviour. Together, the two papers examine how Saudi Arabia and Russia – which, along with the US, are the world’s leading oil exporters, being jointly responsible for around 20% of global production – approach their roles as energy superpowers; how their energy-related decision-making has evolved in recent decades and in light of the Ukraine war; and how their foreign policies and conduct in international forums, including on climate change and other major global issues, will continue to have global implications. It should be noted that this paper was drafted prior to the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, and the subsequent war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza (still ongoing at the time of this paper’s publication). The analysis in the paper is therefore not reflective of the impact of conflict on regional dynamics, or on Saudi Arabia’s oil and foreign policy.</p> -<p><strong>Sören Hellmonds</strong> is a freelance scientist.</p>Christian Mölling and Sören HellmondsDrawing insights from defense experts across NATO members, the study highlights the evolving European defense landscape, emphasizing security of supply concerns and the balance between national and EU initiatives. The report underscores pivotal forthcoming decisions in Europe’s defense amidst changing geopolitical dynamics.Treading A Fine Line2023-10-30T12:00:00+08:002023-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/treading-a-fine-line<p><em>After initial speculation around its involvement in the Hamas attacks, Iran is coming under increasing pressure over how to respond to the conflict.</em></p> +<p>Saudi Arabia has rarely been out of the international spotlight in recent years. From the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, to the efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear programme, Saudi Arabia has been a key stakeholder – and active participant – in many of the conflicts and geopolitical issues that have occupied the centre of UK (and European) foreign and security policies over the past decade. The murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government agents in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018 led many Western governments to seek to distance themselves politically from the Kingdom; then-presidential candidate Joe Biden vowed to treat it as a “pariah”. But Russia’s war against Ukraine has not just changed the European and global security environment: it has also contributed to a shift in the debate about Saudi Arabia.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Since the start of the invasion, Western leaders, including US President Biden, then-prime minister Boris Johnson (and other UK ministers), French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz have travelled to Saudi Arabia for talks with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Energy – specifically, the hope that Saudi Arabia would increase oil production in order to bring down international prices – was a key driver behind this diplomatic re-engagement with Riyadh. Since early 2022, Saudi Arabia’s every move – on oil especially, but also with regard to its ongoing friendly relations with Russia, its efforts to expand ties with China, and its various diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East region – has been scrutinised by policymakers in London and across Europe, as well as in the Western media.</p> -<p>From the moment Hamas attacked Israel, Iran has been extremely vocal, praising the assault and warning Israel and the US of reprisals for military action. However, while initially seen as a beneficiary of the events, the pressure on Iran is now starting to mount.</p> +<p>This renewed focus on Saudi oil policy by the UK and its European partners is not only – and for many countries not even primarily – driven by the need or desire to buy more Saudi crude. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a diversification race, as European states scramble to reduce (and ideally end) hydrocarbon imports from Russia in order to deprive Moscow of revenue and reduce its leverage over them. Germany, for example, received 31% of its oil and 60% of its gas from Russia in 2021. The UK was comparatively less affected by this dynamic: in 2021, only 9% of the UK’s oil and 4% of its gas imports came from Russia, and by January 2023 this had been reduced to zero. Saudi oil exports to Europe have increased since February 2022, but much of the gap in European oil supplies has been filled by crude from Norway, the US, West Africa and other Middle Eastern producers.</p> -<p>After the events of 7 October there was immediate speculation over Iranian involvement, with evidence soon surfacing of meetings between Iran, Hizbullah and Hamas. Iran has long viewed Israel as its greatest regional threat, and vice versa. Israel has been involved in a number of successful security operations against Iran, while the Islamic Republic does not recognise the State of Israel. In 2005, former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad famously gave a speech that was translated as saying Israel “should be wiped off the map”.</p> +<p>Yet, regardless of how the UK and its European partners replaced imports from Russia, they all felt the impact of the surge in oil and gas prices sparked by Moscow’s war. In the 12 months leading up to the invasion, the price of a barrel of Brent crude oil increased from just over $63 in February 2021 to over $92, driven, among other factors, by the recovery of the world economy from the Covid-19 pandemic. Prices for natural gas were on a similar trajectory. But Russia’s war sent prices soaring even higher – Brent reached $119 per barrel in early June 2022. As the conflict has continued into its second year, oil prices have returned to pre-war levels, but towards the end of 2023 they remained in the $85–$95 range, significantly higher than they were in most of the previous decade. Ultimately, in the context of globalised energy markets, the UK is not only exposed to disruptions to its direct oil imports, but also to flows and prices of hydrocarbons everywhere around the world. And few players have as much influence over the flows of globally traded oil as Saudi Arabia.</p> -<p>In addition, the Islamic Republic has made supporting Palestinians a key pillar of its foreign policy. As a result, Hamas has long been backed by Tehran, both for its cause and as part of a network of groups across the Middle East that forms an “axis of resistance” against the US, Israel and its allies. Consequently, over many years, Iran has provided funding, equipment and expertise to help Hamas develop its capabilities.</p> +<p>Saudi Arabia is an oil superpower. It holds the second largest proven oil reserves in the world after Venezuela, and its national oil company Saudi Aramco is one of the largest companies in the world – and by far the most profitable. Having established itself as the world’s swing producer, it has invested in maintaining a level of production capacity that has been – and is currently – significantly higher than its actual production, giving it the unique ability to both decrease and increase output.</p> -<h3 id="iran-initially-a-beneficiary-of-the-war">Iran, Initially a Beneficiary of the War</h3> +<p>Moreover, besides itself accounting for up to 12 million barrels per day – or roughly 10% – of global production capacity, Saudi Arabia is also the de facto leader of OPEC and co-leader of OPEC+, alongside Russia. OPEC accounted for around 36% of global production in 2022 (and 80.4% of global reserves), while OPEC+, which was formed in 2016 and includes nine other non-OPEC producers besides Russia, accounted for around 59%. OPEC+ decisions to adjust production quotas, including for example the significant cuts announced in October 2022 and June 2023, tend to be understood – by governments and the media around the world – as reflecting, to a significant degree, Saudi Arabia’s decision-making, albeit within the context of bargaining with the grouping’s other members.</p> -<p>Part of the immediate rationale for Iranian involvement in the attack was that Iran could be seen as a beneficiary of the horrific events. Firstly, Hamas had shattered the illusion of the invincibility of Iran’s archnemesis. In recent years, Israel’s military and intelligence capability, along with its vast defence spending and veil of protection from the sophisticated Iron Dome missile defence system, had created the idea of an unbeatable foe. However, the events of 7 October exposed a number of Israeli weaknesses which have been celebrated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have used the events in their own propaganda to place further doubt on Israeli capability and to boost their own morale.</p> +<p>In addition to Saudi Arabia’s role in influencing day-to-day global oil prices, the Kingdom’s wider geopolitical posture and behaviour are increasingly a focus for UK and European policymakers. The Kingdom’s regional foreign policy continues to affect regional stability in the Middle East, which, in turn, has implications for UK and European security; and its positioning vis-à-vis the US (and the wider West), Russia and China, and the Global South, are seen as indicators of the posture and direction other countries in the Middle East might adopt in a changing global order. Further, as a hydrocarbon superpower, Saudi Arabia is clearly a major stakeholder in international efforts to combat climate change and decarbonise the global economy.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Iran will not want to risk any major escalation that would force a decision about direct military involvement</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="structure-and-methodology">Structure and Methodology</h4> -<p>Secondly, the events have diverted attention away from Iran’s borders. As the region had begun to look increasingly peaceful, there was a further focus on Iran’s rising nuclear threat, human rights record, and destabilising activities across the Middle East. However, effort and resources have now been refocused towards the west of the region. Last week, for example, the expiration of UN sanctions on Iranian ballistic missiles went largely unreported.</p> +<p>This paper is divided into three chapters. The first examines Saudi Arabia’s relationship with oil, and traces how revenues from crude exports have shaped – and continue to shape – the Kingdom’s social contract, including their envisaged role and importance in the government’s root-and-branch political, economic and social reform agenda, Vision 2030. The second chapter looks at the linkages between oil and Saudi Arabia’s national security and foreign policy, including within the context of OPEC+. The final chapter focuses on how Saudi Arabia is navigating the dual challenges of climate change and climate action.</p> -<p>Thirdly, the attacks have put a halt to any normalisation negotiations between Iran’s archenemy Israel and its regional rival Saudi Arabia. Israel has been slowly building up relations with its neighbours, culminating in the 2020 Abraham Accords with the UAE and Bahrain. More recently, conversations have been progressing with Saudi Arabia, with which Iran made its own deal to restore relations earlier this year. However, reigniting the conflict between Israel and Palestinians has caused a snapback reaction by some Arab states and has temporarily derailed Israeli-Saudi negotiations. All Arab countries have issued statements condemning Israeli airstrikes, and the King of Jordan even cancelled a meeting with US President Joe Biden and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas in protest against Israeli military activities.</p> +<p>The paper argues that Saudi Arabia continues to see itself as the crucial stabiliser of the international oil market. However, its leadership’s ambitious political and socioeconomic domestic agenda, along with its perception of the changing international environment (and its vision for the Kingdom’s role therein) has led to a reorganisation of priorities. The outcome of this is a more unapologetically self-interested and less obviously Western-aligned energy and foreign policy.</p> -<h3 id="the-rising-pressure-on-tehran">The Rising Pressure on Tehran</h3> +<p>The paper is primarily based on desk-based research, consulting open source journals, books, statements from Saudi officials and media reporting. It also draws on 15 supplementary interviews conducted by the author, and more informal engagement with subject matter experts and officials in the Gulf, the UK, Europe and the US, including during two visits to Saudi Arabia in 2023.</p> -<p>However, despite the original speculation around Iranian involvement in the Hamas attacks and the initial benefits to Iran, Tehran quickly denied any participation, and the US has since declared there to be no evidence of direct Iranian involvement in the events of 7 October. Furthermore, as the conflict progresses, Iranian officials are coming under increasing pressure. In particular, Iran needs to demonstrate ongoing support for its Hamas and Hizbullah allies, but will find it ever more difficult to provide weaponry, both as logistics become more challenging in the conflict zones and because of the balancing act between arming these – and other – groups, honouring arms deals with Russia, and maintaining its own defensive capabilities and military arsenal.</p> +<h3 id="i-a-kingdom-built-on-oil">I. A Kingdom Built on Oil</h3> -<p>Iran will also not want to risk any major escalation that would force a decision about direct military involvement. Iran’s strategy has always been to provide “forward defence” through its proxy groups and to follow a policy of maximum tactical flexibility, with provocation that hovers on the threshold of confrontation without spilling into outright war. However, if the war spreads, the Islamic Republic’s options and flexibility will rapidly decrease, and as tensions rise, so does the risk that provocative activity will lead to miscalculation and escalation.</p> +<p>In many ways, Saudi Arabia has been defined by, and was built on, its oil wealth – the country has developed symbiotically with its oil industry, which has fuelled the global economy for most of the past century.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While the destruction of Hamas would significantly weaken Iran’s regional strategy, supporting Hamas in the long term may prove even more costly</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Initially, it was US oil companies that first struck oil in Saudi Arabia in 1938 and established the country’s oil export infrastructure. Having secured the concession for Saudi oil at a bargain price, these companies also built much of Saudi Arabia’s early infrastructure so as to maintain good relations with the king and his government as the scale of the Kingdom’s resource wealth became more apparent. Through the 1960s and 1970s, however, the Saudi state gradually moved to take control: by 1976 it had taken full ownership of Aramco – the Arabian American Oil Company, established in 1944 by Standard Oil of California (today’s Chevron) and the Texas Company (Texaco, now part of Chevron). In 1988, the state finally created the Saudi Arabian Oil Company to take over all of Aramco’s assets, including its name – by which Saudi Arabia’s national oil company is still known today.</p> -<p>Finally, Iranian focus on the Israel–Hamas war will cause further tensions domestically. The country has seen significant unrest in recent months, with the public more concerned about Iran’s flailing economy, returning social restrictions and crackdowns on protests. In particular, anti-government protests have regularly featured the chant “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon. I sacrifice my life for Iran” in response to concerns over the use of government funds to support Hamas and Hizbullah, so Iranian focus in this area is likely to cause further unrest.</p> +<h4 id="oil-islam-and-the-social-contract">Oil, Islam and the Social Contract</h4> -<p>As a result, Iran has some difficult decisions to make over the coming weeks and months. While the pressure around Iranian nuclear activity and Israel’s normalisation of its regional relations may have somewhat reduced, this is only temporary. In addition, while the destruction of Hamas would significantly weaken Iran’s regional strategy, supporting Hamas in the long term may prove even more costly.</p> +<p>Oil and the revenues from its export are a key foundation for Saudi Arabia’s political and socioeconomic development model and for the social contract between the ruling Al-Saud family and the population. It is the income from oil exports, rather than money raised through taxation, that has paid for the Kingdom’s modern infrastructure, the formation of its state institutions, and the extensive package of services and cradle-to-grave welfare benefits they have traditionally delivered to Saudi citizens. It has also paid for large quantities of modern Western military hardware, and for a foreign policy that has, as one of its main tools, the ability to provide financial and material support to partners and allies in the Middle East region and beyond (discussed in more detail in the next section).</p> -<hr /> +<p>Traditionally, oil has also been an important factor in the relationship between the Saudi government (and general state apparatus) and the Kingdom’s conservative religious establishment. Long before the discovery of oil, Islam was a central source of legitimacy and identity for the Al-Saud and their Kingdom (and its previous iterations). Saudi monarchs have derived power and status from their role as the political masters of Islam’s holiest sites in Mecca and Medina; except for King Khalid (ruled 1975–82), all Saudi monarchs since King Faisal (ruled 1964–75) have assumed the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques as their primary honorific. Domestically, religion provided the ideational link between the ruling family and its subjects, with clerics holding positions as crucial intermediaries. For decades, Saudi domestic politics and foreign policy have both been dominated by competing pressures from this powerful constituency; and from the Kingdom’s integration into a rapidly globalising and, for a long time, US/Western-dominated world. Oil revenues gave the Saudi leadership the means to navigate this space.</p> -<p><strong>Louise Kettle</strong> is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Nottingham. Her research is focused on Britain’s foreign and security relationship with the Middle East across the twentieth century and up to the present day. Her current research is examining British-Iranian relations.</p>Louise KettleAfter initial speculation around its involvement in the Hamas attacks, Iran is coming under increasing pressure over how to respond to the conflict.Goodbye Mr Chips?2023-10-30T12:00:00+08:002023-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/goodbye-mr-chips<p><em>Better practices are needed to improve the effectiveness of defence training.</em></p> +<p>With the 1973 oil embargo, Saudi Arabia tried to use its oil-based geopolitical weight to affect the great regional cause of the time, the Arab and Palestinian struggle against Israel (which had an obvious religious dimension). Previous embargoes in the contexts of the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1967 Six-Day War had been ineffectual, but the 1973 embargo was accompanied by a 25% cut in OPEC production that sent oil prices skyrocketing. The embargo largely failed to achieve its immediate political objective of curbing Western support for Israel, but it effectively announced Saudi Arabia’s arrival on the global stage as a power to be reckoned with, and one that the US and its Western allies resolved it would be best to maintain close relations with. Domestically, the resulting oil revenue windfall fuelled an urbanisation and modernisation boom.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>But by the 1980s, the dual shocks of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Islamic extremists, both in 1979, led to a course correction. The Saudi leadership doubled down on religious conservatism by diverting oil-derived state funds to be spent in line with the priorities of the clerical establishment. Internationally, Saudi Arabia walked a tightrope between relying on the US and other Western partners for its defence and security needs and taking on the mantle of leadership for the Arab and Islamic worlds (with particular responsibility for related political and religious causes). The Kingdom turned to Washington to protect it from the fallout of the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s and from Iraq’s subsequent expansionist ambitions (which led it to try to annex Kuwait in 1990); and it worked closely with the US to support the mujahedeen in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. But Saudi Arabia also invested heavily in internationally focused Islamic institutions such as the Muslim World League, the University of Madinah and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, all of which were regarded as promoting the conservative views of the Kingdom’s religious establishment.</p> -<p>Training is crucial for enabling UK Defence to deliver operational success, and broadens the potential talent pool by allowing Defence to recruit people who can develop the necessary skills, rather than simply competing for pre-trained talent (which often is in short supply). The breadth and scale of military training is significant, with a clear management process – the Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT) – in which requirement-setters identify training needs that are passed to delivery authorities, who design and deliver the training; the requirement-setters then review the training to ensure that it provides what is needed. While this sets a structured framework for training, there are challenges Defence must overcome to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its training system. These challenges exist across several areas: culture; system governance; processes; training delivery; the wider learning environment; and workforce capacity.</p> +<h4 id="the-vision-2030-revolution">The Vision 2030 Revolution</h4> -<p>Pockets of good practice exist in Defence, and much could be gained from sharing these more widely, but lessons should also be learned from training practice outside Defence. This paper identifies improvements in four key areas to help modernise Defence training and prepare the armed forces for the challenges to come:</p> +<p>Over the past decade, Saudi Arabia’s approach – including to oil-related decision-making and to how it defines its international role – has changed: subtly in some regards, but more dramatically in others. King Salman (who ascended to the throne in 2015) and especially his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, have made their Vision 2030 the North Star of their domestic and foreign policy. They have radically disempowered the Kingdom’s clerical establishment; declared economic development and diversification to be the primary national objectives; and adopted a more unapologetically self-interested and assertive international posture.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Upskilling the whole training workforce by improving the training given to any personnel engaged in training others (“train the trainer”).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Improving training delivery through more personalised “learning journeys”, active learning and greater use of technology.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>A better understanding of Defence training as a system and as a crucial component of military capability via clearer lines of accountability, better use of data, and mechanisms allowing training to be more responsive to changing individual and organisational needs.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Partnering with external organisations that can complement Defence’s skillset by supplying adult education (andragogical) expertise.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Economic diversification – the idea of reducing the economy’s dependence on oil exports – has long been on the Saudi agenda, at least in theory. In practice, however, very little progress has been made over the decades, with efforts to diversify essentially fluctuating inversely to international oil prices: when prices were low, diversification was in; when prices were high, it dropped down the list of priorities. Vision 2030 appears to have altered this dynamic: a number of path-breaking economic reforms have already been implemented; the government seems to be serious about curbing some aspects of the oil-financed cradle-to-grave welfare state; and there is an intense flurry of activity across the Kingdom to build and invest in new commercial sectors (for example an entertainment industry) and various mega projects (including, most prominently, the Red Sea city NEOM).</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>However, all these efforts remain inextricably linked to oil. In the absence of sufficient foreign direct investment, oil revenues are the most important source of funding for everything the government is trying to achieve. Through a set of centralising political reforms, Saudi Aramco and the Saudi oil industry have been put in the service of enabling Vision 2030. Key steps in this regard have included: the creation of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs, chaired by Mohammed bin Salman, to streamline all decision-making related to Vision 2030, which effectively encompasses all domestic and economic policy fields; the sale of almost 2% of Saudi Aramco in an initial public offering in 2019 and the transfers of two 4% stakes in Saudi Aramco to the Kingdom’s Public Investment Fund in 2022 and 2023, respectively; and the restructuring and rebranding of the Ministry of Energy, which oversees Saudi Aramco. In 2019, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources was split up to create the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources. The energy minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, son of the king, half-brother of the Crown Prince and the first member of the royal family in this ministerial position, has worked to give his ministry a new brand identity, stressing that its focus is on energy writ large, rather than oil alone. He has also presided over Saudi Aramco’s expansion to become a more integrated oil company by investing in both upstream production and downstream means of value generation such as refining capacity and petrochemical production.</p> -<p>Recent defence and security reviews have identified a strategic context wherein armed forces face a “more contested and volatile world”. Simultaneously, rapid advances in technology have changed the way armed forces operate and mean that Defence must constantly refresh its skills base by bringing in new talent and, increasingly, reskilling and repurposing its existing talent. The Integrated Operating Concept and the Haythornthwaite Review corroborated this, highlighting the importance of people in providing the “adaptive edge”. The Defence Command Paper Refresh stated that Defence would “better target our training and education … to upskill those that we recruit and … those already in our workforce”, with “skills at the heart of the way we access, plan and manage our workforce”. Attracting and retaining the necessary talent, however, is challenging, with more people leaving the forces than are joining.</p> +<p>Economic diversification is the central mantra of Vision 2030, which has itself become the defining feature of Saudi Arabia’s domestic politics and national agenda. To commit to this, Saudi Arabia must maintain oil prices at a relatively high level. In the long run, the government hopes that Vision 2030 – and its successors – can modify or replace the old social contract in the Kingdom. While Islam will remain one of the most important features of Saudi identity, the government has felt confident enough about its modernisation agenda’s attractiveness to the population to dismantle the religious establishment as a political force in the Kingdom. Yet, throughout all of this, the Saudi leadership remains aware that the production and export of oil remains the all-important enabler of their Kingdom’s political and socioeconomic development.</p> -<p>Although the armed forces have shrunk substantially since the Cold War and represent a relatively small draw on the overall UK population, not all people are eligible – for example on health, lifestyle (drugs) or fitness grounds – or indeed willing to join. And so, while the UK population is growing in absolute terms, this growth is largely driven by migration and by increases in groups from which the military struggles to recruit. Moreover, the armed forces’ nationality requirements mean they must compete with other employers for UK domestic talent. This is not unique to the UK; there are global shortages of STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) skills, and Defence is in a “war for talent” against more flexible and adaptable commercial employers.</p> +<h3 id="ii-oil-security-and-power">II. Oil, Security and Power</h3> -<p>Noting the demands of new technology and forms of warfare, the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD’s) 2019 Defence People Strategy identified the challenges of a changing labour market and workforce expectations: in a world where more people may not commit to lengthy, linear careers, but instead choose to zig-zag in and out of professions and employers over longer working lives, Defence’s traditional people model will struggle; and while the totality of the Defence offer, including pay, must be competitive, Defence cannot win the war for talent fighting on salary alone, and nor should it try to, given wider affordability challenges. Greater flexibility in accessing talent developed and employed in other parts of the “whole force”, including industry, would help mitigate the risk. However, without the freedom to pay full commercial salaries and differentiate pay across the workforce to target the skills that are in short supply (potentially at the expense of those whose skills are less in demand), the availability of extensive learning and development opportunities is and remains crucial for ensuring the armed forces have access to the skills they need.</p> +<p>For Saudi Arabia, there has always been a direct connection between its oil industry (and status as a world-leading oil producer) and the country’s national security. As outlined above, oil has been and remains the foundation for the Saudi economy and the social contract between the Saudi state and its people; as such, it is inseparable from domestic political stability and security. In terms of foreign affairs, oil has similarly been at the heart of the Kingdom’s most important bilateral relationships, most obviously the one with the US. At the same time, its oil and derived wealth have also been a key source of Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical weight, influence and power on the global stage.</p> -<p>Moreover, the recruiting pool is widened because Defence can recruit untrained personnel and provide them with the right skills, although retaining these skilled people is a different challenge. More broadly, the nation benefits when trained personnel leave the forces to join the wider economy, as such people have valuable technical, leadership and management skills. This also enables social mobility. As digital technologies develop, these kinds of human skills are likely to be in greater demand for honing the uniquely human contribution to human–machine teams. Like digital expertise, these skills are expected to be in short supply, and are often harder to develop.</p> +<h4 id="the-oil-for-security-era">The Oil-for-Security Era</h4> -<p>Learning and development is also highly attractive to young people, especially those from ethnic minority backgrounds, so an improved approach to training, including allowing more personalised learning journeys, could broaden Defence’s appeal as an employer. Meanwhile, greater flexibility and a focus on skills-based training could open up new career pathways for those already in Defence, aiding retention, but this must be accompanied by improvements to the learning environment so that it better reflects a contemporary learner’s expectations. Far from being an overhead or a luxury, therefore, learning and development is a vital tool for ensuring that the armed forces have the skills to deliver in the “more contested and volatile world” described by the Integrated Review Refresh 2023. The Haythornthwaite Review identified that more agile approaches to training were needed, drawing on digital delivery, but did not conduct “a detailed analysis of what training is needed”.</p> +<p>For most of the past century, the link between Saudi Arabia’s oil policy and its foreign, defence and security policy has been most obviously apparent in its relationship with the US. The February 1945 meeting between King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud and US President Franklin D Roosevelt on the USS Quincy, during which the two men forged the oil-for-security bargain around which bilateral relations between Riyadh and Washington have revolved ever since, is part of the folklore of modern Middle East politics. The Carter Doctrine, proclaimed in 1980, made the US’s commitment to the security of the Gulf region – and therefore also to Saudi Arabia – even more explicit, clarifying that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force”. President Jimmy Carter also emphasised that the US would expect “the participation of all those who rely on oil from the Middle East” in these efforts to ensure the uninterrupted flow of hydrocarbons from the Gulf to international markets. Although the Doctrine was initially formulated with the Soviet Union in mind as the threatening “outside force”, the US-led campaign to liberate Kuwait and protect Saudi Arabia from potential further Iraqi aggression in 1990–91 was arguably its most tangible manifestation.</p> -<h4 id="scope">Scope</h4> +<p>Saudi Arabia has generally held up its side of the bargain. Except for the US position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which precipitated the 1973 embargo and production cut described earlier, Saudi Arabia was generally committed to accommodating the US’s interest in maintaining the steady flow of affordable oil to fuel the American economy and, ultimately, the global economy. Energy expert Daniel Yergin has described Saudi Arabia as being akin to the “central bank of world oil”. Saudi Arabia was never under the illusion that it alone – or any other producer or consumer – could ultimately control the highly dynamic international oil market. On several occasions, the decisions to adjust production failed to have their intended effect, either because of miscalculation or because of geopolitical and global economic developments that had much greater impact on energy markets. But in principle at least, Saudi Arabia – through its position at the helm of OPEC, and embracing its status as the great swing producer capable of quickly increasing or decreasing its output – sought to contain oil price fluctuations as much as it could.</p> -<p>This paper complements the defence and security reviews by examining how individual training and education – rather than that delivered to units (collective training) – should change to deliver more effectively the skilled workforce that Defence needs. While this paper focuses on learning and development for individual members of the armed forces, many lessons also apply to the civil service, although the breadth and depth of learning and development offered differ substantially.</p> +<p>These efforts to bring a degree of balance to the international oil market were shaped by more than the desire to retain US favour. Most obviously, Saudi Arabia needed to sell oil to sustain its domestic economy and social contract. That meant, and still means, trying to keep prices high enough to cover its government budget – often referred to as the “break-even price” – and stable enough to allow a degree of planning security. Yet Saudi Arabia also made a conscious effort to prevent prices from climbing too high. Although higher prices would translate to higher revenues for the Saudi state (at least as an immediate consequence), the Kingdom has long urged moderation, lest overly high energy costs slow the global economy and eventually dampen demand or provide additional incentives for the development of alternative energy sources.</p> -<p>This paper first describes the framework within which the armed forces conduct their training, before identifying six challenges constraining the current system’s ability to maximise the value of Defence training and education. Then, drawing on examples of good practice inside and outside Defence, the paper concludes by highlighting how Defence training might be improved for greater efficiency and/or improved effectiveness of the already significant investment UK Defence makes in its people. The paper’s findings are based on both primary and secondary research conducted over five months, involving 32 structured interviews with people managing, delivering or supporting individual training and education: these people range across UK Defence, international armed forces, academia and training providers. The paper also draws on literature dealing with good learning and development practice.</p> +<p>In sum, Saudi Arabia has traditionally understood its hydrocarbon wealth as giving it special responsibilities that went far beyond those an ordinary state might have to its people, instead extending to the health of the global economy. In this context, it also regarded US commitments to Gulf security as being about more than the preservation of the Kingdom’s own national security. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the oil-for-security bargain was not just a bilateral pact serving the interests of two countries, but a critical component of the post-Second World War global order – with the Kingdom as the world’s pivotal energy provider.</p> -<h3 id="i-defence-training-framework">I. Defence Training Framework</h3> +<h4 id="the-emergence-of-a-saudi-first-approach">The Emergence of a “Saudi First” Approach</h4> -<p>The British armed services are consistently in the top 10 of UK apprenticeship providers, with 24,800 people undertaking their apprenticeships in 2022. In 2023, the British Army was the top UK apprenticeship provider, with the Royal Navy third and Royal Air Force seventh. Its breadth of employment is huge too, with a uniformed and civilian workforce of over 200,000, ranging from relatively low skilled manual labour through to cyber experts and nuclear scientists. The Services describe 242 different roles on their websites, and civil service roles add even more. These disparate trades, some of which are unique to Defence – such as combat roles – come with specific training burdens. Despite the evident scale of training and its associated investment, the MoD cannot provide a definitive figure of how many people are in training at any one time, or the cost. Indeed, there appears to be no consistent definition of, or systematic data on, training costs.</p> +<p>In June 2023, after announcing another major production cut, Saudi energy minister Abdulaziz bin Salman declared that the Kingdom and its partners within OPEC and OPEC+ would “do whatever is necessary to bring stability to this market”. He explained that the decision was based on projections of weak global demand in the context of a slow global economy. This was Saudi Arabia playing its traditional role as balancer. The minister and other Saudi leaders made the same arguments to justify the other two recent production cuts, in October 2022 and April 2023. Yet, in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent spike in energy prices, all three announcements attracted vocal criticism. Many observers suggested that the cuts represent a change in Saudi policy, arguing that instead of acting as the pro-Western oil central banker of yesteryear, the Kingdom had adopted a more resource-nationalist “Saudi First” approach aimed at keeping prices elevated, and potentially even favouring OPEC+ member Russia’s interests over those of the US and other Western countries.</p> -<h4 id="types-of-training">Types of Training</h4> +<p>Assertions that there has been a wholesale overhaul of Saudi oil policy and overall foreign political orientation go too far, but it is true that there has been a change in what the Kingdom regards as its main strategic priorities and how it believes it can best achieve them. The shift in Saudi domestic politics described above, encapsulated in the proclamation of Vision 2030 as the Kingdom’s all-encompassing national development roadmap, also finds expression in how Saudi leaders approach oil export decisions, and in Saudi foreign policy more generally. As noted earlier, the need to fund the long list of socioeconomic reforms and development projects represents a renewed incentive to maximise oil revenues. Whereas in the past Saudi leaders might have looked to find a balance between their financial needs and their strategic alignment with the US, the pursuit of Vision 2030 now trumps all other considerations. From decisions on oil production and the willingness to work closely with Russia to coordinate outputs across OPEC+, through the agreement to normalise relations with Iran under the auspices of China, to the re-engagement with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime – if Saudi Arabia believes that an action serves Vision 2030, it is prepared to act in a way that might prompt criticism or opposition from Washington and elsewhere.</p> -<p>Defence divides training into “individual” and “collective” categories. Individual training concerns the knowledge, skills, behaviour and attitudes of the individual. Beyond this, collective training aims to develop units and formations in order for them to function as cohesive entities. While the Chief of Defence People (CDP) is the owner of the process for individual training, collective training responsibility sits with the individual Services, and with Strategic Command. The bridge between the two types of training is a crucial one, where the historically linear progression of individual courses followed by progressive collective training needs to be reconsidered given the smaller workforce, faster-changing skills and ever-increasing demands on forces held at readiness.</p> +<p>This approach is shaped by Saudi Arabia’s perception of key trends in the global environment that have serious implications for its national security. Most importantly, Saudi Arabia has lost confidence in the US’s willingness to hold up its side of the old oil-for-security bargain. Saudi Arabia is aware that the US, with its extensive basing infrastructure and thousands of deployed troops, remains the single most powerful military power in the Gulf region. The Kingdom does not believe that any other external power – not China, not Russia – is prepared (or able) to take over the role the US has played in upholding maritime security in the region, and it is still looking to purchase weapons from the US (and European partners) to strengthen its defence capabilities. Yet, from Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the US commitment not just to be present in the region, but to exercise power and to do so in line with the Kingdom’s conception of regional security and stability, has eroded over the past two decades.</p> -<h4 id="individual-training--phases">Individual Training – Phases</h4> +<p>According to Riyadh, the George W Bush administration dismissed Saudi Arabia’s warnings that regime change in Iraq would unleash regional instability; Riyadh also holds that the Obama administration allowed the regional order to unravel further by abandoning the Mubarak regime in Egypt, not intervening decisively against the Assad regime in Syria and ignoring regional concerns in negotiating the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran; finally, Riyadh’s view is that the Biden administration never attempted to hide its dislike of the Kingdom. Even the Trump administration, which had initially appeared to be more responsive to Saudi concerns, did nothing when Iran attacked Saudi Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais on 14 September 2019. This was a watershed moment for Saudi Arabia: from the Kingdom’s perspective, there could hardly be a more obvious reneging on the oil-for-security bargain than a non-response to an attack that took more than 5 million barrels per day – roughly half of Saudi production – offline.</p> -<p>While much of the forces’ technical training happens in Joint schools, Service-specific training still abounds, especially in the early stages of an individual’s career. Even in “Joint” schools, many courses are exclusively “single Service”, reflecting that Service’s specific needs and different career structures. The MoD identifies three phases of training:</p> +<p>As well as being prompted by the changes the Kingdom perceived in its bilateral relations with the US, recent shifts in Saudi Arabia’s oil-related decision-making and foreign policy have also been a response to how the Kingdom has experienced developments in the US’s energy industry over the past decade. From Riyadh’s perspective, the shale oil and gas revolution in the US has dramatically altered the dynamics of international markets, rapidly increasing overall global production capacity (affecting international prices) and turning the US into a net exporter of hydrocarbons (and therefore a competitor for market share). Moreover, the shale revolution has increased price volatility, partly because shale production has shorter timelines than traditional extraction projects, which contributes to more fluctuations in supply levels, and partly because the companies involved in the US oil industry are mostly private entities operating outside the constraints of the kind of production quotas that Saudi Arabia and its fellow OPEC members have long used to exert influence over the global market.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Phase One training is synonymous with basic training: how the armed forces turn civilians into military personnel. It is delivered on a single Service basis, with separate schools and programmes for officers and non-commissioned personnel. For regulars, these are often lengthy residential programmes delivered at central locations, although course duration differs by Service. For reserves, the training is usually shorter and conducted regionally or at their home unit.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Phase Two provides initial specialist training, where individuals are trained for their specialisation. The content and duration of the training depends on the role. Courses are mostly bespoke to each Service, even where they are run in Joint schools. Some non-commissioned personnel complete Phase One and Phase Two training, usually with some additional workplace training, in just under a year. More demanding roles require longer courses, and often gaps between courses (for example, engineer or pilot roles can require many years before they become “productive”).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Phase Three covers all individual training and education after completing Phase Two. It includes further professional and general management training linked to promotion and career development, and broader Professional Defence and Security Education (PDSE). Further professional training is generally delivered within the single Service systems that delivered Phase Two training. Promotion-based command, leadership and management training is routinely provided by the individual’s Service (for example, non-commissioned officer and officer promotion courses). PDSE is delivered either by single Services (intermediate command and staff courses) or as Joint training (advanced and higher command and staff courses and Royal College of Defence Studies). There are also sponsored places for personnel to study, full time or part time, at civilian universities. Phase Three courses range from a few days to over a year. Most courses result from a specific requirement of a Service person’s career.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>In fact, Saudi Arabia has regarded recent US government decision-making related to the management of international energy markets as hypocritical and wilfully destabilising. In its view, Washington has refused to rein in the US oil industry to prevent the oversupply of the market (though this is arguably hardly possible, as the US oil industry is mostly privately owned and therefore not subject to government-set quotas), and then turned to Saudi Arabia to call for production cuts when prices fell so low as to threaten the viability of US oil companies. The most obvious example of the latter pattern was President Trump’s appeal to Saudi Arabia and Russia to end their price war in April 2020. Moreover, Saudi Arabia feels that the actions the US and other Western governments have taken to deal with the increase in prices since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and to try to target Russian energy exports through sanctions, have equated to precisely the kind of politicisation of energy policy that the Kingdom has been accused of. Riyadh regards the substantial release from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserves since February 2022, and the US–European attempt to impose a price cap on Russian oil, as blatant and politically motivated manipulations of the market.</p> -<p>Separately, individuals must complete annual mandatory training to achieve central competencies such as data protection, heat illness training, the law of armed conflict and unacceptable behaviours awareness. These are mostly delivered online and can be as short as 30 minutes.</p> +<p>The overall result, from Saudi Arabia’s perspective, is a more competitive and volatile market in which the Kingdom is still expected to (and indeed wants to) maintain a degree of balance and stability, while others – the US government and US energy companies in particular – take no such responsibility. The decision to expand the coordination of production levels beyond OPEC by creating the OPEC+ grouping with Russia, and Riyadh’s insistence on continuing to work with Moscow after February 2022, despite intense criticism from the West, has been a key element of how Saudi Arabia has tried to respond to these new dynamics. This is discussed in more detail below.</p> -<h4 id="individual-training--governance">Individual Training – Governance</h4> +<p>A third, related, key driver of changes in Saudi Arabia’s international positioning, including as an energy producer, is the Kingdom’s understanding of the ongoing shifts in the global political and economic order. Long before the shale revolution in the US, the West’s importance as a customer of Saudi – and Middle Eastern – hydrocarbons had declined significantly; as of 2021, the vast majority of Saudi crude exports went to Asia (250.4 million tonnes, with only 72.8 million tonnes going to non-Asian countries; China alone accounted for 87.6 million tonnes). Renewed European interest in Middle Eastern oil and gas following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has not changed the fact that Saudi Arabia (and most other hydrocarbon producers) continue to see markets in Asia as their main priorities and future growth areas. The Western approach to climate change and the energy transition, discussed in the next section, is an important factor in this calculus. Ultimately, Saudi Arabia judges that while the US and the West are still important, including for its defence and the success of its Vision 2030, it is in the Kingdom’s interest to diversify its international relations, not least by forging closer relations with its most important oil customer, China. In Riyadh’s view, this does not imply that it has to position itself against the US, but it does mean that it is determined to resist pressure to conform with what it regards as an emerging Western with-us-or-against-us attitude vis-à-vis Beijing (or Moscow).</p> -<p>Almost all Defence training is governed by the “Joint Service Publication (JSP) 822: Defence Direction and Guidance for Training and Education”. A comprehensive document (679 pages), it describes the Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT), covering the analysis, design, delivery and assurance of training (see Figure 1). Assurance consists of: internal validation (InVal) – did the training deliver the syllabus?; and external validation (ExVal) – did the training achieve what was intended?</p> +<p>The notion that Saudi Arabia has adopted a “Saudi First” approach in recent years is somewhat misleading, in that it suggests that the Kingdom’s foreign policy and decisions on oil exports were previously guided by anything other than what Saudi leaders regarded as their – and their country’s – interests. During the oil-for-security era, Saudi Arabia generally determined that its interests were best served by aligning itself as closely as possible with the US, including in how it exercised its role as an oil exporter committed to stabilising and moderating international prices as much as possible. Indeed, Ibrahim Al-Muhanna, a long-time adviser in the Saudi Ministry of Energy, suggests that Saudi leaders were even prepared to occasionally accommodate requests from US politicians to try to nudge energy prices downwards to help with US election campaigns. Over the past decade, and most obviously since the rise to power of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the proclamation of his Vision 2030, Riyadh’s calculations have changed. The perceived unreliability of the US as a security provider, changes in the global balance of power and the need to fund Vision 2030 are key factors driving an approach that is less US-centric and more focused on maintaining a higher level of prices if possible.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/T5RYsLf.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Elements of DSAT.</strong> Source: MoD, “Joint Service Publication 822: Defence Direction and Guidance for Training and Education: Volume 1”, last updated September 2022, p. 7.</em></p> +<h4 id="saudi-arabia-and-the-opec-connection-with-russia">Saudi Arabia and the OPEC+ Connection with Russia</h4> -<p>DSAT involves three main actors:</p> +<p>The Saudi–Russian partnership, manifested in the countries’ joint leadership of the OPEC+ grouping, is best understood as a marriage of convenience, rather than an expression of a wider strategic alignment – certainly not one that even approaches the importance of the Kingdom’s relationship with the US, or with China, for that matter. OPEC+ was formed in 2016 in response to the disruption to the global oil market caused by the US shale revolution. By increasing the number of countries coordinating production levels, the members of OPEC+ sought to expand their ability to control the supply side of the market and thereby regain a more substantial ability to influence and stabilise international prices. By themselves, Saudi Arabia and its fellow OPEC members accounted for around 36% of global production; bringing Russia and nine other producers into the fold increased that share to 59%.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Training Requirements Authority (TRA): responsible for defining the high-level training need (content and numbers to be trained) and ExVal. Generally, these authorities sit within the Commands, although CDP is the TRA for some joint training.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Training Delivery Authority (TDA): responsible for training design, delivery (which can be outsourced) and InVal.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Training Provider: the school or unit conducting the training.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The strategy worked, at least to an extent. OPEC+’s supply-side interventions in themselves were not enough to control international oil prices, but they generally succeeded in reducing market volatility. However, the brittleness of the alliance was demonstrated in the price war between Moscow and Riyadh in March and April 2020. As the global economy shut down with the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, prompting oil prices to fall, Russia – seeing an opportunity to deal a blow to the US shale industry – refused to go along with Saudi-proposed production cuts. Saudi Arabia, though not necessarily opposed to hurting shale producers, opted for a show of force vis-à-vis Russia. It ramped up production to deliberately push prices down even further so as to force Moscow to relent. It took an intervention from the Trump administration in Washington to convince Saudi Arabia and Russia to return to cooperating with one another, ultimately brokering an unprecedented 10 million barrels per day cut by OPEC+ members in April 2020.</p> -<h4 id="training-challenges">Training Challenges</h4> +<p>In the years since, and thus far unperturbed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, OPEC+ coordination has been much less fractious. Many of the grouping’s members have struggled to fulfil even their reduced production quotas, and there has been persistent speculation that the UAE – after Saudi Arabia and Russia, one of the most important members of the alliance – could consider leaving OPEC in order to more independently and immediately monetise its expanding production capacity. Overall, however, OPEC+ and the Riyadh–Moscow relationship at its apex have held together, even in the face of significant Western political pressure on Saudi Arabia after February 2022. From the Kingdom’s perspective, the expanded supply-side market influence that Russia brings to OPEC+ remains highly valuable; Riyadh may also judge that Moscow can exert a degree of leverage over Iran, an OPEC member with at least the potential capacity to substantially affect global supply even as it remains hamstrung by US sanctions. However, this aspect could become less important to Riyadh, as its own relations with Tehran have become more constructive following the March 2023 Beijing Agreement.</p> -<p>Defence gives learning and development an impressive priority and level of resourcing. Because Defence is a contingent capability, training becomes the substitute for war, as well as the preparation for it. Between operations, training is the organisation’s purpose, while also contributing to the effective management of the Defence enterprise in peacetime. Consequently, Defence invests more in learning and development than most employers. Its investment in senior leadership is exceptional, with individuals likely to have spent well over a year in fully funded formal education. However, the current training system often struggles to meet the demands placed on it in terms of the need for greater agility in a more heavily committed force whose skills need replacing more often. Six challenges are identified below, but they are not universal: examples disproving the points can be found, but on balance there are more examples proving the need for modernisation across culture, system governance, process, training delivery, learning environment and workforce.</p> +<p>It is also important to note that the Saudi–Russian bilateral relationship extends beyond oil. Ever since King Salman’s unprecedented visit to Russia in 2017, the two countries have worked on expanding economic cooperation more generally, including with discussions about joint investments in Russia’s agriculture and energy sectors, for example – though Saudi Arabia has generally been less vocal about these plans than Russia. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has at least reluctantly appreciated Russia’s return to the Middle East as a security actor over the past decade. It did not like Russia’s intervention on the side of the Assad regime in Syria in 2015, at a time when the Kingdom was still committed to an opposition victory in Damascus, but from Riyadh’s perspective Russia was also prepared to stand by its partners in the region, reliably and consistently oppose all forms of destabilising regime-change efforts in the region, and refrain from criticising the Kingdom; all in marked contrast to the US, whose commitment to regional stability seemed less certain, as discussed above.</p> -<p><strong>Culture</strong></p> +<p>As Russia’s war against Ukraine goes on, and particularly if Russia’s economy suffers further and its military struggles continue, Saudi Arabia’s belief in the usefulness of the non-energy components of the bilateral relationship could be eroded. Even then, though, energy and the two countries’ shared leadership of OPEC+ remain powerful connectors, as does the fact that Saudi Arabia is uncomfortable with some of the geopolitical developments surrounding the war. As previously mentioned, Riyadh has been vocal in its opposition to some of the Western sanctions on Russia’s energy sector, particularly the attempt to impose a price cap on Russian exports. Saudi Arabia worries that this could set a precedent for politically motivated interventions in global energy markets by buyers of hydrocarbons that could one day affect the exports of other producers too. Indeed, the Kingdom’s unwillingness to pick sides between the West and Russia goes beyond energy – and Russia, for that matter. In an increasingly competitive and polarised global environment, Saudi Arabia is determined not to be forced to choose between West and East, insisting that it will chart its own path in a multipolar – not bipolar – future world order.</p> -<p>Defence invests heavily in training, and the different Defence training cultures share some – broadly common – constraining characteristics:</p> +<p>But Saudi–Russian cooperation within OPEC+ may not continue forever. The 2020 price war showed that Riyadh is prepared to turn against Russia when it sees its own interests threatened. Russia’s expanding market share in Asia, as it sells its crude at discounted prices to major consumers like China and India, could fuel discord, particularly if Saudi Arabia were to see its own market share in Asia – the continent it sees as the centre of gravity for future exports – become affected. For the moment, Saudi Aramco appears to be managing this risk, not least by buying up Russian crude and selling it on (Saudi Aramco is not just the largest oil producer in the world, but also a leading oil trader). Still, the “Saudi First” approach, the primacy of pursuing its own interests, applies just as much to its cooperation with Russia and other OPEC+ members as it does to its response to Western calls for changes to the Kingdom’s policies.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Mechanistic.</strong> Training is largely mechanistic in nature, being part of an industrial machine that frontloads training early in a career, with later interventions taking place as people pass through career gates (such as promotions or postings). This drives an approach that generally takes little account of prior learning or the need for individual learning journeys. This kind of approach suits static environments where the skills required remain predictable over lengthy careers. However, the pace of technological change and the rapidly fluctuating demand for skills mean that frontloaded training models supporting rigid career siloes are ill-suited to today’s Defence environment. A more fluid/organic approach to talent development is needed: one that gives individuals more agency in “whole life” learning.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Talent definition.</strong> Another cultural challenge is Defence’s limited conception of “talent”, which is too often synonymous with those rising to the most senior ranks. Much of the PDSE offer is concentrated on this particular talent pool, where the value of higher courses is often seen as being in the act of being selected rather than in the learning itself, because selection confirms individuals are in the “talent pool”. A broader definition of talent covers anyone “who can make a significant contribution to organisational performance”. Democratising access to learning and development would capture more of Defence’s talent and improve productivity.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Train to pass.</strong> Linked to the way in which Defence conceives “talent” is how that conception shapes training design and delivery. Often, this produces training that is seen as a bar to be cleared or as a badge of honour for those succeeding, rather than creating programmes that seek to help people pass. The wastage rates from Royal Marines and Army Phase One training are typically 40–60% and 30% respectively, which is expensive in terms of recruitment capacity and wasteful of human talent – a problem Defence is looking to address. Wastage also impacts disproportionately on certain groups; for example, women are twice as likely to receive a musculoskeletal injury during Army basic training (Phase One) and be discharged. The redeployment to other roles of those who fail mitigates the impact of the current culture, but it might be better to orient training around a philosophy that aims to help people reach the required standard.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Accreditation.</strong> The MoD has invested in improving the recognition of Defence-provided training and education, but has done less well in recognising learning gained elsewhere. People often have the skills Defence needs, but, because these skills were acquired elsewhere, must still undertake lengthy Defence-provided courses. While this is also true of regulars, it has a greater impact on reserves, whose civilian employment may overlap with their military role. A culture of greater openness to learning and expertise gained elsewhere, including through pre-course learning assessments that allow people to skip modules they already understand, could enhance efficiency and effectiveness. This might also enhance motivation and retention since the time and effort expended in gaining skills, knowledge and expertise would be properly recognised.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h3 id="iii-between-climate-change-and-climate-action">III. Between Climate Change and Climate Action</h3> -<p><strong>System Governance</strong></p> +<p>Saudi Arabia’s evolving oil-related decision-making and foreign policy must also be understood in the context of the dual challenge that climate change and climate action pose to the Kingdom. In the past, Saudi Arabia has generally approached the climate debate from a defensive position. Given the centrality of its oil industry to its political and socioeconomic development model, it has, like Russia, long regarded international (and especially Western) calls to decarbonise the world economy and limit – and eventually end – the extraction of fossil fuels as a near-existential threat. Until the diversification of Saudi Arabia’s economy progresses further than it has to date, oil exports will remain strategically indispensable for the Kingdom.</p> -<p>Inevitably, managing delivery against Defence’s diverse training needs, delivered by a diffuse set of actors, requires breaking the whole training system into manageable chunks. However, doing so means that Defence lacks a view of the whole system, there being no single place where training strategy, training and operational risk and governance align. This means that training can become stovepiped, with the outcomes of one training element not aligned to the inputs of later courses. At one level this is reflected in the separation of the collective and individual training elements, which fragments the system for delivering forces that, collectively, can “defeat the King’s enemies”. For example, training of future commanders at most Phase One officer academies and the Joint Services Command and Staff College is done at an individual level, with relatively little involvement of the groups such officers are being trained to lead. Involving these groups would have benefits, but may be impractical at scale given the bureaucratic challenges of trying to align multiple programmes (all of different length).</p> +<p>Nevertheless, Riyadh has changed its tone somewhat in recent years. In 2021, it announced 2060 as its target to reach net zero emissions and announced the Saudi Green Initiative and the Middle East Green Initiative to accelerate climate-and sustainability-related development efforts in the Kingdom and the region, respectively. Critical observers have dismissed such announcements as efforts at “greenwashing”, but this analysis is too simplistic. Besides an obvious interest in preserving the future viability of oil as an energy source and its own status as a leading producer, three key factors appear to be shaping Saudi Arabia’s changing position.</p> -<p><strong>Fragmentation.</strong> Another problem associated with separating individual and collective training is that the feedback loop between operational need and individual training can be weak. In this context, the Army has introduced the Battlecraft Syllabus to help close the gap between the output of individual training and the input standard for collective training. There are also other positive signs, with Director Land Warfare trialling new approaches that bridge individual and collective training, allowing them to be conducted in parallel, and with feedback mechanisms permitting each to shape the conduct of the other for greatest effect. In the Royal Navy, meanwhile, Project Selborne is represented at the Navy’s Senior Management Board, alongside representatives of those delivering collective training.</p> +<p>Firstly, there is a growing recognition that climate change poses a significant physical threat to Saudi Arabia itself. Together with the wider Middle East region, the Arabian Peninsula is among the parts of the world where the effects of climate change – particularly rising temperatures and more unpredictable weather patterns, including extreme weather events – have already been acutely felt. Climate change and environmental security may not yet be regarded as being on a par with the threat that anti-hydrocarbon climate action represents, but they are becoming more important in the Kingdom’s calculations.</p> -<p><strong>Risk transference.</strong> Even within individual training, the lack of a “whole system” view causes problems. Training can become viewed and assessed in its own terms, and not as part of achieving something larger – that is, the ability to deliver an operational output. Consequently, questions of effectiveness and efficiency can become self-referential and drive perverse outcomes, for example where course lengths are cut to reduce costs, with the training gap then passed to the frontline, which is not resourced to close the gap effectively. The RAF’s Project Socrates has reduced the time in residential training by over 32% since 2015, with more responsibility for training passed to the frontline – for apprenticeships, this can amount to as much as 70% of the learning. Perhaps the most extreme example was the RAF Personnel Branch training course: there was no classroom-based Phase Two training, and students went straight to their units and learned on the job. Material was provided remotely by the Personnel Administration Training Wing in the Defence College of Logistics, Policing and Administration. Consequently, units that had previously received fully trained individuals faced an additional training burden, while lacking the resources to absorb that burden or the skills to conduct the on-the-job training required. Moreover, trainees’ jobs were not redesigned to allow untrained job holders to balance output and learning. The TRA recognised the risks of this approach, and a hybrid course was developed, combining four weeks of classroom training (40% of the previous classroom time) with online learning undertaken at units. In this case the vulnerabilities were noted, but this pattern of reducing the time spent in training schools is a recurring feature of Defence’s “modernisation” attempts that often merely move the risk elsewhere.</p> +<p>Secondly, over the past decade the Saudi government has grown increasingly aware of the need to rein in unsustainable domestic energy consumption. Improving energy efficiency and investing in renewable energy generation are seen as being necessary to reduce emissions and prevent ever more Saudi oil from being diverted to the domestic market rather than being exported to generate revenues.</p> -<p><strong>New requirements.</strong> The reverse problem also exists, with higher demand for new generic education subjects to be added to programmes to raise awareness of particular areas, most notably in Phase One training and PDSE. Interviewees for this paper highlighted constant pressure to add more training modules to courses – for example, mandatory equality, diversity and inclusion, cyber, data protection and space awareness training. While each module may be relatively short, adding a one-hour annual mandatory training package represents the equivalent of 114 people’s output each year, and the new Space Foundation Course for new Service personnel is eight hours long. Regardless of the individual merit of any mandatory training – and all have a Defence “sponsor” to champion the topic – elements are often added to already busy syllabuses without other material being cut to make room. In the absence of a single owner of the whole system, and given the limited (at best) understanding of direct and lost-opportunity costs, the growth of mandatory training has been relatively unchecked at system level; although Defence has now instituted a 1* board to review mandatory training.</p> +<p>Finally, Saudi Arabia also sees opportunities in the global energy transition. The feasibility of hydrogen (and its derivatives) becoming a commodity that will eventually be traded like oil may still be unclear, just as the export of solar- and wind-generated electricity remains limited by infrastructure constraints, but Saudi Arabia is confident that if/when technological barriers are overcome it is in a prime position to be a major player in both fields. This belief is reinforced by the self-perception and self-confidence that Saudi Arabia has always been an energy power and therefore “gets” energy – whether derived from hydrocarbons or otherwise.</p> -<p>One weakness in the current training system, therefore, relates to developing people and organisations with the ability to see the complete system (of which training forms a part) and to see how the Training Line of Development impacts on, and is impacted by, other Defence Lines of Development (DLODs). For example, catering contracts specify mealtimes that prevent out-of-hours lessons at Phase One training establishments. A system view might mitigate some of the challenges to training modernisation where it only focuses on a narrow aspect of the system and not the whole. As one interviewee put it, Defence is “trying to transform using a system and people designed to manage evolutionary development [and] from which much of the capacity has been cut”.</p> +<p>Saudi Arabia has resolved that it must become a more active participant in the international climate debate. How exactly it intends to do so remains to be seen, but the basic contours of its approach are already emerging. Saudi Arabia (and its fellow OPEC oil producers, including COP28 host the UAE) will likely push back against any efforts to make the total phasing out of hydrocarbons an internationally agreed climate action objective. Riyadh will argue for an inclusive approach to the global energy transition that leaves no-one behind, including hydrocarbon exporters; and it will present itself as the producer capable of providing the cheapest and most emission-efficient oil, and as the one that might even eventually produce carbon-free oil once carbon capture and storage, which Saudi Aramco is investing considerable resources in, are achieved. At the same time, Saudi Arabia will also likely expand its hydrogen- and renewables-related efforts, not to curry favour with international audiences but to capitalise on potential economic opportunities. Within the context of the international climate change/climate action debate, Saudi Arabia will remain a defender of hydrocarbons and resist calls for their complete phasing out.</p> -<p><strong>Process</strong></p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>The DSAT framework, and the way in which Defence enters into contracts with training partners, present two challenges:</p> +<p>Among Western policymakers and in international media outlets, the notion of “the oil weapon” is arguably more closely associated with Saudi Arabia than with any other country. The 1973 oil embargo has become almost legendary, and many remember the Kingdom’s price war with Russia in March and April 2020. Saudi Arabia’s refusal to ramp up oil production in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and its subsequent decisions to repeatedly cut production, all in the face of loud Western protestations, have fuelled debate about the extent to which Riyadh might use its influence over oil markets in ways that are antithetical to Western interests. Other foreign policy moves, both within the Middle East region and towards engaging more closely with Moscow and Beijing, have spurred further speculation about Saudi Arabia moving away from – and perhaps even against – its traditional Western partners. Yet, as this paper shows, much of this speculation is exaggerated and, if anything, reflects an overly Western-centric assessment that fails to understand how Saudi Arabia sees itself and its position in the changing global environment.</p> -<p><em>DSAT</em></p> +<p>For Saudi Arabia, whose economic fortunes and international status will likely remain inextricably linked to its world-leading oil industry, the health and relative stability of the international oil market is of utmost strategic importance. Its commitment to Vision 2030, the new all-important North Star of the Kingdom’s domestic and foreign policy, means that Saudi Arabia needs to try to keep oil prices at a relatively high level, if at all possible. Within the context of the international climate change/climate action debate, Saudi Arabia will remain a defender of hydrocarbons and resist calls for their complete phase-out. At the same time, it feels that both its economic and security needs require it to diversify its international relations beyond its traditional reliance on the US and the wider West, even if that means forging relations with countries that Washington or European capitals consider to be beyond the pale.</p> -<p>DSAT (and other valid training models) have the same basic elements: analysing the need; determining how to train; delivering the training; and operating feedback mechanisms. DSAT’s problem is that in practice it is neither well understood nor properly implemented, and consequently it is slow and overly bureaucratic. This is primarily a resourcing issue: when the Services are short of personnel, training schools are not the top priority when assigning staff, and consequently there are not enough people managing the DSAT process. Moreover, DSAT is complicated. Although JSP 822 has been made more accessible, its 679 pages (of which 235 relate to individual training) are impenetrable to all but those with time to read it carefully. Indeed, there are companies specialising in providing consultancy services for DSAT, including training needs analysis and course design, to supplement the expertise inside the Defence establishment. Finally, the turnover of military personnel makes it difficult to build expertise that might enable shortcuts to be employed or judgements made about the risks and benefits of deviating from the process while abiding by the policy’s spirit (even if straying from its formal stipulations).</p> +<p>Yet, with all that said, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, for all its transformational intent, is ultimately the development agenda of a status quo power. The Vision 2030 agenda has been constructed in the context of an international environment in which the international rules-based order is upheld sufficiently to prevent any conflict that would have catastrophic implications for the Saudi or global economies. It is built on the principles of globalisation and requires the Kingdom to build relations with everyone, West and East. Riyadh may try to intervene in the oil market to secure its interests, but is not, and is unlikely to become, a revisionist power – even as it cooperates with revisionists like Russia.</p> -<p>DSAT is cyclical, but cycling through it is often slow. In many cases, ExVal occurs every five years, which, given the speed at which battlefield realities are changing – as shown by the Ukraine conflict, for example – is too infrequent. For an organisation that aspires to be agile and adaptive, this represents a significant weakness. Such evaluation need not take so long: during the Iraq operation (from 2003), the review process concerning counter-improvised explosive devices was achieved within days. While this kind of rapid learning is not necessary for all skills, the ability to incorporate new knowledge – even that acquired by other institutions – more quickly into the training system will be vital if the armed forces are to compete in a world in which technology (and warfare) advances rapidly.</p> +<p>This has important implications for the UK and its partners in Europe and beyond. Even if the UK were never to import a single barrel of Saudi oil again, the complex and global nature of international energy markets means the behaviour of the hydrocarbon superpower that is Saudi Arabia will substantially impact on the UK’s energy security, including the prices consumers pay to operate their cars or heat their homes. Moreover, the Kingdom’s calculations vis-à-vis its relations with Russia and China will have consequences for the changing global order that the UK too will have to navigate; and Saudi Arabia’s decision-making regarding climate change will significantly shape this global debate and struggle, in which the UK remains committed to playing a leading role.</p> -<p>The separation of requirement-definition (under the TRA) and delivery (under the TDA) ensures that training delivery is assessed against the organisation’s needs, allowing deliverers to focus on how learning is best enabled. This generally works well when delivery sits within the same Service as the requirement-setter and end user. It is, however, less effective where end users have weaker organisational relationships with the TDA (such as different chains of command) or for generic Defence requirements separate from an individual’s core task. In these circumstances, there can be a disconnect: users and/or TRAs can demand things the TDA cannot deliver, or TDAs can prioritise what they are able to teach – or can afford to teach – rather than what is actually needed. For example, the advanced command and staff course (ACSC) prioritises “staff skills” more than “command”. Whether ACSC would be better placed educating joint command rather than teaching more process-oriented planning skills is worthy of consideration. Meanwhile, in Army HQ, the absence of a TRA function has seen the Land Warfare Centre, a TDA, drive training requirements from the bottom up.</p> +<p>UK–Saudi relations have deep roots, are multifaceted, and have grown in importance in recent years – according to statements from London. However, to maintain this relationship and perhaps even have some degree of influence on Saudi Arabia in areas that matter to the UK – from energy, through geopolitics, to climate change – policymakers must continuously refine and update their understanding of – and moreover take seriously – Saudi Arabia’s own strategic calculus. For the foreseeable future, the key to this is likely to be how confident the Kingdom feels about the success of its domestic transformation project.</p> -<p>Management of the training pipeline is often overly bureaucratic. The statements of training requirement (SOTR) and training task (SOTT) are important tools connecting inflow (recruitment) to training and managing the capacity in the training system. As with other parts of DSAT, the concept is good, but often unresponsive in practice. Interviewees reported that it took two to three years to change the SOTR/SOTT through formal routes, a process often mediated by strategic workforce planning models (which in many cases reflected the previous year’s task, with some allowance for under-delivery, either because people were not recruited or they did not complete their training). The consequence of this is that the pipeline slows down and people have to wait longer than is strictly necessary before they are trained.</p> +<hr /> -<p>While DSAT can work well, it is better suited to more static environments where requirements are recognisable because the technology and its use are familiar. In dynamic and transformative environments – where the principle of linear progression does not apply – it is difficult to identify a training need. Emerging technology in particular poses problems, because TRAs may struggle to define requirements in a fast-moving landscape. To mitigate this challenge, training objectives can be defined very broadly to give TDAs the freedom to iterate their training, but commercial staff might struggle to agree to contracts if Defence cannot formally articulate needs that it does not yet fully understand.</p> +<p><strong>Tobias Borck</strong> is Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security Studies at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His main research interests include the international relations of the Middle East, and specifically the foreign, defence and security policies of Arab states, particularly the Gulf monarchies, as well as European – especially German and British – engagement with the Middle East.</p>Tobias BorckSaudi Arabia is set to remain one of the most influential players in global oil and energy markets. Understanding – and taking seriously – its evolving strategic calculus must therefore be a key task for policymakers in the UK and across Europe as they seek to safeguard their countries’ energy security.AI-Generated Lies And Truth2023-11-02T12:00:00+08:002023-11-02T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/ai-generated-lies-and-truth<p><em>How does the technology aid fake news and narratives – particularly in the run-up to 2024 for elections in many Western democracies?</em></p> -<p><em>Contracting</em></p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Contracting with commercial training providers helps to ensure Defence has the requisite andragogical (adult learning) skills in the workforce and can inject fresh ideas into training. However, the contracting process is slow, and contracting for services suffers from many of the same challenges as contracting for equipment. For example, SimCentric has developed a computer-based simulation for weapons handling that reduces lessons from 16 hours to 45 minutes, and which has improved pass rates from 68% to 98%. However, its introduction has been constrained by contractual processes and the absence of a holistic training strategy that guides the balance between live and synthetic, or in-person and online, learning. Even multi-year contracts are often tightly specified, and focused on inputs rather than outputs or outcomes, which limits scope for flexibility/adaptability, although there are notable exceptions in the Royal Navy and Army.</p> +<p>In July 2017, researchers at the University of Washington used AI to make a convincing video of former President Barack Obama giving a speech that he never gave. At the time it seemed novel, but perhaps nothing more consequential than a hacker’s parlour trick. Sadly, it heralded rapid advancements in the realm of synthetic media that few could have predicted. AI experts now estimate that nearly 90% of all online media content may be synthetically generated by 2026. For the first time in the history of digital media, realistic fake content is now cheaper and faster to create than reality, and the consequences for national security as well as civil society are simultaneously both alarming and hard to fathom.</p> -<p>This context makes it difficult to form the kinds of partnerships that would bring most value by harnessing the complementary talents of the MoD (context and subject expertise) and contractors (learning styles and technology). Holding contractors to account for the number of classroom hours, for example, actively disincentivises forms of training that could shorten courses or which involve different means of delivery that could be more effective. Hence, contractors are effectively disincentivised from adopting innovative ways of delivering training that would reduce contact time. Moreover, by over-specifying requirements such as practical training areas and equipment, Defence either makes little use of expensive infrastructure/equipment (for example, 19% classroom utilisation at Lichfield), or has to update training equipment regularly (which can be difficult, because it often has a lower priority than operational equipment). Further education colleges, typically less generously resourced, make more efficient use of their facilities by focusing on generic training aimed at general principles and how to apply them to different situations, rather than Defence’s more workplace-specific learning approach.</p> +<p>The real impact that fake content can have is staggering. In May 2023, investor confidence was shaken amid social media-fuelled reports of a potential terrorist attack near the Pentagon, and the US stock market slid considerably. In that case, the image was easy to debunk, and investor confidence rapidly returned. Repeat the event with a more sophisticated set of tools, however, such as a fake presidential speech and a coordinated influence campaign to spread the lie across many social media platforms, and the results could have been far more dramatic than a stock dip. Indeed, synthetic hoaxes are now seen as an important driver of international events. Prior to the Russian reinvasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, the US revealed a Russian plot to spread deepfake content (media created or manipulated synthetically with the help of AI) as a pretext for the invasion.</p> -<p>The over-specification of requirements also tends to drive transactional rather than relational approaches to the task. Multi-year contracts are likely to be more effective when managed by partners rather than where one side holds the other to account for pre-specified deliverables. Evidence of the negative effect of more transactional positions can be seen in the difficulties unit commanders have in sharing information with their contractors, even where they are keen to do so.</p> +<p>The case of Russia can also be used to illustrate the threat to civil society: that people can believe anything or, caught in the miasma of competing narratives online, simply choose to opt out and believe nothing at all. As journalist Peter Pomerantsev points out in his excellent book Nothing is True and Everything is Possible, authoritarian governments such as Russia increase their power when their citizens are confused and disoriented. In the West, a lack of confidence that anything can be true is a problem for a great many reasons, not least because trust in government is at historic lows at the same time as governments are moving their public-facing communications online, and especially to social media. Consider a public safety scenario in which a governor issues an emergency evacuation order in advance of a powerful hurricane, or a public health official gives a warning about a quickly spreading pandemic. Could these important warnings be identified by a majority of people as belonging to the 10% of truth remaining on the internet, or would they be dismissed by citizens in danger as fake news, a political hoax, or even a prank? What can be done? Rooting out fake news and combatting automated propaganda is an important contribution to societal resilience, but we must look ahead to the next challenges as well.</p> -<p><strong>Delivery</strong></p> +<p>The current solutions to address mis- and disinformation are not up to the task. We can’t count the number of times we have advised students, policymakers and the general public to combat mis- and disinformation on the internet by thinking critically, being skeptical and not reflexively reposting content without fact checking. That recipe is now incomplete. It is clear that the scale of the problem requires technological solutions too, and organisations around the world are investing in ways to quickly identify fake media. However, as technology continues to progress, this problem will soon be reversed, and the hunt for fake media will need to be replaced with verification of truth. In other words, instead of trying to weed out what is fake, we will need to identify ways to validate a truth among lies. This would involve a radical reframing of both the problem and potential solutions.</p> -<p>Much Defence training is delivered in person, as part of lengthy programmes that remove people from the frontline. The trigger for training is often less to do with an individual’s needs and more because a career gate has been reached – a promotion or a posting. While these are reasonable grounds to suggest training interventions are warranted, Defence’s industrial approach, where trainees are processed largely without regard to their existing skills or knowledge, lacks flexibility. It prioritises neatness of planning – common start and end dates, simpler instructor scheduling and so on – over training needs. It is also increasingly out of step with shifts in strategic workforce planning, talent management, and learning and development towards skills-based approaches that link training to skills rather than roles/jobs. The skills-based approach allows personalised training that accommodates individual’s pre-existing skills and avoids unnecessary training. The emerging Defence Talent and Army Skills Frameworks could provide the basis for the transition to a skills-based model.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">For the first time in the history of digital media, realistic fake content is now cheaper and faster to create than reality</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The didactic nature of much Defence training was repeatedly highlighted in the interviews conducted for this paper: that is, instructors leading students through the learning. This approach also means lessons often focus on facts and concepts rather than on the higher-level objectives described in Bloom’s revised taxonomy, reducing the return on training in comparison to those that provide a more active and social learning experience. Pockets of good practice do exist, such as the “flipped classroom” approach at the Royal School of Military Engineering (RSME) at Minley, but elsewhere lessons often transfer knowledge from instructors to students who are largely passive recipients. This is often a function of lesson design, instructor experience and classroom layout that reflects historical teaching environments, albeit with electronic rather than chalk boards. “Reflective learning” is often driven out by the desire to be more “efficient”, either forcing students to extend their learning days in order to reflect and make sense of what they have been taught, or restricting the learning to facts that can be taught easily but which are not fully contextualised or understood.</p> +<p>Currently, social media platforms (and users themselves) are scrambling to tag and label inauthentic content. Soon this will be akin to using an umbrella to block individual raindrops during a monsoon. TikTok, for instance – like most social media companies – has policies requiring labelling synthetic media, but a recent report from misinformation monitor NewsGuard found the implementation of TikTok’s policy wanting. Likewise, fact-checking organisations are already struggling to keep up with the amount of disinformation online. By 2026, their backlog of digital nonsense will keep them busily debunking falsehoods far into the distant future. Turning the status quo equation on its head means that instead of identifying fake news polluting a stream of otherwise legitimate content, we must realise that the stream will soon be the lies, and the truth will need to be plucked out.</p> -<p>In a move accelerated by the Covid-19 pandemic, Defence is making more use of remote learning. However, interviewees expressed concern that Defence was facing “remote learning fatigue”, which could make the otherwise admirable investment in learning and development demotivating. This may not be true for the reserves, where more online learning and shorter residential training might be better suited to the time that Reservists can commit. But Reserve units lack the connectivity and expertise to deliver Reserve training, and moving too much training online at the expense of in-person delivery also risks creating a sense of isolation that weakens the Reservist’s attachment to their unit. A balanced, system-level view is needed.</p> +<p>It is worth noting some antecedents. In the early 2000s, tools such as Photoshop allowed individuals to edit photos more quickly, and social media made it easier to reach a wide audience. In 2008, Iran digitally altered a photograph of rocket launchers to remove one that – rather embarrassingly – failed to fire, with the intent of making itself appear more powerful and capable than it really was. Still, Photoshop was not scalable and could not create fake media from scratch. It had to start with a truth. In the past few years, though, critical advances in generative AI (computer algorithms capable of generating new media from text prompts) are increasing the threat of what has been called an information apocalypse. As with all technological advancements, these developments have been rapidly democratised over time. Now anyone can produce their own high-quality disinformation with algorithms that are already freely available online. Through programs such as FaceSwap, it is straightforward to convincingly put a face on another body. There is no putting this genie back in the bottle, and no amount of ethical use manifestos published by developers is going to trammel such technology.</p> -<p><strong>Learning Environment</strong></p> +<p>The AI genie continues to amaze, and regulators (much less university professors) simply can’t keep up. Before November 2022, when ChatGPT was released, the idea of a computer writing a college-level essay in seconds would have been seen as science fiction. This was a revolutionary step up from tools that could, at best, fix grammar and punctuation. At the same time, software that could create images from text, such as DALL-E and Midjourney, became available to the public. These image generation tools could, with a simple prompt that required no technical knowledge, create 1,000 hyper-realistic photos before a human could develop one. At first, critics of the technology pointed out inaccuracies in the deepfake content, hoping perhaps in vain that the rationality of the human brain was still superior to the computer. In March 2023, the Washington Post published an article providing readers with tips on how to identify deepfakes. One of the examples was to “look at the hands”, since early generative AI tools struggled with making realistic human hands. That same month, however, another article was published by the same newspaper titled “AI can draw hands now”. Trying to identify deepfakes by looking for visual mistakes is a losing strategy. According to a report published by the NSA, FBI and CISA, attempts to detect deepfakes post-production are a cat-and-mouse game where the manipulator has the upper hand – not to mention that people want to see what they already want to believe, which is the primary reason that “cheap fakes” are just as dangerous as deepfakes. Confirmation bias means that people don’t need much convincing to see what they want to see. The pair are a toxic brew.</p> -<p>An effective learning environment requires appropriate furniture, lighting, temperature, air quality, ventilation, ICT infrastructure, connectivity and adaptable classrooms, as well as support facilities such as accommodation and catering. A critical purpose behind the Defence Training Review was to enable investment in infrastructure by reducing the size of the Defence training estate, but the quality of the learning environments in Defence varies greatly. New environments purpose-built for the Defence Academy and at Worthy Down contrast with older sites where classrooms and facilities are poor, and students cannot get a hot shower. While progress has been made, with 1,600 hectares (2%) of the built estate disposed of between 2015 and 2021 to fund improvements elsewhere, the training estate still struggles to provide the appropriate infrastructure (such as flexible classrooms and WiFi in accommodation areas) that is essential for maximising the benefits of new technology.</p> +<p>According to DeepMedia, a company contracted by the US Department of Defense to help detect synthetic media, the amount of deepfakes has tripled in 2023 compared to 2022. How do people know what to believe and trust? If the deepfake is just as realistic as a photo taken by a professional camera, how do organisations prove authenticity? For each photo taken by a journalist, thousands of equally realistic fakes could be made and distributed. This article aims to highlight that very recent technological advances are leading to a perfect content storm, where lies are far cheaper to produce than truths, but just as convincing. The spread of deepfakes is creating an environment of mistrust. A July 2023 report published by members of Purdue University’s Department of Political Science argued that an increase in the amount of fake content makes it easier for someone to challenge the validity of something that is actually true. They called this the Liar’s Dividend. As media becomes saturated with manipulated images and videos, it becomes harder to identify what is trustworthy. Being able to prove that something is fake loses its value when most of the content is synthetic already. The greater and more critical challenge is validating what is true.</p> -<p>Conversely, parts of the estate are so lean that the training system lacks surge capacity. Even for training regular personnel, it is taut; training just 70 Ukrainian engineers in the UK required stopping some Phase Three training. If the UK were required to surge train reserves to enable the regular Army to deploy, capacity would be lacking. In addition, reserves struggle to access courses, training areas and ranges, while contracts for support facilities on bases often mean that there is a reduced service at weekends when reservists are able to train.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As media becomes saturated with manipulated images and videos, it becomes harder to identify what is trustworthy</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong>Workforce</strong></p> +<p>The problem of labelling media content as trustworthy is complicated. As deepfakes become increasingly sophisticated, it will become nearly impossible for individuals – even those trained to look for peculiarities – to distinguish real from fake. As a result, organisations will need to lean more heavily on technical solutions to label and verify media. Why is it also difficult, though, for computers to tell the difference between a photo taken by a camera and a deepfake created by AI? All digital media is, at a technical level, just a file on a computer. Comprised of 1s and 0s, this file is displayed on a screen to a person. The computer has no notion of fake or real. This problem has many similarities with the art world and the challenge of proving that a painting was made by a famous artist and not a copycat. For every real Picasso, there may be 1,000 replicas. Museums and galleries do not waste their limited resources trying to prove the inauthenticity of the copies, though; they focus on validating and maintaining the truth through a concept called provenance. Provenance is the recorded origin and history required for a piece of art to provide viewers with trust and confidence in its authenticity. Even if the methodologies are different for the digital world, it may prove a useful model for seeking and identifying authenticity instead of forever debunking fakes.</p> -<p>While military instructors are experts in their subject, they often lack the andragogical skills to most effectively communicate their expertise. Instructors are typically selected for their technical competence and subsequently trained as instructors under the Defence Trainer Competency Framework. This Level 3 programme runs over the first 12 months of the instructor’s appointment. So while Defence instructors are up to date in their subject matter expertise – a challenge for many civilian colleges – they have a low level of proficiency in supporting learning. In comparison, further education teachers require undergraduate or postgraduate teaching qualifications (Level 6 or 7), or a Level 5 teaching apprenticeship.</p> +<p>The cyber security field already uses capabilities such as encryption and hashing to verify passwords and protect digital communications, but these need to be applied to media in a way that is easily understood and trusted by content consumers with limited technical backgrounds. Organisations such as the Content Authenticity Initiative (CAI) are working to use cryptographic asset hashing to serve as digital provenance online. This project aims to provide a tamper-proof way to validate the origin of images and videos, even while they are shared across social media and news platforms. The CAI aims to meet the technical standards developed by the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity, released in 2022. While these efforts are heading in the right direction, they are not foolproof, and depend heavily on an increased socio-technical understanding of digital media. Additionally, allowing organisations to manage the trustworthiness of media comes with its own concerns. Totalitarian governments will no doubt develop their own “Content Authenticity Initiatives” to self-validate what they want to be believed.</p> -<p>It is not just instructors who lack deep knowledge and skills. TRAs and training support staff such as course designers and those developing training materials receive little training. Analysing and determining how best to close training gaps, and knowing what learning technology is available and how it can be best employed are not easy, but these skills are often assumed to be acquired through osmosis or with limited formal interventions (for example, the Defence Online Learning Course, for those responsible for developing online learning, lasts two days). Moreover, the lack of training for those people managing training means that they are often unfamiliar with the DSAT process and can default to slavish adherence to the letter of the process rather than deviating from the formal rules to achieve its intended purpose where necessary.</p> +<p>Deepfakes are still a young technology. While they have not single-handedly disrupted an election as some might have feared, their use is increasing, and the technology is advancing rapidly. While most deepfakes are currently images or altered videos, the ability to create whole new scenes from a prompt is already here. With the 2024 US presidential election approaching, deepfakes and other “fake news” will likely be on the minds of both candidates and voters. Former CEO of Alphabet Eric Schmidt has warned that mis- and disinformation, through the use of AI in particular, could lead to chaos in the 2024 election. The solution is both technical, by shifting from identifying deepfakes to validating truths, and societal, through technical education and media literacy. For decades, people were taught to trust their senses. Now, seeing and hearing can no longer be believing.</p> -<h3 id="ii-modernisation-opportunities">II. Modernisation Opportunities</h3> +<hr /> -<p>The process of modernising Defence training is continuous, and we must start by acknowledging where training is done well. Good practice exists, which can and should be shared. While Defence’s formal training structures help ensure learning and development happen systematically – in ways that many commercial employers are unable to replicate – the structure also brings constraints, leading to somewhat rigid, industrial approaches. A teacher from the Victorian age would find much that was familiar in Defence training – much more than they would find in more dynamic contemporary higher education settings. Defence training needs to become more digitally relevant, but this does not mean merely replacing classrooms with online learning – both modes of learning have their place, but effective distributed learning needs to be resourced and enabled, including changing the organisational culture to enable individuals to undertake self-education. This paper identifies four areas for modernisation: people; delivery; building knowledge of the system; and partnering.</p> +<p><strong>David Gioe</strong> is a British Academy Global Professor and Visiting Professor of Intelligence and International Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is also an associate professor of history at the US Military Academy and a history fellow for its Army Cyber Institute.</p> -<h4 id="people">People</h4> +<p><strong>Alexander Molnar</strong> is an Active-Duty US Army cyber officer with multiple overseas deployments, including support to special operations. He holds a BS from the US Military Academy and an MS from the Georgia Institute of Technology.</p>David Gioe and Alexander MolnarHow does the technology aid fake news and narratives – particularly in the run-up to 2024 for elections in many Western democracies?Israel’s Gaza Problem2023-11-01T12:00:00+08:002023-11-01T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/israels-gaza-problem<p><em>Following the 7 October attack by Hamas, Israel has determined to destroy the terrorist group controlling Gaza once and for all. The question is not just whether or not it will succeed, but what its plan is for the day after.</em></p> -<p>Arguably the single biggest contribution to modernising Defence training could be achieved by upskilling those engaged in the management, oversight, support and delivery of training materials. Good practice exists in the Royal Navy and at RSME Chatham (where contractors have invested in upskilling Defence’s instructional staff to Level 4 qualifications, beyond the level provided by Defence), and the Defence Academy has supported its staff in gaining higher qualifications. Naval educators are also given membership of the Society of Education and Training, and significant effort is put into online support and coaching to enable their development. But the people involved in designing training programmes, as well as those doing training needs analysis, deciding on training methods and designing materials, would all benefit from having their skills supplemented, and from continuing professional development. Selection for training duties should take account of the soft skills needed for effective andragogy, not merely technical expertise or command authority.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>The constant churn in the Defence training workforce, with individuals changing every two to three years, is also problematic. Longer tours that build greater andragogic expertise, or the creation of a cadre undertaking repeated tours in learning and development (with instruction as a career anchor) could help mitigate other risks in the system and allow the investment made in upskilling to be used for longer periods. But this should be done without compromising the up-to-date operational knowledge that Defence instructors provide their students.</p> +<p>The 7 October attack by Hamas, the worst act of terrorism against Israel since the state’s founding in 1948, was unprecedented in its scale and scope. With more than 1,400 people killed, most of them civilians, the attack has forced the Israeli political establishment to embrace options – like a ground invasion of Gaza – that were previously viewed as extreme. The Israeli intelligence community will no doubt conduct an after-action review to determine how Hamas could have planned and executed such an operation without being noticed. But at this stage, current operational planning is the priority. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have spent the past three weeks engaging in a ferocious air campaign against targets in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, with 6,000 bombs dropped by the Israeli Air Force in the first six days of the counterattack. Israel’s borders with Gaza are sealed, fuel imports have been cut off and Israeli ground forces are making initial forays toward Gaza City to destroy Hamas’s network of tunnels. Around 360,000 reservists have been sent to the front, Israel’s largest mobilisation since the 1973 Yom Kippur War.</p> -<p>Defence also needs to ensure that there are enough staff to operate the training system, which may mean raising the priority of many of the posts. Some efficiencies could be found by reducing duplication of effort, for example using centres of excellence for common material that is produced once and used many times. The Defence Academy’s Education and Research Department, which produces common content modules for many courses, could potentially improve productivity in this regard, but needs to be allowed to prioritise its main programme.</p> +<p>As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared on 27 October, the IDF aims to “completely defeat the murderous enemy and guarantee our existence”. Lofty objectives indeed – but two obvious questions need to be asked and answered. First, is it possible to destroy Hamas? And second, who governs Gaza after Hamas is routed?</p> -<p>Increased use of online learning could expand capacity in the training system while utilising fewer dedicated training staff, but this would place new burdens on course designers and the frontline. Line managers and others involved in facilitating unit learning would need preparation for their new responsibilities, and jobs would need to be redesigned to reflect that jobholders are not fully trained and need time and space to learn in the role.</p> +<h3 id="before-7-october-a-strange-paradigm-between-israel-and-hamas">Before 7 October: A Strange Paradigm Between Israel and Hamas</h3> -<p>Taking a whole force view and combining operationally current and upskilled Defence instructors with commercial partners possessing deep training expertise enhances the value of both groups. The contractors for the Royal Navy (Selborne) and the Army (Holdfast) have a greater responsibility for training management than elsewhere, providing training supervisors and managers, and design and governance functions, that supplement the military instructor’s recent frontline experience. They also act as intelligent customers promoting good practice from outside Defence. Working in partnership also helps protect capacity in the training system, preventing key posts being left unfilled when shortages of Defence personnel necessitate deploying military personnel to higher priority tasks. However, the partners need to be able to share information, be free to adapt training quickly by cycling through the DSAT process faster when necessary, and be able to adopt modern learning practices – all of which require trust between the parties.</p> +<p>Before the 7 October attack, Israel and Hamas had a violent – albeit predictable – arrangement with one another. While Israel’s past wars with Hamas (2008–2009, 2012, 2014 and 2021) were sparked by unique local and regional circumstances, Israel’s objective was always the same: degrade Hamas’s military capacity and restore a sense of deterrence to the Israel–Gaza border region. While Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009) and Operation Protective Edge (2014) included a ground component, Israel largely relied on air power to destroy as much of Hamas’s rocket factories, tunnel network and leadership as it could. Ground engagements inside Gaza lasted for a short period of time; the longest Israeli ground campaign, during Operation Protective Edge, lasted about three weeks.</p> -<h4 id="delivery">Delivery</h4> +<p>In the end, all of these wars concluded with Israel and Hamas negotiating a ceasefire through intermediaries. The terms were straightforward: quiet in exchange for quiet. Over time, Israel and Hamas settled into a mutually acceptable informal arrangement, whereby the Israelis would permit certain economic concessions to induce Hamas to maintain calm. Three months after the 2021 Israel–Hamas war ended with yet another ceasefire, Israel agreed to allow Qatar to channel $10 million a month into Gaza through the UN for the benefit of 100,000 Gazan families. Commercial incentives, such as the re-opening of the Abu Karam crossing, the approval of thousands of permits for Gazans to work in Israel and the periodic expansion of the Gaza fishing zone, were used to keep Hamas wedded to the agreement. This carrot came with a stick in the form of airstrikes and economic pressure whenever Palestinian militant groups broke the terms.</p> -<p>Learning is a fundamentally social activity, so classroom-based training will remain crucial, even as Defence becomes more digitally oriented. Given increased skills, training designers and instructors will be able to make lessons more active and less didactic, and thus engage students in higher levels of learning such as analysis, evaluation or creation. Investing in instructor development can move classroom learning up the pyramid of Bloom’s taxonomy, supporting collective reflection and social learning. Combined with online learning, these approaches could enhance learning outcomes as well as shorten residential programmes (where appropriate), democratise access and support reserves.</p> +<p>Israel and Hamas are sworn enemies, yet in a strange way they have also depended on one another. Although the Israelis have refused to deal with Hamas directly, Israeli Prime Ministers Benjamin Netanyahu, Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid have all counted on Hamas to restrain the even more extremist Palestinian groups located in the enclave. Until now, Hamas controlling Gaza and serving as the territory’s de-facto government has been deemed more pliable than disorder. Hamas, in turn, has relied on Israel to ensure that the much-needed cash from Qatar flowed into Gaza and that Palestinians could access the necessary permits to work in Israel.</p> -<p>A revised culture of learning that recognised that individuals might follow different paths based on their prior learning/experience (such as RSME’s fixed mastery/variable time approach), underpinned by better accreditation of non-Defence training, would enable faster – and more personalised – progression through training. A routine part of course design should be to identify shortcuts through the syllabus, allowing people demonstrating existing competence to avoid lessons that have no learning value for them. This move towards a more organic process requires acceptance that students would have different learning journeys. It might also allow training and trainees to contribute to the frontline more directly, with training outputs focused on benefiting users – for example, by conducting engineering training at units whose equipment needs repairing, rather than instructors “breaking” equipment for students to fix before it is broken again for the next class. It could also open the way for fortuitous course combination, where compatible programmes coincide and can allow collaborative learning; for example, the Fire and Rescue College, wherever possible, combines the Incident Command Course with firefighter development courses. Currently, however, this approach might be challenging for Defence’s preference for training standardisation.</p> +<h3 id="israel-ditches-the-old-playbook-but-can-it-succeed">Israel Ditches the Old Playbook, but Can It Succeed?</h3> -<p>Accepting that individuals may have different learning paths requires both a cultural shift by Defence and a solid foundation in the basics for the students. Experience at the BT telecoms group shows that training on every variant of a given technology can be rendered unnecessary if students have a strong foundation in the core principles and are then given access to technology that can provide specific online instruction, through access to videos showing how a particular task can be completed. A greater focus on universal principles and a reduced emphasis on the particular could also make the training estate more efficient by allowing the flexible use of space that was previously dedicated exclusively to one particular purpose. This could also address the endemic issue whereby training struggles to keep pace with frontline capabilities (a situation that is likely to get worse as Defence embraces the idea of “spiral development” on the frontline).</p> +<p>The previous arrangements between Israel and Hamas worked well enough – until they didn’t. Whatever mutual understanding the two had is now gone after Hamas’s 7 October attack, which was of such barbarity that resurrecting the old paradigm is no longer possible. Whereas successive Israeli governments were content with degrading Hamas’s military structure to buy a few more years of relative stability, it appears the current government will not accept anything less than Hamas’s eradication. Senior Israeli officials have stressed that the ongoing campaign will be longer, tougher and more comprehensive than those in the past. “Our responsibility now is to enter Gaza, go to the places where Hamas organises, operates, plans and launches”, Israel Defense Forces Chief of the General Staff Herzi Halevi told Haaretz on 15 October. “To hit them severely everywhere, every commander, every operative, and to destroy infrastructure. In one word – to win”.</p> -<p>Two elements that could contribute to enabling a shift towards more effective training delivery are technology and individual learning.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Hamas is as much an idea as it is a coherent military entity. Even if Israel manages to destroy the military entity – no sure thing – the idea will survive</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong>Technology</strong></p> +<p>The billion-dollar question is whether this can be accomplished. Destroying a terrorist organisation isn’t impossible, but it’s a difficult endeavour nonetheless. It’s even more difficult if military force is one’s preferred tool. Data analysis by the Rand Corporation finds that only 7% of terrorist groups since 1968 have been terminated through the use of military force. In contrast, 43% of terrorist groups ended when their members joined the political process (think of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the Irish Republican Army and the African National Congress). While it’s true that Hamas did participate in the Palestinian political process in 2006, winning legislative elections that year, it’s also true that Hamas’s already limited interest in democratic participation likely evaporated when the West and Israel refused to accept the results. Given the current situation, it is hard to imagine that Israel would allow Hamas to become a legitimate political actor, even if the group wanted to transition into electoral politics. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, in the 17th year of a four-year term, would also likely balk at the prospect; the last thing he needs when his approval ratings are in the toilet is more competition.</p> -<p>Coupled with the use of learning technologies, such as AI-enabled online learning and virtual reality (VR), more blended approaches better suited to personalised learning journeys could be enabled. AI-enabled content could respond to student inputs, guiding them through online courses, while VR could support forces sent to the frontline without a training stock, or allow those on the frontline to learn before equipment arrives on which they have not been trained. These technologies require investment in the enabling infrastructure to create an open architecture to support technology-agnostic learning systems that allow students to use their own devices for accessing unclassified materials.</p> +<p>So far, Israel has relied on force. At the time of writing, at least 13 Hamas officials, financiers and security officials have been killed, including Asem Abu Rakaba, a top commander of the 7 October operation. More will inevitably be wiped out in the weeks ahead. But as terrorism researchers have shown, terrorist groups – particularly those with a hierarchal structure – have an ability to replace commanders and leaders quickly. Israel has killed countless Hamas commanders over the last quarter-century, yet the organisation was still able to generate revenue, build an arsenal and perpetrate the worst terrorist attack since 9/11.</p> -<p><strong>Individual Learning</strong></p> +<p>It should also be noted that Hamas is not just a terrorist group; it’s a social movement embedded in the Palestinian arena. The organisation is as much an idea as it is a coherent military entity. Even if Israel manages to destroy the military entity – no sure thing – the idea will survive. The Israeli military operation, and the thousands of Palestinian civilian casualties that will likely result from fighting in a highly populated area, is likely to generate the next round of recruits for Hamas and other like-minded groups like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.</p> -<p>Delivery is built on the foundation of a high quality learning environment. Such an environment should embody a greater willingness to allow self-directed learning (without automatically resulting in pressure to reduce course lengths) and widen access to content, not merely for those that trigger an entitlement (a role-based approach) but for encouraging those who wish to own their personal and professional development. Helping students to learn how to think (rather than what to think) by combining more student reflection time with classroom discussions focused on higher-value learning outcomes would add value to both Defence and the students.</p> +<h3 id="does-israel-have-a-day-after-plan">Does Israel Have a “Day After” Plan?</h3> -<h4 id="building-knowledge-of-the-system">Building Knowledge of the System</h4> +<p>Israel’s military objective is clear: destroy Hamas. What it plans to do after this objective is achieved is open for debate. The options for any post-Hamas governing arrangement in Gaza range from bad to worse. Gaza was in a precarious position before the war began, and is undergoing an even deeper socioeconomic catastrophe today. Roughly one-third of residential buildings have been damaged or destroyed over the last two weeks. More than 80% of Gazans are living in poverty and approximately 62% of Gaza’s youth were unemployed last year, according to UN statistics. Mass power outages are a fact of life, and the healthcare system is plagued by supply shortages.</p> -<p>The training of individuals sits within wider force-generation and HR systems. Steps are being taken to improve connections and feedback loops between individual and collective training, but it is too early to judge the success of these initiatives. A high-level strategy that considers individual training, setting the framework for thinking about in-person and remote learning, simulation, use of AI (including generative AI) and establishing agreed definitions of technology and data would help. This might also acknowledge the limitations of the DSAT process in practice and encourage a more dynamic model – one that accepts more risk against standardised training outputs by being willing to exploit emerging opportunities that add greater value, either to the students or to the frontline. For example, using trainees to repair equipment at frontline units, or allowing courses to train together when they coincide, even if that is not the same on every occasion.</p> +<p>Who is going to fix this mess? Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid has suggested bringing in the Palestinian Authority (PA) after hostilities cease. Yet in the 30th year of its existence, the PA has lost the trust of the very people it was meant to govern. The old men running it, Abbas included, are increasingly out of touch with the people they are supposed to represent. They’re viewed at best as a bunch of incompetents, and at worst as enablers of Israel’s occupation. Repeated Israeli raids in the West Bank over the last year, which the PA has been powerless to stop, are clear evidence of Abbas’s ineptitude in the minds of many Palestinians. Some parts of the West Bank – such as the Jenin refugee camp – are no-go areas for the Palestinian security forces and have essentially been handed over to smaller armed groups who hold no allegiance to the traditional Palestinian factions. In March, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that 52% of Palestinians believed the interests of the Palestinian people would be best served by the PA’s dissolution. For those between the ages of 18 and 22, the figure goes up to 59%. If the PA can’t function properly in the limited areas of the West Bank it nominally controls, the probability it would do any better in Gaza – which has been devoid of PA influence since 2007 – is slim to none.</p> -<p>It might also encourage closer relationships between TRAs and TDAs, with either the requirement responsibilities siting within the delivery authority, or placing a small TRA team to work alongside the TDA. This would enable the delivery organisations to become centres of expertise at the leading edge of thinking about how skills are employed and forging stronger relationships with the frontline, doctrine centres and allies. TDAs, therefore, would seek out improvements and propose changes to requirements, rather than wait for often overstretched TRAs to identify new requirements. The alignment of many of these functions under Director Land Warfare in the Army could be a useful test case for this approach.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Israel’s military objective is clear: destroy Hamas. What it plans to do after this objective is achieved is open for debate</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Beyond training, the overall HR ecosystem is less integrated, with often cumbersome processes hindering connections between strategic workforce planning, recruitment, training and career management. The mechanical SOTR/SOTT process that connects recruitment and training remains challenging, although early results from Project Selborne’s use of AI through its new schedule optimisation engine allow an immediate digital recasting of the SOTR/SOTT plans when the situation changes or a new operational requirement is introduced.</p> +<p>Some have suggested an interim Gaza administration run by the UN and Arab states. On the surface, this sounds plausible. UN agencies are well entrenched in Gaza, having run schools and delivered social services to Gazans since well before Hamas’s takeover in 2007. The Gulf states could help finance the UN’s efforts.</p> -<p>A necessary foundation for the modernisation of training is to improve the quality and flow of data across the training schools, across the Commands between Joint TDAs and Service TRAs (through strengthened Customer Executive Boards), and between the MoD and contractors. Doing so – as Ofsted has regularly demanded in its inspection of training establishments – would inform choices and improve management of a more fluid system. It would also permit technology to mitigate the need for human experts that are difficult to find, and could offer a more dynamic approach to recruitment and training that reduces wastage.</p> +<p>Even so, Arab states might not be willing to serve as Gaza’s white knight for a number of reasons. First, Arab leaders don’t want to be portrayed as cleaning up Israel’s mess or making Israel’s job easier in any way, shape or form. Palestinian statehood aspirations may have gone down a few notches on the list of priorities, but Arab governments can’t afford to ignore the issue’s strong salience among their publics. According to the 2022 Arab Opinion Index, organised by the Arab Center Washington DC, 76% of respondents thought the Palestinian cause was a concern for all Arabs, not just Palestinians.</p> -<p>The simplification of DSAT is welcomed, but must be accompanied by upskilling and the resetting of risk tolerance, or Defence will merely be adding new process to reduce the chance of errors by those not steeped in it. Another important change would be for the knowledge, skills, experience and behaviours that individuals require to be mapped to organisational needs (and therefore shape the training and learning designed to fulfil those requirements). The Pan-Defence Skills Framework could help in this regard. Defence also needs to systematise the good work it did in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic when, moving rapidly, it embraced changes that under normal circumstances would have taken a long time to implement. While commendable, these changes now often exist as exceptions to the usual system, and need to be made “normal”.</p> +<p>Israel could adopt a strategy of detachment once major combat operations are over by withdrawing its forces; strengthening land, sea and air restrictions over Gaza; and treating the enclave as a security issue. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s vague concept of establishing a “new security reality” for Gaza seems to hint in this direction. Israel, however, has been implementing such a strategy for the last 16 years, while neglecting the substantive political disagreements underlying the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.</p> -<h4 id="partnering">Partnering</h4> +<p>By far the worst option on the table for Israel is a full re-occupation of the enclave, a feat that even Ariel Sharon – one of Israel’s most hardline prime ministers – wasn’t interested in. US President Joe Biden has said an Israeli reoccupation of Gaza would be “a big mistake”. The Israeli government would likely agree; policing 2.3 million Palestinians – the same people forced to flee their homes in part due to Israeli airstrikes – and administering their affairs would be the definition of a thankless task.</p> -<p>A whole force approach to learning and development is paying dividends in some areas of Defence, where, as Haythornthwaite hoped, the complementary skills of Defence and contractor personnel mitigate risks, enhance outputs and help Defence remain at the cutting edge of training. However, best practice needs to be shared more widely, and more sophisticated arrangements are needed in the training system as much as they are in procurement.</p> +<h3 id="unanswered-questions-linger-as-israel-prepares-for-a-long-war">Unanswered Questions Linger as Israel Prepares for a Long War</h3> -<p>Just as Defence’s skills requirements are not static, neither are the science of learning nor learning technologies. Commercial requirements in contracts spanning over 20 years that specify inputs cannot take account of changing andragogical practice, technologies or even system capacity. More partnership-focused models, such as those at the Defence Academy and Royal Navy, offer significant advantages, especially where they include funded requirements for training innovation and allow the partner to maximise the use of the infrastructure, such as the Holdfast contract at RSME. For example, Project Selborne’s eight output-based key performance indicators drive effective partnership behaviours aligned to the Royal Navy’s strategic goals, where sharing people creates a single workforce (civilian and military) that contributes to the sense of shared endeavour and priorities. More broadly, however, Defence must recognise that external learning expertise is valuable, and be more realistic about its own uniqueness.</p> +<p>Much like the US before the war in Afghanistan, Israel is committed to vanquishing its opponents through the force of arms. The US experience in Afghanistan, however, is instructive for Israel. US objectives were clear and measurable early on – destroy Al-Qa’ida and overthrow the Taliban regime – only for the US to slip into the herculean task of building an Afghan state from the ground up. US casualties mounted, about $2 trillion of US taxpayer money was spent, and US troops were put into a position of defending a corruption-plagued Afghan administration that was incapable of governing. With Israel on the verge of mounting its largest ground offensive since the 1982 invasion of Beirut, Israeli policymakers have a responsibility to ask the very same questions US policymakers failed to ask more than two decades ago.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<hr /> -<p>The skills challenge in Defence is becoming more acute, with traditional roles becoming more complex and new technologies requiring new skills. Moreover, in looking for recruits that possess these skills, Defence is competing directly with employers who have greater flexibility to pay market rates. The extensive training organisation Defence operates is a vital tool for ensuring sustained delivery of its operational outputs. This organisation is a great strength, and an attractive part of the Defence offer to its people, being more systematic and structured than that of most employers.</p> +<p><strong>Daniel R DePetris</strong> is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.</p>Daniel R DePetrisFollowing the 7 October attack by Hamas, Israel has determined to destroy the terrorist group controlling Gaza once and for all. The question is not just whether or not it will succeed, but what its plan is for the day after.The Lost European Vision2023-10-31T12:00:00+08:002023-10-31T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-lost-european-vision<p><em>Drawing insights from defense experts across NATO members, the study highlights the evolving European defense landscape, emphasizing security of supply concerns and the balance between national and EU initiatives. The report underscores pivotal forthcoming decisions in Europe’s defense amidst changing geopolitical dynamics.</em></p> -<p>However, this training system is expensive, and requires modernisation to help it meet the challenges it faces.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Foremost among the challenges is one of culture. The traditional conception of training in Defence is an “industrial” one, where people are raw materials fed into a process that homogenises them via the delivery of standardised training, largely regardless of individual needs. This rather mechanistic approach was effective when skills and careers were static, but is less suited to the rapidly-evolving environments that Defence operates in today. The lack of a “system view”, in which an individual’s training is situated within a broader ecosystem, has hindered modernisation attempts and resulted in risk being displaced rather than removed.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>The second challenge is that although the DSAT process that shapes the development of training is conceptually sound, the failure to resource it properly in practice means that it struggles to deliver, while the process by which Defence contracts for training partners also creates problems.</p> +<p>Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has caused a dramatic shift in the European security landscape, and European defense is now entering a new era. DGAP has initiated a project to provide a comprehensive analysis of the changes in the European defense sector triggered by the Russian attack.</p> -<p>Thirdly, training delivery has failed to keep pace with advances in the understanding of andragogy, often as a result of how the Defence training workforce is itself resourced, trained and employed.</p> +<p>During the first phase of the project, carried out in cooperation with the Friedrich-Naumann-Foun-dation, the analysis concentrated on changes in the perception of the defense environment and their implications for the future military order and defense cooperation.</p> -<p>The final challenge is that many of the essential enablers underpinning the learning environment are missing, including the data, infrastructure and capacity needed to manage fluctuating demand.</p> +<p>The second phase of the EDINA (European Defense in A New Age) project focuses on the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) in the new era of European defense. It highlights the impact of the Russian aggression on Europe’s defense industry and analyzes the structural drivers and constraints that influence the future trajectory of the continent’s industrial base.</p> -<p>Responding to these challenges is complex, but must involve sharing existing good practice, as well as incorporating the lessons that can be learned from others. Key elements of any response would include:</p> +<p>The data base was generated in a similar way to the first phase of the EDINA project. In May and July 2023, DGAP brought together defense experts from European NATO members (Germany, France, United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Greece, Türkiye, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Lithuania, Bulgaria) for two workshops (physical and online) to discuss the current situation and future development of the EDTIB. Prior to the workshops, the experts were asked to prepare country reports as their input to the discussions. The reports allowed to sketch out the industrial landscape in Europe and provided valuable insights into different positions on defense industrial cooperation, dependencies, and structural problems regarding the EDTIB. The reports were based on the following questionnaire:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Upskilling the Defence training workforce – not just instructors, but staff across the training system, including TRAs, training managers and designers, and those validating the learning.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Adopting a less mechanistic, more organic approach to delivery – one that facilitates unique individual journeys through the training system, gives more power to learners, and provides the right learning environment, enabled by modern learning technology.</p> + <p>Industries/ RTO: What are current strengths in production and technologies (top 5-7 companies, revenue, employees, current major projects (timelines), role in the supply chain/product portfolio, cooperation partners, involvement in European projects)?</p> </li> <li> - <p>Building a stronger understanding of the systems within which training sits, including the individual/collective training continuum, and better use of training data and its connection with recruitment and career management, which is how Defence applies the skills people have learned. The shift also needs to normalise the (impressive) response to the Covid-19 pandemic that often stands out as an exception to the standard approach.</p> + <p>How does your country assess the impact of cooperation, dependencies (import/export) and competition among Europeans but also vis-à-vis the United States and Asia on the future ability of the armaments sector to deliver needed output (quantity/quality)?</p> </li> <li> - <p>Building stronger partnerships with providers who can complement the strengths Defence instructors bring to the training system (their up-to-date operational knowledge and ability to contextualise the learning) through a stronger understanding of andragogy and best practice outside Defence.</p> + <p>Future Avenues: How will the national DTIB evolve over the next decade? What are important trigger points for such a development?</p> </li> </ul> -<p>The key strength of Defence’s training organisation – its highly structured approach – also makes it relatively rigid, and thus less able to react to rapidly changing needs. Modifying the structure to make it more flexible – rather than abandoning it – offers the best way forward, but success will only be possible if training modernisation is considered within its broader contexts, taking a “whole system” approach that considers the effects of changes in one part of the system on the other parts. Without this broader understanding, training modernisation could merely transfer risk elsewhere rather than remove it.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Paul O’Neill</strong> is Director of Military Sciences at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). His research interests cover national security strategy, NATO, and organisational aspects of Defence and security, including organisational design, human resources, professional military education and decision-making.He is a CBE, Companion of the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, and a member of the UK Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team.</p> - -<p><strong>Patrick Hinton</strong> is a serving regular officer in the British Army’s Royal Artillery. He has experience working with ground based air defence systems and remotely piloted air systems. He has also worked in the personnel space. Since joining the Army in 2014, his career has consisted of a number of appointments at regimental duty including Troop Command, Executive Officer, and Adjutant. He was the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow in the Military Sciences Research Group at RUSI until the end of August 2023.</p>Paul O’Neill and Patrick HintonBetter practices are needed to improve the effectiveness of defence training.Uncrewed Ground Systems2023-10-26T12:00:00+08:002023-10-26T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uncrewed-ground-systems<p><em>Military experimentation with uncrewed ground systems (UGS) is happening apace. Bomb disposal robots have been in service with armed forces for decades. Now, systems with greater capabilities and autonomy are being developed and tested.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>Potential uses include carrying cargo, casualty evacuation, reconnaissance, chemical-agent detection, communications and fire support. However, the gap between ideal uses and present technical capability is significant. The delivery of systems to where they will be used, the realistic uses once there and the machines’ interactions with soldiers have frequently been underexamined but are crucial to how UGS will form part of land forces and offer genuine operational advantage. The technical limitations of UGS must be reflected in how they are task-organised within land forces. Due consideration must be given to how UGS will move around the battlefield, as it will often not be by their own steam. Maintenance and repair of UGS will require new training courses and a close relationship with industrial partners.</p> +<p>After the workshop, the authors had the opportunity to update their reports in the light of the discussions. For this publication, they were then slightly edited to meet grammatical and spelling standards. Any opinions expressed in the reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).</p> -<p>The principal conclusion to draw is that UGS will require significant support from their human counterparts. Moreover, cognitive burden on operators must be considered and managed. Systems move slowly, and the difficulty of navigating in complex terrain means they are not suited to some of the tasks for which they have been proposed, such as dismounted close combat in complex terrain. It is important to involve as many soldiers as possible in experimentation, and expose them to UGS early and often. This can be achieved by employing UGS in those areas with the highest throughput of soldiers, such as firing ranges and exercise areas, and making use of simulation. In addition, initial training should include education and demonstrations of UGS for new recruits. This will help build familiarity, favourability and trust in these systems.</p> +<p>This project report starts with a presentation of key findings from the workshop and country reports. This section also presents the research team’s analysis of the current situation, a forecast of likely developments, and suggestions for measures to be taken to push the EDTIB forward. This executive summary is followed by the country reports.</p> -<p>The potential of human–machine teams is significant, but hype should not disguise the limitations of UGS and the difficulty of integrating new technology into established structures.</p> +<h3 id="executive-summary">Executive Summary</h3> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022 marks the beginning of a new era in European security, and Europe’s response to the Russian aggression will shape the development of the European defense technological and industrial base (EDTIB) for decades to come. At the same time, there are important economic and political factors influencing the continent’s defense industrial development. Against this background, this report outlines the most likely development scenario for the European industrial base. It also describes the options open to European governments and the EU to maintain a highly capable defense industry and address current shortcomings.</p> -<h4 id="context">Context</h4> +<h4 id="a-snapshot-of-the-european-defense-landscape">A Snapshot of the European Defense Landscape</h4> -<p>The presence of robots on the battlefield is central in today’s military discourse. A recent British Army recruiting advert showed soldiers operating in close combat alongside humanoid and wheeled robots. A former head of the British armed forces has stated that in the 2030s, the Army could comprise 90,000 soldiers and 30,000 robots. The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a recent interview that “you’re going to see significant portions of armies and navies and air forces that will be robotic”. There is a significant jump from where forces are now to this envisioned state. Experimentation with uncrewed ground systems (UGS) in military forces is gaining pace. Many forces are running trials with a variety of systems. Uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) are far more mature in their journey and lessons can be drawn across to their land-based brethren. Similar to UAS, it is believed that UGS will provide competitive advantage to land forces in several ways. UGS have the potential to support logistics and reconnaissance missions, as well as the ability to be armed with remote weapon systems to provide additional firepower to manoeuvre units. They can remove soldiers from harm’s way and increase mass, which underpins fighting power. However, there are substantial technological hurdles and organisational realities which need to be overcome before UGS are seamlessly integrated into military forces and become a force multiplier. The simple existence of such systems is not enough to transform warfare or generate competitive advantage for a force. It is not clear that any military force has integrated UGS at scale except for bomb disposal robots. These basic UGS have been part of military arsenals for decades, but the current zeitgeist is focused on those systems with a degree of autonomy which can unlock operational effectiveness above that seen on battlefields today.</p> +<p>Europe’s defense industry produces the full range of conventional capabilities needed by its armed forces. However, this capacity comes with significant dependencies: On the one hand, given the many years of insufficient national demand, manufacturers have become increasingly dependent on exports to countries outside of the EU and NATO to maintain their skills and production lines. On the other hand, the economization of defense, meaning a growing pressure on prices, has created significant import dependencies on raw materials and key components like semi-conductors. Both elements are now coming under scrutiny as security of supply is becoming a key concern for European nations and their armed forces.</p> -<p>This paper answers three research questions focused on the integration of UGS into light land forces at the tactical level. The first concerns how UGS can be usefully employed in tactical land formations with their technical limitations and tactical realities considered. The second relates to how they get to the fight in the first place: organisation, movement and sustainment of UGS around battlefield echelons must be considered, and this is much less examined in the literature than is their use in frontline combat. The third involves how military forces can ensure that UGS are put to good use by their soldiers. Preparing soldiers to form part of human–machine teams must be a deliberate act, using training and education to build trust and understanding. The paper focuses on developments in the British and US militaries, but lessons can be drawn more widely.</p> +<p>The EDTIB reaches far beyond the EU and its member states. Despite EU initiatives like the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF), and lately the European Peace Facility, the lion share of defense industrial investment undertaken by EU member states takes place outside the EU framework. Also, countries outside the EU – the United Kingdom as a defense industrial heavy weight as well as Norway and Türkiye – add significantly to the landscape, be it through cooperation or competition. At the same time, non-European companies have become part of the continent’s defense industrial ecosystem by contributing components or whole systems. This applies especially to the US industry but is also true for manufacturers for instance from South Korea.</p> -<p>Light land forces have been chosen as the focus for discussion, although employment considerations can be extrapolated to other parts of the force. Light infantry operate with minimal vehicular support, although they may be supported by vehicles such as quad bikes. They have the critical task of closing with the enemy at close quarters and seizing ground in complex terrain. These troops are laden with all the equipment required to operate for days at a time, including weapons, ammunition, rations, water, radios, batteries and more. As a result, they may have much to gain from the advent of UGS.</p> +<p>Moreover, despite more than two decades of working toward closer cooperation in development and procurement within the EU, the EDTIB is still shaped by national choices taken decades ago – especially in the aftermath of the Cold War. These decisions were not primarily driven by defense considerations but influenced by broader domestic economic policies and philosophies, including on state ownership of defense companies. Thus, every country has its own story regarding its defense industrial base and ambitions. Eastern and central European countries had to address an extra challenge: Integration into NATO meant that their industries had to adapt to new standards for equipment and interoperability. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, they also lost their supply basis and economic links. As a result, many companies ceased production or concentrated on the maintenance of legacy equipment or exports to former Soviet states and export destinations of Soviet-made weapon systems.</p> -<p>This variety of potential uses means that UGS offer great potential utility to armed forces. However, their development, introduction and scaling across armies requires careful consideration, the totality of which is not immediately obvious. Considerations are set out below to outline how military procurement professionals and concept developers might conceive the introduction of UGS into the force.</p> +<p>This brief look at recent history underlines the importance of the upcoming decisions for the EDTIB. Europe is entering a new historical phase. The Russian war of aggression is the key impulse that has put security of supply for the armed forces at the top of the political agenda. European countries, whether big or small, now realize the cost of their dependence on global supply chains. Their governments share an aspiration to generate security of supply nationally. But their understanding of what that entails differs significantly. In some cases, countries limit their definition of the supplies they consider essential at the national level to fairly basic elements like ammunition and maintenance. In other cases, governments strive to keep their country’s technological edge regarding components or entire weapon systems. On a broader scale, the choices to be made indicate that the armed forces may require a new mix of quantity and quality.</p> -<h4 id="structure">Structure</h4> +<p>Clearly, not every aspiration and every demand can be supplied nationally, resulting in a trade-off bet-ween ambition and feasibility that could open a path to cooperation. Current practice seems to reflect a pragmatic approach: While countries see their national basis as an indispensable core of their defense efforts, they also maintain their engagement in EU or multinational cooperation. Whether this is a legacy practice or a conscious choice will become clear when economic and financial pressures force tougher decisions on the future path of the defense industrial base.</p> -<p>After setting out its methodology, the paper outlines the principal characteristics of UGS. These are the basis of their numerous uses and the foundation of their strengths and limitations. The drivers behind UGS development – including reducing risk, increasing mass, and the ability to increase advantage through human–machine teams – are noted. Next, the state of the art of UGS is shown, demonstrating the numerous use cases which are developing in forces around the world. With this foundation set out, the bulk of the paper then offers several areas of investigation and recommendations for military forces. The first concerns how such systems might be employed at the tactical level. The second is how UGS can be moved around the battlefield and where they might be assigned organisationally. Third, means by which to socialise UGS within a force, improve education and foster trust are offered. These areas are often sidelined by discussion of experiments or capabilities, without due thought to the various interdependencies and whole-force considerations.</p> +<h4 id="the-start-of-a-new-era">The Start of a New Era</h4> -<h4 id="methodology">Methodology</h4> +<p>There are three main factors that will shape the development of the EDTIB in this new era: The first is the transformation of the security environment, in particular through the dramatic changes brought about by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Governments’ responses to the war have a direct impact on the defense industry and shape the expectations of companies in the sector. The second element consists of the economic interests of states and major defense companies. Both types of actors shape markets, trade, and production chains through their preferences. As preferences have not significantly changed, neither has the general direction of the EDTIB. As a result, economic preferences act as structural barriers to the fundamental change that the development of the security factors would call for. Third, there are the political visions of European integration, both in defense and in overall politics. They should be seen as an underlying long-term factor. The near absence of a discourse about more EU cooperation among EU member states seems to indicate that there is not much appetite to give the EU a larger role.</p> -<p>This paper is founded on both primary and secondary research. First, the author has conducted consultations with both practitioners and analysts, aimed at discussing their experience with UGS and associated technology. He has also deployed on and visited military exercises, such as Project Convergence 22. The author is a serving military officer and has extensive experience of and a professional background in the employment of robotics and autonomous systems (RAS). He has spent time with industry, looking at both hardware and software. A literature review of academic articles, news media and military press releases has also been conducted.</p> +<p><strong>Security Concerns as a Momentum for Change</strong></p> -<p>The author has also attended conferences with military personnel examining UGS. Existing research and expertise on the organisational impact of UGS is limited compared with that on their aerial counterparts. The literature is either very technical with an academic focus, or less analytical, mainly comprising news articles and manufacturer comment. Moreover, the paucity of information in the public domain about military UGS has also imposed a limitation on this research. Attempting to describe a future state is inherently difficult, but the assumptions and considerations laid out in this paper are grounded in reality, and draw on practical knowledge of both RAS and military organisational processes and structure.</p> +<p>The current situation of Europe’s defense industries is primarily shaped by Russia’s war in Ukraine. The conflict has brought security interests to the forefront of politicians’ minds when considering defense decisions.</p> -<h3 id="i-what-are-ugs">I. What are UGS?</h3> +<p>Arguably the most important consequence affecting the EDTIB is a significant increase in demand for military equipment. On the one hand, this is due to the massive amount of armaments that Europe is delivering to Ukraine (already worth more than €36 billion, including deliveries from EU institutions). As many countries do not have large reserves of materiel and ammunition, stocks depleted by deliveries to Ukraine need to be replenished. On the other hand, many European governments have realized that their past efforts were not sufficient to ensure a credible deterrence posture. Decades of austerity and underfunding have left major European players with “bonsai armies” that are no longer able to defend their territories in the event of a Russian attack. This leaves Europe extremely vulnerable. European governments are now making efforts to reverse this trend and close existing capability gaps. Several major modernization programs have been launched, and major procurement decisions have been taken, such as Germany’s purchase of F-35 fighter jets from the United States. To underpin this new level of ambition, many countries have significantly increased their defense spending. Poland’s increase of the GDP share devoted to defense to four percent and Germany’s creation of a €100 billion special fund stand out.</p> -<p>UGS are vehicles or static platforms that operate on land without a human crew inside, although some systems can be optionally uncrewed. UGS can be as small as shoeboxes and even thrown by users. Others are as large as historically crewed vehicles, weighing many tonnes. They may or may not be armoured. UGS may be wheeled, tracked, have legs or a combination of the three. Each type of drivetrain has its advantages and disadvantages. Wheels are good for speed and manoeuvrability on even surfaces, are lightweight and are simple to replace. They are, however, vulnerable to shrapnel damage and punctures. Tracks are useful for offroad manoeuvrability and offer good traction over rough terrain. However, they are generally slower than wheels and are also complex to refit if they become dislodged. UGS with legs, such as the Boston Dynamics Spot, can tackle obstacles such as stairs and climb very steep slopes, and can also move laterally. Wheeled and tracked vehicles are faster over most surfaces, however.</p> +<p>As a result, the overall size of the market has increased and is set to increase further. European governments now all agree that Ukraine will need support for the foreseeable future, as there appears to be little hope for peace any time soon. With security concerns undiminished, defense will continue to be a high priority across the continent, creating an energizing momentum for European defense contractors.</p> -<p>UGS exist on a spectrum of control. They may be operated by a soldier holding a wired controller or a remote control while within line of sight. Examples include mine clearance systems and bomb disposal robots. Teleoperation adds a level of complexity, in which the operator relies on the UGS’ cameras and sensors to make sense of surroundings and controls them from a distance. UGS with levels of automaticity or automation are more complex still. Within this category, there remains significant variety. It is necessary to stress that a system being uncrewed does not mean it is autonomous. The Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) framework is one toolset with which to understand UGS’ autonomous capability. Autonomy can be understood as a system’s “own ability of integrated sensing, perceiving, analyzing, communicating, planning, decision-making, and acting/executing, to achieve its goals as assigned”. Systems with high levels of autonomy are rare. More commonly, UGS have a leader–follower function whereby the vehicle will follow another crewed vehicle or a human commander. Increasing levels of autonomy then allow some UGS to follow waypoints given by a human operator and avoid obstacles while following a given route or exploring a designated area. Some systems may have the capability to act with conditional automation, whereby an operator can take control in certain circumstances, such as if the UGS cannot figure out how to manoeuvre around a certain obstacle. UGS that have the capability to act independently of an operator’s instructions and make a series of linked “decisions” in pursuit of an end objective are scarce. And that end objective will have been given by a human operator, which again means that the system is not fully autonomous. The necessity of human input is a golden thread in this research. Supervision of many systems still requires soldiers to be at least monitoring, and perhaps solely focused on, the UGS, rather than free to conduct other tasks.</p> +<p>Currently, however, the EDTIB is not able to meet wartime demands. It successfully adapted to decades of peace, maintaining high profits despite relatively low levels of defense spending, but it lost the capacity to scale up production for wartime needs. Traditional European manufacturers will be able to partially absorb the new demand by establishing new production capacities, but this will not be sufficient either in terms of volume or of speed. Hence, third countries will benefit. Although the United States is an obvious alternative for supplies and US companies are certain to secure more contracts from Europe, American industry experiences similar bottleneck problems due to high demand.</p> -<p>Systems also differ by use, which is examined in detail in later chapters. For the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that any remote weapons systems associated with UGS will have a human in the loop throughout for decision-making, retaining meaningful control, and providing authorisation for any engagement. This is in line with British defence policy.</p> +<p>Other players such as South Korea and Türkiye are ready to step in. South Korea has recently won major contracts from Poland for K2 battle tanks and artillery ammunition and is establishing partnerships with other European countries as well (e.g., Romania). Türkiye also looks prepared to take on a greater role. Its Bayraktar drones have proved their worth in several conflicts, including the war in Ukraine. The Turkish DTIB has benefitted from high levels of domestic defense spending, which has allowed the sector to modernize and grow. Several Turkish companies appear ready to become serious competitors to their western and northern European peers.</p> -<h4 id="sensors">Sensors</h4> +<p>The war in Ukraine and the threat of further Russian aggression have given new urgency to efforts to fill capability gaps. Governments are prioritizing speed in new procurement programs. As a result, imports and off-the-shelf procurement are becoming more important. Since this usually means buying from non-European third countries (rather than setting up joint European development programs), there is a new momentum for European defense industrial cooperation. Even strong supporters of European cooperation have opted for imports, as demonstrated by Germany’s decision to buy F-35 fighters as nuclear carriers. This has caused friction in Franco-German relations, with France, a strong supporter of European cooperation, expressing disappointment over the German decision.</p> -<p>The simplest remotely operated UGS may have no sensors, as the human operator is expected to be close by. An example might be an excavator. Systems such as bomb disposal robots have cameras that allow the operator a close-up view from the system, and allow the manipulation of the target object with the operator at a safe distance. As systems gain autonomous functions, a suite of sensors can be expected, including LIDAR, RADAR, GPS and cameras. LIDAR and RADAR help the UGS make a 3D map of their surroundings, which is then used for routing and obstacle avoidance. Ultrasonic sensors may be mounted on the sides of the vehicle to detect objects very close up. In civilian applications, these are used to help autonomous vehicles park. Video cameras are used to detect humans or animals, as well as to make sense of traffic lights and signage. Video cameras are also able to pick up more nuances than LIDAR and RADAR, including hand gestures and traffic cones. GPS helps the system situate itself within the wider geography of the area and aids a system to stay on course when navigating a waypoint route or searching an area for reconnaissance purposes. UGS may also have an inertial measurement unit to give an additional indication of the direction and velocity in which the system is moving. This information can complement that of GPS, and is useful when GPS signals are weak, such as when moving through urban areas or tunnels, or during bad weather. Developments in this area are fast moving, and new sensors and combinations are being experimented with. Given this, commenting categorically is difficult, but suffice to say UGS use sensors to make sense of their surroundings.</p> +<p>In central and eastern Europe, defense industry partnerships and purchasing decisions are driven by the desire to keep the United States as the main regional security guarantor, which means that central and eastern European states prefer to buy American rather than European. This is facilitated by the fact that eastern European industries rarely play a role in major European development or procurement programs. As a result, central and eastern European countries do not benefit economically from buying European materiel or from engaging in joint development. Their tendency toward purchasing US equipment could be reinforced as security pressures remain high, speed in deliveries seem more important than ever, and NATO’s position as the bedrock of European security is strengthened.</p> -<h4 id="software">Software</h4> +<p>The outbreak of a major war in Europe also has consequences for the force structure of European militaries. There is a new focus on quantity. Major wars require more mass and deeper reserves and stocks than the external interventions that were the focus of the last two decades. Does this mean that Europe will focus less on innovation and that the EDTIB could fall behind in terms of technology? So far, this looks unlikely. Militaries and governments have defined requirements, and therefore innovation, years in advance, which means that for the next generation of systems, the innovation that industry needs to deliver has already been determined. Europe currently anticipates the production of cutting-edge technologies. However, there is a growing gap between current procurement plans and newly expressed demand in terms of volume. A new balance needs to be struck between mass production of current state of the art systems and high-end platforms designed to be built in smaller numbers.</p> -<p>Software must then make sense of all the inputs described above. The UGS’ use, the environment they will operate in and their level of autonomy determine the complexity of the software. The software uses the sensors to make sense of where the UGS are, what is around them and, in some cases, what might happen next in the case of people and vehicles in close proximity, and what to do if a particular circumstance presents itself, such as another vehicle moving into the systems’ path. Software will use this information to plan UGS’ next move before moving. The systems may take their external environment and plan against a library of scenarios on which they have been previously trained. The software must fuse information from the various sensors to form one combined understanding of the environment, using a variety of filter mechanisms. Software architectures differ from system to system and in complexity. UGS may also have target recognition capability that can spot armoured vehicles and movement on the horizon, which can be fed to commanders for subsequent decisions and actions.</p> +<p>Governments are increasingly aware of the importance of ensuring security of supply. Their ambition spans from spare parts and maintenance via components to entire platforms. As a result, central and eastern European countries are investing in building up their domestic industries to become more independent. While smaller industries (e.g., in Bulgaria and Romania) are trying to secure a share of the maintenance business, others aim to participate in the manufacturing process itself and benefit from technology transfers. Poland is a good example of a government with both the ambition and the funds to develop a strong industrial base. Poland and similarly ambitious players with sufficient financial resources will be able to continue their growth path and play a greater role in the EDTIB. But while they can become more independent from imports, including from their European partners, it is unlikely that they will turn into serious competitors to Europe’s top producers.</p> -<h4 id="power">Power</h4> +<p>A key issue for the future EDTIB is the sustainability of the increase in defense spending. Building a defense technological and industrial base capable of meeting the new level of ambition requires a sustained high level of defense spending to keep funds from being diverted to other government functions in the event of an economic downturn or a reappraisal of policy priorities. Most European governments seem to understand that defense spending must be sustainable to produce results. They are not only willing to maintain their budgets at the current high level but also envisage further increases in the near future. With security pressures expected to remain high, defense will remain a priority across the continent. As a result, the defense market will continue to grow.</p> -<p>Smaller UGS are usually battery powered, with larger systems using a combustion engine or hybrid diesel–electric power train. Each has benefits and limitations. Electric systems are near-silent to run and produce a low heat signature. However, battery life is often limited, and requires extensive management, of replacing batteries and charging them. Systems using diesel or petrol are easier to fold into existing military logistic chains as they are already geared to provide fuel to current fleets. However, they have a significant noise and heat signature, which can make them vulnerable in an era of persistent ISR capability.</p> +<p><strong>Economic Interests as a Barrier to Change</strong></p> -<h4 id="command-and-control">Command and Control</h4> +<p>Although security considerations currently drive the general direction of defense policy in Europe, there are economic trends and considerations that strongly influence the development of the EDTIB. In peacetime, they were arguably more dominant, but even now, no government will take decisions that go against its economic and industrial interests, which are to nurture national arms producers. Any analysis of the defense sector therefore needs to take the industry’s political economy into account. Governments may claim that they are acting in the spirit of European integration or that their motives are exclusively security related, but that is rarely the case. All, even small countries, have bold ambitions for using the additional money and demand to boost their national DTIBs. All envisage to evolve from the current size and product portfolio of the national companies to the next level. Moreover, all countries assessed are keen to boost exports, based on strategies drawn up by the government or the industrial players. They either want to enter foreign markets or expand their role there.</p> -<p>Despite the connotations of autonomy, UGS must in practice remain connected to their human operators. This could be to give the UGS instructions on where to go next, or to execute a particular command. Or it might be to relay information back to the operator, such as a potential target. Data processing may take place at the edge, depending on the size of the platform, or packets of data will be sent for processing elsewhere. UGS will place demands on the existing combat radio network, and this must be planned for. There also exists opportunity for adversary action in jamming or spoofing systems. UGS may be able to carry out tasks without being connected to the network, before reconnecting when necessary, which will increase their survivability.</p> +<p>What differs is the character of these industries, especially the role they play in the production chain. A striking feature of the EDTIB is the heterogeneity of the national industries it comprises. They can be categorized into four different spheres: core industries, traditional mid-sized industries, rising stars, and industries at the periphery.</p> -<h3 id="ii-what-are-the-purported-benefits-of-ugs-to-tactical-land-forces">II. What are the Purported Benefits of UGS to Tactical Land Forces?</h3> +<p>The European defense industrial core is situated in western Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK), where strong industrial bases capable of producing almost the entire portfolio of weapon systems across all domains have been developed and maintained. Their industries are the largest in Europe, producing technologically advanced products that are highly competitive. While all of them also have a strong export profile, a high proportion of the equipment they produce gets purchased by the armed forces of their home countries. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK are home to several of the top 100 defense companies. All the major pan-European defense companies are at least partly owned by stakeholders from these countries, and direct state involvement is not uncommon. The core countries also lead major European development programs such as Eurofighter, A400M, Tornado, and more recently Tempest and FCAS. With the exception of the UK, all are strong supporters of EU initiatives such as PESCO and the EDF.</p> -<p>The drivers for the development of military UGS are numerous, and are broken down below.</p> +<p>Countries such as Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, and Greece are home to some traditional mid-sized industries. They participate in European joint development programs for complex weapon systems without being able to lead them – the naval sector gradually becoming an exception. These countries are heavily dependent on imports from both Europe and the United States.</p> -<h4 id="risk">Risk</h4> +<p>Some smaller manufacturers (or traditionally less important producers for the EDTIB) have embarked on ambitious growth trajectories. Companies in Poland and Türkiye have already achieved remarkable technological developments that set them apart from their regional peers. Türkiye’s industry, in particular, has undergone a major transformation in recent years. Turkish companies have achieved a leading position in the UAV market and moved to the forefront of technology in sectors that include turbojet engines and ballistic missiles. By some measures, Hungary can also be counted into this group, as there is considerable momentum with top tier producers opening facilities in the central European state. These countries are rising stars and can be expected to play a greater role in the future of the EDTIB.</p> -<p>Using uncrewed systems in place of crewed vehicles can reduce risk to personnel. Soldiers can be kept further back from the line of contact and can avoid a number of dull and dangerous tasks that up to now have been the responsibility of humans.</p> +<p>Finally, there are countries with only small or niche industries. They constitute the periphery. This group consists mainly of former Warsaw Pact countries such as Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, and Bulgaria. While they can be competitive in niche sectors, their companies lack the overall technological edge to compete with the European core (let alone the United States). They have few or no system integrators. Most companies focus on component production and maintenance.</p> -<h4 id="mass">Mass</h4> +<p>After the end of the Cold War, the state-owned industries of the periphery were partly privatized. As demand for standard Warsaw Pact components plummeted, they underwent a period of transition and reform which significantly weakened their DTIBs. NATO integration was another challenge, as many companies were unable to produce according to NATO standards and therefore could not be integrated into European supply chains. This means that in the periphery, the modernization of domestic armed forces does not necessarily lead to new orders for national DTIBs.</p> -<p>Uncrewed systems allow the generation of additional mass above that which can be formed through an army’s physical workforce size. A future scenario might see one soldier controlling a suite of UGS, which could increase the area over which a unit has sight, influence and, potentially, control.</p> +<p>The differences in industrial portfolios translate into different approaches to industrial policy and procurement. Two approaches can be identified: a capability-driven approach and an industry-driven approach. The dividing line runs, broadly speaking, between western and eastern Europe, and between the core and traditional mid-sized industries on the one side and the rising stars and the periphery on the other. This is due to fundamental differences which are unlikely to change much over the coming decades.</p> -<h4 id="situational-awareness">Situational Awareness</h4> +<p>Central and eastern European states tend to emphasize capability development over industrial interests (capability-driven approach) to address the security pressure resulting from their geographical proximity to Russia. Of course, they also take their domestic industrial base into account when establishing industrial partnerships. They will attempt to secure small work shares for their domestic companies, especially in maintenance (to be able to operate independently), and seek to benefit from technology transfers. All in all, however, they prioritize operational readiness and capability development over industrial gains. In terms of cooperation, they favor US products over participation in European development projects, which are notorious for cost overruns and delays. Third-country imports and off-the-shelf purchases (which often go hand in hand) are seen as less costly and more efficient than European co-development.</p> -<p>UGS equipped with sensors such as cameras and radar can help commanders get a firmer sense of the battlespace. UAS have proven very effective in this area, and UGS can add additional capabilities, such as navigating through those places less accessible to UAS.</p> +<p>This tendency is reinforced by the fact that their industries are not in a position to contribute significantly to European projects. In some cases, they were even actively excluded from such projects as when Poland’s request to participate in the MGCS was rejected by Germany and France. As a result, rising star and peripheral countries see little or no economic benefit in participating in major European development programs. They are increasingly open to forging new partnerships with non-European producers such as South Korea if these promise rapid delivery and participation in maintenance (and sometimes even production).</p> -<h4 id="burden-reduction">Burden Reduction</h4> +<p>Western and northern European core countries and countries with a traditional mid-sized industry take a different approach. When they take purchasing decisions, they accord at least the same priority, of not more, to the interests of their domestic industries than to their military needs. Governments try to get their domestic producers involved as much as possible when awarding contracts. As a result, their industries focus more on producing high-end systems that are competitive on the world market than on operational readiness.</p> -<p>UGS can carry equipment that currently burdens soldiers. This allows soldiers to move more quickly and with less effort. This is important when soldiers have become loaded with equipment – in the pursuit of protection, reducing their ability to fight.</p> +<p>At the same time, governments realize that the technological complexity of modern armaments systems means that a purely national production is no longer possible. In this situation, western and northern European countries (especially the industrial core) prefer joint European development programs to non-European imports because the former benefit their domestic producers more. This approach is very much in line with the concept of European strategic autonomy, which basically calls for all major platforms to be produced by European companies in Europe.</p> -<h4 id="humanmachine-teaming-hmt">Human–Machine Teaming (HMT)</h4> +<p>Yet that same rationale does not make joint projects run smoothly. Even when working together, core countries are wary of their economic competitors both inside and outside Europe. This causes problems of co-ordination in European development programs and can lead to the exclusion of potential competitors and the duplication of projects just to ensure a greater share of work for domestic companies (as in the case of Tempest and FCAS).</p> -<p>In the popular imagination, machines replace people in their roles entirely. However, this is not how military forces are conceiving of the near to medium horizon. Instead, the optimum balance between soldier and robot is key. HMT makes use of the comparative advantages inherent to humans and machines respectively. Humans do the tasks they are best suited to, and robots do those they are best at. The British Army, for example, envisages that humans will remain the core part of HMT for some time to come. The Army framework sees increasing machine involvement over time. In the immediate future, RAS-enhanced teams will see machines used in a transactional manner, as tools. These teams are limited by the current levels of autonomy and human levels of trust. This phase sees machines used to increase performance in human-led tasks. Later, trust and technology develop to enable RAS-integrated teams in which humans cede more control to machines whose autonomous capabilities have improved. Here, humans and machines perform tasks that result in a combined outcome. Finally, RAS-supervised teams are envisaged in which machines can outperform humans and humans retain a supervisory role to keep meaningful control.</p> +<p>The core (and thus the EDTIB in general) is also marked by an element of risk aversion on the part of large companies, which is turning into an obstacle to innovation. There is not enough private investment to provide funds for research and development (R&amp;D). In contrast to other sectors of the economy, innovation in defense is largely state-funded, which makes companies reluctant to use their own funds, as they know that eventually the government will pay for technological development.</p> -<p>This framework is particular to the British experience, but a similar gradient is noted in other forces. For example, the US Army’s RAS strategy notes three likely epochs of development. The first lasted from 2017 to 2020, when the Army matured concepts and initiated programmes to look at increasing situational awareness, lightening the load on soldiers and improving sustainment. The second epoch, from 2021 to 2030, aims at improvements including achieving automated convoy operations and removing soldiers from lead vehicles. In the far term, from 2031 to 2040, the first era of automated systems will be replaced, and see new organisational designs and fully integrated autonomous systems, which work in concert to achieve the task.</p> +<p>In addition, major arms producers have been reluctant to ramp up production following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In part, this can be explained by ambivalent signals from governments about the sustainability of long-term financing. If companies are uncertain whether an investment will pay off in the medium and long term, they will be reluctant to make it. However, such investments would be crucial for production to meet wartime demand even if not all production capacity is used in peacetime. There seems to be a conflict between the security interests of states (i.e., creating enough capacity to ramp up production in wartime) and the economic interests of firms (avoiding overcapacity to maximize profits).</p> -<p>It is not the case that simply adding systems is the answer to providing mass in armed forces. Depending on levels of autonomy and the requirement of a task, soldiers can only manage so many responsibilities. If an uncrewed ground system is remote controlled without any level of autonomy, the ratio will be one to one, or even worse. It has been noted on some experiments that it takes three soldiers to adequately manage one uncrewed ground system. A one to two ratio would see one soldier jump between systems to operate them. Systems with more autonomy are less burdensome on the operator, and soldiers can then manage more systems at once. Cognitive overload is a crucial consideration when building a force structure that includes UGS. There are only so many screens or notifications a soldier can make sense of. There are also more practical considerations that do not generally make it into discussions of HMT at the policy level. On Project Convergence 22, a US military experimentation exercise, a US Army officer spoke of the difficulty for a junior soldier of sitting in the back of a moving Bradley armoured fighting vehicle while trying to manage uncrewed systems on a tablet computer. They quickly became overwhelmed. This might be because the uncrewed systems required inputs or verification from an operator, or it might be because the information and intelligence being sent from the systems was difficult to digest. Simply sitting in an armoured vehicle on the move is not a comfortable experience. Adding additional cognitive load may be problematic. Ergonomic issues such as motion sickness are an important consideration. Some soldiers may cope better than others. Seemingly minor additional tasks may have significant repercussions for combat effectiveness. This speaks to the importance of allowing soldiers to get used to working with such systems, and being aware of their own abilities and those of the systems.</p> +<p><strong>The Absence of Political Visions</strong></p> -<p>Having outlined the foundational concepts of military UGS, the potential individual tasks of such systems can be investigated, the subject of the next chapter.</p> +<p>Political visions are key to the long-term future of the EDTIB because they create coherence with regard to key design features, such as procurement and cooperation strategies. Even more importantly, they help generate a coherent idea of the vision that a European industry should serve and therefore the shape it should take.</p> -<h3 id="iii-what-are-the-potential-uses-of-ugs">III. What are the Potential Uses of UGS?</h3> +<p>The most influential vision of the last decade has been that of European strategic autonomy. The concept was prominently introduced through the EU’s Global Strategy, in which the EU outlined its ambition to become a more credible security and defense actor. A key element of strategic autonomy is the development of an integrated European defense industrial base capable of producing major weapon systems in Europe. According to this concept, the EDTIB should be able to provide European armed forces with all the weapons they need without having to rely on the United States or other third countries. In short, EU countries should buy European equipment from European producers. In domains where EU countries currently lack capabilities, they should set up joint development programs. The proponents of strategic autonomy see a self-sufficient EDTIB as vital to strengthening Europe’s security of supply and thus boosting its geopolitical weight in systemic competition.</p> -<p>UGS have several proposed uses for military forces, some of which are more obvious than others. These are identified here as potential uses, while subsequent chapters tackle the realities of their employment, whether such uses are realistic, and the implications for the force.</p> +<p>However, the pursuit of strategic autonomy is by no means an undisputed vision. First, there is a debate about which countries the EU should cooperate with. Some governments, including those that are part of the core, wish to allow third countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States to participate in EU-funded programs. Others want to restrict access to EU funds to the European continent and EU countries.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="load-carriage">Load Carriage</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Second, many peripheral and rising countries within the EU do not consider European strategic autonomy a priority, mainly because they do not see the benefit of it. On the contrary, they suspect that core countries with industries at the cutting edge of technology are pursuing their own interests under the guise of a supposedly impartial vision. As it happens, the strongest supporters of the concept of European strategic autonomy are the countries best positioned to benefit economically from European development projects.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gmq8bpj.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>Figure 1: UGS with Cargo Basket</em></p> +<p>Another factor weighing against the concept of strategic autonomy concerns the difficulties associated with joint European development programs in the past. Projects such as the NH90 helicopter, the A400M aircraft, or the Eurofighter were notorious for cost overruns, delays, and a failure to deliver the initially promised benefits in terms of economies of scale and military interoperability.</p> -<p>Load carriage is the principal identified task for UGS at today’s stage of development. This might be carrying personal equipment such as bergens, rations and ammunition, or platoon and company equipment such as ladders or beaching equipment. UGS might also be equipped with stretchers to enable casualties to be extracted from danger areas. Casualty evacuations are a particularly strenuous activity for soldiers. Being able to use UGS instead has multiple benefits. It allows soldiers to preserve energy in close combat, where fatigue can lead to poor decisions and further casualties. It also keeps soldiers free to complete the task at hand, such as winning a firefight. Another related use for UGS is for broader logistic purposes, especially in the dangerous “last mile” delivering supplies to frontline locations.</p> +<p>Finally, attitudes regarding the future of European integration differ within Europe. Countries such as Poland, Hungary, and the UK are keen to uphold their national autonomy, which also has implications for the defense sector.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="communication-node">Communication Node</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>As a result, there is no consistent common vision or idea of what the EDTIB should look like in terms of regional distribution, production portfolio, rules for exports, or cooperation partners. Nor is there any consensus on how much Europe should import or which degree of autonomy it should aim to achieve.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wU9Neva.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>Figure 2: UGS Fitted with Radio Equipment</em></p> +<p>This does not mean, however, that there is no common ground. The EU has established a number of instruments for facilitating joint arms development that are widely regarded as successful, notably the EDF. Although these instruments lack clarity, coherence, and compatibility with NATO processes, most governments agree that such EU policies will be crucial for the future development of the EDTIB.</p> -<p>UGS could carry a unit’s radios, which can be very heavy and slow to move. They may also carry electronic countermeasure and electronic warfare systems, which can be used to prevent explosive devices detonating, or to disable enemy UAS. Equally, there are times when soldiers must be detached to form a rebroadcasting or retransmission service if radio waves are blocked by terrain or another barrier. This allows units and headquarters to communicate with one another. This task might be completed by a UGS with a communications equipment fit.</p> +<h4 id="how-will-the-edtib-develop">How Will the EDTIB Develop?</h4> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="surveillance-and-reconnaissance">Surveillance and Reconnaissance</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The analysis presented above suggests that absent major political initiatives, there will be no major changes to the basic design of the EDTIB in the new era of European defense. Instead, business will be conducted as usual. That is, the European core will continue to produce state-of-the-art capabilities that provide a degree of political and operational autonomy from the United States. The periphery will seek to reduce its dependence, including on its European allies, while maintaining an ambivalent attitude toward European cooperation and European strategic autonomy.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JgewS6X.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>Figure 3: UGS Fitted with Cameras and Sensors for Surveillance and Reconnaissance</em></p> +<p>Although the increase in budgets may revive parts of the defense sector and generate some momentum for defense companies, there are few signs of improved coherence and coordination. Currently, there is no momentum for closer defense industrial cooperation in Europe, nor do waves of consolidation seem likely in the foreseeable future. While small-scale mergers are possible, there appears to be nothing major on the horizon. The overall industrial structure will remain unchanged.</p> -<p>UGS can be equipped with sensors that can scan the area for potential threats. Software can categorise objects in the UGS’ field of view and identify points of interest, both static and mobile. These can then be passed to commanders for further investigation and potential targeting. Another use of UGS is as a reconnaissance screen moving ahead of dismounted or mounted recce soldiers. Or they might be employed in a static or roving function around unit locations or bases.</p> +<p>Regional and economic divides will persist, as will the wide differences over sourcing and cooperation. However, there will be opportunities for more ad-hoc, country-to-country, and sectoral cooperation formats such as the European Sky Shield initiative. But there will be no grand design, no coherent European vision of how to coordinate and drive the EDTIB.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="chemical-biological-radiological-andor-nuclear-cbrn-sensing">Chemical, Biological, Radiological and/or Nuclear (CBRN) Sensing</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The sources of change are the rising stars and the non-European suppliers. The main players to watch are South Korea, Poland, and Türkiye. The United States is a traditional European supplier already. Its share in Europe may increase but without larger industrial relevance to the American DTIB.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/08amkD9.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>Figure 4: UGS Fitted with CBRN Sensors</em></p> +<p>Some mid-sized and smaller European players will continue to grow and increase their role. But there will be no major shift in the industrial balance of power. The industrial core will continue to determine the development of the EDTIB. The fundamental power asymmetry will remain, with all its consequences for European cooperation and coordination.</p> -<p>UGS can provide a sensor capability for CBRN threats. UGS with appropriate sensors could be sent to locations of potential attacks. Equally, they could remain with troops and carry sensor equipment that had previously to be carried by soldiers.</p> +<p>What are the game changers that could shift this trajectory? If European countries were to agree large multilateral programs with sufficient funding to generate major technological advances, new champions and pan-European companies could emerge, which would transform the industrial landscape. Another game changer could be a reform of EU policies to harmonize existing instruments and shape a consistent development path for the EDTIB.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="armed">Armed</h4> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1t109C8.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>Figure 5: UGS with Remote Weapon Station</em></p> +<p>Given the most likely scenario for the future development of the EDTIB, what can the EU and member state governments do to influence the trajectory of the defense sector and produce a better outcome? The following section sets out which actions can be taken to make the EDTIB more coherent and capable.</p> -<p>UGS can be armed with remote weapon stations. Remote weapons are in mainstream use on crewed armoured vehicles today. Their benefit is that they allow the weapon to be fired by operators from inside the vehicle without a soldier having to be exposed in a cupola. Cameras mounted on the system allow the operator to aim the system and maintain control. Such systems, for example the Kongsberg Protector, can be mounted on UGS and operated remotely by offset troops. Such weapons might be used as sentry devices or in a fire-support capacity. Another potential use for UGS is as mobile landmines, a technique that has been adopted by the Ukrainian armed forces fighting Russia.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Regard the EDTIB as a strategic asset: Europe needs to equip the EDTIB to meet both its short and long-term needs. It should regard the EDTIB as a strategic asset, which includes finding answers to questions such as:</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="engineering">Engineering</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5QtdHuJ.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>Figure 6: UGS Fitted with Mine Clearing Capability</em></p> - -<p>Military engineering includes the breaching of obstacles, demining and providing plant for trench digging. This is currently done by hand, or by soldiers using excavators. The civilian mining industry is a world leader in uncrewed technology and uncrewed diggers are in common use. UGS with a digging capability could set up a defensive position with much less human input than is currently required.</p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="deception">Deception</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cWatkzP.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>Figure 7: UGS Fitted with Emitters for Deception</em></p> - -<p>UGS might also be employed to provide deception capability. This could be in the form of “fake” vehicles or groupings, or they can be used for deception using the electromagnetic spectrum. Such systems deliberately radiate to mislead the enemy. UGS equipped with a radio system and antennae can be used to draw enemy resource and disguise intentions and dispositions.</p> + <ul> + <li> + <p>How can “bonsai industries” be rebuilt to meet European demand?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>What can governments do to enhance the development of defense technologies and avoid being overtaken by competitors such as China?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How can governments make the best use of a wide range of instruments, including political control over the sector? Since the defense industry is vital for national and European security, there is no doubt that political intervention in the market and the exercise of political control over market players can be justified.</p> + </li> + </ul> + </li> + <li> + <p>Establish a mechanism for building up stocks: In response to the current shortage of ammunition and materiel, European government should pass legally binding requirements to ensure that the EDTIB has sufficient depth in terms of industrial capacity to be able to equip European militaries in a war scenario. They should also provide for sufficient reserves of ammunition and other critical goods. The design of such a system could be inspired by Cold War arrangements.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Secure funding: To stay at the cutting edge of technology, the EU and its member states must make the necessary funding available, particularly for R&amp;D. This means that funding must be sustainable, which will also attract more private investment. Governments need to be able to credibly tell defense companies that the current increases in defense spending and the new level of ambition for European defense are more than a blip. Doing so would send a message to shareholders and owners that investing into the development of new weaponry carries a low risk and that investments will pay off.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Set up major European development programs: Involving as many European countries as possible in major multilateral development programs is the most effective way to boost the technological development of the EDTIB. Such programs ensure that sufficient financial resources are pooled to produce the high-end capabilities needed to remain competitive. At the same time, they create economies of scale and increase interoperability, which is a decisive military advantage.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Develop a strategy to deal with third countries: As third countries become more important as arms suppliers, European governments should develop a common approach toward them. To this end, they need to decide:</p> -<p>UGS may be multirole and capable of carrying out more than one of these tasks at a time, or of switching between them. Moreover, UGS should not be considered in isolation. There are also UGS built as mobile launch pads for UAS, such as the THeMIS Observe, which is an example of using the two technologies in concert. Military strategy requires conducting the orchestra of military capability in the most suitable way possible. UGS should be used for those tasks where they offer a competitive advantage. They should not be the answer before the question has been asked. There is always a danger of pursuing technological innovation for its own sake, especially in times when commitments outstrip resource – which is a place in which many forces find themselves. This friction has been recognised as problematic in military forces in the past, and has at times resulted in poor decisions.</p> + <ul> + <li> + <p>Who should be allowed to participate in EDF and PESCO projects and thus benefit from EU funds? This concerns primarily the United Kingdom and the United States but potentially also Indo-Pacific partners such as Australia or Japan.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How much should US companies operating in Europe be allowed to contribute to European projects? What share would make it possible for them to add value without compromising European autonomy?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How should Europe deal with Türkiye and South Korea? As partners? As competitors? Each categorization has different policy implications.</p> + </li> + </ul> + </li> + <li> + <p>Europe must also find solutions to the underlying problems of the EDTIB’s economic structure and the lack of a common political vision. A first step would be a comprehensive review of EU policies to assess which have proved useful and which have not. An important issue for discussion would be to reexamine the European Commission’s approach to competition and consolidation in the defense sector. Before the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022, consolidation was seen as beneficial because it reduced overcapacity, pooled technological knowledge, and created synergies. Some effects, however, have proved problematic. As players left the market or merged and overcapacity was reduced, the EDTIB was unable to ramp up production quickly enough to meet current demand. This shows that a certain amount of industrial overcapacity is probably necessary to be able to scale up production in a war scenario.</p> -<p>Having introduced UGS and their proposed military uses, this paper moves in the next chapter to answer three questions:</p> + <p>Another side-effect of consolidation is the concentration of market power in the hands of a small number of European system integrators. In some sectors, this has led to quasi-oligopolistic market structures, with all the negative effects associated with such a concentration of economic power. Paradoxically, the EU’s emphasis on competition has in some cases led to a reduction in competition as consolidation increased.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Align EU and NATO defense industrial frameworks: A better fit is needed between NATO instruments, such as the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and NATO standards, and the EU industrial framework and, more generally, the EDTIB, to reduce duplication and create synergies. This is one of the few aspects on which there is almost complete consensus among European governments. Eastern European countries in particular stress that EU initiatives should not be realized at the expense of NATO frameworks.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Reduce regional imbalances: A major structural obstacle to greater coherence and coordination in the EDTIB consists of regional imbalances between core countries on the one side and mid-sized countries and the periphery on the other side in terms of industrial capacity and technological advantage. The EU – and especially the industrial core – must find ways to make participation in joint European development programs attractive to central and eastern European countries. This will most likely mean the transfer of knowledge and some part of the production. Such a step requires a willingness on the part of core governments and companies to support industrial development in central and eastern Europe even at the expense of some of their domestic profits. This is the price to be paid for greater coherence, coordination, and involvement of peripheral and mid-sized industries. A good starting point could be to use the additional funds becoming available from rising defense budgets to build production facilities in mid-sized and peripheral countries and integrate them into European supply chains.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Establish a secondary market for used and modernized equipment: Smaller countries with fewer financial resources are calling for the establishment of a secondary market to help modernize their armed forces and meet NATO standards in a cost-effective manner.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Address structural dependencies: Europe has become dependent on imports of raw materials, alloys, and components such as semiconductors, mainly from Asia. Given the systemic competition between Western countries and China, security of supply will be a key issue. Europe’s dependence should be addressed.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Deal with other challenges and structural barriers at the national level:</p> + </li> +</ol> <ul> <li> - <p>How can UGS realistically be employed today and in the immediate future, with technological limitations and tactical realities taken into consideration?</p> + <p>Reduce Bureaucracy: Slow and complex procurement processes are a major obstacle in countries across Europe. Eliminating some of the influence of vested interests on the production process will help to speed up procurement decisions. As procurement processes differ from country to country, this is mostly a task for national governments.</p> </li> <li> - <p>How are UGS task-organised and how do they move around the battlespace?</p> + <p>Create the necessary legal environment and defense ecosystem: Some eastern European states have laws which ban the government from supporting and guiding the development of their domestic DTIBs. Yet the production of high-end capabilities requires a comprehensive defense ecosystem with a highly skilled workforce and a sophisticated R&amp;D network, including public research centers. Building such a network across Europe and enabling smaller countries to participate will be crucial.</p> </li> <li> - <p>What is the best way to ensure that soldiers use UGS as intended?</p> + <p>Stabilize funding: Another challenge is the lack of binding long-term fiscal legislation that guarantees funding on a multi-year basis. Spain, Italy, and Germany are major players that lack multi-year budget allocations. Companies are discouraged from investing because they cannot be certain that sufficient funds will be available to complete a project. Defense budgets must be approved annually, which means they are subject to change every year. This contradicts the logic of large procurement and development programs which tend to run for several years.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>The soldier must remain central to these efforts. The uses outlined above broadly represent attempts to do away with human input where possible. However, UGS are built to support soldiers in their endeavours, and it is soldiers who will enable them to do this. The relationship is key, and the focus should remain on the human, as demonstrated below.</p> - -<h3 id="iv-considerations-for-ugs-support-to-light-manoeuvre-forces">IV. Considerations for UGS Support to Light Manoeuvre Forces</h3> - -<h4 id="gently-does-it">Gently Does it</h4> - -<p>UGS lack manoeuvrability in close or complex terrain. This must be a central consideration for their employment in tactical formations. Their ability to troubleshoot when faced with obstacles is currently far below that of humans. When moving autonomously, UGS must make sense of their surroundings to plot a clear path. Navigating obstacles using sensors alone is incredibly difficult. A study using the TAERO optionally crewed wheeled system found that “it is possible to effectively implement autonomous mode up to a speed of 2.8 m/s in an unstructured environment”. Advertised maximum speeds for UGS far exceed that which would be possible in complex terrain. This pattern is seen in numerous trials and reports, in which soldiers outpace their robotic counterparts. This finding is further corroborated by wargames and testing. The civilian transport sector is yet to make autonomous vehicles a viable offering despite billions of dollars and years of research and development. This is also in spite of a relatively robust framework within which they must work. Road networks have defined edges, junctions and rules. The latter are not always followed, of course, and autonomous vehicles on roads must try to account for the actions of other road users, which cannot always be predicted. The problem becomes more difficult when extrapolated to military UGS. Normal road networks are a simpler environment than a battlefield, where smoke, debris, adversarial activity, and disturbed earth make for a much more complex picture, with fewer established norms. Water hazards are illustrative here. Water’s surface is highly refracted, meaning it looks different depending on the view angle, the surrounding area and the weather. In wet weather, determining what is simply a slick surface versus a puddle versus something deeper is difficult for sensors and computers.</p> - -<p>The vision of autonomous land systems moving around the battlefield with abandon is currently fantasy. Most systems that are advertised as, or considered to be, autonomous or AI-enabled are much more limited in their capacities. As noted above, uncrewed does not mean autonomous. For example, the Milrem Robotics THeMIS is one of the more advanced and developed platforms on the market, with buy-in from several European countries. It can be teleoperated and can complete waypoint navigation as given by an operator. At the time of writing, a “follow the leader” capability is still in development, as is the ability to swarm. Teleoperation is usually conducted using a line-of-sight antenna. As such it is limited by terrain and range. In the case of the THeMIS, the line-of-sight range for control is up to 1,500 metres. This central limitation is clarified when overlaid with the proposed tasks of UGS outlined above.</p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="combat">Combat</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZLb65dQ.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>Figure 8: UGS as Fire Support</em></p> - -<p>Dismounted close combat is an inherently complex business. It involves rapid decisions, movement, adaptation to constantly changing dynamics, and the most intimate of command and control, communication and logistic interactions. As a result, such activity will remain the realm of humans. UGS are far from being able to close with and kill the enemy on an objective. There are simply too many variables for systems to manage coherently, and the systems’ vulnerabilities too many.</p> - -<p>However, AI-enabled systems can add value by accurately sensing and categorising objects in their field of view, providing important information to the commander. Sensors and their respective algorithms can distinguish between types of vehicles, military and civilian, with great accuracy. One study showed a 97.25% to 99.5% detection rate at 2,000–5,000 metres, both during the day and at night. Another, using different methods, achieved accuracy of above 85%. The fact that these systems are not achieving 100% accuracy is not a reason for alarm. People are fallible and contend with issues of eyesight, optics, climate and fatigue when engaging in combat. For UGS, these figures will only improve with time and access to labelled datasets, which will in turn grow as the proliferation of UGS continues.</p> - -<p>In the current state of development, armed UGS are probably better placed to provide supporting fires. This task would traditionally be done with a fire support section set off to a flank while another section carried out the assault. Supporting deliberate offensive action lends itself to the use of UGS, as the terrain can be analysed by commanders ahead of time. In this scenario, armed UGS are likely less suited to ad hoc offensive action and instead must be used deliberately. The idea of robots facing off against other robots while humans sit in a command bunker watching the action unfold is misleading. Placing three armed UGS in a fire support position with a human in the loop for engagement authority, and soldiers adhering to battlespace management boundaries, is a more realistic application, balancing well understood norms with novel technology. Equally, static defence tasks such as an anti-tank screen might be envisaged. This matches UGS’ and soldiers’ relative strengths.</p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="supply">Supply</h4> -</blockquote> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Huo8mjk.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>Figure 9: UGS for Supply</em></p> - -<p>Resupply is one of the more mature tasks for UGS, and this is one where most experimentation has been completed. At the larger scale, platoons of uncrewed heavy goods vehicles might be led by a crewed lead vehicle for logistic missions in rear areas. The logistic and movement constraints outlined mean that the use of UGS in rear areas is the place to focus attention. However, due to risk to personnel, current research focuses on autonomous “last mile” resupply. In fact, rear areas are also now vulnerable, in the face of persistent ISR and precision strike. There is, therefore, value in fielding UGS in these areas, where tasks and wayfinding are often more simple than using main supply routes. Fielding UGS here would also allow data collection, which is crucial for system improvement.</p> - -<p>Currently, it is likely that a human would still be involved in these tasks, providing a lead element to be followed, either on foot or in a crewed vehicle. However, UGS would still be useful, as logistic patrols are a significant burden on forces. Reducing crew requirements to free up soldiers to do other tasks is an important contribution of UGS. The urban environment provides an avenue through which UGS could be employed further forward, as moving between buildings leaves soldiers vulnerable.</p> - -<p>That said, a slow-moving UGS would be an easy target for enemy troops. There is a tension at the heart of the proposed use of UGS for burden carriage in combat scenarios. The dismounted troops who have the most to gain from having a system carry their equipment are also those who need to be able to move rapidly through complex terrain such as forests and urban environments. Smaller vehicles may be more agile, but they cannot carry that much equipment. While UGS could reduce what soldiers are carrying, they would add friction if they were unable to keep up in tactical movement in complex terrain due to technical limitations. There may be scope for these systems to follow units a tactical bound behind, but there is a risk that they could get stuck. This then becomes an additional constraint and planning consideration for commanders. Therefore, it is sensible for UGS to remain with companies or the battlegroup echelons, where movement will be more deliberate.</p> - -<blockquote> - <h4 id="reconnaissance">Reconnaissance</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>For the future of Europe’s defense technological and industrial base, it is crucial that the additional public resources invested in defense translate into higher operational readiness of the armed forces and more industrial capacity. This analysis suggests that major reforms are needed to advance the development of the European defense sector. With new funds available, there may be a window of opportunity for change – not necessarily for a fundamental transformation of the sector but certainly to address some of the shortcomings of today’s EDTIB.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yjaWpdm.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>Figure 10: UGS in “Stay-Behind” Reconnaissance Function</em></p> +<hr /> -<p>Employing UGS in a reconnaissance capacity would see lines of robots moving in front of the traditional human recce screen. At present, soldiers move ahead of the formation’s main body looking to spot the enemy before the enemy spots them. This enables shaping activity and for deliberate targeting by indirect fires to take place, which is preferable to having to react on someone else’s terms. Recce is also risky. Recce units are generally small, detached from the larger mass of their formation and susceptible to interdiction by the enemy, which is in turn looking to achieve the same effect in reverse.</p> +<p><strong>Christian Mölling</strong> is deputy director of the DGAP Research Institute and head of the Center for Security and Defense.</p> -<p>A concept proposed in the US supports deploying a forward line of RAS, thereby reducing risk to personnel. A forward line of sensors can probe positions for enemy activity, and potentially force them to unmask. This could be by moving and giving off a signature, be it heat or electromagnetic, or by engaging the UGS, which also gives away their position. However, the limitations discussed above demonstrate that this vision is a long way off for UGS. The use of UGS in this way would slow manoeuvre units to a crawl, making them susceptible to targeting from enemy fires. In addition, there would be significant burden in trying to manage their movement and make sense of their data. This task is best left to UAS. UGS with this function are best suited to static, and perhaps predesignated, roving sentry tasks, where they can support soldiers to maintain situational awareness over an area. A situation where UGS could be used as a “stay behind” capability as friendly troops withdraw is a more suitable use case, and more palatable than using soldiers in what is a very risky activity. Leaving UGS to identify the movement of enemy troops and vehicles and alert friendly forces plays to their strengths in image recognition. It also has the advantage of freeing up recce troops for additional tasks.</p> +<p><strong>Sören Hellmonds</strong> is a freelance scientist.</p>Christian Mölling and Sören HellmondsDrawing insights from defense experts across NATO members, the study highlights the evolving European defense landscape, emphasizing security of supply concerns and the balance between national and EU initiatives. The report underscores pivotal forthcoming decisions in Europe’s defense amidst changing geopolitical dynamics.Treading A Fine Line2023-10-30T12:00:00+08:002023-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/treading-a-fine-line<p><em>After initial speculation around its involvement in the Hamas attacks, Iran is coming under increasing pressure over how to respond to the conflict.</em></p> -<p>The considerations for deployment in these three areas can be mapped across to the other potential tasks outlined earlier in the paper. Those tasks that require high levels of mobility remain under the purview of UAS. CBRN threat monitoring and radio rebroadcasting can be achieved by UAS, although there may be times when UGS are better suited to the tactical situation. This chapter has considered the technological limitations associated with various types of UGS, and has applied these to tactical formations. The next chapter looks at the enabling activities needed to ensure that UGS are in the right place in working order.</p> +<excerpt /> -<h3 id="v-how-do-ugs-get-to-and-stay-in-the-fight">V. How Do UGS Get to, and Stay in, the Fight?</h3> +<p>From the moment Hamas attacked Israel, Iran has been extremely vocal, praising the assault and warning Israel and the US of reprisals for military action. However, while initially seen as a beneficiary of the events, the pressure on Iran is now starting to mount.</p> -<p>Military logistics have been brought into sharp relief by the war in Ukraine. The true potential of UGS can only be unlocked if they are in the right place at the right time for the right task. Like other military equipment, UGS will need to be transported to the area of operations. The size and ability of the system will determine how this might happen. Factoring UGS into future lift capability, on land, at sea and in the air, is important for planners. Military lift capacity is a limiting factor to the success of deployments. Every system that is transported takes up space that cannot be used by another piece of equipment. The military benefit in theatre must therefore be clear. Units and formations are responsible for devising field equipment tables for the kit they need in theatre to do their job while deployed. UGS will feature in these considerations going forward. There is little capacity for superfluous equipment. Larger armoured systems such as the Milrem Type-X, a 12-tonne uncrewed system equipped with 50-mm cannon to support main battle tanks, or the 10-tonne General Dynamics TRX, will need dedicated logistic support. Larger vehicles are moved by aircraft or low-loader trucks and ferries. In the near term, all these options require human crew, emphasising the reliance of UGS on people. Smaller systems such as the Milrem THeMIS, which is the size of a small car, can be towed behind a parent vehicle until they are required. That parent vehicle will need to meet specific towing requirements, such as height of hitch. In the case of the THeMIS, the speed at which it can be towed is three times as fast as it can move itself – 80 km per hour, rather than 20 km per hour. Moving UGS from an initial railhead, port or airfield to the area in which they will be employed must be planned for in detail.</p> +<p>After the events of 7 October there was immediate speculation over Iranian involvement, with evidence soon surfacing of meetings between Iran, Hizbullah and Hamas. Iran has long viewed Israel as its greatest regional threat, and vice versa. Israel has been involved in a number of successful security operations against Iran, while the Islamic Republic does not recognise the State of Israel. In 2005, former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad famously gave a speech that was translated as saying Israel “should be wiped off the map”.</p> -<p>The totality of the system must be considered, including power supply. If the UGS are battery powered, how and where are these batteries charged, and who does the charging? Which echelon should be burdened with the charging capability? Battery technology is relatively nascent, and stamina remains low. On battery power, the THeMIS has a runtime of just one and a half hours. In hybrid mode, using its diesel engine, it has a runtime of 15 hours. Low-level battery management for existing equipment such as radios already requires planning and demands electricity, which may be provided by the mains, generators or other vehicles.</p> +<p>In addition, the Islamic Republic has made supporting Palestinians a key pillar of its foreign policy. As a result, Hamas has long been backed by Tehran, both for its cause and as part of a network of groups across the Middle East that forms an “axis of resistance” against the US, Israel and its allies. Consequently, over many years, Iran has provided funding, equipment and expertise to help Hamas develop its capabilities.</p> -<p>Another consideration for UGS is where repair and battery charging take place. In the case of crewed vehicles, the crew can fix small errors and conduct simple repair jobs. For instance, great pride is taken by tank and artillery howitzer crews in their ability to fix a track if one becomes dislodged. UGS will not have the luxury of an on-hand repair crew. This means that resource must be dedicated to recovering systems once broken. Repair functions in military forces have become eroded in recent times, as systems have become more complex and manufacturers retain the right to repair. The ability to repair equipment and keep it on the battlefield has been shown to be crucial in the conflict in Ukraine. For instance, a third of Ukraine’s howitzers are out of service for repair at any one time. Repairing technical equipment is often left to contractors rather than completed in place, even for well-established capabilities that are in service. Sensors and computer systems, no matter the platform on which they sit, are vulnerable, despite ruggedisation by the manufacturers. Holding UGS back several bounds until they are used for a discrete task before being recovered will allow more sustained repair operations than can be offered at lower formations.</p> +<h3 id="iran-initially-a-beneficiary-of-the-war">Iran, Initially a Beneficiary of the War</h3> -<p>Managing demand for UGS by frontline units is another concern for planners. As in the case of UAS earlier in their development, demand for their support far outstrips UGS supply. It is still the case that larger and more capable UAS are held at divisional or corps level and assigned to discrete tasks depending on a commander’s decision. Specific recommendations for UGS are difficult to outline without firm knowledge of the types and numbers of systems to be procured. They will likely be a scarce resource for some time. However, forces should be wary of putting manoeuvre units in permanent possession of larger, more capable UGS. If soldiers are having to consider what their UGS are doing instead of fighting the enemy, then the systems have been misemployed. Tactical units should bid for UGS support as they currently do for aircraft. In this framework, bids for support from aircraft are submitted while formations are planning for future operations. The demand for aircraft for offensive support, moving people or cargo, or providing reconnaissance and surveillance, generally outstrips supply, as platforms are scarce. To that end, units make bids for capability, and a central cell determines who gets what and when. This generally works on a rolling 72-hour time horizon tied to the operational area’s planning cycles.</p> +<p>Part of the immediate rationale for Iranian involvement in the attack was that Iran could be seen as a beneficiary of the horrific events. Firstly, Hamas had shattered the illusion of the invincibility of Iran’s archnemesis. In recent years, Israel’s military and intelligence capability, along with its vast defence spending and veil of protection from the sophisticated Iron Dome missile defence system, had created the idea of an unbeatable foe. However, the events of 7 October exposed a number of Israeli weaknesses which have been celebrated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have used the events in their own propaganda to place further doubt on Israeli capability and to boost their own morale.</p> -<p>Currently, formations bid for a primary and secondary asset to provide support. The primary would be ideal, but may be tasked elsewhere, so a second, different asset should also be identified. In this case, with UGS in their infancy, the secondary course of action should employ established capabilities. This will mitigate against undue reliance on UGS while the capability is nascent.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Iran will not want to risk any major escalation that would force a decision about direct military involvement</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="network">Network</h4> +<p>Secondly, the events have diverted attention away from Iran’s borders. As the region had begun to look increasingly peaceful, there was a further focus on Iran’s rising nuclear threat, human rights record, and destabilising activities across the Middle East. However, effort and resources have now been refocused towards the west of the region. Last week, for example, the expiration of UN sanctions on Iranian ballistic missiles went largely unreported.</p> -<p>It is not just the physical systems that need to be in place. UGS with a reconnaissance or surveillance function need to be able to relay that information back to commanders, using a robust communications network. That network may also need to permit some UGS to pass information among themselves, either to corroborate a potential target if more than one system can “see” it, or to help them avoid obstacles. Equally, commanders may need to issue instructions to the UGS for a task. The electromagnetic spectrum is not an unlimited resource, and different capabilities must be deconflicted. Radars may interfere with aircraft if their systems operate within the same band. The network needs to remain available and have enough capacity to pass information around. This is the focus of major experiments, such as the Project Convergence series, in which a resilient network is identified as a “backbone” to enable large amounts of data to be passed around. This is easier said than done. Militaries use a host of different communication systems and bearers, from radios through to satellites. The network needs to have low latency, be efficient in its use of bandwidth, and be secure from enemy interference. All additional interactions with these networks provide adversaries with opportunities to interfere. They may look to jam or spoof UGS. Robust countermeasures will need to be in place, or UGS will suffer in the same way UAS have in Ukraine, with 10,000 systems lost a month. What is more, the network needs to be interoperable with those of allies and partner forces. Importantly, it is likely that the network will be provided by a different company, or set of companies, than those who have built the UGS. A variety of bearers, data links and data standards make interoperability very complex. In a contested network space, prioritisation of the information being transmitted is important.</p> +<p>Thirdly, the attacks have put a halt to any normalisation negotiations between Iran’s archenemy Israel and its regional rival Saudi Arabia. Israel has been slowly building up relations with its neighbours, culminating in the 2020 Abraham Accords with the UAE and Bahrain. More recently, conversations have been progressing with Saudi Arabia, with which Iran made its own deal to restore relations earlier this year. However, reigniting the conflict between Israel and Palestinians has caused a snapback reaction by some Arab states and has temporarily derailed Israeli-Saudi negotiations. All Arab countries have issued statements condemning Israeli airstrikes, and the King of Jordan even cancelled a meeting with US President Joe Biden and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas in protest against Israeli military activities.</p> -<h4 id="adversary-activity">Adversary Activity</h4> +<h3 id="the-rising-pressure-on-tehran">The Rising Pressure on Tehran</h3> -<p>While providing opportunity for friendly forces, the proliferation of UGS also provides options for the adversary. This might include jamming GPS or seizing control of systems using electronic warfare means. Systems with automated navigation and reconnaissance capabilities are also vulnerable to adversarial attacks on their software. Here, machine learning and AI models can be “attacked” by objects in the physical environment, where an input specifically designed by an adversary can cause a system to act in an unamenable way. An understanding of a system’s software architecture and logics can allow an adversary to confuse a system and reduce its effectiveness, or deduce the information on which it has been trained. Researchers tricked an autonomous vehicle into misidentifying a stop sign as a 45 miles per hour sign, a mistake that could have had catastrophic consequences. Subtly altered images that look normal to humans can fool AI. In one study, a 3D-printed model of a turtle was specifically designed to trick a computer into thinking it was a rifle, which it did at every angle it was presented to the camera. Such activity is worrying in relation to sensors that seek out targets in a given area, as there are rules of engagement in which possession of a rifle might allow targeting. This shows the importance of maintaining meaningful human control in such systems. Adversarial activity is also troublesome in relation to more benign UGS with logistic functions that may be convinced to stop or get trapped maliciously by adversary action.</p> +<p>However, despite the original speculation around Iranian involvement in the Hamas attacks and the initial benefits to Iran, Tehran quickly denied any participation, and the US has since declared there to be no evidence of direct Iranian involvement in the events of 7 October. Furthermore, as the conflict progresses, Iranian officials are coming under increasing pressure. In particular, Iran needs to demonstrate ongoing support for its Hamas and Hizbullah allies, but will find it ever more difficult to provide weaponry, both as logistics become more challenging in the conflict zones and because of the balancing act between arming these – and other – groups, honouring arms deals with Russia, and maintaining its own defensive capabilities and military arsenal.</p> -<p>This said, the ability for real-world adversarial attacks to be successful is limited. The complexity of defeating multiple sensors in the physical world outside a research environment is a significant barrier, and may simply make such attacks uneconomical. Some of the ability to counter adversary activity will be built into systems by developers. However, military users who are alive to the threat will be better able to manage it, which raises the importance of awareness and understanding, discussed in the next section.</p> +<p>Iran will also not want to risk any major escalation that would force a decision about direct military involvement. Iran’s strategy has always been to provide “forward defence” through its proxy groups and to follow a policy of maximum tactical flexibility, with provocation that hovers on the threshold of confrontation without spilling into outright war. However, if the war spreads, the Islamic Republic’s options and flexibility will rapidly decrease, and as tensions rise, so does the risk that provocative activity will lead to miscalculation and escalation.</p> -<h4 id="force-design">Force Design</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While the destruction of Hamas would significantly weaken Iran’s regional strategy, supporting Hamas in the long term may prove even more costly</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Force structures will look different as UGS become more prevalent. Maintaining the same force structure and simply adding UGS on top will not maximise advantage. One frequent claim is that robots will replace soldiers in some cases. However, it is unlikely that this will be a zero-sum relationship, in which more robots can lead to forces having fewer soldiers. The British Army is experimenting with how force structures might change via its Experimentation and Trials Group, and initiatives such as the Phalanx platoon, which has reimagined the traditional platoon structure for when more uncrewed assets are integrated. In the near to mid-term, a rebalancing of forces into support functions may be required, as the example below demonstrates.</p> +<p>Finally, Iranian focus on the Israel–Hamas war will cause further tensions domestically. The country has seen significant unrest in recent months, with the public more concerned about Iran’s flailing economy, returning social restrictions and crackdowns on protests. In particular, anti-government protests have regularly featured the chant “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon. I sacrifice my life for Iran” in response to concerns over the use of government funds to support Hamas and Hizbullah, so Iranian focus in this area is likely to cause further unrest.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="force-design-lessons-from-uas"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Force Design Lessons from UAS</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>As a result, Iran has some difficult decisions to make over the coming weeks and months. While the pressure around Iranian nuclear activity and Israel’s normalisation of its regional relations may have somewhat reduced, this is only temporary. In addition, while the destruction of Hamas would significantly weaken Iran’s regional strategy, supporting Hamas in the long term may prove even more costly.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">One must look at the whole uncrewed ecosystem to see the interdependencies and how an army with many uncrewed systems might look. The best real examples today involve UAS, as the more mature capability. The British Army’s Watchkeeper is a fixed-wing surveillance UAS. It measures six by ten metres and weighs 450 kg, requiring a runway to operate. It operates on a line of sight data link with an endurance of around 14 hours and a range of 150 km. While it has no pilot inside the aircraft, the personnel and logistic tail is significant. The aircraft is operated by two pilots in a ground control station, with a third required at times. A nuance here is that military pilots can only have an eight-hour duty period, which includes flight planning. Given this, for Watchkeeper to be used at full capacity, two or even three sets of pilots are required. Watchkeeper does not have the ability to taxi and does not have ground brakes, as a weight saving measure, increasing endurance. To this end, it employs a groundcrew of seven to ten people, depending on experience levels and instructor requirements. The groundcrew tow the aircraft to the take off point and run pre-take off computer scripts alongside the pilots in the ground control station. They also set up the cable system that is used to recover the aircraft on landing. Away from the runway sits an engineering detachment of around 20 people. It conducts routine maintenance on the aircraft and keeps it airworthy. It also constructs and dismantles the aircraft when it is loaded into shipping containers for transport. It is supported by two field service representatives from the aircraft’s manufacturer. These people provide technical support and a link back to industry, which can provide in-depth technical support when needed. In addition, a command and flight operations staff of between five and ten people manages the sorties and liaises with wider airfield stakeholders. It manages the risk profile of the aircraft’s flights and provides the wider support wrap to the soldiers in the detachment.</code></em></p> +<hr /> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In this case, one uncrewed system requires a wider staff of over 40 people for it to operate in a benign environment on an established operational airfield. What is more, the infrastructure required to store, transport and maintain the aircraft is a significant footprint.</code></em></p> +<p><strong>Louise Kettle</strong> is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Nottingham. Her research is focused on Britain’s foreign and security relationship with the Middle East across the twentieth century and up to the present day. Her current research is examining British-Iranian relations.</p>Louise KettleAfter initial speculation around its involvement in the Hamas attacks, Iran is coming under increasing pressure over how to respond to the conflict.Goodbye Mr Chips?2023-10-30T12:00:00+08:002023-10-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/goodbye-mr-chips<p><em>Better practices are needed to improve the effectiveness of defence training.</em></p> -<p>While exact roles and ratios may vary, this example is indicative of the challenge of employing uncrewed systems. While such systems technically remove soldiers from a frontline task, the tail of necessary support will likely be extensive, at least in the short to medium term. For example, the key enabler for UGS is the availability of engineers to keep systems running. New technical trades focused on computer-systems engineering will be needed. Software changes rapidly, and it is likely that the burden of keeping engineers up to date with latest developments will be considerable. In turn, this will mean new courses will need to be designed, with an important question being: who would be the right authority to design such courses? These courses will then need to be run from a base, requiring accommodation, classrooms and hangars. The integration of UGS fundamentally changes the size and shape of the force using them.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>This section has made it clear that humans will be the key enabler for UGS – they will move them around the battlefield, they will fix them and they will manage them, at least in the near to medium term. Thus, while it is seemingly logical to focus on technology, it is the soldier who will unlock that technology’s potential, and indeed use it as they see fit, which will be discussed in the next chapter.</p> +<p>Training is crucial for enabling UK Defence to deliver operational success, and broadens the potential talent pool by allowing Defence to recruit people who can develop the necessary skills, rather than simply competing for pre-trained talent (which often is in short supply). The breadth and scale of military training is significant, with a clear management process – the Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT) – in which requirement-setters identify training needs that are passed to delivery authorities, who design and deliver the training; the requirement-setters then review the training to ensure that it provides what is needed. While this sets a structured framework for training, there are challenges Defence must overcome to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its training system. These challenges exist across several areas: culture; system governance; processes; training delivery; the wider learning environment; and workforce capacity.</p> -<h3 id="vi-how-to-make-sure-soldiers-use-them">VI. How to Make Sure Soldiers Use Them</h3> +<p>Pockets of good practice exist in Defence, and much could be gained from sharing these more widely, but lessons should also be learned from training practice outside Defence. This paper identifies improvements in four key areas to help modernise Defence training and prepare the armed forces for the challenges to come:</p> -<p>Integrating new technologies into a force is difficult and should not be considered on a solely technical basis. Scaling the use of UGS across a land force is a deliberate organisational change programme. This chapter examines the role of experimentation, training and trust on the route to successful HMT. Actual future users of UGS, not the abstractions of experimentation, must be front and centre in these endeavours.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Upskilling the whole training workforce by improving the training given to any personnel engaged in training others (“train the trainer”).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Improving training delivery through more personalised “learning journeys”, active learning and greater use of technology.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A better understanding of Defence training as a system and as a crucial component of military capability via clearer lines of accountability, better use of data, and mechanisms allowing training to be more responsive to changing individual and organisational needs.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Partnering with external organisations that can complement Defence’s skillset by supplying adult education (andragogical) expertise.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>It is a mistake to assume that soldiers use equipment given to them in the way intended by designers. One trial saw soldiers continually overload a UGS, as its capacity was not enough for their needs. This led to the system overheating. At the other end of the scale, it should not be assumed that soldiers will use UGS at all. A host of factors interact to determine how soldiers use the kit they are issued. These might include previous experience, who trained them and when they were trained. One example here is personal load-carrying equipment. The British Army brought in a new type of body armour and load-carrying equipment – Virtus. However, many soldiers opted to keep using their old equipment, as it better suited their purposes. They could carry all their equipment, they knew where everything went, and it had worked so far in their career.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<h4 id="experimentation">Experimentation</h4> +<p>Recent defence and security reviews have identified a strategic context wherein armed forces face a “more contested and volatile world”. Simultaneously, rapid advances in technology have changed the way armed forces operate and mean that Defence must constantly refresh its skills base by bringing in new talent and, increasingly, reskilling and repurposing its existing talent. The Integrated Operating Concept and the Haythornthwaite Review corroborated this, highlighting the importance of people in providing the “adaptive edge”. The Defence Command Paper Refresh stated that Defence would “better target our training and education … to upskill those that we recruit and … those already in our workforce”, with “skills at the heart of the way we access, plan and manage our workforce”. Attracting and retaining the necessary talent, however, is challenging, with more people leaving the forces than are joining.</p> -<p>Experimentation is important for understanding the utility of new capability. New technologies are generally examined and researched for a broad use case. Then they will be handed over to troops for a pilot programme, before potentially being rolled out more widely. For all the talk of the importance of such technology in future warfighting, there is little evidence that forces have started to integrate UGS on a regular and even basis. Many soldiers are not being exposed to uncrewed technologies, even if forces may think they are. UGS integration is vulnerable to becoming stuck in an experimental purgatory, on a small scale that disenfranchises the rest of the force. An order from the Dutch Army Command to a single officer was to “just get started and explore the possibilities” of RAS. While an admirable aspiration, this is too tentative. Experimentation often takes place with a limited audience for practical reasons of scale. However, this small scale can have a deleterious effect on the success of the experiment. US Major General James Dubik refers to this increase in scale as “expanding the experimental ground”. Simulation may offer one route to democratising the experimentation process. Bohemia Interactive’s “virtual battlespace” simulation software, in use with the British military, has integrated several of the UGS discussed in this paper, for example the THeMIS. Terminals are widely available throughout the British defence estate and accessible to troops, should they be given the time to make use of them. With simulation, there is less reliance on access to physical systems, of which there are not many. Simulations allow soldiers to test approaches and witness the strengths and weaknesses of the UGS outlined above, confirming appropriate use cases. It is, however, difficult to say yet how this will impact the integration of UGS into the force, or actual future use.</p> +<p>Although the armed forces have shrunk substantially since the Cold War and represent a relatively small draw on the overall UK population, not all people are eligible – for example on health, lifestyle (drugs) or fitness grounds – or indeed willing to join. And so, while the UK population is growing in absolute terms, this growth is largely driven by migration and by increases in groups from which the military struggles to recruit. Moreover, the armed forces’ nationality requirements mean they must compete with other employers for UK domestic talent. This is not unique to the UK; there are global shortages of STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) skills, and Defence is in a “war for talent” against more flexible and adaptable commercial employers.</p> -<p>Another difficulty in experimentation and novel procurement is the military’s propensity to replace like with like. As a result of this propensity, force structures look very similar to how they did 50 years ago. There is difficulty in identifying truly disruptive innovations because they do not look like what the organisation is currently doing. This limits organisations’ openness to the truly disruptive potential of UGS. Indeed, the discussion above itself adds UGS to existing structures, techniques and tactics. It may be the case that using entirely novel tactics may be the way to gain competitive advantage. This is where extensive experimentation with many members of the force should be considered. Giving soldiers the freedom to troubleshoot and use the system without preordained norms may lead to unexpected and beneficial findings.</p> +<p>Noting the demands of new technology and forms of warfare, the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD’s) 2019 Defence People Strategy identified the challenges of a changing labour market and workforce expectations: in a world where more people may not commit to lengthy, linear careers, but instead choose to zig-zag in and out of professions and employers over longer working lives, Defence’s traditional people model will struggle; and while the totality of the Defence offer, including pay, must be competitive, Defence cannot win the war for talent fighting on salary alone, and nor should it try to, given wider affordability challenges. Greater flexibility in accessing talent developed and employed in other parts of the “whole force”, including industry, would help mitigate the risk. However, without the freedom to pay full commercial salaries and differentiate pay across the workforce to target the skills that are in short supply (potentially at the expense of those whose skills are less in demand), the availability of extensive learning and development opportunities is and remains crucial for ensuring the armed forces have access to the skills they need.</p> -<p>Timelines for the introduction of UGS into land forces are tentative. The British Army’s RAS strategy uses horizons stretching out to 2035 for the integration of RAS, despite them having been part of force structures for decades already. Making use of corporate knowledge developed in the UAS world can help ease the frictions of integrating UGS. The US military’s timeline is more assured, but progress towards its ambitions is uncertain. The Project Convergence series of experiments led by the US hopes to merge capabilities between partner nations in the pursuit of effective integration and increased lethality.</p> +<p>Moreover, the recruiting pool is widened because Defence can recruit untrained personnel and provide them with the right skills, although retaining these skilled people is a different challenge. More broadly, the nation benefits when trained personnel leave the forces to join the wider economy, as such people have valuable technical, leadership and management skills. This also enables social mobility. As digital technologies develop, these kinds of human skills are likely to be in greater demand for honing the uniquely human contribution to human–machine teams. Like digital expertise, these skills are expected to be in short supply, and are often harder to develop.</p> -<p>Lethargy is common in military decision-making, and it is important that UGS do not fall into the trap that so often ensnares military procurement. The phenomenon whereby innovative technologies receive government funding but fail to make it into the hands of warfighters is known as the “Valley of Death”. Indeed, it appears that with AI being perceived as a potential silver bullet for many military issues, and RAS and UGS being the physical embodiment of that technology, militaries are having to hedge and spread their bets over a wide variety of initiatives. For example, the UK’s Defence and Security Accelerator has awarded more than £180 million to 1,065 different projects, an average of just £169,000 per serial. This is slightly less than the annual capitation rate of a single software engineer with the professional background and resources to develop this technology meaningfully. Increasing focus on those capabilities that show potential for the use cases described above is a potential route to success. Signalling commitment to the cause and allowing industry to plan accordingly is a key output of any RAS and UGS strategy. Indeed, the extended period of experimentation seen so far that has not led to serious expansion may in fact signal to industry to disinvest from research and development of UGS.</p> +<p>Learning and development is also highly attractive to young people, especially those from ethnic minority backgrounds, so an improved approach to training, including allowing more personalised learning journeys, could broaden Defence’s appeal as an employer. Meanwhile, greater flexibility and a focus on skills-based training could open up new career pathways for those already in Defence, aiding retention, but this must be accompanied by improvements to the learning environment so that it better reflects a contemporary learner’s expectations. Far from being an overhead or a luxury, therefore, learning and development is a vital tool for ensuring that the armed forces have the skills to deliver in the “more contested and volatile world” described by the Integrated Review Refresh 2023. The Haythornthwaite Review identified that more agile approaches to training were needed, drawing on digital delivery, but did not conduct “a detailed analysis of what training is needed”.</p> -<p>The buy-in of top-level leadership is also crucial to successfully instigating change in an organisation. In the case of military experimentation, there can be a propensity for general officers to only attend “distinguished visitors’ days”, which are designed specifically for show, providing an element of innovation theatre. These sessions involve orchestrated demonstrations to show best-case scenarios. They also often take place at the end of an exercise period, in which frictions and realities have been found and then solved or worked around. Multiple rehearsals take place and minute details are agreed on by the deliverers. Such opportunities give industry representatives access to senior officers, and will often be identified as a career-enhancing event for the organisers. This can lead to true frictions being masked, and often means that the generals who hold authority for novel equipment programmes do not have an accurate and holistic picture of the state of play. Moreover, the tendency of armed forces personnel to move roles every two to three years means that only a general, rather than deep, level of understanding can be achieved. In a fast-moving technological environment, this is inimical to progress.</p> +<h4 id="scope">Scope</h4> -<h4 id="trust">Trust</h4> +<p>This paper complements the defence and security reviews by examining how individual training and education – rather than that delivered to units (collective training) – should change to deliver more effectively the skilled workforce that Defence needs. While this paper focuses on learning and development for individual members of the armed forces, many lessons also apply to the civil service, although the breadth and depth of learning and development offered differ substantially.</p> -<p>A significant barrier to successful integration of UGS is trust. The desired human–technology relationship is often framed in terms of trust. This suggests there will always be some level of uncertainty about the workings of such systems, including UGS with some degree of autonomous function. Definitions of trust are numerous, and it is not feasible to give a full review of definitions here. One usable and well-cited definition of trust is, “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party”. To get their full utility, soldiers must embrace these systems and trust them to complete a task. Another conception is that trust in AI-related technology is a contractual one. A system can be considered trustworthy if it can maintain the contract made with a human operator. That is, the system will carry out the given task.</p> +<p>This paper first describes the framework within which the armed forces conduct their training, before identifying six challenges constraining the current system’s ability to maximise the value of Defence training and education. Then, drawing on examples of good practice inside and outside Defence, the paper concludes by highlighting how Defence training might be improved for greater efficiency and/or improved effectiveness of the already significant investment UK Defence makes in its people. The paper’s findings are based on both primary and secondary research conducted over five months, involving 32 structured interviews with people managing, delivering or supporting individual training and education: these people range across UK Defence, international armed forces, academia and training providers. The paper also draws on literature dealing with good learning and development practice.</p> -<p>Computer models that allow some level of autonomous activity are necessarily complex. There is a lack of transparency in many machine learning and AI models. When working with another soldier, it is possible to ask them why they made a decision, and person-to-person interaction is a norm with which all are familiar. This becomes more difficult with a “black box” scenario, where the decision-making process is opaque and not fully understood by the user. Trust is built slowly, but lost rapidly in the face of failure. Unless a system is fully explicable, a sceptical soldier is unable to query UGS as to why they want to act or have acted in a particular way. The military has many examples where lack of trust would cause a breakdown in operational effectiveness. The most obvious is a targeting system where a machine alerts a human operator to the potential presence of the enemy. Scepticism rather than over-trusting here is preferable, where a soldier checks the information before potentially suggesting an engagement through appropriate means. A more nuanced example would be the willingness of soldiers to load injured comrades on to UGS tasked with moving the casualties back to an aid post or hospital. The soldiers may think they could get there faster, and they might well be right. One study showed soldiers opting to manually control a UGV rather than trusting it to follow waypoints or a leader.</p> +<h3 id="i-defence-training-framework">I. Defence Training Framework</h3> -<p>Many studies of autonomous systems are focused on the ethics and practice of lethal autonomous weapons systems. Moreover, this discussion is often happening between civilian commentators. There has been much less research on the importance of various design features to active-duty service people. One study found a direct friction between maintaining meaningful control and understanding on the one hand, and maintaining the increased operational tempo that uncrewed and autonomous systems are hoped to unlock, on the other. Soldiers need to be able to rapidly verify a system’s suggestions and decisions without having to work through the entire evidence body, which would render the system moot. To that end, Jai Galliott and Austin Wyatt suggest that confidence measures in observations by UGS should be accessible to soldiers. Such measures would not be infallible, because of the technical reasons and potential for adversarial action discussed above. Therefore, a secondary suggestion by respondents to the study cited above was for systems to have a means of both simply describing their planned actions and of confirming that UGS have “understood” their operator’s commands. It would be worthwhile to consult a wide user base on this issue, rather than only people who happen to be in small experimental units, which may be more by luck than judgement.</p> +<p>The British armed services are consistently in the top 10 of UK apprenticeship providers, with 24,800 people undertaking their apprenticeships in 2022. In 2023, the British Army was the top UK apprenticeship provider, with the Royal Navy third and Royal Air Force seventh. Its breadth of employment is huge too, with a uniformed and civilian workforce of over 200,000, ranging from relatively low skilled manual labour through to cyber experts and nuclear scientists. The Services describe 242 different roles on their websites, and civil service roles add even more. These disparate trades, some of which are unique to Defence – such as combat roles – come with specific training burdens. Despite the evident scale of training and its associated investment, the MoD cannot provide a definitive figure of how many people are in training at any one time, or the cost. Indeed, there appears to be no consistent definition of, or systematic data on, training costs.</p> -<p>Equally, there is a fear of over-trust. Overestimating the ability of UGS will lead equally to an inefficient allocation of resources. This makes the process of integration and education throughout the force all the more important. Trust in automated systems has led to accidents in both conflict situations and commercial aviation. In Kuwait in 2003, a US Patriot detachment shot down a British Tornado, killing both pilots. The Patriot crew had acted on indicators given by the system’s computer. The best way to build trust is to develop understanding, which is the subject of the next section.</p> +<h4 id="types-of-training">Types of Training</h4> -<h4 id="socialisation">Socialisation</h4> +<p>Defence divides training into “individual” and “collective” categories. Individual training concerns the knowledge, skills, behaviour and attitudes of the individual. Beyond this, collective training aims to develop units and formations in order for them to function as cohesive entities. While the Chief of Defence People (CDP) is the owner of the process for individual training, collective training responsibility sits with the individual Services, and with Strategic Command. The bridge between the two types of training is a crucial one, where the historically linear progression of individual courses followed by progressive collective training needs to be reconsidered given the smaller workforce, faster-changing skills and ever-increasing demands on forces held at readiness.</p> -<p>As UGS proliferate, it is important for as many soldiers as possible to be exposed to them early in a safe manner. This is crucial to building the trust that is a precursor to success in HMT. Familiarity breeds trust, but military forces are poor at introducing soldiers to capabilities that are not their core system. Familiarity can also build favourability, whereby soldiers and commanders are willing to lean on these capabilities when planning operations. Such favourability is not a given. The more that soldiers are exposed to UGS, in whatever guise, the better they will understand them and the more likely they are to become ambassadors. As noted above, building trust is crucial to the full integration of UGS. Importantly, it is recognised that trust will not be developed solely by developers improving software outcomes over time. Instead, most gaps in trust “won’t be solved by code but by conversation”.</p> +<h4 id="individual-training--phases">Individual Training – Phases</h4> -<p>This conversation might take place in several ways. The crucial step is to safely move UGS from being only in the hands of experimenters into those areas which see a large throughput of troops. These are most likely to be training establishments, both for initial training and for later tactical training. The first way is during military training and education. If military forces are not including modules on UGS in basic training, they should do so immediately. This might be as simple as a classroom discussion or presentation. Better still would be a physical demonstration using UGS. This could be a short session where a UGS’ capability is demonstrated to soldiers under training. The seemingly small act of having a trainee lie on a stretcher mounted to a UGS and travel a short distance would have manifest training benefits. As mentioned above, there is also an opportunity for simulation to play a role in widening the population of troops with exposure to UGS.</p> +<p>While much of the forces’ technical training happens in Joint schools, Service-specific training still abounds, especially in the early stages of an individual’s career. Even in “Joint” schools, many courses are exclusively “single Service”, reflecting that Service’s specific needs and different career structures. The MoD identifies three phases of training:</p> -<p>The second area for consideration would be training areas and firing ranges. Large numbers of troops who have gone through basic training pass through these facilities each year. Forces undergoing range work could integrate a serial using a UGS. This could include UGS with a remote weapon system providing overhead fire, a task currently done by soldiers. This would build trust and understanding and increase the audience exposed to such systems. Equally, many range serials involve a simulated casualty evacuation. A “casualty” will be designated by the training staff, and the soldiers will have to give first aid and use a stretcher to evacuate the soldier to a safe area. An uncrewed ground system with a stretcher could be in place on the range and used to show its utility and allow soldiers to interact with novel systems. Pitting a human team against an uncrewed ground system would begin to show soldiers and commanders where and how UGS can be most usefully employed – they do not necessarily need to learn this from an instructional leaflet produced by a faraway department. Instead, troops would be enfranchised by direct experience. These activities would also create additional data for the manufacturer about usage and failure rates.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Phase One training is synonymous with basic training: how the armed forces turn civilians into military personnel. It is delivered on a single Service basis, with separate schools and programmes for officers and non-commissioned personnel. For regulars, these are often lengthy residential programmes delivered at central locations, although course duration differs by Service. For reserves, the training is usually shorter and conducted regionally or at their home unit.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Phase Two provides initial specialist training, where individuals are trained for their specialisation. The content and duration of the training depends on the role. Courses are mostly bespoke to each Service, even where they are run in Joint schools. Some non-commissioned personnel complete Phase One and Phase Two training, usually with some additional workplace training, in just under a year. More demanding roles require longer courses, and often gaps between courses (for example, engineer or pilot roles can require many years before they become “productive”).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Phase Three covers all individual training and education after completing Phase Two. It includes further professional and general management training linked to promotion and career development, and broader Professional Defence and Security Education (PDSE). Further professional training is generally delivered within the single Service systems that delivered Phase Two training. Promotion-based command, leadership and management training is routinely provided by the individual’s Service (for example, non-commissioned officer and officer promotion courses). PDSE is delivered either by single Services (intermediate command and staff courses) or as Joint training (advanced and higher command and staff courses and Royal College of Defence Studies). There are also sponsored places for personnel to study, full time or part time, at civilian universities. Phase Three courses range from a few days to over a year. Most courses result from a specific requirement of a Service person’s career.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h4 id="siloes">Siloes</h4> +<p>Separately, individuals must complete annual mandatory training to achieve central competencies such as data protection, heat illness training, the law of armed conflict and unacceptable behaviours awareness. These are mostly delivered online and can be as short as 30 minutes.</p> -<p>State defence enterprises are large organisations. They consist of tens of thousands or more personnel. There are central departments or ministries and single services, as well as research laboratories such as the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) and the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency. Both the US and the UK have directorates dedicated to scanning the future and identifying concepts and capabilities that might be brought into forces. UGS are such a capability. It is not uncommon for people within defence ministries or the single services to not be aware of complementary activity that is taking place elsewhere within the organisation. This is a significant friction, and it prevents progress. In the UK, for example, DSTL, the Ministry of Defence Head Office and the Army Futures Directorate, which owns the HMT programme, all explore UGS. In addition, commercially, Defence Equipment and Support leads the procurement and delivery of UGS into the force. There is also the Experimentation and Trials Group, which leads experimentation with UGS. Moreover, there is a series of defence technology accelerators and innovation hubs. This list does not take into account the bulk of Army personnel who will become the users of UGS. These people should be the focus of UGS implementation. Within this large cohort, there will be a mixture of experience, aptitude and interest in UGS. If this community could be successfully tapped and exploited, there would be significant additional capacity to enhance the integration of UGS into land forces.</p> +<h4 id="individual-training--governance">Individual Training – Governance</h4> -<p>With such a wide breadth of activity, it is difficult to know who, if anyone, fully understands the totality of UGS research and development. Equally, within forces themselves, understanding of other units’ capabilities is often not well understood even when they are well established. Formations regularly organise briefing days so that staff can be informed of what is available to them during planning. Internal communications on this subject should be a central effort, to ensure coherence and a clear path to actual use, rather than a succession of experiments that remain in the trials arena.</p> +<p>Almost all Defence training is governed by the “Joint Service Publication (JSP) 822: Defence Direction and Guidance for Training and Education”. A comprehensive document (679 pages), it describes the Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT), covering the analysis, design, delivery and assurance of training (see Figure 1). Assurance consists of: internal validation (InVal) – did the training deliver the syllabus?; and external validation (ExVal) – did the training achieve what was intended?</p> -<p>Experimentation is important, but it should not be limited to small numbers of soldiers. Instead, exposure should be wide and varied to make use of the diversity of thought and talent available. The building of trust in robotic systems must be deliberate, through exposure early on in careers and regular, good-quality education. There must be a concerted effort to break down siloes in defence establishments so that best practice and knowledge can be better shared. The common theme is giving primacy to the future users of these systems as quickly as possible and at scale.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/T5RYsLf.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Elements of DSAT.</strong> Source: MoD, “Joint Service Publication 822: Defence Direction and Guidance for Training and Education: Volume 1”, last updated September 2022, p. 7.</em></p> -<h3 id="vii-recommendations-for-ugs-integration">VII. Recommendations for UGS Integration</h3> +<p>DSAT involves three main actors:</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p><strong>Role and management:</strong> Due to current technical limitations, UGS should be employed in standoff roles and in rear areas, where there is a dividend for their use. Treating larger UGS like aircraft whose support can be bid for will allow supply and demand to be managed, as well as keeping UGS from burdening low-level formations.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Force design:</strong> The extra demand UGS will place on engineers and enablers (the invisible tail) needs to be baked into force planning now. The management of UGS may, in fact, require more soldiers.</p> - </li> +<ul> <li> - <p><strong>Logistic burden:</strong> The transport and storage of UGS, and battery management, must be planned for in detail, accepting that it cannot simply be added on to existing commitments, which would further stretch scarce resource. This will ensure the force-wide implications of new technology are catered for adequately.</p> + <p>Training Requirements Authority (TRA): responsible for defining the high-level training need (content and numbers to be trained) and ExVal. Generally, these authorities sit within the Commands, although CDP is the TRA for some joint training.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Education:</strong> Education and training related to UGS should be implemented now, while experimentation is ongoing, rather than waiting until systems are formally brought into service. Basic training should include education on UGS now, even in a basic form, to begin to build trust and familiarity, easing the integration of UGS at scale.</p> + <p>Training Delivery Authority (TDA): responsible for training design, delivery (which can be outsourced) and InVal.</p> </li> <li> - <p><strong>Experimentation:</strong> UGS trials should be integrated into those areas with a significant throughput of soldiers, such as firing ranges. Moreover, it should be ensured that the totality of UGS experimentation and activity is understood by decision-makers and those conducting the experimentation, and that leaders maintain engagement with projects throughout the life cycle, rather than at the beginning and end. Clear ownership of the whole ecosystem is vital, while encouraging bottom-up engagement will create a user base ready to make best use of UGS.</p> + <p>Training Provider: the school or unit conducting the training.</p> </li> -</ol> - -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +</ul> -<p>This paper has discussed UGS and the considerations for successfully integrating these systems into military forces. It has described the physical and software components of such systems, and how they are anticipated to be used by military forces in the near and further future. Having established the state of the art, the paper discussed three questions.</p> - -<p>First, how will UGS be used once they have been deployed? Systems with high levels of autonomous capability remain rare. Thus, most systems are remotely controlled or teleoperated from a distance. Potential benefits abound, such as enabling soldiers to stay out of harm’s way, and increasing the envelope over which they have sight and potentially control. UGS are not ready to manoeuvre in close combat, their movement is limited by the sheer number of variables, and humans retain the upper hand by some way. Equally, full autonomous navigation is possible, but systems move so slowly as to be potentially deleterious to their main functions, such as load carriage for manoeuvre troops.</p> - -<p>Second, how will UGS get to, and stay in, the fight? Some UGS can be carried by soldiers, while others will need to be towed or transported to where they are needed. They will also then require collecting and moving onward to repair and maintenance before further use. A secondary effect of this is that UGS will have a significant logistic tail, at least in the short to medium term. This will lead to an increase in human enablers supporting UGS.</p> - -<p>Third, how can soldiers be encouraged to make proper use of UGS? It is not a given that soldiers will adopt systems in the way originally envisaged by their designers, or even by military procurement officers and decision-makers. Familiarisation is key to building trust. If soldiers believe they can do a particular job better, they will follow that route. Given this, it is also important not to force the integration of UGS that do not add value to the HMT. Integrating UGS into basic training and those areas with a high throughput of soldiers will rapidly help socialise the use of UGS.</p> - -<p>All these themes are interlinked and there are dependencies between them all. They must be considered by planners who have a firm view of the totality of the enterprise. Moving from experimentation to a capability integrated into field forces is no mean feat, and requires energy and direction from senior leadership. Somewhat ironically, it appears that the most sensible approach when considering the integration of uncrewed systems is to focus on the human.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Patrick Hinton</strong> is a serving regular officer in the British Army’s Royal Artillery. He has experience working with ground based air defence systems and remotely piloted air systems. He has also worked in the personnel space. Since joining the Army in 2014, his career has consisted of a number of appointments at regimental duty including Troop Command, Executive Officer, and Adjutant. He was the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow in the Military Sciences Research Group at RUSI until the end of August 2023.</p>Patrick HintonMilitary experimentation with uncrewed ground systems (UGS) is happening apace. Bomb disposal robots have been in service with armed forces for decades. Now, systems with greater capabilities and autonomy are being developed and tested.Taliban’s Campaign Against IS2023-10-25T12:00:00+08:002023-10-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/talibans-campaign-against-islamic-state<p><em>This paper examines the strategies employed by the Taliban in response to the threat posed by the Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K) in 2021–22.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>Despite a recent decline, the Islamic State (IS), and its South Asian branch IS-K, remains one of the most resilient terrorist organisations on the planet – as recent reports of it planning attacks in Turkey and Europe show. Research carried out in late 2021 to mid-2022 with Taliban and IS members shows that IS-K represented a serious challenge for the Taliban in Afghanistan in this period. While they initially dismissed the threat from IS-K, the Taliban soon developed capabilities to confront it – these capabilities, and IS-K’s responses to them, are the subject of this paper.</p> - -<p>The paper outlines five key counter-IS techniques that the Taliban adopted after August 2021: indiscriminate repression; selective repression; choking-off tactics; reconciliation deals; and elite bargaining.</p> - -<p>While their initial response was to indulge in indiscriminate repression, the Taliban gradually moved towards an approach focused on selective repression, with the aim of leaving the local communities in areas of IS-K activity relatively untouched. They also considerably improved their intelligence capabilities in this period. By the second half of 2022, the Taliban had succeeded in destroying enough IS-K cells and blocking enough of the group’s funding to drive down its activities and contain the threat. The Taliban also experimented with reconciliation and reintegration, and managed to persuade a few hundred IS-K members in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province to surrender, contributing decisively to the dismantling of most of IS-K’s organisation there.</p> - -<p>However, there were also significant flaws in the Taliban’s approach. This paper finds that their selective approach to tackling IS-K struggled to find firm footing in the absence of a solid system of the rule of law and of external oversight. The Taliban’s leadership appear to be struggling to figure out how to ensure that the lower layers of their security apparatus follow orders to avoid arbitrary violence. The paper further shows how the Taliban have failed to follow through with their initially promising reconciliation and reintegration efforts.</p> - -<p>For its part, IS-K showed remarkable organisational resilience in response to the rising tide of the Taliban’s counterterrorism efforts. The group transformed itself into an underground organisation, relinquishing all its bases and moving most of its assets to northern Afghanistan. With this approach, and true to the reputation of its founding organisation, IS, IS-K in Afghanistan managed to survive, even when faced with potentially existential challenges, such as a crackdown on its financial hub in Turkey. IS-K has come increasingly to rely on online activities, including for recruitment.</p> - -<p>The Taliban learned faster than most observers expected them to in response to the challenge of IS-K, and scored significant successes. The longer-term prospects of their counter-IS efforts, however, remain dependent on IS-K continuing to struggle financially, because the drivers of mobilisation into its Afghan ranks remain largely unaddressed.</p> - -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> - -<p>The Taliban took power in Afghanistan in August 2021. As practitioners of insurgent warfare, they had to start learning almost overnight ways of doing counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, especially against what emerged as their main challenger, the Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K). Their early efforts have been characterised as “brutal” and “ineffective”. Others have stated a belief that that the Emirate would not be able to successfully tackle IS-K on its own. As this paper will show, the Taliban initially relied largely on ruthless tactics. However, as shown in a 2023 paper by this author, despite the (very limited) financial means and human resources available, in subsequent months the Taliban’s approach has not been exclusively brutal and at the same time was quite effective, at least in the short term. Indeed, the Taliban, widely seen during their “jihad” (2002–21) as a force of nature, were in reality even then already displaying considerable organisational skills.</p> - -<p>This empirical research paper forms part of the EU-funded STRIVE Afghanistan project, and aims to further discuss and analyse how the Taliban applied their organisational capital to countering IS-K. The guiding questions that this paper seeks to answer are: how did the Taliban structure their post-August 2021 counter-IS mix of tactics, how successful were these in fighting IS-K, how did IS-K adapt, and did the Taliban try to achieve long-term stability, seeking non-kinetic approaches and reducing reliance on violence? Since the Taliban do not frame their counter-IS effort with reference to the Western understanding of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, the author will also avoid referring to such terminologies, and will instead examine their specific tactics. As noted in a rare study of non-Western responses to terrorism, Western theorisations of terrorism and counterterrorism might not be very useful in analysing such efforts by non-Western states and actors.</p> - -<p>The discussion focuses on how, after August 2021, the Taliban practised violent repression, both indiscriminately, against people not directly involved in the armed opposition, and selectively, against active insurgents. It also covers how the Taliban have tried to choke off the armed opposition, denying it access to population, supply routes and financial flows. The paper finally looks at whether there may be signs of awareness among the new Taliban elite that their long-term self-interest might be better served by developing reconciliation programmes of some kind, or by reaching some elite bargain.</p> - -<p>There are not many large-scale counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts that have altogether eschewed all forms of ruthless violence, so analysing a “counter” effort requires some careful qualifications. The first useful distinction here is between selective and indiscriminate violence. A regime that focuses its violence on its enemies can deliver a clear message that those who challenge it will meet a terrible fate, while political quietism (accepting the status quo without resistance) is rewarded. Encouraging quietism while targeting “extremists” (defined as anti-ruling system elements) should therefore be a winning approach, even if utterly violent. The question that follows, then, is why ruling elites should be concerned about achieving anything more than an efficient (selective) repression. This is a pertinent question especially where a violent conflict has already taken off. At that point, some form of repression can no longer be avoided. Following a long-term pattern of indiscriminate violence makes non-violent alternatives hard to buy into for any opponent. However, even choosing selective violence does not necessarily make non-violent alternatives easy to pursue. Different actors within any government will each make their own assessments on where the boundary between violent extremists and quietists may lie, resulting in divisions within a state apparatus and a ruling elite.</p> - -<p>Another important distinction is that violent repression may or may not be accompanied by efforts to negotiate local reintegration deals, with the collaboration of local elites. Such deals are often deemed to be a more effective long-term way of stabilising a polity than relying solely on violence, not least because they can potentially create bonds between ruling and local elites, eventually resulting in the latter gaining sufficient leverage with the centre to effectively constrain its use of arbitrary power. Similarly, repression can also be accompanied by elite bargaining, that is, power sharing.</p> - -<p>There are also ways of choking off armed opposition with no political concessions and no negotiations, without using extreme violence. Large-scale military deployments, for example, which, in the presence of adequate levels of manpower, can be achieved without reliance on indiscriminate use of firepower, can result in the capture of territory and assertion of control over the population, reducing or denying the ability of the opposition to recruit new members, access sanctuaries, train and transfer supplies. In other words, the aim of such large operations need not be to destroy the enemy, but can be to choke it off. An even better example of choking-off tactics is financial disruption, where violence plays a very small part. These tactics are particularly appealing to ruling elites, but are not necessarily within their reach. It takes an army considerably superior to the opposing forces to monopolise control over territory and population, and it takes a sophisticated intelligence apparatus to block financial flows towards the armed opposition. Moreover, choking-off tactics can be a protracted affair and even an inconclusive one, depending on the skill of the opponents. An armed opposition could continue operating under more adverse conditions even with little or no access to the wider population, and new channels for transferring cash to rebels can always be devised by creative sanctions busters.</p> - -<p>This is a reason for ruling elites not to write off political tactics completely. There are other reasons as well for not writing off local reintegration deals and elite bargains. One possible incentive to invest in reconciliation or an elite bargain is the awareness within the ranks of the ruling elite that ruthless repressions, even when efficient in the short term, do not successfully remove the roots of opposition, but instead allow it to resurface generations later, or even sooner, leaving the state vulnerable. Another possible incentive is that repressions can drag on inconclusively and go through critical phases, with the final outcome being uncertain and involving a high cost to the ruling elites. In such contexts, softer alternatives to ruthless repression can gain traction.</p> - -<p>This paper is comprised of three chapters. The first examines the state of IS-K and the type of threat it presented to the Taliban as they took power, and how the Taliban assessed that threat. The second chapter discusses in detail how the Taliban sought to meet the IS-K challenge, examining each tactic in turn: indiscriminate repression; selective repression; choking-off tactics; local reconciliation and reintegration; and elite bargaining. The third and final chapter examines IS-K’s response to the Taliban.</p> - -<p>To protect sources, neither the names of the interviewees nor their exact roles in their organisations have been disclosed. IS-K interviewees are classified as either “commanders” (leaders of a tactical group of five to 30 men) or “cadres” (district and provincial-level leaders, or managers of support departments such as logistics or finance, among others).</p> - -<h4 id="methodology">Methodology</h4> - -<p>With the Taliban–IS-K conflict still under way, any findings of this paper can be only partial and preliminary. There are also clear limitations to the research methodology adopted: research was by necessity limited to oral sources, with limited support from news reports and policy-oriented analysis – which are also often partial – and no access to primary written sources, such as the Emirate’s records, or of course to any internal IS-K documents.</p> - -<p>Researching this topic required a number of methodological compromises given that conducting primary research in a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan is extremely difficult. IS-K recruiters and members were, of course, the most difficult to speak to, primarily because they have increasingly been in hiding. As a result, the body of data collected is inevitably incomplete and follow-up on specific themes was often not possible. The analysis contained in the paper inevitably reflects this. However, it should be noted that when reached and given a proper introduction by a third party, such as a relative, friend, colleague or respected individual, even members of IS-K proved quite talkative. This should not be a surprise, as the literature shows that members of violent extremist organisations are typically proud of being members and often brag about their own activities, even when they are supposed to be operating deep underground, as in Europe. The risk faced by this type of research is therefore not one of not obtaining access. There are other risks, however: that interviewees might be affected by a social-desirability bias, resulting in overstating their achievements, capabilities and/or resources; or by reverse causation, leading sources to provide prejudiced information about rival organisations. Mitigation measures are discussed below.</p> - -<p>Taliban officials were quite prudent in their answers, but thanks to their internal tensions and differences, Taliban interviewees were also quite often willing to discuss embarrassing details and to acknowledge limitations in their counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. Taliban interviewees were often dismissive of the IS-K threat and overstated the progress made in countering that threat, while IS-K sources did the exact opposite. This was expected, and it was dealt with by interviewing multiple sources within both the Taliban and IS-K, and by spreading the research effort over 20 months, allowing for the time-testing of responses. This was particularly important and useful as it provided validation points for the reliability of the different sources. For example, initialTaliban dismissals of IS-K were proved wrong, as were IS-K’s triumphalist assumptions made in early 2022. The data points provided by sources could only be assessed against one another over time, as in the case of claims about IS-K moving to northern Afghanistan.</p> - -<p>While the author takes into account the literature relevant to the topic and the period, this paper relies mainly on empirical data collected through interviews. It is based on a series of 54 interviews, carried out between August 2021 and April 2023. Multiple interviews on both sides of the conflict and with non-aligned individuals, such as elders, clerics, former IS-K members and <em>hawala</em> traders, allowed for greater cross-referencing opportunities. The details are provided in the table below.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wddBWob.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Breakdown of Interviews.</strong> Source: Author generated.</em></p> - -<p>The research methodology was a hybrid of investigative journalistic and ethnographic interviewing. The questionnaires were adapted to each interviewee; there were, in fact, 54 different questionnaires. Questions evolved as knowledge of ongoing trends and developments expanded.</p> - -<p>The interviews were commissioned to three Afghan researchers in local languages (Pashto, Dari and Uzbek) and took place mostly in Afghanistan, with some interviews taking place in Pakistan. Two of the researchers were members of the Salafi community, a fact that facilitated access to IS-K sources and reduced risk to researchers to acceptable levels. All of the researchers had a background in journalism and/or research, had participated in previous research projects with a similar typology of interviewees, had been trained to undertake research with a similar methodology, and had contacts or personal/family relations with Taliban and/or IS-K members, which proved crucial in reaching out and gaining access to interviewees.</p> - -<p>The risk that respondents might use the interviews to influence external observers or to misrepresent the facts was assumed from the start as a precautionary measure. This risk was mitigated by using different types of interviewees – such as members of either the Taliban or IS-K, elders of local communities where IS-K operates, clerics and traders – who represented contrasting points of view; by interviewing individuals separately and without them being aware of other interviews taking place; and by inserting questions to which the answer was already known, to verify responses. It proved particularly helpful to present interviewees with information gathered from other sources, such as local elders saying that IS-K members were struggling financially, and ask them to comment. Most IS-K sources could not avoid some degree of openness about apparently negative developments concerning IS-K. Public-domain sources, such as media reports and analytical studies, were also used, where available, to check the credibility of interviewees. The researchers chosen did not know one another, to avoid the risk of researcher collusion to manipulate the content of interviews, for example by inventing content to produce whatever they might have believed the project team wanted to hear. This is always a risk when interviews are carried out by field researchers while the project is being managed remotely. The field researchers were also informed that the purpose of the effort was simply to ascertain facts, and that there was no premium placed on specific findings. Finally, the data collected was validated as much as possible via consultations with independent experts and government and international organisations monitoring developments in Afghanistan, who, given the sensitivity of the topic, asked to remain anonymous.</p> - -<p>The interviewees were told that their answers would be used in an open-access publication, the type of which was not specified. The interviews were carried out in part face to face and in part over the phone – some interviewees were in locations that were difficult to access. All the interviews have been anonymised and all data that could lead to the identification of interviewees has been removed.</p> - -<h3 id="i-the-taliban-and-is-k-sources-of-enmity">I. The Taliban and IS-K: Sources of Enmity</h3> - -<p>The conflict between the Taliban and IS-K did not start in 2021. There was tension between IS-K and the Taliban from the moment IS-K was launched in January 2015. By May 2015, the two organisations were at war, competing over territory, but also over the loyalty of hardened jihadists, be they Afghans, Pakistanis, Central Asians or others. The elements most influenced by the global jihadist agenda were those most likely to be attracted by IS-K, even if its Salafist profile discouraged many who would otherwise have been interested. Several hundred members of the Taliban defected to IS-K, contributing much ill feeling. The fighting, mostly concentrated in Kajaki and Zabul (southern Afghanistan), Nangarhar and Kunar (eastern Afghanistan) and Darzab (northwestern Afghanistan), continued throughout the 2015–21 period and led sometimes to atrocities.</p> - -<p>In those years, the two rival insurgent organisations had their columns of fighters clashing in a kind of semi-regular warfare. The better-disciplined IS-K had an edge against poorly trained local Taliban militias in 2015–18, but the tables turned in 2019–20, when the Taliban started deploying their crack units against IS-K’s strongholds in eastern Afghanistan. After that and until August 2021, IS-K stayed away from confronting the Taliban head on and sought safety in more remote parts of the east, counting on the fact that the Taliban were still primarily busy fighting the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.</p> - -<p>For some time after the violence between the two organisations started in May 2015, IS-K did not produce much propaganda. It was only in more recent years that IS-K set up a large-scale propaganda campaign against the Taliban, challenging their credentials, both as a jihadist group and their religious credentials, especially what IS-K saw as their lax implementation of Islamic law. Friction between adherents of Salafism, a purist form of Islamic fundamentalism, and Hanafis – Deobandis in particular, but also Sufis – helped to feed the conflict. Although the Deobandis are described as being influenced by Salafism, Salafis see them as practitioners of an impure form of Islam. This is even truer of Sufis. Although IS-K initially downplayed its Salafi–jihadist ideology in the hope of attracting a wider range of supporters, after its appearance in 2015, it gradually took on an increasingly hardline Salafi character. The Taliban, on the other hand, became more and more diverse over time, incorporating, in particular, many members from a Muslim Brotherhood background, while the top leadership remained predominantly Deobandi-influenced, with a strong influence of Sufism as well. While a significant number of Salafis joined the Taliban’s jihad between 2003 and 2015, after 2015, most were attracted to IS-K.</p> - -<h3 id="ii-sizing-up-the-is-k-challenge-in-2021">II. Sizing Up the IS-K Challenge in 2021</h3> - -<h4 id="is-ks-manpower">IS-K’s Manpower</h4> - -<p>The extent to which IS-K represented a challenge to those in power in Afghanistan, be they the previous regime or the Taliban, has long been a topic of discussion. The UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, for example, which relies on assessment provided by member states, has provided constantly fluctuating numbers over time. According to IS-K’s own internal sources, IS-K leaders had at their disposal in July 2021 a force of up to 8,000 men. Of these:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>Just over 1,100 were in Pakistan.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The remaining force was mostly concentrated in eastern Afghanistan (Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan), where some 3,700 IS-K members included the bulk of its combat force, some village militias and much of its administrative structure, handling finances and logistics, keeping track of recruitment, making appointments and deciding transfers, planning training and indoctrination, and other tasks. From this area, moving back and forth to and from Pakistan was easy due to the porosity of the nearby border.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The other important concentration was in the northeast, largely in Badakhshan, with almost 1,200 members in that region. This second concentration included well-trained combat forces and some administrative facilities, but was not very active militarily during this period, and instead sought to keep a low profile in central Badakhshan, chiefly in the Khastak valley.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Apart from a few hundred IS-K prison escapees, en route to the east, the rest of the force of IS-K (some 1,300–1,400 men) was at this point mainly spread around the south, the southeast, the region surrounding Kabul, the west, and in the main cities, where it operated underground, recruiting or organising terrorist attacks in urban areas. In several provinces, such as Kapisa, Logar, Ghazni, Paktia, Paktika and Khost, IS-K only had a thin layer of some tens of members, tasked with recruitment, intelligence gathering and preparing the ground for expansion in the future.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>These figures are largely comparable with those provided by the intelligence services of member states to the UN, which put the membership of IS-K at 4,000 for the latter part of 2021. The figures collated by the UN monitoring committee likely relate to the more visible component of IS-K, that is, full-time fighters based in Afghanistan. As detailed by IS-K sources, of the numbers quoted above, around two-thirds (some 4,600) were fighters based in Afghanistan. A proportion of these were essentially village militias (hence quite invisible to external observers), and a few hundred members of terrorist hit teams.</p> - -<p>IS-K sources were claiming mass defections from Taliban ranks in the early months following the fall of Kabul. Such defections would be surprising in light of the morale issues affecting IS-K at that time (see below), and indeed this appears to have been a massively inflated claim. When asked about defections from the Taliban to IS-K after August 2021, IS-K sources had little concrete information to offer and could only cite five lower-level Taliban commanders in Kunar, three in Nangarhar and one in Khost who defected to IS-K. One source in the Emirate’s local apparatus acknowledged that defections from the ranks of the Taliban to IS-K did take place in the early post-takeover months, but had been limited in numbers. The most important defection to be confirmed, at least by local sources, was that of commander Mansoor Hesar with five sub-commanders and 70 fighters in Nangarhar in late August 2021. Another source within the Taliban confirmed only that in the early days post-takeover, two Taliban commanders from Dur Baba and Hisarak defected to IS-K: Mullah Yakub and <em>a’lim</em> Shamsi. Overall, there were few defections (especially when the total manpower of the Taliban is considered), and they added little to IS-K strength and included no high-profile individuals, thus offering little with which the IS-K propaganda machine could work.</p> - -<h4 id="is-ks-finances">IS-K’s Finances</h4> - -<p>IS-K’s efforts in this period seem to have been marred by financial shortcomings. Sources suggest that the group’s finance operations were badly mismanaged in late 2021 to early 2022. During this period, however, and in line with Taliban allegations, IS-K sources claimed connections with elements of Pakistan’s army and intelligence, translating into logistical help and support for IS-K’s efforts to raise money from “Islamic charities” in Pakistan. It has not, however, been possible to verify these claims.</p> - -<h4 id="is-k-morale">IS-K Morale</h4> - -<p>When the Taliban took over, the idea of giving up the fight was reportedly widespread within the ranks of IS-K. Nearly all of the seven former IS-K members interviewed stated that they had been attracted to IS-K to fight “American crusaders”, not the Taliban. This could have contributed to a decline in morale after August 2021 – although respondents might also have wanted to downplay any hatred for the Taliban that they might have harboured. The Taliban also benefited from war weariness in the country, including within the Salafi community. Even elders critical of the Taliban expressed happiness that the fighting had stopped. The defeats that the Taliban inflicted on IS-K in 2019–20 had also left a mark. A further indicator of low morale was the refusal of many detained members of IS-K to rejoin the group after Afghanistan’s prisons were emptied in the chaotic final days of the Islamic Republic. IS-K sources at the time claimed that thousands of escapees from government prisons had rejoined their ranks after the chaos of August 2021. It is clear, however, that, contrary to these claims, many did not rejoin at all, but went into hiding, trying to stay clear of both IS-K and the Taliban (see below on the lack of impact of escapees on IS-K’s strength). It may be added that all former members were reportedly aware that they could contact IS-K via Telegram to rejoin, but many did not take this opportunity. Taliban officials interviewed by the International Crisis Group quantified the escapees who rejoined IS-K in the “hundreds”, rather than in the thousands alleged by some sources.</p> - -<h4 id="how-the-taliban-assessed-is-k">How the Taliban Assessed IS-K</h4> - -<p>The Taliban’s initial neglect of the threat represented by IS-K was not due to any form of tolerance. Many senior Taliban viewed IS-K as a proxy organisation, established or manipulated by the security services of the previous regime and/or by those of neighbouring and regional countries, Pakistan in particular, with the intent of splitting the insurgency and undermining the Taliban. The Taliban thought that, with the previous regime gone and the war won, IS-K would be critically weakened by the disappearance of a critical source of support. Moreover, the Taliban’s belief was that IS-K lacked a mass base:</p> - -<blockquote> - <p>The problem is the Salafi ulema and mullahs, who inoculate the seed of hypocrisy and a very negative view of Hanafism in their Salafi followers … With the normal Salafi villagers, who don’t have any connection with Daesh [IS-K] and with the [Salafi] ulema, [the Taliban’s] relations are very good.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>There was also a belief that people had joined IS-K because of the salaries it was able to pay, thanks to generous funding from foreign supporters.</p> - -<p>The Taliban leadership, therefore, initially tended to underestimate the threat represented by IS-K. At the same time, while IS-K was not perceived as a strategic threat in August 2021, it was nonetheless considered a resolutely hostile and irreconcilable organisation of <em>“khawarij”</em>, against which the officials of the Emirate were ordered to take “aggressive and serious” action.</p> - -<h3 id="iii-the-talibans-counter-is-effort">III. The Taliban’s Counter-IS Effort</h3> - -<p>This chapter will discuss the five key counter-IS techniques that the Taliban adopted after August 2021, as outlined in the Introduction: indiscriminate repression; selective repression; choking-off tactics; reconciliation deals; and elite bargaining.</p> - -<h4 id="indiscriminate-repression">Indiscriminate Repression</h4> - -<p>The Taliban have in the past argued that indiscriminate revenge-taking and repression on the part of Afghan and US security forces in 2001–04 drove many into the ranks of the insurgency. These views were supported by the elders of insurgency-affected areas. Perhaps because very few local Taliban officials were active with the organisation in those years, they seem oblivious today to the obvious lessons that should have been derived from that experience. Indeed, some Taliban officials have sought to undermine IS-K by trying to crush its supporting networks and milieus. Many Taliban cadres had been fighting IS-K before, and had developed a deep hatred for the organisation, which emerges from virtually all the interviews that the research team carried out. Some also harboured a strong hostility towards the Salafi community, from which they knew the bulk of IS-K’s Afghan members came. Some Taliban equated the Salafi community with IS-K. The fact that the Taliban had experienced serious friction with Salafis since the expansion of their insurgency to the east in 2008–09 helped to strengthen these negative views.</p> - -<p>In some cases, indiscriminate repression was a standalone tactic. The best example of this approach in the early wave of post-takeover repression was Kunar’s governor, Haji Usman Turabi, who epitomised the tendency to conflate Salafism and IS-K. Turabi is nowadays acknowledged by members of the Taliban to be “ideologically against Salafism” and to have “killed several Salafi mullahs”. Turabi believed he knew where the main areas of support for IS-K were, and moved to crush local supporting networks and to shut down Salafi madrasas and mosques. All this led to outrage against him, and the Salafi ulema sent a delegation to Kabul to complain.</p> - -<p>In other cases, indiscriminate repression was coordinated with other counter-IS tactics. While attempting to undermine IS-K operations in Jalalabad, which was a key centre of IS-K’s campaign of urban terrorism, the Taliban targeted IS-K underground networks and sympathising milieus in Nangarhar. This campaign was initially very violent. A cadre who gained notoriety here for his ruthless approach to IS-K was Dr Bashir, who became head of the Taliban’s intelligence services, the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), for Nangarhar province in September 2021, and served in that position throughout 2022. Bashir shut down most of the Salafi madrasas and mosques of Nangarhar. Under Bashir’s leadership, the Taliban in Nangarhar adopted a proactive approach, with large-scale operations and extensive house-by-house searches, detaining many. Many extrajudicial executions of suspects took place under his tenure. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan reported 59 confirmed executions of IS-K suspects, mostly in Nangarhar during October to November 2021. Human Rights Watch indicates that more than 100 suspects were killed between August 2021 and April 2022 in Nangarhar. Salafi community leaders confirmed in February 2022 that in October to November around 100 members of the community were killed in this wave of violence, mostly in Nangarhar. Among them were senior Salafi preachers. Others fled or went into hiding.</p> - -<p>It seems clear that Bashir was orchestrating much of the violence, seemingly with the intent of intimidating IS-K support networks and the surrounding milieus – perhaps even the entire Salafi community – into negotiating deals with the Emirate that would guarantee them security in exchange for cutting off relations with IS-K. This approach has similarities with what some of the strongmen of the previous regime had been doing, such as Abdul Raziq in Kandahar, who managed to force local Taliban to negotiate with him after years of relentless and extreme pressure. The Taliban’s reconciliation effort is discussed more fully below.</p> - -<h4 id="selective-repression">Selective Repression</h4> - -<p>The outrage noted above in relation to Haji Usman Turabi’s indiscriminate repression in Kunar led to the Emirate’s authorities deciding to sack him and appoint in his stead Mawlavi Qasim, from Logar, who had served as shadow governor of Kunar during the Taliban’s insurgency (2002–21). Qasim was not popular in Kunar, where the local Taliban base demanded that a local Talib be appointed governor. He appears to have been chosen by Kabul because of his readiness to comply with their request that he avoid unnecessarily antagonising the Salafis, hence transitioning towards more selective repression. The Emirate’s leadership went ahead, even as a very unhappy Turabi threatened to split from the Taliban with his followers.</p> - -<p>Turabi’s removal suggests that the leadership in Kabul was seriously concerned about the reaction of the Salafi ulema. However, transitioning towards selective repression was never going to be a smooth path. Even if indiscriminate repression lessened after 2021, much damage had been done, as the repression entrenched the sense in the Salafi community that the new regime posed a critical threat to the community.</p> - -<p>Moreover, the new policy of selective repression that followed Turabi’s dismissal was not particularly popular with Taliban officials. Within the Taliban ranks there was denial that indiscriminate abuse had taken place. In the words of a police officer:</p> - -<blockquote> - <p>The Islamic Emirate always told the normal Salafi villagers [that is, not associated with IS-K] that it doesn’t have any problem with their sect, unless they support the enemy of Afghanistan, the Daesh <em>khawarij</em> … Those Salafi people arrested or killed by the Taliban, they had some kind of connection and relation with the Daesh <em>khawarij</em>.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Even looking forward, doubts persisted that the new policy was appropriate. One GDI officer commented: “I have doubts [about some of the Salafi ulema and mullahs], but we cannot take any kind of action because I don’t have proof … the Taliban leadership in Kabul is trying not to create problems for Salafi ulema and elders in Kunar”.</p> - -<p>Some other officials were more explicit in their criticism. As one police officer commented, “The ideologies of Salafi and Daesh are the same, then why they shouldn’t support Daesh?”, implying that the entire Salafi community was a security threat. This officer advocated the closure of all Salafi madrasas and schools and criticised what he viewed as the Emirate’s soft approach, dictated by the fear of driving more Salafis into the arms of IS-K.</p> - -<p>Indeed, surrendering IS-K members did warn the Taliban to avoid antagonising the Salafi community, on the grounds that doing so would drive members towards IS-K. Despite this, outside Kunar, Taliban officials continued closing Salafi mosques and madrasas and detaining Salafis, affecting the entire Salafi community. At the end of 2022, Salafi sources alleged that the Taliban had decided to take over Salafi madrasas in southeastern Afghanistan (that is, installing Hanafi principals to run them and replacing many teachers and professors); in universities, teachers accused of being Salafis were dismissed. Taliban and IS-K sources both confirmed these actions. In December 2022, according to Salafi sources, the Taliban took partial control of a madrasa in the Shuhada district of Badakhshan, and in early February 2023, a large-scale Taliban crackdown in Badakhshan led to raids on three local Salafi madrasas and bans on Friday prayers in 10 mosques.</p> - -<p>The quantitative and qualitative growth of the Taliban’s GDI was inevitably going to be instrumental in the implementation of the new directives and in making repression more selective. From the start, rather than investing in protecting every possible target from IS-K attacks, the Taliban opted to focus on infiltrating IS-K cells in and around the cities. Given the limited resources available (the entire annual 2022/23 state budget being just above $2.63 billion, or 48% of what it had been in 2020), this appears to have been a sound approach. As a result, a major focus of the Taliban’s effort throughout 2022 was the expansion and consolidation of the GDI’s network of informers throughout the IS-K-affected area. During 2022–23, the Taliban were able to carry out multiple successful raids on IS-K cells, mostly in Kabul, but also in other cities. Dr Bashir was credited with quickly setting up a vast network of informers and spies in the villages and in Jalalabad, which led to the destruction of numerous IS-K cells. The impact appears to have been obvious, as attacks stopped, although other techniques, such as local negotiations and the targeting of supporting networks, were also used (see below). On social media, IS-K repeatedly warned its members about the Taliban infiltrating its ranks, implicitly acknowledging its difficulties.</p> - -<p>However, there was some obvious evidence of the GDI’s networks being slow to reach areas where IS-K had not originally been expected to operate. One example is a rocket attack from Hayratan into Uzbekistan on 5 July 2022. This was carried out by three Nangarhari members of IS-K, who were able to hide in a safe house in Mazar-i Sharif for seven months. These outsiders should have attracted the attention of the GDI; the fact that they did not highlights how Taliban intelligence gathering in mid-2022 was still weak in this area.</p> - -<p>Another necessary tool for a full transition towards selective repression is the establishment of a functional system of the rule of law. When the Taliban authorities claimed to “have proof” of mosques and madrasas supporting IS-K, including confessions from surrendering IS-K members, such allegations were disputed by Salafi advocates. The Taliban disregarded the advocates’ complaints: “There were some complaints from some Salafi ulema regarding the banning of their madrasas and mosques, but we don’t care”, said one source. In reality, the standards of proof were quite low. A source in the Kunar GDI implicitly acknowledged this: “In Kunar province we have warned Salafi followers that if the Islamic Emirate had a small doubt about any madrasa or mosque spreading propaganda about Daesh, we would close it and will inflict a heavy punishment on the madrasa’s principal or on the mosque’s imam”.</p> - -<p>The low standards of proof predictably resulted in the crackdown continuing on and off, even if not as dramatically as before. At least, the excesses of the Nangarhar death squads of October and November 2021 were not repeated on a comparable scale in 2022.</p> - -<h4 id="choking-off-tactics">Choking-Off Tactics</h4> - -<p>In addition to repression, another key approach taken by the Taliban to countering IS-K in recent years has been choking-off tactics. Typical examples of such tactics include cutting off an insurgency’s supply lines, or the financial flows supporting it, or its access to the population. The Taliban should have been familiar with this: one of the major debates between Kabul and Washington in 2006–21 was over the US’ inability or unwillingness to force Pakistan to cut the supply lines of the Taliban. That failure, many argued, made the war unwinnable.</p> - -<p>While it would have made sense for the Taliban to destroy IS-K’s bases in the far east of Afghanistan in order to disrupt the group’s ability to maintain its influence in eastern Afghanistan, they had limited manpower available as they were taking over the Afghan state in the summer of 2021, with just some 70,000 men in their mobile units as of September 2021. The Taliban’s Emirate had to concentrate thousands of its best troops in Panjshir from early September 2021, where it faced the resistance of local militias and remnants of the previous regime’s armed forces, gathered into the first new armed opposition group to rise after the regime change, the National Resistance Forces. Thousands more troops were busy securing the cities and sealing the border with Tajikistan. The scarcity of manpower in this period is highlighted by the fact that in the months following the takeover, there was only a very thin layer of Taliban armed forces present in most rural areas. In the average district, the Taliban were only able to deploy 20 to 30 men, who guarded district-centre facilities and carried out occasional patrols, riding motorbikes on the roads. They were rarely seen in the villages. While a process did begin of Taliban supporters, reserves, sympathisers and relatives of Taliban members joining the Emirate’s armed forces, it took several months to absorb these untrained or poorly trained individuals into the forces. Moreover, plans for the security sector were initially quite modest, as the Emirate’s leadership decided to keep the size of its armed forces relatively small, for several reasons:</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>The easy victory obtained by the Taliban in Panjshir in September.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The fact that IS-K was viewed as a marginal actor due to its low profile (see “How the Taliban Assessed IS-K”, above).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The positive attitude shown to the new regime by all neighbouring countries, except for Tajikistan (which was hosting the National Resistance Forces), was making it hard for armed opposition groups to find a safe haven and external support.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The limited fiscal base of the Emirate.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>Indeed, Taliban sources circulated the news that the new army would be small, with as few as 40,000 men in combat units and another 20,000 in support and administrative roles. The police force was planned to be 40,000–60,000 men, of whom some 5,000 would be in a special force called Badri 313. These plans soon changed, however, and by January 2022 the Emirate had upgraded its plans for the army and police, overseeing a gradual expansion of the army towards a target of at least 150,000 men. It seems likely that the resumption of IS-K activities in the cities and in the east contributed significantly to this decision.</p> - -<p>The Taliban therefore delayed launching any large operation in the east. They seem to have understood that large military sweeps without the ability to hold territory afterwards are pointless, if not counterproductive – possibly as a result of having observed the failure of such tactics when used against themselves before August 2021. By March 2022, the Taliban were finally able to launch their first relatively large operation in Kunar, with the intent of forcing IS-K to fight for its bases. Initially, they seem to have thought that by threatening the few fixed bases IS-K had in the far east, they would force IS-K to stand and fight, and inflict major losses. According to a local Taliban source, before August 2021, IS-K had access to “every district of Kunar” and had “very active military bases and training centres”. But the insurgents avoided contact, leaving their bases behind and pulling deeper and deeper into the upper valleys. A Salafi <em>a’lim</em> (religious scholar) offered a similar assessment for Dangam district, saying that IS-K had controlled about 30% of the territory before the Taliban takeover, but that most IS-K members moved out after August 2021. The GDI expected to need another military operation, even deeper into the valleys, to “finish IS-K off”. By April 2022, however, the Taliban realised that IS-K had given up its last vestiges of territorial control in Kunar without a fight.</p> - -<p>Whether or not this was initially part of their plans, the Taliban considered that they had achieved an important objective: although IS-K tactics made it impossible for the Taliban to eliminate the group, asserting control over territory and population would still allow them to choke off IS-K. A Taliban cadre in Kunar said in April 2022 that IS-K’s opportunities to approach potential recruits had been greatly reduced, as it had been forced to go underground and to downscale operations.</p> - -<p>The Taliban’s pervasive presence on the ground also allowed the GDI to improve its mapping of IS-K’s presence countrywide. By March 2023, for example, the Taliban claimed to fully know where IS-K cells were operating in Kunar. This choking-off tactic therefore also contributed to enabling more selective repression.</p> - -<p>The other main choking-off tactic used by the Taliban against IS-K was financial disruption. <em>Hawala</em> traders were saying in late 2021 and early 2022 that Taliban authorities (the GDI, but also the National Bank) were increasing pressure on them. At that time, the Taliban had not yet worked out how to effectively block <em>hawala</em> traders from transferring money for IS-K (or any other hostile actor), and so relied on intimidation and implementing existing rules for registering transactions – woefully ignored under the previous regime – to achieve impact. Visits from Taliban patrols served as reminders of the danger of cooperating with IS-K. While these tactics could not completely stop the flow of cash for IS-K from Turkey (where the main financial hub of IS-K was located), they do not seem to have been pointless. IS-K sources reported that by September 2022, IS-K could only rely on a very limited number of <em>hawala</em> traders and a few smugglers who were taking cash for IS-K from Pakistan into Afghanistan. Later in the year, financial transfers were complicated further by a Turkish government crackdown on IS-K networks in Turkey. It is not clear whether the Turkish crackdown was the result of intelligence provided by the GDI, or of the Emirate’s “diplomatic” engagement. In any case, as an IS-K source acknowledged, the group’s expansion into the north was insufficiently funded as a result.</p> - -<p>These efforts appear to have had some impact. One IS-K source claimed in May 2022 that earlier financial flow problems had been fixed, but there was evidence to the contrary. Salaries paid to frontline fighters, at $235 per month in 2022, were lower than in 2015–16, when they were reportedly as high as $600. Although the central leadership of IS continued to promise massive funding increases for the future, in 2022, according to one of IS-K’s financial cadres, it cut the IS-K budget to its lowest level ever.</p> - -<h4 id="the-talibans-reconciliation-deals">The Taliban’s Reconciliation Deals</h4> - -<p>As noted above, Dr Bashir was not simply interested in wreaking havoc in IS-K-supporting networks and milieus. Having gained a position of strength through his crackdown, Bashir moved forward with local negotiations with community elders to undermine the rival organisation. The Taliban had themselves been subject to reconciliation efforts to co-opt some of their ranks when they were fighting their “jihad”, although it is not clear what they made of these efforts, which were in any case poorly implemented by the Afghan government of the day. Bashir is now seen by Taliban officials as having been a “very active chief for Nangarhar GDI department” and as having had a “very good connection with villagers and elders in every village and district of Nangarhar province”.</p> - -<p>The Taliban were probably aware of the role played by Salafi elders in the recruitment of IS-K members, or perhaps presumed such a role, based on their own experience as insurgents. Several surrendered IS-K members acknowledged that many Salafi elders in Nangarhar had previously encouraged villagers to join IS-K. IS-K teams had regular meetings with elders, encouraging them to mobilise villagers. There was reportedly a high level of pressure on individual members of IS-K to invite friends, relatives and neighbours into the group. It was standard practice for Salafi village elders supporting IS-K to be trusted to introduce new members without the standard additional vetting. “Joining Daesh at that time was very easy; it only needed one telephone request”. Individual recruits, on the other hand, were still scrutinised much more seriously, according to a former IS-K member who was recruited via social media.</p> - -<p>Dr Bashir relied on an initially small number of Salafi elders willing to cooperate, and on several Hanafi elders who had connections with some IS-K members or lived in areas affected by the IS-K presence. Former IS-K sources confirm the role of the elders in negotiating their surrender. In the words of one, “When we decided to surrender to the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate, again we used the local elders to negotiate and mediate our surrendering with Dr Bashir”. The GDI arranged for the surrendering IS-K members and their community elders to guarantee under oath that they would not rejoin IS-K or in any way oppose the Emirate. The elders agreed to take responsibility and inform the Emirate’s authorities of any violations.</p> - -<p>On the basis of Dr Bashir’s exploratory efforts in 2021, the GDI and other components of the Taliban’s security apparatus established communication with community elders. The village elders were tasked by the Taliban GDI with negotiating the surrender of any Salafi elder with whom they came into contact. The Taliban identified useful contacts among the elders, and the district governor or the chief of police regularly visited them, as often as weekly or fortnightly.</p> - -<p>The official claim is that in 2021–22 some 500 IS-K members (commanders, fighters, recruiters, support elements and sympathisers) from Nangarhar, Kunar and Laghman surrendered as a result of Bashir’s combination of ruthless repression and negotiations with the community elders. This figure is likely to be somewhat inflated. One of the surrendering IS-K member noted that “there were lots of people among those 70 who surrendered who were not Daesh members; I didn’t recognise many of them”. A source in the Taliban’s provincial administration acknowledged that some Salafi elders, anxious to please the new regime, convinced some members of the community to pose as IS-K members and “surrender”. This was discovered later by the GDI but, overall, the elders-focused effort was still rated highly successful. A police source estimated that 60% of those surrendering were IS-K members from eastern Afghanistan and 40% were civilian supporters. Even a source hostile to the Taliban supported a positive assessment of the campaign, acknowledging that in a single village in Sorkhrod, three IS-K members surrendered to the Taliban. Various ex-IS-K interviewees confirmed having surrendered as part of large groups of IS-K members.</p> - -<p>The majority surrendered because of agreements between the GDI and community elders, but some surrendered directly to the GDI, after Bashir managed to reach out to them in the districts and convince them that surrendering was the best option for them. Bashir’s argument to these IS-K members was that it was not in the Salafi community’s interest to have another war, which would be fought ruthlessly by the Taliban, including in their villages.</p> - -<p>With a much reduced IS-K ability to threaten waverers, due to the group’s weakness on the ground, the path was clear for the Taliban to expand their tactics of negotiating deals with community elders to Kunar province. Indeed, to some extent during 2022 the stream of surrendering IS-K members, which had started in Nangarhar in autumn 2021, spread to Kunar. Here too, the Taliban sought the cooperation of the community elders to convince IS-K members to lay down arms. Some Salafi ulema were also involved. Although the surrenders were fewer than in the neighbouring province, the “tens of Daesh members” who surrendered to the Taliban as a result of the mediation of the elders represented a warning to IS-K. The formula adopted was the same as in Nangarhar, with surrendering members taking an oath never to rejoin IS-K and the elders guaranteeing for them. As in Nangarhar, some IS-K members in Kunar reached out directly to the GDI to negotiate their surrender.</p> - -<p>At the same time, the Taliban continued their local negotiations with elders in Nangarhar. The flow of surrenders therefore continued in 2022. The last group to surrender in 2022 was composed of some 70 members from Nangarhar, who defected in the autumn. As of January 2023, the Taliban believed that 90% of the IS-K structure in Nangarhar had been wiped out; the Taliban were aware of the existence of some IS-K cells, but deemed them too weak to launch attacks. It is difficult to say whether the Taliban’s estimate was correct, but undoubtedly IS-K had taken a big hit in Nangarhar.</p> - -<p>Those who laid down weapons sometimes reported being treated decently by the Taliban; others reported not being treated very well, with Taliban and pro-Taliban villagers looking down on them. Still, they appreciated that they could live with their families, even if most of them had had to relocate to avoid IS-K retaliation. There were complaints about being required to report to the police station every week or two, and not being allowed to move around without permission. Surrendered IS-K members also complained that the Taliban were not implementing their side of the deal – specifically, giving financial support to those who had surrendered. One of those interviewed noted that this would make it hard for the Taliban to convince more to surrender. Another complaint was that those who stayed in the districts did not feel safe from IS-K.</p> - -<p>The fact that madrasas and some mosques were still closed also upset the reconciled IS-K members, in part because the surrender agreements included a clause about reopening them. Reportedly, the surrendering IS-K members had been promised government jobs, the freedom to live anywhere in the country and the receipt of cash payments for six months. In practice, no cash was paid (although some food and some benefits in kind such as blankets were provided), and the surrendering men were only allowed to choose to live in their own community or in the district centre. Some surrendered IS-K members hinted that the reason why surrenders have slowed down was to be found in the violation or non-implementation of these agreements.</p> - -<h4 id="elite-bargaining-with-the-salafi-ulema">Elite Bargaining with the Salafi Ulema</h4> - -<p>In 2020–21, the Taliban did not show much faith in the opportunities offered by intra-Afghan talks, nor were their counterparts in Kabul able to pursue those talks with any degree of effectiveness. Instead, the Taliban sought to co-opt local and regional elites associated with the government of the Islamic Republic. It is probably in a similar spirit and informed by this experience that the Taliban approached the prospect of negotiations for resolving the conflict with IS-K. The Taliban were well aware of the links between IS-K and much of the Salafi clergy. Support from Salafi communities in the east and northeast had proved essential for IS-K to be able to put down roots there. Many Salafi preachers were recruiting for IS-K in this period, as sources within the community admit, and Salafi madrasas and schools in Kabul were sending numerous recruits to IS-K. Much of the Salafi youth joined during this phase. For the Taliban, driving a wedge between IS-K and the Salafi community, from which the former draws most of its support base, must have seemed an attractive opportunity.</p> - -<p>A group of Salafi ulema had already sought an understanding with the Taliban in 2020, as IS-K was losing ground quite fast in the east. A delegation of senior Salafi ulema, led by one of the most senior figures, Sheikh Abdul Aziz, met the Taliban’s emir, Haibatullah Akhundzada, and other senior Taliban in 2020, offering support to the Taliban in exchange for the cessation of violence and reprisals against civilians. The Emirate’s authorities again welcomed delegations of Salafi ulema in Kabul in 2021, reconfirming the agreement with the Salafi ulema and reissuing orders that the Salafis should not be targeted. After that, attacks and harassment of the Salafis reduced, even if some Taliban commanders continued behaving with hostility towards Salafis.</p> - -<p>However, the terms of the agreement were that the Taliban would not allow the Salafi preachers to proselytise, and the madrasas that had been shut on grounds that they had been recruiting for IS-K remained closed. Only the mosques were reopened. Moreover, some senior clerics, accused of links to IS-K, remained in prison: Sheikh Bilal Irfan; Sheikh Qari Muzamil; Sheikh Sardar Wali; Sheikh Jawid; and Delawar Mansur. The Salafi ulema interpreted the closure of the madrasas as temporary and expected that after some time the community could return to its quietist stance, which had in the past (before 2015) been the predominant position among Afghan Salafis.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, even after the second agreement in 2021 many “hot-headed” young members of the community stayed with IS-K. One of the Salafi ulema pledging allegiance to the Emirate admitted in a private interview that the Salafi clerics remain opposed to Hanafi Islam, but that they did not think IS-K stood a chance against the Taliban, and that it was not in the interest of the community to fight. These clerics, however, did not have control over the youth who were still with IS-K.</p> - -<p>On the other side, among the Taliban and the Hanafi ulema, there were voices of moderation, especially among the ulema, who were even willing to tolerate Salafi proselytising – generously funded from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan – on the grounds that otherwise the Salafis would continue being driven towards IS-K. An imam in Jalalabad expressed what might be defined as the midway solution preferred by the Taliban’s leadership, as discussed above: avoid identifying all Salafis as linked to IS-K; leave the Salafis alone; but ban them from proselytising. His words reflected angst about the seemingly unstoppable spread of Salafism: “I am living among Salafi scholars and followers; they are becoming bigger and bigger every day, they have very good financial sources in Saudi Arabia and several other Arab countries … to expand their activities”.</p> - -<p>But the 2021 agreement was also opposed by many among the Taliban and the Hanafi ulema. There are many hardliners. Former Kunar governor Turabi embodied the hardline stance: repression without local reconciliation efforts. Although this approach was not effective and was opposed in Kabul, within the GDI’s ranks, Turabi still had supporters in early 2023, who argued for a crackdown on supporting networks and milieus on the grounds that the safe haven they offered was essential for IS-K operations.</p> - -<p>A common view among Hanafi ulema is that while there are quietist Salafis in Afghanistan who have not embraced the militant Salafism of IS-K, the popularity of IS-K among Salafis is not only due to a defensive reaction on the part of the community. They believe that jihadist Salafism has been spreading through the community. Because of this, many Hanafi ulema have been sceptical about the decision of a number of high-profile Salafi clerics to seek an understanding with the Taliban, believing it to be only a tactical decision to buy time.</p> - -<p>As a result of polarised views within the Taliban and among the Hanafi ulema, the policies of the Emirate concerning the Salafis have continued to fluctuate and vary from province to province, as discussed above. As a result, relations with the Salafi community have remained tense. Kunar received special treatment, with the Taliban’s leadership making clear that especially in Kunar, the GDI should only act against Salafi madrasas and mosques in the presence of solid evidence. The new policy of “working hard to give respect and value to our Salafi brothers and trying our best to finish the dispute between Taliban and Salafi” was introduced after Turabi’s dismissal, according to a source in the provincial administration. The decision was made at the top: “Taliban local leaderships have been told by our leaders in Kabul to keep a good behaviour with Salafi members in Kunar”. There was an at least partial acknowledgement that “one of the reasons why Daesh in Afghanistan became active and somewhat powerful is that some Taliban carried out aggressive acts against the Salafis in Kunar and Nangarhar”. Former IS-K members confirmed that negotiations with Salafi elders and the ulema led to the reopening in 2022 of all mosques and of the Salafi madrasa, except two, which stayed closed due to their connection to IS-K.</p> - -<p>Despite this “special treatment”, a Salafi <em>a’lim</em> estimated in April 2023 that the community in Kunar was split between those who have functional relations with the Taliban and those who are hostile. One Salafi elder estimated that in his district of Dangam, 30% of the Salafi community was on friendly terms with the Taliban and the remaining 70% had tensions. It did not help that the Salafis remained marginalised in Kunar even in early 2023, as all the provincial officials were Hanafi, with only a few rank-and-file Taliban from the Salafi community. The Taliban have regular meetings with the district <em>shura</em> (council) and occasional meetings with the village <em>shuras</em>, but no Salafis were included in the district <em>shura</em> or in at least some of the village <em>shuras</em>. Hence, a Salafi elder complained that “the Taliban don’t want to hear too many complaints from the Salafis, nor their views”. Clearly, while attempting to defuse tension, the Taliban seemed to have no intention of moving towards an elite bargain.</p> - -<p>Even Taliban sources acknowledge that friction between Salafis and Hanafis has persisted. For example, throughout 2022–23, the Taliban were insisting that all imams wish a long life to the Taliban’s amir (or “head of state”), Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, during Friday prayers; the Salafi ulema in Kunar refused to comply. This refusal did not lead to a new crackdown, but it shows that the Salafi ulema were not entirely committed to supporting the Emirate, despite their pledge. The Taliban had offered them a safety guarantee as subjects of the Emirate, but it appeared that the Salafis wanted an elite bargain, that is, at least a share of power and influence. As a result, the Taliban’s engagement with the Salafi ulema went cold towards the end of 2022. After two or three meetings during 2021–22, meetings stopped, and Taliban officials took the view that the Salafi ulema were not willing to fully implement their part of the deal and that several of them were still supporting IS-K.</p> - -<p>There appears to have been no talk at any stage of incorporating significant numbers of Salafi clerics into the ulema councils at the provincial and national levels, which would have been a major step towards an elite bargain with Salafi elites.</p> - -<h3 id="iv-is-ks-response-to-the-talibans-tactics">IV. IS-K’s Response to the Taliban’s Tactics</h3> - -<p>While the Taliban’s efforts posed major challenges to IS-K, not all the techniques discussed above were threatening or, indeed, were perceived as such. IS-K does not appear to have been concerned about indiscriminate repression against its supporting milieus, and its only apparent reaction was intensifying efforts to present itself as the defender of the Salafi community. Its focus was instead on responding to the Taliban’s choking-off effort, especially their campaign to take full control of territory and population.</p> - -<h4 id="the-response-to-choking-off-tactics">The Response to Choking-Off Tactics</h4> - -<p>Even if the Taliban were not, immediately after their takeover, in a position to organise a major military campaign in the far east of Afghanistan (Kunar and Nuristan), IS-K clearly understood the potential threat this would represent. By the time the Taliban took over in August 2021, IS-K had long opted out of a direct confrontation with them, after it had emerged in 2019–20 that its forces could not stand up to the Taliban on an open battlefield. This perception of a major threat from a Taliban assault on IS-K bases in the far east only increased after August 2021, given that the Taliban were at that point no longer busy fighting the forces of the previous regime. IS-K soon relinquished the residual territorial control it still had (see the discussion of choking-off tactics above). The group appears to have hoped to delay the expected Taliban onslaught in the east, or to make it unsustainable by waging a guerrilla war against the Taliban forces deployed there, forcing them to divert forces – while at the same time mitigating the impact of choke-off tactics by reducing the number of non-local members (who were harder to hide and more difficult to support) and creating an extensive underground network.</p> - -<p><strong>Delay and Diversion</strong></p> - -<p>While seeking to retain control over parts of Kunar and Nuristan, IS-K largely switched to asymmetric tactics, such as intensified urban terrorism, hit-and- run raids, ambushes and mines. These efforts produced few results initially, and IS-K’s leaders (the leader of IS-K and the military council) had to keep thinking of new strategies. A plan for sending cells to cities where IS-K was not yet active, such as Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i Sharif, was hatched in spring 2021 – that is, before the Taliban took power – although it was not fully implemented until August 2021.</p> - -<p>Essentially, the IS-K leadership decided to keep the Taliban busy by going on the offensive in the cities, calculating that by risking a few tens of cells it could force the Taliban to commit tens of thousands to guarding the cities. The campaign started somewhat slowly, due to the limited capabilities of existing IS-K underground networks in Kabul and Jalalabad.</p> - -<p>During the last five months of 2021, IS-K was able to increase the number of its large terrorist attacks in Kabul to five, from two in the first half of 2021. Urban guerrilla actions also continued in Jalalabad after a short lull, opening up with a series of six bomb attacks in September, followed by some months of urban guerrilla warfare against members of the Taliban. Taliban sources described the situation in Jalalabad at that time as “daily IS-K attacks”.</p> - -<p>At the same time, during the chaotic power transition of summer 2021, IS-K was able to transfer multiple cells to the cities, which reinforced its presence in Kabul and Jalalabad but also allowed it to expand its terrorist campaign to cities previously unaffected by this campaign. Cells were thus established in Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i Sharif, Charikar, Kunduz, Faizabad and Gulbahar. Among the cells were recruiting teams which targeted, in particular, university campuses. As a result, while IS-K was able to intensify its campaign of terrorist attacks in the cities, it was also hoping that the new urban underground structure would become self-sustainable. An IS-K source acknowledged that the group exploited the chaotic period of the Taliban’s takeover to send more of its cells into the cities. He explained that “because different groups of Taliban entered Jalalabad city and other cities of Afghanistan from the mountains and the districts, it was very difficult for the Taliban … to distinguish between Daesh and Taliban members there”.</p> - -<p>An IS-K source estimated in early 2022 that the Kabul city contingent, following years of decline, had climbed back up to 300 members, in two separate structures – one aimed at preparing and carrying out attacks, and the other at recruiting and propaganda operations. There seemed to be a real opportunity for catching the new regime off guard, with the Taliban still surprised to find themselves in power and dealing with multiple crises in their efforts to keep the Afghan state afloat. While the Taliban were known to be more than a match for IS-K in a conventional fight, IS-K hoped that the Taliban’s lack of experience in counterterrorism would allow several hundred terrorists to cause havoc in the cities, as even Taliban officials confirmed to the International Crisis Group that this was the case.</p> - -<p>Aside from its intensity, in terms of target selection the campaign of terrorist attacks in Kabul was a continuation of IS-K’s earlier campaign against the previous government. The targets of the new phase of the campaign were also religious minorities, such as the Sikhs and, most of all, the Shia community. Aside from forcing the Taliban to divert forces away from the east, the primary intent seems to have been to create chaos in the cities, turning the sizeable Shia community against the Taliban (for their failure to protect it) and exposing the incompetence of the new regime, especially in urban security. In spring 2022, the High Council of IS-K decided, in the context of some fine-tuning of its strategic plan, to further reinforce the focus on terrorism in the main cities, targeting the Shia community via a wide selection of very soft targets, such as schools and mosques. Protecting so many potential targets would have required the Taliban to commit significant human resources, to the detriment of the wider counter-IS effort.</p> - -<p>Operationally, IS-K’s campaign in 2022 produced some visible results. According to a respondent, IS-K’s “research and inquiry” department, which undertakes analysis for the leadership, produced in June 2022 an internal report indicating that in the spring of 2022, IS-K had achieved the highest number of “highlight” (that is, headline-making) attacks and military activities in three years. Impartial data collection shows that the pace of bomb attacks peaked above 10 per month in April–July 2022, but started declining in the latter part of that year, to between three and six per month (see Figure 1). This might have been due to increasingly effective Taliban counterterrorism. However, it is also likely that relocation from the far east had largely been completed, and that IS-K downscaled terrorist attacks in Kabul to a more sustainable level.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Rf6GAx2.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: IS-K Activity and Taliban Counterterrorism Operations, 2022–23.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.afghanwitness.org/reports/taliban-continue-raids-against-iskp-in-may%2C-claim-killing-of-deputy-governor-in-kabul">Afghan Witness, “Taliban Continue Raids Against ISKP in May, Claim Killing of Deputy Governor in Kabul”, 1 June 2023</a>. In the figure, “Arrests” and “Clashes/Raid” refer to Taliban operations against IS-K. Reproduced with permission.</em></p> - -<p><strong>Mitigation</strong></p> - -<p>To lessen the need for supplies inside Afghanistan and also being increasingly unable to protect non-Afghan members, in late 2021 and early 2022, IS-K moved more of its Pakistani members across the border. Taliban sources too noted the disappearance of not only Pakistanis but also Central Asians, Chechens and other non-Afghans from the east, and assumed they too had crossed the border.</p> - -<p>The process of evacuating the bases in the east took eight months; even for some time after this a substantial number of IS-K members, especially leadership and administrative cadres, were hiding in caves and other secret locations, while their relocation was being arranged. The permanent bases were replaced during 2022 by an underground infrastructure, not only in Kunar but also in parts of Nangarhar, with secret cells established in Achin, Naziyan, Lal Pur, Pachir wa Agam, Bati Kot, Mohmand Dara and Jalalabad city. Even as the Taliban kept destroying its cells in Jalalabad, IS-K was able to maintain a presence there. Local elders confirmed the disappearance of obvious signs of IS-K presence, but believed that the group maintained secret cells. In January 2023, a source in the Taliban’s administration stated that IS-K’s presence in Nangarhar consisted of some IS-K cells in Jalalabad and one to two cells each in some districts, such as Achin and Naziyan. As of March 2023, the police estimated that there were 16 IS-K cells in Jalalabad, based on the confessions of detainees, but the cells operated independently and tracking them down was difficult.</p> - -<p>Parallel to the move underground, IS-K also sought to adopt a mobile infrastructure to support the small, dispersed cells, a process that continued throughout 2022. A year after the spring 2022 strategic shift was decided, one IS-K source described as an accomplished fact a new, leaner and more mobile infrastructure that had replaced the old fixed bases:</p> - -<blockquote> - <p>Daesh has training centres and lots of secret cells and secret military bases in Kunar province, but they are changing their locations all the time. Daesh is on the move – its training centre, military bases [and] secret cells are all moving and changing every three or four months. When a member of Daesh is arrested by the Taliban or surrenders, Daesh immediately finds out where these guys were trained, which posts or secret cells they were assigned to, then it changes the locations.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Taliban sources confirmed that IS-K was moving people to the northeast and north and even claimed that the collapse of IS-K activities in Nangarhar was in part due to IS-K moving out.</p> - -<p>While IS-K implemented these mitigating actions quickly, it remains the case that they were not enough to prevent the group’s operations from being constrained. IS-K’s messaging to its members did not mention the coming downgrade of the east, for good reasons. It appears to have been a difficult decision to take, given that a large majority of the group’s Afghan members were from the east and had families there. As of early 2022, IS-K sources were still adamant that they would soon go on the offensive, that their bases in the east were safe and that they had enough manpower to defeat the Taliban in the east. The rationale for having IS-K’s main bases in eastern Afghanistan (Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan) was still being promulgated by IS-K sources at least until mid-2022: “there are many Salafi people and madrasas in these provinces and most of the followers of Salafism are supporting IS-K”. It took until 2023 for IS-K sources to begin showing awareness and acceptance of the fact that IS-K had given up any ambition to hold territory, at least in the short and medium term.</p> - -<p>The constraints that the transition placed on IS-K’s operations are evident when we look at its guerrilla operations in the east. While the transition was ongoing, IS-K, remarkably, sought to keep waging a guerrilla war in eastern Afghanistan. The guerrilla campaign was always limited in scope, affecting only the provinces of Kunar and, to a lesser extent, Nangarhar. Guerrilla activities intensified from late summer 2021, especially in Ghaziabad, Naray and Shegal. Though these mostly consisted of small hit-and-run attacks on Taliban posts and small ambushes, they were beginning to annoy the Taliban. In spring 2022, the High Council of IS-K, while deciding to intensify the terrorist campaign in the cities, also confirmed the decision to continuing the guerrilla war against the Taliban, where possible. However, the new structure left behind in the east proved unable or unwilling to support a steady insurgency there. IS-K guerrilla attacks in Nangarhar remained especially rare. One of the last few recorded attacks was in February 2022, an ambush in Achin which killed two members of the Taliban.</p> - -<p>In Kunar, the picture was similar. In one of the worst incidents, a convoy was ambushed in Shegal and “several Taliban fighters were martyred”. In Dangam in Kunar, some lingering IS-K presence continued in the forested area, without much military activity. Those remaining were local members, reportedly being kept in reserve and perhaps supporting the planning of attacks elsewhere. Most IS-K members had reportedly moved to northeastern and northern Afghanistan (see below). This is likely to have affected the pace of guerrilla operations in the east, not only because of lower numbers, but also because to local members the option of lying low and hiding was more likely to seem viable than it would to their foreign and out-of-area comrades. As the presence of non-local fighters dried out, the level of guerrilla activity declined further. An independent assessment found that IS-K was able to sustain the number of guerrilla attacks at between five and 10 per month during the first half of 2022. The numbers, however, collapsed to between two and five in the second half of the year (see Figure 1, where guerrilla attacks are listed under the category “Gun”).</p> - -<p>IS-K also tried to adapt in response to the Taliban’s financial disruption operations. Confronted with the news that IS-K networks in Turkey had taken a major hit, IS-K sources indicated that the organisation coped successfully, reactivating its old financial hub in the UAE, where the abundance of Afghan <em>hawala</em> traders would make it easier to find complicit ones. The source had to acknowledge that there was a bottleneck at the receiving end, in Afghanistan, as <em>hawala</em> traders were wary of getting caught. He tried hard to present an optimistic picture, noting that other ways of transferring money, through complicit businesses based in Turkey and through flights between Istanbul and Kabul, with the help of some personnel at Kabul’s airport, were being tested. One of his colleagues also suggested that the financial strangulation of IS-K was lessening as of December 2022–January 2023.</p> - -<h4 id="the-response-to-the-reconciliation-and-reintegration-deals">The Response to the Reconciliation and Reintegration Deals</h4> - -<p>The other main concern for IS-K appears to have been about countering the Taliban’s local reconciliation and reintegration efforts, which had the support of some Salafi elders in the villages (see discussion above). The group appears to have seen this as the biggest medium-term threat. IS-K started in 2021–22 to bring pressure on the elders not to facilitate negotiations between IS-K members and the Taliban. One surrendering member heard from villagers that “Daesh is trying a lot to undermine this process. Several elders who were secretly facilitating the negotiations and connecting IS-K members with the Taliban for their surrender have been threatened”.</p> - -<p>Others who surrendered confirmed the same, adding that threats consisted of death threats and threats to burn down the homes of anybody making deals. One of the surrendered members claimed he and two fellow former comrades in arms received threats from IS-K; the group, he said, threatened to “set fire to my house and throw me into the blaze”. Two elders of his village, who had helped the Taliban, he said, were also threatened, and as a result stopped being involved in negotiating surrenders. One even reported that nine surrendered IS-K members ended up rejoining IS-K in Nangarhar, although it is not clear whether this was because of the threats or because of the poor Taliban implementation of the deals. IS-K also increased counter-intelligence efforts among its own ranks. These countermeasures were deemed to be effective by a number of former IS-K members, who believed that surrenders were diminishing or even ceasing. This suggests that IS-K feared the reconciliation/reintegration plans much more than it did indiscriminate repression.</p> - -<h4 id="the-response-to-the-talibans-tentative-elite-bargaining">The Response to the Taliban’s Tentative Elite Bargaining</h4> - -<p>Because of the lack of Taliban success in negotiating with the Salafi ulema, IS-K may not have considered a response to their negotiations with the Salafi ulema a priority – although it is likely that it brought pressure to bear on the Salafi ulema to stay away from the Taliban. IS-K’s short campaign of attacks on pro-Taliban clerics in the summer of 2022 might also have been intended to provoke Taliban retaliation against Salafi clerics and spoil the Taliban’s discussions with them. The killing of Rahman Ansari in Herat in September 2022 might have been a warning as well, as Ansari was a Salafi preacher who had pledged loyalty to the Taliban. IS-K did not claim the killing. The campaign was abandoned in autumn, probably as it was becoming clear that IS-K did not need to be concerned about Taliban negotiations with the Salafi ulema.</p> - -<h4 id="is-k-counterattacks">IS-K Counterattacks</h4> - -<p>While IS-K sought to counter Taliban tactics or at least to limit the damage, its leadership also decided to try re-seizing the long-lost initiative by striking the Taliban where it felt they were more vulnerable. The urban terrorism campaign, discussed above, was more of a diversion than a counter-offensive. Instead, IS-K appears to have placed its hopes for turning around the situation in its expansion in the north. Plans to expand recruitment in the north started in mid-2020 (after an earlier aborted effort in 2017–18). Small numbers of Afghan Pashtuns and even Pakistanis were also sent north. After 2021, these efforts were strengthened, and even moving the IS-K headquarters there in the future was considered.</p> - -<p>In mid-2022, the IS-K leadership was reportedly still in Kunar, but the new phase of the transfer to the north had been initiated a few months earlier. The movement of people and assets to the north and northeast continued, as both a Taliban police officer and a local elder confirmed. IS-K sources talked up the migration with the claim that it was about taking jihad to Central Asia. IS-K sources spoke about training centres being established in Badakhshan, Kunduz and Jawzjan, with plans to open one in Balkh. As IS-K also dramatically expanded its social media activities, it began releasing significant quantities of propaganda, such as statements and pamphlets in Uzbekistani, Tajikistani and Uyghur, in order to support its claims of imminent expansion into Central Asia.</p> - -<p>IS-K seems to have had expectations of rapid expansion into Faryab and the northwest in spring 2022, exploiting intra-Taliban friction. More generally, it is clear that one of the main reasons for the shift in focus northwards was the hope for major defections from the ranks of the Taliban there. That did not happen on any significant scale. When asked for details, an IS-K source could only provide modest defection figures for the entire August 2021 to mid-2022 period: “a few commanders in the north”, with some more in talks as of mid-2022.</p> - -<p>Another aspect of IS-K’s “counter-offensive” was to make up for the group’s limited achievements with media-focused symbolic attacks, such as rocket attacks from Afghan territory on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which caused no damage but won high-profile exposure in the media. An important part of IS-K’s strategy was integrating its military and propaganda campaigns. Graphic details of the terrorist campaign were used by IS-K social media propaganda to project an image of strength and power that was out of all proportion with the reality. Overall, the leadership of IS-K succeeded fairly well in hiding the extent of its difficulties. The regional and world media, as well as policymakers, continued to portray it as a highly threatening organisation, even though its military achievements were almost negligible.</p> - -<p>Although it is difficult to measure how IS-K members and sympathisers reacted to this propaganda, it is clear that one of the intents was to shore up the morale of increasingly dispersed members and convince them that the jihad was succeeding. IS-K tried to diminish the Taliban’s achievements and to stimulate feelings of revenge, for example by claiming that the Taliban had deliberately killed family members of IS-K members during their raids on city cells.</p> - -<p>Initially the Taliban were taken aback by the dramatically expanded output of IS-K’s rather slick propaganda. The GDI responded by targeting IS-K activism on social media, exploiting the recruitment efforts of IS-K to infiltrate its own agents, and succeeding in capturing some online activists. It also managed to seize control of some accounts linked to IS-K, and to develop more effective counter-propaganda. A key theme of Taliban propaganda, distributed through the regime’s media as well as on social media, was to portray IS-K as heretics. A pro-Taliban <em>a’lim</em> argued that IS-K members “should be treated like <em>khawarij</em> [heretics] and their Sharia sentences should be hanging or beheading”. Another <em>a’lim</em> argued that IS-K members “are all <em>khawarij</em>” and that the doctrine is clear that under Islamic law, the punishment for this is death. Overall, however, at the end of 2022 online propaganda was the only domain in which IS-K dominated.</p> - -<h4 id="the-overall-impact-on-is-k-in-202122">The Overall Impact on IS-K in 2021–22</h4> - -<p>Although IS-K propaganda continually claimed that its numbers were rising, when asked for details, sources provided numbers that in fact showed that the group’s size had remained fairly stable in 2021–22, at just under 8,000 men in total. Most of these in June 2022 were already claimed to be in the north/northeast, according to a source who was himself about to be transferred there from the east.</p> - -<p>IS-K sources and propaganda also claimed that recruitment was strong in 2022. When challenged for figures, two IS-K sources provided roughly consistent figures: total new recruitment into IS-K was estimated at 150–200 per month in mid-2022. The main sources of recruits were still identified as “Salafi madrasas, schools, mosques [and] scholars”. As noted elsewhere, IS-K recruitment in universities can be estimated in the low hundreds per year. Overall, these figures seem relatively modest, considering that IS-K was taking losses and suffering defections, and they are consistent with a substantial stagnation in IS-K’s strength during this period.</p> - -<p>In sum, IS-K was able to preserve its manpower and appears to have tailored the level and character of its activities to its ability to recruit and, presumably, spend. During this period, however, the Taliban were rapidly expanding their manpower. IS-K’s transition to a fully underground structure had been fairly smooth, with diversions proving rather successful in distracting the Taliban for some months. It is, however, clear that the group had not been able to seize back the initiative and that its financial difficulties seemed to be worsening.</p> - -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> - -<p>How did the Taliban structure their post-August 2021 mix of tactics for countering IS-K? And how successful were these in fighting the group? Selective violence quickly became the default choice of Taliban policymakers. Identifying the boundaries between extremists, supporting milieus and “quietists” was, however, always contentious. It should also be noted that the Taliban appear to have purposely used bursts of indiscriminate violence to warn hostile populations of what an all-out war with the Emirate would mean for them, and to intimidate them into submission. An aspect of the Taliban’s counter-IS effort that emerges clearly from this paper is that repression, even indiscriminate repression, and reconciliation deals were seen as functional to each other: the stick and the carrot. The new state had to show that it meant business, and that it was able to impose intolerable suffering on the Salafi community if it refused to collaborate.</p> - -<p>IS-K’s leadership appears to have underestimated the ability of the Taliban to adapt quickly. Taliban intelligence, despite some obvious limitations, was able to quickly establish a wide and thick network of informers. As insurgents, the Taliban had had a well-developed intelligence network, and they adapted this; they also seem to have prioritised investment in their intelligence agency. Given IS’s reputation for ruthlessness, it was easy for them to obtain the cooperation of bystanders. At the national leadership level, there seems to have been an understanding of the risk of getting trapped in a cycle of violence, and there were interventions to contain the excesses of provincial officials, especially as the new security apparatus consolidated. The Taliban showed their ability to adapt by developing the sophisticated means to make selective repression viable, for example through setting up social media infiltration teams. Still, when selective repression proved difficult to implement because of insufficient intelligence, local Taliban officials usually had no qualms about reverting to indiscriminate violence, even if the scale never approached the main wave of violence of autumn 2021. It is noteworthy in this regard that the Taliban failed to apply the rule of law to counter-IS efforts. The system remained prone to abuse even from the standpoint of Islamic law, and avoiding excesses was always dependent on interventions from the higher leadership levels.</p> - -<p>The Taliban also tentatively began working at local reconciliation deals with Salafi communities, but the effort was weakly supported by Kabul and, as of early 2023, it was poorly followed up. National-level talks with the Salafi ulema helped the Taliban shift away from indiscriminate violence, but did not lead to any progress towards an elite bargain. The Taliban were offering peace to the Salafis as subjects of the Emirate, but the Salafi ulema were seeking inclusion.</p> - -<p>Where the Taliban were most effective was with choking-off tactics, constraining the ability of IS-K to recruit, resupply and keep money coming in. They waited until they had sufficient manpower available before mounting large-scale military sweeps, to be able to hold the ground afterwards. If they had been engaging in ineffective sweeps, as the previous regime had, they would have alienated the population for no gain.</p> - -<p>A pertinent question is how much of the Taliban’s counter-IS effort has derived from their previous experience as insurgents. While none of the sources directly commented on this point, it seems likely that their reluctance to engage in big military sweeps might derive from having experienced the ineffectiveness of such tactics when they were on the receiving end of them before August 2021. Similarly, having had to recruit new insurgents for 20 years, the Taliban seem well aware of the greater difficulties that an insurgent organisation faces when it lacks territorial control. The Taliban furthermore always argued that the indiscriminate revenge-taking and repression practised by Afghan and US security forces in 2001–04 drove many into their ranks, enabling them to start their insurgency. In the current case, however, they have struggled to implement a coherent policy of selective repression, showing perhaps that learning lessons could well be disrupted by the emotional legacy of a long war. Another example of how hatred for the enemy gets in the way of rational policymaking is the Taliban’s failure to follow up on their good start on reconciliation and reintegration.</p> - -<p>IS-K undoubtedly proved a resilient organisation after August 2021. Despite facing morale and financial issues, it focused on an urban strategy while trying to strengthen its positions in northern Afghanistan. Militarily speaking, it did not mount a serious threat to the Taliban. The leadership opted to spare its fighters, soon even giving up early attempts to wage a guerrilla war in the east. IS-K tried instead to keep the Taliban busy guarding the cities against a massive wave of urban terrorism, while at the same time expecting its efforts to establish itself firmly in the north to be bearing fruit in the medium term. Time, however, was not on IS-K’s side, and the group’s financial difficulties only increased during 2022.</p> - -<p>IS-K appeared to be in a corner by the end of 2022 and early 2023, in good part due to Taliban efforts to counter it. The organisation was surviving by keeping a very low profile, but this meant limited recruitment opportunities and, importantly, far too little fundraising inside Afghanistan. The dependence on money coming from abroad was increasingly proving a liability during 2022. Without financial resources, IS-K was not well positioned to exploit the Taliban’s remaining vulnerability: the fact that the Salafi community, while in general acknowledging a reduction of the pressure exercised by the Emirate, still feels oppressed and very pessimistic about its future under the new regime.</p> +<h4 id="training-challenges">Training Challenges</h4> -<p>It seems clear that IS-K was very vulnerable to the reconciliation efforts deployed by the Taliban, and that a decisive defeat of the organisation could have been achieved if the Taliban had followed through and implemented their reconciliation packages consistently. Instead, as the IS-K threat appeared to be receding in the second half of 2022 and Taliban self-confidence grew, reconciliation efforts lost steam, despite evidence suggesting that this was the most effective path. It was assumed that defectors would easily reintegrate with the help of the community elders, who, however, received no support from the Emirate. The main reasons for this appear to have been animosity against IS-K within the Taliban’s ranks, fuelled by the considerable amount of blood spilled; resentment over the allocation of scarce financial resources to paying reconciled opponents; and the failure to make significant progress towards a wider elite bargain involving Salafi elites.</p> +<p>Defence gives learning and development an impressive priority and level of resourcing. Because Defence is a contingent capability, training becomes the substitute for war, as well as the preparation for it. Between operations, training is the organisation’s purpose, while also contributing to the effective management of the Defence enterprise in peacetime. Consequently, Defence invests more in learning and development than most employers. Its investment in senior leadership is exceptional, with individuals likely to have spent well over a year in fully funded formal education. However, the current training system often struggles to meet the demands placed on it in terms of the need for greater agility in a more heavily committed force whose skills need replacing more often. Six challenges are identified below, but they are not universal: examples disproving the points can be found, but on balance there are more examples proving the need for modernisation across culture, system governance, process, training delivery, learning environment and workforce.</p> -<p>Time will tell if the failed reconciliation process is going to be a great missed opportunity for the Taliban. IS-K’s financial weakness could lead to its terminal decline without much Taliban effort, of course, but financial difficulties could still be reversed in the future, in which case the Taliban might regret having neglected their promising reconciliation efforts. While the strong foreign component of IS-K is clearly not susceptible to being enticed to reintegrate, IS-K nowadays needs Afghan participation more than ever – it cannot rely on Pakistanis for dispersed underground operations in cities and villages. If the Taliban were able to substantially cut into IS-K’s approximately 3,000 Afghan members, the group’s viability as an insurgent organisation in Afghanistan would be comprehensively undermined.</p> +<p><strong>Culture</strong></p> -<hr /> +<p>Defence invests heavily in training, and the different Defence training cultures share some – broadly common – constraining characteristics:</p> -<p><strong>Antonio Giustozzi</strong> is the senior research fellow at RUSI in the Terrorism and Conflict research group. He has been working in and on Afghanistan in various respects since the 1990s and has published extensively on the conflict and specifically the Taliban and the Islamic State. His main research interests are global jihadism in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, the security sector, state-building and insurgencies. He is currently project director for Strive Afghanistan, which is pioneering new P/CVE approaches. He is also associated with the LSE (South Asia Centre) and was previously associated with War Studies at KCL.</p>Antonio GiustozziThis paper examines the strategies employed by the Taliban in response to the threat posed by the Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K) in 2021–22.Blockchain For Democracies2023-10-25T12:00:00+08:002023-10-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/blockchain-for-democracies<p><em>In a world increasingly overflowing with data, blockchain is neither a panacea nor solely an instrument of cryptocurrencies but rather a tool that offers intriguing applications to support democratic governance, including in Ukraine.</em></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Mechanistic.</strong> Training is largely mechanistic in nature, being part of an industrial machine that frontloads training early in a career, with later interventions taking place as people pass through career gates (such as promotions or postings). This drives an approach that generally takes little account of prior learning or the need for individual learning journeys. This kind of approach suits static environments where the skills required remain predictable over lengthy careers. However, the pace of technological change and the rapidly fluctuating demand for skills mean that frontloaded training models supporting rigid career siloes are ill-suited to today’s Defence environment. A more fluid/organic approach to talent development is needed: one that gives individuals more agency in “whole life” learning.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Talent definition.</strong> Another cultural challenge is Defence’s limited conception of “talent”, which is too often synonymous with those rising to the most senior ranks. Much of the PDSE offer is concentrated on this particular talent pool, where the value of higher courses is often seen as being in the act of being selected rather than in the learning itself, because selection confirms individuals are in the “talent pool”. A broader definition of talent covers anyone “who can make a significant contribution to organisational performance”. Democratising access to learning and development would capture more of Defence’s talent and improve productivity.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Train to pass.</strong> Linked to the way in which Defence conceives “talent” is how that conception shapes training design and delivery. Often, this produces training that is seen as a bar to be cleared or as a badge of honour for those succeeding, rather than creating programmes that seek to help people pass. The wastage rates from Royal Marines and Army Phase One training are typically 40–60% and 30% respectively, which is expensive in terms of recruitment capacity and wasteful of human talent – a problem Defence is looking to address. Wastage also impacts disproportionately on certain groups; for example, women are twice as likely to receive a musculoskeletal injury during Army basic training (Phase One) and be discharged. The redeployment to other roles of those who fail mitigates the impact of the current culture, but it might be better to orient training around a philosophy that aims to help people reach the required standard.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Accreditation.</strong> The MoD has invested in improving the recognition of Defence-provided training and education, but has done less well in recognising learning gained elsewhere. People often have the skills Defence needs, but, because these skills were acquired elsewhere, must still undertake lengthy Defence-provided courses. While this is also true of regulars, it has a greater impact on reserves, whose civilian employment may overlap with their military role. A culture of greater openness to learning and expertise gained elsewhere, including through pre-course learning assessments that allow people to skip modules they already understand, could enhance efficiency and effectiveness. This might also enhance motivation and retention since the time and effort expended in gaining skills, knowledge and expertise would be properly recognised.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<excerpt /> +<p><strong>System Governance</strong></p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Inevitably, managing delivery against Defence’s diverse training needs, delivered by a diffuse set of actors, requires breaking the whole training system into manageable chunks. However, doing so means that Defence lacks a view of the whole system, there being no single place where training strategy, training and operational risk and governance align. This means that training can become stovepiped, with the outcomes of one training element not aligned to the inputs of later courses. At one level this is reflected in the separation of the collective and individual training elements, which fragments the system for delivering forces that, collectively, can “defeat the King’s enemies”. For example, training of future commanders at most Phase One officer academies and the Joint Services Command and Staff College is done at an individual level, with relatively little involvement of the groups such officers are being trained to lead. Involving these groups would have benefits, but may be impractical at scale given the bureaucratic challenges of trying to align multiple programmes (all of different length).</p> -<p>Rapid technological change has led to a global deluge of data. Certain aspects of shared information — authenticity, verification, speed, and integrity — are key to good governance and to helping democracies deliver for their citizens. Blockchain and other types of distributed ledger technology (DLT) offer potential benefits that institutions and governments can leverage in various ways to support democratic governance. Blockchain’s increasing use for identity management, land rights, citizen representation, the tracking of goods and services, and other uses necessitates deeper and broader understanding by U.S. foreign policy stakeholders. Given that U.S. foreign policy prioritizes strengthening democratic governance around the world, including through more inclusive access to services and greater transparency, accountability, and integrity in the public sphere, U.S. policymakers must seriously grapple with the opportunities and challenges associated with the increased integration of blockchain technology. Ukraine’s embrace of digitization and use cases for blockchain offer helpful insights into how and in which contexts this technology may be applied.</p> +<p><strong>Fragmentation.</strong> Another problem associated with separating individual and collective training is that the feedback loop between operational need and individual training can be weak. In this context, the Army has introduced the Battlecraft Syllabus to help close the gap between the output of individual training and the input standard for collective training. There are also other positive signs, with Director Land Warfare trialling new approaches that bridge individual and collective training, allowing them to be conducted in parallel, and with feedback mechanisms permitting each to shape the conduct of the other for greatest effect. In the Royal Navy, meanwhile, Project Selborne is represented at the Navy’s Senior Management Board, alongside representatives of those delivering collective training.</p> -<p>Whenever there is a lack of transparency in elections, government transactions, bureaucratic systems, and media, there is an opportunity for corruption to ensue, diluting citizens’ trust in democratic institutions. Certain technological advancements can potentially be a valuable tool for increasing the transparency and accountability of democracies. One such innovative tool is blockchain, a form of DLT that allows a group of users to cooperatively maintain a record of transactions.</p> +<p><strong>Risk transference.</strong> Even within individual training, the lack of a “whole system” view causes problems. Training can become viewed and assessed in its own terms, and not as part of achieving something larger – that is, the ability to deliver an operational output. Consequently, questions of effectiveness and efficiency can become self-referential and drive perverse outcomes, for example where course lengths are cut to reduce costs, with the training gap then passed to the frontline, which is not resourced to close the gap effectively. The RAF’s Project Socrates has reduced the time in residential training by over 32% since 2015, with more responsibility for training passed to the frontline – for apprenticeships, this can amount to as much as 70% of the learning. Perhaps the most extreme example was the RAF Personnel Branch training course: there was no classroom-based Phase Two training, and students went straight to their units and learned on the job. Material was provided remotely by the Personnel Administration Training Wing in the Defence College of Logistics, Policing and Administration. Consequently, units that had previously received fully trained individuals faced an additional training burden, while lacking the resources to absorb that burden or the skills to conduct the on-the-job training required. Moreover, trainees’ jobs were not redesigned to allow untrained job holders to balance output and learning. The TRA recognised the risks of this approach, and a hybrid course was developed, combining four weeks of classroom training (40% of the previous classroom time) with online learning undertaken at units. In this case the vulnerabilities were noted, but this pattern of reducing the time spent in training schools is a recurring feature of Defence’s “modernisation” attempts that often merely move the risk elsewhere.</p> -<p>Blockchain is often associated with the use case of cryptocurrency, but it can be applied to other domains to track both tangible and intangible goods and transactions. Blockchain is a form of tamper-resistant DLT that ensures that all transactions are recorded and validated. This technology achieves extraordinary levels of data integrity for information once it is loaded into the shared ledger. Essentially, the movement or transfer of anything of value can be logged and verified, instilling trust and confidence by raising the costs of malicious activity during that process. This opens the technology to a wide range of applications. Within governance and democratic strengthening efforts, blockchain has recently been introduced in various places to increase government accountability, combat misinformation, reduce costs and the mishandling of data, and quickly trace financial transactions.</p> +<p><strong>New requirements.</strong> The reverse problem also exists, with higher demand for new generic education subjects to be added to programmes to raise awareness of particular areas, most notably in Phase One training and PDSE. Interviewees for this paper highlighted constant pressure to add more training modules to courses – for example, mandatory equality, diversity and inclusion, cyber, data protection and space awareness training. While each module may be relatively short, adding a one-hour annual mandatory training package represents the equivalent of 114 people’s output each year, and the new Space Foundation Course for new Service personnel is eight hours long. Regardless of the individual merit of any mandatory training – and all have a Defence “sponsor” to champion the topic – elements are often added to already busy syllabuses without other material being cut to make room. In the absence of a single owner of the whole system, and given the limited (at best) understanding of direct and lost-opportunity costs, the growth of mandatory training has been relatively unchecked at system level; although Defence has now instituted a 1* board to review mandatory training.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="box-1-what-is-blockchain"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 1: What Is Blockchain?</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>One weakness in the current training system, therefore, relates to developing people and organisations with the ability to see the complete system (of which training forms a part) and to see how the Training Line of Development impacts on, and is impacted by, other Defence Lines of Development (DLODs). For example, catering contracts specify mealtimes that prevent out-of-hours lessons at Phase One training establishments. A system view might mitigate some of the challenges to training modernisation where it only focuses on a narrow aspect of the system and not the whole. As one interviewee put it, Defence is “trying to transform using a system and people designed to manage evolutionary development [and] from which much of the capacity has been cut”.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Distributed ledger technology (DLT) describes a category of technologies that enables the storage of data within and transfer between multiple data stores. Network participants share this ledger of transactions, allowing for synchronized data recording with no central storage hub. Instead, peer-to-peer transmission takes place, recording the same information across many devices. The “ledger” is stored across multiple locations and is visible to all parties.</code></em></p> +<p><strong>Process</strong></p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Blockchain is not singular in design. It can be classified into different types based on which access and governance models are used. The two main categories are private and public blockchains. Private blockchains restrict access to a specific group of participants, while public blockchains allow anyone to join, build, and use applications on the network. Within each of these categories, there are also permissioned and permissionless blockchains. Permissioned blockchains require participants to have explicit permission to host infrastructure and validate network transactions, whereas permissionless blockchains allow anyone to be a validator.</code></em></p> +<p>The DSAT framework, and the way in which Defence enters into contracts with training partners, present two challenges:</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Blockchains that are public and permissioned offer several advantages. They can provide high performance and scalability, processing thousands of transactions per second, and can ensure fast and secure transaction finality. Permissioned governance that provides security, efficiency, and visibility into who is involved in decisionmaking processes and network operation can be combined with public accessibility to all citizens, making the technology a compelling choice for many applications.</code></em></p> +<p><em>DSAT</em></p> -<p>While blockchain and DLT have the capability to help address global challenges and strengthen democratic institutions, the innovative applications of blockchain are still in early stages and not fully understood by key stakeholders in Washington. The United States and its strategic partners must assess and play a role in shaping the next innovative applications of blockchain technology before the opportunity passes. In some respects, China is already possibly years ahead of the United States and many other countries in applying this rapidly evolving technology. Users of the digitized Chinese yuan number over 120 million in China (although conflicting reporting creates some doubt about how widely this currency is actually being used). To create a regulatory and policy environment in which the implementation of DLT strengthens democracy without compromising privacy or muzzling technological innovation, policymakers need a comprehensive understanding of the opportunities as well as the limitations on where and how this technology can be most readily and helpfully adopted. The strategic application of blockchain technology in certain scenarios can enhance trust and better protect information, but implementers must also be mindful of the technology’s shortcomings and challenges.</p> +<p>DSAT (and other valid training models) have the same basic elements: analysing the need; determining how to train; delivering the training; and operating feedback mechanisms. DSAT’s problem is that in practice it is neither well understood nor properly implemented, and consequently it is slow and overly bureaucratic. This is primarily a resourcing issue: when the Services are short of personnel, training schools are not the top priority when assigning staff, and consequently there are not enough people managing the DSAT process. Moreover, DSAT is complicated. Although JSP 822 has been made more accessible, its 679 pages (of which 235 relate to individual training) are impenetrable to all but those with time to read it carefully. Indeed, there are companies specialising in providing consultancy services for DSAT, including training needs analysis and course design, to supplement the expertise inside the Defence establishment. Finally, the turnover of military personnel makes it difficult to build expertise that might enable shortcuts to be employed or judgements made about the risks and benefits of deviating from the process while abiding by the policy’s spirit (even if straying from its formal stipulations).</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States and its strategic partners must assess and play a role in shaping the next innovative applications of blockchain technology before the opportunity passes.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>DSAT is cyclical, but cycling through it is often slow. In many cases, ExVal occurs every five years, which, given the speed at which battlefield realities are changing – as shown by the Ukraine conflict, for example – is too infrequent. For an organisation that aspires to be agile and adaptive, this represents a significant weakness. Such evaluation need not take so long: during the Iraq operation (from 2003), the review process concerning counter-improvised explosive devices was achieved within days. While this kind of rapid learning is not necessary for all skills, the ability to incorporate new knowledge – even that acquired by other institutions – more quickly into the training system will be vital if the armed forces are to compete in a world in which technology (and warfare) advances rapidly.</p> -<h3 id="blockchain-and-democracy">Blockchain and Democracy</h3> +<p>The separation of requirement-definition (under the TRA) and delivery (under the TDA) ensures that training delivery is assessed against the organisation’s needs, allowing deliverers to focus on how learning is best enabled. This generally works well when delivery sits within the same Service as the requirement-setter and end user. It is, however, less effective where end users have weaker organisational relationships with the TDA (such as different chains of command) or for generic Defence requirements separate from an individual’s core task. In these circumstances, there can be a disconnect: users and/or TRAs can demand things the TDA cannot deliver, or TDAs can prioritise what they are able to teach – or can afford to teach – rather than what is actually needed. For example, the advanced command and staff course (ACSC) prioritises “staff skills” more than “command”. Whether ACSC would be better placed educating joint command rather than teaching more process-oriented planning skills is worthy of consideration. Meanwhile, in Army HQ, the absence of a TRA function has seen the Land Warfare Centre, a TDA, drive training requirements from the bottom up.</p> -<p>Democratic backsliding around the world should be a concern for democracies everywhere. Democracy is in a worldwide recession in terms of both quality and prevalence, the causes of which are contested. The cornerstones of flourishing democracies, however, are widely agreed upon and include free and fair elections; a free press; individual rights; economic, political, and religious freedom; and a rule of law equally applied. Governments and societies grappling with how best to support and strengthen democracies should assess how technologies such as blockchain can be applied as practical tools to uphold these foundational principles. The applications may vary considerably, as demonstrated by the following non-exhaustive examples.</p> +<p>Management of the training pipeline is often overly bureaucratic. The statements of training requirement (SOTR) and training task (SOTT) are important tools connecting inflow (recruitment) to training and managing the capacity in the training system. As with other parts of DSAT, the concept is good, but often unresponsive in practice. Interviewees reported that it took two to three years to change the SOTR/SOTT through formal routes, a process often mediated by strategic workforce planning models (which in many cases reflected the previous year’s task, with some allowance for under-delivery, either because people were not recruited or they did not complete their training). The consequence of this is that the pipeline slows down and people have to wait longer than is strictly necessary before they are trained.</p> -<h4 id="protecting-digitized-government-documents">PROTECTING DIGITIZED GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS</h4> +<p>While DSAT can work well, it is better suited to more static environments where requirements are recognisable because the technology and its use are familiar. In dynamic and transformative environments – where the principle of linear progression does not apply – it is difficult to identify a training need. Emerging technology in particular poses problems, because TRAs may struggle to define requirements in a fast-moving landscape. To mitigate this challenge, training objectives can be defined very broadly to give TDAs the freedom to iterate their training, but commercial staff might struggle to agree to contracts if Defence cannot formally articulate needs that it does not yet fully understand.</p> -<p>Identity is inextricably intertwined with democracy. There are clear incentives for all governments, democratic or otherwise, to provide their citizens with means of unique identification, such as for the delivery of key services and benefits. Democracies have a special interest in ensuring individuals’ identities are protected so that the rights and privileges guaranteed to those individuals can be preserved. For example, government-issued identification is a key ingredient for voting, a core democratic responsibility. Likewise, passports assign unique “international standard serial numbers” which allow customs officials to quickly verify identity and citizenship as well as which travel privileges may apply to an individual. Government agencies such as the U.S. Social Security Administration assign identifiers to help administer medical benefits, financial aid, and other social services and benefits.</p> +<p><em>Contracting</em></p> -<p>Worldwide, nearly 1 billion people have no proof of legal identity and are excluded from services and the formal economy. Digital identity can serve to close this “identity gap” by helping deliver immutable and easily accessible identification to those lacking verifiable identity documents, as well as by strengthening the resiliency of existing paper identification. During natural disasters, conflicts, and other crises, citizens may not have the time or ability to grab their paper government documentation, which is necessary to freely move and receive services. DLT’s ability to safely guard such digitized information could alleviate the difficulty of attempting to verify a person’s identity during hectic scenarios in which physical documents are destroyed or inaccessible. Governments could be better equipped to manage refugee crises and natural disasters and administer standard social services, while individuals could have more control of their data. An important factor in realizing this vision entails working toward applications of digital identity systems that empower people rather than surveil and exclude them.</p> +<p>Contracting with commercial training providers helps to ensure Defence has the requisite andragogical (adult learning) skills in the workforce and can inject fresh ideas into training. However, the contracting process is slow, and contracting for services suffers from many of the same challenges as contracting for equipment. For example, SimCentric has developed a computer-based simulation for weapons handling that reduces lessons from 16 hours to 45 minutes, and which has improved pass rates from 68% to 98%. However, its introduction has been constrained by contractual processes and the absence of a holistic training strategy that guides the balance between live and synthetic, or in-person and online, learning. Even multi-year contracts are often tightly specified, and focused on inputs rather than outputs or outcomes, which limits scope for flexibility/adaptability, although there are notable exceptions in the Royal Navy and Army.</p> -<h4 id="securing-land-registration">SECURING LAND REGISTRATION</h4> +<p>This context makes it difficult to form the kinds of partnerships that would bring most value by harnessing the complementary talents of the MoD (context and subject expertise) and contractors (learning styles and technology). Holding contractors to account for the number of classroom hours, for example, actively disincentivises forms of training that could shorten courses or which involve different means of delivery that could be more effective. Hence, contractors are effectively disincentivised from adopting innovative ways of delivering training that would reduce contact time. Moreover, by over-specifying requirements such as practical training areas and equipment, Defence either makes little use of expensive infrastructure/equipment (for example, 19% classroom utilisation at Lichfield), or has to update training equipment regularly (which can be difficult, because it often has a lower priority than operational equipment). Further education colleges, typically less generously resourced, make more efficient use of their facilities by focusing on generic training aimed at general principles and how to apply them to different situations, rather than Defence’s more workplace-specific learning approach.</p> -<p>Land title registries track the ownership of land and property for a given region. The efficient registration of land is an essential component of ensuring property rights, a backbone of any free society. Land registration poses another set of government records for which an agency could maintain a blockchain to improve efficiency and ensure the quality of data storage and transfers. Some countries are already experiencing positive results from deploying DLT in the land registration process. For Georgia, the collapse of the Soviet Union and persistent corruption during early independence caused many property disputes. In response, Georgia was an early adopter of blockchain-based land registration, registering more than 1.5 million land titles in 2018. The Georgian government was able to provide citizens with digital certificates, legitimizing ownership with a timestamp and other cryptographic proof in under three minutes. Importantly, blockchain may help streamline the land registration process, but oversight is still critical to ensure the initial integrity of the data.</p> +<p>The over-specification of requirements also tends to drive transactional rather than relational approaches to the task. Multi-year contracts are likely to be more effective when managed by partners rather than where one side holds the other to account for pre-specified deliverables. Evidence of the negative effect of more transactional positions can be seen in the difficulties unit commanders have in sharing information with their contractors, even where they are keen to do so.</p> -<p>Similar technology can be applied to other asset registrations and government services. For example, the private sector uses blockchain technology to track the shipment of goods and monitor supply chains. Likewise, government agencies have the potential to reduce labor costs and waste by incorporating blockchain in some types of foreign aid delivery and monitoring, the tracking of welfare funds, and the registration of voters, vehicles, and intellectual property.</p> +<p><strong>Delivery</strong></p> -<h4 id="facilitating-fast-and-direct-financial-transfers-and-other-economic-applications">FACILITATING FAST AND DIRECT FINANCIAL TRANSFERS AND OTHER ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS</h4> +<p>Much Defence training is delivered in person, as part of lengthy programmes that remove people from the frontline. The trigger for training is often less to do with an individual’s needs and more because a career gate has been reached – a promotion or a posting. While these are reasonable grounds to suggest training interventions are warranted, Defence’s industrial approach, where trainees are processed largely without regard to their existing skills or knowledge, lacks flexibility. It prioritises neatness of planning – common start and end dates, simpler instructor scheduling and so on – over training needs. It is also increasingly out of step with shifts in strategic workforce planning, talent management, and learning and development towards skills-based approaches that link training to skills rather than roles/jobs. The skills-based approach allows personalised training that accommodates individual’s pre-existing skills and avoids unnecessary training. The emerging Defence Talent and Army Skills Frameworks could provide the basis for the transition to a skills-based model.</p> -<p>The financial services industry is already advancing applications of blockchain technology. Blockchain’s peer-to-peer system has enabled the excision of some intermediaries, instantaneous processing, and the elimination of fees when sending money anywhere in the world. Blockchain technology is not a digital currency, but it is highly associated with digital currencies because decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin function using blockchain.</p> +<p>The didactic nature of much Defence training was repeatedly highlighted in the interviews conducted for this paper: that is, instructors leading students through the learning. This approach also means lessons often focus on facts and concepts rather than on the higher-level objectives described in Bloom’s revised taxonomy, reducing the return on training in comparison to those that provide a more active and social learning experience. Pockets of good practice do exist, such as the “flipped classroom” approach at the Royal School of Military Engineering (RSME) at Minley, but elsewhere lessons often transfer knowledge from instructors to students who are largely passive recipients. This is often a function of lesson design, instructor experience and classroom layout that reflects historical teaching environments, albeit with electronic rather than chalk boards. “Reflective learning” is often driven out by the desire to be more “efficient”, either forcing students to extend their learning days in order to reflect and make sense of what they have been taught, or restricting the learning to facts that can be taught easily but which are not fully contextualised or understood.</p> -<p>Yet cryptocurrency is only a small subset of how blockchain can be and is being used by governments and financial institutions globally. For example, stablecoins, as the name suggests, attempt to provide a stable value by pegging their worth to a real-world “reference” asset such as the U.S. dollar. They can be used to pay for goods and services while benefiting from the low transaction costs of some blockchains. Blockchain technology has also induced the majority of the world’s governments to actively explore managing their national currencies by incorporating central bank digital currencies, with China, Sweden, and others actively exploring their use.</p> +<p>In a move accelerated by the Covid-19 pandemic, Defence is making more use of remote learning. However, interviewees expressed concern that Defence was facing “remote learning fatigue”, which could make the otherwise admirable investment in learning and development demotivating. This may not be true for the reserves, where more online learning and shorter residential training might be better suited to the time that Reservists can commit. But Reserve units lack the connectivity and expertise to deliver Reserve training, and moving too much training online at the expense of in-person delivery also risks creating a sense of isolation that weakens the Reservist’s attachment to their unit. A balanced, system-level view is needed.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Cryptocurrency is only a small subset of how blockchain can be and is being used by governments and financial institutions globally.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Learning Environment</strong></p> -<p>There are also other applications for blockchain in the realm of financial inclusion. Pilot projects in the Global South are looking into how blockchain can be used to issue insurance policies, administer payouts to farmers, close credit gaps, and provide a way to save for those who do not have a savings account. For example, moving money is often made expensive due to bank fees. Leaf, a Rwandan-based project, uses blockchain to enable money transfers without banking fees. The Leaf wallet uses the public Stellar blockchain to help people send, save, and transfer money directly from their mobile phone without the need for personal banking history or in-depth financial literacy. Likewise, smart contracts are being used to carry out insurance agreements with African farmers to protect their livelihoods during extreme weather. If a predetermined amount of rain is recorded within 24 hours in the insured farmer’s region, which can result in destruction of crops, the farmer will receive an automated payment. Blockchain technology is increasingly being incorporated into specific finance-related applications while also helping to create global networks of interoperable financial systems.</p> +<p>An effective learning environment requires appropriate furniture, lighting, temperature, air quality, ventilation, ICT infrastructure, connectivity and adaptable classrooms, as well as support facilities such as accommodation and catering. A critical purpose behind the Defence Training Review was to enable investment in infrastructure by reducing the size of the Defence training estate, but the quality of the learning environments in Defence varies greatly. New environments purpose-built for the Defence Academy and at Worthy Down contrast with older sites where classrooms and facilities are poor, and students cannot get a hot shower. While progress has been made, with 1,600 hectares (2%) of the built estate disposed of between 2015 and 2021 to fund improvements elsewhere, the training estate still struggles to provide the appropriate infrastructure (such as flexible classrooms and WiFi in accommodation areas) that is essential for maximising the benefits of new technology.</p> -<h4 id="contending-with-a-proliferation-of-deepfakes">CONTENDING WITH A PROLIFERATION OF DEEPFAKES</h4> +<p>Conversely, parts of the estate are so lean that the training system lacks surge capacity. Even for training regular personnel, it is taut; training just 70 Ukrainian engineers in the UK required stopping some Phase Three training. If the UK were required to surge train reserves to enable the regular Army to deploy, capacity would be lacking. In addition, reserves struggle to access courses, training areas and ranges, while contracts for support facilities on bases often mean that there is a reduced service at weekends when reservists are able to train.</p> -<p>In a rapidly approaching future with generative artificial intelligence and pervasive deepfake technology, it will be imperative for both governments and private consumers of information to be able to discern what is credible. In many respects, this eventuality has already arrived. The health of democracies is uniquely reliant on an informed citizenry. The intentional dissemination of false information, such as propaganda from authoritarian nations and extremist organizations, often aims to obfuscate reality. The need for verifiable information and data is additionally intensified amid the fog of war, when manipulative information operations are pervasive and the accuracy of situational understanding can be a matter of life and death.</p> +<p><strong>Workforce</strong></p> -<p>The use of emerging technologies by state actors for strategic disinformation campaigns is a national security issue. For this reason, the United States adopted its first federal laws related to deepfakes in 2019. The FY 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required a report on the weaponization of deepfake technology by foreign entities and established a competition with a $5 million prize to stimulate research on machine-manipulated media. Such efforts are not preventative but merely raise awareness of the issue at hand. Beyond increasing awareness, InterAction’s Disinformation Toolkit 2.0 notes how some internationally focused organizations are exposing disinformation campaigns, conducting forensic analyses, coordinating with technology companies, providing digital literacy training, and collaborating with global policymakers. This landscape of mounting policy attention and analysis related to disinformation and deepfakes shapes the context in which applications of blockchain technology are finding their footing.</p> +<p>While military instructors are experts in their subject, they often lack the andragogical skills to most effectively communicate their expertise. Instructors are typically selected for their technical competence and subsequently trained as instructors under the Defence Trainer Competency Framework. This Level 3 programme runs over the first 12 months of the instructor’s appointment. So while Defence instructors are up to date in their subject matter expertise – a challenge for many civilian colleges – they have a low level of proficiency in supporting learning. In comparison, further education teachers require undergraduate or postgraduate teaching qualifications (Level 6 or 7), or a Level 5 teaching apprenticeship.</p> -<p>DLT may offer opportunities to counteract the nefarious aims of certain categories of deepfakes. The Starling Lab for Data Integrity is experimenting with innovative applications of blockchain technology and decentralized systems of storage to bolster trust in digital media. The persistence and safety of digital ledgers support the creation of more trustworthy digital assets where details are corroborated by independent third parties acting as notaries public. Decentralized storage pools can guarantee the safekeeping of information for the long term.</p> +<p>It is not just instructors who lack deep knowledge and skills. TRAs and training support staff such as course designers and those developing training materials receive little training. Analysing and determining how best to close training gaps, and knowing what learning technology is available and how it can be best employed are not easy, but these skills are often assumed to be acquired through osmosis or with limited formal interventions (for example, the Defence Online Learning Course, for those responsible for developing online learning, lasts two days). Moreover, the lack of training for those people managing training means that they are often unfamiliar with the DSAT process and can default to slavish adherence to the letter of the process rather than deviating from the formal rules to achieve its intended purpose where necessary.</p> -<p>News agencies are beginning to explore applications for DLT to better record their reporting and make data, such as the location and date of photographs, permanently accessible. Reuters, for example, has partnered with Canon to develop a professional camera and in-house workflow for photojournalists that freezes and stamps the pixels of a picture the moment a photo is snapped and then registers the photo and corresponding details onto a public blockchain. Especially considering Russia’s propaganda campaigns against Ukraine, blockchain’s potential to verify what information has been altered could be instrumental as authoritarians increasingly deploy gray zone tactics that rely on manipulating the information environment. This verification of alterations only applies to information once it has been stored in a blockchain and cannot account for manipulation prior to that point.</p> +<h3 id="ii-modernisation-opportunities">II. Modernisation Opportunities</h3> -<h4 id="advancing-justice-and-the-rule-of-law">ADVANCING JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW</h4> +<p>The process of modernising Defence training is continuous, and we must start by acknowledging where training is done well. Good practice exists, which can and should be shared. While Defence’s formal training structures help ensure learning and development happen systematically – in ways that many commercial employers are unable to replicate – the structure also brings constraints, leading to somewhat rigid, industrial approaches. A teacher from the Victorian age would find much that was familiar in Defence training – much more than they would find in more dynamic contemporary higher education settings. Defence training needs to become more digitally relevant, but this does not mean merely replacing classrooms with online learning – both modes of learning have their place, but effective distributed learning needs to be resourced and enabled, including changing the organisational culture to enable individuals to undertake self-education. This paper identifies four areas for modernisation: people; delivery; building knowledge of the system; and partnering.</p> -<p>A transparent judicial system is key to the rule of law that undergirds functioning democracies. DLT’s capturing, storing, and verifying of data could be used to better manage court judgments, warrants, and criminal histories. Researchers are exploring blockchain’s ability to corroborate data on several systems as a tool for preserving evidence. The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Justice proposed using DLT to preserve and protect mass quantities of body camera footage to be used in court. Similar applications could be useful for international courts and other human rights watchdogs.</p> +<h4 id="people">People</h4> -<p>The recent hacking of the computer systems of the International Criminal Court (ICC) raises concerns over the safety of centrally located data that could later be used to prosecute the most serious of crimes. The use of blockchain to store and verify data related to war crimes and atrocities aims to assist the courts by providing more trusted and tamper-resistant data for associated proceedings. Governments or other entities seeking to achieve accountability for large-scale human right abuses or wartime atrocities for the purposes of transitional justice may particularly benefit from the use of blockchain to ensure evidence has not been manipulated and to support chain of custody for documentation of abuse.</p> +<p>Arguably the single biggest contribution to modernising Defence training could be achieved by upskilling those engaged in the management, oversight, support and delivery of training materials. Good practice exists in the Royal Navy and at RSME Chatham (where contractors have invested in upskilling Defence’s instructional staff to Level 4 qualifications, beyond the level provided by Defence), and the Defence Academy has supported its staff in gaining higher qualifications. Naval educators are also given membership of the Society of Education and Training, and significant effort is put into online support and coaching to enable their development. But the people involved in designing training programmes, as well as those doing training needs analysis, deciding on training methods and designing materials, would all benefit from having their skills supplemented, and from continuing professional development. Selection for training duties should take account of the soft skills needed for effective andragogy, not merely technical expertise or command authority.</p> -<p>Additionally, “smart contracts,” which automate transactions once the coded conditions are met, could help judicial systems by minimizing disputes, alleviating stress on courts, and making business and government services more efficient.</p> +<p>The constant churn in the Defence training workforce, with individuals changing every two to three years, is also problematic. Longer tours that build greater andragogic expertise, or the creation of a cadre undertaking repeated tours in learning and development (with instruction as a career anchor) could help mitigate other risks in the system and allow the investment made in upskilling to be used for longer periods. But this should be done without compromising the up-to-date operational knowledge that Defence instructors provide their students.</p> -<h4 id="elevating-citizen-representation-and-voice">ELEVATING CITIZEN REPRESENTATION AND VOICE</h4> +<p>Defence also needs to ensure that there are enough staff to operate the training system, which may mean raising the priority of many of the posts. Some efficiencies could be found by reducing duplication of effort, for example using centres of excellence for common material that is produced once and used many times. The Defence Academy’s Education and Research Department, which produces common content modules for many courses, could potentially improve productivity in this regard, but needs to be allowed to prioritise its main programme.</p> -<p>According to a 2021 CSIS report, blockchain-based voting systems hold some potential benefits for securing elections, though they also present a range of risks. Generally speaking, blockchain could reduce the risk of election tampering, as such a system would require the collusion of multiple major entities to alter recorded ballots. There may also be potential for the use of blockchain to further augment trust in mobile and internet voting, which can, in turn, result in greater turnout and reduce voter error. Blockchain-backed e-voting could additionally enhance the physical safety of voters and remove certain types of voter coercion associated with in-person polling, although coercion in private settings can also pose a significant problem. Election transparency may be another benefit, as civil society groups could monitor the election results if granted access to the blockchain network and armed with the requisite technical knowledge to understand it. The transparency associated with blockchains also needs to be balanced with privacy rights associated with voters’ abilities to keep their individual voting selection secret. Further possible advantages include stronger resiliency against network disruptions compared to other internet voting schemes, more secure voter registries, and timely election night reporting systems.</p> +<p>Increased use of online learning could expand capacity in the training system while utilising fewer dedicated training staff, but this would place new burdens on course designers and the frontline. Line managers and others involved in facilitating unit learning would need preparation for their new responsibilities, and jobs would need to be redesigned to reflect that jobholders are not fully trained and need time and space to learn in the role.</p> -<p>While there have not been many pilot projects related to blockchain voting, the Voatz mobile blockchain voting system, used during the 2018 U.S. midterm elections in West Virginia, for example, may have contributed to higher voter turnout on the scale of 3 to 5 percentage points. However, other studies have demonstrated the opposite. For example, in Belgium a similar pilot project resulted in a slightly negative effect on voter turnout. As uses of blockchain expand, there is also increased attention to theoretical applications of blockchain to voting. For example, the concept of liquid democracy, a modern and flexible approach to direct democracy with implications for referendums, voting proxies, and mass-scale voting, could be propelled by blockchain to help verify that votes cast are the same as votes counted.</p> +<p>Taking a whole force view and combining operationally current and upskilled Defence instructors with commercial partners possessing deep training expertise enhances the value of both groups. The contractors for the Royal Navy (Selborne) and the Army (Holdfast) have a greater responsibility for training management than elsewhere, providing training supervisors and managers, and design and governance functions, that supplement the military instructor’s recent frontline experience. They also act as intelligent customers promoting good practice from outside Defence. Working in partnership also helps protect capacity in the training system, preventing key posts being left unfilled when shortages of Defence personnel necessitate deploying military personnel to higher priority tasks. However, the partners need to be able to share information, be free to adapt training quickly by cycling through the DSAT process faster when necessary, and be able to adopt modern learning practices – all of which require trust between the parties.</p> -<p>One key challenge is that although blockchain may help with the prevention of some ballot tampering, election systems and platforms are still dependent on other hardware and software that may make them vulnerable to exploitation that is difficult or even impossible to control. Therefore, at a fundamental level, blockchain is not a silver bullet for solving the insecurity of online voting.</p> +<h4 id="delivery">Delivery</h4> -<h3 id="the-ukrainian-context">The Ukrainian Context</h3> +<p>Learning is a fundamentally social activity, so classroom-based training will remain crucial, even as Defence becomes more digitally oriented. Given increased skills, training designers and instructors will be able to make lessons more active and less didactic, and thus engage students in higher levels of learning such as analysis, evaluation or creation. Investing in instructor development can move classroom learning up the pyramid of Bloom’s taxonomy, supporting collective reflection and social learning. Combined with online learning, these approaches could enhance learning outcomes as well as shorten residential programmes (where appropriate), democratise access and support reserves.</p> -<p>Ukraine, sitting at the cutting edge of the digital revolution, offers a unique context that is experimenting in the digital and blockchain space.</p> +<p>A revised culture of learning that recognised that individuals might follow different paths based on their prior learning/experience (such as RSME’s fixed mastery/variable time approach), underpinned by better accreditation of non-Defence training, would enable faster – and more personalised – progression through training. A routine part of course design should be to identify shortcuts through the syllabus, allowing people demonstrating existing competence to avoid lessons that have no learning value for them. This move towards a more organic process requires acceptance that students would have different learning journeys. It might also allow training and trainees to contribute to the frontline more directly, with training outputs focused on benefiting users – for example, by conducting engineering training at units whose equipment needs repairing, rather than instructors “breaking” equipment for students to fix before it is broken again for the next class. It could also open the way for fortuitous course combination, where compatible programmes coincide and can allow collaborative learning; for example, the Fire and Rescue College, wherever possible, combines the Incident Command Course with firefighter development courses. Currently, however, this approach might be challenging for Defence’s preference for training standardisation.</p> -<h4 id="technological-readiness">TECHNOLOGICAL READINESS</h4> +<p>Accepting that individuals may have different learning paths requires both a cultural shift by Defence and a solid foundation in the basics for the students. Experience at the BT telecoms group shows that training on every variant of a given technology can be rendered unnecessary if students have a strong foundation in the core principles and are then given access to technology that can provide specific online instruction, through access to videos showing how a particular task can be completed. A greater focus on universal principles and a reduced emphasis on the particular could also make the training estate more efficient by allowing the flexible use of space that was previously dedicated exclusively to one particular purpose. This could also address the endemic issue whereby training struggles to keep pace with frontline capabilities (a situation that is likely to get worse as Defence embraces the idea of “spiral development” on the frontline).</p> -<p>Ukraine’s information and communications technology (ICT) industry was immensely successful before Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, with some dubbing it the “emerging tiger of Europe.” In fact, despite challenges posed by the war, it is the only sector of the Ukrainian economy that has grown amid the conflict, exhibiting growing export volumes from 2021 to 2022. The Ukrainian government has also proactively not drafted IT workers as soldiers and has extended tax breaks to small and medium-sized businesses in the industry. These measures have allowed ICT businesses to stay solvent and continue operating and exporting services. The challenges Ukraine is facing are in many ways unique, but this also means that it can serve as a breeding ground for unique innovations. Equipped with over 200,000 skilled IT workers and the demand for creative solutions due to the war, Ukraine is primed to rapidly test technologies.</p> +<p>Two elements that could contribute to enabling a shift towards more effective training delivery are technology and individual learning.</p> -<p>Ukraine demonstrated its technological adaptability with the embrace of cryptocurrency in early fundraising efforts when banks lacked liquidity following Russia’s full-scale invasion. MoneyGram halted payments to Ukraine until it could confirm its banking partners in the country were operational. The Ukrainian government, ranked fourth globally for cryptocurrency adoption, began publicly soliciting cryptocurrency donations online days after the invasion. Cryptocurrency’s capability to facilitate transactions instantly across borders was attractive for the nation as it entered total war. At least 20 million dollars in cryptocurrency were deposited directly to the Ukrainian government in the first months of the war.</p> +<p><strong>Technology</strong></p> -<p>Ukraine had more mobile phone subscriptions than people in 2020, but the war has damaged the digital infrastructure necessary for mobile subscriptions to be operable. Since Russia’s invasion, more than 4,000 Ukrainian telecommunication stations have been seized or destroyed and over 60,000 kilometers of fiber-optic lines have been compromised. The restoration of many lost towers can be attributed to the bravery of Ukrainian telecommunication workers. The public-private partnership between the Department of Defense and SpaceX’s Starlink has enabled battlefield communications at the cost of approximately $20 million per month. Without investments in digital infrastructure, all digital solutions, including those involving blockchain, are futile.</p> +<p>Coupled with the use of learning technologies, such as AI-enabled online learning and virtual reality (VR), more blended approaches better suited to personalised learning journeys could be enabled. AI-enabled content could respond to student inputs, guiding them through online courses, while VR could support forces sent to the frontline without a training stock, or allow those on the frontline to learn before equipment arrives on which they have not been trained. These technologies require investment in the enabling infrastructure to create an open architecture to support technology-agnostic learning systems that allow students to use their own devices for accessing unclassified materials.</p> -<h4 id="commitment-to-digitization">COMMITMENT TO DIGITIZATION</h4> +<p><strong>Individual Learning</strong></p> -<p>Digitization is synonymous with resiliency, a characteristic often ascribed to Ukraine in its battle against Russia. Prior to the war, Ukraine committed to going paperless in September 2021 with a bill prohibiting officials from requiring paper documents. The bill was the latest advancement in digitization following the successful experimentation with electronic identification cards and international passports by the application Diia. Ukraine had issued nearly a million biometric travel passports to Ukrainian citizens in the Russian-controlled Donbas region before the war. Diia, a premier government application used by half of Ukraine’s population, offers an expanding list of digital documents, including identification cards, driver’s licenses, and Covid-19 vaccination certificates. In a unique blend of entertainment and education, Diia has trained almost 1.5 million citizens in digital skills through over 90 free-to-access educational series based on European standards. Given the wartime reliance on social services, digitization efforts have accelerated since the war’s outbreak. Kostiantyn Koshelenko, deputy minister of social policy for digital transformation, recently expressed his commitment to making government services more resilient and client oriented. Applying to be a candidate for child adoption, for example, is now an online government service in Ukraine. The Ministry of Digital Transformation’s mission to “move 100% of government services online” is a core element of Ukraine’s war strategy and a key ingredient for large-scale utilization of blockchain-enabled applications.</p> +<p>Delivery is built on the foundation of a high quality learning environment. Such an environment should embody a greater willingness to allow self-directed learning (without automatically resulting in pressure to reduce course lengths) and widen access to content, not merely for those that trigger an entitlement (a role-based approach) but for encouraging those who wish to own their personal and professional development. Helping students to learn how to think (rather than what to think) by combining more student reflection time with classroom discussions focused on higher-value learning outcomes would add value to both Defence and the students.</p> -<h4 id="applications-of-blockchain">APPLICATIONS OF BLOCKCHAIN</h4> +<h4 id="building-knowledge-of-the-system">Building Knowledge of the System</h4> -<p>Supported by a government that has trumpeted digitization as critical to the country’s future, Ukraine and its partners have combined blockchain technology and photogrammetry to counter disinformation and to document and preserve evidence of Russian war crimes. E-Enemy, for example, is a government-built app that allows users to photograph and geolocate any attacks, thereby providing a first-person perspective of atrocities for posterity and eliminating the potency of deepfakes. War crimes investigators can then “hash” data on war crimes, thereby enabling future prosecution of these heinous acts. Starling Lab, a joint Stanford University–USC Shoah Foundation research center, in partnership with social enterprise Hala Systems, has been preserving possible evidence of Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine via a cryptographic dossier. The aforementioned hacking of the ICC combined with Russia’s espionage efforts to covertly infiltrate the court hint at the urgent need to ensure greater protection for evidence of war crimes.</p> +<p>The training of individuals sits within wider force-generation and HR systems. Steps are being taken to improve connections and feedback loops between individual and collective training, but it is too early to judge the success of these initiatives. A high-level strategy that considers individual training, setting the framework for thinking about in-person and remote learning, simulation, use of AI (including generative AI) and establishing agreed definitions of technology and data would help. This might also acknowledge the limitations of the DSAT process in practice and encourage a more dynamic model – one that accepts more risk against standardised training outputs by being willing to exploit emerging opportunities that add greater value, either to the students or to the frontline. For example, using trainees to repair equipment at frontline units, or allowing courses to train together when they coincide, even if that is not the same on every occasion.</p> -<p>Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky himself has noted the importance of digitizing all accounting of military supplies, an effort that could potentially benefit from blockchain technology. Furthermore, the UN Refugee Agency was awarded the Best Impact Project Award during the 2023 Paris Blockchain Week for a pilot project in Ukraine where it used blockchain to provide financial assistance to displaced people; this assistance could be converted into cash and used for rent, food, utilities, and medical expenses.</p> +<p>It might also encourage closer relationships between TRAs and TDAs, with either the requirement responsibilities siting within the delivery authority, or placing a small TRA team to work alongside the TDA. This would enable the delivery organisations to become centres of expertise at the leading edge of thinking about how skills are employed and forging stronger relationships with the frontline, doctrine centres and allies. TDAs, therefore, would seek out improvements and propose changes to requirements, rather than wait for often overstretched TRAs to identify new requirements. The alignment of many of these functions under Director Land Warfare in the Army could be a useful test case for this approach.</p> -<h4 id="property-registration-and-blockchain">PROPERTY REGISTRATION AND BLOCKCHAIN</h4> +<p>Beyond training, the overall HR ecosystem is less integrated, with often cumbersome processes hindering connections between strategic workforce planning, recruitment, training and career management. The mechanical SOTR/SOTT process that connects recruitment and training remains challenging, although early results from Project Selborne’s use of AI through its new schedule optimisation engine allow an immediate digital recasting of the SOTR/SOTT plans when the situation changes or a new operational requirement is introduced.</p> -<p>Digital solutions for Ukraine’s economic modernization and resilience go beyond the more obvious war effort. Some of the first Ukrainian pilot projects using blockchain were electronic land auctions. In May 2017, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine formally agreed to implement blockchain to help manage the State Register of Property Rights on Real Estate as well as the System of Electronic Trading in Arrested Property. A complaint of foreign investors is that land ownership is still not a possibility in Ukraine given current laws. Legal reform is needed to change this reality, and there is an argument that Kyiv should amend its laws to inspire foreign investors to participate in the country’s economic recovery. This demand may incentivize the Ukrainian government to further explore incorporating blockchain technology in land registration.</p> +<p>A necessary foundation for the modernisation of training is to improve the quality and flow of data across the training schools, across the Commands between Joint TDAs and Service TRAs (through strengthened Customer Executive Boards), and between the MoD and contractors. Doing so – as Ofsted has regularly demanded in its inspection of training establishments – would inform choices and improve management of a more fluid system. It would also permit technology to mitigate the need for human experts that are difficult to find, and could offer a more dynamic approach to recruitment and training that reduces wastage.</p> -<h3 id="additional-considerations-and-challenges">Additional Considerations and Challenges</h3> +<p>The simplification of DSAT is welcomed, but must be accompanied by upskilling and the resetting of risk tolerance, or Defence will merely be adding new process to reduce the chance of errors by those not steeped in it. Another important change would be for the knowledge, skills, experience and behaviours that individuals require to be mapped to organisational needs (and therefore shape the training and learning designed to fulfil those requirements). The Pan-Defence Skills Framework could help in this regard. Defence also needs to systematise the good work it did in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic when, moving rapidly, it embraced changes that under normal circumstances would have taken a long time to implement. While commendable, these changes now often exist as exceptions to the usual system, and need to be made “normal”.</p> -<p>Despite the benefits of blockchain for advancing democratic institutions, the technology is clearly a neutral tool and can be used by good actors as well as malign ones. There are some underlying concerns regarding the risks that DLT systems pose for democracy.</p> +<h4 id="partnering">Partnering</h4> -<h4 id="malign-foreign-activity">MALIGN FOREIGN ACTIVITY</h4> +<p>A whole force approach to learning and development is paying dividends in some areas of Defence, where, as Haythornthwaite hoped, the complementary skills of Defence and contractor personnel mitigate risks, enhance outputs and help Defence remain at the cutting edge of training. However, best practice needs to be shared more widely, and more sophisticated arrangements are needed in the training system as much as they are in procurement.</p> -<p>Foreign actors are known to use blockchain technology for adversarial activity against the United States and its partners. For example, Russia has attempted to use the anonymity associated with some cryptocurrencies to bypass sanctions. The terrorist organization Hamas and two other militant groups — Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah — have also used cryptocurrency to evade sanctions in order to raise funds for their notorious terrorist attacks. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad raised more than $100 million via cryptocurrency between August 2021 and June 2023.</p> +<p>Just as Defence’s skills requirements are not static, neither are the science of learning nor learning technologies. Commercial requirements in contracts spanning over 20 years that specify inputs cannot take account of changing andragogical practice, technologies or even system capacity. More partnership-focused models, such as those at the Defence Academy and Royal Navy, offer significant advantages, especially where they include funded requirements for training innovation and allow the partner to maximise the use of the infrastructure, such as the Holdfast contract at RSME. For example, Project Selborne’s eight output-based key performance indicators drive effective partnership behaviours aligned to the Royal Navy’s strategic goals, where sharing people creates a single workforce (civilian and military) that contributes to the sense of shared endeavour and priorities. More broadly, however, Defence must recognise that external learning expertise is valuable, and be more realistic about its own uniqueness.</p> -<p>It is not clear, however, how much longer cryptocurrency will be thought of as a safe haven for illicit behavior since Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are more traceable than other forms of payment. Investigators have been able to quickly identify and prosecute criminal activity through logged cryptocurrency transactions. For example, within days of the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned two senior Hamas officials along with cryptocurrency exchange Buy Cash Money and Money Transfer Company, as well as six other individuals involved in the financial operation to fund terrorism. Additionally, the arrest of the perpetrators behind the 2016 Bitfinex hack, in which 119,754 bitcoins were stolen, was only possible, in large part, thanks to the immutable ledger that undergirds Bitcoin. (It is important to note, however, that blockchain’s traceability is irrelevant without oversight.)</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<h4 id="accessibility">ACCESSIBILITY</h4> +<p>The skills challenge in Defence is becoming more acute, with traditional roles becoming more complex and new technologies requiring new skills. Moreover, in looking for recruits that possess these skills, Defence is competing directly with employers who have greater flexibility to pay market rates. The extensive training organisation Defence operates is a vital tool for ensuring sustained delivery of its operational outputs. This organisation is a great strength, and an attractive part of the Defence offer to its people, being more systematic and structured than that of most employers.</p> -<p>The accessibility of blockchain technology to the public is also a concern. Whether due to lack of technological familiarity, high expenses, or lack of the necessary equipment to facilitate participation, many communities across the globe are not in a position to use blockchain, which in turn limits democratic participation via DLT systems. Citizens need smartphones and reliable internet access to participate. Digital literacy is another aspect of the divide preventing massive rollout of blockchain-backed government solutions, as technology often faces obstacles to adoption and may be cumbersome, particularly for those who lack digital skills. Tech companies and government entities should collaborate to ensure that such tools are accessible and user friendly. The barrier of entry for users must be lowered before scaling is possible.</p> +<p>However, this training system is expensive, and requires modernisation to help it meet the challenges it faces.</p> -<h4 id="lack-of-accountability-and-selective-data">LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND SELECTIVE DATA</h4> +<p>Foremost among the challenges is one of culture. The traditional conception of training in Defence is an “industrial” one, where people are raw materials fed into a process that homogenises them via the delivery of standardised training, largely regardless of individual needs. This rather mechanistic approach was effective when skills and careers were static, but is less suited to the rapidly-evolving environments that Defence operates in today. The lack of a “system view”, in which an individual’s training is situated within a broader ecosystem, has hindered modernisation attempts and resulted in risk being displaced rather than removed.</p> -<p>Without proper reform, blockchain runs the risk of merely reinforcing the status quo. What prevents corrupt regimes from allowing only state-approved, potentially faulty information to be entered onto a blockchain? Is blockchain the next tool to be used by oppressive regimes to fabricate transparent democracy? For example, since 2018, China has permitted the use of blockchain-stored evidence in the country’s courts, which may actually be a worrying development given the fact that China, an authoritarian regime, can be very selective with which data to store.</p> +<p>The second challenge is that although the DSAT process that shapes the development of training is conceptually sound, the failure to resource it properly in practice means that it struggles to deliver, while the process by which Defence contracts for training partners also creates problems.</p> -<h4 id="energy-consumption">ENERGY CONSUMPTION</h4> +<p>Thirdly, training delivery has failed to keep pace with advances in the understanding of andragogy, often as a result of how the Defence training workforce is itself resourced, trained and employed.</p> -<p>Blockchain technology traditionally has had a reputation of being highly energy intensive. Though there has been some progress on this front — and the high energy use is mainly attributed to cryptocurrency — there remain environmental concerns regarding the technology due to its carbon footprint as well as the affordability of energy in specific communities. However, there is hope that the technology will become more efficient, based on analysis showing that with different technological design options, digital currencies can be configured in a manner that is more energy efficient than popular current payment systems like credit and debit cards.</p> +<p>The final challenge is that many of the essential enablers underpinning the learning environment are missing, including the data, infrastructure and capacity needed to manage fluctuating demand.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>Responding to these challenges is complex, but must involve sharing existing good practice, as well as incorporating the lessons that can be learned from others. Key elements of any response would include:</p> -<p>As the world increasingly overflows with data, U.S. policymakers should consider how to best utilize blockchain and other types of DLT to support democratic governance, including identity management, land rights, and the tracking of goods and services. If U.S. lawmakers do not take greater steps to shape the policy and regulatory environment for blockchain-related activity, there is also a risk of damage to U.S. competitiveness. Policymakers should explore new ways democracies can preserve and advance their principles while more efficiently delivering basic government services. At the same time, blockchain must be viewed neither as a panacea nor as solely an instrument of cryptocurrencies. It is a tool that offers intriguing applications for social and governmental progress.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Upskilling the Defence training workforce – not just instructors, but staff across the training system, including TRAs, training managers and designers, and those validating the learning.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Adopting a less mechanistic, more organic approach to delivery – one that facilitates unique individual journeys through the training system, gives more power to learners, and provides the right learning environment, enabled by modern learning technology.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Building a stronger understanding of the systems within which training sits, including the individual/collective training continuum, and better use of training data and its connection with recruitment and career management, which is how Defence applies the skills people have learned. The shift also needs to normalise the (impressive) response to the Covid-19 pandemic that often stands out as an exception to the standard approach.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Building stronger partnerships with providers who can complement the strengths Defence instructors bring to the training system (their up-to-date operational knowledge and ability to contextualise the learning) through a stronger understanding of andragogy and best practice outside Defence.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Before proceeding with policy decisions related to blockchain technology, Congress should be equipped with knowledge of how exactly the technology can be applied (or misapplied), and make sure that the populations who are meant to benefit from these technologies are also fluent in their use and have access to the necessary digital public infrastructure. This will allow lawmakers to create a broader system and approach in dealing with DLT so that its benefits can be instrumentalized in service of democratic governance.</p> +<p>The key strength of Defence’s training organisation – its highly structured approach – also makes it relatively rigid, and thus less able to react to rapidly changing needs. Modifying the structure to make it more flexible – rather than abandoning it – offers the best way forward, but success will only be possible if training modernisation is considered within its broader contexts, taking a “whole system” approach that considers the effects of changes in one part of the system on the other parts. Without this broader understanding, training modernisation could merely transfer risk elsewhere rather than remove it.</p> <hr /> -<p><strong>Noam Unger</strong> is the director of the Sustainable Development and Resilience Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and a senior fellow with the Project on Prosperity and Development.</p> - -<p><strong>Austin Hardman</strong> is a research assistant for the Project on Prosperity and Development (PPD) at CSIS. In this role, he supports the team’s research agenda, business development opportunities, and event coordination.</p> +<p><strong>Paul O’Neill</strong> is Director of Military Sciences at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). His research interests cover national security strategy, NATO, and organisational aspects of Defence and security, including organisational design, human resources, professional military education and decision-making.He is a CBE, Companion of the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, and a member of the UK Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team.</p> -<p><strong>Ilya Timtchenko</strong> is an intern with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.</p>Noam Unger, et al.In a world increasingly overflowing with data, blockchain is neither a panacea nor solely an instrument of cryptocurrencies but rather a tool that offers intriguing applications to support democratic governance, including in Ukraine.CISA’s Evolving .gov Mission2023-10-23T12:00:00+08:002023-10-23T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/cisas-evolving-.gov-mission<p><em>This report delves into critical cybersecurity issues and offers insightful analysis for policymakers and the public.</em></p> +<p><strong>Patrick Hinton</strong> is a serving regular officer in the British Army’s Royal Artillery. He has experience working with ground based air defence systems and remotely piloted air systems. He has also worked in the personnel space. Since joining the Army in 2014, his career has consisted of a number of appointments at regimental duty including Troop Command, Executive Officer, and Adjutant. He was the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow in the Military Sciences Research Group at RUSI until the end of August 2023.</p>Paul O’Neill and Patrick HintonBetter practices are needed to improve the effectiveness of defence training.Uncrewed Ground Systems2023-10-26T12:00:00+08:002023-10-26T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uncrewed-ground-systems<p><em>Military experimentation with uncrewed ground systems (UGS) is happening apace. Bomb disposal robots have been in service with armed forces for decades. Now, systems with greater capabilities and autonomy are being developed and tested.</em></p> <excerpt /> -<h3 id="foreword">Foreword</h3> - -<p>This project is about service. It brings together a unique mix of public and private sector voices that cut across industries, political parties, and generations. There are lawyers, soldiers, professors, law enforcement professionals, and former senior appointees and intelligence officers. This diverse group is held together by a commitment to securing cyberspace as a public common where people from all walks of life can prosper.</p> - -<p>The members of the task force and research team see twenty-first-century service as helping democratic governments protect the right of free people to exchange goods and ideas through digital networks. Economic, social, and political worlds exist within cyberspace, and the U.S. government has a special obligation to protect them all. These same networks also form key pathways for the provision of the public goods and services that support modern life.</p> - -<p>Over 100 agencies comprising the federal civilian executive branch (FCEB) rely on cyberspace to execute their critical functions. That means that over 330 million people in the United States rely on cyberspace for more than social media. They rely on it for basic services such as food and housing assistance. They rely on it for processing student loans. They rely on it for registering patents and starting new businesses. And they rely on it for supporting research labs that are working on new vaccines and clean energy breakthroughs.</p> - -<p>A commitment to help develop new strategies for securing cyberspace is what brought the members of this project’s task force and research team together. Many have worked on finding ways to balance liberty and security in cyberspace since the 1990s. In 2019, members worked to shape the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act and the creation of the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC). Those core members served on the CSC and CSC 2.0 and developed a total of 116 recommendations. Many of these recommendations have either already been implemented, such as the creation of the Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD), or are nearing implementation.</p> - -<p>Still, the job was not finished. In 2022, Cory Simpson — the former lead for helping the CSC think about future and emerging threats — started a dialogue with a network of businesses and senior U.S. government officials on the challenge of securing the FCEB agencies. Based on the new offices and laws recommended by the CSC and ultimately implemented by Congress and the executive branch, along with key executive orders such as May 2021’s Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity and the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy, there was significant momentum to protect the provision of public goods. At the same time, daily new reports of massive data breaches, ransomware attacks, and threats of using cyberspace to hold Americans hostage during a conflict with China have revealed the magnitude of the challenge ahead. As the CEO and founder of Gray Space Strategies, a strategic advisory firm, Simpson heard from both government officials and private sector firms that they still felt vulnerable.</p> +<p>Potential uses include carrying cargo, casualty evacuation, reconnaissance, chemical-agent detection, communications and fire support. However, the gap between ideal uses and present technical capability is significant. The delivery of systems to where they will be used, the realistic uses once there and the machines’ interactions with soldiers have frequently been underexamined but are crucial to how UGS will form part of land forces and offer genuine operational advantage. The technical limitations of UGS must be reflected in how they are task-organised within land forces. Due consideration must be given to how UGS will move around the battlefield, as it will often not be by their own steam. Maintenance and repair of UGS will require new training courses and a close relationship with industrial partners.</p> -<p>This dialogue prompted him to work with Booz Allen Hamilton to reimagine federal network security and resilience. With its support, Gray Space Strategies hired a network of academic and policy researchers to study the balance of threats to federal networks outside of defense and intelligence agencies. The team conducted interviews and mapped out the history of cybersecurity initiatives. As part of this larger research effort, Gray Space Strategies reached out to Solarium alumni at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and sponsored the creation of an independent task force that led to this study.</p> +<p>The principal conclusion to draw is that UGS will require significant support from their human counterparts. Moreover, cognitive burden on operators must be considered and managed. Systems move slowly, and the difficulty of navigating in complex terrain means they are not suited to some of the tasks for which they have been proposed, such as dismounted close combat in complex terrain. It is important to involve as many soldiers as possible in experimentation, and expose them to UGS early and often. This can be achieved by employing UGS in those areas with the highest throughput of soldiers, such as firing ranges and exercise areas, and making use of simulation. In addition, initial training should include education and demonstrations of UGS for new recruits. This will help build familiarity, favourability and trust in these systems.</p> -<p>The net result is in the following pages. The task force and research team built on the work of Gray Space Strategies and conducted over 30 interviews with a mix of federal and private sector chief information security officers (CISOs) and other technical and policy professionals who work every day behind the scenes to deliver public and private goods through cyberspace. Based on these interviews and baseline research, the research team developed a tabletop exercise to illuminate future threats almost certain to challenge FCEB agencies in the near future. Through six expert tabletop exercise sessions held in the summer of 2023 and a parallel online version with 1,000 members of the U.S. general public, the research team was able to see how both experts and the populace see future threats and assess the capability and capacity of the U.S. government to secure cyberspace.</p> +<p>The potential of human–machine teams is significant, but hype should not disguise the limitations of UGS and the difficulty of integrating new technology into established structures.</p> -<p>What the task force and research team found is that increasing resources is necessary to meeting the challenge at hand, but it is insufficient. The U.S. government has increased funding for cybersecurity and created new agencies and authorities but still struggles with resourcing strategies that align budgets against risks. The good news is that new initiatives and funding are extending the ability of key players in the federal government to secure the FCEB landscape. The bad news is that processes and procedures still need to catch up to create unity of effort. And time is not on the United States’ side.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>Adversaries see better returns from attacking the United States through cyberspace relative to the cost and risk of a more direct confrontation. Perversely, it is easier for them to target critical infrastructure and the basic goods and services offered by the U.S. federal government than it is to shut down the Pentagon or hunt spies online. There is an increasing chance that a major geopolitical crisis becomes a form for digital hostage-taking, with authoritarian states seeking to disrupt FCEB agencies as a way of signaling the risks of escalation to U.S. politicians and the public. This logic flips decades of strategy on its head and makes countervalue targeting — holding innocent civilians at risk — the preferred gambit for authoritarians. The old logic of focusing on counterforce targeting and narrowing hostilities to military forces to preserve space for diplomacy and avoid a broader war may be starting to crumble.</p> +<h4 id="context">Context</h4> -<p>In other words, cybersecurity is not just about force reassurance and protecting defense and intelligence assets during a crisis. It comes down to people. Denying adversaries the ability to hold Americans hostage in cyberspace is now a core national interest. Unlike traditional threats, this denial strategy is not owned by generals and appointees in the Pentagon. It is coordinated by the ONCD and executed by a mix of federal agencies and private sector companies still working to align their priorities and budgets to secure cyberspace.</p> +<p>The presence of robots on the battlefield is central in today’s military discourse. A recent British Army recruiting advert showed soldiers operating in close combat alongside humanoid and wheeled robots. A former head of the British armed forces has stated that in the 2030s, the Army could comprise 90,000 soldiers and 30,000 robots. The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a recent interview that “you’re going to see significant portions of armies and navies and air forces that will be robotic”. There is a significant jump from where forces are now to this envisioned state. Experimentation with uncrewed ground systems (UGS) in military forces is gaining pace. Many forces are running trials with a variety of systems. Uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) are far more mature in their journey and lessons can be drawn across to their land-based brethren. Similar to UAS, it is believed that UGS will provide competitive advantage to land forces in several ways. UGS have the potential to support logistics and reconnaissance missions, as well as the ability to be armed with remote weapon systems to provide additional firepower to manoeuvre units. They can remove soldiers from harm’s way and increase mass, which underpins fighting power. However, there are substantial technological hurdles and organisational realities which need to be overcome before UGS are seamlessly integrated into military forces and become a force multiplier. The simple existence of such systems is not enough to transform warfare or generate competitive advantage for a force. It is not clear that any military force has integrated UGS at scale except for bomb disposal robots. These basic UGS have been part of military arsenals for decades, but the current zeitgeist is focused on those systems with a degree of autonomy which can unlock operational effectiveness above that seen on battlefields today.</p> -<p>At the center of this strategy is the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and its evolving mission to make civilian government networks (i.e., .gov websites) more secure and resilient. New funding and authorities envision continuous diagnostics and mitigation (CDM) applications standing watch across the .gov ecosystem. These guards are extensions of a complex web of agencies, including the National Institute of Standards (NIST), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the ONCD, all working to coordinate security priorities, technology standards, and budget submissions. On the ground, each FCEB agency has a chief information security officer (CISO) constantly negotiating with their agency leadership about imposing cyber hygiene measures and gauging how much money to dedicate to purchasing approved CDM applications and other cybersecurity efforts. Put simply, each of these agencies has to budget both for defending against national security risks and for their statutory requirements to provide unique goods and services. They face rising costs and uneasy choices given the labyrinth of new resources and authorities coming online. In other words, they need help.</p> +<p>This paper answers three research questions focused on the integration of UGS into light land forces at the tactical level. The first concerns how UGS can be usefully employed in tactical land formations with their technical limitations and tactical realities considered. The second relates to how they get to the fight in the first place: organisation, movement and sustainment of UGS around battlefield echelons must be considered, and this is much less examined in the literature than is their use in frontline combat. The third involves how military forces can ensure that UGS are put to good use by their soldiers. Preparing soldiers to form part of human–machine teams must be a deliberate act, using training and education to build trust and understanding. The paper focuses on developments in the British and US militaries, but lessons can be drawn more widely.</p> -<p>And service starts with helping those most in need. In the pages that follow, the task force and research team offer a list of recommendations intended to start a broader dialogue between the branches of government and the U.S. people about how best to defend cyberspace. The report is intended to serve as the start of a dialogue about how to best align ends, ways, and means. The strength of a democracy is its willingness to solve problems in the public square through debate. It is the task force’s hope that the recommendations below contribute to ongoing discussions around how CISA in particular can play a useful role in securing cyberspace.</p> +<p>Light land forces have been chosen as the focus for discussion, although employment considerations can be extrapolated to other parts of the force. Light infantry operate with minimal vehicular support, although they may be supported by vehicles such as quad bikes. They have the critical task of closing with the enemy at close quarters and seizing ground in complex terrain. These troops are laden with all the equipment required to operate for days at a time, including weapons, ammunition, rations, water, radios, batteries and more. As a result, they may have much to gain from the advent of UGS.</p> -<h3 id="executive-summary">Executive Summary</h3> +<p>This variety of potential uses means that UGS offer great potential utility to armed forces. However, their development, introduction and scaling across armies requires careful consideration, the totality of which is not immediately obvious. Considerations are set out below to outline how military procurement professionals and concept developers might conceive the introduction of UGS into the force.</p> -<p>Over the last 40 years, the United States has made progress in securing cyberspace, but its federal networks remain vulnerable to attacks by state and non-state actors. Malign actors can hold the United States hostage by disrupting the ability of the federal government to provide basic services and public goods the country relies on for everything from food to economic growth to cutting-edge research. Beyond the battlefield, the “.gov” — federal civilian executive branch (FCEB) agency — networks remain a critical requirement for American prosperity as well as a crucial vulnerability. Absent renewed efforts to secure these networks, the United States will remain at risk of cost imposition and political warfare in cyberspace.</p> +<h4 id="structure">Structure</h4> -<p>To address this challenge, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) formed a task force of former senior appointees, cybersecurity experts, and private sector chief information security officers (CISOs) to study the past, present, and future of securing the .gov. After a six-month study that involved interviews with federal and private sector CISOs, six tabletop exercises, and a survey of 1,000 members of the general U.S. public, CSIS found that resources alone were insufficient to address the magnitude of the challenge. The U.S. government needs better planning frameworks and coordination mechanisms to work across the diverse mix of agencies within the federal executive branch. Actors such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) play a leading role but need to find ways to better leverage existing authorities to coordinate resources and risk management across over 100 federal executive agencies. As long as these agencies maintain separate budgets and personnel for managing cybersecurity, it creates inherent planning and coordination challenges. While new reporting requirements and capabilities are coming online, for continuous diagnostics and mitigation (CDM) and threat hunt, the mission to secure the .gov is not finished. Planning and new response frameworks will need to follow that enable a more robust and fully staffed CISA to work alongside the CISOs in over 100 federal executive agencies to safeguard American prosperity. This long-term planning must include coordinated budgets and strategy with agencies and other key actors such as the Office of Management of Budget (OMB) and the Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) alongside synchronizing incident response across the whole of government.</p> +<p>After setting out its methodology, the paper outlines the principal characteristics of UGS. These are the basis of their numerous uses and the foundation of their strengths and limitations. The drivers behind UGS development – including reducing risk, increasing mass, and the ability to increase advantage through human–machine teams – are noted. Next, the state of the art of UGS is shown, demonstrating the numerous use cases which are developing in forces around the world. With this foundation set out, the bulk of the paper then offers several areas of investigation and recommendations for military forces. The first concerns how such systems might be employed at the tactical level. The second is how UGS can be moved around the battlefield and where they might be assigned organisationally. Third, means by which to socialise UGS within a force, improve education and foster trust are offered. These areas are often sidelined by discussion of experiments or capabilities, without due thought to the various interdependencies and whole-force considerations.</p> -<p>Based on this study, the task force recommends changes to how the U.S. government resources cybersecurity, executes existing authorities, and creates opportunities and incentives to coordinate across over 100 federal executive agencies. Put bluntly, money is not enough to defend the .gov. The U.S. government needs to do a better job of planning, coordinating, and communicating the risks associated with cyberattacks against federal executive agencies. This will likely require consistent staffing at CISA and exploring new service models such as creating collaborative planning teams that deploy to help agencies develop cyber risk strategies and tailored dashboards to monitor their networks.</p> +<h4 id="methodology">Methodology</h4> -<p>At the same time, the study surfaced ideas about a number of more contentious but important reforms that warrant further debate. First, the ability of the federal government to attract, train, and retain cybersecurity professionals is a national security issue. Until agencies such as CISA are fully staffed and the federal government has a larger cyber workforce, the ability to defend the .gov is diminished. Second, emerging capabilities like artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have the potential to revolutionize cyber defense but also to create new threat vectors. Agencies such as CISA will have to work alongside current AI/ML strategy efforts to ensure the .gov is ready for an entirely new character of cyberspace. Third, there could be a larger economy of scale to pooling cyber defense resources across federal agencies and creating a more centralized defensive strategy similar to the evolution of the Department of Defense Information Networks (DODIN). Finally, inflation has the potential to complicate resourcing for cybersecurity. Long-term planning efforts will have to ensure that there are mechanisms in place to adapt to sudden changes in prices associated with updating CDM and threat hunt capabilities.</p> +<p>This paper is founded on both primary and secondary research. First, the author has conducted consultations with both practitioners and analysts, aimed at discussing their experience with UGS and associated technology. He has also deployed on and visited military exercises, such as Project Convergence 22. The author is a serving military officer and has extensive experience of and a professional background in the employment of robotics and autonomous systems (RAS). He has spent time with industry, looking at both hardware and software. A literature review of academic articles, news media and military press releases has also been conducted.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>The author has also attended conferences with military personnel examining UGS. Existing research and expertise on the organisational impact of UGS is limited compared with that on their aerial counterparts. The literature is either very technical with an academic focus, or less analytical, mainly comprising news articles and manufacturer comment. Moreover, the paucity of information in the public domain about military UGS has also imposed a limitation on this research. Attempting to describe a future state is inherently difficult, but the assumptions and considerations laid out in this paper are grounded in reality, and draw on practical knowledge of both RAS and military organisational processes and structure.</p> -<p>Despite over 40 years of investments and initiatives by the U.S. federal government, cyberspace remains vulnerable. Every day brings small intrusions and insidious espionage campaigns designed to hide malware in networks, creating a dangerous complacency that risks the ability of the federal government to provide basic goods and services. Since no single attack has been a major catastrophe capable of competing with stories about war, inflation, public health, and climate change, headlines prove fickle. The money and data that are lost fail to shock the public. Every additional dollar authorized by Congress to protect the network is squeezed by competing requirements. Everyone moves on to the next attack more vulnerable than before.</p> +<h3 id="i-what-are-ugs">I. What are UGS?</h3> -<p>This tragedy is perfectly encapsulated by the 2020 compromise of the SolarWinds software update, which reveals the promise and peril on the horizon as the U.S. government seeks to secure cyberspace for its citizens. In December 2020, cybersecurity firm FireEye detected a supply chain attack on SolarWinds’ Orion software. The “trojanized” (disguised) malware was unintentionally pushed out to approximately 18,000 federal and private sector clients during a routine software update. The attack hit nine federal agencies and over 100 private companies, embedding backdoors designed to exfiltrate data — and, in a future crisis, to launch crippling cyberattacks. Subsequent reporting estimated that the attackers — linked to Russian intelligence — likely had gained access as much as six months earlier. To put that in perspective, while the National Security Agency (NSA) and Cyber Command proclaimed success in defending forward during the 2020 presidential election and in disrupting Russian cyber capabilities, hackers connected to Moscow were launching one of the largest cyber espionage campaigns in modern history.</p> +<p>UGS are vehicles or static platforms that operate on land without a human crew inside, although some systems can be optionally uncrewed. UGS can be as small as shoeboxes and even thrown by users. Others are as large as historically crewed vehicles, weighing many tonnes. They may or may not be armoured. UGS may be wheeled, tracked, have legs or a combination of the three. Each type of drivetrain has its advantages and disadvantages. Wheels are good for speed and manoeuvrability on even surfaces, are lightweight and are simple to replace. They are, however, vulnerable to shrapnel damage and punctures. Tracks are useful for offroad manoeuvrability and offer good traction over rough terrain. However, they are generally slower than wheels and are also complex to refit if they become dislodged. UGS with legs, such as the Boston Dynamics Spot, can tackle obstacles such as stairs and climb very steep slopes, and can also move laterally. Wheeled and tracked vehicles are faster over most surfaces, however.</p> -<p>At the same time, the SolarWinds response showed the importance of creating a focal point for coordination between the federal executive branch and the private sector, highlighting why twenty-first-century security goes beyond the military and intelligence community. During the SolarWinds crisis, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) worked with FireEye and Microsoft — whose software infrastructure was targeted — to get electronic copies of infected servers. These copies helped the NSA and Cyber Command diagnose the extent of the malware infection.</p> +<p>UGS exist on a spectrum of control. They may be operated by a soldier holding a wired controller or a remote control while within line of sight. Examples include mine clearance systems and bomb disposal robots. Teleoperation adds a level of complexity, in which the operator relies on the UGS’ cameras and sensors to make sense of surroundings and controls them from a distance. UGS with levels of automaticity or automation are more complex still. Within this category, there remains significant variety. It is necessary to stress that a system being uncrewed does not mean it is autonomous. The Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) framework is one toolset with which to understand UGS’ autonomous capability. Autonomy can be understood as a system’s “own ability of integrated sensing, perceiving, analyzing, communicating, planning, decision-making, and acting/executing, to achieve its goals as assigned”. Systems with high levels of autonomy are rare. More commonly, UGS have a leader–follower function whereby the vehicle will follow another crewed vehicle or a human commander. Increasing levels of autonomy then allow some UGS to follow waypoints given by a human operator and avoid obstacles while following a given route or exploring a designated area. Some systems may have the capability to act with conditional automation, whereby an operator can take control in certain circumstances, such as if the UGS cannot figure out how to manoeuvre around a certain obstacle. UGS that have the capability to act independently of an operator’s instructions and make a series of linked “decisions” in pursuit of an end objective are scarce. And that end objective will have been given by a human operator, which again means that the system is not fully autonomous. The necessity of human input is a golden thread in this research. Supervision of many systems still requires soldiers to be at least monitoring, and perhaps solely focused on, the UGS, rather than free to conduct other tasks.</p> -<p>The crisis also illustrated the need to accelerate initiatives to secure soft targets across the 102 entities comprising FCEB agencies. In the wake of SolarWinds, CISA has worked to modernize EINSTEIN, a legacy network of sensors on the federal network; create a new Cyber Analytics and Data System; and enhance its Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program capabilities. These efforts consist of a mix of contracts worth over $400 million and a request for almost $500 million in the FY 2024 budget. Another effort was the American Rescue Plan Act, which included $650 million targeted at addressing FCEB agency weaknesses revealed in the SolarWinds and Microsoft exchange intrusions. These efforts are critical to counter evolving threat actors. SolarWinds took an indirect approach and bypassed the EINSTEIN sensors by compromising trusted third-party software.</p> +<p>Systems also differ by use, which is examined in detail in later chapters. For the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that any remote weapons systems associated with UGS will have a human in the loop throughout for decision-making, retaining meaningful control, and providing authorisation for any engagement. This is in line with British defence policy.</p> -<p>Resources are necessary but insufficient to protect the over 100 agencies in the FCEB landscape. As seen in SolarWinds, CISA must align resources with strategy and coordinate with diverse stakeholders across the federal government and the private sector to enable entities, public and private, to manage their own risk. Strategy must align ends, ways, and means. Moreover, today’s federal cybersecurity has been shaped as much by the threat as by bureaucracy. As such, there is an urgent need to ensure that CISA’s security mission is aligned with new offices and authorities — residing in entities including the ONCD — and to overcome defunct dividing lines that characterize how the U.S. federal government buys technology and secures its networks through the various department and agency budget submissions.</p> +<h4 id="sensors">Sensors</h4> -<p>Absent a renewed focus on organizational structures and processes within the federal government, the millions of dollars on the table to secure FCEBs will produce diminishing marginal returns. Each congressional dollar appropriated will not produce an equal dollar’s worth of security for U.S. citizens. The networks on which the public relies for everything from food and housing subsidies to business permits and patents will prove brittle. As seen with SolarWinds, great powers and other adversaries stand in the shadows ready to exploit the organizational vulnerability of the United States, not just its technical cyber vulnerabilities.</p> +<p>The simplest remotely operated UGS may have no sensors, as the human operator is expected to be close by. An example might be an excavator. Systems such as bomb disposal robots have cameras that allow the operator a close-up view from the system, and allow the manipulation of the target object with the operator at a safe distance. As systems gain autonomous functions, a suite of sensors can be expected, including LIDAR, RADAR, GPS and cameras. LIDAR and RADAR help the UGS make a 3D map of their surroundings, which is then used for routing and obstacle avoidance. Ultrasonic sensors may be mounted on the sides of the vehicle to detect objects very close up. In civilian applications, these are used to help autonomous vehicles park. Video cameras are used to detect humans or animals, as well as to make sense of traffic lights and signage. Video cameras are also able to pick up more nuances than LIDAR and RADAR, including hand gestures and traffic cones. GPS helps the system situate itself within the wider geography of the area and aids a system to stay on course when navigating a waypoint route or searching an area for reconnaissance purposes. UGS may also have an inertial measurement unit to give an additional indication of the direction and velocity in which the system is moving. This information can complement that of GPS, and is useful when GPS signals are weak, such as when moving through urban areas or tunnels, or during bad weather. Developments in this area are fast moving, and new sensors and combinations are being experimented with. Given this, commenting categorically is difficult, but suffice to say UGS use sensors to make sense of their surroundings.</p> -<p>Consider the counterfactual: if the compromise of the SolarWinds software update had not been detected, what could Russia have done to deter U.S. support to Ukraine? The malware pushed to 18,000 federal and private sector networks could have used backdoors to corrupt data and even shut down systems. Commerce officials could have received false emails with the potential to temporarily distort financial markets. The theft of encrypted keys at the Department of the Treasury could have caused a loss of confidence, not just in financial markets but in the entire U.S. federal tax system. The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration might have temporarily delayed transporting nuclear materials and operations at multiple national labs, essentially providing Moscow a nuclear signaling mechanism without an explosion. Department of State correspondence could have been used to mislead U.S. partners as to the nation’s willingness to support Ukraine, creating confusion and uncertainty that bought Moscow time to advance on the battlefield.</p> +<h4 id="software">Software</h4> -<p>This counterfactual is not hyperbole. In May 2023, researchers discovered Volt Typhoon, a massive espionage campaign by the Chinese Communist Party to access critical infrastructure networks it could exploit in the event of a crisis with the United States. In addition to targeting U.S. military bases in the Asia-Pacific — home to thousands of service members and their families — the campaign looked for ways to delay troop movements, degrade communications, and cause economic disruption.</p> +<p>Software must then make sense of all the inputs described above. The UGS’ use, the environment they will operate in and their level of autonomy determine the complexity of the software. The software uses the sensors to make sense of where the UGS are, what is around them and, in some cases, what might happen next in the case of people and vehicles in close proximity, and what to do if a particular circumstance presents itself, such as another vehicle moving into the systems’ path. Software will use this information to plan UGS’ next move before moving. The systems may take their external environment and plan against a library of scenarios on which they have been previously trained. The software must fuse information from the various sensors to form one combined understanding of the environment, using a variety of filter mechanisms. Software architectures differ from system to system and in complexity. UGS may also have target recognition capability that can spot armoured vehicles and movement on the horizon, which can be fed to commanders for subsequent decisions and actions.</p> -<p>Military strategy has become fused with cybersecurity as states use cyberspace not just to target armed forces but to hold civilian populations hostage. This digital hostage taking renews the cruel logic of countervalue targeting and threatens to punish civilian infrastructure as a way of limiting an adversary’s military options (i.e., deterrence by punishment). Every rail line, airport, or seaport disabled has the potential to delay troop mobilization and create critical supply disruptions that risk public panic. Cyber tools can calibrate the pain, creating a risk strategy in which each vulnerability exploited becomes a signal and pressure for the target to back down or face worse consequences during a crisis. Elected officials in a democracy cannot afford to ignore their citizens, resulting in either capitulation or dangerous escalation spirals.</p> +<h4 id="power">Power</h4> -<p>While the world has yet to see the full use of cyber operations along these lines during a war, states are developing new cyber strategies that integrate coercion, mis-, dis-, and malinformation, and other methods of endangering the modern connectivity the world relies on. The recent Chinese intrusions are a harbinger of a new age of cyber operations. To access networks in Guam, the hackers used internet-facing Fortiguard devices, which incorporate machine learning (ML) to detect and respond to malware. The operation involved using legitimate network credentials and network administrative tools to gain access and develop the ability to launch future attacks. In other words, the attacker used stealth to move with the terrain and find ways of bypassing sophisticated digital sentries.</p> +<p>Smaller UGS are usually battery powered, with larger systems using a combustion engine or hybrid diesel–electric power train. Each has benefits and limitations. Electric systems are near-silent to run and produce a low heat signature. However, battery life is often limited, and requires extensive management, of replacing batteries and charging them. Systems using diesel or petrol are easier to fold into existing military logistic chains as they are already geared to provide fuel to current fleets. However, they have a significant noise and heat signature, which can make them vulnerable in an era of persistent ISR capability.</p> -<p>Even if states like Russia struggled to integrate cyber operations with its military operations in 2022, one should not assume the risk is gone. It is not just AI/ML and generative AI that create new threat vectors in cyberspace. The convergence of digital and critical infrastructure networks opens a new configuration of vulnerabilities across the 16 critical infrastructure sectors (see Figure 1). It is easy to imagine a different type of punishment campaign waged by Moscow that substitutes malware for cruise missiles to attack power plants and key rail lines. Similarly, Russia could have temporarily disabled gas pipelines with cyber operations, a tactic already demonstrated in Saudi Arabia by Iran in 2012.</p> +<h4 id="command-and-control">Command and Control</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/J2ITFP1.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Cyber Critical Infrastructure Targeting.</strong> Source: CSIS International Security Program research.</em></p> +<p>Despite the connotations of autonomy, UGS must in practice remain connected to their human operators. This could be to give the UGS instructions on where to go next, or to execute a particular command. Or it might be to relay information back to the operator, such as a potential target. Data processing may take place at the edge, depending on the size of the platform, or packets of data will be sent for processing elsewhere. UGS will place demands on the existing combat radio network, and this must be planned for. There also exists opportunity for adversary action in jamming or spoofing systems. UGS may be able to carry out tasks without being connected to the network, before reconnecting when necessary, which will increase their survivability.</p> -<p>The number of cyberattacks against critical infrastructure appears to be on the rise. As seen in Figure 1, there is a troubling history of cyber operations targeting critical infrastructure that warrants careful consideration. Consider an alternative indirect approach in which a hacker enters through the FCEB agencies linked to these sectors. This is exactly what happened in 2017 when the WannaCry ransomware spread across the National Health Services in the United Kingdom. In other words, cyber operations targeting FCEB agencies could quickly pass through the federal government and spill over into the broader economy.</p> +<h3 id="ii-what-are-the-purported-benefits-of-ugs-to-tactical-land-forces">II. What are the Purported Benefits of UGS to Tactical Land Forces?</h3> -<p>Each new device added to a network can improve efficiency but also create emergent risk vectors that would have been unpredictable before its introduction. In 2015, critical flaws were discovered by third-party operational software that connected sensor data distributed across entities such as power plants, water treatment facilities, and pipelines. The flaw allowed attackers to execute random SQL statements on the system, in effect enabling hackers to tamper with data, elevate their administrative privileges for future attacks, and conduct denial-of-service attacks. In 2021, 14 of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors in the United States experienced ransomware attacks. This trend continued in 2022, with 140 percent growth in cyber operations targeting the industrial sector (i.e., critical manufacturing).</p> +<p>The drivers for the development of military UGS are numerous, and are broken down below.</p> -<p>As the threat evolves, money alone is not enough to secure cyberspace. The government must adapt and create new ways and means of achieving this common end. This report is part of that effort. The following sections show how the past became the present, helping to frame the challenge facing the different bureaucratic structures and processes used by the federal government to secure non-defense and intelligence functions. Given this historical perspective, the report then pivots to look at the current state, including interviews with senior officials and tabletop exercises with a mix of experts and the general public to understand current threats and challenges. The output of these activities highlights likely futures and how the threat could evolve in the near future. Based on these insights, the report concludes with a list of recommendations on how to align new processes and authorities with resources to protect the resilience of the federal government in the information age.</p> +<h4 id="risk">Risk</h4> -<h3 id="how-did-we-get-here">How Did We Get Here?</h3> +<p>Using uncrewed systems in place of crewed vehicles can reduce risk to personnel. Soldiers can be kept further back from the line of contact and can avoid a number of dull and dangerous tasks that up to now have been the responsibility of humans.</p> -<p>New forms of communication tend to produce widespread change. As people exchange ideas in new ways, it leads to different social norms, economic revolutions, and challenges to prevailing governance frameworks. And despite modern attention spans, these changes often take a generation to manifest.</p> +<h4 id="mass">Mass</h4> -<p>This truth is ever-present in the emergence of the internet and the distributed communications networks that have defined the first decades of the twenty-first century. These modes of communication created new challenges for governing institutions that were accustomed to providing public goods in ways that differed little from the twentieth century. This gap between change and governance created a tension at the core of the federal government.</p> +<p>Uncrewed systems allow the generation of additional mass above that which can be formed through an army’s physical workforce size. A future scenario might see one soldier controlling a suite of UGS, which could increase the area over which a unit has sight, influence and, potentially, control.</p> -<p>For decades, it has been increasingly acknowledged within Congress and the larger federal government that there need to be formal mechanisms governing the protection of federal networks. This section provides context for why and how perceptions around federal cybersecurity have evolved, as well as what that means for CISA’s mission today.</p> +<h4 id="situational-awareness">Situational Awareness</h4> -<p>Seen from a historical perspective, federal cybersecurity has been shaped as much by threat as by bureaucracy. From its inception, the internet has seen a combustible mix of great powers and non-state actors competing to exploit network vulnerabilities and hunt the threats that always seem to be one step ahead of the defense. This digital game has strained existing bureaucratic structures and authorities, making it increasingly difficult to coordinate action across branches of government to protect not just cyberspace but the critical infrastructure that is increasingly reliant on modern connectivity to deliver public goods. These coordination challenges have created planning and budgeting dilemmas that agencies continue to grapple with today.</p> +<p>UGS equipped with sensors such as cameras and radar can help commanders get a firmer sense of the battlespace. UAS have proven very effective in this area, and UGS can add additional capabilities, such as navigating through those places less accessible to UAS.</p> -<p>Looking ahead, federal cybersecurity should be about risk management that aligns to the threat and uses the structure and demands of the bureaucracy to the advantage (not detriment) of cyber defenses.</p> +<h4 id="burden-reduction">Burden Reduction</h4> -<h4 id="major-incidents-cyber-strategies-and-legislative-action-pre-cisa">Major Incidents, Cyber Strategies, and Legislative Action Pre-CISA</h4> +<p>UGS can carry equipment that currently burdens soldiers. This allows soldiers to move more quickly and with less effort. This is important when soldiers have become loaded with equipment – in the pursuit of protection, reducing their ability to fight.</p> -<p><strong>FROM BYTES TO RIGHTS: THE EMERGENCE OF CYBERSECURITY REGULATION</strong></p> +<h4 id="humanmachine-teaming-hmt">Human–Machine Teaming (HMT)</h4> -<p>Cybersecurity began in the 1970s when researcher Bob Thomas created a computer program called Creeper. Creeper was more an experiment in self-replicating programs than malware. It was designed to move between computers and leave a message. Fellow researcher Ray Tomlinson then wrote another program, Reaper, that moved across the early network logging out Creeper wherever it identified the program.</p> +<p>In the popular imagination, machines replace people in their roles entirely. However, this is not how military forces are conceiving of the near to medium horizon. Instead, the optimum balance between soldier and robot is key. HMT makes use of the comparative advantages inherent to humans and machines respectively. Humans do the tasks they are best suited to, and robots do those they are best at. The British Army, for example, envisages that humans will remain the core part of HMT for some time to come. The Army framework sees increasing machine involvement over time. In the immediate future, RAS-enhanced teams will see machines used in a transactional manner, as tools. These teams are limited by the current levels of autonomy and human levels of trust. This phase sees machines used to increase performance in human-led tasks. Later, trust and technology develop to enable RAS-integrated teams in which humans cede more control to machines whose autonomous capabilities have improved. Here, humans and machines perform tasks that result in a combined outcome. Finally, RAS-supervised teams are envisaged in which machines can outperform humans and humans retain a supervisory role to keep meaningful control.</p> -<p><strong>Great power competition was part of the internet from its inception.</strong> By 1981, an independent U.S. federal agency, the National Science Foundation (NSF), had begun several initiatives, dubbed ARPANET, that built off the early internet experiment by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. The ARPANET developed the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP) and set the stage for an NSF initiative connecting computers to create early networks. The NSF took on this role because the Department of Defense (DOD) “made it clear they did not want to run a national computer network that wasn’t directly related to defense work.” One critical NSF initiative was the Computer Science Research Network (CSNET). As the name implies, its goal was to connect computers across national university campuses together. The CSNET grew quickly, and by 1981 it merged with the Because It’s Time Network to include email and file transfers. However, the demand for networking grew quickly and set the stage a few years later for joining regional universities with regional supercomputers and the birth of the National Science Foundation Network. This critical accomplishment facilitated research, but it also increased opportunities for Cold War rivals such as the Soviet Union and China to conduct espionage on sensitive U.S. data.</p> +<p>This framework is particular to the British experience, but a similar gradient is noted in other forces. For example, the US Army’s RAS strategy notes three likely epochs of development. The first lasted from 2017 to 2020, when the Army matured concepts and initiated programmes to look at increasing situational awareness, lightening the load on soldiers and improving sustainment. The second epoch, from 2021 to 2030, aims at improvements including achieving automated convoy operations and removing soldiers from lead vehicles. In the far term, from 2031 to 2040, the first era of automated systems will be replaced, and see new organisational designs and fully integrated autonomous systems, which work in concert to achieve the task.</p> -<p>From the beginning, however, <strong>threats in cyberspace were not confined to state-based actors.</strong> In 1983, Wisconsin hackers known as the 414s, led by 17-year-old Neal Patrick, breached the computer defenses of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). LANL was established in 1943 to conduct research for the Manhattan Project and nuclear deterrence. After the FBI investigated the 414s, a congressional report on Mr. Patrick’s witness testimony to a U.S. House of Representative committee highlighted that “ironically . . . [the 414s] gave this new [LANL] account or file the code name ‘Joshua,’ repeating the access code used in the film ‘War Games.’” The intrusion into sensitive systems by Mr. Patrick and the 414s highlighted faults in safeguarding computer networks and might have inspired a separate breach in the mid-1980s by agents working for the Soviet Union.</p> +<p>It is not the case that simply adding systems is the answer to providing mass in armed forces. Depending on levels of autonomy and the requirement of a task, soldiers can only manage so many responsibilities. If an uncrewed ground system is remote controlled without any level of autonomy, the ratio will be one to one, or even worse. It has been noted on some experiments that it takes three soldiers to adequately manage one uncrewed ground system. A one to two ratio would see one soldier jump between systems to operate them. Systems with more autonomy are less burdensome on the operator, and soldiers can then manage more systems at once. Cognitive overload is a crucial consideration when building a force structure that includes UGS. There are only so many screens or notifications a soldier can make sense of. There are also more practical considerations that do not generally make it into discussions of HMT at the policy level. On Project Convergence 22, a US military experimentation exercise, a US Army officer spoke of the difficulty for a junior soldier of sitting in the back of a moving Bradley armoured fighting vehicle while trying to manage uncrewed systems on a tablet computer. They quickly became overwhelmed. This might be because the uncrewed systems required inputs or verification from an operator, or it might be because the information and intelligence being sent from the systems was difficult to digest. Simply sitting in an armoured vehicle on the move is not a comfortable experience. Adding additional cognitive load may be problematic. Ergonomic issues such as motion sickness are an important consideration. Some soldiers may cope better than others. Seemingly minor additional tasks may have significant repercussions for combat effectiveness. This speaks to the importance of allowing soldiers to get used to working with such systems, and being aware of their own abilities and those of the systems.</p> -<p><strong>The concept of threat hunt and how best to continuously monitor and defend federal networks has been a central issue since the early days of connected networks.</strong> In 1986, computer managers at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL) discovered a network breach. LBL was a university research facility that maintained unclassified research and information on its systems. A 24-year-old hacker based in West Germany penetrated the computer systems at LBL, searching files and emails with keywords such as “nuclear,” “Star Wars,” and “S.D.I. [Strategic Defense Initiative].” However, much to the bewilderment of the LBL team, they assessed that this hacker confused LBL with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, a sister laboratory to LBL that conducted classified research. In this moment, the team decided to not deny and isolate the intrusion but rather to study it by tracing it back. They traced the intruder from multiple points, including a defense contractor in Virginia, a Navy data center, and other military and non-military centers. The LBL team further alerted and collaborated with the FBI to investigate and eventually charge Markus Hess in 1990 for selling the stolen data for $54,000 to the Soviet KGB. The character of connected networks enabled easy lateral movement for clever attacks.</p> +<p>Having outlined the foundational concepts of military UGS, the potential individual tasks of such systems can be investigated, the subject of the next chapter.</p> -<p>For policy practitioners in the cybersecurity field, securing computers was a process that started before the high-profile breaches in the 1980s. An early example is from 1972, when the DOD issued Directive 5200.28, “Security Requirements for Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems,” in order to establish “uniform policy, security requirements, administrative controls, and technical measures to protect classified information.” This directive provided new types of authorities that were built on in 1982 with Directive 5215.1, “Computer Security Evaluation Center,” which established the center at the NSA.</p> +<h3 id="iii-what-are-the-potential-uses-of-ugs">III. What are the Potential Uses of UGS?</h3> -<p><strong>Planning and standards played a central role early in imagining how to secure networks of connected devices.</strong> The two directives mentioned above led to a series of trusted computer system evaluation books published by the DOD and NSA known as the “Rainbow Series,” deriving their name from the colorful covers they were issued in. The name also paralleled famous U.S. war plans from the interwar period. The rainbow books were an early attempt to establish standards to secure the DOD components. The most well-known iteration is the “orange book,” published initially in 1983, with a revised version in 1985 titled <em>Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria</em>.</p> +<p>UGS have several proposed uses for military forces, some of which are more obvious than others. These are identified here as potential uses, while subsequent chapters tackle the realities of their employment, whether such uses are realistic, and the implications for the force.</p> -<p>The defense and intelligence communities were not alone in their efforts to secure computers. Picking up where its response to the 414s left off, Congress introduced a series of bills on computer crimes in the 1980s. Of the bills introduced, the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) encapsulated the majority of national efforts to prosecute unauthorized computer network access, codifying civil and criminal penalties and prohibitions against a variety of computer-related conduct and cybercrime. While not exclusively an anti-hacking law, it placed penalties for knowingly accessing a federal computer without authorization.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="load-carriage">Load Carriage</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>The first application of CFAA in criminal proceedings came two years later when a modified computer worm resulted in a widespread denial-of-service attack across thousands of computers. In 1988, a computer science student at Cornell University — the son of an NSA official — hacked the computer network at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and planted what became known as the Morris Worm. This worm did not damage or destroy files, but it quickly slowed down email communications, sometimes for days. While the breach and planting of the worm were at MIT, its fast spread across computer networks caused concern, as even military communications slowed. As the incident gathered speed and became public, the FBI investigated and eventually charged Robert T. Morris in 1991 for unauthorized access to protected computers. The Morris Worm became the first documented case of the CFAA federally prosecuting a hacker, and it highlighted the importance of protecting cyberspace for the nation.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gmq8bpj.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>Figure 1: UGS with Cargo Basket</em></p> -<p><strong>THE GOVERNMENT BYTES BACK: LEGISLATIVE STRIDES IN CYBERSECURITY</strong></p> +<p>Load carriage is the principal identified task for UGS at today’s stage of development. This might be carrying personal equipment such as bergens, rations and ammunition, or platoon and company equipment such as ladders or beaching equipment. UGS might also be equipped with stretchers to enable casualties to be extracted from danger areas. Casualty evacuations are a particularly strenuous activity for soldiers. Being able to use UGS instead has multiple benefits. It allows soldiers to preserve energy in close combat, where fatigue can lead to poor decisions and further casualties. It also keeps soldiers free to complete the task at hand, such as winning a firefight. Another related use for UGS is for broader logistic purposes, especially in the dangerous “last mile” delivering supplies to frontline locations.</p> -<p>Following the launch of the World Wide Web, Congress continued to work toward improving the resiliency of the federal networks, with a focus on information technology (IT). This came into light in 1995 with the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the Information Technology Management Reform Act (Clinger-Cohen Act) of 1995. The Clinger-Cohen Act was a breakthrough for the federal enterprise because it mandated the creation of chief information officers (CIOs) across agencies. The Clinger-Cohen Act also directed agencies to focus on results using IT investment and streamlined procurement processes, detailing how agencies should approach the selection and management of IT projects. <strong>Coordinated action by the executive branch and Congress has been central to securing cyberspace for 40 years.</strong></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="communication-node">Communication Node</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Building on Congress’s actions and picking up the presidential pen in 1998, 10 years after the Morris Worm incident, President Bill Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive NSC-63. Under the directive, the administration signaled its intent to safeguard cyber-based information systems in critical infrastructure. President Clinton presented five important actions: (1) set a national goal to protect critical infrastructure, (2) appoint agency liaisons to work with the private sector and foster public-private partnerships, (3) create a set of general guidelines, (4) issue structure and organization to federal agencies, and (5) task each agency to be responsible for protecting its own critical infrastructure. With the directive, Clinton assured the country that the United States would “take all necessary measures to swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber-attacks on our critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber systems.” <strong>Early on, federal officials saw the interdependencies between cyberspace and critical infrastructure and between cyber and physical security.</strong></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wU9Neva.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>Figure 2: UGS Fitted with Radio Equipment</em></p> -<p><strong>FROM TERROR TO TECHNOLOGY: THE POST-9/11 CYBERSECURITY OVERHAUL</strong></p> +<p>UGS could carry a unit’s radios, which can be very heavy and slow to move. They may also carry electronic countermeasure and electronic warfare systems, which can be used to prevent explosive devices detonating, or to disable enemy UAS. Equally, there are times when soldiers must be detached to form a rebroadcasting or retransmission service if radio waves are blocked by terrain or another barrier. This allows units and headquarters to communicate with one another. This task might be completed by a UGS with a communications equipment fit.</p> -<p>The very concept of security changed after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The attacks not only sparked the war on terror but brought the passage of new legislation to safeguard the homeland. Under President George W. Bush, Congress passed the PATRIOT Act of 2001, which amended the CFAA and extended protections to federal computers located outside the United States. Further, the PATRIOT Act also included computers “used by or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security.” <strong>New threats showed the need for new authorities.</strong></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="surveillance-and-reconnaissance">Surveillance and Reconnaissance</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>In response to both the terrorist attacks and the growing reliance of the federal government on cyberspace, the George W. Bush administration, as a part of its larger Electronic Government (E-Gov) strategy, worked with Congress on the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA). The legislation tasked agencies to “identify and provide information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm resulting from the unauthorized use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information systems.” Importantly, FISMA 2002 not only tasked FCEB agencies with planning out key aspects of their own “tactical-level cybersecurity actions,” but it also attempted to delineate roles between agencies that would support the FCEB agencies, with the OMB providing “strategic support,” the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) providing “operational support,” and the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) establishing standards and guidance. <strong>The number of agencies involved in coordinating cybersecurity was starting to eclipse the planning and budgeting frameworks in place to manage FCEB agencies.</strong></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/JgewS6X.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>Figure 3: UGS Fitted with Cameras and Sensors for Surveillance and Reconnaissance</em></p> -<p>In response to these coordination challenges, the White House released the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace in February 2003. This strategy was developed in response to the September 11 attacks and set forth the U.S. government’s approach to broadly securing networks, reducing vulnerabilities, and minimizing damage from cyber incidents. It was a whole-of-society strategy, underscoring the importance of public and private entities prioritizing cybersecurity as a way to protect critical infrastructure and processes. With regard to federal entities, the strategy emphasized that the government should serve as a model, leading as early adopters for secure technologies and demonstrating best practices in cybersecurity. Further, the strategy mentioned the importance of developing and maintaining clear roles for federal security management. It cited the OMB’s FY 2002 report to Congress that identified ongoing government security gaps, including but not limited to a lack of attention from senior management, a lack of proper education and general awareness training, a lack of security performance metrics and measurements, and a lack of general ability to detect and share information on vulnerabilities.</p> +<p>UGS can be equipped with sensors that can scan the area for potential threats. Software can categorise objects in the UGS’ field of view and identify points of interest, both static and mobile. These can then be passed to commanders for further investigation and potential targeting. Another use of UGS is as a reconnaissance screen moving ahead of dismounted or mounted recce soldiers. Or they might be employed in a static or roving function around unit locations or bases.</p> -<p>The dawn of the twenty-first century saw the United States grappling with new forms of security that eclipsed Cold War–era notions of national security. The active participation of citizens and the provision of goods and services through critical infrastructure emerged as key components that required new thinking. To their credit, officials in the executive and legislative branches rose to the challenge; however, they struggled to achieve lasting results. In the roughly 20 years since the original FISMA and the Bush administration’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, major cyber incidents directly impacting the United States have forced the government to prioritize cybersecurity and reevaluate the very definition of national security. In other words, the proliferation of new networks in cyberspace alongside the acknowledgement that Americans were vulnerable at home drove the need for a new focal point to defend the United States beyond traditional defense, intelligence, and law enforcement considerations.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="chemical-biological-radiological-andor-nuclear-cbrn-sensing">Chemical, Biological, Radiological and/or Nuclear (CBRN) Sensing</h4> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="the-emergence-of-cisa-over-three-administrations">The Emergence of CISA over Three Administrations</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/08amkD9.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>Figure 4: UGS Fitted with CBRN Sensors</em></p> -<p><strong>THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: PAVING THE WAY FOR CISA</strong></p> +<p>UGS can provide a sensor capability for CBRN threats. UGS with appropriate sensors could be sent to locations of potential attacks. Equally, they could remain with troops and carry sensor equipment that had previously to be carried by soldiers.</p> -<p>As a continuation and expansion of Bush-era cyber recommendations, the Obama administration and successive congresses struggled to find the best alignment of cyber and critical infrastructure protection within the newly created DHS. <strong>The optimal structures and processes for securing cyberspace remained elusive.</strong> Many of the initiatives built in 2007 realigned multiple agency portfolios on cyber and critical infrastructure — including defending FCEB agencies — under the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). Through such efforts, the Obama administration laid the foundation for what would eventually become CISA within the DHS.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="armed">Armed</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>First, the administration conducted a 60-day review of the nation’s cyber policies and processes, culminating in the 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review. It then developed and published the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), detailing cybersecurity goals for agencies such as the OMB and DHS. The report was an outgrowth of the CNCI initiative launched by President Bush in National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-54/HSPD-23), which called for the federal government to “integrate many of its technical and organizational capabilities in order to better address sophisticated cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities.” It also built substantially upon the report of the CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th President, <em>Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency</em>. Of relevance to this study, President Obama’s CNCI report details initiatives such as the management of a Federal Enterprise Network with Trusted Internet Connections and the deployment of intrusion detection and prevention systems across the federal enterprise. In other words, <strong>policymakers have seen the importance of defending FCEB agencies and the .gov ecosystem for over 20 years but have struggled to align resources to achieve their ends.</strong></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1t109C8.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>Figure 5: UGS with Remote Weapon Station</em></p> -<p>It was also during this time that the DHS started building and improving on a number of initiatives that have since become key services managed and delivered by CISA. For instance, in 2012, the DHS established the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program and rolled out EINSTEIN 3 Accelerated, which added inline blocking to existing EINSTEIN intrusion detection.</p> +<p>UGS can be armed with remote weapon stations. Remote weapons are in mainstream use on crewed armoured vehicles today. Their benefit is that they allow the weapon to be fired by operators from inside the vehicle without a soldier having to be exposed in a cupola. Cameras mounted on the system allow the operator to aim the system and maintain control. Such systems, for example the Kongsberg Protector, can be mounted on UGS and operated remotely by offset troops. Such weapons might be used as sentry devices or in a fire-support capacity. Another potential use for UGS is as mobile landmines, a technique that has been adopted by the Ukrainian armed forces fighting Russia.</p> -<p>Separately, after nearly a decade of FISMA 2002 guidelines, the Obama administration signed a new FISMA into law in 2014. In addition to updating and streamlining reporting requirements, the new FISMA further delineated roles and responsibilities in cybersecurity management by formally codifying the DHS’s role as the lead for implementing and overseeing FCEB agencies’ IT policies. The government saw a need to coordinate technology standards by getting policies aligned.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="engineering">Engineering</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Most importantly, it should be noted that it was during the final years of the Obama administration that the NPPD was able to develop the plans for the first new operational agency at the DHS since its founding. This plan was provided to Congress and became the basis for later establishing CISA. At the same time, it was clear that these initiatives were still failing to deliver what they promised: an integrated approach to cybersecurity and risk management across the federal government. As seen in the 2015 OMB hack, FCEB agencies were often late in submitting their cyber strategies and struggled to recruit and retain talent. This fact led some circles to call for moving cybersecurity out of the DHS and creating a standalone National Cyber Authority.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/5QtdHuJ.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>Figure 6: UGS Fitted with Mine Clearing Capability</em></p> -<p><strong>THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION: CONSOLIDATING AUTHORITIES AND RESOURCES</strong></p> +<p>Military engineering includes the breaching of obstacles, demining and providing plant for trench digging. This is currently done by hand, or by soldiers using excavators. The civilian mining industry is a world leader in uncrewed technology and uncrewed diggers are in common use. UGS with a digging capability could set up a defensive position with much less human input than is currently required.</p> -<p>Efforts to align federal resources to secure cyberspace accelerated during the Trump administration. Building on President Trump’s Executive Order (EO) 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure, the administration also released its National Cyber Strategy in September 2018 — the first official strategy since the Bush administration’s in 2003.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="deception">Deception</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>A few months after the release of the 2018 cyber strategy, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Act was passed and signed into law, formally creating CISA. The creation of CISA isolated, consolidated, and elevated key functions of the DHS’s NPPD and related DHS initiatives. While the NPPD was already tasked with the majority of the DHS’s cyber responsibilities, this rebranding of the NPPD’s cyber offerings to CISA was more than just a way to consolidate efforts. The initiative also started a path toward greater unity of effort. CISA was empowered to carry out its cyber mission as part of DHS’s mandate to strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure, including federal civilian networks and mission-essential functions. <strong>The consolidation of resources and authorities can help elevate the mission, but its successful execution relies on buy-in from the clients — in this case, FCEB agencies.</strong> The question remained of how best to align resources with the new agency and ensure that it could work, with FCEB entities scattered across the departments outside of the DHS.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/cWatkzP.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>Figure 7: UGS Fitted with Emitters for Deception</em></p> -<p><strong>THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION: SUPPORTING AN EVOLVING CISA MISSION</strong></p> +<p>UGS might also be employed to provide deception capability. This could be in the form of “fake” vehicles or groupings, or they can be used for deception using the electromagnetic spectrum. Such systems deliberately radiate to mislead the enemy. UGS equipped with a radio system and antennae can be used to draw enemy resource and disguise intentions and dispositions.</p> -<p>The Biden administration has continued to build on initiatives started under the Trump and Obama administrations. This continuity relates to the fact that many cybersecurity initiatives involve Congress as much as they do the executive branch. For example, in March 2020, the bipartisan U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission published its final report. Notably, two of its key recommendations were to (1) establish a Senate-confirmed national cyber director, and (2) strengthen CISA. Congress officially established and confirmed a national cyber director, Chris Inglis, in 2021. As one of its primary deliverables, the ONCD developed the Biden administration’s National Cybersecurity Strategy in March 2023. An implementation plan was further released in July 2023.</p> +<p>UGS may be multirole and capable of carrying out more than one of these tasks at a time, or of switching between them. Moreover, UGS should not be considered in isolation. There are also UGS built as mobile launch pads for UAS, such as the THeMIS Observe, which is an example of using the two technologies in concert. Military strategy requires conducting the orchestra of military capability in the most suitable way possible. UGS should be used for those tasks where they offer a competitive advantage. They should not be the answer before the question has been asked. There is always a danger of pursuing technological innovation for its own sake, especially in times when commitments outstrip resource – which is a place in which many forces find themselves. This friction has been recognised as problematic in military forces in the past, and has at times resulted in poor decisions.</p> -<p>The early years of the Biden administration also saw a lot of activity around EO 14028, Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity, and a slew of other executive branch guidance documents supporting and reinforcing it. Of relevance to this report, EO 14028 directs federal government agencies to adopt zero trust architectures (ZTA), a move that has created a necessary — albeit arguably insufficient — role for CISA as the agency that can provide general guidance to FCEB agencies during their ZTA migration.</p> +<p>Having introduced UGS and their proposed military uses, this paper moves in the next chapter to answer three questions:</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FKJWHJf.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: U.S. Government Cybersecurity Timeline.</strong> Source: CSIS International Security Program.</em></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>How can UGS realistically be employed today and in the immediate future, with technological limitations and tactical realities taken into consideration?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How are UGS task-organised and how do they move around the battlespace?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>What is the best way to ensure that soldiers use UGS as intended?</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>In recent years, CISA received additional authorities and resources, the details of which are outlined later in this report. It should also be noted that Congress pushed for FISMA reform in 2022. If passed, the new legislation would have further enhanced CISA’s authorities. However, the legislation passed in the Senate but failed to do so in the House, leaving FISMA 2014 as the status quo. A bipartisan effort is underway to tackle FISMA reform again in 2023. The current bill tracks closely with provisions outlined in the 2022 version (see Recommendation 2.1 in this paper on a report to evaluate CISA’s current and future FCEB mission).</p> +<p>The soldier must remain central to these efforts. The uses outlined above broadly represent attempts to do away with human input where possible. However, UGS are built to support soldiers in their endeavours, and it is soldiers who will enable them to do this. The relationship is key, and the focus should remain on the human, as demonstrated below.</p> -<p><strong>In its next stage of growth, CISA needs to invest in and be supported by larger structural and cultural changes that allow the agency to more effectively work as a strategic partner with FCEB agencies to protect federal networks.</strong></p> +<h3 id="iv-considerations-for-ugs-support-to-light-manoeuvre-forces">IV. Considerations for UGS Support to Light Manoeuvre Forces</h3> -<h4 id="the-past-is-prologue">The Past Is Prologue</h4> +<h4 id="gently-does-it">Gently Does it</h4> -<p>While this section does not provide a comprehensive list of legislative proposals and actions, the selected events and documents represent flashpoints that drove efforts to protect federal networks. Collectively, these events and milestones also paved the way for CISA to assume its important role as the cybersecurity lead for FCEB agencies.</p> +<p>UGS lack manoeuvrability in close or complex terrain. This must be a central consideration for their employment in tactical formations. Their ability to troubleshoot when faced with obstacles is currently far below that of humans. When moving autonomously, UGS must make sense of their surroundings to plot a clear path. Navigating obstacles using sensors alone is incredibly difficult. A study using the TAERO optionally crewed wheeled system found that “it is possible to effectively implement autonomous mode up to a speed of 2.8 m/s in an unstructured environment”. Advertised maximum speeds for UGS far exceed that which would be possible in complex terrain. This pattern is seen in numerous trials and reports, in which soldiers outpace their robotic counterparts. This finding is further corroborated by wargames and testing. The civilian transport sector is yet to make autonomous vehicles a viable offering despite billions of dollars and years of research and development. This is also in spite of a relatively robust framework within which they must work. Road networks have defined edges, junctions and rules. The latter are not always followed, of course, and autonomous vehicles on roads must try to account for the actions of other road users, which cannot always be predicted. The problem becomes more difficult when extrapolated to military UGS. Normal road networks are a simpler environment than a battlefield, where smoke, debris, adversarial activity, and disturbed earth make for a much more complex picture, with fewer established norms. Water hazards are illustrative here. Water’s surface is highly refracted, meaning it looks different depending on the view angle, the surrounding area and the weather. In wet weather, determining what is simply a slick surface versus a puddle versus something deeper is difficult for sensors and computers.</p> -<p><strong>The diffuse and evolving character of cyber threats makes it difficult to galvanize more definitive policy responses.</strong> To date, the United States has not experienced a “cyber 9/11” or a “cyber Pearl Harbor.” Instead, the nation has experienced a series of cyber incidents that, while not necessarily small, have captured public attention to a much lesser degree than terrorist attacks. The result is twofold. On one extreme, certain FCEB leaders do not fully appreciate how cyber threats can impact an agency’s ability to carry out its mission. On the other extreme, there are policymakers, government leaders, and experts who are overeager to plan for the big cyber incident on the horizon — sometimes at the expense of sufficiently planning for the immediate and persistent “smaller” attacks that, when taken together, can greatly undermine the government’s ability to deliver basic services to the American people.</p> +<p>The vision of autonomous land systems moving around the battlefield with abandon is currently fantasy. Most systems that are advertised as, or considered to be, autonomous or AI-enabled are much more limited in their capacities. As noted above, uncrewed does not mean autonomous. For example, the Milrem Robotics THeMIS is one of the more advanced and developed platforms on the market, with buy-in from several European countries. It can be teleoperated and can complete waypoint navigation as given by an operator. At the time of writing, a “follow the leader” capability is still in development, as is the ability to swarm. Teleoperation is usually conducted using a line-of-sight antenna. As such it is limited by terrain and range. In the case of the THeMIS, the line-of-sight range for control is up to 1,500 metres. This central limitation is clarified when overlaid with the proposed tasks of UGS outlined above.</p> -<p>Encouragingly, the past four administrations — in partnership with Congress, the private sector, and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments — have taken great strides to positively elevate cybersecurity, underscore the importance of coordination and collaboration, and at least nod toward the importance of enhancing resilience. But as the threat landscape evolves, so too does the need to create new entities, develop new policies, and adopt new security outlooks and models. While this is generally a welcome trend, without proper coordination or harmonization it can resurface some of the issues identified 20 years ago, such as the need for clearer delineation of cyber leadership roles, and the need for a greater sense of urgency from department and agency leads.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="combat">Combat</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>With regard to CISA, it is unequivocally clear that the agency is the operational lead for FCEB cybersecurity, and there is general bipartisan support to enhance CISA’s ability to carry out that mission. Logistically, however, there remain a number of questions, including but not limited to: What does it mean for CISA to sufficiently protect an FCEB network? What entities, federal or otherwise, play a formal or informal role in helping CISA protect federal networks? And how much of the security burden should FCEB entities manage on their own versus handing off to CISA?</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZLb65dQ.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>Figure 8: UGS as Fire Support</em></p> -<p>In September 2022, CISA unveiled its Strategic Plan: 2023-2025 — the agency’s first since its creation in 2018 — and followed it up in August 2023 with its Strategic Plan: FY2024-2026. What immediately stands out is that CISA’s mission space is vast and that its role as the leader of FCEB cybersecurity is just one of many hats it wears as the nation’s cyber defense agency. <strong>Moving forward, it will be important that the executive and legislative branches continue to empower CISA in ways that responsibly grow its capabilities, authorities, and resources without overextending or compromising its ability to carry out its mission.</strong></p> +<p>Dismounted close combat is an inherently complex business. It involves rapid decisions, movement, adaptation to constantly changing dynamics, and the most intimate of command and control, communication and logistic interactions. As a result, such activity will remain the realm of humans. UGS are far from being able to close with and kill the enemy on an objective. There are simply too many variables for systems to manage coherently, and the systems’ vulnerabilities too many.</p> -<h3 id="the-current-state">The Current State</h3> +<p>However, AI-enabled systems can add value by accurately sensing and categorising objects in their field of view, providing important information to the commander. Sensors and their respective algorithms can distinguish between types of vehicles, military and civilian, with great accuracy. One study showed a 97.25% to 99.5% detection rate at 2,000–5,000 metres, both during the day and at night. Another, using different methods, achieved accuracy of above 85%. The fact that these systems are not achieving 100% accuracy is not a reason for alarm. People are fallible and contend with issues of eyesight, optics, climate and fatigue when engaging in combat. For UGS, these figures will only improve with time and access to labelled datasets, which will in turn grow as the proliferation of UGS continues.</p> -<p>Despite the generational struggle to secure FCEB agencies in cyberspace, there are signs of hope on the horizon. Consider the operations of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Amid all the excitement and chaos surrounding a non-cyber event, a lesser-known operation can be simultaneously underway: a CISA incident response exercise. While it is not ideal to run a network intrusion exercise, what the mission leaders at NASA understand well is that inconvenient times are precisely when an adversary is most likely to attack. Stress-testing responses during real, critical missions is the best way to assess preparedness and system resilience plans. Furthermore, the case shows the art of the possible: agency-level coordination and planning that takes advantage of CDM and threat hunt capabilities.</p> +<p>In the current state of development, armed UGS are probably better placed to provide supporting fires. This task would traditionally be done with a fire support section set off to a flank while another section carried out the assault. Supporting deliberate offensive action lends itself to the use of UGS, as the terrain can be analysed by commanders ahead of time. In this scenario, armed UGS are likely less suited to ad hoc offensive action and instead must be used deliberately. The idea of robots facing off against other robots while humans sit in a command bunker watching the action unfold is misleading. Placing three armed UGS in a fire support position with a human in the loop for engagement authority, and soldiers adhering to battlespace management boundaries, is a more realistic application, balancing well understood norms with novel technology. Equally, static defence tasks such as an anti-tank screen might be envisaged. This matches UGS’ and soldiers’ relative strengths.</p> -<p>CISA’s cybersecurity services to FCEB agencies are varied. Some, such as its system monitoring and threat hunting initiatives, rely on CISA’s technical capabilities. Others, like its ability to run scenario exercises for FCEB entities, rely on the agency’s ability to leverage partnerships, relevant expertise, and guidance in ways that can support FCEB agencies’ individual plans to secure their respective networks. All require coordination and planning that align agency interests across a diverse set of stakeholders in the FCEB space.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="supply">Supply</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>These services have been met with varying degrees of tangible and perceived success. To properly assess current cyber services offered, it is important to evaluate how these initiatives have evolved in recent years and the ways in which FCEB entities actually interact with and utilize them. The non-mutually exclusive categories below underscore some of the primary cybersecurity services that CISA offers to FCEB agencies.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Huo8mjk.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>Figure 9: UGS for Supply</em></p> -<h4 id="risk-assessment-and-vulnerability-management-pre-incident">Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Management (Pre-incident)</h4> +<p>Resupply is one of the more mature tasks for UGS, and this is one where most experimentation has been completed. At the larger scale, platoons of uncrewed heavy goods vehicles might be led by a crewed lead vehicle for logistic missions in rear areas. The logistic and movement constraints outlined mean that the use of UGS in rear areas is the place to focus attention. However, due to risk to personnel, current research focuses on autonomous “last mile” resupply. In fact, rear areas are also now vulnerable, in the face of persistent ISR and precision strike. There is, therefore, value in fielding UGS in these areas, where tasks and wayfinding are often more simple than using main supply routes. Fielding UGS here would also allow data collection, which is crucial for system improvement.</p> -<p>Arguably some of CISA’s most important programs are those that help FCEB agencies gain greater visibility into their networks, allowing them to proactively identify and defend against bad actors on their systems. Over the next few years, this is one area where CISA looks to expand its capabilities, especially as adversaries grow more adept at circumventing traditional cyber defenses.</p> +<p>Currently, it is likely that a human would still be involved in these tasks, providing a lead element to be followed, either on foot or in a crewed vehicle. However, UGS would still be useful, as logistic patrols are a significant burden on forces. Reducing crew requirements to free up soldiers to do other tasks is an important contribution of UGS. The urban environment provides an avenue through which UGS could be employed further forward, as moving between buildings leaves soldiers vulnerable.</p> -<p><strong>Visibility and assessment tools can only be effective if they communicate with each other and can collectively provide an accurate, robust, and up-to-date picture of existing vulnerabilities.</strong> Since investments in pre-incident detection capabilities are rapidly growing, with the goal of providing more visibility for FCEB agencies and CISA, it is important to assess the state of current services and planned initiatives by asking the following: Are updates being clearly communicated to relevant industry and FCEB partners? Will there be any visibility gaps when moving from older to newer monitoring systems? And do planned activities integrate well with other services offered by CISA? While interviews with and public announcements from CISA representatives indicate that the agency is tracking these questions and looking for ways to facilitate smooth transitions, some outside stakeholders might need further convincing that CISA will not only prioritize data integration but also have the capabilities to do so in a seamless way.</p> +<p>That said, a slow-moving UGS would be an easy target for enemy troops. There is a tension at the heart of the proposed use of UGS for burden carriage in combat scenarios. The dismounted troops who have the most to gain from having a system carry their equipment are also those who need to be able to move rapidly through complex terrain such as forests and urban environments. Smaller vehicles may be more agile, but they cannot carry that much equipment. While UGS could reduce what soldiers are carrying, they would add friction if they were unable to keep up in tactical movement in complex terrain due to technical limitations. There may be scope for these systems to follow units a tactical bound behind, but there is a risk that they could get stuck. This then becomes an additional constraint and planning consideration for commanders. Therefore, it is sensible for UGS to remain with companies or the battlegroup echelons, where movement will be more deliberate.</p> -<h4 id="from-einstein-to-cads">From EINSTEIN to CADS</h4> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="reconnaissance">Reconnaissance</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>In its <em>2022 Year in Review</em>, CISA noted that it will be sunsetting the legacy EINSTEIN program and building out newer capabilities in its place that are better able to monitor and detect network intrusions. It will be important for CISA to focus efforts on clearly communicating what aspects of EINSTEIN will continue, what will be improved, and what, if any, visibility or service gaps might arise during transition periods. <strong>The modernization of well-known, well-utilized capabilities like EINSTEIN should be clearly articulated to all stakeholders so as to not unintentionally create new areas of confusion.</strong></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yjaWpdm.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>Figure 10: UGS in “Stay-Behind” Reconnaissance Function</em></p> -<p>CISA’s EINSTEIN program is an intrusion detection system that monitors traffic coming in and out of FCEB networks. The program was initially developed in 2004 by the U.S. Computer Readiness Team and consists of three phases: EINSTEIN 1, EINSTEIN 2, and EINSTEIN 3. Traditionally, FCEB agencies would enter partnership agreements with CISA that essentially allow it to install systems and sensors for collecting information on potential threats to the network. The program operated as an early warning system with “near real-time” awareness of potentially malicious cyber activity. Per an interviewed expert with deep knowledge of the evolution of the program, most FCEB agencies are only aware of the EINSTEIN sensors — the connection points. However, that is only 10 percent of EINSTEIN. There is a larger infrastructure behind the program that collects inputs from a number of other feeds to provide more robust information.</p> +<p>Employing UGS in a reconnaissance capacity would see lines of robots moving in front of the traditional human recce screen. At present, soldiers move ahead of the formation’s main body looking to spot the enemy before the enemy spots them. This enables shaping activity and for deliberate targeting by indirect fires to take place, which is preferable to having to react on someone else’s terms. Recce is also risky. Recce units are generally small, detached from the larger mass of their formation and susceptible to interdiction by the enemy, which is in turn looking to achieve the same effect in reverse.</p> -<p>The stated plan is for EINSTEIN’s “analytics, information sharing, and core infrastructure” capabilities to shift to CISA’s Cyber Analytic and Data Systems (CADS). This will allow CISA to “more rapidly analyze, correlate, and take action to address cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities before damaging intrusions occur.” The overarching concept is for CISA to be the center of FCEB and critical infrastructure threat intelligence, centralizing this data enables analytics that may identify individual events or the spread of events, which in turn will enable faster detection and notification. For FY 2023, CISA targeted $91 million of funding to keep its National Cybersecurity Protection System, which is known for its EINSTEIN set of capabilities. Of the $1.8 billion requested by CISA for FY 2024 efforts related to its FCEB mission, CISA is requesting approximately $425 million dollars specifically for CADS. EINSTEN 1 and EINSTEIN 2 capabilities will primarily be under the authority of the new CISA CADS team, while CISA’s Protective DNS and proposed Protective Email services will serve as a successor to EINSTEIN’s 3A capabilities. The Protective DNS service, distributed across various locations, blocks attempts to access potentially harmful online resources — such as domains or IP addresses — identified by threat data from commercial sources, governments, and agencies. It logs the associated DNS traffic for detailed analysis. Furthermore, this service complies with the mandate from DHS under Title 6 of the U.S. Code, Section 663, which emphasizes the need to detect and mitigate cyber threats in network traffic.</p> +<p>A concept proposed in the US supports deploying a forward line of RAS, thereby reducing risk to personnel. A forward line of sensors can probe positions for enemy activity, and potentially force them to unmask. This could be by moving and giving off a signature, be it heat or electromagnetic, or by engaging the UGS, which also gives away their position. However, the limitations discussed above demonstrate that this vision is a long way off for UGS. The use of UGS in this way would slow manoeuvre units to a crawl, making them susceptible to targeting from enemy fires. In addition, there would be significant burden in trying to manage their movement and make sense of their data. This task is best left to UAS. UGS with this function are best suited to static, and perhaps predesignated, roving sentry tasks, where they can support soldiers to maintain situational awareness over an area. A situation where UGS could be used as a “stay behind” capability as friendly troops withdraw is a more suitable use case, and more palatable than using soldiers in what is a very risky activity. Leaving UGS to identify the movement of enemy troops and vehicles and alert friendly forces plays to their strengths in image recognition. It also has the advantage of freeing up recce troops for additional tasks.</p> -<p>Ultimately, the creation of CADS is also supposed to support the larger Joint Collaborative Environment (JCE), an “interoperable environment for sharing and fusing threat information, insights, and other relevant data” between and across public and private sectors. This initiative was first introduced by the CSC, and in recent months CISA has mentioned that it is actively working to build it out, despite no formal direction and funding from Congress (see Recommendation 1.2 on Congress authorizing and funding a JCE).</p> +<p>The considerations for deployment in these three areas can be mapped across to the other potential tasks outlined earlier in the paper. Those tasks that require high levels of mobility remain under the purview of UAS. CBRN threat monitoring and radio rebroadcasting can be achieved by UAS, although there may be times when UGS are better suited to the tactical situation. This chapter has considered the technological limitations associated with various types of UGS, and has applied these to tactical formations. The next chapter looks at the enabling activities needed to ensure that UGS are in the right place in working order.</p> -<p>Given that a mix of programs is already underway, and that others are still up for approval and authorization, it will be incumbent on CISA to provide routine status updates of the transition progress from EINSTEIN to CADS and to offer possible workarounds for any delays.</p> +<h3 id="v-how-do-ugs-get-to-and-stay-in-the-fight">V. How Do UGS Get to, and Stay in, the Fight?</h3> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="circia-powering-cads-with-the-right-kind-of-information"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CIRCIA: Powering CADS with the Right Kind of Information</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Military logistics have been brought into sharp relief by the war in Ukraine. The true potential of UGS can only be unlocked if they are in the right place at the right time for the right task. Like other military equipment, UGS will need to be transported to the area of operations. The size and ability of the system will determine how this might happen. Factoring UGS into future lift capability, on land, at sea and in the air, is important for planners. Military lift capacity is a limiting factor to the success of deployments. Every system that is transported takes up space that cannot be used by another piece of equipment. The military benefit in theatre must therefore be clear. Units and formations are responsible for devising field equipment tables for the kit they need in theatre to do their job while deployed. UGS will feature in these considerations going forward. There is little capacity for superfluous equipment. Larger armoured systems such as the Milrem Type-X, a 12-tonne uncrewed system equipped with 50-mm cannon to support main battle tanks, or the 10-tonne General Dynamics TRX, will need dedicated logistic support. Larger vehicles are moved by aircraft or low-loader trucks and ferries. In the near term, all these options require human crew, emphasising the reliance of UGS on people. Smaller systems such as the Milrem THeMIS, which is the size of a small car, can be towed behind a parent vehicle until they are required. That parent vehicle will need to meet specific towing requirements, such as height of hitch. In the case of the THeMIS, the speed at which it can be towed is three times as fast as it can move itself – 80 km per hour, rather than 20 km per hour. Moving UGS from an initial railhead, port or airfield to the area in which they will be employed must be planned for in detail.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A key part of CADS is ensuring that quality, comprehensive information is fed into the system. In March 2022, Congress passed the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA). For decades, when critical infrastructure facilities and FCEB agencies were victims of a cyber incident, they were not legally required to report the incident to the federal government. CIRCIA, among other things, tasks CISA to outline cyber incident reporting requirements for “covered entities.” CISA has until March 2024 to publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and then 18 months to publish the Final Rule. Until this goes into effect, cyber incident reporting is still voluntary — though strongly encouraged — with industry providing feedback on the best way to structure reporting and deconflict with other requirements, including those of the Security and Exchange Commission.</code></em></p> +<p>The totality of the system must be considered, including power supply. If the UGS are battery powered, how and where are these batteries charged, and who does the charging? Which echelon should be burdened with the charging capability? Battery technology is relatively nascent, and stamina remains low. On battery power, the THeMIS has a runtime of just one and a half hours. In hybrid mode, using its diesel engine, it has a runtime of 15 hours. Low-level battery management for existing equipment such as radios already requires planning and demands electricity, which may be provided by the mains, generators or other vehicles.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To be successful, CISA needs to identify regulations that collect necessary information without placing undue burdens on reporting entities. It must also make sure that new regulations are harmonized with existing reporting requirements. Relevant to CADS, if CISA is able to structure reporting requirements in a way that goes beyond just notifying the authorities that an incident has occurred but that also captures the technical attributes of an attack, that information can be pulled into CADS at machine speed and provide greater visibility.</code></em></p> +<p>Another consideration for UGS is where repair and battery charging take place. In the case of crewed vehicles, the crew can fix small errors and conduct simple repair jobs. For instance, great pride is taken by tank and artillery howitzer crews in their ability to fix a track if one becomes dislodged. UGS will not have the luxury of an on-hand repair crew. This means that resource must be dedicated to recovering systems once broken. Repair functions in military forces have become eroded in recent times, as systems have become more complex and manufacturers retain the right to repair. The ability to repair equipment and keep it on the battlefield has been shown to be crucial in the conflict in Ukraine. For instance, a third of Ukraine’s howitzers are out of service for repair at any one time. Repairing technical equipment is often left to contractors rather than completed in place, even for well-established capabilities that are in service. Sensors and computer systems, no matter the platform on which they sit, are vulnerable, despite ruggedisation by the manufacturers. Holding UGS back several bounds until they are used for a discrete task before being recovered will allow more sustained repair operations than can be offered at lower formations.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">CIRCIA reporting requirements will bring critical event data into CADS and illuminate events from smaller companies that had not previously been engaged. This thwarts adversary efforts to attack smaller members of the supply chain in the hopes of remaining “below the radar” (see Recommendation 2.2 on reporting requirements).</code></em></p> +<p>Managing demand for UGS by frontline units is another concern for planners. As in the case of UAS earlier in their development, demand for their support far outstrips UGS supply. It is still the case that larger and more capable UAS are held at divisional or corps level and assigned to discrete tasks depending on a commander’s decision. Specific recommendations for UGS are difficult to outline without firm knowledge of the types and numbers of systems to be procured. They will likely be a scarce resource for some time. However, forces should be wary of putting manoeuvre units in permanent possession of larger, more capable UGS. If soldiers are having to consider what their UGS are doing instead of fighting the enemy, then the systems have been misemployed. Tactical units should bid for UGS support as they currently do for aircraft. In this framework, bids for support from aircraft are submitted while formations are planning for future operations. The demand for aircraft for offensive support, moving people or cargo, or providing reconnaissance and surveillance, generally outstrips supply, as platforms are scarce. To that end, units make bids for capability, and a central cell determines who gets what and when. This generally works on a rolling 72-hour time horizon tied to the operational area’s planning cycles.</p> -<p>Increased investments in gathering and analyzing cyber data can increase FCEB network security. First, because the majority of internet traffic takes place on private sector networks, understanding the vulnerability landscape based on incident reporting serves as a form of early warning for the federal government. Investments in CADS that enable machine speed analysis of emerging vulnerabilities and the likelihood of exploitation by different actors empower agency CISOs to manage risk. To be effective, this new data-driven approach to risk analysis will need to ensure proper communication and coordination, as well as a historical inventory of vulnerabilities supporting longitudinal assessments.</p> +<p>Currently, formations bid for a primary and secondary asset to provide support. The primary would be ideal, but may be tasked elsewhere, so a second, different asset should also be identified. In this case, with UGS in their infancy, the secondary course of action should employ established capabilities. This will mitigate against undue reliance on UGS while the capability is nascent.</p> -<p><strong>CONTINUOUS DIAGNOSTICS AND MITIGATION (CDM) PROGRAM</strong></p> +<h4 id="network">Network</h4> -<p>Increasing investments in the technical analysis of cyber vulnerabilities produces a library against which to monitor FCEB agencies. Along these lines, CISA has made the CDM program a central focus of its efforts to ramp up network defense. The Biden administration’s FY 2024 budget requests $408 million for CDM, an increase from the $292 million that was appropriated in FY 2022 and the $332 million appropriated in FY 2023. Per Michael Duffy, CISA’s associate director for capacity building, it is “the U.S. government’s cornerstone for proactive, coordinated, and agile cyber defense of the federal enterprise.” <strong>Given its critical role, it is essential not only that CDM efforts are sufficiently resourced in the coming years, but that there are plans in place for long-term funding so that FCEBs can continue to benefit from the CDM program without disrupting current services.</strong></p> +<p>It is not just the physical systems that need to be in place. UGS with a reconnaissance or surveillance function need to be able to relay that information back to commanders, using a robust communications network. That network may also need to permit some UGS to pass information among themselves, either to corroborate a potential target if more than one system can “see” it, or to help them avoid obstacles. Equally, commanders may need to issue instructions to the UGS for a task. The electromagnetic spectrum is not an unlimited resource, and different capabilities must be deconflicted. Radars may interfere with aircraft if their systems operate within the same band. The network needs to remain available and have enough capacity to pass information around. This is the focus of major experiments, such as the Project Convergence series, in which a resilient network is identified as a “backbone” to enable large amounts of data to be passed around. This is easier said than done. Militaries use a host of different communication systems and bearers, from radios through to satellites. The network needs to have low latency, be efficient in its use of bandwidth, and be secure from enemy interference. All additional interactions with these networks provide adversaries with opportunities to interfere. They may look to jam or spoof UGS. Robust countermeasures will need to be in place, or UGS will suffer in the same way UAS have in Ukraine, with 10,000 systems lost a month. What is more, the network needs to be interoperable with those of allies and partner forces. Importantly, it is likely that the network will be provided by a different company, or set of companies, than those who have built the UGS. A variety of bearers, data links and data standards make interoperability very complex. In a contested network space, prioritisation of the information being transmitted is important.</p> -<p>Whereas EINSTEIN provides perimeter defense, CISA’s CDM program works within FCEB networks to further enhance overall security. Developed in 2012, CDM provides cybersecurity tools, integration services, and a user-friendly dashboard to FCEB agencies so that CISA can gain greater visibility into FCEB networks. Many of the core concepts within CDM date back to NIST guidance from 2011 and early experiments by the Department of State and Army Research Lab in support of DOD networks.</p> +<h4 id="adversary-activity">Adversary Activity</h4> -<p>Overall, the CDM program engages technologies to identify and protect electronic assets, then displays the status on a dashboard, a bit like a running car will show the activity ranges of its components. It is complementary to EINSTEIN and CADS in that it provides the inner workings of a network while a program such as CADS analyzes perimeter activity for ingress and egress attempts.</p> +<p>While providing opportunity for friendly forces, the proliferation of UGS also provides options for the adversary. This might include jamming GPS or seizing control of systems using electronic warfare means. Systems with automated navigation and reconnaissance capabilities are also vulnerable to adversarial attacks on their software. Here, machine learning and AI models can be “attacked” by objects in the physical environment, where an input specifically designed by an adversary can cause a system to act in an unamenable way. An understanding of a system’s software architecture and logics can allow an adversary to confuse a system and reduce its effectiveness, or deduce the information on which it has been trained. Researchers tricked an autonomous vehicle into misidentifying a stop sign as a 45 miles per hour sign, a mistake that could have had catastrophic consequences. Subtly altered images that look normal to humans can fool AI. In one study, a 3D-printed model of a turtle was specifically designed to trick a computer into thinking it was a rifle, which it did at every angle it was presented to the camera. Such activity is worrying in relation to sensors that seek out targets in a given area, as there are rules of engagement in which possession of a rifle might allow targeting. This shows the importance of maintaining meaningful human control in such systems. Adversarial activity is also troublesome in relation to more benign UGS with logistic functions that may be convinced to stop or get trapped maliciously by adversary action.</p> -<p>The CDM program specifically offers five program areas: (1) a dashboard that receives, aggregates, and displays cyber health at the agency and federal level; (2) asset management to answer the question “What is on the network?”; (3) identity and access management to answer the question “Who is on the network?”; (4) network security management to answer the question “What is actually happening on the network?”; and (5) data protection management. The CDM program then uses data collected through its suite of tools to populate agency-level dashboards to 23 agencies, as well as a federal version. The agency dashboard is a data visualization tool that produces reports and alerts IT managers to critical cybersecurity risks. The federal dashboard provides a macro-level view that consolidates information from each agency-level dashboard for a better picture of cybersecurity health across all civilian agencies. Dashboards in turn become an important tool for visualizing and describing risk, a capability that can be further enhanced through migrating to a JCE and longitudinal analysis. The CDM program is an excellent tool for measuring compliance, but far beyond this, it dynamically measures security and risk, enabling a combination of best-in-class tools and metrics to determine success.</p> +<p>This said, the ability for real-world adversarial attacks to be successful is limited. The complexity of defeating multiple sensors in the physical world outside a research environment is a significant barrier, and may simply make such attacks uneconomical. Some of the ability to counter adversary activity will be built into systems by developers. However, military users who are alive to the threat will be better able to manage it, which raises the importance of awareness and understanding, discussed in the next section.</p> -<p>CISA advertises that CDM will directly help FCEB agencies by reducing agency threat surface, increasing visibility, improving response capabilities, and providing assistance more generally. CISA has also issued Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 23-01 which mandates regular, automated reporting to CDM for FCEB agencies. The impact of BOD 23-01 for CISA and FCEB agencies is significant: by mandating the automation of data, the gains are bidirectional. Where CISA gains further visibility into the federal enterprise, so do FCEB agencies, helping them both manage risk in their operations and tailor responses such as patching or threat hunting.</p> +<h4 id="force-design">Force Design</h4> -<p>With the new authorities granted to CISA in the FY 2021 NDAA, CISA no longer needs formal agreements to actively carry out threat hunting on FCEB networks. Acquiring those formal agreements consumed valuable time that delayed incident response. Even as recently as a few years ago, CISA had to heavily rely on voluntary security reports from FCEB agencies. Now, new authorities coupled with new endpoint technologies allow CISA to view and collect object-level data across FCEB networks and to produce instantaneous threat reports that match the pace of adversary activity. At the same time, the technical ability to hunt on an agency network does not usurp requirements for collaborative planning and risk discussions. While CISA is making technical strides, the area it needs to refine is how best to leverage network access and a common operating picture to support risk management across the FCEB landscape. <strong>Technology absent planning is subject to diminishing marginal returns</strong> (see Recommendation 1.1 on consistent funding streams).</p> +<p>Force structures will look different as UGS become more prevalent. Maintaining the same force structure and simply adding UGS on top will not maximise advantage. One frequent claim is that robots will replace soldiers in some cases. However, it is unlikely that this will be a zero-sum relationship, in which more robots can lead to forces having fewer soldiers. The British Army is experimenting with how force structures might change via its Experimentation and Trials Group, and initiatives such as the Phalanx platoon, which has reimagined the traditional platoon structure for when more uncrewed assets are integrated. In the near to mid-term, a rebalancing of forces into support functions may be required, as the example below demonstrates.</p> <blockquote> - <h4 id="two-is-better-than-one"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Two Is Better Than One</code></h4> + <h4 id="force-design-lessons-from-uas"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Force Design Lessons from UAS</code></h4> </blockquote> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">CISA director Jen Easterly described the power of CADS and CDM in a congressional hearing as the following: “Together . . . these programs provide the technological foundation to secure and defend FCEB departments and agencies against advanced cyber threats. CDM enhances the overall security posture of FCEB networks by providing FCEB agencies and CISA’s operators with the capability to identify, prioritize, and address cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities, including through the deployment of Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR), cloud security capabilities, and network security controls.”</code></em></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">One must look at the whole uncrewed ecosystem to see the interdependencies and how an army with many uncrewed systems might look. The best real examples today involve UAS, as the more mature capability. The British Army’s Watchkeeper is a fixed-wing surveillance UAS. It measures six by ten metres and weighs 450 kg, requiring a runway to operate. It operates on a line of sight data link with an endurance of around 14 hours and a range of 150 km. While it has no pilot inside the aircraft, the personnel and logistic tail is significant. The aircraft is operated by two pilots in a ground control station, with a third required at times. A nuance here is that military pilots can only have an eight-hour duty period, which includes flight planning. Given this, for Watchkeeper to be used at full capacity, two or even three sets of pilots are required. Watchkeeper does not have the ability to taxi and does not have ground brakes, as a weight saving measure, increasing endurance. To this end, it employs a groundcrew of seven to ten people, depending on experience levels and instructor requirements. The groundcrew tow the aircraft to the take off point and run pre-take off computer scripts alongside the pilots in the ground control station. They also set up the cable system that is used to recover the aircraft on landing. Away from the runway sits an engineering detachment of around 20 people. It conducts routine maintenance on the aircraft and keeps it airworthy. It also constructs and dismantles the aircraft when it is loaded into shipping containers for transport. It is supported by two field service representatives from the aircraft’s manufacturer. These people provide technical support and a link back to industry, which can provide in-depth technical support when needed. In addition, a command and flight operations staff of between five and ten people manages the sorties and liaises with wider airfield stakeholders. It manages the risk profile of the aircraft’s flights and provides the wider support wrap to the soldiers in the detachment.</code></em></p> -<p>In many ways, CISA’s CDM program is good news. CISA reported in its FY 2023 Q2 update that 55 percent of federal agencies automatically report to CDM. This means they have already surpassed their goal of getting half of all agencies to automate reporting by the end of the fiscal year. Additionally, a 2022 MeriTalk survey of federal and industry stakeholders reported that 93 percent of respondents believed that CDM had improved federal cyber resilience in several ways, with 84 percent noting that CDM actively helped entities comply with EO 14028 requirements. These sentiments seem consistent with those of the experts interviewed for this project. However, in that same MeriTalk survey, only 28 percent of respondents gave CDM an A grade, with responses to other questions demonstrating a belief that CDM is a compliance-based activity (rather than a risk management activity) and that it has a way to go before it reaches its full potential (see Recommendation 2.7 on CDM after-action reviews).</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In this case, one uncrewed system requires a wider staff of over 40 people for it to operate in a benign environment on an established operational airfield. What is more, the infrastructure required to store, transport and maintain the aircraft is a significant footprint.</code></em></p> -<p>The biggest problem, however, is that the CDM funding model is not ideal and that agencies have yet to develop a common risk planning framework tied to resources. Currently, CDM is structured so that CISA covers the initial cost of required tools for two years, after which the FCEB agencies are required to pay for their continued use and maintenance by themselves. There are reasonable concerns that some FCEB agencies are not able or willing to sufficiently budget for the continued use of these tools. Setting aside general inflation-related cost increases, FCEB agencies might not be appropriately factoring into their budget plans the outyear costs for CDM. Current and former CISOs interviewed by CSIS expressed that vendors are closely monitoring these deadlines and coming back to FCEB agencies with tools that are cheaper than the ones that agencies might currently be using but that are not necessarily as capable. As one expert noted, “there’s a lot of chum in the water,” and the situation is difficult for some FCEB agencies to navigate. There are major security concerns as well: CISA invests time and resources to help agencies integrate specific tools, so when those FCEB entities switch to alternatives, CISA might lose progress or visibility for a set period of time as those new tools are integrated into the network — assuming they are ever properly migrated to the CISA dashboard.</p> +<p>While exact roles and ratios may vary, this example is indicative of the challenge of employing uncrewed systems. While such systems technically remove soldiers from a frontline task, the tail of necessary support will likely be extensive, at least in the short to medium term. For example, the key enabler for UGS is the availability of engineers to keep systems running. New technical trades focused on computer-systems engineering will be needed. Software changes rapidly, and it is likely that the burden of keeping engineers up to date with latest developments will be considerable. In turn, this will mean new courses will need to be designed, with an important question being: who would be the right authority to design such courses? These courses will then need to be run from a base, requiring accommodation, classrooms and hangars. The integration of UGS fundamentally changes the size and shape of the force using them.</p> -<p>CISA is in a difficult position. As one expert interviewee acknowledged, CISA is managing expectations and has been generous in its time and general efforts to stand up these programs with FCEB agencies. The general funding model is not ideal, but it also cannot provide guarantees of financial support beyond a set period of time.</p> +<p>This section has made it clear that humans will be the key enabler for UGS – they will move them around the battlefield, they will fix them and they will manage them, at least in the near to medium term. Thus, while it is seemingly logical to focus on technology, it is the soldier who will unlock that technology’s potential, and indeed use it as they see fit, which will be discussed in the next chapter.</p> -<p>The net result is that CDM has made strides in monitoring over half of the FCEB agencies, but the future is clouded by complex bureaucratic and budgeting questions. Even if an agency can resource CDM after the initial two-year window, it struggles to forecast how much it will cost and is confronted with a labyrinth of rules surrounding which congressionally approved budget vehicles and authorities it can use to essentially “buy” security (see Recommendation 1.1 on properly resourcing CDM). In other words, beyond CDM, CISA will need to develop planning frameworks that help align resources against risk assessments and competing budgetary requirements, alongside other actors such as the ONCD and OMB. The federal government cannot buy cybersecurity off-the-shelf products alone to solve the problem. It needs to revisit how it plans and manages resources related to securing networks across FCEB agencies (see Recommendation 2.9 on risks that accompany FCEB budget strategies) as well as how to create dashboards agencies can tailor to monitor their networks.</p> +<h3 id="vi-how-to-make-sure-soldiers-use-them">VI. How to Make Sure Soldiers Use Them</h3> -<p>At the same time that NIST moved to standardize information security continuous monitoring, the cybersecurity community started to hypothesize a coming paradigm shift. Rather than being the “hunted,” constantly responding to threats after they turned into incidents on the defended network, the CISO would become the “hunter.” The concept relates to a practice in the early 2000s by U.S. Air Force personnel, who used the term “hunter-killer” to describe teams of cybersecurity experts conducting force protection on their networks. The term evolved to describe how senior cybersecurity experts would train new analysts by taking them on “hunting trips.” Many of these practices paralleled the rise of using more active red teams to test network defense, as well as a new focus on advanced persistent threats in the cybersecurity community to describe more robust government-sponsored threats.</p> +<p>Integrating new technologies into a force is difficult and should not be considered on a solely technical basis. Scaling the use of UGS across a land force is a deliberate organisational change programme. This chapter examines the role of experimentation, training and trust on the route to successful HMT. Actual future users of UGS, not the abstractions of experimentation, must be front and centre in these endeavours.</p> -<p>In practice, the move from CDM to threat hunt will likely involve more than just purchasing new software. From its origin, the practice involved a mix of red-teaming exercises that connected discrete events across a data sample on possible vulnerabilities. That is, similar to the process envisioned by the JCE, the process requires a repository of data — including common coding typologies such as MITRE ATT&amp;CK — to be effective, along with a mix of collaborative planning and exercises to emulate adversary actions. Threat hunting is as much a practice and an art as it is a technical science.</p> +<p>It is a mistake to assume that soldiers use equipment given to them in the way intended by designers. One trial saw soldiers continually overload a UGS, as its capacity was not enough for their needs. This led to the system overheating. At the other end of the scale, it should not be assumed that soldiers will use UGS at all. A host of factors interact to determine how soldiers use the kit they are issued. These might include previous experience, who trained them and when they were trained. One example here is personal load-carrying equipment. The British Army brought in a new type of body armour and load-carrying equipment – Virtus. However, many soldiers opted to keep using their old equipment, as it better suited their purposes. They could carry all their equipment, they knew where everything went, and it had worked so far in their career.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="cdm-enables-the-hunt"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CDM Enables the Hunt</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="experimentation">Experimentation</h4> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">CISA is making progress on threat hunt and can accelerate it by serving as a central coordinator for threat hunt across FCEB agencies. For example, in March 2023, CISA released Decider, a collaborative tool designed to help agencies map risk using the MITRE ATT&amp;CK framework. The tool is an example of the need for a larger array of common planning and collaborative tools across the FCEB landscape, many of which need not originate in but should ultimately be coordinated by CISA. Along these lines, CISA worked with Sandia Labs to deploy to the Untitled Goose Tool in March 2023, which specializes in authenticating and analyzing data linked to cloud services.</code></em></p> +<p>Experimentation is important for understanding the utility of new capability. New technologies are generally examined and researched for a broad use case. Then they will be handed over to troops for a pilot programme, before potentially being rolled out more widely. For all the talk of the importance of such technology in future warfighting, there is little evidence that forces have started to integrate UGS on a regular and even basis. Many soldiers are not being exposed to uncrewed technologies, even if forces may think they are. UGS integration is vulnerable to becoming stuck in an experimental purgatory, on a small scale that disenfranchises the rest of the force. An order from the Dutch Army Command to a single officer was to “just get started and explore the possibilities” of RAS. While an admirable aspiration, this is too tentative. Experimentation often takes place with a limited audience for practical reasons of scale. However, this small scale can have a deleterious effect on the success of the experiment. US Major General James Dubik refers to this increase in scale as “expanding the experimental ground”. Simulation may offer one route to democratising the experimentation process. Bohemia Interactive’s “virtual battlespace” simulation software, in use with the British military, has integrated several of the UGS discussed in this paper, for example the THeMIS. Terminals are widely available throughout the British defence estate and accessible to troops, should they be given the time to make use of them. With simulation, there is less reliance on access to physical systems, of which there are not many. Simulations allow soldiers to test approaches and witness the strengths and weaknesses of the UGS outlined above, confirming appropriate use cases. It is, however, difficult to say yet how this will impact the integration of UGS into the force, or actual future use.</p> -<p><strong>FEDERAL CLOUD SECURITY</strong></p> +<p>Another difficulty in experimentation and novel procurement is the military’s propensity to replace like with like. As a result of this propensity, force structures look very similar to how they did 50 years ago. There is difficulty in identifying truly disruptive innovations because they do not look like what the organisation is currently doing. This limits organisations’ openness to the truly disruptive potential of UGS. Indeed, the discussion above itself adds UGS to existing structures, techniques and tactics. It may be the case that using entirely novel tactics may be the way to gain competitive advantage. This is where extensive experimentation with many members of the force should be considered. Giving soldiers the freedom to troubleshoot and use the system without preordained norms may lead to unexpected and beneficial findings.</p> -<p>As more FCEB agencies rely on the cloud for their activities, it creates new vulnerabilities. To that end, EO 14028 directs CISA to support efforts to modernize security standards across the federal network. The resulting cloud strategy provides a shared understanding of security standards, configurations, and visibility requirements. <strong>But providing the framework is different than actively supporting the implementation of processes and technologies that FCEB agencies might adopt to comply with the guidance.</strong></p> +<p>Timelines for the introduction of UGS into land forces are tentative. The British Army’s RAS strategy uses horizons stretching out to 2035 for the integration of RAS, despite them having been part of force structures for decades already. Making use of corporate knowledge developed in the UAS world can help ease the frictions of integrating UGS. The US military’s timeline is more assured, but progress towards its ambitions is uncertain. The Project Convergence series of experiments led by the US hopes to merge capabilities between partner nations in the pursuit of effective integration and increased lethality.</p> -<p>This strategy works alongside the larger process involving NIST, the General Services Administration, the DOD, and the DHS to standardize approaches to securing cloud computing consistent with the original vision in FISMA 2002 and 2014. The goal is to balance rapid deployment of cloud computing with sufficient security standards and protocols. FCEB CISOs select from a list of approved software vendors (i.e., software-as-a-service) that as of the spring of 2023 totaled 300 cloud service offerings. The result is a calibrated, risk-based approach to secure cloud services adoption across the federal government by providing standards for cloud services and facilitating a partnership between the federal government and private industry. In addition to long-term cost saving, this approach is intended to save time for agencies and industry providers alike by having everyone operate off a shared security framework.</p> +<p>Lethargy is common in military decision-making, and it is important that UGS do not fall into the trap that so often ensnares military procurement. The phenomenon whereby innovative technologies receive government funding but fail to make it into the hands of warfighters is known as the “Valley of Death”. Indeed, it appears that with AI being perceived as a potential silver bullet for many military issues, and RAS and UGS being the physical embodiment of that technology, militaries are having to hedge and spread their bets over a wide variety of initiatives. For example, the UK’s Defence and Security Accelerator has awarded more than £180 million to 1,065 different projects, an average of just £169,000 per serial. This is slightly less than the annual capitation rate of a single software engineer with the professional background and resources to develop this technology meaningfully. Increasing focus on those capabilities that show potential for the use cases described above is a potential route to success. Signalling commitment to the cause and allowing industry to plan accordingly is a key output of any RAS and UGS strategy. Indeed, the extended period of experimentation seen so far that has not led to serious expansion may in fact signal to industry to disinvest from research and development of UGS.</p> -<p>CISA goes one step further by providing additional guidance to and support for FCEB agencies, advising them on how to actually adopt secure cloud products. Among its prominent initiatives, CISA has introduced the Extensive Visibility Reference Framework (eVRF) and the Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) project.</p> +<p>The buy-in of top-level leadership is also crucial to successfully instigating change in an organisation. In the case of military experimentation, there can be a propensity for general officers to only attend “distinguished visitors’ days”, which are designed specifically for show, providing an element of innovation theatre. These sessions involve orchestrated demonstrations to show best-case scenarios. They also often take place at the end of an exercise period, in which frictions and realities have been found and then solved or worked around. Multiple rehearsals take place and minute details are agreed on by the deliverers. Such opportunities give industry representatives access to senior officers, and will often be identified as a career-enhancing event for the organisers. This can lead to true frictions being masked, and often means that the generals who hold authority for novel equipment programmes do not have an accurate and holistic picture of the state of play. Moreover, the tendency of armed forces personnel to move roles every two to three years means that only a general, rather than deep, level of understanding can be achieved. In a fast-moving technological environment, this is inimical to progress.</p> -<p>SCuBA focuses on securing cloud business applications, providing security guidance through the SCuBA Technical Reference Architecture that is closely aligned with zero trust principles. This architecture offers context, standard views, and threat-based guidance for secure cloud business application deployments, and it aims to secure the cloud environments where federal information is created, shared, and stored. Agencies are expected to cooperate with CISA by implementing comprehensive logging and information-sharing capabilities for better visibility and response to cloud threats.</p> +<h4 id="trust">Trust</h4> -<p>The architecture document, acting as the foundational guide for the SCuBA program, offers a vendor-agnostic approach to securing business applications, aligning with zero trust principles. The eVRF guidebook, on the other hand, helps organizations identify data visibility gaps and provides strategies to mitigate threats. eVRF encourages agencies to provide necessary data to CISA. The agency then evaluates the FCEB agencies’ visibility capabilities and helps integrate visibility concepts into their FCEB cyber practices.</p> +<p>A significant barrier to successful integration of UGS is trust. The desired human–technology relationship is often framed in terms of trust. This suggests there will always be some level of uncertainty about the workings of such systems, including UGS with some degree of autonomous function. Definitions of trust are numerous, and it is not feasible to give a full review of definitions here. One usable and well-cited definition of trust is, “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party”. To get their full utility, soldiers must embrace these systems and trust them to complete a task. Another conception is that trust in AI-related technology is a contractual one. A system can be considered trustworthy if it can maintain the contract made with a human operator. That is, the system will carry out the given task.</p> -<p>What might be helpful moving forward is for CISA to assess how FCEB agencies are engaging with these materials. For example, are they actively being used to develop agency specific plans? Are they adequately filling information gaps that currently exist across FCEB agencies? And do FCEB entities require additional training aids or materials to better assist with implementation?</p> +<p>Computer models that allow some level of autonomous activity are necessarily complex. There is a lack of transparency in many machine learning and AI models. When working with another soldier, it is possible to ask them why they made a decision, and person-to-person interaction is a norm with which all are familiar. This becomes more difficult with a “black box” scenario, where the decision-making process is opaque and not fully understood by the user. Trust is built slowly, but lost rapidly in the face of failure. Unless a system is fully explicable, a sceptical soldier is unable to query UGS as to why they want to act or have acted in a particular way. The military has many examples where lack of trust would cause a breakdown in operational effectiveness. The most obvious is a targeting system where a machine alerts a human operator to the potential presence of the enemy. Scepticism rather than over-trusting here is preferable, where a soldier checks the information before potentially suggesting an engagement through appropriate means. A more nuanced example would be the willingness of soldiers to load injured comrades on to UGS tasked with moving the casualties back to an aid post or hospital. The soldiers may think they could get there faster, and they might well be right. One study showed soldiers opting to manually control a UGV rather than trusting it to follow waypoints or a leader.</p> -<p>These questions are all the more critical given recent audits of FedRAMP compliance across FCEB agencies and the announcement of forthcoming FedRAMP guidance that will address advancements in the cloud marketplace.</p> +<p>Many studies of autonomous systems are focused on the ethics and practice of lethal autonomous weapons systems. Moreover, this discussion is often happening between civilian commentators. There has been much less research on the importance of various design features to active-duty service people. One study found a direct friction between maintaining meaningful control and understanding on the one hand, and maintaining the increased operational tempo that uncrewed and autonomous systems are hoped to unlock, on the other. Soldiers need to be able to rapidly verify a system’s suggestions and decisions without having to work through the entire evidence body, which would render the system moot. To that end, Jai Galliott and Austin Wyatt suggest that confidence measures in observations by UGS should be accessible to soldiers. Such measures would not be infallible, because of the technical reasons and potential for adversarial action discussed above. Therefore, a secondary suggestion by respondents to the study cited above was for systems to have a means of both simply describing their planned actions and of confirming that UGS have “understood” their operator’s commands. It would be worthwhile to consult a wide user base on this issue, rather than only people who happen to be in small experimental units, which may be more by luck than judgement.</p> -<h4 id="information-sharing">Information Sharing</h4> +<p>Equally, there is a fear of over-trust. Overestimating the ability of UGS will lead equally to an inefficient allocation of resources. This makes the process of integration and education throughout the force all the more important. Trust in automated systems has led to accidents in both conflict situations and commercial aviation. In Kuwait in 2003, a US Patriot detachment shot down a British Tornado, killing both pilots. The Patriot crew had acted on indicators given by the system’s computer. The best way to build trust is to develop understanding, which is the subject of the next section.</p> -<p>One of CISA’s value propositions in the federal government is its ability to engage with the private sector. What that means for FCEB agencies is that information-sharing programs hosted and facilitated by CISA valuably pull not only from other government entities but from a number of private sector organizations as well. The key aspects of information-sharing services that can be measured and evaluated include (1) quality of information, (2) timeliness of shared information and updates, (3) reach of information sharing, and (4) format of outputs. While CISA has made gains across these metrics through creating vulnerability catalogs and collaboration environments, it is struggling to keep up with the magnitude of the current cyber threat.</p> +<h4 id="socialisation">Socialisation</h4> -<p>Another key value that CISA uniquely brings is the ability to create a ConOps, or an overall cyber threat picture, populated by real-time activity reports from across FCEB agencies and critical infrastructure. No other entity can do this — not even cybersecurity vendors — once critical infrastructure events are reported into CISA and CDM dashboards are lit up. This is a unique tool and a huge “shields up,” since cyber adversaries cannot assemble this picture. But the United States must follow the steps necessary to gain this advantage: creating the apparatus and expediting cooperation, reporting events, and disseminating threat intelligence back out to FCEB agencies and industry.</p> +<p>As UGS proliferate, it is important for as many soldiers as possible to be exposed to them early in a safe manner. This is crucial to building the trust that is a precursor to success in HMT. Familiarity breeds trust, but military forces are poor at introducing soldiers to capabilities that are not their core system. Familiarity can also build favourability, whereby soldiers and commanders are willing to lean on these capabilities when planning operations. Such favourability is not a given. The more that soldiers are exposed to UGS, in whatever guise, the better they will understand them and the more likely they are to become ambassadors. As noted above, building trust is crucial to the full integration of UGS. Importantly, it is recognised that trust will not be developed solely by developers improving software outcomes over time. Instead, most gaps in trust “won’t be solved by code but by conversation”.</p> -<p><strong>KNOWN EXPLOITED VULNERABILITIES CATALOG</strong></p> +<p>This conversation might take place in several ways. The crucial step is to safely move UGS from being only in the hands of experimenters into those areas which see a large throughput of troops. These are most likely to be training establishments, both for initial training and for later tactical training. The first way is during military training and education. If military forces are not including modules on UGS in basic training, they should do so immediately. This might be as simple as a classroom discussion or presentation. Better still would be a physical demonstration using UGS. This could be a short session where a UGS’ capability is demonstrated to soldiers under training. The seemingly small act of having a trainee lie on a stretcher mounted to a UGS and travel a short distance would have manifest training benefits. As mentioned above, there is also an opportunity for simulation to play a role in widening the population of troops with exposure to UGS.</p> -<p>CISA’s BOD 22-01 mandates that FCEB agencies mitigate known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs) in their systems. The BOD established the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog to list computer Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures and require agencies to remediate vulnerabilities within specific deadlines — 15 calendar days for high or critical severity vulnerabilities and 30 calendar days for medium or low severity ones. Agencies are responsible for reviewing the catalog daily, notifying CISA of any barriers to compliance, and submitting regular status reports. The KEV catalog was mentioned in a number of interviews as a valuable CISA resource. Ongoing success will rely on continuing to receive and provide updates in a timely manner, as well as on FCEBs properly understanding how to act on and prioritize the information presented in the catalog.</p> +<p>The second area for consideration would be training areas and firing ranges. Large numbers of troops who have gone through basic training pass through these facilities each year. Forces undergoing range work could integrate a serial using a UGS. This could include UGS with a remote weapon system providing overhead fire, a task currently done by soldiers. This would build trust and understanding and increase the audience exposed to such systems. Equally, many range serials involve a simulated casualty evacuation. A “casualty” will be designated by the training staff, and the soldiers will have to give first aid and use a stretcher to evacuate the soldier to a safe area. An uncrewed ground system with a stretcher could be in place on the range and used to show its utility and allow soldiers to interact with novel systems. Pitting a human team against an uncrewed ground system would begin to show soldiers and commanders where and how UGS can be most usefully employed – they do not necessarily need to learn this from an instructional leaflet produced by a faraway department. Instead, troops would be enfranchised by direct experience. These activities would also create additional data for the manufacturer about usage and failure rates.</p> -<p>The KEV catalog recently reached 1,000 entries. Its intent is to help organizations prioritize vulnerability management efforts, with several major vendors integrating KEV data into automated vulnerability and patch management tools.</p> +<h4 id="siloes">Siloes</h4> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="binding-operational-directives"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Binding Operational Directives</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>State defence enterprises are large organisations. They consist of tens of thousands or more personnel. There are central departments or ministries and single services, as well as research laboratories such as the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) and the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency. Both the US and the UK have directorates dedicated to scanning the future and identifying concepts and capabilities that might be brought into forces. UGS are such a capability. It is not uncommon for people within defence ministries or the single services to not be aware of complementary activity that is taking place elsewhere within the organisation. This is a significant friction, and it prevents progress. In the UK, for example, DSTL, the Ministry of Defence Head Office and the Army Futures Directorate, which owns the HMT programme, all explore UGS. In addition, commercially, Defence Equipment and Support leads the procurement and delivery of UGS into the force. There is also the Experimentation and Trials Group, which leads experimentation with UGS. Moreover, there is a series of defence technology accelerators and innovation hubs. This list does not take into account the bulk of Army personnel who will become the users of UGS. These people should be the focus of UGS implementation. Within this large cohort, there will be a mixture of experience, aptitude and interest in UGS. If this community could be successfully tapped and exploited, there would be significant additional capacity to enhance the integration of UGS into land forces.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">From time to time, the DHS will issue Emergency Directives and Binding Operational Directives (BODs), compulsory mandates that direct departments and agencies to take certain actions that will help them safeguard their systems. The DHS is authorized to do this through CISA per FISMA. While this is not a CISA service per se, the development, rollout, and enforcement of BODs play a key role in supporting CISA’s larger federal network defense mission.</code></em></p> +<p>With such a wide breadth of activity, it is difficult to know who, if anyone, fully understands the totality of UGS research and development. Equally, within forces themselves, understanding of other units’ capabilities is often not well understood even when they are well established. Formations regularly organise briefing days so that staff can be informed of what is available to them during planning. Internal communications on this subject should be a central effort, to ensure coherence and a clear path to actual use, rather than a succession of experiments that remain in the trials arena.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The following are some of the more recent and relevant BODs impacting FCEB network defense:</code></em></p> +<p>Experimentation is important, but it should not be limited to small numbers of soldiers. Instead, exposure should be wide and varied to make use of the diversity of thought and talent available. The building of trust in robotic systems must be deliberate, through exposure early on in careers and regular, good-quality education. There must be a concerted effort to break down siloes in defence establishments so that best practice and knowledge can be better shared. The common theme is giving primacy to the future users of these systems as quickly as possible and at scale.</p> -<ul> +<h3 id="vii-recommendations-for-ugs-integration">VII. Recommendations for UGS Integration</h3> + +<ol> <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">BOD 23-02: “Mitigating the Risk from Internet-Exposed Management Interfaces”;</code></em></p> + <p><strong>Role and management:</strong> Due to current technical limitations, UGS should be employed in standoff roles and in rear areas, where there is a dividend for their use. Treating larger UGS like aircraft whose support can be bid for will allow supply and demand to be managed, as well as keeping UGS from burdening low-level formations.</p> </li> <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">BOD 23-01: “Improving Asset Visibility and Vulnerability Detection on Federal Networks”;</code></em></p> + <p><strong>Force design:</strong> The extra demand UGS will place on engineers and enablers (the invisible tail) needs to be baked into force planning now. The management of UGS may, in fact, require more soldiers.</p> </li> <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">BOD 22-01: “Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities”; and</code></em></p> + <p><strong>Logistic burden:</strong> The transport and storage of UGS, and battery management, must be planned for in detail, accepting that it cannot simply be added on to existing commitments, which would further stretch scarce resource. This will ensure the force-wide implications of new technology are catered for adequately.</p> </li> <li> - <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">BOD 18-02: “Securing High Value Assets.”</code></em></p> + <p><strong>Education:</strong> Education and training related to UGS should be implemented now, while experimentation is ongoing, rather than waiting until systems are formally brought into service. Basic training should include education on UGS now, even in a basic form, to begin to build trust and familiarity, easing the integration of UGS at scale.</p> </li> -</ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Experimentation:</strong> UGS trials should be integrated into those areas with a significant throughput of soldiers, such as firing ranges. Moreover, it should be ensured that the totality of UGS experimentation and activity is understood by decision-makers and those conducting the experimentation, and that leaders maintain engagement with projects throughout the life cycle, rather than at the beginning and end. Clear ownership of the whole ecosystem is vital, while encouraging bottom-up engagement will create a user base ready to make best use of UGS.</p> + </li> +</ol> + +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> + +<p>This paper has discussed UGS and the considerations for successfully integrating these systems into military forces. It has described the physical and software components of such systems, and how they are anticipated to be used by military forces in the near and further future. Having established the state of the art, the paper discussed three questions.</p> + +<p>First, how will UGS be used once they have been deployed? Systems with high levels of autonomous capability remain rare. Thus, most systems are remotely controlled or teleoperated from a distance. Potential benefits abound, such as enabling soldiers to stay out of harm’s way, and increasing the envelope over which they have sight and potentially control. UGS are not ready to manoeuvre in close combat, their movement is limited by the sheer number of variables, and humans retain the upper hand by some way. Equally, full autonomous navigation is possible, but systems move so slowly as to be potentially deleterious to their main functions, such as load carriage for manoeuvre troops.</p> + +<p>Second, how will UGS get to, and stay in, the fight? Some UGS can be carried by soldiers, while others will need to be towed or transported to where they are needed. They will also then require collecting and moving onward to repair and maintenance before further use. A secondary effect of this is that UGS will have a significant logistic tail, at least in the short to medium term. This will lead to an increase in human enablers supporting UGS.</p> + +<p>Third, how can soldiers be encouraged to make proper use of UGS? It is not a given that soldiers will adopt systems in the way originally envisaged by their designers, or even by military procurement officers and decision-makers. Familiarisation is key to building trust. If soldiers believe they can do a particular job better, they will follow that route. Given this, it is also important not to force the integration of UGS that do not add value to the HMT. Integrating UGS into basic training and those areas with a high throughput of soldiers will rapidly help socialise the use of UGS.</p> + +<p>All these themes are interlinked and there are dependencies between them all. They must be considered by planners who have a firm view of the totality of the enterprise. Moving from experimentation to a capability integrated into field forces is no mean feat, and requires energy and direction from senior leadership. Somewhat ironically, it appears that the most sensible approach when considering the integration of uncrewed systems is to focus on the human.</p> + +<hr /> -<p>Beyond general information about the vulnerabilities themselves, the KEV catalog also captures other important trends with implications for broader cybersecurity. For instance, over three-quarters of the updates in the KEV catalog relate to older vulnerabilities, suggesting the persistence of long-standing security risks across agencies. Likewise, it could also be that vulnerabilities may exist in the wild but have not been optimized to do harm. The inclusion of end-of-life systems, such as Windows Server 2008 and Windows 7, indicates that there are still many organizations utilizing legacy systems.</p> +<p><strong>Patrick Hinton</strong> is a serving regular officer in the British Army’s Royal Artillery. He has experience working with ground based air defence systems and remotely piloted air systems. He has also worked in the personnel space. Since joining the Army in 2014, his career has consisted of a number of appointments at regimental duty including Troop Command, Executive Officer, and Adjutant. He was the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow in the Military Sciences Research Group at RUSI until the end of August 2023.</p>Patrick HintonMilitary experimentation with uncrewed ground systems (UGS) is happening apace. Bomb disposal robots have been in service with armed forces for decades. Now, systems with greater capabilities and autonomy are being developed and tested.Taliban’s Campaign Against IS2023-10-25T12:00:00+08:002023-10-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/talibans-campaign-against-islamic-state<p><em>This paper examines the strategies employed by the Taliban in response to the threat posed by the Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K) in 2021–22.</em></p> -<p>However, further review of the catalog reveals that it would sometimes take over a week after public disclosure for a vulnerability to be added to the catalog. The KEV catalog is not meant to serve as an early warning system. It is a problem that some entities perceive and use it that way.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CzhekAM.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities 2023.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog">“Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog,” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency</a>, accessed August 21, 2023.</em></p> +<p>Despite a recent decline, the Islamic State (IS), and its South Asian branch IS-K, remains one of the most resilient terrorist organisations on the planet – as recent reports of it planning attacks in Turkey and Europe show. Research carried out in late 2021 to mid-2022 with Taliban and IS members shows that IS-K represented a serious challenge for the Taliban in Afghanistan in this period. While they initially dismissed the threat from IS-K, the Taliban soon developed capabilities to confront it – these capabilities, and IS-K’s responses to them, are the subject of this paper.</p> -<p>Moreover, while the information from the KEV list is definitely useful, one of the interviewed federal experts noted that it would be even more helpful if the catalog clearly distinguished differences between the listed vulnerabilities. For example, if CISA pushes an updated list with 10 new entries, are there certain vulnerabilities that federal CISOs should be most concerned about and should address first? Are there others that are lower on the priority list? Moving forward, the catalog’s usefulness will be graded on its ability to update information in a relatively quick manner, while also clearly communicating to users how they should interpret and act on listed information.</p> +<p>The paper outlines five key counter-IS techniques that the Taliban adopted after August 2021: indiscriminate repression; selective repression; choking-off tactics; reconciliation deals; and elite bargaining.</p> -<p><strong>JOINT CYBER DEFENSE COLLABORATIVE</strong></p> +<p>While their initial response was to indulge in indiscriminate repression, the Taliban gradually moved towards an approach focused on selective repression, with the aim of leaving the local communities in areas of IS-K activity relatively untouched. They also considerably improved their intelligence capabilities in this period. By the second half of 2022, the Taliban had succeeded in destroying enough IS-K cells and blocking enough of the group’s funding to drive down its activities and contain the threat. The Taliban also experimented with reconciliation and reintegration, and managed to persuade a few hundred IS-K members in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province to surrender, contributing decisively to the dismantling of most of IS-K’s organisation there.</p> -<p>One of CISA’s most important roles is serving as a trusted hub for information sharing, but it has recently expanded to include more robust operational and planning collaboration across the public and private sectors. This role was formalized and expanded at the recommendation of the CSC, which emphasized the need for a Joint Cyber Planning Cell “under CISA to coordinate cybersecurity planning and readiness across the federal government and between the public and private sectors.” CISA has taken it further by establishing a Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC). In CISA director Jen Easterly’s view, JCDC is “more than just planning.” While the JCDC is still a work in progress, it would be helpful moving forward for there to be more clarity into the changing composition of the group and membership criteria, how it expects to formally coordinate with other information-sharing mechanisms, and what its envisioned role and expected interaction with FCEB agencies are. <strong>While the JCDC has experienced early successes, its ability to provide value in the future will rely on its ability to either scale up or manage a smaller representative group that is trusted as an authoritative coalition by a wide variety of sectors.</strong></p> +<p>However, there were also significant flaws in the Taliban’s approach. This paper finds that their selective approach to tackling IS-K struggled to find firm footing in the absence of a solid system of the rule of law and of external oversight. The Taliban’s leadership appear to be struggling to figure out how to ensure that the lower layers of their security apparatus follow orders to avoid arbitrary violence. The paper further shows how the Taliban have failed to follow through with their initially promising reconciliation and reintegration efforts.</p> -<p>The ultimate goal of the JCDC is to create a common operating picture for federal agencies, industry experts, and critical infrastructure owners and operators so that they can more proactively hunt, plan for, and jointly respond to cyber threats. Just in the past year, CISA has broadened its focus to include industrial control systems expertise, increasing the diversity and strength of the JCDC’s capabilities. CISA is also collecting information from international sources, collaborating with over 150 partners worldwide to share cybersecurity data. Additionally, CISA has touted the JCDC’s response to the Log4Shell vulnerability and the cyber challenges that arose during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as successes.</p> +<p>For its part, IS-K showed remarkable organisational resilience in response to the rising tide of the Taliban’s counterterrorism efforts. The group transformed itself into an underground organisation, relinquishing all its bases and moving most of its assets to northern Afghanistan. With this approach, and true to the reputation of its founding organisation, IS, IS-K in Afghanistan managed to survive, even when faced with potentially existential challenges, such as a crackdown on its financial hub in Turkey. IS-K has come increasingly to rely on online activities, including for recruitment.</p> -<p>Critics of the JCDC point to the office’s lack of a formal charter or clear membership criteria, which could potentially hinder future scalability and transparency. During this project’s expert interviews, for example, it was mentioned that the information flow, in all directions, is not happening fast enough.</p> +<p>The Taliban learned faster than most observers expected them to in response to the challenge of IS-K, and scored significant successes. The longer-term prospects of their counter-IS efforts, however, remain dependent on IS-K continuing to struggle financially, because the drivers of mobilisation into its Afghan ranks remain largely unaddressed.</p> -<p>Relatedly, there are questions about how effectively the JCDC can work in terms of long-term planning (not just during crisis mode) and how it plans to manage its growth in the coming years. Moving forward, it will also be important to see how the JCDC balances ease of reporting and information sharing with more formal concerns about liability. CISA has provided some initial guidance on its website, but there will likely be lingering concerns about liability protection in the absence of more formal assurances. Finally, while there are benefits to using certain commercial platforms for emergency communications, there will always be concerns about alternatives in case those channels are compromised in any way.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>The JCDC will not be effective if everyone is a member, but identifying ways to make membership criteria intentional, representative, and relevant will be key, as will be finding ways to demonstrate the value add to FCEB agencies (see Recommendation 3.5 on the value add of the JCDC).</p> +<p>The Taliban took power in Afghanistan in August 2021. As practitioners of insurgent warfare, they had to start learning almost overnight ways of doing counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, especially against what emerged as their main challenger, the Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K). Their early efforts have been characterised as “brutal” and “ineffective”. Others have stated a belief that that the Emirate would not be able to successfully tackle IS-K on its own. As this paper will show, the Taliban initially relied largely on ruthless tactics. However, as shown in a 2023 paper by this author, despite the (very limited) financial means and human resources available, in subsequent months the Taliban’s approach has not been exclusively brutal and at the same time was quite effective, at least in the short term. Indeed, the Taliban, widely seen during their “jihad” (2002–21) as a force of nature, were in reality even then already displaying considerable organisational skills.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="co-pilots-cisa-and-cyber-commands-partnership-during-a-crisis"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Co-pilots: CISA and Cyber Command’s Partnership during a Crisis</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>This empirical research paper forms part of the EU-funded STRIVE Afghanistan project, and aims to further discuss and analyse how the Taliban applied their organisational capital to countering IS-K. The guiding questions that this paper seeks to answer are: how did the Taliban structure their post-August 2021 counter-IS mix of tactics, how successful were these in fighting IS-K, how did IS-K adapt, and did the Taliban try to achieve long-term stability, seeking non-kinetic approaches and reducing reliance on violence? Since the Taliban do not frame their counter-IS effort with reference to the Western understanding of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, the author will also avoid referring to such terminologies, and will instead examine their specific tactics. As noted in a rare study of non-Western responses to terrorism, Western theorisations of terrorism and counterterrorism might not be very useful in analysing such efforts by non-Western states and actors.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">During the 2023 RSA Conference, CISA executive assistant director for cybersecurity Eric Goldstein and Major General William Hartman, commander of the Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), took the stage to provide an overview on how both entities ride side by side to defend the federal enterprise. They shared overlapping goals, with Goldstein emphasizing the desire to help increase costs on adversaries and signaling to actors that a “call to one is a call to all” so that partners overseas also take action — not just the United States. Complementing Goldstein’s overview, Hartman described the CNMF command as “foreign facing,” defending the homeland and supporting its allies, while highlighting that “no partner is more important than DHS CISA.” Both spoke to the level of collaboration they execute, working side by side through liaison officers at each other’s locations, from senior leaders down to individual analysts and operators. Hartman further elaborated that the CNMF is focused on two things: (1) what information does CISA have relevant to the DOD’s missions that might allow it to disrupt or prevent an attack on the homeland, and (2) what does the CNMF observe through operations in foreign space that can be shared back to CISA to protect the homeland?</code></em></p> +<p>The discussion focuses on how, after August 2021, the Taliban practised violent repression, both indiscriminately, against people not directly involved in the armed opposition, and selectively, against active insurgents. It also covers how the Taliban have tried to choke off the armed opposition, denying it access to population, supply routes and financial flows. The paper finally looks at whether there may be signs of awareness among the new Taliban elite that their long-term self-interest might be better served by developing reconciliation programmes of some kind, or by reaching some elite bargain.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The importance of the CISA-CNMF partnership proved decisive for bidirectional information sharing during some well-known incidents. The first was SolarWinds: within the hour that FireEye alerted the government, CISA and the DOD began to act. CISA rapidly identified nine FCEB agencies that were compromised. This was followed by incident response to understand the breath of intrusions, the payloads, and the artifacts left behind. Next, CISA extracted infected servers and sent data to the CNMF. On the side of the DOD and the CNMF, Major General Hartford stressed that gaining an image of compromised servers from CISA was invaluable. The CNMF used CISA’s server image for modeling to rehearse and exercise hunting skills, and in the span of a few days, the CNMF developed high-end capabilities to hunt the adversaries. At the same time, intelligence indicated that a foreign partner was compromised by the same actor, and the partner requested the assistance of the CNMF. The CNMF team then deployed overseas and almost immediately encountered adversary activity in their hunt-forward operation. The operation was a success and the CNMF collected novel malware from its encounter and moved to share it broadly.</code></em></p> +<p>There are not many large-scale counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts that have altogether eschewed all forms of ruthless violence, so analysing a “counter” effort requires some careful qualifications. The first useful distinction here is between selective and indiscriminate violence. A regime that focuses its violence on its enemies can deliver a clear message that those who challenge it will meet a terrible fate, while political quietism (accepting the status quo without resistance) is rewarded. Encouraging quietism while targeting “extremists” (defined as anti-ruling system elements) should therefore be a winning approach, even if utterly violent. The question that follows, then, is why ruling elites should be concerned about achieving anything more than an efficient (selective) repression. This is a pertinent question especially where a violent conflict has already taken off. At that point, some form of repression can no longer be avoided. Following a long-term pattern of indiscriminate violence makes non-violent alternatives hard to buy into for any opponent. However, even choosing selective violence does not necessarily make non-violent alternatives easy to pursue. Different actors within any government will each make their own assessments on where the boundary between violent extremists and quietists may lie, resulting in divisions within a state apparatus and a ruling elite.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Returning to the public campaign, CISA reviewed the tactics, techniques, and procedures using information that the CNMF brought back to share with the nine compromised FCEB agencies and more broadly. Thanks to this data, CISA then developed an eviction guide to make sure the malicious actors were out of systems. CISA not only worked with the CNMF but also with the NSA, Mandiant, and Microsoft, forming a united front across the .gov, .mil, and .com ecosystems to kick out the invaders. A united front across the multiple sectors helped lend confidence and credibility in the eviction guide and eased worries for both industry and FCEB agencies to arrive at an eviction point.</code></em></p> +<p>Another important distinction is that violent repression may or may not be accompanied by efforts to negotiate local reintegration deals, with the collaboration of local elites. Such deals are often deemed to be a more effective long-term way of stabilising a polity than relying solely on violence, not least because they can potentially create bonds between ruling and local elites, eventually resulting in the latter gaining sufficient leverage with the centre to effectively constrain its use of arbitrary power. Similarly, repression can also be accompanied by elite bargaining, that is, power sharing.</p> -<h4 id="incident-response">Incident Response</h4> +<p>There are also ways of choking off armed opposition with no political concessions and no negotiations, without using extreme violence. Large-scale military deployments, for example, which, in the presence of adequate levels of manpower, can be achieved without reliance on indiscriminate use of firepower, can result in the capture of territory and assertion of control over the population, reducing or denying the ability of the opposition to recruit new members, access sanctuaries, train and transfer supplies. In other words, the aim of such large operations need not be to destroy the enemy, but can be to choke it off. An even better example of choking-off tactics is financial disruption, where violence plays a very small part. These tactics are particularly appealing to ruling elites, but are not necessarily within their reach. It takes an army considerably superior to the opposing forces to monopolise control over territory and population, and it takes a sophisticated intelligence apparatus to block financial flows towards the armed opposition. Moreover, choking-off tactics can be a protracted affair and even an inconclusive one, depending on the skill of the opponents. An armed opposition could continue operating under more adverse conditions even with little or no access to the wider population, and new channels for transferring cash to rebels can always be devised by creative sanctions busters.</p> -<p>During a number of interviews, experts noted that they had been the recipients of CISA’s incident response services or, at the very least, that they could understand why these services were an important part of CISA’s broader offerings. From providing general assistance to impacted FCEBs to actively coordinating with law enforcement on the investigative aspect, CISA is well positioned to deliver timely incident response guidance and immediate assistance.</p> +<p>This is a reason for ruling elites not to write off political tactics completely. There are other reasons as well for not writing off local reintegration deals and elite bargains. One possible incentive to invest in reconciliation or an elite bargain is the awareness within the ranks of the ruling elite that ruthless repressions, even when efficient in the short term, do not successfully remove the roots of opposition, but instead allow it to resurface generations later, or even sooner, leaving the state vulnerable. Another possible incentive is that repressions can drag on inconclusively and go through critical phases, with the final outcome being uncertain and involving a high cost to the ruling elites. In such contexts, softer alternatives to ruthless repression can gain traction.</p> -<p>Prompted by Section 6 of EO 14028, CISA published incident response and vulnerability response playbooks for FCEB agencies. Each playbook walks FCEB agencies through the life cycle of an incident, highlighting activities that can be done both during and pre- and post-crisis to ensure that information is collected and shared in a timely manner and that steps are taken to mitigate the incident’s effects. Additionally, CISA offers free incident response training for interested federal employees and contractors. But where CISA, by way of the DHS, becomes even more helpful is that it can engage in both asset response and threat response activities. Presidential Policy Directive 41 designates the DHS’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Center as lead for asset response. Separately, while the Department of Justice (DOJ) leads in threat response via its investigatory authorities, the DHS plays a critical supporting role in that process.</p> +<p>This paper is comprised of three chapters. The first examines the state of IS-K and the type of threat it presented to the Taliban as they took power, and how the Taliban assessed that threat. The second chapter discusses in detail how the Taliban sought to meet the IS-K challenge, examining each tactic in turn: indiscriminate repression; selective repression; choking-off tactics; local reconciliation and reintegration; and elite bargaining. The third and final chapter examines IS-K’s response to the Taliban.</p> -<p>Moving forward, CISA might consider more intentionally moving away from guidance that focuses on threats and vulnerabilities and instead look to address consequences more broadly. To the extent that these incident response trainings and pre-incident guidance documents can actively change how agencies think about recovery (and what, in fact, they need to recover from), that might help agencies in the long run. A good example for why the consequence-based approach should be intentionally considered is the Colonial Pipeline incident. Even though the ransomware attack was on Colonial Pipeline’s billing system, they had to shut down their entire operational technology (OT) out of concern that the attack was widespread. This suggests that anticipating cascading consequences — and even the public perception of a potential incident — should be more intentionally included in incident plans (see Recommendations 2.4 and 3.7 on revisiting mission-essential functions and promoting resilience, respectively).</p> +<p>To protect sources, neither the names of the interviewees nor their exact roles in their organisations have been disclosed. IS-K interviewees are classified as either “commanders” (leaders of a tactical group of five to 30 men) or “cadres” (district and provincial-level leaders, or managers of support departments such as logistics or finance, among others).</p> -<p>As a general note to appropriators, while these services are considered valuable, CISA is woefully under-resourced for its incident response activities. These capabilities are not available to all and rely heavily on surge plans from other agencies and the National Guard if there is a large demand.</p> +<h4 id="methodology">Methodology</h4> -<h4 id="resilience-building">Resilience Building</h4> +<p>With the Taliban–IS-K conflict still under way, any findings of this paper can be only partial and preliminary. There are also clear limitations to the research methodology adopted: research was by necessity limited to oral sources, with limited support from news reports and policy-oriented analysis – which are also often partial – and no access to primary written sources, such as the Emirate’s records, or of course to any internal IS-K documents.</p> -<p>As suggested in a recent CSIS study on federal government resilience, resilience can broadly be defined as “how well an individual, institution, or society can prepare for and respond to shocks to the system and endure, perhaps even thrive, under prolonged periods of stress.” Short of hardening systems, a number of the other initiatives listed above all contribute to CISA’s ability to help FCEB agencies maintain more secure networks and resilient postures overall. However, this study more narrowly categorizes resilience-building activities as those that help FCEB agencies plan for and start building toward long-term resilience. While resilience-building activities are often surpassed or overlooked in favor of activities that seem to focus on the short term or that yield immediate benefits, these operations are key to helping FCEB entities properly plan for future threats and challenges.</p> +<p>Researching this topic required a number of methodological compromises given that conducting primary research in a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan is extremely difficult. IS-K recruiters and members were, of course, the most difficult to speak to, primarily because they have increasingly been in hiding. As a result, the body of data collected is inevitably incomplete and follow-up on specific themes was often not possible. The analysis contained in the paper inevitably reflects this. However, it should be noted that when reached and given a proper introduction by a third party, such as a relative, friend, colleague or respected individual, even members of IS-K proved quite talkative. This should not be a surprise, as the literature shows that members of violent extremist organisations are typically proud of being members and often brag about their own activities, even when they are supposed to be operating deep underground, as in Europe. The risk faced by this type of research is therefore not one of not obtaining access. There are other risks, however: that interviewees might be affected by a social-desirability bias, resulting in overstating their achievements, capabilities and/or resources; or by reverse causation, leading sources to provide prejudiced information about rival organisations. Mitigation measures are discussed below.</p> -<h4 id="training-and-exercises">Training and Exercises</h4> +<p>Taliban officials were quite prudent in their answers, but thanks to their internal tensions and differences, Taliban interviewees were also quite often willing to discuss embarrassing details and to acknowledge limitations in their counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. Taliban interviewees were often dismissive of the IS-K threat and overstated the progress made in countering that threat, while IS-K sources did the exact opposite. This was expected, and it was dealt with by interviewing multiple sources within both the Taliban and IS-K, and by spreading the research effort over 20 months, allowing for the time-testing of responses. This was particularly important and useful as it provided validation points for the reliability of the different sources. For example, initialTaliban dismissals of IS-K were proved wrong, as were IS-K’s triumphalist assumptions made in early 2022. The data points provided by sources could only be assessed against one another over time, as in the case of claims about IS-K moving to northern Afghanistan.</p> -<p>The United States has invested vast amounts of taxpayer dollars into hardening, evolving, and improving cybersecurity across federal, SLTT, and private sector systems. In addition to investing in technologies and systems, it is just as important to invest in training and process. Similar to how U.S. schools simulate earthquake, fire, tornado, and active-shooter drills to train students and teachers for what they should do during a crisis, CISA simulates the discovery of and response to cyber incidents so relevant actors are proactively mapping out response plans. CISA’s premier exercise is Cyber Storm, where participating organizations are asked to execute strategic decisionmaking and practice interagency coordination to address an incident scenario.</p> +<p>While the author takes into account the literature relevant to the topic and the period, this paper relies mainly on empirical data collected through interviews. It is based on a series of 54 interviews, carried out between August 2021 and April 2023. Multiple interviews on both sides of the conflict and with non-aligned individuals, such as elders, clerics, former IS-K members and <em>hawala</em> traders, allowed for greater cross-referencing opportunities. The details are provided in the table below.</p> -<p>Cyber Storm is a biannual exercise. The most recent one was held in March 2022 (Version VIII), and the next exercise will likely take place in the spring of 2024. Each exercise grows out of the previous one, in a sense building on institutional knowledge and key insights identified during the previous exercise. This process helps new and old players stay up to date on the current concerns and plan through industry best practices.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wddBWob.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Breakdown of Interviews.</strong> Source: Author generated.</em></p> -<p>The latest exercise had a stated goal of “strengthening cybersecurity preparedness and response capabilities by exercising policies, processes, and procedures for identifying and responding to a multi-sector significant cyber incident impacting critical infrastructure.” The exercise included representatives from 100 private companies across 10 critical infrastructure sectors, 33 FCEB agencies, 9 states, and 15 countries. After running the exercise, the group identified shortcomings and areas needing greater clarity with regard to government policies. Ultimately, the exercise was successful in that it not only helped the different entities practice how they should collaborate and share information during a crisis (something that is routinely needed during an actual incident), but also demonstrated gaps that the government needs to address for future plans to be more effective.</p> +<p>The research methodology was a hybrid of investigative journalistic and ethnographic interviewing. The questionnaires were adapted to each interviewee; there were, in fact, 54 different questionnaires. Questions evolved as knowledge of ongoing trends and developments expanded.</p> -<p>Cyber Storm by itself is a tremendous project, but CISA also publishes general exercise information and encourages the general practice of hosting similar exercises. Whether as a host, facilitator, or participant, CISA should continue to invest in training FCEB agencies to conduct exercises on their own and promote these exercises as a way for agencies to, among other things, map out resilience and continuity of operational plans.</p> +<p>The interviews were commissioned to three Afghan researchers in local languages (Pashto, Dari and Uzbek) and took place mostly in Afghanistan, with some interviews taking place in Pakistan. Two of the researchers were members of the Salafi community, a fact that facilitated access to IS-K sources and reduced risk to researchers to acceptable levels. All of the researchers had a background in journalism and/or research, had participated in previous research projects with a similar typology of interviewees, had been trained to undertake research with a similar methodology, and had contacts or personal/family relations with Taliban and/or IS-K members, which proved crucial in reaching out and gaining access to interviewees.</p> -<p><strong>GENERAL GUIDANCE</strong></p> +<p>The risk that respondents might use the interviews to influence external observers or to misrepresent the facts was assumed from the start as a precautionary measure. This risk was mitigated by using different types of interviewees – such as members of either the Taliban or IS-K, elders of local communities where IS-K operates, clerics and traders – who represented contrasting points of view; by interviewing individuals separately and without them being aware of other interviews taking place; and by inserting questions to which the answer was already known, to verify responses. It proved particularly helpful to present interviewees with information gathered from other sources, such as local elders saying that IS-K members were struggling financially, and ask them to comment. Most IS-K sources could not avoid some degree of openness about apparently negative developments concerning IS-K. Public-domain sources, such as media reports and analytical studies, were also used, where available, to check the credibility of interviewees. The researchers chosen did not know one another, to avoid the risk of researcher collusion to manipulate the content of interviews, for example by inventing content to produce whatever they might have believed the project team wanted to hear. This is always a risk when interviews are carried out by field researchers while the project is being managed remotely. The field researchers were also informed that the purpose of the effort was simply to ascertain facts, and that there was no premium placed on specific findings. Finally, the data collected was validated as much as possible via consultations with independent experts and government and international organisations monitoring developments in Afghanistan, who, given the sensitivity of the topic, asked to remain anonymous.</p> -<p>In general, interviewed industry and FCEB experts seemed appreciative of CISA’s guidance documents (see Recommendation 3.8 on transparency guidance). The question then becomes whether it is CISA’s role to aid general guidance with additional support for implementation, or if that is something FCEB agencies should be expected to manage on their own or with the support and guidance of other entities.</p> +<p>The interviewees were told that their answers would be used in an open-access publication, the type of which was not specified. The interviews were carried out in part face to face and in part over the phone – some interviewees were in locations that were difficult to access. All the interviews have been anonymised and all data that could lead to the identification of interviewees has been removed.</p> -<p>CISA’s role as a general information resource for FCEB agencies cannot be overstated. In addition to some of the service-specific resources listed above, CISA recently published reference guides such as its <em>Cloud Security Technical Reference Architecture Guide and Zero Trust Maturity Model</em> — both representing the types of comprehensive guides that FCEB agencies can consult to support their respective agency plans to modernize and enhance security in the coming years.</p> +<h3 id="i-the-taliban-and-is-k-sources-of-enmity">I. The Taliban and IS-K: Sources of Enmity</h3> -<p>During one particularly interesting interview, a federal CISO noted that CISA’s guidance documents are great but that it would be helpful if they could detail out a few subject matter experts to further assist FCEB agencies. For instance, the interviewee thought it would have been helpful for CISA to additionally assign a ZTA expert to the different FCEB agencies to help them with ZTA migration beyond just producing a document (see Recommendation 2.5 on CISA’s role with regard to FCEB ZTA migration).</p> +<p>The conflict between the Taliban and IS-K did not start in 2021. There was tension between IS-K and the Taliban from the moment IS-K was launched in January 2015. By May 2015, the two organisations were at war, competing over territory, but also over the loyalty of hardened jihadists, be they Afghans, Pakistanis, Central Asians or others. The elements most influenced by the global jihadist agenda were those most likely to be attracted by IS-K, even if its Salafist profile discouraged many who would otherwise have been interested. Several hundred members of the Taliban defected to IS-K, contributing much ill feeling. The fighting, mostly concentrated in Kajaki and Zabul (southern Afghanistan), Nangarhar and Kunar (eastern Afghanistan) and Darzab (northwestern Afghanistan), continued throughout the 2015–21 period and led sometimes to atrocities.</p> -<p>This suggestion raises a few questions. Does CISA have the capacity to offer this type of service? And if not, is it their job to find a way to do so given their role as the designated lead for federal network security? Put another way, what is the actual scope of CISA’s mission with regard to FCEB protection, and what are the implications for other entities that directly or indirectly play some role in securing or supporting the maintenance of federal networks?</p> +<p>In those years, the two rival insurgent organisations had their columns of fighters clashing in a kind of semi-regular warfare. The better-disciplined IS-K had an edge against poorly trained local Taliban militias in 2015–18, but the tables turned in 2019–20, when the Taliban started deploying their crack units against IS-K’s strongholds in eastern Afghanistan. After that and until August 2021, IS-K stayed away from confronting the Taliban head on and sought safety in more remote parts of the east, counting on the fact that the Taliban were still primarily busy fighting the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.</p> -<p><strong>POST-INCIDENT REVIEWS</strong></p> +<p>For some time after the violence between the two organisations started in May 2015, IS-K did not produce much propaganda. It was only in more recent years that IS-K set up a large-scale propaganda campaign against the Taliban, challenging their credentials, both as a jihadist group and their religious credentials, especially what IS-K saw as their lax implementation of Islamic law. Friction between adherents of Salafism, a purist form of Islamic fundamentalism, and Hanafis – Deobandis in particular, but also Sufis – helped to feed the conflict. Although the Deobandis are described as being influenced by Salafism, Salafis see them as practitioners of an impure form of Islam. This is even truer of Sufis. Although IS-K initially downplayed its Salafi–jihadist ideology in the hope of attracting a wider range of supporters, after its appearance in 2015, it gradually took on an increasingly hardline Salafi character. The Taliban, on the other hand, became more and more diverse over time, incorporating, in particular, many members from a Muslim Brotherhood background, while the top leadership remained predominantly Deobandi-influenced, with a strong influence of Sufism as well. While a significant number of Salafis joined the Taliban’s jihad between 2003 and 2015, after 2015, most were attracted to IS-K.</p> -<p>The U.S. Cyber Safety Review Board (CSRB) was established by EO 14028 after the SolarWinds incident, and its goal is to investigate significant cyber incidents and socialize lessons learned in the hopes of fortifying national cybersecurity efforts. While some critics have already been quick to call out the board for lack of efficacy, the board is still relatively new, and it is likely too early to fully assess the program.</p> +<h3 id="ii-sizing-up-the-is-k-challenge-in-2021">II. Sizing Up the IS-K Challenge in 2021</h3> -<p>The board comprises no more than 20 individuals appointed by the CISA director, and it studies and produces recommendations to the secretary of homeland security by way of the CISA director. To date, the CSRB has investigated the December 2021 disclosure of the Log4j vulnerability, one of the most serious software vulnerabilities in history, and attacks carried out by the Lapsus$ hacking group. DHS secretary Alejandro Mayorkas also recently announced that the CSRB will conduct a review of cloud service providers and their security practices, with a focus on the recent suspected Chinese intrusion into Microsoft Exchange Online.</p> +<h4 id="is-ks-manpower">IS-K’s Manpower</h4> -<p>Critiques of the board include confidentiality issues, institutional factors such as a lack of full-time staff, budgetary constraints, and potential conflicts of interest. Additionally, there seems to be a reluctance to investigate incidents that are a few years old and a reticence to place blame on a single entity when warranted.</p> +<p>The extent to which IS-K represented a challenge to those in power in Afghanistan, be they the previous regime or the Taliban, has long been a topic of discussion. The UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, for example, which relies on assessment provided by member states, has provided constantly fluctuating numbers over time. According to IS-K’s own internal sources, IS-K leaders had at their disposal in July 2021 a force of up to 8,000 men. Of these:</p> -<p>As described, the CSRB can be a very useful tool and opportunity to generate meaningful recommendations. But as important as it is for the CSRB to move quickly with its investigations, incident selection is just as, if not more, important.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Just over 1,100 were in Pakistan.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The remaining force was mostly concentrated in eastern Afghanistan (Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan), where some 3,700 IS-K members included the bulk of its combat force, some village militias and much of its administrative structure, handling finances and logistics, keeping track of recruitment, making appointments and deciding transfers, planning training and indoctrination, and other tasks. From this area, moving back and forth to and from Pakistan was easy due to the porosity of the nearby border.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The other important concentration was in the northeast, largely in Badakhshan, with almost 1,200 members in that region. This second concentration included well-trained combat forces and some administrative facilities, but was not very active militarily during this period, and instead sought to keep a low profile in central Badakhshan, chiefly in the Khastak valley.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Apart from a few hundred IS-K prison escapees, en route to the east, the rest of the force of IS-K (some 1,300–1,400 men) was at this point mainly spread around the south, the southeast, the region surrounding Kabul, the west, and in the main cities, where it operated underground, recruiting or organising terrorist attacks in urban areas. In several provinces, such as Kapisa, Logar, Ghazni, Paktia, Paktika and Khost, IS-K only had a thin layer of some tens of members, tasked with recruitment, intelligence gathering and preparing the ground for expansion in the future.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong>SECURING .GOV DOMAINS</strong></p> +<p>These figures are largely comparable with those provided by the intelligence services of member states to the UN, which put the membership of IS-K at 4,000 for the latter part of 2021. The figures collated by the UN monitoring committee likely relate to the more visible component of IS-K, that is, full-time fighters based in Afghanistan. As detailed by IS-K sources, of the numbers quoted above, around two-thirds (some 4,600) were fighters based in Afghanistan. A proportion of these were essentially village militias (hence quite invisible to external observers), and a few hundred members of terrorist hit teams.</p> -<p>For an agency to successfully execute its mission, it must cultivate a certain level of trust. It must operate with high levels of integrity and transparency. One of the most basic ways that FCEB agencies accomplish this is by having a consistently updated and well-managed public-facing website. For the past few years, CISA has taken on the role of protecting .gov domains — a role that might be underappreciated but is key to bridging trust between the public and FCEB agencies.</p> +<p>IS-K sources were claiming mass defections from Taliban ranks in the early months following the fall of Kabul. Such defections would be surprising in light of the morale issues affecting IS-K at that time (see below), and indeed this appears to have been a massively inflated claim. When asked about defections from the Taliban to IS-K after August 2021, IS-K sources had little concrete information to offer and could only cite five lower-level Taliban commanders in Kunar, three in Nangarhar and one in Khost who defected to IS-K. One source in the Emirate’s local apparatus acknowledged that defections from the ranks of the Taliban to IS-K did take place in the early post-takeover months, but had been limited in numbers. The most important defection to be confirmed, at least by local sources, was that of commander Mansoor Hesar with five sub-commanders and 70 fighters in Nangarhar in late August 2021. Another source within the Taliban confirmed only that in the early days post-takeover, two Taliban commanders from Dur Baba and Hisarak defected to IS-K: Mullah Yakub and <em>a’lim</em> Shamsi. Overall, there were few defections (especially when the total manpower of the Taliban is considered), and they added little to IS-K strength and included no high-profile individuals, thus offering little with which the IS-K propaganda machine could work.</p> -<p>For 20 years, the General Services Administration managed the security of U.S. federal government internet domains. In December 2020, Congress passed the DOTGOV Act, which designated CISA as the new agency tasked with safeguarding .gov domains. The DOTGOV Act further specifies that .gov domain services will carry zero or negligible costs for “any Federal, State, local or territorial government operated or publicly controlled entity.” Agencies interested in registering a new domain must first secure an authorization letter and then submit their request through the online .gov registrar form. As the designated .gov manager, part of CISA’s job is to spearhead the registration of new domains, with final approval coming from the OMB. Separately, if an organization requires migrating services online, CISA is exploring using DHS grants to facilitate the process; this is in the design stages with the Federal Emergency Management Agency.</p> +<h4 id="is-ks-finances">IS-K’s Finances</h4> -<p>Ultimately, the goal of the DOTGOV Act is to ensure the confidentiality of, integrity of, and access to information on FCEB websites. As was noted in a February 2023 OMB memo, “When .gov domains are used for websites, people have greater confidence that the information on those sites is authoritative and trustworthy.” To ensure a seamless, transparent, and secure registration and management process, CISA has created a five-step new domain registration process and a domain security best practices guide.</p> +<p>IS-K’s efforts in this period seem to have been marred by financial shortcomings. Sources suggest that the group’s finance operations were badly mismanaged in late 2021 to early 2022. During this period, however, and in line with Taliban allegations, IS-K sources claimed connections with elements of Pakistan’s army and intelligence, translating into logistical help and support for IS-K’s efforts to raise money from “Islamic charities” in Pakistan. It has not, however, been possible to verify these claims.</p> -<p>Recommendations 5 and 6 in the domain security guide are particularly noteworthy. Step 5 is a recommendation to sign up for CISA’s free network and vulnerability scanning service called Cyber Hygiene. Cyber Hygiene provides regular reports that can help FCEB agencies secure internet-facing systems from weak configuration and known vulnerabilities. Notably, this program was highlighted as a frequently used service in a number of expert interviews.</p> +<h4 id="is-k-morale">IS-K Morale</h4> -<p>Step 6 in the CISA best practices guide is for SLTT organizations to join the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center. The center is designated by CISA to serve as the cybersecurity information-sharing center for SLTT governments. Some of the services included with membership are access to 24/7 incident response and digital forensic services, IP monitoring, and cybersecurity tabletop exercises.</p> +<p>When the Taliban took over, the idea of giving up the fight was reportedly widespread within the ranks of IS-K. Nearly all of the seven former IS-K members interviewed stated that they had been attracted to IS-K to fight “American crusaders”, not the Taliban. This could have contributed to a decline in morale after August 2021 – although respondents might also have wanted to downplay any hatred for the Taliban that they might have harboured. The Taliban also benefited from war weariness in the country, including within the Salafi community. Even elders critical of the Taliban expressed happiness that the fighting had stopped. The defeats that the Taliban inflicted on IS-K in 2019–20 had also left a mark. A further indicator of low morale was the refusal of many detained members of IS-K to rejoin the group after Afghanistan’s prisons were emptied in the chaotic final days of the Islamic Republic. IS-K sources at the time claimed that thousands of escapees from government prisons had rejoined their ranks after the chaos of August 2021. It is clear, however, that, contrary to these claims, many did not rejoin at all, but went into hiding, trying to stay clear of both IS-K and the Taliban (see below on the lack of impact of escapees on IS-K’s strength). It may be added that all former members were reportedly aware that they could contact IS-K via Telegram to rejoin, but many did not take this opportunity. Taliban officials interviewed by the International Crisis Group quantified the escapees who rejoined IS-K in the “hundreds”, rather than in the thousands alleged by some sources.</p> + +<h4 id="how-the-taliban-assessed-is-k">How the Taliban Assessed IS-K</h4> + +<p>The Taliban’s initial neglect of the threat represented by IS-K was not due to any form of tolerance. Many senior Taliban viewed IS-K as a proxy organisation, established or manipulated by the security services of the previous regime and/or by those of neighbouring and regional countries, Pakistan in particular, with the intent of splitting the insurgency and undermining the Taliban. The Taliban thought that, with the previous regime gone and the war won, IS-K would be critically weakened by the disappearance of a critical source of support. Moreover, the Taliban’s belief was that IS-K lacked a mass base:</p> <blockquote> - <h4 id="cisa-cyber-supports-to-sltt-governments-the-private-sector-and-srmas"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CISA Cyber Supports to SLTT Governments, the Private Sector, and SRMAs</code></h4> + <p>The problem is the Salafi ulema and mullahs, who inoculate the seed of hypocrisy and a very negative view of Hanafism in their Salafi followers … With the normal Salafi villagers, who don’t have any connection with Daesh [IS-K] and with the [Salafi] ulema, [the Taliban’s] relations are very good.</p> </blockquote> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The focus of this report is solely the cybersecurity services offered by CISA to FCEB agencies. However, CISA services are also widely offered to the private sector and SLTT governments as well. Beyond identifying best practices and possible common trends or grievances about how services are delivered to these different entities, it is important to acknowledge how the current system of distributed security management could ultimately impact an FCEB agency’s network security or its ability to fulfill its larger mission.</code></em></p> +<p>There was also a belief that people had joined IS-K because of the salaries it was able to pay, thanks to generous funding from foreign supporters.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Ultimately, even though an FCEB agency might seem “cyber secure,” there are lower-level entities that are resource-strapped but provide or deliver critical services in support of an FCEB agency’s larger mission. Cyber issues need to be prioritized by department and agency leads; attacks on smaller, vulnerable, critical nodes, even if they are not directly supervised by an FCEB agency, can still impact people’s perceptions of the larger organization.</code></em></p> +<p>The Taliban leadership, therefore, initially tended to underestimate the threat represented by IS-K. At the same time, while IS-K was not perceived as a strategic threat in August 2021, it was nonetheless considered a resolutely hostile and irreconcilable organisation of <em>“khawarij”</em>, against which the officials of the Emirate were ordered to take “aggressive and serious” action.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A separate but related relationship that is not fully explored in this report is the one CISA has with Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs). As one industry expert noted, the value of an SRMA is to “translate the good cyber advice into language and protocols that can be understood by [critical infrastructure] operators.” Per this expert, who represents a large entity in a critical industry, CISA has the depth of talent but needs to do more to reach out to stakeholders and encourage partnerships and solicit donations to plus up capabilities, among other activities. Relatedly, CISA should not spread itself thin — it should just be a clearing house and should rely on SRMAs for more support.</code></em></p> +<h3 id="iii-the-talibans-counter-is-effort">III. The Taliban’s Counter-IS Effort</h3> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Moving forward, one challenge for CISA will be to not only provide high levels of assistance and general guidance but to also strike the right balance between centralizing cyber risk (which could lead to cost savings, especially for smaller and medium-sized entities) and delegating out some tasks to other entities (such as some of the SRMAs) that might have greater expertise and reach in a given sector (see Recommendations 3.2 and 3.3 on coordination with SRMAs, information sharing and analysis centers, and others).</code></em></p> +<p>This chapter will discuss the five key counter-IS techniques that the Taliban adopted after August 2021, as outlined in the Introduction: indiscriminate repression; selective repression; choking-off tactics; reconciliation deals; and elite bargaining.</p> -<h4 id="general-gaps">General Gaps</h4> +<h4 id="indiscriminate-repression">Indiscriminate Repression</h4> -<p>According to the head of CISA’s Cybersecurity Division, Executive Assistant Director Eric Goldstein, FY 2021 legislation and EO 14028 shifted the cybersecurity landscape in two dramatic ways. First, new authorities and technologies allowed CISA to proactively engage in system monitoring and threat hunt, which has greatly enhanced CISA’s visibility into and across FCEB networks. Second, and by extension, CISA is now able to develop deeper relationships with the FCEB agencies that it serves. Whereas in its early years CISA’s relationship with departments and agencies was transactional, in Goldstein’s opinion there is a growing perception among the FCEB agencies that CISA is a partner that wants to help them achieve their security goals — and, for smaller and medium- sized FCEBs, actively take on the burden of managing more of their cybersecurity.</p> +<p>The Taliban have in the past argued that indiscriminate revenge-taking and repression on the part of Afghan and US security forces in 2001–04 drove many into the ranks of the insurgency. These views were supported by the elders of insurgency-affected areas. Perhaps because very few local Taliban officials were active with the organisation in those years, they seem oblivious today to the obvious lessons that should have been derived from that experience. Indeed, some Taliban officials have sought to undermine IS-K by trying to crush its supporting networks and milieus. Many Taliban cadres had been fighting IS-K before, and had developed a deep hatred for the organisation, which emerges from virtually all the interviews that the research team carried out. Some also harboured a strong hostility towards the Salafi community, from which they knew the bulk of IS-K’s Afghan members came. Some Taliban equated the Salafi community with IS-K. The fact that the Taliban had experienced serious friction with Salafis since the expansion of their insurgency to the east in 2008–09 helped to strengthen these negative views.</p> -<p>There is no doubt that in recent years, and especially since 2021, CISA has made great strides across several fronts to improve and expand cyber services to FCEB agencies. In fact, with a number of new initiatives and capabilities set to formally roll out in the coming years, it is hard to fully assess where CISA will be even a year or two from now. That said, in this time of growth there are real and perceived potential gaps in services or service quality that CISA and Congress should monitor and address. Aside from the service-specific issues that are listed in the sections above, there were some general trends identified in the expert interviews and discussions that warrant attention.</p> +<p>In some cases, indiscriminate repression was a standalone tactic. The best example of this approach in the early wave of post-takeover repression was Kunar’s governor, Haji Usman Turabi, who epitomised the tendency to conflate Salafism and IS-K. Turabi is nowadays acknowledged by members of the Taliban to be “ideologically against Salafism” and to have “killed several Salafi mullahs”. Turabi believed he knew where the main areas of support for IS-K were, and moved to crush local supporting networks and to shut down Salafi madrasas and mosques. All this led to outrage against him, and the Salafi ulema sent a delegation to Kabul to complain.</p> -<p><strong>CAPABILITIES</strong></p> +<p>In other cases, indiscriminate repression was coordinated with other counter-IS tactics. While attempting to undermine IS-K operations in Jalalabad, which was a key centre of IS-K’s campaign of urban terrorism, the Taliban targeted IS-K underground networks and sympathising milieus in Nangarhar. This campaign was initially very violent. A cadre who gained notoriety here for his ruthless approach to IS-K was Dr Bashir, who became head of the Taliban’s intelligence services, the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), for Nangarhar province in September 2021, and served in that position throughout 2022. Bashir shut down most of the Salafi madrasas and mosques of Nangarhar. Under Bashir’s leadership, the Taliban in Nangarhar adopted a proactive approach, with large-scale operations and extensive house-by-house searches, detaining many. Many extrajudicial executions of suspects took place under his tenure. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan reported 59 confirmed executions of IS-K suspects, mostly in Nangarhar during October to November 2021. Human Rights Watch indicates that more than 100 suspects were killed between August 2021 and April 2022 in Nangarhar. Salafi community leaders confirmed in February 2022 that in October to November around 100 members of the community were killed in this wave of violence, mostly in Nangarhar. Among them were senior Salafi preachers. Others fled or went into hiding.</p> -<p>At a basic level, interviewed experts were eager to see if CISA capabilities could collect and detect intrusions at machine speed and if they could properly integrate inputs from their different services into single repositories to provide actionable intelligence. <strong>Modernization is not just about creating new technological solutions to address old problems. New tools have to integrate with preexisting tools and services to ensure there are no disruptions or visibility gaps.</strong></p> +<p>It seems clear that Bashir was orchestrating much of the violence, seemingly with the intent of intimidating IS-K support networks and the surrounding milieus – perhaps even the entire Salafi community – into negotiating deals with the Emirate that would guarantee them security in exchange for cutting off relations with IS-K. This approach has similarities with what some of the strongmen of the previous regime had been doing, such as Abdul Raziq in Kandahar, who managed to force local Taliban to negotiate with him after years of relentless and extreme pressure. The Taliban’s reconciliation effort is discussed more fully below.</p> -<p>Setting aside CISA’s actual capabilities (since they will be rolled out in the coming months and years), it is possible to assess general perceptions about these capabilities — namely, whether interviewees expect that CISA will be fully authorized and technically capable enough in the near future to actually perform activities such as advanced threat hunting and real-time information sharing, and whether it will have stronger, more reliable capabilities relative to other government or industry entities that could offer the same or better services.</p> +<h4 id="selective-repression">Selective Repression</h4> -<p>Among this project’s sample of interviewed experts, there seemed to be mixed levels of confidence in CISA’s technical capabilities. Some expressed doubt that CISA would be able to accomplish all of its stated goals in the immediate future, while others felt stronger confidence in other government entities’ technical capabilities.</p> +<p>The outrage noted above in relation to Haji Usman Turabi’s indiscriminate repression in Kunar led to the Emirate’s authorities deciding to sack him and appoint in his stead Mawlavi Qasim, from Logar, who had served as shadow governor of Kunar during the Taliban’s insurgency (2002–21). Qasim was not popular in Kunar, where the local Taliban base demanded that a local Talib be appointed governor. He appears to have been chosen by Kabul because of his readiness to comply with their request that he avoid unnecessarily antagonising the Salafis, hence transitioning towards more selective repression. The Emirate’s leadership went ahead, even as a very unhappy Turabi threatened to split from the Taliban with his followers.</p> -<p>As one interviewee expressed, service providers should aim to have strong capabilities, but it might not always be prudent for them to maintain capabilities that far exceed those of the entities they are protecting or managing — in this case, the FCEB agencies. Instead, it is more important that CISA monitor and encourage FCEB entities to have baseline capabilities across federal networks to better facilitate coordination in detection and response.</p> +<p>Turabi’s removal suggests that the leadership in Kabul was seriously concerned about the reaction of the Salafi ulema. However, transitioning towards selective repression was never going to be a smooth path. Even if indiscriminate repression lessened after 2021, much damage had been done, as the repression entrenched the sense in the Salafi community that the new regime posed a critical threat to the community.</p> -<p>Finally, as well put by one of the interviewees, “CISA offers a wide variety of excellent services. But they are just that: individual services.” While there are indications that CISA is actively moving to prioritize service integration so that insights and information collected via different channels are essentially talking to each other, it is worth flagging that, at present, this is a notable gap (see Recommendation 3.6 on system integration).</p> +<p>Moreover, the new policy of selective repression that followed Turabi’s dismissal was not particularly popular with Taliban officials. Within the Taliban ranks there was denial that indiscriminate abuse had taken place. In the words of a police officer:</p> -<p><strong>RESOURCES</strong></p> +<blockquote> + <p>The Islamic Emirate always told the normal Salafi villagers [that is, not associated with IS-K] that it doesn’t have any problem with their sect, unless they support the enemy of Afghanistan, the Daesh <em>khawarij</em> … Those Salafi people arrested or killed by the Taliban, they had some kind of connection and relation with the Daesh <em>khawarij</em>.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>A few of the interviewed experts expressed variations of this sentiment: “It’s great that CISA offers free services. But are they always free?” Some programs require long-term tool maintenance costs over time that might not have been initially understood. Others occasionally place time-intensive burdens on FCEB personnel — an indirect and underappreciated cost. And some, while not initially including a financial burden, might ultimately require financial investments if CISA’s services uncover an issue that an FCEB agency needs to remedy. <strong>It is not just a question of if CISA is properly resourced to continue providing services to the FCEB agencies, but also one of whether the FCEB agencies are properly resourced to take advantage of and implement guidance offered by CISA.</strong></p> +<p>Even looking forward, doubts persisted that the new policy was appropriate. One GDI officer commented: “I have doubts [about some of the Salafi ulema and mullahs], but we cannot take any kind of action because I don’t have proof … the Taliban leadership in Kabul is trying not to create problems for Salafi ulema and elders in Kunar”.</p> -<p>The first concern stems from a larger question of what centralized cyber funding could look like for the federal government and what that might mean for FCEB agencies that are the recipients of funds. At present, and as was outlined in the CDM section of this report, there are questions about the long-term sustainability of tools, with some FCEB entities having a harder time affording the continued use of cyber tools into the future.</p> +<p>Some other officials were more explicit in their criticism. As one police officer commented, “The ideologies of Salafi and Daesh are the same, then why they shouldn’t support Daesh?”, implying that the entire Salafi community was a security threat. This officer advocated the closure of all Salafi madrasas and schools and criticised what he viewed as the Emirate’s soft approach, dictated by the fear of driving more Salafis into the arms of IS-K.</p> -<p>At the CISA level, there is also the question of whether the agency is adequately funded to accomplish its intended mission. Recent fiscal trends indicate an escalating commitment from the federal government toward bolstering cyberspace defense. The DOD’s allocation of $13.5 billion for cyberspace activities in FY 2024 — a significant, 20.5 percent hike from FY 2023 — underscores this commitment. While this budget seeks to operationalize the zero trust framework and advance next-generation encryption solutions, it also emphasizes industry cybersecurity through the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification program and the expansion of the CNMF teams. The integration of these solutions is pivotal, not just as a defense mechanism but as a proactive measure against ever-evolving cyber threats.</p> +<p>Indeed, surrendering IS-K members did warn the Taliban to avoid antagonising the Salafi community, on the grounds that doing so would drive members towards IS-K. Despite this, outside Kunar, Taliban officials continued closing Salafi mosques and madrasas and detaining Salafis, affecting the entire Salafi community. At the end of 2022, Salafi sources alleged that the Taliban had decided to take over Salafi madrasas in southeastern Afghanistan (that is, installing Hanafi principals to run them and replacing many teachers and professors); in universities, teachers accused of being Salafis were dismissed. Taliban and IS-K sources both confirmed these actions. In December 2022, according to Salafi sources, the Taliban took partial control of a madrasa in the Shuhada district of Badakhshan, and in early February 2023, a large-scale Taliban crackdown in Badakhshan led to raids on three local Salafi madrasas and bans on Friday prayers in 10 mosques.</p> -<p>For FY 2024, CISA is requesting $3.1 billion, a 5 percent increase from its FY 2023 budget. Director Easterly testified that if the budget were to fall to 2022 levels (roughly $2.6 billion), then it would “put [CISA] back in a pre-SolarWinds world.” The agency has made great strides in recent years to increase its capabilities, and moving forward it will be interesting to see if CISA’s allocated budget will be fully utilized and what services will be impacted first by any funding shortfalls. It is crucial to delve deeper into these matters to ascertain whether the existing fiscal strategy aligns with evolving cyber defense imperatives (see Pillar 1 Recommendations: Resourcing toward Success).</p> +<p>The quantitative and qualitative growth of the Taliban’s GDI was inevitably going to be instrumental in the implementation of the new directives and in making repression more selective. From the start, rather than investing in protecting every possible target from IS-K attacks, the Taliban opted to focus on infiltrating IS-K cells in and around the cities. Given the limited resources available (the entire annual 2022/23 state budget being just above $2.63 billion, or 48% of what it had been in 2020), this appears to have been a sound approach. As a result, a major focus of the Taliban’s effort throughout 2022 was the expansion and consolidation of the GDI’s network of informers throughout the IS-K-affected area. During 2022–23, the Taliban were able to carry out multiple successful raids on IS-K cells, mostly in Kabul, but also in other cities. Dr Bashir was credited with quickly setting up a vast network of informers and spies in the villages and in Jalalabad, which led to the destruction of numerous IS-K cells. The impact appears to have been obvious, as attacks stopped, although other techniques, such as local negotiations and the targeting of supporting networks, were also used (see below). On social media, IS-K repeatedly warned its members about the Taliban infiltrating its ranks, implicitly acknowledging its difficulties.</p> -<p>For Congress, it is also important to note that the CSIS research team conducted a public survey with 1,000 individuals from the general public. A statistically significant number of respondents indicated that they do not think the federal government currently spends enough money on federal cybersecurity. While CISA has received funding boosts in recent years, and funding alone will not necessarily guarantee increased security, there would likely be political support for upping the cyber budgets for CISA and the FCEB agencies.</p> +<p>However, there was some obvious evidence of the GDI’s networks being slow to reach areas where IS-K had not originally been expected to operate. One example is a rocket attack from Hayratan into Uzbekistan on 5 July 2022. This was carried out by three Nangarhari members of IS-K, who were able to hide in a safe house in Mazar-i Sharif for seven months. These outsiders should have attracted the attention of the GDI; the fact that they did not highlights how Taliban intelligence gathering in mid-2022 was still weak in this area.</p> -<p><strong>AUTHORITIES</strong></p> +<p>Another necessary tool for a full transition towards selective repression is the establishment of a functional system of the rule of law. When the Taliban authorities claimed to “have proof” of mosques and madrasas supporting IS-K, including confessions from surrendering IS-K members, such allegations were disputed by Salafi advocates. The Taliban disregarded the advocates’ complaints: “There were some complaints from some Salafi ulema regarding the banning of their madrasas and mosques, but we don’t care”, said one source. In reality, the standards of proof were quite low. A source in the Kunar GDI implicitly acknowledged this: “In Kunar province we have warned Salafi followers that if the Islamic Emirate had a small doubt about any madrasa or mosque spreading propaganda about Daesh, we would close it and will inflict a heavy punishment on the madrasa’s principal or on the mosque’s imam”.</p> -<p>In a 2022 CSIS study on federal migration to ZTA and endpoint security, interviewees noted general confusion about who was leading strategic coordination of larger federal ZTA efforts. The research team attempted to map out the different federal roles, noting that a clearer division of labor needs to be communicated in order to properly measure progress and hold agencies accountable for different tasks.</p> +<p>The low standards of proof predictably resulted in the crackdown continuing on and off, even if not as dramatically as before. At least, the excesses of the Nangarhar death squads of October and November 2021 were not repeated on a comparable scale in 2022.</p> -<p>With regard to federal network security, CISA is the designated lead. However, in support of its larger network defense mission, other entities such as the ONCD, OMB, and NIST play key roles in providing overall coordination and general guidance. <strong>In order to successfully defend federal networks, CISA needs a clearer delineation of what its role does — and does not — entail.</strong></p> +<h4 id="choking-off-tactics">Choking-Off Tactics</h4> -<p>Chris Inglis, former national cyber director, described his role as the “coach,” with CISA serving as the “quarterback.” And in many ways, this relationship has worked well, with the ONCD sometimes advocating on CISA’s behalf at higher-level meetings where CISA might not currently have a seat at the table. Still, some industry and government experts expressed a need for more clarity in roles and responsibilities at all levels, not just with regard to CISA’s FCEB mission (see Pillar 2 Recommendations: Leveraging and Harmonizing Authorities).</p> +<p>In addition to repression, another key approach taken by the Taliban to countering IS-K in recent years has been choking-off tactics. Typical examples of such tactics include cutting off an insurgency’s supply lines, or the financial flows supporting it, or its access to the population. The Taliban should have been familiar with this: one of the major debates between Kabul and Washington in 2006–21 was over the US’ inability or unwillingness to force Pakistan to cut the supply lines of the Taliban. That failure, many argued, made the war unwinnable.</p> -<p><strong>RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT: SHARED SERVICES</strong></p> +<p>While it would have made sense for the Taliban to destroy IS-K’s bases in the far east of Afghanistan in order to disrupt the group’s ability to maintain its influence in eastern Afghanistan, they had limited manpower available as they were taking over the Afghan state in the summer of 2021, with just some 70,000 men in their mobile units as of September 2021. The Taliban’s Emirate had to concentrate thousands of its best troops in Panjshir from early September 2021, where it faced the resistance of local militias and remnants of the previous regime’s armed forces, gathered into the first new armed opposition group to rise after the regime change, the National Resistance Forces. Thousands more troops were busy securing the cities and sealing the border with Tajikistan. The scarcity of manpower in this period is highlighted by the fact that in the months following the takeover, there was only a very thin layer of Taliban armed forces present in most rural areas. In the average district, the Taliban were only able to deploy 20 to 30 men, who guarded district-centre facilities and carried out occasional patrols, riding motorbikes on the roads. They were rarely seen in the villages. While a process did begin of Taliban supporters, reserves, sympathisers and relatives of Taliban members joining the Emirate’s armed forces, it took several months to absorb these untrained or poorly trained individuals into the forces. Moreover, plans for the security sector were initially quite modest, as the Emirate’s leadership decided to keep the size of its armed forces relatively small, for several reasons:</p> -<p>Separate from its formal authorities in managing FCEB network security, <strong>CISA also has to identify ways to exist and provide value in the larger ecosystem of shared service providers.</strong> In other words, can CISA play nicely with others and elevate, integrate, and coordinate with the other providers already in the field? The DOJ, for example, is officially designated by the OMB as a federal shared service provider. CISA has also indicated that the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Transportation are vetted shared federal service providers</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>The easy victory obtained by the Taliban in Panjshir in September.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The fact that IS-K was viewed as a marginal actor due to its low profile (see “How the Taliban Assessed IS-K”, above).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The positive attitude shown to the new regime by all neighbouring countries, except for Tajikistan (which was hosting the National Resistance Forces), was making it hard for armed opposition groups to find a safe haven and external support.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The limited fiscal base of the Emirate.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>In addition to deconflicting current service offerings, CISA needs to be mindful of newer entities that can offer complementary services to FCEB agencies. For example, the NSA’s Cyber Collaboration Center, one of the DOD’s officially designated service providers that specifically provides tailored services to entities in the defense industrial base, routinely consults with other DOD providers to ensure maximum coordination and no duplication of services. From CSIS’s research, it appears as though the level of coordination between CISA and non-FCEB protecting entities, such as DOD service providers, may not be as high as it could be. Fairly or not, CISA is now the central point for a number of managed services to FCEB agencies, and the burden falls on them to ensure they are in sync and sharing best practices and resources from other providers across industry and governments (see Recommendation 3.4 on coordinating with other shared service providers).</p> +<p>Indeed, Taliban sources circulated the news that the new army would be small, with as few as 40,000 men in combat units and another 20,000 in support and administrative roles. The police force was planned to be 40,000–60,000 men, of whom some 5,000 would be in a special force called Badri 313. These plans soon changed, however, and by January 2022 the Emirate had upgraded its plans for the army and police, overseeing a gradual expansion of the army towards a target of at least 150,000 men. It seems likely that the resumption of IS-K activities in the cities and in the east contributed significantly to this decision.</p> -<p><strong>RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT WITH FCEB AGENCIES</strong></p> +<p>The Taliban therefore delayed launching any large operation in the east. They seem to have understood that large military sweeps without the ability to hold territory afterwards are pointless, if not counterproductive – possibly as a result of having observed the failure of such tactics when used against themselves before August 2021. By March 2022, the Taliban were finally able to launch their first relatively large operation in Kunar, with the intent of forcing IS-K to fight for its bases. Initially, they seem to have thought that by threatening the few fixed bases IS-K had in the far east, they would force IS-K to stand and fight, and inflict major losses. According to a local Taliban source, before August 2021, IS-K had access to “every district of Kunar” and had “very active military bases and training centres”. But the insurgents avoided contact, leaving their bases behind and pulling deeper and deeper into the upper valleys. A Salafi <em>a’lim</em> (religious scholar) offered a similar assessment for Dangam district, saying that IS-K had controlled about 30% of the territory before the Taliban takeover, but that most IS-K members moved out after August 2021. The GDI expected to need another military operation, even deeper into the valleys, to “finish IS-K off”. By April 2022, however, the Taliban realised that IS-K had given up its last vestiges of territorial control in Kunar without a fight.</p> -<p>CISA is taking active steps to position itself as a “partner” to FCEB agencies, but that also means that it needs to be cognizant of unique FCEB missions when providing guidance and developing plans. <strong>CISA needs to be able to balance security concerns with FCEB agencies’ mandates to perform the tasks that are statutorily required of them.</strong></p> +<p>Whether or not this was initially part of their plans, the Taliban considered that they had achieved an important objective: although IS-K tactics made it impossible for the Taliban to eliminate the group, asserting control over territory and population would still allow them to choke off IS-K. A Taliban cadre in Kunar said in April 2022 that IS-K’s opportunities to approach potential recruits had been greatly reduced, as it had been forced to go underground and to downscale operations.</p> -<p>One concern identified by interviewees for this report is that an FCEB agency could use certain tools to prioritize security that would hurt or impact the entity’s mission in other ways. This issue is all the more important if the ease of use for some technologies or processes is key to an agency being able to perform essential parts of its mission. In the name of trying to encourage FCEB agencies to acquire “secure” technologies, products are pushed out that do not necessarily work in ways that are of maximum real use to the FCEB agencies. In other words, the emphasis on security sometimes does not properly balance considerations related to basic operations.</p> +<p>The Taliban’s pervasive presence on the ground also allowed the GDI to improve its mapping of IS-K’s presence countrywide. By March 2023, for example, the Taliban claimed to fully know where IS-K cells were operating in Kunar. This choking-off tactic therefore also contributed to enabling more selective repression.</p> -<p>A related concern is the larger issue of FCEB agencies managing technology debt and dealing with legacy systems that are either integral to the department or agency or are logistically difficult to phase out. In theory, general guidance should be to either phase out or properly secure legacy systems. In specific instances where that might not be possible, CISA should be willing to work with FCEB agencies to identify alternate ways to secure the networks.</p> +<p>The other main choking-off tactic used by the Taliban against IS-K was financial disruption. <em>Hawala</em> traders were saying in late 2021 and early 2022 that Taliban authorities (the GDI, but also the National Bank) were increasing pressure on them. At that time, the Taliban had not yet worked out how to effectively block <em>hawala</em> traders from transferring money for IS-K (or any other hostile actor), and so relied on intimidation and implementing existing rules for registering transactions – woefully ignored under the previous regime – to achieve impact. Visits from Taliban patrols served as reminders of the danger of cooperating with IS-K. While these tactics could not completely stop the flow of cash for IS-K from Turkey (where the main financial hub of IS-K was located), they do not seem to have been pointless. IS-K sources reported that by September 2022, IS-K could only rely on a very limited number of <em>hawala</em> traders and a few smugglers who were taking cash for IS-K from Pakistan into Afghanistan. Later in the year, financial transfers were complicated further by a Turkish government crackdown on IS-K networks in Turkey. It is not clear whether the Turkish crackdown was the result of intelligence provided by the GDI, or of the Emirate’s “diplomatic” engagement. In any case, as an IS-K source acknowledged, the group’s expansion into the north was insufficiently funded as a result.</p> -<p>CISA already advertises that its services do not operate with a one-size-fits-all mentality. CISA needs to take that one step further in creatively thinking through how it defines, measures, and communicates its actual security goals (see Recommendation 3.1 on CISA’s outreach strategy).</p> +<p>These efforts appear to have had some impact. One IS-K source claimed in May 2022 that earlier financial flow problems had been fixed, but there was evidence to the contrary. Salaries paid to frontline fighters, at $235 per month in 2022, were lower than in 2015–16, when they were reportedly as high as $600. Although the central leadership of IS continued to promise massive funding increases for the future, in 2022, according to one of IS-K’s financial cadres, it cut the IS-K budget to its lowest level ever.</p> -<p><strong>MEASURING PROGRESS AND SUCCESS</strong></p> +<h4 id="the-talibans-reconciliation-deals">The Taliban’s Reconciliation Deals</h4> -<p>It is not entirely fair to say that metrics for measuring progress in federal cybersecurity do not exist. For instance, in accordance with FISMA, CISA and the OMB are able to collect information to help them better assess how FCEB agencies are making progress in their plans to implement processes and technologies that enhance federal cybersecurity. Additionally, CISA has noted benchmarks for measuring the success of a number of their services in their latest strategic plan for 2024 to 2026. <strong>Having clearly defined metrics is essential. In the absence of such metrics, it will not only be difficult for Congress to conduct oversight and appropriate funds to grow certain programs, but it will also be difficult for FCEB agencies to justify spending time and resources to engage with these services. Additionally, metrics that fail to properly capture unique areas of progress between different types of FCEB agencies will also possibly create tensions between CISA and its FCEB clients.</strong></p> +<p>As noted above, Dr Bashir was not simply interested in wreaking havoc in IS-K-supporting networks and milieus. Having gained a position of strength through his crackdown, Bashir moved forward with local negotiations with community elders to undermine the rival organisation. The Taliban had themselves been subject to reconciliation efforts to co-opt some of their ranks when they were fighting their “jihad”, although it is not clear what they made of these efforts, which were in any case poorly implemented by the Afghan government of the day. Bashir is now seen by Taliban officials as having been a “very active chief for Nangarhar GDI department” and as having had a “very good connection with villagers and elders in every village and district of Nangarhar province”.</p> -<p>CISA is also likely able to internally track FCEB progress based on the number of services used, the frequency of use, and reporting times, among other metrics. That said, one FCEB interviewee did make the point that CISA might need to be more discerning in how it measures FCEB progress. For instance, if a third-party contractor is failing to meet certain deadlines and performance goals, blame should be assigned to the contractor and not the FCEB agency. An industry interviewee made a similar point, noting that the “matrix of contractors” makes it difficult to see who or what is actually working, and who or what is falling short. The metrics are not necessarily capturing the people and how they can positively or negatively impact progress.</p> +<p>The Taliban were probably aware of the role played by Salafi elders in the recruitment of IS-K members, or perhaps presumed such a role, based on their own experience as insurgents. Several surrendered IS-K members acknowledged that many Salafi elders in Nangarhar had previously encouraged villagers to join IS-K. IS-K teams had regular meetings with elders, encouraging them to mobilise villagers. There was reportedly a high level of pressure on individual members of IS-K to invite friends, relatives and neighbours into the group. It was standard practice for Salafi village elders supporting IS-K to be trusted to introduce new members without the standard additional vetting. “Joining Daesh at that time was very easy; it only needed one telephone request”. Individual recruits, on the other hand, were still scrutinised much more seriously, according to a former IS-K member who was recruited via social media.</p> -<p>Finally, another gap is a lack of measures that can help the public and FCEB agencies measure the usefulness of CISA’s offered services. Beyond use numbers, what are other formal metrics to rank the success (or failures) of certain products and services? And can these be used to generate more buy-in for CISA services? (See Recommendation 2.6 on metrics and FCEB feedback.)</p> +<p>Dr Bashir relied on an initially small number of Salafi elders willing to cooperate, and on several Hanafi elders who had connections with some IS-K members or lived in areas affected by the IS-K presence. Former IS-K sources confirm the role of the elders in negotiating their surrender. In the words of one, “When we decided to surrender to the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate, again we used the local elders to negotiate and mediate our surrendering with Dr Bashir”. The GDI arranged for the surrendering IS-K members and their community elders to guarantee under oath that they would not rejoin IS-K or in any way oppose the Emirate. The elders agreed to take responsibility and inform the Emirate’s authorities of any violations.</p> -<p><strong>MISSION AND PURPOSE</strong></p> +<p>On the basis of Dr Bashir’s exploratory efforts in 2021, the GDI and other components of the Taliban’s security apparatus established communication with community elders. The village elders were tasked by the Taliban GDI with negotiating the surrender of any Salafi elder with whom they came into contact. The Taliban identified useful contacts among the elders, and the district governor or the chief of police regularly visited them, as often as weekly or fortnightly.</p> -<p>At what stage is it CISA’s responsibility to ensure not only that it is providing resources to FCEB agencies but that all FCEB agencies are taking full advantage of CISA’s offered services? In interviews with government and industry experts, there seemed to be varying opinions on this. Some would argue that CISA is already doing a lot and that it is not its fault if some FCEB agencies are not devoting enough time to familiarizing themselves with CISA services. Others thought the burden should fall on CISA to articulate clearly and comprehensively the nature of its services and ensure that they are being widely used by FCEB agencies. This becomes especially true for small and medium entities that, at present, might not have the time or resources to fully prioritize cybersecurity, let alone understand the various aspects of CISA services.</p> +<p>The official claim is that in 2021–22 some 500 IS-K members (commanders, fighters, recruiters, support elements and sympathisers) from Nangarhar, Kunar and Laghman surrendered as a result of Bashir’s combination of ruthless repression and negotiations with the community elders. This figure is likely to be somewhat inflated. One of the surrendering IS-K member noted that “there were lots of people among those 70 who surrendered who were not Daesh members; I didn’t recognise many of them”. A source in the Taliban’s provincial administration acknowledged that some Salafi elders, anxious to please the new regime, convinced some members of the community to pose as IS-K members and “surrender”. This was discovered later by the GDI but, overall, the elders-focused effort was still rated highly successful. A police source estimated that 60% of those surrendering were IS-K members from eastern Afghanistan and 40% were civilian supporters. Even a source hostile to the Taliban supported a positive assessment of the campaign, acknowledging that in a single village in Sorkhrod, three IS-K members surrendered to the Taliban. Various ex-IS-K interviewees confirmed having surrendered as part of large groups of IS-K members.</p> -<p>Beyond the public relations consideration, there is a larger issue underpinning this question: <strong>In order to be the designated lead of FCEB network security, does CISA need to centrally manage cyber risk across the FCEB landscape?</strong> Or should it take a tailored approach, letting some departments and agencies responsibly manage their own cybersecurity while taking on the security burdens of smaller and medium-sized entities?</p> +<p>The majority surrendered because of agreements between the GDI and community elders, but some surrendered directly to the GDI, after Bashir managed to reach out to them in the districts and convince them that surrendering was the best option for them. Bashir’s argument to these IS-K members was that it was not in the Salafi community’s interest to have another war, which would be fought ruthlessly by the Taliban, including in their villages.</p> -<p>Per the 2023 National Cyber Strategy, “federal civilian agencies are responsible for managing and securing their own IT and OT systems,” and federal cybersecurity plans must balance an agency’s “individual authorities and capabilities . . . with the security benefits achieved through a collective approach to defense.” While it can be assumed that this language was developed in close consultation with CISA, it does potentially diverge from CISA’s future goals of being able to manage the security of entities that are unable to sufficiently do so themselves.</p> +<p>With a much reduced IS-K ability to threaten waverers, due to the group’s weakness on the ground, the path was clear for the Taliban to expand their tactics of negotiating deals with community elders to Kunar province. Indeed, to some extent during 2022 the stream of surrendering IS-K members, which had started in Nangarhar in autumn 2021, spread to Kunar. Here too, the Taliban sought the cooperation of the community elders to convince IS-K members to lay down arms. Some Salafi ulema were also involved. Although the surrenders were fewer than in the neighbouring province, the “tens of Daesh members” who surrendered to the Taliban as a result of the mediation of the elders represented a warning to IS-K. The formula adopted was the same as in Nangarhar, with surrendering members taking an oath never to rejoin IS-K and the elders guaranteeing for them. As in Nangarhar, some IS-K members in Kunar reached out directly to the GDI to negotiate their surrender.</p> -<p>For any of the cyber services to be successful moving forward, there needs to be a clarity of mission and long-term purpose. At present, while CISA might operate internally with a clear understanding, its operations are potentially at odds with how others are perceiving CISA’s role, and that could impact its usefulness as it continues to evolve (see Recommendations 2.1 and 2.3 on CISA’s role, and FCEB leaders’ roles, in managing federal networks).</p> +<p>At the same time, the Taliban continued their local negotiations with elders in Nangarhar. The flow of surrenders therefore continued in 2022. The last group to surrender in 2022 was composed of some 70 members from Nangarhar, who defected in the autumn. As of January 2023, the Taliban believed that 90% of the IS-K structure in Nangarhar had been wiped out; the Taliban were aware of the existence of some IS-K cells, but deemed them too weak to launch attacks. It is difficult to say whether the Taliban’s estimate was correct, but undoubtedly IS-K had taken a big hit in Nangarhar.</p> -<h3 id="future-threats-and-challenges-on-the-horizon">Future Threats and Challenges on the Horizon</h3> +<p>Those who laid down weapons sometimes reported being treated decently by the Taliban; others reported not being treated very well, with Taliban and pro-Taliban villagers looking down on them. Still, they appreciated that they could live with their families, even if most of them had had to relocate to avoid IS-K retaliation. There were complaints about being required to report to the police station every week or two, and not being allowed to move around without permission. Surrendered IS-K members also complained that the Taliban were not implementing their side of the deal – specifically, giving financial support to those who had surrendered. One of those interviewed noted that this would make it hard for the Taliban to convince more to surrender. Another complaint was that those who stayed in the districts did not feel safe from IS-K.</p> -<p>For this report, the CSIS research team studied the current state of CISA services in order to better appreciate and predict how these initiatives might fare against future threats and challenges. Assuming current trends continue, the team’s goal was to get a better sense of what CISA’s overall network defense posture might look like in the coming years in order to identify possible service gaps and necessary interventions that should be considered in the near future.</p> +<p>The fact that madrasas and some mosques were still closed also upset the reconciled IS-K members, in part because the surrender agreements included a clause about reopening them. Reportedly, the surrendering IS-K members had been promised government jobs, the freedom to live anywhere in the country and the receipt of cash payments for six months. In practice, no cash was paid (although some food and some benefits in kind such as blankets were provided), and the surrendering men were only allowed to choose to live in their own community or in the district centre. Some surrendered IS-K members hinted that the reason why surrenders have slowed down was to be found in the violation or non-implementation of these agreements.</p> -<p>The research team intentionally limited its scope of study to look at a time frame three to five years out. Instead of hypothesizing major incidents that could arise in the distant future, the research team asked experts and tabletop exercise participants to critically think about realistic threats on the horizon and predict how CISA’s maturing services might be able to address these scenarios.</p> +<h4 id="elite-bargaining-with-the-salafi-ulema">Elite Bargaining with the Salafi Ulema</h4> -<p>There were some specific mentions of actual technologies adversaries could use that might evolve in the coming years and test the effectiveness of CISA services. However, the majority of comments seemed to emphasize that future threats and challenges to FCEB networks will come from the same or similar threat vectors as seen today, just at greater frequency and likely in combination with other attacks. The challenge for CISA and the U.S. government writ large is finding ways to prioritize and appropriately respond to these types of attacks over a sustained period of time. Additionally, if left unaddressed, ongoing coordination, communication, and resourcing challenges will hamper the collective abilities of CISA and FCEB agencies to effectively defend federal networks.</p> +<p>In 2020–21, the Taliban did not show much faith in the opportunities offered by intra-Afghan talks, nor were their counterparts in Kabul able to pursue those talks with any degree of effectiveness. Instead, the Taliban sought to co-opt local and regional elites associated with the government of the Islamic Republic. It is probably in a similar spirit and informed by this experience that the Taliban approached the prospect of negotiations for resolving the conflict with IS-K. The Taliban were well aware of the links between IS-K and much of the Salafi clergy. Support from Salafi communities in the east and northeast had proved essential for IS-K to be able to put down roots there. Many Salafi preachers were recruiting for IS-K in this period, as sources within the community admit, and Salafi madrasas and schools in Kabul were sending numerous recruits to IS-K. Much of the Salafi youth joined during this phase. For the Taliban, driving a wedge between IS-K and the Salafi community, from which the former draws most of its support base, must have seemed an attractive opportunity.</p> -<h4 id="reflections-from-expert-interviews">Reflections from Expert Interviews</h4> +<p>A group of Salafi ulema had already sought an understanding with the Taliban in 2020, as IS-K was losing ground quite fast in the east. A delegation of senior Salafi ulema, led by one of the most senior figures, Sheikh Abdul Aziz, met the Taliban’s emir, Haibatullah Akhundzada, and other senior Taliban in 2020, offering support to the Taliban in exchange for the cessation of violence and reprisals against civilians. The Emirate’s authorities again welcomed delegations of Salafi ulema in Kabul in 2021, reconfirming the agreement with the Salafi ulema and reissuing orders that the Salafis should not be targeted. After that, attacks and harassment of the Salafis reduced, even if some Taliban commanders continued behaving with hostility towards Salafis.</p> -<p>Between this research project and a related effort looking at federal cybersecurity budgets, CSIS researchers and affiliates conducted over 30 informational interviews to better understand threats and challenges to federal networks, as well as the state of CISA cybersecurity services offered to FCEB agencies. The following is an overview of the types of individuals that participated in the expert interviews (not including comments from the expert task force and other experts that shared perspectives during the tabletop exercises):</p> +<p>However, the terms of the agreement were that the Taliban would not allow the Salafi preachers to proselytise, and the madrasas that had been shut on grounds that they had been recruiting for IS-K remained closed. Only the mosques were reopened. Moreover, some senior clerics, accused of links to IS-K, remained in prison: Sheikh Bilal Irfan; Sheikh Qari Muzamil; Sheikh Sardar Wali; Sheikh Jawid; and Delawar Mansur. The Salafi ulema interpreted the closure of the madrasas as temporary and expected that after some time the community could return to its quietist stance, which had in the past (before 2015) been the predominant position among Afghan Salafis.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Seven FCEB CISOs and CIOs</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Twelve federal cybersecurity experts (including individuals representing shared service providers, the ONCD, and CISA)</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Eleven private sector CISOs, CIOs, and cybersecurity experts</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Nevertheless, even after the second agreement in 2021 many “hot-headed” young members of the community stayed with IS-K. One of the Salafi ulema pledging allegiance to the Emirate admitted in a private interview that the Salafi clerics remain opposed to Hanafi Islam, but that they did not think IS-K stood a chance against the Taliban, and that it was not in the interest of the community to fight. These clerics, however, did not have control over the youth who were still with IS-K.</p> -<p>These not-for-attribution interviews covered a range of topics, such as personal experiences with and perceptions of CISA’s current tools and services, resource allocation, formal and implied authorities, marketing strategies, and future threats and challenges.</p> +<p>On the other side, among the Taliban and the Hanafi ulema, there were voices of moderation, especially among the ulema, who were even willing to tolerate Salafi proselytising – generously funded from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan – on the grounds that otherwise the Salafis would continue being driven towards IS-K. An imam in Jalalabad expressed what might be defined as the midway solution preferred by the Taliban’s leadership, as discussed above: avoid identifying all Salafis as linked to IS-K; leave the Salafis alone; but ban them from proselytising. His words reflected angst about the seemingly unstoppable spread of Salafism: “I am living among Salafi scholars and followers; they are becoming bigger and bigger every day, they have very good financial sources in Saudi Arabia and several other Arab countries … to expand their activities”.</p> -<p>Ultimately, even though the interviewed experts represented different-sized public and private sector entities, the CSIS research team was able to capture some interesting trends and notable divergence points between the groups. While specific comments from the interviews helped inform the research team’s general research and are reflected throughout the report, this section summarizes some key trends observed across the different interviews.</p> +<p>But the 2021 agreement was also opposed by many among the Taliban and the Hanafi ulema. There are many hardliners. Former Kunar governor Turabi embodied the hardline stance: repression without local reconciliation efforts. Although this approach was not effective and was opposed in Kabul, within the GDI’s ranks, Turabi still had supporters in early 2023, who argued for a crackdown on supporting networks and milieus on the grounds that the safe haven they offered was essential for IS-K operations.</p> -<p><strong>HOW TO SPEND FUNDS</strong></p> +<p>A common view among Hanafi ulema is that while there are quietist Salafis in Afghanistan who have not embraced the militant Salafism of IS-K, the popularity of IS-K among Salafis is not only due to a defensive reaction on the part of the community. They believe that jihadist Salafism has been spreading through the community. Because of this, many Hanafi ulema have been sceptical about the decision of a number of high-profile Salafi clerics to seek an understanding with the Taliban, believing it to be only a tactical decision to buy time.</p> -<p><strong>Invest in data and service integration for greater visibility.</strong> Across interviews, the most requested investment was for CISA to prioritize data integration between its different tools and services, especially with regard to information collected via CDM. The desired outcome is to optimize visibility for all FCEB agencies by mapping services back to systems and within risk management tools. Some interviewees also suggested the use of AI/ML to assist with data integration. The observed comments underscore that CISA should prioritize investing in and actually communicating updates on data integration and the use of AI/ML to support greater automation.</p> +<p>As a result of polarised views within the Taliban and among the Hanafi ulema, the policies of the Emirate concerning the Salafis have continued to fluctuate and vary from province to province, as discussed above. As a result, relations with the Salafi community have remained tense. Kunar received special treatment, with the Taliban’s leadership making clear that especially in Kunar, the GDI should only act against Salafi madrasas and mosques in the presence of solid evidence. The new policy of “working hard to give respect and value to our Salafi brothers and trying our best to finish the dispute between Taliban and Salafi” was introduced after Turabi’s dismissal, according to a source in the provincial administration. The decision was made at the top: “Taliban local leaderships have been told by our leaders in Kabul to keep a good behaviour with Salafi members in Kunar”. There was an at least partial acknowledgement that “one of the reasons why Daesh in Afghanistan became active and somewhat powerful is that some Taliban carried out aggressive acts against the Salafis in Kunar and Nangarhar”. Former IS-K members confirmed that negotiations with Salafi elders and the ulema led to the reopening in 2022 of all mosques and of the Salafi madrasa, except two, which stayed closed due to their connection to IS-K.</p> -<p><strong>Advocate for cyber investments on behalf of FCEB agencies.</strong> FCEB interviewees pointed out that there is a role for CISA (or other cyber departments and entities in the federal government) to help FCEB agencies make informed decisions about how to invest in new technologies. A big part of that is helping the CISOs, CIOs, and cyber experts make the case for why their departments and agencies need more cyber investments to enhance security.</p> +<p>Despite this “special treatment”, a Salafi <em>a’lim</em> estimated in April 2023 that the community in Kunar was split between those who have functional relations with the Taliban and those who are hostile. One Salafi elder estimated that in his district of Dangam, 30% of the Salafi community was on friendly terms with the Taliban and the remaining 70% had tensions. It did not help that the Salafis remained marginalised in Kunar even in early 2023, as all the provincial officials were Hanafi, with only a few rank-and-file Taliban from the Salafi community. The Taliban have regular meetings with the district <em>shura</em> (council) and occasional meetings with the village <em>shuras</em>, but no Salafis were included in the district <em>shura</em> or in at least some of the village <em>shuras</em>. Hence, a Salafi elder complained that “the Taliban don’t want to hear too many complaints from the Salafis, nor their views”. Clearly, while attempting to defuse tension, the Taliban seemed to have no intention of moving towards an elite bargain.</p> -<p>Some interviewees, for example, expressed the desire for CISA representatives to advocate on behalf of the FCEB agencies for the use of AI technologies in network defense or to invest in training programs that help FCEB agencies more easily adopt and incorporate future technologies. Another common observation was that CISA can use its platform to help FCEB entities justify and allocate funds for more and better cyber talent. Per one FCEB interviewee, the federal enterprise currently lacks an advocate on behalf of the FCEB agencies who could resource departments with the proper funding and workforce to manage network security.</p> +<p>Even Taliban sources acknowledge that friction between Salafis and Hanafis has persisted. For example, throughout 2022–23, the Taliban were insisting that all imams wish a long life to the Taliban’s amir (or “head of state”), Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, during Friday prayers; the Salafi ulema in Kunar refused to comply. This refusal did not lead to a new crackdown, but it shows that the Salafi ulema were not entirely committed to supporting the Emirate, despite their pledge. The Taliban had offered them a safety guarantee as subjects of the Emirate, but it appeared that the Salafis wanted an elite bargain, that is, at least a share of power and influence. As a result, the Taliban’s engagement with the Salafi ulema went cold towards the end of 2022. After two or three meetings during 2021–22, meetings stopped, and Taliban officials took the view that the Salafi ulema were not willing to fully implement their part of the deal and that several of them were still supporting IS-K.</p> -<p><strong>Develop sustainable cybersecurity budgets.</strong> An important common theme observed across a number of interviews is that FCEB agencies, at varying levels, need support in securing and maintaining cybersecurity budgets over long periods of time. This was most commonly referenced in relation to the CDM program, where FCEB agencies were given subsidies to cover their tools for an initial two years but were then expected to fund the tools on their own once the initial funding expired (see CDM section of the report).</p> +<p>There appears to have been no talk at any stage of incorporating significant numbers of Salafi clerics into the ulema councils at the provincial and national levels, which would have been a major step towards an elite bargain with Salafi elites.</p> -<p>These budgets also need to account for inflation-related price increases, added labor costs for managing certain tools overtime, and unanticipated costs associated with patching and fixing certain tools periodically or as vulnerabilities are discovered.</p> +<h3 id="iv-is-ks-response-to-the-talibans-tactics">IV. IS-K’s Response to the Taliban’s Tactics</h3> -<p>While CISA’s role might not necessarily be to help FCEB agencies strategize their cyber budgets, and there were different thoughts on what type of funding model or models would be most appropriate for different types of tools and services, the larger point was that the current structure is not optimal for producing long-term security benefits (see Pillar 1 Recommendations: Resourcing toward Success).</p> +<p>While the Taliban’s efforts posed major challenges to IS-K, not all the techniques discussed above were threatening or, indeed, were perceived as such. IS-K does not appear to have been concerned about indiscriminate repression against its supporting milieus, and its only apparent reaction was intensifying efforts to present itself as the defender of the Salafi community. Its focus was instead on responding to the Taliban’s choking-off effort, especially their campaign to take full control of territory and population.</p> -<p><strong>AUTHORITIES: BALANCING THE BURDENS OF RISK AND ACCOUNTABILITY</strong></p> +<h4 id="the-response-to-choking-off-tactics">The Response to Choking-Off Tactics</h4> -<p>Arguably, the biggest discussion around authorities ultimately got back to <strong>who should be in charge of managing FCEB cyber risk and how that potentially impacts resourcing, information dissemination, general accountability, and related concerns.</strong> One interviewee described CISA’s FCEB mission as a challenge because the agency had to “work in a kitchen with too many cooks.” One extreme that was brought up was the idea for CISA to centralize management of FCEB IT infrastructure, backed with the funding and other resources to fully execute that mission. Pursuing this route would minimize the “cooks” to just one and centralize risk management at CISA. The alternative, alluded to by a number of experts, is for CISA to continue working as a partner in collaboration with FCEB agencies. Beyond general support via its official services, some interviewees expressed a desire to have CISA subject matter experts detailed to their respective FCEB agencies to assist with issues such as overcoming technical knowledge gaps and helping with ZTA migration.</p> +<p>Even if the Taliban were not, immediately after their takeover, in a position to organise a major military campaign in the far east of Afghanistan (Kunar and Nuristan), IS-K clearly understood the potential threat this would represent. By the time the Taliban took over in August 2021, IS-K had long opted out of a direct confrontation with them, after it had emerged in 2019–20 that its forces could not stand up to the Taliban on an open battlefield. This perception of a major threat from a Taliban assault on IS-K bases in the far east only increased after August 2021, given that the Taliban were at that point no longer busy fighting the forces of the previous regime. IS-K soon relinquished the residual territorial control it still had (see the discussion of choking-off tactics above). The group appears to have hoped to delay the expected Taliban onslaught in the east, or to make it unsustainable by waging a guerrilla war against the Taliban forces deployed there, forcing them to divert forces – while at the same time mitigating the impact of choke-off tactics by reducing the number of non-local members (who were harder to hide and more difficult to support) and creating an extensive underground network.</p> + +<p><strong>Delay and Diversion</strong></p> + +<p>While seeking to retain control over parts of Kunar and Nuristan, IS-K largely switched to asymmetric tactics, such as intensified urban terrorism, hit-and- run raids, ambushes and mines. These efforts produced few results initially, and IS-K’s leaders (the leader of IS-K and the military council) had to keep thinking of new strategies. A plan for sending cells to cities where IS-K was not yet active, such as Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i Sharif, was hatched in spring 2021 – that is, before the Taliban took power – although it was not fully implemented until August 2021.</p> + +<p>Essentially, the IS-K leadership decided to keep the Taliban busy by going on the offensive in the cities, calculating that by risking a few tens of cells it could force the Taliban to commit tens of thousands to guarding the cities. The campaign started somewhat slowly, due to the limited capabilities of existing IS-K underground networks in Kabul and Jalalabad.</p> + +<p>During the last five months of 2021, IS-K was able to increase the number of its large terrorist attacks in Kabul to five, from two in the first half of 2021. Urban guerrilla actions also continued in Jalalabad after a short lull, opening up with a series of six bomb attacks in September, followed by some months of urban guerrilla warfare against members of the Taliban. Taliban sources described the situation in Jalalabad at that time as “daily IS-K attacks”.</p> -<p>There are major cultural barriers to CISA becoming the sole manager of risk. And even if it could work through those issues with the FCEB agencies, it is not apparent that CISA currently has the ability to serve in this role in the near future. That said, this is a question that should be studied further, especially since there seem to be different ideas about what balance could yield optimal security outcomes (see Pillar 2 Recommendations: Leveraging and Harmonizing Authorities).</p> +<p>At the same time, during the chaotic power transition of summer 2021, IS-K was able to transfer multiple cells to the cities, which reinforced its presence in Kabul and Jalalabad but also allowed it to expand its terrorist campaign to cities previously unaffected by this campaign. Cells were thus established in Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i Sharif, Charikar, Kunduz, Faizabad and Gulbahar. Among the cells were recruiting teams which targeted, in particular, university campuses. As a result, while IS-K was able to intensify its campaign of terrorist attacks in the cities, it was also hoping that the new urban underground structure would become self-sustainable. An IS-K source acknowledged that the group exploited the chaotic period of the Taliban’s takeover to send more of its cells into the cities. He explained that “because different groups of Taliban entered Jalalabad city and other cities of Afghanistan from the mountains and the districts, it was very difficult for the Taliban … to distinguish between Daesh and Taliban members there”.</p> -<p><strong>COMMUNICATION AND ENGAGEMENT</strong></p> +<p>An IS-K source estimated in early 2022 that the Kabul city contingent, following years of decline, had climbed back up to 300 members, in two separate structures – one aimed at preparing and carrying out attacks, and the other at recruiting and propaganda operations. There seemed to be a real opportunity for catching the new regime off guard, with the Taliban still surprised to find themselves in power and dealing with multiple crises in their efforts to keep the Afghan state afloat. While the Taliban were known to be more than a match for IS-K in a conventional fight, IS-K hoped that the Taliban’s lack of experience in counterterrorism would allow several hundred terrorists to cause havoc in the cities, as even Taliban officials confirmed to the International Crisis Group that this was the case.</p> -<p>While experts did note that CISA has been receptive to their comments and feedback, they still emphasized that for CISA to be successful it needs to prioritize persistent but coordinated engagement with FCEB agencies. This is especially important since interviewees also expressed that some FCEB agencies might not be fully aware of CISA’s complete slate of services offered or of the applications or value add in a sector-specific manner. One participant suggested that in addition to a general outreach campaign, a comprehensive, sector-specific service catalog might be helpful.</p> +<p>Aside from its intensity, in terms of target selection the campaign of terrorist attacks in Kabul was a continuation of IS-K’s earlier campaign against the previous government. The targets of the new phase of the campaign were also religious minorities, such as the Sikhs and, most of all, the Shia community. Aside from forcing the Taliban to divert forces away from the east, the primary intent seems to have been to create chaos in the cities, turning the sizeable Shia community against the Taliban (for their failure to protect it) and exposing the incompetence of the new regime, especially in urban security. In spring 2022, the High Council of IS-K decided, in the context of some fine-tuning of its strategic plan, to further reinforce the focus on terrorism in the main cities, targeting the Shia community via a wide selection of very soft targets, such as schools and mosques. Protecting so many potential targets would have required the Taliban to commit significant human resources, to the detriment of the wider counter-IS effort.</p> -<p>Some of the non-FCEB experts emphasized that if CISA wants to ensure that new services are used and its authorities appreciated, it should be “knocking on the FCEBs’ doors,” sometimes multiple times, to explain the different services, authorities, and other aspects of its activities. The emphasis should be on the value these services can bring to a department or agency. One expert also made the point that CISA should systematically interview or survey its FCEB clients to identify specific demands for certain types of tools (if it does not do so already). This particular expert further argued that developing a proof of concept and proving its value through demonstrations and success stories will help secure more buy-in for new products and services (see Pillar 3 Recommendations: Enhancing Communication and Coordination with Key Stakeholders).</p> +<p>Operationally, IS-K’s campaign in 2022 produced some visible results. According to a respondent, IS-K’s “research and inquiry” department, which undertakes analysis for the leadership, produced in June 2022 an internal report indicating that in the spring of 2022, IS-K had achieved the highest number of “highlight” (that is, headline-making) attacks and military activities in three years. Impartial data collection shows that the pace of bomb attacks peaked above 10 per month in April–July 2022, but started declining in the latter part of that year, to between three and six per month (see Figure 1). This might have been due to increasingly effective Taliban counterterrorism. However, it is also likely that relocation from the far east had largely been completed, and that IS-K downscaled terrorist attacks in Kabul to a more sustainable level.</p> -<p><strong>THE FUTURE THREAT LANDSCAPE</strong></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Rf6GAx2.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: IS-K Activity and Taliban Counterterrorism Operations, 2022–23.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.afghanwitness.org/reports/taliban-continue-raids-against-iskp-in-may%2C-claim-killing-of-deputy-governor-in-kabul">Afghan Witness, “Taliban Continue Raids Against ISKP in May, Claim Killing of Deputy Governor in Kabul”, 1 June 2023</a>. In the figure, “Arrests” and “Clashes/Raid” refer to Taliban operations against IS-K. Reproduced with permission.</em></p> -<p>Malware-as-a-service lowers the cost of entry for adversaries, and it is increasing noise for defenders. Interviewees believe that <strong>AI will further increase this noise, and FCEB agencies and CISA should develop and acquire tools that help automate their defenses and increase their ability to detect vulnerabilities</strong> (see Recommendation 1.4 on AI product pricing strategy). One interviewee attested that they are already finding ChatGPT-elevated malware, highlighting that a response to these types of threats is urgently needed today.</p> +<p><strong>Mitigation</strong></p> -<p>A related point is that it is one thing to identify a threat, but it is another to <strong>fully understand the nature of a threat and, by extension, develop the appropriate countermeasures needed to address the situation.</strong> To tackle emerging threats, some interviewees and experts indicated that certain dangers, such as deepfakes, might not immediately appear to pose a threat to federal network security, but that reputational risks and attacks on individuals that manage key parts of an FCEB agency could have detrimental effects on its ability to carry out its mission. A common theme for the interviews was the need to get a better handle on today’s threats that could manifest with greater frequency as tomorrow’s problems.</p> +<p>To lessen the need for supplies inside Afghanistan and also being increasingly unable to protect non-Afghan members, in late 2021 and early 2022, IS-K moved more of its Pakistani members across the border. Taliban sources too noted the disappearance of not only Pakistanis but also Central Asians, Chechens and other non-Afghans from the east, and assumed they too had crossed the border.</p> -<h4 id="reflections-from-tabletop-exercises-and-the-public-survey">Reflections from Tabletop Exercises and the Public Survey</h4> +<p>The process of evacuating the bases in the east took eight months; even for some time after this a substantial number of IS-K members, especially leadership and administrative cadres, were hiding in caves and other secret locations, while their relocation was being arranged. The permanent bases were replaced during 2022 by an underground infrastructure, not only in Kunar but also in parts of Nangarhar, with secret cells established in Achin, Naziyan, Lal Pur, Pachir wa Agam, Bati Kot, Mohmand Dara and Jalalabad city. Even as the Taliban kept destroying its cells in Jalalabad, IS-K was able to maintain a presence there. Local elders confirmed the disappearance of obvious signs of IS-K presence, but believed that the group maintained secret cells. In January 2023, a source in the Taliban’s administration stated that IS-K’s presence in Nangarhar consisted of some IS-K cells in Jalalabad and one to two cells each in some districts, such as Achin and Naziyan. As of March 2023, the police estimated that there were 16 IS-K cells in Jalalabad, based on the confessions of detainees, but the cells operated independently and tracking them down was difficult.</p> -<p>In addition to the interviews, CSIS researchers conducted tabletop exercises and an online survey experiment with the general public to capture how experts and the public think about the cyber threat landscape. The research team ran the tabletop exercise six times. In total, over 50 experts — academics and think tank thought leaders, federal and private sector CISOs, and other cybersecurity or national security experts from the federal and private sectors — participated in the exercises. Conducted in a virtual setting, these exercises delved deep into potential threats surrounding the 2024 U.S. elections. With the overarching scenario of adversaries targeting critical public services, from SNAP and farm loans to vital research endeavors, the exercises highlighted the vulnerabilities that could shake the core of U.S. society.</p> +<p>Parallel to the move underground, IS-K also sought to adopt a mobile infrastructure to support the small, dispersed cells, a process that continued throughout 2022. A year after the spring 2022 strategic shift was decided, one IS-K source described as an accomplished fact a new, leaner and more mobile infrastructure that had replaced the old fixed bases:</p> -<p>The participants found themselves in the shoes of hackers advising the hypothetical company Veil Vector Technologies (VVT), strategizing cyberattacks on the public services overseen by the FCEB agencies. With a menu of cyberattacks at their disposal — ranging from the individually targeted deepfakes to more institutionally disruptive degrade attacks — participants were exposed to the multifaceted nature of cyber warfare.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Daesh has training centres and lots of secret cells and secret military bases in Kunar province, but they are changing their locations all the time. Daesh is on the move – its training centre, military bases [and] secret cells are all moving and changing every three or four months. When a member of Daesh is arrested by the Taliban or surrenders, Daesh immediately finds out where these guys were trained, which posts or secret cells they were assigned to, then it changes the locations.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Transitioning from offense to defense, in the next phase participants found themselves representing CISA. Tasked with designing countermeasures against the very strategies they had previously developed, they had to delve into CISA’s spectrum of services to assess which might alter adversary behavior. This transition served not just as a strategy assessment tool but also as a testament to the complex task of anticipating and countering cyber threats.</p> +<p>Taliban sources confirmed that IS-K was moving people to the northeast and north and even claimed that the collapse of IS-K activities in Nangarhar was in part due to IS-K moving out.</p> -<p>Separately, the CSIS research team adapted the expert exercise and developed a simplified online survey that could be pushed to the general public. The survey was conducted online via Prolific, with 1,000 participants, ensuring a demographic representation in line with the U.S. population. This careful juxtaposition between expert-driven decisions and those of the general public brought forth a nuanced understanding of cyber threat perceptions, potentially bridging the gap between theoretical strategies and their real-world implications.</p> +<p>While IS-K implemented these mitigating actions quickly, it remains the case that they were not enough to prevent the group’s operations from being constrained. IS-K’s messaging to its members did not mention the coming downgrade of the east, for good reasons. It appears to have been a difficult decision to take, given that a large majority of the group’s Afghan members were from the east and had families there. As of early 2022, IS-K sources were still adamant that they would soon go on the offensive, that their bases in the east were safe and that they had enough manpower to defeat the Taliban in the east. The rationale for having IS-K’s main bases in eastern Afghanistan (Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan) was still being promulgated by IS-K sources at least until mid-2022: “there are many Salafi people and madrasas in these provinces and most of the followers of Salafism are supporting IS-K”. It took until 2023 for IS-K sources to begin showing awareness and acceptance of the fact that IS-K had given up any ambition to hold territory, at least in the short and medium term.</p> -<p>The multifaceted world of cybersecurity is in continuous flux, with threats originating from both state and non-state entities and ranging from traditional attacks to novel strategies such as deepfakes. Harmonizing insights from experts with public perceptions can pave the way for robust strategies, shaping a safer and more informed digital environment for all.</p> +<p>The constraints that the transition placed on IS-K’s operations are evident when we look at its guerrilla operations in the east. While the transition was ongoing, IS-K, remarkably, sought to keep waging a guerrilla war in eastern Afghanistan. The guerrilla campaign was always limited in scope, affecting only the provinces of Kunar and, to a lesser extent, Nangarhar. Guerrilla activities intensified from late summer 2021, especially in Ghaziabad, Naray and Shegal. Though these mostly consisted of small hit-and-run attacks on Taliban posts and small ambushes, they were beginning to annoy the Taliban. In spring 2022, the High Council of IS-K, while deciding to intensify the terrorist campaign in the cities, also confirmed the decision to continuing the guerrilla war against the Taliban, where possible. However, the new structure left behind in the east proved unable or unwilling to support a steady insurgency there. IS-K guerrilla attacks in Nangarhar remained especially rare. One of the last few recorded attacks was in February 2022, an ambush in Achin which killed two members of the Taliban.</p> -<p><strong>INSIGHTS FROM THE TABLETOP EXERCISES AND PUBLIC SURVEY</strong></p> +<p>In Kunar, the picture was similar. In one of the worst incidents, a convoy was ambushed in Shegal and “several Taliban fighters were martyred”. In Dangam in Kunar, some lingering IS-K presence continued in the forested area, without much military activity. Those remaining were local members, reportedly being kept in reserve and perhaps supporting the planning of attacks elsewhere. Most IS-K members had reportedly moved to northeastern and northern Afghanistan (see below). This is likely to have affected the pace of guerrilla operations in the east, not only because of lower numbers, but also because to local members the option of lying low and hiding was more likely to seem viable than it would to their foreign and out-of-area comrades. As the presence of non-local fighters dried out, the level of guerrilla activity declined further. An independent assessment found that IS-K was able to sustain the number of guerrilla attacks at between five and 10 per month during the first half of 2022. The numbers, however, collapsed to between two and five in the second half of the year (see Figure 1, where guerrilla attacks are listed under the category “Gun”).</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Participant Profiles:</strong> The majority of expert participants came from the public and private sectors, supplemented by individuals from academia and think tanks. The public survey, on the other hand, captured U.S. demographic representation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Attacker Choices:</strong> As advisers to VVT, participants were first asked to select which nation-state would be requiring their services. In the second round of the game, the participants were asked to identify what type of non-state actor would require their services. In assessing global threats, experts and the public displayed a divergence in views — especially concerning Russia and China — with the former potentially relying on specialized intelligence and the latter influenced largely by media narratives. This divide extends to perceptions of North Korea, suggesting an information gap where public concerns might be media driven or anchored in broader geopolitical narratives. However, there is a notable alignment in perspectives on non-state threats, possibly due to uniform media portrayals or the transparent nature of such risks. The escalating public concern surrounding “lone wolf” actors underscores the growing recognition of their unpredictability in the digital age.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>IS-K also tried to adapt in response to the Taliban’s financial disruption operations. Confronted with the news that IS-K networks in Turkey had taken a major hit, IS-K sources indicated that the organisation coped successfully, reactivating its old financial hub in the UAE, where the abundance of Afghan <em>hawala</em> traders would make it easier to find complicit ones. The source had to acknowledge that there was a bottleneck at the receiving end, in Afghanistan, as <em>hawala</em> traders were wary of getting caught. He tried hard to present an optimistic picture, noting that other ways of transferring money, through complicit businesses based in Turkey and through flights between Istanbul and Kabul, with the help of some personnel at Kabul’s airport, were being tested. One of his colleagues also suggested that the financial strangulation of IS-K was lessening as of December 2022–January 2023.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HRpsjJ0.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Attacker Choices.</strong></em></p> +<h4 id="the-response-to-the-reconciliation-and-reintegration-deals">The Response to the Reconciliation and Reintegration Deals</h4> -<p>Participants were given three options of domains to target in the exercise:</p> +<p>The other main concern for IS-K appears to have been about countering the Taliban’s local reconciliation and reintegration efforts, which had the support of some Salafi elders in the villages (see discussion above). The group appears to have seen this as the biggest medium-term threat. IS-K started in 2021–22 to bring pressure on the elders not to facilitate negotiations between IS-K members and the Taliban. One surrendering member heard from villagers that “Daesh is trying a lot to undermine this process. Several elders who were secretly facilitating the negotiations and connecting IS-K members with the Taliban for their surrender have been threatened”.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Basic Needs:</strong> The deliberate targeting of critical societal elements — such as healthcare, financial systems, and government benefits — can lead to significant chaos. The ripple effect of an attack on these systems could cripple the daily lives of citizens, leading to public unrest, economic instability, and a significant downturn in public trust in institutions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Small and Medium Businesses:</strong> Often overlooked in the grand scheme of cybersecurity, small and medium businesses (SMBs) represent a soft target for adversaries. Due to frequently limited resources, their cybersecurity infrastructure may not be as fortified as larger entities. Their disruption could not only threaten the livelihoods of many but also create supply chain disturbances, causing economic strain and public mistrust toward market institutions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Science and Technology:</strong> Beyond just data breaches, the compromise of the science and technology sector could erode the foundation of factual, evidence-based decisionmaking in society. Misinformation or manipulated data could skew public opinion, lead to ill-informed policies, and erode trust in research institutions, thereby influencing democratic processes in subtle yet profound ways.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Others who surrendered confirmed the same, adding that threats consisted of death threats and threats to burn down the homes of anybody making deals. One of the surrendered members claimed he and two fellow former comrades in arms received threats from IS-K; the group, he said, threatened to “set fire to my house and throw me into the blaze”. Two elders of his village, who had helped the Taliban, he said, were also threatened, and as a result stopped being involved in negotiating surrenders. One even reported that nine surrendered IS-K members ended up rejoining IS-K in Nangarhar, although it is not clear whether this was because of the threats or because of the poor Taliban implementation of the deals. IS-K also increased counter-intelligence efforts among its own ranks. These countermeasures were deemed to be effective by a number of former IS-K members, who believed that surrenders were diminishing or even ceasing. This suggests that IS-K feared the reconciliation/reintegration plans much more than it did indiscriminate repression.</p> -<p><strong>Participants prioritized going after basic needs over SMBs or science and technology.</strong> After selecting an attacker, participants were asked what types of services they were most interested in attacking (i.e., which services would most successfully undermine trust in U.S. institutions if attacked). For instance, participants who chose non-state actors gravitated toward attacks on basic needs (52 percent) over SMBs (37 percent), with science and technology being the least preferred target, at 10 percent (see Figure 5).</p> +<h4 id="the-response-to-the-talibans-tentative-elite-bargaining">The Response to the Taliban’s Tentative Elite Bargaining</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZEEDkBS.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Distribution of Service Types by Rank (Non-state).</strong></em></p> +<p>Because of the lack of Taliban success in negotiating with the Salafi ulema, IS-K may not have considered a response to their negotiations with the Salafi ulema a priority – although it is likely that it brought pressure to bear on the Salafi ulema to stay away from the Taliban. IS-K’s short campaign of attacks on pro-Taliban clerics in the summer of 2022 might also have been intended to provoke Taliban retaliation against Salafi clerics and spoil the Taliban’s discussions with them. The killing of Rahman Ansari in Herat in September 2022 might have been a warning as well, as Ansari was a Salafi preacher who had pledged loyalty to the Taliban. IS-K did not claim the killing. The campaign was abandoned in autumn, probably as it was becoming clear that IS-K did not need to be concerned about Taliban negotiations with the Salafi ulema.</p> -<p><strong>Attack strategies varied depending on what type of service was being attacked.</strong> For instance, whether hacktivist or state-sponsored, there was consistency in strategies — basic needs and SMBs were targeted with “Disruption,” while science and technology was susceptible to “Espionage” (see Figure 6). Similar results were obtained from the public survey game (see Figure 7).</p> +<h4 id="is-k-counterattacks">IS-K Counterattacks</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ULZclGI.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Expert Group Average Resource Distribution in Attack Types (Non-state Actors, State Actors).</strong></em></p> +<p>While IS-K sought to counter Taliban tactics or at least to limit the damage, its leadership also decided to try re-seizing the long-lost initiative by striking the Taliban where it felt they were more vulnerable. The urban terrorism campaign, discussed above, was more of a diversion than a counter-offensive. Instead, IS-K appears to have placed its hopes for turning around the situation in its expansion in the north. Plans to expand recruitment in the north started in mid-2020 (after an earlier aborted effort in 2017–18). Small numbers of Afghan Pashtuns and even Pakistanis were also sent north. After 2021, these efforts were strengthened, and even moving the IS-K headquarters there in the future was considered.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/V7Xz2cW.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Public: Distribution of Attack Types.</strong></em></p> +<p>In mid-2022, the IS-K leadership was reportedly still in Kunar, but the new phase of the transfer to the north had been initiated a few months earlier. The movement of people and assets to the north and northeast continued, as both a Taliban police officer and a local elder confirmed. IS-K sources talked up the migration with the claim that it was about taking jihad to Central Asia. IS-K sources spoke about training centres being established in Badakhshan, Kunduz and Jawzjan, with plans to open one in Balkh. As IS-K also dramatically expanded its social media activities, it began releasing significant quantities of propaganda, such as statements and pamphlets in Uzbekistani, Tajikistani and Uyghur, in order to support its claims of imminent expansion into Central Asia.</p> -<p><strong>Attack timing varied depending on if the actor was a state or non-state actor.</strong> When players chose state actors, 63 percent opted for a cyberattack strategy focused on future attacks, while 37 percent aimed for immediate results. In contrast, selecting non-state actors saw 56 percent of players planning for future attacks and 44 percent pursuing immediate outcomes. This underscores state actors’ heightened preference for longer-term cyber strategies compared to non-state actors. Additionally, public survey results closely aligned with this expert approach, yielding similar conclusions (see Table 2). There is a statistically significant difference in the attack strategy choices between state and non-state actors, determined by a chi-square test of independence.</p> +<p>IS-K seems to have had expectations of rapid expansion into Faryab and the northwest in spring 2022, exploiting intra-Taliban friction. More generally, it is clear that one of the main reasons for the shift in focus northwards was the hope for major defections from the ranks of the Taliban there. That did not happen on any significant scale. When asked for details, an IS-K source could only provide modest defection figures for the entire August 2021 to mid-2022 period: “a few commanders in the north”, with some more in talks as of mid-2022.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yiScA5z.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Comparison of Attack Strategy Choices between State and Non-state Actors (Public Survey).</strong></em></p> +<p>Another aspect of IS-K’s “counter-offensive” was to make up for the group’s limited achievements with media-focused symbolic attacks, such as rocket attacks from Afghan territory on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which caused no damage but won high-profile exposure in the media. An important part of IS-K’s strategy was integrating its military and propaganda campaigns. Graphic details of the terrorist campaign were used by IS-K social media propaganda to project an image of strength and power that was out of all proportion with the reality. Overall, the leadership of IS-K succeeded fairly well in hiding the extent of its difficulties. The regional and world media, as well as policymakers, continued to portray it as a highly threatening organisation, even though its military achievements were almost negligible.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="public-perception-of-us-cybersecurity-spending"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Public Perception of U.S. Cybersecurity Spending</code></h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Although it is difficult to measure how IS-K members and sympathisers reacted to this propaganda, it is clear that one of the intents was to shore up the morale of increasingly dispersed members and convince them that the jihad was succeeding. IS-K tried to diminish the Taliban’s achievements and to stimulate feelings of revenge, for example by claiming that the Taliban had deliberately killed family members of IS-K members during their raids on city cells.</p> -<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The general public believes the federal government does not spend enough on cybersecurity. The public’s perception of governmental inadequacy in cybersecurity funding is significant. It implies a gap in public communication — where either the federal initiatives are not well publicized or their efforts are not resonating effectively with the general populace — or just a reminder that there is simply not enough money allocated for cybersecurity. This sentiment underscores the need for improved public relations efforts, clearer communication of cybersecurity endeavors, and potential reevaluation of budget allocations based on emerging threats.</code></em></p> +<p>Initially the Taliban were taken aback by the dramatically expanded output of IS-K’s rather slick propaganda. The GDI responded by targeting IS-K activism on social media, exploiting the recruitment efforts of IS-K to infiltrate its own agents, and succeeding in capturing some online activists. It also managed to seize control of some accounts linked to IS-K, and to develop more effective counter-propaganda. A key theme of Taliban propaganda, distributed through the regime’s media as well as on social media, was to portray IS-K as heretics. A pro-Taliban <em>a’lim</em> argued that IS-K members “should be treated like <em>khawarij</em> [heretics] and their Sharia sentences should be hanging or beheading”. Another <em>a’lim</em> argued that IS-K members “are all <em>khawarij</em>” and that the doctrine is clear that under Islamic law, the punishment for this is death. Overall, however, at the end of 2022 online propaganda was the only domain in which IS-K dominated.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mNtTrDm.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: U.S. Funding Survey for Cybersecurity Spending.</strong></em></p> +<h4 id="the-overall-impact-on-is-k-in-202122">The Overall Impact on IS-K in 2021–22</h4> -<p><strong>EMERGING THEMES FROM TABLETOP EXERCISE DISCUSSIONS</strong></p> +<p>Although IS-K propaganda continually claimed that its numbers were rising, when asked for details, sources provided numbers that in fact showed that the group’s size had remained fairly stable in 2021–22, at just under 8,000 men in total. Most of these in June 2022 were already claimed to be in the north/northeast, according to a source who was himself about to be transferred there from the east.</p> -<p>In light of the recent tabletop exercise discussions, several themes emerged regarding potential cyber threats targeting federal networks. These insights, gathered from expert deliberations, point to the evolving nature of the cyber landscape and the increasing sophistication of threat actors:</p> +<p>IS-K sources and propaganda also claimed that recruitment was strong in 2022. When challenged for figures, two IS-K sources provided roughly consistent figures: total new recruitment into IS-K was estimated at 150–200 per month in mid-2022. The main sources of recruits were still identified as “Salafi madrasas, schools, mosques [and] scholars”. As noted elsewhere, IS-K recruitment in universities can be estimated in the low hundreds per year. Overall, these figures seem relatively modest, considering that IS-K was taking losses and suffering defections, and they are consistent with a substantial stagnation in IS-K’s strength during this period.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Sophisticated State-Sponsored Attacks:</strong> Experts believe that state-sponsored attacks, particularly from adversaries such as Russia and China, are growing in complexity. Their focus seems to be on espionage and long-term presence within federal networks to gather intelligence and potentially influence policies.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Deepfakes and Misinformation:</strong> A significant concern raised is the potential use of deepfakes to spread misinformation. Such tactics could be employed to undermine trust in federal communications or to spread false narratives that serve the interests of external actors.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Supply Chain Vulnerabilities:</strong> There is increasing awareness of vulnerabilities within the supply chains that serve federal networks. By compromising a single entity within the supply chain, threat actors can potentially gain access to a broader range of federal systems and data.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Erosion of Trust:</strong> One strategy identified involves eroding public trust in federal institutions. By creating disruptions or manipulating data, threat actors can shake the public’s confidence in government efficiency and reliability.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>In sum, IS-K was able to preserve its manpower and appears to have tailored the level and character of its activities to its ability to recruit and, presumably, spend. During this period, however, the Taliban were rapidly expanding their manpower. IS-K’s transition to a fully underground structure had been fairly smooth, with diversions proving rather successful in distracting the Taliban for some months. It is, however, clear that the group had not been able to seize back the initiative and that its financial difficulties seemed to be worsening.</p> -<p>Additionally, several themes emerged on how cybersecurity architecture can offset these future threats:</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Enhanced Monitoring and Threat Intelligence:</strong> Experts suggest that federal networks should invest in real-time monitoring and threat intelligence capabilities. By understanding the evolving threat landscape, federal entities can be better prepared to detect and respond to intrusions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Robust Incident Response Protocols:</strong> In the event of a breach or cyber incident, having a well-defined and practiced response protocol can significantly reduce the potential damage. Rapid containment and mitigation should be the priority.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Supply Chain Security:</strong> Given the vulnerabilities in supply chains, experts recommend stricter security standards for all vendors serving federal networks. This includes regular security audits and ensuring that vendors comply with best practices.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Public Awareness and Communication:</strong> Experts emphasize the importance of transparent communication with the public. By promptly addressing misinformation and clarifying federal stances, trust can be maintained and the impact of misinformation campaigns can be reduced.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Investment in Advanced Technologies:</strong> To keep up with sophisticated threat actors, experts advocate for continued investment in advanced cybersecurity technologies. This includes AI-driven threat detection, encrypted communications, and secure cloud infrastructures.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>How did the Taliban structure their post-August 2021 mix of tactics for countering IS-K? And how successful were these in fighting the group? Selective violence quickly became the default choice of Taliban policymakers. Identifying the boundaries between extremists, supporting milieus and “quietists” was, however, always contentious. It should also be noted that the Taliban appear to have purposely used bursts of indiscriminate violence to warn hostile populations of what an all-out war with the Emirate would mean for them, and to intimidate them into submission. An aspect of the Taliban’s counter-IS effort that emerges clearly from this paper is that repression, even indiscriminate repression, and reconciliation deals were seen as functional to each other: the stick and the carrot. The new state had to show that it meant business, and that it was able to impose intolerable suffering on the Salafi community if it refused to collaborate.</p> -<p>In conclusion, as the cyber threat landscape continues to evolve, federal networks face increasing challenges. However, by taking a proactive stance, understanding emerging threats, and investing in robust cybersecurity measures, federal entities can effectively safeguard their systems and data. The reflections from the tabletop exercises underscore the importance of continued dialogue, collaboration, and innovation in the realm of federal cybersecurity.</p> +<p>IS-K’s leadership appears to have underestimated the ability of the Taliban to adapt quickly. Taliban intelligence, despite some obvious limitations, was able to quickly establish a wide and thick network of informers. As insurgents, the Taliban had had a well-developed intelligence network, and they adapted this; they also seem to have prioritised investment in their intelligence agency. Given IS’s reputation for ruthlessness, it was easy for them to obtain the cooperation of bystanders. At the national leadership level, there seems to have been an understanding of the risk of getting trapped in a cycle of violence, and there were interventions to contain the excesses of provincial officials, especially as the new security apparatus consolidated. The Taliban showed their ability to adapt by developing the sophisticated means to make selective repression viable, for example through setting up social media infiltration teams. Still, when selective repression proved difficult to implement because of insufficient intelligence, local Taliban officials usually had no qualms about reverting to indiscriminate violence, even if the scale never approached the main wave of violence of autumn 2021. It is noteworthy in this regard that the Taliban failed to apply the rule of law to counter-IS efforts. The system remained prone to abuse even from the standpoint of Islamic law, and avoiding excesses was always dependent on interventions from the higher leadership levels.</p> -<h4 id="other-challenges">Other Challenges</h4> +<p>The Taliban also tentatively began working at local reconciliation deals with Salafi communities, but the effort was weakly supported by Kabul and, as of early 2023, it was poorly followed up. National-level talks with the Salafi ulema helped the Taliban shift away from indiscriminate violence, but did not lead to any progress towards an elite bargain. The Taliban were offering peace to the Salafis as subjects of the Emirate, but the Salafi ulema were seeking inclusion.</p> -<p><strong>AI-ENABLED THREATS</strong></p> +<p>Where the Taliban were most effective was with choking-off tactics, constraining the ability of IS-K to recruit, resupply and keep money coming in. They waited until they had sufficient manpower available before mounting large-scale military sweeps, to be able to hold the ground afterwards. If they had been engaging in ineffective sweeps, as the previous regime had, they would have alienated the population for no gain.</p> -<p>Across the board, one of the immediate areas of concern for interviewed experts and tabletop exercise participants was AI-enabled threats and challenges, along with questions about whether the U.S. government’s defensive measures would be able to sufficiently detect and address these threats in real time.</p> +<p>A pertinent question is how much of the Taliban’s counter-IS effort has derived from their previous experience as insurgents. While none of the sources directly commented on this point, it seems likely that their reluctance to engage in big military sweeps might derive from having experienced the ineffectiveness of such tactics when they were on the receiving end of them before August 2021. Similarly, having had to recruit new insurgents for 20 years, the Taliban seem well aware of the greater difficulties that an insurgent organisation faces when it lacks territorial control. The Taliban furthermore always argued that the indiscriminate revenge-taking and repression practised by Afghan and US security forces in 2001–04 drove many into their ranks, enabling them to start their insurgency. In the current case, however, they have struggled to implement a coherent policy of selective repression, showing perhaps that learning lessons could well be disrupted by the emotional legacy of a long war. Another example of how hatred for the enemy gets in the way of rational policymaking is the Taliban’s failure to follow up on their good start on reconciliation and reintegration.</p> -<p>Promisingly, statements from CISA leaders demonstrate a perspective on AI that is forward looking, flexible, and practical. Plans were mentioned that not only think about how to help safeguard AI models that might be used for new tools and capabilities but also address how CISA can proactively benefit by using AI tools so it can keep pace with the threat landscape.</p> +<p>IS-K undoubtedly proved a resilient organisation after August 2021. Despite facing morale and financial issues, it focused on an urban strategy while trying to strengthen its positions in northern Afghanistan. Militarily speaking, it did not mount a serious threat to the Taliban. The leadership opted to spare its fighters, soon even giving up early attempts to wage a guerrilla war in the east. IS-K tried instead to keep the Taliban busy guarding the cities against a massive wave of urban terrorism, while at the same time expecting its efforts to establish itself firmly in the north to be bearing fruit in the medium term. Time, however, was not on IS-K’s side, and the group’s financial difficulties only increased during 2022.</p> -<p>The following are a few specific types of AI challenges that could impact FCEB agencies in the coming years, with an assessment of how CISA’s planned activities might address these challenges:</p> +<p>IS-K appeared to be in a corner by the end of 2022 and early 2023, in good part due to Taliban efforts to counter it. The organisation was surviving by keeping a very low profile, but this meant limited recruitment opportunities and, importantly, far too little fundraising inside Afghanistan. The dependence on money coming from abroad was increasingly proving a liability during 2022. Without financial resources, IS-K was not well positioned to exploit the Taliban’s remaining vulnerability: the fact that the Salafi community, while in general acknowledging a reduction of the pressure exercised by the Emirate, still feels oppressed and very pessimistic about its future under the new regime.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Synthetic Media and Disinformation:</strong> In recent years there has been growing public awareness about how AI-generated content can be used to spread mis- and disinformation. In a recent CSIS survey, when respondents were presented with a series of images and audio and video clips, they could only correctly identify what content was real versus what content was AI-generated roughly 50 percent of the time, which is basically flipping a coin.</p> +<p>It seems clear that IS-K was very vulnerable to the reconciliation efforts deployed by the Taliban, and that a decisive defeat of the organisation could have been achieved if the Taliban had followed through and implemented their reconciliation packages consistently. Instead, as the IS-K threat appeared to be receding in the second half of 2022 and Taliban self-confidence grew, reconciliation efforts lost steam, despite evidence suggesting that this was the most effective path. It was assumed that defectors would easily reintegrate with the help of the community elders, who, however, received no support from the Emirate. The main reasons for this appear to have been animosity against IS-K within the Taliban’s ranks, fuelled by the considerable amount of blood spilled; resentment over the allocation of scarce financial resources to paying reconciled opponents; and the failure to make significant progress towards a wider elite bargain involving Salafi elites.</p> - <p>There are attempts by coalitions and individual industry actors to authenticate sources of online content, which is a step in the right direction. From CISA’s point of view, it becomes a question of whether it is its role to even be concerned about these types of threats. Whether or not CISA has the capabilities or capacity to deal with mis- and disinformation, let alone AI-generated mis- and disinformation, the core question is: Does its mission to protect FCEB networks even authorize it to engage in this area of work in the first place?</p> +<p>Time will tell if the failed reconciliation process is going to be a great missed opportunity for the Taliban. IS-K’s financial weakness could lead to its terminal decline without much Taliban effort, of course, but financial difficulties could still be reversed in the future, in which case the Taliban might regret having neglected their promising reconciliation efforts. While the strong foreign component of IS-K is clearly not susceptible to being enticed to reintegrate, IS-K nowadays needs Afghan participation more than ever – it cannot rely on Pakistanis for dispersed underground operations in cities and villages. If the Taliban were able to substantially cut into IS-K’s approximately 3,000 Afghan members, the group’s viability as an insurgent organisation in Afghanistan would be comprehensively undermined.</p> - <p>The consulted experts were mixed. Some were unconcerned about AI’s actual impact on institutions, while some were very concerned about its direct and even indirect impact on certain aspects of FCEB agencies. Others expressed a concern but were unsure what role, if any, CISA should play in focusing on this threat.</p> +<hr /> - <p>It is the CSIS research team’s belief that recent incidents (such as the story involving deepfakes of a DHS appointee in compromising situations) illustrate how these types of attacks might have low impacts to networks but can greatly damage personal reputations in ways that could influence an FCEB’s ability to deliver on its mission. Additionally, manipulated images might impact an FCEB agency’s ability to spread timely, reliable information if it is competing with inauthentic and misleading content. While at present CISA does not have a formal role in addressing this type of mis- and disinformation (with the exception of the election context), it might consider exploring some role, especially with regard to cyber-enabled mis-, dis-, and malinformation, since these types of attacks will likely continue in the coming years (see Recommendation 2.8 on CISA’s role in addressing mis- and disinformation).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Data Poisoning and Infiltration:</strong> Experts were keen to mention that CISA’s future successes will rely on its ability to detect and respond to situations at machine speed. Outside researchers should be able to better assess CISA’s ability to do this as it rolls out newer capabilities in the coming years. But aside from the capabilities themselves, there are general concerns about the ability of government and industry to safeguard the AI models used to develop these newer tools. An AI-enabled tool is only as effective as the model used to build it, and poisoned AI models could disrupt CISA’s ability to respond in certain situations. At an even more basic level, CISA and other entities ought to look at ways to address unintentional biases and other flawed information that could be used in developing these tools.</p> +<p><strong>Antonio Giustozzi</strong> is the senior research fellow at RUSI in the Terrorism and Conflict research group. He has been working in and on Afghanistan in various respects since the 1990s and has published extensively on the conflict and specifically the Taliban and the Islamic State. His main research interests are global jihadism in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, the security sector, state-building and insurgencies. He is currently project director for Strive Afghanistan, which is pioneering new P/CVE approaches. He is also associated with the LSE (South Asia Centre) and was previously associated with War Studies at KCL.</p>Antonio GiustozziThis paper examines the strategies employed by the Taliban in response to the threat posed by the Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K) in 2021–22.Blockchain For Democracies2023-10-25T12:00:00+08:002023-10-25T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/blockchain-for-democracies<p><em>In a world increasingly overflowing with data, blockchain is neither a panacea nor solely an instrument of cryptocurrencies but rather a tool that offers intriguing applications to support democratic governance, including in Ukraine.</em></p> - <p>A related concern is that adversaries can use AI tools to monitor patterns in CISA’s automated threat hunt and detection services and then use that to interfere with, avoid, or generally circumvent capabilities that are in place.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<excerpt /> -<p><strong>QUANTUM COMPUTING</strong></p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>The threat of quantum computing was not listed as an immediate area of concern, with experts noting that quantum-related threats will likely manifest in five to ten years as opposed to the closer timeframe this study is focusing on. However, CISA should still be prepared to defend against threats stemming from higher computational power.</p> +<p>Rapid technological change has led to a global deluge of data. Certain aspects of shared information — authenticity, verification, speed, and integrity — are key to good governance and to helping democracies deliver for their citizens. Blockchain and other types of distributed ledger technology (DLT) offer potential benefits that institutions and governments can leverage in various ways to support democratic governance. Blockchain’s increasing use for identity management, land rights, citizen representation, the tracking of goods and services, and other uses necessitates deeper and broader understanding by U.S. foreign policy stakeholders. Given that U.S. foreign policy prioritizes strengthening democratic governance around the world, including through more inclusive access to services and greater transparency, accountability, and integrity in the public sphere, U.S. policymakers must seriously grapple with the opportunities and challenges associated with the increased integration of blockchain technology. Ukraine’s embrace of digitization and use cases for blockchain offer helpful insights into how and in which contexts this technology may be applied.</p> -<p>The most realistic possibility in the near term is adversaries relying on a “harvest now, decrypt later” strategy, whereby exfiltrated encrypted data is stored with the assumption that it can be decrypted by adversaries using post-quantum cryptography algorithms at some later point in time. It is a near-term area of concern only insofar as it further emphasizes the need for departments and agencies to operate with greater levels of resilience — in a way, it is less a matter of if your data will be stolen than when it will be stolen. Beyond any technical solutions, CISA is currently well positioned to provide stronger guidance on how FCEB agencies might concretely anticipate and address these types of situations.</p> +<p>Whenever there is a lack of transparency in elections, government transactions, bureaucratic systems, and media, there is an opportunity for corruption to ensue, diluting citizens’ trust in democratic institutions. Certain technological advancements can potentially be a valuable tool for increasing the transparency and accountability of democracies. One such innovative tool is blockchain, a form of DLT that allows a group of users to cooperatively maintain a record of transactions.</p> -<p><strong>TODAY’S CHALLENGES, TOMORROW’S PROBLEMS</strong></p> +<p>Blockchain is often associated with the use case of cryptocurrency, but it can be applied to other domains to track both tangible and intangible goods and transactions. Blockchain is a form of tamper-resistant DLT that ensures that all transactions are recorded and validated. This technology achieves extraordinary levels of data integrity for information once it is loaded into the shared ledger. Essentially, the movement or transfer of anything of value can be logged and verified, instilling trust and confidence by raising the costs of malicious activity during that process. This opens the technology to a wide range of applications. Within governance and democratic strengthening efforts, blockchain has recently been introduced in various places to increase government accountability, combat misinformation, reduce costs and the mishandling of data, and quickly trace financial transactions.</p> -<p>Despite the various possible threat vectors and new technologies that are projected to cause damage in the coming years, the overwhelming majority of experts consulted for this project — regardless of professional background — emphasized that they are most concerned about the ability of the U.S. government and industry to properly manage today’s challenges. In other words, the actual cost for adversaries to engage in attacks akin to the ones occurring today will be cheaper in the coming years, and for several reasons they are likely to be waged with greater frequency, which will naturally put a strain on the currently offered support services.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="box-1-what-is-blockchain"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Box 1: What Is Blockchain?</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Geopolitical Challenges:</strong> At the macro level, festering geopolitical tensions will increase the likelihood that foreign adversaries invest in and deploy cyberattacks that directly target U.S. government institutions. In July 2023, it was reported that suspected Chinese malware was detected across a number of military systems. While China is typically known for its espionage activities, this particular incident is concerning because it looks like the malware could be used to actively disrupt — as opposed to simply surveil — compromised systems.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Distributed ledger technology (DLT) describes a category of technologies that enables the storage of data within and transfer between multiple data stores. Network participants share this ledger of transactions, allowing for synchronized data recording with no central storage hub. Instead, peer-to-peer transmission takes place, recording the same information across many devices. The “ledger” is stored across multiple locations and is visible to all parties.</code></em></p> - <p>This departure in China’s modus operandi is a general reminder that the threat landscape is changing, and it goes without saying that the strained relationships between the United States and known adversaries needs to be constantly reevaluated in risk assessments. At the operational level, this requires CISA and other entities tasked with a defensive cyber mission to map out all the ways in which these larger issues might manifest into seemingly low-level attacks.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Blockchain is not singular in design. It can be classified into different types based on which access and governance models are used. The two main categories are private and public blockchains. Private blockchains restrict access to a specific group of participants, while public blockchains allow anyone to join, build, and use applications on the network. Within each of these categories, there are also permissioned and permissionless blockchains. Permissioned blockchains require participants to have explicit permission to host infrastructure and validate network transactions, whereas permissionless blockchains allow anyone to be a validator.</code></em></p> - <p>Stemming from this are supply chain risks and vulnerabilities, as well as the question of what explicit role, if any, CISA should take in managing these risks as related to the protection of federal networks.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Structural Challenges:</strong> Following the release of the 2020 CSC report, the commission’s cochair, Senator Angus King, repeatedly justified the recommendation for a national cyber director by saying it would give the government “one throat to choke” after a major incident. But it is now a few years in, and cyber authorities — and by extension the accountability mechanisms — are still dispersed. At one level, it is assumed that some variation of today’s issues around general coordination and role delineation might continue to plague the U.S. government in the coming years. Regarding CISA in particular and its role as the lead for network defense, there are promising signs that it has been establishing strong relationships with U.S. government partners and FCEB and non-FCEB entities alike. But it will be essential that CISA continues to push for more role clarity that can translate into greater overall clarity in reporting structures and ultimate responses, especially considering predicted future threat scenarios.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Blockchains that are public and permissioned offer several advantages. They can provide high performance and scalability, processing thousands of transactions per second, and can ensure fast and secure transaction finality. Permissioned governance that provides security, efficiency, and visibility into who is involved in decisionmaking processes and network operation can be combined with public accessibility to all citizens, making the technology a compelling choice for many applications.</code></em></p> - <p>What will be even more interesting in the near future is to see how CISA’s new initiatives actively manage the cyber risk of FCEB agencies, especially small and medium-sized ones. Paraphrasing the remarks of one FCEB interviewee, “all agencies think they are unique snowflakes, but at the end of the day, a hyper-tailored approach can only go so far, and there are certain consistent practices CISA can and must insist on.” With that being the case, it will be interesting to see how much of the security burden CISA takes on from FCEB agencies, how that compares between different agencies, and what the difference is between what CISA actually manages and what it aspires to manage.</p> +<p>While blockchain and DLT have the capability to help address global challenges and strengthen democratic institutions, the innovative applications of blockchain are still in early stages and not fully understood by key stakeholders in Washington. The United States and its strategic partners must assess and play a role in shaping the next innovative applications of blockchain technology before the opportunity passes. In some respects, China is already possibly years ahead of the United States and many other countries in applying this rapidly evolving technology. Users of the digitized Chinese yuan number over 120 million in China (although conflicting reporting creates some doubt about how widely this currency is actually being used). To create a regulatory and policy environment in which the implementation of DLT strengthens democracy without compromising privacy or muzzling technological innovation, policymakers need a comprehensive understanding of the opportunities as well as the limitations on where and how this technology can be most readily and helpfully adopted. The strategic application of blockchain technology in certain scenarios can enhance trust and better protect information, but implementers must also be mindful of the technology’s shortcomings and challenges.</p> - <p>Understanding this balance will be particularly important in light of many FCEB agencies transitioning and modernizing technologies in the name of enhancing cybersecurity. CISA will need to be particularly attuned to how efforts to rapidly meet certain U.S. government implementation deadlines might unintentionally create visibility gaps or introduce new vulnerabilities into FCEB systems. The challenge for CISA will be in how it decides to allow agencies to maintain independence in managing aspects such as technology debt from legacy systems, an issue that will be more pronounced in the coming years, while confidently executing its mission as the lead for federal network defense.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Workforce Challenges:</strong> In recent years, cyber workforce challenges have been closely examined and well documented. The private and public sectors alike have made plans to address staffing shortfalls. Notably, the ONCD recently published its National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy, which specifically outlines recommendations and opportunities for the federal government to attract and retain cyber talent more intentionally.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The United States and its strategic partners must assess and play a role in shaping the next innovative applications of blockchain technology before the opportunity passes.</code></em></strong></p> - <p>As a next step, the government needs to execute these proposed strategies and quickly fill vacancies. This is important not only for actual cyber entities such as CISA but across FCEB agencies as well. Especially if there is concern that future threats will be more persistent in nature, system resilience will rely on having a sustainable workforce that can also surge in capacity during a prolonged incident. As was observed by one of the interviewed industry leaders, “[the success of CISA services] is less about the CISA programs and more about people.” In other words, success depends on whether the FCEB agencies are well staffed with skilled experts that can take on these different challenges and whether they are coming in with a mindset conducive to working with CISA as a true partner.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Societal Challenges:</strong> During one of the convened tabletop exercises, an expert made the following point: the exercise assumes an adversary can effectively undermine trust in U.S. institutions, implying as a premise that people have trust in institutions in the first place.</p> +<h3 id="blockchain-and-democracy">Blockchain and Democracy</h3> - <p>The polls are clear — Americans have been losing trust in democratic institutions for some time. Mis- and disinformation from foreign and domestic voices alike further exacerbate the situation by selectively promoting information that seemingly resonates with individuals’ legitimate grievances about these institutions. At present, the U.S. public generally does not have the societal resilience to deal with these threats.</p> +<p>Democratic backsliding around the world should be a concern for democracies everywhere. Democracy is in a worldwide recession in terms of both quality and prevalence, the causes of which are contested. The cornerstones of flourishing democracies, however, are widely agreed upon and include free and fair elections; a free press; individual rights; economic, political, and religious freedom; and a rule of law equally applied. Governments and societies grappling with how best to support and strengthen democracies should assess how technologies such as blockchain can be applied as practical tools to uphold these foundational principles. The applications may vary considerably, as demonstrated by the following non-exhaustive examples.</p> - <p>Moreover, the United States is a deeply polarized society, and today’s political climate makes it challenging for individuals and organizations to meaningfully discuss issues related to curbing mis-, dis-, and malinformation. The current state of affairs has arguably also chilled federal government entities, such as CISA, from exploring ways to meaningfully identify opportunities to address these threats. These societal vulnerabilities only increase concerns of attacks originating from insider threats, an ongoing issue that some of the consulted experts believe could be an even bigger problem in the next few years.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h4 id="protecting-digitized-government-documents">PROTECTING DIGITIZED GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS</h4> -<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> +<p>Identity is inextricably intertwined with democracy. There are clear incentives for all governments, democratic or otherwise, to provide their citizens with means of unique identification, such as for the delivery of key services and benefits. Democracies have a special interest in ensuring individuals’ identities are protected so that the rights and privileges guaranteed to those individuals can be preserved. For example, government-issued identification is a key ingredient for voting, a core democratic responsibility. Likewise, passports assign unique “international standard serial numbers” which allow customs officials to quickly verify identity and citizenship as well as which travel privileges may apply to an individual. Government agencies such as the U.S. Social Security Administration assign identifiers to help administer medical benefits, financial aid, and other social services and benefits.</p> -<p>The federal government stands at a cybersecurity crossroads. In the coming years, CISA will greatly expand its offerings as the lead agency for non-defense and intelligence federal network security. At the same time, the scale, frequency, and intensity of cyberattacks against FCEB agencies are increasing. Both state and non-state actors see opportunities for holding the United States hostage through cyberspace. As a result, money is not enough to solve the problem. The United States needs to imagine new ways of coordinating proactive cyber defense and deterrence aligned with its emerging resources (i.e., means) that promote a change in how to think about network security and resilience.</p> +<p>Worldwide, nearly 1 billion people have no proof of legal identity and are excluded from services and the formal economy. Digital identity can serve to close this “identity gap” by helping deliver immutable and easily accessible identification to those lacking verifiable identity documents, as well as by strengthening the resiliency of existing paper identification. During natural disasters, conflicts, and other crises, citizens may not have the time or ability to grab their paper government documentation, which is necessary to freely move and receive services. DLT’s ability to safely guard such digitized information could alleviate the difficulty of attempting to verify a person’s identity during hectic scenarios in which physical documents are destroyed or inaccessible. Governments could be better equipped to manage refugee crises and natural disasters and administer standard social services, while individuals could have more control of their data. An important factor in realizing this vision entails working toward applications of digital identity systems that empower people rather than surveil and exclude them.</p> -<p>While it is premature to comment on some of CISA’s more recent technical capabilities (or soon to be released capabilities) for individual services, or its proposed backend analytic capability, this study highlights actions that Congress, FCEB agencies, and CISA can and must to do to streamline and clarify roles and responsibilities, manage perceptions, and establish clear communication channels in order to ensure that all stakeholders are best positioned to protect federal networks. Congress needs to be prepared to not only further define and scope CISA’s role in this space but also to provide appropriate oversight into new tools and capabilities that will be rapidly deployed to meet future threats and challenges. Setting aside service-specific recommendations, CISA will significantly benefit by connecting its services more clearly and directly to the needs of FCEB agencies. By showing the value it brings to FCEB agencies, at an affordable price point, CISA can deliver as a true partner in network security efforts. At the same time, FCEB agencies, while not monolithic, need to operate with a greater understanding of CISA’s role in defending federal networks today in order to align the role to their respective individual FCEB initiatives. This requires adequate funding to enable choices based on merit rather than cost. The national security of the United States requires a CISA that is not bound to the lowest bid.</p> +<h4 id="securing-land-registration">SECURING LAND REGISTRATION</h4> -<h4 id="pillar-1-resourcing-toward-success">Pillar 1: Resourcing toward Success</h4> +<p>Land title registries track the ownership of land and property for a given region. The efficient registration of land is an essential component of ensuring property rights, a backbone of any free society. Land registration poses another set of government records for which an agency could maintain a blockchain to improve efficiency and ensure the quality of data storage and transfers. Some countries are already experiencing positive results from deploying DLT in the land registration process. For Georgia, the collapse of the Soviet Union and persistent corruption during early independence caused many property disputes. In response, Georgia was an early adopter of blockchain-based land registration, registering more than 1.5 million land titles in 2018. The Georgian government was able to provide citizens with digital certificates, legitimizing ownership with a timestamp and other cryptographic proof in under three minutes. Importantly, blockchain may help streamline the land registration process, but oversight is still critical to ensure the initial integrity of the data.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 1.1 (for Congress): Ensure consistent, coherent, and flexible funding streams for programs such as CDM.</em></strong></p> +<p>Similar technology can be applied to other asset registrations and government services. For example, the private sector uses blockchain technology to track the shipment of goods and monitor supply chains. Likewise, government agencies have the potential to reduce labor costs and waste by incorporating blockchain in some types of foreign aid delivery and monitoring, the tracking of welfare funds, and the registration of voters, vehicles, and intellectual property.</p> -<p>Currently, the CDM program is structured as a centralized funding model, but only for a two-year period. On the one hand, there would be some benefits to Congress signaling an ongoing centralized funding approach to help ensure greater buy-in and continued use of the CDM program. In the current structure, FCEB agencies are prone to face budget constraints and might struggle when their CDM funding expires. This often leads to a piecemeal approach to tool selection and adoption, with agencies making independent decisions based on their individual budget limitations. This can potentially lead to operational disruptions, incomplete coverage, and inconsistent security postures across different agencies. Moreover, there is a case to be made that programs such as CDM provide a national security function on par with some defense-related programs, and as such, they require multiyear funding enabling enterprise agreements that reduce costs and lock in pricing. While this derails some vendor incentives and high margins, it helps democratize cybersecurity excellence.</p> +<h4 id="facilitating-fast-and-direct-financial-transfers-and-other-economic-applications">FACILITATING FAST AND DIRECT FINANCIAL TRANSFERS AND OTHER ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS</h4> -<p>However, the reason Congress typically does not grant multiyear funding is because that allows it to provide oversight and make adjustments if certain allocations are not being properly spent. Additionally, if a funding cycle is too long, it could result in the calcification of certain tools and halt innovation. Multiyear funding can help reduce the influence of industry vendors aggressively trying to sell alternative products to FCEB agencies, but it can also unintentionally have the adverse effect of making FCEB agencies too complacent with tools that are already in use.</p> +<p>The financial services industry is already advancing applications of blockchain technology. Blockchain’s peer-to-peer system has enabled the excision of some intermediaries, instantaneous processing, and the elimination of fees when sending money anywhere in the world. Blockchain technology is not a digital currency, but it is highly associated with digital currencies because decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin function using blockchain.</p> -<p>Ultimately, there are two goals: (1) to provide a more predictable landscape for FCEB agencies participating in the CDM program; and (2) to ensure there is sufficient funding to cover the inventory and security of devices as they evolve. A combination of a working capital funds system, or some flexibility for FCEB agencies to carry over unused funds from previous fiscal year appropriations, might ultimately help provide more consistent funding than what is currently afforded. If nothing else, it will help agencies align their budget requests relative to their cybersecurity risk assessments.</p> +<p>Yet cryptocurrency is only a small subset of how blockchain can be and is being used by governments and financial institutions globally. For example, stablecoins, as the name suggests, attempt to provide a stable value by pegging their worth to a real-world “reference” asset such as the U.S. dollar. They can be used to pay for goods and services while benefiting from the low transaction costs of some blockchains. Blockchain technology has also induced the majority of the world’s governments to actively explore managing their national currencies by incorporating central bank digital currencies, with China, Sweden, and others actively exploring their use.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 1.2 (for Congress): Fund and formalize a Joint Collaborative Environment.</em></strong></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Cryptocurrency is only a small subset of how blockchain can be and is being used by governments and financial institutions globally.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Congress can help catalyze the cybersecurity common operating landscape. As of July 2023, Congress has yet to authorize a JCE. However, recognizing the need for a “set of highways” that can move information easily between the public and private sectors, CISA has indicated that it will commence work with relevant agencies to start building the infrastructure for it. Congress should formally establish the JCE by law and then appropriate funds within the FCEB structure — and for the JCE specifically — so that CISA’s efforts can be scaled quickly and progress can be tracked and measured.</p> +<p>There are also other applications for blockchain in the realm of financial inclusion. Pilot projects in the Global South are looking into how blockchain can be used to issue insurance policies, administer payouts to farmers, close credit gaps, and provide a way to save for those who do not have a savings account. For example, moving money is often made expensive due to bank fees. Leaf, a Rwandan-based project, uses blockchain to enable money transfers without banking fees. The Leaf wallet uses the public Stellar blockchain to help people send, save, and transfer money directly from their mobile phone without the need for personal banking history or in-depth financial literacy. Likewise, smart contracts are being used to carry out insurance agreements with African farmers to protect their livelihoods during extreme weather. If a predetermined amount of rain is recorded within 24 hours in the insured farmer’s region, which can result in destruction of crops, the farmer will receive an automated payment. Blockchain technology is increasingly being incorporated into specific finance-related applications while also helping to create global networks of interoperable financial systems.</p> -<p>This type of infrastructure is especially important given the numerous streams of both formal and informal communications stemming from different reporting requirements, and it is imperative that these streams to and from the public and private sectors are brought together in a meaningful way and are analyzed coherently, benefiting from shared insights rather than just shared information.</p> +<h4 id="contending-with-a-proliferation-of-deepfakes">CONTENDING WITH A PROLIFERATION OF DEEPFAKES</h4> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 1.3 (for Congress): Fund an entity to collect, analyze, share, and adequately protect information about cyber statistics.</em></strong></p> +<p>In a rapidly approaching future with generative artificial intelligence and pervasive deepfake technology, it will be imperative for both governments and private consumers of information to be able to discern what is credible. In many respects, this eventuality has already arrived. The health of democracies is uniquely reliant on an informed citizenry. The intentional dissemination of false information, such as propaganda from authoritarian nations and extremist organizations, often aims to obfuscate reality. The need for verifiable information and data is additionally intensified amid the fog of war, when manipulative information operations are pervasive and the accuracy of situational understanding can be a matter of life and death.</p> -<p>CISA should be resourced to host — or assign a third party to host — an anonymized, publicly accessible repository of known incidents and vulnerabilities. The data should be hosted as an application program interface and presented on a public-facing dashboard so that CISA and other outside researchers can analyze the history of cyber incidents while also making projections based on past distributions. Preferably, this dashboard would include information from the public and private sectors so that researchers can have a full picture of the threat landscape. This entity would ideally be housed within and supported by the infrastructure of a larger JCE (see Recommendation 1.2 on funding a JCE).</p> +<p>The use of emerging technologies by state actors for strategic disinformation campaigns is a national security issue. For this reason, the United States adopted its first federal laws related to deepfakes in 2019. The FY 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required a report on the weaponization of deepfake technology by foreign entities and established a competition with a $5 million prize to stimulate research on machine-manipulated media. Such efforts are not preventative but merely raise awareness of the issue at hand. Beyond increasing awareness, InterAction’s Disinformation Toolkit 2.0 notes how some internationally focused organizations are exposing disinformation campaigns, conducting forensic analyses, coordinating with technology companies, providing digital literacy training, and collaborating with global policymakers. This landscape of mounting policy attention and analysis related to disinformation and deepfakes shapes the context in which applications of blockchain technology are finding their footing.</p> -<p>CISA should ensure that it supports agency-level analysis of pooled data alongside reporting at machine speed. CISA should help agencies understand how to tailor their dashboard so that they can better assess risk at the agency level. This could include collaborative planning teams that deploy from CISA to support the agencies most in need. It should also include building in capabilities to increase the speed of analysis and sharing best practices across agencies.</p> +<p>DLT may offer opportunities to counteract the nefarious aims of certain categories of deepfakes. The Starling Lab for Data Integrity is experimenting with innovative applications of blockchain technology and decentralized systems of storage to bolster trust in digital media. The persistence and safety of digital ledgers support the creation of more trustworthy digital assets where details are corroborated by independent third parties acting as notaries public. Decentralized storage pools can guarantee the safekeeping of information for the long term.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 1.4 (for CISA, the ONCD, the OMB, and Congress): Develop a strategy that locks in baseline prices for computing and storage resources for analytics, AI products, and related processing sold to FCEB agencies.</em></strong></p> +<p>News agencies are beginning to explore applications for DLT to better record their reporting and make data, such as the location and date of photographs, permanently accessible. Reuters, for example, has partnered with Canon to develop a professional camera and in-house workflow for photojournalists that freezes and stamps the pixels of a picture the moment a photo is snapped and then registers the photo and corresponding details onto a public blockchain. Especially considering Russia’s propaganda campaigns against Ukraine, blockchain’s potential to verify what information has been altered could be instrumental as authoritarians increasingly deploy gray zone tactics that rely on manipulating the information environment. This verification of alterations only applies to information once it has been stored in a blockchain and cannot account for manipulation prior to that point.</p> -<p>All signs indicate that CISA is exploring how it can use AI technologies, and engage AI companies of all sizes, to advance its mission. As a part of its AI strategy plans, the study team recommends that CISA include three important areas: (1) routine assessments that test the agency’s readiness to deal with AI threats, (2) talent development and upskilling of existing staff to manage AI systems effectively, and (3) coordination with other departments and agencies that are actively thinking of how to work with AI tools and address AI threats (e.g., the DOD’s generative AI and large language models task force, Task Force Lima).</p> +<h4 id="advancing-justice-and-the-rule-of-law">ADVANCING JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW</h4> -<p>But in addition to general plans about how CISA can deal with future AI threats, CISA, the ONCD, the OMB, and Congress should also be actively thinking about how to lock in certain contracts related to common AI tools that might be sold to FCEB agencies. This is uncharted territory, and in order for FCEBs to start proactively thinking about how these tools might fit into their budget, it would be helpful for relevant entities to put down some price points — or at the very least some general guidance — before market pressures drive up the anticipated prices of these tools.</p> +<p>A transparent judicial system is key to the rule of law that undergirds functioning democracies. DLT’s capturing, storing, and verifying of data could be used to better manage court judgments, warrants, and criminal histories. Researchers are exploring blockchain’s ability to corroborate data on several systems as a tool for preserving evidence. The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Justice proposed using DLT to preserve and protect mass quantities of body camera footage to be used in court. Similar applications could be useful for international courts and other human rights watchdogs.</p> -<h4 id="pillar-2-leveraging-and-harmonizing-authorities">Pillar 2: Leveraging and Harmonizing Authorities</h4> +<p>The recent hacking of the computer systems of the International Criminal Court (ICC) raises concerns over the safety of centrally located data that could later be used to prosecute the most serious of crimes. The use of blockchain to store and verify data related to war crimes and atrocities aims to assist the courts by providing more trusted and tamper-resistant data for associated proceedings. Governments or other entities seeking to achieve accountability for large-scale human right abuses or wartime atrocities for the purposes of transitional justice may particularly benefit from the use of blockchain to ensure evidence has not been manipulated and to support chain of custody for documentation of abuse.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.1 (for CISA): Commission an independent report, in coordination with the ONCD, OMB, and NIST, clearly articulating CISA’s roles and responsibilities as the lead for federal network defense.</em></strong></p> +<p>Additionally, “smart contracts,” which automate transactions once the coded conditions are met, could help judicial systems by minimizing disputes, alleviating stress on courts, and making business and government services more efficient.</p> -<p>What does it mean to be the leader of federal network defense, and what are the formal roles that the ONCD, OMB (including federal CISOs), and NIST play in support of this mission? To help all entities involved better appreciate CISA’s role (and its possible limits), it would be helpful for CISA to clearly articulate its current role and what its role could be in the coming years with regard to its FCEB mission. This report should address the mission relative to existing resources and staffing models and identify any key gaps in CISA’s ability to secure the .gov with its current set of authorities and funding.</p> +<h4 id="elevating-citizen-representation-and-voice">ELEVATING CITIZEN REPRESENTATION AND VOICE</h4> -<p>Beyond analyzing CISA’s roles and limitations, CISA leadership should also clearly articulate who holds the burden of risk and accountability. If there are anticipated changes in the coming years — for instance, if CISA is tasked to manage more risk for certain FCEB agencies over others — that too should be explained with a plan for how that transition will take place. The 2023 FISMA reform legislation that is currently working its way through Congress is in part intended to help clarify the roles between these different entities.</p> +<p>According to a 2021 CSIS report, blockchain-based voting systems hold some potential benefits for securing elections, though they also present a range of risks. Generally speaking, blockchain could reduce the risk of election tampering, as such a system would require the collusion of multiple major entities to alter recorded ballots. There may also be potential for the use of blockchain to further augment trust in mobile and internet voting, which can, in turn, result in greater turnout and reduce voter error. Blockchain-backed e-voting could additionally enhance the physical safety of voters and remove certain types of voter coercion associated with in-person polling, although coercion in private settings can also pose a significant problem. Election transparency may be another benefit, as civil society groups could monitor the election results if granted access to the blockchain network and armed with the requisite technical knowledge to understand it. The transparency associated with blockchains also needs to be balanced with privacy rights associated with voters’ abilities to keep their individual voting selection secret. Further possible advantages include stronger resiliency against network disruptions compared to other internet voting schemes, more secure voter registries, and timely election night reporting systems.</p> -<p>There is a larger question here as to whether CISA should eventually move toward a model where it directly manages the entirety of the .gov landscape. There are definitely trade-offs: centralized management would hold CISA accountable for any issues with network security and likely will provide cost savings in the long run, but the counter is that CISA then becomes a central — if not single — point of failure. Further, that model would absolve FCEB leaders of responsibility for their own cyber health, even though they control resources and are responsible for all other aspects of security. Moreover, there are some immediate hurdles in that CISA’s current capabilities are nowhere near those required for such an effort. FCEB agencies are likely to resist this dramatic change. CISA should provide a report describing the pros and cons of this kind of approach, along with its preferred balance of responsibility and the types of roles it hopes to fulfill in the coming years.</p> +<p>While there have not been many pilot projects related to blockchain voting, the Voatz mobile blockchain voting system, used during the 2018 U.S. midterm elections in West Virginia, for example, may have contributed to higher voter turnout on the scale of 3 to 5 percentage points. However, other studies have demonstrated the opposite. For example, in Belgium a similar pilot project resulted in a slightly negative effect on voter turnout. As uses of blockchain expand, there is also increased attention to theoretical applications of blockchain to voting. For example, the concept of liquid democracy, a modern and flexible approach to direct democracy with implications for referendums, voting proxies, and mass-scale voting, could be propelled by blockchain to help verify that votes cast are the same as votes counted.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.2 (for Congress): Designate CISA as the agency to which U.S. government departments and agencies should report a major cyber incident.</em></strong></p> +<p>One key challenge is that although blockchain may help with the prevention of some ballot tampering, election systems and platforms are still dependent on other hardware and software that may make them vulnerable to exploitation that is difficult or even impossible to control. Therefore, at a fundamental level, blockchain is not a silver bullet for solving the insecurity of online voting.</p> -<p>Centralized reporting is an essential part of ensuring that all stakeholders have the necessary intelligence about a given incident. While different departments and agencies might still have roles related to certain aspects of the response (e.g., the FBI will maintain primary investigative authority), CISA can still be mandated as the lead entity to which FCEB agencies should report cyber incidents. A central reporting structure will aid in intelligence gathering and providing actionable information back out to the FCEB agencies, as well as their critical infrastructure partners, to include the NSA Cyber Collaboration Center.</p> +<h3 id="the-ukrainian-context">The Ukrainian Context</h3> -<p>The Cyber Incident Reporting Council recently delivered a report to Congress outlining suggestions to align reporting requirements and proposing model language for private entities. The report highlights an often-overlooked basic principle that starts with defining “reportable cyber incidents” to establish a consistent definition; this definition should be adopted as a model, which also includes language to be amendable by CISA. Regarding FCEB reporting, there is merit in establishing a common definition for use across FCEB agencies. The next step is to organize reporting under a single, modular forum that captures sufficient data fields — while being amendable if FCEB agencies do not have the proper legal authorities to share but can still leverage such a forum. This will help reduce duplication in individual FCEB processes for reporting and remove additional resource burdens. It is then on CISA to prioritize and coordinate the dissemination of the incidents across relevant stakeholders.</p> +<p>Ukraine, sitting at the cutting edge of the digital revolution, offers a unique context that is experimenting in the digital and blockchain space.</p> -<p>There is also a need to harmonize federal information sharing and communication back to the private sector. CISA and the FBI need to create a plan to coordinate sharing information back to those who report. If the FBI uses information from CISA and has knowledge of the information originators or victims, the latter groups must be informed. Further, it should be made clear that reported cyber threat information in CIRCIA is shielded from use by other agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, as an investigation by such a body was not a stated purpose in the construction of CIRCIA. Done correctly, this data should be pooled and accessible in a dashboard that allows tailored data analytics across the FCEB space. This capability creates a requirement to ensure CISA has filled key billets in incident response, data analytics, and collaborative planning and risk management.</p> +<h4 id="technological-readiness">TECHNOLOGICAL READINESS</h4> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.3 (for FCEB agencies): Elevate conversations about cybersecurity and network security to leadership levels within the FCEB agencies.</em></strong></p> +<p>Ukraine’s information and communications technology (ICT) industry was immensely successful before Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, with some dubbing it the “emerging tiger of Europe.” In fact, despite challenges posed by the war, it is the only sector of the Ukrainian economy that has grown amid the conflict, exhibiting growing export volumes from 2021 to 2022. The Ukrainian government has also proactively not drafted IT workers as soldiers and has extended tax breaks to small and medium-sized businesses in the industry. These measures have allowed ICT businesses to stay solvent and continue operating and exporting services. The challenges Ukraine is facing are in many ways unique, but this also means that it can serve as a breeding ground for unique innovations. Equipped with over 200,000 skilled IT workers and the demand for creative solutions due to the war, Ukraine is primed to rapidly test technologies.</p> -<p>Culturally, federal and private sector CISOs are asked to manage cybersecurity, while CEOs and FCEB leads are tasked with managing the larger entity and ensuring it is functioning properly and able to conduct mission-essential functions. Too often, leaders view these functions as separate, siloed tasks. However, there is a case to be made that today’s cyber threats challenge a business or an FCEB agency’s ability to carry out its basic functions. As such, one of two things (or preferably both) need to happen: (1) cybersecurity conversations need to be elevated to higher leadership levels within an FCEB agency, and (2) CISOs need to be empowered to better lead and manage cybersecurity as a core function of the organization. It should not just be the case that the CISO is the point person if there is an incident. Accountability needs to reside at higher levels within an FCEB agency, and that starts with elevating the importance of cybersecurity. Just like “enterprise security” has become a core tenet in the private sector — particularly the financial sector — that mindset needs to pervade FCEB agencies as well.</p> +<p>Ukraine demonstrated its technological adaptability with the embrace of cryptocurrency in early fundraising efforts when banks lacked liquidity following Russia’s full-scale invasion. MoneyGram halted payments to Ukraine until it could confirm its banking partners in the country were operational. The Ukrainian government, ranked fourth globally for cryptocurrency adoption, began publicly soliciting cryptocurrency donations online days after the invasion. Cryptocurrency’s capability to facilitate transactions instantly across borders was attractive for the nation as it entered total war. At least 20 million dollars in cryptocurrency were deposited directly to the Ukrainian government in the first months of the war.</p> -<p>To support this effort, CISA should explore forming collaborative planning teams that support CISOs across the FCEB landscape. These planning teams could help with risk assessments, budget analysis, and how best to communicate cyber risks to agency leadership. Ensuring CISA has a large enough cyber workforce to support collaborative planning teams is a key component of defending the .gov.</p> +<p>Ukraine had more mobile phone subscriptions than people in 2020, but the war has damaged the digital infrastructure necessary for mobile subscriptions to be operable. Since Russia’s invasion, more than 4,000 Ukrainian telecommunication stations have been seized or destroyed and over 60,000 kilometers of fiber-optic lines have been compromised. The restoration of many lost towers can be attributed to the bravery of Ukrainian telecommunication workers. The public-private partnership between the Department of Defense and SpaceX’s Starlink has enabled battlefield communications at the cost of approximately $20 million per month. Without investments in digital infrastructure, all digital solutions, including those involving blockchain, are futile.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.4 (for CISA and Congress): Identify a more visible and practical role for CISA in FCEB ZTA implementation.</em></strong></p> +<h4 id="commitment-to-digitization">COMMITMENT TO DIGITIZATION</h4> -<p>When it comes to federal migration to ZTA, the OMB plays a guiding and assessing role, the National Security Council and the ONCD play coordinating roles, and CISA plays an enabling role. More than anything else, CISA provides general resource materials on issues such as best practices that can be used by FCEB agencies to aid in their migration efforts. But CISA could be tasked and resourced to provide more hands-on assistance with implementation.</p> +<p>Digitization is synonymous with resiliency, a characteristic often ascribed to Ukraine in its battle against Russia. Prior to the war, Ukraine committed to going paperless in September 2021 with a bill prohibiting officials from requiring paper documents. The bill was the latest advancement in digitization following the successful experimentation with electronic identification cards and international passports by the application Diia. Ukraine had issued nearly a million biometric travel passports to Ukrainian citizens in the Russian-controlled Donbas region before the war. Diia, a premier government application used by half of Ukraine’s population, offers an expanding list of digital documents, including identification cards, driver’s licenses, and Covid-19 vaccination certificates. In a unique blend of entertainment and education, Diia has trained almost 1.5 million citizens in digital skills through over 90 free-to-access educational series based on European standards. Given the wartime reliance on social services, digitization efforts have accelerated since the war’s outbreak. Kostiantyn Koshelenko, deputy minister of social policy for digital transformation, recently expressed his commitment to making government services more resilient and client oriented. Applying to be a candidate for child adoption, for example, is now an online government service in Ukraine. The Ministry of Digital Transformation’s mission to “move 100% of government services online” is a core element of Ukraine’s war strategy and a key ingredient for large-scale utilization of blockchain-enabled applications.</p> -<p>Not to overextend CISA, but there is an opportunity for the agency to have some designated experts that can further elaborate on the points outlined in the ZTA guidance. Even if it is not possible to detail ZTA subject matter experts to the FCEB agencies, at a minimum CISA can identify outside contractors and experts that might be able to fill this advisory role. CISA can also work with outside groups to conduct studies on ZTA migration-related IT and OT disruptions and advise FCEB agencies on how to address these issues as they arise. Collaborative planning teams again provide a possible framework, with CISA deploying support to agencies as they manage the ZTA transition.</p> +<h4 id="applications-of-blockchain">APPLICATIONS OF BLOCKCHAIN</h4> -<p>An even more radical approach would be to fund CISA as a core aspect of their CDM next-generation approach to provide a centralized “Zero Trust Center of Excellence,” with close coordination with NIST and the OMB, to guide FCEB agencies along a zero trust architecture, roadmap, and implementation plan. While centralized, it should be tailored to the priorities and unique aspects of each agency or component. Again, collaborative planning teams — if sufficiently staffed — could play a critical role in supporting CISOs across the FCEB landscape. CISA collaborative planning teams could be deployed to agencies identified as needing assistance and bring with them expert insights on how best to implement new ZTA guidelines. In this line, CISA can establish a shared services environment similar to the Defense Information Systems Agency’s Thunderdome, where agencies that are not well resourced can access integrated capabilities to increase their zero trust maturity. Regardless of the approach, the transition will be complex. There is no master list of all federal systems online at any one time, and each agency will likely have varying rates of adding new systems and even cloud services that complicate implementation. This complexity is why CISA should analyze its current staffing levels and consider building collaborative planning teams.</p> +<p>Supported by a government that has trumpeted digitization as critical to the country’s future, Ukraine and its partners have combined blockchain technology and photogrammetry to counter disinformation and to document and preserve evidence of Russian war crimes. E-Enemy, for example, is a government-built app that allows users to photograph and geolocate any attacks, thereby providing a first-person perspective of atrocities for posterity and eliminating the potency of deepfakes. War crimes investigators can then “hash” data on war crimes, thereby enabling future prosecution of these heinous acts. Starling Lab, a joint Stanford University–USC Shoah Foundation research center, in partnership with social enterprise Hala Systems, has been preserving possible evidence of Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine via a cryptographic dossier. The aforementioned hacking of the ICC combined with Russia’s espionage efforts to covertly infiltrate the court hint at the urgent need to ensure greater protection for evidence of war crimes.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.5 (for CISA and Congress): Develop tailored metrics to measure the progress and integration of new tools.</em></strong></p> +<p>Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky himself has noted the importance of digitizing all accounting of military supplies, an effort that could potentially benefit from blockchain technology. Furthermore, the UN Refugee Agency was awarded the Best Impact Project Award during the 2023 Paris Blockchain Week for a pilot project in Ukraine where it used blockchain to provide financial assistance to displaced people; this assistance could be converted into cash and used for rent, food, utilities, and medical expenses.</p> -<p>As mentioned earlier in this report, there is a need for more creative metrics to measure actual progress with CISA’s cyber services to FCEB agencies. For CISA, the challenge is to identify internal metrics that can realistically show progress without unintentionally overburdening FCEB agencies, as well as to measure security outcomes more holistically than simple program outputs.</p> +<h4 id="property-registration-and-blockchain">PROPERTY REGISTRATION AND BLOCKCHAIN</h4> -<p>Moving forward, the metrics should focus on not only the progress of individual tools and processes (e.g., the progress of implementing the tools and separately measuring how these tools enhance cybersecurity), but also CISA’s ability to integrate new capabilities with preexisting tools. The more clearly defined the metrics, the easier it will be to hold CISA accountable for what it is uniquely authorized to accomplish.</p> +<p>Digital solutions for Ukraine’s economic modernization and resilience go beyond the more obvious war effort. Some of the first Ukrainian pilot projects using blockchain were electronic land auctions. In May 2017, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine formally agreed to implement blockchain to help manage the State Register of Property Rights on Real Estate as well as the System of Electronic Trading in Arrested Property. A complaint of foreign investors is that land ownership is still not a possibility in Ukraine given current laws. Legal reform is needed to change this reality, and there is an argument that Kyiv should amend its laws to inspire foreign investors to participate in the country’s economic recovery. This demand may incentivize the Ukrainian government to further explore incorporating blockchain technology in land registration.</p> -<p>Moreover, as CISA collects feedback from FCEB agencies, the research team encourages it to formally leave space for narrative responses as to why certain FCEB agencies either have not met a certain goal or are actively not planning to, and how they plan to mitigate the risk in alternative ways. If certain metrics are focused on outcomes, FCEBs should be given room to more fully explain how they are meeting security goals in ways other than what is recommended or otherwise required by CISA.</p> +<h3 id="additional-considerations-and-challenges">Additional Considerations and Challenges</h3> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.6 (for CISA and Congress): Dedicate after-action reviews to better understand progress and issues related to CDM.</em></strong></p> +<p>Despite the benefits of blockchain for advancing democratic institutions, the technology is clearly a neutral tool and can be used by good actors as well as malign ones. There are some underlying concerns regarding the risks that DLT systems pose for democracy.</p> -<p>Related to the need for better metrics in general, every interviewee had very specific but varied feedback on the CDM program, highlighting a need for a formal lessons-learned or after-action process and better metrics for measuring progress with CDM. With new project developments set to take place in the coming months and years, CISA (at the request of Congress) should be prepared to (1) highlight challenges with implementation, (2) outline results or the efficacy of CDM once implemented, and (3) propose realistic next steps for CDM as it relates to specific departments or agencies.</p> +<h4 id="malign-foreign-activity">MALIGN FOREIGN ACTIVITY</h4> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.7 (for CISA): Identify a way to effectively engage in the mis- and disinformation discourse.</em></strong></p> +<p>Foreign actors are known to use blockchain technology for adversarial activity against the United States and its partners. For example, Russia has attempted to use the anonymity associated with some cryptocurrencies to bypass sanctions. The terrorist organization Hamas and two other militant groups — Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah — have also used cryptocurrency to evade sanctions in order to raise funds for their notorious terrorist attacks. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad raised more than $100 million via cryptocurrency between August 2021 and June 2023.</p> -<p>For reasons outlined earlier in this study, the federal government has struggled to find a meaningful and appropriate role in addressing mis- and disinformation. Cyber operations can and have been used to further information operations that impact CISA’s mission. Elections come to mind as an immediate example, but there is also cyber-enabled disinformation that can lead to the sabotaging of electric and communications facilities, for example, or that undermine trust in public institutions and objective information put out by the federal government. At the same time, the issue can create a perception of government overreach that makes it difficult to create an objective policy debate around a core national security challenge.</p> +<p>It is not clear, however, how much longer cryptocurrency will be thought of as a safe haven for illicit behavior since Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are more traceable than other forms of payment. Investigators have been able to quickly identify and prosecute criminal activity through logged cryptocurrency transactions. For example, within days of the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned two senior Hamas officials along with cryptocurrency exchange Buy Cash Money and Money Transfer Company, as well as six other individuals involved in the financial operation to fund terrorism. Additionally, the arrest of the perpetrators behind the 2016 Bitfinex hack, in which 119,754 bitcoins were stolen, was only possible, in large part, thanks to the immutable ledger that undergirds Bitcoin. (It is important to note, however, that blockchain’s traceability is irrelevant without oversight.)</p> -<p>While this issue is larger than CISA, the agency has a role. As a first step, it might make sense for CISA, perhaps through the CSRB, to formally study recent incidents of high-profile cyber and cyber-enabled disinformation campaigns. The committee could then come back with a series of recommendations for how CISA and other entities might most appropriately be involved in understanding and addressing the risks that misinformation poses to CISA’s mission moving forward. As part of this effort, the CSRB may need subpoena authority.</p> +<h4 id="accessibility">ACCESSIBILITY</h4> -<p>Additionally, CISA should consider working with outside researchers to develop training exercises and workshops for FCEB employees that teach them about threats related to mobile device management and walk them through plans for addressing these issues. Most important is to ensure that federal agencies understand how mis- and disinformation, especially when enabled by cyber operations, have the potential to undermine the provision of public goods through cyberspace. These efforts will almost certainly include addressing computational propaganda designed to smear individuals and institutions.</p> +<p>The accessibility of blockchain technology to the public is also a concern. Whether due to lack of technological familiarity, high expenses, or lack of the necessary equipment to facilitate participation, many communities across the globe are not in a position to use blockchain, which in turn limits democratic participation via DLT systems. Citizens need smartphones and reliable internet access to participate. Digital literacy is another aspect of the divide preventing massive rollout of blockchain-backed government solutions, as technology often faces obstacles to adoption and may be cumbersome, particularly for those who lack digital skills. Tech companies and government entities should collaborate to ensure that such tools are accessible and user friendly. The barrier of entry for users must be lowered before scaling is possible.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.8 (for CISA): Develop risk strategies that accompany ONCD and OMB financial planning for the FCEB agencies.</em></strong></p> +<h4 id="lack-of-accountability-and-selective-data">LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND SELECTIVE DATA</h4> -<p>In theory, FCEB cyber budgets are coordinated with the ONCD and OMB. But in the longer budget-approval process, essential line-item requests are deprioritized, underfunded, or completely stricken from the final budgets that are ultimately approved by FCEB leadership, the OMB, or Congress. To help federal CISOs and CIOs more effectively advocate for larger cyber budgets, CISA should consider developing risk profiles that accompany the budget plans. In a sense, these risk assessments would highlight what types of risk an FCEB agency might incur if certain tools or services were not adequately funded. Additionally, CISA, in partnership with FCEB entities, could map out how different types of tools might serve an agency’s larger security strategy and support its overall mission, as opposed to looking at tools as one-off fixes to address cyber concerns. Not only can these risk profiles be used to help FCEB agencies advocate for necessary funding, but they can also be used by the executive branch to compare different FCEB agencies.</p> +<p>Without proper reform, blockchain runs the risk of merely reinforcing the status quo. What prevents corrupt regimes from allowing only state-approved, potentially faulty information to be entered onto a blockchain? Is blockchain the next tool to be used by oppressive regimes to fabricate transparent democracy? For example, since 2018, China has permitted the use of blockchain-stored evidence in the country’s courts, which may actually be a worrying development given the fact that China, an authoritarian regime, can be very selective with which data to store.</p> -<p>The White House could consider some sort of ranking system whereby the leaders from low-scoring FCEB agencies have to meet periodically with a designated White House leader to explain (1) why their scores are so low, and (2) what plans they have in place to improve their risk score. Whatever method is adopted, it will have to incentivize CISOs from across the FCEB landscape to participate.</p> +<h4 id="energy-consumption">ENERGY CONSUMPTION</h4> -<p>Risk profiles should leverage the granular visibility that CDM has into agency enterprise in a way that is both (1) at object level, so that it can be tied to specific agency components and systems, and (2) near real time (i.e., machine speed) where possible. Second, these profiles can be linked together to provide actionable and contextualized risk recommendations at both the policy and algorithm level (i.e., CDM’s AWARE risk algorithm). Here again, CISA could deploy collaboration planning teams and experts to help agencies manage risk, including integrating their risk management strategies with tailored dashboards, ZTA implementation plans, and budget submissions.</p> +<p>Blockchain technology traditionally has had a reputation of being highly energy intensive. Though there has been some progress on this front — and the high energy use is mainly attributed to cryptocurrency — there remain environmental concerns regarding the technology due to its carbon footprint as well as the affordability of energy in specific communities. However, there is hope that the technology will become more efficient, based on analysis showing that with different technological design options, digital currencies can be configured in a manner that is more energy efficient than popular current payment systems like credit and debit cards.</p> -<h4 id="pillar-3-enhancing-communication-and-coordination-with-key-stakeholders">Pillar 3: Enhancing Communication and Coordination with Key Stakeholders</h4> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.1 (for CISA): Develop a public campaign to promote CISA’s role as the lead for federal network defense.</em></strong></p> +<p>As the world increasingly overflows with data, U.S. policymakers should consider how to best utilize blockchain and other types of DLT to support democratic governance, including identity management, land rights, and the tracking of goods and services. If U.S. lawmakers do not take greater steps to shape the policy and regulatory environment for blockchain-related activity, there is also a risk of damage to U.S. competitiveness. Policymakers should explore new ways democracies can preserve and advance their principles while more efficiently delivering basic government services. At the same time, blockchain must be viewed neither as a panacea nor as solely an instrument of cryptocurrencies. It is a tool that offers intriguing applications for social and governmental progress.</p> -<p>As an agency, CISA has worked hard to establish a recognizable brand, particularly with the private sector. CISA has a very visible social media presence and can be lauded for putting out periodic updates (such as its first two strategic plans) on where it hopes to go in the coming years. However, there is room for CISA to be more coordinated in its marketing, especially with regard to services offered to FCEB agencies.</p> +<p>Before proceeding with policy decisions related to blockchain technology, Congress should be equipped with knowledge of how exactly the technology can be applied (or misapplied), and make sure that the populations who are meant to benefit from these technologies are also fluent in their use and have access to the necessary digital public infrastructure. This will allow lawmakers to create a broader system and approach in dealing with DLT so that its benefits can be instrumentalized in service of democratic governance.</p> -<p>From cleaning up its website (and deleting outdated content) to creating a more intentional rhythm for periodic updates with an updated service catalog specifically for FCEB agencies, CISA could benefit from simplifying its messaging. This will also be helpful for FCEB agencies to better understand the full suite of current CISA offerings.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Related to this, interviewees noted that some of CISA’s programs, such as CDM, could benefit from more positive communications about success stories and upward trending metrics. These stories can paint a picture that the process is working and that FCEB agencies would be well served by participating to the fullest extent possible.</p> +<p><strong>Noam Unger</strong> is the director of the Sustainable Development and Resilience Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and a senior fellow with the Project on Prosperity and Development.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.2 (for CISA): Establish a framework for more consistent coordination with SRMAs, information sharing and analysis centers, and other activities with regard to FCEB protection.</em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Austin Hardman</strong> is a research assistant for the Project on Prosperity and Development (PPD) at CSIS. In this role, he supports the team’s research agenda, business development opportunities, and event coordination.</p> -<p>One of the comments that came up in private sector interviews is that there are networks and entities that already work with CISA in other capacities that can likely be more plugged-in to support CISA’s FCEB mission. While this might already be inherently baked into CISA’s plans, it might help for CISA to formally map out its existing stakeholders and clearly identify how each can specifically support CISA’s FCEB mission.</p> +<p><strong>Ilya Timtchenko</strong> is an intern with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.</p>Noam Unger, et al.In a world increasingly overflowing with data, blockchain is neither a panacea nor solely an instrument of cryptocurrencies but rather a tool that offers intriguing applications to support democratic governance, including in Ukraine.CISA’s Evolving .gov Mission2023-10-23T12:00:00+08:002023-10-23T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/cisas-evolving-.gov-mission<p><em>This report delves into critical cybersecurity issues and offers insightful analysis for policymakers and the public.</em></p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.3 (for CISA): Provide sector-specific cybersecurity guidance, especially for low-security sectors with “soft targets.”</em></strong></p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Gaps in CISA support across the 16 critical sectors and FCEB agencies exist not out of willfulness or lack of direction but due to inherent limitations driven by budget constraints, staff bandwidth, and talent availability. However, it is likely that CISA will continue to acquire, train, and retain talent and grow to meet the expanding cyber picture. What CISA could do in the short term is review the 16 critical infrastructure sectors on a triannual basis to assess and prioritize three to five “soft target” sectors. In this manner, at a minimum CISA will assist these sectors to improve their cyber resilience, conserving staff bandwidth and prioritizing the entities and agencies that need the most help. This tiered approach could help CISA defend the .gov while it grows its capabilities and talent. The approach also lends itself to generating and deploying collaborating planning teams that focus on integrating risk management with budgets and strategy at the agency level.</p> +<h3 id="foreword">Foreword</h3> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.4 (for CISA): Host a database of shared service offerings for FCEB agencies.</em></strong></p> +<p>This project is about service. It brings together a unique mix of public and private sector voices that cut across industries, political parties, and generations. There are lawyers, soldiers, professors, law enforcement professionals, and former senior appointees and intelligence officers. This diverse group is held together by a commitment to securing cyberspace as a public common where people from all walks of life can prosper.</p> -<p>CISA’s website already advertises cyber services offered by the Departments of Justice, Transportation, and Health and Human Services. It also mentions that there are efforts in progress aimed at vetting other services and providers that will be included on the website at a later date. Whether by CISA or some other entity, it should be a priority that one of the shared service providers manage a public database that clearly outlines which departments and agencies are current providers and what their specific offerings are.</p> +<p>The members of the task force and research team see twenty-first-century service as helping democratic governments protect the right of free people to exchange goods and ideas through digital networks. Economic, social, and political worlds exist within cyberspace, and the U.S. government has a special obligation to protect them all. These same networks also form key pathways for the provision of the public goods and services that support modern life.</p> -<p>CISA might even consider hosting an annual or biannual consortium of federal shared service providers to discuss best practices, share insights, and discuss current gaps, among other activities. Given CISA’s authorities and reach, the agency is in a strong position to host this sort of convening. This forum would also offer an opportunity to introduce agencies to collaborative planning teams or other services that CISA provides to support defending the .gov.</p> +<p>Over 100 agencies comprising the federal civilian executive branch (FCEB) rely on cyberspace to execute their critical functions. That means that over 330 million people in the United States rely on cyberspace for more than social media. They rely on it for basic services such as food and housing assistance. They rely on it for processing student loans. They rely on it for registering patents and starting new businesses. And they rely on it for supporting research labs that are working on new vaccines and clean energy breakthroughs.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.5 (for CISA): Explain the value add of the JCDC to FCEB agencies (separate from the value add for the private sector).</em></strong></p> +<p>A commitment to help develop new strategies for securing cyberspace is what brought the members of this project’s task force and research team together. Many have worked on finding ways to balance liberty and security in cyberspace since the 1990s. In 2019, members worked to shape the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act and the creation of the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC). Those core members served on the CSC and CSC 2.0 and developed a total of 116 recommendations. Many of these recommendations have either already been implemented, such as the creation of the Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD), or are nearing implementation.</p> -<p>The JCDC continues to provide value for public and private entities alike and has already had some early successes. Moving forward, it could be helpful for FCEB agencies writ large to have clearer direction on the value that the JCDC can have for their respective agencies. Moreover, FCEB agencies should be more aware of which organizations comprise the JCDC, along with why and how their individual needs are being addressed by the select FCEB leaders represented in the group.</p> +<p>Still, the job was not finished. In 2022, Cory Simpson — the former lead for helping the CSC think about future and emerging threats — started a dialogue with a network of businesses and senior U.S. government officials on the challenge of securing the FCEB agencies. Based on the new offices and laws recommended by the CSC and ultimately implemented by Congress and the executive branch, along with key executive orders such as May 2021’s Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity and the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy, there was significant momentum to protect the provision of public goods. At the same time, daily new reports of massive data breaches, ransomware attacks, and threats of using cyberspace to hold Americans hostage during a conflict with China have revealed the magnitude of the challenge ahead. As the CEO and founder of Gray Space Strategies, a strategic advisory firm, Simpson heard from both government officials and private sector firms that they still felt vulnerable.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.6 (for CISA): Prioritize (and communicate) system integration when rolling out new capabilities and programs.</em></strong></p> +<p>This dialogue prompted him to work with Booz Allen Hamilton to reimagine federal network security and resilience. With its support, Gray Space Strategies hired a network of academic and policy researchers to study the balance of threats to federal networks outside of defense and intelligence agencies. The team conducted interviews and mapped out the history of cybersecurity initiatives. As part of this larger research effort, Gray Space Strategies reached out to Solarium alumni at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and sponsored the creation of an independent task force that led to this study.</p> -<p>One of the identified gaps in CISA’s services is that, at a minimum, there is an outside perception that CISA’s tools and services are distinct lines of effort. It is not clear that information and best practices are being consistently shared between platforms. In many ways, this a hard issue for CISA to address, especially given that some of the services offered predate CISA and might have previously operated under different parts of the DHS or other agencies altogether. In other words, when developed, some of these services were not intentionally designed to be integrated with other tools and services.</p> +<p>The net result is in the following pages. The task force and research team built on the work of Gray Space Strategies and conducted over 30 interviews with a mix of federal and private sector chief information security officers (CISOs) and other technical and policy professionals who work every day behind the scenes to deliver public and private goods through cyberspace. Based on these interviews and baseline research, the research team developed a tabletop exercise to illuminate future threats almost certain to challenge FCEB agencies in the near future. Through six expert tabletop exercise sessions held in the summer of 2023 and a parallel online version with 1,000 members of the U.S. general public, the research team was able to see how both experts and the populace see future threats and assess the capability and capacity of the U.S. government to secure cyberspace.</p> -<p>CISA does appear to be actively trying to address this issue, notably by having CADS serve as a data repository that collects information from these various points. However, as CISA continues to make promises on scaling up, modernizing, and generally updating its capabilities, it needs to more intentionally map out and communicate how these lines of effort work within existing programs. The lack of such planning could lead to problems down the road, as well as potential visibility gaps.</p> +<p>What the task force and research team found is that increasing resources is necessary to meeting the challenge at hand, but it is insufficient. The U.S. government has increased funding for cybersecurity and created new agencies and authorities but still struggles with resourcing strategies that align budgets against risks. The good news is that new initiatives and funding are extending the ability of key players in the federal government to secure the FCEB landscape. The bad news is that processes and procedures still need to catch up to create unity of effort. And time is not on the United States’ side.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.7 (for all): Operate with a clear understanding of what it means to have resilient networks and processes.</em></strong></p> +<p>Adversaries see better returns from attacking the United States through cyberspace relative to the cost and risk of a more direct confrontation. Perversely, it is easier for them to target critical infrastructure and the basic goods and services offered by the U.S. federal government than it is to shut down the Pentagon or hunt spies online. There is an increasing chance that a major geopolitical crisis becomes a form for digital hostage-taking, with authoritarian states seeking to disrupt FCEB agencies as a way of signaling the risks of escalation to U.S. politicians and the public. This logic flips decades of strategy on its head and makes countervalue targeting — holding innocent civilians at risk — the preferred gambit for authoritarians. The old logic of focusing on counterforce targeting and narrowing hostilities to military forces to preserve space for diplomacy and avoid a broader war may be starting to crumble.</p> -<p>Cybersecurity is an exercise in risk management, not risk elimination. While that might be something that CISA, some of the more cyber mature FCEB agencies, and federal CISOs are aware of, it is not a clearly understood concept across the board. In its larger public awareness campaigns, it is important that CISA not only call out the importance of resilience by name but actually define in practical terms what that means for an FCEB agency with regard to its federal network and processes.</p> +<p>In other words, cybersecurity is not just about force reassurance and protecting defense and intelligence assets during a crisis. It comes down to people. Denying adversaries the ability to hold Americans hostage in cyberspace is now a core national interest. Unlike traditional threats, this denial strategy is not owned by generals and appointees in the Pentagon. It is coordinated by the ONCD and executed by a mix of federal agencies and private sector companies still working to align their priorities and budgets to secure cyberspace.</p> -<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.8 (for CISA): Explicitly promote transparency as a way of achieving greater resilience.</em></strong></p> +<p>At the center of this strategy is the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and its evolving mission to make civilian government networks (i.e., .gov websites) more secure and resilient. New funding and authorities envision continuous diagnostics and mitigation (CDM) applications standing watch across the .gov ecosystem. These guards are extensions of a complex web of agencies, including the National Institute of Standards (NIST), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the ONCD, all working to coordinate security priorities, technology standards, and budget submissions. On the ground, each FCEB agency has a chief information security officer (CISO) constantly negotiating with their agency leadership about imposing cyber hygiene measures and gauging how much money to dedicate to purchasing approved CDM applications and other cybersecurity efforts. Put simply, each of these agencies has to budget both for defending against national security risks and for their statutory requirements to provide unique goods and services. They face rising costs and uneasy choices given the labyrinth of new resources and authorities coming online. In other words, they need help.</p> -<p>The ubiquity of data coupled with today’s advancements in cyber technology mean that it will be impossible for FCEB agencies, even after implementing all appropriate safeguards, to assume that sensitive information will not be compromised. With that in mind, CISA can use its platform to more intentionally — via guidance documents and planning manuals — tie the value of transparency to greater resilience for FCEB agencies. In other words, it can highlight why operating with transparency can provide greater resilience and result in less reliance on sensitive information.</p> +<p>And service starts with helping those most in need. In the pages that follow, the task force and research team offer a list of recommendations intended to start a broader dialogue between the branches of government and the U.S. people about how best to defend cyberspace. The report is intended to serve as the start of a dialogue about how to best align ends, ways, and means. The strength of a democracy is its willingness to solve problems in the public square through debate. It is the task force’s hope that the recommendations below contribute to ongoing discussions around how CISA in particular can play a useful role in securing cyberspace.</p> -<p>Beyond that, CISA can promote transparency across a number of other lines of effort: in incident reporting, in opening networks for outside researchers under careful bug bounty programs to find weaknesses, among the vendor community in coming forward with vulnerabilities in products, and between government and industry with regard to sharing vulnerabilities, among many other efforts.</p> +<h3 id="executive-summary">Executive Summary</h3> -<p>Transparency, as it relates to cybersecurity, is not something FCEB agencies will necessarily invest in or prioritize, but CISA can lead the way in providing actionable recommendations for how to operate in this type of environment.</p> +<p>Over the last 40 years, the United States has made progress in securing cyberspace, but its federal networks remain vulnerable to attacks by state and non-state actors. Malign actors can hold the United States hostage by disrupting the ability of the federal government to provide basic services and public goods the country relies on for everything from food to economic growth to cutting-edge research. Beyond the battlefield, the “.gov” — federal civilian executive branch (FCEB) agency — networks remain a critical requirement for American prosperity as well as a crucial vulnerability. Absent renewed efforts to secure these networks, the United States will remain at risk of cost imposition and political warfare in cyberspace.</p> -<h4 id="other-ideas">Other Ideas</h4> +<p>To address this challenge, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) formed a task force of former senior appointees, cybersecurity experts, and private sector chief information security officers (CISOs) to study the past, present, and future of securing the .gov. After a six-month study that involved interviews with federal and private sector CISOs, six tabletop exercises, and a survey of 1,000 members of the general U.S. public, CSIS found that resources alone were insufficient to address the magnitude of the challenge. The U.S. government needs better planning frameworks and coordination mechanisms to work across the diverse mix of agencies within the federal executive branch. Actors such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) play a leading role but need to find ways to better leverage existing authorities to coordinate resources and risk management across over 100 federal executive agencies. As long as these agencies maintain separate budgets and personnel for managing cybersecurity, it creates inherent planning and coordination challenges. While new reporting requirements and capabilities are coming online, for continuous diagnostics and mitigation (CDM) and threat hunt, the mission to secure the .gov is not finished. Planning and new response frameworks will need to follow that enable a more robust and fully staffed CISA to work alongside the CISOs in over 100 federal executive agencies to safeguard American prosperity. This long-term planning must include coordinated budgets and strategy with agencies and other key actors such as the Office of Management of Budget (OMB) and the Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) alongside synchronizing incident response across the whole of government.</p> -<p>While the task force had broad agreement on the recommendations above, several other ideas emerged over the course of the study that either did not achieve consensus or were beyond the scope of the current effort. Below, the core research team captured the aspects most relevant to generating a larger dialogue about how to secure the .gov.</p> +<p>Based on this study, the task force recommends changes to how the U.S. government resources cybersecurity, executes existing authorities, and creates opportunities and incentives to coordinate across over 100 federal executive agencies. Put bluntly, money is not enough to defend the .gov. The U.S. government needs to do a better job of planning, coordinating, and communicating the risks associated with cyberattacks against federal executive agencies. This will likely require consistent staffing at CISA and exploring new service models such as creating collaborative planning teams that deploy to help agencies develop cyber risk strategies and tailored dashboards to monitor their networks.</p> -<p><strong>WORKFORCE</strong></p> +<p>At the same time, the study surfaced ideas about a number of more contentious but important reforms that warrant further debate. First, the ability of the federal government to attract, train, and retain cybersecurity professionals is a national security issue. Until agencies such as CISA are fully staffed and the federal government has a larger cyber workforce, the ability to defend the .gov is diminished. Second, emerging capabilities like artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have the potential to revolutionize cyber defense but also to create new threat vectors. Agencies such as CISA will have to work alongside current AI/ML strategy efforts to ensure the .gov is ready for an entirely new character of cyberspace. Third, there could be a larger economy of scale to pooling cyber defense resources across federal agencies and creating a more centralized defensive strategy similar to the evolution of the Department of Defense Information Networks (DODIN). Finally, inflation has the potential to complicate resourcing for cybersecurity. Long-term planning efforts will have to ensure that there are mechanisms in place to adapt to sudden changes in prices associated with updating CDM and threat hunt capabilities.</p> -<p>While progress is being made in the cyber workforce, it is not yet clear whether current efforts are sufficient, given enduring challenges associated with the issue. The new National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy (NCWES) is certainly a step in the right direction that looks at the problem holistically. The strategy acknowledges the need for hiring and pay flexibility, but it is not immediately clear how to create the type of incentive pay required to attract and retain talent, much less who should pay for additional personnel costs. Leaving over 100 federal agencies to pick up the tab risks creating “haves” and “have nots” because of internal budget challenges that accrue as they pay for approved CDM suites alongside expanded pay incentives for a cyber workforce.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>There are also significant communication issues associated with ensuring that current and prospective members of the cyber workforce understand which federal benefits they can take advantage of. According to the strategy, “in fiscal year 2019, only 320 IT Specialists out of the more than 84,000 eligible benefited from student loan repayments. As a second example, critical pay authority is currently available for 800 positions, and only 47 have been used (data provided by [the Office of Personnel Management]).” In addition, even when agencies grant additional authorizations to increase pay, the implementation can lag. According to the strategy, “the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General have been granted the authority (by sec. 401 of the Abolish Trafficking Reauthorization Act of 2022, Public L. No. 117-347, 136 Stat. 6199 (2023)) to provide increased incentive pay to DHS and Department of Justice employees identified as possessing cyber skills. As of this writing, these authorities have not yet been implemented.”</p> +<p>Despite over 40 years of investments and initiatives by the U.S. federal government, cyberspace remains vulnerable. Every day brings small intrusions and insidious espionage campaigns designed to hide malware in networks, creating a dangerous complacency that risks the ability of the federal government to provide basic goods and services. Since no single attack has been a major catastrophe capable of competing with stories about war, inflation, public health, and climate change, headlines prove fickle. The money and data that are lost fail to shock the public. Every additional dollar authorized by Congress to protect the network is squeezed by competing requirements. Everyone moves on to the next attack more vulnerable than before.</p> -<p>Resource challenges are also likely to confront expanding education opportunities. While the NCWES expands the number of universities offering cybersecurity education through NSF and NSA outreach programs, the resources do not match philanthropic efforts. For example, the Craig Newmark Foundation alone will invest more than the NSF, NIST, and Department of Labor on cybersecurity education and training through its $100 million Cyber Civil Defense Initiative.183 It is also not immediately clear how some lead agency efforts contribute to the vision as part of the NCWES. For example, CISA’s contribution to the effort was a Cyber Security Awareness Month initiative focused largely on media outreach. No amount of media outreach is likely to address the growing shortfall of IT professionals in the cyber workforce.</p> +<p>This tragedy is perfectly encapsulated by the 2020 compromise of the SolarWinds software update, which reveals the promise and peril on the horizon as the U.S. government seeks to secure cyberspace for its citizens. In December 2020, cybersecurity firm FireEye detected a supply chain attack on SolarWinds’ Orion software. The “trojanized” (disguised) malware was unintentionally pushed out to approximately 18,000 federal and private sector clients during a routine software update. The attack hit nine federal agencies and over 100 private companies, embedding backdoors designed to exfiltrate data — and, in a future crisis, to launch crippling cyberattacks. Subsequent reporting estimated that the attackers — linked to Russian intelligence — likely had gained access as much as six months earlier. To put that in perspective, while the National Security Agency (NSA) and Cyber Command proclaimed success in defending forward during the 2020 presidential election and in disrupting Russian cyber capabilities, hackers connected to Moscow were launching one of the largest cyber espionage campaigns in modern history.</p> -<p><strong>INFLATION PROOFING</strong></p> +<p>At the same time, the SolarWinds response showed the importance of creating a focal point for coordination between the federal executive branch and the private sector, highlighting why twenty-first-century security goes beyond the military and intelligence community. During the SolarWinds crisis, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) worked with FireEye and Microsoft — whose software infrastructure was targeted — to get electronic copies of infected servers. These copies helped the NSA and Cyber Command diagnose the extent of the malware infection.</p> -<p>The entire congressional appropriations process struggles with the challenges posed by higher inflation. The same is true with cybersecurity, where vendors increase the costs of software and contractors increase labor costs. Therefore, the U.S. government — and especially Congress — needs to explore mechanisms for making FCEB agencies more resilient to inflation. Currently, only select mandatory entitlement programs are indexed to inflation. Congress should consider studying current dynamics around cyber funding, specifically how in some cases the projected costs for essential security tools and services might make it difficult for some FCEB agencies to consistently use those tools in the future. Congress should also be monitoring unforeseen operations and maintenance costs associated with managing or updating tools or services. While not possible for all tools, Congress should consider if there are unique circumstances or a specific set of services that should be indexed to inflation or what other mechanisms are available to address sudden cost spikes. If Congress does pursue this type of action, it should frequently revisit which tools and services qualify, so as to not unintentionally block the use of other tools that might perform better than those currently in use.</p> +<p>The crisis also illustrated the need to accelerate initiatives to secure soft targets across the 102 entities comprising FCEB agencies. In the wake of SolarWinds, CISA has worked to modernize EINSTEIN, a legacy network of sensors on the federal network; create a new Cyber Analytics and Data System; and enhance its Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program capabilities. These efforts consist of a mix of contracts worth over $400 million and a request for almost $500 million in the FY 2024 budget. Another effort was the American Rescue Plan Act, which included $650 million targeted at addressing FCEB agency weaknesses revealed in the SolarWinds and Microsoft exchange intrusions. These efforts are critical to counter evolving threat actors. SolarWinds took an indirect approach and bypassed the EINSTEIN sensors by compromising trusted third-party software.</p> -<p><strong>PREPARING FOR AN ALGORITHMIC FUTURE</strong></p> +<p>Resources are necessary but insufficient to protect the over 100 agencies in the FCEB landscape. As seen in SolarWinds, CISA must align resources with strategy and coordinate with diverse stakeholders across the federal government and the private sector to enable entities, public and private, to manage their own risk. Strategy must align ends, ways, and means. Moreover, today’s federal cybersecurity has been shaped as much by the threat as by bureaucracy. As such, there is an urgent need to ensure that CISA’s security mission is aligned with new offices and authorities — residing in entities including the ONCD — and to overcome defunct dividing lines that characterize how the U.S. federal government buys technology and secures its networks through the various department and agency budget submissions.</p> -<p>Beyond pricing, there is a need for a larger set of standards guiding AI model assurance and testing as well as red teaming generative AI models, but this is outside the scope of the current report. The Biden administration is still in the process of developing a larger policy framework that will affect this evolving technology. For example, the Office of Science and Technology Policy has proposed a blueprint for an AI bill of rights. This initiative parallels multiple high-profile efforts, including the 2021 Federal Data Strategy, the 2021 National Security Commission on AI’s final report, the 2023 National Artificial Intelligence Research Resources task force report, and NIST’s AI Risk Management Framework.</p> +<p>Absent a renewed focus on organizational structures and processes within the federal government, the millions of dollars on the table to secure FCEBs will produce diminishing marginal returns. Each congressional dollar appropriated will not produce an equal dollar’s worth of security for U.S. citizens. The networks on which the public relies for everything from food and housing subsidies to business permits and patents will prove brittle. As seen with SolarWinds, great powers and other adversaries stand in the shadows ready to exploit the organizational vulnerability of the United States, not just its technical cyber vulnerabilities.</p> -<p>With respect to cyber defense, the most important output from these AI initiatives rests in technical standards for testing and evaluation. These standards will need to include red teaming generative AI models to combat misinformation and deepfakes as well as requirements for vendors selling AI-enabled threat hunt capabilities.</p> +<p>Consider the counterfactual: if the compromise of the SolarWinds software update had not been detected, what could Russia have done to deter U.S. support to Ukraine? The malware pushed to 18,000 federal and private sector networks could have used backdoors to corrupt data and even shut down systems. Commerce officials could have received false emails with the potential to temporarily distort financial markets. The theft of encrypted keys at the Department of the Treasury could have caused a loss of confidence, not just in financial markets but in the entire U.S. federal tax system. The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration might have temporarily delayed transporting nuclear materials and operations at multiple national labs, essentially providing Moscow a nuclear signaling mechanism without an explosion. Department of State correspondence could have been used to mislead U.S. partners as to the nation’s willingness to support Ukraine, creating confusion and uncertainty that bought Moscow time to advance on the battlefield.</p> -<p>Last, the standards must include more detailed requirements for cloud security. There is no AI without big data, and there is no big data without cloud computing. Failing to secure the cloud would create a back door into corrupting new AI/ML applications. At the same time, there is optimism that generative AI applications offer opportunities to enhance security.</p> +<p>This counterfactual is not hyperbole. In May 2023, researchers discovered Volt Typhoon, a massive espionage campaign by the Chinese Communist Party to access critical infrastructure networks it could exploit in the event of a crisis with the United States. In addition to targeting U.S. military bases in the Asia-Pacific — home to thousands of service members and their families — the campaign looked for ways to delay troop movements, degrade communications, and cause economic disruption.</p> -<p>Once broader federal and technical guidelines are established, CISA will likely need to develop an agency-wide AI strategy focused on limiting the ability of threat actors to hold the United States hostage in cyberspace using malware tailored by generate models. Securing the .gov domain space will require AI applications at multiple levels.</p> +<p>Military strategy has become fused with cybersecurity as states use cyberspace not just to target armed forces but to hold civilian populations hostage. This digital hostage taking renews the cruel logic of countervalue targeting and threatens to punish civilian infrastructure as a way of limiting an adversary’s military options (i.e., deterrence by punishment). Every rail line, airport, or seaport disabled has the potential to delay troop mobilization and create critical supply disruptions that risk public panic. Cyber tools can calibrate the pain, creating a risk strategy in which each vulnerability exploited becomes a signal and pressure for the target to back down or face worse consequences during a crisis. Elected officials in a democracy cannot afford to ignore their citizens, resulting in either capitulation or dangerous escalation spirals.</p> -<p><strong>USING A JFHQ-DODIN MODEL TO FURTHER CENTRALIZE THE .GOV ECOSYSTEM</strong></p> +<p>While the world has yet to see the full use of cyber operations along these lines during a war, states are developing new cyber strategies that integrate coercion, mis-, dis-, and malinformation, and other methods of endangering the modern connectivity the world relies on. The recent Chinese intrusions are a harbinger of a new age of cyber operations. To access networks in Guam, the hackers used internet-facing Fortiguard devices, which incorporate machine learning (ML) to detect and respond to malware. The operation involved using legitimate network credentials and network administrative tools to gain access and develop the ability to launch future attacks. In other words, the attacker used stealth to move with the terrain and find ways of bypassing sophisticated digital sentries.</p> -<p>A more radical approach to securing the .gov space would be to centralize budgets, authorities, and operational response across the over 100 federal agencies that constitute it. This approach could, in principle, parallel how the DOD created new entities to defend its networks.</p> +<p>Even if states like Russia struggled to integrate cyber operations with its military operations in 2022, one should not assume the risk is gone. It is not just AI/ML and generative AI that create new threat vectors in cyberspace. The convergence of digital and critical infrastructure networks opens a new configuration of vulnerabilities across the 16 critical infrastructure sectors (see Figure 1). It is easy to imagine a different type of punishment campaign waged by Moscow that substitutes malware for cruise missiles to attack power plants and key rail lines. Similarly, Russia could have temporarily disabled gas pipelines with cyber operations, a tactic already demonstrated in Saudi Arabia by Iran in 2012.</p> -<p>During the Obama administration, the DOD sought to better align its cyber capabilities, including protecting defense networks, building on over 10 years of Joint Task Forces and other command and control constructs. As part of this effort, the DOD created the Joint Force Headquarters - Department of Defense Information Network (JFHQ-DODIN) in 2014, based on earlier plans by U.S. Strategic Command.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/J2ITFP1.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Cyber Critical Infrastructure Targeting.</strong> Source: CSIS International Security Program research.</em></p> -<p>The original concept of operations started from the premise that defense networks are contested battlespace that require centralized planning, control, and named operations (e.g., Operation Gladiator Phoenix, Operation Gladiator Shield) to defend the network. According to Admiral Mike Rogers, this construct also meant that JFHQ-DODIN could assume operational control of different cyber mission forces as part of its defense mission. In other words, the creation of a centralized task force to defend DOD networks was not just about budgets and authorities; it represented a planning and risk management framework.</p> +<p>The number of cyberattacks against critical infrastructure appears to be on the rise. As seen in Figure 1, there is a troubling history of cyber operations targeting critical infrastructure that warrants careful consideration. Consider an alternative indirect approach in which a hacker enters through the FCEB agencies linked to these sectors. This is exactly what happened in 2017 when the WannaCry ransomware spread across the National Health Services in the United Kingdom. In other words, cyber operations targeting FCEB agencies could quickly pass through the federal government and spill over into the broader economy.</p> -<p>Applied to CISA, the JFHQ-DODIN model implies a higher degree of centralization. Agencies would see reduced budgets and personnel if functions normally performed by the CISO were centralized and incident reporting, response, and risk management were performed across the network by federated teams under operational control of CISA. In some ways, this centralization is the natural evolution of the .gov top domain management started in 2021.</p> +<p>Each new device added to a network can improve efficiency but also create emergent risk vectors that would have been unpredictable before its introduction. In 2015, critical flaws were discovered by third-party operational software that connected sensor data distributed across entities such as power plants, water treatment facilities, and pipelines. The flaw allowed attackers to execute random SQL statements on the system, in effect enabling hackers to tamper with data, elevate their administrative privileges for future attacks, and conduct denial-of-service attacks. In 2021, 14 of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors in the United States experienced ransomware attacks. This trend continued in 2022, with 140 percent growth in cyber operations targeting the industrial sector (i.e., critical manufacturing).</p> -<p>Yet the option is also not a panacea. The DOD still struggles to report and address cyber incidents, including in the defense industrial base. Centralizing budgets and authorities across over 100 federal agencies would take time, cause friction, and, despite increased visibility (i.e., CDM) and responsiveness (i.e., threat hunt), might not create cost savings.</p> +<p>As the threat evolves, money alone is not enough to secure cyberspace. The government must adapt and create new ways and means of achieving this common end. This report is part of that effort. The following sections show how the past became the present, helping to frame the challenge facing the different bureaucratic structures and processes used by the federal government to secure non-defense and intelligence functions. Given this historical perspective, the report then pivots to look at the current state, including interviews with senior officials and tabletop exercises with a mix of experts and the general public to understand current threats and challenges. The output of these activities highlights likely futures and how the threat could evolve in the near future. Based on these insights, the report concludes with a list of recommendations on how to align new processes and authorities with resources to protect the resilience of the federal government in the information age.</p> -<p><strong>GETTING THIRD-PARTY RISK RIGHT</strong></p> +<h3 id="how-did-we-get-here">How Did We Get Here?</h3> -<p>In the near future, a large number of government services will transition to a cloud-based architecture. CISA’s recent guidelines for “security-by-design” and “security-by-default” linked to pillar three of the 2023 National Cyber Strategy offer a start but not an end to the effort to manage risk in the cloud. There will need to be additional studies and experiments to test how best to manage third-party risks during the cloud transition. Even the best defense still leaves holes dedicated attacks could exploit, and the cloud creates opportunities to capture and exploit a larger array of services. In addition, there will need to be renewed efforts to engage on “security-by-design” internationally through forums such as the International Technical Union. In the twenty-first century, standards are strategy. The best way to manage third-party risk will be to build in technical standards that make digital infrastructure harder to compromise.</p> +<p>New forms of communication tend to produce widespread change. As people exchange ideas in new ways, it leads to different social norms, economic revolutions, and challenges to prevailing governance frameworks. And despite modern attention spans, these changes often take a generation to manifest.</p> -<h3 id="the-future-of-collective-defense">The Future of Collective Defense</h3> +<p>This truth is ever-present in the emergence of the internet and the distributed communications networks that have defined the first decades of the twenty-first century. These modes of communication created new challenges for governing institutions that were accustomed to providing public goods in ways that differed little from the twentieth century. This gap between change and governance created a tension at the core of the federal government.</p> -<p>In the next three to five years, CISA’s challenge will be not only to grow and integrate its capabilities, but also to clearly communicate its capabilities to partners and adversaries alike to enhance deterrence.</p> +<p>For decades, it has been increasingly acknowledged within Congress and the larger federal government that there need to be formal mechanisms governing the protection of federal networks. This section provides context for why and how perceptions around federal cybersecurity have evolved, as well as what that means for CISA’s mission today.</p> -<p>One of the more concerning aspects of the SolarWinds software compromise is not just that the malware comprehensively penetrated over 200 U.S. government and allied systems as early as 2019. It is that it was able to do so at a time when CISA, FedRAMP reporting, CDM and EINSTEIN, and a host of other agencies, capabilities, and processes were in place that should have, in theory, more quickly detected the intrusion.</p> +<p>Seen from a historical perspective, federal cybersecurity has been shaped as much by threat as by bureaucracy. From its inception, the internet has seen a combustible mix of great powers and non-state actors competing to exploit network vulnerabilities and hunt the threats that always seem to be one step ahead of the defense. This digital game has strained existing bureaucratic structures and authorities, making it increasingly difficult to coordinate action across branches of government to protect not just cyberspace but the critical infrastructure that is increasingly reliant on modern connectivity to deliver public goods. These coordination challenges have created planning and budgeting dilemmas that agencies continue to grapple with today.</p> -<p>One of the key takeaways from the expert tabletop exercises is that while knowledge of CISA services encouraged a few of the attackers to change their attack strategy, most of CISA’s services, while important to have, did not greatly factor into the attackers’ analyses. The experts came to these conclusions from a few different perspectives. Some believed that the benefits of CISA cyber services, such as those that promote system and process resilience, could only be realized in the long term and would not fully be realized in the immediate future, thereby making them ineffective as deterrents. Others were skeptical that CISA’s capabilities would be sufficiently advanced in the near future. And some of the experts did not believe that CISA alone with its defensive posture could undermine an attack strategy without reinforcements from other government entities with investigatory or prosecutorial powers.</p> +<p>Looking ahead, federal cybersecurity should be about risk management that aligns to the threat and uses the structure and demands of the bureaucracy to the advantage (not detriment) of cyber defenses.</p> -<p>But the truth is that with increased resourcing, CISA is making meaningful steps to not only up its capabilities but also make sure those capabilities are integrated and provide a greater picture of the threats and vulnerabilities that FCEB agencies need to address. CISA’s current capabilities, combined with planned reporting requirements and processes, will ensure that the agency has a more fulsome global cyber activity picture. CISA is well positioned not only to monitor and collect information but also to disseminate the information and help entities plan their responses at different levels. The challenge is to ensure CISA can adapt to the evolving threat landscape while navigating bureaucratic challenges.</p> +<h4 id="major-incidents-cyber-strategies-and-legislative-action-pre-cisa">Major Incidents, Cyber Strategies, and Legislative Action Pre-CISA</h4> -<hr /> +<p><strong>FROM BYTES TO RIGHTS: THE EMERGENCE OF CYBERSECURITY REGULATION</strong></p> -<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow for future war, gaming, and strategy in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> +<p>Cybersecurity began in the 1970s when researcher Bob Thomas created a computer program called Creeper. Creeper was more an experiment in self-replicating programs than malware. It was designed to move between computers and leave a message. Fellow researcher Ray Tomlinson then wrote another program, Reaper, that moved across the early network logging out Creeper wherever it identified the program.</p> -<p><strong>Devi Nair</strong> is a former associate director and associate fellow with the CSIS Defending Democratic Institutions Project, where her research focused on cyber and disinformation operation efforts aimed at undermining trust in democratic institutions.</p> +<p><strong>Great power competition was part of the internet from its inception.</strong> By 1981, an independent U.S. federal agency, the National Science Foundation (NSF), had begun several initiatives, dubbed ARPANET, that built off the early internet experiment by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. The ARPANET developed the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP) and set the stage for an NSF initiative connecting computers to create early networks. The NSF took on this role because the Department of Defense (DOD) “made it clear they did not want to run a national computer network that wasn’t directly related to defense work.” One critical NSF initiative was the Computer Science Research Network (CSNET). As the name implies, its goal was to connect computers across national university campuses together. The CSNET grew quickly, and by 1981 it merged with the Because It’s Time Network to include email and file transfers. However, the demand for networking grew quickly and set the stage a few years later for joining regional universities with regional supercomputers and the birth of the National Science Foundation Network. This critical accomplishment facilitated research, but it also increased opportunities for Cold War rivals such as the Soviet Union and China to conduct espionage on sensitive U.S. data.</p> -<p><strong>Yasir Atalan</strong> is a PhD candidate and a graduate fellow at the Center for Data Science at American University. His research focuses on civil-military relations and international security implications of technology. Methodologically, he is interested in Bayesian analysis, machine learning, and large language models. He is a replication analyst at Political Analysis.</p> +<p>From the beginning, however, <strong>threats in cyberspace were not confined to state-based actors.</strong> In 1983, Wisconsin hackers known as the 414s, led by 17-year-old Neal Patrick, breached the computer defenses of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). LANL was established in 1943 to conduct research for the Manhattan Project and nuclear deterrence. After the FBI investigated the 414s, a congressional report on Mr. Patrick’s witness testimony to a U.S. House of Representative committee highlighted that “ironically . . . [the 414s] gave this new [LANL] account or file the code name ‘Joshua,’ repeating the access code used in the film ‘War Games.’” The intrusion into sensitive systems by Mr. Patrick and the 414s highlighted faults in safeguarding computer networks and might have inspired a separate breach in the mid-1980s by agents working for the Soviet Union.</p> -<p><strong>Jose M. Macias</strong> is a research associate in the Futures Lab within the International Security Program at CSIS. He is also a Pearson fellow and teaching assistant at the University of Chicago’s Harris School of Public Policy. With a keen interest in the quantitative study of war, Jose’s research delves into topics like cross-domain conflicts, societal impacts, and the integration of machine learning in international relations research, with prior significant contributions to the Correlates of War Project, including notable work quantifying the effects of U.S. bilateral counterterrorism treaties in the Global South and eastern Europe.</p>Benjamin Jensen, et al.This report delves into critical cybersecurity issues and offers insightful analysis for policymakers and the public.Paper Tiger or Pacing Threat?2023-10-19T12:00:00+08:002023-10-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/paper-tiger-or-pacing-threats<p><em>China has long couched its engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean in primarily economic terms. However, China is becoming increasingly strident in its efforts to bolster defense and security initiatives in the Western Hemisphere.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Chinese defense and security engagements manifest along a spectrum, including dual-use civilian and military infrastructure projects, public safety assistance, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, arms sales, and joint military-to-military exchanges and trainings. An expanded military and security presence in the hemisphere poses significant concerns for the United States in the event of a potential conflict or crisis, imperils regional stability by empowering criminal regimes in the hemisphere, and risks eroding democratic norms within regional militaries and police forces.</em></p> +<p><strong>The concept of threat hunt and how best to continuously monitor and defend federal networks has been a central issue since the early days of connected networks.</strong> In 1986, computer managers at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL) discovered a network breach. LBL was a university research facility that maintained unclassified research and information on its systems. A 24-year-old hacker based in West Germany penetrated the computer systems at LBL, searching files and emails with keywords such as “nuclear,” “Star Wars,” and “S.D.I. [Strategic Defense Initiative].” However, much to the bewilderment of the LBL team, they assessed that this hacker confused LBL with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, a sister laboratory to LBL that conducted classified research. In this moment, the team decided to not deny and isolate the intrusion but rather to study it by tracing it back. They traced the intruder from multiple points, including a defense contractor in Virginia, a Navy data center, and other military and non-military centers. The LBL team further alerted and collaborated with the FBI to investigate and eventually charge Markus Hess in 1990 for selling the stolen data for $54,000 to the Soviet KGB. The character of connected networks enabled easy lateral movement for clever attacks.</p> -<p>Taken together, these trendlines place the United States at an inflection point — it remains a preferred security partner for most countries in the hemisphere but must act now to preserve this status, lest it slip at a precarious moment. To fortify security partnerships with countries in the region, and counter Chinese influence in the security and defense space, the United States should pursue the following lines of effort:</p> +<p>For policy practitioners in the cybersecurity field, securing computers was a process that started before the high-profile breaches in the 1980s. An early example is from 1972, when the DOD issued Directive 5200.28, “Security Requirements for Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems,” in order to establish “uniform policy, security requirements, administrative controls, and technical measures to protect classified information.” This directive provided new types of authorities that were built on in 1982 with Directive 5215.1, “Computer Security Evaluation Center,” which established the center at the NSA.</p> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Leverage U.S. partners to fill force modernization and equipment shortfalls.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Bolster the defense cooperation mechanisms of the inter-American system.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Clarify U.S. red lines when it comes to security engagement.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Invest in U.S. core competencies in military education and training.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Enhance interagency and international cooperation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Improve cooperation on countering illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and the nexus between transnational organized crime and environmental crimes.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Strengthen awareness and training on cybersecurity.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Invest in citizen security and delink citizen security from the regional conversation on drugs.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p><strong>Planning and standards played a central role early in imagining how to secure networks of connected devices.</strong> The two directives mentioned above led to a series of trusted computer system evaluation books published by the DOD and NSA known as the “Rainbow Series,” deriving their name from the colorful covers they were issued in. The name also paralleled famous U.S. war plans from the interwar period. The rainbow books were an early attempt to establish standards to secure the DOD components. The most well-known iteration is the “orange book,” published initially in 1983, with a revised version in 1985 titled <em>Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria</em>.</p> -<h3 id="from-creeping-concern-to-strategic-competitor">From Creeping Concern to Strategic Competitor</h3> +<p>The defense and intelligence communities were not alone in their efforts to secure computers. Picking up where its response to the 414s left off, Congress introduced a series of bills on computer crimes in the 1980s. Of the bills introduced, the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) encapsulated the majority of national efforts to prosecute unauthorized computer network access, codifying civil and criminal penalties and prohibitions against a variety of computer-related conduct and cybercrime. While not exclusively an anti-hacking law, it placed penalties for knowingly accessing a federal computer without authorization.</p> -<p>Peering out from the treetops on a hillside near Bejucal, Cuba, massive parabolic antennas mark the location of a suspected signals intelligence base reportedly operated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1999. More recently, images of the facility have sprung up across U.S. media after reports that China and Cuba had reached an agreement to open another such facility on the island. The true extent of China’s military footprint on the island remains hotly debated in open sources but given the proximity of any such facility to key commercial, technological, and military infrastructure along the southeastern coast of the United States, it should inspire planning for the worst. Adding yet more fuel to the fire, on June 20, 2023, the Wall Street Journal reported that Chinese officials had been in high-level talks with their Cuban counterparts to open yet another base on the island, this one dedicated to military training. These combined revelations garnered a raft of comparisons to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, assessments which, while perhaps exaggerations to some, underscore both the strategic import of the Western Hemisphere to the United States and the changing nature of the security and defense challenges in the region. Over 60 years ago, fear of missiles housed less than a hundred miles off the coast of Florida brought the world to the nuclear brink, but today the spectrum of potential threats encompasses a staggering range of issues, from cybersecurity and infrastructure investment to overseas police outposts, security cameras, and telecommunications networks. In such a diffuse threat environment, it may be easy to downplay individual risks as not rising to the level of serious concern. However, failing to see the ways in which they intersect and cumulate would represent a serious lack of foresight.</p> +<p>The first application of CFAA in criminal proceedings came two years later when a modified computer worm resulted in a widespread denial-of-service attack across thousands of computers. In 1988, a computer science student at Cornell University — the son of an NSA official — hacked the computer network at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and planted what became known as the Morris Worm. This worm did not damage or destroy files, but it quickly slowed down email communications, sometimes for days. While the breach and planting of the worm were at MIT, its fast spread across computer networks caused concern, as even military communications slowed. As the incident gathered speed and became public, the FBI investigated and eventually charged Robert T. Morris in 1991 for unauthorized access to protected computers. The Morris Worm became the first documented case of the CFAA federally prosecuting a hacker, and it highlighted the importance of protecting cyberspace for the nation.</p> -<p>The United States, for its part, has demonstrated an admirable degree of strategic clarity when it comes to defense of the hemisphere. The 2022 National Security Strategy states that “no region impacts the United States more directly than the Western Hemisphere” and that preventing the emergence of a hostile military presence in the region has for decades been a guiding light of U.S. defense posture. Historically, the United States has oriented its approach to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) around the idea of “strategic denial.” As one of the authors has noted previously, strategic denial consists of efforts to “prevent major rivals from developing regional footholds from which they can menace, distract, or otherwise undercut the strategic interests of the United States.” Nevertheless, the defense and security dimensions and considerations of China’s engagement with LAC has been comparatively understudied. Indeed, when faced with the scale of China’s economic and trade relations with the hemisphere, other dimensions of engagement often appear secondary priorities for Beijing at best. To categorize defense and security as afterthoughts, however, is to fundamentally misunderstand China’s approach in LAC, wherein economic ties often serve as a foray into security engagement and sometimes security gains. This can be seen most notably with the proliferation of PRC-financed dual-use infrastructure in the hemisphere, particularly ports, airports, and space facilities — a raft of projects that span the southern tip of Argentina to the ports of the Bahamas.</p> +<p><strong>THE GOVERNMENT BYTES BACK: LEGISLATIVE STRIDES IN CYBERSECURITY</strong></p> -<p>More explicitly in the military realm, senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officials conducted more than 200 visits to LAC countries between 2002 and 2019. Exchanges such as the defense forum between China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) provide additional opportunities for high-level coordination on security matters. For example, the “China-CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas (2022-2024)” listed “Political and Security Cooperation” as the top issue area upon which to build. China has also stepped up its sales and gifts of arms to countries throughout the hemisphere and broadened the aperture of security to include citizen security initiatives to create both physical and digital beachheads throughout the region. China’s preference to let security engagement be overshadowed by economic and political engagement in LAC means that the United States may ignore the challenge until it proves too late. Cuba seems to be a case in point, as the United States faces limited options from a security standpoint, beyond diplomatic pressure and condemnation, to mitigate the risks posed by an expanding Chinese military presence. Elsewhere in the hemisphere, the continuous drumbeat of Chinese infrastructure in Argentina, the rising tally of countries accepting China’s “safe cities” technology and surveillance equipment, and Beijing’s unflinching support for the Maduro regime in Venezuela all suggest that the concept of integrated deterrence is at risk of failing in the very region where it should hold most firm.</p> +<p>Following the launch of the World Wide Web, Congress continued to work toward improving the resiliency of the federal networks, with a focus on information technology (IT). This came into light in 1995 with the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the Information Technology Management Reform Act (Clinger-Cohen Act) of 1995. The Clinger-Cohen Act was a breakthrough for the federal enterprise because it mandated the creation of chief information officers (CIOs) across agencies. The Clinger-Cohen Act also directed agencies to focus on results using IT investment and streamlined procurement processes, detailing how agencies should approach the selection and management of IT projects. <strong>Coordinated action by the executive branch and Congress has been central to securing cyberspace for 40 years.</strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BaYI6J3.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: PLA Military Diplomacy 2003–2018.</strong> Source: <a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1249864/chinese-military-diplomacy-20032016-trends-and-implications/">Kenneth Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and John Chen, Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, July 2017)</a>. Elaborated with data from <a href="https://csis-ilab.github.io/cpower-viz/military-diplomacy/military-diplomacy/dist/index.html">“China’s Military Diplomatic Activities,” China Power, CSIS</a>.</em></p> +<p>Building on Congress’s actions and picking up the presidential pen in 1998, 10 years after the Morris Worm incident, President Bill Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive NSC-63. Under the directive, the administration signaled its intent to safeguard cyber-based information systems in critical infrastructure. President Clinton presented five important actions: (1) set a national goal to protect critical infrastructure, (2) appoint agency liaisons to work with the private sector and foster public-private partnerships, (3) create a set of general guidelines, (4) issue structure and organization to federal agencies, and (5) task each agency to be responsible for protecting its own critical infrastructure. With the directive, Clinton assured the country that the United States would “take all necessary measures to swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber-attacks on our critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber systems.” <strong>Early on, federal officials saw the interdependencies between cyberspace and critical infrastructure and between cyber and physical security.</strong></p> -<p>Furthermore, there is reason to believe security and defense issues could rise on China’s priorities list due to its growing military power and the confidence of its leadership. As China’s economic dynamo continues to flag, security cooperation, carried out by the PLA, could represent a durable means to prolong the influence it gained originally from investment flows. As competition with the United States sharpens in the Indo-Pacific, China can be expected to escalate in other regions, with LAC being viewed as a strategic blind spot within the United States’ traditional “sphere of influence” — and therefore open for exploitation in times of conflict. In addition, as home to the majority of Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies, LAC stands out as a potential catalyst for cross-strait escalation. If China is able to entice some or all of these countries to switch their recognition to Beijing, it may embolden China’s disposition and accelerate its timetable to pursue reunification by force.</p> +<p><strong>FROM TERROR TO TECHNOLOGY: THE POST-9/11 CYBERSECURITY OVERHAUL</strong></p> -<p>Within the hemisphere itself, Chinese security and defense engagement presents three core challenges to the United States. First, such engagement most explicitly furthers China’s preparations for and options in a potential Taiwan contingency. Access to the Western Hemisphere during wartime opens a number of opportunities for the PLA. This includes both passively ensuring a continued flow of important foodstuffs and raw materials from the region to sustain China’s war effort and enabling more active efforts, such as using intelligence operatives, threatening U.S. deployment and sustainment flows, putting the U.S. homeland at risk, and even opening the door to the potential military use of LAC infrastructure such as ports and airbases for operations by PLA forces. Second, Chinese security support, including both explicitly military systems as well as digital systems for monitoring and controlling populations, may empower and extend the life of dictators within the hemisphere, especially in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Third, Chinese engagement with armed forces throughout the hemisphere shows signs of eroding standards of military subordination to civilian control, respect for human rights, or otherwise leading militaries in the region to behave in undesirable ways. Taken together, these risks paint a troubling picture wherein China is able to compel “neutrality” from the region in times of conflict, foment ungovernability in the region that undermines or distracts the United States in its own hemisphere, and overall erodes the ability of actors in the region to resist China’s will.</p> +<p>The very concept of security changed after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The attacks not only sparked the war on terror but brought the passage of new legislation to safeguard the homeland. Under President George W. Bush, Congress passed the PATRIOT Act of 2001, which amended the CFAA and extended protections to federal computers located outside the United States. Further, the PATRIOT Act also included computers “used by or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security.” <strong>New threats showed the need for new authorities.</strong></p> -<p>Fortunately, the United States remains in a position of strength as the predominant security partner for the region. However, it must work to realign priorities and capabilities for competition with China, beginning with a clear statement of strategic goals. For the purposes of this report, the following is assumed to encapsulate the guiding policy objective of U.S. defense posture in LAC: to preserve freedom of operation, navigation, and access for U.S. forces in times of crisis, as well as maintain strategic denial of the region to adversaries, by remaining the partner of choice during peacetime.</p> +<p>In response to both the terrorist attacks and the growing reliance of the federal government on cyberspace, the George W. Bush administration, as a part of its larger Electronic Government (E-Gov) strategy, worked with Congress on the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA). The legislation tasked agencies to “identify and provide information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm resulting from the unauthorized use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information systems.” Importantly, FISMA 2002 not only tasked FCEB agencies with planning out key aspects of their own “tactical-level cybersecurity actions,” but it also attempted to delineate roles between agencies that would support the FCEB agencies, with the OMB providing “strategic support,” the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) providing “operational support,” and the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) establishing standards and guidance. <strong>The number of agencies involved in coordinating cybersecurity was starting to eclipse the planning and budgeting frameworks in place to manage FCEB agencies.</strong></p> -<p>Simultaneously, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the U.S. Department of Defense should be clear about their limitations. China’s defense cooperation often comes on the heels of, or is intertwined with, vastly expanded economic cooperation. Without a broader U.S. strategy to meet the economic and development requirements of LAC, no amount of increased security cooperation will be sufficient to curb the growing Chinese presence in the hemisphere. A cohesive, practical, and forward-looking framework for engagement with allies and partners in LAC will nevertheless be essential, lest the United States lose one of its greatest assets for national defense.</p> +<p>In response to these coordination challenges, the White House released the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace in February 2003. This strategy was developed in response to the September 11 attacks and set forth the U.S. government’s approach to broadly securing networks, reducing vulnerabilities, and minimizing damage from cyber incidents. It was a whole-of-society strategy, underscoring the importance of public and private entities prioritizing cybersecurity as a way to protect critical infrastructure and processes. With regard to federal entities, the strategy emphasized that the government should serve as a model, leading as early adopters for secure technologies and demonstrating best practices in cybersecurity. Further, the strategy mentioned the importance of developing and maintaining clear roles for federal security management. It cited the OMB’s FY 2002 report to Congress that identified ongoing government security gaps, including but not limited to a lack of attention from senior management, a lack of proper education and general awareness training, a lack of security performance metrics and measurements, and a lack of general ability to detect and share information on vulnerabilities.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">For the purposes of this report, the following is assumed to encapsulate the guiding policy objective of U.S. defense posture in LAC: to preserve freedom of operation, navigation, and access for U.S. forces in times of crisis, as well as maintain strategic denial of the region to adversaries, by remaining the partner of choice during peacetime.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The dawn of the twenty-first century saw the United States grappling with new forms of security that eclipsed Cold War–era notions of national security. The active participation of citizens and the provision of goods and services through critical infrastructure emerged as key components that required new thinking. To their credit, officials in the executive and legislative branches rose to the challenge; however, they struggled to achieve lasting results. In the roughly 20 years since the original FISMA and the Bush administration’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, major cyber incidents directly impacting the United States have forced the government to prioritize cybersecurity and reevaluate the very definition of national security. In other words, the proliferation of new networks in cyberspace alongside the acknowledgement that Americans were vulnerable at home drove the need for a new focal point to defend the United States beyond traditional defense, intelligence, and law enforcement considerations.</p> -<p>This report takes a comprehensive look at China’s means, methods, and motivations for engaging LAC countries on security and defense issues. Subsequent sections of this report first analyze China’s objectives for security and defense cooperation with LAC, proposing a typology that observes five overarching categories of engagement along a continuum from dual-use infrastructure investments to direct military-to-military trainings and exercises. Next, it outlines how each of these five categories manifest in the Western Hemisphere, and what role they play in China’s overall strategic framework. Subsequently, the report delves into the three primary threats posed by a more assertive Chinese security and defense posture in the region over the short to medium term. It concludes by outlining a range of policy recommendations to bolster U.S. security partnerships in LAC, limit the risks associated with existing Chinese engagement, and better address the growing security and defense challenges faced by partner countries.</p> +<h4 id="the-emergence-of-cisa-over-three-administrations">The Emergence of CISA over Three Administrations</h4> -<h3 id="arrows-in-the-quiver">Arrows in the Quiver</h3> +<p><strong>THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: PAVING THE WAY FOR CISA</strong></p> -<p><em>China’s Security and Defense Strategy in LAC</em></p> +<p>As a continuation and expansion of Bush-era cyber recommendations, the Obama administration and successive congresses struggled to find the best alignment of cyber and critical infrastructure protection within the newly created DHS. <strong>The optimal structures and processes for securing cyberspace remained elusive.</strong> Many of the initiatives built in 2007 realigned multiple agency portfolios on cyber and critical infrastructure — including defending FCEB agencies — under the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). Through such efforts, the Obama administration laid the foundation for what would eventually become CISA within the DHS.</p> -<p>Conventional assessments of LAC’s strategic importance to China relegate the region to the bottom of Beijing’s priorities list. Indeed, compared to regions such as the Indo-Pacific, which has a direct bearing on the revisionist ambitions of China as the theater where any potential war over Taiwan would be waged, or Africa, which possesses important resource wealth and strategic geography China is looking to secure for itself, the Western Hemisphere is less directly critical to China’s national security. However, to write off the region as unimportant or marginal to U.S.-China security competition overlooks important evolutions in China’s strategic calculus in the Western Hemisphere.</p> +<p>First, the administration conducted a 60-day review of the nation’s cyber policies and processes, culminating in the 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review. It then developed and published the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), detailing cybersecurity goals for agencies such as the OMB and DHS. The report was an outgrowth of the CNCI initiative launched by President Bush in National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-54/HSPD-23), which called for the federal government to “integrate many of its technical and organizational capabilities in order to better address sophisticated cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities.” It also built substantially upon the report of the CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th President, <em>Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency</em>. Of relevance to this study, President Obama’s CNCI report details initiatives such as the management of a Federal Enterprise Network with Trusted Internet Connections and the deployment of intrusion detection and prevention systems across the federal enterprise. In other words, <strong>policymakers have seen the importance of defending FCEB agencies and the .gov ecosystem for over 20 years but have struggled to align resources to achieve their ends.</strong></p> -<p>China’s 2015 and 2019 defense white papers emphasize strengthening military partnerships with LAC nations. However, the most telling sign of China’s shifting view of security and defense engagement comes from President Xi Jinping’s announcement of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in April 2022. Proposing “a holistic approach, maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains,” the GSI broadens the aperture for Chinese international security activities, including on matters of cybersecurity, data governance, and public health. In doing so, it takes explicit aim at the U.S. model of security and defense engagement, described by one international affairs scholar as “increasingly militant and belligerent” in the post-Cold War era. A holistic approach to security that encompasses emerging challenges and non-traditional concepts such as environmental and health security is not unwarranted. However, the most proximate outcome of the GSI is to enable China to engage with countries, even traditional U.S. partners, across a broader range of activities, especially in the police and cyber domains, where the United States may have a weaker presence in regions such as LAC. In general, the GSI is but one of several new initiatives — along with the Global Development Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative — launched by Xi to encourage a more Beijing-centric international order.</p> +<p>It was also during this time that the DHS started building and improving on a number of initiatives that have since become key services managed and delivered by CISA. For instance, in 2012, the DHS established the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program and rolled out EINSTEIN 3 Accelerated, which added inline blocking to existing EINSTEIN intrusion detection.</p> -<p>LAC countries are exemplary test beds for the application of the GSI. The region itself is remarkably free from interstate conflict but confronts a plethora of other security threats beyond this fortunate trend. The region makes up just 8 percent of the global population while accounting for one-third of homicides worldwide, driven by deeply entrenched transnational criminal networks. Climate change has exposed many countries to increased extreme weather events, devastating communities and uprooting thousands. The Covid-19 pandemic hit LAC harder than any other region, with 1.74 million deaths reported as of December 2022, over a quarter of the global death toll at that point. For each of these challenges, the GSI promises ready-made solutions — tested, refined, and proven in the crucible of China’s highly efficient (and ruthless) state security apparatus.</p> +<p>Separately, after nearly a decade of FISMA 2002 guidelines, the Obama administration signed a new FISMA into law in 2014. In addition to updating and streamlining reporting requirements, the new FISMA further delineated roles and responsibilities in cybersecurity management by formally codifying the DHS’s role as the lead for implementing and overseeing FCEB agencies’ IT policies. The government saw a need to coordinate technology standards by getting policies aligned.</p> -<p>In practice, however, the initiatives that China has sought to export and bring together under the GSI umbrella have led to an expanded Chinese presence — to the detriment of the sovereignty of recipient countries. China’s answer to crime and instability, for instance, has been opening new overseas police stations, exporting cameras and digital infrastructure with dubious safeguards, and deploying former PLA and People’s Armed Police personnel as security contractors. Its answer to the pandemic was to use vaccines as a cudgel to suppress criticism from countries such as Brazil and to try and pressure Paraguay into dropping its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. Such tendencies are indicative of China’s motivation in recent years to apply its internal quest for order at the international level to “make the world safe” for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in the words of a leading scholar who has carefully studied Xi’s “Comprehensive National Security Concept.”</p> +<p>Most importantly, it should be noted that it was during the final years of the Obama administration that the NPPD was able to develop the plans for the first new operational agency at the DHS since its founding. This plan was provided to Congress and became the basis for later establishing CISA. At the same time, it was clear that these initiatives were still failing to deliver what they promised: an integrated approach to cybersecurity and risk management across the federal government. As seen in the 2015 OMB hack, FCEB agencies were often late in submitting their cyber strategies and struggled to recruit and retain talent. This fact led some circles to call for moving cybersecurity out of the DHS and creating a standalone National Cyber Authority.</p> -<p>The Western Hemisphere also plays a crucial role in China’s strategy of political warfare. As the region with the greatest potential to affect U.S. national security, every advance China makes in the Western Hemisphere is inherently more consequential. Even if these gains appear minor, they are often zero-sum and compounding. A country which elects to buy its armored vehicles from China will most likely not purchase similar platforms from the United States. Similarly, countries that use Huawei as the backbone of their telecommunications infrastructure will have little use for U.S. or European firms offering similar services. On the diplomatic front, China’s military-to-military exchanges and trainings hold the potential to increase familiarity and goodwill between regional militaries and the PLA, as well as undermine the United States’ links to and ability to coordinate with longstanding allies.</p> +<p><strong>THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION: CONSOLIDATING AUTHORITIES AND RESOURCES</strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XxU9fBq.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ Officials from Cuba, Ecuador, Costa Rica, China, and the Bahamas attend the first ministerial meeting of the Forum of China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (China-CELAC) in Beijing on January 6, 2015.</em></p> +<p>Efforts to align federal resources to secure cyberspace accelerated during the Trump administration. Building on President Trump’s Executive Order (EO) 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure, the administration also released its National Cyber Strategy in September 2018 — the first official strategy since the Bush administration’s in 2003.</p> -<p>Such advances will undoubtedly be useful for China in the event of a war with the United States, but even below the threshold of armed conflict, they shape the theater in which the United States must operate and live. Activities that may appear minor on the surface, such as denial of port calls or the rejection of U.S. bids to supply military equipment, can subtly reshape the physical and human terrain of the Western Hemisphere, throwing up unexpected wrinkles and pitfalls for the United States while at the same time smoothing over these obstacles for China.</p> +<p>A few months after the release of the 2018 cyber strategy, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Act was passed and signed into law, formally creating CISA. The creation of CISA isolated, consolidated, and elevated key functions of the DHS’s NPPD and related DHS initiatives. While the NPPD was already tasked with the majority of the DHS’s cyber responsibilities, this rebranding of the NPPD’s cyber offerings to CISA was more than just a way to consolidate efforts. The initiative also started a path toward greater unity of effort. CISA was empowered to carry out its cyber mission as part of DHS’s mandate to strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure, including federal civilian networks and mission-essential functions. <strong>The consolidation of resources and authorities can help elevate the mission, but its successful execution relies on buy-in from the clients — in this case, FCEB agencies.</strong> The question remained of how best to align resources with the new agency and ensure that it could work, with FCEB entities scattered across the departments outside of the DHS.</p> -<p>Finally, China’s strategy for defense and security engagement recognizes that the United States’ conventional preponderance in the Western Hemisphere makes competing one-for-one on traditional defense issues an impossibility. As a result, China has exploited a variety of tools not commonly associated with direct military competition, but which nevertheless offer important security benefits and enable military operations. These include areas such as civilian infrastructure, policing, and even professional military education. U.S. institutions are not prepared to compete in these areas and are allowing China to advance steadily on several fronts. In this context, military engagement is not the spear tip of China’s advance in the Americas. Rather, a diffuse array of security and defense policies comprise a quiver of arrows China can use to turn the strategic environment to its advantage.</p> +<p><strong>THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION: SUPPORTING AN EVOLVING CISA MISSION</strong></p> -<h3 id="the-full-spectrum-of-engagement">The Full Spectrum of Engagement</h3> +<p>The Biden administration has continued to build on initiatives started under the Trump and Obama administrations. This continuity relates to the fact that many cybersecurity initiatives involve Congress as much as they do the executive branch. For example, in March 2020, the bipartisan U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission published its final report. Notably, two of its key recommendations were to (1) establish a Senate-confirmed national cyber director, and (2) strengthen CISA. Congress officially established and confirmed a national cyber director, Chris Inglis, in 2021. As one of its primary deliverables, the ONCD developed the Biden administration’s National Cybersecurity Strategy in March 2023. An implementation plan was further released in July 2023.</p> -<p>China’s strategy of avoiding overt military action in the Western Hemisphere can make it challenging to disentangle security engagement from other forms of influence. Accordingly, it is useful to conceptualize Chinese engagement in this space along a continuum encompassing five areas: (1) facilities and infrastructure, (2) citizen security assistance, (3) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, (4) arms sales and equipment transfers, and (5) joint training and exercises.</p> +<p>The early years of the Biden administration also saw a lot of activity around EO 14028, Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity, and a slew of other executive branch guidance documents supporting and reinforcing it. Of relevance to this report, EO 14028 directs federal government agencies to adopt zero trust architectures (ZTA), a move that has created a necessary — albeit arguably insufficient — role for CISA as the agency that can provide general guidance to FCEB agencies during their ZTA migration.</p> -<h4 id="1-facilities-and-infrastructure">1. FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FKJWHJf.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: U.S. Government Cybersecurity Timeline.</strong> Source: CSIS International Security Program.</em></p> -<p>Strategic infrastructure projects are one of the most successful areas in which China has been able to advance its defense and security interests in the Western Hemisphere. With the exception of the proposed Cuban training facility, China does not maintain any overt military bases in the hemisphere. Indeed, in accordance with Deng Xiaoping’s exhortation to “hide your strength and bide your time,” China remains exceptionally cautious in its terminology, referring to its first overseas naval base in Djibouti as a “support facility.” As a result, this category does not always fall neatly within the framework of defense and security engagement. However, it is crucial to consider facilities and infrastructure given China’s pattern of “civil-military fusion” — the effort to ensure civilian resources and infrastructure can be seamlessly integrated with military capabilities when needed, which has been documented in projects related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Civil-military fusion is therefore closely tied to the PLA’s pursuit of overseas basing and access, a capability that will be essential for that force to achieve its aspirations of power projection on a global scale.</p> +<p>In recent years, CISA received additional authorities and resources, the details of which are outlined later in this report. It should also be noted that Congress pushed for FISMA reform in 2022. If passed, the new legislation would have further enhanced CISA’s authorities. However, the legislation passed in the Senate but failed to do so in the House, leaving FISMA 2014 as the status quo. A bipartisan effort is underway to tackle FISMA reform again in 2023. The current bill tracks closely with provisions outlined in the 2022 version (see Recommendation 2.1 in this paper on a report to evaluate CISA’s current and future FCEB mission).</p> -<p>Key to China’s definition of interoperability is familiarity with and reliable access to infrastructure that its forces can use, and it has worked assiduously to expand its influence through infrastructure investments that cast long shadows due to dual-use military and civilian capabilities. Dual-use facilities present an inherent challenge for U.S. deterrence. First, their military utility can be obfuscated from public view until a project is a near <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">fait accompli</code></em>. This is doubly true given China’s penchant for opaque contracts, which, in the case of port facilities in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, have later been revealed to contain specifications that would allow People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships to dock and conduct resupply. PRC-funded port projects in the United Arab Emirates and Equatorial Guinea have also been revealed to house facilities and capabilities that could be used to provide overseas refueling and resupply capabilities, as well as command and control assistance, for the PLAN. Second, if the United States seeks to block such facilities, it risks the appearance of stymieing a country’s development.</p> +<p><strong>In its next stage of growth, CISA needs to invest in and be supported by larger structural and cultural changes that allow the agency to more effectively work as a strategic partner with FCEB agencies to protect federal networks.</strong></p> -<p>Although dual-use infrastructure is often associated with more overt displays of military power, such as the appearance of a PLAN warship in port, or the presence of military officers at a satellite research station, the ways in which such projects can further China’s strategic goals are often much more subtle and yet omnipresent. Chinese port projects around the world are illustrative of this fact. In Germany, for instance, a logistics hub in Wilhelmshaven recently drew attention for its location a mere three miles from Germany’s largest naval base. Replete with cameras, cell towers, and PRC-designed data management software, the facility provides China with a permanent base from which to collect human and electronic intelligence on the German navy. Within LAC, Chinese-owned and-operated ports in Veracruz, Mexico, and Paranaguá, Brazil also operate virtually next door to host country military bases.</p> +<h4 id="the-past-is-prologue">The Past Is Prologue</h4> -<p>Even the raw data collected by port operators, which in the case of Chinese firms are required to hand over data to the CCP if deemed relevant for national security, can be a powerful strategic asset. Knowledge of shipping manifests, and vessel locations, as well as the ability to hold cargo, delay departures or prevent vessels from docking could be used, according to one recent study, “to selectively seize critical goods, such as medicines; divert or delay military components; or let essential supplies just sit in storage — no naval deployments needed.” Thus, the appearance of a gray-hulled PLAN destroyer in a LAC port does not encompass the totality of the dual-use challenge. Rather, the risks to U.S. and regional security and defense are a constant from the moment the first ship docks at a PRC-owned or operated terminal.</p> +<p>While this section does not provide a comprehensive list of legislative proposals and actions, the selected events and documents represent flashpoints that drove efforts to protect federal networks. Collectively, these events and milestones also paved the way for CISA to assume its important role as the cybersecurity lead for FCEB agencies.</p> -<p>The strategic relevance of dual-use infrastructure projects is further underscored by leaked U.S. intelligence documents that show several such projects included as part of “Project 141,” an ambitious effort by China to expand the global reach of its armed forces and power-projection capabilities. According to these documents, the PLA has identified overseas basing and logistics facilities as essential to China’s national security objectives and made it a priority to secure access to these bases by 2030. At the time of the leaks in April 2023, no facilities in the Western Hemisphere were included as Project 141 initiatives, though the Cuban training base would almost certainly qualify. Within the Western Hemisphere, two dual-use infrastructure projects carry implications for U.S. defense and security that are significant enough to describe here in detail.</p> +<p><strong>The diffuse and evolving character of cyber threats makes it difficult to galvanize more definitive policy responses.</strong> To date, the United States has not experienced a “cyber 9/11” or a “cyber Pearl Harbor.” Instead, the nation has experienced a series of cyber incidents that, while not necessarily small, have captured public attention to a much lesser degree than terrorist attacks. The result is twofold. On one extreme, certain FCEB leaders do not fully appreciate how cyber threats can impact an agency’s ability to carry out its mission. On the other extreme, there are policymakers, government leaders, and experts who are overeager to plan for the big cyber incident on the horizon — sometimes at the expense of sufficiently planning for the immediate and persistent “smaller” attacks that, when taken together, can greatly undermine the government’s ability to deliver basic services to the American people.</p> -<p>Chinese forays in the Panama Canal Zone have been the subject of growing alarm, most recently voiced at a high level by SOUTHCOM commander General Laura Richardson in her 2023 force posture statement before Congress.36 Since its inauguration, the canal has been a strategic commercial and military node in the hemisphere, further cemented as the site of SOUTHCOM’s original headquarters. As early as 1997, Hong Kong-based Hutchison Ports PPC won contracts to operate the ports of Balboa and Cristobal, located on the Pacific and Atlantic sides of the canal, respectively. While the move aroused controversy at the time, concerns were assuaged by the independence of Hong Kong relative to the rest of China, a status which Beijing has by and large dispensed with since 2019. In 2016, the Shandong-headquartered Landbridge Group acquired Margarita Island to the tune of nearly $1 billion, home to Panama’s strategically and commercially critical Colón Free Trade Zone (FTZ). Shortly thereafter, as Panama first switched diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in favor of China in 2017, and subsequently became the first Latin American country to accede to the BRI, plans moved forward for construction of a deep-water port in the Colón FTZ. Construction was to be helmed by the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC), two key state-owned enterprises that also happened to be part of the winning bid on the $1.3 billion contract to construct a fourth bridge over the Panama Canal.</p> +<p>Encouragingly, the past four administrations — in partnership with Congress, the private sector, and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments — have taken great strides to positively elevate cybersecurity, underscore the importance of coordination and collaboration, and at least nod toward the importance of enhancing resilience. But as the threat landscape evolves, so too does the need to create new entities, develop new policies, and adopt new security outlooks and models. While this is generally a welcome trend, without proper coordination or harmonization it can resurface some of the issues identified 20 years ago, such as the need for clearer delineation of cyber leadership roles, and the need for a greater sense of urgency from department and agency leads.</p> -<p>However, China’s progress on these efforts has been uneven. The government of Panama’s current president, Laurentino Cortizo, canceled the port project after a review from the Panama Maritime Authority found the project to be in violation of numerous contractual terms. Another proposal, for the Colón FTZ to be added to China’s “safe cities” initiative, was also rejected amid skepticism from the Cortizo government and pressure from the United States. However, these setbacks have not rolled back Chinese influence entirely. For example, 300 security cameras donated by China to help establish the Colón “safe city” remain in place; in 2021, Hutchison was granted a 25-year renewal of its port concessions; and, after a number of setbacks, CCCC and CHEC have moved forward with construction on the fourth canal bridge.</p> +<p>With regard to CISA, it is unequivocally clear that the agency is the operational lead for FCEB cybersecurity, and there is general bipartisan support to enhance CISA’s ability to carry out that mission. Logistically, however, there remain a number of questions, including but not limited to: What does it mean for CISA to sufficiently protect an FCEB network? What entities, federal or otherwise, play a formal or informal role in helping CISA protect federal networks? And how much of the security burden should FCEB entities manage on their own versus handing off to CISA?</p> -<p>The Panama Canal is perhaps the most important piece of infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere. For the United States’ blue-water navy, the canal reduces the average time needed to reposition forces between the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters by about five months, and commanders from World War II to the Persian Gulf campaign have cited its criticality to their efforts. For this reason, there are a number of mechanisms intended to prevent the canal from being disrupted in times of conflict, namely the Torrijos–Carter Treaties, which both established that the canal must remain neutral for international transit and enshrined the right of the United States to seize control in the event of a security threat to the canal’s continued operation. These measures mean China cannot easily use political or economic coercion to shut the canal in times of conflict, but U.S. military planners should not overlook the potential for China or others to disrupt access, either through sabotage or kinetic efforts, or by selectively manipulating the infrastructure and data that feeds this critical maritime artery. If China were to deny the canal to U.S. warships during a crisis, even momentarily, it could spell fatal consequences for forward-deployed units in the Indo-Pacific. During peacetime as well, China benefits from access to Hutchison’s shipping data and camera systems, which the company is obliged to share due to China’s stringent “national security” law.</p> +<p>In September 2022, CISA unveiled its Strategic Plan: 2023-2025 — the agency’s first since its creation in 2018 — and followed it up in August 2023 with its Strategic Plan: FY2024-2026. What immediately stands out is that CISA’s mission space is vast and that its role as the leader of FCEB cybersecurity is just one of many hats it wears as the nation’s cyber defense agency. <strong>Moving forward, it will be important that the executive and legislative branches continue to empower CISA in ways that responsibly grow its capabilities, authorities, and resources without overextending or compromising its ability to carry out its mission.</strong></p> -<p>Further south, the Espacio Lejano Station in Neuquén Province, Argentina, has drawn consternation for the direct role of Chinese military forces from the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) in its quotidian operations. Espacio Lejano represents China’s only deep space ground station in the southern hemisphere, thus filling an important coverage gap in China’s space domain awareness. The internal workings of the station are remarkably opaque, even by the standards of China’s dealings, with the media describing the facility as a “black box.” The facility is officially considered sovereign Chinese territory, and Argentina is barred from conducting inspections. The equipment contained in Espacio Lejano possesses important dual-use telemetry tracking and control (TT&amp;C) capabilities, used for monitoring and providing positional guidance to satellites in orbit. In times of conflict, the TT&amp;C capacity found here would greatly augment China’s anti-satellite warfare operations, a capability the PLA has assiduously cultivated since its first successful anti-satellite test in 2007. Even more concerning is the fact that the United States’ own satellite coverage of the southern hemisphere remains incomplete. Therefore, Espacio Lejano not only offers the PLASSF an important capability to degrade or deny the space domain to the United States but also could enable China to conduct attacks with conventional or hypersonic missiles against the homeland, striking up from Antarctica and, in the process, evading U.S. missile defenses, the majority of which are oriented toward the Arctic.</p> +<h3 id="the-current-state">The Current State</h3> -<p>The risks are compounded by the fact that China has pursued space cooperation agreements throughout Latin America. These include physical infrastructure in the form of satellite ground stations in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Chile. Elsewhere in Argentina, a proposed ground station in Rio Gallegos, close to the southernmost point of the country, promises to augment China’s coverage of the Southern Hemisphere and enhance the ability of China’s stations in Antarctica to communicate with the rest of China’s space support network. Today, LAC with the greatest quantity of PRC space infrastructure outside of mainland China. China’s efforts also encompass technical and diplomatic cooperation, such as the China–Brazil Earth Resources Satellite program and the recent incorporation of Venezuela into China’s lunar research station project. Thus, as concerning as the Espacio Lejano station is, it ought to be considered as part of a broader effort by China to establish space domain awareness under the nose and in the blind spot of the United States.</p> +<p>Despite the generational struggle to secure FCEB agencies in cyberspace, there are signs of hope on the horizon. Consider the operations of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Amid all the excitement and chaos surrounding a non-cyber event, a lesser-known operation can be simultaneously underway: a CISA incident response exercise. While it is not ideal to run a network intrusion exercise, what the mission leaders at NASA understand well is that inconvenient times are precisely when an adversary is most likely to attack. Stress-testing responses during real, critical missions is the best way to assess preparedness and system resilience plans. Furthermore, the case shows the art of the possible: agency-level coordination and planning that takes advantage of CDM and threat hunt capabilities.</p> -<p>The above represent just two of a startling array of projects currently being pursued by China. Other noteworthy infrastructure projects either under development or proposed include a potential expansion of the port at La Unión in El Salvador, to be carried out by China-based Asia Pacific Xuanhao (APX), as well as the nearly completed $1.3 billion deep-water port of Chancay near Lima, Peru, where construction is managed by a laundry list of Chinese state-owned enterprises, including CCCC, CHEC, China Railway, and Cosco Shipping. China has also pursued several leads in its search for a foothold along the Strait of Magellan from which it could strengthen its strategic position in the Antarctic, as well as monitor and disrupt maritime traffic through that global choke point in times of conflict. These efforts have included talks with the Chilean government to grant access to port facilities in Punta Arenas and overtures to Argentina to help construct a “polar logistics facility” in Ushuaia. After Buenos Aires rebuffed these efforts under U.S. pressure, China pivoted again to a commercial strategy, with the state-owned Shaanxi Chemical Industry Group reportedly signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in May 2023 with the provincial government of Tierra del Fuego to build a multipurpose port in Rio Grande.</p> +<p>CISA’s cybersecurity services to FCEB agencies are varied. Some, such as its system monitoring and threat hunting initiatives, rely on CISA’s technical capabilities. Others, like its ability to run scenario exercises for FCEB entities, rely on the agency’s ability to leverage partnerships, relevant expertise, and guidance in ways that can support FCEB agencies’ individual plans to secure their respective networks. All require coordination and planning that align agency interests across a diverse set of stakeholders in the FCEB space.</p> -<p>The security challenges posed by dual-use facilities are inherently difficult to estimate, as they depend not only on their technical specifications but also on how such facilities would factor into Chinese strategies and plans for military confrontation. Nevertheless, Beijing’s close involvement with the construction of so many critical infrastructure projects in the Western Hemisphere undoubtedly gives China more options for how and where it may project power within the United States’ shared neighborhood.</p> +<p>These services have been met with varying degrees of tangible and perceived success. To properly assess current cyber services offered, it is important to evaluate how these initiatives have evolved in recent years and the ways in which FCEB entities actually interact with and utilize them. The non-mutually exclusive categories below underscore some of the primary cybersecurity services that CISA offers to FCEB agencies.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/uk2Aynh.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Map 1: Known PRC Infrastructure Projects.</strong> Source: Isaac B. Kardon and Wendy Leutert, “Pier Competitor: China’s Power Position in Global Ports,” International Security 46, no. 4 (2022): 9–47, doi:10.1162/isec_a_00433; <a href="https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-ground-stations-space/">Matthew P. Funaiole et al., “Eyes on the Skies: China’s Growing Space Footprint in South America,” CSIS, Hidden Reach no. 1, October 4, 2022</a>; and elaborated with authors’ research based on multiple sources cited throughout this report.</em></p> +<h4 id="risk-assessment-and-vulnerability-management-pre-incident">Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Management (Pre-incident)</h4> -<h4 id="2-citizen-security-assistance">2. CITIZEN SECURITY ASSISTANCE</h4> +<p>Arguably some of CISA’s most important programs are those that help FCEB agencies gain greater visibility into their networks, allowing them to proactively identify and defend against bad actors on their systems. Over the next few years, this is one area where CISA looks to expand its capabilities, especially as adversaries grow more adept at circumventing traditional cyber defenses.</p> -<p>While the United States remains predominant in military-to-military cooperation, China has identified citizen security as an area ripe for expansion, opening the door to displacing the United States in military-to-military cooperation someday. As LAC countries grapple with resurgent transnational organized crime and under-resourced, sometimes corrupt police forces, such overtures are sure to meet with a receptive audience. Indeed, the “China-CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas (2022–2024)” positions political and security cooperation first, ahead of even economic cooperation and development. The inauguration of the wide-ranging GSI promises to elevate China’s focus on security engagement with LAC further still.</p> +<p><strong>Visibility and assessment tools can only be effective if they communicate with each other and can collectively provide an accurate, robust, and up-to-date picture of existing vulnerabilities.</strong> Since investments in pre-incident detection capabilities are rapidly growing, with the goal of providing more visibility for FCEB agencies and CISA, it is important to assess the state of current services and planned initiatives by asking the following: Are updates being clearly communicated to relevant industry and FCEB partners? Will there be any visibility gaps when moving from older to newer monitoring systems? And do planned activities integrate well with other services offered by CISA? While interviews with and public announcements from CISA representatives indicate that the agency is tracking these questions and looking for ways to facilitate smooth transitions, some outside stakeholders might need further convincing that CISA will not only prioritize data integration but also have the capabilities to do so in a seamless way.</p> -<p>To understand where such engagement may lead, it is instructive to first look beyond the Western Hemisphere. China’s security cooperation agreement with the Solomon Islands offers a concerning portent — China has shown its ability to leverage cooperation on citizen security issues to gain advantages in the defense and military domains. While the text makes no mention of explicit military cooperation or basing, it intentionally conflates Chinese police and military personnel and includes a provision allowing for Chinese forces to conduct logistical replenishment in the islands. The Solomon Islands’ subsequent denial of port calls to all U.S. Coast Guard vessels further demonstrates the cumulative implications such Chinese engagement can have on freedom of navigation operations. Should this model of security cooperation become ascendant in LAC, it would likely grant Beijing a freer hand to project power within the Western Hemisphere.</p> +<h4 id="from-einstein-to-cads">From EINSTEIN to CADS</h4> -<p>This trend can already be observed in LAC, where police exchanges and training programs are starting to mature. While attention is often focused on the PLA and military exchanges, China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) has expanded its overseas reach and sought to compete directly with U.S. police assistance programs offered by agencies such as the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) at the Department of State. According to one analysis of MPS capacity-building programs, LAC ranks third in terms of overall allocation of MPS trainings, behind Asia and Africa, receiving 12 percent of all such programming between 2004 and 2021. In 2019 alone, these activities included a 15-member delegation from the Peruvian national police to Zhongshan to study counternarcotics and methods for countering fraud, 14-member delegations from Brazil and Cuba, and an anti-drug seminar at China’s Shandong Police College that hosted two dozen members of the Royal Grenada Police Force. China also sells and donates military-grade equipment to police forces throughout the hemisphere, often with substantial public relations campaigns, such as when it donated 6,000 ballistic vests to the Panamanian police forces shortly after the fatal shooting of one of their officers. Other recipients of Chinese police equipment include Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Trinidad and Tobago, among others.</p> +<p>In its <em>2022 Year in Review</em>, CISA noted that it will be sunsetting the legacy EINSTEIN program and building out newer capabilities in its place that are better able to monitor and detect network intrusions. It will be important for CISA to focus efforts on clearly communicating what aspects of EINSTEIN will continue, what will be improved, and what, if any, visibility or service gaps might arise during transition periods. <strong>The modernization of well-known, well-utilized capabilities like EINSTEIN should be clearly articulated to all stakeholders so as to not unintentionally create new areas of confusion.</strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/toFOuql.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: China’s Police Engagement.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-expanding-international-reach-of-chinas-police/">Jordan Link, The Expanding International Reach of China’s Police (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, October 2022)</a>; and elaborated with authors’ research based on multiple sources cited throughout this report.</em></p> +<p>CISA’s EINSTEIN program is an intrusion detection system that monitors traffic coming in and out of FCEB networks. The program was initially developed in 2004 by the U.S. Computer Readiness Team and consists of three phases: EINSTEIN 1, EINSTEIN 2, and EINSTEIN 3. Traditionally, FCEB agencies would enter partnership agreements with CISA that essentially allow it to install systems and sensors for collecting information on potential threats to the network. The program operated as an early warning system with “near real-time” awareness of potentially malicious cyber activity. Per an interviewed expert with deep knowledge of the evolution of the program, most FCEB agencies are only aware of the EINSTEIN sensors — the connection points. However, that is only 10 percent of EINSTEIN. There is a larger infrastructure behind the program that collects inputs from a number of other feeds to provide more robust information.</p> -<p>Digital security assistance represents a growing area of concern and perhaps one of the sectors in which China has shown the greatest savvy in marketing itself to potential LAC partners. China’s “safe cities” initiative represents the culmination of such policies, with an estimated 12 countries across LAC that have deployed Chinese-made surveillance technologies, including in Ecuador, Guyana, and Suriname. Beyond formal “safe cities,” Chinese telecommunications and technology companies such as Huawei, Hikvision, and Dahua have been actively involved in installing interconnected monitoring systems, including cameras and other sensors empowered by biometrics and analytical capabilities throughout the hemisphere. These capabilities are themselves troubling but are made doubly concerning given their tendency to be clustered by embassies, ports, and other sensitive facilities. These approaches to citizen security attempt to replicate China’s own domestic model of policing, which involves conducting mass data collection in the name of tracking and preventing criminal activity. They also carry understandable appeal for policymakers in LAC, especially at the municipal and mayoral level, where crime and violence remain the most proximate threats. To these leaders, China’s promises of efficient, orderly, and comprehensive security are seen as useful to curb the powerful transnational criminal enterprises that have penetrated the highest echelons of power in every country in the hemisphere and curry favor with voters who increasingly report security as a top concern. However, absent significant reforms to public security institutions, and training these police forces on proper storage and cybersecurity measures, there is a serious risk that widespread adoption may simply grant China a back door through which to access the personal data of millions of individuals, companies, and government organizations throughout LAC.</p> +<p>The stated plan is for EINSTEIN’s “analytics, information sharing, and core infrastructure” capabilities to shift to CISA’s Cyber Analytic and Data Systems (CADS). This will allow CISA to “more rapidly analyze, correlate, and take action to address cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities before damaging intrusions occur.” The overarching concept is for CISA to be the center of FCEB and critical infrastructure threat intelligence, centralizing this data enables analytics that may identify individual events or the spread of events, which in turn will enable faster detection and notification. For FY 2023, CISA targeted $91 million of funding to keep its National Cybersecurity Protection System, which is known for its EINSTEIN set of capabilities. Of the $1.8 billion requested by CISA for FY 2024 efforts related to its FCEB mission, CISA is requesting approximately $425 million dollars specifically for CADS. EINSTEN 1 and EINSTEIN 2 capabilities will primarily be under the authority of the new CISA CADS team, while CISA’s Protective DNS and proposed Protective Email services will serve as a successor to EINSTEIN’s 3A capabilities. The Protective DNS service, distributed across various locations, blocks attempts to access potentially harmful online resources — such as domains or IP addresses — identified by threat data from commercial sources, governments, and agencies. It logs the associated DNS traffic for detailed analysis. Furthermore, this service complies with the mandate from DHS under Title 6 of the U.S. Code, Section 663, which emphasizes the need to detect and mitigate cyber threats in network traffic.</p> -<p>Formal collaboration with police also opens the door to more overt forms of Chinese police presence in the hemisphere. While China approaches the question of overseas military basing with caution, it reportedly operates 14 overseas police outposts across 10 LAC countries. The physical presence of representatives from the People’s Armed Police in LAC countries is a major victory for one of the GSI’s core principles: to make the CCP’s state security — and by extension, party security — a matter of foreign policy. In some cases, an expanded overseas police presence may be welcomed by some countries, such as in 2016 when China and Argentina collaborated to bring down the Pixiu mafia, the most active Chinese criminal organization in Argentina. However, looking beyond the hemisphere once again reveals the troubling consequences of such collaboration. In Fiji for instance, Chinese police forces rounded up more than a hundred suspected criminals and sent them back to China in 2017 with only a modicum of cooperation with Fijian police and no extradition agreement in place. China’s globetrotting police operations Fox Hunt and Sky Net have also faced scrutiny after reports of Chinese forces engaging in state-sponsored kidnapping and targeting of political dissidents outside of China. Such incidents suggest that China has few qualms about violating other countries’ sovereignty when confronting a perceived threat to domestic order and tranquility.</p> +<p>Ultimately, the creation of CADS is also supposed to support the larger Joint Collaborative Environment (JCE), an “interoperable environment for sharing and fusing threat information, insights, and other relevant data” between and across public and private sectors. This initiative was first introduced by the CSC, and in recent months CISA has mentioned that it is actively working to build it out, despite no formal direction and funding from Congress (see Recommendation 1.2 on Congress authorizing and funding a JCE).</p> -<p>The final piece in Beijing’s vision of security engagement involves a burgeoning number of Chinese private security companies (PSCs). Many of these firms are well established in Africa and Southeast Asia, where they play a role in protecting important investments and project sites, especially in fragile country contexts. In LAC, the on-the-ground presence of PRC-based security contractors has been more muted thus far, but they have been carefully preparing the legal terrain to significantly scale up activity in the region. The China Overseas Security Group, for instance, has reported conducting fieldwork in Argentina “to prepare the establishment of branch offices.” Meanwhile, the Zhong Bao Hua An Security Company has also reportedly held strategic cooperation dialogues with the governments of Panama, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. PSCs play a growing role in China’s strategy of political warfare and pursuit of strategic goals well beyond China’s borders. As one CSIS analysis notes: “Even if the activities conducted by a given PSC are not directly related to China’s geopolitical goals, they present an additional threat vector that allows Beijing to build nontraditional security and political relationships through market forces.” Indeed, China’s substantial economic interests in the region provide natural cover for an expansion of PSCs as necessary to protect key investments in an increasingly challenging security context. Shandong Huawei Security Group already contracts with Chinese mining companies in Africa, while the China Security Technology Group signed a $21 million contract in 2018 with Grand Tai Peru S.A.C. to provide security services in the mining sector. An expansion of Chinese PSCs in the hemisphere would augment China’s ability to provide security assistance training and services to host governments, further undercutting the United States’ role as partner of choice in the security space.</p> +<p>Given that a mix of programs is already underway, and that others are still up for approval and authorization, it will be incumbent on CISA to provide routine status updates of the transition progress from EINSTEIN to CADS and to offer possible workarounds for any delays.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VSgkpoL.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Map 2: PRC Police Outposts and Extradition Agreements.</strong> Source: <a href="https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/patrol-and-persuade-follow-110-overseas-investigation">Safeguard Defenders, Patrol and Persuade: A follow-up investigation to 110 Overseas (Safeguard Defenders, December 2022)</a>; and <a href="https://fiugis.maps.arcgis.com/apps/dashboards/58ace2b67a37433b90ce46fd62318b8e">“China’s Activities in Latin America Dashboard,” FIU, Security Research Hub</a>.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="circia-powering-cads-with-the-right-kind-of-information"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CIRCIA: Powering CADS with the Right Kind of Information</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="3-humanitarian-assistance-and-disaster-relief">3. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF</h4> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A key part of CADS is ensuring that quality, comprehensive information is fed into the system. In March 2022, Congress passed the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA). For decades, when critical infrastructure facilities and FCEB agencies were victims of a cyber incident, they were not legally required to report the incident to the federal government. CIRCIA, among other things, tasks CISA to outline cyber incident reporting requirements for “covered entities.” CISA has until March 2024 to publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and then 18 months to publish the Final Rule. Until this goes into effect, cyber incident reporting is still voluntary — though strongly encouraged — with industry providing feedback on the best way to structure reporting and deconflict with other requirements, including those of the Security and Exchange Commission.</code></em></p> -<p>If there is a sector where the United States ought to adopt a permissive approach to PLA activity in the hemisphere, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) is the most likely contender. Here the United States is likely to remain the partner of choice, owing to its relationships with and proximity to the region, as well as the strong logistical capabilities of the U.S. armed forces. While Chinese efforts have been comparatively limited, spending just $19 million on HADR in the Western Hemisphere between 2010 and 2022, they remain an important means of enhancing China’s reputation and capabilities. Historically, HADR has opened doors for China in the region, such as when the PLA and Peruvian armed forces conducted a joint training exercise in the use of a mobile military hospital in 2010. The PLAN’s hospital ship, the Peace Ark, also visited the region in 2011 and 2018 and represents an important tool in China’s naval engagement with the hemisphere. China has also worked to establish the China-CELAC Ministerial Forum on Cooperation and Management of Disaster Risk Reduction as a channel for multilateral coordination between Beijing and the region.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">To be successful, CISA needs to identify regulations that collect necessary information without placing undue burdens on reporting entities. It must also make sure that new regulations are harmonized with existing reporting requirements. Relevant to CADS, if CISA is able to structure reporting requirements in a way that goes beyond just notifying the authorities that an incident has occurred but that also captures the technical attributes of an attack, that information can be pulled into CADS at machine speed and provide greater visibility.</code></em></p> -<p>Nevertheless, while there may be reasons to welcome an expanded Chinese HADR commitment to the Western Hemisphere, there is cause for skepticism as well. China has evinced a willingness to use disaster response as a political bargaining chip, such as in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan when China delayed the delivery of aid to the Philippines as a result of ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Even within the hemisphere, it is telling that the Peace Ark’s past deployments have focused on providing medical assistance to China’s authoritarian allies in Venezuela and Cuba, an approach which risks treating the symptoms of humanitarian emergency while simultaneously propping up the which drive such crises.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">CIRCIA reporting requirements will bring critical event data into CADS and illuminate events from smaller companies that had not previously been engaged. This thwarts adversary efforts to attack smaller members of the supply chain in the hopes of remaining “below the radar” (see Recommendation 2.2 on reporting requirements).</code></em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rNnY80V.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ Soldiers lower a boat from a trailer to help evacuate people in the municipality of La Lima, near San Pedro Sula, 240 km north of Tegucigalpa, an area flooded due to the overflowing of the Chamelecon river after the passage of Hurricane Iota, on November 18, 2020.</em></p> +<p>Increased investments in gathering and analyzing cyber data can increase FCEB network security. First, because the majority of internet traffic takes place on private sector networks, understanding the vulnerability landscape based on incident reporting serves as a form of early warning for the federal government. Investments in CADS that enable machine speed analysis of emerging vulnerabilities and the likelihood of exploitation by different actors empower agency CISOs to manage risk. To be effective, this new data-driven approach to risk analysis will need to ensure proper communication and coordination, as well as a historical inventory of vulnerabilities supporting longitudinal assessments.</p> -<p>Furthermore, one report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission found that “Beijing also exploits HA/DR-related exchanges to learn combat skills from and gather intelligence on advanced militaries, particularly the United States and its allies and partners.” Given the close collaboration between LAC armed forces and the United States on HADR responses, expanded Chinese involvement in such operations could open the door to greater awareness of U.S. capabilities and tactics. The China-CELAC disaster forum illustrates how China views cooperation on disaster response as a means to expand its ability to operate militarily in the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, many of the topics discussed, such as increased information sharing, exercises, and access to LAC countries’ logistics infrastructure, would also help to grow China’s knowledge and relationships, which it could then exploit in times of conflict or crisis.</p> +<p><strong>CONTINUOUS DIAGNOSTICS AND MITIGATION (CDM) PROGRAM</strong></p> -<p>Finally, the participation of 130 Chinese riot police in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti from 2004 to 2012 stands out as a notable case of engagement in humanitarian missions in a country that continues to officially recognize Taiwan. As climate change increases the vulnerability of the region to natural disasters, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations could provide China with inroads for operating within other Taiwanese diplomatic allies such as Guatemala and the Caribbean island states.</p> +<p>Increasing investments in the technical analysis of cyber vulnerabilities produces a library against which to monitor FCEB agencies. Along these lines, CISA has made the CDM program a central focus of its efforts to ramp up network defense. The Biden administration’s FY 2024 budget requests $408 million for CDM, an increase from the $292 million that was appropriated in FY 2022 and the $332 million appropriated in FY 2023. Per Michael Duffy, CISA’s associate director for capacity building, it is “the U.S. government’s cornerstone for proactive, coordinated, and agile cyber defense of the federal enterprise.” <strong>Given its critical role, it is essential not only that CDM efforts are sufficiently resourced in the coming years, but that there are plans in place for long-term funding so that FCEBs can continue to benefit from the CDM program without disrupting current services.</strong></p> -<h4 id="4-arms-sales-and-equipment-transfers">4. ARMS SALES AND EQUIPMENT TRANSFERS</h4> +<p>Whereas EINSTEIN provides perimeter defense, CISA’s CDM program works within FCEB networks to further enhance overall security. Developed in 2012, CDM provides cybersecurity tools, integration services, and a user-friendly dashboard to FCEB agencies so that CISA can gain greater visibility into FCEB networks. Many of the core concepts within CDM date back to NIST guidance from 2011 and early experiments by the Department of State and Army Research Lab in support of DOD networks.</p> -<p>China is the fourth-largest supplier of conventional arms globally, behind only the United States, Russia, and France. In spite of a decline following the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, Beijing has made strategic investments to insert itself in key sectors, including combat aviation, missiles, and uncrewed vehicles. Furthermore, Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine has opened new opportunities for China to fill the gap when it comes to providing a similar supply of low-cost, no-frills weapons and equipment. Notably, Western sanctions on the Russian defense industry, combined with the steep attrition rates for military equipment in high-intensity modern warfare, has caused Moscow’s arms exports to fall from 22 percent to 16 percent of the global market, and such exports are set to decline even further in 2023. China, which currently captures 5 percent of the arms market, and is home to 6 of the top 25 defense companies, is well positioned to step into this gap.</p> +<p>Overall, the CDM program engages technologies to identify and protect electronic assets, then displays the status on a dashboard, a bit like a running car will show the activity ranges of its components. It is complementary to EINSTEIN and CADS in that it provides the inner workings of a network while a program such as CADS analyzes perimeter activity for ingress and egress attempts.</p> -<p>Arms sales facilitate broad, long-term Chinese military relationships with countries in the region. When one country buys a weapons system from another, they are not just buying the physical gear but often are signing a contract for post-sale parts and servicing, which must be done typically by technicians from or certified by the seller country. Likewise, such purchases often also create a dependency on that country for replacement parts.</p> +<p>The CDM program specifically offers five program areas: (1) a dashboard that receives, aggregates, and displays cyber health at the agency and federal level; (2) asset management to answer the question “What is on the network?”; (3) identity and access management to answer the question “Who is on the network?”; (4) network security management to answer the question “What is actually happening on the network?”; and (5) data protection management. The CDM program then uses data collected through its suite of tools to populate agency-level dashboards to 23 agencies, as well as a federal version. The agency dashboard is a data visualization tool that produces reports and alerts IT managers to critical cybersecurity risks. The federal dashboard provides a macro-level view that consolidates information from each agency-level dashboard for a better picture of cybersecurity health across all civilian agencies. Dashboards in turn become an important tool for visualizing and describing risk, a capability that can be further enhanced through migrating to a JCE and longitudinal analysis. The CDM program is an excellent tool for measuring compliance, but far beyond this, it dynamically measures security and risk, enabling a combination of best-in-class tools and metrics to determine success.</p> -<p>China already has a substantial presence in the region. Venezuela in particular is notable for being the first LAC country to purchase Chinese military radars, while Chinese VN-4 armored personnel carriers saw action in 2017 during the Maduro regime’s crushing of anti-regime protesters. Meanwhile, Bolivia is one of the largest Chinese clients in the hemisphere, having purchased millions of dollars in weapons from China, including capabilities from small arms and night vision goggles to artillery, helicopters, and planes. China has also made several large donations to the Bolivian armed forces. Peru increasingly merits close attention, having acquired 27 Type-90BM multiple rocket launchers from China, and previously the Peruvian defense ministry contemplated purchasing MBT-2000 tanks. In 2012, the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) successfully convinced Peru to cancel a more than $100 million contract with Northrop Grumman for man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), replacing these with China’s indigenous QW-series MANPADs instead. With Peru’s defense acquisitions budget set to grow by 116 percent in 2023, and surpass $200 million by 2028, the Peruvian armed forces represent a potentially rich market for Chinese military hardware.</p> +<p>CISA advertises that CDM will directly help FCEB agencies by reducing agency threat surface, increasing visibility, improving response capabilities, and providing assistance more generally. CISA has also issued Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 23-01 which mandates regular, automated reporting to CDM for FCEB agencies. The impact of BOD 23-01 for CISA and FCEB agencies is significant: by mandating the automation of data, the gains are bidirectional. Where CISA gains further visibility into the federal enterprise, so do FCEB agencies, helping them both manage risk in their operations and tailor responses such as patching or threat hunting.</p> -<p>More recently, the Argentine air force’s consideration of the JF-17 fighter jet, mostly as a means to evade the United Kingdom’s supply chain chokehold on ejector seats through English company Martin Baker, has been perhaps the highest-profile instance of China’s arms export efforts in the region. The deal has gone through multiple rounds of negotiation, with a U.S. counteroffer proposing Danish F-16s as an alternative initially being rebuffed by Argentine defense minister Jorge Taiana on account of difficulties procuring replacement parts and the fact that the F-16s would come without weapons. While it appears Argentina has circled back to consider the F-16, finalization of such a deal would have represented one of the most sophisticated transfers of Chinese military capabilities to a South American country and would include a multi-year partnership between China and Argentina to train, sustain, and repair the aircraft.</p> +<p>With the new authorities granted to CISA in the FY 2021 NDAA, CISA no longer needs formal agreements to actively carry out threat hunting on FCEB networks. Acquiring those formal agreements consumed valuable time that delayed incident response. Even as recently as a few years ago, CISA had to heavily rely on voluntary security reports from FCEB agencies. Now, new authorities coupled with new endpoint technologies allow CISA to view and collect object-level data across FCEB networks and to produce instantaneous threat reports that match the pace of adversary activity. At the same time, the technical ability to hunt on an agency network does not usurp requirements for collaborative planning and risk discussions. While CISA is making technical strides, the area it needs to refine is how best to leverage network access and a common operating picture to support risk management across the FCEB landscape. <strong>Technology absent planning is subject to diminishing marginal returns</strong> (see Recommendation 1.1 on consistent funding streams).</p> -<p>In addition to sales, China has bolstered its position in the region with donations, including of a patrol boat to the Barbados Defense Force in 2018, a Y-12 transport aircraft and military construction equipment to the Guyanese Defense Force in 2012, and vehicles to the Dominican Republic’s military in 2020. Both sales and gifts exploit China’s centralized power structure to outmaneuver the United States and deliver on timelines which may take only a fraction of the time to arrive compared to U.S. equipment. Therefore, while many LAC militaries have expressed their preference for U.S. equipment, the lengthy approval processes associated with U.S. defense exports have pushed many into China’s arms for their defense needs. This is compounded by the fact that much of the equipment included in China’s sales and donations — from ambulances to Peru, to bridge laying equipment to Colombia, to the more than 700 logistics support vehicles recently delivered to Ecuador — do not represent top-line combat capabilities. Rather, they are practical tools in high demand across regional militaries, delivered on a timeline that foments goodwill among recipient countries, especially when U.S. equipment packages remain mired in arms export bureaucracy. China’s operations demonstrate the importance of delivering with speed and meeting partners’ needs, as expressed on their own terms.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="two-is-better-than-one"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Two Is Better Than One</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Ot4Eg2A.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Chinese Arms Sales to LAC.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers">“Trade Registers,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, n.d.</a>.</em></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">CISA director Jen Easterly described the power of CADS and CDM in a congressional hearing as the following: “Together . . . these programs provide the technological foundation to secure and defend FCEB departments and agencies against advanced cyber threats. CDM enhances the overall security posture of FCEB networks by providing FCEB agencies and CISA’s operators with the capability to identify, prioritize, and address cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities, including through the deployment of Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR), cloud security capabilities, and network security controls.”</code></em></p> -<p>Finally, China has evinced a greater willingness to take part in joint ventures to co-develop and manufacture new weapons systems. The JF-17s considered by Argentina, for instance, are the product of a joint venture by China and Pakistan, a partnership which also birthed Pakistan’s new MBT-2000 tank. An earlier version of the JF-17 deal even suggested that China might transfer technology and co-produce the planes with Argentina. Such a partnership with LAC defense sectors could establish a durable and long-term military-to-military pipeline between China and the region. One candidate for such a joint venture could be Venezuela, which co-developed its Tiuna jeeps with Iran and has allegedly entered into an agreement to construct Iranian Mohajer-2 loitering munitions. However, given the collapsed state of Venezuela’s industrial and scientific base, a Chinese partnership with a country that is home to a more robust defense sector, such as Brazil, could be cause for even greater concern. More importantly, Chinese defense industrial supply chains tend to avoid many suppliers in the West, making them attractive alternatives to governments worried about being cut off for human rights, corruption, or governance concerns.</p> +<p>In many ways, CISA’s CDM program is good news. CISA reported in its FY 2023 Q2 update that 55 percent of federal agencies automatically report to CDM. This means they have already surpassed their goal of getting half of all agencies to automate reporting by the end of the fiscal year. Additionally, a 2022 MeriTalk survey of federal and industry stakeholders reported that 93 percent of respondents believed that CDM had improved federal cyber resilience in several ways, with 84 percent noting that CDM actively helped entities comply with EO 14028 requirements. These sentiments seem consistent with those of the experts interviewed for this project. However, in that same MeriTalk survey, only 28 percent of respondents gave CDM an A grade, with responses to other questions demonstrating a belief that CDM is a compliance-based activity (rather than a risk management activity) and that it has a way to go before it reaches its full potential (see Recommendation 2.7 on CDM after-action reviews).</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VetwB1t.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Chinese, Russian, and U.S. Arms Sales by Share to Selected LAC Countries, 2000–2022 (%).</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers">Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Top list TIV tables”</a>.</em></p> +<p>The biggest problem, however, is that the CDM funding model is not ideal and that agencies have yet to develop a common risk planning framework tied to resources. Currently, CDM is structured so that CISA covers the initial cost of required tools for two years, after which the FCEB agencies are required to pay for their continued use and maintenance by themselves. There are reasonable concerns that some FCEB agencies are not able or willing to sufficiently budget for the continued use of these tools. Setting aside general inflation-related cost increases, FCEB agencies might not be appropriately factoring into their budget plans the outyear costs for CDM. Current and former CISOs interviewed by CSIS expressed that vendors are closely monitoring these deadlines and coming back to FCEB agencies with tools that are cheaper than the ones that agencies might currently be using but that are not necessarily as capable. As one expert noted, “there’s a lot of chum in the water,” and the situation is difficult for some FCEB agencies to navigate. There are major security concerns as well: CISA invests time and resources to help agencies integrate specific tools, so when those FCEB entities switch to alternatives, CISA might lose progress or visibility for a set period of time as those new tools are integrated into the network — assuming they are ever properly migrated to the CISA dashboard.</p> -<h4 id="5-joint-training-and-exercises">5. JOINT TRAINING AND EXERCISES</h4> +<p>CISA is in a difficult position. As one expert interviewee acknowledged, CISA is managing expectations and has been generous in its time and general efforts to stand up these programs with FCEB agencies. The general funding model is not ideal, but it also cannot provide guarantees of financial support beyond a set period of time.</p> -<p>At the other end on the spectrum of Chinese defense and security engagement in LAC lies participation in joint training and exercises. China has been making comparatively small but compounding inroads in developing partnerships with regional militaries, including key U.S. allies such as Brazil and Colombia. Indeed, Chinese forces have participated in courses at Colombia’s Lancero School for special operations as well as the world-renowned Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Joint Training Center and the Jungle Warfare Training Center. The latter is of note, as a future conflict scenario in the Indo-Pacific, including over Taiwan, would most certainly involve combat in jungle terrain. Training with Brazilian and Colombian armed forces also gives the PLA indirect exposure to U.S. doctrine and, in this respect, could play a direct role in helping develop China’s military capabilities for a U.S.-China conflict scenario.</p> +<p>The net result is that CDM has made strides in monitoring over half of the FCEB agencies, but the future is clouded by complex bureaucratic and budgeting questions. Even if an agency can resource CDM after the initial two-year window, it struggles to forecast how much it will cost and is confronted with a labyrinth of rules surrounding which congressionally approved budget vehicles and authorities it can use to essentially “buy” security (see Recommendation 1.1 on properly resourcing CDM). In other words, beyond CDM, CISA will need to develop planning frameworks that help align resources against risk assessments and competing budgetary requirements, alongside other actors such as the ONCD and OMB. The federal government cannot buy cybersecurity off-the-shelf products alone to solve the problem. It needs to revisit how it plans and manages resources related to securing networks across FCEB agencies (see Recommendation 2.9 on risks that accompany FCEB budget strategies) as well as how to create dashboards agencies can tailor to monitor their networks.</p> -<p>While PLA forces are travelling to LAC, hundreds of officers from across the region have also received training in China at a variety of institutions, including the Chinese National Defense University. At least 18 LAC countries have sent personnel to China to receive a variety of courses offered to groups ranging from second lieutenants to colonels and higher. China trained more officers from LAC countries than the United States for the first time in 2015 and would continue to do so for at least four more years. However, Chinese PME overall remains focused on field grade officers, who rank between major and colonel, with fewer inroads at the captain rank and below, and more nascent efforts to engage non-commissioned officers. This is changing, however, as China works to overhaul its military education institutions and further position itself as a leading source for PME.</p> +<p>At the same time that NIST moved to standardize information security continuous monitoring, the cybersecurity community started to hypothesize a coming paradigm shift. Rather than being the “hunted,” constantly responding to threats after they turned into incidents on the defended network, the CISO would become the “hunter.” The concept relates to a practice in the early 2000s by U.S. Air Force personnel, who used the term “hunter-killer” to describe teams of cybersecurity experts conducting force protection on their networks. The term evolved to describe how senior cybersecurity experts would train new analysts by taking them on “hunting trips.” Many of these practices paralleled the rise of using more active red teams to test network defense, as well as a new focus on advanced persistent threats in the cybersecurity community to describe more robust government-sponsored threats.</p> -<p>As with arms sales, these exchanges create durable linkages between the PLA and LAC militaries by sharing doctrine but also, even more importantly, by demystifying and marketing China to military personnel across the region. Indeed, reports from individuals familiar with China’s approach to training suggest that comparatively little effort is devoted to exchanging information on tactics, operations, and military best practices. Instead, China spends lavishly on visiting officers, many of whom will likely be visiting for the first time. Furthermore, one recent assessment of Chinese PME found trainings on human rights, democracy, and military ethics — mainstays of U.S. efforts — were largely absent from PRC training programs. China’s hope is that such efforts cultivate a favorable view of the country among attendees, who will in turn be more likely to advocate for participation in future trainings to their colleagues and carry such positive impressions with them long into their careers. In at least one of its training courses, programming included material seeking to convince LAC militaries that the United States is not a partner of choice for defense cooperation.</p> +<p>In practice, the move from CDM to threat hunt will likely involve more than just purchasing new software. From its origin, the practice involved a mix of red-teaming exercises that connected discrete events across a data sample on possible vulnerabilities. That is, similar to the process envisioned by the JCE, the process requires a repository of data — including common coding typologies such as MITRE ATT&amp;CK — to be effective, along with a mix of collaborative planning and exercises to emulate adversary actions. Threat hunting is as much a practice and an art as it is a technical science.</p> -<p>China views military education as an important mechanism for strategic competition and has refined its approach to professional military education with this in mind. For example, in Guyana, China has hosted more than a dozen members of the Guyana Defense Force (GDF) each year since at least 2019. Programming for these courses emphasizes cybersecurity and language instruction in Mandarin. For the GDF, whose armed forces number just 3,400 active personnel, with a mere few hundred of those being commissioned officers, the cumulative effect of this training seeks to ensure PLA doctrine guides Guyana’s approach to military cybersecurity. Meanwhile, the United States’ International Military Education and Training (IMET) program faces steep resource constraints, preventing it from supporting this kins of large-scale exchange, especially with smaller LAC forces. Furthermore, foreign participants in IMET are often scattered across numerous service academies and training programs, preventing the development of a critical mass of officers steeped in U.S. doctrine on any given issue as China has done for the GDF.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="cdm-enables-the-hunt"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CDM Enables the Hunt</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/66aD9Kv.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: U.S. Foreign Military Training in LAC, 1999–2019.</strong> Source: <a href="https://securityassistance.org/foreign-military-training/">“Foreign Military Training,” Security Assistance Monitor</a>.</em></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">CISA is making progress on threat hunt and can accelerate it by serving as a central coordinator for threat hunt across FCEB agencies. For example, in March 2023, CISA released Decider, a collaborative tool designed to help agencies map risk using the MITRE ATT&amp;CK framework. The tool is an example of the need for a larger array of common planning and collaborative tools across the FCEB landscape, many of which need not originate in but should ultimately be coordinated by CISA. Along these lines, CISA worked with Sandia Labs to deploy to the Untitled Goose Tool in March 2023, which specializes in authenticating and analyzing data linked to cloud services.</code></em></p> -<p>One area in which China has not made substantial inroads is on joint exercises and operations with LAC militaries. The most noteworthy PLA engagement in this regard was the 2022 Sniper Frontier competition hosted in Venezuela as part of Russia’s International Army Games. However, the number of foreign exercises conducted each year by China has grown since 2013, suggesting the potential for overtures from China to LAC countries in the future. Venezuela, with its deep security assistance ties to Beijing, stands out as one candidate. However, an even more concerning development would be PLA exercises with U.S. partner militaries such as Argentina, Brazil, or Colombia, which could offer critical insights into U.S. doctrine and capabilities in the region, as well as provide China an opportunity to test its ability to operate a military force in the hemisphere.</p> +<p><strong>FEDERAL CLOUD SECURITY</strong></p> -<p>Joint training, arms transfers, and cooperation on HADR initiatives also contribute to enhancing interoperability between the PLA and regional militaries. Here it is important to note that China’s concept of interoperability differs substantially from that of the United States. While there is little reason to assume that PLA forces would deploy side-by-side with LAC militaries in a potential future conflict, familiarity with one another and positive military-to-military ties will be essential for China to make use of its dual-use facilities with a high-level of reliability. There is little sense in investing in ports capable of resupplying PLAN warships if the country they are based in refuses docking rights. Even upon clearing this threshold, for the PLA to successfully conduct replenishment and sustainment operations oceans away, it must be familiar with the logistics systems of the countries where it operates, from the physical routes and delivery systems used, to the key individuals in related military and civilian entities. This familiarity can be built over time through commercial operations as well as regular military-to-military engagement. In fact, it is one of the pillars of the United States’ own global logistics network. As the PLA seeks to become a force capable of global power projection, it is making a concerted effort to replicate this model for its own logistics and supply chains.</p> +<p>As more FCEB agencies rely on the cloud for their activities, it creates new vulnerabilities. To that end, EO 14028 directs CISA to support efforts to modernize security standards across the federal network. The resulting cloud strategy provides a shared understanding of security standards, configurations, and visibility requirements. <strong>But providing the framework is different than actively supporting the implementation of processes and technologies that FCEB agencies might adopt to comply with the guidance.</strong></p> -<h3 id="layered-risks">Layered Risks</h3> +<p>This strategy works alongside the larger process involving NIST, the General Services Administration, the DOD, and the DHS to standardize approaches to securing cloud computing consistent with the original vision in FISMA 2002 and 2014. The goal is to balance rapid deployment of cloud computing with sufficient security standards and protocols. FCEB CISOs select from a list of approved software vendors (i.e., software-as-a-service) that as of the spring of 2023 totaled 300 cloud service offerings. The result is a calibrated, risk-based approach to secure cloud services adoption across the federal government by providing standards for cloud services and facilitating a partnership between the federal government and private industry. In addition to long-term cost saving, this approach is intended to save time for agencies and industry providers alike by having everyone operate off a shared security framework.</p> -<p>While China’s security and defense engagement in LAC may still appear an afterthought in comparison to the behemoth of China’s economic ties, accounting for the full spectrum of engagement reveals a complex and layered set of challenges for the United States and its allies to confront.</p> +<p>CISA goes one step further by providing additional guidance to and support for FCEB agencies, advising them on how to actually adopt secure cloud products. Among its prominent initiatives, CISA has introduced the Extensive Visibility Reference Framework (eVRF) and the Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) project.</p> -<p>At present, China’s security and defense efforts in LAC present three primary risks to U.S. defense and security as well as to the region at large. The first, most obvious, and most calamitous risk is the potential for dual-use infrastructure to be employed by China against the United States in a conflict or crisis scenario. As detailed previously, there is a wide array of forms such engagement could take, ranging from the interruption of commerce and navigation through the Panama Canal and around the Straits of Magellan, to the use of satellite stations to aid in counterspace activities, interception of electronic signals, and even strikes against the continental United States itself.</p> +<p>SCuBA focuses on securing cloud business applications, providing security guidance through the SCuBA Technical Reference Architecture that is closely aligned with zero trust principles. This architecture offers context, standard views, and threat-based guidance for secure cloud business application deployments, and it aims to secure the cloud environments where federal information is created, shared, and stored. Agencies are expected to cooperate with CISA by implementing comprehensive logging and information-sharing capabilities for better visibility and response to cloud threats.</p> -<p>The penetration of Chinese-made sensors and digital infrastructure throughout LAC also poses risks for U.S. forces, as they may fall under intense surveillance long before they reach the Indo-Pacific. Cybersecurity gaps are another area where China has proven particularly adept at exploiting vulnerabilities, while LAC militaries themselves have been dragging their feet, as evidenced in a series of high-profile hacks and data breaches of sensitive government information in recent years. Much of this is driven by a lack of high-level commitment to cybersecurity among LAC governments, preventing the kind of interagency cooperation needed to shore up defenses in cyberspace. In Mexico, for instance, the lack of a national cybersecurity agency has left this role in the hands of the Secretariat of National Defense, which was itself the victim of a massive cyberattack in the fall of 2022, losing six terabytes of data in the process. In this environment, China can and has offered to supply cybersecurity solutions to governments in the region, and it can be expected that PRC-built digital infrastructure will contain a back door that allows Beijing a high degree of access. Critically, in this scenario LAC would not even need to take sides in such a conflict nor allow their physical infrastructure to be used for explicit military confrontation. China’s presence alone could already provide it with a huge advantage to surveil U.S. movements. China’s cultivation of relationships with regional militaries can facilitate cooperation and interoperability with the PLA and, in doing so, undermine the United States’ own ability to interface with these forces, for fear that information shared may be willingly or unwittingly passed along to Beijing.</p> +<p>The architecture document, acting as the foundational guide for the SCuBA program, offers a vendor-agnostic approach to securing business applications, aligning with zero trust principles. The eVRF guidebook, on the other hand, helps organizations identify data visibility gaps and provides strategies to mitigate threats. eVRF encourages agencies to provide necessary data to CISA. The agency then evaluates the FCEB agencies’ visibility capabilities and helps integrate visibility concepts into their FCEB cyber practices.</p> -<p>Beyond utilizing physical and digital infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere for intelligence-gathering purposes, China could also seek to spark concurrent crises to draw U.S. attention and resources away from the Indo-Pacific. China would be aided in this regard by its close relations with the hemisphere’s three dictatorships: Venezuela, Cuba, and, to a growing extent, Nicaragua. These regimes have invested heavily in both their conventional armed forces as well as hybrid and gray zone capabilities such as cyber warfare, disinformation and misinformation, and the use of irregular armed groups. For example, China’s spy base in Bejucal, Cuba, is allegedly operated in partnership with an electronic warfare unit attached to Cuba’s Directorate of Military Intelligence. Accordingly, the capacity for each of these criminal regimes to disrupt regional security should not be understated, especially if they are emboldened by a conflict between China and United States.</p> +<p>What might be helpful moving forward is for CISA to assess how FCEB agencies are engaging with these materials. For example, are they actively being used to develop agency specific plans? Are they adequately filling information gaps that currently exist across FCEB agencies? And do FCEB entities require additional training aids or materials to better assist with implementation?</p> -<p>In addition to actively tapping these three hemispheric dictatorships in the event of a crisis, China’s defense and security engagement plays a passive disruptive role already by empowering, emboldening, and extending the life of authoritarian and other populist-autocratic regimes within the hemisphere. To date, Caracas, Havana, and Managua have been more reliant on Russia to meet their security needs; however, if Moscow’s ongoing war in Ukraine continues to drain Russian capacity to project power in the hemisphere, China may step up to fill that gap. As China’s red-hot economic growth appears to cool, security assistance has in many ways already eclipsed financing as the most important category of assistance to LAC dictatorships. For instance, Venezuela has not received any loans from Chinese policy or commercial banks since 2015 but has continued to receive support for its armed forces in the form of radars, drones, and a maintenance center for its fleet of Chinese-produced armored vehicles.</p> +<p>These questions are all the more critical given recent audits of FedRAMP compliance across FCEB agencies and the announcement of forthcoming FedRAMP guidance that will address advancements in the cloud marketplace.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yLqI0pZ.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ A demonstrator stands in front of a Chinese-made VN-4 armored vehicle of the riot police during a rally against Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, in Caracas on April 19, 2017.</em></p> +<h4 id="information-sharing">Information Sharing</h4> -<p>Venezuela’s unmitigated economic calamity brought on by the Maduro regime’s disastrous management has dissuaded China from extending new lines of credit. Nevertheless, Sino-Venezuelan security cooperation remains firmly in place and on full display, from the prominent role of Chinese riot control vehicles in suppressing protests against the Maduro regime (for which the regime is now under a nascent investigation for “crimes against humanity” by the International Criminal Court), to the more insidious effects of Carnet de la Patria (“Homeland card”), a national ID card co-developed with China and modeled on China’s social credit tool kit. China has also worked closely in both Venezuela and Cuba on refining digital tools of repression through misinformation and disinformation campaigns, as well as controlling access to information and shutting off internet access selectively to disrupt protests.</p> +<p>One of CISA’s value propositions in the federal government is its ability to engage with the private sector. What that means for FCEB agencies is that information-sharing programs hosted and facilitated by CISA valuably pull not only from other government entities but from a number of private sector organizations as well. The key aspects of information-sharing services that can be measured and evaluated include (1) quality of information, (2) timeliness of shared information and updates, (3) reach of information sharing, and (4) format of outputs. While CISA has made gains across these metrics through creating vulnerability catalogs and collaboration environments, it is struggling to keep up with the magnitude of the current cyber threat.</p> -<p>These developments suggest that while China has often been depicted as a lender of last resort to countries shunned by much of the international community, it is increasingly taking on the role of the security partner of last resort as well. As far back as 2014, for instance, when the heavy-handed response of Venezuelan riot police to protests caused Spain and Brazil to halt their exports of tear gas and police equipment to the regime, China stepped in to fill that void. Meanwhile, in the wake of the July 2021 mass protests in Cuba, China played an important role in propping up Havana both diplomatically and practically by helping Cuba enforce internet blackouts on its Huawei- and ZTE-provided telecommunications networks. The Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua has also benefitted from China’s focus on policing assistance, receiving donations of riot gear and protective equipment to its police force from China even amid mounting evidence of human rights abuses by the Nicaraguan security services.</p> +<p>Another key value that CISA uniquely brings is the ability to create a ConOps, or an overall cyber threat picture, populated by real-time activity reports from across FCEB agencies and critical infrastructure. No other entity can do this — not even cybersecurity vendors — once critical infrastructure events are reported into CISA and CDM dashboards are lit up. This is a unique tool and a huge “shields up,” since cyber adversaries cannot assemble this picture. But the United States must follow the steps necessary to gain this advantage: creating the apparatus and expediting cooperation, reporting events, and disseminating threat intelligence back out to FCEB agencies and industry.</p> -<p>For other authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes looking to preserve their hold on power, China appears poised to deliver a full spectrum of repressive tools, giving rise to a third risk: growing Chinese engagement with LAC militaries and police forces may erode standards of civil-military relations. Currently, China has found more success in capturing political, rather than military, elites, and civil-military relations throughout the hemisphere appear stable, if less than ideal. However, military-to-military exchange almost invariably results in opportunities for imparting values, as well as tactics, techniques, procedures, and doctrine, which may lead to troubling behaviors by militaries in times of crisis. China’s growing efforts to train foreign military officials may include elements of China’s “discursive competition,” and promotion of its party-army model among graduates suggests an effort to undermine traditional notions of military subordination to civilian leadership.</p> +<p><strong>KNOWN EXPLOITED VULNERABILITIES CATALOG</strong></p> -<p>Militaries in LAC remain some of the most trusted institutions, consistently ranked as the second most trusted institution, according to Latinobarómetro, behind only the church, and viewed as more efficient and professional than politicians. What military leaders say matters in the region, and to the extent that there is political and ideological transfer that accompanies China’s trainings and military diplomacy engagement, this can have profound consequences for the health of LAC democracies, which often suffer from corruption and unconsolidated institutions and checks and balances. Furthermore, in a hemisphere largely marked by small and shrinking military budgets, China’s approach of providing or donating equipment at low cost and with few restrictions might embolden armed forces, which have seen their societal roles swell considerably in recent years. China’s practice of gifting military and police equipment is an especially tantalizing tool for influence in this regard, allowing security forces to increase their stature without needing to spend from their own pocket.</p> +<p>CISA’s BOD 22-01 mandates that FCEB agencies mitigate known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs) in their systems. The BOD established the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog to list computer Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures and require agencies to remediate vulnerabilities within specific deadlines — 15 calendar days for high or critical severity vulnerabilities and 30 calendar days for medium or low severity ones. Agencies are responsible for reviewing the catalog daily, notifying CISA of any barriers to compliance, and submitting regular status reports. The KEV catalog was mentioned in a number of interviews as a valuable CISA resource. Ongoing success will rely on continuing to receive and provide updates in a timely manner, as well as on FCEBs properly understanding how to act on and prioritize the information presented in the catalog.</p> -<p>In the citizen security space as well, rising Chinese engagement has already shown its potential to be especially corrosive to democracy. This applies not only to full-fledged authoritarian regimes but to ostensibly democratic governments as well, where leaders have often deployed the rhetoric of public safety as a pretext to restrict civic space and to intimidate and dismantle organized political opposition. Under former president Rafael Correa, Ecuador was an eager adopter of Chinese “safe cities” equipment, which was swiftly used to spy on opposition parties and which had a chilling effect on journalists and civil society watchdogs. Footage from CCTV cameras were fed through the country’s central intelligence agency. In 2019, Bolivia also announced the development of a new Integrated System of Citizen Security, replete with the purchase of hundreds of facial recognition cameras from China, as well as a new center of operations to be built by the China National Electronics Import &amp; Export Corporation (CEIEC). As of July 2023, the rollout of this program has continued apace, with CEIEC recently completing its deployment of more than five dozen cameras to the town of Warnes, the first provincial center to be integrated into Bolivia’s new security system.</p> +<p>The KEV catalog recently reached 1,000 entries. Its intent is to help organizations prioritize vulnerability management efforts, with several major vendors integrating KEV data into automated vulnerability and patch management tools.</p> -<p>More recently, the government of Nayib Bukele in El Salvador has shown deeply concerning autocratic tendencies, exacerbated by his heavy-handed and expansive security policy. Parallel to his challenges to El Salvador’s democracy, Bukele has been exploring closer relations with China. On the citizen security front, China has offered to provide computers and other equipment to El Salvador’s national police. Taken together, these developments mean that El Salvador joining a “safe cities” project should be of grave concern to both the United States and other defenders of democracy.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="binding-operational-directives"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Binding Operational Directives</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<h3 id="policy-recommendations">Policy Recommendations</h3> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">From time to time, the DHS will issue Emergency Directives and Binding Operational Directives (BODs), compulsory mandates that direct departments and agencies to take certain actions that will help them safeguard their systems. The DHS is authorized to do this through CISA per FISMA. While this is not a CISA service per se, the development, rollout, and enforcement of BODs play a key role in supporting CISA’s larger federal network defense mission.</code></em></p> -<p>China is encroaching along several divergent axes in the security and defense space. The United States should engage the region with confidence that its longstanding partnerships and ties offer a strong foundation. However, the United States’ commitments to Europe and the Indo-Pacific mean that in the coming years policymakers must be realistic about the resource constraints they face. It will require a more agile, multifaceted strategy to insulate LAC militaries and police forces from the most corrosive effects of Chinese influence, curtail Beijing’s advances in infrastructure, citizen security, and arms sales, and compete to preserve strategic denial in the hemisphere.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The following are some of the more recent and relevant BODs impacting FCEB network defense:</code></em></p> -<ol> +<ul> <li> - <p><strong>Leverage U.S. partners to fill force modernization and equipment shortfalls.</strong></p> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">BOD 23-02: “Mitigating the Risk from Internet-Exposed Management Interfaces”;</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">BOD 23-01: “Improving Asset Visibility and Vulnerability Detection on Federal Networks”;</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">BOD 22-01: “Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities”; and</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">BOD 18-02: “Securing High Value Assets.”</code></em></p> + </li> +</ul> - <p>Many Latin American militaries currently using legacy Russian weapons systems are liable to find these increasingly obsolete and to have no way of servicing them, particularly as U.S. sanctions on Russia’s military-industrial complex continue to bite. The United States can play a role in reducing dependence on Russian weapons, but only if it is forthcoming in sales of alternatives which are competitive on price, especially in comparison to China.</p> +<p>Beyond general information about the vulnerabilities themselves, the KEV catalog also captures other important trends with implications for broader cybersecurity. For instance, over three-quarters of the updates in the KEV catalog relate to older vulnerabilities, suggesting the persistence of long-standing security risks across agencies. Likewise, it could also be that vulnerabilities may exist in the wild but have not been optimized to do harm. The inclusion of end-of-life systems, such as Windows Server 2008 and Windows 7, indicates that there are still many organizations utilizing legacy systems.</p> - <p>Additional funding for U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is sorely needed. The Western Hemisphere receives the lowest levels of FMF and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) across all geographic regions. In fact, FMF for the region declined by about 12 percent between fiscal years 2019 and 2023. Absent alternative financing options, LAC militaries must pay up front for equipment purchased from the United States. These sales may in turn be caught up in bureaucratic red tape as they navigate the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, leading to further delays. Panama, for instance, waited for over a year to receive a second Beechcraft King Air turboprop plane for marine patrols on account of delays related to supply chain disruption and Covid-19. Yet, compared to the speed with which the United States has proven itself capable of funneling equipment to its European and East Asian allies, LAC armed forces have found themselves hard pressed not to ascribe a double standard to U.S. military sales.</p> +<p>However, further review of the catalog reveals that it would sometimes take over a week after public disclosure for a vulnerability to be added to the catalog. The KEV catalog is not meant to serve as an early warning system. It is a problem that some entities perceive and use it that way.</p> - <p>Another area where the United States can preempt potential encroachment from China is in joint ventures. While the Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status held by Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia is intended to facilitate co-development of defense technologies, the promise of this designation has been slow to materialize. The United States should seek to identify qualitative advantages in these countries’ sectors, beginning with Brazil, whose aerospace industry has extensive experience with military aviation and is currently partnering with Swedish firm Saab for research and development on the Gripen fighter jet. However, the United States must also look beyond the MNNA box to develop new, more innovative financing mechanisms and partnership opportunities with other key partners, including Ecuador, Uruguay, and Chile. At the same time, the United States must remain cognizant of the possibility that arms sales or technology transfers may find their way from LAC militaries into China’s hands or those of another geostrategic rival. To assuage such concerns, the United States can pursue formal agreements with key security partners that their defense industrial bases will adhere to U.S. standards for handling classified technologies and prioritize training regional militaries and defense firms on U.S. best practices for defense-industrial security.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CzhekAM.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities 2023.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog">“Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog,” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency</a>, accessed August 21, 2023.</em></p> - <p>At the same time, the top-line systems that would stir up the greatest concerns are only sought after by a handful of LAC militaries. For much of the region, far more practical equipment such as bridge-layers, trucks, small arms, boots, and personal protective equipment are in far greater demand, with China often moving the fastest to supply these bread-and-butter items. The U.S. Congress can address this blind spot by authorizing the secretary of defense to approve requests from geographic combatant commands such as SOUTHCOM to provide small-scale aid to local militaries. More broadly, the Departments of Defense and State should work together to develop a list of less-sensitive defense articles such as logistics trucks or military construction equipment to be subject to an expedited FMS process, allowing the United States to deliver critical support to partners on competitive timelines while ensuring a more thorough review for sensitive technologies and advanced equipment.</p> +<p>Moreover, while the information from the KEV list is definitely useful, one of the interviewed federal experts noted that it would be even more helpful if the catalog clearly distinguished differences between the listed vulnerabilities. For example, if CISA pushes an updated list with 10 new entries, are there certain vulnerabilities that federal CISOs should be most concerned about and should address first? Are there others that are lower on the priority list? Moving forward, the catalog’s usefulness will be graded on its ability to update information in a relatively quick manner, while also clearly communicating to users how they should interpret and act on listed information.</p> - <p>Finally, where the United States lacks the resources to sufficiently meet the force modernization and equipment needs of LAC countries, it can look to like-minded countries such as South Korea, Israel, and Sweden, countries with their own established or ascendant arms industries that are also aligned with U.S. geopolitical goals. Bringing a coalition to fill LAC’s defense requirements promises to put more options on the table in order to prevent China from emerging as the primary arms exporter for countries in the hemisphere.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Bolster the defense cooperation mechanisms of the inter-American system.</strong></p> +<p><strong>JOINT CYBER DEFENSE COLLABORATIVE</strong></p> - <p>The Western Hemisphere is home to an impressive web of security coordination mechanisms, such as the System of Cooperation Among the American Air Forces (SICOFAA), Conference of American Armies (CAA), and Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas (CDMA). Among these, however, the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) and its counterpart focused on professional military education, the Inter-American Defense College (IADC), stand out as some of the most storied and expansive players in helping develop and align policy on hemispheric security issues. Both institutions are explicitly tied to the Organization of American States (OAS), which orients their missions around the OAS’s commitment to democracy and human rights. Together with forums such as the SICOFAA, CAA, and CDMA, which include promotion of healthy civil-military relations in their own mission and values statements, the inter-American system has a sound base of institutions to promote principled security cooperation.</p> +<p>One of CISA’s most important roles is serving as a trusted hub for information sharing, but it has recently expanded to include more robust operational and planning collaboration across the public and private sectors. This role was formalized and expanded at the recommendation of the CSC, which emphasized the need for a Joint Cyber Planning Cell “under CISA to coordinate cybersecurity planning and readiness across the federal government and between the public and private sectors.” CISA has taken it further by establishing a Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC). In CISA director Jen Easterly’s view, JCDC is “more than just planning.” While the JCDC is still a work in progress, it would be helpful moving forward for there to be more clarity into the changing composition of the group and membership criteria, how it expects to formally coordinate with other information-sharing mechanisms, and what its envisioned role and expected interaction with FCEB agencies are. <strong>While the JCDC has experienced early successes, its ability to provide value in the future will rely on its ability to either scale up or manage a smaller representative group that is trusted as an authoritative coalition by a wide variety of sectors.</strong></p> - <p>Closer engagement with the IADB can serve as a force multiplier for U.S. defense engagement with LAC countries. Indeed, the board’s areas of focus, from leading the MECODEX 2022 disaster relief exercise to its efforts to promote awareness among OAS member states on cybersecurity, closely align with U.S. priorities in LAC. Meanwhile the IADB’s independent status means that it can serve as a more effective interlocutor with countries that may otherwise hesitate to welcome purely bilateral military engagement with the United States. A practical first step to help raise the profile of these inter-American security cooperation mechanisms would be to expand SOUTHCOM’s J7/9 directorate, responsible for exercises and coalition affairs. As the smallest combatant command, SOUTHCOM suffers from personnel shortfalls across the board, but given the premium placed throughout the hemisphere on multilateral defense cooperation, prioritizing this directorate stands out as an area where a small investment in additional staff can have an outsized effect.</p> +<p>The ultimate goal of the JCDC is to create a common operating picture for federal agencies, industry experts, and critical infrastructure owners and operators so that they can more proactively hunt, plan for, and jointly respond to cyber threats. Just in the past year, CISA has broadened its focus to include industrial control systems expertise, increasing the diversity and strength of the JCDC’s capabilities. CISA is also collecting information from international sources, collaborating with over 150 partners worldwide to share cybersecurity data. Additionally, CISA has touted the JCDC’s response to the Log4Shell vulnerability and the cyber challenges that arose during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as successes.</p> - <p>Considering China’s forays into multilateral security conversations broadly through the GSI, and regionally with the China-CELAC defense forum, the United States should also seek to highlight the IADB and inter-American system more broadly as a counterpoint for countries in the region to conduct their military diplomacy and security cooperation activities. In doing so, U.S. policymakers should also use public messaging to question China’s fixation on working around these existing institutions and excluding the United States, one of the region’s core security providers.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Clarify U.S. red lines when it comes to security engagement.</strong></p> +<p>Critics of the JCDC point to the office’s lack of a formal charter or clear membership criteria, which could potentially hinder future scalability and transparency. During this project’s expert interviews, for example, it was mentioned that the information flow, in all directions, is not happening fast enough.</p> - <p>The breadth and depth of the China’s engagement in LAC means that an all-or-nothing approach would likely be destined to fail. Especially when it comes to Chinese dual-use infrastructure, the lack of a credible U.S. counteroffer for countries’ transportation, energy, or communications needs means that warnings of the risks of dealing with Beijing often fall on deaf ears. Nevertheless, China’s preferred approach to security and defense cooperation means that it is difficult to discern a clear point at which such engagement crosses into national security concern. In a worst-case scenario, China’s history of opaque dealings and espionage means that militaries which cooperate closely with the PLA could be deemed too risky for the United States to engage with, for fear that information on sensitive capabilities or doctrine would find its way back to Beijing. To avoid this future, especially in the case of MNNAs in the hemisphere, the United States must clearly spell out which elements of engagement it views as “red lines” to prevent unnecessarily isolating partners.</p> +<p>Relatedly, there are questions about how effectively the JCDC can work in terms of long-term planning (not just during crisis mode) and how it plans to manage its growth in the coming years. Moving forward, it will also be important to see how the JCDC balances ease of reporting and information sharing with more formal concerns about liability. CISA has provided some initial guidance on its website, but there will likely be lingering concerns about liability protection in the absence of more formal assurances. Finally, while there are benefits to using certain commercial platforms for emergency communications, there will always be concerns about alternatives in case those channels are compromised in any way.</p> - <p>Permanent deployment of PLA combat forces in the hemisphere represents one such red line. To this end, news of a potential new Chinese base in Cuba should be subjected to close inspection by the U.S. intelligence community. While it appears unlikely that any such facility would be designed with the intention of conducting offensive operations against the United States, the Departments of Defense and State should be actively involved in planning for such a contingency and drawing up sets of options for the administration to consider in the event such a project moves forward.</p> +<p>The JCDC will not be effective if everyone is a member, but identifying ways to make membership criteria intentional, representative, and relevant will be key, as will be finding ways to demonstrate the value add to FCEB agencies (see Recommendation 3.5 on the value add of the JCDC).</p> - <p>Other clear red lines include participation of the PLA in exercises with a major U.S. ally in LAC. Such activities would give Chinese military forces the opportunity to observe the performance of U.S.-trained militaries up close, potentially offering critical insights into the United States’ own doctrine and capabilities. Transfers of high-end military equipment, especially if accompanied by offers of technological cooperation or co-production, represent another red line due to China’s ability to establish a long-term and deep presence in the partner country’s defense industrial base. The deal appears to have been a success in the end, but the lengthy and tumultuous process leading up to it portends ill for future U.S. efforts to dissuade countries from purchasing equipment from strategic rivals.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="co-pilots-cisa-and-cyber-commands-partnership-during-a-crisis"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Co-pilots: CISA and Cyber Command’s Partnership during a Crisis</code></h4> +</blockquote> - <p>One final area where the United States should seek to clarify its stance applies to the proliferation of Chinese space research stations in the hemisphere. In particular, the United States should urge the Argentine government to push for inspections and closer monitoring of the Espacio Lejano ground station. In doing so, the United States should reiterate that signing away sovereignty over such facilities is not only a concern for Washington but also undermines Argentina’s own sovereignty and security.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Invest in U.S. core competencies in military education and training.</strong></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">During the 2023 RSA Conference, CISA executive assistant director for cybersecurity Eric Goldstein and Major General William Hartman, commander of the Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), took the stage to provide an overview on how both entities ride side by side to defend the federal enterprise. They shared overlapping goals, with Goldstein emphasizing the desire to help increase costs on adversaries and signaling to actors that a “call to one is a call to all” so that partners overseas also take action — not just the United States. Complementing Goldstein’s overview, Hartman described the CNMF command as “foreign facing,” defending the homeland and supporting its allies, while highlighting that “no partner is more important than DHS CISA.” Both spoke to the level of collaboration they execute, working side by side through liaison officers at each other’s locations, from senior leaders down to individual analysts and operators. Hartman further elaborated that the CNMF is focused on two things: (1) what information does CISA have relevant to the DOD’s missions that might allow it to disrupt or prevent an attack on the homeland, and (2) what does the CNMF observe through operations in foreign space that can be shared back to CISA to protect the homeland?</code></em></p> - <p>The United States remains the security and defense partner of choice for LAC by a large margin and should endeavor to maintain the status quo. One of the greatest assets in this regard lies in U.S. professional military education, regarded as the gold standard by militaries across the region. Foreign graduates of these programs often go on to play leading roles in their home countries’ armed forces, and shared experiences forge long-lasting bonds at all levels of command. However, currently U.S. PME efforts are not purpose-built for competition with a near-peer adversary. The top-down approach, wherein domestic service academies dictate to embassy staff the number of individuals from each country they can accept and the types of courses they will offer, is counterproductive to a more strategic assessment of what kinds of trainings LAC militaries need most. A bottom-up approach, wherein embassies coordinate with regional combatant commands to identify the number of personnel and types of skill sets are most needed, would represent a sea change in the United States’ ability to leverage its core competency in military education for competition with China.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The importance of the CISA-CNMF partnership proved decisive for bidirectional information sharing during some well-known incidents. The first was SolarWinds: within the hour that FireEye alerted the government, CISA and the DOD began to act. CISA rapidly identified nine FCEB agencies that were compromised. This was followed by incident response to understand the breath of intrusions, the payloads, and the artifacts left behind. Next, CISA extracted infected servers and sent data to the CNMF. On the side of the DOD and the CNMF, Major General Hartford stressed that gaining an image of compromised servers from CISA was invaluable. The CNMF used CISA’s server image for modeling to rehearse and exercise hunting skills, and in the span of a few days, the CNMF developed high-end capabilities to hunt the adversaries. At the same time, intelligence indicated that a foreign partner was compromised by the same actor, and the partner requested the assistance of the CNMF. The CNMF team then deployed overseas and almost immediately encountered adversary activity in their hunt-forward operation. The operation was a success and the CNMF collected novel malware from its encounter and moved to share it broadly.</code></em></p> - <p>Other key limitations to reforming U.S. military education and training programs for competition with China include the Section 312 and 321 requirements that the Department of Defense focus on “developing countries.” The department uses World Bank income classifications to assess which countries fall into this category, meaning that military personnel from Chile, Panama, Uruguay, and most recently Guyana cannot receive funding to attend security cooperation meetings or train with U.S. forces. Such a standard is artificial at best and arbitrary at worst, limiting the ability of the U.S. military to engage some of its most important partners in the hemisphere. Tellingly, the World Bank itself has moved away from using income groups to assign “developing country” status in favor of a more holistic assessment of development indicators. The Department of Defense should follow suit, and the Joint Staff should urgently engage with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to reevaluate its method for determining Section 312 and 321 exemptions. Doing so would rapidly increase the range of tools available to the United States for military-to-military training and partnerships.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Returning to the public campaign, CISA reviewed the tactics, techniques, and procedures using information that the CNMF brought back to share with the nine compromised FCEB agencies and more broadly. Thanks to this data, CISA then developed an eviction guide to make sure the malicious actors were out of systems. CISA not only worked with the CNMF but also with the NSA, Mandiant, and Microsoft, forming a united front across the .gov, .mil, and .com ecosystems to kick out the invaders. A united front across the multiple sectors helped lend confidence and credibility in the eviction guide and eased worries for both industry and FCEB agencies to arrive at an eviction point.</code></em></p> - <p>Within the hemisphere as well, a multitude of tools exist for joint exercises and trainings, ranging from Joint Combined Exchange Trainings, which focus on improving linkages between special forces, to larger initiatives involving thousands of personnel from several countries, such as PANAMAX 22, which concluded in August of last year. More exercises seeking to bring together a broad cross-section of the hemisphere may be important for fostering a sense of regional solidarity and alignment that China will find difficult to replicate.</p> +<h4 id="incident-response">Incident Response</h4> - <p>The United States can further leverage the National Guard’s State Partnership Program, which has active relationships with 27 countries in the region, to serve as a force multiplier in training efforts. An integrated approach to professional military education which brings together SOUTHCOM, embassy, and National Guard personnel to train partner militaries would be a major step forward in terms of demonstrating sustained U.S. commitment and building up important skills. Such exercises can be tailored based on the security needs of the country in question while remaining oriented around a single key capability, such as cybersecurity or disaster response, to have the greatest effect.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Enhance interagency and international cooperation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.</strong></p> +<p>During a number of interviews, experts noted that they had been the recipients of CISA’s incident response services or, at the very least, that they could understand why these services were an important part of CISA’s broader offerings. From providing general assistance to impacted FCEBs to actively coordinating with law enforcement on the investigative aspect, CISA is well positioned to deliver timely incident response guidance and immediate assistance.</p> - <p>HADR represents one of the most critical mission sets the United States conducts in the hemisphere. The ability of U.S. forces to access disaster areas and distribute lifesaving aid, combined with the presence of pre-positioned supplies in the region through Joint Task Force Bravo, makes the U.S. military an indispensable partner. However, demand for HADR in LAC is liable to grow significantly across the region. SOUTHCOM can strengthen the United States’ role in disaster relief operations by expanding its efforts to convene regional militaries for planning, coordination, and exercises to improve responses in a region that has been heavily impacted as of late by extreme weather, health crises, and natural disasters. The two-week Tradewinds exercise, the 38th iteration of which included more than 1,800 participants from 21 partner countries as well as every branch of the U.S. Armed Forces, is one of the most important tools in this regard for bolstering multilateral disaster response capabilities. SOUTHCOM’s investments in compact “clinic in a can” medical facilities, which can be deployed rapidly to offer care in times of crisis, also represent an important development for making U.S. HADR more reactive and prompt.</p> +<p>Prompted by Section 6 of EO 14028, CISA published incident response and vulnerability response playbooks for FCEB agencies. Each playbook walks FCEB agencies through the life cycle of an incident, highlighting activities that can be done both during and pre- and post-crisis to ensure that information is collected and shared in a timely manner and that steps are taken to mitigate the incident’s effects. Additionally, CISA offers free incident response training for interested federal employees and contractors. But where CISA, by way of the DHS, becomes even more helpful is that it can engage in both asset response and threat response activities. Presidential Policy Directive 41 designates the DHS’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Center as lead for asset response. Separately, while the Department of Justice (DOJ) leads in threat response via its investigatory authorities, the DHS plays a critical supporting role in that process.</p> - <p>However, the United States continues to struggle to harmonize its policies around when and where humanitarian assistance can be deployed. Currently, USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs (USAID/BHA), as the lead agency on HADR, must issue a disaster assistance declaration before actors such as SOUTHCOM can step in. This process risks creating delays when speed is of the essence. It also limits the United States’ ability to engage partner countries on crises which may not rise to the level of a declared disaster, such as wildfires, oil spills, or water shortages. The United States should consider signing MOUs with countries in the region that allow local U.S. first-response elements to be deployed on request from partner governments.</p> +<p>Moving forward, CISA might consider more intentionally moving away from guidance that focuses on threats and vulnerabilities and instead look to address consequences more broadly. To the extent that these incident response trainings and pre-incident guidance documents can actively change how agencies think about recovery (and what, in fact, they need to recover from), that might help agencies in the long run. A good example for why the consequence-based approach should be intentionally considered is the Colonial Pipeline incident. Even though the ransomware attack was on Colonial Pipeline’s billing system, they had to shut down their entire operational technology (OT) out of concern that the attack was widespread. This suggests that anticipating cascading consequences — and even the public perception of a potential incident — should be more intentionally included in incident plans (see Recommendations 2.4 and 3.7 on revisiting mission-essential functions and promoting resilience, respectively).</p> - <p>Another area for increased focus should be developing and offering more courses on HADR operations as part of U.S. professional military education and training programs. Such efforts will be important for regional militaries to develop their own strategies for disaster response and ensuring these synergize with SOUTHCOMs efforts. Information-sharing mechanisms should also be strengthened as the first pillar of disaster risk reduction, and streamlining early-warning and first-responder communications should be a critical area for investment.</p> +<p>As a general note to appropriators, while these services are considered valuable, CISA is woefully under-resourced for its incident response activities. These capabilities are not available to all and rely heavily on surge plans from other agencies and the National Guard if there is a large demand.</p> - <p>Finally, to the extent possible, the United States should more extensively leverage partners from outside the hemisphere to augment its own HADR capabilities. For instance, Taiwan has a strong track record with its seven diplomatic allies, and closer cooperation with SOUTHCOM and USAID/BHA could help continue to elevate Taiwan’s profile in the region, along with that of other key U.S. partners, including South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Improve cooperation on countering illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and the nexus between transnational organized crime and environmental crimes.</strong></p> +<h4 id="resilience-building">Resilience Building</h4> - <p>Just as climate change and environmental degradation is creating new risks for LAC countries and the United States alike, environmental crime throughout the hemisphere has surged. IUU fishing, in particular, is one of the most pervasive criminal, environmental, and economic challenges facing the region today. It is also a sector in which militaries, especially navies and coast guards, play a vital role. China stands out as one of the largest perpetrators of IUU fishing both globally and in LAC. China’s vast deep-water fishing fleet represents an important tool in Beijing’s gray zone arsenal in the South China Sea, often deployed alongside PLAN vessels as provocations in disputed waters.</p> +<p>As suggested in a recent CSIS study on federal government resilience, resilience can broadly be defined as “how well an individual, institution, or society can prepare for and respond to shocks to the system and endure, perhaps even thrive, under prolonged periods of stress.” Short of hardening systems, a number of the other initiatives listed above all contribute to CISA’s ability to help FCEB agencies maintain more secure networks and resilient postures overall. However, this study more narrowly categorizes resilience-building activities as those that help FCEB agencies plan for and start building toward long-term resilience. While resilience-building activities are often surpassed or overlooked in favor of activities that seem to focus on the short term or that yield immediate benefits, these operations are key to helping FCEB entities properly plan for future threats and challenges.</p> - <p>In the Western Hemisphere as well, China’s complicity in IUU fishing presents layered security and environmental risks, such as in 2019, when more than 300 Chinese vessels conducted thousands of hours of illegal fishing off the coast of the Galápagos Islands, prompting urgent calls for assistance from the Ecuadorean navy. Elsewhere along the Southern Cone of South America, vessels originating from China have decimated marine ecosystems and been found responsible for labor and human rights abuses onboard. Likewise, other forms of environmental crime, such as wildlife trafficking and illegal logging, have grown in the hemisphere. Critically, these operations often form part of a nexus involving China, with the illicit animal trade in Mexico, for instance, becoming an increasingly important channel through which cartels acquire fentanyl precursors from China.</p> +<h4 id="training-and-exercises">Training and Exercises</h4> - <p>The United States should seek to raise awareness of China’s complicity in such activities in both regional and international fora. Indeed, China’s tacit encouragement of IUU fishing by its deep-water fleets undermines Beijing’s efforts to style itself as an exemplar of law and order at home and abroad. The United States should support efforts such as Panama’s recently announced IUU fishing protection center and seek to lead joint trainings and even enforcement exercises against IUU fishing fleets. U.S. Coast Guard, Navy, and Air Force assets should all consider host-nation rider programs to allow regional militaries to come aboard for hands-on training and exchange. Indeed, both Panama and Ecuador were highlighted as priority countries for cooperation in the United States’ five-year strategy for countering IUU fishing. Outside of the military realm, the United States, through the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, can pursue capacity-building partnerships with LAC governments on environmental crime and seek to improve intelligence sharing with national police forces on activities such as illegal wildlife and timber trafficking.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Strengthen awareness and training on cybersecurity.</strong></p> +<p>The United States has invested vast amounts of taxpayer dollars into hardening, evolving, and improving cybersecurity across federal, SLTT, and private sector systems. In addition to investing in technologies and systems, it is just as important to invest in training and process. Similar to how U.S. schools simulate earthquake, fire, tornado, and active-shooter drills to train students and teachers for what they should do during a crisis, CISA simulates the discovery of and response to cyber incidents so relevant actors are proactively mapping out response plans. CISA’s premier exercise is Cyber Storm, where participating organizations are asked to execute strategic decisionmaking and practice interagency coordination to address an incident scenario.</p> - <p>Cyber vulnerabilities not only create practical information security risks that damage the national security of LAC countries, but a lack of general knowledge on cybersecurity also opens the door to Chinese offers to provide quick solutions. China is also not the only extra-hemispheric authoritarian making such inroads; the Brazilian military renewed its contract with the Russian company Kaspersky Lab to provide cybersecurity services in the summer of 2022 as the war in Ukraine was raging and just as the company was deemed a national security risk by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission.</p> +<p>Cyber Storm is a biannual exercise. The most recent one was held in March 2022 (Version VIII), and the next exercise will likely take place in the spring of 2024. Each exercise grows out of the previous one, in a sense building on institutional knowledge and key insights identified during the previous exercise. This process helps new and old players stay up to date on the current concerns and plan through industry best practices.</p> - <p>In March 2023, the United States released the National Cybersecurity Strategy, which included among its objectives efforts to “expand U.S. ability to assist allies and partners” as well as avenues for both multilateral and bilateral cooperation on network resilience and countering digital threats. One starting point would be to encourage LAC countries to adopt their own cybersecurity strategies. Indeed, less than half of the countries in the Western Hemisphere currently have a national plan for addressing cyber threats. Alongside the development of national strategies, U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) can engage directly with regional armed forces to outline the importance of developing specialized units for national defense of the digital domain.</p> +<p>The latest exercise had a stated goal of “strengthening cybersecurity preparedness and response capabilities by exercising policies, processes, and procedures for identifying and responding to a multi-sector significant cyber incident impacting critical infrastructure.” The exercise included representatives from 100 private companies across 10 critical infrastructure sectors, 33 FCEB agencies, 9 states, and 15 countries. After running the exercise, the group identified shortcomings and areas needing greater clarity with regard to government policies. Ultimately, the exercise was successful in that it not only helped the different entities practice how they should collaborate and share information during a crisis (something that is routinely needed during an actual incident), but also demonstrated gaps that the government needs to address for future plans to be more effective.</p> - <p>SOUTHCOM, in partnership with CYBERCOM and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, can lead training with partner countries to outline key risks and the elements of a better strategy to counter cyber threats. Such efforts should also leverage U.S. allies and partners, with one key player in this regard being Costa Rica, which has invested heavily in shoring up its digital defenses since the 2022 Conti ransomware attacks. Indeed, regional partnerships will be critical to help tailor cybersecurity training to the LAC context and overcome language barriers and other obstacles to effective knowledge transfer. SOUTHCOM’s recent inauguration of a $9.8 million commitment to strengthen Costa Rica’s cyber defenses presents one opportunity to not only build up bilateral cooperation but potentially offer a springboard for regional cybersecurity efforts.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Invest in citizen security and delink citizen security from the regional conversation on drugs.</strong></p> +<p>Cyber Storm by itself is a tremendous project, but CISA also publishes general exercise information and encourages the general practice of hosting similar exercises. Whether as a host, facilitator, or participant, CISA should continue to invest in training FCEB agencies to conduct exercises on their own and promote these exercises as a way for agencies to, among other things, map out resilience and continuity of operational plans.</p> - <p>While the United States is competing from a point of relative strength when it comes to military-to-military engagement, the reverse may be true with respect to policing and citizen security efforts. Insecurity is the single greatest security threat most LAC governments face today, meaning that without a credible plan for citizen security assistance, the United States risks ceding this critical front entirely to China in its efforts to engage regional police forces. Accordingly, U.S. law enforcement agencies, as well as the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, have an important role to play in articulating a counternarrative to China’s when it comes to citizen security.</p> +<p><strong>GENERAL GUIDANCE</strong></p> - <p>One key weakness of the United States in the citizen security space is its lack of a comprehensive menu of options. When partner governments request assistance, such as when the Guillermo Lasso administration called out for a “Plan Ecuador” to address rising levels of violence and criminal activity, the United States often struggles to put together an effective package in response. The Department of State can lead an assessment of previous U.S. overseas security assistance programs, including efforts such as Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative. Identifying best practices and areas from improvement should subsequently inform U.S. planning for new citizen security partnerships. Understanding the types of assistance and their relative advantages and weaknesses is essential for the United States to be able to effectively deploy its resources to help partner governments. However, U.S. law enforcement and security assistance budgets have not kept pace with the needs of the region, meaning that ultimately Congress will need to appropriate additional resources to fully correct this mismatch.</p> +<p>In general, interviewed industry and FCEB experts seemed appreciative of CISA’s guidance documents (see Recommendation 3.8 on transparency guidance). The question then becomes whether it is CISA’s role to aid general guidance with additional support for implementation, or if that is something FCEB agencies should be expected to manage on their own or with the support and guidance of other entities.</p> - <p>The United States should also seek to bring delegations from its own local police forces, such as from New York and Los Angeles, to the region to share their experience on data protection in police work. These departments employ sophisticated surveillance technologies, including thousands of security cameras, in their police work. Bringing them into contact with their counterparts in LAC represents one way to promote frameworks for responsible use of surveillance technology.</p> +<p>CISA’s role as a general information resource for FCEB agencies cannot be overstated. In addition to some of the service-specific resources listed above, CISA recently published reference guides such as its <em>Cloud Security Technical Reference Architecture Guide and Zero Trust Maturity Model</em> — both representing the types of comprehensive guides that FCEB agencies can consult to support their respective agency plans to modernize and enhance security in the coming years.</p> - <p>Another particularly impactful development would be the establishment of a new International Law Enforcement Academy in the Caribbean region, where China has made significant inroads in the field of police and citizen security efforts. Given the important role of the armed forces in many LAC countries for countering transnational organized crime, SOUTHCOM has a role to play in ensuring healthy civil-military relations as well as best practices for armed forces which engage in domestic peace and security missions.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>During one particularly interesting interview, a federal CISO noted that CISA’s guidance documents are great but that it would be helpful if they could detail out a few subject matter experts to further assist FCEB agencies. For instance, the interviewee thought it would have been helpful for CISA to additionally assign a ZTA expert to the different FCEB agencies to help them with ZTA migration beyond just producing a document (see Recommendation 2.5 on CISA’s role with regard to FCEB ZTA migration).</p> -<p>Even backed by strong political will and resource-backed commitments, countering China’s forays in the security and defense space represents just one facet of the grand strategy the United States needs to address China’s growing influence in LAC. Nevertheless, a revitalized, multifaceted, and forward-looking U.S. approach to defense and security in the Western Hemisphere promises to pay dividends not only in the context of strategic competition but in meeting shared challenges together with allies and partners in the region.</p> +<p>This suggestion raises a few questions. Does CISA have the capacity to offer this type of service? And if not, is it their job to find a way to do so given their role as the designated lead for federal network security? Put another way, what is the actual scope of CISA’s mission with regard to FCEB protection, and what are the implications for other entities that directly or indirectly play some role in securing or supporting the maintenance of federal networks?</p> -<hr /> +<p><strong>POST-INCIDENT REVIEWS</strong></p> -<p><strong>Ryan C. Berg</strong> is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is also an adjunct professor at the Catholic University of America and visiting research fellow at the University of Oxford’s Changing Character of War Programme. His research focuses on U.S.-Latin America relations, authoritarian regimes, armed conflict, strategic competition, and trade and development issues. He also studies Latin America’s criminal groups and the region’s governance and security challenges.</p> +<p>The U.S. Cyber Safety Review Board (CSRB) was established by EO 14028 after the SolarWinds incident, and its goal is to investigate significant cyber incidents and socialize lessons learned in the hopes of fortifying national cybersecurity efforts. While some critics have already been quick to call out the board for lack of efficacy, the board is still relatively new, and it is likely too early to fully assess the program.</p> -<p><strong>Henry Ziemer</strong> is a research associate with the Americas Program at CSIS, where he supports the program’s research agenda and coordinates event planning and outreach.</p>Ryan C. Berg and Henry ZiemerChina has long couched its engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean in primarily economic terms. However, China is becoming increasingly strident in its efforts to bolster defense and security initiatives in the Western Hemisphere.UK In N. European Security2023-10-17T12:00:00+08:002023-10-17T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uk-in-northern-european-security<p><em>This Policy Brief is to explain why the UK has chosen to explicitly prioritise the security of Northern Europe following Russia’s war in Ukraine.</em></p> +<p>The board comprises no more than 20 individuals appointed by the CISA director, and it studies and produces recommendations to the secretary of homeland security by way of the CISA director. To date, the CSRB has investigated the December 2021 disclosure of the Log4j vulnerability, one of the most serious software vulnerabilities in history, and attacks carried out by the Lapsus$ hacking group. DHS secretary Alejandro Mayorkas also recently announced that the CSRB will conduct a review of cloud service providers and their security practices, with a focus on the recent suspected Chinese intrusion into Microsoft Exchange Online.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Critiques of the board include confidentiality issues, institutional factors such as a lack of full-time staff, budgetary constraints, and potential conflicts of interest. Additionally, there seems to be a reluctance to investigate incidents that are a few years old and a reticence to place blame on a single entity when warranted.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>As described, the CSRB can be a very useful tool and opportunity to generate meaningful recommendations. But as important as it is for the CSRB to move quickly with its investigations, incident selection is just as, if not more, important.</p> -<p>Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine was an inflection point for European security. For the UK, it prompted a “refresh” of its defence, security and foreign policy. The March 2023 Integrated Review Refresh (IR2023) concluded that “the most pressing national security and foreign policy priority in the short-to-medium term is to address the threat posed by Russia to European security … and denying Russia any strategic benefit from its invasion”. Underpinning this ambition, the Refresh committed the UK to “lead and galvanise where we have most value to add, giving particular priority … to the contribution we can make in northern Europe as a security actor” (p. 11).</p> +<p><strong>SECURING .GOV DOMAINS</strong></p> -<p>The purpose of this Policy Brief is to explain why the UK has chosen to explicitly prioritise the security of Northern Europe following Russia’s war against Ukraine. It identifies exactly where the UK is best placed to lead and galvanise to address the current and likely future Russian threat. There is no common definition of “Northern Europe” among Allies, so the Brief defines the region collectively as the sub-regions of the Arctic, the North Atlantic, the High North and the Baltic Sea region, extending to Estonia – the location of the UK-led NATO multinational battlegroup.</p> +<p>For an agency to successfully execute its mission, it must cultivate a certain level of trust. It must operate with high levels of integrity and transparency. One of the most basic ways that FCEB agencies accomplish this is by having a consistently updated and well-managed public-facing website. For the past few years, CISA has taken on the role of protecting .gov domains — a role that might be underappreciated but is key to bridging trust between the public and FCEB agencies.</p> -<p>The explicit prioritisation of Northern Europe is a natural evolution of UK policy, and the increased investment in the region addresses both immediate security requirements – the acute Russian threat – and future ones, as rapidly melting ice in the Arctic creates viable sea lines of communication directly linking the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific – priority one and two geographic “strategic arenas” (pp. 3, 9) for the UK respectively. Given this, Northern Europe is a “transitional theatre” for the UK, where enhanced engagement now can produce value and strategic advantage for the UK – and its allies – in the future.</p> +<p>For 20 years, the General Services Administration managed the security of U.S. federal government internet domains. In December 2020, Congress passed the DOTGOV Act, which designated CISA as the new agency tasked with safeguarding .gov domains. The DOTGOV Act further specifies that .gov domain services will carry zero or negligible costs for “any Federal, State, local or territorial government operated or publicly controlled entity.” Agencies interested in registering a new domain must first secure an authorization letter and then submit their request through the online .gov registrar form. As the designated .gov manager, part of CISA’s job is to spearhead the registration of new domains, with final approval coming from the OMB. Separately, if an organization requires migrating services online, CISA is exploring using DHS grants to facilitate the process; this is in the design stages with the Federal Emergency Management Agency.</p> -<p>The UK offers unique value to Northern Europe as a security actor for three principal reasons. First, the UK, as a regional geopolitical heavyweight, acts as a substantial backstop to the US presence and engagement. Second, the UK provides specialist military capabilities, spanning warfighting and sub-threshold, such as anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and other sub-sea capabilities that are in short supply in Europe and best match the Russian threat. Third, the geostrategic position of the British homeland – within the North Atlantic – is critical to the successful execution of NATO’s new regional defence plan for “the Atlantic and European Arctic” and “the Baltic and Central Europe”, alongside its transatlantic reinforcement plan. With growing and ambitious security commitments to Northern Europe, the UK is sending a strong message of reassurance to Allies and a strong signal of deterrence to Russia, and to China as a “near-Arctic state”, in the context of a growing partnership between the two powers in the Arctic.</p> +<p>Ultimately, the goal of the DOTGOV Act is to ensure the confidentiality of, integrity of, and access to information on FCEB websites. As was noted in a February 2023 OMB memo, “When .gov domains are used for websites, people have greater confidence that the information on those sites is authoritative and trustworthy.” To ensure a seamless, transparent, and secure registration and management process, CISA has created a five-step new domain registration process and a domain security best practices guide.</p> -<p>The research for this Brief is drawn from two main sources. First, a review of UK government and NATO policy documents, including the 2021 Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper alongside their 2023 updates, and the UK’s Arctic and High North policies. Second, four expert-led roundtable discussions held between April 2022 and June 2023 and attended by Norwegian, UK and US officials and academics, in London, Oslo and Washington, DC. It is augmented with analysis of official government announcements, research papers and media reporting. This Policy Brief is part of a two-year transatlantic security dialogue in collaboration between RUSI, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The project is supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and focuses on the Norwegian, UK and US roles in securing Northern Europe.</p> +<p>Recommendations 5 and 6 in the domain security guide are particularly noteworthy. Step 5 is a recommendation to sign up for CISA’s free network and vulnerability scanning service called Cyber Hygiene. Cyber Hygiene provides regular reports that can help FCEB agencies secure internet-facing systems from weak configuration and known vulnerabilities. Notably, this program was highlighted as a frequently used service in a number of expert interviews.</p> -<h3 id="why-is-the-uk-prioritising-northern-europe">Why is the UK Prioritising Northern Europe?</h3> +<p>Step 6 in the CISA best practices guide is for SLTT organizations to join the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center. The center is designated by CISA to serve as the cybersecurity information-sharing center for SLTT governments. Some of the services included with membership are access to 24/7 incident response and digital forensic services, IP monitoring, and cybersecurity tabletop exercises.</p> -<p>The explicit prioritisation of Northern European security is an evolution of UK policy over the past decade. The Arctic, and the High North in particular, have become central to UK strategic thinking, and they are the only regions to receive specific policy documents. UK objectives in the region are a blend of hard and soft security issues, majoring on: the protection of UK and Allied critical national infrastructure (CNI); reinforcing the rules-based international order and enforcing freedom of navigation; and managing climate change (pp. 10, 11). Central to the UK approach has been a similar security policy outlook and working with likeminded Allies and partners, in particular Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) members, on Euro-Atlantic security challenges, the utility of military force and the pervasive Russian threat. Indeed, UK engagement has increased significantly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; multilaterally through NATO, and minilaterally through the JEF and the Northern Group of Defence Ministers. These engagements are underpinned by bilateral and trilateral agreements, including most significantly the strong mutual security guarantees offered to both Finland and Sweden during the NATO membership process. The UK is also heavily reliant on the region for energy, with Norway being the UK’s primary gas supplier.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="cisa-cyber-supports-to-sltt-governments-the-private-sector-and-srmas"><code class="highlighter-rouge">CISA Cyber Supports to SLTT Governments, the Private Sector, and SRMAs</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>The acute Russian threat in Northern Europe binds Allies together. Despite Russia severely weakening and fixing a large portion of its land forces in Ukraine, the country’s naval capabilities remain largely intact, through its Northern Fleet, including strategic nuclear forces, and its Baltic Fleet – notwithstanding heavy losses (p. 6) for two Russian Arctic brigades. Russia also intends to militarily reinforce the region in response to NATO enlargement. This short-term conventional military weakness is likely to push Russia to rely more heavily on hybrid activity and nuclear signalling to achieve its objectives, which may become a potential source of conflict escalation, and which feature heavily in its 2022 Maritime Doctrine. Furthermore, some European intelligence agencies, such as the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, assess that Russia could still exert “credible military pressure” on the Baltic states, and its military capabilities near the Estonian border could be “quantitatively reconstituted in up to four years” (p. 11).</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The focus of this report is solely the cybersecurity services offered by CISA to FCEB agencies. However, CISA services are also widely offered to the private sector and SLTT governments as well. Beyond identifying best practices and possible common trends or grievances about how services are delivered to these different entities, it is important to acknowledge how the current system of distributed security management could ultimately impact an FCEB agency’s network security or its ability to fulfill its larger mission.</code></em></p> -<p>As NATO orientates its new defence posture to defend “every inch” (p. 6) of NATO territory, the UK is galvanising its northern flank into the most secure Alliance region, a region that is continually the target of Russian hybrid aggression and exposed to persistent conventional and nuclear threat. The rationale for the UK’s strategic focus in the region and how this is perceived by the regional actors has been summarised thus:</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Ultimately, even though an FCEB agency might seem “cyber secure,” there are lower-level entities that are resource-strapped but provide or deliver critical services in support of an FCEB agency’s larger mission. Cyber issues need to be prioritized by department and agency leads; attacks on smaller, vulnerable, critical nodes, even if they are not directly supervised by an FCEB agency, can still impact people’s perceptions of the larger organization.</code></em></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Given that the United Kingdom shares historical, cultural, and geopolitical ties with the Nordic countries, the UK would benefit from having all Nordic countries within NATO. As relatively small countries, the Nordics would certainly benefit from the UK’s support, especially related to logistics, intelligence sharing, and the security provided by the nuclear umbrella. If combined with the UK’s capabilities and focus, this unified North would outrank any other European force structure and would help secure both the Eastern and Northern Flank of NATO.</code></em></strong></p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A separate but related relationship that is not fully explored in this report is the one CISA has with Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs). As one industry expert noted, the value of an SRMA is to “translate the good cyber advice into language and protocols that can be understood by [critical infrastructure] operators.” Per this expert, who represents a large entity in a critical industry, CISA has the depth of talent but needs to do more to reach out to stakeholders and encourage partnerships and solicit donations to plus up capabilities, among other activities. Relatedly, CISA should not spread itself thin — it should just be a clearing house and should rely on SRMAs for more support.</code></em></p> -<p>The UK is the European power best placed to lead and galvanise NATO’s northern flank and support the full integration of Finland (and Sweden) into the Alliance, both through providing strategic depth and its capabilities (military, non-military and command enablers), and through its significant defence and security engagement in the region.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Moving forward, one challenge for CISA will be to not only provide high levels of assistance and general guidance but to also strike the right balance between centralizing cyber risk (which could lead to cost savings, especially for smaller and medium-sized entities) and delegating out some tasks to other entities (such as some of the SRMAs) that might have greater expertise and reach in a given sector (see Recommendations 3.2 and 3.3 on coordination with SRMAs, information sharing and analysis centers, and others).</code></em></p> -<h3 id="the-uk-as-a-backstop-for-us-engagement-and-presence-in-northern-europe">The UK as a Backstop for US Engagement and Presence in Northern Europe</h3> +<h4 id="general-gaps">General Gaps</h4> -<p>The US is the indispensable security partner for Northern Europe, a region that has a strongly transatlantic outlook. For Nordic states, and to a lesser extent Baltic states, strategic depth is secured primarily through NATO and the Article 5 security guarantee, and augmented by bilateral and trilateral agreements that bind the US to the region. For example, Norway’s defence relies on a denial ambition until Allied (US) reinforcements are in position. Moreover, Norway’s role as a reception, staging and onward integration location for US reinforcements will become more important as Finland, and soon Sweden, joins the Alliance. Indeed, the inclusion of Finland and Sweden in NATO defensive plans will provide increased strategic depth, especially with the scale of forces that Finland can mobilise at short notice, but Nordic defence will remain heavily reliant on follow-on forces from the US. Therefore, the fundamental risk that security actors in Northern Europe must manage is the possible reduction of attention and corresponding drawdown in US assets to redeploy to the Indo-Pacific as US security concerns there grow, especially if the war in Ukraine ends on terms that benefit NATO, or a US president less sympathetic to European security is elected in 2024. This possibility is a strategic risk for Northern Europe, not only in terms of overall mass in the form of combat-capable brigades, but also in terms of specialist capabilities such as ISR. In the short term, the UK is the only European country realistically able to support Europe’s “ISR gap” in Northern Europe, and it is unlikely to contribute more brigades to NATO’s New Force Model for the remainder of the decade.</p> +<p>According to the head of CISA’s Cybersecurity Division, Executive Assistant Director Eric Goldstein, FY 2021 legislation and EO 14028 shifted the cybersecurity landscape in two dramatic ways. First, new authorities and technologies allowed CISA to proactively engage in system monitoring and threat hunt, which has greatly enhanced CISA’s visibility into and across FCEB networks. Second, and by extension, CISA is now able to develop deeper relationships with the FCEB agencies that it serves. Whereas in its early years CISA’s relationship with departments and agencies was transactional, in Goldstein’s opinion there is a growing perception among the FCEB agencies that CISA is a partner that wants to help them achieve their security goals — and, for smaller and medium- sized FCEBs, actively take on the burden of managing more of their cybersecurity.</p> -<p>As a major regional power, the UK’s engagement and capabilities are best able to mitigate any potential US shortfall and provide enhanced strategic depth. US Arctic priorities are motivated by strategic competition, whereas the Nordic states prioritise defence and deterrence against Russia. The UK is positioned on a scale between the two, and can play an important role in bridging between them. Specifically, the UK is best placed to lead in two areas, both of which already enjoy high levels of cooperation with the US, providing critical continuity.</p> +<p>There is no doubt that in recent years, and especially since 2021, CISA has made great strides across several fronts to improve and expand cyber services to FCEB agencies. In fact, with a number of new initiatives and capabilities set to formally roll out in the coming years, it is hard to fully assess where CISA will be even a year or two from now. That said, in this time of growth there are real and perceived potential gaps in services or service quality that CISA and Congress should monitor and address. Aside from the service-specific issues that are listed in the sections above, there were some general trends identified in the expert interviews and discussions that warrant attention.</p> -<p>First, NATO considers Russia’s ability to disrupt Atlantic reinforcement in the High North a “strategic challenge” (p. 4). The UK has traditionally secured the Greenland–Iceland–UK gap with ASW capabilities and, more recently, through the UK–US–Norway trilateral interoperability (p. 21) of the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), which increases availability of a critical ISR capability and allows it to operate further north. The ability to operate further north is a growing requirement, as Russia has refitted multiple vessels with the 3M-54 Kalibr missile, which gives a longer range to precision strike operations, allowing Russian assets to enjoy better protection of its Arctic and High North defensive bastions, in turn drawing NATO assets further north. To meet this challenge, Norway is hosting NATO submarines (p. 22), mainly from the UK and the US, in new Norwegian facilities to enable operations to push further north to match Russia’s reach. Moreover, the UK has established a land and littoral presence in the High North, now operating from a new facility in Norway called Camp Viking. With a multi-domain presence and specialist capabilities, including logistic and intelligence enablers, the UK is the best placed European nation to secure end-to-end transatlantic reinforcements from the US to NATO’s eastern front, thereby delivering strategic depth.</p> +<p><strong>CAPABILITIES</strong></p> -<p>Second, the UK can lead on re-establishing and maintaining strategic stability, consistent with “a new long-term goal to manage the risks of miscalculation and escalation between major powers, upholding strategic stability through strategic-level dialogue and an updated approach to arms control and counter-proliferation” (p. 13). The UK, as a European nuclear power, will be a valuable actor in the region, which also hosts Russian strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. Moreover, the UK is well placed to support Finland and Sweden as they join a nuclear alliance and, for the first time, have a direct role in nuclear policy and planning, by providing a greater understanding of deterrence, risk reduction and arms control.</p> +<p>At a basic level, interviewed experts were eager to see if CISA capabilities could collect and detect intrusions at machine speed and if they could properly integrate inputs from their different services into single repositories to provide actionable intelligence. <strong>Modernization is not just about creating new technological solutions to address old problems. New tools have to integrate with preexisting tools and services to ensure there are no disruptions or visibility gaps.</strong></p> -<h3 id="galvanising-nato-command-and-control">Galvanising NATO Command and Control</h3> +<p>Setting aside CISA’s actual capabilities (since they will be rolled out in the coming months and years), it is possible to assess general perceptions about these capabilities — namely, whether interviewees expect that CISA will be fully authorized and technically capable enough in the near future to actually perform activities such as advanced threat hunting and real-time information sharing, and whether it will have stronger, more reliable capabilities relative to other government or industry entities that could offer the same or better services.</p> -<p>Finland, and eventually Sweden, joining NATO fundamentally changes defence and security policy in Northern Europe. Finland’s membership has already doubled the NATO border with Russia, and the inclusion of Sweden will expand the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s land area of operations by more than 866,000 km2. While this obviously presents significant opportunities for NATO, there are also considerable challenges. The UK has an interest in being a security “integrator” in the region by supporting its newest members and building coherence between Nordic and Baltic regional plans and Alliance command and control (C2). Here there is a significant opportunity for the UK to lead and galvanise and make a major contribution to Euro-Atlantic security.</p> +<p>Among this project’s sample of interviewed experts, there seemed to be mixed levels of confidence in CISA’s technical capabilities. Some expressed doubt that CISA would be able to accomplish all of its stated goals in the immediate future, while others felt stronger confidence in other government entities’ technical capabilities.</p> + +<p>As one interviewee expressed, service providers should aim to have strong capabilities, but it might not always be prudent for them to maintain capabilities that far exceed those of the entities they are protecting or managing — in this case, the FCEB agencies. Instead, it is more important that CISA monitor and encourage FCEB entities to have baseline capabilities across federal networks to better facilitate coordination in detection and response.</p> + +<p>Finally, as well put by one of the interviewees, “CISA offers a wide variety of excellent services. But they are just that: individual services.” While there are indications that CISA is actively moving to prioritize service integration so that insights and information collected via different channels are essentially talking to each other, it is worth flagging that, at present, this is a notable gap (see Recommendation 3.6 on system integration).</p> -<p>The enlargement creates NATO C2 headaches for Northern Europe, as does the timing gap between the two countries joining. Finland has joined under the command of Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum, alongside the Baltic states, Poland and Germany. However, Norway (and likely Sweden when it joins) falls under JFC Norfolk in the US, which is responsible for the North Atlantic, including the Arctic. This arrangement (p. 14) creates C2 incoherence between the “European Arctic and Atlantic” and “Baltic and Central Europe” defence plans, which will make their execution more difficult and create potential friction precisely when the Nordic states are finally united in NATO, and it could set back growing defence integration efforts between them. Integrating NATO’s regional plans and Nordic–Baltic security policy more broadly will be critical to their delivery. Specifically, better integrating Finland and Estonia would best serve this purpose, securing the Baltic Sea and containing Russia and denying it freedom of manoeuvre in wartime between St Petersburg and access to the Baltic Sea and Kaliningrad.</p> +<p><strong>RESOURCES</strong></p> -<p>UK engagement and interests straddle the Nordic and Baltic states through the JEF, the Northern Group of Defence Ministers, and close bilateral security cooperation with both Finland and Estonia – the latter being the location of the UK-led NATO multinational battlegroup. The July 2023 Defence Command Paper Refresh stated:</p> +<p>A few of the interviewed experts expressed variations of this sentiment: “It’s great that CISA offers free services. But are they always free?” Some programs require long-term tool maintenance costs over time that might not have been initially understood. Others occasionally place time-intensive burdens on FCEB personnel — an indirect and underappreciated cost. And some, while not initially including a financial burden, might ultimately require financial investments if CISA’s services uncover an issue that an FCEB agency needs to remedy. <strong>It is not just a question of if CISA is properly resourced to continue providing services to the FCEB agencies, but also one of whether the FCEB agencies are properly resourced to take advantage of and implement guidance offered by CISA.</strong></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As the Alliance looks to welcome in two new members, the UK will also lead the collaboration amongst Allies to shape a revised Control and Command structure, with a specific focus on Northern Europe – the regional area of greatest importance to our homeland defence (p. 62).</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The first concern stems from a larger question of what centralized cyber funding could look like for the federal government and what that might mean for FCEB agencies that are the recipients of funds. At present, and as was outlined in the CDM section of this report, there are questions about the long-term sustainability of tools, with some FCEB entities having a harder time affording the continued use of cyber tools into the future.</p> -<p>As an established European framework nation, the UK – known for its C2 ability, structures and maturity – would be well placed to manage Finland and Swedish integration and C2 coherence in Northern Europe. During the Cold War, the UK was a C2 enabler for NATO, emphasising strengths in the naval and air domains, through Allied Forces Northern Europe and UK Command through Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe. Today, the UK hosts both NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM) and JEF C2 through Standing Joint Force Headquarters, which, since the Russian invasion, has deployed nodes and liaison officers across Northern Europe.</p> +<p>At the CISA level, there is also the question of whether the agency is adequately funded to accomplish its intended mission. Recent fiscal trends indicate an escalating commitment from the federal government toward bolstering cyberspace defense. The DOD’s allocation of $13.5 billion for cyberspace activities in FY 2024 — a significant, 20.5 percent hike from FY 2023 — underscores this commitment. While this budget seeks to operationalize the zero trust framework and advance next-generation encryption solutions, it also emphasizes industry cybersecurity through the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification program and the expansion of the CNMF teams. The integration of these solutions is pivotal, not just as a defense mechanism but as a proactive measure against ever-evolving cyber threats.</p> -<h3 id="uk-leadership-of-the-jef">UK Leadership of the JEF</h3> +<p>For FY 2024, CISA is requesting $3.1 billion, a 5 percent increase from its FY 2023 budget. Director Easterly testified that if the budget were to fall to 2022 levels (roughly $2.6 billion), then it would “put [CISA] back in a pre-SolarWinds world.” The agency has made great strides in recent years to increase its capabilities, and moving forward it will be interesting to see if CISA’s allocated budget will be fully utilized and what services will be impacted first by any funding shortfalls. It is crucial to delve deeper into these matters to ascertain whether the existing fiscal strategy aligns with evolving cyber defense imperatives (see Pillar 1 Recommendations: Resourcing toward Success).</p> -<p>The JEF has developed into a key mechanism for the UK to provide leadership in Northern Europe and galvanise the Nordic and Baltic states together to optimise defence and deterrence against Russia. In 2022, the JEF came of age. The first-ever JEF leaders’ meeting was held the day after Russia’s invasion, followed by two more during the year, which included a commitment to developing a 10-year vision ahead of the 2023 leaders’ summit.</p> +<p>For Congress, it is also important to note that the CSIS research team conducted a public survey with 1,000 individuals from the general public. A statistically significant number of respondents indicated that they do not think the federal government currently spends enough money on federal cybersecurity. While CISA has received funding boosts in recent years, and funding alone will not necessarily guarantee increased security, there would likely be political support for upping the cyber budgets for CISA and the FCEB agencies.</p> -<p>The September 2022 attacks on the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines in the Baltic Sea brought into sharper focus the security requirement to better protect CNI, and highlighted the risk of attacks specifically to undersea assets. This was reinforced by the October 2023 damage to the Balticconnector natural gas pipeline and communications cable between Finland and Estonia likely caused by “external activity”. This is an area where the Russian threat is acute. NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security, David Cattler, has warned of an increase in Russian submarine and underwater activity, including “actively mapping allied critical infrastructure both on land and on the seabed”.</p> +<p><strong>AUTHORITIES</strong></p> -<p>To respond, the JEF will focus activity on countering hybrid aggression in its area of operations of the North Atlantic, High North and Baltic, especially in relation to the protection of CNI, including underwater cables and pipelines. Here, the UK provides leadership, through committing to protect Allied CNI, alongside upholding freedom of navigation and international norms in the region. Immediately following the Nord Stream attacks, the UK announced that two Multirole Ocean Surveillance ships would be sped into service. This capability, alongside Astute-class submarines, mine-countermeasure vessels and RAF MPA, will be critical to protecting underwater CNI. Moreover, MARCOM hosts NATO’s new Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell, and the UK has signed new bilateral agreements such as the UK–Norway strategic partnership on undersea threats. The UK, as a regional geopolitical heavyweight, is ideally situated to engage with the JEF collectively and individually; to link its agenda to other key regional actors, such as France, Germany and Poland; and to develop greater JEF coherence between the myriad of security institutions in Northern Europe, including NATO, the EU, the Northern Group of Defence Ministers, Nordic Defence Cooperation and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable.</p> +<p>In a 2022 CSIS study on federal migration to ZTA and endpoint security, interviewees noted general confusion about who was leading strategic coordination of larger federal ZTA efforts. The research team attempted to map out the different federal roles, noting that a clearer division of labor needs to be communicated in order to properly measure progress and hold agencies accountable for different tasks.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion-the-uk-orients-to-future-challenges-in-northern-europe">Conclusion: The UK Orients to Future Challenges in Northern Europe</h3> +<p>With regard to federal network security, CISA is the designated lead. However, in support of its larger network defense mission, other entities such as the ONCD, OMB, and NIST play key roles in providing overall coordination and general guidance. <strong>In order to successfully defend federal networks, CISA needs a clearer delineation of what its role does — and does not — entail.</strong></p> -<p>The explicit prioritisation of Northern Europe addresses both immediate UK security requirements – defence and deterrence against Russia – and future challenges – China’s increasing presence in the Arctic and High North as a “near-Arctic state”, and growing Sino-Russian cooperation. The IR2023 declared that the prosperity and security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific were “inextricably linked”, upgraded China as an “epoch-defining challenge”, and cemented the Indo-Pacific “tilt” as a permanent pillar of UK foreign policy (pp. 9, 3, 22). A rapidly heating Arctic climate will make the Northern Sea Route increasingly navigable during the summer and the Transpolar Sea Route will likely be usable by 2050 (p. 36). This transformational geopolitical change will directly link the UK’s two priority geographic “strategic arenas” – politically, economically and militarily – which will fundamentally impact UK and Euro-Atlantic security. Given this, NATO may have not only to contend with Russia, but also with a more assertive Chinese presence in the Arctic and High North. Therefore, heavily investing in Northern Europe now will enhance UK strategic advantage, reassure Allies and deter future threats.</p> +<p>Chris Inglis, former national cyber director, described his role as the “coach,” with CISA serving as the “quarterback.” And in many ways, this relationship has worked well, with the ONCD sometimes advocating on CISA’s behalf at higher-level meetings where CISA might not currently have a seat at the table. Still, some industry and government experts expressed a need for more clarity in roles and responsibilities at all levels, not just with regard to CISA’s FCEB mission (see Pillar 2 Recommendations: Leveraging and Harmonizing Authorities).</p> -<hr /> +<p><strong>RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT: SHARED SERVICES</strong></p> -<p><strong>Ed Arnold</strong> is a Research Fellow for European Security within the International Security department at RUSI. His experience covers defence, intelligence, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, within the public and private sector. His primary research focus is on the transformation of European security following Russia’s war on Ukraine. Specifically, he covers the evolving Euro-Atlantic security architecture, the security of northern Europe, and the UK contribution to European security through NATO, the Joint Expeditionary Force, and other fora. Ed has a particular interest in UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Reviews.</p>Ed ArnoldThis Policy Brief is to explain why the UK has chosen to explicitly prioritise the security of Northern Europe following Russia’s war in Ukraine.Containing A Catastrophe2023-10-17T12:00:00+08:002023-10-17T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/containing-a-catastrophe<p><em>As Israel prepares to launch a ground offensive in Gaza, there is a real risk that the war could escalate into a wider conflagration. Efforts to contain the conflict will test key relationships across the region.</em></p> +<p>Separate from its formal authorities in managing FCEB network security, <strong>CISA also has to identify ways to exist and provide value in the larger ecosystem of shared service providers.</strong> In other words, can CISA play nicely with others and elevate, integrate, and coordinate with the other providers already in the field? The DOJ, for example, is officially designated by the OMB as a federal shared service provider. CISA has also indicated that the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Transportation are vetted shared federal service providers</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>In addition to deconflicting current service offerings, CISA needs to be mindful of newer entities that can offer complementary services to FCEB agencies. For example, the NSA’s Cyber Collaboration Center, one of the DOD’s officially designated service providers that specifically provides tailored services to entities in the defense industrial base, routinely consults with other DOD providers to ensure maximum coordination and no duplication of services. From CSIS’s research, it appears as though the level of coordination between CISA and non-FCEB protecting entities, such as DOD service providers, may not be as high as it could be. Fairly or not, CISA is now the central point for a number of managed services to FCEB agencies, and the burden falls on them to ensure they are in sync and sharing best practices and resources from other providers across industry and governments (see Recommendation 3.4 on coordinating with other shared service providers).</p> -<p>It is already clear that Hamas’s attack on Israel on 7 October was a watershed moment. It was the deadliest attack on the State of Israel since its existence; its scale and brutality make it paradigm-shifting. Looking to past conflicts – the Gaza wars of 2008/09, 2012 and 2014, for example, or the Israel–Hezbollah war in 2006 – therefore has only limited value. A week after the attack, there are two broad scenarios for how this crisis could unfold.</p> +<p><strong>RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT WITH FCEB AGENCIES</strong></p> -<h3 id="two-scenarios-for-escalation">Two Scenarios for Escalation</h3> +<p>CISA is taking active steps to position itself as a “partner” to FCEB agencies, but that also means that it needs to be cognizant of unique FCEB missions when providing guidance and developing plans. <strong>CISA needs to be able to balance security concerns with FCEB agencies’ mandates to perform the tasks that are statutorily required of them.</strong></p> -<p>In the first scenario, the Israel–Hamas war could stay contained to Gaza and southern Israel. The launch of Israel’s impending attack on Hamas “from the air, sea and land” will have unpredictable consequences. But there is still the possibility that the war could remain limited in scope, at least geographically.</p> +<p>One concern identified by interviewees for this report is that an FCEB agency could use certain tools to prioritize security that would hurt or impact the entity’s mission in other ways. This issue is all the more important if the ease of use for some technologies or processes is key to an agency being able to perform essential parts of its mission. In the name of trying to encourage FCEB agencies to acquire “secure” technologies, products are pushed out that do not necessarily work in ways that are of maximum real use to the FCEB agencies. In other words, the emphasis on security sometimes does not properly balance considerations related to basic operations.</p> -<p>In the second scenario, the war could expand beyond southern Israel and become a regional conflict. The escalation logic of this scenario is plain: the unfolding war in Gaza could lead other groups that define themselves through their resistance or enmity towards Israel – most notably armed Palestinian factions in the West Bank; Hezbollah in Lebanon; Iranian-backed groups in Syria, Iraq or elsewhere; or even Iran itself – to conclude that they must get involved lest they lose legitimacy. A major attack on Israel by any of these actors would likely be met with a furious response from the Israeli military, which would in turn further fuel escalation in the region.</p> +<p>A related concern is the larger issue of FCEB agencies managing technology debt and dealing with legacy systems that are either integral to the department or agency or are logistically difficult to phase out. In theory, general guidance should be to either phase out or properly secure legacy systems. In specific instances where that might not be possible, CISA should be willing to work with FCEB agencies to identify alternate ways to secure the networks.</p> -<p>Thus far, the clashes and skirmishes that have occurred in the West Bank and across the Israeli-Lebanese and Israeli-Syrian borders have remained relatively limited, indicating a level of intentional restraint on all sides. Nevertheless, the escalation scenario should not be dismissed as alarmist. Much will be written in the coming months about how it was possible for Israel to fail to see Hamas’s 7 October attack coming. One conclusion is likely to be that there was a failure of imagination: Israeli and other intelligence services may have been aware of various different Hamas actions or of Israel’s own vulnerabilities, but the dots were not joined together – it wasn’t just that no one thought that an attack of such scale was possible, but that no one had thought of such an attack at all. Policymakers around the world, including in the UK, now have a responsibility not to commit the same mistake and to take a potential escalation of the conflict – even beyond all precedent – seriously.</p> +<p>CISA already advertises that its services do not operate with a one-size-fits-all mentality. CISA needs to take that one step further in creatively thinking through how it defines, measures, and communicates its actual security goals (see Recommendation 3.1 on CISA’s outreach strategy).</p> -<p>To be clear, even the first scenario is catastrophic. The war in Gaza, like the attack that provoked it, has already reached unprecedented levels of brutality, bloodshed and destruction. The Israeli hostages taken by Hamas, together with hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who had no hand in Hamas’s actions at all, are in mortal jeopardy. Even among the combatants – both Hamas and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) – casualties must be expected at rates not seen before. Yet still, the second scenario is much worse.</p> +<p><strong>MEASURING PROGRESS AND SUCCESS</strong></p> -<h3 id="regional-de-escalation-upended--and-tested">Regional De-Escalation Upended – and Tested</h3> +<p>It is not entirely fair to say that metrics for measuring progress in federal cybersecurity do not exist. For instance, in accordance with FISMA, CISA and the OMB are able to collect information to help them better assess how FCEB agencies are making progress in their plans to implement processes and technologies that enhance federal cybersecurity. Additionally, CISA has noted benchmarks for measuring the success of a number of their services in their latest strategic plan for 2024 to 2026. <strong>Having clearly defined metrics is essential. In the absence of such metrics, it will not only be difficult for Congress to conduct oversight and appropriate funds to grow certain programs, but it will also be difficult for FCEB agencies to justify spending time and resources to engage with these services. Additionally, metrics that fail to properly capture unique areas of progress between different types of FCEB agencies will also possibly create tensions between CISA and its FCEB clients.</strong></p> -<p>Hamas’s attack has upended the regional trend towards de-escalation and reducing tensions that has prevailed in the Middle East over the past three years. The notion that governments in the region could agree to put their differences aside, rebuild diplomatic relations and focus on shared interests in economic development – all while leaving the leaving the root causes and underlying conflicts that led to instability and tensions in the first place unaddressed – has been exposed as untenable. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict – or, for that matter, the ongoing conflicts in Libya, Syria and Yemen, or the socio-economic cleavages in many other countries in the region – cannot be ignored or put in boxes, no matter how much governments in the region and beyond may want to focus on more positive agendas.</p> +<p>CISA is also likely able to internally track FCEB progress based on the number of services used, the frequency of use, and reporting times, among other metrics. That said, one FCEB interviewee did make the point that CISA might need to be more discerning in how it measures FCEB progress. For instance, if a third-party contractor is failing to meet certain deadlines and performance goals, blame should be assigned to the contractor and not the FCEB agency. An industry interviewee made a similar point, noting that the “matrix of contractors” makes it difficult to see who or what is actually working, and who or what is falling short. The metrics are not necessarily capturing the people and how they can positively or negatively impact progress.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Governments across the region are likely to come under immense popular pressure as their populations rally in support of the Palestinians in Gaza</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Finally, another gap is a lack of measures that can help the public and FCEB agencies measure the usefulness of CISA’s offered services. Beyond use numbers, what are other formal metrics to rank the success (or failures) of certain products and services? And can these be used to generate more buy-in for CISA services? (See Recommendation 2.6 on metrics and FCEB feedback.)</p> -<p>At the same time, however, the Israel–Hamas war and the real threat of its escalation into a regional conflagration will now test the new relationships that have been formed over the past three years – between Israel and the Gulf Arab states, between Israel and Turkey, between Turkey and Egypt and the Gulf Arab states, and between the Gulf Arab states and Iran. Governments across the region, from Ankara and Cairo to Riyadh and even Tehran, have a shared interest in at the very least containing the current crisis to remain within the confines of the first scenario. Many of them are likely to come under immense popular pressure as their pro-Palestinian (though not necessarily pro-Hamas) populations rally in support of the Palestinians in Gaza. But the drivers for their push towards de-escalation, including the conclusion that escalation only begets more instability in the region, and the desire for stability and economic development, remain unchanged.</p> +<p><strong>MISSION AND PURPOSE</strong></p> -<p>Iran’s precise role in Hamas’s 7 October attack will likely become clearer in the coming weeks and months, but it is incontrovertible that Tehran now has significant agency in determining whether the war escalates or not. Threatening statements by Iran’s foreign minister, warning Israel – or “the Zionist entity” as he calls it – to halt its operations in Gaza or risk suffering “a huge earthquake,” should be taken very seriously. It is important to note that Iran does not fully control its partners in the region. Hamas, Hezbollah, the groups it supports in Syria and Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen all have their own political agendas and the ability to make decisions. But Tehran certainly has more influence over them than anyone else.</p> +<p>At what stage is it CISA’s responsibility to ensure not only that it is providing resources to FCEB agencies but that all FCEB agencies are taking full advantage of CISA’s offered services? In interviews with government and industry experts, there seemed to be varying opinions on this. Some would argue that CISA is already doing a lot and that it is not its fault if some FCEB agencies are not devoting enough time to familiarizing themselves with CISA services. Others thought the burden should fall on CISA to articulate clearly and comprehensively the nature of its services and ensure that they are being widely used by FCEB agencies. This becomes especially true for small and medium entities that, at present, might not have the time or resources to fully prioritize cybersecurity, let alone understand the various aspects of CISA services.</p> -<p>The US and its Western allies, including the UK, are already working to deter Iran. The rapid deployment of a US aircraft carrier group to the Eastern Mediterranean in the days after 7 October, now joined by two Royal Navy ships, is surely meant to send at least two distinct messages: to reassure Israel, and to deter Iran and its partners across the region.</p> +<p>Beyond the public relations consideration, there is a larger issue underpinning this question: <strong>In order to be the designated lead of FCEB network security, does CISA need to centrally manage cyber risk across the FCEB landscape?</strong> Or should it take a tailored approach, letting some departments and agencies responsibly manage their own cybersecurity while taking on the security burdens of smaller and medium-sized entities?</p> -<p>Others can do more than send deterring signals to Iran – and are doing so. On 11 October, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman spoke with Iran’s President Ibrahim Raisi about Riyadh’s efforts to “stop the ongoing escalation”; it was the first-ever publicised phone call between the two men. Other governments across the region, especially in the Gulf, are likely similarly seeking to convince Iran not to push for further escalation.</p> +<p>Per the 2023 National Cyber Strategy, “federal civilian agencies are responsible for managing and securing their own IT and OT systems,” and federal cybersecurity plans must balance an agency’s “individual authorities and capabilities . . . with the security benefits achieved through a collective approach to defense.” While it can be assumed that this language was developed in close consultation with CISA, it does potentially diverge from CISA’s future goals of being able to manage the security of entities that are unable to sufficiently do so themselves.</p> -<h3 id="short--and-long-term-challenges-for-regional-governments">Short- and Long-Term Challenges for Regional Governments</h3> +<p>For any of the cyber services to be successful moving forward, there needs to be a clarity of mission and long-term purpose. At present, while CISA might operate internally with a clear understanding, its operations are potentially at odds with how others are perceiving CISA’s role, and that could impact its usefulness as it continues to evolve (see Recommendations 2.1 and 2.3 on CISA’s role, and FCEB leaders’ roles, in managing federal networks).</p> -<p>The Gulf Arab states, together with Turkey and Egypt, also play an important role with regard to the first scenario and the ongoing war in Gaza. Their urgent calls on Israel to moderate or even end its operations in Gaza are unlikely to be heeded anytime soon, but they can nevertheless have a meaningful impact.</p> +<h3 id="future-threats-and-challenges-on-the-horizon">Future Threats and Challenges on the Horizon</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In the longer term, Western capitals must recognise that they cannot turn their backs on the Middle East, however much they might want to</code></em></strong></p> +<p>For this report, the CSIS research team studied the current state of CISA services in order to better appreciate and predict how these initiatives might fare against future threats and challenges. Assuming current trends continue, the team’s goal was to get a better sense of what CISA’s overall network defense posture might look like in the coming years in order to identify possible service gaps and necessary interventions that should be considered in the near future.</p> -<p>Egypt, which shares the only border with Gaza that is not directly controlled by Israel, is under enormous pressure to allow refugees to enter its territory. Thus far, Cairo has refused. It worries that an influx of refugees could destabilise the Sinai Peninsula, where Egypt has struggled to contain a low-level insurgency for the past decade, and further undermine the already struggling Egyptian economy. Perhaps most importantly, it fears that refugees could end up staying in Egypt indefinitely, unable to return to Gaza either due to the destruction wrought by the war, or because Israel – once in control of the territory – might not allow them to come back. It is incumbent upon the US, other Western governments and the richer Gulf Arab states to work with Cairo to alleviate these concerns, including by putting pressure on Israel to allow passage across the Gaza–Egypt border in both directions.</p> +<p>The research team intentionally limited its scope of study to look at a time frame three to five years out. Instead of hypothesizing major incidents that could arise in the distant future, the research team asked experts and tabletop exercise participants to critically think about realistic threats on the horizon and predict how CISA’s maturing services might be able to address these scenarios.</p> -<p>Meanwhile, Qatar, and perhaps Egypt and Turkey, appear to be the only international actors (besides Iran) that could feasibly exercise a degree of influence over Hamas with regard to the Israeli hostages taken on 7 October. Doha, Cairo and Ankara have all been able to engage with Hamas’s political leadership in the past. However, it is unclear whether their interlocutors still have any real influence on the situation on the ground.</p> +<p>There were some specific mentions of actual technologies adversaries could use that might evolve in the coming years and test the effectiveness of CISA services. However, the majority of comments seemed to emphasize that future threats and challenges to FCEB networks will come from the same or similar threat vectors as seen today, just at greater frequency and likely in combination with other attacks. The challenge for CISA and the U.S. government writ large is finding ways to prioritize and appropriately respond to these types of attacks over a sustained period of time. Additionally, if left unaddressed, ongoing coordination, communication, and resourcing challenges will hamper the collective abilities of CISA and FCEB agencies to effectively defend federal networks.</p> -<p>In the longer term, regional countries – most importantly Saudi Arabia, but also Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, the UAE and others – will have a crucial role to play in helping to rebuild a Palestinian political leadership that can legitimately speak for the Palestinian people. With the 7 October attack, Hamas has completely disqualified itself from ever being regarded as a legitimate political entity – whether by Israel or most of the international community. At the same time, Hamas’s attack has also once again exposed the Palestinian Authority in its current form as woefully ineffective. Once the current war ends, there must be a re-engagement with the Middle East Peace Process, which has been completely neglected in recent years by all sides. Riyadh and others in the region who are committed to building a more stable Middle East are best placed to help identify and then build up a Palestinian leadership that is strong enough to eventually rebuild Gaza, seriously govern the West Bank and work with Israeli counterparts (who must also be found and empowered) towards lasting solutions.</p> +<h4 id="reflections-from-expert-interviews">Reflections from Expert Interviews</h4> -<h3 id="the-west-cannot-ignore-the-middle-east">The West Cannot Ignore the Middle East</h3> +<p>Between this research project and a related effort looking at federal cybersecurity budgets, CSIS researchers and affiliates conducted over 30 informational interviews to better understand threats and challenges to federal networks, as well as the state of CISA cybersecurity services offered to FCEB agencies. The following is an overview of the types of individuals that participated in the expert interviews (not including comments from the expert task force and other experts that shared perspectives during the tabletop exercises):</p> -<p>If Hamas’s attack has upended – or at the very least interrupted – the regional drive towards de-escalation, it has also highlighted that the West’s approach towards the region in recent years is unsustainable. Policymakers in the US and the UK and across Europe have sought to deprioritise the region, partly due to more urgent crises demanding their attention – most notably Russia’s war in Ukraine – and partly driven by a fatigue with the intractability of the region’s conflicts.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Seven FCEB CISOs and CIOs</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Twelve federal cybersecurity experts (including individuals representing shared service providers, the ONCD, and CISA)</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Eleven private sector CISOs, CIOs, and cybersecurity experts</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>In the coming weeks and months, Washington, London, Brussels and others must work with partners across the region to prevent escalation. They must persuade Israel – likely behind closed doors – to exercise as much restraint as possible, and support and empower regional leaders in their efforts to stave off a wider conflagration. In the longer term, they must recognise that they cannot turn their backs on the Middle East, however much they might want to. Focusing on geopolitical challenges that are identified as more strategically important – confronting Russia, pivoting/tilting to the Indo-Pacific and dealing with China, to name but a few – is hardly possible when the Middle East is spiralling into turmoil.</p> +<p>These not-for-attribution interviews covered a range of topics, such as personal experiences with and perceptions of CISA’s current tools and services, resource allocation, formal and implied authorities, marketing strategies, and future threats and challenges.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Ultimately, even though the interviewed experts represented different-sized public and private sector entities, the CSIS research team was able to capture some interesting trends and notable divergence points between the groups. While specific comments from the interviews helped inform the research team’s general research and are reflected throughout the report, this section summarizes some key trends observed across the different interviews.</p> -<p><strong>Tobias Borck</strong> is Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security Studies at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His main research interests include the international relations of the Middle East, and specifically the foreign, defence and security policies of Arab states, particularly the Gulf monarchies, as well as European – especially German and British – engagement with the Middle East.</p>Tobias BorckAs Israel prepares to launch a ground offensive in Gaza, there is a real risk that the war could escalate into a wider conflagration. Efforts to contain the conflict will test key relationships across the region.The Orient Express2023-10-16T12:00:00+08:002023-10-16T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-orient-express<p><em>Dozens of high-resolution satellite images taken in recent months reveal that Russia has likely begun shipping North Korean munitions at scale, opening a new supply route that could have profound consequences for the war in Ukraine and international security dynamics in East Asia.</em></p> +<p><strong>HOW TO SPEND FUNDS</strong></p> -<excerpt /> +<p><strong>Invest in data and service integration for greater visibility.</strong> Across interviews, the most requested investment was for CISA to prioritize data integration between its different tools and services, especially with regard to information collected via CDM. The desired outcome is to optimize visibility for all FCEB agencies by mapping services back to systems and within risk management tools. Some interviewees also suggested the use of AI/ML to assist with data integration. The observed comments underscore that CISA should prioritize investing in and actually communicating updates on data integration and the use of AI/ML to support greater automation.</p> -<p>Just a few weeks after the momentous visit of Russia’s Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu to North Korea, in July, three Russian cargo vessels connected to Moscow’s international military transportation networks embarked on an unusual journey.</p> +<p><strong>Advocate for cyber investments on behalf of FCEB agencies.</strong> FCEB interviewees pointed out that there is a role for CISA (or other cyber departments and entities in the federal government) to help FCEB agencies make informed decisions about how to invest in new technologies. A big part of that is helping the CISOs, CIOs, and cyber experts make the case for why their departments and agencies need more cyber investments to enhance security.</p> -<p>Their destination was an inconspicuous naval facility tucked away in the secluded Russian port of Dunai, situated in the remote eastern reaches of the country. Once identified by the CIA at the height of the Cold War as a Soviet submarine base, the Dunai facility sits approximately nine kilometres south of the town of Fokino, a closed administrative-territorial entity south of Vladivostok, where movement and residency are strictly controlled for military and security reasons</p> +<p>Some interviewees, for example, expressed the desire for CISA representatives to advocate on behalf of the FCEB agencies for the use of AI technologies in network defense or to invest in training programs that help FCEB agencies more easily adopt and incorporate future technologies. Another common observation was that CISA can use its platform to help FCEB entities justify and allocate funds for more and better cyber talent. Per one FCEB interviewee, the federal enterprise currently lacks an advocate on behalf of the FCEB agencies who could resource departments with the proper funding and workforce to manage network security.</p> -<p>While the unremarkable port facility at Dunai had largely been relegated to the annals of Cold War history, recent deliveries by the Russian-flagged Angara, Maria and Lady R of what are likely to be North Korean munitions have thrust it into the international spotlight, and place it at the centre of the burgeoning relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow.</p> +<p><strong>Develop sustainable cybersecurity budgets.</strong> An important common theme observed across a number of interviews is that FCEB agencies, at varying levels, need support in securing and maintaining cybersecurity budgets over long periods of time. This was most commonly referenced in relation to the CDM program, where FCEB agencies were given subsidies to cover their tools for an initial two years but were then expected to fund the tools on their own once the initial funding expired (see CDM section of the report).</p> -<p>Embroiled in a grinding attritional conflict in Ukraine, Moscow has scoured the globe for munitions to supply its armed forces, which are currently attempting to repel a determined Ukrainian counteroffensive. But while Iran answered Moscow’s call, supplying the country with hundreds of Shahed loitering munitions, other UAVs and weapons, North Korean arms have yet to appear in significant quantities on the battlefield.</p> +<p>These budgets also need to account for inflation-related price increases, added labor costs for managing certain tools overtime, and unanticipated costs associated with patching and fixing certain tools periodically or as vulnerabilities are discovered.</p> -<p>That, however, is about to change. Dozens of high-resolution images, revealed here for the first time and captured in recent months over Dunai and the North Korean port of Rajin, show the three cargo vessels repeatedly transporting hundreds of containers likely packed with North Korean armaments.</p> +<p>While CISA’s role might not necessarily be to help FCEB agencies strategize their cyber budgets, and there were different thoughts on what type of funding model or models would be most appropriate for different types of tools and services, the larger point was that the current structure is not optimal for producing long-term security benefits (see Pillar 1 Recommendations: Resourcing toward Success).</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sd1C6tl.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Angara and Maria shipments between Dunai and Rajin.</strong> Source: Planet Labs, RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> +<p><strong>AUTHORITIES: BALANCING THE BURDENS OF RISK AND ACCOUNTABILITY</strong></p> -<p>Although it is difficult to determine the specific contents of these containers from imagery alone, the US government accused the North Koreans of supplying munitions and military material to Russia on 13 October. These claims were accompanied by imagery detailing the alleged end-destination of these shipments in Tikhoretsk, a small town in Russia’s Krasnodar region, facing the Kerch Strait and Russian-occupied Crimea.</p> +<p>Arguably, the biggest discussion around authorities ultimately got back to <strong>who should be in charge of managing FCEB cyber risk and how that potentially impacts resourcing, information dissemination, general accountability, and related concerns.</strong> One interviewee described CISA’s FCEB mission as a challenge because the agency had to “work in a kitchen with too many cooks.” One extreme that was brought up was the idea for CISA to centralize management of FCEB IT infrastructure, backed with the funding and other resources to fully execute that mission. Pursuing this route would minimize the “cooks” to just one and centralize risk management at CISA. The alternative, alluded to by a number of experts, is for CISA to continue working as a partner in collaboration with FCEB agencies. Beyond general support via its official services, some interviewees expressed a desire to have CISA subject matter experts detailed to their respective FCEB agencies to assist with issues such as overcoming technical knowledge gaps and helping with ZTA migration.</p> -<p>High-resolution imagery collected in recent weeks in the vicinity of Tikhoretsk confirms the rapid expansion of a munitions storage facility here beginning in August 2023 – the same time that North Korea’s shipments from Rajin began. Crucially, these images also appear to show trains delivering the same size and colour of cargo containers as those shipped from North Korea to Russia’s far east.</p> +<p>There are major cultural barriers to CISA becoming the sole manager of risk. And even if it could work through those issues with the FCEB agencies, it is not apparent that CISA currently has the ability to serve in this role in the near future. That said, this is a question that should be studied further, especially since there seem to be different ideas about what balance could yield optimal security outcomes (see Pillar 2 Recommendations: Leveraging and Harmonizing Authorities).</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ICMWguj.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Renovations as the Tikhoretsk munitions depot.</strong> Source: Planet Labs, RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> +<p><strong>COMMUNICATION AND ENGAGEMENT</strong></p> -<h3 id="the-orient-express">The Orient Express</h3> +<p>While experts did note that CISA has been receptive to their comments and feedback, they still emphasized that for CISA to be successful it needs to prioritize persistent but coordinated engagement with FCEB agencies. This is especially important since interviewees also expressed that some FCEB agencies might not be fully aware of CISA’s complete slate of services offered or of the applications or value add in a sector-specific manner. One participant suggested that in addition to a general outreach campaign, a comprehensive, sector-specific service catalog might be helpful.</p> -<p>The first stop for North Korea’s shipments to Russia is in Dunai, a secure military facility with controlled entrances, disguised storage areas and a number of secure berths often frequented by Russian naval assets. High-resolution satellite imagery captured in recent months shows that containers are regularly delivered and removed from here by semi-trailers and railway wagons, likely for transport across Russia towards Tikhoretsk and the border with Ukraine.</p> +<p>Some of the non-FCEB experts emphasized that if CISA wants to ensure that new services are used and its authorities appreciated, it should be “knocking on the FCEBs’ doors,” sometimes multiple times, to explain the different services, authorities, and other aspects of its activities. The emphasis should be on the value these services can bring to a department or agency. One expert also made the point that CISA should systematically interview or survey its FCEB clients to identify specific demands for certain types of tools (if it does not do so already). This particular expert further argued that developing a proof of concept and proving its value through demonstrations and success stories will help secure more buy-in for new products and services (see Pillar 3 Recommendations: Enhancing Communication and Coordination with Key Stakeholders).</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/0EgNHC4.jpg" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: The Secure Facility at Dunai, Russia.</strong> Source: Airbus Defence and Space, RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> +<p><strong>THE FUTURE THREAT LANDSCAPE</strong></p> -<p>The initial shipment of hundreds of containers was loaded on to the Angara at Dunai in late August, before the vessel made its way to the North Korean port of Rajin on the country’s eastern coast. Notably, the vessel also switched off its AIS transponder, obscuring its movements between the two countries. Once in North Korea, satellite imagery shows the vessel unloading these containers onto a berth with a dedicated rail line.</p> +<p>Malware-as-a-service lowers the cost of entry for adversaries, and it is increasing noise for defenders. Interviewees believe that <strong>AI will further increase this noise, and FCEB agencies and CISA should develop and acquire tools that help automate their defenses and increase their ability to detect vulnerabilities</strong> (see Recommendation 1.4 on AI product pricing strategy). One interviewee attested that they are already finding ChatGPT-elevated malware, highlighting that a response to these types of threats is urgently needed today.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZBekepl.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: The Angara loading and unloading containers in Rajin, North Korea.</strong> Source: Planet Labs, RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> +<p>A related point is that it is one thing to identify a threat, but it is another to <strong>fully understand the nature of a threat and, by extension, develop the appropriate countermeasures needed to address the situation.</strong> To tackle emerging threats, some interviewees and experts indicated that certain dangers, such as deepfakes, might not immediately appear to pose a threat to federal network security, but that reputational risks and attacks on individuals that manage key parts of an FCEB agency could have detrimental effects on its ability to carry out its mission. A common theme for the interviews was the need to get a better handle on today’s threats that could manifest with greater frequency as tomorrow’s problems.</p> -<p>Since this first shipment, the Angara has regularly shuttled containers from the port of Rajin to the Russian facility at Dunai, being joined by a second cargo vessel named the Maria on 12 September and a third vessel named the Lady R on 6 October. While the vessels are still operating without transmitting on their AIS transponders, dozens of satellite images show the vessels continually loading and delivering cargo from North Korea to Russia.</p> +<h4 id="reflections-from-tabletop-exercises-and-the-public-survey">Reflections from Tabletop Exercises and the Public Survey</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/K4C65G1.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: The Maria in Dunai, 14 October 2023.</strong> Source: Planet Labs, RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> +<p>In addition to the interviews, CSIS researchers conducted tabletop exercises and an online survey experiment with the general public to capture how experts and the public think about the cyber threat landscape. The research team ran the tabletop exercise six times. In total, over 50 experts — academics and think tank thought leaders, federal and private sector CISOs, and other cybersecurity or national security experts from the federal and private sectors — participated in the exercises. Conducted in a virtual setting, these exercises delved deep into potential threats surrounding the 2024 U.S. elections. With the overarching scenario of adversaries targeting critical public services, from SNAP and farm loans to vital research endeavors, the exercises highlighted the vulnerabilities that could shake the core of U.S. society.</p> -<p>Over the course of the last three months, the Angara has made at least three trips between Russia and North Korea, while the Maria made one trip in September and recently completed another round trip on 14 October. The Lady R also appears to have made a trip, visiting Rajin on 6 October.</p> +<p>The participants found themselves in the shoes of hackers advising the hypothetical company Veil Vector Technologies (VVT), strategizing cyberattacks on the public services overseen by the FCEB agencies. With a menu of cyberattacks at their disposal — ranging from the individually targeted deepfakes to more institutionally disruptive degrade attacks — participants were exposed to the multifaceted nature of cyber warfare.</p> -<p>All three vessels appear to first unload containers at the northern pier in Rajin, before moving to a second berth to then load containers for delivery to Dunai. Over the course of these voyages, satellite imagery indicates the Angara and Maria have moved several hundred containers to and from North Korea.</p> +<p>Transitioning from offense to defense, in the next phase participants found themselves representing CISA. Tasked with designing countermeasures against the very strategies they had previously developed, they had to delve into CISA’s spectrum of services to assess which might alter adversary behavior. This transition served not just as a strategy assessment tool but also as a testament to the complex task of anticipating and countering cyber threats.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9GtccHr.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: The Angara and Maria at Dunai and the Angara at Rajin, North Korea.</strong> Source: Airbus Defence and Space, Planet Labs and RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> +<p>Separately, the CSIS research team adapted the expert exercise and developed a simplified online survey that could be pushed to the general public. The survey was conducted online via Prolific, with 1,000 participants, ensuring a demographic representation in line with the U.S. population. This careful juxtaposition between expert-driven decisions and those of the general public brought forth a nuanced understanding of cyber threat perceptions, potentially bridging the gap between theoretical strategies and their real-world implications.</p> -<h3 id="suspect-couriers">Suspect Couriers</h3> +<p>The multifaceted world of cybersecurity is in continuous flux, with threats originating from both state and non-state entities and ranging from traditional attacks to novel strategies such as deepfakes. Harmonizing insights from experts with public perceptions can pave the way for robust strategies, shaping a safer and more informed digital environment for all.</p> -<p>While the Angara was sanctioned by the US government in May 2022, the Maria has yet to be designated. However, both vessels are owned and operated by companies with connections to Russia’s military logistics networks. For instance, the companies that own and operate the Angara – M Leasing and Marine Trans Shipping – were both sanctioned by the US soon after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine for transporting weapons on behalf of the Russian government.</p> +<p><strong>INSIGHTS FROM THE TABLETOP EXERCISES AND PUBLIC SURVEY</strong></p> -<p>But the Angara’s links to Moscow’s weapons handlers stretch much further back. For several years, the Angara – which then sailed under the name Ocean Energy – was owned by the Kaalbye Group, a company accused of transporting Russian arms to Syria and South Sudan. During this time, media reports identified the Ocean Energy delivering Russian T-90 tanks from Russia to Iraq.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Participant Profiles:</strong> The majority of expert participants came from the public and private sectors, supplemented by individuals from academia and think tanks. The public survey, on the other hand, captured U.S. demographic representation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Attacker Choices:</strong> As advisers to VVT, participants were first asked to select which nation-state would be requiring their services. In the second round of the game, the participants were asked to identify what type of non-state actor would require their services. In assessing global threats, experts and the public displayed a divergence in views — especially concerning Russia and China — with the former potentially relying on specialized intelligence and the latter influenced largely by media narratives. This divide extends to perceptions of North Korea, suggesting an information gap where public concerns might be media driven or anchored in broader geopolitical narratives. However, there is a notable alignment in perspectives on non-state threats, possibly due to uniform media portrayals or the transparent nature of such risks. The escalating public concern surrounding “lone wolf” actors underscores the growing recognition of their unpredictability in the digital age.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Notably, M Leasing’s two other Ro-Ro vessels, the Adler and Ascalon, have also been sanctioned. Both of these vessels, under different identities, had reportedly shipped missiles for the S-400 surface-to-air missile system to China in 2018.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/HRpsjJ0.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Attacker Choices.</strong></em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dz1zuD5.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Ownership and management chart for the Angara and Maria.</strong> Source: IHS Maritime, Corporate Records, OFAC and RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> +<p>Participants were given three options of domains to target in the exercise:</p> -<p>The Maria’s owner, on the other hand, is a subsidiary of Cyprus-based Azia Shipping Holdings; the latter also serves as its operator. Azia Shipping Holdings owns several vessels, one of which was allegedly involved in the shipment of Russian weapons to Myanmar in January 2022. Notably, several employees of the Maria’s DOC company JSC Sovfracht were indicted by the US Treasury in 2018 for allegedly operating a scheme to supply Syria with jet fuel.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Basic Needs:</strong> The deliberate targeting of critical societal elements — such as healthcare, financial systems, and government benefits — can lead to significant chaos. The ripple effect of an attack on these systems could cripple the daily lives of citizens, leading to public unrest, economic instability, and a significant downturn in public trust in institutions.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Small and Medium Businesses:</strong> Often overlooked in the grand scheme of cybersecurity, small and medium businesses (SMBs) represent a soft target for adversaries. Due to frequently limited resources, their cybersecurity infrastructure may not be as fortified as larger entities. Their disruption could not only threaten the livelihoods of many but also create supply chain disturbances, causing economic strain and public mistrust toward market institutions.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Science and Technology:</strong> Beyond just data breaches, the compromise of the science and technology sector could erode the foundation of factual, evidence-based decisionmaking in society. Misinformation or manipulated data could skew public opinion, lead to ill-informed policies, and erode trust in research institutions, thereby influencing democratic processes in subtle yet profound ways.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Meanwhile, the vessel’s Vladivostok-based technical manager, the similarly named Azia Shipping Company, was formerly part-owned by Russia’s sanctioned Oboronlogistics LLC. This Moscow-based company was allegedly created to oversee logistics for the Russian Ministry of Defence, and is the owner of the sanctioned SPARTA IV, a vessel recently engaged in moving Russian military equipment from Syria to Russia.</p> +<p><strong>Participants prioritized going after basic needs over SMBs or science and technology.</strong> After selecting an attacker, participants were asked what types of services they were most interested in attacking (i.e., which services would most successfully undermine trust in U.S. institutions if attacked). For instance, participants who chose non-state actors gravitated toward attacks on basic needs (52 percent) over SMBs (37 percent), with science and technology being the least preferred target, at 10 percent (see Figure 5).</p> -<p>Like both the Angara and the Maria, the Lady R has been linked to Moscow’s military transportation networks. The vessel’s owner, TransMorFlot LLC, has been sanctioned by U.S, UK and Ukraine for being involved in arms shipments on behalf of the Russian government.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZEEDkBS.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Distribution of Service Types by Rank (Non-state).</strong></em></p> -<h3 id="final-destination">Final Destination</h3> +<p><strong>Attack strategies varied depending on what type of service was being attacked.</strong> For instance, whether hacktivist or state-sponsored, there was consistency in strategies — basic needs and SMBs were targeted with “Disruption,” while science and technology was susceptible to “Espionage” (see Figure 6). Similar results were obtained from the public survey game (see Figure 7).</p> -<p>The final destination of these shipments appears to be a munitions depot in the Russia town of Tikhoretsk, approximately 200 km from the Ukrainian border.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ULZclGI.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Expert Group Average Resource Distribution in Attack Types (Non-state Actors, State Actors).</strong></em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1WUHQSt.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: Map of Tikhoretsk ammunition depot.</strong> Source: Planet Labs, RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/V7Xz2cW.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Public: Distribution of Attack Types.</strong></em></p> -<p>Beginning in mid-August 2023, high-resolution imagery shows that the ammunition depot has undergone a rapid overhaul, with excavators digging over 100 new munitions pits with earth berms designed to divert the force of a blast in case of an explosion.</p> +<p><strong>Attack timing varied depending on if the actor was a state or non-state actor.</strong> When players chose state actors, 63 percent opted for a cyberattack strategy focused on future attacks, while 37 percent aimed for immediate results. In contrast, selecting non-state actors saw 56 percent of players planning for future attacks and 44 percent pursuing immediate outcomes. This underscores state actors’ heightened preference for longer-term cyber strategies compared to non-state actors. Additionally, public survey results closely aligned with this expert approach, yielding similar conclusions (see Table 2). There is a statistically significant difference in the attack strategy choices between state and non-state actors, determined by a chi-square test of independence.</p> -<p>Recent imagery from 28 September also shows trains arriving at the facility, delivering dozens of containers of the same size and colours as those being loaded in North Korea. In these images, containers can be seen placed next to newly dug munitions pits, which are potentially being loaded with munitions boxes.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yiScA5z.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 2: Comparison of Attack Strategy Choices between State and Non-state Actors (Public Survey).</strong></em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/X2w1kaq.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Map of Tikhoretsk ammo depot and active work there.</strong> Source: Planet Labs, RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="public-perception-of-us-cybersecurity-spending"><code class="highlighter-rouge">Public Perception of U.S. Cybersecurity Spending</code></h4> +</blockquote> -<p>From here, North Korean weapons and munitions could be shipped to logistics depots on the border of Ukraine for distribution to frontline units.</p> +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The general public believes the federal government does not spend enough on cybersecurity. The public’s perception of governmental inadequacy in cybersecurity funding is significant. It implies a gap in public communication — where either the federal initiatives are not well publicized or their efforts are not resonating effectively with the general populace — or just a reminder that there is simply not enough money allocated for cybersecurity. This sentiment underscores the need for improved public relations efforts, clearer communication of cybersecurity endeavors, and potential reevaluation of budget allocations based on emerging threats.</code></em></p> -<h3 id="tectonic-shifts">Tectonic Shifts</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/mNtTrDm.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: U.S. Funding Survey for Cybersecurity Spending.</strong></em></p> -<p>Having prepared for a massive conventional war with South Korea for decades, North Korea’s supplying of significant quantities of munitions to Moscow will have profound consequences for the war in Ukraine. For the Russians, a major North Korean supply line will alleviate shortages of munitions for what has proven to be an ordinance-hungry conflict and enable the Russian armed forces to feed their frontline troops as they try to repel a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Ukraine and its supporters will also have to contend with this new reality, potentially escalating their support by providing additional quantities of weapons and munitions to Ukraine’s defenders.</p> +<p><strong>EMERGING THEMES FROM TABLETOP EXERCISE DISCUSSIONS</strong></p> -<p>But the impact will be felt much further than the battlefield in Ukraine. The sale of such quantities of munitions will fill the coffers of the cash-strapped regime in Pyongyang, which has traditionally used the proceeds of arms deliveries to develop its own nuclear and ballistic missile programme in violation of UN sanctions. Moreover, in addition to the pecuniary benefits, North Korea may seek other assistance from Russia in return for its support, including the provision of missile and other advanced military technologies.</p> +<p>In light of the recent tabletop exercise discussions, several themes emerged regarding potential cyber threats targeting federal networks. These insights, gathered from expert deliberations, point to the evolving nature of the cyber landscape and the increasing sophistication of threat actors:</p> -<p>As a result, North Korea’s agreements with Moscow will also cause significant alarm in Japan and South Korea, countries already on the sharp end of Pyongyang’s ongoing provocations. Confronted with a strengthening alliance between North Korea and Russia, Tokyo and Seoul might explore additional avenues to offset the North Korean threat while extending further support to Ukraine’s efforts to oust Russian forces from its territory.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Sophisticated State-Sponsored Attacks:</strong> Experts believe that state-sponsored attacks, particularly from adversaries such as Russia and China, are growing in complexity. Their focus seems to be on espionage and long-term presence within federal networks to gather intelligence and potentially influence policies.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Deepfakes and Misinformation:</strong> A significant concern raised is the potential use of deepfakes to spread misinformation. Such tactics could be employed to undermine trust in federal communications or to spread false narratives that serve the interests of external actors.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Supply Chain Vulnerabilities:</strong> There is increasing awareness of vulnerabilities within the supply chains that serve federal networks. By compromising a single entity within the supply chain, threat actors can potentially gain access to a broader range of federal systems and data.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Erosion of Trust:</strong> One strategy identified involves eroding public trust in federal institutions. By creating disruptions or manipulating data, threat actors can shake the public’s confidence in government efficiency and reliability.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>However, Pyongyang’s decision to deliver munitions at scale once again underscores the grave threat that North Korea poses to international security, this time feeding a conflagration on European soil that has already cost the lives of tens of thousands of Ukrainians and consumed tens of billions of dollars in Western military support.</p> +<p>Additionally, several themes emerged on how cybersecurity architecture can offset these future threats:</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CxxXKP5.png" alt="image10" /></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Enhanced Monitoring and Threat Intelligence:</strong> Experts suggest that federal networks should invest in real-time monitoring and threat intelligence capabilities. By understanding the evolving threat landscape, federal entities can be better prepared to detect and respond to intrusions.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Robust Incident Response Protocols:</strong> In the event of a breach or cyber incident, having a well-defined and practiced response protocol can significantly reduce the potential damage. Rapid containment and mitigation should be the priority.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Supply Chain Security:</strong> Given the vulnerabilities in supply chains, experts recommend stricter security standards for all vendors serving federal networks. This includes regular security audits and ensuring that vendors comply with best practices.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Public Awareness and Communication:</strong> Experts emphasize the importance of transparent communication with the public. By promptly addressing misinformation and clarifying federal stances, trust can be maintained and the impact of misinformation campaigns can be reduced.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Investment in Advanced Technologies:</strong> To keep up with sophisticated threat actors, experts advocate for continued investment in advanced cybersecurity technologies. This includes AI-driven threat detection, encrypted communications, and secure cloud infrastructures.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<hr /> +<p>In conclusion, as the cyber threat landscape continues to evolve, federal networks face increasing challenges. However, by taking a proactive stance, understanding emerging threats, and investing in robust cybersecurity measures, federal entities can effectively safeguard their systems and data. The reflections from the tabletop exercises underscore the importance of continued dialogue, collaboration, and innovation in the realm of federal cybersecurity.</p> -<p><strong>James Byrne</strong> is Director of the Open-Source Intelligence and Analysis (OSIA) Research Group.</p> +<h4 id="other-challenges">Other Challenges</h4> -<p><strong>Joe Byrne</strong> is a Research Fellow at RUSI’s OSIA Research Group.</p> +<p><strong>AI-ENABLED THREATS</strong></p> -<p>__Gary Somervill__e is a Research Fellow at RUSI’s OSIA Research Group.</p>James Byrne, et al.Dozens of high-resolution satellite images taken in recent months reveal that Russia has likely begun shipping North Korean munitions at scale, opening a new supply route that could have profound consequences for the war in Ukraine and international security dynamics in East Asia.Israel Confronts Hamas2023-10-16T12:00:00+08:002023-10-16T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/israel-confronts-hamas<p><em>The legal and ethical challenges of operating in densely populated areas are going to be a tragic constant of 21st century warfare, with no easy solutions.</em></p> +<p>Across the board, one of the immediate areas of concern for interviewed experts and tabletop exercise participants was AI-enabled threats and challenges, along with questions about whether the U.S. government’s defensive measures would be able to sufficiently detect and address these threats in real time.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Promisingly, statements from CISA leaders demonstrate a perspective on AI that is forward looking, flexible, and practical. Plans were mentioned that not only think about how to help safeguard AI models that might be used for new tools and capabilities but also address how CISA can proactively benefit by using AI tools so it can keep pace with the threat landscape.</p> -<p>The impending ground invasion of Gaza by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has raised a range of questions about how military operations should be conducted in densely populated areas. The political context of the Israel–Palestine conflict, and the human tragedy that has engulfed Israeli and Palestinian families, has made the military considerations secondary to a raging political debate. For the military, however, the questions at stake are not exceptional but routine, and will likely define many of the planning considerations for operations throughout this century. Precedents set in Gaza, therefore, may cast a long shadow.</p> +<p>The following are a few specific types of AI challenges that could impact FCEB agencies in the coming years, with an assessment of how CISA’s planned activities might address these challenges:</p> -<p>Israel has declared war on Hamas. Legally, there are two questions that arise: the legality of the war, and the legality of how it is fought. As regards the former, Hamas’s incursion on to Israeli territory, the deliberate massacre of over 1,300 and the kidnapping of hundreds of Israeli civilians undoubtedly counts as an armed attack in response to which Israel has the right of self-defence. Given that Hamas has a stated objective of destroying the Israeli state, took the hostages on to the territory it controls, and is launching rockets and conducting command and control from that territory, it is also legal for Israel to operate against Hamas on the territory of Gaza in response. There is therefore no question as to the legality of the Israeli action, which aims to eliminate the capacity of Hamas to conduct further attacks.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Synthetic Media and Disinformation:</strong> In recent years there has been growing public awareness about how AI-generated content can be used to spread mis- and disinformation. In a recent CSIS survey, when respondents were presented with a series of images and audio and video clips, they could only correctly identify what content was real versus what content was AI-generated roughly 50 percent of the time, which is basically flipping a coin.</p> -<p>The difficulties arise as to how such a mission is to be carried out, given that the area of operations comprises densely populated urban terrain with a large proportion of children and non-combatants and very weak critical infrastructure. Under the Laws of Armed Conflict and International Humanitarian Law, Israeli forces are obligated to discriminate military from civilian targets, to restrict their activities to those that are of military necessity, and to exercise proportionality. It is not illegal for civilians to be killed as a result of operations. It is illegal for operations to target civilians or for there to be a lack of proportionality in striking military targets relative to assessed collateral damage.</p> + <p>There are attempts by coalitions and individual industry actors to authenticate sources of online content, which is a step in the right direction. From CISA’s point of view, it becomes a question of whether it is its role to even be concerned about these types of threats. Whether or not CISA has the capabilities or capacity to deal with mis- and disinformation, let alone AI-generated mis- and disinformation, the core question is: Does its mission to protect FCEB networks even authorize it to engage in this area of work in the first place?</p> -<p>Discrimination is simplified by the fact that Hamas systematically uses civilian objects for military purposes. It has dug subterranean infrastructure beneath civilian buildings, including ammunition depots, and has boasted in its own media about using Gaza’s water reticulation infrastructure for manufacturing rockets. When militaries do this, they render such areas military objects that are targetable, which is why – for example – it was legal for coalition forces to strike a hospital in Mosul that had been repurposed for IED manufacture in 2016. The challenge for the attacking force therefore becomes a question of judging the military value of a target against the risk of collateral damage.</p> + <p>The consulted experts were mixed. Some were unconcerned about AI’s actual impact on institutions, while some were very concerned about its direct and even indirect impact on certain aspects of FCEB agencies. Others expressed a concern but were unsure what role, if any, CISA should play in focusing on this threat.</p> -<p>The legal case for striking urban targets is often heavily weighted to the detriment of civilians because of the asymmetry in certainty about targets. If a Hamas command post is communicating from a structure and this is intercepted, if an Israeli ground unit takes fire from a structure, or if rockets are launched into Israel from a site, then there is confirmation that enemy military activity is taking place there. The civilians hiding in the building, trying to sleep or keep out of the line of fire, are invisible, and therefore are not counted in the judgement as to proportionality. This is why the RAF has long maintained that it knows of only one civilian killed in its strikes in Iraq, even though the civilian death toll from the air campaign during the war against Islamic State numbered in the thousands.</p> + <p>It is the CSIS research team’s belief that recent incidents (such as the story involving deepfakes of a DHS appointee in compromising situations) illustrate how these types of attacks might have low impacts to networks but can greatly damage personal reputations in ways that could influence an FCEB’s ability to deliver on its mission. Additionally, manipulated images might impact an FCEB agency’s ability to spread timely, reliable information if it is competing with inauthentic and misleading content. While at present CISA does not have a formal role in addressing this type of mis- and disinformation (with the exception of the election context), it might consider exploring some role, especially with regard to cyber-enabled mis-, dis-, and malinformation, since these types of attacks will likely continue in the coming years (see Recommendation 2.8 on CISA’s role in addressing mis- and disinformation).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Data Poisoning and Infiltration:</strong> Experts were keen to mention that CISA’s future successes will rely on its ability to detect and respond to situations at machine speed. Outside researchers should be able to better assess CISA’s ability to do this as it rolls out newer capabilities in the coming years. But aside from the capabilities themselves, there are general concerns about the ability of government and industry to safeguard the AI models used to develop these newer tools. An AI-enabled tool is only as effective as the model used to build it, and poisoned AI models could disrupt CISA’s ability to respond in certain situations. At an even more basic level, CISA and other entities ought to look at ways to address unintentional biases and other flawed information that could be used in developing these tools.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The laws of war are effective when parties view them as viable instructions for how to fight. When they prohibit fighting altogether, they are likely to be ignored</code></em></strong></p> + <p>A related concern is that adversaries can use AI tools to monitor patterns in CISA’s automated threat hunt and detection services and then use that to interfere with, avoid, or generally circumvent capabilities that are in place.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>The campaign to defeat the Islamic State – which involved the assault of several major cities, from Ramadi and Fallujah to Mosul, Tel Affar and Raqqa – was conducted slowly, with painstaking targeting and legal processes to try and mitigate civilian harm. Nevertheless, the cities were laid waste, and thousands of civilians died. The death toll was also high for the attacking force. Iraq’s Counterterrorism Service, one of the most experienced and capable military units in the world at the time, suffered 40% casualties during the assault on Mosul.</p> +<p><strong>QUANTUM COMPUTING</strong></p> -<p>The challenge of how to take urban ground without destroying the city is insurmountable with the tools currently available. Moreover, because there is no prize for second place in war, and because sensor dominance quickly leads to an asymmetry in casualties, weaker forces will retreat into dense, urban terrain. Ukrainian troops did this in Mariupol. British forces expect to have to operate from urban strongholds in future conflict. Hamas and Islamic State’s decision to fall back into urban terrain made sound tactical sense.</p> +<p>The threat of quantum computing was not listed as an immediate area of concern, with experts noting that quantum-related threats will likely manifest in five to ten years as opposed to the closer timeframe this study is focusing on. However, CISA should still be prepared to defend against threats stemming from higher computational power.</p> -<p>The laws of war are effective when parties view them as viable instructions for how to fight. When they prohibit fighting altogether, they are likely to be ignored. How to craft rules that protect civilians in this context, therefore, requires thoughtful proposals. The proposal advocated by some groups to exclude explosive weapons from urban fighting is a non-starter, as it would confer such an advantage on to the defender as to prevent an attacker from prosecuting operations.</p> +<p>The most realistic possibility in the near term is adversaries relying on a “harvest now, decrypt later” strategy, whereby exfiltrated encrypted data is stored with the assumption that it can be decrypted by adversaries using post-quantum cryptography algorithms at some later point in time. It is a near-term area of concern only insofar as it further emphasizes the need for departments and agencies to operate with greater levels of resilience — in a way, it is less a matter of if your data will be stolen than when it will be stolen. Beyond any technical solutions, CISA is currently well positioned to provide stronger guidance on how FCEB agencies might concretely anticipate and address these types of situations.</p> -<p>For Israel, tactical options are constrained by a range of additional factors. Iron Dome – the air defence system protecting Israeli cities from rocket attack – has a finite number of interceptors. Given the massive threat if Hizbullah joins the fray, Israel is keen to limit its expenditure of interceptors by interdicting left of launch. The threat of escalation with Hizbullah also means that Israel feels it necessary to preserve combat power. Both factors lead to an approach to Gaza that is fast and favours firepower. This weights the judgement as to military necessity.</p> +<p><strong>TODAY’S CHALLENGES, TOMORROW’S PROBLEMS</strong></p> -<p>In the absence of tools and methods for fighting among the people, advertising intent and clear avenues for civilians to vacate the battlespace is a viable alternative. This is what Israel has done by instructing civilians to move South of the Gaza River, while indicating the routes and times where movement will not be interdicted. The proposed timeframe for evacuation was short, although it has now been extended by delays to the ground operation.</p> +<p>Despite the various possible threat vectors and new technologies that are projected to cause damage in the coming years, the overwhelming majority of experts consulted for this project — regardless of professional background — emphasized that they are most concerned about the ability of the U.S. government and industry to properly manage today’s challenges. In other words, the actual cost for adversaries to engage in attacks akin to the ones occurring today will be cheaper in the coming years, and for several reasons they are likely to be waged with greater frequency, which will naturally put a strain on the currently offered support services.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A policy to permanently drive Palestinians from Gaza would amount to ethnic cleansing and a war crime</code></em></strong></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Geopolitical Challenges:</strong> At the macro level, festering geopolitical tensions will increase the likelihood that foreign adversaries invest in and deploy cyberattacks that directly target U.S. government institutions. In July 2023, it was reported that suspected Chinese malware was detected across a number of military systems. While China is typically known for its espionage activities, this particular incident is concerning because it looks like the malware could be used to actively disrupt — as opposed to simply surveil — compromised systems.</p> -<p>Despite these measures, many civilians – as always in these cases – will choose to stay. Furthermore, in this specific context, many Palestinians fear that Israel is not trying to move them to a safe place, but instead trying to get them to vacate land which will be occupied and eventually settled. Palestinians fear that they will not be allowed to return. This is not the stated policy of the Israeli government. However, given Israel’s past conduct and the statements of several of its current ministers, this fear is understandable. It is also important to note that Israel has a history of valid tactical military justifications being instrumentalised by a minority within its cabinet to radically reshape its policy over time. This is how Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982, authorised by the Israeli cabinet to secure its northern border, was morphed in stages by Defence Minister Ariel Sharon into a siege of Beirut.</p> + <p>This departure in China’s modus operandi is a general reminder that the threat landscape is changing, and it goes without saying that the strained relationships between the United States and known adversaries needs to be constantly reevaluated in risk assessments. At the operational level, this requires CISA and other entities tasked with a defensive cyber mission to map out all the ways in which these larger issues might manifest into seemingly low-level attacks.</p> -<p>A policy to permanently drive Palestinians from Gaza would amount to ethnic cleansing and a war crime. It is therefore vital that, alongside support to Israel in defending itself, the international community is clear as to its expectations in confirming Israeli intent, and the consequences if that intent morphs into something illegal. One clear test is whether Israel will help to make the area to which people are evacuating safe by allowing food, medicine and clean water to be moved into southern Gaza.</p> + <p>Stemming from this are supply chain risks and vulnerabilities, as well as the question of what explicit role, if any, CISA should take in managing these risks as related to the protection of federal networks.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Structural Challenges:</strong> Following the release of the 2020 CSC report, the commission’s cochair, Senator Angus King, repeatedly justified the recommendation for a national cyber director by saying it would give the government “one throat to choke” after a major incident. But it is now a few years in, and cyber authorities — and by extension the accountability mechanisms — are still dispersed. At one level, it is assumed that some variation of today’s issues around general coordination and role delineation might continue to plague the U.S. government in the coming years. Regarding CISA in particular and its role as the lead for network defense, there are promising signs that it has been establishing strong relationships with U.S. government partners and FCEB and non-FCEB entities alike. But it will be essential that CISA continues to push for more role clarity that can translate into greater overall clarity in reporting structures and ultimate responses, especially considering predicted future threat scenarios.</p> -<p>It is also clear, however, that the international community will lack any credibility or authority on the issue if it simply demands a return to the status-quo ante. For many Palestinians, the progressive erosion of their control of the West Bank was choking off any prospect of a path to peace. For Israelis, the massacre conducted by Hamas on 7 October fundamentally changed their calculus. For years, Israel has been fearful as Iran and Hizbullah have consolidated their hold on Lebanon and Syria, amassing an arsenal of sophisticated weapons. In combination with the training and support to Hamas and the infiltration of Judea and Samaria, the IDF had come to view the status quo – amid increasing US disengagement from the region – as similarly unsustainable.</p> + <p>What will be even more interesting in the near future is to see how CISA’s new initiatives actively manage the cyber risk of FCEB agencies, especially small and medium-sized ones. Paraphrasing the remarks of one FCEB interviewee, “all agencies think they are unique snowflakes, but at the end of the day, a hyper-tailored approach can only go so far, and there are certain consistent practices CISA can and must insist on.” With that being the case, it will be interesting to see how much of the security burden CISA takes on from FCEB agencies, how that compares between different agencies, and what the difference is between what CISA actually manages and what it aspires to manage.</p> -<p>The IDF’s assessment today is that if the threat is left to expand, it will eventually threaten the viability of the Israeli state. Thus, their objective in the current conflict is not to simply inflict a dose of pain on Hamas to deter further fighting, but to systematically destroy its military capacity to conduct operations and thereby write down one of the threats. This risks Hizbullah intervening. But given that the Israeli security state fears things getting worse over time, many in the security establishment feel that if a fight must happen, then they would rather have it today.</p> + <p>Understanding this balance will be particularly important in light of many FCEB agencies transitioning and modernizing technologies in the name of enhancing cybersecurity. CISA will need to be particularly attuned to how efforts to rapidly meet certain U.S. government implementation deadlines might unintentionally create visibility gaps or introduce new vulnerabilities into FCEB systems. The challenge for CISA will be in how it decides to allow agencies to maintain independence in managing aspects such as technology debt from legacy systems, an issue that will be more pronounced in the coming years, while confidently executing its mission as the lead for federal network defense.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Workforce Challenges:</strong> In recent years, cyber workforce challenges have been closely examined and well documented. The private and public sectors alike have made plans to address staffing shortfalls. Notably, the ONCD recently published its National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy, which specifically outlines recommendations and opportunities for the federal government to attract and retain cyber talent more intentionally.</p> -<p>For the international community, therefore, while deterring a regional escalation should be an objective, a mere temporary “stability” is unlikely to look attractive to either side. If the international community wants long-term stability, it must be more proactively engaged in exploring a path to peace, rather than pursuing a systematic disengagement that simply cedes the region to Iran, which has characterised Washington’s approach for the last three years. There may emerge, from the ashes of this unfolding tragedy, an opportunity to build a new road to peace, just as there is the risk that the flames will engulf what remains of a rules-based international system that so many words have been pledged to defend.</p> + <p>As a next step, the government needs to execute these proposed strategies and quickly fill vacancies. This is important not only for actual cyber entities such as CISA but across FCEB agencies as well. Especially if there is concern that future threats will be more persistent in nature, system resilience will rely on having a sustainable workforce that can also surge in capacity during a prolonged incident. As was observed by one of the interviewed industry leaders, “[the success of CISA services] is less about the CISA programs and more about people.” In other words, success depends on whether the FCEB agencies are well staffed with skilled experts that can take on these different challenges and whether they are coming in with a mindset conducive to working with CISA as a true partner.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Societal Challenges:</strong> During one of the convened tabletop exercises, an expert made the following point: the exercise assumes an adversary can effectively undermine trust in U.S. institutions, implying as a premise that people have trust in institutions in the first place.</p> -<hr /> + <p>The polls are clear — Americans have been losing trust in democratic institutions for some time. Mis- and disinformation from foreign and domestic voices alike further exacerbate the situation by selectively promoting information that seemingly resonates with individuals’ legitimate grievances about these institutions. At present, the U.S. public generally does not have the societal resilience to deal with these threats.</p> -<p><strong>Jack Watling</strong> is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute. Jack works closely with the British military on the development of concepts of operation, assessments of the future operating environment, and conducts operational analysis of contemporary conflicts.</p>Jack WatlingThe legal and ethical challenges of operating in densely populated areas are going to be a tragic constant of 21st century warfare, with no easy solutions.Change Or False Alarm?2023-10-13T12:00:00+08:002023-10-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/change-or-false-alarm<p><em>A potential shift in China’s approach to nuclear weapons could indicate that it is taking a page from Moscow’s book.</em></p> + <p>Moreover, the United States is a deeply polarized society, and today’s political climate makes it challenging for individuals and organizations to meaningfully discuss issues related to curbing mis-, dis-, and malinformation. The current state of affairs has arguably also chilled federal government entities, such as CISA, from exploring ways to meaningfully identify opportunities to address these threats. These societal vulnerabilities only increase concerns of attacks originating from insider threats, an ongoing issue that some of the consulted experts believe could be an even bigger problem in the next few years.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<excerpt /> +<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3> -<p>China recently released its proposal for a new global order: “Proposal of the People’s Republic of China on the Reform and Development of Global Governance”. The blueprint repeats several earlier talking points on how China aims to change the global order. The pillars of the new order lean heavily on Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative, and Global Civilisation Initiative. As an unprecedently open step towards a global order that mirrors the governance of a one-party state, the proposal deserves in-depth analysis beyond the scope of this article. A significant issue examined here is China dropping its long-term No First Use of nuclear weapons policy from the proposal; this raises eyebrows as global security risks intensify with a protracted Russian war of aggression against Ukraine (where China is siding with Russia), along with China’s aggressive behaviour around Taiwan.</p> +<p>The federal government stands at a cybersecurity crossroads. In the coming years, CISA will greatly expand its offerings as the lead agency for non-defense and intelligence federal network security. At the same time, the scale, frequency, and intensity of cyberattacks against FCEB agencies are increasing. Both state and non-state actors see opportunities for holding the United States hostage through cyberspace. As a result, money is not enough to solve the problem. The United States needs to imagine new ways of coordinating proactive cyber defense and deterrence aligned with its emerging resources (i.e., means) that promote a change in how to think about network security and resilience.</p> -<p>China officially became the world’s fifth nuclear weapon-possessing state in 1964 and was then recognised under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). For decades, China carefully advanced its nuclear arsenal to maintain its minimum deterrent strategy. However, in recent years, China has clearly abandoned this strategy, heavily increasing its count of nuclear weapons and becoming the world’s third-largest nuclear weapons power. The Pentagon has estimated that if the current trajectory continues, China could field approximately 1,500 warheads by 2035.</p> +<p>While it is premature to comment on some of CISA’s more recent technical capabilities (or soon to be released capabilities) for individual services, or its proposed backend analytic capability, this study highlights actions that Congress, FCEB agencies, and CISA can and must to do to streamline and clarify roles and responsibilities, manage perceptions, and establish clear communication channels in order to ensure that all stakeholders are best positioned to protect federal networks. Congress needs to be prepared to not only further define and scope CISA’s role in this space but also to provide appropriate oversight into new tools and capabilities that will be rapidly deployed to meet future threats and challenges. Setting aside service-specific recommendations, CISA will significantly benefit by connecting its services more clearly and directly to the needs of FCEB agencies. By showing the value it brings to FCEB agencies, at an affordable price point, CISA can deliver as a true partner in network security efforts. At the same time, FCEB agencies, while not monolithic, need to operate with a greater understanding of CISA’s role in defending federal networks today in order to align the role to their respective individual FCEB initiatives. This requires adequate funding to enable choices based on merit rather than cost. The national security of the United States requires a CISA that is not bound to the lowest bid.</p> -<p>In August 2023, at the NPT Review Conference, the Director-General of the Department of Arms Control of the Foreign Ministry of China, Sun Xiaobo, reaffirmed China’s 1964 policy “not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances” and “not to threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states”.</p> +<h4 id="pillar-1-resourcing-toward-success">Pillar 1: Resourcing toward Success</h4> -<p>Nonetheless, a month later, China’s proposal for global governance seems to have dropped this decades-old policy. Up until August 2023, China had repeatedly reaffirmed its No First Use policy from 1964 onwards, although on some occasions Beijing has stretched it to exclude other nuclear powers, especially the US. The dual pledges of No First Use and No Threatening to Use nuclear weapons have long been cornerstones of China’s nuclear strategy. The fact that China’s proposal on global governance omits these commitments – while otherwise expressing China’s positions in a detailed manner – could indicate a change in China’s position on nuclear weapons, especially because China has never previously wavered or appeared ambiguous about these commitments.</p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 1.1 (for Congress): Ensure consistent, coherent, and flexible funding streams for programs such as CDM.</em></strong></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China may have learned from Moscow’s capitalisation on European fear regarding Russian nuclear weapons use</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Currently, the CDM program is structured as a centralized funding model, but only for a two-year period. On the one hand, there would be some benefits to Congress signaling an ongoing centralized funding approach to help ensure greater buy-in and continued use of the CDM program. In the current structure, FCEB agencies are prone to face budget constraints and might struggle when their CDM funding expires. This often leads to a piecemeal approach to tool selection and adoption, with agencies making independent decisions based on their individual budget limitations. This can potentially lead to operational disruptions, incomplete coverage, and inconsistent security postures across different agencies. Moreover, there is a case to be made that programs such as CDM provide a national security function on par with some defense-related programs, and as such, they require multiyear funding enabling enterprise agreements that reduce costs and lock in pricing. While this derails some vendor incentives and high margins, it helps democratize cybersecurity excellence.</p> -<p>China’s ultimate aim in its 1964 policy on the use of nuclear arms was “to deter others from using or threatening to use” nuclear weapons against China. Could dropping this from an important policy document simply be a mistake, or is this a deliberate new shift in policy, perhaps based on Xi Jinping’s analyses of “changes not seen in a hundred years”, or influenced by Russia’s threatening rhetoric directed at NATO allies regarding nuclear weapons?</p> +<p>However, the reason Congress typically does not grant multiyear funding is because that allows it to provide oversight and make adjustments if certain allocations are not being properly spent. Additionally, if a funding cycle is too long, it could result in the calcification of certain tools and halt innovation. Multiyear funding can help reduce the influence of industry vendors aggressively trying to sell alternative products to FCEB agencies, but it can also unintentionally have the adverse effect of making FCEB agencies too complacent with tools that are already in use.</p> -<p>While China’s proposal for global governance demands that the international community oppose the threat or use of nuclear weapons, China appears to have excluded its unilateral pledge to do so. Beyond this, China’s tacit support for Russia in its invasion of Ukraine has cemented talking points on “invisible security” and how countries’ national security should not threaten that of others. China sees this as the root cause of the war in Ukraine. In Beijing’s view, “the crisis” – China still refuses to call the war anything else – stems from a flawed, unbalanced European security architecture, where other parties’ security concerns are ignored. In this context, multiple Chinese researchers have sided with Russia. Furthermore, following Finland’s NATO accession, a number of Chinese researchers took the view that since Russia could not match NATO’s conventional deterrence, Russia had no other option but to increase its nuclear arsenal.</p> +<p>Ultimately, there are two goals: (1) to provide a more predictable landscape for FCEB agencies participating in the CDM program; and (2) to ensure there is sufficient funding to cover the inventory and security of devices as they evolve. A combination of a working capital funds system, or some flexibility for FCEB agencies to carry over unused funds from previous fiscal year appropriations, might ultimately help provide more consistent funding than what is currently afforded. If nothing else, it will help agencies align their budget requests relative to their cybersecurity risk assessments.</p> -<p>The consequences of China abandoning its No First Use/No Threatening to Use policy are minor at most; China has in any case refused to engage in any arms-control dialogue with the US. Thus, its policy promises have often been taken with a grain of salt. Nevertheless, two immediate implications of China’s potential new approach still come to mind. First, China’s quick nuclear build-up means that the US will face two nuclear-armed powers, China and Russia, working together as its adversaries. Second, China may have learned from Moscow’s capitalisation on European fear regarding Russian nuclear weapons in order to, at a minimum, delay help for Ukraine. Similarly, triggering fear by threatening the use of nuclear weapons could rein in Japan’s and other US allies’ willingness to defend Taiwan, if the People’s Liberation Army tries to take the island by force.</p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 1.2 (for Congress): Fund and formalize a Joint Collaborative Environment.</em></strong></p> -<hr /> +<p>Congress can help catalyze the cybersecurity common operating landscape. As of July 2023, Congress has yet to authorize a JCE. However, recognizing the need for a “set of highways” that can move information easily between the public and private sectors, CISA has indicated that it will commence work with relevant agencies to start building the infrastructure for it. Congress should formally establish the JCE by law and then appropriate funds within the FCEB structure — and for the JCE specifically — so that CISA’s efforts can be scaled quickly and progress can be tracked and measured.</p> -<p><strong>Sari Arho Havrén</strong> is a RUSI Associate Fellow based in Brussels. She specialises in China’s foreign relations, China foresight, and in great power competition. She is also a visiting scholar at the University of Helsinki.</p>Sari Arho HavrénA potential shift in China’s approach to nuclear weapons could indicate that it is taking a page from Moscow’s book.Seize Initiative In Ukraine2023-10-12T12:00:00+08:002023-10-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/seize-initiative-in-ukraine<p><em>Ukrainian forces retain the initiative in the war but advanced an average of only 90 meters per day on the southern front during the peak of their summer offensive, according to new CSIS analysis.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Russia’s extensive fortifications — which include minefields, trench networks, and support from artillery, attack helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft — have slowed Ukrainian advances. In particular, Russia has expanded the size of its minefields from 120 meters to 500 meters in some areas, making Ukraine the most heavily mined country in the world today. Ukrainian military progress is still possible, but the United States and other Western countries need to provide sustained military aid and other assistance.</em></p> +<p>This type of infrastructure is especially important given the numerous streams of both formal and informal communications stemming from different reporting requirements, and it is imperative that these streams to and from the public and private sectors are brought together in a meaningful way and are analyzed coherently, benefiting from shared insights rather than just shared information.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 1.3 (for Congress): Fund an entity to collect, analyze, share, and adequately protect information about cyber statistics.</em></strong></p> -<p>The war in Ukraine has become a test of political will and industrial capacity between two competing blocks: allied countries aiding Ukraine, such as the United States and numerous countries in Europe and Asia; and axis countries aiding Russia, such as China, North Korea, and Iran. Despite Ukraine’s efforts to liberate territory illegally seized by Russia, offensive operations have been slow. Some policymakers have erroneously argued that poor Ukrainian strategy has contributed to the slow pace of operations. According to proponents of this view, the Ukrainian military mistakenly focused on conducting operations along multiple fronts rather than on a single front in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.</p> +<p>CISA should be resourced to host — or assign a third party to host — an anonymized, publicly accessible repository of known incidents and vulnerabilities. The data should be hosted as an application program interface and presented on a public-facing dashboard so that CISA and other outside researchers can analyze the history of cyber incidents while also making projections based on past distributions. Preferably, this dashboard would include information from the public and private sectors so that researchers can have a full picture of the threat landscape. This entity would ideally be housed within and supported by the infrastructure of a larger JCE (see Recommendation 1.2 on funding a JCE).</p> -<p>To better understand military operations in Ukraine, this analysis asks three questions. What is the state of the offense-defense balance in the Ukraine war? What factors have impacted Ukrainian offensive operations? What are the policy implications for the United States and other Western countries?</p> +<p>CISA should ensure that it supports agency-level analysis of pooled data alongside reporting at machine speed. CISA should help agencies understand how to tailor their dashboard so that they can better assess risk at the agency level. This could include collaborative planning teams that deploy from CISA to support the agencies most in need. It should also include building in capabilities to increase the speed of analysis and sharing best practices across agencies.</p> -<p>Ukrainian operations raise the age-old question in warfare about whether it is easier for militaries to seize territory or defend it. This phenomenon is called the “offense-defense balance,” and it refers to the relative strength between the offense and defense in warfare. The main idea is that there are several factors, such as geography, force employment, strategy, and technology, that can influence whether the offense or defense has the advantage. When the offense has the advantage, it is generally easier for an attacking state to destroy its opponent’s military and seize territory than it is to defend one’s own territory. When the defense has the advantage, it is generally easier to hold territory than it is to move forward and seize it.</p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 1.4 (for CISA, the ONCD, the OMB, and Congress): Develop a strategy that locks in baseline prices for computing and storage resources for analytics, AI products, and related processing sold to FCEB agencies.</em></strong></p> -<p>This analysis utilizes several sources of information. To understand historical rates of advance, this assessment compiles data on offensive campaigns from World War I through Ukraine’s 2023 offensive. It also examines open-source data on fortifications, unit positions, and the attrition of military equipment. In addition, it uses satellite imagery and drone footage of the battlefield in eastern and southern Ukraine to understand the challenges of offensive operations. Finally, the authors conducted interviews with Ukrainian, U.S., and European military officials.</p> +<p>All signs indicate that CISA is exploring how it can use AI technologies, and engage AI companies of all sizes, to advance its mission. As a part of its AI strategy plans, the study team recommends that CISA include three important areas: (1) routine assessments that test the agency’s readiness to deal with AI threats, (2) talent development and upskilling of existing staff to manage AI systems effectively, and (3) coordination with other departments and agencies that are actively thinking of how to work with AI tools and address AI threats (e.g., the DOD’s generative AI and large language models task force, Task Force Lima).</p> -<p>The analysis comes to three main conclusions. First, defense has the advantage in the war. This reality should not come as a major surprise. Carl von Clausewitz wrote in On War that “defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack” and that “the superiority of the defensive (if rightly understood) is very great, far greater than appears at first sight.” Ukrainian forces averaged approximately 90 meters of advance per day during their recent push on the southern front between early June and late August 2023.</p> +<p>But in addition to general plans about how CISA can deal with future AI threats, CISA, the ONCD, the OMB, and Congress should also be actively thinking about how to lock in certain contracts related to common AI tools that might be sold to FCEB agencies. This is uncharted territory, and in order for FCEBs to start proactively thinking about how these tools might fit into their budget, it would be helpful for relevant entities to put down some price points — or at the very least some general guidance — before market pressures drive up the anticipated prices of these tools.</p> -<p>Second, the reason for the slow pace of advance was not poor Ukrainian strategic choices, as some have argued. Instead, it was likely caused by a Ukrainian change in force employment, especially the deliberate adoption of small-unit tactics, and the lack of key technology such as fighter aircraft for suppression of enemy air defense and close air support. In addition, Russia constructed substantial defensive fortifications, including minefields, and utilized attack helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) against advancing Ukrainian forces.</p> +<h4 id="pillar-2-leveraging-and-harmonizing-authorities">Pillar 2: Leveraging and Harmonizing Authorities</h4> -<p>Third, Ukraine still retains the initiative in the war, and the United States and other Western countries should provide long-term aid packages that help Ukraine strengthen its defense and prevent or deter a Russian counterattack in the future. They should also provide additional aid to help Ukraine on offense to maximize the possibility that it can retake as much territory as possible from Russia. After all, one of the United States’ most significant adversaries, Russia, has been reduced to a second- or third-rate military power without a single U.S. military casualty. As many as 120,000 Russian soldiers have been killed, as well as over 300,000 wounded, and Ukrainian soldiers have destroyed a massive number of Russian weapons systems, from main battle tanks and fighter aircraft to submarines and landing ships. U.S. aid to Ukraine should continue even with U.S. support to Israel likely to grow following the October 2023 Hamas attack, since Russia, Iran, and their partners represent a significant threat to U.S. interests.</p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.1 (for CISA): Commission an independent report, in coordination with the ONCD, OMB, and NIST, clearly articulating CISA’s roles and responsibilities as the lead for federal network defense.</em></strong></p> -<p>The rest of this brief is divided into three sections. The first examines the state of the war and the strength of the defensive advantage in Ukraine. The second section explores the factors contributing to the defensive advantage. The third outlines several policy implications for the United States and other Western countries.</p> +<p>What does it mean to be the leader of federal network defense, and what are the formal roles that the ONCD, OMB (including federal CISOs), and NIST play in support of this mission? To help all entities involved better appreciate CISA’s role (and its possible limits), it would be helpful for CISA to clearly articulate its current role and what its role could be in the coming years with regard to its FCEB mission. This report should address the mission relative to existing resources and staffing models and identify any key gaps in CISA’s ability to secure the .gov with its current set of authorities and funding.</p> -<h3 id="defense-dominance">Defense Dominance</h3> +<p>Beyond analyzing CISA’s roles and limitations, CISA leadership should also clearly articulate who holds the burden of risk and accountability. If there are anticipated changes in the coming years — for instance, if CISA is tasked to manage more risk for certain FCEB agencies over others — that too should be explained with a plan for how that transition will take place. The 2023 FISMA reform legislation that is currently working its way through Congress is in part intended to help clarify the roles between these different entities.</p> -<p>In early June 2023, Ukraine began a counteroffensive to retake territory illegally occupied by Russian forces in the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk Oblasts. Ukraine retains the operational initiative, but its relatively slow pace of advance and the trade-offs it has made to preserve personnel and equipment indicate that the defense has significant advantages.</p> +<p>There is a larger question here as to whether CISA should eventually move toward a model where it directly manages the entirety of the .gov landscape. There are definitely trade-offs: centralized management would hold CISA accountable for any issues with network security and likely will provide cost savings in the long run, but the counter is that CISA then becomes a central — if not single — point of failure. Further, that model would absolve FCEB leaders of responsibility for their own cyber health, even though they control resources and are responsible for all other aspects of security. Moreover, there are some immediate hurdles in that CISA’s current capabilities are nowhere near those required for such an effort. FCEB agencies are likely to resist this dramatic change. CISA should provide a report describing the pros and cons of this kind of approach, along with its preferred balance of responsibility and the types of roles it hopes to fulfill in the coming years.</p> -<p>This section examines Ukraine’s efforts across three main fronts in summer 2023. First, Ukrainian offensive operations were primarily concentrated along the southern front, in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast and western portions of the Donetsk Oblast. Second, Ukraine was on the offensive in various locations along the eastern front in the Donetsk Oblast. Third Ukraine conducted raids across the Dnipro River in the Kherson Oblast, although it did not conduct larger military operation in the region. In addition, Russia and Ukraine were engaged in attacks using missiles, UASs, and special operations forces beyond the front lines in such areas as Crimea.</p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.2 (for Congress): Designate CISA as the agency to which U.S. government departments and agencies should report a major cyber incident.</em></strong></p> -<p>Southern Front: Beginning in June 2023, Ukraine pursued two main lines of attack on the southern front: one toward the city of Melitopol and other toward the city of Berdiansk. Both cities are transit routes and logistical hubs for Russian forces throughout southern Ukraine and Crimea, the disruption of which represents significant strategic value to Ukraine. However, Ukraine’s progress on the southern front was slow, though deliberate.</p> +<p>Centralized reporting is an essential part of ensuring that all stakeholders have the necessary intelligence about a given incident. While different departments and agencies might still have roles related to certain aspects of the response (e.g., the FBI will maintain primary investigative authority), CISA can still be mandated as the lead entity to which FCEB agencies should report cyber incidents. A central reporting structure will aid in intelligence gathering and providing actionable information back out to the FCEB agencies, as well as their critical infrastructure partners, to include the NSA Cyber Collaboration Center.</p> -<p>Ukraine’s most significant advance was around the town of Robotyne, in the direction of Melitopol. Ukraine advanced a total of roughly 7.6 kilometers from early June to late August 2023 — an average of approximately 90 meters per day. This advance was slow even when compared with historical offensives in which the attacker did not draw major benefit from surprise or from air superiority. The Ukrainian offensive did, however, continue to move forward, unlike many historical examples in which the attackers were thrown back.</p> +<p>The Cyber Incident Reporting Council recently delivered a report to Congress outlining suggestions to align reporting requirements and proposing model language for private entities. The report highlights an often-overlooked basic principle that starts with defining “reportable cyber incidents” to establish a consistent definition; this definition should be adopted as a model, which also includes language to be amendable by CISA. Regarding FCEB reporting, there is merit in establishing a common definition for use across FCEB agencies. The next step is to organize reporting under a single, modular forum that captures sufficient data fields — while being amendable if FCEB agencies do not have the proper legal authorities to share but can still leverage such a forum. This will help reduce duplication in individual FCEB processes for reporting and remove additional resource burdens. It is then on CISA to prioritize and coordinate the dissemination of the incidents across relevant stakeholders.</p> -<p>Ukraine also moved slower than in its previous offensives against Russia, in which it faced less organized defenses. In its 2023 counteroffensive, Ukraine faced a system of fortified defenses — extensively prepared trench lines, minefields, and other fieldworks. During its 2022 counteroffensive in the Kherson Oblast, Ukraine advanced 590 meters a day on average through prepared defenses — systems that include fortifications but that nevertheless were limited by time and resource constraints. Around the same time, Ukraine advanced rapidly in a counteroffensive in the Kharkiv Oblast, moving forward 7.5 kilometers a day on average and overcoming hasty defenses — systems constructed either in contact or when contact is imminent with opposing forces, and that therefore depend on enhancing the natural terrain.</p> +<p>There is also a need to harmonize federal information sharing and communication back to the private sector. CISA and the FBI need to create a plan to coordinate sharing information back to those who report. If the FBI uses information from CISA and has knowledge of the information originators or victims, the latter groups must be informed. Further, it should be made clear that reported cyber threat information in CIRCIA is shielded from use by other agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, as an investigation by such a body was not a stated purpose in the construction of CIRCIA. Done correctly, this data should be pooled and accessible in a dashboard that allows tailored data analytics across the FCEB space. This capability creates a requirement to ensure CISA has filled key billets in incident response, data analytics, and collaborative planning and risk management.</p> -<p>Figure 1 shows the average rate of advance for selected combined arms offensives, such as Galicia, the Somme, Gorzia, and Belleau Wood during World War I; Leningrad and Kursk-Oboyan during World War II; Deversoir (Chinese Farm) during the Yom Kippur War; and Ukraine in 2022 and 2023. Cases were selected from a universe of offensive campaigns lasting more than one day in which the attacker advanced, did not achieve substantial or complete surprise, and did not benefit from air superiority. In addition, cases were selected to ensure variation in geography, technology, time period, attacking and defending forces, and average advance. A much larger number of cases were also consulted, though not included in Figure 1.</p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.3 (for FCEB agencies): Elevate conversations about cybersecurity and network security to leadership levels within the FCEB agencies.</em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CcrYTor.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Rates of Advance for Selected Combined Arms Offensives, 1914–2023.</strong> Source: CSIS analysis of open-source imagery of combat in Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv Oblasts; and <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA220426.pdf">Robert L. Helmbold, “CDB90,” in A Compilation of Data on Rates of Advance in Land Combat Operations (Bethesda, MD: U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, 1990)</a>. CDB90 is based on information collected over a period of several years by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization and revised by the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency.</em></p> +<p>Culturally, federal and private sector CISOs are asked to manage cybersecurity, while CEOs and FCEB leads are tasked with managing the larger entity and ensuring it is functioning properly and able to conduct mission-essential functions. Too often, leaders view these functions as separate, siloed tasks. However, there is a case to be made that today’s cyber threats challenge a business or an FCEB agency’s ability to carry out its basic functions. As such, one of two things (or preferably both) need to happen: (1) cybersecurity conversations need to be elevated to higher leadership levels within an FCEB agency, and (2) CISOs need to be empowered to better lead and manage cybersecurity as a core function of the organization. It should not just be the case that the CISO is the point person if there is an incident. Accountability needs to reside at higher levels within an FCEB agency, and that starts with elevating the importance of cybersecurity. Just like “enterprise security” has become a core tenet in the private sector — particularly the financial sector — that mindset needs to pervade FCEB agencies as well.</p> -<p>Slow progress on the southern front does not mean that Ukraine is failing or will fail in its objectives. It merely indicates that seizing terrain is difficult, probably more so than in its previous offensives. It is possible that Ukraine’s rate of advance may accelerate if it can overcome Russia’s defensive positions near the current front lines or if the Russian military experiences operational or strategic collapse. Such changes in fortune are not unprecedented in modern warfare. The Allied breakout from Normandy in Operation Cobra followed 17 days of grinding combat in which General Omar Bradley’s First Army suffered more than 40,000 casualties to advance 11 kilometers, an advance rate of approximately 650 meters per day. It succeeded despite the exhaustion of several of the infantry divisions tasked with the initial penetration, eventually breaking through German lines and advancing another 11 kilometers in the three days following the initial assault. The success was achieved due to German defensive failings and Allied airpower and demonstrates that slow advances are not incapable of becoming rapid breakthroughs. While Ukraine lacks the offensive advantages the Allies enjoyed in Normandy, the Russian military has also not demonstrated the operational competence of the German Wehrmacht in World War II. The example suggests that an accelerated advance remains possible, if unlikely.</p> +<p>To support this effort, CISA should explore forming collaborative planning teams that support CISOs across the FCEB landscape. These planning teams could help with risk assessments, budget analysis, and how best to communicate cyber risks to agency leadership. Ensuring CISA has a large enough cyber workforce to support collaborative planning teams is a key component of defending the .gov.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1DBsKJs.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Russian Fortifications on the Southern Front.</strong> Note: Fortifications constructed before 2022 are not pictured. Source: <a href="https://read.bradyafrick.com/p/russian-field-fortifications-in-ukraine">Brady Africk, “Russian Field Fortifications in Ukraine,” Medium, bradyafrick.com, September 11, 2023</a>.</em></p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.4 (for CISA and Congress): Identify a more visible and practical role for CISA in FCEB ZTA implementation.</em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/N3jA8t8.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Ukrainian Advance and Russian Fortifications around Robotyne, Ukraine.</strong> Source: CSIS analysis of Sentinel-2 imagery, maps from the Institute for the Study of War, and Africk, “Russian Field Fortifications in Ukraine.”</em></p> +<p>When it comes to federal migration to ZTA, the OMB plays a guiding and assessing role, the National Security Council and the ONCD play coordinating roles, and CISA plays an enabling role. More than anything else, CISA provides general resource materials on issues such as best practices that can be used by FCEB agencies to aid in their migration efforts. But CISA could be tasked and resourced to provide more hands-on assistance with implementation.</p> -<p>Despite the slow progress, Ukraine advanced past the first of three lines of Russian fortifications in some areas along the southern front, as shown in Figure 3. It is possible that a Ukrainian breakthrough of the second line could accelerate the rate of advance, but Russia can probably still limit the strategic impact of a second breakthrough. Russia maintains a third defensive system consisting of a constellation of disconnected fortifications surrounding key cities in the region, as shown in Figure 2.</p> +<p>Not to overextend CISA, but there is an opportunity for the agency to have some designated experts that can further elaborate on the points outlined in the ZTA guidance. Even if it is not possible to detail ZTA subject matter experts to the FCEB agencies, at a minimum CISA can identify outside contractors and experts that might be able to fill this advisory role. CISA can also work with outside groups to conduct studies on ZTA migration-related IT and OT disruptions and advise FCEB agencies on how to address these issues as they arise. Collaborative planning teams again provide a possible framework, with CISA deploying support to agencies as they manage the ZTA transition.</p> -<p>Attrition ratios also suggest that the cost of seizing terrain has increased. As shown in Figure 4, Ukraine suffered greater attrition in its summer 2023 counteroffensive than in its previous offensives. According to open-source data, Russia lost only 2.0 fighting vehicles (defined as a tank, armored fighting vehicle, or infantry fighting vehicle) for each Ukrainian fighting vehicle destroyed, captured, abandoned, or seriously damaged in its current offensive. This ratio is less favorable to Ukraine than the 3.9 Russian vehicles lost per Ukrainian vehicle during its summer 2022 counteroffensive and 6.7 Russian vehicles lost per Ukrainian vehicle during the counteroffensive that drove Russia back from Kyiv in early 2022. While loss ratios and rates of advance are crude metrics for measuring Ukrainian progress, they together suggest that taking territory has been more difficult in the 2023 offensive than in Ukraine’s previous operations.</p> +<p>An even more radical approach would be to fund CISA as a core aspect of their CDM next-generation approach to provide a centralized “Zero Trust Center of Excellence,” with close coordination with NIST and the OMB, to guide FCEB agencies along a zero trust architecture, roadmap, and implementation plan. While centralized, it should be tailored to the priorities and unique aspects of each agency or component. Again, collaborative planning teams — if sufficiently staffed — could play a critical role in supporting CISOs across the FCEB landscape. CISA collaborative planning teams could be deployed to agencies identified as needing assistance and bring with them expert insights on how best to implement new ZTA guidelines. In this line, CISA can establish a shared services environment similar to the Defense Information Systems Agency’s Thunderdome, where agencies that are not well resourced can access integrated capabilities to increase their zero trust maturity. Regardless of the approach, the transition will be complex. There is no master list of all federal systems online at any one time, and each agency will likely have varying rates of adding new systems and even cloud services that complicate implementation. This complexity is why CISA should analyze its current staffing levels and consider building collaborative planning teams.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YjEuw6L.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Loss Ratio of Russian to Ukrainian Fighting Vehicles.</strong> Source: Data compiled by Daniel Scarnecchia from Oryx, <a href="https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html">“Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx</a>; and <a href="https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-ukrainian.html">“Attack On Europe: Documenting Ukrainian Equipment Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx</a>. Oryx data is not geolocated, and therefore the ratios are calculated from the total number of fighting vehicles confirmed to be lost across the entire country. The data are biased by the mode of collection, but the bias is assumed to be constant across the three Ukrainian offensives depicted. The 2022 Kyiv counteroffensive was coded as beginning March 16, 2022, the 2022 summer offensive as beginning August 29, 2022, and the 2023 summer counteroffensive as beginning June 4, 2023.</em></p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.5 (for CISA and Congress): Develop tailored metrics to measure the progress and integration of new tools.</em></strong></p> -<p>Elsewhere along the southern front, Ukraine made limited advances south of the city of Velyka Novosilka in the direction of Berdiansk. Ukrainian forces liberated several towns in their advance south of Velyka Novosilka, engaging in significant fighting. However, Ukraine’s gains in the area represented only approximately 10 kilometers of advance from early June to late August 2023.</p> +<p>As mentioned earlier in this report, there is a need for more creative metrics to measure actual progress with CISA’s cyber services to FCEB agencies. For CISA, the challenge is to identify internal metrics that can realistically show progress without unintentionally overburdening FCEB agencies, as well as to measure security outcomes more holistically than simple program outputs.</p> -<p>Eastern Front: Unlike on the southern front, where Ukrainian offensive operations over the summer represented a new phase in the war, fighting on the eastern front has been continuous in some areas for over a year. Ukraine made marginal gains over the summer in a handful of pockets along the eastern front, particularly in the Donetsk Oblast. One example is around Bakhmut, where Russia has pressed since August 2022 for small territorial gains at high costs to personnel. Beginning in May 2023, however, Ukraine conducted a series of flanking counterattacks, retaking pieces of territory southwest and northwest of the city.</p> +<p>Moving forward, the metrics should focus on not only the progress of individual tools and processes (e.g., the progress of implementing the tools and separately measuring how these tools enhance cybersecurity), but also CISA’s ability to integrate new capabilities with preexisting tools. The more clearly defined the metrics, the easier it will be to hold CISA accountable for what it is uniquely authorized to accomplish.</p> -<p>Despite these successes, Ukraine has yet to approach key Russian positions beyond the current frontlines. These include the cities of Donetsk, Makiivka, and Horlivka, as well as the network of Russian fortifications that stretch between them. As CSIS assessed in June 2023, a Ukrainian attempt to push through these cities is unlikely because of the difficulties and likelihood of high casualties in urban warfare. For now, sustained Ukrainian operations on the eastern front have fixed large numbers of Russian forces that otherwise would have been available to reinforce Russian defensive efforts to the south.</p> +<p>Moreover, as CISA collects feedback from FCEB agencies, the research team encourages it to formally leave space for narrative responses as to why certain FCEB agencies either have not met a certain goal or are actively not planning to, and how they plan to mitigate the risk in alternative ways. If certain metrics are focused on outcomes, FCEBs should be given room to more fully explain how they are meeting security goals in ways other than what is recommended or otherwise required by CISA.</p> -<p>Unlike most other locations in Ukraine, Russian forces were involved in limited offensive operations in multiple areas along the eastern front over the summer. In addition to pushing back against Ukrainian gains in the Donetsk Oblast, Russia increased its presence near and attacks against the northern city of Kupiansk, which Ukraine liberated in September 2022.</p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.6 (for CISA and Congress): Dedicate after-action reviews to better understand progress and issues related to CDM.</em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kEl8YK2.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Russian Fortifications on the Eastern Front.</strong> Note: Fortifications constructed before 2022 are not pictured. Source: Africk, “Russian Field Fortifications in Ukraine.”</em></p> +<p>Related to the need for better metrics in general, every interviewee had very specific but varied feedback on the CDM program, highlighting a need for a formal lessons-learned or after-action process and better metrics for measuring progress with CDM. With new project developments set to take place in the coming months and years, CISA (at the request of Congress) should be prepared to (1) highlight challenges with implementation, (2) outline results or the efficacy of CDM once implemented, and (3) propose realistic next steps for CDM as it relates to specific departments or agencies.</p> -<p>Dnipro Front: Throughout the summer, Ukraine conducted limited crossings of the Dnipro River in the Kherson Oblast to perform reconnaissance and raid Russian positions. These crossings vary in size, but they typically involved small groups of Ukrainian soldiers using speedboats to discretely cross the river and execute their missions quickly before returning across to Ukrainian-controlled territory.</p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.7 (for CISA): Identify a way to effectively engage in the mis- and disinformation discourse.</em></strong></p> -<p>It is possible that Ukraine plans to establish and sustain bridgeheads across the river from which to launch larger military operations in the near future. Ukrainian military leaders stated their intent to set the conditions for future larger crossings, including by destroying Russian artillery that could target large river-crossing forces and clearing mines that could slow landing forces. However, even with proper preparation, amphibious assaults are one of the most complex and demanding operations a military can attempt. Any attempt to cross the Dnipro with a large number of forces would likely be discovered and contested by Russian forces in the first line of fortifications that spans from the Dnipro Delta across from the city of Kherson and up the Dnipro River northward. Moreover, even a successful crossing would require complicated logistical support and need to overcome a large number of fieldworks Russia has constructed along the major roads in the region, as shown in Figure 6. For now, Ukraine more likely intends its attacks to fix Russian forces in Kherson, preventing them from redeploying to the southern or eastern fronts.</p> +<p>For reasons outlined earlier in this study, the federal government has struggled to find a meaningful and appropriate role in addressing mis- and disinformation. Cyber operations can and have been used to further information operations that impact CISA’s mission. Elections come to mind as an immediate example, but there is also cyber-enabled disinformation that can lead to the sabotaging of electric and communications facilities, for example, or that undermine trust in public institutions and objective information put out by the federal government. At the same time, the issue can create a perception of government overreach that makes it difficult to create an objective policy debate around a core national security challenge.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/D7YOsMd.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Russian Fortifications on the Dnipro Front.</strong> Source: Africk, “Pre-2022 Field Fortifications in Russian-Occupied Ukraine.”</em></p> +<p>While this issue is larger than CISA, the agency has a role. As a first step, it might make sense for CISA, perhaps through the CSRB, to formally study recent incidents of high-profile cyber and cyber-enabled disinformation campaigns. The committee could then come back with a series of recommendations for how CISA and other entities might most appropriately be involved in understanding and addressing the risks that misinformation poses to CISA’s mission moving forward. As part of this effort, the CSRB may need subpoena authority.</p> -<p>Beyond the Frontlines: In addition to the fighting on the three fronts, the war has been marked in recent months by intensified missile barrages and escalating naval engagements. Since May, Russia has renewed its long-range UAS and missile attacks in Ukraine. Targets include a mix of critical infrastructure, command and control installations, and other military and civilian targets throughout Ukraine. For its part, Ukraine continues to conduct missile and UAS strikes against Russian military assets, headquarters, and strategic infrastructure in occupied territory. Ukraine has also conducted UAS attacks inside Russia. These attacks have been concentrated in the Bryansk and Belgorod regions near the western border with Ukraine, in Crimea, and in Moscow. On July 30, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that Russian territory was fair game: “Gradually, the war is returning to the territory of Russia — to its symbolic centers and military bases, and this is an inevitable, natural, and absolutely fair process.”</p> +<p>Additionally, CISA should consider working with outside researchers to develop training exercises and workshops for FCEB employees that teach them about threats related to mobile device management and walk them through plans for addressing these issues. Most important is to ensure that federal agencies understand how mis- and disinformation, especially when enabled by cyber operations, have the potential to undermine the provision of public goods through cyberspace. These efforts will almost certainly include addressing computational propaganda designed to smear individuals and institutions.</p> -<p>With the termination of a grain export deal in mid-July, tensions escalated in the Black Sea region. Ukraine struck Russian targets — including diesel-electric submarines, air defense systems, amphibious landing ships, radar installations, and infrastructure, such as dry docks — in and around Crimea using UK-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles, UASs, special operations forces, and other weapons systems and forces. On July 17, Ukrainian UASs damaged the Kerch Strait Bridge used by Russia to move supplies and troops into Crimea. On August 24, Ukrainian special operation forces also reportedly conducted a nighttime raid against Russian positions in Crimea. In response to Ukrainian attacks, Russia withdrew the bulk of its Black Sea Fleet, such as attack submarines and frigates, from Sevastopol to other ports in Russia and Crimea.</p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 2.8 (for CISA): Develop risk strategies that accompany ONCD and OMB financial planning for the FCEB agencies.</em></strong></p> -<p>Over the summer, Russia also conducted a series of attacks against Ukrainian Danube ports that serve as hubs for the export of grain and other food commodities. According to Romanian officials, Russian UASs were flown near and occasionally inside Romanian air space to strike Ukrainian ports, such as Izmail and Reni, just a few hundred yards from Romanian territory. On several occasions, Romanian officials collected fragments from Russian UASs inside of Romanian territory.</p> +<p>In theory, FCEB cyber budgets are coordinated with the ONCD and OMB. But in the longer budget-approval process, essential line-item requests are deprioritized, underfunded, or completely stricken from the final budgets that are ultimately approved by FCEB leadership, the OMB, or Congress. To help federal CISOs and CIOs more effectively advocate for larger cyber budgets, CISA should consider developing risk profiles that accompany the budget plans. In a sense, these risk assessments would highlight what types of risk an FCEB agency might incur if certain tools or services were not adequately funded. Additionally, CISA, in partnership with FCEB entities, could map out how different types of tools might serve an agency’s larger security strategy and support its overall mission, as opposed to looking at tools as one-off fixes to address cyber concerns. Not only can these risk profiles be used to help FCEB agencies advocate for necessary funding, but they can also be used by the executive branch to compare different FCEB agencies.</p> -<h3 id="debating-battlefield-performance">Debating Battlefield Performance</h3> +<p>The White House could consider some sort of ranking system whereby the leaders from low-scoring FCEB agencies have to meet periodically with a designated White House leader to explain (1) why their scores are so low, and (2) what plans they have in place to improve their risk score. Whatever method is adopted, it will have to incentivize CISOs from across the FCEB landscape to participate.</p> -<p>Battlefield success hinges on a complex interaction of several factors, including force employment, strategy, technology, leadership, weather, and combat motivation. While Ukraine retains the initiative in the war, Ukraine’s military advance has been relatively slow. Why? This section examines four possible hypotheses: Ukrainian strategy, Russian defenses, Ukrainian technology, and Ukrainian force employment.</p> +<p>Risk profiles should leverage the granular visibility that CDM has into agency enterprise in a way that is both (1) at object level, so that it can be tied to specific agency components and systems, and (2) near real time (i.e., machine speed) where possible. Second, these profiles can be linked together to provide actionable and contextualized risk recommendations at both the policy and algorithm level (i.e., CDM’s AWARE risk algorithm). Here again, CISA could deploy collaboration planning teams and experts to help agencies manage risk, including integrating their risk management strategies with tailored dashboards, ZTA implementation plans, and budget submissions.</p> -<p>Ukrainian Strategy: Some policymakers and analysts contend that poor Ukrainian strategy contributed to the slow pace of Ukrainian operations, though there is little evidence to support this argument. According to proponents, the Ukrainian military focused too much on conducting operations along multiple fronts, rather than concentrating forces on a single front in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The military objective in the south — and indeed a major objective of Ukrainian military operations more broadly — appeared to be pushing south to the Sea of Azov, cutting Russian occupation forces in two, severing the land corridor between Russia and occupied Crimea, and retaking such cities as Melitopol.</p> +<h4 id="pillar-3-enhancing-communication-and-coordination-with-key-stakeholders">Pillar 3: Enhancing Communication and Coordination with Key Stakeholders</h4> -<p>Instead of focusing on a southeast axis, however, Ukrainian commanders divided troops and firepower between the east and the south. Some U.S. military officials advised Ukraine to concentrate its forces in the south and drive toward Melitopol to punch through Russian defenses. Likewise, some criticized the Ukrainian military for moving forward on multiple axes within Zaporizhzhia Oblast itself rather than focusing on one main axis. The argument about how and where Ukraine should concentrate its offensive efforts is, in part, a debate about force ratios. Proponents of focusing solely on the south argue that massing Ukrainian forces along a single axis in Zaporizhzhia would have allowed Ukraine to achieve the favorable force ratio necessary to generate a significant breakthrough.</p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.1 (for CISA): Develop a public campaign to promote CISA’s role as the lead for federal network defense.</em></strong></p> -<p>But this argument is unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, Russian military leaders came to the same conclusion and prepared accordingly. They anticipated that Ukrainian forces would likely focus on the southern front and sent forces to fortify Melitopol and Tokmak, as well as other areas in Zaporizhzhia. Second, well-designed mechanized campaigns almost always progress on multiple axes, not just one. Advancing along a single axis allows the defender to fully concentrate on stopping that advance. In this case, the Russians would almost certainly have moved forces from other parts of the theater as rapidly as possible to stop the Ukrainian drive toward Melitopol. Instead, Ukrainian advances in Bakhmut and other eastern areas pinned down Russian forces since Russia was not prepared to lose Bakhmut.</p> +<p>As an agency, CISA has worked hard to establish a recognizable brand, particularly with the private sector. CISA has a very visible social media presence and can be lauded for putting out periodic updates (such as its first two strategic plans) on where it hopes to go in the coming years. However, there is room for CISA to be more coordinated in its marketing, especially with regard to services offered to FCEB agencies.</p> -<p>Actual force ratios across the long front lines in Ukraine are impossible to determine using open sources, but there is little reason to believe that Ukraine’s multifront approach was a mistake. To achieve favorable force ratios despite its smaller military, Ukraine would have had to move forces to the decisive point before the Russian defenders could react and surge their own forces to that area. But Russia anticipated that Ukraine would attack in Zaporizhzhia, prepared its most extensive networks of fortifications in the region as shown in Figure 7, and almost certainly planned to redeploy forces to reinforce against a Ukrainian advance there.</p> +<p>From cleaning up its website (and deleting outdated content) to creating a more intentional rhythm for periodic updates with an updated service catalog specifically for FCEB agencies, CISA could benefit from simplifying its messaging. This will also be helpful for FCEB agencies to better understand the full suite of current CISA offerings.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/egsJsi1.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Construction of Russian Fortifications between February 2022 and August 2023.</strong> Source: Africk, “Russian Field Fortifications in Ukraine.”</em></p> +<p>Related to this, interviewees noted that some of CISA’s programs, such as CDM, could benefit from more positive communications about success stories and upward trending metrics. These stories can paint a picture that the process is working and that FCEB agencies would be well served by participating to the fullest extent possible.</p> -<p>As a result, Ukraine likely could not have achieved more favorable force ratios even by massing its forces along one or two axes in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. While a more favorable force ratio is always desirable, evidence suggests that a higher concentration of Ukraine’s efforts along the southern front likely would have been met by a higher concentration of Russian forces in heavily fortified terrain.</p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.2 (for CISA): Establish a framework for more consistent coordination with SRMAs, information sharing and analysis centers, and other activities with regard to FCEB protection.</em></strong></p> -<p>Russian Defenses: Another possible explanation for Ukraine’s limited progress is that Russian forces constructed and used defensive fortifications effectively. There is some evidence to support this argument. In advance of Ukraine’s offensive, Russia built the most extensive defensive works in Europe since World War II, with expansive fortifications in eastern and southern Ukraine. These defenses consist of a network of trenches, anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, razor wire, earthen berms, and dragon’s teeth, as shown in Figure 8.</p> +<p>One of the comments that came up in private sector interviews is that there are networks and entities that already work with CISA in other capacities that can likely be more plugged-in to support CISA’s FCEB mission. While this might already be inherently baked into CISA’s plans, it might help for CISA to formally map out its existing stakeholders and clearly identify how each can specifically support CISA’s FCEB mission.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KjbEH5h.png" alt="image08" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: Multilayered Defenses North of Mykhailivka, Ukraine.</strong></em></p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.3 (for CISA): Provide sector-specific cybersecurity guidance, especially for low-security sectors with “soft targets.”</em></strong></p> -<p>Ukraine’s slow advance can be attributed, in part, to Russia’s successes using fortifications to defend against Ukrainian assaults. Across the entire front, Russian troops primarily fought from infantry trench systems. Russian forces in some areas, such as the 7th Guards Air Assault Division, were so thoroughly dug in that Ukrainian forces discovered carpets and pictures on the walls of captured Russian positions.</p> +<p>Gaps in CISA support across the 16 critical sectors and FCEB agencies exist not out of willfulness or lack of direction but due to inherent limitations driven by budget constraints, staff bandwidth, and talent availability. However, it is likely that CISA will continue to acquire, train, and retain talent and grow to meet the expanding cyber picture. What CISA could do in the short term is review the 16 critical infrastructure sectors on a triannual basis to assess and prioritize three to five “soft target” sectors. In this manner, at a minimum CISA will assist these sectors to improve their cyber resilience, conserving staff bandwidth and prioritizing the entities and agencies that need the most help. This tiered approach could help CISA defend the .gov while it grows its capabilities and talent. The approach also lends itself to generating and deploying collaborating planning teams that focus on integrating risk management with budgets and strategy at the agency level.</p> -<p>Russia employed a variety of fortifications to slow the advance of Ukrainian vehicles. However, not all fortifications are created equal. One former Ukrainian commander belittled the effectiveness of Russian dragon’s teeth defenses in September 2023. Based on satellite imagery and other information, CSIS analysis in June 2023 similarly questioned the potential effectiveness of Russia’s dragon’s teeth given the varied quality in their installation and make.</p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.4 (for CISA): Host a database of shared service offerings for FCEB agencies.</em></strong></p> -<p>But Russia’s extensive use of mines effectively slowed Ukrainian advances. Ukraine is now the most mined country in the world after Russia expanded the size of minefields from 120 meters to 500 meters. The increased size and frequency of minefields complicated Ukrainian planning and limited the effectiveness of Ukraine’s equipment. For example, when the Ukrainian 47th Assault Brigade and 33rd Mechanized Brigade attempted to cross a minefield north of Robotyne on June 8, 2023, mine-clearing efforts were insufficient. Slowed or disabled by mines, Ukrainian vehicles came under fire from Russian attack helicopters, and Ukrainian soldiers were forced to abandon their equipment and retreat. The incident reportedly resulted in the loss or abandonment of at least 25 tanks and fighting vehicles, although some were later recovered. Drone footage and satellite imagery show a cluster of 11 vehicles damaged and abandoned in one location from the failed advance, as shown in Figure 9.</p> +<p>CISA’s website already advertises cyber services offered by the Departments of Justice, Transportation, and Health and Human Services. It also mentions that there are efforts in progress aimed at vetting other services and providers that will be included on the website at a later date. Whether by CISA or some other entity, it should be a priority that one of the shared service providers manage a public database that clearly outlines which departments and agencies are current providers and what their specific offerings are.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dWgSVRu.png" alt="image09" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Damaged and Abandoned Vehicle from an Attempted Ukrainian Advance North of Robotyne, June 2023.</strong> Source: Screenshot of video release by the Russian Ministry of Defense.</em></p> +<p>CISA might even consider hosting an annual or biannual consortium of federal shared service providers to discuss best practices, share insights, and discuss current gaps, among other activities. Given CISA’s authorities and reach, the agency is in a strong position to host this sort of convening. This forum would also offer an opportunity to introduce agencies to collaborative planning teams or other services that CISA provides to support defending the .gov.</p> -<p>Minefields disrupted Ukraine’s offensive momentum and imposed constraints on Ukraine’s rate of advance. Russian minelaying increased the demand on Ukrainian reconnaissance and engineers and complicates military planning. As a result, Ukrainian operations in mined areas had to be slow and deliberate or risk trapping equipment and personnel on exposed ground.</p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.5 (for CISA): Explain the value add of the JCDC to FCEB agencies (separate from the value add for the private sector).</em></strong></p> -<p>The terrain in Ukraine increased the effectiveness of Russian defenses. Rows of flat, open farm fields separated by tree lines characterize the southern front. Without air superiority, Ukrainian ground forces had to advance by crossing these fields with little natural cover to conceal their movement. In addition to laying mines, Russia targeted advancing Ukrainian troops and vehicles with artillery fire, attack helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft. Using thick summer foliage to their advantage, Russia concealed tanks, anti-tank units, and infantry units in the tree lines that border the fields to ambush Ukrainian forces.</p> +<p>The JCDC continues to provide value for public and private entities alike and has already had some early successes. Moving forward, it could be helpful for FCEB agencies writ large to have clearer direction on the value that the JCDC can have for their respective agencies. Moreover, FCEB agencies should be more aware of which organizations comprise the JCDC, along with why and how their individual needs are being addressed by the select FCEB leaders represented in the group.</p> -<p>In urban areas, Russia used infrastructure to its advantage. Buildings and other structures provide cover to defending forces and enable ambushes. Russia also methodically destroyed roads and created obstacles in urban areas to disrupt the advance of Ukrainian vehicles and channel them into dangerous areas. For example, a Ukrainian assault in late July on the town of Staromaiorske along the southern front was reportedly slowed by a combination of such defenses.</p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.6 (for CISA): Prioritize (and communicate) system integration when rolling out new capabilities and programs.</em></strong></p> -<p>Ukraine’s advance was further complicated by the proliferation of sensors and rapid precision strike capabilities on the battlefield, especially long-range precision fires and UASs. Russia deployed significant numbers of small UASs in contested areas, and some Ukrainian sources reported losing 10,000 UASs every month, which demonstrated the sheer number of these systems being employed on the battlefield. The ubiquity of these systems makes it impossible to establish that sensor saturation and advanced strike capabilities provide a distinct defensive advantage, but there are good reasons to believe this is the case. Sensor saturation creates a “transparent battlefield” in which forces can be found and targeted more easily than in past decades.</p> +<p>One of the identified gaps in CISA’s services is that, at a minimum, there is an outside perception that CISA’s tools and services are distinct lines of effort. It is not clear that information and best practices are being consistently shared between platforms. In many ways, this a hard issue for CISA to address, especially given that some of the services offered predate CISA and might have previously operated under different parts of the DHS or other agencies altogether. In other words, when developed, some of these services were not intentionally designed to be integrated with other tools and services.</p> -<p>The advancement of precision fires and the proliferation of lethal UASs shorten the time it takes to strike enemy forces once they are located. In many cases, a UAS may act as both the sensor and the strike capability. Loitering munitions, for example, can circle battlefields until a target is acquired and approved for an immediate strike. On a transparent battlefield onto which an adversary can rapidly strike detected forces, attackers must distribute further, move more deliberately, make greater use of cover, and more tightly coordinate movement with suppressive fire in order to survive their advance. In contrast, defenders can take advantage of prepared fighting positions that are less exposed both to enemy detection and enemy fire.</p> +<p>CISA does appear to be actively trying to address this issue, notably by having CADS serve as a data repository that collects information from these various points. However, as CISA continues to make promises on scaling up, modernizing, and generally updating its capabilities, it needs to more intentionally map out and communicate how these lines of effort work within existing programs. The lack of such planning could lead to problems down the road, as well as potential visibility gaps.</p> -<p>Ukrainian Technology: A third possibility is that offense was weakened by insufficient technology, especially weapons systems that would facilitate a breakthrough. There is some evidence to support this argument. Ukraine received significant military assistance from the West, which aided combat operations. Examples include artillery, main battle tanks, armored carriers, ground support vehicles, air defense systems, air-to-ground missiles, manned aircraft, UASs, coastal defense systems, and radar and communications. U.S.-supplied cluster munitions, which can cause devastation over a broader area than ordinary shells, were also helpful for Ukrainian forces. Ukraine used cluster munitions to target Russian troops running across open ground, either to flee or to provide reinforcements. However, Ukraine’s lack of fighter aircraft, disadvantage in fires, and limited enablers made it more difficult to break through Russian lines.</p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.7 (for all): Operate with a clear understanding of what it means to have resilient networks and processes.</em></strong></p> -<p>Ukrainian Force Employment: Some have argued that the speed of Ukrainian advances was impacted by its military doctrine and tactical implementation, a combination known as “force employment.” There is some evidence to support this argument.</p> +<p>Cybersecurity is an exercise in risk management, not risk elimination. While that might be something that CISA, some of the more cyber mature FCEB agencies, and federal CISOs are aware of, it is not a clearly understood concept across the board. In its larger public awareness campaigns, it is important that CISA not only call out the importance of resilience by name but actually define in practical terms what that means for an FCEB agency with regard to its federal network and processes.</p> -<p>Choices in how militaries use the soldiers and equipment at their disposal can permit attackers to advance despite the extreme lethality of defenders’ firepower or permit defenders to limit the gains of numerically overwhelming attackers. Effective force employment requires tight coordination between infantry, armor, artillery, and airpower at several organizational levels, as well as high levels of autonomy, initiative, and tactical prowess at lower echelons.</p> +<p><strong><em>Recommendation 3.8 (for CISA): Explicitly promote transparency as a way of achieving greater resilience.</em></strong></p> -<p>Ukraine changed how it used its forces to reduce its losses while accepting an advance rate much slower than its leaders may have initially desired. There is little doubt that Ukraine’s initial force employment resulted in high rates of attrition. But it remains unclear why Ukraine’s initial force employment resulted in such high losses without generating sizable advances. Training, force structure, organizational culture, or lack of airpower all may have played roles, and the interaction between Russian defenses and Zaporizhzhia’s terrain may have forestalled a mechanized breakthrough independent of those factors.</p> +<p>The ubiquity of data coupled with today’s advancements in cyber technology mean that it will be impossible for FCEB agencies, even after implementing all appropriate safeguards, to assume that sensitive information will not be compromised. With that in mind, CISA can use its platform to more intentionally — via guidance documents and planning manuals — tie the value of transparency to greater resilience for FCEB agencies. In other words, it can highlight why operating with transparency can provide greater resilience and result in less reliance on sensitive information.</p> -<p>While granular data on Ukraine’s force employment is scarce, open-source information suggests a shift in tactics after its unsuccessful first assaults. Accounts based on interviews with combatants suggest a change in how Ukraine coordinated its infantry, armor, and artillery. Ukrainian operations in June 2023 appear to have been organized around larger maneuver units than later Ukrainian operations in the summer, which employed smaller infantry units supported by artillery and small numbers of tanks. Analysis by the Royal United Services Institute demonstrates that Ukraine can effectively integrate multiple combat branches at lower echelons.</p> +<p>Beyond that, CISA can promote transparency across a number of other lines of effort: in incident reporting, in opening networks for outside researchers under careful bug bounty programs to find weaknesses, among the vendor community in coming forward with vulnerabilities in products, and between government and industry with regard to sharing vulnerabilities, among many other efforts.</p> -<p>Ukraine also emphasized destroying Russian artillery as part of its changing offensive strategy. Open-source data shows that Ukraine greatly increased its destruction of Russian artillery systems in late June and early July following its initial failures to advance, as shown in Figure 10. This is consistent with some reporting on Ukraine’s changed operational approach. This appears to mark a shift toward destroying enemy artillery before advancing and away from the combined arms approach of advancing while simultaneously suppressing the enemy using artillery fire.</p> +<p>Transparency, as it relates to cybersecurity, is not something FCEB agencies will necessarily invest in or prioritize, but CISA can lead the way in providing actionable recommendations for how to operate in this type of environment.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iFDwnY8.png" alt="image10" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 10: GeoConfirmed Data on Rates of Destroyed Russian Artillery (June 2023–September 2023).</strong> Source: Data from <a href="https://geoconfirmed.azurewebsites.net/ukraine">“Ukraine,” GeoConfirmed.org, September 15, 2023</a>.</em></p> +<h4 id="other-ideas">Other Ideas</h4> -<p>These changes were associated with a significant decrease in Ukrainian losses. U.S. and European officials reported that Ukraine lost as much as 20 percent of the weapons sent to the battlefield in the first two weeks of the offensive, a rate that prompted Ukrainian commanders to reevaluate their tactics. After adopting an operational approach centered around small-unit probes and attrition by artillery and UAS strikes, Ukrainian equipment loss rates were cut in half, with approximately 10 percent of equipment lost in the next phase of operations. In a war of attrition, such a decrease in loss rates was probably seen by Ukrainians as worth the slow pace of advance.</p> +<p>While the task force had broad agreement on the recommendations above, several other ideas emerged over the course of the study that either did not achieve consensus or were beyond the scope of the current effort. Below, the core research team captured the aspects most relevant to generating a larger dialogue about how to secure the .gov.</p> -<p>The key question of whether Ukraine’s initial mechanized assaults would have succeeded if executed with greater skill is unanswerable, despite remarks made by some military officials, political figures, and security analysts. Effective coordination between branches of arms might have allowed Ukraine to break through Russian lines. It is also plausible that Ukraine’s lack of air superiority on a sensor-saturated battlefield would have limited the benefits of such coordination. Previous analysis of World War II breakthroughs suggests that skillful implementation of combined arms tactics have mattered for successful offensive operations, but also that preponderance of firepower, operational maneuverability, speed, surprise, and air dominance have also influenced the likelihood of a breakthrough and exploitation. There is little reason to believe that more effective combined arms tactics would have been sufficient to achieve the breakthrough that Ukraine and its backers initially hoped for in the summer of 2023 without the advantages of surprise and air superiority.</p> +<p><strong>WORKFORCE</strong></p> -<h3 id="policy-implications">Policy Implications</h3> +<p>While progress is being made in the cyber workforce, it is not yet clear whether current efforts are sufficient, given enduring challenges associated with the issue. The new National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy (NCWES) is certainly a step in the right direction that looks at the problem holistically. The strategy acknowledges the need for hiring and pay flexibility, but it is not immediately clear how to create the type of incentive pay required to attract and retain talent, much less who should pay for additional personnel costs. Leaving over 100 federal agencies to pick up the tab risks creating “haves” and “have nots” because of internal budget challenges that accrue as they pay for approved CDM suites alongside expanded pay incentives for a cyber workforce.</p> -<p>Opposition to providing further aid to Ukraine is building among some members of U.S. Congress, as highlighted in the September 2023 stopgap spending bill that did not include additional money for Ukraine. Some argue that the United States should concentrate exclusively on countering China in the Indo-Pacific and defending Taiwan. These officials contend that U.S. resources are finite, that weapons exports to Ukraine come at Taiwan’s expense, and that sustained focus on war in Europe benefits China. Some also argue that the United States should prioritize aid to Israel over Ukraine. Others maintain that every dollar spent on Ukraine is a waste of taxpayer money that could be better used on domestic priorities, such as improving healthcare, cracking down on illegal immigration, or combating the spread of fentanyl.</p> +<p>There are also significant communication issues associated with ensuring that current and prospective members of the cyber workforce understand which federal benefits they can take advantage of. According to the strategy, “in fiscal year 2019, only 320 IT Specialists out of the more than 84,000 eligible benefited from student loan repayments. As a second example, critical pay authority is currently available for 800 positions, and only 47 have been used (data provided by [the Office of Personnel Management]).” In addition, even when agencies grant additional authorizations to increase pay, the implementation can lag. According to the strategy, “the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General have been granted the authority (by sec. 401 of the Abolish Trafficking Reauthorization Act of 2022, Public L. No. 117-347, 136 Stat. 6199 (2023)) to provide increased incentive pay to DHS and Department of Justice employees identified as possessing cyber skills. As of this writing, these authorities have not yet been implemented.”</p> -<p>But these arguments are misguided. Continuing aid to Ukraine is essential to prevent authoritarian leaders, such as Vladimir Putin, from achieving their revanchist aims. In fact, Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran have deepened their military, economic, and diplomatic ties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.</p> +<p>Resource challenges are also likely to confront expanding education opportunities. While the NCWES expands the number of universities offering cybersecurity education through NSF and NSA outreach programs, the resources do not match philanthropic efforts. For example, the Craig Newmark Foundation alone will invest more than the NSF, NIST, and Department of Labor on cybersecurity education and training through its $100 million Cyber Civil Defense Initiative.183 It is also not immediately clear how some lead agency efforts contribute to the vision as part of the NCWES. For example, CISA’s contribution to the effort was a Cyber Security Awareness Month initiative focused largely on media outreach. No amount of media outreach is likely to address the growing shortfall of IT professionals in the cyber workforce.</p> -<p>U.S. allies and enemies alike see Ukraine as a test of Western resolve. The Ukrainian military still has the initiative in the war and continues to advance forward. Ukraine’s supporters can meaningfully impact two of the factors outlined in the previous section: Ukrainian force employment and technology. The fundamental challenge is that both take time. A war that continues to favor the defense is also likely to be protracted, since Ukrainian advances will likely continue to be slow.</p> +<p><strong>INFLATION PROOFING</strong></p> -<p>The United States and its Western allies need to be prepared to support a long war and to develop a long-term aid plan. They have already provided extensive training and intelligence to improve Ukraine’s force employment, including combined arms maneuver, air defense, special operations activities, intelligence, and the operation and maintenance of more than 20 military systems. This support needs to continue and adapt as the war evolves.</p> +<p>The entire congressional appropriations process struggles with the challenges posed by higher inflation. The same is true with cybersecurity, where vendors increase the costs of software and contractors increase labor costs. Therefore, the U.S. government — and especially Congress — needs to explore mechanisms for making FCEB agencies more resilient to inflation. Currently, only select mandatory entitlement programs are indexed to inflation. Congress should consider studying current dynamics around cyber funding, specifically how in some cases the projected costs for essential security tools and services might make it difficult for some FCEB agencies to consistently use those tools in the future. Congress should also be monitoring unforeseen operations and maintenance costs associated with managing or updating tools or services. While not possible for all tools, Congress should consider if there are unique circumstances or a specific set of services that should be indexed to inflation or what other mechanisms are available to address sudden cost spikes. If Congress does pursue this type of action, it should frequently revisit which tools and services qualify, so as to not unintentionally block the use of other tools that might perform better than those currently in use.</p> -<p>In addition, Ukraine needs more and better technology in two respects. The first is long-term assistance that will help Ukraine strengthen its defense and prevent or deter a Russian counterattack in the future. Examples include mines, anti-tank guided missiles, air defense systems, stockpiles of munitions, counter-UAS systems, and area-effect weapons, such as artillery.</p> +<p><strong>PREPARING FOR AN ALGORITHMIC FUTURE</strong></p> -<p>The second type of assistance is aid that helps Ukraine on offense in the current campaign and maximizes the possibility that it can break through well-fortified areas and retake as much territory as possible from Russia. Examples include a steady supply of munitions; attack aircraft, such as F-16s; long-range missiles, such as MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS); and UASs that can conduct intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike missions.</p> +<p>Beyond pricing, there is a need for a larger set of standards guiding AI model assurance and testing as well as red teaming generative AI models, but this is outside the scope of the current report. The Biden administration is still in the process of developing a larger policy framework that will affect this evolving technology. For example, the Office of Science and Technology Policy has proposed a blueprint for an AI bill of rights. This initiative parallels multiple high-profile efforts, including the 2021 Federal Data Strategy, the 2021 National Security Commission on AI’s final report, the 2023 National Artificial Intelligence Research Resources task force report, and NIST’s AI Risk Management Framework.</p> -<p>Based on current trends, continuing aid to Ukraine may cost roughly $14.5 billion per year. Figure 11 highlights what this might look like through the end of 2024. This aid has a highly favorable risk-reward ratio. One of the United States’ most significant adversaries, Russia, is suffering extraordinary attrition. As many 120,000 Russian soldiers have died, and perhaps three times that number have been wounded, along with several dozen Russian general officers. Ukrainian soldiers have destroyed substantial numbers of Russian military equipment, such as main battle tanks, armored and infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, artillery, surface-to-air missile systems, fighter aircraft, helicopters, UASs, submarines, landing ships, and a guided missile cruiser. And the United States has lost zero soldiers in the war.</p> +<p>With respect to cyber defense, the most important output from these AI initiatives rests in technical standards for testing and evaluation. These standards will need to include red teaming generative AI models to combat misinformation and deepfakes as well as requirements for vendors selling AI-enabled threat hunt capabilities.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1WiLk6R.png" alt="image11" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 11: U.S. Presidential Drawdowns for Ukraine (February 2022–September 2023) and Projected Drawdown Amounts (September 2023–December 2024).</strong> Source: <a href="https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Execution/pda_announcements/">“Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) Announcements,” Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)/CFO, Accessed September 21, 2023</a>.</em></p> +<p>Last, the standards must include more detailed requirements for cloud security. There is no AI without big data, and there is no big data without cloud computing. Failing to secure the cloud would create a back door into corrupting new AI/ML applications. At the same time, there is optimism that generative AI applications offer opportunities to enhance security.</p> -<p>The war is now, in part, a contest between the defense industrial bases of the two sides: Russia and its partners, such as China and Iran; and Ukraine and its partners, including the United States and other Western countries. A decision by the United States to significantly reduce military aid would shift the military balance-of-power in favor of Russia and increase the possibility that Russia will ultimately win the war by seizing additional Ukrainian territory in a grinding war of attrition. Too much is at stake. As UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher said to President George H.W. Bush in the leadup to the First Gulf War, after Iraq had invaded Kuwait, “This is no time to go wobbly.”</p> +<p>Once broader federal and technical guidelines are established, CISA will likely need to develop an agency-wide AI strategy focused on limiting the ability of threat actors to hold the United States hostage in cyberspace using malware tailored by generate models. Securing the .gov domain space will require AI applications at multiple levels.</p> -<hr /> +<p><strong>USING A JFHQ-DODIN MODEL TO FURTHER CENTRALIZE THE .GOV ECOSYSTEM</strong></p> -<p><strong>Seth G. Jones</strong> is senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>A more radical approach to securing the .gov space would be to centralize budgets, authorities, and operational response across the over 100 federal agencies that constitute it. This approach could, in principle, parallel how the DOD created new entities to defend its networks.</p> -<p><strong>Riley McCabe</strong> is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS.</p> +<p>During the Obama administration, the DOD sought to better align its cyber capabilities, including protecting defense networks, building on over 10 years of Joint Task Forces and other command and control constructs. As part of this effort, the DOD created the Joint Force Headquarters - Department of Defense Information Network (JFHQ-DODIN) in 2014, based on earlier plans by U.S. Strategic Command.</p> -<p><strong>Alexander Palmer</strong> is a research associate with the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS.</p>Seth G. Jones, et al.Ukrainian forces retain the initiative in the war but advanced an average of only 90 meters per day on the southern front during the peak of their summer offensive, according to new CSIS analysis.Integrate Offence And Defence2023-10-11T12:00:00+08:002023-10-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/integrate-offence-and-defence<p><em>This article articulates pathways forward in a future operating environment dominated by stalemates and threats to national homelands.</em></p> +<p>The original concept of operations started from the premise that defense networks are contested battlespace that require centralized planning, control, and named operations (e.g., Operation Gladiator Phoenix, Operation Gladiator Shield) to defend the network. According to Admiral Mike Rogers, this construct also meant that JFHQ-DODIN could assume operational control of different cyber mission forces as part of its defense mission. In other words, the creation of a centralized task force to defend DOD networks was not just about budgets and authorities; it represented a planning and risk management framework.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Applied to CISA, the JFHQ-DODIN model implies a higher degree of centralization. Agencies would see reduced budgets and personnel if functions normally performed by the CISO were centralized and incident reporting, response, and risk management were performed across the network by federated teams under operational control of CISA. In some ways, this centralization is the natural evolution of the .gov top domain management started in 2021.</p> -<p>A core challenge that is likely to be presented by the future operating environment is the combination of stalemates at the front with threats to national homebases. Not only will this strain militaries, but it will also generate organisational competition between those responsible for defensive tasks and those responsible for manoeuvre at the front.</p> +<p>Yet the option is also not a panacea. The DOD still struggles to report and address cyber incidents, including in the defense industrial base. Centralizing budgets and authorities across over 100 federal agencies would take time, cause friction, and, despite increased visibility (i.e., CDM) and responsiveness (i.e., threat hunt), might not create cost savings.</p> -<p>One way of overcoming these contradictions is through a concept which adopts elements of strike, Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD), and manoeuvre. This is the goal envisioned under Israel’s Operational Victory Concept. Per this concept, which heavily emphasises multidomain integration, close coordination must be achieved between air and missile defences, strike and ground forces.</p> +<p><strong>GETTING THIRD-PARTY RISK RIGHT</strong></p> -<p>As described by one of the authors in a previous article, this approach would involve three things. The first is the integration of sensors used for offensive and defensive tasks, and the use of the same capabilities to enable both strikes and interceptions. This integration can enable responsive fires. Instead of depending almost solely on an attempt to deliver a knockout blow at the outset of a conflict, this approach would also seek to create a blanket of sensor coverage to ensure that any projectile fired creates a risk of unmasking the launcher. Defensive forward-based intercepts can be followed up with strikes on launchers. As demonstrated by the updating of defensive radar systems such as the AN/MPQ-64 to extrapolate a launcher’s location from a missile’s trajectory, this is technologically viable today. The second element of the approach is strike capabilities with the range and speed to engage targets before they move or even complete a multi-rocket firing sequence. Precisely what this range and speed requirement is depends on the target. Over longer distances, one might need recourse to tools such as longer-range missiles or loitering munitions. It is also possible to create dual-purpose interceptors which can serve both air defence and strike missions, as illustrated by the US Navy’s SM-6. Though this entails costs, an integrated system is arguably cheaper than two separate lines of effort to support strike and defence. If operated in proximity to the enemy, as in the context of offensive manoeuvres, short-range strike-intercepting munitions might even be cheaper than descent-phase interceptors. The final component of this model is ground forces that manoeuvre to support strike by infiltrating an opponent’s lines, unmasking targets and forcing them to move, as well as engaging targets of opportunity. Sufficiently small and distributed ground formations networked with a wider force could serve as force multipliers for strike.</p> +<p>In the near future, a large number of government services will transition to a cloud-based architecture. CISA’s recent guidelines for “security-by-design” and “security-by-default” linked to pillar three of the 2023 National Cyber Strategy offer a start but not an end to the effort to manage risk in the cloud. There will need to be additional studies and experiments to test how best to manage third-party risks during the cloud transition. Even the best defense still leaves holes dedicated attacks could exploit, and the cloud creates opportunities to capture and exploit a larger array of services. In addition, there will need to be renewed efforts to engage on “security-by-design” internationally through forums such as the International Technical Union. In the twenty-first century, standards are strategy. The best way to manage third-party risk will be to build in technical standards that make digital infrastructure harder to compromise.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The costs of deflecting Iran’s proxies in the early stages of a conflict with Tehran could leave Israel exhausted in the event of direct Iranian intervention later on</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="the-future-of-collective-defense">The Future of Collective Defense</h3> -<p>In effect, this approach still maintains a focus on manoeuvre, presenting an opponent with multiple dilemmas and preventing them from acting in a coherent manner. However, physical manoeuvre is in this context a supporting element in a system based on dislocation by fire. In effect, manoeuvre, fire and defence must be balanced in a system which integrates their effects.</p> +<p>In the next three to five years, CISA’s challenge will be not only to grow and integrate its capabilities, but also to clearly communicate its capabilities to partners and adversaries alike to enhance deterrence.</p> -<h3 id="lessons-from-the-israeli-example">Lessons from the Israeli Example</h3> +<p>One of the more concerning aspects of the SolarWinds software compromise is not just that the malware comprehensively penetrated over 200 U.S. government and allied systems as early as 2019. It is that it was able to do so at a time when CISA, FedRAMP reporting, CDM and EINSTEIN, and a host of other agencies, capabilities, and processes were in place that should have, in theory, more quickly detected the intrusion.</p> -<p>The Israeli experience is instructive here. Israel faces the prospect of a multi-front war with Iranian proxies and Iran itself, in which there is a considerable risk that its air defence capabilities will be exhausted by the sheer volume of fire that it faces. Moreover, the state faces a prioritisation issue – the costs of deflecting Iran’s proxies in the early stages of a conflict could leave it exhausted in the event of direct Iranian intervention later on. It would seem, then, that seeking efficiencies by integrating offence and defence is an essential task.</p> +<p>One of the key takeaways from the expert tabletop exercises is that while knowledge of CISA services encouraged a few of the attackers to change their attack strategy, most of CISA’s services, while important to have, did not greatly factor into the attackers’ analyses. The experts came to these conclusions from a few different perspectives. Some believed that the benefits of CISA cyber services, such as those that promote system and process resilience, could only be realized in the long term and would not fully be realized in the immediate future, thereby making them ineffective as deterrents. Others were skeptical that CISA’s capabilities would be sufficiently advanced in the near future. And some of the experts did not believe that CISA alone with its defensive posture could undermine an attack strategy without reinforcements from other government entities with investigatory or prosecutorial powers.</p> -<p>That being said, there exist considerable points of friction within the IDF. One criticism of the argument that fires and defences should be better integrated – advanced by the supporters of both manoeuvre and defence – is that a new investment in offensive ground capabilities in general, and in particular in an offensive forward-interception and launch-suppression layer, will draw from the resources the IDF requires in order to continue to strengthen and develop its existing multi-layer interception system. Dividing force design efforts would, in practice, be to Israel’s detriment. Given the relative effectiveness of Israeli defences thus far, there is an understandable conservatism regarding change. Phrases often heard in the corridors of the General Staff include: “don’t change horses midstream” or “don’t change a winning team”.</p> +<p>But the truth is that with increased resourcing, CISA is making meaningful steps to not only up its capabilities but also make sure those capabilities are integrated and provide a greater picture of the threats and vulnerabilities that FCEB agencies need to address. CISA’s current capabilities, combined with planned reporting requirements and processes, will ensure that the agency has a more fulsome global cyber activity picture. CISA is well positioned not only to monitor and collect information but also to disseminate the information and help entities plan their responses at different levels. The challenge is to ensure CISA can adapt to the evolving threat landscape while navigating bureaucratic challenges.</p> -<p>However, if we examine the IDF’s last modernisation process in the 1990s, when the Syrian armour threat was regarded as a key strategic issue, Israel did not refrain from building a combat system that enjoyed five to six separate layers of response. Fighter plane interdiction capabilities were not considered an alternative to building a new cutting-edge fleet of remotely piloted aircraft. The plethora of aerial capabilities did not make redundant the long-range precision-guided munition squads deployed in the ground divisions, along with the Northern Command’s rocket and missile artillery division. All the while, the IDF continued to build and upgrade the Armoured Corps, supplying it with advanced tanks to help deal with forward enemy forces, and it would later control Syrian territory through improved capabilities. Thus, the decision to invest in another combat layer at the cost of a few billion NIS should not be seen as threatening other layers of defence. Put simply, the cost of layered and potentially redundant systems is outweighed by both the military and material costs of a single-vector solution. A failure to overwhelm a missile-centric adversary will surely prove to be more expensive in blood and treasure, as well as in strategic outcomes.</p> +<hr /> -<p>In addition, many of the improvements in areas such as ISR that could enable a strike-based concept could also improve IAMD. For example, new and comparatively cheap UAVs and nano-satellites could enhance both the tracking of certain targets and the interception of ascending missiles and active launchers. Integrated systems such as the US Navy’s Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air and the US Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System have already shown how non-dedicated ISR assets like the F/A-18 and F-35 can enhance missile defence, as well as how air defence radar can provide data to enable subsequent strikes.</p> +<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow for future war, gaming, and strategy in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Developing a significant forward fighting layer that can engage ballistic and UAV threats is a crucial component in fulfilling Israel’s goal of moving from responding to initiating</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Devi Nair</strong> is a former associate director and associate fellow with the CSIS Defending Democratic Institutions Project, where her research focused on cyber and disinformation operation efforts aimed at undermining trust in democratic institutions.</p> -<p>Moreover, the ability to engage targets with comparatively short-range capabilities including strike platforms and interceptors that rely on semi-active homing can free up more expensive assets for longer-range missions. Greater awareness about which missiles are likely to hit targets and new modes of intercept based on directed energy weapons (lasers) can also support this aim, though the latter will mature over the long term. As examples of the capabilities currently diverted from more strategically decisive missions, we might consider Israel’s “long arm” strategic strike capabilities and its next-generation Iron Dome (together with Arrow and David Sling). Both the air assets needed for strategic strike and the defensive capabilities of Iron Dome would be necessary for a conflict with Iran. However, if they are currently pinned down defending against more proximate threats, they will not be available for this role.</p> +<p><strong>Yasir Atalan</strong> is a PhD candidate and a graduate fellow at the Center for Data Science at American University. His research focuses on civil-military relations and international security implications of technology. Methodologically, he is interested in Bayesian analysis, machine learning, and large language models. He is a replication analyst at Political Analysis.</p> -<h3 id="general-principles-for-defence-in-an-age-of-protracted-conflict-and-missile-threats">General Principles for Defence in an Age of Protracted Conflict and Missile Threats</h3> +<p><strong>Jose M. Macias</strong> is a research associate in the Futures Lab within the International Security Program at CSIS. He is also a Pearson fellow and teaching assistant at the University of Chicago’s Harris School of Public Policy. With a keen interest in the quantitative study of war, Jose’s research delves into topics like cross-domain conflicts, societal impacts, and the integration of machine learning in international relations research, with prior significant contributions to the Correlates of War Project, including notable work quantifying the effects of U.S. bilateral counterterrorism treaties in the Global South and eastern Europe.</p>Benjamin Jensen, et al.This report delves into critical cybersecurity issues and offers insightful analysis for policymakers and the public.Paper Tiger or Pacing Threat?2023-10-19T12:00:00+08:002023-10-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/paper-tiger-or-pacing-threats<p><em>China has long couched its engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean in primarily economic terms. However, China is becoming increasingly strident in its efforts to bolster defense and security initiatives in the Western Hemisphere.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Chinese defense and security engagements manifest along a spectrum, including dual-use civilian and military infrastructure projects, public safety assistance, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, arms sales, and joint military-to-military exchanges and trainings. An expanded military and security presence in the hemisphere poses significant concerns for the United States in the event of a potential conflict or crisis, imperils regional stability by empowering criminal regimes in the hemisphere, and risks eroding democratic norms within regional militaries and police forces.</em></p> -<p>There are a number of lessons that can be derived about the relationship between strike and defence, both in an Israeli context and more broadly:</p> +<p>Taken together, these trendlines place the United States at an inflection point — it remains a preferred security partner for most countries in the hemisphere but must act now to preserve this status, lest it slip at a precarious moment. To fortify security partnerships with countries in the region, and counter Chinese influence in the security and defense space, the United States should pursue the following lines of effort:</p> -<ul> +<ol> <li> - <p>The principles of the challenge facing multiple countries are quite similar. Protracted indecision in long multi-front wars disadvantages democracies with capital-intensive militaries. The need to defend civilians and critical national infrastructure, moreover, creates real opportunity costs in other areas. Countries that must defend against large numbers of cheap capabilities – from multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) to UAVs and even some missiles – will have to strip formations at the front of much-needed ground-based air defence (GBAD), unless they can find solutions. A combination of strike and defence can achieve this.</p> + <p>Leverage U.S. partners to fill force modernization and equipment shortfalls.</p> </li> <li> - <p>It is possible and necessary to strive towards short wars and to remove the threat to the home front. Preserving routine in major cities, and especially the security of civilians, is of primary importance. The continuity of everyday life, education and the economy must be maintained.</p> + <p>Bolster the defense cooperation mechanisms of the inter-American system.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Future wars have the potential to become multi-arena scenarios, and as such it will be critical to achieve a decisive victory vis-à-vis proximate threats in order to free up resources deal with more distant ones.</p> + <p>Clarify U.S. red lines when it comes to security engagement.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Strengthening intelligence, aerial strike and multi-layered defence components is crucial; however, it is not sufficient. Focusing on these components forces Israel into an attrition war and a strategy that serves its adversaries. Engaging MLRS, UAVs or missiles emanating from an area like Kaliningrad or southern Lebanon with aircraft or expensive GBAD and counter-rocket, artillery and mortar assets will both expend resources at unsustainable levels and draw assets from the offensive military actions needed to decide a war. For Israel, this would be long-range strike, while for NATO it might be supporting ground manoeuvre formations.</p> + <p>Invest in U.S. core competencies in military education and training.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Developing a significant forward fighting layer that can engage ballistic and UAV threats is a crucial component in fulfilling Israel’s goal of moving from responding to initiating. The ability to strike a launcher as it is embarking munitions, or to destroy a missile with a short-range interceptor that does not rely on an expensive seeker, will be crucial to thinning out threats. As much as possible, these systems should be able to leverage each other’s sensors.</p> + <p>Enhance interagency and international cooperation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.</p> </li> <li> - <p>It is vital to prioritise research, planning, development and production of sophisticated responses to advanced weapons systems that will emerge in the coming years, such as hypersonic missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, cruise missiles and other capabilities.</p> + <p>Improve cooperation on countering illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and the nexus between transnational organized crime and environmental crimes.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Without this, many of the cutting-edge capabilities and combat methods developed by militaries such as the IDF, including those incorporated in Momentum and the next multi-year plan, will end up amounting to only tactical improvements – which, important as they are, will not flip the script.</p> + <p>Strengthen awareness and training on cybersecurity.</p> </li> -</ul> - -<p>In effect, then, responding to the twofold challenges of a positional battlefield and adversaries with superior mass will require a synthesis of capabilities. Single-vector solutions, be they based on manoeuvre, fires or active defence, will likely be found wanting. An integrated solution that seeks to leverage synergies between fires, manoeuvre and active defence is likely to be costly, organisationally difficult and applicable only in comparatively small theatres. However, the efficiencies that such a solution provides are a prerequisite for operating in the future combat environment.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Sidharth Kaushal</strong> is the Research Fellow of Sea Power at RUSI. His research covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.</p> - -<p><strong>Eran Ortal</strong> is the current commander of The Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies. Ortal is also the founder of the Israel Defense Force Dado Center journal, dedicated to Operational art and military transformation.</p> + <li> + <p>Invest in citizen security and delink citizen security from the regional conversation on drugs.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p><strong>Ran Kochav</strong> is an Israel Defense Forces brigadier general who has served as the commander of the Israeli Air and Missile Defense Forces. General Kochav has held a number of command roles within the IDF, including as the commander of the 66th battalion the divisional anti-aircraft officer of the 91st Division before the 2006 Lebanon war and head of the special forces section in the Air Group of IAF (2005-2006).</p>Sidharth Kaushal, et al.This article articulates pathways forward in a future operating environment dominated by stalemates and threats to national homelands.Manoeuvre Or Defence?2023-10-10T12:00:00+08:002023-10-10T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/manoeuvre-or-defence<p><em>This article examines the points of divergence between two major schools of thought within the Israel Defense Forces regarding how best to defend the state against evolving threats.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Though specific to Israel, the debate has ramifications for European militaries as they confront a fires-centric Russian army that will attempt to operate from behind layers of anti-access capabilities including missiles, drones and UAVs.</em></p> +<h3 id="from-creeping-concern-to-strategic-competitor">From Creeping Concern to Strategic Competitor</h3> -<p>In a recent article, three officers in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) outlined what they called Israel’s Golden Age of Security. According to them, the sunset of the Golden Age has to do with the breakdown of three privileges Israel has enjoyed in the past few decades: the privilege of low-intensity conflicts (replaced by large-scale scenarios involving Iran and increasingly capable proxies); the privilege of US support (which is weakening); and the privilege of internal unity in Israel (which is eroding). In the wake of the lessons from Russia’s war in Ukraine and the shadow of a likely US pivot to the Indo-Pacific should a war over Taiwan within the Davidson Window materialise, many of these challenges will be faced by European states as well.</p> +<p>Peering out from the treetops on a hillside near Bejucal, Cuba, massive parabolic antennas mark the location of a suspected signals intelligence base reportedly operated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1999. More recently, images of the facility have sprung up across U.S. media after reports that China and Cuba had reached an agreement to open another such facility on the island. The true extent of China’s military footprint on the island remains hotly debated in open sources but given the proximity of any such facility to key commercial, technological, and military infrastructure along the southeastern coast of the United States, it should inspire planning for the worst. Adding yet more fuel to the fire, on June 20, 2023, the Wall Street Journal reported that Chinese officials had been in high-level talks with their Cuban counterparts to open yet another base on the island, this one dedicated to military training. These combined revelations garnered a raft of comparisons to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, assessments which, while perhaps exaggerations to some, underscore both the strategic import of the Western Hemisphere to the United States and the changing nature of the security and defense challenges in the region. Over 60 years ago, fear of missiles housed less than a hundred miles off the coast of Florida brought the world to the nuclear brink, but today the spectrum of potential threats encompasses a staggering range of issues, from cybersecurity and infrastructure investment to overseas police outposts, security cameras, and telecommunications networks. In such a diffuse threat environment, it may be easy to downplay individual risks as not rising to the level of serious concern. However, failing to see the ways in which they intersect and cumulate would represent a serious lack of foresight.</p> -<p>The Israeli challenge is primarily a missile-based one that has seen an order of magnitude change in the sophistication of adversaries and the size of their arsenals. Take, for example, the case of Hezbollah, which has converted unguided missiles like the Zelzal-2 into precision strike weapons with GPS guidance kits. Compounding this challenge are two other issues. Firstly, there is the sheer weight of fire that an opponent like Hezbollah can deliver. Secondly, the organisation has demonstrated the ability to conduct a defence based on fortified outposts such as Marun ar Ras and urban conurbations such as Ghanduriyeh, setting the conditions for a number of rockets to be fired into Israel before Hezbollah ground positions could be overrun. And the challenge of confronting an opponent in defensible terrain even as fires strike the homeland is not exclusive to Lebanon – it extends to the Gaza Strip, albeit in a less sophisticated form.</p> +<p>The United States, for its part, has demonstrated an admirable degree of strategic clarity when it comes to defense of the hemisphere. The 2022 National Security Strategy states that “no region impacts the United States more directly than the Western Hemisphere” and that preventing the emergence of a hostile military presence in the region has for decades been a guiding light of U.S. defense posture. Historically, the United States has oriented its approach to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) around the idea of “strategic denial.” As one of the authors has noted previously, strategic denial consists of efforts to “prevent major rivals from developing regional footholds from which they can menace, distract, or otherwise undercut the strategic interests of the United States.” Nevertheless, the defense and security dimensions and considerations of China’s engagement with LAC has been comparatively understudied. Indeed, when faced with the scale of China’s economic and trade relations with the hemisphere, other dimensions of engagement often appear secondary priorities for Beijing at best. To categorize defense and security as afterthoughts, however, is to fundamentally misunderstand China’s approach in LAC, wherein economic ties often serve as a foray into security engagement and sometimes security gains. This can be seen most notably with the proliferation of PRC-financed dual-use infrastructure in the hemisphere, particularly ports, airports, and space facilities — a raft of projects that span the southern tip of Argentina to the ports of the Bahamas.</p> -<p>Should European armed forces ever face an open conflict with Russia, they might well encounter a similar challenge from the direction of Kaliningrad, for example. As shown by Russia’s combination of an entrenched force manning the Surovikin lines with strikes across the depth of Ukraine to target civilians, a strategy based on a combination of stalemate at the front and deep strikes against a country’s rear is not exclusive to non-state actors. The size of the European theatre may necessitate longer-range missiles, but as Russia mass-produces and improves the Iranian Shahed, this will be possible at scale. Furthermore, in frontline areas or near bastions like Kaliningrad, rockets can be used as a strategic tool, much as they are in smaller theatres.</p> +<p>More explicitly in the military realm, senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officials conducted more than 200 visits to LAC countries between 2002 and 2019. Exchanges such as the defense forum between China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) provide additional opportunities for high-level coordination on security matters. For example, the “China-CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas (2022-2024)” listed “Political and Security Cooperation” as the top issue area upon which to build. China has also stepped up its sales and gifts of arms to countries throughout the hemisphere and broadened the aperture of security to include citizen security initiatives to create both physical and digital beachheads throughout the region. China’s preference to let security engagement be overshadowed by economic and political engagement in LAC means that the United States may ignore the challenge until it proves too late. Cuba seems to be a case in point, as the United States faces limited options from a security standpoint, beyond diplomatic pressure and condemnation, to mitigate the risks posed by an expanding Chinese military presence. Elsewhere in the hemisphere, the continuous drumbeat of Chinese infrastructure in Argentina, the rising tally of countries accepting China’s “safe cities” technology and surveillance equipment, and Beijing’s unflinching support for the Maduro regime in Venezuela all suggest that the concept of integrated deterrence is at risk of failing in the very region where it should hold most firm.</p> -<p>In the Israeli context, broadly speaking, two dominant schools of thought have emerged regarding prospective solutions. These are, the stand-off fire and defence approach, and the decisive manoeuvres approach. The stand-off fire and defence approach, as articulated by figures such as Colonel Nir Yanai, is a product of the last several decades and emphasises the importance of air attack and precision strikes against key targets at the outset of a war. The second component of this approach is a multi-layered air and missile defence system built to interdict a threat that has been thinned out by offensive capabilities. This approach aims to buy policymakers the time to respond to the threat in a deliberate way aimed at eroding adversary capability over time. By contrast, the decisive manoeuvres approach is an evolution of traditional Israeli concepts in which the aggressive movement and early employment of ground forces leads to the collapse of an adversary’s operational system. In effect, the best way to silence launchers, per this school, is overrunning the ground on which they are situated.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/BaYI6J3.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: PLA Military Diplomacy 2003–2018.</strong> Source: <a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1249864/chinese-military-diplomacy-20032016-trends-and-implications/">Kenneth Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and John Chen, Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, July 2017)</a>. Elaborated with data from <a href="https://csis-ilab.github.io/cpower-viz/military-diplomacy/military-diplomacy/dist/index.html">“China’s Military Diplomatic Activities,” China Power, CSIS</a>.</em></p> -<h3 id="the-challenges-of-stalemate-and-attrition">The Challenges of Stalemate and Attrition</h3> +<p>Furthermore, there is reason to believe security and defense issues could rise on China’s priorities list due to its growing military power and the confidence of its leadership. As China’s economic dynamo continues to flag, security cooperation, carried out by the PLA, could represent a durable means to prolong the influence it gained originally from investment flows. As competition with the United States sharpens in the Indo-Pacific, China can be expected to escalate in other regions, with LAC being viewed as a strategic blind spot within the United States’ traditional “sphere of influence” — and therefore open for exploitation in times of conflict. In addition, as home to the majority of Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies, LAC stands out as a potential catalyst for cross-strait escalation. If China is able to entice some or all of these countries to switch their recognition to Beijing, it may embolden China’s disposition and accelerate its timetable to pursue reunification by force.</p> -<p>Each approach described faces considerable challenges. The major challenge facing the manoeuvre approach is the fact that, since Operation Defensive Shield (2012), a variety of factors including political restraints have prevented Israel from conducting truly decisive ground manoeuvres. Operations such as Cast Lead (2002) and Protective Edge (2014), as well as the Second Lebanon War (2006), saw much more limited ground offensives.</p> +<p>Within the hemisphere itself, Chinese security and defense engagement presents three core challenges to the United States. First, such engagement most explicitly furthers China’s preparations for and options in a potential Taiwan contingency. Access to the Western Hemisphere during wartime opens a number of opportunities for the PLA. This includes both passively ensuring a continued flow of important foodstuffs and raw materials from the region to sustain China’s war effort and enabling more active efforts, such as using intelligence operatives, threatening U.S. deployment and sustainment flows, putting the U.S. homeland at risk, and even opening the door to the potential military use of LAC infrastructure such as ports and airbases for operations by PLA forces. Second, Chinese security support, including both explicitly military systems as well as digital systems for monitoring and controlling populations, may empower and extend the life of dictators within the hemisphere, especially in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Third, Chinese engagement with armed forces throughout the hemisphere shows signs of eroding standards of military subordination to civilian control, respect for human rights, or otherwise leading militaries in the region to behave in undesirable ways. Taken together, these risks paint a troubling picture wherein China is able to compel “neutrality” from the region in times of conflict, foment ungovernability in the region that undermines or distracts the United States in its own hemisphere, and overall erodes the ability of actors in the region to resist China’s will.</p> -<p>Moreover, the challenges faced in the Second Lebanon War, while by no means insurmountable, were harbingers of a trend that challenges manoeuvre. The defence of fortified and urban terrain by Hezbollah and the group’s adept use of anti-tank guided missiles was emulated by the Houthis in encounters such as the Battle of Aden. Another point emerging from Yemen is that defeating an adversary’s ground forces does not necessarily guarantee the immediate elimination of a well-hidden missile threat in any given sector – a process which, as pointed out by IDF Major General Yaakov Amidror, may involve months of gruelling searches of prepared hiding spots. Trends such as the growing concentration of populations in increasingly large urban nodes will only exacerbate the challenge of manoeuvre, and will create new complex terrain within which missile threats can be hidden. Moreover, even in the open, field fortifications can represent a formidable obstacle, as shown in Ukraine.</p> +<p>Fortunately, the United States remains in a position of strength as the predominant security partner for the region. However, it must work to realign priorities and capabilities for competition with China, beginning with a clear statement of strategic goals. For the purposes of this report, the following is assumed to encapsulate the guiding policy objective of U.S. defense posture in LAC: to preserve freedom of operation, navigation, and access for U.S. forces in times of crisis, as well as maintain strategic denial of the region to adversaries, by remaining the partner of choice during peacetime.</p> -<p>In a European context, one might consider the additional challenges of needing to suppress sophisticated air defence and electronic warfare systems as well as nuclear risk when assaulting adversary forces, generating fires from urban nodes like Kaliningrad in which potentially nuclear-armed capabilities like the Iskander are based. Furthermore, some launch platforms that are relevant in a European context are held at a depth which means they cannot be overrun.</p> +<p>Simultaneously, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the U.S. Department of Defense should be clear about their limitations. China’s defense cooperation often comes on the heels of, or is intertwined with, vastly expanded economic cooperation. Without a broader U.S. strategy to meet the economic and development requirements of LAC, no amount of increased security cooperation will be sufficient to curb the growing Chinese presence in the hemisphere. A cohesive, practical, and forward-looking framework for engagement with allies and partners in LAC will nevertheless be essential, lest the United States lose one of its greatest assets for national defense.</p> -<p>A major challenge with which any manoeuvrist vision of warfare must contend, then, is that it lacks an explanation of how the conditions for the collapse of an opponent can be set under the contemporary fires-centric context. It is just as likely that offensive ground actions must necessitate the sort of protracted fighting and possibly sustained occupation of hostile territory which most democratic states would wish to avoid. Moreover, as illustrated by the ongoing war in Ukraine, ground manoeuvre exacts a cost in life that many states will struggle to pay. Democracies are often relatively casualty-averse, which will be a consideration here – especially for states like Israel which rely on national service to force generate.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">For the purposes of this report, the following is assumed to encapsulate the guiding policy objective of U.S. defense posture in LAC: to preserve freedom of operation, navigation, and access for U.S. forces in times of crisis, as well as maintain strategic denial of the region to adversaries, by remaining the partner of choice during peacetime.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>However, the fire and defend school faces its own challenges – specifically, the difficulty of sustaining a battle of attrition. Air defence interceptors are generally much more expensive than most of the capabilities that they must intercept, and the emergence of new forms of air threat such as comparatively cheap UAVs only compounds this. Bottlenecks in areas such as electronics will only exacerbate the issue if they persist. The interceptor shortfalls faced by Ukraine – a country that had Europe’s largest air defence arsenal at the war’s outset, augmented with Western systems – acutely illustrates this. Most opponents will not have as many cruise and ballistic missiles as Russia, but they can certainly generate a weight of fire with UAVs, multiple-launch rock systems and a limited number of cruise and ballistic missiles. Nor can it be assumed that this threat will be thinned out at the outset of a conflict – opponents have a range of palliative options, from underground shelters and hiding among the population to the employment of proliferating air defence systems and electronic warfare assets. A passive defence carries the risk of saturation by sheer weight of fire.</p> +<p>This report takes a comprehensive look at China’s means, methods, and motivations for engaging LAC countries on security and defense issues. Subsequent sections of this report first analyze China’s objectives for security and defense cooperation with LAC, proposing a typology that observes five overarching categories of engagement along a continuum from dual-use infrastructure investments to direct military-to-military trainings and exercises. Next, it outlines how each of these five categories manifest in the Western Hemisphere, and what role they play in China’s overall strategic framework. Subsequently, the report delves into the three primary threats posed by a more assertive Chinese security and defense posture in the region over the short to medium term. It concludes by outlining a range of policy recommendations to bolster U.S. security partnerships in LAC, limit the risks associated with existing Chinese engagement, and better address the growing security and defense challenges faced by partner countries.</p> -<p>Countries will increasingly have to make a choice between developing forces to achieve decision, and forces that give them the endurance to last in what may well be indecisive wars. This will require adjudicating between requirements to defend the homeland and protect manoeuvre elements, which will be politically challenging. It will also require the careful balancing of imperatives between different elements of individual services, which will adhere to either manoeuvre or endurance as national ideals.</p> +<h3 id="arrows-in-the-quiver">Arrows in the Quiver</h3> -<p>Ultimately, neither model provides a complete solution. It would be a mistake for any modern state to plan on decisive manoeuvre – history shows that wars between peers are often protracted affairs. However, a reactive approach based on endurance may be both financially difficult and politically intolerable. While it is often presumed that countries can simultaneously defend their homelands and achieve strategic effects at the front if they invest the right resources into doing so, in practice they will often face trade-offs between these important but competing imperatives. The core question they will face, then, is whether to aim for shortening the wars they fight or adapting their force structures to the reality of protracted missile warfare. Ultimately, an effective solution will need to involve a synthesis of the two schools – individually, each provides only imperfect answers under contemporary operating conditions.</p> +<p><em>China’s Security and Defense Strategy in LAC</em></p> -<hr /> +<p>Conventional assessments of LAC’s strategic importance to China relegate the region to the bottom of Beijing’s priorities list. Indeed, compared to regions such as the Indo-Pacific, which has a direct bearing on the revisionist ambitions of China as the theater where any potential war over Taiwan would be waged, or Africa, which possesses important resource wealth and strategic geography China is looking to secure for itself, the Western Hemisphere is less directly critical to China’s national security. However, to write off the region as unimportant or marginal to U.S.-China security competition overlooks important evolutions in China’s strategic calculus in the Western Hemisphere.</p> -<p><strong>Sidharth Kaushal</strong> is the Research Fellow of Sea Power at RUSI. His research covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.</p> +<p>China’s 2015 and 2019 defense white papers emphasize strengthening military partnerships with LAC nations. However, the most telling sign of China’s shifting view of security and defense engagement comes from President Xi Jinping’s announcement of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in April 2022. Proposing “a holistic approach, maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains,” the GSI broadens the aperture for Chinese international security activities, including on matters of cybersecurity, data governance, and public health. In doing so, it takes explicit aim at the U.S. model of security and defense engagement, described by one international affairs scholar as “increasingly militant and belligerent” in the post-Cold War era. A holistic approach to security that encompasses emerging challenges and non-traditional concepts such as environmental and health security is not unwarranted. However, the most proximate outcome of the GSI is to enable China to engage with countries, even traditional U.S. partners, across a broader range of activities, especially in the police and cyber domains, where the United States may have a weaker presence in regions such as LAC. In general, the GSI is but one of several new initiatives — along with the Global Development Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative — launched by Xi to encourage a more Beijing-centric international order.</p> -<p><strong>Eran Ortal</strong> is the current commander of The Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies. Ortal is also the founder of the Israel Defense Force Dado Center journal, dedicated to Operational art and military transformation.</p> +<p>LAC countries are exemplary test beds for the application of the GSI. The region itself is remarkably free from interstate conflict but confronts a plethora of other security threats beyond this fortunate trend. The region makes up just 8 percent of the global population while accounting for one-third of homicides worldwide, driven by deeply entrenched transnational criminal networks. Climate change has exposed many countries to increased extreme weather events, devastating communities and uprooting thousands. The Covid-19 pandemic hit LAC harder than any other region, with 1.74 million deaths reported as of December 2022, over a quarter of the global death toll at that point. For each of these challenges, the GSI promises ready-made solutions — tested, refined, and proven in the crucible of China’s highly efficient (and ruthless) state security apparatus.</p> -<p><strong>Ran Kochav</strong> is an Israel Defense Forces brigadier general who has served as the commander of the Israeli Air and Missile Defense Forces. General Kochav has held a number of command roles within the IDF, including as the commander of the 66th battalion the divisional anti-aircraft officer of the 91st Division before the 2006 Lebanon war and head of the special forces section in the Air Group of IAF (2005-2006).</p>Sidharth Kaushal, et al.This article examines the points of divergence between two major schools of thought within the Israel Defense Forces regarding how best to defend the state against evolving threats.Israel And The Palestinians2023-10-09T12:00:00+08:002023-10-09T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/israel-and-the-palestinians<p><em>Nothing will be the same after the weekend’s carnage in Israel. The Palestinian question is back on the agenda, and with a vengeance. So will be Israel’s response.</em></p> +<p>In practice, however, the initiatives that China has sought to export and bring together under the GSI umbrella have led to an expanded Chinese presence — to the detriment of the sovereignty of recipient countries. China’s answer to crime and instability, for instance, has been opening new overseas police stations, exporting cameras and digital infrastructure with dubious safeguards, and deploying former PLA and People’s Armed Police personnel as security contractors. Its answer to the pandemic was to use vaccines as a cudgel to suppress criticism from countries such as Brazil and to try and pressure Paraguay into dropping its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. Such tendencies are indicative of China’s motivation in recent years to apply its internal quest for order at the international level to “make the world safe” for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in the words of a leading scholar who has carefully studied Xi’s “Comprehensive National Security Concept.”</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>The Western Hemisphere also plays a crucial role in China’s strategy of political warfare. As the region with the greatest potential to affect U.S. national security, every advance China makes in the Western Hemisphere is inherently more consequential. Even if these gains appear minor, they are often zero-sum and compounding. A country which elects to buy its armored vehicles from China will most likely not purchase similar platforms from the United States. Similarly, countries that use Huawei as the backbone of their telecommunications infrastructure will have little use for U.S. or European firms offering similar services. On the diplomatic front, China’s military-to-military exchanges and trainings hold the potential to increase familiarity and goodwill between regional militaries and the PLA, as well as undermine the United States’ links to and ability to coordinate with longstanding allies.</p> -<p>On Saturday, 7 October, Hamas launched an unprecedented surprise attack on Israel. Under a barrage of thousands of rockets fired from Gaza, hundreds of Hamas fighters managed to cross the heavily guarded border into Israel. They were able to briefly take over parts of Israeli towns – most notably Sderot – and military positions. An as yet unknown number of Israeli civilians and military personnel, possibly in the dozens, were taken hostage and transferred to Gaza; by Monday morning more than 700 Israelis and more than 400 Palestinians had been killed. Hours after the beginning of the attack, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared: “Citizens of Israel, we are at war. Not an operation, not a round [of fighting,] at war.”</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/XxU9fBq.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ Officials from Cuba, Ecuador, Costa Rica, China, and the Bahamas attend the first ministerial meeting of the Forum of China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (China-CELAC) in Beijing on January 6, 2015.</em></p> -<p>The attack must have been planned for months. Even as chaos of the Saturday morning assault is still unfolding, Hamas social media outlets have published apparently professionally produced footage of militants using paragliders to fly into Israel, and later of drones dropping grenades onto tanks and positions of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The date for the launch of the attack also does not appear to be accidental coming as Israelis marked the Jewish holiday of Shemini Atzeret. It also came exactly 50 years and a day after Egypt and Syria launched the Yom Kippur War, also known as the October War, against Israel on 6 October 1973. While the eventual scale of this current conflagration is still unclear, 7 October seems certain to become another infamous turning point in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and possibly for the wider geopolitics of the Middle East.</p> +<p>Such advances will undoubtedly be useful for China in the event of a war with the United States, but even below the threshold of armed conflict, they shape the theater in which the United States must operate and live. Activities that may appear minor on the surface, such as denial of port calls or the rejection of U.S. bids to supply military equipment, can subtly reshape the physical and human terrain of the Western Hemisphere, throwing up unexpected wrinkles and pitfalls for the United States while at the same time smoothing over these obstacles for China.</p> -<p>The violence unleashed by Hamas this weekend will continue for weeks to come, and its full implications will take months to become apparent. An escalation of this scale was not on anyone’s radar – including Israeli intelligence – so it is prudent to be cautious with definitive conclusions about what this will mean. But there are a few early assumptions that can be made, including with regards to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, the ongoing speculations about a potential agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia to normalise relations and the trend towards de-escalation and rapprochement that has prevailed in the region for the past three years.</p> +<p>Finally, China’s strategy for defense and security engagement recognizes that the United States’ conventional preponderance in the Western Hemisphere makes competing one-for-one on traditional defense issues an impossibility. As a result, China has exploited a variety of tools not commonly associated with direct military competition, but which nevertheless offer important security benefits and enable military operations. These include areas such as civilian infrastructure, policing, and even professional military education. U.S. institutions are not prepared to compete in these areas and are allowing China to advance steadily on several fronts. In this context, military engagement is not the spear tip of China’s advance in the Americas. Rather, a diffuse array of security and defense policies comprise a quiver of arrows China can use to turn the strategic environment to its advantage.</p> -<h3 id="a-new-phase-of-palestinian-israeli-conflict">A New Phase of Palestinian-Israeli Conflict</h3> +<h3 id="the-full-spectrum-of-engagement">The Full Spectrum of Engagement</h3> -<p>Hamas’ attack on Saturday morning was unprecedented in its sophistication and ferocity, and Israel’s response will likely far exceed any previous operations carried out by the IDF in Gaza over the past two decades. This is not simply a continuation, or even an intensification, of the already high levels of tensions and violence between Israel and Palestinian factions in Gaza and – especially – the West Bank over the past two years. This war opens a new chapter in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It is too early to compare it to the Intifadas of the late 1980s and early 2000s, but it certainly seems to have the potential to be as significant.</p> +<p>China’s strategy of avoiding overt military action in the Western Hemisphere can make it challenging to disentangle security engagement from other forms of influence. Accordingly, it is useful to conceptualize Chinese engagement in this space along a continuum encompassing five areas: (1) facilities and infrastructure, (2) citizen security assistance, (3) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, (4) arms sales and equipment transfers, and (5) joint training and exercises.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Once the fighting eventually settles, serious questions will be asked about how a Hamas surprise attack of this scale could have been possible, leaving Prime Minister Netanyahu and his government vulnerable</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="1-facilities-and-infrastructure">1. FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE</h4> -<p>One key question in this regard is whether the violence will primarily remain contained in and around Gaza, or whether it will spread to the West Bank (thus far, there have been several deadly clashes, but nothing of the scale of what has been happening in Gaza and southern Israel). Moreover, it is also still unclear whether the Lebanese Hezbollah will fully intervene; thus far it has only rhetorically expressed solidarity with Hamas and launched seemingly intentionally limited drone attacks on the disputed Shebaa Farms in the Golan Heights, resulting in limited Israeli artillery strikes into southern Lebanon. In short, an expansion of the war is not inevitable, but certainly a possibility.</p> +<p>Strategic infrastructure projects are one of the most successful areas in which China has been able to advance its defense and security interests in the Western Hemisphere. With the exception of the proposed Cuban training facility, China does not maintain any overt military bases in the hemisphere. Indeed, in accordance with Deng Xiaoping’s exhortation to “hide your strength and bide your time,” China remains exceptionally cautious in its terminology, referring to its first overseas naval base in Djibouti as a “support facility.” As a result, this category does not always fall neatly within the framework of defense and security engagement. However, it is crucial to consider facilities and infrastructure given China’s pattern of “civil-military fusion” — the effort to ensure civilian resources and infrastructure can be seamlessly integrated with military capabilities when needed, which has been documented in projects related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Civil-military fusion is therefore closely tied to the PLA’s pursuit of overseas basing and access, a capability that will be essential for that force to achieve its aspirations of power projection on a global scale.</p> -<p>In Israel, this weekend’s attack and the war that now follows will shape politics going forward. Initially, there is likely to be a rallying-around-the-flag effect with the deep divisions that have characterised Israeli domestic politics for the past year fading into the background. However, once the fighting eventually settles, serious questions will be asked about how a Hamas surprise attack of this scale could have been possible, leaving Prime Minister Netanyahu and his government vulnerable. In fact, while he will probably remain in office for as long as this war takes, Netanyahu’s political career may well be finished; upended not by his legal troubles, but by having what looks to be one of the most catastrophic breakdowns of security in Israel happen on his watch. He may well have to follow in the footsteps of Golda Meir and Menachem Begin. Both built reputations as staunch security-first prime ministers but were ousted after major perceived security and military failures – the Yom Kippur War and the botched Lebanon invasion in the early 1980s, respectively. At the same time, the brutality of the attack, and especially Hamas’ killing and kidnapping of many civilians, including women and children, could well bolster the positions of those with the most uncompromising stands vis-à-vis the Palestinians, including Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition allies.</p> +<p>Key to China’s definition of interoperability is familiarity with and reliable access to infrastructure that its forces can use, and it has worked assiduously to expand its influence through infrastructure investments that cast long shadows due to dual-use military and civilian capabilities. Dual-use facilities present an inherent challenge for U.S. deterrence. First, their military utility can be obfuscated from public view until a project is a near <em><code class="highlighter-rouge">fait accompli</code></em>. This is doubly true given China’s penchant for opaque contracts, which, in the case of port facilities in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, have later been revealed to contain specifications that would allow People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships to dock and conduct resupply. PRC-funded port projects in the United Arab Emirates and Equatorial Guinea have also been revealed to house facilities and capabilities that could be used to provide overseas refueling and resupply capabilities, as well as command and control assistance, for the PLAN. Second, if the United States seeks to block such facilities, it risks the appearance of stymieing a country’s development.</p> -<p>On the Palestinian side, meanwhile, the attack has once again exposed the ineffectiveness and fecklessness of the Palestinian Authority (PA) under aging President Mahmoud Abbas. If the PA has already struggled – and woefully failed – to assert itself meaningfully as the leadership of the Palestinian people in recent years, especially in the West Bank, this weekend’s attack has exposed it as little more than a powerless bystander. The debate about the future of the Palestinian leadership will continue until Abbas vacates his position, but for the moment all the initiative clearly belongs to Hamas and other militant factions.</p> +<p>Although dual-use infrastructure is often associated with more overt displays of military power, such as the appearance of a PLAN warship in port, or the presence of military officers at a satellite research station, the ways in which such projects can further China’s strategic goals are often much more subtle and yet omnipresent. Chinese port projects around the world are illustrative of this fact. In Germany, for instance, a logistics hub in Wilhelmshaven recently drew attention for its location a mere three miles from Germany’s largest naval base. Replete with cameras, cell towers, and PRC-designed data management software, the facility provides China with a permanent base from which to collect human and electronic intelligence on the German navy. Within LAC, Chinese-owned and-operated ports in Veracruz, Mexico, and Paranaguá, Brazil also operate virtually next door to host country military bases.</p> -<p>The perhaps most important early takeaway from this weekend – and certainly one that the UK and other Western governments concerned about stability in the Middle East must heed – is that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict still matters and cannot be relegated to the status of a permanent but ultimately manageable feature of regional politics as has arguably been the case in recent years. Hamas’ attack and the war that now rages is primarily about Israel and the Palestinian territories. This escalation of violence will make finding a way to make progress towards a sustainable resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict even more difficult. But it also highlights that ignoring it is something no one can afford – least of all the Israelis and Palestinians, but also not policymakers in London, Washington or European capitals.</p> +<p>Even the raw data collected by port operators, which in the case of Chinese firms are required to hand over data to the CCP if deemed relevant for national security, can be a powerful strategic asset. Knowledge of shipping manifests, and vessel locations, as well as the ability to hold cargo, delay departures or prevent vessels from docking could be used, according to one recent study, “to selectively seize critical goods, such as medicines; divert or delay military components; or let essential supplies just sit in storage — no naval deployments needed.” Thus, the appearance of a gray-hulled PLAN destroyer in a LAC port does not encompass the totality of the dual-use challenge. Rather, the risks to U.S. and regional security and defense are a constant from the moment the first ship docks at a PRC-owned or operated terminal.</p> -<p>Nevertheless, this new phase in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is also likely to have repercussions for wider regional dynamics.</p> +<p>The strategic relevance of dual-use infrastructure projects is further underscored by leaked U.S. intelligence documents that show several such projects included as part of “Project 141,” an ambitious effort by China to expand the global reach of its armed forces and power-projection capabilities. According to these documents, the PLA has identified overseas basing and logistics facilities as essential to China’s national security objectives and made it a priority to secure access to these bases by 2030. At the time of the leaks in April 2023, no facilities in the Western Hemisphere were included as Project 141 initiatives, though the Cuban training base would almost certainly qualify. Within the Western Hemisphere, two dual-use infrastructure projects carry implications for U.S. defense and security that are significant enough to describe here in detail.</p> -<h3 id="a-setback-for-arab-israeli-normalisation">A Setback for Arab-Israeli Normalisation</h3> +<p>Chinese forays in the Panama Canal Zone have been the subject of growing alarm, most recently voiced at a high level by SOUTHCOM commander General Laura Richardson in her 2023 force posture statement before Congress.36 Since its inauguration, the canal has been a strategic commercial and military node in the hemisphere, further cemented as the site of SOUTHCOM’s original headquarters. As early as 1997, Hong Kong-based Hutchison Ports PPC won contracts to operate the ports of Balboa and Cristobal, located on the Pacific and Atlantic sides of the canal, respectively. While the move aroused controversy at the time, concerns were assuaged by the independence of Hong Kong relative to the rest of China, a status which Beijing has by and large dispensed with since 2019. In 2016, the Shandong-headquartered Landbridge Group acquired Margarita Island to the tune of nearly $1 billion, home to Panama’s strategically and commercially critical Colón Free Trade Zone (FTZ). Shortly thereafter, as Panama first switched diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in favor of China in 2017, and subsequently became the first Latin American country to accede to the BRI, plans moved forward for construction of a deep-water port in the Colón FTZ. Construction was to be helmed by the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC), two key state-owned enterprises that also happened to be part of the winning bid on the $1.3 billion contract to construct a fourth bridge over the Panama Canal.</p> -<p>Much early commentary in the immediate aftermath of Hamas’ attack has focused on what this means for the prospects of further normalisation of relations agreements between Israel and Arab states, especially between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Some have even suggested that the attack was Hamas’ – and by extension its supporter Iran’s – way to sabotage Israeli-Saudi normalisation talks. Although statements by leaders of Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad warning Arab states not to engage with Israel obviously fuel such analysis, it is far too simplistic. It risks overlooking the fact that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, more so than regional politics, is the root cause of the violence, as noted above.</p> +<p>However, China’s progress on these efforts has been uneven. The government of Panama’s current president, Laurentino Cortizo, canceled the port project after a review from the Panama Maritime Authority found the project to be in violation of numerous contractual terms. Another proposal, for the Colón FTZ to be added to China’s “safe cities” initiative, was also rejected amid skepticism from the Cortizo government and pressure from the United States. However, these setbacks have not rolled back Chinese influence entirely. For example, 300 security cameras donated by China to help establish the Colón “safe city” remain in place; in 2021, Hutchison was granted a 25-year renewal of its port concessions; and, after a number of setbacks, CCCC and CHEC have moved forward with construction on the fourth canal bridge.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Hamas’ attack this weekend has dramatically highlighted the fundamental flaw in the de-escalation and rapprochement narrative about dynamics in the Middle East that has taken hold in many Western capitals over the past couple of years</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The Panama Canal is perhaps the most important piece of infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere. For the United States’ blue-water navy, the canal reduces the average time needed to reposition forces between the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters by about five months, and commanders from World War II to the Persian Gulf campaign have cited its criticality to their efforts. For this reason, there are a number of mechanisms intended to prevent the canal from being disrupted in times of conflict, namely the Torrijos–Carter Treaties, which both established that the canal must remain neutral for international transit and enshrined the right of the United States to seize control in the event of a security threat to the canal’s continued operation. These measures mean China cannot easily use political or economic coercion to shut the canal in times of conflict, but U.S. military planners should not overlook the potential for China or others to disrupt access, either through sabotage or kinetic efforts, or by selectively manipulating the infrastructure and data that feeds this critical maritime artery. If China were to deny the canal to U.S. warships during a crisis, even momentarily, it could spell fatal consequences for forward-deployed units in the Indo-Pacific. During peacetime as well, China benefits from access to Hutchison’s shipping data and camera systems, which the company is obliged to share due to China’s stringent “national security” law.</p> -<p>Still, this weekend’s events will have an impact. In the long-term, Saudi-Israeli normalisation remains likely – the shared strategic interests that have driven the talks to date (and the engagement between the Gulf Arab states and Israel, more generally) will remain unchanged. That said, the obstacles for a Saudi-Israeli agreement are now greater than they were a week ago. Whether or not Netanyahu’s government would be willing and able to make the necessary concessions to the Palestinians, which Saudi Arabia has consistently insisted it needs in order to officially recognise Israel, was always one of the main questions. In light of Hamas’ attack, any Israeli government – consisting of Netanyahu’s and his right-wing allies or of any other political parties – will find it extraordinarily difficult to make any meaningful concessions to the Palestinians at all in the coming months (even if these will be needed in the long-run).</p> +<p>Further south, the Espacio Lejano Station in Neuquén Province, Argentina, has drawn consternation for the direct role of Chinese military forces from the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) in its quotidian operations. Espacio Lejano represents China’s only deep space ground station in the southern hemisphere, thus filling an important coverage gap in China’s space domain awareness. The internal workings of the station are remarkably opaque, even by the standards of China’s dealings, with the media describing the facility as a “black box.” The facility is officially considered sovereign Chinese territory, and Argentina is barred from conducting inspections. The equipment contained in Espacio Lejano possesses important dual-use telemetry tracking and control (TT&amp;C) capabilities, used for monitoring and providing positional guidance to satellites in orbit. In times of conflict, the TT&amp;C capacity found here would greatly augment China’s anti-satellite warfare operations, a capability the PLA has assiduously cultivated since its first successful anti-satellite test in 2007. Even more concerning is the fact that the United States’ own satellite coverage of the southern hemisphere remains incomplete. Therefore, Espacio Lejano not only offers the PLASSF an important capability to degrade or deny the space domain to the United States but also could enable China to conduct attacks with conventional or hypersonic missiles against the homeland, striking up from Antarctica and, in the process, evading U.S. missile defenses, the majority of which are oriented toward the Arctic.</p> -<p>Saudi Arabia itself has removed any doubt regarding its stance on the matter. It called for “an immediate halt to the escalation between the two sides, the protection of civilians, and restraint.” But its statement, published on Saturday, also noted that the Kingdom had repeatedly warned of “the dangers of the explosion of the situation as a result of the continued occupation, the deprivation of the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights,” and called for a “credible peace process that leads to the two-state solution.”</p> +<p>The risks are compounded by the fact that China has pursued space cooperation agreements throughout Latin America. These include physical infrastructure in the form of satellite ground stations in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Chile. Elsewhere in Argentina, a proposed ground station in Rio Gallegos, close to the southernmost point of the country, promises to augment China’s coverage of the Southern Hemisphere and enhance the ability of China’s stations in Antarctica to communicate with the rest of China’s space support network. Today, LAC with the greatest quantity of PRC space infrastructure outside of mainland China. China’s efforts also encompass technical and diplomatic cooperation, such as the China–Brazil Earth Resources Satellite program and the recent incorporation of Venezuela into China’s lunar research station project. Thus, as concerning as the Espacio Lejano station is, it ought to be considered as part of a broader effort by China to establish space domain awareness under the nose and in the blind spot of the United States.</p> -<p>Across the region, including in the countries that have already normalised relations with Israel, governments and populations will have been shocked by Hamas’ violence against Israeli civilians, but they will also be devastated and outraged by the violence of the IDF against Palestinian civilians over the coming days and weeks. Throughout it all, the Arab-Israeli conflict – to the extent that it is separate from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict – will live on too.</p> +<p>The above represent just two of a startling array of projects currently being pursued by China. Other noteworthy infrastructure projects either under development or proposed include a potential expansion of the port at La Unión in El Salvador, to be carried out by China-based Asia Pacific Xuanhao (APX), as well as the nearly completed $1.3 billion deep-water port of Chancay near Lima, Peru, where construction is managed by a laundry list of Chinese state-owned enterprises, including CCCC, CHEC, China Railway, and Cosco Shipping. China has also pursued several leads in its search for a foothold along the Strait of Magellan from which it could strengthen its strategic position in the Antarctic, as well as monitor and disrupt maritime traffic through that global choke point in times of conflict. These efforts have included talks with the Chilean government to grant access to port facilities in Punta Arenas and overtures to Argentina to help construct a “polar logistics facility” in Ushuaia. After Buenos Aires rebuffed these efforts under U.S. pressure, China pivoted again to a commercial strategy, with the state-owned Shaanxi Chemical Industry Group reportedly signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in May 2023 with the provincial government of Tierra del Fuego to build a multipurpose port in Rio Grande.</p> -<h3 id="a-blow-to-regional-de-escalation">A Blow to Regional De-escalation</h3> +<p>The security challenges posed by dual-use facilities are inherently difficult to estimate, as they depend not only on their technical specifications but also on how such facilities would factor into Chinese strategies and plans for military confrontation. Nevertheless, Beijing’s close involvement with the construction of so many critical infrastructure projects in the Western Hemisphere undoubtedly gives China more options for how and where it may project power within the United States’ shared neighborhood.</p> -<p>Finally, Hamas’ attack this weekend has dramatically highlighted the fundamental flaw in the de-escalation and rapprochement narrative about dynamics in the Middle East that has taken hold in many Western capitals over the past couple of years. The end of the Gulf Crisis between Qatar and its neighbours, the re-engagement between Turkey and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the rapprochement between Iran and the Gulf Arab states (most spectacularly illustrated by the agreement to resume diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, overseen by China, in March this year), and the reduction in at least the most egregious violence in the conflicts in Libya, Syria and Yemen had fuelled a sense that the Middle East was settling into a more stable equilibrium. To be clear, these efforts at de-escalation, pursued by almost all regional governments and some non-state actors, were real and commendable. However, they also routinely represented agreements to disagree and turn to other matters (especially to focus on economic development objectives), rather than actual resolution of the strategic, political and ideological differences that led to the tensions and conflicts – and with them regional instability – in the first place. The unprecedented and unexpected re-eruption of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict this weekend should serve as a reminder of the destructive force suppressed and unaddressed conflicts across the region can have.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/uk2Aynh.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Map 1: Known PRC Infrastructure Projects.</strong> Source: Isaac B. Kardon and Wendy Leutert, “Pier Competitor: China’s Power Position in Global Ports,” International Security 46, no. 4 (2022): 9–47, doi:10.1162/isec_a_00433; <a href="https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-ground-stations-space/">Matthew P. Funaiole et al., “Eyes on the Skies: China’s Growing Space Footprint in South America,” CSIS, Hidden Reach no. 1, October 4, 2022</a>; and elaborated with authors’ research based on multiple sources cited throughout this report.</em></p> -<hr /> +<h4 id="2-citizen-security-assistance">2. CITIZEN SECURITY ASSISTANCE</h4> -<p><strong>Tobias Borck</strong> is Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security Studies at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His main research interests include the international relations of the Middle East, and specifically the foreign, defence and security policies of Arab states, particularly the Gulf monarchies, as well as European – especially German and British – engagement with the Middle East.</p>Tobias BorckNothing will be the same after the weekend’s carnage in Israel. The Palestinian question is back on the agenda, and with a vengeance. So will be Israel’s response.In Chip Race2023-10-06T12:00:00+08:002023-10-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/in-chip-race<p><em>With a new smartphone and new chip, Huawei has returned to the 5G smartphone business in defiance of U.S. sanctions. This report assesses the implications from this latest development for China’s AI industry and the future of semiconductor export controls.</em></p> +<p>While the United States remains predominant in military-to-military cooperation, China has identified citizen security as an area ripe for expansion, opening the door to displacing the United States in military-to-military cooperation someday. As LAC countries grapple with resurgent transnational organized crime and under-resourced, sometimes corrupt police forces, such overtures are sure to meet with a receptive audience. Indeed, the “China-CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas (2022–2024)” positions political and security cooperation first, ahead of even economic cooperation and development. The inauguration of the wide-ranging GSI promises to elevate China’s focus on security engagement with LAC further still.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>To understand where such engagement may lead, it is instructive to first look beyond the Western Hemisphere. China’s security cooperation agreement with the Solomon Islands offers a concerning portent — China has shown its ability to leverage cooperation on citizen security issues to gain advantages in the defense and military domains. While the text makes no mention of explicit military cooperation or basing, it intentionally conflates Chinese police and military personnel and includes a provision allowing for Chinese forces to conduct logistical replenishment in the islands. The Solomon Islands’ subsequent denial of port calls to all U.S. Coast Guard vessels further demonstrates the cumulative implications such Chinese engagement can have on freedom of navigation operations. Should this model of security cooperation become ascendant in LAC, it would likely grant Beijing a freer hand to project power within the Western Hemisphere.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>This trend can already be observed in LAC, where police exchanges and training programs are starting to mature. While attention is often focused on the PLA and military exchanges, China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) has expanded its overseas reach and sought to compete directly with U.S. police assistance programs offered by agencies such as the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) at the Department of State. According to one analysis of MPS capacity-building programs, LAC ranks third in terms of overall allocation of MPS trainings, behind Asia and Africa, receiving 12 percent of all such programming between 2004 and 2021. In 2019 alone, these activities included a 15-member delegation from the Peruvian national police to Zhongshan to study counternarcotics and methods for countering fraud, 14-member delegations from Brazil and Cuba, and an anti-drug seminar at China’s Shandong Police College that hosted two dozen members of the Royal Grenada Police Force. China also sells and donates military-grade equipment to police forces throughout the hemisphere, often with substantial public relations campaigns, such as when it donated 6,000 ballistic vests to the Panamanian police forces shortly after the fatal shooting of one of their officers. Other recipients of Chinese police equipment include Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Trinidad and Tobago, among others.</p> -<p>On August 29, Huawei launched its new Mate60 Pro smartphone. Normally, smartphone launches do not attract attention in U.S. national security circles. However, this one did, and rightfully so. The Mate60 Pro dramatically marked Huawei’s return to the 5G smartphone business after years of ever-tightening U.S. Department of Commerce export controls effectively cut Huawei off from 5G technology. How? By restricting Huawei’s access to U.S. semiconductor technology, especially chips, chip design software, and chipmaking equipment.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/toFOuql.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: China’s Police Engagement.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-expanding-international-reach-of-chinas-police/">Jordan Link, The Expanding International Reach of China’s Police (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, October 2022)</a>; and elaborated with authors’ research based on multiple sources cited throughout this report.</em></p> -<p>The mobile application processor chip at the heart of the new Huawei phone has an integrated 5G modem. The chip was designed by Huawei’s HiSilicon subsidiary and manufactured by a Chinese company, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC). In March 2023, China’s government reportedly made Huawei and SMIC, along with two leading Chinese semiconductor equipment companies, Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment (AMEC) and Naura, the heart of a new government initiative for semiconductor self-reliance. Huawei is effectively the leader of the Chinese government-backed team, with a privileged position to influence semiconductor policymaking.</p> +<p>Digital security assistance represents a growing area of concern and perhaps one of the sectors in which China has shown the greatest savvy in marketing itself to potential LAC partners. China’s “safe cities” initiative represents the culmination of such policies, with an estimated 12 countries across LAC that have deployed Chinese-made surveillance technologies, including in Ecuador, Guyana, and Suriname. Beyond formal “safe cities,” Chinese telecommunications and technology companies such as Huawei, Hikvision, and Dahua have been actively involved in installing interconnected monitoring systems, including cameras and other sensors empowered by biometrics and analytical capabilities throughout the hemisphere. These capabilities are themselves troubling but are made doubly concerning given their tendency to be clustered by embassies, ports, and other sensitive facilities. These approaches to citizen security attempt to replicate China’s own domestic model of policing, which involves conducting mass data collection in the name of tracking and preventing criminal activity. They also carry understandable appeal for policymakers in LAC, especially at the municipal and mayoral level, where crime and violence remain the most proximate threats. To these leaders, China’s promises of efficient, orderly, and comprehensive security are seen as useful to curb the powerful transnational criminal enterprises that have penetrated the highest echelons of power in every country in the hemisphere and curry favor with voters who increasingly report security as a top concern. However, absent significant reforms to public security institutions, and training these police forces on proper storage and cybersecurity measures, there is a serious risk that widespread adoption may simply grant China a back door through which to access the personal data of millions of individuals, companies, and government organizations throughout LAC.</p> -<p>SMIC manufactured the new chips at the advanced 7-nanometer (nm) technology node (N+2 in SMIC process naming conventions), raising questions in U.S. national security circles about whether the effectiveness of U.S. technology export controls on Huawei — and perhaps China more broadly — is coming to an end.</p> +<p>Formal collaboration with police also opens the door to more overt forms of Chinese police presence in the hemisphere. While China approaches the question of overseas military basing with caution, it reportedly operates 14 overseas police outposts across 10 LAC countries. The physical presence of representatives from the People’s Armed Police in LAC countries is a major victory for one of the GSI’s core principles: to make the CCP’s state security — and by extension, party security — a matter of foreign policy. In some cases, an expanded overseas police presence may be welcomed by some countries, such as in 2016 when China and Argentina collaborated to bring down the Pixiu mafia, the most active Chinese criminal organization in Argentina. However, looking beyond the hemisphere once again reveals the troubling consequences of such collaboration. In Fiji for instance, Chinese police forces rounded up more than a hundred suspected criminals and sent them back to China in 2017 with only a modicum of cooperation with Fijian police and no extradition agreement in place. China’s globetrotting police operations Fox Hunt and Sky Net have also faced scrutiny after reports of Chinese forces engaging in state-sponsored kidnapping and targeting of political dissidents outside of China. Such incidents suggest that China has few qualms about violating other countries’ sovereignty when confronting a perceived threat to domestic order and tranquility.</p> -<p>That was certainly the message that China wanted to send. Chinese state-run media outlets were exuberant, arguing in editorials that Huawei’s new phone “shows how ineffective Washington’s tech sanctions have been” and that “extreme suppression by the US has failed.” The new phone was announced during Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo’s visit to China, which placed a double emphasis on the phone’s significance toward U.S. export controls.</p> +<p>The final piece in Beijing’s vision of security engagement involves a burgeoning number of Chinese private security companies (PSCs). Many of these firms are well established in Africa and Southeast Asia, where they play a role in protecting important investments and project sites, especially in fragile country contexts. In LAC, the on-the-ground presence of PRC-based security contractors has been more muted thus far, but they have been carefully preparing the legal terrain to significantly scale up activity in the region. The China Overseas Security Group, for instance, has reported conducting fieldwork in Argentina “to prepare the establishment of branch offices.” Meanwhile, the Zhong Bao Hua An Security Company has also reportedly held strategic cooperation dialogues with the governments of Panama, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. PSCs play a growing role in China’s strategy of political warfare and pursuit of strategic goals well beyond China’s borders. As one CSIS analysis notes: “Even if the activities conducted by a given PSC are not directly related to China’s geopolitical goals, they present an additional threat vector that allows Beijing to build nontraditional security and political relationships through market forces.” Indeed, China’s substantial economic interests in the region provide natural cover for an expansion of PSCs as necessary to protect key investments in an increasingly challenging security context. Shandong Huawei Security Group already contracts with Chinese mining companies in Africa, while the China Security Technology Group signed a $21 million contract in 2018 with Grand Tai Peru S.A.C. to provide security services in the mining sector. An expansion of Chinese PSCs in the hemisphere would augment China’s ability to provide security assistance training and services to host governments, further undercutting the United States’ role as partner of choice in the security space.</p> -<p>However, there is a big difference between claiming that Chinese technological progress proves the current approach to export controls is not achieving all of its desired effects and claiming that Chinese technological progress proves that those same export controls are strategically useless. In principle, either might or might not be true, but the former does not inherently imply the latter.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VSgkpoL.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Map 2: PRC Police Outposts and Extradition Agreements.</strong> Source: <a href="https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/patrol-and-persuade-follow-110-overseas-investigation">Safeguard Defenders, Patrol and Persuade: A follow-up investigation to 110 Overseas (Safeguard Defenders, December 2022)</a>; and <a href="https://fiugis.maps.arcgis.com/apps/dashboards/58ace2b67a37433b90ce46fd62318b8e">“China’s Activities in Latin America Dashboard,” FIU, Security Research Hub</a>.</em></p> -<p>In the case of the 7 nm chip powering the new Mate60 smartphone, this is a legitimate breakthrough on China’s part, not in terms of reaching the global state of the art, but in continuing to make technological progress despite U.S. and allied restrictions. The Trump administration’s entity list-based export controls on Huawei and its primary chip manufacturer SMIC had explicitly sought to prevent Huawei and SMIC from designing and manufacturing chips more advanced than 10 nm and from producing 5G chips. The same is true of the Biden administration’s October 7, 2022, semiconductor export control policy, which restricted exports to China of, among other things, advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment.</p> +<h4 id="3-humanitarian-assistance-and-disaster-relief">3. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF</h4> -<p>While the Huawei phone is not itself a major national security issue for the United States, what the chip inside signals about the state of the Chinese semiconductor industry absolutely is. The 7 nm chips at the heart of the new Huawei phone provide many data points regarding the current and likely future state of the Chinese semiconductor industry. In short, China is still not at the global state of the art for semiconductor manufacturing, but the gap between the peak technological level of China and that of the rest of the world has shrunk, even despite the many hurdles that the U.S. government has attempted to place in SMIC’s way.</p> +<p>If there is a sector where the United States ought to adopt a permissive approach to PLA activity in the hemisphere, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) is the most likely contender. Here the United States is likely to remain the partner of choice, owing to its relationships with and proximity to the region, as well as the strong logistical capabilities of the U.S. armed forces. While Chinese efforts have been comparatively limited, spending just $19 million on HADR in the Western Hemisphere between 2010 and 2022, they remain an important means of enhancing China’s reputation and capabilities. Historically, HADR has opened doors for China in the region, such as when the PLA and Peruvian armed forces conducted a joint training exercise in the use of a mobile military hospital in 2010. The PLAN’s hospital ship, the Peace Ark, also visited the region in 2011 and 2018 and represents an important tool in China’s naval engagement with the hemisphere. China has also worked to establish the China-CELAC Ministerial Forum on Cooperation and Management of Disaster Risk Reduction as a channel for multilateral coordination between Beijing and the region.</p> -<p>These advanced chip production capabilities will inevitably be made available to the Chinese military if they have not been already. Thus, the Huawei and SMIC breakthrough raises many tough questions about the efficacy of the current U.S. approach. In fairness to the Biden administration, however, their desired approach — a multilateral one — has only just begun.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, while there may be reasons to welcome an expanded Chinese HADR commitment to the Western Hemisphere, there is cause for skepticism as well. China has evinced a willingness to use disaster response as a political bargaining chip, such as in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan when China delayed the delivery of aid to the Philippines as a result of ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Even within the hemisphere, it is telling that the Peace Ark’s past deployments have focused on providing medical assistance to China’s authoritarian allies in Venezuela and Cuba, an approach which risks treating the symptoms of humanitarian emergency while simultaneously propping up the which drive such crises.</p> -<p>This paper will analyze the strategic implications of the Huawei Mate60 Pro and its SMIC 7 nm chip in the context of U.S. and allied export controls on the two companies and on China more generally. It concludes by presenting a list of tough questions where U.S. and allied country policymakers urgently need answers.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/rNnY80V.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ Soldiers lower a boat from a trailer to help evacuate people in the municipality of La Lima, near San Pedro Sula, 240 km north of Tegucigalpa, an area flooded due to the overflowing of the Chamelecon river after the passage of Hurricane Iota, on November 18, 2020.</em></p> -<h3 id="background-on-the-trump-administration-export-controls-on-huawei-and-smic">Background on the Trump Administration Export Controls on Huawei and SMIC</h3> +<p>Furthermore, one report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission found that “Beijing also exploits HA/DR-related exchanges to learn combat skills from and gather intelligence on advanced militaries, particularly the United States and its allies and partners.” Given the close collaboration between LAC armed forces and the United States on HADR responses, expanded Chinese involvement in such operations could open the door to greater awareness of U.S. capabilities and tactics. The China-CELAC disaster forum illustrates how China views cooperation on disaster response as a means to expand its ability to operate militarily in the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, many of the topics discussed, such as increased information sharing, exercises, and access to LAC countries’ logistics infrastructure, would also help to grow China’s knowledge and relationships, which it could then exploit in times of conflict or crisis.</p> -<p>In Washington, Huawei is mostly known for its telecommunications infrastructure business, but the company was at the forefront of China’s remarkable rise in the smartphone, computer, and artificial intelligence (AI) semiconductor chip design industry during the 2010s. In late 2018, there were only two companies in the world selling smartphones with 7 nm mobile application processors, Apple and Huawei, both of which designed the chips in house and outsourced manufacturing to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC).</p> +<p>Finally, the participation of 130 Chinese riot police in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti from 2004 to 2012 stands out as a notable case of engagement in humanitarian missions in a country that continues to officially recognize Taiwan. As climate change increases the vulnerability of the region to natural disasters, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations could provide China with inroads for operating within other Taiwanese diplomatic allies such as Guatemala and the Caribbean island states.</p> -<p>The original stated intention of adding Huawei to the entity list in May 2019 was to punish the company for selling technology to Iran in violation of U.S. sanctions, and especially for repeatedly lying to U.S. officials, destroying evidence, and otherwise trying to obstruct justice. The U.S. government also expressed a broader goal of preventing the company from using U.S. technology in ways that contradicted U.S. national security interests. The national security issue was initially focused on Huawei’s business in 5G telecommunications infrastructure, not smartphones. However, the national security focus grew to include ensuring that Huawei did not use U.S. technology to assist it in evading the reach of U.S. export controls, which thereafter led to a more generalized focus on Huawei’s activities related to chip design and chip manufacturing, including for base stations and smartphones.</p> +<h4 id="4-arms-sales-and-equipment-transfers">4. ARMS SALES AND EQUIPMENT TRANSFERS</h4> -<p>As described in a previous CSIS paper, the 2019 U.S. export controls on Huawei — as well as the earlier April 2018 export controls on Chinese telecom firm ZTE — were a landmark in the Chinese national security policy community. China’s pursuit of semiconductor self-sufficiency had already been a top Chinese industrial policy priority from the Made in China 2025 policy of 2015 and even earlier with China’s establishment of its “Big Fund” in 2014. However, after 2018, semiconductor self-sufficiency became a top Chinese national security priority, not just an industrial policy one. Semiconductor self-sufficiency received more than $100 billion in Chinese government financial support and regularly attracted the personal attention of Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping.</p> +<p>China is the fourth-largest supplier of conventional arms globally, behind only the United States, Russia, and France. In spite of a decline following the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, Beijing has made strategic investments to insert itself in key sectors, including combat aviation, missiles, and uncrewed vehicles. Furthermore, Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine has opened new opportunities for China to fill the gap when it comes to providing a similar supply of low-cost, no-frills weapons and equipment. Notably, Western sanctions on the Russian defense industry, combined with the steep attrition rates for military equipment in high-intensity modern warfare, has caused Moscow’s arms exports to fall from 22 percent to 16 percent of the global market, and such exports are set to decline even further in 2023. China, which currently captures 5 percent of the arms market, and is home to 6 of the top 25 defense companies, is well positioned to step into this gap.</p> -<p>De-Americanization of the supply chain became a priority not just for Huawei and the Chinese government, but also for many leading Chinese chipmakers. For example, in May 2021, Nikkei Asia reported that Yangtze Memory Technologies Corporation (YMTC), one of China’s most advanced semiconductor manufacturers, had already been engaged in a full-blown de-Americanization campaign involving the full-time work of more than 800 staff for two years. This included the establishment of multiple major partnerships with domestic Chinese equipment producers. Industry sources told CSIS that YMTC also conducted a close examination of the foreign sources within the supply chain of U.S. equipment manufacturers and launched an effort to begin direct purchases from the foreign suppliers of U.S. firms.</p> +<p>Arms sales facilitate broad, long-term Chinese military relationships with countries in the region. When one country buys a weapons system from another, they are not just buying the physical gear but often are signing a contract for post-sale parts and servicing, which must be done typically by technicians from or certified by the seller country. Likewise, such purchases often also create a dependency on that country for replacement parts.</p> -<p>In May 2020, the Department of Commerce concluded that the 2019 Huawei entity listing had an effect but failed to achieve its goals: U.S. chip manufacturers such as Intel, Qualcomm, and Xilinx continued selling many types of advanced chips directly to Huawei, as many of their chips were not produced in the United States and therefore were not subject to the export controls as written at the time. More importantly, however, Huawei was successfully designing replacement chips (using U.S. chip design software) and contracting with chip foundries outside of China to manufacture them (in facilities that relied heavily on U.S. chip manufacturing equipment). Industry sources told CSIS that U.S. companies were losing revenue not as a direct result of no longer selling to Huawei, but rather because Huawei was replacing U.S. chips with their own self-designed versions.</p> +<p>China already has a substantial presence in the region. Venezuela in particular is notable for being the first LAC country to purchase Chinese military radars, while Chinese VN-4 armored personnel carriers saw action in 2017 during the Maduro regime’s crushing of anti-regime protesters. Meanwhile, Bolivia is one of the largest Chinese clients in the hemisphere, having purchased millions of dollars in weapons from China, including capabilities from small arms and night vision goggles to artillery, helicopters, and planes. China has also made several large donations to the Bolivian armed forces. Peru increasingly merits close attention, having acquired 27 Type-90BM multiple rocket launchers from China, and previously the Peruvian defense ministry contemplated purchasing MBT-2000 tanks. In 2012, the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) successfully convinced Peru to cancel a more than $100 million contract with Northrop Grumman for man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), replacing these with China’s indigenous QW-series MANPADs instead. With Peru’s defense acquisitions budget set to grow by 116 percent in 2023, and surpass $200 million by 2028, the Peruvian armed forces represent a potentially rich market for Chinese military hardware.</p> -<p>Then secretary of commerce Wilbur Ross put it this way: “Despite the Entity List actions the Department took last year, Huawei and its foreign affiliates have stepped-up efforts to undermine these national security-based restrictions through an indigenization effort. However, that effort is still dependent on U.S. technologies.”</p> +<p>More recently, the Argentine air force’s consideration of the JF-17 fighter jet, mostly as a means to evade the United Kingdom’s supply chain chokehold on ejector seats through English company Martin Baker, has been perhaps the highest-profile instance of China’s arms export efforts in the region. The deal has gone through multiple rounds of negotiation, with a U.S. counteroffer proposing Danish F-16s as an alternative initially being rebuffed by Argentine defense minister Jorge Taiana on account of difficulties procuring replacement parts and the fact that the F-16s would come without weapons. While it appears Argentina has circled back to consider the F-16, finalization of such a deal would have represented one of the most sophisticated transfers of Chinese military capabilities to a South American country and would include a multi-year partnership between China and Argentina to train, sustain, and repair the aircraft.</p> -<p>The May 2020 updated export controls therefore applied a revised version of the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR) to prevent foreign entities from assisting Huawei and its chip design subsidiary HiSilicon in designing or manufacturing chips that were a “direct product” of U.S. technology. Overnight, Huawei’s access to semiconductors shrank drastically to only three sources: the less technologically advanced subset of chips for which U.S. licenses were still being approved, the vast set of U.S. and foreign chips that were manufactured or assembled outside of the United States and were therefore not subject to the U.S. rules, and the enormous stockpile of critical chips that Huawei had amassed by making purchases when they were still legal. The Chinese chip manufacturers that were still willing to work with Huawei generally had dramatically inferior technology. Even the initial application of the FDPR in May 2020 did not affect chips produced outside of the United States, with the exception of those designed by HiSilicon. This allowed Huawei to engage in a massive stockpiling effort.</p> +<p>In addition to sales, China has bolstered its position in the region with donations, including of a patrol boat to the Barbados Defense Force in 2018, a Y-12 transport aircraft and military construction equipment to the Guyanese Defense Force in 2012, and vehicles to the Dominican Republic’s military in 2020. Both sales and gifts exploit China’s centralized power structure to outmaneuver the United States and deliver on timelines which may take only a fraction of the time to arrive compared to U.S. equipment. Therefore, while many LAC militaries have expressed their preference for U.S. equipment, the lengthy approval processes associated with U.S. defense exports have pushed many into China’s arms for their defense needs. This is compounded by the fact that much of the equipment included in China’s sales and donations — from ambulances to Peru, to bridge laying equipment to Colombia, to the more than 700 logistics support vehicles recently delivered to Ecuador — do not represent top-line combat capabilities. Rather, they are practical tools in high demand across regional militaries, delivered on a timeline that foments goodwill among recipient countries, especially when U.S. equipment packages remain mired in arms export bureaucracy. China’s operations demonstrate the importance of delivering with speed and meeting partners’ needs, as expressed on their own terms.</p> -<p>Then, the Trump administration decided to finally cut off Huawei’s access to chips and updated the FDPR in August of 2020 to apply not only to Huawei and HiSilicon’s own chips but to all chips produced using U.S. technology that was being sold to Huawei.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Ot4Eg2A.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Chinese Arms Sales to LAC.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers">“Trade Registers,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, n.d.</a>.</em></p> -<p>Despite Huawei’s stockpiling, the May and August 2020 controls eventually did serious damage. Huawei’s worldwide revenue declined 28.5 percent between 2020 and 2021. The damage was especially severe in Huawei’s smartphones business, which required a much higher volume of advanced chips and was essentially cut off from 5G technology. Early in 2023, Huawei told its investors that it optimistically hoped to sell a mere 30 million phones that year, an 88 percent decline from the 240 million it sold in 2019. Huawei had to take dramatic steps, such as selling off the majority of its consumer smartphone business to a new spinoff known as Honor, as well as its Intel-based X86 server business, which is now known as “XFusion.” These moves allowed Huawei to conserve its massive chip stockpile for more strategic parts of its business such as network infrastructure and premium smartphone products.</p> +<p>Finally, China has evinced a greater willingness to take part in joint ventures to co-develop and manufacture new weapons systems. The JF-17s considered by Argentina, for instance, are the product of a joint venture by China and Pakistan, a partnership which also birthed Pakistan’s new MBT-2000 tank. An earlier version of the JF-17 deal even suggested that China might transfer technology and co-produce the planes with Argentina. Such a partnership with LAC defense sectors could establish a durable and long-term military-to-military pipeline between China and the region. One candidate for such a joint venture could be Venezuela, which co-developed its Tiuna jeeps with Iran and has allegedly entered into an agreement to construct Iranian Mohajer-2 loitering munitions. However, given the collapsed state of Venezuela’s industrial and scientific base, a Chinese partnership with a country that is home to a more robust defense sector, such as Brazil, could be cause for even greater concern. More importantly, Chinese defense industrial supply chains tend to avoid many suppliers in the West, making them attractive alternatives to governments worried about being cut off for human rights, corruption, or governance concerns.</p> -<p>The Mate60 Pro marks Huawei’s return to the 5G smartphone business and thereby proves that the effects of the Trump-era controls are rapidly coming to an end as Huawei redesigns its supply chain to rely more on its HiSilicon subsidiary for chip design and more on SMIC (as opposed to TSMC of Taiwan) for manufacturing. Huawei’s revised sales projections for 2023 suggest that it expects to sell roughly 40 million smartphones in 2023, of which roughly half will use the new 7 nm chips. Industry analysts with ties to Huawei’s supply chain report that Huawei expects to sell 60 million smartphones in 2024, of which most or all will use Huawei-designed, SMIC-manufactured mobile application processors with integrated 5G modems. The Mate60 Pro’s memory chips are manufactured by SK Hynix of South Korea. SK Hynix has stated that it stopped doing business with Huawei after the introduction of U.S. sanctions and that it is investigating how Huawei came to use its chips. Though selling 60 million smartphones would still be a significant decrease from Huawei’s 2019 peak, it likely signals the start of a comeback for the company.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VetwB1t.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Chinese, Russian, and U.S. Arms Sales by Share to Selected LAC Countries, 2000–2022 (%).</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers">Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Top list TIV tables”</a>.</em></p> -<p>The sophistication of the Huawei chip from a design perspective — it is at least equal to and often better than the best Western-designed smartphone chips of the 7 nm era — indicates that there has been no significant erosion in HiSilicon’s design excellence. Moreover, Huawei’s integration of the 5G modem onto the same silicon die as the mobile application processor brings many technological performance benefits. Huawei has achieved this three years before Apple currently expects to do so. Radio-frequency engineering, the critical technology involved in developing modems, is the technical core of Huawei’s business, and industry sources told CSIS that Huawei is far ahead of most companies in this space.</p> +<h4 id="5-joint-training-and-exercises">5. JOINT TRAINING AND EXERCISES</h4> -<p>While this supply chain is still critically dependent upon U.S. technology, some of the pre-October 2022 export controls and entity list restrictions on Huawei’s suppliers were not especially well designed for a goal of blocking SMIC from producing 7 nm chips, despite that being their explicit goal. For example, the entity list license review policy for SMIC established in December 2020 states that license applications to export to SMIC will be reviewed under a policy of “presumption of denial for items uniquely required for production of semiconductors at advanced technology nodes (10 nanometers and below, including extreme ultraviolet technology); Case by case for all other items.”</p> +<p>At the other end on the spectrum of Chinese defense and security engagement in LAC lies participation in joint training and exercises. China has been making comparatively small but compounding inroads in developing partnerships with regional militaries, including key U.S. allies such as Brazil and Colombia. Indeed, Chinese forces have participated in courses at Colombia’s Lancero School for special operations as well as the world-renowned Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Joint Training Center and the Jungle Warfare Training Center. The latter is of note, as a future conflict scenario in the Indo-Pacific, including over Taiwan, would most certainly involve combat in jungle terrain. Training with Brazilian and Colombian armed forces also gives the PLA indirect exposure to U.S. doctrine and, in this respect, could play a direct role in helping develop China’s military capabilities for a U.S.-China conflict scenario.</p> -<p>The problem with this standard is the “uniquely required” phrase. This is both vague and a poor fit for the reality of semiconductor manufacturing. Nearly all semiconductor manufacturing equipment that can be used to produce 10 nm and below chips can also be used to produce less advanced 14 nm and above chips and vice versa. This is known as “capex recycling” by the semiconductor industry, and industry sources told CSIS that equipment reuse rates between these nodes are sometimes higher than 90 percent. Furthermore, the rules only applied to “U.S. origin items and technology” which did not include a major portion of semiconductor capital equipment produced by U.S. firms outside of the United States in locations such as Singapore and Malaysia. In some cases, the companies did not even need to apply for a license, as their equipment was not technically U.S. origin and was therefore not even subject to the rules.</p> +<p>While PLA forces are travelling to LAC, hundreds of officers from across the region have also received training in China at a variety of institutions, including the Chinese National Defense University. At least 18 LAC countries have sent personnel to China to receive a variety of courses offered to groups ranging from second lieutenants to colonels and higher. China trained more officers from LAC countries than the United States for the first time in 2015 and would continue to do so for at least four more years. However, Chinese PME overall remains focused on field grade officers, who rank between major and colonel, with fewer inroads at the captain rank and below, and more nascent efforts to engage non-commissioned officers. This is changing, however, as China works to overhaul its military education institutions and further position itself as a leading source for PME.</p> -<p>The companies applying for export licenses simply stated this truth in their export license applications, at which point the Department of Commerce frequently approved them. Department of Commerce license application reviewers are (understandably) trained to follow the letter of the law, even if that law’s text is a poor fit for what department leadership describes as the goal of that law. According to a Reuters analysis of Department of Commerce documents, “113 export licenses worth $61 billion were approved for suppliers to ship products to Huawei (HWT.UL) while another 188 licenses valued at nearly $42 billion were greenlighted for Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp (SMIC) (0.981.HK)” between November 2020 and April 2021. However, industry sources told CSIS that nearly all applications for export licenses to SMIC’s most advanced facilities were typically denied after August 2021.</p> +<p>As with arms sales, these exchanges create durable linkages between the PLA and LAC militaries by sharing doctrine but also, even more importantly, by demystifying and marketing China to military personnel across the region. Indeed, reports from individuals familiar with China’s approach to training suggest that comparatively little effort is devoted to exchanging information on tactics, operations, and military best practices. Instead, China spends lavishly on visiting officers, many of whom will likely be visiting for the first time. Furthermore, one recent assessment of Chinese PME found trainings on human rights, democracy, and military ethics — mainstays of U.S. efforts — were largely absent from PRC training programs. China’s hope is that such efforts cultivate a favorable view of the country among attendees, who will in turn be more likely to advocate for participation in future trainings to their colleagues and carry such positive impressions with them long into their careers. In at least one of its training courses, programming included material seeking to convince LAC militaries that the United States is not a partner of choice for defense cooperation.</p> -<p>Thus, almost the only types of sales that the December 2020 SMIC entity listing definitively blocked were for the technology that it specifically stated would be prohibited, namely extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography equipment, which United States companies do not principally supply. Thus, blocking EUV sales required a policy change by the Dutch government since the sole supplier of complete EUV lithography machines is a Dutch company, ASML. The Trump administration reportedly reached an informal agreement with the Dutch government in early 2020. According to a later published Dutch government document, the Dutch Ministry of Defence was a strong supporter of limiting EUV exports to China at the time.</p> +<p>China views military education as an important mechanism for strategic competition and has refined its approach to professional military education with this in mind. For example, in Guyana, China has hosted more than a dozen members of the Guyana Defense Force (GDF) each year since at least 2019. Programming for these courses emphasizes cybersecurity and language instruction in Mandarin. For the GDF, whose armed forces number just 3,400 active personnel, with a mere few hundred of those being commissioned officers, the cumulative effect of this training seeks to ensure PLA doctrine guides Guyana’s approach to military cybersecurity. Meanwhile, the United States’ International Military Education and Training (IMET) program faces steep resource constraints, preventing it from supporting this kins of large-scale exchange, especially with smaller LAC forces. Furthermore, foreign participants in IMET are often scattered across numerous service academies and training programs, preventing the development of a critical mass of officers steeped in U.S. doctrine on any given issue as China has done for the GDF.</p> -<p>Industry sources told CSIS that, at the time, ASML was poised to ship EUV tools to China and that SMIC was planning to work with key research labs in Europe such as the Interuniversity Microelectronics Centre (IMEC) to help develop their EUV-based manufacturing process.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/66aD9Kv.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: U.S. Foreign Military Training in LAC, 1999–2019.</strong> Source: <a href="https://securityassistance.org/foreign-military-training/">“Foreign Military Training,” Security Assistance Monitor</a>.</em></p> -<p>Blocking China from acquiring EUV technology has complicated China’s path to producing chips at technology nodes more advanced than 7 nm. However, it actually did not block SMIC from legally acquiring all the equipment required to manufacture 7 nm chips, since much of the advanced deposition, etching, inspection, and metrology equipment was not blocked from purchase. Moreover, advanced deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography equipment can be used as an alternative to EUV for the production of 7 nm chips.</p> +<p>One area in which China has not made substantial inroads is on joint exercises and operations with LAC militaries. The most noteworthy PLA engagement in this regard was the 2022 Sniper Frontier competition hosted in Venezuela as part of Russia’s International Army Games. However, the number of foreign exercises conducted each year by China has grown since 2013, suggesting the potential for overtures from China to LAC countries in the future. Venezuela, with its deep security assistance ties to Beijing, stands out as one candidate. However, an even more concerning development would be PLA exercises with U.S. partner militaries such as Argentina, Brazil, or Colombia, which could offer critical insights into U.S. doctrine and capabilities in the region, as well as provide China an opportunity to test its ability to operate a military force in the hemisphere.</p> -<p>The clearest proof of this is the fact that SMIC was already producing and selling 7 nm chips no later than July 2022 and potentially as early as July 2021, despite having no EUV machines. TSMC, the Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturing giant, achieved 7 nm mass production by 2018 without using EUV technology. Adopting EUV, however, brings benefits in production reliability, speed, scale, and therefore economic competitiveness.</p> +<p>Joint training, arms transfers, and cooperation on HADR initiatives also contribute to enhancing interoperability between the PLA and regional militaries. Here it is important to note that China’s concept of interoperability differs substantially from that of the United States. While there is little reason to assume that PLA forces would deploy side-by-side with LAC militaries in a potential future conflict, familiarity with one another and positive military-to-military ties will be essential for China to make use of its dual-use facilities with a high-level of reliability. There is little sense in investing in ports capable of resupplying PLAN warships if the country they are based in refuses docking rights. Even upon clearing this threshold, for the PLA to successfully conduct replenishment and sustainment operations oceans away, it must be familiar with the logistics systems of the countries where it operates, from the physical routes and delivery systems used, to the key individuals in related military and civilian entities. This familiarity can be built over time through commercial operations as well as regular military-to-military engagement. In fact, it is one of the pillars of the United States’ own global logistics network. As the PLA seeks to become a force capable of global power projection, it is making a concerted effort to replicate this model for its own logistics and supply chains.</p> -<p>SMIC’s initial 7 nm chips (using SMIC’s N+1 process) were specialized chips for cryptocurrency mining. Such chips are less complicated to manufacture than a smartphone’s application processor due to their lack of dense static random-access (SRAM) memory. For SMIC, the barrier to making more complex 7 nm chips in 2021 was a need for improved operational experience and skill in using the equipment it already had to improve its 7 nm production process and then reliably operate it at scale, not necessarily a need for additional equipment.</p> +<h3 id="layered-risks">Layered Risks</h3> -<p>The Huawei chip (using SMIC’s N+2 process) proves that SMIC’s skill in manufacturing at the 7 nm node has advanced significantly since July 2022, despite the Biden administration’s new semiconductor export control architecture that was launched on October 7, 2022. It is worth noting, however, that SMIC’s work on N+2 has been underway at least since early 2020. Thus, much of the relevant development work took place long before October 7. Industry sources told CSIS that, both before and after October 7, SMIC was the beneficiary of significant foreign technical advice, though after October 7, this advice was limited to non-U.S. persons.</p> +<p>While China’s security and defense engagement in LAC may still appear an afterthought in comparison to the behemoth of China’s economic ties, accounting for the full spectrum of engagement reveals a complex and layered set of challenges for the United States and its allies to confront.</p> -<h3 id="huawei-mate60-pro-and-smic-7-nm-chip-implications-for-biden-era-export-controls">Huawei Mate60 Pro and SMIC 7 nm Chip Implications for Biden-Era Export Controls</h3> +<p>At present, China’s security and defense efforts in LAC present three primary risks to U.S. defense and security as well as to the region at large. The first, most obvious, and most calamitous risk is the potential for dual-use infrastructure to be employed by China against the United States in a conflict or crisis scenario. As detailed previously, there is a wide array of forms such engagement could take, ranging from the interruption of commerce and navigation through the Panama Canal and around the Straits of Magellan, to the use of satellite stations to aid in counterspace activities, interception of electronic signals, and even strikes against the continental United States itself.</p> -<p>The Biden administration’s October 7 export controls doubled down on the Trump administration’s attempt to restrict the export of U.S. advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China. However, the Biden administration went significantly further in an effort to not only restrict the pace of China’s technological progress but also to, as much as possible, actively degrade the current state of the art back to a pre-14 nm manufacturing level.</p> +<p>The penetration of Chinese-made sensors and digital infrastructure throughout LAC also poses risks for U.S. forces, as they may fall under intense surveillance long before they reach the Indo-Pacific. Cybersecurity gaps are another area where China has proven particularly adept at exploiting vulnerabilities, while LAC militaries themselves have been dragging their feet, as evidenced in a series of high-profile hacks and data breaches of sensitive government information in recent years. Much of this is driven by a lack of high-level commitment to cybersecurity among LAC governments, preventing the kind of interagency cooperation needed to shore up defenses in cyberspace. In Mexico, for instance, the lack of a national cybersecurity agency has left this role in the hands of the Secretariat of National Defense, which was itself the victim of a massive cyberattack in the fall of 2022, losing six terabytes of data in the process. In this environment, China can and has offered to supply cybersecurity solutions to governments in the region, and it can be expected that PRC-built digital infrastructure will contain a back door that allows Beijing a high degree of access. Critically, in this scenario LAC would not even need to take sides in such a conflict nor allow their physical infrastructure to be used for explicit military confrontation. China’s presence alone could already provide it with a huge advantage to surveil U.S. movements. China’s cultivation of relationships with regional militaries can facilitate cooperation and interoperability with the PLA and, in doing so, undermine the United States’ own ability to interface with these forces, for fear that information shared may be willingly or unwittingly passed along to Beijing.</p> -<p>The policy also went beyond mere entity listings and put blanket restrictions on all of China that sought to, in some instances, cut off SMIC and other advanced Chinese chipmakers from the supply of U.S. equipment, spare parts, software updates, components, maintenance, and even expert advisory services. The goal was to force existing Chinese chip manufacturers to shut down or reconfigure their advanced product lines to focus on legacy technologies. SMIC is the most advanced logic chip foundry in China, so it was absolutely a target of this policy.</p> +<p>Beyond utilizing physical and digital infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere for intelligence-gathering purposes, China could also seek to spark concurrent crises to draw U.S. attention and resources away from the Indo-Pacific. China would be aided in this regard by its close relations with the hemisphere’s three dictatorships: Venezuela, Cuba, and, to a growing extent, Nicaragua. These regimes have invested heavily in both their conventional armed forces as well as hybrid and gray zone capabilities such as cyber warfare, disinformation and misinformation, and the use of irregular armed groups. For example, China’s spy base in Bejucal, Cuba, is allegedly operated in partnership with an electronic warfare unit attached to Cuba’s Directorate of Military Intelligence. Accordingly, the capacity for each of these criminal regimes to disrupt regional security should not be understated, especially if they are emboldened by a conflict between China and United States.</p> -<p>Technology degrading did indeed happen in the case of YMTC, which was forced to abandon — perhaps only temporarily — plans for a 232-layer NAND flash memory product. However, the Huawei Mate60 Pro demonstrates that SMIC’s peak manufacturing technological capability has not only not been degraded, but it has advanced.</p> +<p>In addition to actively tapping these three hemispheric dictatorships in the event of a crisis, China’s defense and security engagement plays a passive disruptive role already by empowering, emboldening, and extending the life of authoritarian and other populist-autocratic regimes within the hemisphere. To date, Caracas, Havana, and Managua have been more reliant on Russia to meet their security needs; however, if Moscow’s ongoing war in Ukraine continues to drain Russian capacity to project power in the hemisphere, China may step up to fill that gap. As China’s red-hot economic growth appears to cool, security assistance has in many ways already eclipsed financing as the most important category of assistance to LAC dictatorships. For instance, Venezuela has not received any loans from Chinese policy or commercial banks since 2015 but has continued to receive support for its armed forces in the form of radars, drones, and a maintenance center for its fleet of Chinese-produced armored vehicles.</p> -<p>For the Biden administration, the Mate60 Pro launch is an important data point that raises legitimate questions regarding the key assumptions underlying their signature semiconductor export control policy. Most obviously, this development suggests that the October 7 export control policy, and especially the recently updated export control policies of the Japanese and Dutch governments, were needed earlier to have a realistic opportunity to achieve all their intended effects. However, it also shows one of the key mechanisms of the policy — end-use restrictions on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment — is not working as intended and will require an update to close existing loopholes.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/yLqI0pZ.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ A demonstrator stands in front of a Chinese-made VN-4 armored vehicle of the riot police during a rally against Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, in Caracas on April 19, 2017.</em></p> -<p>Industry experts consistently told CSIS that no combination of Chinese semiconductor manufacturing equipment companies can produce even 10 percent of the diverse types of advanced equipment required to operate a 7 nm chip foundry. In fact, there is no 7 nm fab in the world that does not rely upon controlled U.S. technology, so it is quite clear that SMIC is using U.S. technology — machines, components, spare parts, and materials — in producing these chips for Huawei.</p> +<p>Venezuela’s unmitigated economic calamity brought on by the Maduro regime’s disastrous management has dissuaded China from extending new lines of credit. Nevertheless, Sino-Venezuelan security cooperation remains firmly in place and on full display, from the prominent role of Chinese riot control vehicles in suppressing protests against the Maduro regime (for which the regime is now under a nascent investigation for “crimes against humanity” by the International Criminal Court), to the more insidious effects of Carnet de la Patria (“Homeland card”), a national ID card co-developed with China and modeled on China’s social credit tool kit. China has also worked closely in both Venezuela and Cuba on refining digital tools of repression through misinformation and disinformation campaigns, as well as controlling access to information and shutting off internet access selectively to disrupt protests.</p> -<p>It is also highly likely that Huawei designed these chips using software tools from U.S. electronic design automation (EDA) companies. Huawei only announced in March 2023 that it had finally made a breakthrough on 14 nm software tools after years of work. These claims have yet to be verified externally. The idea that Huawei had completed development of its more advanced 7 nm EDA tools in time to design the core processors for a phone that launched in September is not consistent with typical industry chip design or EDA tool development timelines.</p> +<p>These developments suggest that while China has often been depicted as a lender of last resort to countries shunned by much of the international community, it is increasingly taking on the role of the security partner of last resort as well. As far back as 2014, for instance, when the heavy-handed response of Venezuelan riot police to protests caused Spain and Brazil to halt their exports of tear gas and police equipment to the regime, China stepped in to fill that void. Meanwhile, in the wake of the July 2021 mass protests in Cuba, China played an important role in propping up Havana both diplomatically and practically by helping Cuba enforce internet blackouts on its Huawei- and ZTE-provided telecommunications networks. The Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua has also benefitted from China’s focus on policing assistance, receiving donations of riot gear and protective equipment to its police force from China even amid mounting evidence of human rights abuses by the Nicaraguan security services.</p> -<p>The companies that do have mature EDA software available for designing 7 nm chips are all American. Prior to Huawei’s entity listing, Huawei was legally allowed to license this software from the companies and did so. That was how Huawei designed its first 7 nm chip back in 2018. However, the U.S. providers of EDA software have been prohibited from renewing Huawei’s software licenses or providing software updates since 2020. Industry officials told CSIS that the Huawei chip was most likely designed with a pirated version of U.S. EDA tools. Chinese software piracy is a well-known problem in the EDA industry.</p> +<p>For other authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes looking to preserve their hold on power, China appears poised to deliver a full spectrum of repressive tools, giving rise to a third risk: growing Chinese engagement with LAC militaries and police forces may erode standards of civil-military relations. Currently, China has found more success in capturing political, rather than military, elites, and civil-military relations throughout the hemisphere appear stable, if less than ideal. However, military-to-military exchange almost invariably results in opportunities for imparting values, as well as tactics, techniques, procedures, and doctrine, which may lead to troubling behaviors by militaries in times of crisis. China’s growing efforts to train foreign military officials may include elements of China’s “discursive competition,” and promotion of its party-army model among graduates suggests an effort to undermine traditional notions of military subordination to civilian leadership.</p> -<p>Thus, the fact that Huawei and SMIC used U.S. technology is not controversial. It is clearly the case. Determining whether Huawei and SMIC’s use of U.S. technology involved violations of U.S. law — either by those companies, by their Chinese suppliers, or by the U.S. companies that produce the technology — is not quite as obvious. However, there are many suspicious circumstances that deserve immediate inquiry. The following sections of this paper will detail the regulatory mechanisms by which the October 7 export controls were intended to address the gaps in the Trump administration policy and also assess the questions that U.S. policymakers should be asking as they consider updated controls.</p> +<p>Militaries in LAC remain some of the most trusted institutions, consistently ranked as the second most trusted institution, according to Latinobarómetro, behind only the church, and viewed as more efficient and professional than politicians. What military leaders say matters in the region, and to the extent that there is political and ideological transfer that accompanies China’s trainings and military diplomacy engagement, this can have profound consequences for the health of LAC democracies, which often suffer from corruption and unconsolidated institutions and checks and balances. Furthermore, in a hemisphere largely marked by small and shrinking military budgets, China’s approach of providing or donating equipment at low cost and with few restrictions might embolden armed forces, which have seen their societal roles swell considerably in recent years. China’s practice of gifting military and police equipment is an especially tantalizing tool for influence in this regard, allowing security forces to increase their stature without needing to spend from their own pocket.</p> -<h3 id="analysis-of-existing-us-regulatory-mechanisms-to-prevent-7-nm-chip-fabrication">Analysis of Existing U.S. Regulatory Mechanisms to Prevent 7 nm Chip Fabrication</h3> +<p>In the citizen security space as well, rising Chinese engagement has already shown its potential to be especially corrosive to democracy. This applies not only to full-fledged authoritarian regimes but to ostensibly democratic governments as well, where leaders have often deployed the rhetoric of public safety as a pretext to restrict civic space and to intimidate and dismantle organized political opposition. Under former president Rafael Correa, Ecuador was an eager adopter of Chinese “safe cities” equipment, which was swiftly used to spy on opposition parties and which had a chilling effect on journalists and civil society watchdogs. Footage from CCTV cameras were fed through the country’s central intelligence agency. In 2019, Bolivia also announced the development of a new Integrated System of Citizen Security, replete with the purchase of hundreds of facial recognition cameras from China, as well as a new center of operations to be built by the China National Electronics Import &amp; Export Corporation (CEIEC). As of July 2023, the rollout of this program has continued apace, with CEIEC recently completing its deployment of more than five dozen cameras to the town of Warnes, the first provincial center to be integrated into Bolivia’s new security system.</p> -<p>The Trump administration took three major actions in the semiconductor sector. First, it placed entity list restrictions on hundreds of Chinese companies, including ZTE (later removed), Fujian Jinhua, Huawei, and SMIC. Second, the Trump administration adjusted the scope and application of the FDPR. Third, it persuaded the Dutch government to restrict sales of EUV machines to China as a whole based on an informal agreement to deny a license for technology that was already controlled on a multilateral basis through the Wassenaar Arrangement control list.</p> +<p>More recently, the government of Nayib Bukele in El Salvador has shown deeply concerning autocratic tendencies, exacerbated by his heavy-handed and expansive security policy. Parallel to his challenges to El Salvador’s democracy, Bukele has been exploring closer relations with China. On the citizen security front, China has offered to provide computers and other equipment to El Salvador’s national police. Taken together, these developments mean that El Salvador joining a “safe cities” project should be of grave concern to both the United States and other defenders of democracy.</p> -<p>The Biden administration did not reverse or weaken any Trump-era semiconductor trade restrictions and added to them significantly by adopting new restrictions that applied to China as a whole. Most importantly, the Biden administration’s October 7, 2022, policy was focused on restricting China’s access to advanced chips for AI development, but that policy significantly expanded export regulations related to semiconductor manufacturing equipment in order to prevent China from domestically producing alternatives to the advanced AI chips that the United States no longer allowed exporting.</p> +<h3 id="policy-recommendations">Policy Recommendations</h3> -<p>The policy’s chip equipment restrictions were split into three broad categories:</p> +<p>China is encroaching along several divergent axes in the security and defense space. The United States should engage the region with confidence that its longstanding partnerships and ties offer a strong foundation. However, the United States’ commitments to Europe and the Indo-Pacific mean that in the coming years policymakers must be realistic about the resource constraints they face. It will require a more agile, multifaceted strategy to insulate LAC militaries and police forces from the most corrosive effects of Chinese influence, curtail Beijing’s advances in infrastructure, citizen security, and arms sales, and compete to preserve strategic denial in the hemisphere.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Blanket prohibition of exports of a narrow set of advanced deposition equipment to all of China, as well as all parts and accessories related to that equipment:</strong> These restrictions took the form of creating a new Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 3B090, which was restricted under a Regional Security (“RS-China”) justification.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>End-use prohibition of exports intended for use in advanced node semiconductor manufacturing or where the manufacturing node is not clear:</strong> The second major restriction was the creation of a new license restriction based on end use with a presumption of denial, by adding section 744.23 to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). This effectively imposed a blanket ban on exports to China in cases where the exporter in question has “knowledge” that the exported goods will be used for a restricted end use. The restricted end uses in question are production of advanced node semiconductors — defined as logic chips at or below 16 nm, DRAM memory chips at or below 18 nm, and NAND storage at or above 128 layers — or supporting Chinese production of any semiconductor manufacturing equipment, components, or parts. An additional near-blanket prohibition exists for selling to any facility in which the seller knows that the facility produces chips but does not know whether or not the chips produced at that facility are at an advanced technology node.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>To ensure that shipments of U.S. technology for restricted goods (or even transfers of relevant subject matter expertise) would not occur through foreign subsidiaries, joint ventures, or partnerships, the regulations modified section 744.6 of the EAR, the so-called “U.S. persons rule,” which dramatically expanded licensing requirements. It also applies an updated FDPR provision, section 742.6(a)(6), to prevent foreign firms from using U.S. technology to assist China in pursuing the end uses specified in section 744.23. These restrictions apply on a China-wide basis, though only for restricted end uses and end users.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The broader set of equipment and components restricted by section 744.23 includes all items subject to the EAR, of which ECCNs 3B001, 3B002, 3B090, 3B611, 3B991, and 3B992 directly pertain to semiconductor manufacturing equipment and components. This equipment is still generally allowed to be sold to China in cases where two criteria are met. First, the exporter must not have specific knowledge that the buyer intends to use the equipment for advanced node manufacturing. Second, the equipment must not be destined for end use at a facility in which the equipment provider does not know whether or not it is engaged in advanced node manufacturing. For the newly restricted types of chip equipment covered under 3B991 and 3B992, the exporter does not even have to apply for a license to export the goods to China in cases where the exporter has no specific knowledge that they are going toward a prohibited end use or end user.</p> - </li> +<ol> <li> - <p><strong>Blanket export ban to YMTC, China’s most advanced NAND company:</strong> Two months later, in December 2022, the U.S. government also added YMTC to the entity list under a blanket presumption of denial for exporting “all items subject to the EAR.” Any purchase of semiconductor manufacturing equipment or components by YMTC after December 2022 would have been in some way illegal under U.S. law, unless the U.S. government had approved a license.</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<p>The Biden administration adopted these new rules in an attempt to degrade the peak technology level of the Chinese chipmaking sector through the loss of access to spare parts, maintenance, and advisory services. It would, for example, be illegal for any U.S. company to provide SMIC with spare parts or new equipment if the U.S. company had knowledge that SMIC was using the equipment to support its 7 nm manufacturing line. In practice, this means that all shipments to SMIC’s SN1 and SN2 fab facilities in Shanghai are prohibited. For shipments to other SMIC facilities, the October 7 policy instructs companies to follow official “Know Your Customer” guidance and best practices, including obtaining a signed end-use statement from the customer and also evaluating “all other available information to determine whether a license is required pursuant to § [section] 744.23.”</p> - -<p>Overall, this is a significantly stricter due diligence requirement than is typical for Department of Commerce export controls, but it still raises the question of just how much leverage the U.S. government will have to punish companies that use already-installed equipment for prohibited end uses. It also raises the question of whether SMIC and other Chinese firms could be deceiving U.S. firms about the true end uses of their purchases.</p> - -<h3 id="why-did-the-october-7-export-controls-fail-to-prevent-smic-from-advancing-7nm-production">Why Did the October 7 Export Controls Fail to Prevent SMIC from Advancing 7nm Production?</h3> + <p><strong>Leverage U.S. partners to fill force modernization and equipment shortfalls.</strong></p> -<p>It is clear at this point that the October 7 policy has thus far failed to degrade SMIC’s peak technological capability, but that is not especially surprising. SMIC had already begun a ferocious capacity-expansion and equipment-buying campaign both before and after its December 2020 entity listing. As noted above, the U.S. restrictions prior to October 7 did very little to limit SMIC’s purchase of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, even when that equipment was known to be directly supporting a 7 nm production line. SMIC had 14 nm fin-shaped field-effect transistor (FinFet) production commercially available in 2019 and thus had nearly all the equipment it needed to advance to 7 nm due to the ability to “recycle” the equipment for future nodes.</p> + <p>Many Latin American militaries currently using legacy Russian weapons systems are liable to find these increasingly obsolete and to have no way of servicing them, particularly as U.S. sanctions on Russia’s military-industrial complex continue to bite. The United States can play a role in reducing dependence on Russian weapons, but only if it is forthcoming in sales of alternatives which are competitive on price, especially in comparison to China.</p> -<p>In much the same way that Huawei had stockpiled a two-year supply of chips prior to U.S. entity restrictions taking effect, SMIC has amassed a large number of machines and potentially also a large stockpile of spare parts that it can draw from. In recent years, Chinese semiconductor manufacturing equipment purchases have been so extensive that non-Chinese chip manufacturers have been complaining that it is delaying equipment providers from completing their non-Chinese orders on time. Industry sources told CSIS that equipment providers routinely refer to Chinese customers under the label of “non-market demand,” meaning that the customers were buying for strategic reasons unrelated to market conditions or profit maximization.</p> + <p>Additional funding for U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is sorely needed. The Western Hemisphere receives the lowest levels of FMF and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) across all geographic regions. In fact, FMF for the region declined by about 12 percent between fiscal years 2019 and 2023. Absent alternative financing options, LAC militaries must pay up front for equipment purchased from the United States. These sales may in turn be caught up in bureaucratic red tape as they navigate the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, leading to further delays. Panama, for instance, waited for over a year to receive a second Beechcraft King Air turboprop plane for marine patrols on account of delays related to supply chain disruption and Covid-19. Yet, compared to the speed with which the United States has proven itself capable of funneling equipment to its European and East Asian allies, LAC armed forces have found themselves hard pressed not to ascribe a double standard to U.S. military sales.</p> -<p>Moreover, industry sources told CSIS that, prior to the October 7 regulations, some semiconductor manufacturing equipment, components, and spare parts from U.S. companies were exported to China without a license via foreign-headquartered partners. In the absence of the application of the FDPR or the U.S. persons rule, this is not necessarily a violation of U.S. law. Industry sources also told CSIS that SMIC has set up a network of shell companies and partner firms in China through which it has been able to continue acquiring U.S. equipment and components by deceiving U.S. exporters. If true, sales to such shell companies would involve violations of U.S. law by SMIC, though not necessarily by U.S. companies, so long as the U.S. firm had no knowledge of the fact that the shell company was acting on behalf of SMIC.</p> + <p>Another area where the United States can preempt potential encroachment from China is in joint ventures. While the Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status held by Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia is intended to facilitate co-development of defense technologies, the promise of this designation has been slow to materialize. The United States should seek to identify qualitative advantages in these countries’ sectors, beginning with Brazil, whose aerospace industry has extensive experience with military aviation and is currently partnering with Swedish firm Saab for research and development on the Gripen fighter jet. However, the United States must also look beyond the MNNA box to develop new, more innovative financing mechanisms and partnership opportunities with other key partners, including Ecuador, Uruguay, and Chile. At the same time, the United States must remain cognizant of the possibility that arms sales or technology transfers may find their way from LAC militaries into China’s hands or those of another geostrategic rival. To assuage such concerns, the United States can pursue formal agreements with key security partners that their defense industrial bases will adhere to U.S. standards for handling classified technologies and prioritize training regional militaries and defense firms on U.S. best practices for defense-industrial security.</p> -<p>In cases where SMIC did face a legitimate problem due to U.S. restrictions, it was, until very recently, largely unrestricted in its ability to purchase equipment and spare parts from the Netherlands, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. According to a Financial Times analysis of Chinese customs data, the total value of Chinese imports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment increased from $2.9 billion over the two months in June and July 2022 to $5.0 billion over the same two months in 2023. The analysis further found that “most of the imports came from the Netherlands and Japan.” Japan’s export controls only took effect in late July 2023. The Netherlands’ export controls only took effect in September, and Dutch companies are being allowed to complete the delivery of previously approved licensed exports to China even if those deliveries occur after September 2023, so long as the shipment is completed by January 1, 2024.</p> + <p>At the same time, the top-line systems that would stir up the greatest concerns are only sought after by a handful of LAC militaries. For much of the region, far more practical equipment such as bridge-layers, trucks, small arms, boots, and personal protective equipment are in far greater demand, with China often moving the fastest to supply these bread-and-butter items. The U.S. Congress can address this blind spot by authorizing the secretary of defense to approve requests from geographic combatant commands such as SOUTHCOM to provide small-scale aid to local militaries. More broadly, the Departments of Defense and State should work together to develop a list of less-sensitive defense articles such as logistics trucks or military construction equipment to be subject to an expedited FMS process, allowing the United States to deliver critical support to partners on competitive timelines while ensuring a more thorough review for sensitive technologies and advanced equipment.</p> -<p>The Chinese customs data analyzed by the Financial Times includes finished and fully integrated manufacturing equipment but does not include components, spare parts, and materials. One industry source told CSIS that, because of this omission, the customs data significantly understates the extent to which U.S. technology is being displaced by foreign suppliers. This individual said that as U.S. equipment firms have been forced to reduce their presence in the market, “Japanese firms have been gorging themselves on Chinese revenue from selling fully integrated machines. Korean firms have been gorging themselves on selling subsystems and spare parts.” In conversations with CSIS, multiple industry sources highlighted the problem of South Korean firms backfilling export-controlled U.S. technology and also training Chinese staff in both equipment maintenance and fab operations.</p> + <p>Finally, where the United States lacks the resources to sufficiently meet the force modernization and equipment needs of LAC countries, it can look to like-minded countries such as South Korea, Israel, and Sweden, countries with their own established or ascendant arms industries that are also aligned with U.S. geopolitical goals. Bringing a coalition to fill LAC’s defense requirements promises to put more options on the table in order to prevent China from emerging as the primary arms exporter for countries in the hemisphere.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Bolster the defense cooperation mechanisms of the inter-American system.</strong></p> -<p>In early 2021, SMIC told its Chinese government investors that its goal for the SN1 chip fab — SMIC’s second most advanced facility and the one which produces 14 nm node wafers — was production capacity of 35,000 finished wafers per month (WPM).</p> + <p>The Western Hemisphere is home to an impressive web of security coordination mechanisms, such as the System of Cooperation Among the American Air Forces (SICOFAA), Conference of American Armies (CAA), and Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas (CDMA). Among these, however, the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) and its counterpart focused on professional military education, the Inter-American Defense College (IADC), stand out as some of the most storied and expansive players in helping develop and align policy on hemispheric security issues. Both institutions are explicitly tied to the Organization of American States (OAS), which orients their missions around the OAS’s commitment to democracy and human rights. Together with forums such as the SICOFAA, CAA, and CDMA, which include promotion of healthy civil-military relations in their own mission and values statements, the inter-American system has a sound base of institutions to promote principled security cooperation.</p> -<p>SMIC’s most advanced chip fab is SN2, which is part of the same SMIC Southern Shanghai campus as SN1. SN2 is the facility where SMIC conducts advanced node research and development (R&amp;D) and is also the facility where SMIC has begun mass production of its 7 nm (N+1 and N+2) processes. According to a June 2020 report by Guolian Securities, a Chinese investment advisory firm, SMIC planned for 7 nm production capacity at SN2 to also reach 35,000 WPM on an unspecified timeframe. According to one Chinese semiconductor industry analyst, SMIC also planned as recently as September 2022 to eventually pursue 5 nm production at SN2 despite lacking access to EUV machines. For comparison, TSMC first achieved 7 nm mass production without EUV but later upgraded its 7 nm process to use EUV. No major international chipmaker has ever engaged in mass production of 5 nm chips without using EUV lithography machines.</p> + <p>Closer engagement with the IADB can serve as a force multiplier for U.S. defense engagement with LAC countries. Indeed, the board’s areas of focus, from leading the MECODEX 2022 disaster relief exercise to its efforts to promote awareness among OAS member states on cybersecurity, closely align with U.S. priorities in LAC. Meanwhile the IADB’s independent status means that it can serve as a more effective interlocutor with countries that may otherwise hesitate to welcome purely bilateral military engagement with the United States. A practical first step to help raise the profile of these inter-American security cooperation mechanisms would be to expand SOUTHCOM’s J7/9 directorate, responsible for exercises and coalition affairs. As the smallest combatant command, SOUTHCOM suffers from personnel shortfalls across the board, but given the premium placed throughout the hemisphere on multilateral defense cooperation, prioritizing this directorate stands out as an area where a small investment in additional staff can have an outsized effect.</p> -<p>Both the SN1 and SN2 projects were announced in 2017. The SN1 facility was producing 3,000 WPM in late 2019, 6,000 WPM at the 14 nm node in June 2020, and in February 2021 SMIC claimed that SN1 had achieved 15,000 WPM production capacity by the end of 2020. According to a SMIC press release in early 2020, SMIC had originally anticipated hitting the 35,000 WPM production target for SN1 by the end of 2022. More likely than not, SMIC has by now hit this SN1 production capacity target. SMIC stated in February 2023 that it would accelerate capacity expansion despite weakening demand and market oversupply. DigiTimes Asia reported in June 2023 that SMIC was continuing to offer and deliver 14 nm production to customers.</p> + <p>Considering China’s forays into multilateral security conversations broadly through the GSI, and regionally with the China-CELAC defense forum, the United States should also seek to highlight the IADB and inter-American system more broadly as a counterpoint for countries in the region to conduct their military diplomacy and security cooperation activities. In doing so, U.S. policymakers should also use public messaging to question China’s fixation on working around these existing institutions and excluding the United States, one of the region’s core security providers.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Clarify U.S. red lines when it comes to security engagement.</strong></p> -<p>One industry source told CSIS that SMIC’s FinFET production capacity across both SN1 and SN2 is currently 35,000 WPM and that roughly one-third of this capacity is currently being devoted to 7 nm production.</p> + <p>The breadth and depth of the China’s engagement in LAC means that an all-or-nothing approach would likely be destined to fail. Especially when it comes to Chinese dual-use infrastructure, the lack of a credible U.S. counteroffer for countries’ transportation, energy, or communications needs means that warnings of the risks of dealing with Beijing often fall on deaf ears. Nevertheless, China’s preferred approach to security and defense cooperation means that it is difficult to discern a clear point at which such engagement crosses into national security concern. In a worst-case scenario, China’s history of opaque dealings and espionage means that militaries which cooperate closely with the PLA could be deemed too risky for the United States to engage with, for fear that information on sensitive capabilities or doctrine would find its way back to Beijing. To avoid this future, especially in the case of MNNAs in the hemisphere, the United States must clearly spell out which elements of engagement it views as “red lines” to prevent unnecessarily isolating partners.</p> -<p>No data is publicly available on SN2’s progress in production capacity ramp up. T.P. Huang, an independent semiconductor industry analyst, estimates that by the end of 2023, SMIC will have legally acquired enough advanced DUV lithography machines across all SMIC facilities to eventually support production of more than 50,000 FinFET WPM, which would have to be split across the 14 nm and 7 nm production. It is unclear what share of these machines currently resides at SN1 and SN2. Based on analysis of a SMIC notice, Huang projects that all SN2 equipment installations will be completed by July 2024.</p> + <p>Permanent deployment of PLA combat forces in the hemisphere represents one such red line. To this end, news of a potential new Chinese base in Cuba should be subjected to close inspection by the U.S. intelligence community. While it appears unlikely that any such facility would be designed with the intention of conducting offensive operations against the United States, the Departments of Defense and State should be actively involved in planning for such a contingency and drawing up sets of options for the administration to consider in the event such a project moves forward.</p> -<p>Industry sources told CSIS that this estimate is reasonable and that SMIC will likely reach production capacity of 50,000 WPM across SN1 and SN2 by the end of 2024. SMIC has existing customers for its 14 nm capacity, so presumably it will not immediately reallocate all of its machines to 7 nm. In lithography, the Dutch export controls only restrict exports of EUV machines and the most advanced DUV machines, so it is possible that additional future purchases could increase SMIC’s potential 7 nm production even beyond 50,000 WPM.</p> + <p>Other clear red lines include participation of the PLA in exercises with a major U.S. ally in LAC. Such activities would give Chinese military forces the opportunity to observe the performance of U.S.-trained militaries up close, potentially offering critical insights into the United States’ own doctrine and capabilities. Transfers of high-end military equipment, especially if accompanied by offers of technological cooperation or co-production, represent another red line due to China’s ability to establish a long-term and deep presence in the partner country’s defense industrial base. The deal appears to have been a success in the end, but the lengthy and tumultuous process leading up to it portends ill for future U.S. efforts to dissuade countries from purchasing equipment from strategic rivals.</p> -<p>For most new semiconductor manufacturers, manufacturing yield (the share of the chips on the finished wafer that are usable) starts at a low level and then improves as the company’s mastery of a new technology node and production process improves. Industry sources told CSIS that SMIC’s current yield is roughly 50 percent. By comparison, TSMC’s early production with 7 nm was already achieving 76 percent yield in 2017, even before introducing EUV technology. It is reasonable to assume that SMIC’s yield will improve over time, as more of ASML’s most advanced DUV lithography machines are delivered and as SMIC gains operational experience with the N+2 process node. However, SMIC may never match the high yields that TSMC achieved after introducing EUV.</p> + <p>One final area where the United States should seek to clarify its stance applies to the proliferation of Chinese space research stations in the hemisphere. In particular, the United States should urge the Argentine government to push for inspections and closer monitoring of the Espacio Lejano ground station. In doing so, the United States should reiterate that signing away sovereignty over such facilities is not only a concern for Washington but also undermines Argentina’s own sovereignty and security.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Invest in U.S. core competencies in military education and training.</strong></p> -<p>The yield rate directly relates to the economics of chip production. Costs are incurred on a per-wafer basis, so increasing the number of usable chips per wafer is equivalent to increasing output without increasing costs. Per chip costs are not typically made publicly available, but Fomalhaut Techno Solutions, a Tokyo-based research company, estimated in 2022 that Apple paid TSMC $110 per chip for its 4 nm production, up from $46 per chip for TSMC’s 5 nm production. TSMC’s 5 nm production process, which used EUV, reportedly achieved excellent yields early in its history.</p> + <p>The United States remains the security and defense partner of choice for LAC by a large margin and should endeavor to maintain the status quo. One of the greatest assets in this regard lies in U.S. professional military education, regarded as the gold standard by militaries across the region. Foreign graduates of these programs often go on to play leading roles in their home countries’ armed forces, and shared experiences forge long-lasting bonds at all levels of command. However, currently U.S. PME efforts are not purpose-built for competition with a near-peer adversary. The top-down approach, wherein domestic service academies dictate to embassy staff the number of individuals from each country they can accept and the types of courses they will offer, is counterproductive to a more strategic assessment of what kinds of trainings LAC militaries need most. A bottom-up approach, wherein embassies coordinate with regional combatant commands to identify the number of personnel and types of skill sets are most needed, would represent a sea change in the United States’ ability to leverage its core competency in military education for competition with China.</p> -<p>If SMIC hypothetically had 100 percent yield and 35,000 7 nm WPM production capacity at SN2 with 550 Huawei chips per wafer, then SMIC could produce enough chips for 231 million phones over the course of a year. As mentioned previously, Huawei only expects to sell 60 million such phones in 2024.</p> + <p>Other key limitations to reforming U.S. military education and training programs for competition with China include the Section 312 and 321 requirements that the Department of Defense focus on “developing countries.” The department uses World Bank income classifications to assess which countries fall into this category, meaning that military personnel from Chile, Panama, Uruguay, and most recently Guyana cannot receive funding to attend security cooperation meetings or train with U.S. forces. Such a standard is artificial at best and arbitrary at worst, limiting the ability of the U.S. military to engage some of its most important partners in the hemisphere. Tellingly, the World Bank itself has moved away from using income groups to assign “developing country” status in favor of a more holistic assessment of development indicators. The Department of Defense should follow suit, and the Joint Staff should urgently engage with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to reevaluate its method for determining Section 312 and 321 exemptions. Doing so would rapidly increase the range of tools available to the United States for military-to-military training and partnerships.</p> -<p>This is no doubt exactly what Huawei hopes for: to win back the customers it lost to Apple and other competitors during the years it was cut off from 5G chips. The Chinese government’s instructions to all employees of the Chinese government and all state-owned enterprises not to use Apple phones might soon be followed by nationalist pressure to buy Huawei’s alternative, even if the technical performance is inferior. If SMIC’s yield remains low, Huawei’s 5G smartphone business may require significant subsidization or a protected domestic market to be economically viable. Assuming that Huawei is paying SMIC’s per wafer prices comparable to what Apple paid TSMC for 7 nm capacity — $10,000 per wafer — then $4.2 billion in annual subsidies would be enough to pay for Huawei buying the entirety of SMIC’s annual 7 nm production assuming 35,000 WPM.</p> + <p>Within the hemisphere as well, a multitude of tools exist for joint exercises and trainings, ranging from Joint Combined Exchange Trainings, which focus on improving linkages between special forces, to larger initiatives involving thousands of personnel from several countries, such as PANAMAX 22, which concluded in August of last year. More exercises seeking to bring together a broad cross-section of the hemisphere may be important for fostering a sense of regional solidarity and alignment that China will find difficult to replicate.</p> -<p>Smartphone companies tend to be early adopters of new semiconductor technology nodes. If the production capacity was directed not toward phones but other uses, such as manufacturing AI chips, which tend to be far larger, then SMIC could manufacture perhaps 10 million per year even at low yields. AI chips tend to be much larger and thus put more of their production investment at risk from manufacturing defects. AI chip producers tend to adopt a manufacturing process node roughly two years after the smartphone early adopters because by that time the defect rate has come down considerably. Further analysis of the implications of this chip for China’s AI sector is included later in this report.</p> + <p>The United States can further leverage the National Guard’s State Partnership Program, which has active relationships with 27 countries in the region, to serve as a force multiplier in training efforts. An integrated approach to professional military education which brings together SOUTHCOM, embassy, and National Guard personnel to train partner militaries would be a major step forward in terms of demonstrating sustained U.S. commitment and building up important skills. Such exercises can be tailored based on the security needs of the country in question while remaining oriented around a single key capability, such as cybersecurity or disaster response, to have the greatest effect.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Enhance interagency and international cooperation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.</strong></p> -<p>It is currently unclear based on the available information whether or not SMIC has also benefitted from illegal technology purchases made in violation of the October 7 or other U.S. export controls. Dylan Patel, Afzal Ahmad, and Myron Xie of the semiconductor consulting firm Semianalysis have argued forcefully, however, that this is indeed the case. Their provocative claims are worth quoting at length:</p> + <p>HADR represents one of the most critical mission sets the United States conducts in the hemisphere. The ability of U.S. forces to access disaster areas and distribute lifesaving aid, combined with the presence of pre-positioned supplies in the region through Joint Task Force Bravo, makes the U.S. military an indispensable partner. However, demand for HADR in LAC is liable to grow significantly across the region. SOUTHCOM can strengthen the United States’ role in disaster relief operations by expanding its efforts to convene regional militaries for planning, coordination, and exercises to improve responses in a region that has been heavily impacted as of late by extreme weather, health crises, and natural disasters. The two-week Tradewinds exercise, the 38th iteration of which included more than 1,800 participants from 21 partner countries as well as every branch of the U.S. Armed Forces, is one of the most important tools in this regard for bolstering multilateral disaster response capabilities. SOUTHCOM’s investments in compact “clinic in a can” medical facilities, which can be deployed rapidly to offer care in times of crisis, also represent an important development for making U.S. HADR more reactive and prompt.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>The equipment companies such as Applied Materials, Lam Research, Tokyo Electron, KLA, Screen, ASM International, Kokusai, etc. are selling basically every tool they offer to China. This is because most deposition, etch, metrology, cleaning, coaters, developers, ion implant, epitaxy, etc. tools for 7nm and even 5nm can also plausibly be used in 28nm. These tools are being sold to SMIC for “28nm,” but, in reality, SMIC is lying to the firms’ faces and using them for 7nm.</p> -</blockquote> + <p>However, the United States continues to struggle to harmonize its policies around when and where humanitarian assistance can be deployed. Currently, USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs (USAID/BHA), as the lead agency on HADR, must issue a disaster assistance declaration before actors such as SOUTHCOM can step in. This process risks creating delays when speed is of the essence. It also limits the United States’ ability to engage partner countries on crises which may not rise to the level of a declared disaster, such as wildfires, oil spills, or water shortages. The United States should consider signing MOUs with countries in the region that allow local U.S. first-response elements to be deployed on request from partner governments.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>While SMIC is expanding 28nm and other trailing edge nodes, it is much less than they claim as these tools are being rerouted to leading edge. It’s even possible that people within these equipment firms know what’s happening, but are turning a blind eye.</p> -</blockquote> + <p>Another area for increased focus should be developing and offering more courses on HADR operations as part of U.S. professional military education and training programs. Such efforts will be important for regional militaries to develop their own strategies for disaster response and ensuring these synergize with SOUTHCOMs efforts. Information-sharing mechanisms should also be strengthened as the first pillar of disaster risk reduction, and streamlining early-warning and first-responder communications should be a critical area for investment.</p> -<p>The Semianalysis authors did not specifically disclose the sources for these claims in their article but elsewhere cited “rumors from China.” One industry source told CSIS that illegal diversion of U.S. exports in materials and spare parts to prohibited Chinese end uses and end users was “rampant” even after October 7, 2022, and that the end-use controls outlined in section 744.23 were being intentionally violated by SMIC and other advanced Chinese chip manufacturers. Other industry sources told CSIS that rumors of diversion at the fully integrated equipment level were entirely false and that diversion at the subsystem and part levels was done by third parties, not U.S. firms. These accusations may or may not be true, and there has been no proof provided to verify or disprove the accusations. Nevertheless, they deserve immediate investigation by the U.S. government.</p> + <p>Finally, to the extent possible, the United States should more extensively leverage partners from outside the hemisphere to augment its own HADR capabilities. For instance, Taiwan has a strong track record with its seven diplomatic allies, and closer cooperation with SOUTHCOM and USAID/BHA could help continue to elevate Taiwan’s profile in the region, along with that of other key U.S. partners, including South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Improve cooperation on countering illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and the nexus between transnational organized crime and environmental crimes.</strong></p> -<p>If exports are being diverted from their legally licensed destination toward fabs that are operating toward prohibited end uses, that is strong legal justification for the U.S. government and its allies to strengthen export control restrictions. It is at a minimum plausible that SMIC’s claims to be expanding capacity at 28 nm are disingenuous. Other Chinese chipmaking companies have built fabs with the explicit intention of starting production at 28 nm and later shifting production to more advanced technology nodes. In February 2021, a Chinese news outlet reported that SMIC’s Huahong Factory No. 6 in Shanghai would begin production at 28 nm but that SMIC ultimately planned to upgrade the facility to 14 nm with a production capacity of 40,000 WPM. However, SMIC does have a large and growing set of customers for 28 nm production, so this transition to 7 nm, even if planned, may be well in the future.</p> + <p>Just as climate change and environmental degradation is creating new risks for LAC countries and the United States alike, environmental crime throughout the hemisphere has surged. IUU fishing, in particular, is one of the most pervasive criminal, environmental, and economic challenges facing the region today. It is also a sector in which militaries, especially navies and coast guards, play a vital role. China stands out as one of the largest perpetrators of IUU fishing both globally and in LAC. China’s vast deep-water fishing fleet represents an important tool in Beijing’s gray zone arsenal in the South China Sea, often deployed alongside PLAN vessels as provocations in disputed waters.</p> -<h3 id="impacts-of-export-controls-on-chinas-chipmaking-and-chip-equipment-industries">Impacts of Export Controls on China’s Chipmaking and Chip Equipment Industries</h3> + <p>In the Western Hemisphere as well, China’s complicity in IUU fishing presents layered security and environmental risks, such as in 2019, when more than 300 Chinese vessels conducted thousands of hours of illegal fishing off the coast of the Galápagos Islands, prompting urgent calls for assistance from the Ecuadorean navy. Elsewhere along the Southern Cone of South America, vessels originating from China have decimated marine ecosystems and been found responsible for labor and human rights abuses onboard. Likewise, other forms of environmental crime, such as wildlife trafficking and illegal logging, have grown in the hemisphere. Critically, these operations often form part of a nexus involving China, with the illicit animal trade in Mexico, for instance, becoming an increasingly important channel through which cartels acquire fentanyl precursors from China.</p> -<p>However, even if there are legal grounds for expanded export controls, the U.S. government must have a clear sense of what effect strengthened export controls are realistically going to have and how the United States would know whether or not its efforts are succeeding.</p> + <p>The United States should seek to raise awareness of China’s complicity in such activities in both regional and international fora. Indeed, China’s tacit encouragement of IUU fishing by its deep-water fleets undermines Beijing’s efforts to style itself as an exemplar of law and order at home and abroad. The United States should support efforts such as Panama’s recently announced IUU fishing protection center and seek to lead joint trainings and even enforcement exercises against IUU fishing fleets. U.S. Coast Guard, Navy, and Air Force assets should all consider host-nation rider programs to allow regional militaries to come aboard for hands-on training and exchange. Indeed, both Panama and Ecuador were highlighted as priority countries for cooperation in the United States’ five-year strategy for countering IUU fishing. Outside of the military realm, the United States, through the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, can pursue capacity-building partnerships with LAC governments on environmental crime and seek to improve intelligence sharing with national police forces on activities such as illegal wildlife and timber trafficking.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Strengthen awareness and training on cybersecurity.</strong></p> -<p>YMTC is the clearest test case for the power of unilateral U.S. semiconductor export controls against Chinese chipmakers. With a blanket export ban adopted in December 2022, YMTC’s entity list restrictions are far stronger than anything that the United States placed on SMIC or included in the October 7 regulations. Reporting by the Financial Times and South China Morning Post claims that YMTC was initially hit hard by the controls, but that a combination of government subsidies, Dutch and Japanese equipment, previously purchased U.S. equipment, and the improving quality of Chinese equipment suppliers has given YMTC the confidence to restart advanced NAND memory production and make major investments.</p> + <p>Cyber vulnerabilities not only create practical information security risks that damage the national security of LAC countries, but a lack of general knowledge on cybersecurity also opens the door to Chinese offers to provide quick solutions. China is also not the only extra-hemispheric authoritarian making such inroads; the Brazilian military renewed its contract with the Russian company Kaspersky Lab to provide cybersecurity services in the summer of 2022 as the war in Ukraine was raging and just as the company was deemed a national security risk by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission.</p> -<p>It is worth emphasizing again that YMTC had been extensively preparing for U.S. export controls since 2019 — three-and-a-half years before the time they arrived. Furthermore, YMTC will have arguably had more than four-and-a-half years of preparation by the time Dutch controls take full effect in January 2024.</p> + <p>In March 2023, the United States released the National Cybersecurity Strategy, which included among its objectives efforts to “expand U.S. ability to assist allies and partners” as well as avenues for both multilateral and bilateral cooperation on network resilience and countering digital threats. One starting point would be to encourage LAC countries to adopt their own cybersecurity strategies. Indeed, less than half of the countries in the Western Hemisphere currently have a national plan for addressing cyber threats. Alongside the development of national strategies, U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) can engage directly with regional armed forces to outline the importance of developing specialized units for national defense of the digital domain.</p> -<p>At the same time, China’s domestic semiconductor equipment sector is experiencing significant growth and collectively organizing itself around the goal of producing alternatives to U.S. equipment, components, and spare parts. Analysis by CINNO Research, a Chinese consultancy, finds that the 10 largest Chinese semiconductor manufacturing equipment firms have seen their revenue increase 39 percent compared with 2022, totaling $2.2 billion for the first half of 2023. This builds on progress that was already underway even before October 2022. Dr. Doug Fuller of the Copenhagen Business School claims that Chinese semiconductor equipment firms have increased their share of China’s domestic market from 8.5 percent in 2020 to 25 percent in the first 10 months of 2022, though these sales were overwhelmingly concentrated at legacy nodes and far from the state of the art. Chinese equipment firms are also concentrated in non-critical processes.</p> + <p>SOUTHCOM, in partnership with CYBERCOM and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, can lead training with partner countries to outline key risks and the elements of a better strategy to counter cyber threats. Such efforts should also leverage U.S. allies and partners, with one key player in this regard being Costa Rica, which has invested heavily in shoring up its digital defenses since the 2022 Conti ransomware attacks. Indeed, regional partnerships will be critical to help tailor cybersecurity training to the LAC context and overcome language barriers and other obstacles to effective knowledge transfer. SOUTHCOM’s recent inauguration of a $9.8 million commitment to strengthen Costa Rica’s cyber defenses presents one opportunity to not only build up bilateral cooperation but potentially offer a springboard for regional cybersecurity efforts.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Invest in citizen security and delink citizen security from the regional conversation on drugs.</strong></p> -<p>Moreover, after October 7, the Chinese government has further increased its already massive subsidization of the semiconductor industry. In September, Reuters reported that China is preparing to launch a new $40 billion state-backed investment fund for its semiconductor sector. This follows similarly massive funds launched in 2014 and 2019. On September 18, 2023, the Chinese government strengthened R&amp;D tax incentives such that 120 percent of the cost of all R&amp;D by Chinese semiconductor companies can now be deducted from taxes. The semiconductor industry is among the most R&amp;D-intensive industries worldwide, so this is a massive subsidy stacked on top of many other massive subsidies that remain in effect.</p> + <p>While the United States is competing from a point of relative strength when it comes to military-to-military engagement, the reverse may be true with respect to policing and citizen security efforts. Insecurity is the single greatest security threat most LAC governments face today, meaning that without a credible plan for citizen security assistance, the United States risks ceding this critical front entirely to China in its efforts to engage regional police forces. Accordingly, U.S. law enforcement agencies, as well as the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, have an important role to play in articulating a counternarrative to China’s when it comes to citizen security.</p> -<p>The Dutch and Japanese export controls are a license requirement with unclear (at least in terms of publicly available information) license approval criteria. It is possible that the Dutch and Japanese licensing restrictions will be enforced similarly to the U.S. framework, which applies extremely broad restrictions for the advanced fabs such as the one that YMTC is building. If that is indeed the case, YMTC will be cut off from nearly every foreign machine that it needs to build and maintain its advanced fab legally. Whether or not illegal means are available will depend upon the strength of enforcement capacity.</p> + <p>One key weakness of the United States in the citizen security space is its lack of a comprehensive menu of options. When partner governments request assistance, such as when the Guillermo Lasso administration called out for a “Plan Ecuador” to address rising levels of violence and criminal activity, the United States often struggles to put together an effective package in response. The Department of State can lead an assessment of previous U.S. overseas security assistance programs, including efforts such as Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative. Identifying best practices and areas from improvement should subsequently inform U.S. planning for new citizen security partnerships. Understanding the types of assistance and their relative advantages and weaknesses is essential for the United States to be able to effectively deploy its resources to help partner governments. However, U.S. law enforcement and security assistance budgets have not kept pace with the needs of the region, meaning that ultimately Congress will need to appropriate additional resources to fully correct this mismatch.</p> -<p>However, it is worth asking whether or not Dutch or Japanese export controls can be truly effective in the absence of Dutch and Japanese legal equivalents to the U.S. FDPR and U.S. persons rule. The absence of such provisions has been a challenge for earlier Japanese export controls. Most notably, a recent World Bank analysis of Japan’s 2019 export controls on the sale of semiconductor manufacturing chemicals to South Korea found that Japanese chemical suppliers responded by simply shifting some production of the chemicals from Japan to their subsidiary companies headquartered in South Korea or by forming joint ventures with South Korean firms.</p> + <p>The United States should also seek to bring delegations from its own local police forces, such as from New York and Los Angeles, to the region to share their experience on data protection in police work. These departments employ sophisticated surveillance technologies, including thousands of security cameras, in their police work. Bringing them into contact with their counterparts in LAC represents one way to promote frameworks for responsible use of surveillance technology.</p> -<p>This was not in legal violation of Japanese export controls, though it was obviously in violation of the policy’s intent. If sales and shipments of Dutch and Japanese equipment, components, and spare parts are simply routed through foreign subsidiaries or distributors, then the export controls will have limited effect on China’s ability to expand advanced node production. Many Dutch and Japanese business executives will likely use all legal means available to continue sales to China. At least one Japanese business executive has already stated his intention to “develop duplicate supply chains — one for the U.S.-led economic bloc and one for the China-led bloc.”</p> + <p>Another particularly impactful development would be the establishment of a new International Law Enforcement Academy in the Caribbean region, where China has made significant inroads in the field of police and citizen security efforts. Given the important role of the armed forces in many LAC countries for countering transnational organized crime, SOUTHCOM has a role to play in ensuring healthy civil-military relations as well as best practices for armed forces which engage in domestic peace and security missions.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>One industry source told CSIS that “we’re definitely seeing the Chinese equipment industry making progress faster than previously expected.” The degree of dominance of U.S. firms in certain categories of semiconductor manufacturing equipment at the fully integrated systems level is real, but that is as the manager of a global supply chain in which other countries provide many components and subsystems that make up important parts of the finished system.</p> +<p>Even backed by strong political will and resource-backed commitments, countering China’s forays in the security and defense space represents just one facet of the grand strategy the United States needs to address China’s growing influence in LAC. Nevertheless, a revitalized, multifaceted, and forward-looking U.S. approach to defense and security in the Western Hemisphere promises to pay dividends not only in the context of strategic competition but in meeting shared challenges together with allies and partners in the region.</p> -<p>Industry sources told CSIS that Chinese semiconductor equipment companies have worked aggressively to map U.S. equipment firms’ supply chains and to develop independent purchasing relationships with U.S. equipment companies’ non-U.S. suppliers. Because Chinese semiconductor equipment and component firms have already been subject to blanket U.S. export controls and have weak prospects for sales outside of China, they have little incentive to respect U.S. intellectual property, export controls, or other laws. Thus, these firms take advantage of non-U.S. suppliers where they are can and seek to reverse engineer U.S. or allied technology where they must.</p> +<hr /> -<p>One Chinese equipment company, AMEC, claimed at an August 2023 investor relations meeting that they have 35 different types of etching equipment tools under development that are designed to provide full coverage of the etching processes required for manufacturing sub-20 nm DRAM memory. Of these 35, AMEC claims that 14 of the tools are already in mass production, while the other 21 have completed laboratory verification. An industry source told CSIS that AMEC’s tools that have completed laboratory verification are two to five years away from being viable for mass production under ideal conditions, and that the actual time to availability may be longer. Regardless, this still represents significant progress from where AMEC was three years ago. As mentioned above, AMEC is part of the China’s new approach of centralizing collaboration between the Chinese government and leading private sector semiconductor firms, a collaboration led by Huawei.</p> +<p><strong>Ryan C. Berg</strong> is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is also an adjunct professor at the Catholic University of America and visiting research fellow at the University of Oxford’s Changing Character of War Programme. His research focuses on U.S.-Latin America relations, authoritarian regimes, armed conflict, strategic competition, and trade and development issues. He also studies Latin America’s criminal groups and the region’s governance and security challenges.</p> -<p>Industry sources also told CSIS that South Korean, European, and Japanese subsystems suppliers are aggressively pursuing the Chinese market that has been opened up in the wake of U.S. export controls. Two sources specifically stated that South Korean firms have been instrumental in providing spare parts, maintenance, and advisory services related to U.S. equipment.</p> +<p><strong>Henry Ziemer</strong> is a research associate with the Americas Program at CSIS, where he supports the program’s research agenda and coordinates event planning and outreach.</p>Ryan C. Berg and Henry ZiemerChina has long couched its engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean in primarily economic terms. However, China is becoming increasingly strident in its efforts to bolster defense and security initiatives in the Western Hemisphere.UK In N. European Security2023-10-17T12:00:00+08:002023-10-17T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/uk-in-northern-european-security<p><em>This Policy Brief is to explain why the UK has chosen to explicitly prioritise the security of Northern Europe following Russia’s war in Ukraine.</em></p> -<p>YMTC likewise has little incentive to comply with U.S. laws. As long as sales of components and materials are continuing through distributors in China, genuinely cutting YMTC off will be difficult unless the United States and its allies are willing to tighten restrictions on a China-wide basis. One industry expert told CSIS that the Department of Commerce has failed to effectively identify all the shell companies and industry partners that YMTC uses to continue receiving U.S. technology in violation of export controls. Multiple industry sources said the same was true of SMIC.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>CMXT, a Chinese DRAM memory producer, is reportedly spending hundreds of millions of dollars to purchase legacy equipment suitable for producing large quantities of legacy DRAM that is less advanced than the performance specifications in the October 7 controls. If CMXT’s intentions are sincere, then this is arguably a success story for the October 7 policy since CMXT had previously been planning to expand advanced node capacity. However, one industry analyst told CSIS that the composition of equipment purchases by CMXT is inconsistent with an intention of producing legacy DRAM chips and would make far more sense if CMXT’s true intention was to produce chips more advanced than those prohibited by the October 7 end-use controls. If true, this would suggest that CMXT is deceiving U.S. companies and regulators in order to amass a stockpile of U.S. equipment that will at some point be redirected to restricted end uses. Another industry source told CSIS that CMXT is open with its Dutch and Japanese equipment suppliers about its intention to produce chips more advanced than those allowed under U.S. export controls.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>The October 7 export controls — and especially the Dutch and Japanese restrictions — were too late to prevent SMIC from bringing online a facility that will likely soon achieve 35,000 WPM of 7 nm production capacity with decent, if not world-leading, yield. This is a genuine threat to U.S. and allied national security, not least because of what it likely means for the Chinese military’s access to domestically produced AI chips.</p> +<p>Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine was an inflection point for European security. For the UK, it prompted a “refresh” of its defence, security and foreign policy. The March 2023 Integrated Review Refresh (IR2023) concluded that “the most pressing national security and foreign policy priority in the short-to-medium term is to address the threat posed by Russia to European security … and denying Russia any strategic benefit from its invasion”. Underpinning this ambition, the Refresh committed the UK to “lead and galvanise where we have most value to add, giving particular priority … to the contribution we can make in northern Europe as a security actor” (p. 11).</p> -<p>The highest levels of leadership in both the United States and China — including Xi Jinping — believe that leading in AI technology is critical to the future of global military and economic power. In May 2023, a group of AI industry and academic leaders issued a statement warning that the risks of advanced AI should be viewed in the same way as pandemics and nuclear war. None of those risks will be any easier to manage if China achieves its vision of becoming an AI-enabled authoritarian superpower.</p> +<p>The purpose of this Policy Brief is to explain why the UK has chosen to explicitly prioritise the security of Northern Europe following Russia’s war against Ukraine. It identifies exactly where the UK is best placed to lead and galvanise to address the current and likely future Russian threat. There is no common definition of “Northern Europe” among Allies, so the Brief defines the region collectively as the sub-regions of the Arctic, the North Atlantic, the High North and the Baltic Sea region, extending to Estonia – the location of the UK-led NATO multinational battlegroup.</p> -<h3 id="potential-implications-for-chinas-ai-and-ai-chip-sector">Potential Implications for China’s AI and AI Chip Sector</h3> +<p>The explicit prioritisation of Northern Europe is a natural evolution of UK policy, and the increased investment in the region addresses both immediate security requirements – the acute Russian threat – and future ones, as rapidly melting ice in the Arctic creates viable sea lines of communication directly linking the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific – priority one and two geographic “strategic arenas” (pp. 3, 9) for the UK respectively. Given this, Northern Europe is a “transitional theatre” for the UK, where enhanced engagement now can produce value and strategic advantage for the UK – and its allies – in the future.</p> -<p>Huawei’s new chip and 5G phone attracted the bulk of the media attention during and after Secretary Raimondo’s August 2023 visit to China. However, the more strategically important disclosure related to Huawei’s progress on AI chips. On August 27, the chairman of iFlytek, one of China’s largest and most technologically sophisticated AI companies, said at a conference that “I am particularly happy to tell you that Huawei’s GPU capabilities are now the same as Nvidia’s A100. [Huawei CEO] Ren Zhengfei attaches great importance to it, and three directors of Huawei have gone to work in iFlytek at HKUST [Hong Kong University of Science and Technology]. Now they have benchmarked against Nvidia’s A100 [Google automated translation].”</p> +<p>The UK offers unique value to Northern Europe as a security actor for three principal reasons. First, the UK, as a regional geopolitical heavyweight, acts as a substantial backstop to the US presence and engagement. Second, the UK provides specialist military capabilities, spanning warfighting and sub-threshold, such as anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and other sub-sea capabilities that are in short supply in Europe and best match the Russian threat. Third, the geostrategic position of the British homeland – within the North Atlantic – is critical to the successful execution of NATO’s new regional defence plan for “the Atlantic and European Arctic” and “the Baltic and Central Europe”, alongside its transatlantic reinforcement plan. With growing and ambitious security commitments to Northern Europe, the UK is sending a strong message of reassurance to Allies and a strong signal of deterrence to Russia, and to China as a “near-Arctic state”, in the context of a growing partnership between the two powers in the Arctic.</p> -<p>In short, at the same time that Huawei was announcing its return to the 5G smartphone market, it was also announcing its return to the GPU (also known as AI chip) market. In contrast to more general-purpose processors, AI chips are specially designed to increase speed and reduce the power consumption of developing (referred to in the industry as “training”) and operationally using (referred to as “inference”) machine learning AI models.</p> +<p>The research for this Brief is drawn from two main sources. First, a review of UK government and NATO policy documents, including the 2021 Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper alongside their 2023 updates, and the UK’s Arctic and High North policies. Second, four expert-led roundtable discussions held between April 2022 and June 2023 and attended by Norwegian, UK and US officials and academics, in London, Oslo and Washington, DC. It is augmented with analysis of official government announcements, research papers and media reporting. This Policy Brief is part of a two-year transatlantic security dialogue in collaboration between RUSI, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The project is supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and focuses on the Norwegian, UK and US roles in securing Northern Europe.</p> -<p>Huawei has sold AI accelerator chips under its Ascend product line since 2019. These chips were designed by HiSilicon and manufactured by TSMC. This halted in May 2020 after the first Huawei FDPR rule. However, Huawei was rumored to have amassed a major stockpile of these chips, allowing the company to continue winning major data center contracts across China. Independent testing by Chinese university scholars in September 2022 found that that Huawei’s Ascend chips were inferior to Western competitor products, most notably Nvidia, on nearly all performance metrics related to chip design and hardware.</p> +<h3 id="why-is-the-uk-prioritising-northern-europe">Why is the UK Prioritising Northern Europe?</h3> -<p>However, in the case of Nvidia, its competitive dominance is based not only on the performance of its chips but also on the strength of the software ecosystem that is based upon Nvidia standards, particularly Nvidia’s CUDA software ecosystem. CUDA makes it much easier for programmers to write massively parallelized software (as all modern AI software is) and ensures backward and forward compatibility so that older chips can still run newer software and vice versa. Any customer who seeks to stop using Nvidia chips has to leave the CUDA ecosystem, which requires solving a lot of incredibly hard software problems for which CUDA already provides free answers. Those free answers reflect billions of dollars of investment in the CUDA platform by both Nvidia and its customers.</p> +<p>The explicit prioritisation of Northern European security is an evolution of UK policy over the past decade. The Arctic, and the High North in particular, have become central to UK strategic thinking, and they are the only regions to receive specific policy documents. UK objectives in the region are a blend of hard and soft security issues, majoring on: the protection of UK and Allied critical national infrastructure (CNI); reinforcing the rules-based international order and enforcing freedom of navigation; and managing climate change (pp. 10, 11). Central to the UK approach has been a similar security policy outlook and working with likeminded Allies and partners, in particular Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) members, on Euro-Atlantic security challenges, the utility of military force and the pervasive Russian threat. Indeed, UK engagement has increased significantly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; multilaterally through NATO, and minilaterally through the JEF and the Northern Group of Defence Ministers. These engagements are underpinned by bilateral and trilateral agreements, including most significantly the strong mutual security guarantees offered to both Finland and Sweden during the NATO membership process. The UK is also heavily reliant on the region for energy, with Norway being the UK’s primary gas supplier.</p> -<p>The strength of the combined offering of CUDA software and Nvidia hardware goes a long way toward explaining why Nvidia accounted for 95 percent of AI chip sales in China in 2022, according to estimates by Fubon Securities Investment Services.</p> +<p>The acute Russian threat in Northern Europe binds Allies together. Despite Russia severely weakening and fixing a large portion of its land forces in Ukraine, the country’s naval capabilities remain largely intact, through its Northern Fleet, including strategic nuclear forces, and its Baltic Fleet – notwithstanding heavy losses (p. 6) for two Russian Arctic brigades. Russia also intends to militarily reinforce the region in response to NATO enlargement. This short-term conventional military weakness is likely to push Russia to rely more heavily on hybrid activity and nuclear signalling to achieve its objectives, which may become a potential source of conflict escalation, and which feature heavily in its 2022 Maritime Doctrine. Furthermore, some European intelligence agencies, such as the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, assess that Russia could still exert “credible military pressure” on the Baltic states, and its military capabilities near the Estonian border could be “quantitatively reconstituted in up to four years” (p. 11).</p> -<p>Even in 2019, Huawei’s strategy for competing with Nvidia in the AI chip hardware market included creating a software alternative to CUDA, which Huawei refers to as its Compute Architecture for Neural Networks (CANN). According to Huawei, “CANN is not only a software platform, but also a development system that includes a programming language, compilation and debugging tools, and programming models. CANN creates a programming framework based on Ascend AI Processors.” Huawei claimed in September 2022 that Ascend and CANN were generating traction: “More than 900,000 developers have launched more than 1,100 AI solutions based on Ascend, which are widely used in government, telecommunications, finance, electricity, internet and other fields.”</p> +<p>As NATO orientates its new defence posture to defend “every inch” (p. 6) of NATO territory, the UK is galvanising its northern flank into the most secure Alliance region, a region that is continually the target of Russian hybrid aggression and exposed to persistent conventional and nuclear threat. The rationale for the UK’s strategic focus in the region and how this is perceived by the regional actors has been summarised thus:</p> -<p>iFlyTek is one AI firm that has close ties to the Chinese government, including developing AI technologies used in the surveillance and repression of China’s Uyghur minority. For this reason, iFlyTek was placed on the U.S. entity list in 2019. iFlyTek is therefore a natural target customer for Huawei’s AI chips, since its access to U.S. alternatives is restricted. Prior to the entity listing, iFlyTek primarily used Nvidia products.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Given that the United Kingdom shares historical, cultural, and geopolitical ties with the Nordic countries, the UK would benefit from having all Nordic countries within NATO. As relatively small countries, the Nordics would certainly benefit from the UK’s support, especially related to logistics, intelligence sharing, and the security provided by the nuclear umbrella. If combined with the UK’s capabilities and focus, this unified North would outrank any other European force structure and would help secure both the Eastern and Northern Flank of NATO.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>More recently, Huawei claimed in July 2023 that the number of Ascend and CANN developers has doubled to 1.8 million. It is unclear how Huawei is measuring the number of Ascend and CANN developers or how active an average Ascend developer is. For comparison, Nvidia said in May 2023 that CUDA has 4 million active developers and that CUDA has been downloaded more than 40 million times, including 25 million times in just the past year. Despite the October 2022 export controls, Nvidia’s chips that are legally approved for export to the Chinese market, the A800 and H800, are reportedly in high demand by Chinese hyperscale cloud computing vendors. The A800 and H800 are degraded versions of the A100 and H100 chips, respectively. Specifically, the A800 and H800 have equivalent processing power to their non-degraded counterparts but significantly reduced interconnect speed that is below the export control thresholds.</p> +<p>The UK is the European power best placed to lead and galvanise NATO’s northern flank and support the full integration of Finland (and Sweden) into the Alliance, both through providing strategic depth and its capabilities (military, non-military and command enablers), and through its significant defence and security engagement in the region.</p> -<p>Nvidia’s A100 models (launched in 2020) are manufactured by TSMC on their 7 nm process, while its H100 models (launched in 2022) use a custom TSMC 4 nm process node. Nvidia has not announced the release date for its forthcoming B100 product line, but it will reportedly use TSMC’s 3 nm process node and launch in either late 2024 or early 2025.</p> +<h3 id="the-uk-as-a-backstop-for-us-engagement-and-presence-in-northern-europe">The UK as a Backstop for US Engagement and Presence in Northern Europe</h3> -<p>All of this suggests that even Nvidia’s products that are degraded to comply with export controls will be more attractive than Huawei’s alternatives for at least the next few years. Huawei and SMIC do not have a clear path to producing chips beyond the 5 nm node, and SMIC will likely have poor unit economics to produce 5 nm chips without access to EUV technology. The greater maturity of the CUDA software ecosystem also makes Nvidia chips more attractive.</p> +<p>The US is the indispensable security partner for Northern Europe, a region that has a strongly transatlantic outlook. For Nordic states, and to a lesser extent Baltic states, strategic depth is secured primarily through NATO and the Article 5 security guarantee, and augmented by bilateral and trilateral agreements that bind the US to the region. For example, Norway’s defence relies on a denial ambition until Allied (US) reinforcements are in position. Moreover, Norway’s role as a reception, staging and onward integration location for US reinforcements will become more important as Finland, and soon Sweden, joins the Alliance. Indeed, the inclusion of Finland and Sweden in NATO defensive plans will provide increased strategic depth, especially with the scale of forces that Finland can mobilise at short notice, but Nordic defence will remain heavily reliant on follow-on forces from the US. Therefore, the fundamental risk that security actors in Northern Europe must manage is the possible reduction of attention and corresponding drawdown in US assets to redeploy to the Indo-Pacific as US security concerns there grow, especially if the war in Ukraine ends on terms that benefit NATO, or a US president less sympathetic to European security is elected in 2024. This possibility is a strategic risk for Northern Europe, not only in terms of overall mass in the form of combat-capable brigades, but also in terms of specialist capabilities such as ISR. In the short term, the UK is the only European country realistically able to support Europe’s “ISR gap” in Northern Europe, and it is unlikely to contribute more brigades to NATO’s New Force Model for the remainder of the decade.</p> -<p>However, if the performance thresholds specified in the October 7 export controls are held constant, then the attractiveness of Nvidia products compared with Huawei alternatives could change significantly in the future. The current performance penalty for training large AI models with the degraded Nvidia chips is reportedly in the range of 10 to 30 percent. This is significant, but able to be overcome by Chinese AI firms that benefit from both government subsidies and a protected domestic market.</p> +<p>As a major regional power, the UK’s engagement and capabilities are best able to mitigate any potential US shortfall and provide enhanced strategic depth. US Arctic priorities are motivated by strategic competition, whereas the Nordic states prioritise defence and deterrence against Russia. The UK is positioned on a scale between the two, and can play an important role in bridging between them. Specifically, the UK is best placed to lead in two areas, both of which already enjoy high levels of cooperation with the US, providing critical continuity.</p> -<p>Industry sources told CSIS that the performance penalty will grow over time as the consequences of capped interconnect speed become more and more pronounced. This could potentially mean that Huawei chips, which would obviously not comply with interconnect speed restrictions, could have superior overall performance even if they are manufactured on an inferior semiconductor process node. Moreover, there are other sources of improvement to chip performance besides adopting a superior manufacturing process node. Nvidia’s chief scientist Bill Dally recently said that of the 1,000-fold performance improvement that AI model training on Nvidia chips has undergone over the past 10 years, semiconductor manufacturing process node improvements were only the third most important factor. More specifically, he said that process node improvements had delivered a two-and-a-half times performance boost between the 28 nm node and 5 nm node.</p> +<p>First, NATO considers Russia’s ability to disrupt Atlantic reinforcement in the High North a “strategic challenge” (p. 4). The UK has traditionally secured the Greenland–Iceland–UK gap with ASW capabilities and, more recently, through the UK–US–Norway trilateral interoperability (p. 21) of the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), which increases availability of a critical ISR capability and allows it to operate further north. The ability to operate further north is a growing requirement, as Russia has refitted multiple vessels with the 3M-54 Kalibr missile, which gives a longer range to precision strike operations, allowing Russian assets to enjoy better protection of its Arctic and High North defensive bastions, in turn drawing NATO assets further north. To meet this challenge, Norway is hosting NATO submarines (p. 22), mainly from the UK and the US, in new Norwegian facilities to enable operations to push further north to match Russia’s reach. Moreover, the UK has established a land and littoral presence in the High North, now operating from a new facility in Norway called Camp Viking. With a multi-domain presence and specialist capabilities, including logistic and intelligence enablers, the UK is the best placed European nation to secure end-to-end transatlantic reinforcements from the US to NATO’s eastern front, thereby delivering strategic depth.</p> -<p>This suggests that — even if export controls were able to effectively constrain China’s AI development to the 28 nm node as was their original intent — there are limits to how much export controls on Nvidia and related firms can degrade the performance of U.S. AI chips before Chinese firms will make an economically rational choice to buy domestic alternatives, such as those designed by Huawei, Biren, or Cambricon. Chinese AI firms would likely prefer a 28 nm Chinese chip over a 7 nm U.S. chip if the U.S. chips’ interconnect speed limitations degrade AI model training performance more than the use of an older node degrades the Chinese chips’ performance.</p> +<p>Second, the UK can lead on re-establishing and maintaining strategic stability, consistent with “a new long-term goal to manage the risks of miscalculation and escalation between major powers, upholding strategic stability through strategic-level dialogue and an updated approach to arms control and counter-proliferation” (p. 13). The UK, as a European nuclear power, will be a valuable actor in the region, which also hosts Russian strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. Moreover, the UK is well placed to support Finland and Sweden as they join a nuclear alliance and, for the first time, have a direct role in nuclear policy and planning, by providing a greater understanding of deterrence, risk reduction and arms control.</p> -<p>However, the 28 nm target might now be out of reach, unless the United States and its allies are willing to engage in dramatically more aggressive restrictions. If SMIC is able to build out Chinese domestic availability of 7 nm production capacity with adequate reliability and yield, that would significantly accelerate the timeframe in which Chinese AI development firms such as Alibaba and Baidu might find Huawei chips attractive in comparison to those of Nvidia. There are, of course, significant switching costs to leaving the CUDA ecosystem.</p> +<h3 id="galvanising-nato-command-and-control">Galvanising NATO Command and Control</h3> -<p>Along with the Chinese government and its corporate partners, Huawei is now engaged in a project to build a Chinese computing ecosystem that is entirely independent of the United States. The list of projects that Huawei and its partners have underway at varying levels of maturity is extraordinary. It includes at a minimum the following:</p> +<p>Finland, and eventually Sweden, joining NATO fundamentally changes defence and security policy in Northern Europe. Finland’s membership has already doubled the NATO border with Russia, and the inclusion of Sweden will expand the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s land area of operations by more than 866,000 km2. While this obviously presents significant opportunities for NATO, there are also considerable challenges. The UK has an interest in being a security “integrator” in the region by supporting its newest members and building coherence between Nordic and Baltic regional plans and Alliance command and control (C2). Here there is a significant opportunity for the UK to lead and galvanise and make a major contribution to Euro-Atlantic security.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>EDA chip design software;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Chip manufacturing equipment;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Chip manufacturing facilities;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Chip designs for personal computers, smartphones, and data centers;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>AI chip enablement software ecosystems;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>AI software development frameworks;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>AI models;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Computer and smartphone software operating systems;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Computer, smartphone, and data center hardware systems; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Cloud computing.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The enlargement creates NATO C2 headaches for Northern Europe, as does the timing gap between the two countries joining. Finland has joined under the command of Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum, alongside the Baltic states, Poland and Germany. However, Norway (and likely Sweden when it joins) falls under JFC Norfolk in the US, which is responsible for the North Atlantic, including the Arctic. This arrangement (p. 14) creates C2 incoherence between the “European Arctic and Atlantic” and “Baltic and Central Europe” defence plans, which will make their execution more difficult and create potential friction precisely when the Nordic states are finally united in NATO, and it could set back growing defence integration efforts between them. Integrating NATO’s regional plans and Nordic–Baltic security policy more broadly will be critical to their delivery. Specifically, better integrating Finland and Estonia would best serve this purpose, securing the Baltic Sea and containing Russia and denying it freedom of manoeuvre in wartime between St Petersburg and access to the Baltic Sea and Kaliningrad.</p> -<p>In much the same way that one of the first major initial uses of the Chinese yuan currency for international trade transactions was avoiding U.S. sanctions, the initial customer base for Huawei’s alternative AI computing ecosystem is sanctioned and entity-listed actors in China. That may soon grow to include other countries such as Russia and Iran. Within China, entity-listed firms and government agencies comprise a larger and more technologically sophisticated customer base than is commonly understood in Western policy circles. iFlyTek, for example, has routinely published research papers at leading international AI conferences. Even after being sanctioned, iFlyTek has 40 percent market share in China’s automotive voice recognition market.</p> +<p>UK engagement and interests straddle the Nordic and Baltic states through the JEF, the Northern Group of Defence Ministers, and close bilateral security cooperation with both Finland and Estonia – the latter being the location of the UK-led NATO multinational battlegroup. The July 2023 Defence Command Paper Refresh stated:</p> -<p>Beyond the Chinese domestic market, the other critical market for Huawei’s technology stack is exports, especially to the global South.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">As the Alliance looks to welcome in two new members, the UK will also lead the collaboration amongst Allies to shape a revised Control and Command structure, with a specific focus on Northern Europe – the regional area of greatest importance to our homeland defence (p. 62).</code></em></strong></p> -<h3 id="the-need-for-timely-us-intelligence-collection-and-technology-analysis-on-chinas-semiconductors">The Need for Timely U.S. Intelligence Collection and Technology Analysis on China’s Semiconductors</h3> +<p>As an established European framework nation, the UK – known for its C2 ability, structures and maturity – would be well placed to manage Finland and Swedish integration and C2 coherence in Northern Europe. During the Cold War, the UK was a C2 enabler for NATO, emphasising strengths in the naval and air domains, through Allied Forces Northern Europe and UK Command through Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe. Today, the UK hosts both NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM) and JEF C2 through Standing Joint Force Headquarters, which, since the Russian invasion, has deployed nodes and liaison officers across Northern Europe.</p> -<p>Perhaps the most surprising fact about the Huawei breakthrough is that so many U.S. government leaders were evidently surprised. Asked about the chip on September 6, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated that “I’m going to withhold comment on the particular chip in question until we get more information about precisely its character and composition.” Similarly, a group of Republican members of Congress wrote a letter to Department of Commerce leadership in which they expressed being “extremely troubled and perplexed” by what the Huawei phone suggests about the efficacy of U.S. export controls.</p> +<h3 id="uk-leadership-of-the-jef">UK Leadership of the JEF</h3> -<p>None of these statements give confidence that these U.S. leaders in either the White House or Congress are receiving good intelligence about the state of China’s quest for semiconductor self-sufficiency. If this is indeed the case, it is simply unacceptable. It is possible, of course, that the U.S. intelligence community has more answers than the U.S. government is making public.</p> +<p>The JEF has developed into a key mechanism for the UK to provide leadership in Northern Europe and galvanise the Nordic and Baltic states together to optimise defence and deterrence against Russia. In 2022, the JEF came of age. The first-ever JEF leaders’ meeting was held the day after Russia’s invasion, followed by two more during the year, which included a commitment to developing a 10-year vision ahead of the 2023 leaders’ summit.</p> -<p>The October 7 export controls were one of the most important foreign policy moves that the Biden administration adopted in 2022, perhaps second only to supporting Ukraine against the Russian invasion. Senior U.S. national security and foreign policy leaders need to know to what extent that policy is having the intended effect, and they need to learn that before China rubs it in a U.S. cabinet secretary’s face during a trip to China.</p> +<p>The September 2022 attacks on the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines in the Baltic Sea brought into sharper focus the security requirement to better protect CNI, and highlighted the risk of attacks specifically to undersea assets. This was reinforced by the October 2023 damage to the Balticconnector natural gas pipeline and communications cable between Finland and Estonia likely caused by “external activity”. This is an area where the Russian threat is acute. NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security, David Cattler, has warned of an increase in Russian submarine and underwater activity, including “actively mapping allied critical infrastructure both on land and on the seabed”.</p> -<p>The Huawei phone and SMIC chip were not well-kept secrets. Reports of Huawei returning to the 5G market with a SMIC-manufactured 7 nm chip were already widespread enough in July of this year that Chinese industry executives were publicly commenting on it.</p> +<p>To respond, the JEF will focus activity on countering hybrid aggression in its area of operations of the North Atlantic, High North and Baltic, especially in relation to the protection of CNI, including underwater cables and pipelines. Here, the UK provides leadership, through committing to protect Allied CNI, alongside upholding freedom of navigation and international norms in the region. Immediately following the Nord Stream attacks, the UK announced that two Multirole Ocean Surveillance ships would be sped into service. This capability, alongside Astute-class submarines, mine-countermeasure vessels and RAF MPA, will be critical to protecting underwater CNI. Moreover, MARCOM hosts NATO’s new Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell, and the UK has signed new bilateral agreements such as the UK–Norway strategic partnership on undersea threats. The UK, as a regional geopolitical heavyweight, is ideally situated to engage with the JEF collectively and individually; to link its agenda to other key regional actors, such as France, Germany and Poland; and to develop greater JEF coherence between the myriad of security institutions in Northern Europe, including NATO, the EU, the Northern Group of Defence Ministers, Nordic Defence Cooperation and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable.</p> -<p>Hopefully, this incident merely reflects a failure of the relevant information to reach U.S. leaders and not a genuine gap in the capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community. During the Cold War, the U.S. intelligence community produced exceptionally good analyses of the Soviet semiconductor industry and the effectiveness of U.S. semiconductor export controls. Today, there are a host of critical questions about the Chinese semiconductor industry and the effectiveness of U.S. export controls where the U.S. intelligence community needs to supply senior U.S. decisionmakers with timely intelligence. Here is just a sample:</p> +<h3 id="conclusion-the-uk-orients-to-future-challenges-in-northern-europe">Conclusion: The UK Orients to Future Challenges in Northern Europe</h3> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Are SMIC or CMXT deceiving U.S. semiconductor equipment companies when they claim that post-October 7 equipment purchases are going to be exclusively used for production less advanced than the October 7 technology thresholds?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How much advanced chip production capacity does SMIC intend to build out? At what technology nodes will this occur and over what timeframe?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Does the Chinese government intend to pressure Chinese businesses and consumers to purchase Huawei smartphones and chips (and not to purchase U.S. alternatives) in order to drive economies of scale? If so, what will be the likely costs to U.S. firms in terms of lost sales?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How are SMIC and YMTC getting spare parts to continue operating their advanced node U.S. equipment? Are they illegally diverting U.S. exports via shell companies or other tactics? Are they being supplied by foreign firms that manufacture viable alternatives? Or are there Chinese companies with adequate technology to supply them?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Are reports that YMTC is close to restarting advanced production with improved Chinese domestic equipment alternatives true? Is YMTC also benefitting from equipment and components acquired in violation of U.S. export controls?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How much technological progress have domestic Chinese equipment makers made, and in what areas? How much foreign help are they receiving, and from what sources?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>What level of Chinese government subsidization are Huawei and SMIC specifically receiving to support their advanced node manufacturing? Do the firms have a credible path to profitable 7 nm products without government support? Is the Chinese government prepared to sustain or increase this support indefinitely?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How has China’s crackdown on foreign consulting firms impacted the ability of U.S. compliance companies to engage in substantive due diligence prior to selling to Chinese companies?</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The explicit prioritisation of Northern Europe addresses both immediate UK security requirements – defence and deterrence against Russia – and future challenges – China’s increasing presence in the Arctic and High North as a “near-Arctic state”, and growing Sino-Russian cooperation. The IR2023 declared that the prosperity and security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific were “inextricably linked”, upgraded China as an “epoch-defining challenge”, and cemented the Indo-Pacific “tilt” as a permanent pillar of UK foreign policy (pp. 9, 3, 22). A rapidly heating Arctic climate will make the Northern Sea Route increasingly navigable during the summer and the Transpolar Sea Route will likely be usable by 2050 (p. 36). This transformational geopolitical change will directly link the UK’s two priority geographic “strategic arenas” – politically, economically and militarily – which will fundamentally impact UK and Euro-Atlantic security. Given this, NATO may have not only to contend with Russia, but also with a more assertive Chinese presence in the Arctic and High North. Therefore, heavily investing in Northern Europe now will enhance UK strategic advantage, reassure Allies and deter future threats.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion-the-future-of-export-controls">Conclusion: The Future of Export Controls</h3> +<hr /> -<p>Limiting China’s access to advanced AI chips is a highly desirable national security outcome. However, given the flaws and long timelines for how the Trump and Biden administrations have pursued export control policies, it is difficult to see how the United States could degrade China’s current technological state of the art without dramatically expanding export controls and significantly increasing resources devoted to identifying and patching loopholes and strictly enforcing violations.</p> +<p><strong>Ed Arnold</strong> is a Research Fellow for European Security within the International Security department at RUSI. His experience covers defence, intelligence, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, within the public and private sector. His primary research focus is on the transformation of European security following Russia’s war on Ukraine. Specifically, he covers the evolving Euro-Atlantic security architecture, the security of northern Europe, and the UK contribution to European security through NATO, the Joint Expeditionary Force, and other fora. Ed has a particular interest in UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Reviews.</p>Ed ArnoldThis Policy Brief is to explain why the UK has chosen to explicitly prioritise the security of Northern Europe following Russia’s war in Ukraine.Containing A Catastrophe2023-10-17T12:00:00+08:002023-10-17T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/containing-a-catastrophe<p><em>As Israel prepares to launch a ground offensive in Gaza, there is a real risk that the war could escalate into a wider conflagration. Efforts to contain the conflict will test key relationships across the region.</em></p> -<p>It is not clear, for example, that even a complete entity listing of SMIC with presumption of denial for all products would cause the SN1 and SN2 fabs to shut down. With the current staffing and budget given to the Department of Commerce for export controls, there are reasons to doubt that the U.S. government can identify shell companies at the rate that Huawei, SMIC, and their partners can create them. Only China-wide restrictions imposed simultaneously and without advance notice by the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands on multiple categories of exports, especially raw materials, would have a clear path to shutting down the SMIC fabs.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>If SMIC has indeed been engaged in a massive campaign of export control evasion and has been providing false information to U.S. firms for their export license applications, then the case for such an option is stronger. It would provide strong evidence that China is already sprinting full out toward its own strategy for semiconductor decoupling without the slightest care of complying with U.S. law or preserving room for reaching an understanding with the United States.</p> +<p>It is already clear that Hamas’s attack on Israel on 7 October was a watershed moment. It was the deadliest attack on the State of Israel since its existence; its scale and brutality make it paradigm-shifting. Looking to past conflicts – the Gaza wars of 2008/09, 2012 and 2014, for example, or the Israel–Hezbollah war in 2006 – therefore has only limited value. A week after the attack, there are two broad scenarios for how this crisis could unfold.</p> -<p>In such a case, the United States might conclude that it is better for semiconductor decoupling to happen when it is inconvenient for China rather than wait for China to do it when it is more convenient and on China’s terms.</p> +<h3 id="two-scenarios-for-escalation">Two Scenarios for Escalation</h3> -<p>But it will likely be more difficult to persuade U.S. allies to go along with such extreme measures if SMIC’s achievement has been done entirely or almost entirely through equipment purchases made in full compliance with U.S. law.</p> +<p>In the first scenario, the Israel–Hamas war could stay contained to Gaza and southern Israel. The launch of Israel’s impending attack on Hamas “from the air, sea and land” will have unpredictable consequences. But there is still the possibility that the war could remain limited in scope, at least geographically.</p> -<p>What if SMIC has simply been exploiting legal loopholes in the Trump administration approach and taking advantage of the Biden administration’s very slow onboarding of Japan and the Netherlands? What if SMIC is sincere in its statements that the massive expansion of fab capacity that it is bringing online will exclusively be used for 28 nm production?</p> +<p>In the second scenario, the war could expand beyond southern Israel and become a regional conflict. The escalation logic of this scenario is plain: the unfolding war in Gaza could lead other groups that define themselves through their resistance or enmity towards Israel – most notably armed Palestinian factions in the West Bank; Hezbollah in Lebanon; Iranian-backed groups in Syria, Iraq or elsewhere; or even Iran itself – to conclude that they must get involved lest they lose legitimacy. A major attack on Israel by any of these actors would likely be met with a furious response from the Israeli military, which would in turn further fuel escalation in the region.</p> -<p>U.S. allies will be more willing to restrict the actions of their companies and citizens if they understand the evidence of reverse engineering and illegal purchases of equipment, as well as how China’s plans are not in their own national interest. This underscores the need for timely and high-quality intelligence.</p> +<p>Thus far, the clashes and skirmishes that have occurred in the West Bank and across the Israeli-Lebanese and Israeli-Syrian borders have remained relatively limited, indicating a level of intentional restraint on all sides. Nevertheless, the escalation scenario should not be dismissed as alarmist. Much will be written in the coming months about how it was possible for Israel to fail to see Hamas’s 7 October attack coming. One conclusion is likely to be that there was a failure of imagination: Israeli and other intelligence services may have been aware of various different Hamas actions or of Israel’s own vulnerabilities, but the dots were not joined together – it wasn’t just that no one thought that an attack of such scale was possible, but that no one had thought of such an attack at all. Policymakers around the world, including in the UK, now have a responsibility not to commit the same mistake and to take a potential escalation of the conflict – even beyond all precedent – seriously.</p> -<p>There are other aspects of this story where SMIC could be in violation of U.S. law besides whether SMIC’s post-October 2022 equipment purchases were intended for 7 nm manufacturing. The FDPR as applied to Huawei has thus far restricted the ability of firms that use U.S. equipment to produce chips on behalf of Huawei, regardless of when that equipment was purchased. The rule, as written, also includes coverage of more than exports, including in-country transfers (such as the SMIC’s sale of chips to Huawei). A group of U.S. members of Congress sent a letter to the Department of Commerce directly alleging that SMIC’s production on behalf of Huawei was in violation of U.S. export controls. As mentioned above, this does indeed seem to be the case.</p> +<p>To be clear, even the first scenario is catastrophic. The war in Gaza, like the attack that provoked it, has already reached unprecedented levels of brutality, bloodshed and destruction. The Israeli hostages taken by Hamas, together with hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who had no hand in Hamas’s actions at all, are in mortal jeopardy. Even among the combatants – both Hamas and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) – casualties must be expected at rates not seen before. Yet still, the second scenario is much worse.</p> -<p>The U.S. government’s response will have to take this into account. After all, if the United States fails to respond to export control violations by Chinese entities, firms in Taiwan, South Korea, Europe, and elsewhere will feel they are being unfairly treated when the U.S. government requires them to comply.</p> +<h3 id="regional-de-escalation-upended--and-tested">Regional De-Escalation Upended – and Tested</h3> -<p>One area where it makes obvious sense to expand restrictions is in preventing U.S. and allied companies from supporting the maturation of Chinese equipment and component companies. There is little strategic sense in allowing U.S. and allied companies to help China to prepare for decoupling with the United States and its allies. It is not in South Korea’s national interest, for example, for South Korean equipment and spare parts firms to aid China’s equipment indigenization effort. Nor is it in South Korea’s interest to allow South Korean consultants to train Chinese engineers on how to improve the yields of their memory production fabs. Both of these will inevitably be used to break South Korea’s leadership in semiconductor manufacturing.</p> +<p>Hamas’s attack has upended the regional trend towards de-escalation and reducing tensions that has prevailed in the Middle East over the past three years. The notion that governments in the region could agree to put their differences aside, rebuild diplomatic relations and focus on shared interests in economic development – all while leaving the leaving the root causes and underlying conflicts that led to instability and tensions in the first place unaddressed – has been exposed as untenable. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict – or, for that matter, the ongoing conflicts in Libya, Syria and Yemen, or the socio-economic cleavages in many other countries in the region – cannot be ignored or put in boxes, no matter how much governments in the region and beyond may want to focus on more positive agendas.</p> -<p>Similarly, the United States and its allies need to crack down on third-party sales of spare parts and components.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Governments across the region are likely to come under immense popular pressure as their populations rally in support of the Palestinians in Gaza</code></em></strong></p> -<p>In the absence of good intelligence, however, the United States will continue to be faced with an undesirable choice between taking strong action early enough to have an impact (but in a way that might seem premature or unjustified to allies) or on the other hand waiting until the justification is clear, at which point it might be too late to have an impact in the wake of Chinese equipment stockpiling and indigenization campaigns.</p> +<p>At the same time, however, the Israel–Hamas war and the real threat of its escalation into a regional conflagration will now test the new relationships that have been formed over the past three years – between Israel and the Gulf Arab states, between Israel and Turkey, between Turkey and Egypt and the Gulf Arab states, and between the Gulf Arab states and Iran. Governments across the region, from Ankara and Cairo to Riyadh and even Tehran, have a shared interest in at the very least containing the current crisis to remain within the confines of the first scenario. Many of them are likely to come under immense popular pressure as their pro-Palestinian (though not necessarily pro-Hamas) populations rally in support of the Palestinians in Gaza. But the drivers for their push towards de-escalation, including the conclusion that escalation only begets more instability in the region, and the desire for stability and economic development, remain unchanged.</p> -<p>This is the same unattractive choice that the United States has faced again and again since the Trump administration began using semiconductor export controls as a tool of foreign policy in 2018. Thus far, the United States has chosen repeatedly to enact export controls that are threatening enough to incentivize Chinese firms to stockpile and to de-Americanize their supply chains, but not strongly enough written or enforced to prevent China from succeeding in their indigenization and stockpiling efforts.</p> +<p>Iran’s precise role in Hamas’s 7 October attack will likely become clearer in the coming weeks and months, but it is incontrovertible that Tehran now has significant agency in determining whether the war escalates or not. Threatening statements by Iran’s foreign minister, warning Israel – or “the Zionist entity” as he calls it – to halt its operations in Gaza or risk suffering “a huge earthquake,” should be taken very seriously. It is important to note that Iran does not fully control its partners in the region. Hamas, Hezbollah, the groups it supports in Syria and Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen all have their own political agendas and the ability to make decisions. But Tehran certainly has more influence over them than anyone else.</p> -<p>The United States has incurred essentially all of the costs of an aggressive export control policy toward China, but it has done so in a way that does not provide all the potential strategic benefits of actually constraining China’s future technological capabilities. The U.S. and allied approach does appear to have limited China’s access to nodes more advanced than 7 nm in economically competitive terms and more advanced than 5 nm in absolute terms.</p> +<p>The US and its Western allies, including the UK, are already working to deter Iran. The rapid deployment of a US aircraft carrier group to the Eastern Mediterranean in the days after 7 October, now joined by two Royal Navy ships, is surely meant to send at least two distinct messages: to reassure Israel, and to deter Iran and its partners across the region.</p> -<p>It is possible that China’s extremely expensive efforts to indigenize everything will prove to be a strategic error: forcing China’s government to perpetually subsidize an often-corrupt semiconductor industry that produces products that are uncompetitive in Chinese or global markets. Such was the case with the Soviet semiconductor industry.</p> +<p>Others can do more than send deterring signals to Iran – and are doing so. On 11 October, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman spoke with Iran’s President Ibrahim Raisi about Riyadh’s efforts to “stop the ongoing escalation”; it was the first-ever publicised phone call between the two men. Other governments across the region, especially in the Gulf, are likely similarly seeking to convince Iran not to push for further escalation.</p> -<p>However, it is also possible that China’s domestic champions will ultimately achieve some degree of financial sustainability, driven by partially or fully protected sales in the large Chinese home market as well as successful exports abroad. Such was the case with China’s automotive and solar cell manufacturing industries.</p> +<h3 id="short--and-long-term-challenges-for-regional-governments">Short- and Long-Term Challenges for Regional Governments</h3> -<p>Imposing these costs upon China is not without strategic value, both in terms of slowing its military development and in preserving U.S. technological leadership. Ben Thompson of Stratechery argues that China’s obsession with achieving 7 nm production in violation of U.S. export controls may actually slow China’s overall technological development: “Every year that China stays banging its head on the wall at 7nm instead of focusing on moving down the learning curve from a fully indigenous .13 micron process to 90nm to 65nm to 40nm to 28nm to 22nm to 16nm to 10nm to 7nm is another year that China doesn’t break the 5nm barrier.”</p> +<p>The Gulf Arab states, together with Turkey and Egypt, also play an important role with regard to the first scenario and the ongoing war in Gaza. Their urgent calls on Israel to moderate or even end its operations in Gaza are unlikely to be heeded anytime soon, but they can nevertheless have a meaningful impact.</p> -<p>In a similar argument, Bloomberg’s Tim Culpan argued that the Huawei chip shows that U.S. curbs “are porous, not useless.”</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">In the longer term, Western capitals must recognise that they cannot turn their backs on the Middle East, however much they might want to</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Still, this will be an unsatisfying outcome for those who hoped for more from the October 7 policy. Export controls as a tool rarely deliver perfect solutions, especially not with regards to countries as large and technologically advanced as China. To the extent that export controls worked against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it was because there was so little economic engagement between the camps to begin with and because they were so broadly enforced. To the extent that export controls worked after the Cold War, it was because the aims were quite limited and because even governments that could agree on little else could agree that they were opposed to terrorists and rogue states acquiring nuclear weapons.</p> +<p>Egypt, which shares the only border with Gaza that is not directly controlled by Israel, is under enormous pressure to allow refugees to enter its territory. Thus far, Cairo has refused. It worries that an influx of refugees could destabilise the Sinai Peninsula, where Egypt has struggled to contain a low-level insurgency for the past decade, and further undermine the already struggling Egyptian economy. Perhaps most importantly, it fears that refugees could end up staying in Egypt indefinitely, unable to return to Gaza either due to the destruction wrought by the war, or because Israel – once in control of the territory – might not allow them to come back. It is incumbent upon the US, other Western governments and the richer Gulf Arab states to work with Cairo to alleviate these concerns, including by putting pressure on Israel to allow passage across the Gaza–Egypt border in both directions.</p> -<p>Trying to draw neat export control lines that achieve ideal and durable technological outcomes for dual-use technologies in the U.S.-China relationship is significantly more difficult. Broader controls, especially multilateral ones, have a better chance of success, but the political coordination and enforcement challenges are still difficult. The United States has imposed significant costs upon China, but not so significant that they have changed the Chinese government’s position on issues such as military AI development, human rights violations, sanctions violations, or intellectual property theft. Rather than change its ways, China is now spending hundreds of billions of dollars to decouple itself from multiple parts of the U.S. semiconductor and related technology ecosystem.</p> +<p>Meanwhile, Qatar, and perhaps Egypt and Turkey, appear to be the only international actors (besides Iran) that could feasibly exercise a degree of influence over Hamas with regard to the Israeli hostages taken on 7 October. Doha, Cairo and Ankara have all been able to engage with Hamas’s political leadership in the past. However, it is unclear whether their interlocutors still have any real influence on the situation on the ground.</p> -<p>Beginning in 2018, the United States has imposed costs upon China that are severe enough to persuade China to accelerate the indigenization of its semiconductor supply chain, but the United States and its allies have not — at least thus far — implemented export controls that are tight enough and multilateral enough to definitively prevent China from succeeding in indigenizing. Previously, the United States allowed Huawei to stockpile U.S. chips before cutting Huawei off. More recently, the United States has allowed Chinese chip fabs to stockpile U.S., Dutch, and Japanese equipment before imposing broad restrictions on the sale of such equipment. Even now, China is still acquiring significant technology and knowhow from South Korean and other firms.</p> +<p>In the longer term, regional countries – most importantly Saudi Arabia, but also Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, the UAE and others – will have a crucial role to play in helping to rebuild a Palestinian political leadership that can legitimately speak for the Palestinian people. With the 7 October attack, Hamas has completely disqualified itself from ever being regarded as a legitimate political entity – whether by Israel or most of the international community. At the same time, Hamas’s attack has also once again exposed the Palestinian Authority in its current form as woefully ineffective. Once the current war ends, there must be a re-engagement with the Middle East Peace Process, which has been completely neglected in recent years by all sides. Riyadh and others in the region who are committed to building a more stable Middle East are best placed to help identify and then build up a Palestinian leadership that is strong enough to eventually rebuild Gaza, seriously govern the West Bank and work with Israeli counterparts (who must also be found and empowered) towards lasting solutions.</p> -<p>These are all enormous shifts underway, and the future is far from certain. What is clear, however, is that the existing export controls need to be expanded to include South Korea, Germany, and ideally the entire European Union. It is also clear that U.S. allies need to strengthen their export control regimes to be effective, which means creating legal authorities that restrict knowledge transfers and the actions of overseas subsidiaries.</p> +<h3 id="the-west-cannot-ignore-the-middle-east">The West Cannot Ignore the Middle East</h3> -<p>Finally, it is clear that all allied governments need improved intelligence and improved economic and technological analytic capacity as well as improved export control enforcement capacity. Even though export controls are central to U.S. foreign policy toward both Russia and China, Congress is now poised to deny the Department of Commerce’s export controls bureau its meager request for funds needed to keep a flat budget after accounting for inflation. This is, in real dollar terms, a budget cut — and a shocking error given how much of U.S. national security and economic security now depends upon the efficacy of the U.S. export controls system.</p> +<p>If Hamas’s attack has upended – or at the very least interrupted – the regional drive towards de-escalation, it has also highlighted that the West’s approach towards the region in recent years is unsustainable. Policymakers in the US and the UK and across Europe have sought to deprioritise the region, partly due to more urgent crises demanding their attention – most notably Russia’s war in Ukraine – and partly driven by a fatigue with the intractability of the region’s conflicts.</p> -<p>Even if the future will often be foggy, the U.S. government must be willing to invest heavily in an improved ability to see clearly and to act effectively.</p> +<p>In the coming weeks and months, Washington, London, Brussels and others must work with partners across the region to prevent escalation. They must persuade Israel – likely behind closed doors – to exercise as much restraint as possible, and support and empower regional leaders in their efforts to stave off a wider conflagration. In the longer term, they must recognise that they cannot turn their backs on the Middle East, however much they might want to. Focusing on geopolitical challenges that are identified as more strategically important – confronting Russia, pivoting/tilting to the Indo-Pacific and dealing with China, to name but a few – is hardly possible when the Middle East is spiralling into turmoil.</p> <hr /> -<p><strong>Gregory C. Allen</strong> is the director of the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, he was the director of strategy and policy at the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, where he oversaw development and implementation of the DOD’s AI Strategy, drove policy and human capital reforms to accelerate the DOD’s adoption of AI, and developed mechanisms for AI governance and ethics.</p>Gregory C. AllenWith a new smartphone and new chip, Huawei has returned to the 5G smartphone business in defiance of U.S. sanctions. This report assesses the implications from this latest development for China’s AI industry and the future of semiconductor export controls.Waterfall’s Shadow In Mekong2023-09-29T12:00:00+08:002023-09-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/waterfalls-shadow-in-mekong<excerpt /> +<p><strong>Tobias Borck</strong> is Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security Studies at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His main research interests include the international relations of the Middle East, and specifically the foreign, defence and security policies of Arab states, particularly the Gulf monarchies, as well as European – especially German and British – engagement with the Middle East.</p>Tobias BorckAs Israel prepares to launch a ground offensive in Gaza, there is a real risk that the war could escalate into a wider conflagration. Efforts to contain the conflict will test key relationships across the region.The Orient Express2023-10-16T12:00:00+08:002023-10-16T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-orient-express<p><em>Dozens of high-resolution satellite images taken in recent months reveal that Russia has likely begun shipping North Korean munitions at scale, opening a new supply route that could have profound consequences for the war in Ukraine and international security dynamics in East Asia.</em></p> -<p><em>Infrastructure programs like China’s Belt and Road Initiative further authoritarian influence in climate and water-stressed regions. The United States needs strategies that simultaneously advance water security and national security to compete with China.</em></p> +<excerpt /> -<h3 id="the-issue">The Issue</h3> +<p>Just a few weeks after the momentous visit of Russia’s Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu to North Korea, in July, three Russian cargo vessels connected to Moscow’s international military transportation networks embarked on an unusual journey.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>The United States and its network of democratic partners and allies increasingly find themselves struggling to safeguard the rule of law, free markets, civil liberties, and human security in countries most at risk from climate change and its impact on water security.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>A network of authoritarian states led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are using infrastructure investment programs like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) alongside gray zone campaigns to gain access and influence, often in areas most at risk of further climate shock and water insecurity, particularly in the Mekong region.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>As a result, continuing to develop water strategies offers a viable means of integrating development and deterrence to address core human security challenges and deny further authoritarian access and influence across the world’s most climate-stressed societies.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Their destination was an inconspicuous naval facility tucked away in the secluded Russian port of Dunai, situated in the remote eastern reaches of the country. Once identified by the CIA at the height of the Cold War as a Soviet submarine base, the Dunai facility sits approximately nine kilometres south of the town of Fokino, a closed administrative-territorial entity south of Vladivostok, where movement and residency are strictly controlled for military and security reasons</p> + +<p>While the unremarkable port facility at Dunai had largely been relegated to the annals of Cold War history, recent deliveries by the Russian-flagged Angara, Maria and Lady R of what are likely to be North Korean munitions have thrust it into the international spotlight, and place it at the centre of the burgeoning relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow.</p> -<p>Taiwan is not the only flash point in the growing contest between the United States and China. As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exports its authoritarian model for governance and development, it creates new arenas for competition beyond the military sphere. From the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and infrastructure investments to the use of political warfare, Beijing is creating a new sphere of influence.</p> +<p>Embroiled in a grinding attritional conflict in Ukraine, Moscow has scoured the globe for munitions to supply its armed forces, which are currently attempting to repel a determined Ukrainian counteroffensive. But while Iran answered Moscow’s call, supplying the country with hundreds of Shahed loitering munitions, other UAVs and weapons, North Korean arms have yet to appear in significant quantities on the battlefield.</p> -<p>Through a combination of trade, diplomacy, development, and coercion, the CCP is securing key terrain in a new geopolitical race. This terrain is centered on critical transportation and trade corridors beyond the traditional focus on sea lines of communication vital for securing its trade and power projection. This logic extends beyond the sea to river and ground lines of communication. For decades, China has been using multiple instruments of power to gain access and influence in the Lower Mekong River Basin. Over 245 million people live in the Mekong Region, and this population is projected to grow by as much as 100 percent by 2050. Trade between China and countries in the Lower Mekong has grown to over $400 billion, and Beijing uses its economic and diplomatic influence to gain military access, including increasing its regional force posture and building secret military bases.</p> +<p>That, however, is about to change. Dozens of high-resolution images, revealed here for the first time and captured in recent months over Dunai and the North Korean port of Rajin, show the three cargo vessels repeatedly transporting hundreds of containers likely packed with North Korean armaments.</p> -<p>The Lower Mekong region, which includes Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia, is one of the most vulnerable to climate change, with an estimated 55 percent of the Mekong Delta population likely to be affected in the coming years. China funds dam projects in multiple countries that complicate water management and exacerbate environmental stress. The region is sinking as sea levels rise, leading to increased salinity and flooding in areas that Southeast Asia relies on to feed its growing population. In Vietnam alone, 500 hectares are lost each year to erosion thanks to these twin forces. This combination of rising seas, changing weather patterns, and water management issues, including upstream dams in China, is threatening food security. The Mekong is thereby a portrait of how population growth, environmental degradation, and climate change coalesce to threaten human security.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sd1C6tl.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Angara and Maria shipments between Dunai and Rajin.</strong> Source: Planet Labs, RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> -<p>The states along the Mekong River are also a focal point for a new era of great power competition. After decades of inattention, the United States is working with allies like Japan and a network of international institutions to make the region more resilient to Chinese influence. Since 2009, the United States has promoted a series of initiatives in the region, including the Lower Mekong Initiative and Mekong-U.S. Partnership, to promote projects ranging from food security and education to energy and water security. These initiatives are part of a larger regional strategy designed to outflank the growing influence of the CCP and related businesses with direct links to Beijing. As a result, water security — the ability of people to access clean, safe water for personal and agricultural use — is converging with national security.</p> +<p>Although it is difficult to determine the specific contents of these containers from imagery alone, the US government accused the North Koreans of supplying munitions and military material to Russia on 13 October. These claims were accompanied by imagery detailing the alleged end-destination of these shipments in Tikhoretsk, a small town in Russia’s Krasnodar region, facing the Kerch Strait and Russian-occupied Crimea.</p> -<p>Water programming can play a central role in U.S. infrastructure development initiatives and development assistance in the Lower Mekong River Basin, where water access and management issues collide with great power competition and climate fragility. The region is also a focal point for China’s BRI, which intensifies the dilemma. Southeast Asian states must balance the promise of economic development they need to support rising living standards and growing populations with the loss of autonomy that comes with debt trap diplomacy, corruption, and gray zone campaigns. This challenge makes water a key cross-cutting issue that connects multiple U.S. government and Group of Seven (G7) initiatives designed to counter the growth of authoritarian access and influence under the guise of development assistance.</p> +<p>High-resolution imagery collected in recent weeks in the vicinity of Tikhoretsk confirms the rapid expansion of a munitions storage facility here beginning in August 2023 – the same time that North Korea’s shipments from Rajin began. Crucially, these images also appear to show trains delivering the same size and colour of cargo containers as those shipped from North Korea to Russia’s far east.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Water security — the ability of people to access clean, safe water for personal and agricultural use — is converging with national security.</p> -</blockquote> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ICMWguj.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Renovations as the Tikhoretsk munitions depot.</strong> Source: Planet Labs, RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> -<p>This brief reports on a series of tabletop exercises (TTXs) used to explore how water programming, in coordination with a broader infrastructure strategy, can address both human security and national security challenges. Like earlier CSIS TTXs on water security focused on the Sahel, this series, which focuses on the Lower Mekong River Basin, examines the interplay of economic development and climate change with water security. Unlike the earlier TTX on the Sahel, however, this installment addresses long-term competition and explores how development initiatives interact with broader national security priorities.</p> +<h3 id="the-orient-express">The Orient Express</h3> -<p>Based on the TTXs, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the broader interagency network committed to development should use water as a focal point for competitive foreign policy. By combining development projects that address core human needs with ongoing infrastructure initiatives designed to create regional and global economic corridors using theater strategy, the United States can take a new approach to competition with China. This competition complements the pivot to integrated deterrence by reassuring partners and offering a viable alternative to the BRI. Seen in this light, making water projects a focal point for strategy better aligns resources both within the U.S. government and across its network of allies and private sector partners. This alignment will help overcome common pitfalls of water projects, which tend to be underfinanced and require multiyear implementation plans. More importantly, it can show how new infrastructure networks offer an alternative to debt trap diplomacy and authoritarian influence that flows through the BRI around the world.</p> +<p>The first stop for North Korea’s shipments to Russia is in Dunai, a secure military facility with controlled entrances, disguised storage areas and a number of secure berths often frequented by Russian naval assets. High-resolution satellite imagery captured in recent months shows that containers are regularly delivered and removed from here by semi-trailers and railway wagons, likely for transport across Russia towards Tikhoretsk and the border with Ukraine.</p> -<h3 id="control-the-water-control-the-region">Control the Water, Control the Region</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/0EgNHC4.jpg" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: The Secure Facility at Dunai, Russia.</strong> Source: Airbus Defence and Space, RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> -<p>China uses BRI infrastructure investments to connect the Mekong River Basin and further bind states to its economy and geopolitical interests by focusing on water and trade. Through the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) initiative, China seeks to gain leverage over water management while promoting economic development. Along these lines, China conducts “hydro-diplomacy” to build dams across the region. While these dams generate electricity, they also often create significant environmental strain that affects downstream water levels and food security. In addition to environmental stress, the projects often involve forcible displacement and uproot entire communities.</p> +<p>The initial shipment of hundreds of containers was loaded on to the Angara at Dunai in late August, before the vessel made its way to the North Korean port of Rajin on the country’s eastern coast. Notably, the vessel also switched off its AIS transponder, obscuring its movements between the two countries. Once in North Korea, satellite imagery shows the vessel unloading these containers onto a berth with a dedicated rail line.</p> -<p>China also supports projects that increase trade along the Mekong. Beijing has funded the construction of multiple river ports, often expanding existing sites to handle larger cargo ships. These efforts include shadowy investment vehicles that combine the state with business figures, including a significant investment in a Laos river port by a sanctioned Chinese businessman linked to casinos and illicit trade. These port investments frequently accompany larger special economic zones where sovereign governments cede more extensive tracts of land to Chinese business interests. Some of these special zones have become magnets for illegal wildlife trade. Parallel to these ports, China invests in rail lines, including major projects in Thailand and Laos.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZBekepl.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: The Angara loading and unloading containers in Rajin, North Korea.</strong> Source: Planet Labs, RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> -<p>These projects bolster China’s centrality in the region. If nineteenth- and twentieth-century geopolitics are about ground and sea lines of communication connecting the world, then twenty-first-century strategy revolves around the infrastructure that enables modern trade. By connecting the Mekong region, China makes itself a principal node in the larger regional network and diminishes the influence of other states like the United States, Japan, and Australia. The CCP can also use a mix of subtle threats and espionage to turn otherwise independent nations into a new category of client states — a dependence compounded by upstream dams. Through the BRI, China has put itself in a position to dictate the terms of trade and the flow of water.</p> +<p>Since this first shipment, the Angara has regularly shuttled containers from the port of Rajin to the Russian facility at Dunai, being joined by a second cargo vessel named the Maria on 12 September and a third vessel named the Lady R on 6 October. While the vessels are still operating without transmitting on their AIS transponders, dozens of satellite images show the vessels continually loading and delivering cargo from North Korea to Russia.</p> -<h3 id="using-water-security-and-infrastructure-to-counter-the-chinese-communist-party">Using Water Security and Infrastructure to Counter the Chinese Communist Party</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/K4C65G1.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: The Maria in Dunai, 14 October 2023.</strong> Source: Planet Labs, RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> -<p>Over the last 10 years, thought leaders in Congress, academia, and successive presidential administrations have begun to see the importance of using increased focus on water strategy and large-scale infrastructure projects to promote the interests of the United States and its democratic partners and allies globally. In 2017, USAID launched the U.S. Global Water Strategy, a five-year planning framework focused on increasing water security. The same year, water security made its way into the National Security Strategy. These efforts built on earlier initiatives across the U.S. government.</p> +<p>Over the course of the last three months, the Angara has made at least three trips between Russia and North Korea, while the Maria made one trip in September and recently completed another round trip on 14 October. The Lady R also appears to have made a trip, visiting Rajin on 6 October.</p> -<p>As a more recent example, the 2022 U.S. Global Water Strategy and supporting action plan approach water security as both a risk and an opportunity. Consistent with earlier USAID efforts, the strategy envisions using a mix of increased access to safe drinking water and sanitation (WASH), improved water resources management (WRM), and water productivity (WP) to reduce water-related conflict and fragility. The strategy envisions allocating additional resources to existing water security programs in an effort to increase access to safe WASH while addressing climate resilience and food security challenges associated with water sheds like the Mekong River Basin.</p> +<p>All three vessels appear to first unload containers at the northern pier in Rajin, before moving to a second berth to then load containers for delivery to Dunai. Over the course of these voyages, satellite imagery indicates the Angara and Maria have moved several hundred containers to and from North Korea.</p> -<p>These investments promote the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), advance U.S. foreign policy interests, and expand water access, which is a core human need. Building water projects that encourage better environmental stewardship and trade through a network of local governments, U.S. partners and treaty allies, nongovernmental organizations, and international institutions would offer a rival network to the BRI and authoritarian influence. Since modern geopolitics is more about networks than nations, any project that increases access to different political, economic, and human networks therefore creates a strategic advantage and offers a viable alternative to countries whose sovereignty is under threat from authoritarian states.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9GtccHr.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: The Angara and Maria at Dunai and the Angara at Rajin, North Korea.</strong> Source: Airbus Defence and Space, Planet Labs and RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> -<p>While interest in water strategy has been growing since 2008, a new development involves infrastructure projects that link democratic states and the private sector to promote trade and human security while offering an alternative to the BRI. Parallel to a domestic focus on infrastructure investment in 2021, the administration under U.S. president Joseph Biden announced the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative, which became the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) in 2022. The effort called for aligning foreign policy and sustainable development through projects that address climate change, health security, digital innovation and access, and gender equality. These pillars act as focal points for investments by G7 nations and create new opportunities for public-private partnerships.</p> +<h3 id="suspect-couriers">Suspect Couriers</h3> -<p>In other words, to counter the $1 trillion China has invested in the BRI, the Biden administration would create a rival infrastructure network that links free states and private companies. This approach is consistent with the network theory of victory, articulated above, wherein power stems from greater participation in one network over another. In 2022 the G7 committed to investing $600 billion dollars in public-private sector initiatives by 2027. PGII investments, in addition to the B3W pillars, would be guided by transparency, good governance, and respect for human rights, thus providing an alternative to the BRI and authoritarian overreach.</p> +<p>While the Angara was sanctioned by the US government in May 2022, the Maria has yet to be designated. However, both vessels are owned and operated by companies with connections to Russia’s military logistics networks. For instance, the companies that own and operate the Angara – M Leasing and Marine Trans Shipping – were both sanctioned by the US soon after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine for transporting weapons on behalf of the Russian government.</p> -<p>These efforts reflect an increased focus on economic corridors as a central pillar of strategy in the Biden administration. These corridors combine public-private sector investments in transportation infrastructure (rail lines, riverine ports, and roads) with investments in clean energy and information and communication technology (ICT). The result is hubs that promote food security and access to healthcare as much as economic growth. For example, the Lobito corridor in southern Africa will link the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Angola, creating the network of rail lines, economic hubs, and ports required to develop the region and ensure access to key minerals for a clean energy transition.</p> +<p>But the Angara’s links to Moscow’s weapons handlers stretch much further back. For several years, the Angara – which then sailed under the name Ocean Energy – was owned by the Kaalbye Group, a company accused of transporting Russian arms to Syria and South Sudan. During this time, media reports identified the Ocean Energy delivering Russian T-90 tanks from Russia to Iraq.</p> -<p>In many respects, the strategic vision articulated in both the PGII and 2022 Global Water Strategy builds on USAID and U.S. allied water programs in the Mekong River Basin. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) is investing in infrastructure projects, many of which also complement G7 partner initiatives. For example, the Japan-U.S.-Mekong Power Partnership (JUMPP) funds projects that combine regional trade integration with energy security.</p> +<p>Notably, M Leasing’s two other Ro-Ro vessels, the Adler and Ascalon, have also been sanctioned. Both of these vessels, under different identities, had reportedly shipped missiles for the S-400 surface-to-air missile system to China in 2018.</p> -<p>From this perspective, the Mekong River offers an ideal regional case study for refining the complementary strategic initiatives envisioned by the Biden administration to counter the BRI. The challenge is to develop new policy playbooks that help visualize and describe a regional strategy for countering malign influence by the CCP while helping populations most affected by forces like climate change.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dz1zuD5.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Ownership and management chart for the Angara and Maria.</strong> Source: IHS Maritime, Corporate Records, OFAC and RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> -<h3 id="using-tabletop-exercises-to-refine-water-strategy">Using Tabletop Exercises to Refine Water Strategy</h3> +<p>The Maria’s owner, on the other hand, is a subsidiary of Cyprus-based Azia Shipping Holdings; the latter also serves as its operator. Azia Shipping Holdings owns several vessels, one of which was allegedly involved in the shipment of Russian weapons to Myanmar in January 2022. Notably, several employees of the Maria’s DOC company JSC Sovfracht were indicted by the US Treasury in 2018 for allegedly operating a scheme to supply Syria with jet fuel.</p> -<p>Because water and infrastructure projects are, by definition, interagency concerns, they create coordination challenges. These challenges are exacerbated by the focus on public-private partnerships in PGII and emphasis on combining diverse stakeholders specified in the 2022 Global Water Strategy. As a result, policymakers need creative forums to conduct stress tests and refine their strategy to bridge traditional governmental divides. Because strategy involves competing interests and uncertainty, these forums must include modeling how rival states like China and local spoilers might respond. Water strategy must find a way to combine development and deterrence, so PGII should complement broader theater campaign plans and efforts to deny malign Chinese influence. It is difficult to create a viable long-term strategy without illustrating how conflicting interests create alternative futures and shift the logic of programmatic investments over time. A TTX can help flesh out these types of programmatic uncertainties.</p> +<p>Meanwhile, the vessel’s Vladivostok-based technical manager, the similarly named Azia Shipping Company, was formerly part-owned by Russia’s sanctioned Oboronlogistics LLC. This Moscow-based company was allegedly created to oversee logistics for the Russian Ministry of Defence, and is the owner of the sanctioned SPARTA IV, a vessel recently engaged in moving Russian military equipment from Syria to Russia.</p> -<p>TTXs, alongside crisis simulations and gaming in general, are tailor made for strategic problems like the challenge of advancing a water strategy that addresses human security and counters malign authoritarian influence. These forums allow expert players to simulate the fog, friction, and uncertainty at the heart of great power competition. This experience, in turn, promotes critical analysis and reflections on how to refine strategies that advance U.S. interests. Because strategy involves thinking about the clash of interests over time and space, it requires thinking about alternative futures and red teaming the different pathways to those futures.</p> +<p>Like both the Angara and the Maria, the Lady R has been linked to Moscow’s military transportation networks. The vessel’s owner, TransMorFlot LLC, has been sanctioned by U.S, UK and Ukraine for being involved in arms shipments on behalf of the Russian government.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/m8yONlG.jpg" alt="image01" /></p> +<h3 id="final-destination">Final Destination</h3> -<p>To this end, CSIS constructed a series of water security TTXs that focused on WASH and WRM efforts in the face of great power competition. The first iteration explored the Sahel and how a mix of political and public health shocks interacted with climate stress in the region. Players aligned PGII investments and water security to counter these crisis events.</p> +<p>The final destination of these shipments appears to be a munitions depot in the Russia town of Tikhoretsk, approximately 200 km from the Ukrainian border.</p> -<p>Based on the findings, CSIS built a second TTX that shifted the geographic focus to the Mekong River Basin and transformed the game design from crisis response to competitive strategy. The scenario explored how rival groups of players with a mix of military and development experience set strategic priorities and developed plans around water and infrastructure investments in the Mekong River Basin.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1WUHQSt.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: Map of Tikhoretsk ammunition depot.</strong> Source: Planet Labs, RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> -<p>The TTX started with an orientation that helped players understand prevailing water security issues in the region. The purpose was to illustrate the convergence of infrastructure investments and environmental insecurity with great power competition in the Mekong River Basin. The orientation included the following data:</p> +<p>Beginning in mid-August 2023, high-resolution imagery shows that the ammunition depot has undergone a rapid overhaul, with excavators digging over 100 new munitions pits with earth berms designed to divert the force of a blast in case of an explosion.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>whether the country is part of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), a large U.S. trade initiative in the region</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>existing USAID water-related needs score by country</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Freedom House trends for each country (2022 Global Freedom index)</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>China’s trade and debt trap diplomacy metrics, including countries’ imports from China and debt held by Beijing</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>U.S. foreign aid obligated and dispersed by country</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>resilience indicators including the Fragile States Index and Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) Index, which evaluates how well states can adapt to climate change</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Recent imagery from 28 September also shows trains arriving at the facility, delivering dozens of containers of the same size and colours as those being loaded in North Korea. In these images, containers can be seen placed next to newly dug munitions pits, which are potentially being loaded with munitions boxes.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/L5nBJjR.jpg" alt="image02" /></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/X2w1kaq.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Map of Tikhoretsk ammo depot and active work there.</strong> Source: Planet Labs, RUSI Project Sandstone.</em></p> -<p>The scores helped participants understand water and infrastructure issues as they relate to foreign policy across the region. The USAID WASH Needs Index ranks countries in terms of their overall lack of access to clean water. The higher the score, the less access to reliable, safe water. In the Mekong, Thailand has the most reliable access to water, while Cambodia has the worst. By way of comparison, China ranks 61 with an index score of 0.31. Over 80 million people lack basic water access, and over 100 million lack basic sanitation. The score does not directly address issues related to climate change, such as growing salinity due to rising sea levels, changing weather patterns, and dam construction, and their combined effect on food security.</p> +<p>From here, North Korean weapons and munitions could be shipped to logistics depots on the border of Ukraine for distribution to frontline units.</p> -<p>The ND-GAIN Index addresses vulnerability to climate change and how well prepared states are to respond in terms of institutional readiness. The higher the score, the more prepared states are to adapt to the reality of climate change. As Table 1 shows, multiple countries (red highlighted cells) along the Mekong River Basin are rated as highly vulnerable to future climate shocks. Combined with foreign aid and trade data, the orientation helped players understand the growing influence of China in the region alongside the deterioration of freedom and growing state fragility, such as due to climate-induced stress.</p> +<h3 id="tectonic-shifts">Tectonic Shifts</h3> -<p>After the orientation, the U.S. team was briefed that additional funds were available to combine interagency efforts to counter BRI activities in Southeast Asia with a focus on the Mekong River Basin. The teams had to articulate a larger competitive strategy and three water security projects (WASH, WRM, WP) for the region as part of the larger PGII.</p> +<p>Having prepared for a massive conventional war with South Korea for decades, North Korea’s supplying of significant quantities of munitions to Moscow will have profound consequences for the war in Ukraine. For the Russians, a major North Korean supply line will alleviate shortages of munitions for what has proven to be an ordinance-hungry conflict and enable the Russian armed forces to feed their frontline troops as they try to repel a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Ukraine and its supporters will also have to contend with this new reality, potentially escalating their support by providing additional quantities of weapons and munitions to Ukraine’s defenders.</p> -<p>To frame this strategy, the U.S. team was briefed that the strategic end state, according to guidance developed through the National Security Council (NSC), was to sustain U.S. and partner nation access and influence in Southeast Asia, consistent with the vision of a rules-based international order. The two principal objectives to achieve this end state were (1) promote PGII initiatives focused on water security and (2) reassure U.S. partners and allies. In other words, the TTX asked U.S. players to think about how development merges with deterrence in modern great power competition. To that end, the U.S. players filled out Table 2 to prioritize water security investments. Players could nominate three water programs (WASH, WRM, WP); each had to align with at least one PGII pillar and country. Based on the enhancement, players rated the extent to which the new water program would increase the access of the United States and its democratic partners to the region while denying China access and influence. For example, a player could propose a WASH initiative in Vietnam to counter increased water salinity owing to climate change and its effect on food security as one of the three expanded water programs.</p> +<p>But the impact will be felt much further than the battlefield in Ukraine. The sale of such quantities of munitions will fill the coffers of the cash-strapped regime in Pyongyang, which has traditionally used the proceeds of arms deliveries to develop its own nuclear and ballistic missile programme in violation of UN sanctions. Moreover, in addition to the pecuniary benefits, North Korea may seek other assistance from Russia in return for its support, including the provision of missile and other advanced military technologies.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>In other words, the TTX asked U.S. players to think about how development merges with deterrence in modern great power competition.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>As a result, North Korea’s agreements with Moscow will also cause significant alarm in Japan and South Korea, countries already on the sharp end of Pyongyang’s ongoing provocations. Confronted with a strengthening alliance between North Korea and Russia, Tokyo and Seoul might explore additional avenues to offset the North Korean threat while extending further support to Ukraine’s efforts to oust Russian forces from its territory.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Q7OFTlp.jpg" alt="image03" /></p> +<p>However, Pyongyang’s decision to deliver munitions at scale once again underscores the grave threat that North Korea poses to international security, this time feeding a conflagration on European soil that has already cost the lives of tens of thousands of Ukrainians and consumed tens of billions of dollars in Western military support.</p> -<p>The U.S. team then revealed its plans and discussed its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats with a team playing the CCP. This action-reaction dynamic helped facilitate dialogue about the opportunity costs inherent in using water security programs and larger infrastructure projects to compete with China. Overall, players saw water strategy as a viable tool for countering the BRI but found that it required better integration with other instruments of power to support long-term competition.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CxxXKP5.png" alt="image10" /></p> -<p>U.S. players tended to take a mixed approach to the region with two major strategies and one minority opinion. Two teams focused on Thailand and Vietnam — the countries they thought the most accessible and open to countering the CCP. The third team focused its efforts on the countries with higher WASH needs scores: Cambodia and Laos.</p> +<hr /> -<p>The Thailand group proposed focusing on cultivating public-private partnerships to make Thailand the focal point for regional projects. These projects were concentrated in the digital and gender pillars of the PGII. The theory of competition was that creating new technical skills and increasing female employment in key sectors would benefit Thailand while creating a regional champion for water security projects.</p> +<p><strong>James Byrne</strong> is Director of the Open-Source Intelligence and Analysis (OSIA) Research Group.</p> -<p>Since Thailand had the best WASH scores in the region, the group proposed investing in water-related businesses based in Thailand that could access Cambodia and Laos, which are closer to Beijing. The idea was to promote a new cadre of local businesses, including increased opportunities for more diverse workplaces that could build water projects across the region. The U.S. players rated this approach as likely to draw both G7 interest and private sector capital.</p> +<p><strong>Joe Byrne</strong> is a Research Fellow at RUSI’s OSIA Research Group.</p> -<p>The red team replicating the CCP noted that while Beijing would not challenge Thai businesses directly, China maintains indirect economic mechanisms it could use to counter a U.S.-led initiative. For example, one red player noted China could apply economic pressure by curtailing the number of tourists that travel to Thailand, a practice it used against South Korea in 2017. The red team also saw opportunities to use low-level cyber operations and propaganda, consistent with political warfare, to undermine trust and confidence in U.S.-backed businesses. In other words, U.S. efforts to work through a local partner to promote water security could be effective but would not remove all the ways and means Beijing has to apply pressure to states in the Mekong River Basin.</p> +<p>__Gary Somervill__e is a Research Fellow at RUSI’s OSIA Research Group.</p>James Byrne, et al.Dozens of high-resolution satellite images taken in recent months reveal that Russia has likely begun shipping North Korean munitions at scale, opening a new supply route that could have profound consequences for the war in Ukraine and international security dynamics in East Asia.Israel Confronts Hamas2023-10-16T12:00:00+08:002023-10-16T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/israel-confronts-hamas<p><em>The legal and ethical challenges of operating in densely populated areas are going to be a tragic constant of 21st century warfare, with no easy solutions.</em></p> -<p>A separate strategy that emerged focused on combining water projects with food security efforts to build resilience to climate shocks. The focus was on the climate pillar. This group assessed the magnitude of the climate challenge confronting Vietnam. Countries critical to regional food supplies, like Thailand, justified the focus, as Thailand and Vietnam two of the three top rice exporting countries in the world. The group also recommended a water-related project linked to agriculture and climate stress in Thailand. The focus of these efforts was more on mitigating future food security issues than on addressing current challenges. The team also assessed that these water programs could complement recent U.S. military outreach to Vietnam. Furthermore, given the size of the population and economic growth trends, the players rated projects in Vietnam as very attractive to both G7 and private sector partnerships.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>The red team noted that while these issues would produce regional benefits in the long run, they were unlikely to shift the U.S.-Vietnam relationship to a strategic partnership in the short term. Beijing would still retain the ability to drive a wedge between Washington and Hanoi. China retains significant military, economic, and ideological instruments to influence Vietnam, despite long-standing differences between the two countries.</p> +<p>The impending ground invasion of Gaza by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has raised a range of questions about how military operations should be conducted in densely populated areas. The political context of the Israel–Palestine conflict, and the human tragedy that has engulfed Israeli and Palestinian families, has made the military considerations secondary to a raging political debate. For the military, however, the questions at stake are not exceptional but routine, and will likely define many of the planning considerations for operations throughout this century. Precedents set in Gaza, therefore, may cast a long shadow.</p> -<p>This discussion led to a debate about the balance of U.S. foreign assistance and how much should be linked to larger interagency strategies to counter China. Some saw addressing climate change and increasing water security as goals in themselves. The majority assessed that the United States, especially if its foreign assistance budgets increased, could integrate a focus on engaging local government and civil society, foreign assistance linked to poverty reduction and environmental growth, infrastructure-linked economic development, and governance programs with long-term competition without falling victim to the traps of the Cold War.</p> +<p>Israel has declared war on Hamas. Legally, there are two questions that arise: the legality of the war, and the legality of how it is fought. As regards the former, Hamas’s incursion on to Israeli territory, the deliberate massacre of over 1,300 and the kidnapping of hundreds of Israeli civilians undoubtedly counts as an armed attack in response to which Israel has the right of self-defence. Given that Hamas has a stated objective of destroying the Israeli state, took the hostages on to the territory it controls, and is launching rockets and conducting command and control from that territory, it is also legal for Israel to operate against Hamas on the territory of Gaza in response. There is therefore no question as to the legality of the Israeli action, which aims to eliminate the capacity of Hamas to conduct further attacks.</p> -<p>These practitioners highlighted a need to refine interagency coordination along these lines and run periodic TTXs as a form of further calibrating regional strategies. These events would have to integrate multiple Biden administration strategies like the Indo-Pacific Strategy with PGII and the 2022 Global Water Strategy. In fact, the myriad of strategies published by the Biden administration led one player to express a need for more dynamic interagency coordination than traditional NSC meetings. Participants viewed the TTXs as a way of investigating opportunities to achieve the objectives in multiple strategy documents and avoid policy fratricide. One participant noted that this effort would also need to include integrated country strategies to balance regional, functional, and country-specific aspects of foreign policy. Another participant noted that while there is an agency strategic planning process in the U.S. Department of State and USAID, as well as different interagency coordination processes, efforts tended to have too many objectives to easily prioritize. This participant saw the focus on water security, infrastructure, and integrating development with deterrence as a way to synchronize and prioritize objectives.</p> +<p>The difficulties arise as to how such a mission is to be carried out, given that the area of operations comprises densely populated urban terrain with a large proportion of children and non-combatants and very weak critical infrastructure. Under the Laws of Armed Conflict and International Humanitarian Law, Israeli forces are obligated to discriminate military from civilian targets, to restrict their activities to those that are of military necessity, and to exercise proportionality. It is not illegal for civilians to be killed as a result of operations. It is illegal for operations to target civilians or for there to be a lack of proportionality in striking military targets relative to assessed collateral damage.</p> -<p>The third strategy to emerge from the TTX — and the minority perspective — was to focus on Cambodia and Laos, the countries with the worst WASH scores and projects linked to the health and digital pillars. Specifically, the players wanted to invest in low-cost internet of things (IoT) networks linked to local cellular service for remote monitoring — an opportunity to use ICT for WASH. The team assessed that they could address local needs in these countries in a way that offset some of the negative effects of Chinese dam construction on water and food security. One participant discussed how changing water flows were disrupting local economies and leading to migration. Another participant noted that despite Laos’s high dependence on China, the relationship between water governance and agriculture in Laos created a way to both address water security and show the population the negative effects of the Chinese authoritarian development model. Other players noted that this messaging could be enhanced by coordinating with elements like the Global Engagement Center (GEC). The player wanted to use the GEC’s data-driven approach to studying the information environment to tailor messages about the water security programs while monitoring for China’s efforts to undermine confidence in U.S. and allied water and infrastructure investments.</p> +<p>Discrimination is simplified by the fact that Hamas systematically uses civilian objects for military purposes. It has dug subterranean infrastructure beneath civilian buildings, including ammunition depots, and has boasted in its own media about using Gaza’s water reticulation infrastructure for manufacturing rockets. When militaries do this, they render such areas military objects that are targetable, which is why – for example – it was legal for coalition forces to strike a hospital in Mosul that had been repurposed for IED manufacture in 2016. The challenge for the attacking force therefore becomes a question of judging the military value of a target against the risk of collateral damage.</p> -<p>The red team responded that while the effort might increase WASH scores in both countries, it would not significantly alter the influence of the CCP. Cambodia and Laos depend heavily on the Chinese economy. Furthermore, China could use its own propaganda and concepts like “Three Warfares” — influence operations that combine psychological and legal warfare with traditional propaganda — to promote rival narratives about the importance of each country’s relationship to Beijing. One red team member even said China could use this construct to take credit for Western money invested in water security while pinning the negative effects of its dam construction on foreign (G7) business interests.</p> +<p>The legal case for striking urban targets is often heavily weighted to the detriment of civilians because of the asymmetry in certainty about targets. If a Hamas command post is communicating from a structure and this is intercepted, if an Israeli ground unit takes fire from a structure, or if rockets are launched into Israel from a site, then there is confirmation that enemy military activity is taking place there. The civilians hiding in the building, trying to sleep or keep out of the line of fire, are invisible, and therefore are not counted in the judgement as to proportionality. This is why the RAF has long maintained that it knows of only one civilian killed in its strikes in Iraq, even though the civilian death toll from the air campaign during the war against Islamic State numbered in the thousands.</p> -<p>The discussion around the third strategy again highlighted the need to coordinate different agency planning processes with a focus on the information environment. One player suggested a need for an interagency competition manual similar to the recent U.S. Department of Defense Joint Concept for Competing. The group agreed the interagency collaboration needed a framework for conceptualizing long-term competition beyond deterrence and departmental interests. The challenge was how to develop this framework and balance military strategy with diplomacy and development. One player asked bluntly, “Who owns competition?” While the U.S. Department of State has processes to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives at the country and regional levels, it was not clear these formed critical components of major U.S. Department of Defense campaign plans that focus on competition. This insight brought some of the players back to recommending additional interagency TTXs to visualize and describe how to synchronize and prioritize objectives across multiple government agencies oriented toward long-term competition.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The laws of war are effective when parties view them as viable instructions for how to fight. When they prohibit fighting altogether, they are likely to be ignored</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The discussion led one player to note the missing role of the U.S. Congress in the debate. Congressional action led to prioritization of water security, and Congress must be brought into any discussion about increasing the foreign assistance budget. The participant noted increasing signs that Congress was interested in TTXs and creative forums for analyzing policy, though the initial forays focused on military matters. The player proposed designing the TTXs on long-term competition in a manner that allowed congressional staffers — and, if possible, entire committees — to play, building on recent efforts by the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party. The player advocated starting a new series of congressional games that touch multiple committees, including the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and House Armed Services Committee.</p> +<p>The campaign to defeat the Islamic State – which involved the assault of several major cities, from Ramadi and Fallujah to Mosul, Tel Affar and Raqqa – was conducted slowly, with painstaking targeting and legal processes to try and mitigate civilian harm. Nevertheless, the cities were laid waste, and thousands of civilians died. The death toll was also high for the attacking force. Iraq’s Counterterrorism Service, one of the most experienced and capable military units in the world at the time, suffered 40% casualties during the assault on Mosul.</p> -<h3 id="connect-the-world-to-compete-with-china">Connect the World to Compete with China</h3> +<p>The challenge of how to take urban ground without destroying the city is insurmountable with the tools currently available. Moreover, because there is no prize for second place in war, and because sensor dominance quickly leads to an asymmetry in casualties, weaker forces will retreat into dense, urban terrain. Ukrainian troops did this in Mariupol. British forces expect to have to operate from urban strongholds in future conflict. Hamas and Islamic State’s decision to fall back into urban terrain made sound tactical sense.</p> -<p>Modern competition is about more than military balances. It extends to development projects and building a network that connects people and creates conditions for solving collective action problems plaguing the twenty-first century: climate change, water access, food insecurity, and poverty. In the process, it also creates a new positional advantage that prevents authoritarian states from co-opting economic corridors. It is a new great game that must be played with a different set of rules than the cold wars of old.</p> +<p>The laws of war are effective when parties view them as viable instructions for how to fight. When they prohibit fighting altogether, they are likely to be ignored. How to craft rules that protect civilians in this context, therefore, requires thoughtful proposals. The proposal advocated by some groups to exclude explosive weapons from urban fighting is a non-starter, as it would confer such an advantage on to the defender as to prevent an attacker from prosecuting operations.</p> -<p>The more the Biden administration can synchronize its development and diplomacy with theater strategy, the more likely it will be to gain an enduring advantage in long-term competition with China. This advantage starts with visualizing and describing regions in terms of people’s needs, likely environmental shocks, and transportation corridors to identify clusters of projects that offset authoritarian overreach while helping local communities address core human security challenges.</p> +<p>For Israel, tactical options are constrained by a range of additional factors. Iron Dome – the air defence system protecting Israeli cities from rocket attack – has a finite number of interceptors. Given the massive threat if Hizbullah joins the fray, Israel is keen to limit its expenditure of interceptors by interdicting left of launch. The threat of escalation with Hizbullah also means that Israel feels it necessary to preserve combat power. Both factors lead to an approach to Gaza that is fast and favours firepower. This weights the judgement as to military necessity.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Calibrate regional strategies.</strong> The United States should look for opportunities to better align foreign assistance and defense budgets. Unfortunately, aid budgets are unlikely to grow in the near term based on the budget deal and election cycle. As a result, USAID — along with the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the DFC — will need to work with Congress and interagency partners to identify how best to align existing programs and resources. Based on standing legislation, USAID will continue to spend on water projects. These efforts could be coordinated with less confrontational defense dollars linked to efforts like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and ongoing theater campaigns. The net results would be a two-level prioritization framework that better aligns ends, ways, and means. USAID should prioritize projects likely to draw the most traction across agencies as a means of making each development dollar go further and extend U.S. strategic interests.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Conduct stress tests and refine regional strategies through TTXs.</strong> USAID and other interagency partners will need to augment traditional approaches to long-term planning to embrace more dynamic methods aligned with understanding the new era of competition. Turning traditional war games into peace games and TTXs is the first step and will help leaders analyze complex interactions almost certain to accompany water and broader infrastructure projects. These games should occur at three levels. First, they should be part of program design and help identify opportunities for interagency as well as private sector partnerships. Second, they should be conducted through existing interagency processes and evaluate how guidance ranging from the Indo-Pacific Strategy to integrated country strategies align with PGII and the 2022 Global Water Strategy. Third, the games must involve Congress and bring a mix of staffers and elected representatives into the dialogue. Too often, U.S. strategy — whether defense or development — has been stovepiped and segmented by branch and agencies, producing unhealthy tension and friction. Games offer a means to overcome these self-imposed barriers that help different stakeholders develop a common understanding of modern competition. These congressional games should also focus not just on optimal resourcing but also on authorities and how best to tailor the interagency framework to support long-term competition. If twenty-first-century competition is as much as about development as deterrence, the United States needs to ensure it has both the ways and means to gain an enduring advantage.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Amplify regional strategies.</strong> In a connected world, the message matters as much as the facts. Efforts to better integrate water projects with public-private sector infrastructure initiatives and theater strategy require global messaging that counters authoritarian influence campaigns. This messaging campaign should be integrated with existing initiatives like the GEC and embassy-level outreach and should be built into programmatic requirements for the network of vendors that support modern development. The messages should be tailored to audiences across diverse regions and retain the ability to counter malign foreign influence campaigns. The result is not propaganda but ensuring affected populations can cut through the noise to understand why the U.S. government, alongside its partners and the private sector, is investing in water infrastructure.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>In the absence of tools and methods for fighting among the people, advertising intent and clear avenues for civilians to vacate the battlespace is a viable alternative. This is what Israel has done by instructing civilians to move South of the Gaza River, while indicating the routes and times where movement will not be interdicted. The proposed timeframe for evacuation was short, although it has now been extended by delays to the ground operation.</p> -<hr /> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A policy to permanently drive Palestinians from Gaza would amount to ethnic cleansing and a war crime</code></em></strong></p> -<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow for future war, gaming, and strategy in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> +<p>Despite these measures, many civilians – as always in these cases – will choose to stay. Furthermore, in this specific context, many Palestinians fear that Israel is not trying to move them to a safe place, but instead trying to get them to vacate land which will be occupied and eventually settled. Palestinians fear that they will not be allowed to return. This is not the stated policy of the Israeli government. However, given Israel’s past conduct and the statements of several of its current ministers, this fear is understandable. It is also important to note that Israel has a history of valid tactical military justifications being instrumentalised by a minority within its cabinet to radically reshape its policy over time. This is how Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982, authorised by the Israeli cabinet to secure its northern border, was morphed in stages by Defence Minister Ariel Sharon into a siege of Beirut.</p> -<p><strong>Daniel F. Runde</strong> is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at CSIS.</p> +<p>A policy to permanently drive Palestinians from Gaza would amount to ethnic cleansing and a war crime. It is therefore vital that, alongside support to Israel in defending itself, the international community is clear as to its expectations in confirming Israeli intent, and the consequences if that intent morphs into something illegal. One clear test is whether Israel will help to make the area to which people are evacuating safe by allowing food, medicine and clean water to be moved into southern Gaza.</p> -<p><strong>Thomas Bryja</strong> is a program coordinator in the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.</p>Benjamin Jensen, et al.Project Atom 20232023-09-29T12:00:00+08:002023-09-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/project-atom-2023<p><em>How can the United States deter two peer competitors? To assist U.S. policy makers in addressing this question, the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for deterring Russia and China through 2035.</em></p> +<p>It is also clear, however, that the international community will lack any credibility or authority on the issue if it simply demands a return to the status-quo ante. For many Palestinians, the progressive erosion of their control of the West Bank was choking off any prospect of a path to peace. For Israelis, the massacre conducted by Hamas on 7 October fundamentally changed their calculus. For years, Israel has been fearful as Iran and Hizbullah have consolidated their hold on Lebanon and Syria, amassing an arsenal of sophisticated weapons. In combination with the training and support to Hamas and the infiltration of Judea and Samaria, the IDF had come to view the status quo – amid increasing US disengagement from the region – as similarly unsustainable.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>The IDF’s assessment today is that if the threat is left to expand, it will eventually threaten the viability of the Israeli state. Thus, their objective in the current conflict is not to simply inflict a dose of pain on Hamas to deter further fighting, but to systematically destroy its military capacity to conduct operations and thereby write down one of the threats. This risks Hizbullah intervening. But given that the Israeli security state fears things getting worse over time, many in the security establishment feel that if a fight must happen, then they would rather have it today.</p> -<h3 id="project-atom-2023-first-principles-for-deterring-two-peer-competitors">Project Atom 2023: First Principles for Deterring Two Peer Competitors</h3> +<p>For the international community, therefore, while deterring a regional escalation should be an objective, a mere temporary “stability” is unlikely to look attractive to either side. If the international community wants long-term stability, it must be more proactively engaged in exploring a path to peace, rather than pursuing a systematic disengagement that simply cedes the region to Iran, which has characterised Washington’s approach for the last three years. There may emerge, from the ashes of this unfolding tragedy, an opportunity to build a new road to peace, just as there is the risk that the flames will engulf what remains of a rules-based international system that so many words have been pledged to defend.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="heather-williams-kelsey-hartigan-and-lachlan-mackenzie">Heather Williams, Kelsey Hartigan, and Lachlan MacKenzie</h4> -</blockquote> +<hr /> -<p>How can the United States deter two peer competitors? Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated Putin’s willingness to rely on nuclear threats to pursue regional ambitions. Conventional losses in Ukraine may also increase Russian reliance on nuclear weapons in the years to come. China’s expanding and increasingly diverse nuclear arsenal suggests that it, too, has ambitions that may rely on nuclear threats. Beijing has proven itself to be a patient but ambitious actor, described as a “pacing” threat in the 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy, which will also present challenges for U.S. nuclear strategy and policy in the coming decade. U.S. political and military leaders need to determine the nation’s strategy to deter and, if necessary (and possible), defeat two nuclear peers simultaneously or in sequence. In doing so, leadership must also consider the implications of this strategy for nuclear force posture, nuclear modernization, extended deterrence and assurance, and arms control and disarmament strategy and commitments.</p> +<p><strong>Jack Watling</strong> is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute. Jack works closely with the British military on the development of concepts of operation, assessments of the future operating environment, and conducts operational analysis of contemporary conflicts.</p>Jack WatlingThe legal and ethical challenges of operating in densely populated areas are going to be a tragic constant of 21st century warfare, with no easy solutions.Change Or False Alarm?2023-10-13T12:00:00+08:002023-10-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/change-or-false-alarm<p><em>A potential shift in China’s approach to nuclear weapons could indicate that it is taking a page from Moscow’s book.</em></p> -<p>To assist in addressing these challenges for U.S. strategy, the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for deterring two peer competitors through 2035. This study revives a concept and approach that the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) developed a decade ago to review U.S. nuclear strategy and posture for 2025 through 2050. This project is predicated on the assumption that the vision of a world without nuclear weapons is not likely in the near future given the behavior of multiple potential adversaries. It is unconstrained by current strategy (e.g., sizing the conventional force to fight and win one major conflict, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy) and current policy (e.g., the decision to cancel or not move forward with additional nuclear capabilities) unless explicitly stated otherwise in the assumptions. However, it is constrained by likely technological trends and industrial constraints on nuclear modernization. These constraints proved to be important both in assessments of modernization options and recommendations. Beyond that, authors were asked to provide a brief picture of the world in 2035 regarding nuclear and strategic issues, to identify any other underlying assumptions of their analysis. The strategies focused on four specific themes: force posture, modernization, extended deterrence and assurance, and arms control. The strategies demonstrate surprising agreement on key issues, such as the need to assure allies and why now is not the time for nuclear reductions. But they also highlight ongoing areas of disagreement about the nature of the threats from Russia and China, requirements for U.S. nuclear forces, and the role of arms control.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>After providing an overview of the competing strategies, this introductory analysis distills 10 “first principles” for a strategy to deter two peer competitors. These principles capture areas of consensus among the strategies but also engage with areas of disagreement to identify which strategy options are best suited for the current threat environment. The introduction ends with a summary of specific recommendations about the way forward for U.S. decisionmakers.</p> +<p>China recently released its proposal for a new global order: “Proposal of the People’s Republic of China on the Reform and Development of Global Governance”. The blueprint repeats several earlier talking points on how China aims to change the global order. The pillars of the new order lean heavily on Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative, and Global Civilisation Initiative. As an unprecedently open step towards a global order that mirrors the governance of a one-party state, the proposal deserves in-depth analysis beyond the scope of this article. A significant issue examined here is China dropping its long-term No First Use of nuclear weapons policy from the proposal; this raises eyebrows as global security risks intensify with a protracted Russian war of aggression against Ukraine (where China is siding with Russia), along with China’s aggressive behaviour around Taiwan.</p> -<h4 id="competing-strategies-for-deterring-two-peer-competitors">Competing Strategies for Deterring Two Peer Competitors</h4> +<p>China officially became the world’s fifth nuclear weapon-possessing state in 1964 and was then recognised under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). For decades, China carefully advanced its nuclear arsenal to maintain its minimum deterrent strategy. However, in recent years, China has clearly abandoned this strategy, heavily increasing its count of nuclear weapons and becoming the world’s third-largest nuclear weapons power. The Pentagon has estimated that if the current trajectory continues, China could field approximately 1,500 warheads by 2035.</p> -<p>The PONI team provided experts with four assumptions and respective guiding questions as an analytical framework. This report contains five chapters, each of which constitutes a distinct strategy for deterring two peer competitors. A comparison of the strategies across the analytical framework is provided in Tables 1–4.</p> +<p>In August 2023, at the NPT Review Conference, the Director-General of the Department of Arms Control of the Foreign Ministry of China, Sun Xiaobo, reaffirmed China’s 1964 policy “not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances” and “not to threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states”.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KBjuPFj.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Table 1: Comparing Strategies for Deterring Two Peer Competitors — Deterrence Strategy.</em></p> +<p>Nonetheless, a month later, China’s proposal for global governance seems to have dropped this decades-old policy. Up until August 2023, China had repeatedly reaffirmed its No First Use policy from 1964 onwards, although on some occasions Beijing has stretched it to exclude other nuclear powers, especially the US. The dual pledges of No First Use and No Threatening to Use nuclear weapons have long been cornerstones of China’s nuclear strategy. The fact that China’s proposal on global governance omits these commitments – while otherwise expressing China’s positions in a detailed manner – could indicate a change in China’s position on nuclear weapons, especially because China has never previously wavered or appeared ambiguous about these commitments.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OtAjjLR.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ Table 2: Comparing Strategies for Deterring Two Peer Competitors — Modernization.</em></p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">China may have learned from Moscow’s capitalisation on European fear regarding Russian nuclear weapons use</code></em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/agPMi3F.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ Table 3: Comparing Strategies for Deterring Two Peer Competitors — Extended Deterrence.</em></p> +<p>China’s ultimate aim in its 1964 policy on the use of nuclear arms was “to deter others from using or threatening to use” nuclear weapons against China. Could dropping this from an important policy document simply be a mistake, or is this a deliberate new shift in policy, perhaps based on Xi Jinping’s analyses of “changes not seen in a hundred years”, or influenced by Russia’s threatening rhetoric directed at NATO allies regarding nuclear weapons?</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LO31CST.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ Table 4: Comparing Strategies for Deterring Two Peer Competitors — Arms Control.</em></p> +<p>While China’s proposal for global governance demands that the international community oppose the threat or use of nuclear weapons, China appears to have excluded its unilateral pledge to do so. Beyond this, China’s tacit support for Russia in its invasion of Ukraine has cemented talking points on “invisible security” and how countries’ national security should not threaten that of others. China sees this as the root cause of the war in Ukraine. In Beijing’s view, “the crisis” – China still refuses to call the war anything else – stems from a flawed, unbalanced European security architecture, where other parties’ security concerns are ignored. In this context, multiple Chinese researchers have sided with Russia. Furthermore, following Finland’s NATO accession, a number of Chinese researchers took the view that since Russia could not match NATO’s conventional deterrence, Russia had no other option but to increase its nuclear arsenal.</p> -<p>It is important to acknowledge at the outset that some of the Project Atom experts questioned the premise of the exercise. Multiple strategies make a case for maintaining the status quo despite the two peer competitor problem and caution that changes to the nuclear posture or modernization plans could have an escalatory effect. One expert disagrees that China is a “competitor” and focuses the analysis on why China should not be treated similarly to Russia. These definitional issues underpin areas where the strategies align and where there are areas of disagreement.</p> +<p>The consequences of China abandoning its No First Use/No Threatening to Use policy are minor at most; China has in any case refused to engage in any arms-control dialogue with the US. Thus, its policy promises have often been taken with a grain of salt. Nevertheless, two immediate implications of China’s potential new approach still come to mind. First, China’s quick nuclear build-up means that the US will face two nuclear-armed powers, China and Russia, working together as its adversaries. Second, China may have learned from Moscow’s capitalisation on European fear regarding Russian nuclear weapons in order to, at a minimum, delay help for Ukraine. Similarly, triggering fear by threatening the use of nuclear weapons could rein in Japan’s and other US allies’ willingness to defend Taiwan, if the People’s Liberation Army tries to take the island by force.</p> -<p>Important areas of agreement include:</p> +<hr /> -<ul> - <li> - <p>China and Russia’s nuclear arsenals pose significant challenges for the United States and its allies.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The United States should not pursue unilateral nuclear reductions at this time.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The United States does not need to match Russia and China’s combined arsenal numbers.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The United States needs more flexibility and agility in its arsenal, whether that be with more advanced conventional capabilities, additional new nuclear delivery platforms, or the ability to adjust modernization plans.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>U.S. credibility with allies is fragile, and Washington can take steps, such as more consultations and joint planning, to improve this.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Prospects for arms control in the near term are bleak, but verifiable arms control that constrains adversary capabilities, reduces the risk of war, and avoids unnecessary nuclear arms competition remains in the U.S. national interest. More informal risk reduction options are a better way forward for the time being.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><strong>Sari Arho Havrén</strong> is a RUSI Associate Fellow based in Brussels. She specialises in China’s foreign relations, China foresight, and in great power competition. She is also a visiting scholar at the University of Helsinki.</p>Sari Arho HavrénA potential shift in China’s approach to nuclear weapons could indicate that it is taking a page from Moscow’s book.Seize Initiative In Ukraine2023-10-12T12:00:00+08:002023-10-12T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/seize-initiative-in-ukraine<p><em>Ukrainian forces retain the initiative in the war but advanced an average of only 90 meters per day on the southern front during the peak of their summer offensive, according to new CSIS analysis.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Russia’s extensive fortifications — which include minefields, trench networks, and support from artillery, attack helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft — have slowed Ukrainian advances. In particular, Russia has expanded the size of its minefields from 120 meters to 500 meters in some areas, making Ukraine the most heavily mined country in the world today. Ukrainian military progress is still possible, but the United States and other Western countries need to provide sustained military aid and other assistance.</em></p> -<p>While the strategies are largely aligned on these overarching principles, they differ on details of how to manage complexity and uncertainty in the evolving geopolitical and technological landscapes. Areas of disagreement include:</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Beijing’s intentions, and how the United States can influence China’s strategic calculus.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Whether or not the United States should expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal, such as with nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-Ns) or with a warhead buildup when New START expires.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The escalatory risks of nuclear weapons, particularly in the face of advanced conventional weapons and nonnuclear strategic capabilities.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Reliance on nuclear weapons for extended deterrence and as a tool to strengthen credibility with allies.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How the United States might incentivize China to join arms control agreements.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>The war in Ukraine has become a test of political will and industrial capacity between two competing blocks: allied countries aiding Ukraine, such as the United States and numerous countries in Europe and Asia; and axis countries aiding Russia, such as China, North Korea, and Iran. Despite Ukraine’s efforts to liberate territory illegally seized by Russia, offensive operations have been slow. Some policymakers have erroneously argued that poor Ukrainian strategy has contributed to the slow pace of operations. According to proponents of this view, the Ukrainian military mistakenly focused on conducting operations along multiple fronts rather than on a single front in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.</p> -<p>The remainder of this section offers a more in-depth analysis of how the competing strategies address questions of force posture, modernization, extended deterrence, and arms control. The authors were given a series of assumptions and guiding questions, which are included here for context.</p> +<p>To better understand military operations in Ukraine, this analysis asks three questions. What is the state of the offense-defense balance in the Ukraine war? What factors have impacted Ukrainian offensive operations? What are the policy implications for the United States and other Western countries?</p> -<h4 id="framing-assumptions">Framing Assumptions</h4> +<p>Ukrainian operations raise the age-old question in warfare about whether it is easier for militaries to seize territory or defend it. This phenomenon is called the “offense-defense balance,” and it refers to the relative strength between the offense and defense in warfare. The main idea is that there are several factors, such as geography, force employment, strategy, and technology, that can influence whether the offense or defense has the advantage. When the offense has the advantage, it is generally easier for an attacking state to destroy its opponent’s military and seize territory than it is to defend one’s own territory. When the defense has the advantage, it is generally easier to hold territory than it is to move forward and seize it.</p> -<p>DETERRENCE STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR POSTURE REQUIREMENTS</p> +<p>This analysis utilizes several sources of information. To understand historical rates of advance, this assessment compiles data on offensive campaigns from World War I through Ukraine’s 2023 offensive. It also examines open-source data on fortifications, unit positions, and the attrition of military equipment. In addition, it uses satellite imagery and drone footage of the battlefield in eastern and southern Ukraine to understand the challenges of offensive operations. Finally, the authors conducted interviews with Ukrainian, U.S., and European military officials.</p> -<p><strong>Assumption #1</strong>: The United States will pursue a multi-domain deterrence strategy to deal with complexity and uncertainty in the current and future threat environment, and nuclear weapons will remain one element of a broader approach. This raises the following questions with regards to deterring two peer competitors:</p> +<p>The analysis comes to three main conclusions. First, defense has the advantage in the war. This reality should not come as a major surprise. Carl von Clausewitz wrote in On War that “defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack” and that “the superiority of the defensive (if rightly understood) is very great, far greater than appears at first sight.” Ukrainian forces averaged approximately 90 meters of advance per day during their recent push on the southern front between early June and late August 2023.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>What should the United States’ core deterrence objectives be in 2035?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Does deterring two peer competitors require overhauling current U.S. thinking about deterrence? How, and in what way?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How might nuclear force structure requirements change in the future, and what factors should the United States consider when setting those requirements going forward?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How should the United States approach integrating nuclear and conventional capabilities, as well as cyber and space operations, to deter two peer competitors while at the same time managing escalation dynamics?</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Second, the reason for the slow pace of advance was not poor Ukrainian strategic choices, as some have argued. Instead, it was likely caused by a Ukrainian change in force employment, especially the deliberate adoption of small-unit tactics, and the lack of key technology such as fighter aircraft for suppression of enemy air defense and close air support. In addition, Russia constructed substantial defensive fortifications, including minefields, and utilized attack helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) against advancing Ukrainian forces.</p> + +<p>Third, Ukraine still retains the initiative in the war, and the United States and other Western countries should provide long-term aid packages that help Ukraine strengthen its defense and prevent or deter a Russian counterattack in the future. They should also provide additional aid to help Ukraine on offense to maximize the possibility that it can retake as much territory as possible from Russia. After all, one of the United States’ most significant adversaries, Russia, has been reduced to a second- or third-rate military power without a single U.S. military casualty. As many as 120,000 Russian soldiers have been killed, as well as over 300,000 wounded, and Ukrainian soldiers have destroyed a massive number of Russian weapons systems, from main battle tanks and fighter aircraft to submarines and landing ships. U.S. aid to Ukraine should continue even with U.S. support to Israel likely to grow following the October 2023 Hamas attack, since Russia, Iran, and their partners represent a significant threat to U.S. interests.</p> -<p>Force posture refers to day-to-day and readiness status and the deployment location of various elements of the force; force structure refers to the kinds of nuclear forces to field.</p> +<p>The rest of this brief is divided into three sections. The first examines the state of the war and the strength of the defensive advantage in Ukraine. The second section explores the factors contributing to the defensive advantage. The third outlines several policy implications for the United States and other Western countries.</p> -<p>In any future strategy, establishing who and what specifically the United States and its allies intend to deter is critical. The strategies agree that deterring nuclear use by U.S. adversaries should continue to be an enduring objective, as well as that Russia and China pose the most significant deterrence challenges, with North Korea posing a lesser threat. But these strategies do not simply approach the issue with a blank slate. The challenge of deterring two nuclear peers may be less about overhauling U.S. nuclear strategy and current thinking about deterrence and more about what capabilities and approaches are required to achieve the United States’ broader, long-standing objectives. Each of the strategies make clear that deterring nuclear use must be part and parcel of a broader deterrence strategy that seeks to deter aggression below the nuclear threshold — a goal consistent with the current U.S. strategy of deterring both aggression and strategic attacks on the United States and its allies and partners.</p> +<h3 id="defense-dominance">Defense Dominance</h3> -<p>Much of the analysis and many of the recommendations in this report deal primarily with two separate but related deterrence challenges. The first is deterring limited nuclear use, a particularly pronounced challenge considering the prospects for a regional conflict to escalate beyond the conventional level and the fact that limited nuclear use is perhaps the most likely pathway to large-scale escalation. The strategies differ on the question of what will deter Russia or China from escalating to limited nuclear use in a regional conflict and what options a president might want available if deterrence fails. Miller as well as Karako and Soofer weigh different options for augmenting existing low-yield capabilities and conclude that the United States should move forward with the SLCM-N to increase the availability of credible response options. Tomero, Mastro, and Wolfsthal reject this notion. Wolfsthal argues there is no need to change U.S. force posture and what he identifies as the “five current modes of nuclear employment.” Tomero argues instead that deterring limited nuclear war “requires credible signaling that an adversary will not gain any military or political advantage from using nuclear weapons,” and that “adding ever more low-yield nuclear weapons cannot substitute for credible threats clearly communicated.” Alternatives for signaling threat credibility are relatively under-explored in some of the papers, however. Supporters of SLCM-N argue that signaling to adversaries that they cannot gain an advantage may be difficult or impossible with non-nuclear capabilities, whereas appropriate nuclear capabilities have a unique ability to signal resolve to adversaries and allies alike.</p> +<p>In early June 2023, Ukraine began a counteroffensive to retake territory illegally occupied by Russian forces in the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk Oblasts. Ukraine retains the operational initiative, but its relatively slow pace of advance and the trade-offs it has made to preserve personnel and equipment indicate that the defense has significant advantages.</p> -<p>The second deterrence challenge is deterring collusion and opportunistic aggression, or the notion that Russia and China (or a regional actor) could conduct simultaneous or sequential attacks that would force the United States to deter and possibly wage large-scale conflicts in two theaters against two nuclear peers. The strategies make slightly different assumptions about what “opportunistic aggression” or simultaneous conflicts might entail. Soofer and Karako argue that the need to deter a simultaneous conflict with Russia and China places “an increasing burden on the role of nuclear weapons to deter conventional aggression.” Mastro, on the other hand, argues that “nuclear weapons do not deter admittedly problematic conventional activities,” and that “the United States should avoid this pathway for the sake of assuring allies because it could encourage China to then threaten nuclear use in response to U.S. conventional activity, which would seriously complicate defense planning.” And Miller stresses the importance of simultaneous deterrence because of the risk of collusion.</p> +<p>This section examines Ukraine’s efforts across three main fronts in summer 2023. First, Ukrainian offensive operations were primarily concentrated along the southern front, in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast and western portions of the Donetsk Oblast. Second, Ukraine was on the offensive in various locations along the eastern front in the Donetsk Oblast. Third Ukraine conducted raids across the Dnipro River in the Kherson Oblast, although it did not conduct larger military operation in the region. In addition, Russia and Ukraine were engaged in attacks using missiles, UASs, and special operations forces beyond the front lines in such areas as Crimea.</p> -<p>MODERNIZATION</p> +<p>Southern Front: Beginning in June 2023, Ukraine pursued two main lines of attack on the southern front: one toward the city of Melitopol and other toward the city of Berdiansk. Both cities are transit routes and logistical hubs for Russian forces throughout southern Ukraine and Crimea, the disruption of which represents significant strategic value to Ukraine. However, Ukraine’s progress on the southern front was slow, though deliberate.</p> -<p><strong>Assumption #2</strong>: The United States will continue to strategically compete with adversaries by modernizing U.S. nuclear forces and developing emerging technologies. This raises the following questions in regard to two peer competitors:</p> +<p>Ukraine’s most significant advance was around the town of Robotyne, in the direction of Melitopol. Ukraine advanced a total of roughly 7.6 kilometers from early June to late August 2023 — an average of approximately 90 meters per day. This advance was slow even when compared with historical offensives in which the attacker did not draw major benefit from surprise or from air superiority. The Ukrainian offensive did, however, continue to move forward, unlike many historical examples in which the attackers were thrown back.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Are current modernization plans and the nuclear triad fit for the purpose of deterring two peer competitors?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>If deterring two peer adversaries requires adjustments to current modernization plans, what changes might be required, what limitations exist, and how could the United States manage the risks of a future arms race?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Will the development of artificial intelligence (AI) and other advanced technologies by the United States and its adversaries confer greater benefits to U.S. deterrence efforts?</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Ukraine also moved slower than in its previous offensives against Russia, in which it faced less organized defenses. In its 2023 counteroffensive, Ukraine faced a system of fortified defenses — extensively prepared trench lines, minefields, and other fieldworks. During its 2022 counteroffensive in the Kherson Oblast, Ukraine advanced 590 meters a day on average through prepared defenses — systems that include fortifications but that nevertheless were limited by time and resource constraints. Around the same time, Ukraine advanced rapidly in a counteroffensive in the Kharkiv Oblast, moving forward 7.5 kilometers a day on average and overcoming hasty defenses — systems constructed either in contact or when contact is imminent with opposing forces, and that therefore depend on enhancing the natural terrain.</p> -<p>The United States is currently in the midst of a massive effort to modernize every element of its nuclear forces. The strategies differ on what changes can and should be made to the current program of record, but they largely agree on the importance of building a more responsive nuclear infrastructure and prioritizing investments in nuclear command and control upgrades. Mastro takes a wide look at the trade-offs between nuclear force modernization and conventional force posture investments and concludes that “in instances in which nuclear modernization may come at the expense of conventional force development, conventional force development should have priority.” Miller, on the other hand, argues that the “current U.S. nuclear modernization plan itself is necessary but not sufficient.” He explains, “simple logic and arithmetic suggest that the force level enshrined in the New START treaty in the 2010s and designed for a world far different from today’s is insufficient for 2023 — let alone for later in this decade and on into the 2030s.” Given the long lead times and industrial capacity constraints that currently exist, Miller as well as Soofer and Karako make the case for uploading additional warheads on existing platforms, or at least ensuring that U.S. forces can do so if and when necessary.</p> +<p>Figure 1 shows the average rate of advance for selected combined arms offensives, such as Galicia, the Somme, Gorzia, and Belleau Wood during World War I; Leningrad and Kursk-Oboyan during World War II; Deversoir (Chinese Farm) during the Yom Kippur War; and Ukraine in 2022 and 2023. Cases were selected from a universe of offensive campaigns lasting more than one day in which the attacker advanced, did not achieve substantial or complete surprise, and did not benefit from air superiority. In addition, cases were selected to ensure variation in geography, technology, time period, attacking and defending forces, and average advance. A much larger number of cases were also consulted, though not included in Figure 1.</p> -<p>Tomero, on the other hand, does not support an increase to the current U.S. stockpile but leaves open the possibility of changes to the current modernization program, arguing that the United States should “prioritize survivable platforms and architectures to provide stability and resilience” and “think more creatively about basing modes and concepts of operation.” Wolfsthal agrees with Tomero that the current program of record is “more than adequate” but highlights the importance of investment in nuclear command and control and early warning capabilities. How many and what kinds of nuclear weapons the United States needs to support its strategy is a matter of significant debate in this series, and one that comes down to, in part, how the strategies consider the trade-offs between nuclear modernization and investments in conventional capabilities and forces. These debates fundamentally revolve around the question of the role of nuclear weapons in different strategies and what forces will be required to enable those strategies.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CcrYTor.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Rates of Advance for Selected Combined Arms Offensives, 1914–2023.</strong> Source: CSIS analysis of open-source imagery of combat in Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv Oblasts; and <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA220426.pdf">Robert L. Helmbold, “CDB90,” in A Compilation of Data on Rates of Advance in Land Combat Operations (Bethesda, MD: U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, 1990)</a>. CDB90 is based on information collected over a period of several years by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization and revised by the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency.</em></p> -<h4 id="extended-deterrence-and-assurance">Extended Deterrence and Assurance</h4> +<p>Slow progress on the southern front does not mean that Ukraine is failing or will fail in its objectives. It merely indicates that seizing terrain is difficult, probably more so than in its previous offensives. It is possible that Ukraine’s rate of advance may accelerate if it can overcome Russia’s defensive positions near the current front lines or if the Russian military experiences operational or strategic collapse. Such changes in fortune are not unprecedented in modern warfare. The Allied breakout from Normandy in Operation Cobra followed 17 days of grinding combat in which General Omar Bradley’s First Army suffered more than 40,000 casualties to advance 11 kilometers, an advance rate of approximately 650 meters per day. It succeeded despite the exhaustion of several of the infantry divisions tasked with the initial penetration, eventually breaking through German lines and advancing another 11 kilometers in the three days following the initial assault. The success was achieved due to German defensive failings and Allied airpower and demonstrates that slow advances are not incapable of becoming rapid breakthroughs. While Ukraine lacks the offensive advantages the Allies enjoyed in Normandy, the Russian military has also not demonstrated the operational competence of the German Wehrmacht in World War II. The example suggests that an accelerated advance remains possible, if unlikely.</p> -<p><strong>Assumption #3</strong>: The United States will continue to provide extended deterrence and assurance guarantees to allies in Europe and Asia. This raises the following questions:</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1DBsKJs.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Russian Fortifications on the Southern Front.</strong> Note: Fortifications constructed before 2022 are not pictured. Source: <a href="https://read.bradyafrick.com/p/russian-field-fortifications-in-ukraine">Brady Africk, “Russian Field Fortifications in Ukraine,” Medium, bradyafrick.com, September 11, 2023</a>.</em></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>How can the United States assure a diverse group of allies against two peer competitors and other regional threats, and how might allies contribute more to their own security?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>What synchronization challenges with allies should the United States expect to face in the future? How can the United States best prepare to overcome these challenges?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>How might divergent threat perceptions among allies affect the future of U.S. extended deterrence and perceptions of U.S. credibility?</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/N3jA8t8.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Ukrainian Advance and Russian Fortifications around Robotyne, Ukraine.</strong> Source: CSIS analysis of Sentinel-2 imagery, maps from the Institute for the Study of War, and Africk, “Russian Field Fortifications in Ukraine.”</em></p> -<p>All strategies recognized the need for the United States to strengthen its credibility with allies. The majority of strategies recognized that nuclear risks will be highest in regional conflicts, likely involving U.S. allies. Extended deterrence and assurance, therefore, will be essential for a U.S. strategy in deterring two peer competitors, but it will also be challenging. As such, the United States needs to take steps to strengthen credibility with allies. All strategies spoke to this point, with varying recommendations for how to do so. Tomero focuses on more non-nuclear interoperability, Karako and Soofer recommend more consultations, and Mastro also suggests more consultations along with joint planning. Miller offers the most ambitious strategy for assurance, identifies why new capabilities, such as SLCM-N, serve important extended deterrence and assurance functions, and recommends integrating Japan and South Korea into AUKUS.</p> +<p>Despite the slow progress, Ukraine advanced past the first of three lines of Russian fortifications in some areas along the southern front, as shown in Figure 3. It is possible that a Ukrainian breakthrough of the second line could accelerate the rate of advance, but Russia can probably still limit the strategic impact of a second breakthrough. Russia maintains a third defensive system consisting of a constellation of disconnected fortifications surrounding key cities in the region, as shown in Figure 2.</p> -<p>The strategies differ, however, in the escalatory risks of these assurance strategies, with Mastro particularly cautioning against increased reliance on nuclear weapons because of how this could be perceived in Beijing. Namely, Beijing could see an increased U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, a nuclear buildup, or any change in U.S. nuclear posture for the purposes of extended deterrence and assurance as a sign of the United States’ desire to gain supremacy over China in a future conflict, prompting an arms race in the region. Similarly, Wolfsthal warns that “being willing to resort to early and first use may have negative implications for crisis stability and arms racing.” Tomero and others consider nonnuclear options for assurance that may strike a delicate balance of strengthening extended deterrence and credibility with allies while avoiding an action-reaction cycle with China or Russia. But shifting away from nuclear weapons in signaling credibility and commitment could be risky in the security environment of the next decade.</p> +<p>Attrition ratios also suggest that the cost of seizing terrain has increased. As shown in Figure 4, Ukraine suffered greater attrition in its summer 2023 counteroffensive than in its previous offensives. According to open-source data, Russia lost only 2.0 fighting vehicles (defined as a tank, armored fighting vehicle, or infantry fighting vehicle) for each Ukrainian fighting vehicle destroyed, captured, abandoned, or seriously damaged in its current offensive. This ratio is less favorable to Ukraine than the 3.9 Russian vehicles lost per Ukrainian vehicle during its summer 2022 counteroffensive and 6.7 Russian vehicles lost per Ukrainian vehicle during the counteroffensive that drove Russia back from Kyiv in early 2022. While loss ratios and rates of advance are crude metrics for measuring Ukrainian progress, they together suggest that taking territory has been more difficult in the 2023 offensive than in Ukraine’s previous operations.</p> -<p>The strategies briefly touch on an important question as to whether or not U.S. allies should pursue independent nuclear programs. Mastro urges restraint on the part of the United States in supporting allies’ proliferation interests because of the potential risk that “this could undermine the global nonproliferation regime and increase the likelihood of nuclear use due to accident.” Conversely, Karako and Soofer suggest that over the long term it may become necessary to revisit the question of nuclear nonproliferation, and they consider the potential risks and benefits for Japan, for example, pursuing an independent nuclear program. To be clear, Karako and Soofer do not go so far as recommending this as a policy option, but they point to it as an important consideration as the United States develops a strategy for deterring two peer competitors.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YjEuw6L.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Loss Ratio of Russian to Ukrainian Fighting Vehicles.</strong> Source: Data compiled by Daniel Scarnecchia from Oryx, <a href="https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html">“Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx</a>; and <a href="https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-ukrainian.html">“Attack On Europe: Documenting Ukrainian Equipment Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx</a>. Oryx data is not geolocated, and therefore the ratios are calculated from the total number of fighting vehicles confirmed to be lost across the entire country. The data are biased by the mode of collection, but the bias is assumed to be constant across the three Ukrainian offensives depicted. The 2022 Kyiv counteroffensive was coded as beginning March 16, 2022, the 2022 summer offensive as beginning August 29, 2022, and the 2023 summer counteroffensive as beginning June 4, 2023.</em></p> -<p>ARMS CONTROL</p> +<p>Elsewhere along the southern front, Ukraine made limited advances south of the city of Velyka Novosilka in the direction of Berdiansk. Ukrainian forces liberated several towns in their advance south of Velyka Novosilka, engaging in significant fighting. However, Ukraine’s gains in the area represented only approximately 10 kilometers of advance from early June to late August 2023.</p> -<p><strong>Assumption #4</strong>: The United States will continue to be obligated to comply with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and will continue to pursue a dual-track approach of arms control and deterrence. It will complete implementation of New START in 2026, but whether or not there is a follow-on arms control effort is undecided and up to the discretion of the authors. This raises the following questions:</p> +<p>Eastern Front: Unlike on the southern front, where Ukrainian offensive operations over the summer represented a new phase in the war, fighting on the eastern front has been continuous in some areas for over a year. Ukraine made marginal gains over the summer in a handful of pockets along the eastern front, particularly in the Donetsk Oblast. One example is around Bakhmut, where Russia has pressed since August 2022 for small territorial gains at high costs to personnel. Beginning in May 2023, however, Ukraine conducted a series of flanking counterattacks, retaking pieces of territory southwest and northwest of the city.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>How can the United States continue to pursue progress toward arms control and disarmament while deterring two peer competitors?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>What are the risks to U.S. interests if arms control efforts stall? How can the United States mitigate those risks?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Can the United States consider making meaningful progress toward Article VI commitments when Russia does not seem to be committed to making reciprocal moves and China has shown no willingness to limit its nuclear growth and modernization efforts?</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Despite these successes, Ukraine has yet to approach key Russian positions beyond the current frontlines. These include the cities of Donetsk, Makiivka, and Horlivka, as well as the network of Russian fortifications that stretch between them. As CSIS assessed in June 2023, a Ukrainian attempt to push through these cities is unlikely because of the difficulties and likelihood of high casualties in urban warfare. For now, sustained Ukrainian operations on the eastern front have fixed large numbers of Russian forces that otherwise would have been available to reinforce Russian defensive efforts to the south.</p> -<p>One area of consistency across the strategies is support for arms control efforts, albeit in different forms. Mastro, for example, outlines options for engaging China on arms control for emerging technologies, which aligns with Tomero’s focus on the potentially escalatory nature of many of these capabilities. Miller recommends that the three competitors immediately pursue a test ban on fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS). Wolfsthal outlines priorities for modernization that will lay the groundwork for future arms control, such as increasing predictability and decisionmaking time, but stresses that the United States should not “pursue modernization to enhance arms control prospects.”</p> +<p>Unlike most other locations in Ukraine, Russian forces were involved in limited offensive operations in multiple areas along the eastern front over the summer. In addition to pushing back against Ukrainian gains in the Donetsk Oblast, Russia increased its presence near and attacks against the northern city of Kupiansk, which Ukraine liberated in September 2022.</p> -<p>While all strategies recognize the intersection of arms control and deterrence, there is disagreement in how they should operate in relationship to one another. Miller and Karako and Soofer emphasize that deterrence, to include force posture and modernization plans, should be the priority and precede any decisions about arms control. Conversely, Wolfsthal recommends that the United States “seek concepts that make nuclear weapon use less likely and less acceptable.” While these would seemingly be obvious priorities, they may be at odds with a deterrence strategy that will rely on moving deterrence “to the left,” deterring opportunistic aggression, and strengthening U.S. credibility among allies.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kEl8YK2.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 5: Russian Fortifications on the Eastern Front.</strong> Note: Fortifications constructed before 2022 are not pictured. Source: Africk, “Russian Field Fortifications in Ukraine.”</em></p> -<p>By raising the question about the long-term desirability of nonproliferation, as discussed above, Karako and Soofer also challenge the assumption that implementing the disarmament envisioned by the NPT is in the United States’ long-term interests. For Wolfsthal in particular, remaining committed to reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and disarmament over the long term should be a priority. Undermining the NPT either by supporting proliferation or failing to commit to continued implementation of Article VI could have wider repercussions for the nuclear order.</p> +<p>Dnipro Front: Throughout the summer, Ukraine conducted limited crossings of the Dnipro River in the Kherson Oblast to perform reconnaissance and raid Russian positions. These crossings vary in size, but they typically involved small groups of Ukrainian soldiers using speedboats to discretely cross the river and execute their missions quickly before returning across to Ukrainian-controlled territory.</p> -<h4 id="first-principles-for-deterring-two-peer-competitors">First Principles for Deterring Two Peer Competitors</h4> +<p>It is possible that Ukraine plans to establish and sustain bridgeheads across the river from which to launch larger military operations in the near future. Ukrainian military leaders stated their intent to set the conditions for future larger crossings, including by destroying Russian artillery that could target large river-crossing forces and clearing mines that could slow landing forces. However, even with proper preparation, amphibious assaults are one of the most complex and demanding operations a military can attempt. Any attempt to cross the Dnipro with a large number of forces would likely be discovered and contested by Russian forces in the first line of fortifications that spans from the Dnipro Delta across from the city of Kherson and up the Dnipro River northward. Moreover, even a successful crossing would require complicated logistical support and need to overcome a large number of fieldworks Russia has constructed along the major roads in the region, as shown in Figure 6. For now, Ukraine more likely intends its attacks to fix Russian forces in Kherson, preventing them from redeploying to the southern or eastern fronts.</p> -<p>Plans and requirements for U.S. force posture, modernization, extended deterrence, and arms control will all fundamentally depend on the overarching U.S. deterrence strategy. The competing strategies — including their areas of agreement and disagreement — help to tease out certain fundamentals that should guide such a deterrence strategy. Based on these arguments, this report identifies 10 “first principles” to inform strategy and policymaking across the U.S. government. These principles are not agreed to by all the authors but are the analysis of the PONI research team based on reviewing the competing strategies.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/D7YOsMd.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 6: Russian Fortifications on the Dnipro Front.</strong> Source: Africk, “Pre-2022 Field Fortifications in Russian-Occupied Ukraine.”</em></p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Principle 1: The fundamentals of how deterrence works have not changed. U.S. decisionmakers should be specific about who and what they are attempting to deter. Deterrence continues to rely on capability, credibility, and communication. It requires convincing an adversary’s leadership that they cannot achieve their objectives through aggression or escalation and that they will incur costs that far exceed any gains they hope to achieve. This requires, in part, identifying and holding at risk what an adversary values most, being able to deliver on that threat, and being able to impose unacceptable costs. The impending two-peer threat environment is unprecedented and requires tailoring deterrence to two different competitors, separately and in combination. Specifically, it requires a strategy that identifies who the United States is trying to deter, what it is trying to deter, and under what conditions. Extended deterrence fundamentals are also the same as they have always been, but they require tailoring to multiple allies with diverse requirements and concerns.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Principle 2: The United States does not need to match Russia and China’s combined arsenal size, but it does need to evaluate U.S. force requirements in order to compete with Russia and China to strengthen strategic stability, maintain a credible deterrent, reassure allies, and achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails. This competition will likely require some nuclear buildup, particularly for more flexible systems; however, it can also entail nonnuclear capabilities and finding new applications of emerging technologies that enhance deterrence. Any nuclear buildup should take into account the potential risks of misperception and escalation by Beijing and Moscow.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Principle 3: The United States should not make any unilateral reductions to its nuclear arsenal or cut back on the current program of record. Doing so would limit options for a U.S. president in future crisis scenarios. It could undermine the fundamentals of deterrence — the ability to deliver upon a threat in a way that is credible. Additionally, any unilateral reductions at this time would further weaken the United States’ credibility with allies and the credibility of threats to adversaries. This includes any unilateral reductions in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) nuclear mission or by other NATO nuclear actors.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Principle 4: Flexibility should be a priority in both force posture and force structure. The president should have more options, nuclear and non-nuclear, in the event of a catastrophic threat to the United States or its allies. More flexibility will also strengthen credibility. In terms of force posture, this might require more ambiguity in the United States’ declaratory policy and removing mention of plans to work toward a “sole purpose” doctrine. And in terms of force structure, this means reconsidering supplemental nuclear delivery platforms that are survivable, rapidly available in theater, and credible, such as SLCM-N, along with more advanced conventional options that can deliver deep precision strikes and hit hard and deeply buried targets. Overall, the nuclear enterprise will need to become more agile to respond to these changes.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Principle 5: Emerging technologies are an essential domain of competition. Many of these technologies risk giving an adversary an asymmetric strategic advantage, undermining strategic stability, and increasing nuclear risks. At a minimum, the United States should commit — unilaterally or multilaterally, such as through the P5 process — to keeping a human in the loop in nuclear decisionmaking. The United States should compete in emerging technologies, to include AI and hypersonics, both to avoid strategic surprise and to provide the president with more response options, including non-kinetic ones. Any strategy for deterring peer competitors should capitalize on the potential advantages of emerging technologies but also balance these developments with efforts to avoid their potentially destabilizing effects, such as by including them in a future strategic stability dialogue with Beijing.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Principle 6: U.S. strategy should give more attention to preventing and managing escalation at the regional level. Deterrence strategy should focus on deterring regional coercion and aggression, to include opportunistic aggression, re-establishing deterrence in the event of escalation, and signaling resolve to defend allies. At the same time, the United States will need to ensure a capability to deter and defend against attacks on the homeland and ensure the survivability of the U.S. arsenal. This will require a more diverse deterrence tool kit, to include nonnuclear strategic capabilities.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Principle 7: Allies are a force-multiplier. Strengthening U.S. credibility with allies should be a priority. Assuring allies may require even more effort than deterring adversaries. Potential tools for doing so include additional capabilities, such as SLCM-N and rapid deployment of the nuclear-capable F-35, as the best way to strengthen credibility with allies. Washington can also improve nonnuclear interoperability with allies and address long-standing classification and export control challenges that impede its ability to share technologies and information with its closest allies. Other means of doing so include sustained investment in the nuclear enterprise, to include the National Nuclear Security Administration and the National Laboratories, more frequent and in-depth planning, consultations and exercises, and additional high-level standing dialogues.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Principle 8: Arms control and risk reduction initiatives can provide tools for escalation management and work hand-in-hand with deterrence. As deterrence becomes more integrated, so must arms control. Some specific arms control and risk reduction proposals to be considered include a multilateral FOBS test ban, joint P5 statements on a “human in the loop,” investment in new verification tools, cross-generational arms control knowledge transfer, and remaining open to dialogue with Beijing. Any future arms control with Russia will likely depend on the outcome of the war in Ukraine and on how China’s rapid nuclear force expansion affects U.S. nuclear force requirements.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Principle 9: Now is not the time to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. Reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and making more progress toward “general and complete disarmament,” as outlined in NPT Article VI, should remain a goal for long-term policy both for nonproliferation purposes and to uphold the rules-based international order. On the one hand, continuing to express this objective demonstrates U.S. commitment to the NPT and to upholding the nuclear order. Additionally, these signals are important for some allies with strong disarmament legacies and movements. On the other hand, in the current climate, such statements risk setting unrealistic expectations and undermining U.S. deterrence and assurance priorities. The United States can find other avenues for demonstrating commitment to Article VI, such as leading in the P5 process, combatting Russian and Chinese disinformation that threatens to undermine the NPT, and offering new arms control and risk reduction initiatives that will help avoid arms racing and nuclear use, the most fundamental shared objective among deterrence supporters and skeptics alike.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Principle 10: The United States should be a leader in the global nuclear order. This should include at least three main components. First and foremost, the United States should strengthen existing institutions, particularly the NPT. More states with nuclear weapons mean more nuclear risks. The nonproliferation regime still serves U.S. interests. It should discourage allies’ proliferation, which may require additional signals and capabilities as a demonstration of the United States’ commitment to their security. Second, the United States should prioritize more informal approaches to arms control and risk reduction measures. And finally, the United States can lay important groundwork now by investing in people, not just capabilities. The complexity of the security environment requires developing different kinds of analysts and leaders who can think holistically about deterrence and managing competition across both the nuclear and conventional realms. Developing a clear strategy, tailoring deterrence to specific adversaries, assuring allies, and making difficult decisions about how to plan, invest in, and employ U.S. forces are fundamentally human tasks that require investing in people — not just things. This means focusing on education, cognitive understanding and decisionmaking, and communication skills.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Beyond the Frontlines: In addition to the fighting on the three fronts, the war has been marked in recent months by intensified missile barrages and escalating naval engagements. Since May, Russia has renewed its long-range UAS and missile attacks in Ukraine. Targets include a mix of critical infrastructure, command and control installations, and other military and civilian targets throughout Ukraine. For its part, Ukraine continues to conduct missile and UAS strikes against Russian military assets, headquarters, and strategic infrastructure in occupied territory. Ukraine has also conducted UAS attacks inside Russia. These attacks have been concentrated in the Bryansk and Belgorod regions near the western border with Ukraine, in Crimea, and in Moscow. On July 30, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that Russian territory was fair game: “Gradually, the war is returning to the territory of Russia — to its symbolic centers and military bases, and this is an inevitable, natural, and absolutely fair process.”</p> -<h4 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h4> +<p>With the termination of a grain export deal in mid-July, tensions escalated in the Black Sea region. Ukraine struck Russian targets — including diesel-electric submarines, air defense systems, amphibious landing ships, radar installations, and infrastructure, such as dry docks — in and around Crimea using UK-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles, UASs, special operations forces, and other weapons systems and forces. On July 17, Ukrainian UASs damaged the Kerch Strait Bridge used by Russia to move supplies and troops into Crimea. On August 24, Ukrainian special operation forces also reportedly conducted a nighttime raid against Russian positions in Crimea. In response to Ukrainian attacks, Russia withdrew the bulk of its Black Sea Fleet, such as attack submarines and frigates, from Sevastopol to other ports in Russia and Crimea.</p> -<p>The overarching finding of these strategies is that the United States needs increased flexibility. A flexible strategy will require focusing on investing in the nuclear enterprise so that it can become more agile and can respond to leadership demand signals and further changes in the threat environment. The United States should also immediately focus on strengthening its credibility with allies through consultations. It can lead on arms control and risk reduction by exploring multilateral opportunities, though these are likely to be informal and allow for flexibility in adapting to the new security environment. Over the medium and long term, that might require developing new conventional capabilities or new delivery platforms and building up the arsenal, which would require making decisions now about force structure and acquisition. Many of the necessary capabilities for deterring two peer competitors will have long lead times, and part of a flexible deterrence strategy requires flexibility in the nuclear enterprise that does not currently exist.</p> +<p>Over the summer, Russia also conducted a series of attacks against Ukrainian Danube ports that serve as hubs for the export of grain and other food commodities. According to Romanian officials, Russian UASs were flown near and occasionally inside Romanian air space to strike Ukrainian ports, such as Izmail and Reni, just a few hundred yards from Romanian territory. On several occasions, Romanian officials collected fragments from Russian UASs inside of Romanian territory.</p> -<p>There are challenges to these first principles and recommendations. One potential risk is U.S. force posture and modernization decisions being misinterpreted by adversaries as aggression rather than a response to their actions. Another is further inhibiting prospects for arms control. Over the long term, many of these questions will depend on the evolution of the security environment; therefore, a flexible strategy is the best option for the strategic landscape of the next 10 years.</p> +<h3 id="debating-battlefield-performance">Debating Battlefield Performance</h3> -<h3 id="project-atom-defining-us-nuclear-strategy-20302050">Project Atom: Defining U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 2030–2050</h3> +<p>Battlefield success hinges on a complex interaction of several factors, including force employment, strategy, technology, leadership, weather, and combat motivation. While Ukraine retains the initiative in the war, Ukraine’s military advance has been relatively slow. Why? This section examines four possible hypotheses: Ukrainian strategy, Russian defenses, Ukrainian technology, and Ukrainian force employment.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="rob-soofer-and-tom-karako">Rob Soofer and Tom Karako</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Ukrainian Strategy: Some policymakers and analysts contend that poor Ukrainian strategy contributed to the slow pace of Ukrainian operations, though there is little evidence to support this argument. According to proponents, the Ukrainian military focused too much on conducting operations along multiple fronts, rather than concentrating forces on a single front in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The military objective in the south — and indeed a major objective of Ukrainian military operations more broadly — appeared to be pushing south to the Sea of Azov, cutting Russian occupation forces in two, severing the land corridor between Russia and occupied Crimea, and retaking such cities as Melitopol.</p> -<h4 id="introduction">Introduction</h4> +<p>Instead of focusing on a southeast axis, however, Ukrainian commanders divided troops and firepower between the east and the south. Some U.S. military officials advised Ukraine to concentrate its forces in the south and drive toward Melitopol to punch through Russian defenses. Likewise, some criticized the Ukrainian military for moving forward on multiple axes within Zaporizhzhia Oblast itself rather than focusing on one main axis. The argument about how and where Ukraine should concentrate its offensive efforts is, in part, a debate about force ratios. Proponents of focusing solely on the south argue that massing Ukrainian forces along a single axis in Zaporizhzhia would have allowed Ukraine to achieve the favorable force ratio necessary to generate a significant breakthrough.</p> -<p>In August 2021, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Admiral Charles Richard, issued a public challenge for fresh thinking about deterrence theory and nuclear strategy:</p> +<p>But this argument is unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, Russian military leaders came to the same conclusion and prepared accordingly. They anticipated that Ukrainian forces would likely focus on the southern front and sent forces to fortify Melitopol and Tokmak, as well as other areas in Zaporizhzhia. Second, well-designed mechanized campaigns almost always progress on multiple axes, not just one. Advancing along a single axis allows the defender to fully concentrate on stopping that advance. In this case, the Russians would almost certainly have moved forces from other parts of the theater as rapidly as possible to stop the Ukrainian drive toward Melitopol. Instead, Ukrainian advances in Bakhmut and other eastern areas pinned down Russian forces since Russia was not prepared to lose Bakhmut.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>At STRATCOM, we are re-writing operational deterrence theory and asking the hard questions. This will take a national and academic undertaking. Only when we gain a fundamental understanding of how deterrence theory is applicable in today’s strategic environment, can we inform strategy, create a mutual understanding of that strategy and threat, and then execute plans in support of our national defense.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Actual force ratios across the long front lines in Ukraine are impossible to determine using open sources, but there is little reason to believe that Ukraine’s multifront approach was a mistake. To achieve favorable force ratios despite its smaller military, Ukraine would have had to move forces to the decisive point before the Russian defenders could react and surge their own forces to that area. But Russia anticipated that Ukraine would attack in Zaporizhzhia, prepared its most extensive networks of fortifications in the region as shown in Figure 7, and almost certainly planned to redeploy forces to reinforce against a Ukrainian advance there.</p> -<p>Consistent with Admiral Richard’s charge, Project Atom’s study objective is to determine the “best U.S. strategy for deterring two peer competitors” and to assist the United States in making “crucial decisions about its future nuclear strategy and forces.” While the broader question of deterring Russian and Chinese conventional aggression and adventurism must be foremost in these considerations, the focus of this paper is on the nuclear concepts, policies, strategies, forces, and posture necessary to deter and prevent nuclear use by Russia and China — the two nuclear peer (2NP) competitors. How the government addresses the 2NP, or three-party, problem also has implications for and will be influenced by budget and arms control considerations.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/egsJsi1.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 7: Construction of Russian Fortifications between February 2022 and August 2023.</strong> Source: Africk, “Russian Field Fortifications in Ukraine.”</em></p> -<p>For each of the research questions, this paper first outlines principles of theory and strategy, then applies these to the new Russian and Chinese strategic contexts.</p> +<p>As a result, Ukraine likely could not have achieved more favorable force ratios even by massing its forces along one or two axes in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. While a more favorable force ratio is always desirable, evidence suggests that a higher concentration of Ukraine’s efforts along the southern front likely would have been met by a higher concentration of Russian forces in heavily fortified terrain.</p> -<h4 id="understanding-the-problem">Understanding the Problem</h4> +<p>Russian Defenses: Another possible explanation for Ukraine’s limited progress is that Russian forces constructed and used defensive fortifications effectively. There is some evidence to support this argument. In advance of Ukraine’s offensive, Russia built the most extensive defensive works in Europe since World War II, with expansive fortifications in eastern and southern Ukraine. These defenses consist of a network of trenches, anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, razor wire, earthen berms, and dragon’s teeth, as shown in Figure 8.</p> -<p>It has been the long-standing national security policy of the United States to deter aggression by Russia, China, and other states posing a threat to U.S. vital interests. As noted in the 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy, the United States’ top-level priority is to deter threats against and strategic attacks against the United States and its allies and partners. With respect to nuclear threats, the strategy and forces necessary to deter Chinese aggression and nuclear escalation have largely been considered a lesser included case: if the United States maintains the strength necessary to deter Russia, it can also deter a much smaller Chinese nuclear force. The expansion of Chinese power in all its dimensions (e.g., economic, conventional, nuclear, cyber, and space) means that China must be considered a true rival in its own right and no longer a lesser included nuclear case.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KjbEH5h.png" alt="image08" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 8: Multilayered Defenses North of Mykhailivka, Ukraine.</strong></em></p> -<p>Complicating the strategic problem is the possibility that the United States may find itself in a crisis or conflict with both Russia and China at the same time — including the scenario of opportunistic aggression. This may be the result of intentional collusion or alliance between Russia and China, although it is difficult to be predictive on this score. As noted in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review: “In a potential conflict with a competitor, the United States would need to be able to deter opportunistic aggression by another competitor. We will rely in part on nuclear weapons to help mitigate this risk, recognizing that a near simultaneous conflict with two nuclear armed states would constitute an extreme circumstance.”</p> +<p>Ukraine’s slow advance can be attributed, in part, to Russia’s successes using fortifications to defend against Ukrainian assaults. Across the entire front, Russian troops primarily fought from infantry trench systems. Russian forces in some areas, such as the 7th Guards Air Assault Division, were so thoroughly dug in that Ukrainian forces discovered carpets and pictures on the walls of captured Russian positions.</p> -<p>The phrase “extreme circumstance” is noteworthy because it refers back to the long-standing U.S. policy that the nation would only employ nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend its vital interests. This phrasing suggests that in a circumstance where U.S. and allied conventional forces may not be adequate to address a simultaneous conflict with Russia and China, nuclear weapons may come into play. If this were the case in any particular scenario, then U.S. nuclear forces and strategy would play an important role.</p> +<p>Russia employed a variety of fortifications to slow the advance of Ukrainian vehicles. However, not all fortifications are created equal. One former Ukrainian commander belittled the effectiveness of Russian dragon’s teeth defenses in September 2023. Based on satellite imagery and other information, CSIS analysis in June 2023 similarly questioned the potential effectiveness of Russia’s dragon’s teeth given the varied quality in their installation and make.</p> -<p>The recognition that China has now amassed significant conventional capabilities makes the challenge more complex. In the context of renewed long-term strategic competition, the 2018 National Defense Strategy’s approach to conventional forces and a blunting strategy (i.e., forces in place to resist the initial aggression) is important to preclude nonnuclear strategic defeat. Strategic deterrence in the 2NP problem is more than just nuclear deterrence. The problem also includes the need to deter major aggression short of nuclear employment and to do so under two major nuclear shadows.</p> +<p>But Russia’s extensive use of mines effectively slowed Ukrainian advances. Ukraine is now the most mined country in the world after Russia expanded the size of minefields from 120 meters to 500 meters. The increased size and frequency of minefields complicated Ukrainian planning and limited the effectiveness of Ukraine’s equipment. For example, when the Ukrainian 47th Assault Brigade and 33rd Mechanized Brigade attempted to cross a minefield north of Robotyne on June 8, 2023, mine-clearing efforts were insufficient. Slowed or disabled by mines, Ukrainian vehicles came under fire from Russian attack helicopters, and Ukrainian soldiers were forced to abandon their equipment and retreat. The incident reportedly resulted in the loss or abandonment of at least 25 tanks and fighting vehicles, although some were later recovered. Drone footage and satellite imagery show a cluster of 11 vehicles damaged and abandoned in one location from the failed advance, as shown in Figure 9.</p> -<p>The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) notes that the United States must “be able to deter both large-scale and limited nuclear attacks from a range of adversaries” and that “the ability to deter limited nuclear use is the key to deterring non-nuclear aggression.” U.S. conventional forces alone are not currently adequate to address a simultaneous conflict with Russia and China (and possibly on the Korean peninsula), thus placing an increasing burden on the role of nuclear weapons to deter conventional aggression. In the face of the significant Chinese conventional force buildup, this relationship seems unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Increased conventional forces and air and missile defenses, however, will be critical to contribute to raising the threshold at which nuclear employment may be required to blunt non-nuclear aggression.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/dWgSVRu.png" alt="image09" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 9: Damaged and Abandoned Vehicle from an Attempted Ukrainian Advance North of Robotyne, June 2023.</strong> Source: Screenshot of video release by the Russian Ministry of Defense.</em></p> -<p>In summary, potential Russian and Chinese cooperation poses a challenge to U.S. interests in peacetime, crisis, and war. In peacetime, the United States and its allies must be prepared to respond in a timely manner to potential future developments in the strategic postures of China and Russia, whether qualitative or quantitative. The United States must persuade Beijing and Moscow through words and deeds that nuclear competition is a failing proposition that will provide no strategic advantage. In a time of crisis, the United States and its allies would have to strengthen deterrence simultaneously in two theaters. This is not a new problem for U.S. military strategy, but the 2NP challenge puts a rising premium on the capacity of U.S. allies and partners to contribute to alliance deterrence postures in new ways.</p> +<p>Minefields disrupted Ukraine’s offensive momentum and imposed constraints on Ukraine’s rate of advance. Russian minelaying increased the demand on Ukrainian reconnaissance and engineers and complicates military planning. As a result, Ukrainian operations in mined areas had to be slow and deliberate or risk trapping equipment and personnel on exposed ground.</p> -<p>In war against one adversary, the United States would have to contemplate the possibility of war with the other, whether simultaneously or in close succession. This implies the need to be capable of strategic nuclear attacks against both Russia and China even after either or both engage in a preemptive nuclear attack on U.S. forces. The United States and its allies would also need to anticipate the consequences of (perhaps limited) nuclear strikes in one theater on the deterrence and escalation dynamics in the other theater. Would the third party conclude that the United States still would be willing to run additional risk after suffering nuclear strikes, or would they conclude instead that the United States would retreat in hope of avoiding further escalation?</p> +<p>The terrain in Ukraine increased the effectiveness of Russian defenses. Rows of flat, open farm fields separated by tree lines characterize the southern front. Without air superiority, Ukrainian ground forces had to advance by crossing these fields with little natural cover to conceal their movement. In addition to laying mines, Russia targeted advancing Ukrainian troops and vehicles with artillery fire, attack helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft. Using thick summer foliage to their advantage, Russia concealed tanks, anti-tank units, and infantry units in the tree lines that border the fields to ambush Ukrainian forces.</p> -<h4 id="deterrence-theory-and-strategy">Deterrence Theory and Strategy</h4> +<p>In urban areas, Russia used infrastructure to its advantage. Buildings and other structures provide cover to defending forces and enable ambushes. Russia also methodically destroyed roads and created obstacles in urban areas to disrupt the advance of Ukrainian vehicles and channel them into dangerous areas. For example, a Ukrainian assault in late July on the town of Staromaiorske along the southern front was reportedly slowed by a combination of such defenses.</p> -<p>While the nature of deterrence does not change, its character must adjust for new actors, circumstances, and weapons. To deter, one must create in the mind of the adversary the fear not to attack — to convince them that costs will outweigh the benefits and that the use of nuclear weapons is the worst possible choice. The credibility of nuclear deterrence depends on a combination of resolve and capabilities.</p> +<p>Ukraine’s advance was further complicated by the proliferation of sensors and rapid precision strike capabilities on the battlefield, especially long-range precision fires and UASs. Russia deployed significant numbers of small UASs in contested areas, and some Ukrainian sources reported losing 10,000 UASs every month, which demonstrated the sheer number of these systems being employed on the battlefield. The ubiquity of these systems makes it impossible to establish that sensor saturation and advanced strike capabilities provide a distinct defensive advantage, but there are good reasons to believe this is the case. Sensor saturation creates a “transparent battlefield” in which forces can be found and targeted more easily than in past decades.</p> -<p>While China’s emergence as a serious nuclear competitor requires that the United States tailor its deterrence strategies, it is not clear that the central problems of nuclear deterrence have changed. The dilemmas of extended deterrence — that is, threatening to use nuclear weapons on behalf of distant allies despite one’s own vulnerability to nuclear retaliation — that existed during the Cold War in the U.S.-Russia context will be relived, albeit in a three-way contest. This may have implications for force structure but should not affect the theoretical underpinning and complexity of deterrence.</p> +<p>The advancement of precision fires and the proliferation of lethal UASs shorten the time it takes to strike enemy forces once they are located. In many cases, a UAS may act as both the sensor and the strike capability. Loitering munitions, for example, can circle battlefields until a target is acquired and approved for an immediate strike. On a transparent battlefield onto which an adversary can rapidly strike detected forces, attackers must distribute further, move more deliberately, make greater use of cover, and more tightly coordinate movement with suppressive fire in order to survive their advance. In contrast, defenders can take advantage of prepared fighting positions that are less exposed both to enemy detection and enemy fire.</p> -<p>As during the Cold War, the United States must convince both Chinese and Russian leaders that the costs and risks of nuclear use will outweigh any benefits — that any nuclear use will make them worse off. This requires a belief in the credible use of nuclear weapons by the United States in response to the adversary’s use of nuclear weapons.</p> +<p>Ukrainian Technology: A third possibility is that offense was weakened by insufficient technology, especially weapons systems that would facilitate a breakthrough. There is some evidence to support this argument. Ukraine received significant military assistance from the West, which aided combat operations. Examples include artillery, main battle tanks, armored carriers, ground support vehicles, air defense systems, air-to-ground missiles, manned aircraft, UASs, coastal defense systems, and radar and communications. U.S.-supplied cluster munitions, which can cause devastation over a broader area than ordinary shells, were also helpful for Ukrainian forces. Ukraine used cluster munitions to target Russian troops running across open ground, either to flee or to provide reinforcements. However, Ukraine’s lack of fighter aircraft, disadvantage in fires, and limited enablers made it more difficult to break through Russian lines.</p> -<p>Does nuclear deterrence become more complicated in a three-way game? Three is not inherently more unstable than two, although that appears to be the conventional wisdom in the academic literature. One recent article compares the 2NP problem to the “three-body” problem in astrophysics, where it is impossible to predict the motion of three celestial bodies. Others fear the increasing prospect for misunderstanding or inadvertent nuclear use resulting from a greater number of nuclear great powers.</p> +<p>Ukrainian Force Employment: Some have argued that the speed of Ukrainian advances was impacted by its military doctrine and tactical implementation, a combination known as “force employment.” There is some evidence to support this argument.</p> -<p>It is also possible that a tripolar nuclear context would induce greater caution and stability. For instance, if Russian and U.S. leaders were to contemplate nuclear use against each other during a conventional conflict, they must also consider that China may be the unharmed beneficiary from that nuclear exchange — the last country standing, so to speak.</p> +<p>Choices in how militaries use the soldiers and equipment at their disposal can permit attackers to advance despite the extreme lethality of defenders’ firepower or permit defenders to limit the gains of numerically overwhelming attackers. Effective force employment requires tight coordination between infantry, armor, artillery, and airpower at several organizational levels, as well as high levels of autonomy, initiative, and tactical prowess at lower echelons.</p> -<p>What if Russia and China collude to attack the United States simultaneously? Or what if one country takes the opportunity to challenge U.S. interests in one region while the United States is occupied with the other adversary? Does this weaken the United States’ ability to deter both at the same time? It is a challenging set of questions, to be sure, but in theory nuclear deterrence can hold if the United States successfully creates the necessary fear of nuclear use against both Russia and China under all circumstances. The concern is whether the United States may be so weakened by the first nuclear attack (or not be able to communicate with its nuclear forces) that this lessens the fear in the mind of the second adversary. It also begs the question of whether a combined nuclear attack would be able to effectively disarm the United States. The solution to these concerns is one of strategy and forces, not deterrence theory.</p> +<p>Ukraine changed how it used its forces to reduce its losses while accepting an advance rate much slower than its leaders may have initially desired. There is little doubt that Ukraine’s initial force employment resulted in high rates of attrition. But it remains unclear why Ukraine’s initial force employment resulted in such high losses without generating sizable advances. Training, force structure, organizational culture, or lack of airpower all may have played roles, and the interaction between Russian defenses and Zaporizhzhia’s terrain may have forestalled a mechanized breakthrough independent of those factors.</p> -<p>This dilemma is related to, but not to be confused with, the traditional “two-war” problem that U.S. presidents have faced since the end of the Cold War. In 1993, President Bill Clinton adopted a readiness standard to fight a large offensive ground war in the Persian Gulf and another on the Korean peninsula, while George W. Bush laid out the requirement to simultaneously fight a war in two critical areas and be expected to win decisively in one of those conflicts, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Nuclear deterrence is not a substitute for strong conventional forces, which are needed to address the two-war problem.</p> +<p>While granular data on Ukraine’s force employment is scarce, open-source information suggests a shift in tactics after its unsuccessful first assaults. Accounts based on interviews with combatants suggest a change in how Ukraine coordinated its infantry, armor, and artillery. Ukrainian operations in June 2023 appear to have been organized around larger maneuver units than later Ukrainian operations in the summer, which employed smaller infantry units supported by artillery and small numbers of tanks. Analysis by the Royal United Services Institute demonstrates that Ukraine can effectively integrate multiple combat branches at lower echelons.</p> -<p>On balance, it is not necessary to reconsider the nuclear deterrence theories developed during the Cold War to confront this environment. Nevertheless, the United States must ensure that it can operationalize deterrence through its nuclear strategy and forces. U.S. nuclear strategy must be able to achieve the political and military objectives established by the president for those forces. More fundamentally, U.S. nuclear employment must credibly be able to impose costs on the adversary that are out of all proportion to the assumed benefits of its action. If it can do so, this contributes to deterrence against both adversaries; if it is unable to do so, the United States must either alter the strategy or provide additional forces to implement the strategy against two nuclear peers.</p> +<p>Ukraine also emphasized destroying Russian artillery as part of its changing offensive strategy. Open-source data shows that Ukraine greatly increased its destruction of Russian artillery systems in late June and early July following its initial failures to advance, as shown in Figure 10. This is consistent with some reporting on Ukraine’s changed operational approach. This appears to mark a shift toward destroying enemy artillery before advancing and away from the combined arms approach of advancing while simultaneously suppressing the enemy using artillery fire.</p> -<h4 id="the-logic-of-us-nuclear-strategy">The Logic of U.S. Nuclear Strategy</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/iFDwnY8.png" alt="image10" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 10: GeoConfirmed Data on Rates of Destroyed Russian Artillery (June 2023–September 2023).</strong> Source: Data from <a href="https://geoconfirmed.azurewebsites.net/ukraine">“Ukraine,” GeoConfirmed.org, September 15, 2023</a>.</em></p> -<p>Nuclear strategy is the employment or threatened employment of nuclear weapons to achieve policy-related or wartime objectives. These objectives could include defense of the United States, an ally, or other vital interests, or terminating a nuclear exchange as quickly as possible. Political and military objectives could change during a conflict, and it may be necessary for nuclear strategy to adapt accordingly.</p> +<p>These changes were associated with a significant decrease in Ukrainian losses. U.S. and European officials reported that Ukraine lost as much as 20 percent of the weapons sent to the battlefield in the first two weeks of the offensive, a rate that prompted Ukrainian commanders to reevaluate their tactics. After adopting an operational approach centered around small-unit probes and attrition by artillery and UAS strikes, Ukrainian equipment loss rates were cut in half, with approximately 10 percent of equipment lost in the next phase of operations. In a war of attrition, such a decrease in loss rates was probably seen by Ukrainians as worth the slow pace of advance.</p> -<p>Nuclear strategy is related to nuclear deterrence because if the nuclear strategy is credible, it is more likely to persuade an adversary that the risks and costs of aggression outweigh any supposed benefits. If the nuclear strategy or its employment is not credible (either because the United States lacks capabilities or is threatened with unacceptable retaliation), this diminishes the deterrent effect. As former secretary of defense Robert S. McNamara said, “One cannot fashion a credible deterrent out of an incredible act.”</p> +<p>The key question of whether Ukraine’s initial mechanized assaults would have succeeded if executed with greater skill is unanswerable, despite remarks made by some military officials, political figures, and security analysts. Effective coordination between branches of arms might have allowed Ukraine to break through Russian lines. It is also plausible that Ukraine’s lack of air superiority on a sensor-saturated battlefield would have limited the benefits of such coordination. Previous analysis of World War II breakthroughs suggests that skillful implementation of combined arms tactics have mattered for successful offensive operations, but also that preponderance of firepower, operational maneuverability, speed, surprise, and air dominance have also influenced the likelihood of a breakthrough and exploitation. There is little reason to believe that more effective combined arms tactics would have been sufficient to achieve the breakthrough that Ukraine and its backers initially hoped for in the summer of 2023 without the advantages of surprise and air superiority.</p> -<p>U.S. nuclear strategy rests on the idea that the country’s ability to meet all nuclear provocations — large and small — can encourage adversaries to rethink their use of nuclear weapons. It is not a strategy of preemption or disarming first strikes. It does not require superiority or escalation dominance — only that the adversary likewise does not enjoy these advantages.</p> +<h3 id="policy-implications">Policy Implications</h3> -<p>It is a strategy of resolve and restraint. U.S. employment of nuclear weapons could seek to restore deterrence (avert further escalation) after an adversary’s initial limited use of nuclear weapons in a theater of operations; to cease nuclear escalation at the lowest possible level of violence; or to convince the adversary that whatever led them to believe that using nuclear weapons would provide them an advantage was a mistake.</p> +<p>Opposition to providing further aid to Ukraine is building among some members of U.S. Congress, as highlighted in the September 2023 stopgap spending bill that did not include additional money for Ukraine. Some argue that the United States should concentrate exclusively on countering China in the Indo-Pacific and defending Taiwan. These officials contend that U.S. resources are finite, that weapons exports to Ukraine come at Taiwan’s expense, and that sustained focus on war in Europe benefits China. Some also argue that the United States should prioritize aid to Israel over Ukraine. Others maintain that every dollar spent on Ukraine is a waste of taxpayer money that could be better used on domestic priorities, such as improving healthcare, cracking down on illegal immigration, or combating the spread of fentanyl.</p> -<p>U.S. nuclear strategy deters large-scale nuclear attacks against the homeland by maintaining the capability to inflict costs unacceptable to an opponent. As such, U.S. nuclear forces would target an adversary’s senior leadership and political structures, nuclear and theater conventional forces, and war-supporting industry.</p> +<p>But these arguments are misguided. Continuing aid to Ukraine is essential to prevent authoritarian leaders, such as Vladimir Putin, from achieving their revanchist aims. In fact, Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran have deepened their military, economic, and diplomatic ties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.</p> -<p>Maintaining the ability to retaliate against large-scale attacks against the United States reinforces the country’s ability to restore nuclear deterrence at lower levels because the adversary has nothing to gain from further nuclear escalation to the strategic nuclear level.</p> +<p>U.S. allies and enemies alike see Ukraine as a test of Western resolve. The Ukrainian military still has the initiative in the war and continues to advance forward. Ukraine’s supporters can meaningfully impact two of the factors outlined in the previous section: Ukrainian force employment and technology. The fundamental challenge is that both take time. A war that continues to favor the defense is also likely to be protracted, since Ukrainian advances will likely continue to be slow.</p> -<p>In terms of ends, ways, and means:</p> +<p>The United States and its Western allies need to be prepared to support a long war and to develop a long-term aid plan. They have already provided extensive training and intelligence to improve Ukraine’s force employment, including combined arms maneuver, air defense, special operations activities, intelligence, and the operation and maintenance of more than 20 military systems. This support needs to continue and adapt as the war evolves.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>The ends of U.S. nuclear strategy are to help deter both large-scale conventional aggression and nuclear use and, should deterrence fail, restore deterrence with the least amount of nuclear destruction and on the best possible terms for the United States and its allies.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The means include a range of nuclear delivery systems with various yields to address a variety of regional and strategic scenarios. U.S. nuclear strategy calls for forces capable of delivering large-scale nuclear responses as well as limited and graduated response options.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The ways include nuclear strikes that limit further attacks on civilians by targeting adversary nuclear and conventional forces, strikes that hold at risk what the United States assesses that the adversary values, and, through selective restraint, incentivizes them from engaging in further attacks.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>In addition, Ukraine needs more and better technology in two respects. The first is long-term assistance that will help Ukraine strengthen its defense and prevent or deter a Russian counterattack in the future. Examples include mines, anti-tank guided missiles, air defense systems, stockpiles of munitions, counter-UAS systems, and area-effect weapons, such as artillery.</p> -<p>It is difficult to know whether further exchanges could be limited once nuclear use occurs. But it is prudent to develop strategies for confronting limited nuclear use because the United States’ adversaries field capabilities to do so. There is always the risk that the adversary will ignore or misinterpret a U.S. signal of restraint and respond with large-scale attacks, though this would be tantamount to national suicide because the United States maintains the option for a large-scale nuclear response (an assured destruction capability).</p> +<p>The second type of assistance is aid that helps Ukraine on offense in the current campaign and maximizes the possibility that it can break through well-fortified areas and retake as much territory as possible from Russia. Examples include a steady supply of munitions; attack aircraft, such as F-16s; long-range missiles, such as MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS); and UASs that can conduct intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike missions.</p> -<p>This inherent uncertainty about what happens after limited nuclear use is one reason it is important to remember that nuclear forces do not exist in isolation and would not exist in isolation even after their employment. The dial does not simply switch from “conventional war” to “nuclear war.” Conventional forces, including long-range strike, continue to be relevant as both deterrents themselves and for damage limitation purposes. The war could well continue, even if it does not include further nuclear employment. U.S. Global Strike Command has control of significant nuclear forces, but they also control significant conventional strike, and there is little reason to suppose that conventional forces would cease even after limited nuclear use. The goal of stemming further escalation could even be enhanced by the simultaneous signals of restraint and resolve that would be communicated by returning to conventional strikes.</p> +<p>Based on current trends, continuing aid to Ukraine may cost roughly $14.5 billion per year. Figure 11 highlights what this might look like through the end of 2024. This aid has a highly favorable risk-reward ratio. One of the United States’ most significant adversaries, Russia, is suffering extraordinary attrition. As many 120,000 Russian soldiers have died, and perhaps three times that number have been wounded, along with several dozen Russian general officers. Ukrainian soldiers have destroyed substantial numbers of Russian military equipment, such as main battle tanks, armored and infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, artillery, surface-to-air missile systems, fighter aircraft, helicopters, UASs, submarines, landing ships, and a guided missile cruiser. And the United States has lost zero soldiers in the war.</p> -<p>In addition to conventional strike, another aspect of conventional forces relevant to nuclear posture is air and missile defenses, which may contribute to the survivability of both nuclear and nonnuclear strategic assets. As the prospects increase for nonnuclear strategic attack, including through air and missile forces in particular, those assets that cannot be moved or hidden may require active defense. Such an approach underlies the Biden administration’s approach, led by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, to the 360-degree air and missile defense for Guam. Given its salience for power projection and broad U.S. deterrence and defense goals in the region, including for bomber forces, a significant attack that negated U.S. ability to project power from Guam would be a strategic event, irrespective of whether or not nuclear weapons were used. By raising the threshold for a successful attack on strategic power-projection abilities, air and missile defenses can contribute to crisis stability and to escalation control.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1WiLk6R.png" alt="image11" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 11: U.S. Presidential Drawdowns for Ukraine (February 2022–September 2023) and Projected Drawdown Amounts (September 2023–December 2024).</strong> Source: <a href="https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Execution/pda_announcements/">“Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) Announcements,” Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)/CFO, Accessed September 21, 2023</a>.</em></p> -<p>The risk that a limited nuclear escalation could, however, rise to large-scale nuclear attack adds to the deterrent effect at the outset. As noted in the 2020 Report to Congress on Nuclear Employment Guidance:</p> +<p>The war is now, in part, a contest between the defense industrial bases of the two sides: Russia and its partners, such as China and Iran; and Ukraine and its partners, including the United States and other Western countries. A decision by the United States to significantly reduce military aid would shift the military balance-of-power in favor of Russia and increase the possibility that Russia will ultimately win the war by seizing additional Ukrainian territory in a grinding war of attrition. Too much is at stake. As UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher said to President George H.W. Bush in the leadup to the First Gulf War, after Iraq had invaded Kuwait, “This is no time to go wobbly.”</p> -<blockquote> - <p>A tailored and graduated nuclear response does not mean an adversary can confidently predict only a symmetrical response or that the adversary can define escalation thresholds by the matter of its initial nuclear use. What an adversary can confidently anticipate is the certainty of an effective U.S. response to nuclear attack, at any level, and in any context, in ways that will impose greater costs than any expected or hoped-for gain.</p> -</blockquote> +<hr /> -<p>U.S. nuclear strategy seeks to deter adversary nuclear use by convincing them that there is no scenario for nuclear use to which the United States cannot respond in an unacceptably costly manner to the adversary. Should nuclear deterrence fail, the U.S. response is intended to demonstrate both resolve and restraint in the hope of convincing the adversary to abandon further nuclear use.</p> +<p><strong>Seth G. Jones</strong> is senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p>But will this strategy hold up against two nuclear peers at the same time?</p> +<p><strong>Riley McCabe</strong> is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS.</p> -<p>STRESS TESTING THE STRATEGY</p> +<p><strong>Alexander Palmer</strong> is a research associate with the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS.</p>Seth G. Jones, et al.Ukrainian forces retain the initiative in the war but advanced an average of only 90 meters per day on the southern front during the peak of their summer offensive, according to new CSIS analysis.Integrate Offence And Defence2023-10-11T12:00:00+08:002023-10-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/integrate-offence-and-defence<p><em>This article articulates pathways forward in a future operating environment dominated by stalemates and threats to national homelands.</em></p> -<p>How does the logic of U.S. nuclear strategy stand up in a 2NP environment? Here is where the analysis becomes speculative and where assumptions can make a big difference. For the sake of discussion, the authors postulate the following to be the case by 2035:</p> +<excerpt /> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Russia and China deploy a triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems at roughly New START force levels (1,550 warheads and approximately 700 delivery systems).</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Russia and China enjoy significant regional nuclear superiority. Russia retains over 2,000 land, air, and sea-based “nonstrategic” nuclear weapons. China possesses over 900 nuclear-capable theater-range missiles.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>All nuclear forces will be on alert during a crisis; all adversaries will maintain the capability to launch under attack; and mobile land and sea forces will be dispersed, ensuring each country maintains an assured second-strike capability.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The United States will continue to be vulnerable to the second-strike capabilities of Russia and China and unable to limit damage to politically acceptable levels through precision non-nuclear strikes, a disarming preemptive nuclear first-strike, or missile defense. The same is true for Russia and China in relation to potential strikes from the United States. All three powers, however, have significant air and missile defenses that could impede the penetration ability of some delivery systems.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Russian and Chinese doctrines, like that of the United States, allow for limited nuclear use and escalation management. In other words, escalation to massive strategic nuclear strikes is not an inescapable conclusion but remains a possibility for which the United States must plan.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>A core challenge that is likely to be presented by the future operating environment is the combination of stalemates at the front with threats to national homebases. Not only will this strain militaries, but it will also generate organisational competition between those responsible for defensive tasks and those responsible for manoeuvre at the front.</p> -<p>U.S. nuclear strategy for deterring limited or regional nuclear use is predicated on restoring deterrence (i.e., preventing further nuclear escalation) at the lowest level possible through flexible, limited, and graduated response options and by withholding strikes on what the adversary values most, to encourage restraint. The growth of Russian and Chinese nonstrategic nuclear forces suggest that the deterrent effect of this strategy may be diminished during a regional conflict. Russia and China have many more regional nuclear options, while the options available to the United States are not necessarily prompt, may lack survivability, and may be exposed to Russian and Chinese air defenses.</p> +<p>One way of overcoming these contradictions is through a concept which adopts elements of strike, Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD), and manoeuvre. This is the goal envisioned under Israel’s Operational Victory Concept. Per this concept, which heavily emphasises multidomain integration, close coordination must be achieved between air and missile defences, strike and ground forces.</p> + +<p>As described by one of the authors in a previous article, this approach would involve three things. The first is the integration of sensors used for offensive and defensive tasks, and the use of the same capabilities to enable both strikes and interceptions. This integration can enable responsive fires. Instead of depending almost solely on an attempt to deliver a knockout blow at the outset of a conflict, this approach would also seek to create a blanket of sensor coverage to ensure that any projectile fired creates a risk of unmasking the launcher. Defensive forward-based intercepts can be followed up with strikes on launchers. As demonstrated by the updating of defensive radar systems such as the AN/MPQ-64 to extrapolate a launcher’s location from a missile’s trajectory, this is technologically viable today. The second element of the approach is strike capabilities with the range and speed to engage targets before they move or even complete a multi-rocket firing sequence. Precisely what this range and speed requirement is depends on the target. Over longer distances, one might need recourse to tools such as longer-range missiles or loitering munitions. It is also possible to create dual-purpose interceptors which can serve both air defence and strike missions, as illustrated by the US Navy’s SM-6. Though this entails costs, an integrated system is arguably cheaper than two separate lines of effort to support strike and defence. If operated in proximity to the enemy, as in the context of offensive manoeuvres, short-range strike-intercepting munitions might even be cheaper than descent-phase interceptors. The final component of this model is ground forces that manoeuvre to support strike by infiltrating an opponent’s lines, unmasking targets and forcing them to move, as well as engaging targets of opportunity. Sufficiently small and distributed ground formations networked with a wider force could serve as force multipliers for strike.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The costs of deflecting Iran’s proxies in the early stages of a conflict with Tehran could leave Israel exhausted in the event of direct Iranian intervention later on</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>In effect, this approach still maintains a focus on manoeuvre, presenting an opponent with multiple dilemmas and preventing them from acting in a coherent manner. However, physical manoeuvre is in this context a supporting element in a system based on dislocation by fire. In effect, manoeuvre, fire and defence must be balanced in a system which integrates their effects.</p> + +<h3 id="lessons-from-the-israeli-example">Lessons from the Israeli Example</h3> + +<p>The Israeli experience is instructive here. Israel faces the prospect of a multi-front war with Iranian proxies and Iran itself, in which there is a considerable risk that its air defence capabilities will be exhausted by the sheer volume of fire that it faces. Moreover, the state faces a prioritisation issue – the costs of deflecting Iran’s proxies in the early stages of a conflict could leave it exhausted in the event of direct Iranian intervention later on. It would seem, then, that seeking efficiencies by integrating offence and defence is an essential task.</p> -<p>This rationale supported the 2018 NPR’s recommendation for the W76-2 low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warhead and the nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) to strengthen nuclear strategy and bolster nuclear deterrence at the regional level. The principal advantage of the SLCM-N over other theater nuclear options is that it provides a timely response from a platform already located in the theater rather than from fighter aircraft or long-range bombers generated from the U.S. homeland. Based at sea on attack submarines, the SLCM-N is inherently more survivable than land-based options and avoids potential political problems associated with asking host nations to base nuclear forces on their territory. Placing SLCM-N on attack submarines also complicates the anti-submarine warfare problem for adversaries, enhancing the overall survivability of the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad.</p> +<p>That being said, there exist considerable points of friction within the IDF. One criticism of the argument that fires and defences should be better integrated – advanced by the supporters of both manoeuvre and defence – is that a new investment in offensive ground capabilities in general, and in particular in an offensive forward-interception and launch-suppression layer, will draw from the resources the IDF requires in order to continue to strengthen and develop its existing multi-layer interception system. Dividing force design efforts would, in practice, be to Israel’s detriment. Given the relative effectiveness of Israeli defences thus far, there is an understandable conservatism regarding change. Phrases often heard in the corridors of the General Staff include: “don’t change horses midstream” or “don’t change a winning team”.</p> -<p>Assuming the United States continues to deploy the W76-2 and by 2030 deploys SCLM-N to bolster regional deterrence options, then the current U.S. nuclear strategy, forces, and force posture could be sufficient to enable U.S. nuclear strategy against both China and Russia at the theater level. Additionally, the United States must maintain sufficient survivable strategic nuclear forces to ensure that China or Russia do not contemplate disarming the United States at any point during the crisis. The assured retaliatory force must be large enough, at the end of whatever escalation ladder has been played out, to target what the leadership of both adversaries holds dear — presumably political and military control structures, strategic forces, and war recovery targets.</p> +<p>However, if we examine the IDF’s last modernisation process in the 1990s, when the Syrian armour threat was regarded as a key strategic issue, Israel did not refrain from building a combat system that enjoyed five to six separate layers of response. Fighter plane interdiction capabilities were not considered an alternative to building a new cutting-edge fleet of remotely piloted aircraft. The plethora of aerial capabilities did not make redundant the long-range precision-guided munition squads deployed in the ground divisions, along with the Northern Command’s rocket and missile artillery division. All the while, the IDF continued to build and upgrade the Armoured Corps, supplying it with advanced tanks to help deal with forward enemy forces, and it would later control Syrian territory through improved capabilities. Thus, the decision to invest in another combat layer at the cost of a few billion NIS should not be seen as threatening other layers of defence. Put simply, the cost of layered and potentially redundant systems is outweighed by both the military and material costs of a single-vector solution. A failure to overwhelm a missile-centric adversary will surely prove to be more expensive in blood and treasure, as well as in strategic outcomes.</p> -<p>What if U.S. strategy fails to induce restraint and one of the two adversaries escalates from limited to large-scale nuclear attacks against the U.S. homeland? At this point, the United States would need sufficient and enduring nuclear forces to keep fighting or deterring limited use in one theater while retaliating against a large-scale attack from the other adversary.</p> +<p>In addition, many of the improvements in areas such as ISR that could enable a strike-based concept could also improve IAMD. For example, new and comparatively cheap UAVs and nano-satellites could enhance both the tracking of certain targets and the interception of ascending missiles and active launchers. Integrated systems such as the US Navy’s Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air and the US Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System have already shown how non-dedicated ISR assets like the F/A-18 and F-35 can enhance missile defence, as well as how air defence radar can provide data to enable subsequent strikes.</p> -<p>The requirements here are considerable. In addition to maintaining nuclear weapons of ample diversity, survivability, and adaptability to deter or respond to limited nuclear use by both adversaries, the United States must be capable of inflicting intolerable damage against both adversaries to deter up to two simultaneous, large-scale attacks against the U.S. homeland. It is a difficult (though not totally unlikely) scenario to imagine because U.S. nuclear forces will be on alert: even combined adversary attacks against U.S. nuclear forces should not be able to prevent the United States’ ability to respond, assuming it ensures that its forces and nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) are survivable and can operate over a protracted period.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Developing a significant forward fighting layer that can engage ballistic and UAV threats is a crucial component in fulfilling Israel’s goal of moving from responding to initiating</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="modernization-and-force-posture">Modernization and Force Posture</h4> +<p>Moreover, the ability to engage targets with comparatively short-range capabilities including strike platforms and interceptors that rely on semi-active homing can free up more expensive assets for longer-range missions. Greater awareness about which missiles are likely to hit targets and new modes of intercept based on directed energy weapons (lasers) can also support this aim, though the latter will mature over the long term. As examples of the capabilities currently diverted from more strategically decisive missions, we might consider Israel’s “long arm” strategic strike capabilities and its next-generation Iron Dome (together with Arrow and David Sling). Both the air assets needed for strategic strike and the defensive capabilities of Iron Dome would be necessary for a conflict with Iran. However, if they are currently pinned down defending against more proximate threats, they will not be available for this role.</p> -<p>To deter limited or large-scale nuclear escalation by an adversary, the United States requires a credible strategy for the employment of nuclear weapons in all circumstances against any combination of aggressors. This calls for a strategic nuclear force capable of limited and graduated nuclear options, backed by a secure capability for inflicting intolerable damage after absorbing a large-scale nuclear attack by, potentially, Russia and China. This leads to three force posture recommendations.</p> +<h3 id="general-principles-for-defence-in-an-age-of-protracted-conflict-and-missile-threats">General Principles for Defence in an Age of Protracted Conflict and Missile Threats</h3> -<p>First, the United States must never enter a position where adversaries could think that it could conduct a disarming first strike against U.S. nuclear forces. Therefore, the survivability and durability of U.S. nuclear forces remain the first priority. As China and Russia increase the size of their strategic nuclear forces, the United States can respond either by increasing the size of its strategic nuclear forces or by making its existing nuclear force more survivable and less targetable (or a combination of the two). While a full military-technical-political analysis of these measures is beyond the scope of this paper, some ways to improve that survivability may include:</p> +<p>There are a number of lessons that can be derived about the relationship between strike and defence, both in an Israeli context and more broadly:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Making a portion of the ICBM force road-mobile (garrison-based);</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Adding more redundant NC3 channels and pathways;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Enhancing bomber survivability earlier in a crisis (e.g., place on strip alert);</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Re-examining the relationship between warning, alert, stability, and dispersal levels (e.g., consider raising to higher alert levels, earlier in a crisis);</p> + <p>The principles of the challenge facing multiple countries are quite similar. Protracted indecision in long multi-front wars disadvantages democracies with capital-intensive militaries. The need to defend civilians and critical national infrastructure, moreover, creates real opportunity costs in other areas. Countries that must defend against large numbers of cheap capabilities – from multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) to UAVs and even some missiles – will have to strip formations at the front of much-needed ground-based air defence (GBAD), unless they can find solutions. A combination of strike and defence can achieve this.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Modifying procedures for SSBN deployment and operations to get more boats out to sea sooner; and</p> + <p>It is possible and necessary to strive towards short wars and to remove the threat to the home front. Preserving routine in major cities, and especially the security of civilians, is of primary importance. The continuity of everyday life, education and the economy must be maintained.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Defending strategic forces and other critical infrastructure with limited air and missile defense with the objective of increasing the uncertainty of a successful disarming first strike against U.S. strategic nuclear forces.</p> + <p>Future wars have the potential to become multi-arena scenarios, and as such it will be critical to achieve a decisive victory vis-à-vis proximate threats in order to free up resources deal with more distant ones.</p> </li> -</ul> - -<p>Second, the United States must be capable of convincing adversaries that their limited nuclear usage in a regional confrontation would not succeed and would induce unacceptable risk and cost. The United States requires additional nuclear forces at the regional level to address Russia and China’s significant advantages in the numbers and types of nuclear weapons they have available in the region.</p> - -<p>Matching adversary numbers is not necessary. Rather, the deployment of some additional theater nuclear forces would signal to Russia and China that the United States is prepared to meet any potential limited or theater nuclear escalation without having to rely on strategic nuclear forces, which may not appear credible to the adversary or timely in certain circumstances. While the recommended course of action is to deploy a modest number of SLCM-Ns on attack submarines, other options to explore could include the following (though none of these options match the advantages in survivability and presence granted by SLCM-N):</p> - -<ul> <li> - <p>Regionally deploy nuclear ground-launched, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty-range ballistic and cruise missiles;</p> + <p>Strengthening intelligence, aerial strike and multi-layered defence components is crucial; however, it is not sufficient. Focusing on these components forces Israel into an attrition war and a strategy that serves its adversaries. Engaging MLRS, UAVs or missiles emanating from an area like Kaliningrad or southern Lebanon with aircraft or expensive GBAD and counter-rocket, artillery and mortar assets will both expend resources at unsustainable levels and draw assets from the offensive military actions needed to decide a war. For Israel, this would be long-range strike, while for NATO it might be supporting ground manoeuvre formations.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Forward deploy dual-capable fighter aircraft to the Indo-Pacific, similar to U.S. deployment in Europe;</p> + <p>Developing a significant forward fighting layer that can engage ballistic and UAV threats is a crucial component in fulfilling Israel’s goal of moving from responding to initiating. The ability to strike a launcher as it is embarking munitions, or to destroy a missile with a short-range interceptor that does not rely on an expensive seeker, will be crucial to thinning out threats. As much as possible, these systems should be able to leverage each other’s sensors.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Demonstrate the ability to forward deploy B-52s with cruise missiles when needed; and</p> + <p>It is vital to prioritise research, planning, development and production of sophisticated responses to advanced weapons systems that will emerge in the coming years, such as hypersonic missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, cruise missiles and other capabilities.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Establish new nuclear burden-sharing, planning, and training arrangements with allies.</p> + <p>Without this, many of the cutting-edge capabilities and combat methods developed by militaries such as the IDF, including those incorporated in Momentum and the next multi-year plan, will end up amounting to only tactical improvements – which, important as they are, will not flip the script.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>Third, with respect to strategic nuclear forces, it has been a long-standing policy requirement of U.S. strategic nuclear forces to target adversary nuclear forces, to the extent practicable, to limit the damage of retaliatory strikes. If this remains a critical targeting objective, then the United States may require additional nuclear forces to meet the growth in Chinese and Russian nuclear forces, though not on a weapon-for-weapon basis. Despite recent improvements in the accuracy and hard-target-kill capability of nuclear forces, the United States may find it difficult to limit adversary retaliation regardless of how many additional offensive forces it deploys because Russian and Chinese nuclear forces have become more survivable through mobility. Russian and Chinese early warning systems may also permit launch under attack. Still, there are other targets of value to the adversary, and that number is likely to rise in the case of deterring Russia and China simultaneously. How the United States responds to the growth of Chinese and Russian nuclear forces will depend on the timing and nature of that expansion and will require a formal analysis conducted by U.S. Strategic Command in concert with political authorities.</p> - -<p>Prudence dictates that the United States should anticipate and hedge against a Chinese race for nuclear parity or superiority by ensuring the capability to upload reserve warheads onto the SLBM and perhaps the ICBM force and additional cruise missiles and bombs to the strategic bomber force upon expiration of the New START treaty in February 2026. The extent to which the United States deploys additional warheads above current levels should be based in part on the number and trajectory of the Chinese and Russian nuclear threats, as well as prospects for further arms control measures. At a minimum, preparation must begin in the near term to ensure nuclear warheads in the inactive stockpile are brought to an active status — not a trivial process.</p> - -<p>Hedging is necessary to avoid or mitigate risks to the nuclear force that could develop over time, such as an unforeseen technical difficulty with a particular category of warhead or delivery system or advances in adversary offensive and defensive capabilities. Hedging can also dissuade adversaries from seeking to gain advantage through “breakout” (i.e., quickly deploying additional nuclear forces) by maintaining a U.S. capability to produce and deploy additional weapons if needed. Though the 2022 NPR does not include “hedging” as a formal goal (as was the case in the 2018 NPR), it does place emphasis on “a resilient and adaptive nuclear security enterprise” to “be able to respond in a timely way to threat developments and technology opportunities, maintain effectiveness over time, and at all times ensure that Presidential guidance can be achieved.” Central to the administration’s approach is a “production-based resilience program” to efficiently produce weapons required in the near term and beyond. This will be important to rebuild the “hedge” should it become necessary to upload warheads from the inactive reserve.</p> - -<p>Finally, as the United States anticipates the need to upload reserve warheads onto the existing deployed force, it must redouble efforts to build a responsive nuclear infrastructure capable of reconstituting the nuclear warhead hedge for the future. Likewise, as noted in the 2022 NPR, the United States will have to reevaluate the Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration programs and requirements as the security environment evolves. Time is of the essence. According to Deborah Rosenblum, assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, “We find ourselves at an urgent inflection point. . . . we have a third imperative task before us: to look over the next 20 years to identify the capability that we believe we will need based on the threat picture and start expending the necessary resources now to pace those threats.”</p> - -<h4 id="extended-deterrence-and-assurance-1">Extended Deterrence and Assurance</h4> +<p>In effect, then, responding to the twofold challenges of a positional battlefield and adversaries with superior mass will require a synthesis of capabilities. Single-vector solutions, be they based on manoeuvre, fires or active defence, will likely be found wanting. An integrated solution that seeks to leverage synergies between fires, manoeuvre and active defence is likely to be costly, organisationally difficult and applicable only in comparatively small theatres. However, the efficiencies that such a solution provides are a prerequisite for operating in the future combat environment.</p> -<p>The emerging strategic environment will have important implications for extended deterrence and, by extension, assurance of allies. Russia and China have increasingly threatened the United States and its allies with hybrid, conventional, and nuclear forces. Accordingly, allied dependence on U.S. extended deterrence will remain a key feature of the international system between 2030 and 2050. As Kurt Campbell, the president’s coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs, recently pointed out, allies are nervous — there can be no doubt about this. Whether certain allies will act upon this loss of confidence to develop their own nuclear capabilities or to accommodate Russia or China is unknowable, but it is best not to find out. Instead, the United States should continue to provide credible security assurances backed up by effective nuclear capabilities.</p> +<hr /> -<p>The United States faced the problem of assuring allies for most of the Cold War. For U.S. extended deterrence and assurance to remain credible, the United States must continue to provide political assurances while also convincing its allies and adversaries that it is willing and able to employ nuclear weapons on behalf of its allies even in the most stressing circumstances. Effective deterrence is the foundation for effective assurance; as the requirements for extended deterrence increase, so do the requirements for assurance.</p> +<p><strong>Sidharth Kaushal</strong> is the Research Fellow of Sea Power at RUSI. His research covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.</p> -<p>Nuclear tripolarity exacerbates this problem. Allies may worry that the United States will be reluctant to fight an adversary if doing so could lead to nuclear escalation against two nuclear powers. The United States will have to reassure allies that it has sufficient conventional and nuclear forces to deal with two nuclear peers at the same time, and that it is willing to run risks on their behalf. It is not clear, however, if the United States has enough bombers and dual-capable fighter aircraft to meet both conventional and nuclear missions in two major theaters of war. Finally, allies could worry that they will not be the primary theater of concern if the United States is forced to choose between two.</p> +<p><strong>Eran Ortal</strong> is the current commander of The Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies. Ortal is also the founder of the Israel Defense Force Dado Center journal, dedicated to Operational art and military transformation.</p> -<p>Allies recognize that the United States is vulnerable to nuclear retaliation and pay close attention to the United States’ response to China’s (and North Korea’s) nuclear modernization. If the United States does little to address the new situation, allies will question U.S. commitment to their security. Adaptations to nuclear deterrence — to extended deterrence posture — will be necessary. Changes are needed to both the “hardware” (i.e., capabilities and force posture) and “software” (i.e., planning, consultations, and exercises) of U.S. nuclear strategy. The United States must ask allies to do more and provide enhanced consultative mechanisms — the time is ripe for more extensive nuclear burden sharing and consultation, such as the newly constituted Nuclear Consultative Group between the United States and South Korea. If allies lose confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella, this failure could cause them to accommodate regional adversaries, reduce alliance cohesion, or seek nuclear arsenals of their own.</p> +<p><strong>Ran Kochav</strong> is an Israel Defense Forces brigadier general who has served as the commander of the Israeli Air and Missile Defense Forces. General Kochav has held a number of command roles within the IDF, including as the commander of the 66th battalion the divisional anti-aircraft officer of the 91st Division before the 2006 Lebanon war and head of the special forces section in the Air Group of IAF (2005-2006).</p>Sidharth Kaushal, et al.This article articulates pathways forward in a future operating environment dominated by stalemates and threats to national homelands.Manoeuvre Or Defence?2023-10-10T12:00:00+08:002023-10-10T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/manoeuvre-or-defence<p><em>This article examines the points of divergence between two major schools of thought within the Israel Defense Forces regarding how best to defend the state against evolving threats.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>Though specific to Israel, the debate has ramifications for European militaries as they confront a fires-centric Russian army that will attempt to operate from behind layers of anti-access capabilities including missiles, drones and UAVs.</em></p> -<h4 id="adjusting-extended-deterrence-postures">Adjusting Extended Deterrence Postures</h4> +<p>In a recent article, three officers in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) outlined what they called Israel’s Golden Age of Security. According to them, the sunset of the Golden Age has to do with the breakdown of three privileges Israel has enjoyed in the past few decades: the privilege of low-intensity conflicts (replaced by large-scale scenarios involving Iran and increasingly capable proxies); the privilege of US support (which is weakening); and the privilege of internal unity in Israel (which is eroding). In the wake of the lessons from Russia’s war in Ukraine and the shadow of a likely US pivot to the Indo-Pacific should a war over Taiwan within the Davidson Window materialise, many of these challenges will be faced by European states as well.</p> -<p>The current extended deterrence posture and assurance frameworks are products of a post-Cold War goal to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in foreign policy. For example, the United States has withdrawn its nuclear weapons from the Indo-Pacific region and all but the B61 nuclear gravity bomb from Europe. The United States does not have a multilateral consultative framework in the Indo-Pacific as it does in Europe through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).</p> +<p>The Israeli challenge is primarily a missile-based one that has seen an order of magnitude change in the sophistication of adversaries and the size of their arsenals. Take, for example, the case of Hezbollah, which has converted unguided missiles like the Zelzal-2 into precision strike weapons with GPS guidance kits. Compounding this challenge are two other issues. Firstly, there is the sheer weight of fire that an opponent like Hezbollah can deliver. Secondly, the organisation has demonstrated the ability to conduct a defence based on fortified outposts such as Marun ar Ras and urban conurbations such as Ghanduriyeh, setting the conditions for a number of rockets to be fired into Israel before Hezbollah ground positions could be overrun. And the challenge of confronting an opponent in defensible terrain even as fires strike the homeland is not exclusive to Lebanon – it extends to the Gaza Strip, albeit in a less sophisticated form.</p> -<p>The increased threat from China, Russia, and North Korea provides an opportunity to reconsider these architectures, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Today, Japan, South Korea, and Australia may be more willing to enter a more formal consultative arrangement with the United States similar to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. A new arrangement could offer opportunities for defense ministers to weigh in on nuclear posture, planning, tabletop exercises, and other matters. It is also worth exploring how current diplomatic structures could be expanded to encompass issues and activities pertaining to force posture, basing, nuclear sharing, training, and other matters related to nuclear deterrence.</p> +<p>Should European armed forces ever face an open conflict with Russia, they might well encounter a similar challenge from the direction of Kaliningrad, for example. As shown by Russia’s combination of an entrenched force manning the Surovikin lines with strikes across the depth of Ukraine to target civilians, a strategy based on a combination of stalemate at the front and deep strikes against a country’s rear is not exclusive to non-state actors. The size of the European theatre may necessitate longer-range missiles, but as Russia mass-produces and improves the Iranian Shahed, this will be possible at scale. Furthermore, in frontline areas or near bastions like Kaliningrad, rockets can be used as a strategic tool, much as they are in smaller theatres.</p> -<p>The United States must ask more of allies in terms of conventional forces as well as participation in nuclear deterrence activities because a strong conventional defense could obviate the need for or increase reliance upon nuclear weapons to deter aggression.</p> +<p>In the Israeli context, broadly speaking, two dominant schools of thought have emerged regarding prospective solutions. These are, the stand-off fire and defence approach, and the decisive manoeuvres approach. The stand-off fire and defence approach, as articulated by figures such as Colonel Nir Yanai, is a product of the last several decades and emphasises the importance of air attack and precision strikes against key targets at the outset of a war. The second component of this approach is a multi-layered air and missile defence system built to interdict a threat that has been thinned out by offensive capabilities. This approach aims to buy policymakers the time to respond to the threat in a deliberate way aimed at eroding adversary capability over time. By contrast, the decisive manoeuvres approach is an evolution of traditional Israeli concepts in which the aggressive movement and early employment of ground forces leads to the collapse of an adversary’s operational system. In effect, the best way to silence launchers, per this school, is overrunning the ground on which they are situated.</p> -<p>One could explore these possible nuclear-related options to bolster extended deterrence. Some measures are already underway, and some are politically fraught. This analysis provides a range of options for illustrative purposes which could be pursued with allies.</p> +<h3 id="the-challenges-of-stalemate-and-attrition">The Challenges of Stalemate and Attrition</h3> -<p><strong>NATO</strong>:</p> +<p>Each approach described faces considerable challenges. The major challenge facing the manoeuvre approach is the fact that, since Operation Defensive Shield (2012), a variety of factors including political restraints have prevented Israel from conducting truly decisive ground manoeuvres. Operations such as Cast Lead (2002) and Protective Edge (2014), as well as the Second Lebanon War (2006), saw much more limited ground offensives.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Continue the planned nuclear force modernization and survivability measures;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Modernize dual-capable aircraft (e.g., realistic training, planning, and exercises);</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Improve the survivability of NATO’s nuclear forces through dispersal and other active and passive measures;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Expand nuclear burden sharing by seeking other allies to fly nuclear-armed aircraft or base nuclear weapons in their countries, although the U.S. president will maintain control over these weapons; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Deploy ground- and sea-based nuclear forces, with SLCM-N being the preference.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Moreover, the challenges faced in the Second Lebanon War, while by no means insurmountable, were harbingers of a trend that challenges manoeuvre. The defence of fortified and urban terrain by Hezbollah and the group’s adept use of anti-tank guided missiles was emulated by the Houthis in encounters such as the Battle of Aden. Another point emerging from Yemen is that defeating an adversary’s ground forces does not necessarily guarantee the immediate elimination of a well-hidden missile threat in any given sector – a process which, as pointed out by IDF Major General Yaakov Amidror, may involve months of gruelling searches of prepared hiding spots. Trends such as the growing concentration of populations in increasingly large urban nodes will only exacerbate the challenge of manoeuvre, and will create new complex terrain within which missile threats can be hidden. Moreover, even in the open, field fortifications can represent a formidable obstacle, as shown in Ukraine.</p> -<p><strong>U.S. Indo-Pacific Command</strong>:</p> +<p>In a European context, one might consider the additional challenges of needing to suppress sophisticated air defence and electronic warfare systems as well as nuclear risk when assaulting adversary forces, generating fires from urban nodes like Kaliningrad in which potentially nuclear-armed capabilities like the Iskander are based. Furthermore, some launch platforms that are relevant in a European context are held at a depth which means they cannot be overrun.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Complete the robust air and missile defense capabilities for Guam in the 2020s, including with robust fire control integration, consistent with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s prioritization;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Build on existing bilateral consultative forums, including the new Nuclear Consultative Group between the United States and South Korea;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Consider multilateral consultative frameworks similar to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Consider more tangible U.S. nuclear force presence, such as demonstrating the ability to deploy U.S. nuclear-capable fighter aircraft to the region; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Prioritize the conventional long-range strike capability and capacity of key allies such as Japan and Australia.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>A major challenge with which any manoeuvrist vision of warfare must contend, then, is that it lacks an explanation of how the conditions for the collapse of an opponent can be set under the contemporary fires-centric context. It is just as likely that offensive ground actions must necessitate the sort of protracted fighting and possibly sustained occupation of hostile territory which most democratic states would wish to avoid. Moreover, as illustrated by the ongoing war in Ukraine, ground manoeuvre exacts a cost in life that many states will struggle to pay. Democracies are often relatively casualty-averse, which will be a consideration here – especially for states like Israel which rely on national service to force generate.</p> -<p><strong>Forward Deployment</strong>:</p> +<p>However, the fire and defend school faces its own challenges – specifically, the difficulty of sustaining a battle of attrition. Air defence interceptors are generally much more expensive than most of the capabilities that they must intercept, and the emergence of new forms of air threat such as comparatively cheap UAVs only compounds this. Bottlenecks in areas such as electronics will only exacerbate the issue if they persist. The interceptor shortfalls faced by Ukraine – a country that had Europe’s largest air defence arsenal at the war’s outset, augmented with Western systems – acutely illustrates this. Most opponents will not have as many cruise and ballistic missiles as Russia, but they can certainly generate a weight of fire with UAVs, multiple-launch rock systems and a limited number of cruise and ballistic missiles. Nor can it be assumed that this threat will be thinned out at the outset of a conflict – opponents have a range of palliative options, from underground shelters and hiding among the population to the employment of proliferating air defence systems and electronic warfare assets. A passive defence carries the risk of saturation by sheer weight of fire.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Deploy F-35s with gravity bombs or standoff weapons in one or more regions;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Regionally deploy nuclear-capable bombers (or place on rotational deployment);</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Deploy SLCM-N on U.S. attack submarines;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Acquire the capability to regionally deploy ground-launched cruise or ballistic missiles, and diplomatically explore contingency basing operations for the same;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Exercise and prepare contingency operations for mobile air and missile defenses to protect both U.S. and allied interests;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Acquire the capability and significant capacity for rapidly deployable ground-based, long-range precision fires; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Field long-range hypersonic weapons based in multiple domains.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Countries will increasingly have to make a choice between developing forces to achieve decision, and forces that give them the endurance to last in what may well be indecisive wars. This will require adjudicating between requirements to defend the homeland and protect manoeuvre elements, which will be politically challenging. It will also require the careful balancing of imperatives between different elements of individual services, which will adhere to either manoeuvre or endurance as national ideals.</p> -<p>To be sure, some of these recommended courses of action will face political, operational, and funding challenges, while others could be perceived as escalatory by adversaries. This includes allied basing requirements, survivability of the systems and command and control, and congressional considerations. For reasons stated elsewhere, the authors believe the SLCM-N provides the best combination of survivability, responsiveness, and flexibility with little or no political costs associated with host-nation basing.</p> +<p>Ultimately, neither model provides a complete solution. It would be a mistake for any modern state to plan on decisive manoeuvre – history shows that wars between peers are often protracted affairs. However, a reactive approach based on endurance may be both financially difficult and politically intolerable. While it is often presumed that countries can simultaneously defend their homelands and achieve strategic effects at the front if they invest the right resources into doing so, in practice they will often face trade-offs between these important but competing imperatives. The core question they will face, then, is whether to aim for shortening the wars they fight or adapting their force structures to the reality of protracted missile warfare. Ultimately, an effective solution will need to involve a synthesis of the two schools – individually, each provides only imperfect answers under contemporary operating conditions.</p> -<h4 id="arms-control">Arms Control</h4> +<hr /> -<p>Arms control could be a useful tool in managing and bounding the 2NP problem, but the United States needs willing partners. Expiration of the New START in February 2026 will drive the search for a follow-on framework sooner rather than later. Russia’s suspension of participation in inspections and reporting requirements under the treaty is not encouraging. Nevertheless, the United States should not determine its negotiating position until it first settles on a nuclear deterrence strategy and the forces necessary to implement employment guidance, and discussions take place between the administration and Congress on this approach. Regardless of whether the United States can secure limitations on nuclear forces, there are a range of other risk reduction measures that should be explored with Russia and China (i.e., so-called “arms control without treaties”).</p> +<p><strong>Sidharth Kaushal</strong> is the Research Fellow of Sea Power at RUSI. His research covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.</p> -<p>China will be difficult to bring to the table, but any future arms control treaty or framework with Russia to replace New START must consider Chinese nuclear forces even if China is not a party to the formal agreement. A follow-on agreement or framework does not require the United States to match the combined nuclear strength of both Russia and China — only that it maintains sufficient survivable and flexible forces to deter both regional and strategic nuclear threats under all likely circumstances. This reality will require a modest increase in the size of the deployed U.S. nuclear arsenal, but one that the authors believe Russia can accommodate, rather than an unlimited nuclear arms race that it cannot afford to run.</p> +<p><strong>Eran Ortal</strong> is the current commander of The Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies. Ortal is also the founder of the Israel Defense Force Dado Center journal, dedicated to Operational art and military transformation.</p> -<p>The New START limited Russia and the United States to 1,550 warheads on 700 strategic delivery vehicles (i.e., ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers). This limit may be too low to accommodate the additional regional nuclear capabilities (if they are captured in a new agreement) and potential strategic warhead uploads necessary to address the 2NP problem after 2030. The New START also does not limit Russian nonstrategic nuclear warheads, estimated at about 2,000 for land-, air-, and sea-based regional dual-capable forces.</p> +<p><strong>Ran Kochav</strong> is an Israel Defense Forces brigadier general who has served as the commander of the Israeli Air and Missile Defense Forces. General Kochav has held a number of command roles within the IDF, including as the commander of the 66th battalion the divisional anti-aircraft officer of the 91st Division before the 2006 Lebanon war and head of the special forces section in the Air Group of IAF (2005-2006).</p>Sidharth Kaushal, et al.This article examines the points of divergence between two major schools of thought within the Israel Defense Forces regarding how best to defend the state against evolving threats.Israel And The Palestinians2023-10-09T12:00:00+08:002023-10-09T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/israel-and-the-palestinians<p><em>Nothing will be the same after the weekend’s carnage in Israel. The Palestinian question is back on the agenda, and with a vengeance. So will be Israel’s response.</em></p> -<p>The arms control objective, therefore, is to negotiate a new overall warhead ceiling that provides room for a modest expansion of U.S. nuclear forces to address the 2NP problem while reducing or capping the growth of Russian nonstrategic and novel nuclear weapons. One Project Atom contributor suggests a ceiling of about 3,500 total warheads with sub-limits for strategic forces covered under New START. That number could be smaller. Arms control advocates will no doubt blanche at raising the New START warhead ceiling and question whether it serves U.S. national security to return to larger mutual strategic nuclear force levels with Russia, but for those who believe the United States needs a larger strategic arsenal to deal with China, this option is preferable to an open-ended nuclear competition. Others may question whether increasing U.S. and Russian strategic forces will cause China to increase its nuclear forces beyond the levels currently projected.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>While current Russian noncompliance with the New START suggests that any treaty will be a hard sell in the current environment, Vladimir Putin did indicate toward the end of the Trump administration that he might accept a one-year freeze on all Russian nuclear weapons. If one assumes that the war in Ukraine is creating budgetary pressures for Russia, then treaty limits on U.S. strategic nuclear forces will likely remain in Russia’s interest after New START expires. The United States will require negotiating leverage to include all warheads in a new agreement, which it can obtain in the near term through the threat of additional warhead uploads onto U.S. strategic nuclear forces and in the longer term by threatening to continue production of new ICBMs, nuclear ballistic missile submarines, air-launched cruise missiles, and heavy bombers after the 2030s.</p> +<p>On Saturday, 7 October, Hamas launched an unprecedented surprise attack on Israel. Under a barrage of thousands of rockets fired from Gaza, hundreds of Hamas fighters managed to cross the heavily guarded border into Israel. They were able to briefly take over parts of Israeli towns – most notably Sderot – and military positions. An as yet unknown number of Israeli civilians and military personnel, possibly in the dozens, were taken hostage and transferred to Gaza; by Monday morning more than 700 Israelis and more than 400 Palestinians had been killed. Hours after the beginning of the attack, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared: “Citizens of Israel, we are at war. Not an operation, not a round [of fighting,] at war.”</p> -<p>While the prospects for negotiated arms control treaties seem bleak now, this does not mean the United States should eschew other forms of nuclear risk reduction — what some might call arms control without treaties. Covered more extensively by other contributors to Project Atom, one could imagine creating and continuing dialogues with Russia and China on what sometimes is referred to as “strategic stability” or “crisis stability” issues. This might include dialogue on crisis communications, nuclear strategy and doctrine, and transparency of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic forces, for both long-range strike and missile defenses, as well as unilateral and parallel reciprocal measures to provide transparency and constraints on nuclear forces.</p> +<p>The attack must have been planned for months. Even as chaos of the Saturday morning assault is still unfolding, Hamas social media outlets have published apparently professionally produced footage of militants using paragliders to fly into Israel, and later of drones dropping grenades onto tanks and positions of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The date for the launch of the attack also does not appear to be accidental coming as Israelis marked the Jewish holiday of Shemini Atzeret. It also came exactly 50 years and a day after Egypt and Syria launched the Yom Kippur War, also known as the October War, against Israel on 6 October 1973. While the eventual scale of this current conflagration is still unclear, 7 October seems certain to become another infamous turning point in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and possibly for the wider geopolitics of the Middle East.</p> -<p>Given the strategic environment and doubts about either Russian or Chinese reductions or even transparency, it is doubtful that there can or should be meaningful progress toward the NPT commitments for disarmament in the near term. Article VI’s obligations for pursuing negotiations toward “a treaty on general and complete disarmament” is unlikely to be a productive topic of discussion. Recognizing that fact candidly is important. Indeed, under the current circumstances, whispers are growing louder in Japan and South Korea for potential nuclear capabilities of their own, or for a nuclear sharing arrangement with the United States. Former prime minister Abe Shinzo suggested such an arrangement publicly in February 2022, in the days after Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine.</p> +<p>The violence unleashed by Hamas this weekend will continue for weeks to come, and its full implications will take months to become apparent. An escalation of this scale was not on anyone’s radar – including Israeli intelligence – so it is prudent to be cautious with definitive conclusions about what this will mean. But there are a few early assumptions that can be made, including with regards to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, the ongoing speculations about a potential agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia to normalise relations and the trend towards de-escalation and rapprochement that has prevailed in the region for the past three years.</p> -<p>This suggestion may strike some as discordant with the long-standing policies and postures toward nuclear disarmament. It is. The charge of Project Atom is to consider a far-reaching timeline, for which the strictures and solutions of the mid-twentieth century may require adjustment. Inasmuch as renewed long-term strategic competition is the central challenge of the current era, it may in time even become necessary to revisit the question of nuclear nonproliferation more broadly. A nuclear-armed Japan, for instance, could be preferable to failing to deter a major war with China, and it could become necessary if Japan’s defense buildup does not progress sufficiently fast. In the near term, however, the conventional munitions and forces buildups for Japan, Australia, and the United States in the Indo-Pacific should continue to be pursued with prioritization. If the United States wishes to avoid a nuclear arms race, it may need to be more serious about a conventional arms race.</p> +<h3 id="a-new-phase-of-palestinian-israeli-conflict">A New Phase of Palestinian-Israeli Conflict</h3> -<h4 id="conclusion-1">Conclusion</h4> +<p>Hamas’ attack on Saturday morning was unprecedented in its sophistication and ferocity, and Israel’s response will likely far exceed any previous operations carried out by the IDF in Gaza over the past two decades. This is not simply a continuation, or even an intensification, of the already high levels of tensions and violence between Israel and Palestinian factions in Gaza and – especially – the West Bank over the past two years. This war opens a new chapter in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It is too early to compare it to the Intifadas of the late 1980s and early 2000s, but it certainly seems to have the potential to be as significant.</p> -<p>Project Atom asked the several competitive teams to frame an approach to U.S. nuclear strategy that wrestles with the need to simultaneously deter two nuclear great powers while considering the broader implications for U.S. nuclear modernization, extended deterrence, and arms control.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Once the fighting eventually settles, serious questions will be asked about how a Hamas surprise attack of this scale could have been possible, leaving Prime Minister Netanyahu and his government vulnerable</code></em></strong></p> -<p>This paper contends that no major changes are warranted to the fundamentals of deterrence theory or to current U.S. nuclear strategy and employment guidance. The complexities and difficulties of sustaining nuclear deterrence will not be appreciably intensified due to China’s nuclear expansion. Moreover, the long-standing U.S. nuclear strategy of flexible and tailored response remains preferable to the alternatives of minimum deterrence or nuclear primacy. Nevertheless, while theory and employment guidance remain valid in the emerging strategic environment, some modest changes to the ways and means of U.S. nuclear strategy may be in order. The United States today lacks certain nuclear forces necessary to ensure deterrence against two nuclear great powers, potentially at the same time.</p> +<p>One key question in this regard is whether the violence will primarily remain contained in and around Gaza, or whether it will spread to the West Bank (thus far, there have been several deadly clashes, but nothing of the scale of what has been happening in Gaza and southern Israel). Moreover, it is also still unclear whether the Lebanese Hezbollah will fully intervene; thus far it has only rhetorically expressed solidarity with Hamas and launched seemingly intentionally limited drone attacks on the disputed Shebaa Farms in the Golan Heights, resulting in limited Israeli artillery strikes into southern Lebanon. In short, an expansion of the war is not inevitable, but certainly a possibility.</p> -<p>First and foremost, force posture changes are necessary to improve the survivability and endurance of U.S. strategic nuclear forces and increase the flexibility and readiness of forward-based nuclear forces. Next, a modest number of additional regional nuclear forces, including the SLCM-N, would reinforce deterrence at the regional level — where war is likely to start — and compensate for Russian and Chinese advantage in nonstrategic nuclear forces. These changes should be supplemented by increased and survivable conventionally armed munitions, improved regional air and missile defenses, and improved conventional-nuclear integration. Additional hedging options, such as warhead uploading, are necessary to enable a timely increase in the size of U.S. strategic forces if needed to respond to the growth of Chinese strategic nuclear forces after 2030.</p> +<p>In Israel, this weekend’s attack and the war that now follows will shape politics going forward. Initially, there is likely to be a rallying-around-the-flag effect with the deep divisions that have characterised Israeli domestic politics for the past year fading into the background. However, once the fighting eventually settles, serious questions will be asked about how a Hamas surprise attack of this scale could have been possible, leaving Prime Minister Netanyahu and his government vulnerable. In fact, while he will probably remain in office for as long as this war takes, Netanyahu’s political career may well be finished; upended not by his legal troubles, but by having what looks to be one of the most catastrophic breakdowns of security in Israel happen on his watch. He may well have to follow in the footsteps of Golda Meir and Menachem Begin. Both built reputations as staunch security-first prime ministers but were ousted after major perceived security and military failures – the Yom Kippur War and the botched Lebanon invasion in the early 1980s, respectively. At the same time, the brutality of the attack, and especially Hamas’ killing and kidnapping of many civilians, including women and children, could well bolster the positions of those with the most uncompromising stands vis-à-vis the Palestinians, including Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition allies.</p> -<p>Domestic political and production limitations will pose challenges for the United States to grow its nuclear forces in the near to mid term. The ongoing debate between the administration and Congress over the development and fielding of a SLCM-N suggests it will be difficult to reach political consensus on the augmentation of U.S. nuclear forces. In the near term, it is more feasible to improve the survivability and endurance of existing nuclear forces, although not without cost. Increased capability and capacity of conventional strike forces and air and missile defenses will also play a critical role in increasing stability, supporting escalation control, and improving survivability of strategic assets. It is, however, possible to envision political compromises that combine support for a modest increase in U.S. nuclear forces with support for a follow-on arms control framework that limits nuclear growth after New START and addresses the expansion of Chinese nuclear forces. Deterrence in a 2NP environment will be difficult but not impossible; it is less a matter of strategic imagination than of commitment and sustained effort.</p> +<p>On the Palestinian side, meanwhile, the attack has once again exposed the ineffectiveness and fecklessness of the Palestinian Authority (PA) under aging President Mahmoud Abbas. If the PA has already struggled – and woefully failed – to assert itself meaningfully as the leadership of the Palestinian people in recent years, especially in the West Bank, this weekend’s attack has exposed it as little more than a powerless bystander. The debate about the future of the Palestinian leadership will continue until Abbas vacates his position, but for the moment all the initiative clearly belongs to Hamas and other militant factions.</p> -<h3 id="chinas-nuclear-enterprise">China’s Nuclear Enterprise</h3> +<p>The perhaps most important early takeaway from this weekend – and certainly one that the UK and other Western governments concerned about stability in the Middle East must heed – is that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict still matters and cannot be relegated to the status of a permanent but ultimately manageable feature of regional politics as has arguably been the case in recent years. Hamas’ attack and the war that now rages is primarily about Israel and the Palestinian territories. This escalation of violence will make finding a way to make progress towards a sustainable resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict even more difficult. But it also highlights that ignoring it is something no one can afford – least of all the Israelis and Palestinians, but also not policymakers in London, Washington or European capitals.</p> -<p><em>Trends, Developments, and Implications for the United States and Its Allies</em></p> +<p>Nevertheless, this new phase in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is also likely to have repercussions for wider regional dynamics.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="oriana-skylar-mastro">Oriana Skylar Mastro</h4> -</blockquote> +<h3 id="a-setback-for-arab-israeli-normalisation">A Setback for Arab-Israeli Normalisation</h3> -<p>The focus of this volume is how the United States should respond to deterring two peer competitors: Russia and China. This paper’s main contention is that the nature of U.S.-China military competition from 2035 to 2050 will exhibit some unique characteristics compared to the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship that require new thinking on these topics. As such, this paper differs from others in this volume by focusing on what changes in Chinese military posture, doctrine, and modernization mean for U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy, modernization, reassurance of allies, and arms control efforts. The reason for focusing on China is to challenge the premise that the United States should treat Russia and China as similar peers, and because assumptions among nuclear experts about what modernization efforts in China mean for Chinese nuclear policy are limiting thinking on ideal policy responses. The details of force modernization are consistent with the idea that China is maintaining the same nuclear policy it has had since 1964. This is advantageous for the United States, and thus most of this paper’s recommendations revolve around discouraging deviations. Admittedly, this piece raises more questions than it answers, but understanding which components of U.S. thinking will also serve the United States well in the future, and which require additional consideration, is the first step to devising any useful responses. Each section lays out relevant Chinese approaches, U.S. assumptions, and key issues that color best responses. While this paper focuses on Chinese nuclear modernization, what it means for U.S. strategy, and how the United States should respond, it should not be interpreted as dismissing the challenges of responding to Russian nuclear aggression and expansion. Rather, it focuses on challenging the premise that the United States needs to make significant changes in posture or policy to deter China.</p> +<p>Much early commentary in the immediate aftermath of Hamas’ attack has focused on what this means for the prospects of further normalisation of relations agreements between Israel and Arab states, especially between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Some have even suggested that the attack was Hamas’ – and by extension its supporter Iran’s – way to sabotage Israeli-Saudi normalisation talks. Although statements by leaders of Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad warning Arab states not to engage with Israel obviously fuel such analysis, it is far too simplistic. It risks overlooking the fact that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, more so than regional politics, is the root cause of the violence, as noted above.</p> -<p>The advisable U.S. approaches to force modernization, deterrence, and arms control depend on understanding Chinese nuclear modernization. While there are recent indications from the U.S. Department of Defense that China will increase its nuclear arsenal, these changes are insufficient to suggest that China has abandoned core aspects of its nuclear policy such as no-first-use, no tactical nuclear weapons, and not striving for parity with the United States in terms of the size of its arsenal. China’s modernization efforts are compatible with maintaining its policy, but it is adjusting its posture given advancements in U.S. missile defense and increased tensions in U.S.-China relations. These points have important implications for ideal U.S. modernization plans, deterrence of China, reassurance of allies, and arms control. One of the most important takeaways is that the United States should avoid relying on nuclear weapons to deter China’s conventional threats, as this might encourage China to threaten nuclear use in response to the United States’ conventional activities.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Hamas’ attack this weekend has dramatically highlighted the fundamental flaw in the de-escalation and rapprochement narrative about dynamics in the Middle East that has taken hold in many Western capitals over the past couple of years</code></em></strong></p> -<p>This paper first outlines fundamental principles of China’s nuclear policy, to include limited assured retaliation. It then explores the implications of China’s nuclear policy for U.S. force posture, modernization, extended deterrence, and arms control.</p> +<p>Still, this weekend’s events will have an impact. In the long-term, Saudi-Israeli normalisation remains likely – the shared strategic interests that have driven the talks to date (and the engagement between the Gulf Arab states and Israel, more generally) will remain unchanged. That said, the obstacles for a Saudi-Israeli agreement are now greater than they were a week ago. Whether or not Netanyahu’s government would be willing and able to make the necessary concessions to the Palestinians, which Saudi Arabia has consistently insisted it needs in order to officially recognise Israel, was always one of the main questions. In light of Hamas’ attack, any Israeli government – consisting of Netanyahu’s and his right-wing allies or of any other political parties – will find it extraordinarily difficult to make any meaningful concessions to the Palestinians at all in the coming months (even if these will be needed in the long-run).</p> -<h4 id="chinas-nuclear-policy">China’s Nuclear Policy</h4> +<p>Saudi Arabia itself has removed any doubt regarding its stance on the matter. It called for “an immediate halt to the escalation between the two sides, the protection of civilians, and restraint.” But its statement, published on Saturday, also noted that the Kingdom had repeatedly warned of “the dangers of the explosion of the situation as a result of the continued occupation, the deprivation of the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights,” and called for a “credible peace process that leads to the two-state solution.”</p> -<p>CHINA’S MINIMAL RETALIATION CAPABILITY AND NO-FIRST-USE PLEDGE</p> +<p>Across the region, including in the countries that have already normalised relations with Israel, governments and populations will have been shocked by Hamas’ violence against Israeli civilians, but they will also be devastated and outraged by the violence of the IDF against Palestinian civilians over the coming days and weeks. Throughout it all, the Arab-Israeli conflict – to the extent that it is separate from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict – will live on too.</p> -<p>The expansion of and improvements in China’s nuclear arsenal by 2050 do not necessarily mean that China is abandoning its limited assured retaliation strategy. The buildup in numbers is consistent with China’s traditional nuclear policy of a minimal retaliation capability with a no-first-use pledge.</p> +<h3 id="a-blow-to-regional-de-escalation">A Blow to Regional De-escalation</h3> -<p>First, the Chinese strategy of assured retaliation requires that Beijing develop enough weapons to absorb a strike and still impose unacceptable damage from the adversary’s perspective. In the strategic doctrine of the Second Artillery, the predecessor of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, China’s strategic nuclear forces focus on “effective and limited nuclear counterattack” as the core of nuclear deterrence. As China makes a no-first-use promise regarding nuclear weapons and only has a limited number of nuclear weapons, this doctrine emphasizes the need for the preservation of nuclear forces as a prerequisite to carry out “focused strikes,” as well as “scientific use of nuclear firepower, and carefully crafted strike plans” in order to “achieve the greatest political and military benefits at a relatively small cost.” Although China’s nuclear weapons are limited, the nuclear forces that survive a surprise attack by a nuclear adversary are still sufficient to carry out a nuclear counterattack, and a few nuclear weapons attacking important targets in the adversary’s territory could destroy its industry, society, and mentality and paralyze its state apparatus. This posture leaves some flexibility in terms of specific numbers; Chinese strategists want sufficient forces but are careful not to fall into the track of building “excessive” ones.</p> +<p>Finally, Hamas’ attack this weekend has dramatically highlighted the fundamental flaw in the de-escalation and rapprochement narrative about dynamics in the Middle East that has taken hold in many Western capitals over the past couple of years. The end of the Gulf Crisis between Qatar and its neighbours, the re-engagement between Turkey and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the rapprochement between Iran and the Gulf Arab states (most spectacularly illustrated by the agreement to resume diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, overseen by China, in March this year), and the reduction in at least the most egregious violence in the conflicts in Libya, Syria and Yemen had fuelled a sense that the Middle East was settling into a more stable equilibrium. To be clear, these efforts at de-escalation, pursued by almost all regional governments and some non-state actors, were real and commendable. However, they also routinely represented agreements to disagree and turn to other matters (especially to focus on economic development objectives), rather than actual resolution of the strategic, political and ideological differences that led to the tensions and conflicts – and with them regional instability – in the first place. The unprecedented and unexpected re-eruption of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict this weekend should serve as a reminder of the destructive force suppressed and unaddressed conflicts across the region can have.</p> -<p>Second, the contours of Chinese nuclear modernization are consistent with the view that nuclear weapons are only useful for deterring nuclear use and do not have a warfighting component. Although the United States has assessed that China may be moving toward a launch-on-warning posture, which means they would launch a nuclear strike upon detecting an incoming attack, this policy is compatible with China’s no-first-use policy. Chinese leaders have also increasingly focused on growing regional nuclear options such as the DF-26 and DF-21A/C missiles, but these are attractive mainly because they are regional weapons lower on the escalation ladder and thus their use is more strategically feasible in the event of a conflict.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Lastly, the “sudden” change in nuclear policy around 2018 and 2019 can be explained within the context of China’s traditional nuclear policy. China’s level of concern regarding U.S. nuclear capabilities “suddenly” surged around this time period, consequently accelerating its nuclear force development. Advancements in missile defense which reduced the retaliatory capacity of a smaller arsenal further supported the need. The Pentagon notes in its 2022 report to Congress that China’s “long-term concerns about United States missile defense capabilities” have likely spurred investments in hypersonic glide vehicles and fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS).</p> +<p><strong>Tobias Borck</strong> is Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security Studies at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. His main research interests include the international relations of the Middle East, and specifically the foreign, defence and security policies of Arab states, particularly the Gulf monarchies, as well as European – especially German and British – engagement with the Middle East.</p>Tobias BorckNothing will be the same after the weekend’s carnage in Israel. The Palestinian question is back on the agenda, and with a vengeance. So will be Israel’s response.In Chip Race2023-10-06T12:00:00+08:002023-10-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/in-chip-race<p><em>With a new smartphone and new chip, Huawei has returned to the 5G smartphone business in defiance of U.S. sanctions. This report assesses the implications from this latest development for China’s AI industry and the future of semiconductor export controls.</em></p> -<p>Additionally, Chinese leaders likely aspired to strengthen their nuclear deterrent long before 2018 given U.S. dominance. Chinese leaders have multi-stage plans in their military modernization; in the conventional domains of competition, the strategy was to modernize the force first (i.e., increase the proportion of modern equipment) and then to expand the numbers of certain platforms. Notably, Xi Jinping explicitly directed the military in 2012 to “accelerate the construction of advanced strategic deterrent” capabilities; this has been the strongest and most unambiguous public statement on the matter. Coupled with recent investments in strategic nuclear submarines, China’s emphasis on quality has expanded to include a growing willingness to invest in quantity long before 2018.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>CHINA IS NOT SEEKING PARITY</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>China is not striving for parity with the United States. Chinese leaders have long understood, since 1964, that they cannot compete with the United States in the quantity of nuclear weapons, and thus they have needed to embrace a different approach. As Mao Zedong stated in December 1963, China needed to have the atomic bomb but could not afford to compete for parity in numbers.</p> +<p>On August 29, Huawei launched its new Mate60 Pro smartphone. Normally, smartphone launches do not attract attention in U.S. national security circles. However, this one did, and rightfully so. The Mate60 Pro dramatically marked Huawei’s return to the 5G smartphone business after years of ever-tightening U.S. Department of Commerce export controls effectively cut Huawei off from 5G technology. How? By restricting Huawei’s access to U.S. semiconductor technology, especially chips, chip design software, and chipmaking equipment.</p> -<p>Recent reporting has caused heightened concern that China is building up its nuclear arsenal. In 2021, anxiety amassed over China’s nuclear modernization: satellite imagery showed that approximately 360 silos were under construction at facilities in Gansu, Inner Mongolia, and eastern Xinjiang. In a worst-case scenario, with DF-41s carrying three warheads in each silo, Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) could “carry more than 875 warheads.” The Pentagon’s annual report to Congress estimated that the the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) now has over 400 nuclear warheads; if current production trends continue, China could have as many as 1,500 by 2035. The report also estimated that China currently has at least 300 ICBMs.</p> +<p>The mobile application processor chip at the heart of the new Huawei phone has an integrated 5G modem. The chip was designed by Huawei’s HiSilicon subsidiary and manufactured by a Chinese company, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC). In March 2023, China’s government reportedly made Huawei and SMIC, along with two leading Chinese semiconductor equipment companies, Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment (AMEC) and Naura, the heart of a new government initiative for semiconductor self-reliance. Huawei is effectively the leader of the Chinese government-backed team, with a privileged position to influence semiconductor policymaking.</p> -<p>But it would be a mistake to take these projections at face value or to conclude that such an uptick signifies that China is now striving for parity, as some experts have posited. Admittedly, China’s avoidance of direct competition in nuclear power was starker in the early 1990s, when the United States had 47 times more nuclear weapons than China. But even the worst-case projections of 1,000 weapons puts the Chinese arsenal at less than a quarter of the current U.S. level of 5,244 nuclear weapons. Additionally, the fact that China has more land-based launchers than the United States is more a testament to the differences in nuclear posture than heightened threat; about three-fourths of China’s arsenal is land based, compared to one-fifth for the United States.</p> +<p>SMIC manufactured the new chips at the advanced 7-nanometer (nm) technology node (N+2 in SMIC process naming conventions), raising questions in U.S. national security circles about whether the effectiveness of U.S. technology export controls on Huawei — and perhaps China more broadly — is coming to an end.</p> -<p>One critique of these numerical comparisons is that the most strategically relevant metric is not total numbers; instead, strategists need to consider deployed nuclear weapons versus stockpiled weapons. The United States has 1,770 deployed in accordance with the New START (technically 1,550 are allowed, but bombers count as “one” even though they can carry multiple nuclear weapons). In other words, when comparing arsenals, some might use the 1,770 deployed number instead of the 5,244 that quantifies the United States’ total inventory.</p> +<p>That was certainly the message that China wanted to send. Chinese state-run media outlets were exuberant, arguing in editorials that Huawei’s new phone “shows how ineffective Washington’s tech sanctions have been” and that “extreme suppression by the US has failed.” The new phone was announced during Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo’s visit to China, which placed a double emphasis on the phone’s significance toward U.S. export controls.</p> -<p>But even here, the evidence for a China striving for parity is weak. Under the New START conception of “deployable” nuclear weapons — carried by ICBMs on alert, submarines out on patrols, and bombers — China’s nuclear weapons are not deployable; they are in fixed locations and cannot be deployed to the Western Pacific or the South China Sea. But there is evidence that China might want some “deployable” nuclear weapons in the future; solid-fueled missiles such as the DF-41 and DF-31AG have much faster fueling times and require fewer support vehicles, and China’s Jin-class submarines have fueled the nuclear-armed JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) since 2015. In total, China has six Jin-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and the Pentagon has confirmed that they are “conducting continuous at-sea deterrence patrols” as of February 2023.</p> +<p>However, there is a big difference between claiming that Chinese technological progress proves the current approach to export controls is not achieving all of its desired effects and claiming that Chinese technological progress proves that those same export controls are strategically useless. In principle, either might or might not be true, but the former does not inherently imply the latter.</p> -<p>CHINA’S SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITY</p> +<p>In the case of the 7 nm chip powering the new Mate60 smartphone, this is a legitimate breakthrough on China’s part, not in terms of reaching the global state of the art, but in continuing to make technological progress despite U.S. and allied restrictions. The Trump administration’s entity list-based export controls on Huawei and its primary chip manufacturer SMIC had explicitly sought to prevent Huawei and SMIC from designing and manufacturing chips more advanced than 10 nm and from producing 5G chips. The same is true of the Biden administration’s October 7, 2022, semiconductor export control policy, which restricted exports to China of, among other things, advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment.</p> -<p>Chinese modernization is driven by concerns about maintaining a second-strike capability needed for deterrence.</p> +<p>While the Huawei phone is not itself a major national security issue for the United States, what the chip inside signals about the state of the Chinese semiconductor industry absolutely is. The 7 nm chips at the heart of the new Huawei phone provide many data points regarding the current and likely future state of the Chinese semiconductor industry. In short, China is still not at the global state of the art for semiconductor manufacturing, but the gap between the peak technological level of China and that of the rest of the world has shrunk, even despite the many hurdles that the U.S. government has attempted to place in SMIC’s way.</p> -<p>From China’s perspective, the strategic environment has changed in ways that call for a larger, more survivable arsenal even under its current nuclear policy. The United States has intensified the construction of a missile defense system in the East Asian region: the Aegis system. This is deployed on 17 U.S. Navy destroyers and cruisers in the region to detect, target, and engage ballistic missiles. These Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) ships have the capability to intercept short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their midcourse or terminal flight phases. They also play a role in defending the United States by detecting and tracking ICBMs and relaying this information to Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska and California. As of December 2018, the system had a success rate of 40 out of 49 attempts in intercepting ballistic missile targets. China believes this poses a serious threat to the reliability and effectiveness of China’s nuclear counterattack capability. Second, the nuclear arsenals of neighboring countries like India, Pakistan, and North Korea have increased in recent years. Possibly as part of a move toward a launch-on-warning posture, China has been increasing its inventory of regional nuclear-capable systems, such as the DF-26 and DF-21A/C missiles. These are designed to target various assets, including naval vessels and land-based targets, enhancing China’s strategic capabilities and potentially altering the regional balance of power. Additionally, major countries are vigorously developing new types of conventional military capabilities that could be used against its nuclear capabilities.</p> +<p>These advanced chip production capabilities will inevitably be made available to the Chinese military if they have not been already. Thus, the Huawei and SMIC breakthrough raises many tough questions about the efficacy of the current U.S. approach. In fairness to the Biden administration, however, their desired approach — a multilateral one — has only just begun.</p> -<p>China has also built up and tested its own missile defense program in recent years. Specifically, China has focused on developing a ground-based mid-course missile defense systems capable of intercepting short- and medium-range ICBMs, including the HQ9 and HQ19 missile defense systems. Despite increased ground-based interception capabilities, it is unlikely that China would deploy this technology at scale. Rather, these missile defense systems would be deployed at fixed sites including command and control (C2) facilities and missile silos. In April 2023, China’s defense ministry announced that it successfully conducted a ground-based mid-course missile interception test. Details of the target of the test and the number of interceptors launched were not provided by state officials. Despite progress in interception capabilities for short- and medium-range missiles, China has not announced the development of a long-range system as of 2022.</p> +<p>This paper will analyze the strategic implications of the Huawei Mate60 Pro and its SMIC 7 nm chip in the context of U.S. and allied export controls on the two companies and on China more generally. It concludes by presenting a list of tough questions where U.S. and allied country policymakers urgently need answers.</p> -<p>Thus, the likely explanation is that China is developing capabilities to ensure that it has a second-strike capability. In the 1980s, China began making significant advances in ICBM development and deployment, and from the mid-1990s onwards, China’s rocket force has moved from fixed silos to mobile launchers, shifted from liquid to solid fuel, and modestly expanded the number of warheads and ICBMs that include multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Now with an arsenal of at least 60 DF-5s, 78 DF-31s, and 54 DF-41s coming online, China can deliver 90 missiles with 130 warheads to the continental United States. The number of warheads on China’s land-based ICBMs capable of threatening the United States is expected to grow to roughly 200 by 2025. The United States does not consider ICBMs second-strike systems, but that is because the United States puts them on high-readiness, maintains a launch-on-warning posture, and relies much more on its sea and air legs of the triad than on its land-based systems (while about three-fourths of Chinese forces are land-based).</p> +<h3 id="background-on-the-trump-administration-export-controls-on-huawei-and-smic">Background on the Trump Administration Export Controls on Huawei and SMIC</h3> -<p>This could signal a shift to a launch-on-attack posture, but it is also consistent with the need to take measures such as deploying mobile defenses to key sites including fixed silos and C2 facilities to reduce the impact of a first strike in order to maintain a second strike. Moreover, China has been making significant advancements in its early warning radar and satellite capabilities. These developments aim to enhance its ability to detect and track incoming threats, such as ballistic missiles, and improve its overall situational awareness. The deployment of advanced early warning radars, such as the JY-26 and JY-27A, demonstrates China’s commitment to strengthening its air defense capabilities. Additionally, China’s growing network of reconnaissance and early warning satellites, including the Yaogan and Gaofen series, contribute to its ability to monitor regional and global activities more effectively. These advancements in early warning systems not only bolster China’s defense capabilities but also have a positive impact on stability, as they contribute to China’s confidence in its second-strike capabilities.</p> +<p>In Washington, Huawei is mostly known for its telecommunications infrastructure business, but the company was at the forefront of China’s remarkable rise in the smartphone, computer, and artificial intelligence (AI) semiconductor chip design industry during the 2010s. In late 2018, there were only two companies in the world selling smartphones with 7 nm mobile application processors, Apple and Huawei, both of which designed the chips in house and outsourced manufacturing to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC).</p> -<p>China has also been developing hypersonic weapons, which pose particular challenges to missile defense systems because of features such as their long range, low altitude, high maneuverability, and adjustability. The Chinese military has also increased the number of ballistic missile brigades by around a third in the past three years both to enhance its nuclear-strike capabilities amid escalating tensions with the United States and to prepare for a possible war against Taiwan (which includes the need to deter U.S. nuclear coercion). One Beijing-based military source said that China has deployed its most advanced hypersonic missile, the DF-17, to the area. In this way, it is possible that technological developments, in particular China’s ability to defeat U.S. missile defense systems, will create more stability by convincing Beijing its arsenal is sufficient to deter nuclear use.</p> +<p>The original stated intention of adding Huawei to the entity list in May 2019 was to punish the company for selling technology to Iran in violation of U.S. sanctions, and especially for repeatedly lying to U.S. officials, destroying evidence, and otherwise trying to obstruct justice. The U.S. government also expressed a broader goal of preventing the company from using U.S. technology in ways that contradicted U.S. national security interests. The national security issue was initially focused on Huawei’s business in 5G telecommunications infrastructure, not smartphones. However, the national security focus grew to include ensuring that Huawei did not use U.S. technology to assist it in evading the reach of U.S. export controls, which thereafter led to a more generalized focus on Huawei’s activities related to chip design and chip manufacturing, including for base stations and smartphones.</p> -<p>THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHINA-RUSSIA ALLIANCE</p> +<p>As described in a previous CSIS paper, the 2019 U.S. export controls on Huawei — as well as the earlier April 2018 export controls on Chinese telecom firm ZTE — were a landmark in the Chinese national security policy community. China’s pursuit of semiconductor self-sufficiency had already been a top Chinese industrial policy priority from the Made in China 2025 policy of 2015 and even earlier with China’s establishment of its “Big Fund” in 2014. However, after 2018, semiconductor self-sufficiency became a top Chinese national security priority, not just an industrial policy one. Semiconductor self-sufficiency received more than $100 billion in Chinese government financial support and regularly attracted the personal attention of Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping.</p> -<p>China has no interest in forming a traditional military alliance with Russia. The results of a long-term research project the author has been conducting on the China-Russia military relationship suggests that China and Russia are significantly aligned, but their alignment is limited to facilitating China’s challenge to U.S. hegemony in Asia; it does not include helping Russia to take on the United States in Europe. Additionally, military support from Russia mainly comes in the form of assisting China in building up its own combat capabilities, though recent activities suggest movement toward supporting China, to a limited degree, in wartime as well. In other words, the two sides are not preparing to fight together in the traditional sense of allies. China also prefers that Russia not threaten the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) if it is fighting the United States because that increases the likelihood that U.S. allies will become deeply and directly involved, in which case the likelihood of victory plummets and the economic costs of war become too high. This means that Russia and China can be analytically treated as separate cases; hence, this essay is about what is needed to deter China. What is required to maintain nuclear deterrence and promote arms control with Russia is likely very different. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that China and Russia will actively collude in the context of a nuclear crisis or other major conventional war in Asia, but that does not negate the possibility of Russia taking advantage of a crisis in East Asia to advance its own objectives independently.</p> +<p>De-Americanization of the supply chain became a priority not just for Huawei and the Chinese government, but also for many leading Chinese chipmakers. For example, in May 2021, Nikkei Asia reported that Yangtze Memory Technologies Corporation (YMTC), one of China’s most advanced semiconductor manufacturers, had already been engaged in a full-blown de-Americanization campaign involving the full-time work of more than 800 staff for two years. This included the establishment of multiple major partnerships with domestic Chinese equipment producers. Industry sources told CSIS that YMTC also conducted a close examination of the foreign sources within the supply chain of U.S. equipment manufacturers and launched an effort to begin direct purchases from the foreign suppliers of U.S. firms.</p> -<h4 id="implications-for-us-policy">Implications for U.S. Policy</h4> +<p>In May 2020, the Department of Commerce concluded that the 2019 Huawei entity listing had an effect but failed to achieve its goals: U.S. chip manufacturers such as Intel, Qualcomm, and Xilinx continued selling many types of advanced chips directly to Huawei, as many of their chips were not produced in the United States and therefore were not subject to the export controls as written at the time. More importantly, however, Huawei was successfully designing replacement chips (using U.S. chip design software) and contracting with chip foundries outside of China to manufacture them (in facilities that relied heavily on U.S. chip manufacturing equipment). Industry sources told CSIS that U.S. companies were losing revenue not as a direct result of no longer selling to Huawei, but rather because Huawei was replacing U.S. chips with their own self-designed versions.</p> -<p>IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION</p> +<p>Then secretary of commerce Wilbur Ross put it this way: “Despite the Entity List actions the Department took last year, Huawei and its foreign affiliates have stepped-up efforts to undermine these national security-based restrictions through an indigenization effort. However, that effort is still dependent on U.S. technologies.”</p> -<p>Assumptions about Chinese nuclear intentions lead to a popular recommendation in Washington: that the United States needs to build more nuclear weapons and delivery systems, or at the very least deploy more from its stockpiles. But it is far from clear that such a costly endeavor would have positive impacts on deterrence and stability in the region. Based on an assessment of Chinese thinking through readings and interaction with Chinese counterparts, more U.S. nuclear weapons would have a negligible impact on China’s calculus. The United States already has nuclear dominance, its elites are largely confident in its nuclear deterrent against China, and China’s minimal deterrence posture has traditionally been based on the belief (correct, in the author’s view) that the prospect of even one nuclear detonation on U.S. soil is enough to deter a U.S. nuclear attack.</p> +<p>The May 2020 updated export controls therefore applied a revised version of the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR) to prevent foreign entities from assisting Huawei and its chip design subsidiary HiSilicon in designing or manufacturing chips that were a “direct product” of U.S. technology. Overnight, Huawei’s access to semiconductors shrank drastically to only three sources: the less technologically advanced subset of chips for which U.S. licenses were still being approved, the vast set of U.S. and foreign chips that were manufactured or assembled outside of the United States and were therefore not subject to the U.S. rules, and the enormous stockpile of critical chips that Huawei had amassed by making purchases when they were still legal. The Chinese chip manufacturers that were still willing to work with Huawei generally had dramatically inferior technology. Even the initial application of the FDPR in May 2020 did not affect chips produced outside of the United States, with the exception of those designed by HiSilicon. This allowed Huawei to engage in a massive stockpiling effort.</p> -<p>Moreover, more nuclear weapons will not solve other perennial issues, such as deterring a range of more limited Chinese military actions or non-military coercive activities, as their use in these scenarios is not credible. And given that collusion between Russia and China is unlikely in the nuclear realm (indeed, China is likely cautioning Russia to not use nuclear weapons in Ukraine), the United States need not match the combined arsenals of China and Russia for deterrence to hold. Moreover, even if China is increasing its arsenal to maintain a second-strike capability, and maintain a limited retaliatory capability, and even if it increases its arsenal to 1,000 weapons, this does not undermine U.S. deterrence.</p> +<p>Then, the Trump administration decided to finally cut off Huawei’s access to chips and updated the FDPR in August of 2020 to apply not only to Huawei and HiSilicon’s own chips but to all chips produced using U.S. technology that was being sold to Huawei.</p> -<p>While more work should be done to confirm these views, based on current trends and developments China will not necessarily change its nuclear strategy and posture away from the core components of treating nuclear weapons mainly as tools to deter nuclear use. Moreover, the existence of additional U.S. nuclear weapons does not fundamentally change China’s thinking on its strategy, doctrine, and posture — at least not in ways that benefit the United States. It is possible that such moves could encourage changes in China’s nuclear strategy that the United States should seek to avoid, such as China threatening nuclear use against any country that intervenes in its territorial disputes or against non-nuclear claimants to make gains. Indeed, dissuading China from moving away from the strategy that has served it well since 1964 should be the key objective of U.S. deterrence strategy and will be discussed more in the next section. What should the United States do, if not build up its own nuclear arsenal? It should use the Chinese buildup to make gains in other areas, such as conventional deterrence. This will be discussed more in the section on arms control.</p> +<p>Despite Huawei’s stockpiling, the May and August 2020 controls eventually did serious damage. Huawei’s worldwide revenue declined 28.5 percent between 2020 and 2021. The damage was especially severe in Huawei’s smartphones business, which required a much higher volume of advanced chips and was essentially cut off from 5G technology. Early in 2023, Huawei told its investors that it optimistically hoped to sell a mere 30 million phones that year, an 88 percent decline from the 240 million it sold in 2019. Huawei had to take dramatic steps, such as selling off the majority of its consumer smartphone business to a new spinoff known as Honor, as well as its Intel-based X86 server business, which is now known as “XFusion.” These moves allowed Huawei to conserve its massive chip stockpile for more strategic parts of its business such as network infrastructure and premium smartphone products.</p> -<p>IMPLICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE</p> +<p>The Mate60 Pro marks Huawei’s return to the 5G smartphone business and thereby proves that the effects of the Trump-era controls are rapidly coming to an end as Huawei redesigns its supply chain to rely more on its HiSilicon subsidiary for chip design and more on SMIC (as opposed to TSMC of Taiwan) for manufacturing. Huawei’s revised sales projections for 2023 suggest that it expects to sell roughly 40 million smartphones in 2023, of which roughly half will use the new 7 nm chips. Industry analysts with ties to Huawei’s supply chain report that Huawei expects to sell 60 million smartphones in 2024, of which most or all will use Huawei-designed, SMIC-manufactured mobile application processors with integrated 5G modems. The Mate60 Pro’s memory chips are manufactured by SK Hynix of South Korea. SK Hynix has stated that it stopped doing business with Huawei after the introduction of U.S. sanctions and that it is investigating how Huawei came to use its chips. Though selling 60 million smartphones would still be a significant decrease from Huawei’s 2019 peak, it likely signals the start of a comeback for the company.</p> -<p>The most important role of nuclear weapons is to enhance deterrence. However, how nuclear weapons impact other countries’ calculus on using force and what exactly states hope to deter can be debatable and evolve over time. This section focuses on the trade-offs between conventional and nuclear deterrence. This starts with the premise, developed in the previous section, that China’s unique nuclear strategy to date ensures that the balance of nuclear warheads and delivery systems in the 2035 to 2050 period is as likely to deter Chinese nuclear use as any U.S. force posture could. This does not mean that there are not problematic deterrence and escalation dynamics; allies and partners might be reassured by a larger arsenal (even though logically they should not be). But the likelihood and nature of a war with China are unlikely to be significantly impacted by improvements in U.S. nuclear force posture.</p> +<p>The sophistication of the Huawei chip from a design perspective — it is at least equal to and often better than the best Western-designed smartphone chips of the 7 nm era — indicates that there has been no significant erosion in HiSilicon’s design excellence. Moreover, Huawei’s integration of the 5G modem onto the same silicon die as the mobile application processor brings many technological performance benefits. Huawei has achieved this three years before Apple currently expects to do so. Radio-frequency engineering, the critical technology involved in developing modems, is the technical core of Huawei’s business, and industry sources told CSIS that Huawei is far ahead of most companies in this space.</p> -<p>This section addresses one of the primary topics in deterrence: the relationship between nuclear and conventional deterrence. During the Cold War, the United States adopted nuclear deterrence as an “asymmetrical response” against the Soviet Union. The approach reinforced Washington’s strength in nuclear weapons and, in turn, neutralized Moscow’s advantage in conventional forces. The Eisenhower administration believed that nuclear weapons make deterrence more credible and decrease the risk of aggression at minimal cost. Conventional and mutual deterrence, however, were still valued among other administrations: Kennedy pursued a flexible response that would equip the United States with numerous feasible options against different types of aggressions as potential alternatives to resorting to nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence is relatively stable between China and the United States, but because of China’s unique approach, characterized by no-first-use, minimal deterrence, and a lack of tactical warheads, the presence of nuclear weapons does not impose the level of caution on each side that deterrence theory might espouse.</p> +<p>While this supply chain is still critically dependent upon U.S. technology, some of the pre-October 2022 export controls and entity list restrictions on Huawei’s suppliers were not especially well designed for a goal of blocking SMIC from producing 7 nm chips, despite that being their explicit goal. For example, the entity list license review policy for SMIC established in December 2020 states that license applications to export to SMIC will be reviewed under a policy of “presumption of denial for items uniquely required for production of semiconductors at advanced technology nodes (10 nanometers and below, including extreme ultraviolet technology); Case by case for all other items.”</p> -<p>The fact that both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons means that any war could escalate to the nuclear level, which should impose caution on both sides. There is reason to believe, however, that the power of nuclear weapons to deter conventional conflict is relatively weak in the U.S.-China case. This is because of China’s view that nuclear weapons are only for deterring nuclear use and U.S. confidence in its escalation dominance in the nuclear realm. China firmly believes that nuclear war cannot be controlled once it begins; societal pressure on leaders not to back down, the circumstances of the country, and uncertainty about reactions from adversaries incentivize escalation. As such, China poses that strategic weapons are better than tactical weapons, and that they are only useful for signaling resolve, not waging war. Combined with practical concerns about having a weaker nuclear arsenal than the United States — where only half of its weapons can strike the continental United States — China is dedicated to maintaining a no-first-use policy.</p> +<p>The problem with this standard is the “uniquely required” phrase. This is both vague and a poor fit for the reality of semiconductor manufacturing. Nearly all semiconductor manufacturing equipment that can be used to produce 10 nm and below chips can also be used to produce less advanced 14 nm and above chips and vice versa. This is known as “capex recycling” by the semiconductor industry, and industry sources told CSIS that equipment reuse rates between these nodes are sometimes higher than 90 percent. Furthermore, the rules only applied to “U.S. origin items and technology” which did not include a major portion of semiconductor capital equipment produced by U.S. firms outside of the United States in locations such as Singapore and Malaysia. In some cases, the companies did not even need to apply for a license, as their equipment was not technically U.S. origin and was therefore not even subject to the rules.</p> -<p>Moreover, the concept of mutually assured destruction was based on the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship, in which both countries had thousands of nuclear weapons and relative parity with one another. This is not the case for the United States and China, the latter of which has chosen to pursue an assured retaliation posture. China also arguably did not have a second-strike capability until relatively recently. With only a few hundred warheads, and with the majority of its systems comprised of older missiles that were land-based, liquid-fueled, slow-launching, and stored in easily targeted silos, there was the possibility of a successful debilitating first strike. But China started to modernize its nuclear force in the 1990s, and now it has 50 to 75 ICBM launchers, of which 33 are the newer, road-mobile DF-31 and DF-31A. In 2017, China also showcased the DF-31AG, an improved version of the DF-31A missile, featuring an enhanced launcher, reduced support needs, and a wheeled transporter erector launcher capable of navigating off-road terrain. As of 2015, China also has a sea-based nuclear deterrence in its four Jin-class nuclear submarines, each of which carries 48 nuclear-capable JL-2 SLBMs. However, China’s mobile missiles still have the highest survival rate. This is because the Jin-class submarines are easily tracked. Given advances in U.S. missile defense, it is possible that China could not deliver a sufficient retaliatory strike against the United States after absorbing an attack. Even if the United States needed 80 warheads to destroy one DF-31, given the challenges of detection, Washington could probably destroy enough that China could not reliably retaliate after absorbing an attack on its nuclear forces.</p> +<p>The companies applying for export licenses simply stated this truth in their export license applications, at which point the Department of Commerce frequently approved them. Department of Commerce license application reviewers are (understandably) trained to follow the letter of the law, even if that law’s text is a poor fit for what department leadership describes as the goal of that law. According to a Reuters analysis of Department of Commerce documents, “113 export licenses worth $61 billion were approved for suppliers to ship products to Huawei (HWT.UL) while another 188 licenses valued at nearly $42 billion were greenlighted for Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp (SMIC) (0.981.HK)” between November 2020 and April 2021. However, industry sources told CSIS that nearly all applications for export licenses to SMIC’s most advanced facilities were typically denied after August 2021.</p> -<p>The fact that the United States and China both possess nuclear weapons reduces the likelihood of conventional conflict, but it does not make it unthinkable, given the persistent asymmetry in vulnerability. Whether it should be the case or not, the reality is that Chinese military planners believe it is very possible to fight a conventional war with the United States without escalating to the nuclear level. This is in part because they believe that once nuclear weapons are used, escalation would be uncontrollable, and therefore neither side will strike first. Additionally, many Chinese experts believe that the United States would avoid intervening in a conflict between a U.S. ally and China if doing so would ultimately lead to a nuclear confrontation. PLA strategists, not unlike some U.S. strategists, believe that advancements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities as well as C2 capabilities and precision weapons have further strengthened the ability to control war. Indeed, most of U.S. war planning over Taiwan makes this assumption implicitly or explicitly. Whether or not a war escalates to the nuclear level depends on whether the two sides can negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement and can prevent accidents.</p> +<p>Thus, almost the only types of sales that the December 2020 SMIC entity listing definitively blocked were for the technology that it specifically stated would be prohibited, namely extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography equipment, which United States companies do not principally supply. Thus, blocking EUV sales required a policy change by the Dutch government since the sole supplier of complete EUV lithography machines is a Dutch company, ASML. The Trump administration reportedly reached an informal agreement with the Dutch government in early 2020. According to a later published Dutch government document, the Dutch Ministry of Defence was a strong supporter of limiting EUV exports to China at the time.</p> -<p>In other words, the nuclear relationship between China and the United States has less of an impact on Chinese calculations about use of force than its perception of conventional balance of power. Unlike the Cold War, the United States cannot use nuclear threats to compensate for conventional issues given that China has no plans to attack and occupy other inhabited entities, with Taiwan being the exception — and this level of threat and cost makes U.S. willingness to fight nuclear wars relatively incredible. Indeed, in the case of U.S.-China tensions, the atrophy of U.S. conventional deterrence is the main driver for an increased likelihood of war, and thus the United States needs to prioritize re-establishing conventional deterrence. This means that in instances in which nuclear modernization may come at the expense of conventional force development, conventional force development should have priority. A good example of this was the United States pulling out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 following “Russia’s repeated violations of the treaty,” which allows the United States to now develop a key class of new conventional weapons to deter China.</p> +<p>Industry sources told CSIS that, at the time, ASML was poised to ship EUV tools to China and that SMIC was planning to work with key research labs in Europe such as the Interuniversity Microelectronics Centre (IMEC) to help develop their EUV-based manufacturing process.</p> -<p>There are two policy changes in particular that U.S. strategy should be designed to deter. First is a Sino-Russian alignment to the degree to which each provides some form of extended deterrence to the other. There is no consideration of this in China, so it does not present a real threat in the foreseeable future, but it is still worth mentioning.</p> +<p>Blocking China from acquiring EUV technology has complicated China’s path to producing chips at technology nodes more advanced than 7 nm. However, it actually did not block SMIC from legally acquiring all the equipment required to manufacture 7 nm chips, since much of the advanced deposition, etching, inspection, and metrology equipment was not blocked from purchase. Moreover, advanced deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography equipment can be used as an alternative to EUV for the production of 7 nm chips.</p> -<p>Instead, the most important goal for U.S. deterrence policy should be to ensure it does not encourage a change in China’s nuclear policy and in posture. To state this more clearly, if China starts to threaten nuclear use in response to U.S. conventional intervention in conflicts, this will severely impact U.S. war planning. China has never leveraged its nuclear arsenal to make up for conventional inferiorities, even in the 1990s when it was outclassed by far by the United States. But China might believe it could improve its ability to coerce U.S. partners and allies in Asia without risking confrontation with the United States. If the Chinese threat is credible, the United States will find itself with limited options to defend its allies in lower-level conflicts, in effect forcing the United States to concede the region to China. In other words, any movement in the United States to integrate conventional and nuclear operations, or to use nuclear weapons to make up for issues in U.S. regional conventional force posture, should be avoided, as they could encourage China to do the same.</p> +<p>The clearest proof of this is the fact that SMIC was already producing and selling 7 nm chips no later than July 2022 and potentially as early as July 2021, despite having no EUV machines. TSMC, the Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturing giant, achieved 7 nm mass production by 2018 without using EUV technology. Adopting EUV, however, brings benefits in production reliability, speed, scale, and therefore economic competitiveness.</p> -<p>In line with these concerns, the Biden administration’s decision to cancel the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) program in 2022 demonstrates a commitment to avoiding the co-mingling of conventional and nuclear systems on vessels that are not SSBNs. This decision helps reduce the risk of platform ambiguity in the Indo-Pacific region, which could potentially escalate conflicts due to misinterpretation of intentions. By taking this step, the United States is actively working to prevent any changes in China’s nuclear policy and posture that could result from the integration of conventional and nuclear operations, thus maintaining stability in the region and safeguarding the interests of its allies.</p> +<p>SMIC’s initial 7 nm chips (using SMIC’s N+1 process) were specialized chips for cryptocurrency mining. Such chips are less complicated to manufacture than a smartphone’s application processor due to their lack of dense static random-access (SRAM) memory. For SMIC, the barrier to making more complex 7 nm chips in 2021 was a need for improved operational experience and skill in using the equipment it already had to improve its 7 nm production process and then reliably operate it at scale, not necessarily a need for additional equipment.</p> -<p>Given the limited nature of Chinese ambitions, the United States should also rethink the objectives of extended deterrence and how to best reassure allies and partners. First, given China’s limited nuclear arsenal and policy of not using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, China’s nuclear threat to U.S. allies in Asia is more limited than Russia’s threat to NATO allies, especially during the Cold War. The big question concerns China’s willingness to use nuclear weapons against U.S. assets in Asia, which might be on allied soil, as an intermediate rung on the escalation ladder to using them against the U.S. homeland. This is likely the motivation behind recent Chinese posture changes that show much greater interest in intermediate escalation options such as the DF-26, air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs), the DF-21, and the DF-17.</p> +<p>The Huawei chip (using SMIC’s N+2 process) proves that SMIC’s skill in manufacturing at the 7 nm node has advanced significantly since July 2022, despite the Biden administration’s new semiconductor export control architecture that was launched on October 7, 2022. It is worth noting, however, that SMIC’s work on N+2 has been underway at least since early 2020. Thus, much of the relevant development work took place long before October 7. Industry sources told CSIS that, both before and after October 7, SMIC was the beneficiary of significant foreign technical advice, though after October 7, this advice was limited to non-U.S. persons.</p> -<p>Notably, the DF-26 is often referred to as the “Guam Killer” due to its ability to target U.S. military installations on the island of Guam in the Western Pacific. ALBMs can be launched from aircraft and offer the potential for rapid response, mobility, and the ability to launch nuclear strikes outside of the coverage areas of traditional missile defense systems. The DF-21 is commonly referred to as the “Carrier Killer” because of its intended capability to target aircraft carriers and other large warships. The DF-17 is known for its maneuverability and ability to fly at extremely high speeds, making it more difficult for existing missile defense systems to intercept. Additionally, as per the previous discussion, nuclear weapons do not deter admittedly problematic conventional activities. And the United States should avoid this pathway for the sake of assuring allies because it could encourage China to then threaten nuclear use in response to U.S. conventional activity, which would seriously complicate defense planning.</p> +<h3 id="huawei-mate60-pro-and-smic-7-nm-chip-implications-for-biden-era-export-controls">Huawei Mate60 Pro and SMIC 7 nm Chip Implications for Biden-Era Export Controls</h3> -<h4 id="implications-for-extended-assurance-and-deterrence">Implications for Extended Assurance and Deterrence</h4> +<p>The Biden administration’s October 7 export controls doubled down on the Trump administration’s attempt to restrict the export of U.S. advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China. However, the Biden administration went significantly further in an effort to not only restrict the pace of China’s technological progress but also to, as much as possible, actively degrade the current state of the art back to a pre-14 nm manufacturing level.</p> -<p>U.S. strategists should also revisit whether there are more costs than benefits associated with its allies in Asia possessing nuclear weapons, namely South Korea, Japan, and Australia. The downsides include that this could undermine the global nonproliferation regime and increase the likelihood of nuclear use due to an accident. Historical records show that the United States had many “close calls” where the “accidental or unauthorized detonation” of a nuclear weapon was a real possibility. The upside is that Chinese conventional attack, and subsequent escalation to nuclear war, becomes less likely.</p> +<p>The policy also went beyond mere entity listings and put blanket restrictions on all of China that sought to, in some instances, cut off SMIC and other advanced Chinese chipmakers from the supply of U.S. equipment, spare parts, software updates, components, maintenance, and even expert advisory services. The goal was to force existing Chinese chip manufacturers to shut down or reconfigure their advanced product lines to focus on legacy technologies. SMIC is the most advanced logic chip foundry in China, so it was absolutely a target of this policy.</p> -<p>China’s growing conventional and nuclear capabilities in the Indo-Pacific have driven many in allied countries to question their current approaches. Many in South Korea are worried by the possibility that U.S. extended deterrence could fail. In their eyes, North Korea’s ability to hit any U.S. city could prevent U.S. assistance in the event of a restarted Korean war, making a South Korean nuclear deterrent the only guarantor of the country’s safety — a logic that applies to China as well. South Koreans are historically more open to the idea of developing a nuclear bomb than their Japanese counterparts, and in recent years that option has been discussed more frequently. In January 2023, President Yoon Suk Yeol commented that the nation may have to pursue nuclear weapons development or “demand redeployment of U.S. nuclear arms” to South Korea in response to the North Korean nuclear threat. According to a 2022 poll, 71 percent of South Koreans were in support of the nation pursuing its own nuclear weapons. The North Korean nuclear threat has also influenced thinking in this area. While no country has taken steps toward this option, what was once an unthinkable topic has now become more mainstream.</p> +<p>Technology degrading did indeed happen in the case of YMTC, which was forced to abandon — perhaps only temporarily — plans for a 232-layer NAND flash memory product. However, the Huawei Mate60 Pro demonstrates that SMIC’s peak manufacturing technological capability has not only not been degraded, but it has advanced.</p> -<p>In Japan, the specter of a rising China and the Trump administration’s unreliability undermined Tokyo’s faith in extended deterrence. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has done even more to drive the debate underway in Japan. And whereas advocates of pursuing a nuclear weapon are traditionally found on the far right, this formerly taboo opinion is becoming more mainstream, with Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, shortly before his death, publicly raising the idea of housing U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan (i.e. through a nuclear-sharing arrangement). While the current prime minister, Kishida Fumio, quickly rejected the suggestion, Kishida was also severely criticized for failing to “mention the [Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons] and for not clarifying Japan’s future role in nuclear disarmament” in the 2022 NPT Review Conference. It is important to note here that besides Russia’s invasion, China’s conventional buildup and increasingly aggressive foreign policy are likely driving most of Japanese anxiety. China’s nuclear buildup is probably only a secondary driver. Japan’s 2022 National Defense Strategy, for instance, discusses China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) network, aggressive activities around the Senkakus, and threat to Taiwan much more than its nuclear forces.</p> +<p>For the Biden administration, the Mate60 Pro launch is an important data point that raises legitimate questions regarding the key assumptions underlying their signature semiconductor export control policy. Most obviously, this development suggests that the October 7 export control policy, and especially the recently updated export control policies of the Japanese and Dutch governments, were needed earlier to have a realistic opportunity to achieve all their intended effects. However, it also shows one of the key mechanisms of the policy — end-use restrictions on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment — is not working as intended and will require an update to close existing loopholes.</p> -<p>While the Australian government maintains its firm stance on nuclear nonproliferation, the development of China’s military capacity has posed increasing security risks to the nation and prompted discussion on the strengthening of U.S. extended deterrence. Australian minister for defense Richard Marles expressed his concerns toward China’s use of force in the South China Sea and called for increased U.S. military presence as part of Australia’s new defense strategy. Some defense analysts have questioned U.S. extended deterrence and suggested the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons. A 2022 poll revealed that 36 percent of Australians were in favor of obtaining nuclear weapons — more than double the amount in a 2010 poll conducted on a similar (though differently phrased) question.</p> +<p>Industry experts consistently told CSIS that no combination of Chinese semiconductor manufacturing equipment companies can produce even 10 percent of the diverse types of advanced equipment required to operate a 7 nm chip foundry. In fact, there is no 7 nm fab in the world that does not rely upon controlled U.S. technology, so it is quite clear that SMIC is using U.S. technology — machines, components, spare parts, and materials — in producing these chips for Huawei.</p> -<p>How can the United States deal with these growing concerns about U.S. extended deterrence? First, deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Asia is not the answer. At best, this has little impact on Beijing’s thinking, and at worst, it may enhance the legitimacy of China’s attacks on U.S. regional bases and even on Taiwan if nuclear weapons were discussed as an option for cross-strait stability. That leaves the software options of greater consultations and joint defense planning, which might reassure allies and partners of U.S. intentions even as they have minimal impact on Chinese contingency planning.</p> +<p>It is also highly likely that Huawei designed these chips using software tools from U.S. electronic design automation (EDA) companies. Huawei only announced in March 2023 that it had finally made a breakthrough on 14 nm software tools after years of work. These claims have yet to be verified externally. The idea that Huawei had completed development of its more advanced 7 nm EDA tools in time to design the core processors for a phone that launched in September is not consistent with typical industry chip design or EDA tool development timelines.</p> -<h4 id="implications-for-arms-control-approaches">Implications for Arms Control Approaches</h4> +<p>The companies that do have mature EDA software available for designing 7 nm chips are all American. Prior to Huawei’s entity listing, Huawei was legally allowed to license this software from the companies and did so. That was how Huawei designed its first 7 nm chip back in 2018. However, the U.S. providers of EDA software have been prohibited from renewing Huawei’s software licenses or providing software updates since 2020. Industry officials told CSIS that the Huawei chip was most likely designed with a pirated version of U.S. EDA tools. Chinese software piracy is a well-known problem in the EDA industry.</p> -<p>Political scientist Joseph Nye defines arms control as efforts between nations to “limit the numbers, types, or disposition of weapons.” There are two key data points that drive the following recommendations on the potential of arms control agreements with China. First, China’s participation in arms control regimes to date is largely driven by the belief that these arrangements give them a competitive edge. Granted, China’s participation in arms regimes is widely touted as a success story. In 1980, Beijing was essentially uninvolved in international arms control agreements, but by the late 1990s, its participation rate was on par with that of other major powers. China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1984, agreed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1992, helped negotiate the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in 1996, and signed and ratified the 1993 Chemical Weapons Ban Treaty.</p> +<p>Thus, the fact that Huawei and SMIC used U.S. technology is not controversial. It is clearly the case. Determining whether Huawei and SMIC’s use of U.S. technology involved violations of U.S. law — either by those companies, by their Chinese suppliers, or by the U.S. companies that produce the technology — is not quite as obvious. However, there are many suspicious circumstances that deserve immediate inquiry. The following sections of this paper will detail the regulatory mechanisms by which the October 7 export controls were intended to address the gaps in the Trump administration policy and also assess the questions that U.S. policymakers should be asking as they consider updated controls.</p> -<p>But given China’s different approach to nuclear weapons and conventional arms sales, China has sacrificed little in terms of potential power gains. It makes sense, therefore, for China to work to constrain the United States’ ability to leverage its advantages in these areas. Indeed, Chinese experts such as Tang Yongsheng, professor at the PLA National Defence University, have been direct about the strategy, arguing that China should “use the UN arms control and disarmament institutions to restrain U.S. arms development and deescalate the U.S.-China arms race.” China has gone further than current regimes, advocating for a complete ban and destruction of nuclear weapons and advocating for a global no-first-use treaty for nuclear states. Indeed, this self-serving approach to arms control best explains why China has more of a spotty record on export controls.</p> +<h3 id="analysis-of-existing-us-regulatory-mechanisms-to-prevent-7-nm-chip-fabrication">Analysis of Existing U.S. Regulatory Mechanisms to Prevent 7 nm Chip Fabrication</h3> -<p>Second, taking into account the modernization discussion in the first section, which argues that China has yet to deviate from its minimal-deterrent nuclear strategy and posture, there is likely no possibility of China joining bilateral arms control arrangements between Russia and the United States that focus on restricting the quantity of its nuclear weapons or the effectiveness of its delivery systems until Russia and the United States reduce their arsenals to China’s level. Fu Cong, the head of the arms control department of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explicitly stated that “China has no interest in joining the so-called trilateral negotiations, given the huge gap between the nuclear arsenal of China and those of the U.S. and the Russian Federation.” In the eyes of Chinese military strategists, arms control is generally seen as a tool by the strong to keep down the weak. This inherent suspicion is illustrated in the Science of Military Strategy, a core textbook for senior PLA officers, in which arms control is described as a “struggle” between self-interested great powers. Chinese leaders are particularly suspicious of U.S.-led arms control regimes, which Chinese strategists see as a “trap” designed to solidify U.S. nuclear dominance and undermine China’s nuclear deterrent. Indeed, China mostly uses arms control as a notion to protest against other countries’ arm deployment and development.</p> +<p>The Trump administration took three major actions in the semiconductor sector. First, it placed entity list restrictions on hundreds of Chinese companies, including ZTE (later removed), Fujian Jinhua, Huawei, and SMIC. Second, the Trump administration adjusted the scope and application of the FDPR. Third, it persuaded the Dutch government to restrict sales of EUV machines to China as a whole based on an informal agreement to deny a license for technology that was already controlled on a multilateral basis through the Wassenaar Arrangement control list.</p> -<p>This does not mean progress cannot be made, but U.S. objectives need to shift. First, to support the argument in the deterrence section about instability in conventional deterrence, the United States could consider asymmetric arms control arrangements, such as reductions in U.S. theater missile defense capabilities or even in the number of nuclear warheads, in exchange for demobilization of certain types and numbers of Chinese conventional missiles. Chinese interlocutors have often expressed interest in a U.S. statement of mutual vulnerability. What would make such a concession to China worthwhile to the United States? The United States could maintain that it possesses a strong nuclear capability, and that China would certainly suffer far more than the United States in any nuclear exchange, while also admitting at the same time that the United States is vulnerable to nuclear attack.</p> +<p>The Biden administration did not reverse or weaken any Trump-era semiconductor trade restrictions and added to them significantly by adopting new restrictions that applied to China as a whole. Most importantly, the Biden administration’s October 7, 2022, policy was focused on restricting China’s access to advanced chips for AI development, but that policy significantly expanded export regulations related to semiconductor manufacturing equipment in order to prevent China from domestically producing alternatives to the advanced AI chips that the United States no longer allowed exporting.</p> -<p>China, the United States, and Russia have been focused on developing artificial intelligence (AI), but through different approaches. The Russian projects are directed at creating military hardware which relies on AI but leaves decisions entirely in human hands, while the U.S. approach is also more conservative, with the goal of producing computers that can assist human decisionmaking but not contribute on their own. China has the most aggressive approach, focusing on developing advanced AI that could contribute to strategic decisionmaking. In China’s 2017 New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, which lays out its goal of leading the world in AI by 2030, China aims to have AI systems that can outperform humans in complex, changing environments and that can process more battlefield information than humans. This would give the PLA a substantial advantage over its adversaries that have less ability to utilize information. Despite these lofty goals, much more research and development needs to be done before any existing AI system is advanced enough to advise battlefield operations.</p> +<p>The policy’s chip equipment restrictions were split into three broad categories:</p> -<p>China understands that the proliferation of AI brings new risks and challenges to the global stage and wants to be in charge of setting the norms for this new technology. As such, China’s New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan calls on minimizing the risks of AI to ensure a “safe, reliable, and controllable” development of the technology. This includes formulating laws, regulations, ethical norms, and safety mechanisms for AI.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Blanket prohibition of exports of a narrow set of advanced deposition equipment to all of China, as well as all parts and accessories related to that equipment:</strong> These restrictions took the form of creating a new Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 3B090, which was restricted under a Regional Security (“RS-China”) justification.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>End-use prohibition of exports intended for use in advanced node semiconductor manufacturing or where the manufacturing node is not clear:</strong> The second major restriction was the creation of a new license restriction based on end use with a presumption of denial, by adding section 744.23 to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). This effectively imposed a blanket ban on exports to China in cases where the exporter in question has “knowledge” that the exported goods will be used for a restricted end use. The restricted end uses in question are production of advanced node semiconductors — defined as logic chips at or below 16 nm, DRAM memory chips at or below 18 nm, and NAND storage at or above 128 layers — or supporting Chinese production of any semiconductor manufacturing equipment, components, or parts. An additional near-blanket prohibition exists for selling to any facility in which the seller knows that the facility produces chips but does not know whether or not the chips produced at that facility are at an advanced technology node.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>To ensure that shipments of U.S. technology for restricted goods (or even transfers of relevant subject matter expertise) would not occur through foreign subsidiaries, joint ventures, or partnerships, the regulations modified section 744.6 of the EAR, the so-called “U.S. persons rule,” which dramatically expanded licensing requirements. It also applies an updated FDPR provision, section 742.6(a)(6), to prevent foreign firms from using U.S. technology to assist China in pursuing the end uses specified in section 744.23. These restrictions apply on a China-wide basis, though only for restricted end uses and end users.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The broader set of equipment and components restricted by section 744.23 includes all items subject to the EAR, of which ECCNs 3B001, 3B002, 3B090, 3B611, 3B991, and 3B992 directly pertain to semiconductor manufacturing equipment and components. This equipment is still generally allowed to be sold to China in cases where two criteria are met. First, the exporter must not have specific knowledge that the buyer intends to use the equipment for advanced node manufacturing. Second, the equipment must not be destined for end use at a facility in which the equipment provider does not know whether or not it is engaged in advanced node manufacturing. For the newly restricted types of chip equipment covered under 3B991 and 3B992, the exporter does not even have to apply for a license to export the goods to China in cases where the exporter has no specific knowledge that they are going toward a prohibited end use or end user.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Blanket export ban to YMTC, China’s most advanced NAND company:</strong> Two months later, in December 2022, the U.S. government also added YMTC to the entity list under a blanket presumption of denial for exporting “all items subject to the EAR.” Any purchase of semiconductor manufacturing equipment or components by YMTC after December 2022 would have been in some way illegal under U.S. law, unless the U.S. government had approved a license.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Chinese officials have also expressed concerns about an AI arms race and emphasized the need for international cooperation and potential arms control. PLA scholars have indicated that they are concerned that AI “will lower the threshold of military action” because states may be more willing to attack each other with AI military systems due to lowered casualty risks. Chinese officials have also expressed that they are concerned about increased misperceptions through the use of these systems. China’s private sector, which plays a big role in developing a lot of AI systems — for example, Baidu makes autonomous vehicles, Alibaba Cloud is in charge of smart cities, and Tencent makes medical imaging — have also voiced their worries. Jack Ma, the chairman of Alibaba, explicitly stated at the 2019 Davos World Economic Forum that he was concerned that the global competition over AI could lead to war.</p> +<p>The Biden administration adopted these new rules in an attempt to degrade the peak technology level of the Chinese chipmaking sector through the loss of access to spare parts, maintenance, and advisory services. It would, for example, be illegal for any U.S. company to provide SMIC with spare parts or new equipment if the U.S. company had knowledge that SMIC was using the equipment to support its 7 nm manufacturing line. In practice, this means that all shipments to SMIC’s SN1 and SN2 fab facilities in Shanghai are prohibited. For shipments to other SMIC facilities, the October 7 policy instructs companies to follow official “Know Your Customer” guidance and best practices, including obtaining a signed end-use statement from the customer and also evaluating “all other available information to determine whether a license is required pursuant to § [section] 744.23.”</p> -<p>There may be more room to maneuver, therefore, to discuss how cyber warfare, counterspace capabilities, or AI-enabled systems could create crisis dynamics that neither side favors, and thus China may be willing to agree to mutual constraints in these areas to protect C2 and otherwise reduce the likelihood of accidents and miscalculation. For instance, the U.S. 2022 Nuclear Posture Review emphasizes the importance of keeping a human in the loop for nuclear employment and decisionmaking. This approach aims to maintain control and reduce risks associated with AI-driven systems. A general agreement with China on this matter could be useful in promoting transparency, trust, and stability between the United States and China. Given China’s concerns about AI arms races, misperceptions, and the potential for conflict, it is possible that it may be open to such an agreement, as it aligns with its security interests.</p> +<p>Overall, this is a significantly stricter due diligence requirement than is typical for Department of Commerce export controls, but it still raises the question of just how much leverage the U.S. government will have to punish companies that use already-installed equipment for prohibited end uses. It also raises the question of whether SMIC and other Chinese firms could be deceiving U.S. firms about the true end uses of their purchases.</p> -<p>On space, China has been promoting the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty, which aims to prohibit the placement of weapons in outer space. China supports this treaty to prevent a space arms race. However, the United States opposes the agreement, as it believes the treaty lacks proper verification mechanisms and could potentially limit its ability to defend its space assets. Furthermore, the United States has been advocating for international norms and rules to regulate space activities, while Beijing has expressed reservations about this approach. China’s 2013 Science of Military Strategy prefers to argue that “seizing command of space and network dominance will become crucial for obtaining comprehensive superiority on the battlefield and conquering an enemy.” Despite these disagreements, reaching a consensus would be challenging but possible. As China and the United States consider space weaponization and threats to space assets, including satellite systems that support nuclear C2 on the ground, agreements on protecting these systems will become critical points for maintaining control over nuclear forces — something of mutual interest to both nations.</p> +<h3 id="why-did-the-october-7-export-controls-fail-to-prevent-smic-from-advancing-7nm-production">Why Did the October 7 Export Controls Fail to Prevent SMIC from Advancing 7nm Production?</h3> -<p>In addition to refining which capabilities to control and restrict, U.S. strategists should also consider whether bringing China into bilateral agreements currently in place with Russia is the right strategy. This largely depends on alliance dynamics between China and Russia. If it looks like the two countries might team up to promote their preferred norms, trilaterals may not be superior to two separate bilateral channels. However, if China’s participation will impose constraints on Russia or vice versa, or the two countries are so clearly in alignment that they concede deterrence is determined by the balance of U.S. forces against an aggregate of Chinese and Russian nuclear forces (such that then the United States is outnumbered and may have to make some concessions), trilateral and broader multilateral arrangements may be the optimal future modality.</p> +<p>It is clear at this point that the October 7 policy has thus far failed to degrade SMIC’s peak technological capability, but that is not especially surprising. SMIC had already begun a ferocious capacity-expansion and equipment-buying campaign both before and after its December 2020 entity listing. As noted above, the U.S. restrictions prior to October 7 did very little to limit SMIC’s purchase of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, even when that equipment was known to be directly supporting a 7 nm production line. SMIC had 14 nm fin-shaped field-effect transistor (FinFet) production commercially available in 2019 and thus had nearly all the equipment it needed to advance to 7 nm due to the ability to “recycle” the equipment for future nodes.</p> -<p>Lastly, China tends to exploit gaps in the international order, making advances at the expense of others when international norms are not solid. Many of the main concepts central to arms control — such as what defines a strategic system, a deployed system, or a tactical nuclear weapon — are debatable. This ambiguity creates space for China to pursue its modernization goals with relatively less pushback and reputational costs. Even if China and the United States cannot agree on force posture, a first step in arms control should be to reach agreement about these fundamental concepts and their meanings and implications.</p> +<p>In much the same way that Huawei had stockpiled a two-year supply of chips prior to U.S. entity restrictions taking effect, SMIC has amassed a large number of machines and potentially also a large stockpile of spare parts that it can draw from. In recent years, Chinese semiconductor manufacturing equipment purchases have been so extensive that non-Chinese chip manufacturers have been complaining that it is delaying equipment providers from completing their non-Chinese orders on time. Industry sources told CSIS that equipment providers routinely refer to Chinese customers under the label of “non-market demand,” meaning that the customers were buying for strategic reasons unrelated to market conditions or profit maximization.</p> -<h4 id="conclusion-2">Conclusion</h4> +<p>Moreover, industry sources told CSIS that, prior to the October 7 regulations, some semiconductor manufacturing equipment, components, and spare parts from U.S. companies were exported to China without a license via foreign-headquartered partners. In the absence of the application of the FDPR or the U.S. persons rule, this is not necessarily a violation of U.S. law. Industry sources also told CSIS that SMIC has set up a network of shell companies and partner firms in China through which it has been able to continue acquiring U.S. equipment and components by deceiving U.S. exporters. If true, sales to such shell companies would involve violations of U.S. law by SMIC, though not necessarily by U.S. companies, so long as the U.S. firm had no knowledge of the fact that the shell company was acting on behalf of SMIC.</p> -<p>China’s nuclear modernization and buildup requires new thinking on deterrence, force posture, and arms control. However, it is not necessarily the case that the solutions of the past suit the challenges in store for the coming period between 2035 and 2050. A best-case scenario for U.S. and allied security is for Chinese nuclear doctrine and strategy to treat nuclear weapons as only relevant for nuclear deterrence, serving no war fighting use. As the United States considers changing its approach to its own nuclear modernization, extended deterrence, or arms control, a primary question should be how these changes might alter the role of nuclear weapons in China’s strategy. This does not need to be a two-peer competition, as this volume posits, but rather the United States could avoid creating a strategic adversary in Beijing altogether. Preventing a more permissive Chinese nuclear strategy should be the top priority of all efforts, even if it means living with a larger, more survivable Chinese nuclear arsenal.</p> +<p>In cases where SMIC did face a legitimate problem due to U.S. restrictions, it was, until very recently, largely unrestricted in its ability to purchase equipment and spare parts from the Netherlands, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. According to a Financial Times analysis of Chinese customs data, the total value of Chinese imports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment increased from $2.9 billion over the two months in June and July 2022 to $5.0 billion over the same two months in 2023. The analysis further found that “most of the imports came from the Netherlands and Japan.” Japan’s export controls only took effect in late July 2023. The Netherlands’ export controls only took effect in September, and Dutch companies are being allowed to complete the delivery of previously approved licensed exports to China even if those deliveries occur after September 2023, so long as the shipment is completed by January 1, 2024.</p> -<h3 id="us-nuclear-policy-in-a-two-peer-nuclear-adversary-world">U.S. Nuclear Policy in a Two Peer Nuclear Adversary World</h3> +<p>The Chinese customs data analyzed by the Financial Times includes finished and fully integrated manufacturing equipment but does not include components, spare parts, and materials. One industry source told CSIS that, because of this omission, the customs data significantly understates the extent to which U.S. technology is being displaced by foreign suppliers. This individual said that as U.S. equipment firms have been forced to reduce their presence in the market, “Japanese firms have been gorging themselves on Chinese revenue from selling fully integrated machines. Korean firms have been gorging themselves on selling subsystems and spare parts.” In conversations with CSIS, multiple industry sources highlighted the problem of South Korean firms backfilling export-controlled U.S. technology and also training Chinese staff in both equipment maintenance and fab operations.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="franklin-c-miller">Franklin C. Miller</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>In early 2021, SMIC told its Chinese government investors that its goal for the SN1 chip fab — SMIC’s second most advanced facility and the one which produces 14 nm node wafers — was production capacity of 35,000 finished wafers per month (WPM).</p> -<h4 id="prologue-how-did-we-get-to-where-we-are">Prologue: How Did We Get to Where We Are?</h4> +<p>SMIC’s most advanced chip fab is SN2, which is part of the same SMIC Southern Shanghai campus as SN1. SN2 is the facility where SMIC conducts advanced node research and development (R&amp;D) and is also the facility where SMIC has begun mass production of its 7 nm (N+1 and N+2) processes. According to a June 2020 report by Guolian Securities, a Chinese investment advisory firm, SMIC planned for 7 nm production capacity at SN2 to also reach 35,000 WPM on an unspecified timeframe. According to one Chinese semiconductor industry analyst, SMIC also planned as recently as September 2022 to eventually pursue 5 nm production at SN2 despite lacking access to EUV machines. For comparison, TSMC first achieved 7 nm mass production without EUV but later upgraded its 7 nm process to use EUV. No major international chipmaker has ever engaged in mass production of 5 nm chips without using EUV lithography machines.</p> -<p>Beginning in the late 1940s, nuclear forces first dominated, and then were a dominating factor in, U.S. defense policy for over 40 years. As the Cold War ended, and the threat of al Qaeda and global terrorism emerged, the U.S. defense establishment turned its focus away from nuclear deterrence and the forces which it supported. Systems which were first built in the 1960s and were then modernized or replaced in the 1980s should have been similarly modernized or replaced beginning in the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, but they were not. As a result, as the Obama administration ended, the outgoing secretary of defense, the late Ashton Carter, observed:</p> +<p>Both the SN1 and SN2 projects were announced in 2017. The SN1 facility was producing 3,000 WPM in late 2019, 6,000 WPM at the 14 nm node in June 2020, and in February 2021 SMIC claimed that SN1 had achieved 15,000 WPM production capacity by the end of 2020. According to a SMIC press release in early 2020, SMIC had originally anticipated hitting the 35,000 WPM production target for SN1 by the end of 2022. More likely than not, SMIC has by now hit this SN1 production capacity target. SMIC stated in February 2023 that it would accelerate capacity expansion despite weakening demand and market oversupply. DigiTimes Asia reported in June 2023 that SMIC was continuing to offer and deliver 14 nm production to customers.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>. . . the Defense Department cannot further defer recapitalizing Cold War-era systems if we are to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear force that will continue to deter potential adversaries that are making improvements in their air defenses and their own nuclear weapons systems. The choice is not between replacing these platforms or keeping them, but rather between replacing them and losing them altogether. The latter outcome would, unfortunately, result in lost confidence in our ability to deter. The United States cannot afford this in today’s security environment or in any reasonably foreseeable future security environment.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>One industry source told CSIS that SMIC’s FinFET production capacity across both SN1 and SN2 is currently 35,000 WPM and that roughly one-third of this capacity is currently being devoted to 7 nm production.</p> -<p>Concurrent with this neglect of force posture, the U.S. government failed to view nuclear deterrence policy as a major area of interest, and even the idea that a nuclear deterrent relationship with Russia, or even the small but growing nuclear forces of China or North Korea, required high-level attention attracted little support. Russia’s invasion of Crimea, North Korea’s continued expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and the emergence of the aggressive Xi Jinping as China’s next leader caused the Obama administration in mid-stream to rediscover the importance of nuclear deterrence. Successive U.S. administrations have continued on that path, but as they have done so, the global scene has become more unsettled.</p> +<p>No data is publicly available on SN2’s progress in production capacity ramp up. T.P. Huang, an independent semiconductor industry analyst, estimates that by the end of 2023, SMIC will have legally acquired enough advanced DUV lithography machines across all SMIC facilities to eventually support production of more than 50,000 FinFET WPM, which would have to be split across the 14 nm and 7 nm production. It is unclear what share of these machines currently resides at SN1 and SN2. Based on analysis of a SMIC notice, Huang projects that all SN2 equipment installations will be completed by July 2024.</p> -<h4 id="an-unsettling-echo-of-the-past">An Unsettling Echo of the Past</h4> +<p>Industry sources told CSIS that this estimate is reasonable and that SMIC will likely reach production capacity of 50,000 WPM across SN1 and SN2 by the end of 2024. SMIC has existing customers for its 14 nm capacity, so presumably it will not immediately reallocate all of its machines to 7 nm. In lithography, the Dutch export controls only restrict exports of EUV machines and the most advanced DUV machines, so it is possible that additional future purchases could increase SMIC’s potential 7 nm production even beyond 50,000 WPM.</p> -<p>By any reasonable measure, the world has become a more dangerous place over the past 10 years. Russia, China, and North Korea are increasingly dangerous. All three nations’ autocratic leaders seek to intimidate their democratically oriented neighbors, and all three harbor ambitions of imperial aggression.</p> +<p>For most new semiconductor manufacturers, manufacturing yield (the share of the chips on the finished wafer that are usable) starts at a low level and then improves as the company’s mastery of a new technology node and production process improves. Industry sources told CSIS that SMIC’s current yield is roughly 50 percent. By comparison, TSMC’s early production with 7 nm was already achieving 76 percent yield in 2017, even before introducing EUV technology. It is reasonable to assume that SMIC’s yield will improve over time, as more of ASML’s most advanced DUV lithography machines are delivered and as SMIC gains operational experience with the N+2 process node. However, SMIC may never match the high yields that TSMC achieved after introducing EUV.</p> -<p>A student of history would observe that the 2020s are eerily reminiscent of the 1930s. Adolf Hitler doubted the will of the Western democracies and went to war against them despite the advice of his military. (His claim that wherever the German language was spoken must be incorporated into the Nazi state resembles Putin’s claims about Russophone territory.) In Tokyo, Premier Togo Shigenori and his ruling clique were similarly convinced, in highly racist terms, that the United States and United Kingdom were weak, failing nations that lacked the will to defend themselves. Both Berlin and Tokyo were convinced that the internal domestic political divisions in the United States and United Kingdom would prevent any unity to rally against aggression. All of this rings true today, with the exception that Putin, Xi, and Kim Jong-un also possess nuclear weapons their twentieth-century forebears lacked. As a result, the United States’ credibility and its commitment to defend allies are once again being called into question by aggressive authoritarian regimes — but today these countries’ possession of nuclear weapons allows them to add a dangerous new element of intimidation and coercion.</p> +<p>The yield rate directly relates to the economics of chip production. Costs are incurred on a per-wafer basis, so increasing the number of usable chips per wafer is equivalent to increasing output without increasing costs. Per chip costs are not typically made publicly available, but Fomalhaut Techno Solutions, a Tokyo-based research company, estimated in 2022 that Apple paid TSMC $110 per chip for its 4 nm production, up from $46 per chip for TSMC’s 5 nm production. TSMC’s 5 nm production process, which used EUV, reportedly achieved excellent yields early in its history.</p> -<p>Putin, Xi, and Kim believe deeply in the political power of nuclear weapons. This is evidenced by their significant investment in the modernization and growth of their nuclear forces, for both long-range and theater/tactical purposes. It is made evident by their use of nuclear blackmail, in Xi’s case a more subtle exercise of that blackmail than Putin or Kim’s efforts; but in all three cases, such blackmail had an effect on regional politics and stability. None of them accepts traditional Western ideas of “strategic stability” (despite decades of well-meaning Westerners seeking to “educate” them). This can be seen in their continued embrace of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) equipped with multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs), their continued rejection of transparency, and their continued willingness to push the envelope with respect to state-sanctioned dangerous military activities and incidents at sea (despite Moscow and Beijing’s membership in accords which prohibit such reckless behavior). All of this is compounded by investments in massive conventional forces and offensive space and cyber capabilities.</p> +<p>If SMIC hypothetically had 100 percent yield and 35,000 7 nm WPM production capacity at SN2 with 550 Huawei chips per wafer, then SMIC could produce enough chips for 231 million phones over the course of a year. As mentioned previously, Huawei only expects to sell 60 million such phones in 2024.</p> -<p>Accordingly, as the United States faces the present and the future, its overriding priority must be to protect U.S. and allied security and territorial integrity without having to fight a war. This means the United States must deter major aggression and blackmail by an enemy (or enemies) using conventional forces, nuclear forces, cyber forces, or space capabilities. That is the country’s deterrent task for today and for tomorrow.</p> +<p>This is no doubt exactly what Huawei hopes for: to win back the customers it lost to Apple and other competitors during the years it was cut off from 5G chips. The Chinese government’s instructions to all employees of the Chinese government and all state-owned enterprises not to use Apple phones might soon be followed by nationalist pressure to buy Huawei’s alternative, even if the technical performance is inferior. If SMIC’s yield remains low, Huawei’s 5G smartphone business may require significant subsidization or a protected domestic market to be economically viable. Assuming that Huawei is paying SMIC’s per wafer prices comparable to what Apple paid TSMC for 7 nm capacity — $10,000 per wafer — then $4.2 billion in annual subsidies would be enough to pay for Huawei buying the entirety of SMIC’s annual 7 nm production assuming 35,000 WPM.</p> -<h4 id="the-essence-of-deterrence-policy">The Essence of Deterrence Policy</h4> +<p>Smartphone companies tend to be early adopters of new semiconductor technology nodes. If the production capacity was directed not toward phones but other uses, such as manufacturing AI chips, which tend to be far larger, then SMIC could manufacture perhaps 10 million per year even at low yields. AI chips tend to be much larger and thus put more of their production investment at risk from manufacturing defects. AI chip producers tend to adopt a manufacturing process node roughly two years after the smartphone early adopters because by that time the defect rate has come down considerably. Further analysis of the implications of this chip for China’s AI sector is included later in this report.</p> -<p>The Biden administration, in its October 2022 National Security Strategy, recognized the gravity of the threats facing the United States and its allies:</p> +<p>It is currently unclear based on the available information whether or not SMIC has also benefitted from illegal technology purchases made in violation of the October 7 or other U.S. export controls. Dylan Patel, Afzal Ahmad, and Myron Xie of the semiconductor consulting firm Semianalysis have argued forcefully, however, that this is indeed the case. Their provocative claims are worth quoting at length:</p> <blockquote> - <p>Russia poses an immediate threat to the free and open international system, recklessly flouting the basic laws of the international order today, as its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has shown. The PRC, by contrast, is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective.</p> + <p>The equipment companies such as Applied Materials, Lam Research, Tokyo Electron, KLA, Screen, ASM International, Kokusai, etc. are selling basically every tool they offer to China. This is because most deposition, etch, metrology, cleaning, coaters, developers, ion implant, epitaxy, etc. tools for 7nm and even 5nm can also plausibly be used in 28nm. These tools are being sold to SMIC for “28nm,” but, in reality, SMIC is lying to the firms’ faces and using them for 7nm.</p> </blockquote> -<p>These twin political challenges are made more fraught by the fact that, due to the buildup of its nuclear arsenal, China has now essentially joined Russia as a “nuclear peer” of the United States. (While some will point out that China’s strategic arsenal is today considerably smaller than that of the United States, two facts — that it (1) now fields an operational strategic nuclear triad and a large number of theater and tactical-range nuclear weapons, and (2) that it is continuing to deploy more nuclear weapons — certainly qualifies it to be a “nuclear peer” of the United States.) Never before in the nuclear age has the United States faced two potential nuclear peer adversaries, each of which can act alone or, potentially, in concert with the other. This is the reality of the “new nuclear world.”</p> - -<p>To preserve peace and prevent war, the United States must return to the fundamental constructs of deterrence policy. The basic and traditional deterrence policy construct holds for this new world: the leadership of potential aggressors must see the United States as capable of inflicting various amounts of unacceptable pain should they decide to attack the United States or its allies at any level. The 1983 Scowcroft Commission produced the best statement of this principle:</p> - <blockquote> - <p>Deterrence is not and cannot be bluff. In order for deterrence to be effective we must not merely have weapons, we must be perceived to be able, and prepared, if necessary, to use them effectively against the key elements of [an enemy’s] power. Deterrence is not an abstract notion amenable to simple quantification. Still less is it a mirror of what would deter ourselves. Deterrence is the set of beliefs in the minds of the [enemy] leaders, given their own values and attitudes, about our capabilities and our will. It requires us to determine, as best we can, what would deter them from considering aggression, even in a crisis — not to determine what would deter us.</p> + <p>While SMIC is expanding 28nm and other trailing edge nodes, it is much less than they claim as these tools are being rerouted to leading edge. It’s even possible that people within these equipment firms know what’s happening, but are turning a blind eye.</p> </blockquote> -<p>To continue to deter effectively today and for the foreseeable future, the United States must credibly continue to hold at risk what potential enemy leaders value most: themselves, the security forces which keep them in power, their military forces, and their war-supporting industry.</p> - -<p>As noted above, what has changed in this new world is the emergence of China as a second nuclear peer to the United States. Recognizing this, the United States needs, for the first time in the nuclear age, to be able to deter Russia and China simultaneously (not just sequentially). Dictators can act quickly and with great secrecy. The United States must be ever mindful of the possibility that, like Hitler and Stalin, Xi and Putin could unveil at any point, most dangerously in a crisis, a treaty of military and political alliance.</p> +<p>The Semianalysis authors did not specifically disclose the sources for these claims in their article but elsewhere cited “rumors from China.” One industry source told CSIS that illegal diversion of U.S. exports in materials and spare parts to prohibited Chinese end uses and end users was “rampant” even after October 7, 2022, and that the end-use controls outlined in section 744.23 were being intentionally violated by SMIC and other advanced Chinese chip manufacturers. Other industry sources told CSIS that rumors of diversion at the fully integrated equipment level were entirely false and that diversion at the subsystem and part levels was done by third parties, not U.S. firms. These accusations may or may not be true, and there has been no proof provided to verify or disprove the accusations. Nevertheless, they deserve immediate investigation by the U.S. government.</p> -<h4 id="from-policy-to-forces-why-a-triad">From Policy to Forces: Why a Triad?</h4> +<p>If exports are being diverted from their legally licensed destination toward fabs that are operating toward prohibited end uses, that is strong legal justification for the U.S. government and its allies to strengthen export control restrictions. It is at a minimum plausible that SMIC’s claims to be expanding capacity at 28 nm are disingenuous. Other Chinese chipmaking companies have built fabs with the explicit intention of starting production at 28 nm and later shifting production to more advanced technology nodes. In February 2021, a Chinese news outlet reported that SMIC’s Huahong Factory No. 6 in Shanghai would begin production at 28 nm but that SMIC ultimately planned to upgrade the facility to 14 nm with a production capacity of 40,000 WPM. However, SMIC does have a large and growing set of customers for 28 nm production, so this transition to 7 nm, even if planned, may be well in the future.</p> -<p>The United States’ continued investment in a strategic nuclear force based on a triad of land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and manned bombers equipped with either stand-off cruise missiles or gravity bombs remains, despite skepticism in some quarters, the optimal manner in which to deploy a nuclear deterrent. The triad started life, admittedly, as the offspring of the inter-service rivalries of the 1950s. During the 1960s, however, strategists recognized that the combination of three different basing modes, each with unique strengths and different but offsetting vulnerabilities, separate attack azimuths, and complementary alert postures, presented potential enemy offenses and defenses with insurmountable obstacles. All of this remains true today. As a result, the three-legged combination continues to provide maximum deterrent stability because an aggressor cannot pre-emptively destroy the triad or prevent the retaliation it could impose. Interestingly, while some U.S. critics deride the triad concept, it is worth noting that it has been copied by Russia, China, Israel, and India.</p> +<h3 id="impacts-of-export-controls-on-chinas-chipmaking-and-chip-equipment-industries">Impacts of Export Controls on China’s Chipmaking and Chip Equipment Industries</h3> -<h4 id="why-a-modernized-triad">Why a Modernized Triad?</h4> +<p>However, even if there are legal grounds for expanded export controls, the U.S. government must have a clear sense of what effect strengthened export controls are realistically going to have and how the United States would know whether or not its efforts are succeeding.</p> -<p>As former secretary of defense Ash Carter’s comment indicates, the viability of the U.S. deterrent is slowly deteriorating. The Minuteman III ICBMs were first deployed in the 1970s. Their electronics, guidance systems, and motors have all been modernized several times over the last 50 years, but those options are no longer available to prolong their lifespan. The existing force will have to be retired within the next 10 years. The new Sentinel ICBM will replace the 450 Minuteman missiles on a one-for-one basis, thereby ensuring the continuation of a sovereign-based force which will possess high responsiveness and accuracy as well as rapid, secure communications. Ohio-class submarines, the first of which began its service in 1982, have served longer than any previous class of U.S. nuclear-powered submarine. A submarine’s safety is affected principally by the pressure its hull has endured throughout its lifetime and whether the equipment associated with the nuclear plant has become brittle. Based on these indicators, the Ohio-class submarines must be retired within the next 10 to 15 years. A “minimum of 12” Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) will begin replacing the 14 Ohio-class boats starting in the late 2020s. The bomber force consists of (modernized) 1960s-era B-52s and a small number of 1990s-era B-2s. The B-52s have been incapable for decades of penetrating heavily defended airspace and have been equipped with cruise missiles as a result. Those cruise missiles, however, entered into service in the early 1980s and had a designed service life of 10 years. They will not pose a credible threat by the end of this decade. A replacement cruise missile, the Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) cruise missile is scheduled to enter service in 2029–2030, thereby ensuring the B-52’s continued relevance. Only 19 stealth penetrating B-2 bombers exist, and these are scheduled to be replaced by 120 new penetrating B-21 bombers.</p> +<p>YMTC is the clearest test case for the power of unilateral U.S. semiconductor export controls against Chinese chipmakers. With a blanket export ban adopted in December 2022, YMTC’s entity list restrictions are far stronger than anything that the United States placed on SMIC or included in the October 7 regulations. Reporting by the Financial Times and South China Morning Post claims that YMTC was initially hit hard by the controls, but that a combination of government subsidies, Dutch and Japanese equipment, previously purchased U.S. equipment, and the improving quality of Chinese equipment suppliers has given YMTC the confidence to restart advanced NAND memory production and make major investments.</p> -<p>Ever since the current strategic modernization program was first approved during the Obama administration, twin questions have been raised as to its affordability and its priority among other defense needs. The program is affordable. The Department of Defense (DOD)’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (basing its figures on a smaller DOD budget than exists today) stated:</p> +<p>It is worth emphasizing again that YMTC had been extensively preparing for U.S. export controls since 2019 — three-and-a-half years before the time they arrived. Furthermore, YMTC will have arguably had more than four-and-a-half years of preparation by the time Dutch controls take full effect in January 2024.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>While estimates of the cost to sustain and replace U.S. nuclear capabilities vary . . . even the highest of these projections place the highpoint of the future cost at approximately 6.4 percent of the current DoD budget. Maintaining and operating our current aging nuclear forces now requires between two and three percent of the DoD budget and the replacement program to rebuild the triad for decades of service will peak for several years at only approximately four percent beyond the existing sustainment level of spending. This 6.4 percent of the current DoD budget required for the long-term program represents less than one percent of today’s overall federal budget.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>At the same time, China’s domestic semiconductor equipment sector is experiencing significant growth and collectively organizing itself around the goal of producing alternatives to U.S. equipment, components, and spare parts. Analysis by CINNO Research, a Chinese consultancy, finds that the 10 largest Chinese semiconductor manufacturing equipment firms have seen their revenue increase 39 percent compared with 2022, totaling $2.2 billion for the first half of 2023. This builds on progress that was already underway even before October 2022. Dr. Doug Fuller of the Copenhagen Business School claims that Chinese semiconductor equipment firms have increased their share of China’s domestic market from 8.5 percent in 2020 to 25 percent in the first 10 months of 2022, though these sales were overwhelmingly concentrated at legacy nodes and far from the state of the art. Chinese equipment firms are also concentrated in non-critical processes.</p> -<p>Prioritizing nuclear modernization is not a real issue when one considers that nuclear deterrence fundamentally underwrites U.S. strategic interests and military missions around the world. To be sure, the United States is currently in urgent need of, among other things: deployed conventional prompt strike systems; rebuilt war reserve munitions stockpiles across the board for ground, air, and naval forces; more robust space offensive and defensive systems; advanced cyber warfare capabilities; and dramatically more tanker aircraft than today. All contribute to the United States’ ability to deter adventurism, aggression, and war. But their deterrent effect in a world defined by two nuclear peer states depends first and foremost on an unquestioned strategic nuclear deterrent.</p> +<p>Moreover, after October 7, the Chinese government has further increased its already massive subsidization of the semiconductor industry. In September, Reuters reported that China is preparing to launch a new $40 billion state-backed investment fund for its semiconductor sector. This follows similarly massive funds launched in 2014 and 2019. On September 18, 2023, the Chinese government strengthened R&amp;D tax incentives such that 120 percent of the cost of all R&amp;D by Chinese semiconductor companies can now be deducted from taxes. The semiconductor industry is among the most R&amp;D-intensive industries worldwide, so this is a massive subsidy stacked on top of many other massive subsidies that remain in effect.</p> -<h4 id="how-much-is-enough">How Much Is Enough?</h4> +<p>The Dutch and Japanese export controls are a license requirement with unclear (at least in terms of publicly available information) license approval criteria. It is possible that the Dutch and Japanese licensing restrictions will be enforced similarly to the U.S. framework, which applies extremely broad restrictions for the advanced fabs such as the one that YMTC is building. If that is indeed the case, YMTC will be cut off from nearly every foreign machine that it needs to build and maintain its advanced fab legally. Whether or not illegal means are available will depend upon the strength of enforcement capacity.</p> -<p>Deterring China and Russia simultaneously leads to a need for an increased level of U.S. strategic warheads: simple logic and arithmetic suggest that the force level enshrined in New START during the 2010s and designed for a world far different from today’s is insufficient for 2023 — let alone for later in this decade and on into the 2030s. Therefore, it follows that the current U.S. nuclear modernization plan itself is necessary but not sufficient. While the triad concept remains sound, the modernization plan was conceived to deal with a far less dangerous world. Within the next several years, either as a result of an ignominious early end to New START or its expiration in 2026, the United States will have to begin to deploy a larger deterrent force. For the near term, and probably through at least the mid-2030s, the United States will need to take warheads out of the “reserve hedge” and place them in the field. This will require increasing the loadout on the Minuteman 3 ICBM from one to two or three warheads (and in the future continuing this on the new Sentinel ground-based strategic deterrent ICBM system), increasing the loadout on the Trident II/D-5 SLBM up to eight (as well as restoring to operational status the four missile tubes on each Ohio-class submarine which were “neutered” under New START), and increasing to the maximum number possible the AGM-86B air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM-Bs) and B61-12 bombs assigned to the B-52s and B-2s. (The United States should also take steps to return to nuclear-capable status those B-52s “neutered” under New START, although there will not be sufficient LRSOs to arm them until the 2030s.) None of this can be achieved overnight. The United States can, however, begin to reach the levels required to deter Moscow and Beijing simultaneously by preparing now to upload and doing so after New START constraints have been removed. This will sustain deterrence through the 2030s as replacement systems come online. Assuming no diminution in the threat, and therefore the continued need to maintain those force levels in the 2030s and beyond, the United States can sustain deterrence by extending the modernization programs for the Columbia SSBN, B-21, and LRSO — building more than 12 Columbia SSBNs and more than 120 B-21s and ensuring that the Air Force has sufficient LRSOs to hang one on every mounting point on the B-52s and B-21s (which is not the current Air Force plan).</p> +<p>However, it is worth asking whether or not Dutch or Japanese export controls can be truly effective in the absence of Dutch and Japanese legal equivalents to the U.S. FDPR and U.S. persons rule. The absence of such provisions has been a challenge for earlier Japanese export controls. Most notably, a recent World Bank analysis of Japan’s 2019 export controls on the sale of semiconductor manufacturing chemicals to South Korea found that Japanese chemical suppliers responded by simply shifting some production of the chemicals from Japan to their subsidiary companies headquartered in South Korea or by forming joint ventures with South Korean firms.</p> -<p>Russia, China, and North Korea all have significant short-range and mid-range nuclear forces, and Putin and Kim often indulge in threats to use these systems. (As noted, Xi’s threats are more subtle but nevertheless real). The United States needs to have a clear range of options below the strategic level to deter the use of these weapons in wartime. The United States’ sub-strategic options outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Europe (where the country has NATO-deployed dual-combat aircraft) are confined to the W76-2 SLBM warhead. Having only one type of response option is never a sound deterrent approach; the United States needs to augment the W76-2 particularly for non-NATO contingencies. As a result, the country must proceed to develop and deploy a new sea-launched, nuclear-tipped cruise missile to bolster theater deterrence.</p> +<p>This was not in legal violation of Japanese export controls, though it was obviously in violation of the policy’s intent. If sales and shipments of Dutch and Japanese equipment, components, and spare parts are simply routed through foreign subsidiaries or distributors, then the export controls will have limited effect on China’s ability to expand advanced node production. Many Dutch and Japanese business executives will likely use all legal means available to continue sales to China. At least one Japanese business executive has already stated his intention to “develop duplicate supply chains — one for the U.S.-led economic bloc and one for the China-led bloc.”</p> -<p>Underwriting the weapons systems is an aging nuclear command and control structure which also must be upgraded and modernized.</p> +<p>One industry source told CSIS that “we’re definitely seeing the Chinese equipment industry making progress faster than previously expected.” The degree of dominance of U.S. firms in certain categories of semiconductor manufacturing equipment at the fully integrated systems level is real, but that is as the manager of a global supply chain in which other countries provide many components and subsystems that make up important parts of the finished system.</p> -<h4 id="how-much-is-too-much">How Much Is “Too Much”?</h4> +<p>Industry sources told CSIS that Chinese semiconductor equipment companies have worked aggressively to map U.S. equipment firms’ supply chains and to develop independent purchasing relationships with U.S. equipment companies’ non-U.S. suppliers. Because Chinese semiconductor equipment and component firms have already been subject to blanket U.S. export controls and have weak prospects for sales outside of China, they have little incentive to respect U.S. intellectual property, export controls, or other laws. Thus, these firms take advantage of non-U.S. suppliers where they are can and seek to reverse engineer U.S. or allied technology where they must.</p> -<p>The measure of whether the United States’ strategic nuclear force is sufficient should be whether it allows the country to hold at risk the valued assets of the Russian, Chinese, and North Korean leaderships and to maintain an adequate reserve force. The idea that the United States must maintain “parity” or rough equivalence with Russian or Chinese nuclear force levels should not be a factor in force sizing. As long as the United States is confident in its ability to cover its targets — and it can make that convincingly clear to potential adversaries — it should not enter into a competition to achieve numerical parity. It should be of no consequence if Moscow or Beijing (or both) seek to build and deploy forces which exceed U.S. levels; their ability “to make the rubble bounce” is not strategically significant and should not be perceived as such. The only area where parity or equality is required is in arms control — any treaty the United States enters into must provide the right to deploy the same force levels as the other treaty parties.</p> +<p>One Chinese equipment company, AMEC, claimed at an August 2023 investor relations meeting that they have 35 different types of etching equipment tools under development that are designed to provide full coverage of the etching processes required for manufacturing sub-20 nm DRAM memory. Of these 35, AMEC claims that 14 of the tools are already in mass production, while the other 21 have completed laboratory verification. An industry source told CSIS that AMEC’s tools that have completed laboratory verification are two to five years away from being viable for mass production under ideal conditions, and that the actual time to availability may be longer. Regardless, this still represents significant progress from where AMEC was three years ago. As mentioned above, AMEC is part of the China’s new approach of centralizing collaboration between the Chinese government and leading private sector semiconductor firms, a collaboration led by Huawei.</p> -<h4 id="integrated-deterrence">Integrated Deterrence?</h4> +<p>Industry sources also told CSIS that South Korean, European, and Japanese subsystems suppliers are aggressively pursuing the Chinese market that has been opened up in the wake of U.S. export controls. Two sources specifically stated that South Korean firms have been instrumental in providing spare parts, maintenance, and advisory services related to U.S. equipment.</p> -<p>While a robust strategic nuclear deterrent undergirds everything the United States undertakes around the world, it is a necessary but insufficient counter to potential aggression in a world in which Russia, China, and even several rogue states maintain capable conventional forces as well as offensive space and cyber capabilities. While those particular threats are not the subject, per se, of Project Atom’s work, it would be wrong not to comment on them, however briefly. A credible deterrent must provide responses to all forms of a potential enemy’s aggression.</p> +<p>YMTC likewise has little incentive to comply with U.S. laws. As long as sales of components and materials are continuing through distributors in China, genuinely cutting YMTC off will be difficult unless the United States and its allies are willing to tighten restrictions on a China-wide basis. One industry expert told CSIS that the Department of Commerce has failed to effectively identify all the shell companies and industry partners that YMTC uses to continue receiving U.S. technology in violation of export controls. Multiple industry sources said the same was true of SMIC.</p> -<p>Given Russian and Chinese capabilities, the United States must continue to deploy powerful air, naval, and ground conventional forces, offensive and defensive counterspace systems, and world-class offensive and defensive cyber assets. There are significant gaps in these nonnuclear areas. For one, the United States currently lacks adequate offensive and defensive counterspace capability. In another example, given Moscow and Beijing’s extensive anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities designed to prevent U.S. naval forces from operating successfully in the Baltic and South China Seas, respectively, the United States requires but has not fielded the means — the Conventional Prompt Strike system — to destroy the A2/AD threat. While a joint Army and Navy program has developed this long-range conventional hypersonic missile, both service’s bureaucracies are treating deployment as a matter of routine business rather than an urgently needed requirement. Similarly, the Air Force tanker fleet is woefully inadequate to support a major war in the Pacific, let alone a world in which U.S. forces might have to fight in both Europe and Asia. The real issue in all of this is the non-responsive, process-oriented, and deeply risk-averse nature of the service bureaucracies — the organizations focus on numbers of platforms rather than needed capabilities, including for both cutting-edge technologies and mundane but essential items such as war reserve munitions. This problem is compounded by a defense-industrial base which has been deliberately allowed (even encouraged) to atrophy since the end of the Cold War and which requires major rejuvenation — a task in which the DOD and Congress must both play a role.</p> +<p>CMXT, a Chinese DRAM memory producer, is reportedly spending hundreds of millions of dollars to purchase legacy equipment suitable for producing large quantities of legacy DRAM that is less advanced than the performance specifications in the October 7 controls. If CMXT’s intentions are sincere, then this is arguably a success story for the October 7 policy since CMXT had previously been planning to expand advanced node capacity. However, one industry analyst told CSIS that the composition of equipment purchases by CMXT is inconsistent with an intention of producing legacy DRAM chips and would make far more sense if CMXT’s true intention was to produce chips more advanced than those prohibited by the October 7 end-use controls. If true, this would suggest that CMXT is deceiving U.S. companies and regulators in order to amass a stockpile of U.S. equipment that will at some point be redirected to restricted end uses. Another industry source told CSIS that CMXT is open with its Dutch and Japanese equipment suppliers about its intention to produce chips more advanced than those allowed under U.S. export controls.</p> -<p>Finally, an effective deterrent requires integration of all of these military capabilities and, to a larger degree, integration of whole-of-government activities to deter aggression and prevent war. This is an area where the United States has not particularly excelled for decades; today, despite the administration’s rhetorical commitment to “integrated deterrence,” the DOD does not plan in an integrated manner. The bureaucratic barriers and baronial and territorial instincts of the various combatant command staffs have proved a major impediment to integrating regional and functional forces and even to planning most effectively for such employment — all despite well-meaning commitments at the four-star level in the Pentagon to create cross-cutting planning and operations. A failure to address this meaningfully will undercut U.S. combat capability globally. There are various ways to force the regional and functional combatant commands to plan in an integrated manner. All would be bureaucratically difficult to create, but the function is absolutely necessary.</p> +<p>The October 7 export controls — and especially the Dutch and Japanese restrictions — were too late to prevent SMIC from bringing online a facility that will likely soon achieve 35,000 WPM of 7 nm production capacity with decent, if not world-leading, yield. This is a genuine threat to U.S. and allied national security, not least because of what it likely means for the Chinese military’s access to domestically produced AI chips.</p> -<p>Of all the various approaches, the best would be to build on the experience of the Omaha-based Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, which was co-located with Strategic Air Command from 1960 until the demise of both in 1992. A new Joint Strategic Planning Staff, reporting to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should be created to ensure the geographic combatant commanders’ war plans include not only air, ground, and maritime operations but also integrated space, cyber, and nuclear ones as well.</p> +<p>The highest levels of leadership in both the United States and China — including Xi Jinping — believe that leading in AI technology is critical to the future of global military and economic power. In May 2023, a group of AI industry and academic leaders issued a statement warning that the risks of advanced AI should be viewed in the same way as pandemics and nuclear war. None of those risks will be any easier to manage if China achieves its vision of becoming an AI-enabled authoritarian superpower.</p> -<h4 id="the-nuclear-weapons-complex">The Nuclear Weapons Complex</h4> +<h3 id="potential-implications-for-chinas-ai-and-ai-chip-sector">Potential Implications for China’s AI and AI Chip Sector</h3> -<p>In the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration advocated for the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. While never ratified by the U.S. Senate, the treaty’s existence and the administration’s view of the international security situation led it to slash funding for the agency responsible for the maintenance and production of U.S. nuclear weapons: the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The result over time was a production complex housed more often than not in World War II-era buildings, unable to produce new uranium pits or new warhead designs, and largely focused on the life extension of existing weapons. Funding increases beginning in 2020 and continuing today have been unable to significantly change the capabilities of the nuclear weapons complex. Construction of new facilities has been delayed, and costs have risen accordingly. To exacerbate the situation further, significant numbers of skilled and experienced workers and scientists are reaching retirement age, and the NNSA has been unable to attract and retain adequate numbers of replacements. All of this has led to a situation where, despite having stellar leadership today, the NNSA has become the single greatest impediment to modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent. A recent NNSA internal study observed: “On the current path, warhead modernization programs, facility construction, and capability recapitalization will continue to slip and, even worse, we may not be able to attract and retain the needed workforce.”</p> +<p>Huawei’s new chip and 5G phone attracted the bulk of the media attention during and after Secretary Raimondo’s August 2023 visit to China. However, the more strategically important disclosure related to Huawei’s progress on AI chips. On August 27, the chairman of iFlytek, one of China’s largest and most technologically sophisticated AI companies, said at a conference that “I am particularly happy to tell you that Huawei’s GPU capabilities are now the same as Nvidia’s A100. [Huawei CEO] Ren Zhengfei attaches great importance to it, and three directors of Huawei have gone to work in iFlytek at HKUST [Hong Kong University of Science and Technology]. Now they have benchmarked against Nvidia’s A100 [Google automated translation].”</p> -<p>There may be no good answers to solving this crucial but seemingly intractable problem. Drawing on the work of the 2014 Mies-Augustine report, it is possible to advance several potential remedies:</p> +<p>In short, at the same time that Huawei was announcing its return to the 5G smartphone market, it was also announcing its return to the GPU (also known as AI chip) market. In contrast to more general-purpose processors, AI chips are specially designed to increase speed and reduce the power consumption of developing (referred to in the industry as “training”) and operationally using (referred to as “inference”) machine learning AI models.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>The NNSA should be removed from the Department of Energy (whose leadership’s focus has traditionally been on non-defense issues) and be made an independent agency;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The administration should accord the rebuilding of the nuclear weapons complex a “Moonshot-like” priority and act expeditiously to resolve the myriad problems which have made it a major vulnerability in the overall U.S. deterrent posture; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The administration should undertake the politically difficult but nonetheless necessary task of persuading Congress to remove NNSA funding from the Energy and Water Committees and place it under the Armed Services Committees.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Huawei has sold AI accelerator chips under its Ascend product line since 2019. These chips were designed by HiSilicon and manufactured by TSMC. This halted in May 2020 after the first Huawei FDPR rule. However, Huawei was rumored to have amassed a major stockpile of these chips, allowing the company to continue winning major data center contracts across China. Independent testing by Chinese university scholars in September 2022 found that that Huawei’s Ascend chips were inferior to Western competitor products, most notably Nvidia, on nearly all performance metrics related to chip design and hardware.</p> -<h4 id="allies-and-extended-deterrence">Allies and Extended Deterrence</h4> +<p>However, in the case of Nvidia, its competitive dominance is based not only on the performance of its chips but also on the strength of the software ecosystem that is based upon Nvidia standards, particularly Nvidia’s CUDA software ecosystem. CUDA makes it much easier for programmers to write massively parallelized software (as all modern AI software is) and ensures backward and forward compatibility so that older chips can still run newer software and vice versa. Any customer who seeks to stop using Nvidia chips has to leave the CUDA ecosystem, which requires solving a lot of incredibly hard software problems for which CUDA already provides free answers. Those free answers reflect billions of dollars of investment in the CUDA platform by both Nvidia and its customers.</p> -<p>While somewhat of a truism, the fact is that the United States’ biggest single advantage over Russia, China, and North Korea in international affairs is that it has allies and they do not. The United States shares democratic forms of government and a strong belief in the Western liberal political tradition with those allies. It also has strong trading relationships. But a key factor which binds the United States’ European and Asia-Pacific allies is their perceived need for protection from blackmail, coercion, and attack from their nuclear-armed neighbors. Much of the concerns of U.S. allies faded after the end of the Cold War, only to return with heightened fears over the past four to five years, given Putin’s murderous aggression against Ukraine and nuclear threats, Xi’s many attempts to intimidate Tokyo, Canberra, Seoul, and Taipei, and Kim’s occasional outbursts. Reassuring allies that the United States can and will continue to protect them involves a mixture of diplomacy and demonstration of military capability; based on history and geography, the elements of that mixture are different in Europe than in the Asia-Pacific.</p> +<p>The strength of the combined offering of CUDA software and Nvidia hardware goes a long way toward explaining why Nvidia accounted for 95 percent of AI chip sales in China in 2022, according to estimates by Fubon Securities Investment Services.</p> -<p>EUROPE</p> +<p>Even in 2019, Huawei’s strategy for competing with Nvidia in the AI chip hardware market included creating a software alternative to CUDA, which Huawei refers to as its Compute Architecture for Neural Networks (CANN). According to Huawei, “CANN is not only a software platform, but also a development system that includes a programming language, compilation and debugging tools, and programming models. CANN creates a programming framework based on Ascend AI Processors.” Huawei claimed in September 2022 that Ascend and CANN were generating traction: “More than 900,000 developers have launched more than 1,100 AI solutions based on Ascend, which are widely used in government, telecommunications, finance, electricity, internet and other fields.”</p> -<p>Faced with the threat of invasion by a large Red Army following World War II, and confronting an unwillingness to pay the sums deemed necessary to provide a conventional force equal to it, the United States and its European allies formed a defensive alliance — NATO — and based its defense posture principally on the threat of a nuclear response. The purpose of NATO was simple: to prevent a third major conventional war which would devastate the homelands of the European members of the alliance. Beginning in the mid-1950s, the United States began deploying thousands of mid-range and short-range weapons to NATO Europe for potential use in wartime by both U.S. and allied forces. This demonstration of military capability contributed to an effective deterrent throughout the Cold War. In the 1960s, NATO governments increasingly evinced concern about how the Europe-based weapons might be used in wartime and pressed for a consultative mechanism on the topic, an arrangement the United States agreed to in 1967.</p> +<p>iFlyTek is one AI firm that has close ties to the Chinese government, including developing AI technologies used in the surveillance and repression of China’s Uyghur minority. For this reason, iFlyTek was placed on the U.S. entity list in 2019. iFlyTek is therefore a natural target customer for Huawei’s AI chips, since its access to U.S. alternatives is restricted. Prior to the entity listing, iFlyTek primarily used Nvidia products.</p> -<p>Over the past 55 years, allied governments and their polities have remained essentially supportive of NATO’s nuclear arrangements. The consultation process is long established and accepted. The size and scope of the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons has been reduced dramatically as a result of the end of the Cold War, and the lowered threat perception derived from the demise of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union led to calls from some quarters for their complete removal. However, as Russia’s aggressive nuclear diplomacy increased, coupled with its invasion of Georgia, its occupation of Crimea, and its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, there is a general acceptance of the value of and need for NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements. Indeed, Putin’s declarative threats against NATO have heightened a collective awareness among publics, politicians, and governments of the danger posed by Russia. Many are and will be watching carefully how the Biden administration deals with the war in Ukraine, including potential Russian use of nuclear weapons; any perceived weakness will inevitably undermine confidence in the United States’ commitment to defend NATO from Russian aggression. It will also be important politically, both within NATO’s European members as well as among political elites in Washington, for alliance members to meaningfully carry out their commitments to increase their own defense capabilities. Augmenting U.S. military prowess with increased allied conventional (particularly ground) forces, cyber capabilities, and, to some much smaller extent, space assets will be seen as key to success here.</p> +<p>More recently, Huawei claimed in July 2023 that the number of Ascend and CANN developers has doubled to 1.8 million. It is unclear how Huawei is measuring the number of Ascend and CANN developers or how active an average Ascend developer is. For comparison, Nvidia said in May 2023 that CUDA has 4 million active developers and that CUDA has been downloaded more than 40 million times, including 25 million times in just the past year. Despite the October 2022 export controls, Nvidia’s chips that are legally approved for export to the Chinese market, the A800 and H800, are reportedly in high demand by Chinese hyperscale cloud computing vendors. The A800 and H800 are degraded versions of the A100 and H100 chips, respectively. Specifically, the A800 and H800 have equivalent processing power to their non-degraded counterparts but significantly reduced interconnect speed that is below the export control thresholds.</p> -<p>ASIA</p> +<p>Nvidia’s A100 models (launched in 2020) are manufactured by TSMC on their 7 nm process, while its H100 models (launched in 2022) use a custom TSMC 4 nm process node. Nvidia has not announced the release date for its forthcoming B100 product line, but it will reportedly use TSMC’s 3 nm process node and launch in either late 2024 or early 2025.</p> -<p>The United States’ extended deterrence posture in the Asia-Pacific has, mostly for historical reasons, been markedly different from that in NATO Europe. The possibility of war, except perhaps on the Korean peninsula, was largely discounted by regional allies historically. U.S. nuclear weapons had been deployed only in one Asia-Pacific allied nation, South Korea, and they were earmarked for wartime use solely by U.S. forces. With U.S. Navy aircraft carriers and patrol squadrons removed from nuclear roles at the end of the Cold War, the only U.S. non-strategic weapon available to the region was the nuclear-tipped Tomahawk SLCM, and it was retired without replacement by the Obama administration (over Japanese objections). Given the U.S.-centric nature of regional nuclear deployments, no consultative arrangements with Asian allies were ever created or sought.</p> +<p>All of this suggests that even Nvidia’s products that are degraded to comply with export controls will be more attractive than Huawei’s alternatives for at least the next few years. Huawei and SMIC do not have a clear path to producing chips beyond the 5 nm node, and SMIC will likely have poor unit economics to produce 5 nm chips without access to EUV technology. The greater maturity of the CUDA software ecosystem also makes Nvidia chips more attractive.</p> -<p>Within the last 15 years or so, however, the need for both diplomatic and hardware solutions has emerged. Successive governments in Japan have been increasingly unsettled by China’s provocative behavior in and around Japanese airspace and its maritime borders. The steady buildup of Chinese and North Korean nuclear forces has led to concerns in Tokyo that there are “holes” in the U.S. extended deterrence umbrella, and senior politicians have even floated the idea that Japan should become a nuclear weapons state. Similar sentiments have emerged in Seoul as well. The Obama administration sought to allay these concerns by establishing recurring nuclear policy discussions with both Japan and South Korea. While these discussions have been an important first step in restoring confidence in the extended deterrent, they are only that — a first step. Follow-on steps should include:</p> +<p>However, if the performance thresholds specified in the October 7 export controls are held constant, then the attractiveness of Nvidia products compared with Huawei alternatives could change significantly in the future. The current performance penalty for training large AI models with the degraded Nvidia chips is reportedly in the range of 10 to 30 percent. This is significant, but able to be overcome by Chinese AI firms that benefit from both government subsidies and a protected domestic market.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>The United States should proceed with the development and deployment of SLCM-N aboard U.S. submarines.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) agreement should be expanded to include Japan and South Korea in a broad and loose alliance that features enhanced information and technology sharing, joint exercises, and joint planning conferences.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>The United States should build a broad and loose alliance that also encourages allied development of conventional, cyber, and potentially space capabilities which are interoperable with and complementary to U.S. systems.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Finally, the United States must put to rest the notion, popular in some quarters, that it cannot successfully fight simultaneously in Europe and the Pacific. Europe is primarily a ground war augmented by allied air power; the Pacific is a maritime and air war. Space and cyber will occur on a global basis regardless of which adversary the United States faces. The United States can fight successfully in both theaters with allied help.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Industry sources told CSIS that the performance penalty will grow over time as the consequences of capped interconnect speed become more and more pronounced. This could potentially mean that Huawei chips, which would obviously not comply with interconnect speed restrictions, could have superior overall performance even if they are manufactured on an inferior semiconductor process node. Moreover, there are other sources of improvement to chip performance besides adopting a superior manufacturing process node. Nvidia’s chief scientist Bill Dally recently said that of the 1,000-fold performance improvement that AI model training on Nvidia chips has undergone over the past 10 years, semiconductor manufacturing process node improvements were only the third most important factor. More specifically, he said that process node improvements had delivered a two-and-a-half times performance boost between the 28 nm node and 5 nm node.</p> -<h4 id="arms-control-and-its-future">Arms Control and Its Future</h4> +<p>This suggests that — even if export controls were able to effectively constrain China’s AI development to the 28 nm node as was their original intent — there are limits to how much export controls on Nvidia and related firms can degrade the performance of U.S. AI chips before Chinese firms will make an economically rational choice to buy domestic alternatives, such as those designed by Huawei, Biren, or Cambricon. Chinese AI firms would likely prefer a 28 nm Chinese chip over a 7 nm U.S. chip if the U.S. chips’ interconnect speed limitations degrade AI model training performance more than the use of an older node degrades the Chinese chips’ performance.</p> -<p>The pursuit of arms control grew from a cottage industry in the 1970s into an area of major U.S. and international government focus in the 1980s, in many ways obtaining a position of primacy among national security theorists and even some practitioners. Along the way, a fundamental truth was lost. Arms control is a tool which can contribute to national and international security and to reduced tensions. Arms control is not and never can be a substitute for a strong deterrent capability. As the United States enters the world of two potential nuclear adversaries, it should do so with a deterrent force equal to that situation. While advocates of maintaining New START (or a follow-on keeping its limits) will oppose any attempt to move beyond its limits, such a point of view is dangerous. Deterrence should be the United States’ first priority. Arms control agreements can moderate the threat, but the United States cannot allow arms control to undercut what it needs for deterrence — nor does it have to (more on this below). Finally, looking to the future, the United States should broaden the focus on great power arms control beyond intercontinental weapons to include all nuclear weapons, including short- and medium-range weapons as well as exotic and long-range ones. The rationale for this should be clear: Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons threaten U.S. allies (whom the United States has committed to defend), and any initial use of nuclear weapons would almost certainly begin not through intercontinental strikes but as a result of nuclear use in a war which starts in the theater. It is intellectually dishonest to argue that arms control is an important element of moderating international conflict and then to ignore the weapons most likely to be used first in a war.</p> +<p>However, the 28 nm target might now be out of reach, unless the United States and its allies are willing to engage in dramatically more aggressive restrictions. If SMIC is able to build out Chinese domestic availability of 7 nm production capacity with adequate reliability and yield, that would significantly accelerate the timeframe in which Chinese AI development firms such as Alibaba and Baidu might find Huawei chips attractive in comparison to those of Nvidia. There are, of course, significant switching costs to leaving the CUDA ecosystem.</p> -<p>Setting the above aside momentarily, it must be acknowledged that the future of arms control in the near term is bleak:</p> +<p>Along with the Chinese government and its corporate partners, Huawei is now engaged in a project to build a Chinese computing ecosystem that is entirely independent of the United States. The list of projects that Huawei and its partners have underway at varying levels of maturity is extraordinary. It includes at a minimum the following:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>It is difficult to conceive of how the United States can return to an arms control negotiation with Russia as long as Vladimir Putin remains its president.</p> + <p>EDA chip design software;</p> </li> <li> - <p>The Chinese government has long been dismissive of entering arms talks (and views transparency and inspection regimes — both fundamental to a successful arms control accord — as weakness).</p> + <p>Chip manufacturing equipment;</p> </li> <li> - <p>And disarmament is unrealistic and not in the cards. In this regard, it is instructive and curious that of the P5 countries, only the United States, the United Kingdom, and to some degree France are sensitive to the domestic and international criticism that they have not fulfilled their Article VI commitment of the Treaty on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (itself an ambiguous commitment based on the negotiating record and the U.S. government’s interpretation of it). Russia and China both appear impervious to such commentary, and international critics largely ignore Moscow and Beijing’s nuclear buildups.</p> + <p>Chip manufacturing facilities;</p> </li> -</ul> - -<p>Even before Russia destabilized Europe by invading Ukraine, the idea of arms control was under significant stress, as major actors showed an inclination to violate basic norms:</p> - -<ul> <li> - <p>Under Putin, Russia has violated nine treaties and agreements which his predecessors had signed with the United States. In addition, Russian air and naval assets, as an element of state policy, routinely violate the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement and the 1989 Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities.</p> + <p>Chip designs for personal computers, smartphones, and data centers;</p> </li> <li> - <p>Chinese air and naval forces, as a matter of state policy, routinely violate the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea.</p> + <p>AI chip enablement software ecosystems;</p> </li> -</ul> - -<p>Furthermore, difficulties have arisen when sensitive sources have uncovered cheating, but the United States cannot expose the offender or inform allies or the public due to concerns about “sources and methods.” Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is the poster child in this regard.</p> - -<h4 id="a-possible-way-forward">A Possible Way Forward</h4> - -<p>Beginning with two big “ifs” — if Putin is no longer ruling Russia in several years, and if Ukraine is able to successfully repel its Russian invaders to the degree it is prepared to sign a peace treaty with Moscow — it is possible to imagine a U.S.-Russian arms control treaty along the following lines:</p> - -<ul> <li> - <p>Washington and Moscow would agree that all deployed air-, naval- and ground-launched nuclear weapons on both sides would be subject to a new quantitative agreement. This would include traditional intercontinental weapons, exotic intercontinental weapons such as the Poseidon/Status 6 system, mid- and short-range nuclear weapons (to include land mines), dual-capable aircraft and B-61s in NATO, and the United States’ SLCM-N.</p> + <p>AI software development frameworks;</p> </li> <li> - <p>The agreement would permit complete freedom to mix; within the overall agreed cap, each side would be free to declare, and alter in the future, subject to notification and inspections, the composition of its nuclear forces.</p> + <p>AI models;</p> </li> <li> - <p>Reporting and intrusive verification provisions similar to those found in START I would apply.</p> + <p>Computer and smartphone software operating systems;</p> </li> <li> - <p>China would be welcome to join the treaty’s initial negotiations or to join it after its entry into force.</p> + <p>Computer, smartphone, and data center hardware systems; and</p> </li> <li> - <p>An entering rule for beginning negotiations would be that the negotiations would cover only nuclear weapons and dual-capable weapons systems; missile defense, offensive space systems, and offensive cyber systems — the inclusion of any of which would doom a successful conclusion and ratification — would be excluded.</p> + <p>Cloud computing.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>Before entering into negotiations, the U.S. government would need to determine the size and composition of the nuclear arsenal it requires to have a successful deterrent against Russia and China both for itself and for its allies, and it would have to protect that number in the treaty’s outcome. While such an idea might appear farfetched and totally unrealistic, it is difficult to imagine any other negotiated approach which would provide security for the United States and its allies.</p> - -<p>As a final note, it would be important for the United States, Russia, and China to seek, urgently and before additional tests might occur to validate a system’s reliability, a ban on fractional orbital bombardment systems. China’s deployment of such a system, allowing it to conduct an unwarned decapitation strike against its enemies’ nuclear command and control apparatus, would be a highly destabilizing act. Banning this highly dangerous technology before it reaches maturity would contribute to nuclear stability and inhibit its adoption by other nuclear powers.</p> - -<h4 id="conclusion-3">Conclusion</h4> - -<p>Students of U.S. history understand that the United States accepted its role as the protector of Western European and Asian-Pacific democracy with great reluctance. The role was thrust upon the United States in the wake of two world wars that devastated Europe and Asia, and in light of perceived threat of further invasion and conflict by Russia and China. Nuclear deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence have been fundamental to the United States’ success in this role.</p> +<p>In much the same way that one of the first major initial uses of the Chinese yuan currency for international trade transactions was avoiding U.S. sanctions, the initial customer base for Huawei’s alternative AI computing ecosystem is sanctioned and entity-listed actors in China. That may soon grow to include other countries such as Russia and Iran. Within China, entity-listed firms and government agencies comprise a larger and more technologically sophisticated customer base than is commonly understood in Western policy circles. iFlyTek, for example, has routinely published research papers at leading international AI conferences. Even after being sanctioned, iFlyTek has 40 percent market share in China’s automotive voice recognition market.</p> -<p>It is worth considering the number of times Europe’s great powers went to war with one another after 1648, the date when the Treaty of Westphalia ushered the modern nation-state into existence. From 1648 to 1800, there were at least seven significant wars. From 1800 to 1900, there were at least six significant wars, and that includes lumping all the Napoleonic Wars into one and similarly counting the three wars of Italian independence as one. In 1914, there was World War I, the “war to end all wars,” whose massive carnage and destruction of a generation of European males was not sufficient to prevent World War II.</p> +<p>Beyond the Chinese domestic market, the other critical market for Huawei’s technology stack is exports, especially to the global South.</p> -<p>Then, after 1945, a historic pause suddenly began. Did humankind change? Did the nature of governments change? No, the existence of nuclear weapons made war between the major powers too dangerous to contemplate as an instrument of prudent policy. As long as the United States maintains a strong deterrent, and as long as potential enemy leaders act rationally, it will be possible to prevent major war. Popularly appealing but ill-thought-out slogans such as “reducing the role of nuclear weapons” both threaten the basis of the United States’ policy success over the past many decades and appear risible in a world in which potential enemies have demonstrably increased their reliance on nuclear weapons and routinely employ nuclear blackmail to try to intimidate the United States and its allies.</p> +<h3 id="the-need-for-timely-us-intelligence-collection-and-technology-analysis-on-chinas-semiconductors">The Need for Timely U.S. Intelligence Collection and Technology Analysis on China’s Semiconductors</h3> -<h3 id="deterring-two-peer-competitors-for-us-deterrence-strategy">Deterring Two Peer Competitors for U.S. Deterrence Strategy</h3> +<p>Perhaps the most surprising fact about the Huawei breakthrough is that so many U.S. government leaders were evidently surprised. Asked about the chip on September 6, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated that “I’m going to withhold comment on the particular chip in question until we get more information about precisely its character and composition.” Similarly, a group of Republican members of Congress wrote a letter to Department of Commerce leadership in which they expressed being “extremely troubled and perplexed” by what the Huawei phone suggests about the efficacy of U.S. export controls.</p> -<p><em>Time to Innovate</em></p> +<p>None of these statements give confidence that these U.S. leaders in either the White House or Congress are receiving good intelligence about the state of China’s quest for semiconductor self-sufficiency. If this is indeed the case, it is simply unacceptable. It is possible, of course, that the U.S. intelligence community has more answers than the U.S. government is making public.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="leonor-tomero">Leonor Tomero</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The October 7 export controls were one of the most important foreign policy moves that the Biden administration adopted in 2022, perhaps second only to supporting Ukraine against the Russian invasion. Senior U.S. national security and foreign policy leaders need to know to what extent that policy is having the intended effect, and they need to learn that before China rubs it in a U.S. cabinet secretary’s face during a trip to China.</p> -<p>Geopolitical reality and nuclear modernization in Russia and China will soon require the United States to deter two peer competitors. Meanwhile, dramatic technological changes are emerging from the commercial sector in areas related to deterrence. These changes include not only new nuclear dangers but more broadly increased risks of miscalculation and rapid escalation that could lead to nuclear war. The United States needs to adapt and strengthen its deterrence posture against these new challenges and use innovation for deterrence resilience to prevent nuclear war.</p> +<p>The Huawei phone and SMIC chip were not well-kept secrets. Reports of Huawei returning to the 5G market with a SMIC-manufactured 7 nm chip were already widespread enough in July of this year that Chinese industry executives were publicly commenting on it.</p> -<p>Given the increasing threat environment and higher risks of inadvertent escalation, the core objective of future U.S. strategic deterrence should be to prevent nuclear war. This goal entails concurrently deterring conflict with Russia and China as early as possible by denying any potential adversary the benefit of attack while reducing the risk of escalation to nuclear weapons use. While nuclear deterrence remains central to national security, the United States should harness innovation to pursue a stable deterrence architecture that is more resilient against inadvertent escalation. This paper will examine:</p> +<p>Hopefully, this incident merely reflects a failure of the relevant information to reach U.S. leaders and not a genuine gap in the capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community. During the Cold War, the U.S. intelligence community produced exceptionally good analyses of the Soviet semiconductor industry and the effectiveness of U.S. semiconductor export controls. Today, there are a host of critical questions about the Chinese semiconductor industry and the effectiveness of U.S. export controls where the U.S. intelligence community needs to supply senior U.S. decisionmakers with timely intelligence. Here is just a sample:</p> -<ol> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Are SMIC or CMXT deceiving U.S. semiconductor equipment companies when they claim that post-October 7 equipment purchases are going to be exclusively used for production less advanced than the October 7 technology thresholds?</p> + </li> <li> - <p>how increasing threats, technological disruption, and increased risk of miscalculation are impacting deterrence strategy, including why and how deterrence doctrine must evolve to address new threats and prevent nuclear war, such as the need to adapt nuclear deterrence strategy;</p> + <p>How much advanced chip production capacity does SMIC intend to build out? At what technology nodes will this occur and over what timeframe?</p> </li> <li> - <p>how modernization should prioritize survivable nuclear forces and provide modern capabilities to move deterrence to the left, meaning strengthen deterrence earlier in a crisis or conflict, as well as why modernization should leverage innovation and emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, new space and cyber domains, and the private sector, to enhance deterrence and reduce the risk of miscalculation;</p> + <p>Does the Chinese government intend to pressure Chinese businesses and consumers to purchase Huawei smartphones and chips (and not to purchase U.S. alternatives) in order to drive economies of scale? If so, what will be the likely costs to U.S. firms in terms of lost sales?</p> </li> <li> - <p>extended deterrence, including the importance of interoperability; and</p> + <p>How are SMIC and YMTC getting spare parts to continue operating their advanced node U.S. equipment? Are they illegally diverting U.S. exports via shell companies or other tactics? Are they being supplied by foreign firms that manufacture viable alternatives? Or are there Chinese companies with adequate technology to supply them?</p> </li> <li> - <p>arms control, including applying emerging technologies.</p> + <p>Are reports that YMTC is close to restarting advanced production with improved Chinese domestic equipment alternatives true? Is YMTC also benefitting from equipment and components acquired in violation of U.S. export controls?</p> </li> -</ol> + <li> + <p>How much technological progress have domestic Chinese equipment makers made, and in what areas? How much foreign help are they receiving, and from what sources?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>What level of Chinese government subsidization are Huawei and SMIC specifically receiving to support their advanced node manufacturing? Do the firms have a credible path to profitable 7 nm products without government support? Is the Chinese government prepared to sustain or increase this support indefinitely?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How has China’s crackdown on foreign consulting firms impacted the ability of U.S. compliance companies to engage in substantive due diligence prior to selling to Chinese companies?</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>In summary, preventing nuclear war now demands a better understanding of emerging escalation pathways and a concerted effort to move deterrence to further “left” of nuclear weapons use. Incremental changes to twentieth-century architecture and Cold War strategy will not keep pace with technological change. To reliably deter U.S. adversaries, a modernized deterrence should recognize that emerging technologies and commercialization of outer space are critical to strategic stability and resilience. This requires harnessing new capabilities and private sector innovation to ensure resilience through survivability, adding decisionmaking time and opportunities for de-escalation, and undertaking rapid acquisition to reduce the risks of unintended nuclear war.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion-the-future-of-export-controls">Conclusion: The Future of Export Controls</h3> -<h4 id="deterrence-strategy">Deterrence Strategy</h4> +<p>Limiting China’s access to advanced AI chips is a highly desirable national security outcome. However, given the flaws and long timelines for how the Trump and Biden administrations have pursued export control policies, it is difficult to see how the United States could degrade China’s current technological state of the art without dramatically expanding export controls and significantly increasing resources devoted to identifying and patching loopholes and strictly enforcing violations.</p> -<p>Adversary threats are shifting across several domains — nuclear, space, and emerging technologies — and, when combined with an increased risk of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation — could lead to nuclear war. To understand the requirements for deterrence strategy, it is critical to understand the scope of new threats.</p> +<p>It is not clear, for example, that even a complete entity listing of SMIC with presumption of denial for all products would cause the SN1 and SN2 fabs to shut down. With the current staffing and budget given to the Department of Commerce for export controls, there are reasons to doubt that the U.S. government can identify shell companies at the rate that Huawei, SMIC, and their partners can create them. Only China-wide restrictions imposed simultaneously and without advance notice by the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands on multiple categories of exports, especially raw materials, would have a clear path to shutting down the SMIC fabs.</p> -<p>INCREASING NUCLEAR THREATS</p> +<p>If SMIC has indeed been engaged in a massive campaign of export control evasion and has been providing false information to U.S. firms for their export license applications, then the case for such an option is stronger. It would provide strong evidence that China is already sprinting full out toward its own strategy for semiconductor decoupling without the slightest care of complying with U.S. law or preserving room for reaching an understanding with the United States.</p> -<p>First, nuclear threats are growing, including in sheer numbers as well as increased likelihood of nuclear weapons use. China is adding hundreds of nuclear weapons and will reach at least 1,500 by 2035. China is aggressively modernizing its nuclear force, developing launch-on-warning capabilities, and diversifying its nuclear weapons, achieving a nascent nuclear triad. Combined with a new launch-under-attack posture that exacerbates time-pressure on Chinese decisionmakers and its persistent refusal to negotiate nuclear constraints or risk reduction, this expansion could increase the risks of miscalculation and of nuclear weapons use. China’s modernization implies new basing modes and a nuclear warfighting capability, which introduces risks of miscalculation not present in smaller, less ready forces.</p> +<p>In such a case, the United States might conclude that it is better for semiconductor decoupling to happen when it is inconvenient for China rather than wait for China to do it when it is more convenient and on China’s terms.</p> -<p>Meanwhile, Russia is taking more risks with nuclear weapons. It has implied that it may use nuclear weapons to sustain its illegal war against Ukraine. It is also expanding its numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and plans to deploy some of them in Belarus. Russia is developing novel nuclear weapons systems to overcome potential U.S. missile defenses and could rapidly upload nuclear weapons if and when New START terminates. Russian leadership is also increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons and dangerously has raised the specter of using nuclear weapons in Europe, increasing the risk of inadvertent escalation.</p> +<p>But it will likely be more difficult to persuade U.S. allies to go along with such extreme measures if SMIC’s achievement has been done entirely or almost entirely through equipment purchases made in full compliance with U.S. law.</p> -<p>In addition, China and Russia have committed to a friendship “without limits.” While a formal alliance between Russia and China still seems unlikely today, they are cooperating more closely as their interests align to counter the United States. Russia and China are deepening economic and defense cooperation. For example, they have held bilateral summits, and Russia is supplying enriched uranium for China’s fast breeder reactors.</p> +<p>What if SMIC has simply been exploiting legal loopholes in the Trump administration approach and taking advantage of the Biden administration’s very slow onboarding of Japan and the Netherlands? What if SMIC is sincere in its statements that the massive expansion of fab capacity that it is bringing online will exclusively be used for 28 nm production?</p> -<p>These nuclear threats and the prospect of two nuclear peer adversaries are raising questions about whether the United States must match, or prepare to match, adversary advances qualitatively and quantitatively, whether it should increase its numbers of nuclear weapons, and whether it should develop new low-yield nuclear weapons. U.S. nuclear modernization could use open production lines and new investments to increase numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), bombers, and associated warheads. Admiral Charles Richard, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testified in March 2022 that more U.S. nuclear weapons may be needed. After Russia suspended New START, House Armed Services Committee chairman Mike Rogers stated, “All options must be on the table, including deploying additional nuclear forces and increasing the readiness of our nuclear triad.”</p> +<p>U.S. allies will be more willing to restrict the actions of their companies and citizens if they understand the evidence of reverse engineering and illegal purchases of equipment, as well as how China’s plans are not in their own national interest. This underscores the need for timely and high-quality intelligence.</p> -<p>THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL DISRUPTION ON DETERRENCE STRATEGY REQUIREMENTS</p> +<p>There are other aspects of this story where SMIC could be in violation of U.S. law besides whether SMIC’s post-October 2022 equipment purchases were intended for 7 nm manufacturing. The FDPR as applied to Huawei has thus far restricted the ability of firms that use U.S. equipment to produce chips on behalf of Huawei, regardless of when that equipment was purchased. The rule, as written, also includes coverage of more than exports, including in-country transfers (such as the SMIC’s sale of chips to Huawei). A group of U.S. members of Congress sent a letter to the Department of Commerce directly alleging that SMIC’s production on behalf of Huawei was in violation of U.S. export controls. As mentioned above, this does indeed seem to be the case.</p> -<p>Strategic threats are more complicated than just increasing the number and types of nuclear weapons. Considering the nuclear threat in a vacuum will lead to flawed recommendations. China and Russia are concurrently pursuing emerging and non-kinetic technologies, including cyberattacks, electronic warfare, and directed energy attacks. Both China and Russia have expanded and demonstrated counterspace capabilities, including anti-satellite weapons, that threaten U.S. and allied space assets. According to the 2020 U.S. Defense Space Strategy, “China and Russia each have weaponized space as a means to reduce U.S. and allied . . . freedom of operation in space.” In response, the United States in 2017 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2019 declared space a new warfighting domain.</p> +<p>The U.S. government’s response will have to take this into account. After all, if the United States fails to respond to export control violations by Chinese entities, firms in Taiwan, South Korea, Europe, and elsewhere will feel they are being unfairly treated when the U.S. government requires them to comply.</p> -<p>The Office of the Director of National Intelligence noted in its Global Trends 2040 report that “in this more competitive global environment, the risk of interstate conflict is likely to rise because of advances in technology and an expanding range of targets, new frontiers for conflict and a greater variety of actors, more difficult deterrence, and a weakening or a lack of treaties and norms on acceptable use.” Further increasing this risk, a strategic conflict with China or Russia could begin in the context of a regional conventional conflict and escalate rapidly in the space or cyber domains, leading to strategic effects such as targeting and potentially endangering and degrading strategic deterrence capabilities or critical infrastructure.</p> +<p>One area where it makes obvious sense to expand restrictions is in preventing U.S. and allied companies from supporting the maturation of Chinese equipment and component companies. There is little strategic sense in allowing U.S. and allied companies to help China to prepare for decoupling with the United States and its allies. It is not in South Korea’s national interest, for example, for South Korean equipment and spare parts firms to aid China’s equipment indigenization effort. Nor is it in South Korea’s interest to allow South Korean consultants to train Chinese engineers on how to improve the yields of their memory production fabs. Both of these will inevitably be used to break South Korea’s leadership in semiconductor manufacturing.</p> -<p>In addition, China and Russia are taking a much broader view of conflict and using nontraditional tools, including disinformation, to attack U.S. political cohesion and decision space. They have demonstrated the willingness and capability to use emerging technology to disrupt the cohesion of the United States’ society and its constitutional democracy by interfering in elections (as Russia did in 2016 and 2020), targeting critical infrastructure, and sowing division. Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, former Air Force deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration, observed in 2021:</p> +<p>Similarly, the United States and its allies need to crack down on third-party sales of spare parts and components.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>We are having the wrong national-security debate in this country. Neither Russia’s nuclear arsenal, China’s rapidly modernizing nuclear force, or even North Korea’s advancing nuclear capability pose the most pressing existential threat to this nation. International and domestic disinformation campaigns targeting Americans is our most pressing and dire threat to the security of our republic.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>In the absence of good intelligence, however, the United States will continue to be faced with an undesirable choice between taking strong action early enough to have an impact (but in a way that might seem premature or unjustified to allies) or on the other hand waiting until the justification is clear, at which point it might be too late to have an impact in the wake of Chinese equipment stockpiling and indigenization campaigns.</p> -<p>This use of new tools and the expanding reach of disinformation campaigns pose potentially enormous dangers to deterrence, which is fundamentally about using information to influence adversary behavior. Successful weaponization of social media could tempt U.S. adversaries to believe they can degrade, shape, or otherwise limit U.S. deterrence resolve, leading to dangerous new possibilities for miscalculation. In her seminal article, “Wormhole Escalation in the New Nuclear Age,” Dr. Rebecca Hersman, director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, stated:</p> +<p>This is the same unattractive choice that the United States has faced again and again since the Trump administration began using semiconductor export controls as a tool of foreign policy in 2018. Thus far, the United States has chosen repeatedly to enact export controls that are threatening enough to incentivize Chinese firms to stockpile and to de-Americanize their supply chains, but not strongly enough written or enforced to prevent China from succeeding in their indigenization and stockpiling efforts.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Adversaries can amplify effects, obscure attribution, and prime the information space to their advantage long before a crisis begins, as well as shape it during such a crisis. By promoting false narratives, flooding the information zone with contradictory claims, manipulating social and economic institutions, and instigating general or targeted social unrest, potential adversaries can break confidence in U.S. and allied institutions, increase distrust and confusion, and coerce desirable outcomes at lower levels of conflict.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>The United States has incurred essentially all of the costs of an aggressive export control policy toward China, but it has done so in a way that does not provide all the potential strategic benefits of actually constraining China’s future technological capabilities. The U.S. and allied approach does appear to have limited China’s access to nodes more advanced than 7 nm in economically competitive terms and more advanced than 5 nm in absolute terms.</p> -<p>Nuclear experts such as Dr. Heather Williams of CSIS are exploring how social media may affect escalation and deterrence, and more focus is needed in this area. Attacks on U.S. deterrence resolve could be compounded by new vulnerabilities and attack surfaces in the space and cyber domains, sowing further confusion, targeting the Unted States’ will to fight, and degrading critical capabilities. These new attack vectors are expanding conflict and impacting deterrence in unprecedented ways that must be better understood. New ways to target and influence either senior decisionmakers or the broader public will affect deterrence credibility and strategy.</p> +<p>It is possible that China’s extremely expensive efforts to indigenize everything will prove to be a strategic error: forcing China’s government to perpetually subsidize an often-corrupt semiconductor industry that produces products that are uncompetitive in Chinese or global markets. Such was the case with the Soviet semiconductor industry.</p> -<p>THE INCREASED RISK OF MISCALCULATION AND INADVERTENT ESCALATION LEADING TO NUCLEAR WAR</p> +<p>However, it is also possible that China’s domestic champions will ultimately achieve some degree of financial sustainability, driven by partially or fully protected sales in the large Chinese home market as well as successful exports abroad. Such was the case with China’s automotive and solar cell manufacturing industries.</p> -<p>The risk of miscalculation that led to near misses during the Cold War has not been sufficiently prioritized as a key consideration in deterrence strategy and has become an even greater danger today. The Cold War is replete with instances of close calls. Aside from the 1963 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the word came perilously close to nuclear war, examples of false warning triggering increased nuclear alerts include the 1979 U.S. false warning of a Soviet nuclear missile attack; the 1985 Able Archer exercise, whereby the Soviets mistook a NATO military exercise as initial steps of a nuclear invasion of the Soviet Union; and the 1995 Norwegian sounding rocket mistaken for U.S. nuclear missiles. Technology improvements and a few historic policy solutions such as the Hot Line and Open Ocean Targeting agreements contributed significantly to risk reduction. However, U.S. deterrence posture generally has, and continues to be, focused on intentional lethality, to the exclusion of unintentional escalation.</p> +<p>Imposing these costs upon China is not without strategic value, both in terms of slowing its military development and in preserving U.S. technological leadership. Ben Thompson of Stratechery argues that China’s obsession with achieving 7 nm production in violation of U.S. export controls may actually slow China’s overall technological development: “Every year that China stays banging its head on the wall at 7nm instead of focusing on moving down the learning curve from a fully indigenous .13 micron process to 90nm to 65nm to 40nm to 28nm to 22nm to 16nm to 10nm to 7nm is another year that China doesn’t break the 5nm barrier.”</p> -<p>Today, new technologies and domains as well as risk-prone bravado from adversaries are increasing the risks of unintended escalation. In their book, The Age of AI, Henry Kissinger, Eric Schmidt, and Daniel Huttenlocher warn that “the current and foreseeable increased threat of inadvertent rapid escalation and miscalculation that could lead to nuclear use or large-scale nuclear war represent a renewed threat that was never adequately addressed.” Specifically, these risks are exacerbated by leaders who miscalculate or are willing to take more risks. Putin takes extreme risks. Examples range from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, to threatening the use of nuclear weapons, to expanding Russia’s reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons in its so-called “escalate-to-deescalate” doctrine, to suspending implementation New START. U.S. national defense must be resilient against Putin’s tendency to miscalculate.</p> +<p>In a similar argument, Bloomberg’s Tim Culpan argued that the Huawei chip shows that U.S. curbs “are porous, not useless.”</p> -<p>Similarly, the risk of miscalculation in the context of a war with China over Taiwan is significant. China is fielding a nuclear triad and new launch-on-warning capabilities as a major departure from its decades-long minimum-deterrence strategy. China lacks the shared experience of the Cuban Missile Crisis and decades of effective nuclear arms control with the United States. This absence of shared understanding is exacerbated by China’s aggressive pursuit of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence.</p> +<p>Still, this will be an unsatisfying outcome for those who hoped for more from the October 7 policy. Export controls as a tool rarely deliver perfect solutions, especially not with regards to countries as large and technologically advanced as China. To the extent that export controls worked against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it was because there was so little economic engagement between the camps to begin with and because they were so broadly enforced. To the extent that export controls worked after the Cold War, it was because the aims were quite limited and because even governments that could agree on little else could agree that they were opposed to terrorists and rogue states acquiring nuclear weapons.</p> -<p>Ambiguity and conflict in space imply unprecedented challenges for deterrence, due in part to the difficulty of attribution in the space and cyber domains, the reversibility of some forms of attack, the brittleness of legacy systems, and the potential for strategic attacks that materially degrade critical deterrence capabilities without any kinetic attack on the ground and, potentially, without loss of life, such as against space nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) capabilities. An adversary may attack assets in space in the context of a conventional war, but those could be perceived as escalatory if they targeted strategic assets such as nuclear command and control satellites (which currently provide tactical as well as strategic communications). In addition, attacks against space assets, such as the Global Positioning System could prove more escalatory than an adversary might intend, as many systems depend on it.</p> +<p>Trying to draw neat export control lines that achieve ideal and durable technological outcomes for dual-use technologies in the U.S.-China relationship is significantly more difficult. Broader controls, especially multilateral ones, have a better chance of success, but the political coordination and enforcement challenges are still difficult. The United States has imposed significant costs upon China, but not so significant that they have changed the Chinese government’s position on issues such as military AI development, human rights violations, sanctions violations, or intellectual property theft. Rather than change its ways, China is now spending hundreds of billions of dollars to decouple itself from multiple parts of the U.S. semiconductor and related technology ecosystem.</p> -<p>EVOLVING DETERRENCE DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY TO ADDRESS NEW THREATS AND PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR</p> +<p>Beginning in 2018, the United States has imposed costs upon China that are severe enough to persuade China to accelerate the indigenization of its semiconductor supply chain, but the United States and its allies have not — at least thus far — implemented export controls that are tight enough and multilateral enough to definitively prevent China from succeeding in indigenizing. Previously, the United States allowed Huawei to stockpile U.S. chips before cutting Huawei off. More recently, the United States has allowed Chinese chip fabs to stockpile U.S., Dutch, and Japanese equipment before imposing broad restrictions on the sale of such equipment. Even now, China is still acquiring significant technology and knowhow from South Korean and other firms.</p> -<p>While the United States faces two peer competitors and new threats have increased the risk of nuclear war, nuclear deterrence doctrine and strategy have largely been static for over 40 years. Kissinger, Schmidt, and Huttenlocher note that “the management of nuclear weapons, the endeavor of half a century, remains incomplete and fragmentary” and that the “unsolved riddles of nuclear strategy must be given new attention and recognized for what they are: one of the great human strategic technical and moral challenges.”</p> +<p>These are all enormous shifts underway, and the future is far from certain. What is clear, however, is that the existing export controls need to be expanded to include South Korea, Germany, and ideally the entire European Union. It is also clear that U.S. allies need to strengthen their export control regimes to be effective, which means creating legal authorities that restrict knowledge transfers and the actions of overseas subsidiaries.</p> -<p>New threats require that the United States adapt its doctrine and strategy not just because of increased numbers, but more so because of new non-nuclear strategic capabilities that could precipitate a conflict much earlier in a crisis, nuclear conflict, or conventional war. Sputnik may have been the single greatest disruption to Cold War deterrence, dwarfing the supposed bomber and missile “gaps.” Today, the United States should focus not just on numerical gaps but on the emergence of the next Sputnik moment.</p> +<p>Finally, it is clear that all allied governments need improved intelligence and improved economic and technological analytic capacity as well as improved export control enforcement capacity. Even though export controls are central to U.S. foreign policy toward both Russia and China, Congress is now poised to deny the Department of Commerce’s export controls bureau its meager request for funds needed to keep a flat budget after accounting for inflation. This is, in real dollar terms, a budget cut — and a shocking error given how much of U.S. national security and economic security now depends upon the efficacy of the U.S. export controls system.</p> -<p>More specifically, the heightened nuclear threat in the context of the war in Ukraine and the increased risk of conflict over Taiwan, combined with a potential future in which neither Russia nor China participate in strategic stability and risk reduction through negotiation, demand a new deterrence strategy. Ignoring the need for this shift may mean that in a crisis or conventional conflict, the United States could suffer debilitating losses well before a nuclear conflict. As Dr. Rebecca Hersman stated, “Increasingly capable and intrusive digital information technologies, advanced dual-use military capabilities, and diffused global power structures will reshape future crises and conflicts between nuclear-armed adversaries and challenge traditional ways of thinking about escalation and stability” and “will require new concepts and tools to manage the risk of unintended escalation and reduce nuclear dangers.”</p> +<p>Even if the future will often be foggy, the U.S. government must be willing to invest heavily in an improved ability to see clearly and to act effectively.</p> -<p>The United States urgently needs to better understand how emerging technologies, cyber and social media, and space affect nuclear deterrence. At the 20th anniversary of Nunn-Lugar, late secretary of defense Ashton Carter noted “the nuclear systems that supported the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union were fundamentally social and human.” As another example of policymakers’ recognition of these new attack vectors, the FY 2022 National Defense Authorization Act mandated an independent review of the safety, security and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons (the so-called “new failsafe report”), which mandated an examination of potential cyber and other vulnerabilities.</p> +<hr /> -<p>A novel deterrence concept for reducing the risk of nuclear war starts with moving deterrence to the left, meaning strengthening deterrence well before the threat of nuclear war. While nuclear deterrence remains central to national security, the United States needs a more resilient and broader strategic deterrence strategy that prevents escalation earlier in a crisis or conflict. Because of the risk of rapid or inadvertent escalation in the modern strategic environment and because of the inability to ensure the United Sates will be able to “restore deterrence” once nuclear conflict begins, reducing the risk of nuclear war increasingly means reducing the risk of conventional war. Herman Kahn’s historic effort to strengthen nuclear deterrence by thinking “right of boom,” to consider the difference between potential aftermaths of nuclear war scenarios, has taken planning for nuclear warfighting to implausible extremes. As emerging technologies imply new counterforce vulnerabilities and escalation pathways, as well as opportunities to control these pathways, U.S. deterrence planning must extend just as far “left of boom” to prevent nuclear war.</p> +<p><strong>Gregory C. Allen</strong> is the director of the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, he was the director of strategy and policy at the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, where he oversaw development and implementation of the DOD’s AI Strategy, drove policy and human capital reforms to accelerate the DOD’s adoption of AI, and developed mechanisms for AI governance and ethics.</p>Gregory C. AllenWith a new smartphone and new chip, Huawei has returned to the 5G smartphone business in defiance of U.S. sanctions. This report assesses the implications from this latest development for China’s AI industry and the future of semiconductor export controls.Waterfall’s Shadow In Mekong2023-09-29T12:00:00+08:002023-09-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/waterfalls-shadow-in-mekong<excerpt /> -<p>ADAPTING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY</p> +<p><em>Infrastructure programs like China’s Belt and Road Initiative further authoritarian influence in climate and water-stressed regions. The United States needs strategies that simultaneously advance water security and national security to compete with China.</em></p> -<p>With regard to the narrower question of nuclear deterrence and strategy requirements to address two peer competitors, the United States should balance reflexive appetites for additional nuclear weapons with other measures and capabilities to deny adversaries any benefit from nuclear weapons use. Nuclear deterrence requirements must be distinguished from requirements to meet military objectives if deterrence fails. With 3,750 nuclear warheads in the U.S. nuclear stockpile (as of 2020), no changes are needed to deter both Russia and China. Referring to the U.S.-Russian nuclear balance, J. Robert Oppenheimer stated in 1953 that “Our twenty thousandth bomb will not in any deep strategic sense offset their two thousandth.” While the United States maintains rough parity with Russia today with regard to strategic nuclear weapons (and not with regard to nonstrategic nuclear weapons), there is no evidence that building up conveys any meaningful added capability that would be required either politically or militarily. Despite claims of a perceived deterrence gap requiring new low-yield nuclear weapons, there is no evidence of such a gap. The United States maintains a nuclear triad comprised of varied, complementary, and redundant capabilities, including a variety of low-yield options, such as air-launched and now sea-based options with deployment in 2019 of the W76-2 nuclear-capable submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM-N). There is no evidence that adding more low-yield options would deter adversaries from expanding their nuclear arsenals or considering the use of a low-yield nuclear weapons in the context of losing a conventional fight. While proponents of additional low-yield options point to thousands of Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons, this claim sidesteps that the main driver for Russia’s non-strategic arsenal is NATO’s conventional superiority.</p> +<h3 id="the-issue">The Issue</h3> -<p>In the case of a limited nuclear war escalating to a larger nuclear war, U.S. deterrence capability — including the numerical strength and reliability of its nuclear arsenal, with more than 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear weapons (and the capacity to upload in the absence of New START, and to keep production lines open) — is also beyond dispute. Therefore, nuclear deterrence does not require new or additional nuclear weapons.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>The United States and its network of democratic partners and allies increasingly find themselves struggling to safeguard the rule of law, free markets, civil liberties, and human security in countries most at risk from climate change and its impact on water security.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>A network of authoritarian states led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are using infrastructure investment programs like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) alongside gray zone campaigns to gain access and influence, often in areas most at risk of further climate shock and water insecurity, particularly in the Mekong region.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>As a result, continuing to develop water strategies offers a viable means of integrating development and deterrence to address core human security challenges and deny further authoritarian access and influence across the world’s most climate-stressed societies.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>However, the question remains how many nuclear weapons would be needed to meet U.S. military objectives if deterrence fails (including, for example, counterforce targets and damage limitation objectives). Current numbers appear sufficient to fight one nuclear war while deterring another. No changes in U.S. numbers will be needed before the 2030s as China builds up its arsenal over a decade to its goal of at least 1,500 nuclear weapons by 2035. Nearing 2035, the current objectives for nuclear weapons employment in the event of escalation to a large-scale nuclear war with China and Russia may require higher numbers to cover additional targets. The value of meeting these objectives should be evaluated critically against adversary reactions to new capabilities.</p> +<p>Taiwan is not the only flash point in the growing contest between the United States and China. As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exports its authoritarian model for governance and development, it creates new arenas for competition beyond the military sphere. From the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and infrastructure investments to the use of political warfare, Beijing is creating a new sphere of influence.</p> -<p>First, adding more low-yield nuclear options will not keep a limited nuclear war limited. Rather, it may lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons in the context of a regional war, risk normalizing planning for extensive, multi-round nuclear warfighting, and fail to prevent uncontrolled escalation. There is no evidence that additional low-yield options (including more prompt options for using low-yield nuclear weapons) would deter Russia from using low-yield nuclear weapons. Instead, managing deterrence of limited nuclear war requires credibly signaling that an adversary will not gain any military or political advantage from using nuclear weapons. Strong warnings from President Joe Biden and attention to the risk of miscalculation probably helped defuse the risk of Russian use of nuclear weapons in the fall of 2022. Adding ever more low-yield nuclear weapons cannot substitute for credible threats clearly communicated.</p> +<p>Through a combination of trade, diplomacy, development, and coercion, the CCP is securing key terrain in a new geopolitical race. This terrain is centered on critical transportation and trade corridors beyond the traditional focus on sea lines of communication vital for securing its trade and power projection. This logic extends beyond the sea to river and ground lines of communication. For decades, China has been using multiple instruments of power to gain access and influence in the Lower Mekong River Basin. Over 245 million people live in the Mekong Region, and this population is projected to grow by as much as 100 percent by 2050. Trade between China and countries in the Lower Mekong has grown to over $400 billion, and Beijing uses its economic and diplomatic influence to gain military access, including increasing its regional force posture and building secret military bases.</p> -<p>Second, beyond deterring limited nuclear war and because escalation beyond a limited war cannot be controlled reliably, the United States needs to consider the possible scenario of a large-scale nuclear war. This threat is not new. The new question is whether the United States should prepare for two large-scale nuclear wars (one with Russia and another with China, in the unlikely case of strategic alliance or in the case of opportunistic aggression). The author’s answer to this question is no, as it is not in any way realistic for the United States to fight two nuclear wars to acceptable outcomes — one large-scale nuclear war would end civilization as we know it. During a massive nuclear exchange with Russia (or China), a U.S. president would be faced with catastrophic loss of life, devastation, economic ruin, and humanitarian abyss. It is hard to imagine any likely geopolitical circumstance that would require a second, concurrent large-scale nuclear war. Amid or after a major nuclear war with Russia or China, it is highly unlikely that a U.S. president would have any plausible incentive to fight a second large-scale nuclear war. Thus, a scenario where the United States fights one nuclear war and deters another nuclear war is realistically sufficient. The specific assumptions that drive requirements for capabilities to employ large numbers of nuclear weapons against two peer competitors simultaneously should be assessed critically against alternatives (such as building up conventional capabilities) that may be more useful for deterring or fighting a war against China, Russia, or both.</p> +<p>The Lower Mekong region, which includes Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia, is one of the most vulnerable to climate change, with an estimated 55 percent of the Mekong Delta population likely to be affected in the coming years. China funds dam projects in multiple countries that complicate water management and exacerbate environmental stress. The region is sinking as sea levels rise, leading to increased salinity and flooding in areas that Southeast Asia relies on to feed its growing population. In Vietnam alone, 500 hectares are lost each year to erosion thanks to these twin forces. This combination of rising seas, changing weather patterns, and water management issues, including upstream dams in China, is threatening food security. The Mekong is thereby a portrait of how population growth, environmental degradation, and climate change coalesce to threaten human security.</p> -<p>The United States needs a careful re-look at objectives (including counterforce targets and damage limitation). What classes of targets is the United States holding at risk? How much damage or what kind of destruction is needed, including for damage limitation? For how long are these effects needed and with what conventional or nuclear capabilities can they be delivered? Military capacity and options must be weighed against the political reality and likelihood of what a U.S. president would be inclined to do. Are nuclear weapons necessary for all current targets? If additional conventional weapons are needed, what kind and how many? What risks of arms-racing or escalation do new capabilities pose? These considerations need serious and informed debate and should not be papered over. If this review must be classified (because objectives and targets are classified), Congress and the public should ensure that it is done rigorously.</p> +<p>The states along the Mekong River are also a focal point for a new era of great power competition. After decades of inattention, the United States is working with allies like Japan and a network of international institutions to make the region more resilient to Chinese influence. Since 2009, the United States has promoted a series of initiatives in the region, including the Lower Mekong Initiative and Mekong-U.S. Partnership, to promote projects ranging from food security and education to energy and water security. These initiatives are part of a larger regional strategy designed to outflank the growing influence of the CCP and related businesses with direct links to Beijing. As a result, water security — the ability of people to access clean, safe water for personal and agricultural use — is converging with national security.</p> -<p>Preventing nuclear war demands that the United States address the risks of miscalculation and unintended escalation directly. Theories of victory in nuclear war must be balanced against this imperative. In the face of the renewed and dynamic risk of nuclear war, the United States must pursue creative solutions rather than become self-satisfied with decades-old answers that are now insufficient or ill-suited to new threats. The United States must question and assess the assumptions of deterrence to ensure they are adapted to new environments, new threats, and effective modern deterrence requirements and objectives beyond arithmetic and implausible political scenarios of two large-scale nuclear wars.</p> +<p>Water programming can play a central role in U.S. infrastructure development initiatives and development assistance in the Lower Mekong River Basin, where water access and management issues collide with great power competition and climate fragility. The region is also a focal point for China’s BRI, which intensifies the dilemma. Southeast Asian states must balance the promise of economic development they need to support rising living standards and growing populations with the loss of autonomy that comes with debt trap diplomacy, corruption, and gray zone campaigns. This challenge makes water a key cross-cutting issue that connects multiple U.S. government and Group of Seven (G7) initiatives designed to counter the growth of authoritarian access and influence under the guise of development assistance.</p> -<h4 id="modernization">Modernization</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>Water security — the ability of people to access clean, safe water for personal and agricultural use — is converging with national security.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>MODERNIZING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES BY PRIORITIZING SURVIVABILITY</p> +<p>This brief reports on a series of tabletop exercises (TTXs) used to explore how water programming, in coordination with a broader infrastructure strategy, can address both human security and national security challenges. Like earlier CSIS TTXs on water security focused on the Sahel, this series, which focuses on the Lower Mekong River Basin, examines the interplay of economic development and climate change with water security. Unlike the earlier TTX on the Sahel, however, this installment addresses long-term competition and explores how development initiatives interact with broader national security priorities.</p> -<p>A strategy that drives higher numbers of vulnerable weapons is ill-suited to stable deterrence. Matching on number of silos and missiles will lead to a dangerous, expensive, and counter-productive arms race. The United States must move beyond nuclear modernization constrained to incremental changes to a twentieth-century construct of vulnerable platforms and architectures. In this context, silo-based ICBMs are more vulnerable than they were in the 1960s because they are use-or-lose weapons if attacked and drive short decision times.</p> +<p>Based on the TTXs, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the broader interagency network committed to development should use water as a focal point for competitive foreign policy. By combining development projects that address core human needs with ongoing infrastructure initiatives designed to create regional and global economic corridors using theater strategy, the United States can take a new approach to competition with China. This competition complements the pivot to integrated deterrence by reassuring partners and offering a viable alternative to the BRI. Seen in this light, making water projects a focal point for strategy better aligns resources both within the U.S. government and across its network of allies and private sector partners. This alignment will help overcome common pitfalls of water projects, which tend to be underfinanced and require multiyear implementation plans. More importantly, it can show how new infrastructure networks offer an alternative to debt trap diplomacy and authoritarian influence that flows through the BRI around the world.</p> -<p>While the United States may not need additional nuclear weapons, it does need new concepts and capabilities that are survivable for stable deterrence. When the triad was first deployed, strategic nuclear weapons platforms were survivable. Recognizing adversary advances in defensive capabilities and improved accuracy, the United States should adapt its modern nuclear forces to ensure they remain survivable. Modernization should prioritize survivable platforms and architectures to provide stability and resilience. The United States must think more creatively about basing modes and concepts of operation. Specifically, if additional platforms are needed, the United States should prioritize adding SSBNs and shift to, or at least include, the option of mobile ICBMs (that would be kept in garrison but could be flushed in a crisis or conflict), understanding potential escalation risks from flushing mobile missiles (as there would be with dispersing nuclear bombers or putting more SSBNs to sea). The United States must prioritize resilient and layered nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems. While much of the financial investments and planning focus on new platforms and warheads, the critical need to upgrade NC3 systems is usually less salient. U.S. nuclear modernization must also prioritize infrastructure resilience and more agility to adapt to new requirements.</p> +<h3 id="control-the-water-control-the-region">Control the Water, Control the Region</h3> -<p>MODERN CAPABILITIES THAT MOVE DETERRENCE TO THE LEFT</p> +<p>China uses BRI infrastructure investments to connect the Mekong River Basin and further bind states to its economy and geopolitical interests by focusing on water and trade. Through the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) initiative, China seeks to gain leverage over water management while promoting economic development. Along these lines, China conducts “hydro-diplomacy” to build dams across the region. While these dams generate electricity, they also often create significant environmental strain that affects downstream water levels and food security. In addition to environmental stress, the projects often involve forcible displacement and uproot entire communities.</p> -<p>Modernization plans must account for historic changes beyond the growth of Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals that will impact deterrence well before consideration of using nuclear weapons. The United States must apply solutions to prioritize and adequately address the increased risk of miscalculation rather than further exacerbating this risk. The Cold War showed that deterrence architectures can be more or less stable against arms racing and in crises. Modernizing strategic deterrence by moving deterrence to the left requires building more stable architectures by using new capabilities including cyber, space, private sector innovation, and resilience, including rapid acquisition. Conversely, without these tools, vulnerabilities may emerge that threaten debilitating losses early in a conflict or result in the unproductive option of escalating to using nuclear weapons first. The United States should pursue the most stable deterrence architecture possible with the best available technology.</p> +<p>China also supports projects that increase trade along the Mekong. Beijing has funded the construction of multiple river ports, often expanding existing sites to handle larger cargo ships. These efforts include shadowy investment vehicles that combine the state with business figures, including a significant investment in a Laos river port by a sanctioned Chinese businessman linked to casinos and illicit trade. These port investments frequently accompany larger special economic zones where sovereign governments cede more extensive tracts of land to Chinese business interests. Some of these special zones have become magnets for illegal wildlife trade. Parallel to these ports, China invests in rail lines, including major projects in Thailand and Laos.</p> -<p>INNOVATION</p> +<p>These projects bolster China’s centrality in the region. If nineteenth- and twentieth-century geopolitics are about ground and sea lines of communication connecting the world, then twenty-first-century strategy revolves around the infrastructure that enables modern trade. By connecting the Mekong region, China makes itself a principal node in the larger regional network and diminishes the influence of other states like the United States, Japan, and Australia. The CCP can also use a mix of subtle threats and espionage to turn otherwise independent nations into a new category of client states — a dependence compounded by upstream dams. Through the BRI, China has put itself in a position to dictate the terms of trade and the flow of water.</p> -<p>New capabilities are transforming the battlefield, moving beyond modernization of the nuclear triad and beyond a twentieth-century construct. Ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee Adam Smith noted in a broader context that “we need to modernize deterrence by updating . . . the military to the modern fight: information systems, missiles, drones, missile defense, counter-drone — we need to get better at these things. Large legacy platforms still have a place, but they are not as invulnerable as they used to be.” Legacy systems may no longer be optimized or appropriate for effective nuclear deterrence, and new technologies offer new tools. Air Force chief of staff General Charles Q. Brown and commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps General David H. Berger wrote in a 2021 article that “without a fundamental reexamination of the concept of readiness, we will continue to spend limited resources on maintaining legacy capabilities, at the expense of investing in the modern capabilities the United States needs to compete with the People’s Republic of China and Russia.” This warning should be applied to strategic deterrence.</p> +<h3 id="using-water-security-and-infrastructure-to-counter-the-chinese-communist-party">Using Water Security and Infrastructure to Counter the Chinese Communist Party</h3> -<p>“The threat that leaves something to chance” has been interpreted as nuclear threats that would lead to millions of civilian deaths. The United States should not be satisfied with an approach that unduly risks its national survival and endangers human civilization. The United States should prefer a strategic posture that is stabilizing, depends less on chance (or on Vladimir Putin or the Chinese Communist Party), and provides options other than rapid escalation toward nuclear war. To achieve a more modern and stable deterrence architecture, the United States should lead through innovation to create options that do not force escalation or lead to mass annihilation of civilians. U.S. deterrence that reflects U.S. values is inherently more credible than threats that do not. Schmidt notes that “the ability to innovate faster and better — the foundation on which military, economic, and cultural power now rest — will determine the outcome of the great-power competition between the United States and China.” He continues, “At stake is nothing less than the future of free societies, open markets, democratic government, and the broader world order. . . . Silicon Valley’s old mantra holds true not just in industry but also in geopolitics: innovate or die.” Innovation is the United States’ unique competitive edge vis-à-vis China and Russia.</p> +<p>Over the last 10 years, thought leaders in Congress, academia, and successive presidential administrations have begun to see the importance of using increased focus on water strategy and large-scale infrastructure projects to promote the interests of the United States and its democratic partners and allies globally. In 2017, USAID launched the U.S. Global Water Strategy, a five-year planning framework focused on increasing water security. The same year, water security made its way into the National Security Strategy. These efforts built on earlier initiatives across the U.S. government.</p> -<p>EMERGING TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE: NEW KEYS TO DETERRING CONVENTIONAL WAR AND TO PREVENTING ESCALATION</p> +<p>As a more recent example, the 2022 U.S. Global Water Strategy and supporting action plan approach water security as both a risk and an opportunity. Consistent with earlier USAID efforts, the strategy envisions using a mix of increased access to safe drinking water and sanitation (WASH), improved water resources management (WRM), and water productivity (WP) to reduce water-related conflict and fragility. The strategy envisions allocating additional resources to existing water security programs in an effort to increase access to safe WASH while addressing climate resilience and food security challenges associated with water sheds like the Mekong River Basin.</p> -<p><em>Artificial Intelligence</em></p> +<p>These investments promote the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), advance U.S. foreign policy interests, and expand water access, which is a core human need. Building water projects that encourage better environmental stewardship and trade through a network of local governments, U.S. partners and treaty allies, nongovernmental organizations, and international institutions would offer a rival network to the BRI and authoritarian influence. Since modern geopolitics is more about networks than nations, any project that increases access to different political, economic, and human networks therefore creates a strategic advantage and offers a viable alternative to countries whose sovereignty is under threat from authoritarian states.</p> -<p>Being in a strategic competition with China and Russia means understanding and managing competition in AI and emerging technology. AI and machine learning (including machine reinforcement) could determine the outcome of a crisis or conflict early. Marc Andreesen, founder of a16z, stated in 2011: “Software is eating the world,” meaning that the virtual is displacing the material across the global economy. Trae Stephens, founder of the Founders Fund, more recently said that “software is finally eating the battlefield, whether the defense industry likes it or not.” Last year, Gilman Louie observed that “tomorrow it is real-time speed, algorithm warfare. It’s gonna be algorithms trying to outsmart the other algorithms. It’s gonna be machine-on-machine, algorithm-on-algorithm. Those are the systems of the future, and that requires total integration.” AI and machine learning offer new solutions. Quantum computing will also allow faster processing of even larger amounts of data. Eric Schmidt warned recently that a breakthrough in artificial general intelligence (AGI) — a more comprehensive AI, which is currently used to solve discrete problems — “could usher in an era of predominance not unlike the short period of nuclear superiority the United States enjoyed in the late 1940s.”</p> +<p>While interest in water strategy has been growing since 2008, a new development involves infrastructure projects that link democratic states and the private sector to promote trade and human security while offering an alternative to the BRI. Parallel to a domestic focus on infrastructure investment in 2021, the administration under U.S. president Joseph Biden announced the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative, which became the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) in 2022. The effort called for aligning foreign policy and sustainable development through projects that address climate change, health security, digital innovation and access, and gender equality. These pillars act as focal points for investments by G7 nations and create new opportunities for public-private partnerships.</p> -<p>AI and big data processing are key to enable faster and better information for decisionmakers, and support “information dominance.” Effective and rapid information could provide time warning of adversary action, holding them accountable and increasing options for de-escalation. Noting that the military currently processes 2 percent of the data it collects, General Glen VanHerck, commander of U.S. Northern Command, emphasized that “we can’t apply what I say are industrial age, industrial base processes to software-driven capabilities in today’s environment,” adding that “machines . . . can start counting numbers and tell you when there’s changes in . . . vehicles in a parking lot, vehicles in a weapons storage area.” The early impact of emerging technology on the battlefield is already becoming apparent; as Schmidt noted: “Ukraine offers a preview of future conflicts: wars that will be waged and won by humans and machines working together.”</p> +<p>In other words, to counter the $1 trillion China has invested in the BRI, the Biden administration would create a rival infrastructure network that links free states and private companies. This approach is consistent with the network theory of victory, articulated above, wherein power stems from greater participation in one network over another. In 2022 the G7 committed to investing $600 billion dollars in public-private sector initiatives by 2027. PGII investments, in addition to the B3W pillars, would be guided by transparency, good governance, and respect for human rights, thus providing an alternative to the BRI and authoritarian overreach.</p> -<p><em>Space</em></p> +<p>These efforts reflect an increased focus on economic corridors as a central pillar of strategy in the Biden administration. These corridors combine public-private sector investments in transportation infrastructure (rail lines, riverine ports, and roads) with investments in clean energy and information and communication technology (ICT). The result is hubs that promote food security and access to healthcare as much as economic growth. For example, the Lobito corridor in southern Africa will link the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Angola, creating the network of rail lines, economic hubs, and ports required to develop the region and ensure access to key minerals for a clean energy transition.</p> -<p>Second, space is a key tool for increasing survivability and transparency, reducing the risk of surprise in a crisis or conflict, and increasing accountability of U.S. adversaries. Cheaper and ubiquitous space imagery is a tool that has already transformed conflict with Russia. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the value of unclassified commercial imagery from space start-ups. Capella’s synthetic aperture radar imagery can see through clouds, and space imagery from Maxar and Planet have provided the world with irrefutable images of Russia’s brutal invasion and intent to subvert the global order, unifying U.S. and European allies, including by documenting advancing Russian tank columns and the evidence of Russia targeting Ukrainian civilian infrastructure such as apartments and hospitals. Drone- and space-provided images also showed columns of tanks stopped due to mechanical and logistical problems, laying bare Russia’s military readiness challenges. As another example of new tools giving the world sharable information, open-source analysis is providing rapid information, with Google Maps revealing the exact time that the Russian invasion began, even as Russia denied that they were invading Ukraine.</p> +<p>In many respects, the strategic vision articulated in both the PGII and 2022 Global Water Strategy builds on USAID and U.S. allied water programs in the Mekong River Basin. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) is investing in infrastructure projects, many of which also complement G7 partner initiatives. For example, the Japan-U.S.-Mekong Power Partnership (JUMPP) funds projects that combine regional trade integration with energy security.</p> -<p>To this end, the United States must innovate to adapt its space capabilities and architectures and make them more survivable. General John Hyten, former vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted the vulnerability of a “few juicy targets” in space and the need to change acquisition strategy and architectures. Making space resilient means using various orbits and more numerous, smaller and cheaper satellites at proliferated low Earth orbit (pLEO) to complicate attack options, and using both military and commercial systems for added layers of operational capability. The Space Development Agency, the U.S. Space Force, and the Missile Defense Agency are deploying a resilient missile warning and tracking constellation in pLEO and medium earth orbit and are developing cheaper and smaller payloads to provide a mesh-layer of redundancy. Moreover, Congress is rightly prioritizing tactically responsive launch and tactically responsive space capabilities. In addition, disaggregation (not comingling tactical and strategic communications capabilities on the same satellite) will also enable a more stable deterrence architecture that reduces the risk of inadvertent escalation.</p> +<p>From this perspective, the Mekong River offers an ideal regional case study for refining the complementary strategic initiatives envisioned by the Biden administration to counter the BRI. The challenge is to develop new policy playbooks that help visualize and describe a regional strategy for countering malign influence by the CCP while helping populations most affected by forces like climate change.</p> -<p><em>Private Sector</em></p> +<h3 id="using-tabletop-exercises-to-refine-water-strategy">Using Tabletop Exercises to Refine Water Strategy</h3> -<p>Third, for both the space and cyber domains, an increasing share of the infrastructure necessary for strategic deterrence is owned by private sector companies, such as SpaceX and Google as well as hundreds of new start-ups such as Planet. For example, SpaceX has provided Ukraine with receivers and access to Starlink connectivity, though it also has sought to limit this access. The United States needs to partner with the private sector to move deterrence left of mass destruction. In The Age of AI, Kissinger, Schmidt, and Huttenlocher state that “the expertise required for technological preeminence is no longer concentrated in government. . . . [A] process of mutual education between industry, academia, and government can help . . . ensure that . . . AI’s strategic implications are understood in a common conceptual framework.” Creating the incentives and culture to leverage private sector innovation is crucial to national security. Former House Armed Services Committee chairman Mac Thornberry warned, “We need a culture of collaboration that opens new pathways to work with the private sector, relooks at our approach to interactions with outside organizations and reframes the department [Department of Defense] as open to sharing research and information rather than one that is uncooperative both internally and externally.”</p> +<p>Because water and infrastructure projects are, by definition, interagency concerns, they create coordination challenges. These challenges are exacerbated by the focus on public-private partnerships in PGII and emphasis on combining diverse stakeholders specified in the 2022 Global Water Strategy. As a result, policymakers need creative forums to conduct stress tests and refine their strategy to bridge traditional governmental divides. Because strategy involves competing interests and uncertainty, these forums must include modeling how rival states like China and local spoilers might respond. Water strategy must find a way to combine development and deterrence, so PGII should complement broader theater campaign plans and efforts to deny malign Chinese influence. It is difficult to create a viable long-term strategy without illustrating how conflicting interests create alternative futures and shift the logic of programmatic investments over time. A TTX can help flesh out these types of programmatic uncertainties.</p> -<p>Leveraging private sector innovation requires processes for agile and rapid acquisition. Congress enabled the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct more rapid acquisition in section 804 of the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act. While the DOD is beginning to leverage transformational breakthroughs and innovation in the private sector for national security, sustained and focused senior leadership and new processes to break through legacy bureaucratic challenges will be required. General Hyten noted “the Department of Defense doesn’t know how to buy it [innovation]. We think we can buy software like we buy tanks.” Schmidt warned that “business as usual will not do. Instead, the U.S. government will have to overcome its stultified bureaucratic impulses, create favorable conditions for innovation. . . . It needs to commit itself to promoting innovation in the service of the country and in the service of democracy.” Pockets within the DOD, such as AFWERX, SPACEWERX, the Defense Innovation Unit, and the Space Development Agency, are establishing an innovative acquisition culture that incentivizes using private sector innovation, allowing early failure and learning, and prioritizing rapid acquisition. Continued focus and expansion of these models are necessary.</p> +<p>TTXs, alongside crisis simulations and gaming in general, are tailor made for strategic problems like the challenge of advancing a water strategy that addresses human security and counters malign authoritarian influence. These forums allow expert players to simulate the fog, friction, and uncertainty at the heart of great power competition. This experience, in turn, promotes critical analysis and reflections on how to refine strategies that advance U.S. interests. Because strategy involves thinking about the clash of interests over time and space, it requires thinking about alternative futures and red teaming the different pathways to those futures.</p> -<h4 id="extended-deterrence-and-assurance-2">Extended Deterrence and Assurance</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/m8yONlG.jpg" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>Alliance, like innovation, is at the core of the United States’ competitive edge and U.S. strength to address Russian and Chinese threats. Strengthening extended deterrence and alliances requires increasing partnership and interoperability with allied conventional deterrence capabilities. Allied and partner contributions to conventional deterrence, missile defense, and innovation significantly enhance deterrence and help move deterrence to the left to prevent a regional conventional war. For example, the European Union’s Innovation Fund could enhance deterrence and rapidly contribute new commercial and innovative capabilities. To better leverage U.S. international partnerships and to maximize capacity and redundancy for deterrence, the DOD should prioritize processes for enabling interoperability with European and Asian allies’ defense systems while safeguarding cybersecurity. Making progress on interoperability entails not only focused senior leadership but also overcoming deep-seated bureaucratic stumbling blocks, including overclassification and export control hurdles.</p> +<p>To this end, CSIS constructed a series of water security TTXs that focused on WASH and WRM efforts in the face of great power competition. The first iteration explored the Sahel and how a mix of political and public health shocks interacted with climate stress in the region. Players aligned PGII investments and water security to counter these crisis events.</p> -<p>Increased NATO and European cohesion in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and unified support for Ukraine, including significant funding and transfers of military equipment to Ukraine as well as financial sanctions on Russia, strengthen deterrence to protect NATO countries. These actions also strengthen deterrence in the Pacific as China assesses lessons learned with regard to potential implications of invading Taiwan. Japan and South Korea’s attendance at the 2022 NATO summit as observers and hosting of NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg in 2023 indicate opportunities for closer defense cooperation and strengthening unity among U.S. allies in the face of the growing Russian and Chinese threats.</p> +<p>Based on the findings, CSIS built a second TTX that shifted the geographic focus to the Mekong River Basin and transformed the game design from crisis response to competitive strategy. The scenario explored how rival groups of players with a mix of military and development experience set strategic priorities and developed plans around water and infrastructure investments in the Mekong River Basin.</p> -<p>Credible assurance is a product of presidential and senior-level communication and engagement more than boutique capabilities. Consultation and understanding U.S. conventional and nuclear forces are key to credibility. Credible assurances to U.S. allies have been undermined by a range of actions, including (1) promising unnecessary and controversial new nuclear capabilities (such as the SLCM-N, which the Trump administration proposed and the Biden administration canceled); (2) focusing on unrealistic or difficult-to-execute new deployments of platforms that are unsuited to temporary forward deployment (such as promising forward deployment of nuclear-capable dual-capable aircraft to Asian allies); or (3) discussing new permanent stationing of forward-deployed nuclear weapons in allied territory in Asia (which would likely contravene the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). Instead, the United States should increase both tabletop exercises and joint military exercises; enable a better understanding of nuclear deterrence through deeper and frequent consultations; rely on and demonstrate eminently forward-deployable nuclear platforms such as B52s, B2s, the future B21s, and submarines; and increase joint senior public messaging to adversaries of allied unity (as Jens Stoltenberg has done within NATO).</p> +<p>The TTX started with an orientation that helped players understand prevailing water security issues in the region. The purpose was to illustrate the convergence of infrastructure investments and environmental insecurity with great power competition in the Mekong River Basin. The orientation included the following data:</p> -<h4 id="arms-control-1">Arms Control</h4> +<ul> + <li> + <p>whether the country is part of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), a large U.S. trade initiative in the region</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>existing USAID water-related needs score by country</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Freedom House trends for each country (2022 Global Freedom index)</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>China’s trade and debt trap diplomacy metrics, including countries’ imports from China and debt held by Beijing</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>U.S. foreign aid obligated and dispersed by country</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>resilience indicators including the Fragile States Index and Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) Index, which evaluates how well states can adapt to climate change</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>While future arms control would continue to significantly benefit national security and continues to be possible with effective U.S. and Russian (and Chinese) leadership, it seems unlikely absent a political breakthrough that would allow both effective international negotiations and domestic political support.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/L5nBJjR.jpg" alt="image02" /></p> -<p>The specific tool of arms control — meaning legally binding constraints on nuclear platforms — may no longer be available to maintain strategic stability, and New START may expire without any follow-on treaty. Russia suspended implementation of the New START, which expires in 2026, leading to the risk of an impending new era without verifiable nuclear weapons limits. It is unclear whether this latest development is a signal that Russia is gambling with New START to seek leverage in its losing war in Ukraine, or whether it is willing to abandon legally binding nuclear arms control as a tool for predictability for the first time in six decades. In the United States, arms control has become dangerously polarized, and the U.S. Senate no longer has the expertise and long-standing bipartisan agreement that arms control benefits national security.</p> +<p>The scores helped participants understand water and infrastructure issues as they relate to foreign policy across the region. The USAID WASH Needs Index ranks countries in terms of their overall lack of access to clean water. The higher the score, the less access to reliable, safe water. In the Mekong, Thailand has the most reliable access to water, while Cambodia has the worst. By way of comparison, China ranks 61 with an index score of 0.31. Over 80 million people lack basic water access, and over 100 million lack basic sanitation. The score does not directly address issues related to climate change, such as growing salinity due to rising sea levels, changing weather patterns, and dam construction, and their combined effect on food security.</p> -<p>The United States must continue to press for follow-on nuclear weapons constraints on the total number of nuclear warheads (not just the number of platforms or the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons). However, it cannot count on New START or any future nuclear arms control agreement being in effect in the next few years, let alone in 2035, and should plan to prevent nuclear war in an environment without any legally binding or verifiable numerical limits.</p> +<p>The ND-GAIN Index addresses vulnerability to climate change and how well prepared states are to respond in terms of institutional readiness. The higher the score, the more prepared states are to adapt to the reality of climate change. As Table 1 shows, multiple countries (red highlighted cells) along the Mekong River Basin are rated as highly vulnerable to future climate shocks. Combined with foreign aid and trade data, the orientation helped players understand the growing influence of China in the region alongside the deterioration of freedom and growing state fragility, such as due to climate-induced stress.</p> -<p>Therefore, the United States must reconsider arms control with a broader focus on avoiding a nuclear war, rather than a narrow focus on nuclear weapons. The P5 restated the Reagan-Gorbachev statement that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Recalibrating and expanding the scope of risk reduction should consider cross-domain arms control. Such an approach could include as examples: (1) constraining missile defenses that the United States would not pursue in exchange for constraints on Russia’s novel nuclear weapons; (2) defending priority critical infrastructure; (3) constraining the number or location of certain conventional capabilities in exchange for nuclear weapons constraints; and (4) pursuing dialog on understanding the implications and dangers of AI for NC3 systems.</p> +<p>After the orientation, the U.S. team was briefed that additional funds were available to combine interagency efforts to counter BRI activities in Southeast Asia with a focus on the Mekong River Basin. The teams had to articulate a larger competitive strategy and three water security projects (WASH, WRM, WP) for the region as part of the larger PGII.</p> -<p>Increased investment in new commercial and innovative technologies, such as crypto and blockchain technology, that could be applied to verification should also be prioritized.</p> +<p>To frame this strategy, the U.S. team was briefed that the strategic end state, according to guidance developed through the National Security Council (NSC), was to sustain U.S. and partner nation access and influence in Southeast Asia, consistent with the vision of a rules-based international order. The two principal objectives to achieve this end state were (1) promote PGII initiatives focused on water security and (2) reassure U.S. partners and allies. In other words, the TTX asked U.S. players to think about how development merges with deterrence in modern great power competition. To that end, the U.S. players filled out Table 2 to prioritize water security investments. Players could nominate three water programs (WASH, WRM, WP); each had to align with at least one PGII pillar and country. Based on the enhancement, players rated the extent to which the new water program would increase the access of the United States and its democratic partners to the region while denying China access and influence. For example, a player could propose a WASH initiative in Vietnam to counter increased water salinity owing to climate change and its effect on food security as one of the three expanded water programs.</p> -<h4 id="conclusion-4">Conclusion</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>In other words, the TTX asked U.S. players to think about how development merges with deterrence in modern great power competition.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>In conclusion, new threats are rapidly materializing, including the risk of rapid escalation to nuclear war, requiring that the United States adapt and evolve deterrence strategy and modernization requirements. Making changes on the margins of twentieth-century deterrence architecture, including adding more nuclear missiles, especially lower-yield weapons, will not make the United States safer and could exacerbate the risks of a nuclear arms race and lower the threshold for nuclear weapons use. The United States must expand its focus from a narrow emphasis on nuclear strategy and nuclear weapons to take advantage of new tools and U.S. innovation as part of its modernization plans. The United States urgently needs more resilient and agile architectures and platforms for deterrence stability and more agile acquisition processes that leverage private sector innovation. As the land of SpaceX and Google, the United States’ competitive edge must enhance strategic deterrence and prevent the risk of nuclear war in a two-peer environment.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Q7OFTlp.jpg" alt="image03" /></p> -<h3 id="the-challenges-of-deterrence-reassurance-and-stability-in-a-world-of-growing-nuclear-competition">The Challenges of Deterrence, Reassurance, and Stability in a World of Growing Nuclear Competition</h3> +<p>The U.S. team then revealed its plans and discussed its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats with a team playing the CCP. This action-reaction dynamic helped facilitate dialogue about the opportunity costs inherent in using water security programs and larger infrastructure projects to compete with China. Overall, players saw water strategy as a viable tool for countering the BRI but found that it required better integration with other instruments of power to support long-term competition.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="jon-wolfsthal">Jon Wolfsthal</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>U.S. players tended to take a mixed approach to the region with two major strategies and one minority opinion. Two teams focused on Thailand and Vietnam — the countries they thought the most accessible and open to countering the CCP. The third team focused its efforts on the countries with higher WASH needs scores: Cambodia and Laos.</p> -<p>The future challenge of managing the risks inherent in the existence and possession of nuclear weapons and in competition among multiple nuclear armed states will be more complicated than those of the recent past. In many ways, these risks will be more difficult to manage than those faced during the Cold War. Having not one but two nuclear peer competitors, along with a host of smaller nuclear possessor states, will pose new burdens and dangers for the United States and its allies. Yet, despite these risks, the basic concept for how one may use nuclear weapons to deter aggression (nuclear and otherwise) against the United States and its allies has not changed. To deter, one needs to be able to deny an adversary the thing they hope to gain through aggression or punish them so that the gains of an aggression are outweighed by the cost. Deterring means knowing what your adversary values, holding those things at risk, and making clear your ability and willingness to follow through on those threats. This was true even before nuclear weapons were invented.</p> +<p>The Thailand group proposed focusing on cultivating public-private partnerships to make Thailand the focal point for regional projects. These projects were concentrated in the digital and gender pillars of the PGII. The theory of competition was that creating new technical skills and increasing female employment in key sectors would benefit Thailand while creating a regional champion for water security projects.</p> -<p>Even sound deterrence policy comes with grave risks. Deterrence can fail — and can do so with global consequences. Thus, there is an inherent risk to over-relying on nuclear weapons for deterrence. Aside from the prospects that a country just gets it wrong or miscalculates, or a leader proves incapable of handling a crisis with rational precision, arms races are costly and pose significant risks through both escalation and misunderstandings. One country’s rational nuclear strategy can look highly threatening and destabilizing to another. Arms racing and instability also bring a greater pace of nuclear operations, which in turn increases the risk of nuclear accidents that can have unimaginable consequences. And managing relationships in a time of tension when nuclear weapons are a feature of state competition is inherently unpredictable. Every clash of forces has a nuclear tint and every confrontation can become a nuclear test of wills. Thus, the United States has a strong incentive as a status-quo power to avoid constructs that rely on matching both Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities at the same time as a recipe for stable deterrence. It does not appear strategically necessary, nor does it offer anything in terms of stability or broader security.</p> +<p>Since Thailand had the best WASH scores in the region, the group proposed investing in water-related businesses based in Thailand that could access Cambodia and Laos, which are closer to Beijing. The idea was to promote a new cadre of local businesses, including increased opportunities for more diverse workplaces that could build water projects across the region. The U.S. players rated this approach as likely to draw both G7 interest and private sector capital.</p> -<p>Put simply, ensuring credible deterrence of both Russia and China does not appear to require holding all Russian or Chinese nuclear weapons at risk simultaneously. Doing so may be useful for other purposes, such as nuclear war fighting, damage limitation, or alliance management (in some but not all cases). But unless there is evidence that Russia or China values its nuclear weapons more than other assets (such as regime survival, economic centers, and broader elements of state control), then holding Moscow and Beijing’s nuclear weapons at risk one for one is not needed for effective deterrence.</p> +<p>The red team replicating the CCP noted that while Beijing would not challenge Thai businesses directly, China maintains indirect economic mechanisms it could use to counter a U.S.-led initiative. For example, one red player noted China could apply economic pressure by curtailing the number of tourists that travel to Thailand, a practice it used against South Korea in 2017. The red team also saw opportunities to use low-level cyber operations and propaganda, consistent with political warfare, to undermine trust and confidence in U.S.-backed businesses. In other words, U.S. efforts to work through a local partner to promote water security could be effective but would not remove all the ways and means Beijing has to apply pressure to states in the Mekong River Basin.</p> -<p>While the need to match both states at once is in question, there is little doubt that U.S. allies will be looking to Washington for enhanced reassurances about the United States’ ability and commitment to protect them in this new, more complex environment. U.S. nuclear weapons and pledges to rely on nuclear use in the face of extreme threats will likely be part of any U.S. strategy. However, relying predominantly on additional U.S. nuclear capabilities to do so — either in increased numbers or type — will likely prove ineffective. Nuclear weapons reassurance has limits, especially when the main concern about the United States is focused on its willingness to provide defense, not its ability to do so. Put simply, a credibility problem cannot be solved only with capabilities. Thus, for both nuclear deterrence and reassurance purposes, investments in current and projected U.S. nuclear forces over the next few decades appear analytically sufficient, if not excessive.</p> +<p>A separate strategy that emerged focused on combining water projects with food security efforts to build resilience to climate shocks. The focus was on the climate pillar. This group assessed the magnitude of the climate challenge confronting Vietnam. Countries critical to regional food supplies, like Thailand, justified the focus, as Thailand and Vietnam two of the three top rice exporting countries in the world. The group also recommended a water-related project linked to agriculture and climate stress in Thailand. The focus of these efforts was more on mitigating future food security issues than on addressing current challenges. The team also assessed that these water programs could complement recent U.S. military outreach to Vietnam. Furthermore, given the size of the population and economic growth trends, the players rated projects in Vietnam as very attractive to both G7 and private sector partnerships.</p> -<p>Alliance management, including credible extended deterrence, has always relied on much more than nuclear weapons, or military forces overall. Deterrence is about both capabilities and commitment to act in the face of threats. The possible rise of a new near-peer competitor in China, combined with the continued dangers posed by a revanchist Russia, will demand more (politically and financially) from U.S. reassurance and alliance management strategy. If U.S. alliances are to continue to benefit both allied and U.S. security, the United States will need to do more to enhance its military and its non-military means of reassuring Washington’s allies of its willingness and capability to defend them. On the military side, these goals will require greater investments in conventional and non-conventional military capabilities — including cyber, space, intelligence, and command, control, and communications (C3) — and could create additional cost constraints on the U.S. defense budget, which is already rapidly approaching $1 trillion per year. And nuclear weapons will continue to be an important component in these efforts. However, it would be ineffective and counterproductive for the United States to rely predominantly on nuclear capabilities to address the requirements for extended deterrence, or indeed to depend solely on its military strength for allied management. The reality is that the United States relies more on its allies today than ever before for its economic, technical, political, and cultural strength. The United States and its allies have never been more reliant on each other, and the loss of any one major U.S. ally could irreparably damage the safety, security, and prosperity of the American people. This reality — U.S.-allied interdependence — should be a key part of U.S. alliance management strategy, especially for states who worry that the United States might abandon them in a crisis.</p> +<p>The red team noted that while these issues would produce regional benefits in the long run, they were unlikely to shift the U.S.-Vietnam relationship to a strategic partnership in the short term. Beijing would still retain the ability to drive a wedge between Washington and Hanoi. China retains significant military, economic, and ideological instruments to influence Vietnam, despite long-standing differences between the two countries.</p> -<p>Lastly, the United States continues to have a strong continued incentive to reduce the role nuclear weapons play globally, to impose costs on states who seek to use their nuclear weapons for coercion or blackmail, and to prevent nuclear proliferation to both U.S. adversaries and allies. The growing emphasis on “responsible nuclear behavior” by the United States is a continued recognition of this reality. Both for hard self-interest and for the ways pursing a less nuclear world can enhance allied cohesion and cooperation and U.S. global leadership, continuing to champion the vision of disarmament and the near-term effort to prevent proliferation will continue to pay benefits for U.S. and allied security. That such efforts appear harder to achieve now than in the past should not, in itself, undermine the support for these important objectives.</p> +<p>This discussion led to a debate about the balance of U.S. foreign assistance and how much should be linked to larger interagency strategies to counter China. Some saw addressing climate change and increasing water security as goals in themselves. The majority assessed that the United States, especially if its foreign assistance budgets increased, could integrate a focus on engaging local government and civil society, foreign assistance linked to poverty reduction and environmental growth, infrastructure-linked economic development, and governance programs with long-term competition without falling victim to the traps of the Cold War.</p> -<p>The United States and its allies will continue to face military threats in the coming decades, and thus will rely on military means for defense and deterrence. For the foreseeable future, it is also clear that the country will rely on nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of U.S. security and of its extended deterrent commitments. But longer-term security will require far more than maintaining certain nuclear capabilities, and nuclear weapons may not be very well suited in scenarios where U.S. allies are uncertain, and U.S. adversaries undermine U.S. interests. For example, if and when the United States loses its conventional superiority in East Asia, the threat to use nuclear weapons to respond to nonnuclear scenarios may be seen as less credible to both adversaries and allies alike, regardless of how many nuclear weapons the United States possesses. Threats to escalate to the nuclear level against a nuclear armed opponent are harder to make credible. Thus, to enhance security, the United States and its allies and partners should sustain a broader set of military, economic, political, and diplomatic capabilities to ensure it retains the ability to deter adversary decision making and reassure partners in a variety of scenarios. At the same time, U.S. strategy should also remember that nuclear weapons can also work against U.S. and allied interests, and that proliferation can threaten U.S. military and technological superiority in a number of ways. One need to look no further than the way Russia has used nuclear threats to deter greater U.S. involvement in Ukraine to see that deterrence and coercion can work against U.S. and allied interests. As such, there remains a strong interest for the United States to reduce the global role played by nuclear weapons and to continue to slow or reverse their vertical and horizontal spread.</p> +<p>These practitioners highlighted a need to refine interagency coordination along these lines and run periodic TTXs as a form of further calibrating regional strategies. These events would have to integrate multiple Biden administration strategies like the Indo-Pacific Strategy with PGII and the 2022 Global Water Strategy. In fact, the myriad of strategies published by the Biden administration led one player to express a need for more dynamic interagency coordination than traditional NSC meetings. Participants viewed the TTXs as a way of investigating opportunities to achieve the objectives in multiple strategy documents and avoid policy fratricide. One participant noted that this effort would also need to include integrated country strategies to balance regional, functional, and country-specific aspects of foreign policy. Another participant noted that while there is an agency strategic planning process in the U.S. Department of State and USAID, as well as different interagency coordination processes, efforts tended to have too many objectives to easily prioritize. This participant saw the focus on water security, infrastructure, and integrating development with deterrence as a way to synchronize and prioritize objectives.</p> -<p>Thus, the needs of deterrence and nuclear reassurance need to be balanced against the risk that nuclear overreliance can create risks of escalation, pre-emption, crisis instability, and arms race instability. Nothing is cost-free. In addition, the extent to which the United States emphasizes its nuclear commitments to allies could further enhance domestic demands for independent nuclear capabilities if and when U.S. commitments are seen as being less credible. To the extent that these tools of nuclear reassurance further normalize nuclear reliance, U.S. efforts to reassure could erode norms against proliferation and nuclear possession.</p> +<p>The third strategy to emerge from the TTX — and the minority perspective — was to focus on Cambodia and Laos, the countries with the worst WASH scores and projects linked to the health and digital pillars. Specifically, the players wanted to invest in low-cost internet of things (IoT) networks linked to local cellular service for remote monitoring — an opportunity to use ICT for WASH. The team assessed that they could address local needs in these countries in a way that offset some of the negative effects of Chinese dam construction on water and food security. One participant discussed how changing water flows were disrupting local economies and leading to migration. Another participant noted that despite Laos’s high dependence on China, the relationship between water governance and agriculture in Laos created a way to both address water security and show the population the negative effects of the Chinese authoritarian development model. Other players noted that this messaging could be enhanced by coordinating with elements like the Global Engagement Center (GEC). The player wanted to use the GEC’s data-driven approach to studying the information environment to tailor messages about the water security programs while monitoring for China’s efforts to undermine confidence in U.S. and allied water and infrastructure investments.</p> -<p>There are some who discount or reject the serious risks that come with reliance on nuclear deterrence. This stance belies the imperial evidence of near-misses, accidents, averted escalation, and the ever-present risk of miscalculation. These dangers were constant features of the Cold War, and historical research indicates that Soviet fear of U.S. superiority and aggression was a more dominant factor in the Soviet Union’s nuclear procurement than ambitions of territorial aggression. Thus, it remains important for the United States to continue to evaluate the missions assigned to nuclear weapons and consider reducing or replacing them with more credible and effective capabilities where practicable.</p> +<p>The red team responded that while the effort might increase WASH scores in both countries, it would not significantly alter the influence of the CCP. Cambodia and Laos depend heavily on the Chinese economy. Furthermore, China could use its own propaganda and concepts like “Three Warfares” — influence operations that combine psychological and legal warfare with traditional propaganda — to promote rival narratives about the importance of each country’s relationship to Beijing. One red team member even said China could use this construct to take credit for Western money invested in water security while pinning the negative effects of its dam construction on foreign (G7) business interests.</p> -<h4 id="background">Background</h4> +<p>The discussion around the third strategy again highlighted the need to coordinate different agency planning processes with a focus on the information environment. One player suggested a need for an interagency competition manual similar to the recent U.S. Department of Defense Joint Concept for Competing. The group agreed the interagency collaboration needed a framework for conceptualizing long-term competition beyond deterrence and departmental interests. The challenge was how to develop this framework and balance military strategy with diplomacy and development. One player asked bluntly, “Who owns competition?” While the U.S. Department of State has processes to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives at the country and regional levels, it was not clear these formed critical components of major U.S. Department of Defense campaign plans that focus on competition. This insight brought some of the players back to recommending additional interagency TTXs to visualize and describe how to synchronize and prioritize objectives across multiple government agencies oriented toward long-term competition.</p> -<p>The United States maintains nuclear weapons to deter nuclear and other attacks on the United States and its friends and allies around the world. Should deterrence fail, the president has directed the U.S. military to be able to employ nuclear weapons in order to achieve certain outcomes. These deterrence goals can be broken down into three main components: core nuclear deterrence (deterring nuclear use against the United States), extended nuclear deterrence (deterring nuclear use against U.S. allies and partners), and what this paper refers to as “expanded” nuclear deterrence (deterring nonnuclear attacks against the United States and its allies and partners). Core deterrence — deterring nuclear attacks on the United States and its allies — is a widely accepted mission for nuclear weapons and has received sustained political and policy support in the United States. It has been highly credible for decades and mostly stable. Extended nuclear deterrence is also a long-standing and sustained U.S. policy and forms a key part of U.S. alliance commitments. Even so, there have always been questions about the credibility of these commitments. Pledging to risk yourself for another state is not a common act in geopolitical affairs. Yet extended deterrence is widely credited as having reduced, but not eliminated, the demand for independent nuclear capabilities among U.S. allies, a key benefit of U.S. alliance efforts over decades. A more nuclear world is a less stable one for all, especially the United States. The credibility of these extended deterrence commitments is a function of both U.S. capability and projected intent to follow through on pledges and legal obligations to protect allies. There are times when capability has been in doubt, just as there are times when intent has been seen as less dependable.</p> +<p>The discussion led one player to note the missing role of the U.S. Congress in the debate. Congressional action led to prioritization of water security, and Congress must be brought into any discussion about increasing the foreign assistance budget. The participant noted increasing signs that Congress was interested in TTXs and creative forums for analyzing policy, though the initial forays focused on military matters. The player proposed designing the TTXs on long-term competition in a manner that allowed congressional staffers — and, if possible, entire committees — to play, building on recent efforts by the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party. The player advocated starting a new series of congressional games that touch multiple committees, including the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and House Armed Services Committee.</p> -<p>The definition of expanded nuclear deterrence has changed over time but has predominantly focused on use of nuclear weapons to respond to large-scale conventional attacks (or other attacks) that threaten the existence of the United States or its allies that cannot be deterred or defeated solely through conventional and other means. The relative emphasis on this aspect of U.S. policy has ebbed and flowed over time and remains the subject of debate both among allies and inside U.S. policy circles. During the 1950s and 1960s, extended deterrence led the United States to deploy a wide variety of nuclear weapons in Europe and develop a nuclear ladder of escalation due to the perceived conventional inferiority to Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of both the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union saw Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton withdraw and destroy most U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons from around the world. As the perceived threat has changed, U.S. capabilities and deployment strategy have also changed.</p> +<h3 id="connect-the-world-to-compete-with-china">Connect the World to Compete with China</h3> -<p>Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has relied less on nuclear weapons, both because it has not needed to do so and because it recognized that doing so would increase the demand for nuclear weapons by some states, as well as their incentive to use weapons early. The threat to use nuclear weapons first has been less credible because it has been less necessary. But even when the perceived need was higher, there have always been questions about the willingness of a U.S. president to use nuclear weapons first (or at all) against a nuclear adversary to protect U.S. allies. The United States has never had to prove that it would trade Boston for Berlin, but there has never been an instance where U.S., European, and adversary leaders all believed the United States would take such a step with absolute certainty. For the most part, U.S. decisionmakers have preferred to leave these questions unanswered and have taken the lack of an attack against U.S. allies as evidence — in the absence of conclusive proof — that these threats are effective. That the threat was even remotely credible was seen as enough to justify its continuation.</p> +<p>Modern competition is about more than military balances. It extends to development projects and building a network that connects people and creates conditions for solving collective action problems plaguing the twenty-first century: climate change, water access, food insecurity, and poverty. In the process, it also creates a new positional advantage that prevents authoritarian states from co-opting economic corridors. It is a new great game that must be played with a different set of rules than the cold wars of old.</p> -<p>While nuclear weapons clearly influence adversary and allied behavior, there has been an overconfidence in the role deterrent commitments have had over time and overreliance on nuclear weapons — particularly in the role of expanded nuclear deterrence — can be detrimental to U.S. security. It is understandable that the United States might seek to rely on nuclear weapons to counter larger conventional threats if it has no alternatives, yet doing so is less credible than conventional countermeasures and raises questions about credibility that can never be satisfied. And over time, U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons informs decisions by other states to increase their own nuclear and conventional military capabilities. It seems at least likely, if not probable, that China’s long-delayed decision to seek nuclear parity with the United States is driven by a desire to no longer be potentially vulnerable to coercion from expanded nuclear deterrence by Washington. The United States is already in an action-reaction cycle with China, just as it has been with Russia for decades. Ignoring this reality will make it much harder to find stable outcomes.</p> +<p>The more the Biden administration can synchronize its development and diplomacy with theater strategy, the more likely it will be to gain an enduring advantage in long-term competition with China. This advantage starts with visualizing and describing regions in terms of people’s needs, likely environmental shocks, and transportation corridors to identify clusters of projects that offset authoritarian overreach while helping local communities address core human security challenges.</p> -<h4 id="bilateral-deterrence-vs-the-three-body-problem">Bilateral Deterrence vs. the “Three-Body Problem”</h4> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Calibrate regional strategies.</strong> The United States should look for opportunities to better align foreign assistance and defense budgets. Unfortunately, aid budgets are unlikely to grow in the near term based on the budget deal and election cycle. As a result, USAID — along with the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the DFC — will need to work with Congress and interagency partners to identify how best to align existing programs and resources. Based on standing legislation, USAID will continue to spend on water projects. These efforts could be coordinated with less confrontational defense dollars linked to efforts like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and ongoing theater campaigns. The net results would be a two-level prioritization framework that better aligns ends, ways, and means. USAID should prioritize projects likely to draw the most traction across agencies as a means of making each development dollar go further and extend U.S. strategic interests.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Conduct stress tests and refine regional strategies through TTXs.</strong> USAID and other interagency partners will need to augment traditional approaches to long-term planning to embrace more dynamic methods aligned with understanding the new era of competition. Turning traditional war games into peace games and TTXs is the first step and will help leaders analyze complex interactions almost certain to accompany water and broader infrastructure projects. These games should occur at three levels. First, they should be part of program design and help identify opportunities for interagency as well as private sector partnerships. Second, they should be conducted through existing interagency processes and evaluate how guidance ranging from the Indo-Pacific Strategy to integrated country strategies align with PGII and the 2022 Global Water Strategy. Third, the games must involve Congress and bring a mix of staffers and elected representatives into the dialogue. Too often, U.S. strategy — whether defense or development — has been stovepiped and segmented by branch and agencies, producing unhealthy tension and friction. Games offer a means to overcome these self-imposed barriers that help different stakeholders develop a common understanding of modern competition. These congressional games should also focus not just on optimal resourcing but also on authorities and how best to tailor the interagency framework to support long-term competition. If twenty-first-century competition is as much as about development as deterrence, the United States needs to ensure it has both the ways and means to gain an enduring advantage.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Amplify regional strategies.</strong> In a connected world, the message matters as much as the facts. Efforts to better integrate water projects with public-private sector infrastructure initiatives and theater strategy require global messaging that counters authoritarian influence campaigns. This messaging campaign should be integrated with existing initiatives like the GEC and embassy-level outreach and should be built into programmatic requirements for the network of vendors that support modern development. The messages should be tailored to audiences across diverse regions and retain the ability to counter malign foreign influence campaigns. The result is not propaganda but ensuring affected populations can cut through the noise to understand why the U.S. government, alongside its partners and the private sector, is investing in water infrastructure.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>U.S. nuclear forces will remain directly relevant to preventing nuclear attack by Russia, China, and North Korea. Understanding the nature of each adversary, identifying how they are likely to act in various situations, and being able to maintain the key tenets of deterrence through denial or punishment remain key parts of any U.S. nuclear strategy toward these states.</p> +<hr /> -<p>However, due to the fallible nature of deterrence (it works until it fails) and the humanity-changing consequences of any future nuclear use, the United States should remain committed to and enhance its efforts to engage Russia, China, and North Korea to reduce the number of nuclear weapons all states possess as its works toward broader multilateral efforts to eliminate all nuclear weapons under effective verification. Nothing suggests this process will be easy or quick, but neither are the demands of deterrence and defense. But nuclear deterrence is an unstable and ultimately unreliable means to an end — security — and should not be seen as a means unto itself. Alternatives to permanent nuclear constructs must be part of a balanced approach to stability and security.</p> +<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow for future war, gaming, and strategy in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> -<p>To date, U.S. nuclear strategy has focused predominately on deterring nuclear use by the Soviet Union, and later the Russian Federation. The focus on Russia was due to the global competition between these two states, Russia’s ability to threaten U.S. allies and trading partners, and the comparative size of their nuclear and other military capabilities. This size factor should not be discounted; in a world where the Soviet Union’s leaders viewed their nuclear-peer status as a key part of their global position, holding Soviet nuclear forces at risk developed into a key feature of deterrence. (They cared about them, so the United States held them at risk.)</p> +<p><strong>Daniel F. Runde</strong> is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at CSIS.</p> + +<p><strong>Thomas Bryja</strong> is a program coordinator in the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.</p>Benjamin Jensen, et al.Project Atom 20232023-09-29T12:00:00+08:002023-09-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/project-atom-2023<p><em>How can the United States deter two peer competitors? To assist U.S. policy makers in addressing this question, the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for deterring Russia and China through 2035.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<h3 id="project-atom-2023-first-principles-for-deterring-two-peer-competitors">Project Atom 2023: First Principles for Deterring Two Peer Competitors</h3> + +<blockquote> + <h4 id="heather-williams-kelsey-hartigan-and-lachlan-mackenzie">Heather Williams, Kelsey Hartigan, and Lachlan MacKenzie</h4> +</blockquote> + +<p>How can the United States deter two peer competitors? Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated Putin’s willingness to rely on nuclear threats to pursue regional ambitions. Conventional losses in Ukraine may also increase Russian reliance on nuclear weapons in the years to come. China’s expanding and increasingly diverse nuclear arsenal suggests that it, too, has ambitions that may rely on nuclear threats. Beijing has proven itself to be a patient but ambitious actor, described as a “pacing” threat in the 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy, which will also present challenges for U.S. nuclear strategy and policy in the coming decade. U.S. political and military leaders need to determine the nation’s strategy to deter and, if necessary (and possible), defeat two nuclear peers simultaneously or in sequence. In doing so, leadership must also consider the implications of this strategy for nuclear force posture, nuclear modernization, extended deterrence and assurance, and arms control and disarmament strategy and commitments.</p> + +<p>To assist in addressing these challenges for U.S. strategy, the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for deterring two peer competitors through 2035. This study revives a concept and approach that the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) developed a decade ago to review U.S. nuclear strategy and posture for 2025 through 2050. This project is predicated on the assumption that the vision of a world without nuclear weapons is not likely in the near future given the behavior of multiple potential adversaries. It is unconstrained by current strategy (e.g., sizing the conventional force to fight and win one major conflict, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy) and current policy (e.g., the decision to cancel or not move forward with additional nuclear capabilities) unless explicitly stated otherwise in the assumptions. However, it is constrained by likely technological trends and industrial constraints on nuclear modernization. These constraints proved to be important both in assessments of modernization options and recommendations. Beyond that, authors were asked to provide a brief picture of the world in 2035 regarding nuclear and strategic issues, to identify any other underlying assumptions of their analysis. The strategies focused on four specific themes: force posture, modernization, extended deterrence and assurance, and arms control. The strategies demonstrate surprising agreement on key issues, such as the need to assure allies and why now is not the time for nuclear reductions. But they also highlight ongoing areas of disagreement about the nature of the threats from Russia and China, requirements for U.S. nuclear forces, and the role of arms control.</p> -<p>Over time, deterrence efforts have expanded to include possible threats from China and more recently North Korea. However, due to the mismatch in defense, and particularly nuclear capabilities, between these states and the United States, successive U.S. presidents and their military and civilian advisers have agreed that the nuclear and conventional capabilities needed to address the potential threat from Moscow has been adequate to handle any realistic contingency from Beijing or Pyongyang. Also, while it is clear that North Korea’s leaders view their nuclear forces as keys to survival and power, nuclear weapons have not been seen as central to Chinese leaders’ status or control. The growth of China’s conventional and nuclear capabilities demands that the United States constantly reassess these conclusions, which could lead to new requirements. North Korea, even with its growing nuclear forces, will not be in a position to challenge the United States conventionally, so it poses a different kind of deterrent challenge beyond the scope of this paper.</p> +<p>After providing an overview of the competing strategies, this introductory analysis distills 10 “first principles” for a strategy to deter two peer competitors. These principles capture areas of consensus among the strategies but also engage with areas of disagreement to identify which strategy options are best suited for the current threat environment. The introduction ends with a summary of specific recommendations about the way forward for U.S. decisionmakers.</p> -<p>CHINA</p> +<h4 id="competing-strategies-for-deterring-two-peer-competitors">Competing Strategies for Deterring Two Peer Competitors</h4> -<p>There is mounting concern over China’s growing conventional and nuclear capabilities and its more assertive behavior in East Asia. It appears (and China’s lack of direct engagement and discussion leaves some motives to guesswork) that China has determined that possessing a larger nuclear force, perhaps even similar in size and composition to that of Russia or the United States, is required to assert a position of global power and influence. The growth in China’s forces has led some U.S. strategists to worry that the United States must increase its nuclear forces to maintain effective deterrence of Beijing and reassure nervous allies. However, the fundamental requirements for deterrence — the ability to hold what Chinese leaders value at risk or deny them the thing they may seek to achieve through means of force — do not change just because China has more nuclear weapons, unless, of course, the United States determines that nuclear weapons are what China values most and that each weapon must be held at risk to make deterrence credible. There are strong reasons to doubt that this is the case. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the United States will need to significantly alter its nuclear force structure to maintain effective nuclear and extended deterrence vis-à-vis China in the coming decade or beyond. Enhanced conventional investment to ensure China does not believe it can beat U.S. and allied forces is likely to be an even more relevant factor in stability and deterrence in East Asia. Of course, it should also not be taken for granted that what the United States has today will be enough to deter Chinese aggression in the future. Significant investments in both direct diplomacy and engagement with China are a must, as are greater investments in intelligence and analytic capabilities to understand Chinese thinking, behavior, and decisionmaking.</p> +<p>The PONI team provided experts with four assumptions and respective guiding questions as an analytical framework. This report contains five chapters, each of which constitutes a distinct strategy for deterring two peer competitors. A comparison of the strategies across the analytical framework is provided in Tables 1–4.</p> -<p>Why? Because deterrence is not static. Having high confidence in what U.S. adversaries care about and being able to credibly (both in terms of capability and intent) hold them at risk (deterrence by punishment) or deny them those things (deterrence by denial) are basic requirements of deterrence. Before spending hundreds of billions on nuclear weapons that may not add to deterrence, the United States would do better to spend the money needed to hire more Chinese language and military and economic experts who can help understand and interpret Chinese actions and intentions. There is currently a serious shortfall of experienced, trained, and informed analysts on nuclear deterrence, strategy, and stability issues. The community of experts is a fraction of what it was during the Cold War, and greater investments in this area are critically needed. There is and will be a continuing need to reevaluate the credibility of deterrence commitments (nuclear and nonnuclear) and to constantly reassess what adversaries value.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/KBjuPFj.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Table 1: Comparing Strategies for Deterring Two Peer Competitors — Deterrence Strategy.</em></p> -<p>There is also today a tendency in the United States to assume that China will behave in ways similar to the Soviet Union in the Cold War. This forgets that the United States did not correctly assess Soviet actions or intentions then, that the two are very different states, and that the nature of the U.S. relationship with China today is very different from the U.S.-Soviet ties in the 1950s to 1980s. The United States and the Soviet Union had few economic or cultural ties, whereas the United States and China are economically interdependent and millions of Americans claim Chinese ancestry. The United States and the Soviet Union did not have any significant trade or technical interactions, and Europe had very little at all. By comparison, China, the United States, and Europe are all economically and financially interdependent, which increases the levers to influence policy and actions as well as the costs of conflict, competition, and war.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OtAjjLR.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ Table 2: Comparing Strategies for Deterring Two Peer Competitors — Modernization.</em></p> -<p>RUSSIA</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/agPMi3F.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ Table 3: Comparing Strategies for Deterring Two Peer Competitors — Extended Deterrence.</em></p> -<p>Deterring Russian nuclear attack against the United States or its allies and partners remains a major U.S. objective, but one the United States understands well and remains highly capable of achieving. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that Russia remains highly deterred from taking action against the United States and its allies, and especially nuclear action. If one assumes that Russia leaders will remain rational, holding Russian nuclear forces and other means of military and state control at risk, combined with other non-nuclear means of state influence, should continue to be sufficient to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies. Moreover, while Russia is likely to value its nuclear forces more in the decades to come, especially now that its conventional forces have proven to be ineffective in Ukraine and elsewhere, it remains far from certain that Putin and Russian leaders value nuclear force above financial or other means of political and state control. As such, nuclear weapons will remain a part of but by no means the most important or most dominant feature of U.S. deterrence and reassurance strategy.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/LO31CST.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ Table 4: Comparing Strategies for Deterring Two Peer Competitors — Arms Control.</em></p> -<p>Reassurance of U.S. allies in Europe in the face of a less stable and predictable Russia — especially one that is less invested in the global financial system and less interdependent with Europe — will remain a major U.S. political and strategic challenge. Since the invasion of Ukraine, however, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have responded remarkably well, with increased investments in European defense, the strongest U.S. leadership in NATO in a generation, and the enlargement of NATO to include Finland and soon Sweden, which both represent major additions to the ability of Europe to deter and respond to Russian aggression. These challenges will continue as long as Russia remains a non-status quo state and will require constant attention and political commitments from the United States. In addition, the United States has let much of its nuclear and Russian expertise erode over the past 30 years, and government investment in experts who understand nuclear weapons, stability, risk reduction, and negotiations as well as the Russian language and Russian economic and political factors is sorely needed. The United States’ overestimation of Russia’s conventional military capabilities, and indeed Putin’s flawed decisionmaking in deciding to invade Ukraine, demonstrates that the United States has gaps in its ability to accurately predict what Russia is and what it may do.</p> +<p>It is important to acknowledge at the outset that some of the Project Atom experts questioned the premise of the exercise. Multiple strategies make a case for maintaining the status quo despite the two peer competitor problem and caution that changes to the nuclear posture or modernization plans could have an escalatory effect. One expert disagrees that China is a “competitor” and focuses the analysis on why China should not be treated similarly to Russia. These definitional issues underpin areas where the strategies align and where there are areas of disagreement.</p> -<p>RUSSIA-CHINA COLLABORATION?</p> +<p>Important areas of agreement include:</p> -<p>Deterring one state is hard. Deterring two states at the same time is even harder. But what about two states working in concert? The concern that Russia and China might somehow coordinate their nuclear attacks or threats is gaining attention in the U.S. nuclear community. Simply put, does the potential for collaboration between Moscow and Beijing extend so far that the United States must be prepared to fight two nuclear wars — one against Russia and another against China — at the same time?</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>China and Russia’s nuclear arsenals pose significant challenges for the United States and its allies.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The United States should not pursue unilateral nuclear reductions at this time.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The United States does not need to match Russia and China’s combined arsenal numbers.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The United States needs more flexibility and agility in its arsenal, whether that be with more advanced conventional capabilities, additional new nuclear delivery platforms, or the ability to adjust modernization plans.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>U.S. credibility with allies is fragile, and Washington can take steps, such as more consultations and joint planning, to improve this.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Prospects for arms control in the near term are bleak, but verifiable arms control that constrains adversary capabilities, reduces the risk of war, and avoids unnecessary nuclear arms competition remains in the U.S. national interest. More informal risk reduction options are a better way forward for the time being.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>There is no indication that the coordination of policy or closer relationship between Russia and China has developed into a full-fledged nuclear alliance. If there were credible and convincing evidence that Russia-China relationship had changed to such a degree that this were likely, then it could lead to a determination that the United States might have to match both Russia and China at the same times as part of a damage limitation or warfighting strategy. It is hard to overstate the global and strategic consequences of such a determination. Moreover, seeking to maintain dual parity with both countries could, in turn, lead Russia and China to each build up individually to restore their own parity with the United States — a cycle that could lead to a global arms race of unparalleled scope. However, as there is as yet no indication that the nature of the relationship between the two states is anywhere close to one that would involve joint nuclear war fighting, or indeed putting one state at risk for the benefit of the other. The relationship, as of today and for the foreseeable future, remains highly transactional. Any suggestions that the Russia-China relationship has evolved to this level requires the highest level of scrutiny both for its consequences but also for how it would go against many hundreds of years of political history between the two states.</p> +<p>While the strategies are largely aligned on these overarching principles, they differ on details of how to manage complexity and uncertainty in the evolving geopolitical and technological landscapes. Areas of disagreement include:</p> -<p>In sum, as indicated under President Biden, it would appear that the United States can deter nuclear use by Russia and China without needing to match the combined nuclear forces of each. Of course, a future president might determine that U.S. nuclear forces need to be configured in a way to hold all nuclear forces in both Russia and China at risk at the same time for other reasons. Those needs cannot be discounted, but that would be distinct from any deterrence requirements. The financial and security implications of having to match the nuclear arsenals of both countries at the same time would be significant, and any allied demands or presidential determination along those lines would have to be balanced against the financial and opportunity costs. Options for dealing with such requirements, including reducing reliance on land-based systems, increasing less vulnerable submarine-based nuclear options, and further enhancing nonnuclear options that can replace nuclear missions, would also have to be part of those deliberations. Likewise, to the extent that reassurance of allies is a major driving force in U.S. nuclear requirements, other factors, including economic, geopolitical, technical, and domestic political factors, must also be taken into account. It should be recognized within the nuclear security and deterrence communities that there is a limit to what can be accomplished by seeking to compensate for a lack of confidence in U.S. intent with enhanced nuclear capability.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Beijing’s intentions, and how the United States can influence China’s strategic calculus.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Whether or not the United States should expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal, such as with nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-Ns) or with a warhead buildup when New START expires.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The escalatory risks of nuclear weapons, particularly in the face of advanced conventional weapons and nonnuclear strategic capabilities.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Reliance on nuclear weapons for extended deterrence and as a tool to strengthen credibility with allies.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How the United States might incentivize China to join arms control agreements.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Reassuring of allies in a world with more than one nuclear peer will clearly be among the more difficult challenges for the United States. As relative U.S. power and influence wanes, the United States’ commitments to its allies will come increasingly into question. To address this, the United States must continue to encourage allies to take on a greater portion of conventional deterrence and defenses capabilities; improve alliance military integration and economic and diplomatic coordination; maintain unified policies designed to protect territorial integrity and the global rule of law; and develop more nuanced strategies for deterring key dangers without overextending U.S. capabilities. This is a tall order and goes well beyond nuclear strategy. The risk, however, is that in such an environment U.S. policymakers will assign to nuclear weapons more missions to which they are not well suited, enhancing the perceived value and utility of nuclear weapons.</p> +<p>The remainder of this section offers a more in-depth analysis of how the competing strategies address questions of force posture, modernization, extended deterrence, and arms control. The authors were given a series of assumptions and guiding questions, which are included here for context.</p> -<p>In an era where U.S. assurances are seen more skeptically, there will temptation for allies to pursue their own nuclear capabilities and for the United States to tolerate or even accept such trends. U.S. policy needs to anticipate this and develop more holistic approaches that discourage and increasingly stigmatize the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by more states, friends and foes alike. This requires the United States to invest more heavily in developing effective arms control strategies that consider trade-offs between categories of weapons — nuclear and nonnuclear — and set strategic priorities for negotiated agreements. Determining what the United States is trying to do (e.g., increase decision time, reduce the risk of battlefield nuclear use, and enhance crisis stability) and developing the means to verify commitments that can achieve those goals should be far higher priorities than they are today. This should include a willingness of the United States and its allies to more openly consider constraints on Western defense and nuclear capabilities if they can achieve valuable and verified constraints on the part of major adversaries. Just as arms control should not become a means unto itself, nuclear and conventional force modernization should not be an end, but a means to an end — achieving enhanced stability and security. Pursuing military capabilities without an integrated diplomatic and arms control strategy is a recipe for a never-ending arms race and crisis instability.</p> +<h4 id="framing-assumptions">Framing Assumptions</h4> -<h4 id="force-structure-and-modernization">Force Structure and Modernization</h4> +<p>DETERRENCE STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR POSTURE REQUIREMENTS</p> -<p>The nuclear triad is a misnomer. The United States currently maintains a nuclear pentad, with five distinct platforms for delivering nuclear weapons: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), air-launched cruise missiles, air-dropped gravity bombs on strategic bombers, and air dropped-gravity bombs on shorter-range fighter/bomber aircraft. All aspects of this pentad of nuclear delivery platforms are in the process of being replaced with modern versions with life-extended warheads and nuclear explosive packages.</p> +<p><strong>Assumption #1</strong>: The United States will pursue a multi-domain deterrence strategy to deal with complexity and uncertainty in the current and future threat environment, and nuclear weapons will remain one element of a broader approach. This raises the following questions with regards to deterring two peer competitors:</p> -<p>This program is more than adequate to ensure the United States has a diverse and survivable nuclear force for core and extended nuclear deterrence for decades to come, assuming there is general consistency — as there has been for decades — in presidential employment guidance. Far more pressing are long overdue investments in nuclear command and control and early warning capabilities and efforts to carry out long-term warhead surveillance and nuclear infrastructure modernization to maintain the United States’ nuclear weapons. As long as the United States determines that it needs nuclear weapons for its defense and the defense of others, those weapons need to be safe, secure, and effective. Moreover, great efforts must continue to be made and enhanced to ensure that the United States can communicate with its allies and its adversaries in a crisis as needed and to ensure that nuclear weapons are only used when legally authorized by the commander in chief.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>What should the United States’ core deterrence objectives be in 2035?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Does deterring two peer competitors require overhauling current U.S. thinking about deterrence? How, and in what way?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How might nuclear force structure requirements change in the future, and what factors should the United States consider when setting those requirements going forward?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How should the United States approach integrating nuclear and conventional capabilities, as well as cyber and space operations, to deter two peer competitors while at the same time managing escalation dynamics?</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>There is little potential in today’s political and financial environment to debate the prospects for major changes in U.S. force structure. While adjustments to the forces may be made over time due to operational, cost, or technical factors (it is unlikely that the current program of record will come in anywhere close to on schedule or at estimated costs), the reality is the United States will likely continue to maintain all five current modes for nuclear employment. Those are more than sufficient to deter and, if necessary, carry out current or prospective U.S. presidential employment guidance. There are no compelling military or strategic rationales for pursuing other modes of employment, with a few exceptions discussed before on modernization. That being said, if there were a political opening to discuss strategic costs and benefits for U.S. force structure, there are strong arguments for the United States to move away from large silo-based ICBM forces, which risk creating escalatory pressures in a conflict, since these are easily targeted by an enemy and risk putting pressure on a U.S. president to use or lose these force in a crisis. Despite arguments from states that host ICBMs, these systems are the least stabilizing and most vulnerable part of the U.S. nuclear force.</p> +<p>Force posture refers to day-to-day and readiness status and the deployment location of various elements of the force; force structure refers to the kinds of nuclear forces to field.</p> -<p>It remains unclear whether the size of U.S. nuclear forces will need to change as China’s force grows. However, the capabilities the United States will need to have to reassure allies in East Asia remains a complex question. There is a strong numerical component to the perception that the United States is capable and prepared to protect U.S. allies in the face of a rising China. This is also the case vis-à-vis Russia. The question of “rough parity” may become more acute if and when China’s forces come within range of the United States’ deployed arsenal. However, this is not the case now, nor will it be for perhaps the next decade, with China having perhaps 400 total weapons to the United States’ 1,500 to 2,000 deployed nuclear weapons and just under 4,000 total weapons. Yet numbers may not resolve this debate. Already there are strong U.S. advocates for a new nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) in order to reassure allies. The United States retired the previous version of the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear in 2009. While it is understandable that analysts who want to reinforce U.S. alliances and reassure allies would seek a capability-based solution, there is a lack of a compelling military or force-exchange argument for these weapons. This is why the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the secretary of defense have advised the current administration not to pursue the SLCM-N. Instead, the main case for the SLCM-N rests on the argument that the United States must do something new to demonstrate its commitment to allies and its ability to act quickly in the region in the face of growing Chinese military capabilities.</p> +<p>In any future strategy, establishing who and what specifically the United States and its allies intend to deter is critical. The strategies agree that deterring nuclear use by U.S. adversaries should continue to be an enduring objective, as well as that Russia and China pose the most significant deterrence challenges, with North Korea posing a lesser threat. But these strategies do not simply approach the issue with a blank slate. The challenge of deterring two nuclear peers may be less about overhauling U.S. nuclear strategy and current thinking about deterrence and more about what capabilities and approaches are required to achieve the United States’ broader, long-standing objectives. Each of the strategies make clear that deterring nuclear use must be part and parcel of a broader deterrence strategy that seeks to deter aggression below the nuclear threshold — a goal consistent with the current U.S. strategy of deterring both aggression and strategic attacks on the United States and its allies and partners.</p> -<p>In the absence of a clear military case for nuclear SCLMs, however, the United States should instead work with allies on a broader range of deterrence and reassurance options — nuclear and nonnuclear — to determine if other forms of reassurance may be equally or more credible than new nuclear weapons without the commensurate costs and risk associated with developing and deploying yet another new nuclear system. It is worth noting that U.S. allies will continue to ask for whatever options might be available for the United States, particularly if they do not have to pay for or face the consequences of those procurement decisions. To determine how valuable such systems might be for deterrence, it would be useful for U.S. allies to be asked to invest in the development and procurement of those systems to determine where they actually sit on these countries’ lists of defense priorities. There should be little debate that the United States should continue to work to reassure its allies. However, U.S. actors have a responsibility to understand that much of the doubt among U.S. allies comes not from the range of U.S. nuclear or conventional military capabilities, but due to domestic political and geostrategic factors. There would seem to be little the United States can do with a SLCM-N to address those doubts and concerns. For now, the United States seems to have found a mix of interoperability with Japan and enhanced nuclear communication and coordination with South Korea that may provide time for the United States and its allies to find more effective and less nuclear-focused options to enhance reassurance and defense.</p> +<p>Much of the analysis and many of the recommendations in this report deal primarily with two separate but related deterrence challenges. The first is deterring limited nuclear use, a particularly pronounced challenge considering the prospects for a regional conflict to escalate beyond the conventional level and the fact that limited nuclear use is perhaps the most likely pathway to large-scale escalation. The strategies differ on the question of what will deter Russia or China from escalating to limited nuclear use in a regional conflict and what options a president might want available if deterrence fails. Miller as well as Karako and Soofer weigh different options for augmenting existing low-yield capabilities and conclude that the United States should move forward with the SLCM-N to increase the availability of credible response options. Tomero, Mastro, and Wolfsthal reject this notion. Wolfsthal argues there is no need to change U.S. force posture and what he identifies as the “five current modes of nuclear employment.” Tomero argues instead that deterring limited nuclear war “requires credible signaling that an adversary will not gain any military or political advantage from using nuclear weapons,” and that “adding ever more low-yield nuclear weapons cannot substitute for credible threats clearly communicated.” Alternatives for signaling threat credibility are relatively under-explored in some of the papers, however. Supporters of SLCM-N argue that signaling to adversaries that they cannot gain an advantage may be difficult or impossible with non-nuclear capabilities, whereas appropriate nuclear capabilities have a unique ability to signal resolve to adversaries and allies alike.</p> -<p>Beyond deterrence and reassurance, it remains possible that a future U.S. president may determine that it is important for the United States to hold all Chinese nuclear forces at risk, for either force-exchange or nuclear war-fighting reasons. The determination of what U.S. nuclear weapons are for and when they might be used is exclusively the president’s decision. To prepare for this option, without having to pursue it prematurely, the United States should continue to invest in a flexible and responsive nuclear infrastructure. Investments to date have not been adequate, nor is the defense-industrial capacity in place to quickly and safely ensure the United States can respond to geopolitical developments. Instead, the United States has chosen to prioritize new delivery systems — a balance that risks leaving it with fewer deployed weapons than it might need as well as a less than responsive infrastructure. In short, there is not enough money, people, and capable companies to go around. At the same time, the need to upgrade U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (C3) systems remains both relevant and pressing. Instead of making nuclear planning decisions on the basis of numbers alone, the United States should adopt a nuclear strategy that ensures the survivability of forces, as well as the responsiveness of people and facilities, and invests needed resources in broader forms (mostly nonnuclear) of defense, deterrence, and reassurance. A wide variety of options for pursuing this exists.</p> +<p>The second deterrence challenge is deterring collusion and opportunistic aggression, or the notion that Russia and China (or a regional actor) could conduct simultaneous or sequential attacks that would force the United States to deter and possibly wage large-scale conflicts in two theaters against two nuclear peers. The strategies make slightly different assumptions about what “opportunistic aggression” or simultaneous conflicts might entail. Soofer and Karako argue that the need to deter a simultaneous conflict with Russia and China places “an increasing burden on the role of nuclear weapons to deter conventional aggression.” Mastro, on the other hand, argues that “nuclear weapons do not deter admittedly problematic conventional activities,” and that “the United States should avoid this pathway for the sake of assuring allies because it could encourage China to then threaten nuclear use in response to U.S. conventional activity, which would seriously complicate defense planning.” And Miller stresses the importance of simultaneous deterrence because of the risk of collusion.</p> -<p>In short, the United States, for now and the foreseeable future, has a nuclear force capable of deterring China and reassuring allies, but over time this may not be true and should be routinely reassessed. The balance that needs to be struck cannot be defined now but should include a healthy dose of skepticism regarding the role that enhanced capabilities (especially nuclear) can provide, instead relying on a more tailored and nuanced set of defense, deterrence, and reassurance strategies.</p> +<p>MODERNIZATION</p> -<p>It also remains important to keep in mind the significant expense associated with nuclear modernization. While a price tag of some $50 billion a year is small compared with an overall defense budget rapidly approaching $1 trillion per year, the long-term sustainability of such a program over the next 30 years — especially given the likelihood of cost overruns and project delays — cannot be assumed. There is renewed evidence that, in fact, the cost of U.S. nuclear modernization does compete with other defense priorities and obligations. The pronounced necessity for the United States to provide cluster munitions to Ukraine due to an acute shortage of even basic 155 mm artillery shells shows that U.S. defense investments may need to be dramatically realigned given actual defense conditions globally. The costs of nuclear weapons must also be considered, as voices within the U.S. domestic political scene call increasingly for the government to do less abroad and more at home, calls that stem from both the conservative and progressive sides of the political spectrum. It is just as common to hear unilateralist Republicans call for more fire stations at home as it is to hear similar statements from extremely progressive voices, echoing the old “guns versus butter” debate. Supporters of the nuclear modernization program like to point to what they call a consensus for nuclear modernization, but there remains a real prospect that this “consensus” is fragile, as it exists inside a very narrow band and can change rapidly. Should support for nuclear programs change, three options in particular should be considered:</p> +<p><strong>Assumption #2</strong>: The United States will continue to strategically compete with adversaries by modernizing U.S. nuclear forces and developing emerging technologies. This raises the following questions in regard to two peer competitors:</p> -<ol> +<ul> <li> - <p>Reduce the ICBM buy and consider multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs). It remains unclear why the United States needs to maintain 450 ICBM silos from a deterrence perspective. The idea that a widely dispersed set of ICBMs complicates targeting by an adversary is not unreasonable, but the distinction between 300 and 450 seems far from critical in this case. Moreover, unlike in the Cold War, it is not credible to be concerned that the difference between 300 and 450 aim points will prove a tipping point for a state in deciding whether or not to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike.</p> - - <p>Moreover, the impetus for moving to single-warhead ICBMs was part of a negotiating process with Russia that sought to reduce its reliance on MIRVed ICBMs. That decision has already been made, and Russia has invested heavily in and is deploying such weapons. While it would be more stabilizing in a crisis for both the United States and Russia to have ICBMs with single reentry vehicles, the importance of doing so is no longer as relevant as it was in the 1990s when the concept was developed. Thus, the United States should consider the option of deploying fewer ICBMs and equipping some with multiple reentry vehicles. A reasonable option could be 300 ICBMs with some combination of one or two reentry vehicles. This option may prove valuable if ICBM production is affected by challenges such as slipping timelines or cost increases.</p> + <p>Are current modernization plans and the nuclear triad fit for the purpose of deterring two peer competitors?</p> </li> <li> - <p>Invest in mobile ICBMs. If the United States plans to continue to consider its nuclear forces as retaliatory and wants to ensure their ability to survive a first strike, the option of mobility should be considered. If cost is not an issue, then there is all the more reason to consider whether the United States should pursue a mobile ICBM program instead of or as a partial replacement for the planned ICBM modernization program. Systems could be kept in bastions during normal times and scrambled as a signal in times of crisis. Such system could be far more survivable than fixed ICBMs. The cost implications are not insignificant and should be studied. This is also an important issue in the highly unlikely but not fully dismissible case that U.S. ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) become more vulnerable due to advances in anti-submarine warfare capabilities enhanced by underwater drones and artificial intelligence. Mobility and survivability for U.S. ICBMs would seem to be justified and are worth considering, especially if they could result in a smaller production run for missiles.</p> + <p>If deterring two peer adversaries requires adjustments to current modernization plans, what changes might be required, what limitations exist, and how could the United States manage the risks of a future arms race?</p> </li> <li> - <p>Consider expanded Columbia-class submarine buys in lieu of ICBM construction. U.S. submarines remain highly survivable and critical elements for deterrence. They are more stabilizing than ICBMs because they are hard to target and do not need to be used early in a conflict. As the U.S. need to reassure allies increases, there may be a greater need to enable port visits for U.S. SSBNs to U.S. allies. In a future where U.S. requirements for deterrence or reassurance increase, building a larger SLBM force — with equal or reduced loading of weapons — may make sense.</p> + <p>Will the development of artificial intelligence (AI) and other advanced technologies by the United States and its adversaries confer greater benefits to U.S. deterrence efforts?</p> </li> -</ol> +</ul> -<p>Overall, the United States should prioritize, to the extent that such trade-offs prove necessary, its submarine and bomber development programs and stockpile stewardship and surveillance programs over the ICBM modernization effort. ICBMs remain the most vulnerable and arguably the least stabilizing leg of the nuclear force structure, and their reduction and even elimination would not inherently undermine U.S. deterrence goals, depending on broader employment guidance and geopolitical circumstances. There also remain questions about the eventual scope of the B-21 bomber acquisition program. There are hopes that this effort will not replicate the B-2 effort that sought to purchase 100 bombers and ended with only one-fifth of that fleet, but the significant costs of the program suggest that there remain long-term obstacles to the program reaching its full size.</p> +<p>The United States is currently in the midst of a massive effort to modernize every element of its nuclear forces. The strategies differ on what changes can and should be made to the current program of record, but they largely agree on the importance of building a more responsive nuclear infrastructure and prioritizing investments in nuclear command and control upgrades. Mastro takes a wide look at the trade-offs between nuclear force modernization and conventional force posture investments and concludes that “in instances in which nuclear modernization may come at the expense of conventional force development, conventional force development should have priority.” Miller, on the other hand, argues that the “current U.S. nuclear modernization plan itself is necessary but not sufficient.” He explains, “simple logic and arithmetic suggest that the force level enshrined in the New START treaty in the 2010s and designed for a world far different from today’s is insufficient for 2023 — let alone for later in this decade and on into the 2030s.” Given the long lead times and industrial capacity constraints that currently exist, Miller as well as Soofer and Karako make the case for uploading additional warheads on existing platforms, or at least ensuring that U.S. forces can do so if and when necessary.</p> -<p>Also, the United States should avoid the tendency to develop nuclear weapons systems solely as part of either an arms control or reassurance strategy. The temptation to develop a SLCM-N in order to provide enhanced assurance to East Asian allies in ineffective, counterproductive, and anachronistic. Dubbed “shiny object reassurance,” the idea that the deterrence credibility of the United States is significantly enhanced if it buys a dedicated nuclear system for the protection of allies lacks evidence and does not withstand serious scrutiny.</p> +<p>Tomero, on the other hand, does not support an increase to the current U.S. stockpile but leaves open the possibility of changes to the current modernization program, arguing that the United States should “prioritize survivable platforms and architectures to provide stability and resilience” and “think more creatively about basing modes and concepts of operation.” Wolfsthal agrees with Tomero that the current program of record is “more than adequate” but highlights the importance of investment in nuclear command and control and early warning capabilities. How many and what kinds of nuclear weapons the United States needs to support its strategy is a matter of significant debate in this series, and one that comes down to, in part, how the strategies consider the trade-offs between nuclear modernization and investments in conventional capabilities and forces. These debates fundamentally revolve around the question of the role of nuclear weapons in different strategies and what forces will be required to enable those strategies.</p> -<p>As the United States pursues nuclear modernization, it is critical that U.S. nuclear policy and investments not be made in a vacuum or in isolation from other critical components of U.S. military and diplomatic strategy. The Biden administration’s decision to approach the Nuclear Posture Review and National Defense Strategy as a cohesive process was a step in the right direction, but it still drew upon stovepipes within the nuclear process to inform its policies. Instead, a broader frame is needed for future strategic planning. As the United States pursues these strategies, there are certain guidelines that should be followed, including investments in three key areas:</p> +<h4 id="extended-deterrence-and-assurance">Extended Deterrence and Assurance</h4> -<ol> +<p><strong>Assumption #3</strong>: The United States will continue to provide extended deterrence and assurance guarantees to allies in Europe and Asia. This raises the following questions:</p> + +<ul> <li> - <p>Ensure the integrated foundations of deterrence. The key to a stable deterrent dynamic is ensuring the combined capabilities of the United States and its allies conventional and nonnuclear, nonconventional capabilities (e.g., space, cyber, AI, and non-kinetic), and political strategies are sufficient to deny China (and to a lesser extent Russia) the ability to unilaterally undermine the security of U.S. allies and partners without facing significant consequences that put the success of any such attack in doubt.</p> + <p>How can the United States assure a diverse group of allies against two peer competitors and other regional threats, and how might allies contribute more to their own security?</p> </li> <li> - <p>Enhance U.S. intelligence and broader analytical understanding of Russian and Chinese goals, objectives, and priorities to inform both U.S. deterrence and diplomatic strategy. If the goal of U.S. nuclear forces is to, inter alia, hold key targets that Russia and China value at risk, then it needs to have high confidence that it knows what those military targets are and the ability to put them at risk through a variety of means. It remains far from certain that either state (especially China) views its strategic nuclear assets as among its most valued targets.</p> + <p>What synchronization challenges with allies should the United States expect to face in the future? How can the United States best prepare to overcome these challenges?</p> </li> <li> - <p>Enhance the ability of the United States to use nonnuclear and nonmilitary means to influence Russian and Chinese behavior and actions. There are far more opportunities to influence China, given that it is far more economically integrated into the world system now than the Soviet Union was during the Cold War. These opportunities should be emphasized, and a broader deterrence and influence strategy should be developed to lessen the need to rely on either conventional or nuclear response options.</p> + <p>How might divergent threat perceptions among allies affect the future of U.S. extended deterrence and perceptions of U.S. credibility?</p> </li> -</ol> +</ul> -<h4 id="extended-deterrence-and-assurance-3">Extended Deterrence and Assurance</h4> +<p>All strategies recognized the need for the United States to strengthen its credibility with allies. The majority of strategies recognized that nuclear risks will be highest in regional conflicts, likely involving U.S. allies. Extended deterrence and assurance, therefore, will be essential for a U.S. strategy in deterring two peer competitors, but it will also be challenging. As such, the United States needs to take steps to strengthen credibility with allies. All strategies spoke to this point, with varying recommendations for how to do so. Tomero focuses on more non-nuclear interoperability, Karako and Soofer recommend more consultations, and Mastro also suggests more consultations along with joint planning. Miller offers the most ambitious strategy for assurance, identifies why new capabilities, such as SLCM-N, serve important extended deterrence and assurance functions, and recommends integrating Japan and South Korea into AUKUS.</p> -<p>As discussed above, the United States should seek to sustain its core and extended nuclear deterrence commitments and capabilities. Doing so enhances U.S. and allied security and supports broader goals of preventing nuclear proliferation. Core nuclear and extended nuclear deterrence are seen as credible and stabilizing in normal times and as long as broader deterrence holds.</p> +<p>The strategies differ, however, in the escalatory risks of these assurance strategies, with Mastro particularly cautioning against increased reliance on nuclear weapons because of how this could be perceived in Beijing. Namely, Beijing could see an increased U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, a nuclear buildup, or any change in U.S. nuclear posture for the purposes of extended deterrence and assurance as a sign of the United States’ desire to gain supremacy over China in a future conflict, prompting an arms race in the region. Similarly, Wolfsthal warns that “being willing to resort to early and first use may have negative implications for crisis stability and arms racing.” Tomero and others consider nonnuclear options for assurance that may strike a delicate balance of strengthening extended deterrence and credibility with allies while avoiding an action-reaction cycle with China or Russia. But shifting away from nuclear weapons in signaling credibility and commitment could be risky in the security environment of the next decade.</p> -<p>The effort to use nuclear weapons to deter nonnuclear threats by nuclear-armed states, however, especially against allies, is seen by many as less credible and creates certain risks, including what is widely known as a commitment trap. By saying that the United States might be willing to use nuclear weapons in certain scenarios, the pressure to follow through on those pledges if those circumstances come to pass is significant. The long-standing debate over the value of trying to deter nonnuclear threats through the use of nuclear weapons is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon. While it remains possible that a stated willingness to use nuclear weapons first in certain nonnuclear scenarios may influence a nuclear-armed adversary’s course of action, U.S. policies that include options for first use can also make it more politically acceptable for U.S. adversaries to do the same (see Russian threats and justifications as one example). It is hard to determine the net effect of first-use options by the United States, but it would seem useful to consider not only whether ambiguity or possible first-use options might contribute to deterrence but also look at broader secondary and follow-on effects and how they impact U.S. security objectives. And as discussed above, determining on balance if the costs of such commitments are worth the benefits relies on subjective analysis. There is no question that allies want the United States to be ready and to project a willingness to use nuclear weapons early in a crisis. The maintenance of first-use options is driven mainly by a strong set of allied views that the adoption of more restrictive declaratory policies would undermine the goal of deterrence. Allied views on such issues were formed largely during the Cold War, based mainly on a logic that nuclear use would ensure the conflict is between the United States and its opponent and not fought only on allied territory. This logic still holds for many supporters of the status quo. That desire needs to be balanced against the very real evidence that being willing to resort to early and first use may have negative implications for crisis stability and arms racing, especially when combined with missile defenses and other strategic nonnuclear capabilities. Just as allied views need to be taken into account for many security issues, they should not be seen as absolute, as in the case of the decision to provide cluster munitions to Ukraine.</p> +<p>The strategies briefly touch on an important question as to whether or not U.S. allies should pursue independent nuclear programs. Mastro urges restraint on the part of the United States in supporting allies’ proliferation interests because of the potential risk that “this could undermine the global nonproliferation regime and increase the likelihood of nuclear use due to accident.” Conversely, Karako and Soofer suggest that over the long term it may become necessary to revisit the question of nuclear nonproliferation, and they consider the potential risks and benefits for Japan, for example, pursuing an independent nuclear program. To be clear, Karako and Soofer do not go so far as recommending this as a policy option, but they point to it as an important consideration as the United States develops a strategy for deterring two peer competitors.</p> -<p>What is clear is that there is no one-size-fits-all policy for providing assurances to allies and partners. Just as the United States has pursued tailored deterrence with regards to its adversaries, it must pursue tailored and expanded reassurance with regards to its allies, and this must include more than just nuclear or military components. An enhanced set of reassurance initiatives that focus on economic, political, technical, cultural, people-to-people, and other ties is critical to reinforcing extended reassurance in the coming decades. Moreover, in the defense and security spaces, it is clear that what works in Japan, as evidenced by their newly adopted defense policy and expanded conventional, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and space investments, may not be as effective in South Korea, and vice versa.</p> +<p>ARMS CONTROL</p> -<p>Given the trajectory of Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear and other defense capabilities, the United States should be guided by three main objectives in managing its alliance relationships:</p> +<p><strong>Assumption #4</strong>: The United States will continue to be obligated to comply with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and will continue to pursue a dual-track approach of arms control and deterrence. It will complete implementation of New START in 2026, but whether or not there is a follow-on arms control effort is undecided and up to the discretion of the authors. This raises the following questions:</p> -<ol> +<ul> <li> - <p>Strengthen the credibility of core and extended nuclear deterrence;</p> + <p>How can the United States continue to pursue progress toward arms control and disarmament while deterring two peer competitors?</p> </li> <li> - <p>Enhance nonnuclear defense and deterrence capabilities through greater investments, integration, and cooperation with and among allies (U.S.-Japan defense planning offer an attractive model); and</p> + <p>What are the risks to U.S. interests if arms control efforts stall? How can the United States mitigate those risks?</p> </li> <li> - <p>Reduce, to the extent possible, the role of nuclear weapons in deterring nonnuclear threats and reinforce the barriers to acquisition of nuclear weapons or nuclear latency by allies.</p> + <p>Can the United States consider making meaningful progress toward Article VI commitments when Russia does not seem to be committed to making reciprocal moves and China has shown no willingness to limit its nuclear growth and modernization efforts?</p> </li> -</ol> - -<p>This last point remains critical. With a few exceptions in the 1950s and 1960s, the United States has remained committed to a basic axiom that the consequences of more countries acquiring nuclear weapons are negative for U.S. and global security and stability. Proliferation increases the risk of nuclear use, theft, and broader proliferation. All of these make it harder to maintain U.S. power and influence and the stability that has brought with it unparalleled American prosperity. The temptation to accept the acquisition of nuclear weapons by U.S. friends and allies is a siren song that should be resisted at all costs.</p> +</ul> -<p>It is appropriate for arms control to be considered in the context of broader deterrence and allied management policy. NATO itself has integrated deterrence and arms control as integral components of security for the alliance. The same concept holds true for U.S. allies in East Asia, as well as for U.S. security on its own.</p> +<p>One area of consistency across the strategies is support for arms control efforts, albeit in different forms. Mastro, for example, outlines options for engaging China on arms control for emerging technologies, which aligns with Tomero’s focus on the potentially escalatory nature of many of these capabilities. Miller recommends that the three competitors immediately pursue a test ban on fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS). Wolfsthal outlines priorities for modernization that will lay the groundwork for future arms control, such as increasing predictability and decisionmaking time, but stresses that the United States should not “pursue modernization to enhance arms control prospects.”</p> -<h4 id="arms-control-2">Arms Control</h4> +<p>While all strategies recognize the intersection of arms control and deterrence, there is disagreement in how they should operate in relationship to one another. Miller and Karako and Soofer emphasize that deterrence, to include force posture and modernization plans, should be the priority and precede any decisions about arms control. Conversely, Wolfsthal recommends that the United States “seek concepts that make nuclear weapon use less likely and less acceptable.” While these would seemingly be obvious priorities, they may be at odds with a deterrence strategy that will rely on moving deterrence “to the left,” deterring opportunistic aggression, and strengthening U.S. credibility among allies.</p> -<p>It is commonly stated today that arms control is either a policy of the past or that arms control is not possible without willing partners. Rumors of arms control’s demise remain premature, but it is accurate that effective arms control agreements are not possible without willing partners. That does not mean the work of thinking about, planning for, and pursuing arms control begins only when another country decides it is ready to talk. The United States continues to have a strategic incentive to develop and pursue policies that reduce the role of nuclear weapons in ways that enhance U.S. and allied security, predictability, and stability. Being committed to nuclear engagement and arms control shows the rest of the world, and importantly U.S. allies, that it is taking a balanced approach to security and threat management. Support for arms control has been and remains a valuable component of alliance management strategy. While defense procurements and deployments, as well as changes in policy, can influence alliance management and deterrent policies, arms control strategies and approaches can as well, including ones that help shape the strategic political and diplomatic landscape. By demonstrating over and over that the United States is the one interested in pursuing practical and serious arms control efforts to reduce nuclear risks and pursue reductions, it can either convince Russia and China to engage or demonstrate that it is Moscow and Beijing, not Washington, that is the obstacle to progress. Both goals are in the U.S. and allied interest. This approach is also a key component in demonstrating what the United States now calls “responsible nuclear behavior,” with important implications for its global diplomatic strategy.</p> +<p>By raising the question about the long-term desirability of nonproliferation, as discussed above, Karako and Soofer also challenge the assumption that implementing the disarmament envisioned by the NPT is in the United States’ long-term interests. For Wolfsthal in particular, remaining committed to reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and disarmament over the long term should be a priority. Undermining the NPT either by supporting proliferation or failing to commit to continued implementation of Article VI could have wider repercussions for the nuclear order.</p> -<p>The United States must remain active in developing bilateral and multilateral strategies for how arms control can enhance U.S. and allied security, alliance management, and deterrence. This includes doing complicated analysis on what adjustments the United States and its allies would be prepared to make in order to find agreement with Russia or China, for example, on changes to their military capabilities. Knowing what the United States would want Russia and China do to, and for what purpose as part of constraint agreements, is a key component, currently lacking from U.S. strategy. This was the type of net assessment that was inherent in the negotiation and adoption of the U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile, Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty (SALT) I, and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces agreements.</p> +<h4 id="first-principles-for-deterring-two-peer-competitors">First Principles for Deterring Two Peer Competitors</h4> -<p>In order to develop and shape the diplomatic landscape for future arms control with Russia and China, the United States and its allies should:</p> +<p>Plans and requirements for U.S. force posture, modernization, extended deterrence, and arms control will all fundamentally depend on the overarching U.S. deterrence strategy. The competing strategies — including their areas of agreement and disagreement — help to tease out certain fundamentals that should guide such a deterrence strategy. Based on these arguments, this report identifies 10 “first principles” to inform strategy and policymaking across the U.S. government. These principles are not agreed to by all the authors but are the analysis of the PONI research team based on reviewing the competing strategies.</p> -<ol> +<ul> <li> - <p>seek concepts that make nuclear weapons use less likely and less acceptable;</p> + <p>Principle 1: The fundamentals of how deterrence works have not changed. U.S. decisionmakers should be specific about who and what they are attempting to deter. Deterrence continues to rely on capability, credibility, and communication. It requires convincing an adversary’s leadership that they cannot achieve their objectives through aggression or escalation and that they will incur costs that far exceed any gains they hope to achieve. This requires, in part, identifying and holding at risk what an adversary values most, being able to deliver on that threat, and being able to impose unacceptable costs. The impending two-peer threat environment is unprecedented and requires tailoring deterrence to two different competitors, separately and in combination. Specifically, it requires a strategy that identifies who the United States is trying to deter, what it is trying to deter, and under what conditions. Extended deterrence fundamentals are also the same as they have always been, but they require tailoring to multiple allies with diverse requirements and concerns.</p> </li> <li> - <p>enhance decision times for leaders on all aides;</p> + <p>Principle 2: The United States does not need to match Russia and China’s combined arsenal size, but it does need to evaluate U.S. force requirements in order to compete with Russia and China to strengthen strategic stability, maintain a credible deterrent, reassure allies, and achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails. This competition will likely require some nuclear buildup, particularly for more flexible systems; however, it can also entail nonnuclear capabilities and finding new applications of emerging technologies that enhance deterrence. Any nuclear buildup should take into account the potential risks of misperception and escalation by Beijing and Moscow.</p> </li> <li> - <p>find ways to reduce the possible incentives for states to use nuclear weapons easily in a crisis or under threat of nuclear attack;</p> + <p>Principle 3: The United States should not make any unilateral reductions to its nuclear arsenal or cut back on the current program of record. Doing so would limit options for a U.S. president in future crisis scenarios. It could undermine the fundamentals of deterrence — the ability to deliver upon a threat in a way that is credible. Additionally, any unilateral reductions at this time would further weaken the United States’ credibility with allies and the credibility of threats to adversaries. This includes any unilateral reductions in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) nuclear mission or by other NATO nuclear actors.</p> </li> <li> - <p>create predictability in nuclear force structure changes that can reduce the pressure to pursue worst- case planning on all sides;</p> + <p>Principle 4: Flexibility should be a priority in both force posture and force structure. The president should have more options, nuclear and non-nuclear, in the event of a catastrophic threat to the United States or its allies. More flexibility will also strengthen credibility. In terms of force posture, this might require more ambiguity in the United States’ declaratory policy and removing mention of plans to work toward a “sole purpose” doctrine. And in terms of force structure, this means reconsidering supplemental nuclear delivery platforms that are survivable, rapidly available in theater, and credible, such as SLCM-N, along with more advanced conventional options that can deliver deep precision strikes and hit hard and deeply buried targets. Overall, the nuclear enterprise will need to become more agile to respond to these changes.</p> </li> <li> - <p>ensure that arms control and reduction requirements are factored into procurement and modernization decisions (contract adjustments that include opt-outs for procurement by the Department of Defense and National Nuclear Security Administration);</p> + <p>Principle 5: Emerging technologies are an essential domain of competition. Many of these technologies risk giving an adversary an asymmetric strategic advantage, undermining strategic stability, and increasing nuclear risks. At a minimum, the United States should commit — unilaterally or multilaterally, such as through the P5 process — to keeping a human in the loop in nuclear decisionmaking. The United States should compete in emerging technologies, to include AI and hypersonics, both to avoid strategic surprise and to provide the president with more response options, including non-kinetic ones. Any strategy for deterring peer competitors should capitalize on the potential advantages of emerging technologies but also balance these developments with efforts to avoid their potentially destabilizing effects, such as by including them in a future strategic stability dialogue with Beijing.</p> </li> <li> - <p>do not pursue modernization to enhance arms control prospects. Be prepared to adjust modernization efforts as part of negotiated agreements or new arrangements if possible, and develop and pursue proposals for them before modernization programs come to an end; and</p> + <p>Principle 6: U.S. strategy should give more attention to preventing and managing escalation at the regional level. Deterrence strategy should focus on deterring regional coercion and aggression, to include opportunistic aggression, re-establishing deterrence in the event of escalation, and signaling resolve to defend allies. At the same time, the United States will need to ensure a capability to deter and defend against attacks on the homeland and ensure the survivability of the U.S. arsenal. This will require a more diverse deterrence tool kit, to include nonnuclear strategic capabilities.</p> </li> <li> - <p>pursue broader public diplomacy efforts to demonstrate that the United States is seeking stability and security through arms control as well as defense and modernization efforts.</p> + <p>Principle 7: Allies are a force-multiplier. Strengthening U.S. credibility with allies should be a priority. Assuring allies may require even more effort than deterring adversaries. Potential tools for doing so include additional capabilities, such as SLCM-N and rapid deployment of the nuclear-capable F-35, as the best way to strengthen credibility with allies. Washington can also improve nonnuclear interoperability with allies and address long-standing classification and export control challenges that impede its ability to share technologies and information with its closest allies. Other means of doing so include sustained investment in the nuclear enterprise, to include the National Nuclear Security Administration and the National Laboratories, more frequent and in-depth planning, consultations and exercises, and additional high-level standing dialogues.</p> </li> -</ol> + <li> + <p>Principle 8: Arms control and risk reduction initiatives can provide tools for escalation management and work hand-in-hand with deterrence. As deterrence becomes more integrated, so must arms control. Some specific arms control and risk reduction proposals to be considered include a multilateral FOBS test ban, joint P5 statements on a “human in the loop,” investment in new verification tools, cross-generational arms control knowledge transfer, and remaining open to dialogue with Beijing. Any future arms control with Russia will likely depend on the outcome of the war in Ukraine and on how China’s rapid nuclear force expansion affects U.S. nuclear force requirements.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Principle 9: Now is not the time to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. Reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and making more progress toward “general and complete disarmament,” as outlined in NPT Article VI, should remain a goal for long-term policy both for nonproliferation purposes and to uphold the rules-based international order. On the one hand, continuing to express this objective demonstrates U.S. commitment to the NPT and to upholding the nuclear order. Additionally, these signals are important for some allies with strong disarmament legacies and movements. On the other hand, in the current climate, such statements risk setting unrealistic expectations and undermining U.S. deterrence and assurance priorities. The United States can find other avenues for demonstrating commitment to Article VI, such as leading in the P5 process, combatting Russian and Chinese disinformation that threatens to undermine the NPT, and offering new arms control and risk reduction initiatives that will help avoid arms racing and nuclear use, the most fundamental shared objective among deterrence supporters and skeptics alike.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Principle 10: The United States should be a leader in the global nuclear order. This should include at least three main components. First and foremost, the United States should strengthen existing institutions, particularly the NPT. More states with nuclear weapons mean more nuclear risks. The nonproliferation regime still serves U.S. interests. It should discourage allies’ proliferation, which may require additional signals and capabilities as a demonstration of the United States’ commitment to their security. Second, the United States should prioritize more informal approaches to arms control and risk reduction measures. And finally, the United States can lay important groundwork now by investing in people, not just capabilities. The complexity of the security environment requires developing different kinds of analysts and leaders who can think holistically about deterrence and managing competition across both the nuclear and conventional realms. Developing a clear strategy, tailoring deterrence to specific adversaries, assuring allies, and making difficult decisions about how to plan, invest in, and employ U.S. forces are fundamentally human tasks that require investing in people — not just things. This means focusing on education, cognitive understanding and decisionmaking, and communication skills.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Based on current trends, it will be exceedingly hard for the United States to negotiate and adopt legally binding agreements with Russia that limit the size of each country’s strategic nuclear forces for several years. Likewise, China’s refusal to engage in direct strategic stability discussions with the United States suggests that any such efforts with Beijing will take longer to achieve. It may be possible that China will refuse any such engagement until its modernization efforts reach a level that gives Beijing confidence that it is able to maintain a fully survivable retaliatory capability that can withstand U.S. attack and U.S. and allies middle defense efforts.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h4> -<p>In this environment, the United States and its allies should pursue two strategies. The first is to be prepared to pursue arms control negotiations and reductions with either or both states if and when possible. This means investing in the people, technologies, and analysis to support rapid restart of arms control if and when geostrategic circumstances allow. The United States was not properly organized and prepared in the 1980s and 1990s when negotiating opportunities presented themselves, and any potential future capability gaps should be avoided. National and regional circumstances can change without warning, and the United States needs to be prepared to respond quickly on complicated diplomatic issues in the same way it seeks the ability to be able to respond to unpredictable military developments. The United States should be prepared to lead in these efforts and, even if not convinced that U.S. and allied adversaries will follow suit, should consider steps that do not significantly compromise U.S. and allied security in order to create global political and other pressure on adversaries in other ways. A prime example is the issue of transparency, where the United States can continue to demonstrate its commitment to predictability by sharing the size and general disposition of its nuclear forces and contrast its behavior with that of China and Russia, who refuse even the most basic steps toward predictability and transparency. Other steps, such as the anti-satellite direct ascent policy, offer examples where the United States loses little but can use the moral and political upper hand to contrast behavior among nuclear states.</p> +<p>The overarching finding of these strategies is that the United States needs increased flexibility. A flexible strategy will require focusing on investing in the nuclear enterprise so that it can become more agile and can respond to leadership demand signals and further changes in the threat environment. The United States should also immediately focus on strengthening its credibility with allies through consultations. It can lead on arms control and risk reduction by exploring multilateral opportunities, though these are likely to be informal and allow for flexibility in adapting to the new security environment. Over the medium and long term, that might require developing new conventional capabilities or new delivery platforms and building up the arsenal, which would require making decisions now about force structure and acquisition. Many of the necessary capabilities for deterring two peer competitors will have long lead times, and part of a flexible deterrence strategy requires flexibility in the nuclear enterprise that does not currently exist.</p> -<p>The development of serious, strategic, and viable arms control initiatives requires a whole-of-government effort within the United States. However, the knowledge and skill sets needed to develop, assess, and pursue such programs are in short supply. The retirement of an entire generation of U.S. experts and officials who pursued and implemented arms control in in the late twentieth-century means that the U.S. government and security community lack the necessary skills and experience to effectively pursue constructive arms control. Likewise, the political space to consider or even propose legal agreements to enhance U.S. security with Russia and China is hard to find. The political environment for restraint has always been hard, but the domestic political landscape has made it — and indeed many things that could benefit U.S. security — harder to pursue. The political will to pursue a balanced approach to security will clearly involve defense and deterrent investments, but the United States should also make investments in the ability to understand Russian and Chinese thinking and strategy, develop effective verification approaches, and pursue coordinated diplomatic strategies to achieve effective outcomes, whether normative, legal, or otherwise.</p> +<p>There are challenges to these first principles and recommendations. One potential risk is U.S. force posture and modernization decisions being misinterpreted by adversaries as aggression rather than a response to their actions. Another is further inhibiting prospects for arms control. Over the long term, many of these questions will depend on the evolution of the security environment; therefore, a flexible strategy is the best option for the strategic landscape of the next 10 years.</p> -<p>At a time when the United States is spending $50 billion per year on nuclear weapons alone, not including associated strategic programs, the investment in the future people, skills, technology, and analytical capacity needed in the sphere is unfathomably small. This mismatch will create a self-fulfilling policy outcome, where every problem has a nuclear solution but the ability to pursue offramps to arms race instability and de-escalation approaches has disappeared or largely atrophied. Likewise, the need for a robust civil society and academic and policy community outside government to inform, drive, and, when appropriate, support U.S. government efforts is also acute. A shortage of investment and career opportunities within the broader nuclear security and arms control field will deprive the U.S. government of a historical source of thinking and analysis on these important issues. Investments from both government and private foundations are needed to address these shortfalls.</p> +<h3 id="project-atom-defining-us-nuclear-strategy-20302050">Project Atom: Defining U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 2030–2050</h3> -<h4 id="conclusion-5">Conclusion</h4> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="rob-soofer-and-tom-karako">Rob Soofer and Tom Karako</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>The world faces a complex and extended period of global competition where the demands of managing nuclear risk will continue to grow. Understanding the limits of U.S. nuclear capabilities in both deterring adversaries and reassuring allies is a key part of getting this critical issue right. There are things the U.S. nuclear arsenal can do and some things it cannot, and nothing (just as in life) is cost-free. The balance — between (1) using U.S. nuclear weapons to deter and reassure while (2) seeking a change in global strategic conditions to permit a broader effort to curb proliferation and pursue nuclear restraint, reductions, and eventually elimination — needs to be kept in mind as the United States and its friends, allies, and partners navigate this complex era. Nuclear skepticism is needed to balance faith in nuclear deterrence. Investments in non-nuclear and even non-military approaches to both reassurance and deterrence, as well as serious efforts to reinvigorate arms control, will be as important as investments in new nuclear weapons and their associated delivery systems. A failure to pursue all of these approaches together will lead to negative outcomes for U.S. security and global stability.</p> +<h4 id="introduction">Introduction</h4> -<hr /> +<p>In August 2021, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Admiral Charles Richard, issued a public challenge for fresh thinking about deterrence theory and nuclear strategy:</p> -<p><strong>Heather Williams</strong> is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a senior associate fellow with the European Leadership Network, and a member of the Wilton Park Advisory Council.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>At STRATCOM, we are re-writing operational deterrence theory and asking the hard questions. This will take a national and academic undertaking. Only when we gain a fundamental understanding of how deterrence theory is applicable in today’s strategic environment, can we inform strategy, create a mutual understanding of that strategy and threat, and then execute plans in support of our national defense.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Kelsey Hartigan</strong> is the deputy director of the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) and a senior fellow with the International Security Program at CSIS. In this role, she is responsible for managing the country’s preeminent national program for developing the next generation of nuclear experts.</p> +<p>Consistent with Admiral Richard’s charge, Project Atom’s study objective is to determine the “best U.S. strategy for deterring two peer competitors” and to assist the United States in making “crucial decisions about its future nuclear strategy and forces.” While the broader question of deterring Russian and Chinese conventional aggression and adventurism must be foremost in these considerations, the focus of this paper is on the nuclear concepts, policies, strategies, forces, and posture necessary to deter and prevent nuclear use by Russia and China — the two nuclear peer (2NP) competitors. How the government addresses the 2NP, or three-party, problem also has implications for and will be influenced by budget and arms control considerations.</p> -<p><strong>Lachlan MacKenzie</strong> is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> +<p>For each of the research questions, this paper first outlines principles of theory and strategy, then applies these to the new Russian and Chinese strategic contexts.</p> -<p><strong>Robert M. Soofer</strong> is a senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he leads its Nuclear Strategy Project. He is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies, teaching courses in nuclear strategy, missile defense, and arms control.</p> +<h4 id="understanding-the-problem">Understanding the Problem</h4> -<p><strong>Thomas Karako</strong> is a senior fellow with the International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at CSIS, where he arrived in 2014. His research focuses on national security, missile defense, nuclear deterrence, and public law.</p> +<p>It has been the long-standing national security policy of the United States to deter aggression by Russia, China, and other states posing a threat to U.S. vital interests. As noted in the 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy, the United States’ top-level priority is to deter threats against and strategic attacks against the United States and its allies and partners. With respect to nuclear threats, the strategy and forces necessary to deter Chinese aggression and nuclear escalation have largely been considered a lesser included case: if the United States maintains the strength necessary to deter Russia, it can also deter a much smaller Chinese nuclear force. The expansion of Chinese power in all its dimensions (e.g., economic, conventional, nuclear, cyber, and space) means that China must be considered a true rival in its own right and no longer a lesser included nuclear case.</p> -<p><strong>Oriana Skylar Mastro</strong> is a center fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, where her research focuses on Chinese military and security policy, Asia-Pacific security issues, war termination, nuclear dynamics, and coercive diplomacy. She is also the courtesy assistant professor in the political science department at Stanford University and a non-resident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. She continues to serve in the United States Air Force Reserve, for which she works as an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) to the Policy and Posture Branch Chief at INDOPACOM J5, Camp Smith, Hawaii.</p> +<p>Complicating the strategic problem is the possibility that the United States may find itself in a crisis or conflict with both Russia and China at the same time — including the scenario of opportunistic aggression. This may be the result of intentional collusion or alliance between Russia and China, although it is difficult to be predictive on this score. As noted in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review: “In a potential conflict with a competitor, the United States would need to be able to deter opportunistic aggression by another competitor. We will rely in part on nuclear weapons to help mitigate this risk, recognizing that a near simultaneous conflict with two nuclear armed states would constitute an extreme circumstance.”</p> -<p><strong>Frank Miller</strong> served from January 2001 to March 2005 as a special assistant to President George W. Bush and as senior director for defense policy and arms control on the National Security Council staff. At the White House he was responsible for a wide range of presidential policy initiatives related to nuclear deterrence policy, strategic arms reductions, national space policy, defense trade reform, land mines, and transforming the U.S. and NATO militaries. He directed interagency support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.</p> +<p>The phrase “extreme circumstance” is noteworthy because it refers back to the long-standing U.S. policy that the nation would only employ nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend its vital interests. This phrasing suggests that in a circumstance where U.S. and allied conventional forces may not be adequate to address a simultaneous conflict with Russia and China, nuclear weapons may come into play. If this were the case in any particular scenario, then U.S. nuclear forces and strategy would play an important role.</p> -<p><strong>Leonor Tomero</strong> served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from January 2021–October 2021, supporting the under secretary of defense for policy and the assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans, and capabilities by developing strategies, informing policies, and conducting oversight of nuclear deterrence policy, arms control and missile defense policy.</p> +<p>The recognition that China has now amassed significant conventional capabilities makes the challenge more complex. In the context of renewed long-term strategic competition, the 2018 National Defense Strategy’s approach to conventional forces and a blunting strategy (i.e., forces in place to resist the initial aggression) is important to preclude nonnuclear strategic defeat. Strategic deterrence in the 2NP problem is more than just nuclear deterrence. The problem also includes the need to deter major aggression short of nuclear employment and to do so under two major nuclear shadows.</p> -<p><strong>Jon Wolfsthal</strong> is an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He served from 2014 to 2017 as special assistant to former U.S. president Barack Obama as senior director for arms control and nonproliferation at the National Security Council. In that post, he was the most senior White House official setting and implementing U.S. government policy on all aspects of arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear policy.</p>Heather Williams, et al.How can the United States deter two peer competitors? To assist U.S. policy makers in addressing this question, the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for deterring Russia and China through 2035.Prime The Innovation System2023-09-29T12:00:00+08:002023-09-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/priming-the-innovation-system<p><em>In an age when innovation is the primary engine for accelerating national competitiveness and strength, the United States needs to make significant and sustained investments to raise its game.</em></p> +<p>The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) notes that the United States must “be able to deter both large-scale and limited nuclear attacks from a range of adversaries” and that “the ability to deter limited nuclear use is the key to deterring non-nuclear aggression.” U.S. conventional forces alone are not currently adequate to address a simultaneous conflict with Russia and China (and possibly on the Korean peninsula), thus placing an increasing burden on the role of nuclear weapons to deter conventional aggression. In the face of the significant Chinese conventional force buildup, this relationship seems unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Increased conventional forces and air and missile defenses, however, will be critical to contribute to raising the threshold at which nuclear employment may be required to blunt non-nuclear aggression.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>In summary, potential Russian and Chinese cooperation poses a challenge to U.S. interests in peacetime, crisis, and war. In peacetime, the United States and its allies must be prepared to respond in a timely manner to potential future developments in the strategic postures of China and Russia, whether qualitative or quantitative. The United States must persuade Beijing and Moscow through words and deeds that nuclear competition is a failing proposition that will provide no strategic advantage. In a time of crisis, the United States and its allies would have to strengthen deterrence simultaneously in two theaters. This is not a new problem for U.S. military strategy, but the 2NP challenge puts a rising premium on the capacity of U.S. allies and partners to contribute to alliance deterrence postures in new ways.</p> -<p>To secure the economic and geopolitical advantage in the twenty-first century, the United States needs a technology strategy that reflects new realities, learns from the past, and is committed for the long term.</p> +<p>In war against one adversary, the United States would have to contemplate the possibility of war with the other, whether simultaneously or in close succession. This implies the need to be capable of strategic nuclear attacks against both Russia and China even after either or both engage in a preemptive nuclear attack on U.S. forces. The United States and its allies would also need to anticipate the consequences of (perhaps limited) nuclear strikes in one theater on the deterrence and escalation dynamics in the other theater. Would the third party conclude that the United States still would be willing to run additional risk after suffering nuclear strikes, or would they conclude instead that the United States would retreat in hope of avoiding further escalation?</p> -<p>The United States has long been the global leader in advanced technology. But accelerating global competition — especially from China — and a diminished U.S. ability to invent, produce, and refine new high-tech products means that we cannot take this position for granted.</p> +<h4 id="deterrence-theory-and-strategy">Deterrence Theory and Strategy</h4> -<p>Recognizing that an effective innovation system is a strategic priority, Congress in 2022 passed bipartisan legislation including the CHIPS and Science Act to renew the nation’s infrastructure, reshore advanced manufacturing networks, and accelerate the commercialization of green and emerging technologies.</p> +<p>While the nature of deterrence does not change, its character must adjust for new actors, circumstances, and weapons. To deter, one must create in the mind of the adversary the fear not to attack — to convince them that costs will outweigh the benefits and that the use of nuclear weapons is the worst possible choice. The credibility of nuclear deterrence depends on a combination of resolve and capabilities.</p> -<p>These measures are a continuation of a long and effective tradition of U.S. policies and partnerships to support science, technology, and innovation.</p> +<p>While China’s emergence as a serious nuclear competitor requires that the United States tailor its deterrence strategies, it is not clear that the central problems of nuclear deterrence have changed. The dilemmas of extended deterrence — that is, threatening to use nuclear weapons on behalf of distant allies despite one’s own vulnerability to nuclear retaliation — that existed during the Cold War in the U.S.-Russia context will be relived, albeit in a three-way contest. This may have implications for force structure but should not affect the theoretical underpinning and complexity of deterrence.</p> -<p>In forging the innovation system for the twenty-first century, policymakers need to make sure that they apply the positive lessons from the past. Importantly, these include sustained policy commitment followed by significant public support for the development of new technologies.</p> +<p>As during the Cold War, the United States must convince both Chinese and Russian leaders that the costs and risks of nuclear use will outweigh any benefits — that any nuclear use will make them worse off. This requires a belief in the credible use of nuclear weapons by the United States in response to the adversary’s use of nuclear weapons.</p> -<h3 id="government-role-in-the-innovation-system">Government Role in the Innovation System</h3> +<p>Does nuclear deterrence become more complicated in a three-way game? Three is not inherently more unstable than two, although that appears to be the conventional wisdom in the academic literature. One recent article compares the 2NP problem to the “three-body” problem in astrophysics, where it is impossible to predict the motion of three celestial bodies. Others fear the increasing prospect for misunderstanding or inadvertent nuclear use resulting from a greater number of nuclear great powers.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>“Government has played an important role in the technology development and transfer in almost every U.S. industry that has become competitive on a global scale.”</p> -</blockquote> +<p>It is also possible that a tripolar nuclear context would induce greater caution and stability. For instance, if Russian and U.S. leaders were to contemplate nuclear use against each other during a conventional conflict, they must also consider that China may be the unharmed beneficiary from that nuclear exchange — the last country standing, so to speak.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="vernon-ruttan-technology-growth-and-development">Vernon Ruttan, Technology Growth and Development</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>What if Russia and China collude to attack the United States simultaneously? Or what if one country takes the opportunity to challenge U.S. interests in one region while the United States is occupied with the other adversary? Does this weaken the United States’ ability to deter both at the same time? It is a challenging set of questions, to be sure, but in theory nuclear deterrence can hold if the United States successfully creates the necessary fear of nuclear use against both Russia and China under all circumstances. The concern is whether the United States may be so weakened by the first nuclear attack (or not be able to communicate with its nuclear forces) that this lessens the fear in the mind of the second adversary. It also begs the question of whether a combined nuclear attack would be able to effectively disarm the United States. The solution to these concerns is one of strategy and forces, not deterrence theory.</p> -<p>The foundations of the American innovation system can be found in the U.S. Constitution, which calls for patents to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Patents turn ideas into property that their owners can further develop in cooperation with others. To further promote coordination and interoperability, the Constitution also gives Congress the power to “fix the standard of weight and measurement.”</p> +<p>This dilemma is related to, but not to be confused with, the traditional “two-war” problem that U.S. presidents have faced since the end of the Cold War. In 1993, President Bill Clinton adopted a readiness standard to fight a large offensive ground war in the Persian Gulf and another on the Korean peninsula, while George W. Bush laid out the requirement to simultaneously fight a war in two critical areas and be expected to win decisively in one of those conflicts, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Nuclear deterrence is not a substitute for strong conventional forces, which are needed to address the two-war problem.</p> -<p>Throughout its history, the United States has developed successful industrial policies to respond to national needs and new global realities.</p> +<p>On balance, it is not necessary to reconsider the nuclear deterrence theories developed during the Cold War to confront this environment. Nevertheless, the United States must ensure that it can operationalize deterrence through its nuclear strategy and forces. U.S. nuclear strategy must be able to achieve the political and military objectives established by the president for those forces. More fundamentally, U.S. nuclear employment must credibly be able to impose costs on the adversary that are out of all proportion to the assumed benefits of its action. If it can do so, this contributes to deterrence against both adversaries; if it is unable to do so, the United States must either alter the strategy or provide additional forces to implement the strategy against two nuclear peers.</p> -<p>In the modern context, industrial policy refers to active government support for the development of technologies that are deemed strategically important. This support has also taken the form of broader government investments in research and education followed by procurement. One recent successful U.S. industrial policy is the Trump administration’s effort to develop and produce vaccines during the coronavirus pandemic.</p> +<h4 id="the-logic-of-us-nuclear-strategy">The Logic of U.S. Nuclear Strategy</h4> -<p>Some orthodox economists deride industrial policies, seeing them as aid to businesses unable to successfully compete. In some cases, efforts to support ailing firms have failed. But in many of these cases, their inability to compete is rooted in the policies and market protection of other nations, or is simply the result of ineffective management. The Obama administration’s effort to resuscitate General Motors and Chrysler is one example where changes in management and re-capitalization proved hugely successful.</p> +<p>Nuclear strategy is the employment or threatened employment of nuclear weapons to achieve policy-related or wartime objectives. These objectives could include defense of the United States, an ally, or other vital interests, or terminating a nuclear exchange as quickly as possible. Political and military objectives could change during a conflict, and it may be necessary for nuclear strategy to adapt accordingly.</p> -<h3 id="roots-of-innovation-policy">Roots of Innovation Policy</h3> +<p>Nuclear strategy is related to nuclear deterrence because if the nuclear strategy is credible, it is more likely to persuade an adversary that the risks and costs of aggression outweigh any supposed benefits. If the nuclear strategy or its employment is not credible (either because the United States lacks capabilities or is threatened with unacceptable retaliation), this diminishes the deterrent effect. As former secretary of defense Robert S. McNamara said, “One cannot fashion a credible deterrent out of an incredible act.”</p> -<p>American industrial policy has a strong track record of supporting innovation and enabling new technologies through long-term policy continuity and support. This strategy has been successful. Indeed, many of these technologies have fundamentally transformed the U.S. economy.</p> +<p>U.S. nuclear strategy rests on the idea that the country’s ability to meet all nuclear provocations — large and small — can encourage adversaries to rethink their use of nuclear weapons. It is not a strategy of preemption or disarming first strikes. It does not require superiority or escalation dominance — only that the adversary likewise does not enjoy these advantages.</p> -<h4 id="foundations-of-innovation">Foundations of Innovation</h4> +<p>It is a strategy of resolve and restraint. U.S. employment of nuclear weapons could seek to restore deterrence (avert further escalation) after an adversary’s initial limited use of nuclear weapons in a theater of operations; to cease nuclear escalation at the lowest possible level of violence; or to convince the adversary that whatever led them to believe that using nuclear weapons would provide them an advantage was a mistake.</p> -<p>The earliest call for a U.S. industrial policy dates back to shortly after the nation’s founding. In 1791, Alexander Hamilton, the first secretary of the treasury, approached Congress with his Report on the Subject of Manufactures. Breaking with those who thought the United States should remain an agricultural nation, the report outlined a strategy to develop manufacturing. Its goals were to reduce dependency on Britain and ultimately build the material base for an independent national defense.</p> +<p>U.S. nuclear strategy deters large-scale nuclear attacks against the homeland by maintaining the capability to inflict costs unacceptable to an opponent. As such, U.S. nuclear forces would target an adversary’s senior leadership and political structures, nuclear and theater conventional forces, and war-supporting industry.</p> -<p>Since then, Hamilton’s call has been realized in an effective and evolving U.S. industrial policy. Throughout its history, the United States has used these policies to spur important innovations that have enhanced its security and technological leadership.</p> +<p>Maintaining the ability to retaliate against large-scale attacks against the United States reinforces the country’s ability to restore nuclear deterrence at lower levels because the adversary has nothing to gain from further nuclear escalation to the strategic nuclear level.</p> -<h4 id="the-postwar-strategy">The Postwar Strategy</h4> +<p>In terms of ends, ways, and means:</p> -<p>The pace of technological change picked up in the years following World War II. At that time, the U.S. manufacturing base was robust, having geared up for war production and postwar reconstruction.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>The ends of U.S. nuclear strategy are to help deter both large-scale conventional aggression and nuclear use and, should deterrence fail, restore deterrence with the least amount of nuclear destruction and on the best possible terms for the United States and its allies.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The means include a range of nuclear delivery systems with various yields to address a variety of regional and strategic scenarios. U.S. nuclear strategy calls for forces capable of delivering large-scale nuclear responses as well as limited and graduated response options.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The ways include nuclear strikes that limit further attacks on civilians by targeting adversary nuclear and conventional forces, strikes that hold at risk what the United States assesses that the adversary values, and, through selective restraint, incentivizes them from engaging in further attacks.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>But, as President Truman’s advisor Vannevar Bush pointed out at the time, the nation’s research base needed to be strengthened. To address this need, the U.S. government invested heavily in basic research, including through the creation of the National Science Foundation and the expansion of the National Laboratory system. It also actively recruited leading scientists and engineers from Europe.</p> +<p>It is difficult to know whether further exchanges could be limited once nuclear use occurs. But it is prudent to develop strategies for confronting limited nuclear use because the United States’ adversaries field capabilities to do so. There is always the risk that the adversary will ignore or misinterpret a U.S. signal of restraint and respond with large-scale attacks, though this would be tantamount to national suicide because the United States maintains the option for a large-scale nuclear response (an assured destruction capability).</p> -<p>This strategy contributed to new technological innovations that helped win the Cold War. Moreover, the new information and communications technologies generated by this strategy transformed the U.S. economy and underpin its economic leadership today.</p> +<p>This inherent uncertainty about what happens after limited nuclear use is one reason it is important to remember that nuclear forces do not exist in isolation and would not exist in isolation even after their employment. The dial does not simply switch from “conventional war” to “nuclear war.” Conventional forces, including long-range strike, continue to be relevant as both deterrents themselves and for damage limitation purposes. The war could well continue, even if it does not include further nuclear employment. U.S. Global Strike Command has control of significant nuclear forces, but they also control significant conventional strike, and there is little reason to suppose that conventional forces would cease even after limited nuclear use. The goal of stemming further escalation could even be enhanced by the simultaneous signals of restraint and resolve that would be communicated by returning to conventional strikes.</p> -<h4 id="capitalizing-on-us-research">Capitalizing on U.S. Research</h4> +<p>In addition to conventional strike, another aspect of conventional forces relevant to nuclear posture is air and missile defenses, which may contribute to the survivability of both nuclear and nonnuclear strategic assets. As the prospects increase for nonnuclear strategic attack, including through air and missile forces in particular, those assets that cannot be moved or hidden may require active defense. Such an approach underlies the Biden administration’s approach, led by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, to the 360-degree air and missile defense for Guam. Given its salience for power projection and broad U.S. deterrence and defense goals in the region, including for bomber forces, a significant attack that negated U.S. ability to project power from Guam would be a strategic event, irrespective of whether or not nuclear weapons were used. By raising the threshold for a successful attack on strategic power-projection abilities, air and missile defenses can contribute to crisis stability and to escalation control.</p> -<p>In the 1970s and 80s, Japan emerged as a major competitor in technology development and manufacturing. In response, new U.S. policies sought to more efficiently connect the research advances made at U.S. universities into development and commercialization of new competitive products by the private sector.</p> +<p>The risk that a limited nuclear escalation could, however, rise to large-scale nuclear attack adds to the deterrent effect at the outset. As noted in the 2020 Report to Congress on Nuclear Employment Guidance:</p> -<p>Together, these public-private partnerships promote cooperation across the innovation system. Widely seen as best practices in innovation policy, many have been adapted around the world. For example, countries as diverse as India and the United Kingdom have adopted or adapted Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) in an attempt to engage innovative small businesses more effectively in their national economies.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>A tailored and graduated nuclear response does not mean an adversary can confidently predict only a symmetrical response or that the adversary can define escalation thresholds by the matter of its initial nuclear use. What an adversary can confidently anticipate is the certainty of an effective U.S. response to nuclear attack, at any level, and in any context, in ways that will impose greater costs than any expected or hoped-for gain.</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="an-ecosystem-approach-to-innovation">An Ecosystem Approach to Innovation</h4> +<p>U.S. nuclear strategy seeks to deter adversary nuclear use by convincing them that there is no scenario for nuclear use to which the United States cannot respond in an unacceptably costly manner to the adversary. Should nuclear deterrence fail, the U.S. response is intended to demonstrate both resolve and restraint in the hope of convincing the adversary to abandon further nuclear use.</p> -<p>Throughout this postwar period, U.S. innovation strategy has relied on a relatively simple linear model of innovation.</p> +<p>But will this strategy hold up against two nuclear peers at the same time?</p> -<p>This model concentrated on public funding of basic research at the front end. From there, private actors would take the lead in applying that research to new products and bringing them to the market.</p> +<p>STRESS TESTING THE STRATEGY</p> -<p>Through the years, our understanding of the innovation process has advanced. Instead of a linear process, innovation is now understood as an “ecosystem” in which various networks each play a role in developing new technologies and bringing them to market. For innovation to move at its full potential, each of these networks need to operate individually as well as connect with the other networks through partnerships across the innovation ecosystem.</p> +<p>How does the logic of U.S. nuclear strategy stand up in a 2NP environment? Here is where the analysis becomes speculative and where assumptions can make a big difference. For the sake of discussion, the authors postulate the following to be the case by 2035:</p> -<ol> +<ul> <li> - <p>Research Networks</p> - - <p>American universities, research institutes, and national labs are rich sources of new ideas and concepts.</p> + <p>Russia and China deploy a triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems at roughly New START force levels (1,550 warheads and approximately 700 delivery systems).</p> </li> <li> - <p>Financial Networks</p> - - <p>Banks, venture capital funds, and other sources of capital provide the wherewithal for entrepreneurs to fund and develop these concepts into products and services for the market.</p> + <p>Russia and China enjoy significant regional nuclear superiority. Russia retains over 2,000 land, air, and sea-based “nonstrategic” nuclear weapons. China possesses over 900 nuclear-capable theater-range missiles.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Entrepreneurial Networks</p> - - <p>Start-ups, innovative firms, and small and medium manufacturers are key actors in the innovation system, drawing on new ideas, seeking funding, and driving innovation to the marketplace.</p> + <p>All nuclear forces will be on alert during a crisis; all adversaries will maintain the capability to launch under attack; and mobile land and sea forces will be dispersed, ensuring each country maintains an assured second-strike capability.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Educational and Training Networks</p> - - <p>Universities, colleges, and vocational institutes provide the skills and workforce needed by industry to scale up and produce new products and services.</p> + <p>The United States will continue to be vulnerable to the second-strike capabilities of Russia and China and unable to limit damage to politically acceptable levels through precision non-nuclear strikes, a disarming preemptive nuclear first-strike, or missile defense. The same is true for Russia and China in relation to potential strikes from the United States. All three powers, however, have significant air and missile defenses that could impede the penetration ability of some delivery systems.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Manufacturing and Distribution Networks</p> - - <p>Firms that make innovative products and services and find and develop markets are an integral part of the innovation system. R&amp;D and manufacturing are tightly intertwined — it is often not possible to design a product without understanding how it could be manufactured. Feedback from manufacturers and markets provides important feedback and financial returns for other stakeholders within the innovation system.</p> + <p>Russian and Chinese doctrines, like that of the United States, allow for limited nuclear use and escalation management. In other words, escalation to massive strategic nuclear strikes is not an inescapable conclusion but remains a possibility for which the United States must plan.</p> </li> -</ol> - -<h4 id="a-complete-ecosystem">A Complete Ecosystem</h4> +</ul> -<p>A healthy innovation ecosystem contains strong, dynamic, and distributed networks, with effective connections across networks. These make the system more resilient, more adaptive, and more capable of making use of the knowledge within the system — especially when compared to more planned systems. American traditions in individual initiative and entrepreneurship, combined with what Alexis de Tocqueville called “the spirit of association,” give the United States an innate advantage in building these innovation networks.</p> +<p>U.S. nuclear strategy for deterring limited or regional nuclear use is predicated on restoring deterrence (i.e., preventing further nuclear escalation) at the lowest level possible through flexible, limited, and graduated response options and by withholding strikes on what the adversary values most, to encourage restraint. The growth of Russian and Chinese nonstrategic nuclear forces suggest that the deterrent effect of this strategy may be diminished during a regional conflict. Russia and China have many more regional nuclear options, while the options available to the United States are not necessarily prompt, may lack survivability, and may be exposed to Russian and Chinese air defenses.</p> -<h3 id="todays-challenges">Today’s Challenges</h3> +<p>This rationale supported the 2018 NPR’s recommendation for the W76-2 low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warhead and the nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) to strengthen nuclear strategy and bolster nuclear deterrence at the regional level. The principal advantage of the SLCM-N over other theater nuclear options is that it provides a timely response from a platform already located in the theater rather than from fighter aircraft or long-range bombers generated from the U.S. homeland. Based at sea on attack submarines, the SLCM-N is inherently more survivable than land-based options and avoids potential political problems associated with asking host nations to base nuclear forces on their territory. Placing SLCM-N on attack submarines also complicates the anti-submarine warfare problem for adversaries, enhancing the overall survivability of the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad.</p> -<p>Emerging challenges have the potential to disrupt the United States’ innovation system. Understanding these challenges will be key to restoring U.S. leadership in innovation.</p> +<p>Assuming the United States continues to deploy the W76-2 and by 2030 deploys SCLM-N to bolster regional deterrence options, then the current U.S. nuclear strategy, forces, and force posture could be sufficient to enable U.S. nuclear strategy against both China and Russia at the theater level. Additionally, the United States must maintain sufficient survivable strategic nuclear forces to ensure that China or Russia do not contemplate disarming the United States at any point during the crisis. The assured retaliatory force must be large enough, at the end of whatever escalation ladder has been played out, to target what the leadership of both adversaries holds dear — presumably political and military control structures, strategic forces, and war recovery targets.</p> -<h4 id="the-loss-of-manufacturing">The Loss of Manufacturing</h4> +<p>What if U.S. strategy fails to induce restraint and one of the two adversaries escalates from limited to large-scale nuclear attacks against the U.S. homeland? At this point, the United States would need sufficient and enduring nuclear forces to keep fighting or deterring limited use in one theater while retaliating against a large-scale attack from the other adversary.</p> -<p>Over the past few decades, U.S. companies embraced outsourcing to capitalize on lower wages in Mexico and especially East Asia with the goal of lowering costs and increasing short-term shareholder returns. This has degraded U.S. manufacturing capabilities.</p> +<p>The requirements here are considerable. In addition to maintaining nuclear weapons of ample diversity, survivability, and adaptability to deter or respond to limited nuclear use by both adversaries, the United States must be capable of inflicting intolerable damage against both adversaries to deter up to two simultaneous, large-scale attacks against the U.S. homeland. It is a difficult (though not totally unlikely) scenario to imagine because U.S. nuclear forces will be on alert: even combined adversary attacks against U.S. nuclear forces should not be able to prevent the United States’ ability to respond, assuming it ensures that its forces and nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) are survivable and can operate over a protracted period.</p> -<p>Without a strong domestic manufacturing network, which is a close complement to research and commercialization activities, the entire domestic innovation system becomes less effective. For example, the drive by U.S. firms to offshore manufacturing of display screens to East Asia, combined with South Korea’s strategic investments in its domestic R&amp;D and manufacturing systems, led to the loss of the U.S. display industry to South Korea.</p> +<h4 id="modernization-and-force-posture">Modernization and Force Posture</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9Woda9v.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>To deter limited or large-scale nuclear escalation by an adversary, the United States requires a credible strategy for the employment of nuclear weapons in all circumstances against any combination of aggressors. This calls for a strategic nuclear force capable of limited and graduated nuclear options, backed by a secure capability for inflicting intolerable damage after absorbing a large-scale nuclear attack by, potentially, Russia and China. This leads to three force posture recommendations.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/C0wFIG0.png" alt="image02" /></p> +<p>First, the United States must never enter a position where adversaries could think that it could conduct a disarming first strike against U.S. nuclear forces. Therefore, the survivability and durability of U.S. nuclear forces remain the first priority. As China and Russia increase the size of their strategic nuclear forces, the United States can respond either by increasing the size of its strategic nuclear forces or by making its existing nuclear force more survivable and less targetable (or a combination of the two). While a full military-technical-political analysis of these measures is beyond the scope of this paper, some ways to improve that survivability may include:</p> -<h4 id="the-china-challenge">The China Challenge</h4> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Making a portion of the ICBM force road-mobile (garrison-based);</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Adding more redundant NC3 channels and pathways;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Enhancing bomber survivability earlier in a crisis (e.g., place on strip alert);</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Re-examining the relationship between warning, alert, stability, and dispersal levels (e.g., consider raising to higher alert levels, earlier in a crisis);</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Modifying procedures for SSBN deployment and operations to get more boats out to sea sooner; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Defending strategic forces and other critical infrastructure with limited air and missile defense with the objective of increasing the uncertainty of a successful disarming first strike against U.S. strategic nuclear forces.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>China has implemented a focused strategy to become a manufacturing powerhouse and innovation leader. It has massively increased its spending on R&amp;D — now second only to the United States — and importantly, much more of its R&amp;D budget is focused on applied rather than basic research.</p> +<p>Second, the United States must be capable of convincing adversaries that their limited nuclear usage in a regional confrontation would not succeed and would induce unacceptable risk and cost. The United States requires additional nuclear forces at the regional level to address Russia and China’s significant advantages in the numbers and types of nuclear weapons they have available in the region.</p> -<p>In addition, China is pursuing determined policies to ensure its dominance in artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, and quantum computing. It is especially focused on advanced semiconductor manufacturing, which the Chinese government correctly sees as a critical enabling technology for both civilian and military applications. China’s goal is to create a world-class high-tech manufacturing sector that is not reliant on inputs from other countries, and ultimately to make other countries dependent on its outputs.</p> +<p>Matching adversary numbers is not necessary. Rather, the deployment of some additional theater nuclear forces would signal to Russia and China that the United States is prepared to meet any potential limited or theater nuclear escalation without having to rely on strategic nuclear forces, which may not appear credible to the adversary or timely in certain circumstances. While the recommended course of action is to deploy a modest number of SLCM-Ns on attack submarines, other options to explore could include the following (though none of these options match the advantages in survivability and presence granted by SLCM-N):</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/PyEDSGZ.png" alt="image03" /></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Regionally deploy nuclear ground-launched, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty-range ballistic and cruise missiles;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Forward deploy dual-capable fighter aircraft to the Indo-Pacific, similar to U.S. deployment in Europe;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Demonstrate the ability to forward deploy B-52s with cruise missiles when needed; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Establish new nuclear burden-sharing, planning, and training arrangements with allies.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h4 id="meeting-the-challenges">Meeting the Challenges</h4> +<p>Third, with respect to strategic nuclear forces, it has been a long-standing policy requirement of U.S. strategic nuclear forces to target adversary nuclear forces, to the extent practicable, to limit the damage of retaliatory strikes. If this remains a critical targeting objective, then the United States may require additional nuclear forces to meet the growth in Chinese and Russian nuclear forces, though not on a weapon-for-weapon basis. Despite recent improvements in the accuracy and hard-target-kill capability of nuclear forces, the United States may find it difficult to limit adversary retaliation regardless of how many additional offensive forces it deploys because Russian and Chinese nuclear forces have become more survivable through mobility. Russian and Chinese early warning systems may also permit launch under attack. Still, there are other targets of value to the adversary, and that number is likely to rise in the case of deterring Russia and China simultaneously. How the United States responds to the growth of Chinese and Russian nuclear forces will depend on the timing and nature of that expansion and will require a formal analysis conducted by U.S. Strategic Command in concert with political authorities.</p> -<p>Being a global hub for innovation has conferred innumerable geopolitical and commercial benefits for the United States over the last century. But without a concerted effort to match its innovation policy to the challenges of today, the United States will not enjoy those same benefits in the century to come. And it risks ceding them to geopolitical rivals with different visions of global order.</p> +<p>Prudence dictates that the United States should anticipate and hedge against a Chinese race for nuclear parity or superiority by ensuring the capability to upload reserve warheads onto the SLBM and perhaps the ICBM force and additional cruise missiles and bombs to the strategic bomber force upon expiration of the New START treaty in February 2026. The extent to which the United States deploys additional warheads above current levels should be based in part on the number and trajectory of the Chinese and Russian nuclear threats, as well as prospects for further arms control measures. At a minimum, preparation must begin in the near term to ensure nuclear warheads in the inactive stockpile are brought to an active status — not a trivial process.</p> -<p>To maintain its lead in innovation, the United States has to invest in and maintain the ecosystem supporting R&amp;D, workforce development, and the manufacture of new products and services for the global market. Fortunately, the Biden administration has passed several important pieces of legislation recommitting to U.S. leadership in the twenty-first century, though much of the resources are yet to be committed to those efforts.</p> +<p>Hedging is necessary to avoid or mitigate risks to the nuclear force that could develop over time, such as an unforeseen technical difficulty with a particular category of warhead or delivery system or advances in adversary offensive and defensive capabilities. Hedging can also dissuade adversaries from seeking to gain advantage through “breakout” (i.e., quickly deploying additional nuclear forces) by maintaining a U.S. capability to produce and deploy additional weapons if needed. Though the 2022 NPR does not include “hedging” as a formal goal (as was the case in the 2018 NPR), it does place emphasis on “a resilient and adaptive nuclear security enterprise” to “be able to respond in a timely way to threat developments and technology opportunities, maintain effectiveness over time, and at all times ensure that Presidential guidance can be achieved.” Central to the administration’s approach is a “production-based resilience program” to efficiently produce weapons required in the near term and beyond. This will be important to rebuild the “hedge” should it become necessary to upload warheads from the inactive reserve.</p> -<p>While these efforts are promising initial steps to prime American innovation, sustained follow-through is needed. As a start, Congress now needs to make good on the important initiatives it has recently passed and appropriate the funds to sustain and grow a competitive economy for the twenty-first century. The money appropriated (actual dollars released) for innovation initiatives in the CHIPS and Science Act has so far fallen far short of the amounts authorized (dollars promised). This represents a concerning trend that could cause these programs to underperform their potential.</p> +<p>Finally, as the United States anticipates the need to upload reserve warheads onto the existing deployed force, it must redouble efforts to build a responsive nuclear infrastructure capable of reconstituting the nuclear warhead hedge for the future. Likewise, as noted in the 2022 NPR, the United States will have to reevaluate the Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration programs and requirements as the security environment evolves. Time is of the essence. According to Deborah Rosenblum, assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, “We find ourselves at an urgent inflection point. . . . we have a third imperative task before us: to look over the next 20 years to identify the capability that we believe we will need based on the threat picture and start expending the necessary resources now to pace those threats.”</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1LlkqLL.png" alt="image04" /></p> +<h4 id="extended-deterrence-and-assurance-1">Extended Deterrence and Assurance</h4> -<h4 id="renewing-american-innovation">Renewing American Innovation</h4> +<p>The emerging strategic environment will have important implications for extended deterrence and, by extension, assurance of allies. Russia and China have increasingly threatened the United States and its allies with hybrid, conventional, and nuclear forces. Accordingly, allied dependence on U.S. extended deterrence will remain a key feature of the international system between 2030 and 2050. As Kurt Campbell, the president’s coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs, recently pointed out, allies are nervous — there can be no doubt about this. Whether certain allies will act upon this loss of confidence to develop their own nuclear capabilities or to accommodate Russia or China is unknowable, but it is best not to find out. Instead, the United States should continue to provide credible security assurances backed up by effective nuclear capabilities.</p> -<p>In an era when allies and rivals are making major investments to capture leading positions in powerful new technologies, the United States needs to upgrade its own policy structures and make large and sustained investments in R&amp;D and in its industrial infrastructure, building out the innovation ecosystem.</p> +<p>The United States faced the problem of assuring allies for most of the Cold War. For U.S. extended deterrence and assurance to remain credible, the United States must continue to provide political assurances while also convincing its allies and adversaries that it is willing and able to employ nuclear weapons on behalf of its allies even in the most stressing circumstances. Effective deterrence is the foundation for effective assurance; as the requirements for extended deterrence increase, so do the requirements for assurance.</p> -<p>The United States has set the global standard for fostering innovation multiple times in its history, and there is every reason to believe that it is capable of doing so again. But doing so will require both effective long-term planning and the financial commitments to realizing those plans. The future of the global order, and the United States’ leading role in it, depends on the success of these efforts.</p> +<p>Nuclear tripolarity exacerbates this problem. Allies may worry that the United States will be reluctant to fight an adversary if doing so could lead to nuclear escalation against two nuclear powers. The United States will have to reassure allies that it has sufficient conventional and nuclear forces to deal with two nuclear peers at the same time, and that it is willing to run risks on their behalf. It is not clear, however, if the United States has enough bombers and dual-capable fighter aircraft to meet both conventional and nuclear missions in two major theaters of war. Finally, allies could worry that they will not be the primary theater of concern if the United States is forced to choose between two.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Allies recognize that the United States is vulnerable to nuclear retaliation and pay close attention to the United States’ response to China’s (and North Korea’s) nuclear modernization. If the United States does little to address the new situation, allies will question U.S. commitment to their security. Adaptations to nuclear deterrence — to extended deterrence posture — will be necessary. Changes are needed to both the “hardware” (i.e., capabilities and force posture) and “software” (i.e., planning, consultations, and exercises) of U.S. nuclear strategy. The United States must ask allies to do more and provide enhanced consultative mechanisms — the time is ripe for more extensive nuclear burden sharing and consultation, such as the newly constituted Nuclear Consultative Group between the United States and South Korea. If allies lose confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella, this failure could cause them to accommodate regional adversaries, reduce alliance cohesion, or seek nuclear arsenals of their own.</p> -<p><strong>Sujai Shivakumar</strong> is the Director and Senior Fellow, Renewing American Innovation Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p>Sujai ShivakumarIn an age when innovation is the primary engine for accelerating national competitiveness and strength, the United States needs to make significant and sustained investments to raise its game.In The Shadow Of Ukraine2023-09-29T12:00:00+08:002023-09-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/in-the-shadow-of-ukraine<p><em>Russian leaders are committed to a reconstitution of the Russian military — especially the Russian army — over the next several years, though achieving this goal will be challenging. In addition, Russia views the United States as its main enemy for the foreseeable future.</em></p> +<h4 id="adjusting-extended-deterrence-postures">Adjusting Extended Deterrence Postures</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>The current extended deterrence posture and assurance frameworks are products of a post-Cold War goal to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in foreign policy. For example, the United States has withdrawn its nuclear weapons from the Indo-Pacific region and all but the B61 nuclear gravity bomb from Europe. The United States does not have a multilateral consultative framework in the Indo-Pacific as it does in Europe through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).</p> -<blockquote> - <p>“Each war has to be matched with a special strategic behavior; each war constitutes a particular case that requires establishing its own special logic instead of applying some template.”</p> -</blockquote> +<p>The increased threat from China, Russia, and North Korea provides an opportunity to reconsider these architectures, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Today, Japan, South Korea, and Australia may be more willing to enter a more formal consultative arrangement with the United States similar to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. A new arrangement could offer opportunities for defense ministers to weigh in on nuclear posture, planning, tabletop exercises, and other matters. It is also worth exploring how current diplomatic structures could be expanded to encompass issues and activities pertaining to force posture, basing, nuclear sharing, training, and other matters related to nuclear deterrence.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="aa-svechin">A.A. Svechin</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>The United States must ask more of allies in terms of conventional forces as well as participation in nuclear deterrence activities because a strong conventional defense could obviate the need for or increase reliance upon nuclear weapons to deter aggression.</p> -<h3 id="executive-summary">EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</h3> +<p>One could explore these possible nuclear-related options to bolster extended deterrence. Some measures are already underway, and some are politically fraught. This analysis provides a range of options for illustrative purposes which could be pursued with allies.</p> -<p>This report asks two main questions: how is the Russian military thinking about the future of warfare, and how is the Russian military thinking about force design over the next five years? As used here, force design includes the overall plan for structuring, staffing, training, and equipping military forces, including in the maritime, land, air, cyber, and space domains. Since the goal of this analysis is to better understand Russian military thinking, this report relies primarily on Russian military journals and other sources, supplemented by interviews with U.S., European, and Ukrainian officials.</p> +<p><strong>NATO</strong>:</p> -<p>The report has several findings.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Continue the planned nuclear force modernization and survivability measures;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Modernize dual-capable aircraft (e.g., realistic training, planning, and exercises);</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Improve the survivability of NATO’s nuclear forces through dispersal and other active and passive measures;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Expand nuclear burden sharing by seeking other allies to fly nuclear-armed aircraft or base nuclear weapons in their countries, although the U.S. president will maintain control over these weapons; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Deploy ground- and sea-based nuclear forces, with SLCM-N being the preference.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>First, Russian military thinking is dominated by a view that the United States is — and will remain — Moscow’s main enemy (главный враг) for the foreseeable future. This view of the United States as the main enemy has increased since the 2022 invasion, with significant implications for the future of warfare and force design. Russian political and military leaders assess that Russian struggles in Ukraine have been largely due to aid from the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which Russian leaders interpret as direct participation in the war. In addition, Russian leaders believe that the United States is attempting to expand its power, further encircle Russia, and weaken Russia militarily, politically, and economically. These sentiments make Russia a dangerous enemy over the next five years and will likely drive Moscow’s desire to reconstitute its military as rapidly as possible, strengthen nuclear and conventional deterrence, prepare to fight the West if deterrence fails as part of a strategy of “active defense” (активная оборона), and engage in irregular and hybrid activities.</p> +<p><strong>U.S. Indo-Pacific Command</strong>:</p> -<p>Second, Russian analyses generally conclude that while the nature of warfare — its essence and purpose — is unchanging, the character of future warfare will rapidly evolve in ways that require adaptation. This report focuses on four categories of interest to Russia: long-range, high-precision weapons; autonomous and unmanned systems; emerging technologies; and the utility of hybrid and irregular warfare. In these and other areas, Russian leaders assess that it will be critical to cooperate with other countries, such as China and Iran.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Complete the robust air and missile defense capabilities for Guam in the 2020s, including with robust fire control integration, consistent with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s prioritization;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Build on existing bilateral consultative forums, including the new Nuclear Consultative Group between the United States and South Korea;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Consider multilateral consultative frameworks similar to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Consider more tangible U.S. nuclear force presence, such as demonstrating the ability to deploy U.S. nuclear-capable fighter aircraft to the region; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Prioritize the conventional long-range strike capability and capacity of key allies such as Japan and Australia.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Third, Russian political and military leaders are committed to a major reconstitution of the Russian military — especially the Russian army — over the next several years, though achieving this goal will be challenging. Force design may evolve in the following areas:</p> +<p><strong>Forward Deployment</strong>:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Land: Russian force design in land warfare will likely include an attempt to reconstitute the Russian army over the next five years. In particular, the army will likely continue to shift to a division structure, though it is unclear whether Russia can fill the ranks of larger units. These changes are a sharp divergence from the changes implemented under former minister of defense Anatoly Serdyukov. In addition, the Russian military has indicated a desire to restructure the army to allow for more mobility and decentralization in the field in response to the United States’ and NATO’s long-range precision strike capabilities.</p> + <p>Deploy F-35s with gravity bombs or standoff weapons in one or more regions;</p> </li> <li> - <p>Air: Force design in the air domain will likely involve some reversals initiated by Serdyukov, as well as a major focus on unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). For example, the Russian military wants to increase the size of the Russian Aerospace Forces beyond the current force structure. Future developments may also include the use of UASs for logistics in contested environments, which will require new organizational structures.</p> + <p>Regionally deploy nuclear-capable bombers (or place on rotational deployment);</p> </li> <li> - <p>Maritime: The Russian military has expressed a desire to expand its naval forces in response to growing tensions with the United States and NATO. The Russian Ministry of Defense has outlined the creation of five naval infantry divisions for the navy’s coastal troops. In addition, the Russian navy will likely increase the presence of unmanned maritime vessels as part of force design and focus on the development, production, and use of submarines.</p> + <p>Deploy SLCM-N on U.S. attack submarines;</p> </li> <li> - <p>Space and Cyber: The Russian military will attempt to further develop its space and cyber capabilities, including offensive capabilities. It will also likely attempt to expand the size and activities of Russian Space Forces and a range of Russian cyber organizations, such as the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU), Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and Federal Security Service (FSB), though it will likely struggle in such areas as space because of Western sanctions.</p> + <p>Acquire the capability to regionally deploy ground-launched cruise or ballistic missiles, and diplomatically explore contingency basing operations for the same;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Exercise and prepare contingency operations for mobile air and missile defenses to protect both U.S. and allied interests;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Acquire the capability and significant capacity for rapidly deployable ground-based, long-range precision fires; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Field long-range hypersonic weapons based in multiple domains.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>Russia retains a significant arsenal of nuclear weapons, a relatively strong navy and air force that remain largely intact, and a reasonably good relationship with China and other countries, such as Iran, that could provide a much-needed jump start.</p> +<p>To be sure, some of these recommended courses of action will face political, operational, and funding challenges, while others could be perceived as escalatory by adversaries. This includes allied basing requirements, survivability of the systems and command and control, and congressional considerations. For reasons stated elsewhere, the authors believe the SLCM-N provides the best combination of survivability, responsiveness, and flexibility with little or no political costs associated with host-nation basing.</p> -<p>Nevertheless, Russia faces a suite of financial, military, political, social, and other issues that will force political and military leaders to prioritize changes in force design. Building a bigger navy and air force will be expensive, as will increasing the size of Russian ground forces. While it is impossible to predict with certainty how Russian leaders will prioritize force design changes, likely candidates are ones that are relatively cheap or essential to improve fighting effectiveness.</p> +<h4 id="arms-control">Arms Control</h4> -<p>In the land domain, for example, the Russian army may prioritize restructuring its land forces around divisions, strengthening its defense industrial base to develop and produce precision munitions and weapons systems for a protracted war, and experimenting with tactical units to allow for greater mobility and autonomy against adversaries that have precision strike capabilities. Russia will likely rely on such countries as China, Iran, and North Korea for some weapons systems and components.</p> +<p>Arms control could be a useful tool in managing and bounding the 2NP problem, but the United States needs willing partners. Expiration of the New START in February 2026 will drive the search for a follow-on framework sooner rather than later. Russia’s suspension of participation in inspections and reporting requirements under the treaty is not encouraging. Nevertheless, the United States should not determine its negotiating position until it first settles on a nuclear deterrence strategy and the forces necessary to implement employment guidance, and discussions take place between the administration and Congress on this approach. Regardless of whether the United States can secure limitations on nuclear forces, there are a range of other risk reduction measures that should be explored with Russia and China (i.e., so-called “arms control without treaties”).</p> -<p>However, a successful reconstitution of the military and a redesign of the force, especially the army, will be difficult for several reasons.</p> +<p>China will be difficult to bring to the table, but any future arms control treaty or framework with Russia to replace New START must consider Chinese nuclear forces even if China is not a party to the formal agreement. A follow-on agreement or framework does not require the United States to match the combined nuclear strength of both Russia and China — only that it maintains sufficient survivable and flexible forces to deter both regional and strategic nuclear threats under all likely circumstances. This reality will require a modest increase in the size of the deployed U.S. nuclear arsenal, but one that the authors believe Russia can accommodate, rather than an unlimited nuclear arms race that it cannot afford to run.</p> -<p>First, Russia’s deepening economic crisis will likely constrain its efforts to expand the quantity and quality of its ground, air, and naval forces. The war in Ukraine has fueled Russia’s worst labor crunch in decades, and the Russian economy has been stressed by low growth, a decrease in the ruble against the dollar, and inflation. Second, corruption and graft remain rampant in the Russian military, which could undermine Moscow’s overall plan to effectively structure, staff, train, and equip its forces. Third, Russia’s defense industrial base will likely face challenges because of the war in Ukraine. Russia has already expended significant amounts of precision-guided and other munitions in the Ukraine war, and many of its weapons systems and equipment have been destroyed or severely worn down. Economic sanctions may create shortages of higher-end foreign components and force Moscow to substitute them with lower-quality alternatives. Fourth, Russia could face a significant challenge because of growing civil-military friction. Tension between the Russian military and population could worsen over time because of a protracted war in Ukraine, a languishing economy, and an increasingly authoritarian state. A reconstitution of the Russian military will likely require some level of support and sacrifice from the Russian population.</p> +<p>The New START limited Russia and the United States to 1,550 warheads on 700 strategic delivery vehicles (i.e., ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers). This limit may be too low to accommodate the additional regional nuclear capabilities (if they are captured in a new agreement) and potential strategic warhead uploads necessary to address the 2NP problem after 2030. The New START also does not limit Russian nonstrategic nuclear warheads, estimated at about 2,000 for land-, air-, and sea-based regional dual-capable forces.</p> -<h3 id="1-introduction">1 INTRODUCTION</h3> +<p>The arms control objective, therefore, is to negotiate a new overall warhead ceiling that provides room for a modest expansion of U.S. nuclear forces to address the 2NP problem while reducing or capping the growth of Russian nonstrategic and novel nuclear weapons. One Project Atom contributor suggests a ceiling of about 3,500 total warheads with sub-limits for strategic forces covered under New START. That number could be smaller. Arms control advocates will no doubt blanche at raising the New START warhead ceiling and question whether it serves U.S. national security to return to larger mutual strategic nuclear force levels with Russia, but for those who believe the United States needs a larger strategic arsenal to deal with China, this option is preferable to an open-ended nuclear competition. Others may question whether increasing U.S. and Russian strategic forces will cause China to increase its nuclear forces beyond the levels currently projected.</p> -<p>The Russian military has faced a wide range of shortcomings following its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Examples include a failure to conduct effective joint and combined arms operations, low morale of soldiers, inadequate leadership, poor logistics support to combat forces, and erroneous intelligence analyses. These problems have occurred despite considerable efforts by the Russian military to examine the future of war and to design a force capable of conducting effective conventional and hybrid operations. Russia’s challenges in Ukraine have also severely undermined its security position. Finland and Sweden have opted to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the West has imposed economic sanctions against Russia (including its defense industry), and the United States and other Western countries have provided significant military, economic, and political support to Ukraine.</p> +<p>While current Russian noncompliance with the New START suggests that any treaty will be a hard sell in the current environment, Vladimir Putin did indicate toward the end of the Trump administration that he might accept a one-year freeze on all Russian nuclear weapons. If one assumes that the war in Ukraine is creating budgetary pressures for Russia, then treaty limits on U.S. strategic nuclear forces will likely remain in Russia’s interest after New START expires. The United States will require negotiating leverage to include all warheads in a new agreement, which it can obtain in the near term through the threat of additional warhead uploads onto U.S. strategic nuclear forces and in the longer term by threatening to continue production of new ICBMs, nuclear ballistic missile submarines, air-launched cruise missiles, and heavy bombers after the 2030s.</p> -<p>These challenges have enormous implications for the future of the Russian military in an increasingly competitive security environment. After all, if the Russian military has struggled against Ukraine, how might Russia fare in a future war with the United States and other NATO countries?</p> +<p>While the prospects for negotiated arms control treaties seem bleak now, this does not mean the United States should eschew other forms of nuclear risk reduction — what some might call arms control without treaties. Covered more extensively by other contributors to Project Atom, one could imagine creating and continuing dialogues with Russia and China on what sometimes is referred to as “strategic stability” or “crisis stability” issues. This might include dialogue on crisis communications, nuclear strategy and doctrine, and transparency of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic forces, for both long-range strike and missile defenses, as well as unilateral and parallel reciprocal measures to provide transparency and constraints on nuclear forces.</p> -<h4 id="research-design">RESEARCH DESIGN</h4> +<p>Given the strategic environment and doubts about either Russian or Chinese reductions or even transparency, it is doubtful that there can or should be meaningful progress toward the NPT commitments for disarmament in the near term. Article VI’s obligations for pursuing negotiations toward “a treaty on general and complete disarmament” is unlikely to be a productive topic of discussion. Recognizing that fact candidly is important. Indeed, under the current circumstances, whispers are growing louder in Japan and South Korea for potential nuclear capabilities of their own, or for a nuclear sharing arrangement with the United States. Former prime minister Abe Shinzo suggested such an arrangement publicly in February 2022, in the days after Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine.</p> -<p>To better understand Russian military thinking, this report asks two sets of questions. First, how is the Russian military thinking about the future of warfare? Second, how might the Russian military evolve its force design over the next five years? As used here, “force design” includes the overall plan for structuring, staffing, training, and equipping military forces, including maritime, land, and air forces. Force design directly affects manpower policies and retention goals. It also impacts “force structure,” which includes the number and type of combat units a military can sustain, the forces a military has available, how they are equipped, and how they are organized.</p> +<p>This suggestion may strike some as discordant with the long-standing policies and postures toward nuclear disarmament. It is. The charge of Project Atom is to consider a far-reaching timeline, for which the strictures and solutions of the mid-twentieth century may require adjustment. Inasmuch as renewed long-term strategic competition is the central challenge of the current era, it may in time even become necessary to revisit the question of nuclear nonproliferation more broadly. A nuclear-armed Japan, for instance, could be preferable to failing to deter a major war with China, and it could become necessary if Japan’s defense buildup does not progress sufficiently fast. In the near term, however, the conventional munitions and forces buildups for Japan, Australia, and the United States in the Indo-Pacific should continue to be pursued with prioritization. If the United States wishes to avoid a nuclear arms race, it may need to be more serious about a conventional arms race.</p> -<p>To answer the main questions, this report uses a mixed-methods approach. First, the research involved a compilation and translation of primary- and secondary-source Russian analyses of warfare and force design across multiple domains of war. Examples included Военная Мысль [Military Thought] and Вестник Академии Военных Наук [Journal of the Academy of Military Sciences]. A limited number of analytical opinion and commentary in such publications as Военно-промышленный курьер [Military-Industrial Courier], Красная звезда [Red Star], TASS, and others were also included.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion-1">Conclusion</h4> -<p>While reviewing these documents is important, there are some limitations. For example, the quality of Russian military journals has declined over time — especially following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Articles frequently lack innovative thought. Part of the reason may be because Russian military thinkers have few incentives to write critical and reflective pieces during a war that has gone poorly for the Russian military and in a country that has become increasingly totalitarian and wary of any criticism — explicit or implicit. In addition, this analysis uses only unclassified material. An assessment on Russian military thinking with access to classified information and analysis would still face information hurdles and gaps in knowledge. But a reliance on open-source information presents even greater hurdles. Nevertheless, taking precautionary steps — such as qualifying judgments where appropriate and identifying gaps in information — still leads to a useful understanding of Russian thinking on the future of warfare and force design.</p> +<p>Project Atom asked the several competitive teams to frame an approach to U.S. nuclear strategy that wrestles with the need to simultaneously deter two nuclear great powers while considering the broader implications for U.S. nuclear modernization, extended deterrence, and arms control.</p> -<p>Second, this report benefited from interviews with numerous government and subject matter experts. One example was a trip to NATO’s eastern flank — including Finland, the Baltics, and Poland — to talk with military, political, and intelligence officials about how Russian military leaders view the future of warfare and force design. The report also benefited from interviews with officials from the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada, the United States, Ukraine, Finland, Estonia, Poland, and NATO, as well as discussions with a range of subject matter experts from such organizations as the Polish Institute of International Affairs, the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.</p> +<p>This paper contends that no major changes are warranted to the fundamentals of deterrence theory or to current U.S. nuclear strategy and employment guidance. The complexities and difficulties of sustaining nuclear deterrence will not be appreciably intensified due to China’s nuclear expansion. Moreover, the long-standing U.S. nuclear strategy of flexible and tailored response remains preferable to the alternatives of minimum deterrence or nuclear primacy. Nevertheless, while theory and employment guidance remain valid in the emerging strategic environment, some modest changes to the ways and means of U.S. nuclear strategy may be in order. The United States today lacks certain nuclear forces necessary to ensure deterrence against two nuclear great powers, potentially at the same time.</p> -<h4 id="organization-of-the-report">ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT</h4> +<p>First and foremost, force posture changes are necessary to improve the survivability and endurance of U.S. strategic nuclear forces and increase the flexibility and readiness of forward-based nuclear forces. Next, a modest number of additional regional nuclear forces, including the SLCM-N, would reinforce deterrence at the regional level — where war is likely to start — and compensate for Russian and Chinese advantage in nonstrategic nuclear forces. These changes should be supplemented by increased and survivable conventionally armed munitions, improved regional air and missile defenses, and improved conventional-nuclear integration. Additional hedging options, such as warhead uploading, are necessary to enable a timely increase in the size of U.S. strategic forces if needed to respond to the growth of Chinese strategic nuclear forces after 2030.</p> -<p>The rest of this report is divided into the following chapters. Chapter 2 examines the historical evolution of Russian thinking about the future of warfare and force design. Chapter 3 analyzes contemporary Russian thinking about the future of warfare and force design. Chapter 4 provides an overview of challenges that the Russian military may face in implementing these changes.</p> +<p>Domestic political and production limitations will pose challenges for the United States to grow its nuclear forces in the near to mid term. The ongoing debate between the administration and Congress over the development and fielding of a SLCM-N suggests it will be difficult to reach political consensus on the augmentation of U.S. nuclear forces. In the near term, it is more feasible to improve the survivability and endurance of existing nuclear forces, although not without cost. Increased capability and capacity of conventional strike forces and air and missile defenses will also play a critical role in increasing stability, supporting escalation control, and improving survivability of strategic assets. It is, however, possible to envision political compromises that combine support for a modest increase in U.S. nuclear forces with support for a follow-on arms control framework that limits nuclear growth after New START and addresses the expansion of Chinese nuclear forces. Deterrence in a 2NP environment will be difficult but not impossible; it is less a matter of strategic imagination than of commitment and sustained effort.</p> -<h3 id="2-the-historical-context">2 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT</h3> +<h3 id="chinas-nuclear-enterprise">China’s Nuclear Enterprise</h3> -<p>This chapter briefly examines the evolution of Russian views on warfare and force design from the end of the Cold War to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It is not meant to be a comprehensive examination of historical trends in Russian views on warfare and force design, but rather is intended to establish a baseline for analyzing Russia today. Consequently, it focuses on three developments that are representative of the evolution of Russian military thinking on future warfare: precision weapons and related concepts, such as the reconnaissance-strike complex and reconnaissance-fire complex; force design, including the creation of battalion tactical groups (BTGs); and irregular and hybrid warfare.</p> +<p><em>Trends, Developments, and Implications for the United States and Its Allies</em></p> -<p>The rest of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first examines the evolution in Russian thinking about precision weapons and related developments. The second section outlines the evolution of Russian force design. The third assesses Russian thinking about hybrid and irregular warfare. The fourth section provides a brief conclusion.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="oriana-skylar-mastro">Oriana Skylar Mastro</h4> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="precision-weapons">PRECISION WEAPONS</h4> +<p>The focus of this volume is how the United States should respond to deterring two peer competitors: Russia and China. This paper’s main contention is that the nature of U.S.-China military competition from 2035 to 2050 will exhibit some unique characteristics compared to the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship that require new thinking on these topics. As such, this paper differs from others in this volume by focusing on what changes in Chinese military posture, doctrine, and modernization mean for U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy, modernization, reassurance of allies, and arms control efforts. The reason for focusing on China is to challenge the premise that the United States should treat Russia and China as similar peers, and because assumptions among nuclear experts about what modernization efforts in China mean for Chinese nuclear policy are limiting thinking on ideal policy responses. The details of force modernization are consistent with the idea that China is maintaining the same nuclear policy it has had since 1964. This is advantageous for the United States, and thus most of this paper’s recommendations revolve around discouraging deviations. Admittedly, this piece raises more questions than it answers, but understanding which components of U.S. thinking will also serve the United States well in the future, and which require additional consideration, is the first step to devising any useful responses. Each section lays out relevant Chinese approaches, U.S. assumptions, and key issues that color best responses. While this paper focuses on Chinese nuclear modernization, what it means for U.S. strategy, and how the United States should respond, it should not be interpreted as dismissing the challenges of responding to Russian nuclear aggression and expansion. Rather, it focuses on challenging the premise that the United States needs to make significant changes in posture or policy to deter China.</p> + +<p>The advisable U.S. approaches to force modernization, deterrence, and arms control depend on understanding Chinese nuclear modernization. While there are recent indications from the U.S. Department of Defense that China will increase its nuclear arsenal, these changes are insufficient to suggest that China has abandoned core aspects of its nuclear policy such as no-first-use, no tactical nuclear weapons, and not striving for parity with the United States in terms of the size of its arsenal. China’s modernization efforts are compatible with maintaining its policy, but it is adjusting its posture given advancements in U.S. missile defense and increased tensions in U.S.-China relations. These points have important implications for ideal U.S. modernization plans, deterrence of China, reassurance of allies, and arms control. One of the most important takeaways is that the United States should avoid relying on nuclear weapons to deter China’s conventional threats, as this might encourage China to threaten nuclear use in response to the United States’ conventional activities.</p> -<p>Beginning in the 1970s, Soviet military thinkers were at the forefront of grappling with the implications of technological innovations on warfare, what some called the Military-Technical Revolution (MTR). One of the most influential figures was Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Union. According to Ogarkov, emerging technologies made it possible to see and strike deep in the future battlefield. These advances required organizational and conceptual changes to adjust force design and structure in each military service.</p> +<p>This paper first outlines fundamental principles of China’s nuclear policy, to include limited assured retaliation. It then explores the implications of China’s nuclear policy for U.S. force posture, modernization, extended deterrence, and arms control.</p> -<p>Among the most significant advances were long-range, high-precision weapons, which could increase the potential for attacking an adversary’s command-and-control facilities and lead to a compressed sensor-to-shooter kill chain. By the 1980s, the debate about the impact of the MTR led to the development of several concepts: deep operations battle, the reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire complexes; and operational maneuver groups. In a 1983 article in Red Star, Ogarkov concluded that there were significant changes afoot in warfare because of “precision weapons, reconnaissance-strike complexes, and weapons based on new physical principles.” In a 1984 interview with Red Star, he noted that “the development of conventional means of destruction . . . is making many kinds of weapons global” and is triggering a rise “in the destructive potential of conventional weapons, making them almost as effective as weapons of mass destruction.”</p> +<h4 id="chinas-nuclear-policy">China’s Nuclear Policy</h4> -<p>After the end of the Cold War, Russian views on the future of warfare and force design were significantly impacted by a close examination of U.S. wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, the Balkans, and other areas, as well as Moscow’s own experience in Chechnya, Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine. Russian military thinkers paid close attention to U.S. military operations and strategic thinking. The First Gulf War (1990–1991) and Second Gulf War (2003) were, in many ways, watershed moments for the Russian military. According to Russian analyses, the United States’ technological superiority over the Iraqi military overwhelmed the numerical advantages of the Iraqi military. As one assessment concluded, “Reconnaissance, fire, electronic, and information warfare forces of different branches and arms of the service were integrated the first time ever into a shared spatially distributed reconnaissance and strike system making wide use of modern information technologies and automated troops and weapons control systems.”</p> +<p>CHINA’S MINIMAL RETALIATION CAPABILITY AND NO-FIRST-USE PLEDGE</p> -<p>The U.S. military began with a massive attack by some of the latest electronic warfare capabilities and then launched, in parallel, an offensive by the U.S. Air Force and sea-based cruise missiles, reinforced with reconnaissance strike aircraft and artillery barrages.</p> +<p>The expansion of and improvements in China’s nuclear arsenal by 2050 do not necessarily mean that China is abandoning its limited assured retaliation strategy. The buildup in numbers is consistent with China’s traditional nuclear policy of a minimal retaliation capability with a no-first-use pledge.</p> -<p>In these operations, the U.S. military effectively used technologies to conduct non-contact warfare (бесконтактная война) in which much of the fighting would take place using stand-off precision weapons. Medium- and long-range strikes from air, maritime, land, cyber, and even space-based platforms aided ground forces. As Major General Vladimir Slipchenko argued, for example, new technologies increased the importance of precision-guided weapons (or высокоточное оружие) and increased the role of airpower and the information components of war (including psychological operations, electronic warfare, and cyber warfare). The origins of Russian approaches toward non-contact warfare stem, in part, from the leading Russian military theorists inspired by the intellectual legacy of Ogarkov’s revolution in military affairs.</p> +<p>First, the Chinese strategy of assured retaliation requires that Beijing develop enough weapons to absorb a strike and still impose unacceptable damage from the adversary’s perspective. In the strategic doctrine of the Second Artillery, the predecessor of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, China’s strategic nuclear forces focus on “effective and limited nuclear counterattack” as the core of nuclear deterrence. As China makes a no-first-use promise regarding nuclear weapons and only has a limited number of nuclear weapons, this doctrine emphasizes the need for the preservation of nuclear forces as a prerequisite to carry out “focused strikes,” as well as “scientific use of nuclear firepower, and carefully crafted strike plans” in order to “achieve the greatest political and military benefits at a relatively small cost.” Although China’s nuclear weapons are limited, the nuclear forces that survive a surprise attack by a nuclear adversary are still sufficient to carry out a nuclear counterattack, and a few nuclear weapons attacking important targets in the adversary’s territory could destroy its industry, society, and mentality and paralyze its state apparatus. This posture leaves some flexibility in terms of specific numbers; Chinese strategists want sufficient forces but are careful not to fall into the track of building “excessive” ones.</p> -<p>Integrating these technologies into warfare would also require an evolution in concepts. One of the most important was an evolution in the reconnaissance strike complex (or разведивательно-ударный комплех) for stand-off strike, which involved the need to collect real-time intelligence and quickly push information to air, ground, and maritime units for strikes. A major goal of the reconnaissance strike complex was to improve command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) on the battlefield to facilitate the coordinated employment of high-precision, long-range weapons linked to real-time intelligence data.</p> +<p>Second, the contours of Chinese nuclear modernization are consistent with the view that nuclear weapons are only useful for deterring nuclear use and do not have a warfighting component. Although the United States has assessed that China may be moving toward a launch-on-warning posture, which means they would launch a nuclear strike upon detecting an incoming attack, this policy is compatible with China’s no-first-use policy. Chinese leaders have also increasingly focused on growing regional nuclear options such as the DF-26 and DF-21A/C missiles, but these are attractive mainly because they are regional weapons lower on the escalation ladder and thus their use is more strategically feasible in the event of a conflict.</p> -<p>Russian operations in Syria underscored the growing importance of precision strike to support ground force advances and to hit adversary logistics hubs and other targets. A growing reliance on long-range strike requires sufficient stockpiles of munitions (especially precision-guided munitions); an arms production capacity able to produce munitions in sufficient quantities; adequate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to identify potential targets; and an all-domain command-and-control system that allows users to quickly take advantage of real-time intelligence.</p> +<p>Lastly, the “sudden” change in nuclear policy around 2018 and 2019 can be explained within the context of China’s traditional nuclear policy. China’s level of concern regarding U.S. nuclear capabilities “suddenly” surged around this time period, consequently accelerating its nuclear force development. Advancements in missile defense which reduced the retaliatory capacity of a smaller arsenal further supported the need. The Pentagon notes in its 2022 report to Congress that China’s “long-term concerns about United States missile defense capabilities” have likely spurred investments in hypersonic glide vehicles and fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS).</p> -<p>Russia integrated its air operations into a reconnaissance-strike complex. The Russian military heavily relied on medium-range and long-range strike from air, land, and maritime platforms and systems to help ground forces take — and retake — territory. Moscow combined air operations with ground-based fires and sea-launched stand-off weapons. At the tactical level, Russia attempted to establish kill chains that flowed from sensors to warfighters. In addition, Russia took advantage of the relatively permissive environment in Syria to test and refine this concept, integrating strikes from fixed-wing aircraft with unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), such as the Orlan-10, Forpost, and Eleron-3SV; electronic warfare; space-based systems; and other ISR platforms and systems.</p> +<p>Additionally, Chinese leaders likely aspired to strengthen their nuclear deterrent long before 2018 given U.S. dominance. Chinese leaders have multi-stage plans in their military modernization; in the conventional domains of competition, the strategy was to modernize the force first (i.e., increase the proportion of modern equipment) and then to expand the numbers of certain platforms. Notably, Xi Jinping explicitly directed the military in 2012 to “accelerate the construction of advanced strategic deterrent” capabilities; this has been the strongest and most unambiguous public statement on the matter. Coupled with recent investments in strategic nuclear submarines, China’s emphasis on quality has expanded to include a growing willingness to invest in quantity long before 2018.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Y9xYjcp.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>A Forpost from Russia’s Baltic Fleet flies overhead in the Kaliningrad region.</strong> Source: Russian Ministry of Defense.</em></p> +<p>CHINA IS NOT SEEKING PARITY</p> -<p>However, there were challenges with the reconnaissance-strike complex. To begin with, Russia lacked sufficient numbers of precision-guided munitions. Roughly 80 percent of ordnance dropped over the first few months of the war in Syria were unguided bombs from Su-24s and Su-25s. In addition, the only dedicated airborne ISR assets that the Russian air force maintained in Syria were a small number of IL-20 Coots and the intermittent presence of a Tu-214R ISR testbed aircraft. The Russian air group’s pool of potential intelligence collectors was further thinned by a shortage of targeting pods that impaired the ability of Russian fighters to provide the kind of nontraditional ISR that Western militaries possess. The Russian air force could not match the 1:2 ISR-to-strike sortie ratio maintained by U.S. and coalition air forces in Iraq and Syria, much less the 4:1 ratio that NATO executed over Afghanistan.</p> +<p>China is not striving for parity with the United States. Chinese leaders have long understood, since 1964, that they cannot compete with the United States in the quantity of nuclear weapons, and thus they have needed to embrace a different approach. As Mao Zedong stated in December 1963, China needed to have the atomic bomb but could not afford to compete for parity in numbers.</p> -<p>In addition, most Russian sorties in Syria were still deliberately planned missions. The Russian air force did not effectively operationalize the processes necessary to react on the fly to unexpected battlefield emergencies and was unable to take full advantage of its reconnaissance-strike complex. Russia failed to conduct the ground-directed dynamic targeting that has come to define most Western air operations.</p> +<p>Recent reporting has caused heightened concern that China is building up its nuclear arsenal. In 2021, anxiety amassed over China’s nuclear modernization: satellite imagery showed that approximately 360 silos were under construction at facilities in Gansu, Inner Mongolia, and eastern Xinjiang. In a worst-case scenario, with DF-41s carrying three warheads in each silo, Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) could “carry more than 875 warheads.” The Pentagon’s annual report to Congress estimated that the the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) now has over 400 nuclear warheads; if current production trends continue, China could have as many as 1,500 by 2035. The report also estimated that China currently has at least 300 ICBMs.</p> -<h4 id="force-design">FORCE DESIGN</h4> +<p>But it would be a mistake to take these projections at face value or to conclude that such an uptick signifies that China is now striving for parity, as some experts have posited. Admittedly, China’s avoidance of direct competition in nuclear power was starker in the early 1990s, when the United States had 47 times more nuclear weapons than China. But even the worst-case projections of 1,000 weapons puts the Chinese arsenal at less than a quarter of the current U.S. level of 5,244 nuclear weapons. Additionally, the fact that China has more land-based launchers than the United States is more a testament to the differences in nuclear posture than heightened threat; about three-fourths of China’s arsenal is land based, compared to one-fifth for the United States.</p> -<p>Based on the Russian military’s views about the future of warfare, Russian force design evolved through the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russian thinkers based force design, in part, on a strategy of active defense (активная оборона). The concept of a strong defense has a long and rich tradition in Russian military thinking, including from such individuals as Alexander Svechin. It involved integrating preemptive measures and — if that failed — denying an opponent a decisive victory in the initial period of war by degrading their effort and setting the conditions for a counteroffensive. The strategy privileged a permanent standing force, arrayed as high-readiness operational formations in each strategic direction.</p> +<p>One critique of these numerical comparisons is that the most strategically relevant metric is not total numbers; instead, strategists need to consider deployed nuclear weapons versus stockpiled weapons. The United States has 1,770 deployed in accordance with the New START (technically 1,550 are allowed, but bombers count as “one” even though they can carry multiple nuclear weapons). In other words, when comparing arsenals, some might use the 1,770 deployed number instead of the 5,244 that quantifies the United States’ total inventory.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lLteJwp.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.1: Example of a Russian Battalion Tactical Group.</strong> Sources: Mark Galeotti, Armies of Russia’s War in Ukraine (New York: Osprey, 2019), 40; and Dmanrock29, “Russian Battalion Tactical Group,” Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0).</em></p> +<p>But even here, the evidence for a China striving for parity is weak. Under the New START conception of “deployable” nuclear weapons — carried by ICBMs on alert, submarines out on patrols, and bombers — China’s nuclear weapons are not deployable; they are in fixed locations and cannot be deployed to the Western Pacific or the South China Sea. But there is evidence that China might want some “deployable” nuclear weapons in the future; solid-fueled missiles such as the DF-41 and DF-31AG have much faster fueling times and require fewer support vehicles, and China’s Jin-class submarines have fueled the nuclear-armed JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) since 2015. In total, China has six Jin-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and the Pentagon has confirmed that they are “conducting continuous at-sea deterrence patrols” as of February 2023.</p> -<p>One important period in force design was defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov’s “New Look” reform beginning in 2008, which led to one of the most radical changes in the Russian military since World War II. The goal was to create a flexible, professional army in a permanent combat-ready state that was able to mount a spectrum of operations from small-scale interventions to high-end warfare. Serdyukov reduced the size of the armed forces from 1.13 million to 1 million by 2012, and he decreased the size of the officer corps as well. As Serdyukov put it, “our army today is reminiscent of an egg which is swollen in the middle. There are more colonels and lieutenant colonels than there are junior officers.” Overall, the division gave way to a smaller, more flexible structure at the battalion level.</p> +<p>CHINA’S SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITY</p> -<p>The reforms led to the dismissal of 200 generals, and the military cut nearly 205,000 officer positions. Before the reforms, the Russian order of battle resembled a smaller Soviet one, with 24 divisions, 12 independent brigades, and two separate external task forces deployed to Armenia and Tajikistan. However, only six divisions — five motor rifle divisions and a tank division — were at full strength and operational. Russian leaders believed that a smaller but better-equipped and -trained military could handle a range of conflicts. This process took place largely between 2008 and 2012. The army’s fighting force comprised 4 tank brigades, 35 motor rifle brigades and a cover, or fortification, brigade, supported by 9 missile, 9 artillery, 4 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, 9 air defense, and 10 support brigades. This left the army with 85 brigades, 40 of which were frontline combat units.</p> +<p>Chinese modernization is driven by concerns about maintaining a second-strike capability needed for deterrence.</p> -<p>Around 2015, however, the Russian military partially revived larger formations geared for major wars. In 2016, the military reactivated the First Tank Army in the Western Military District, including two reestablished divisions of long and revered history: the 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division and a reformed 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motorized Rifle Division that had been the first converted to a brigade.</p> +<p>From China’s perspective, the strategic environment has changed in ways that call for a larger, more survivable arsenal even under its current nuclear policy. The United States has intensified the construction of a missile defense system in the East Asian region: the Aegis system. This is deployed on 17 U.S. Navy destroyers and cruisers in the region to detect, target, and engage ballistic missiles. These Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) ships have the capability to intercept short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their midcourse or terminal flight phases. They also play a role in defending the United States by detecting and tracking ICBMs and relaying this information to Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska and California. As of December 2018, the system had a success rate of 40 out of 49 attempts in intercepting ballistic missile targets. China believes this poses a serious threat to the reliability and effectiveness of China’s nuclear counterattack capability. Second, the nuclear arsenals of neighboring countries like India, Pakistan, and North Korea have increased in recent years. Possibly as part of a move toward a launch-on-warning posture, China has been increasing its inventory of regional nuclear-capable systems, such as the DF-26 and DF-21A/C missiles. These are designed to target various assets, including naval vessels and land-based targets, enhancing China’s strategic capabilities and potentially altering the regional balance of power. Additionally, major countries are vigorously developing new types of conventional military capabilities that could be used against its nuclear capabilities.</p> -<p>The Russian military eventually adopted a force structure that could deploy as BTGs, or as the entire formation, such as a regiment or brigade. BTGs were combined arms units, which were typically drawn from all-volunteer companies and battalions in existing brigades. They were task-organized motorized rifle or tank combat entities designed to perform semi-independent combined arms operations. The goal was for Russians to deploy meaningfully sized field forces drawn from “kontraktniki” (or контрактники) — professionals who were better trained than conscripts and legally deployable abroad. While the structure of the BTGs varied somewhat based on operational needs and available personnel, most included roughly 600 to 800 soldiers. As highlighted in Figure 2.1, they were generally mechanized battalions, with two to four tank or mechanized infantry companies and attached artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, electronic warfare, and rear support platoons. The support platoon generally consisted of motor transport, field mess, vehicle recovery, maintenance, and hygiene squads. The result was a somewhat self-sufficient ground combat unit with disproportionate fire and rear support. Most BTGs had sufficient ammunition, food, and fuel in high-intensity combat for one to three days before needing logistics support.</p> +<p>China has also built up and tested its own missile defense program in recent years. Specifically, China has focused on developing a ground-based mid-course missile defense systems capable of intercepting short- and medium-range ICBMs, including the HQ9 and HQ19 missile defense systems. Despite increased ground-based interception capabilities, it is unlikely that China would deploy this technology at scale. Rather, these missile defense systems would be deployed at fixed sites including command and control (C2) facilities and missile silos. In April 2023, China’s defense ministry announced that it successfully conducted a ground-based mid-course missile interception test. Details of the target of the test and the number of interceptors launched were not provided by state officials. Despite progress in interception capabilities for short- and medium-range missiles, China has not announced the development of a long-range system as of 2022.</p> -<h4 id="hybrid-warfare">HYBRID WARFARE</h4> +<p>Thus, the likely explanation is that China is developing capabilities to ensure that it has a second-strike capability. In the 1980s, China began making significant advances in ICBM development and deployment, and from the mid-1990s onwards, China’s rocket force has moved from fixed silos to mobile launchers, shifted from liquid to solid fuel, and modestly expanded the number of warheads and ICBMs that include multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Now with an arsenal of at least 60 DF-5s, 78 DF-31s, and 54 DF-41s coming online, China can deliver 90 missiles with 130 warheads to the continental United States. The number of warheads on China’s land-based ICBMs capable of threatening the United States is expected to grow to roughly 200 by 2025. The United States does not consider ICBMs second-strike systems, but that is because the United States puts them on high-readiness, maintains a launch-on-warning posture, and relies much more on its sea and air legs of the triad than on its land-based systems (while about three-fourths of Chinese forces are land-based).</p> -<p>Finally, Russia relied on a mix of regular and irregular actions — or hybrid warfare (гибридная война). As used here, irregular warfare refers to activities short of regular (or conventional) warfare that are designed to expand a country’s influence and weaken its adversaries. Examples include information and disinformation operations, cyber operations, support to state and non-state partners, covert action, espionage, and economic coercion. In addition, hybrid warfare involves the combination of regular and irregular warfare.</p> +<p>This could signal a shift to a launch-on-attack posture, but it is also consistent with the need to take measures such as deploying mobile defenses to key sites including fixed silos and C2 facilities to reduce the impact of a first strike in order to maintain a second strike. Moreover, China has been making significant advancements in its early warning radar and satellite capabilities. These developments aim to enhance its ability to detect and track incoming threats, such as ballistic missiles, and improve its overall situational awareness. The deployment of advanced early warning radars, such as the JY-26 and JY-27A, demonstrates China’s commitment to strengthening its air defense capabilities. Additionally, China’s growing network of reconnaissance and early warning satellites, including the Yaogan and Gaofen series, contribute to its ability to monitor regional and global activities more effectively. These advancements in early warning systems not only bolster China’s defense capabilities but also have a positive impact on stability, as they contribute to China’s confidence in its second-strike capabilities.</p> -<p>State and non-state partner forces played a critical role in conducting ground operations — including fire and maneuver — with outside training, advising, and assistance efforts. In Syria, for example, Russia benefited from competent and well-trained Lebanese Hezbollah forces, which were well equipped and had significant experience fighting highly capable Israel Defense Force units in 2006 in Lebanon. Hezbollah forces were tactically and operationally proficient at cover and concealment, fire discipline, mortar marksmanship, and coordination of direct-fire support, which were helpful for their involvement in the Syrian war. Moscow also worked with militias whose members were recruited from Iraq, Palestinian territory, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other locations.</p> +<p>China has also been developing hypersonic weapons, which pose particular challenges to missile defense systems because of features such as their long range, low altitude, high maneuverability, and adjustability. The Chinese military has also increased the number of ballistic missile brigades by around a third in the past three years both to enhance its nuclear-strike capabilities amid escalating tensions with the United States and to prepare for a possible war against Taiwan (which includes the need to deter U.S. nuclear coercion). One Beijing-based military source said that China has deployed its most advanced hypersonic missile, the DF-17, to the area. In this way, it is possible that technological developments, in particular China’s ability to defeat U.S. missile defense systems, will create more stability by convincing Beijing its arsenal is sufficient to deter nuclear use.</p> -<p>Russia also leveraged private military companies (PMCs), such as the Wagner Group, which trained and advised Syrian army units and a number of pro-Assad and foreign militias fighting for the regime, including the 5th Corps and Shia militias such as the Palestinian Liwa al-Quds. PMCs provided training to other Russian-backed Syrian militias, such as Sayadou Da’esh (Islamic State Hunters), which emerged in early 2017 and was deployed to protect installations in and around Palmyra, including the military airport and oil and gas fields. Other Russian PMCs, such as Vegacy Strategic Services, conducted smaller training missions for pro-regime militia forces, such as Liwa al-Quds. In addition, PMCs engaged in some urban clearing operations. Wagner Group forces, for example, participated in operations at Latakia, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and greater Damascus, as well as the counteroffensive to retake Palmyra in 2016 and 2017.</p> +<p>THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHINA-RUSSIA ALLIANCE</p> -<p>More broadly, Moscow expanded its overseas use of PMCs to over two dozen countries, such as Ukraine, Libya, Sudan, Mali, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, and Venezuela. These countries spanned Africa, the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Russian PMCs cooperated closely with the Russian government, including various combinations of the Kremlin, Ministry of Defense, Foreign Intelligence Service, and Federal Security Service. PMCs performed a variety of tasks, such as combat operations, intelligence collection and analysis, protective services, training, site security, information operations, and propaganda to further Moscow’s interests.</p> +<p>China has no interest in forming a traditional military alliance with Russia. The results of a long-term research project the author has been conducting on the China-Russia military relationship suggests that China and Russia are significantly aligned, but their alignment is limited to facilitating China’s challenge to U.S. hegemony in Asia; it does not include helping Russia to take on the United States in Europe. Additionally, military support from Russia mainly comes in the form of assisting China in building up its own combat capabilities, though recent activities suggest movement toward supporting China, to a limited degree, in wartime as well. In other words, the two sides are not preparing to fight together in the traditional sense of allies. China also prefers that Russia not threaten the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) if it is fighting the United States because that increases the likelihood that U.S. allies will become deeply and directly involved, in which case the likelihood of victory plummets and the economic costs of war become too high. This means that Russia and China can be analytically treated as separate cases; hence, this essay is about what is needed to deter China. What is required to maintain nuclear deterrence and promote arms control with Russia is likely very different. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that China and Russia will actively collude in the context of a nuclear crisis or other major conventional war in Asia, but that does not negate the possibility of Russia taking advantage of a crisis in East Asia to advance its own objectives independently.</p> -<h4 id="conclusion">CONCLUSION</h4> +<h4 id="implications-for-us-policy">Implications for U.S. Policy</h4> -<p>By Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the military had become a partial-mobilization force. Its leaders hoped to have more forces and equipment, reduced staffing and costs, and the ability to generate substantial combat power on short notice. The Russian military had also shed much of its Soviet legacy. It was ostensibly well suited to short, high-intensity campaigns defined by a heavy use of artillery and precision weapons, bolstered by such concepts as the reconnaissance-strike complex and reconnaissance-fire complex. The military could also conduct hybrid warfare by combining regular and irregular operations. Russian leaders were bolstered by the military’s success in helping the Bashar al-Assad government retake much of its territory in Syria. As would soon become clear, however, the Russian military was unprepared — at least initially — for a conventional war of attrition.</p> +<p>IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION</p> -<h3 id="3-the-future-of-warfare-and-russian-force-design">3 THE FUTURE OF WARFARE AND RUSSIAN FORCE DESIGN</h3> +<p>Assumptions about Chinese nuclear intentions lead to a popular recommendation in Washington: that the United States needs to build more nuclear weapons and delivery systems, or at the very least deploy more from its stockpiles. But it is far from clear that such a costly endeavor would have positive impacts on deterrence and stability in the region. Based on an assessment of Chinese thinking through readings and interaction with Chinese counterparts, more U.S. nuclear weapons would have a negligible impact on China’s calculus. The United States already has nuclear dominance, its elites are largely confident in its nuclear deterrent against China, and China’s minimal deterrence posture has traditionally been based on the belief (correct, in the author’s view) that the prospect of even one nuclear detonation on U.S. soil is enough to deter a U.S. nuclear attack.</p> -<p>This chapter asks two questions: how is the Russian military thinking about the future of warfare, and how might the Russian military evolve its force design over the next five years? The chapter makes two main arguments based on a review of Russian documents, supplemented by interviews. First, Russian analyses generally conclude that while the nature of warfare — its essence and purpose — is unchanging, the character of future warfare is rapidly evolving in ways that may force Moscow to adapt more quickly. Of particular interest to Russian military thinkers is the continuing growth in precision weapons; autonomous and unmanned systems; specific emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI), stealth, and electronic warfare; and hybrid warfare.</p> +<p>Moreover, more nuclear weapons will not solve other perennial issues, such as deterring a range of more limited Chinese military actions or non-military coercive activities, as their use in these scenarios is not credible. And given that collusion between Russia and China is unlikely in the nuclear realm (indeed, China is likely cautioning Russia to not use nuclear weapons in Ukraine), the United States need not match the combined arsenals of China and Russia for deterrence to hold. Moreover, even if China is increasing its arsenal to maintain a second-strike capability, and maintain a limited retaliatory capability, and even if it increases its arsenal to 1,000 weapons, this does not undermine U.S. deterrence.</p> -<p>Second, Russian political and military leaders are committed to a major reconstitution of the Russian military — especially the Russian army — over the next several years, making Russia a serious threat. Future force design will likely focus on deterring and — if deterrence fails — fighting the United States and NATO if necessary. According to Russian assessments, the Russian military is considering evolving force design in several areas:</p> +<p>While more work should be done to confirm these views, based on current trends and developments China will not necessarily change its nuclear strategy and posture away from the core components of treating nuclear weapons mainly as tools to deter nuclear use. Moreover, the existence of additional U.S. nuclear weapons does not fundamentally change China’s thinking on its strategy, doctrine, and posture — at least not in ways that benefit the United States. It is possible that such moves could encourage changes in China’s nuclear strategy that the United States should seek to avoid, such as China threatening nuclear use against any country that intervenes in its territorial disputes or against non-nuclear claimants to make gains. Indeed, dissuading China from moving away from the strategy that has served it well since 1964 should be the key objective of U.S. deterrence strategy and will be discussed more in the next section. What should the United States do, if not build up its own nuclear arsenal? It should use the Chinese buildup to make gains in other areas, such as conventional deterrence. This will be discussed more in the section on arms control.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Land</strong>: Russian force design in land warfare will likely include a continuing shift to divisions, although it is unclear whether the army can sufficiently fill the ranks of larger units. These changes mark a major shift away from the changes implemented under former minister of defense Anatoly Serdyukov. In addition, Russia will likely attempt to restructure its forces to allow for more mobility and decentralization in the field in response to U.S. and NATO long-range precision strike capabilities.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Air</strong>: Force design in the air domain will likely involve some reversals initiated by Serdyukov, as well as a major focus on unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). For example, the Russian military will likely attempt to increase the size of the Russian Aerospace Forces. The Russian military may also partially restructure its air forces to incorporate a significant increase in the use of UASs. Future developments may include the use of UASs for logistics in contested environments, which will require new organizational structures.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Maritime</strong>: Russia may expand its naval forces in response to growing tensions with the United States and NATO. The Ministry of Defense has expressed an interest in creating five naval infantry divisions for the navy’s coastal troops based on existing naval infantry brigades.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Space and Cyber</strong>: The Russian military will continue to develop its offensive space and cyber capabilities, including its electronic warfare capabilities. It will also likely try to expand the size and activities of the Russian Space Forces and a range of Russian cyber organizations, such as the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU), Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and Federal Security Service (FSB). But Russia will likely face serious challenges in implementing some of these changes, especially to the Russian Space Forces, because of Western sanctions and other factors.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>IMPLICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE</p> -<p>Russia will likely face significant challenges in making all — or even most — of these changes, as outlined in the next chapter. Consequently, Russia will need to prioritize which steps it takes, as discussed in the last section of this chapter.</p> +<p>The most important role of nuclear weapons is to enhance deterrence. However, how nuclear weapons impact other countries’ calculus on using force and what exactly states hope to deter can be debatable and evolve over time. This section focuses on the trade-offs between conventional and nuclear deterrence. This starts with the premise, developed in the previous section, that China’s unique nuclear strategy to date ensures that the balance of nuclear warheads and delivery systems in the 2035 to 2050 period is as likely to deter Chinese nuclear use as any U.S. force posture could. This does not mean that there are not problematic deterrence and escalation dynamics; allies and partners might be reassured by a larger arsenal (even though logically they should not be). But the likelihood and nature of a war with China are unlikely to be significantly impacted by improvements in U.S. nuclear force posture.</p> -<p>The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first examines Russia’s current thinking about the future of warfare. The second section assesses Russian thinking about force design. The third focuses on how Russia may prioritize among force design options.</p> +<p>This section addresses one of the primary topics in deterrence: the relationship between nuclear and conventional deterrence. During the Cold War, the United States adopted nuclear deterrence as an “asymmetrical response” against the Soviet Union. The approach reinforced Washington’s strength in nuclear weapons and, in turn, neutralized Moscow’s advantage in conventional forces. The Eisenhower administration believed that nuclear weapons make deterrence more credible and decrease the risk of aggression at minimal cost. Conventional and mutual deterrence, however, were still valued among other administrations: Kennedy pursued a flexible response that would equip the United States with numerous feasible options against different types of aggressions as potential alternatives to resorting to nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence is relatively stable between China and the United States, but because of China’s unique approach, characterized by no-first-use, minimal deterrence, and a lack of tactical warheads, the presence of nuclear weapons does not impose the level of caution on each side that deterrence theory might espouse.</p> -<h4 id="the-future-of-warfare">THE FUTURE OF WARFARE</h4> +<p>The fact that both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons means that any war could escalate to the nuclear level, which should impose caution on both sides. There is reason to believe, however, that the power of nuclear weapons to deter conventional conflict is relatively weak in the U.S.-China case. This is because of China’s view that nuclear weapons are only for deterring nuclear use and U.S. confidence in its escalation dominance in the nuclear realm. China firmly believes that nuclear war cannot be controlled once it begins; societal pressure on leaders not to back down, the circumstances of the country, and uncertainty about reactions from adversaries incentivize escalation. As such, China poses that strategic weapons are better than tactical weapons, and that they are only useful for signaling resolve, not waging war. Combined with practical concerns about having a weaker nuclear arsenal than the United States — where only half of its weapons can strike the continental United States — China is dedicated to maintaining a no-first-use policy.</p> -<p>Russian military thinking generally assumes that the character of warfare is rapidly evolving, though the nature of warfare remains a violent struggle between opponents. If there were any doubts before, the war in Ukraine has been a stark reminder. “War,” Carl von Clausewitz writes, “is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.” War is still nasty and brutish. By contrast, the character of warfare — including the conduct of warfare, the speed and complexity of tactical decisionmaking, and the technology and weapons systems that militaries use and need — is evolving. In particular, technology is advancing in such areas as robotics, sensors, AI, cyber, space, long-range precision strike, hypersonics, and advanced communications, command, and control. There will also be an overload of information available to military and intelligence personnel that will be collected by space-based, aerial, ground, surface, sub-surface, and cyber sensors.</p> +<p>Moreover, the concept of mutually assured destruction was based on the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship, in which both countries had thousands of nuclear weapons and relative parity with one another. This is not the case for the United States and China, the latter of which has chosen to pursue an assured retaliation posture. China also arguably did not have a second-strike capability until relatively recently. With only a few hundred warheads, and with the majority of its systems comprised of older missiles that were land-based, liquid-fueled, slow-launching, and stored in easily targeted silos, there was the possibility of a successful debilitating first strike. But China started to modernize its nuclear force in the 1990s, and now it has 50 to 75 ICBM launchers, of which 33 are the newer, road-mobile DF-31 and DF-31A. In 2017, China also showcased the DF-31AG, an improved version of the DF-31A missile, featuring an enhanced launcher, reduced support needs, and a wheeled transporter erector launcher capable of navigating off-road terrain. As of 2015, China also has a sea-based nuclear deterrence in its four Jin-class nuclear submarines, each of which carries 48 nuclear-capable JL-2 SLBMs. However, China’s mobile missiles still have the highest survival rate. This is because the Jin-class submarines are easily tracked. Given advances in U.S. missile defense, it is possible that China could not deliver a sufficient retaliatory strike against the United States after absorbing an attack. Even if the United States needed 80 warheads to destroy one DF-31, given the challenges of detection, Washington could probably destroy enough that China could not reliably retaliate after absorbing an attack on its nuclear forces.</p> -<p>Overall, there are several themes about the future of warfare in Russian military thinking: contact versus non-contact warfare, autonomous and unmanned systems, technological innovation, and hybrid warfare. These are not meant to be exhaustive, but rather representative of some of the most important themes debated by Russian military thinkers.</p> +<p>The fact that the United States and China both possess nuclear weapons reduces the likelihood of conventional conflict, but it does not make it unthinkable, given the persistent asymmetry in vulnerability. Whether it should be the case or not, the reality is that Chinese military planners believe it is very possible to fight a conventional war with the United States without escalating to the nuclear level. This is in part because they believe that once nuclear weapons are used, escalation would be uncontrollable, and therefore neither side will strike first. Additionally, many Chinese experts believe that the United States would avoid intervening in a conflict between a U.S. ally and China if doing so would ultimately lead to a nuclear confrontation. PLA strategists, not unlike some U.S. strategists, believe that advancements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities as well as C2 capabilities and precision weapons have further strengthened the ability to control war. Indeed, most of U.S. war planning over Taiwan makes this assumption implicitly or explicitly. Whether or not a war escalates to the nuclear level depends on whether the two sides can negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement and can prevent accidents.</p> -<p><strong>Contact vs. Non-Contact Warfare</strong>: There remains a tension in Russian military thinking between the future prevalence of contact warfare (контактная война) and non-contact warfare (бесконтактная война). On the one hand, numerous Russian military thinkers believe that warfare involving long-range precision weapons will become ubiquitous. On the other hand, many also believe that warfare will still involve violent contact between opposing ground forces that fight for control of territory. Russian military thinkers appear to be grappling with how to fight for control of territory while dealing with an adversary’s long-range precision strike.</p> +<p>In other words, the nuclear relationship between China and the United States has less of an impact on Chinese calculations about use of force than its perception of conventional balance of power. Unlike the Cold War, the United States cannot use nuclear threats to compensate for conventional issues given that China has no plans to attack and occupy other inhabited entities, with Taiwan being the exception — and this level of threat and cost makes U.S. willingness to fight nuclear wars relatively incredible. Indeed, in the case of U.S.-China tensions, the atrophy of U.S. conventional deterrence is the main driver for an increased likelihood of war, and thus the United States needs to prioritize re-establishing conventional deterrence. This means that in instances in which nuclear modernization may come at the expense of conventional force development, conventional force development should have priority. A good example of this was the United States pulling out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 following “Russia’s repeated violations of the treaty,” which allows the United States to now develop a key class of new conventional weapons to deter China.</p> -<p>Russian military analysts generally agree that there will be a continuing development of advanced precision weapons that allow for a “high level of target destruction.” The goal of non-contact warfare is to destroy the adversary’s will and ability to fight at a distance before any contact occurs — or, at the very least, to strike fixed-wing aircraft, air defense systems, and other targets and weaken the adversary’s ability to hit back or defend itself. Conducting these types of attacks will increasingly require good intelligence about the adversary’s locations, plans, and intentions.</p> +<p>There are two policy changes in particular that U.S. strategy should be designed to deter. First is a Sino-Russian alignment to the degree to which each provides some form of extended deterrence to the other. There is no consideration of this in China, so it does not present a real threat in the foreseeable future, but it is still worth mentioning.</p> -<p>The importance of long-range air, ground, and naval fires in Ukraine has reinforced the need to continue developing precision capabilities and the reconnaissance-strike complex (разведивательно-ударный комплех) and reconnaissance-fire complex (разведивательно-огновой комплех). After all, Russian forces have failed to conduct dynamic targeting in Ukraine and to quickly move from sensor to shooter in a kill chain. Ukraine has also demonstrated that long-range precision strike may require large volumes of munitions when facing an adversary with good — or reasonably good — air defense capabilities.</p> +<p>Instead, the most important goal for U.S. deterrence policy should be to ensure it does not encourage a change in China’s nuclear policy and in posture. To state this more clearly, if China starts to threaten nuclear use in response to U.S. conventional intervention in conflicts, this will severely impact U.S. war planning. China has never leveraged its nuclear arsenal to make up for conventional inferiorities, even in the 1990s when it was outclassed by far by the United States. But China might believe it could improve its ability to coerce U.S. partners and allies in Asia without risking confrontation with the United States. If the Chinese threat is credible, the United States will find itself with limited options to defend its allies in lower-level conflicts, in effect forcing the United States to concede the region to China. In other words, any movement in the United States to integrate conventional and nuclear operations, or to use nuclear weapons to make up for issues in U.S. regional conventional force posture, should be avoided, as they could encourage China to do the same.</p> -<p>Nevertheless, Ukraine has highlighted the persistence of contact warfare and the need to fight for control of physical territory. As one Russian analysis concludes, “There is no reason to expect that [long-range precision weapons] will render useless the more advanced forms and methods of contact warfare. . . . The supporters of this theory spread false information, arguing that modern and, above all, future wars will only be non-contact.” Warfare will still hinge, in part, on the struggle for territorial control that involves the use of brute force among armies.</p> +<p>In line with these concerns, the Biden administration’s decision to cancel the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) program in 2022 demonstrates a commitment to avoiding the co-mingling of conventional and nuclear systems on vessels that are not SSBNs. This decision helps reduce the risk of platform ambiguity in the Indo-Pacific region, which could potentially escalate conflicts due to misinterpretation of intentions. By taking this step, the United States is actively working to prevent any changes in China’s nuclear policy and posture that could result from the integration of conventional and nuclear operations, thus maintaining stability in the region and safeguarding the interests of its allies.</p> -<p>The broader debate about contact and non-contact warfare has at least three implications. First, Russia and its partners (such as China) will be in a race with its adversaries (such as the United States) to develop precision weapons that are faster, stealthier, longer range, and carry a higher payload. Examples include the use of more advanced seekers, improved surface material on missiles, laser guidance, anti-jamming capabilities, sensors, and robust algorithms for precision strike. Second, the growth in precision weapons will present significant dangers to ground forces, which will be exposed to saturation from medium- and long-range strikes. As discussed later in this chapter, ground forces will likely need to be more mobile and decentralized. Third, Russian assessments conclude that the military needs to expedite defensive measures to protect civilian and military targets. One area is integrated air and missile defense to defend against incoming stand-off weapons. Another is denial and deception (maskirovka, or маскировка) to make it more difficult for adversaries to identify and hit targets, including the use of concealment, thermal camouflage, anti-thermal material, imitation with decoys and dummies, denial, disinformation, and other tactics, techniques, and procedures.</p> +<p>Given the limited nature of Chinese ambitions, the United States should also rethink the objectives of extended deterrence and how to best reassure allies and partners. First, given China’s limited nuclear arsenal and policy of not using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, China’s nuclear threat to U.S. allies in Asia is more limited than Russia’s threat to NATO allies, especially during the Cold War. The big question concerns China’s willingness to use nuclear weapons against U.S. assets in Asia, which might be on allied soil, as an intermediate rung on the escalation ladder to using them against the U.S. homeland. This is likely the motivation behind recent Chinese posture changes that show much greater interest in intermediate escalation options such as the DF-26, air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs), the DF-21, and the DF-17.</p> -<p><strong>Autonomous and Unmanned Systems</strong>: Russian assessments of the future of war assume a growing role for all types of unmanned systems — air, land, surface, and sub-surface. The importance of unmanned systems also means that a key aspect of future warfare will be countering these systems.</p> +<p>Notably, the DF-26 is often referred to as the “Guam Killer” due to its ability to target U.S. military installations on the island of Guam in the Western Pacific. ALBMs can be launched from aircraft and offer the potential for rapid response, mobility, and the ability to launch nuclear strikes outside of the coverage areas of traditional missile defense systems. The DF-21 is commonly referred to as the “Carrier Killer” because of its intended capability to target aircraft carriers and other large warships. The DF-17 is known for its maneuverability and ability to fly at extremely high speeds, making it more difficult for existing missile defense systems to intercept. Additionally, as per the previous discussion, nuclear weapons do not deter admittedly problematic conventional activities. And the United States should avoid this pathway for the sake of assuring allies because it could encourage China to then threaten nuclear use in response to U.S. conventional activity, which would seriously complicate defense planning.</p> -<p>UASs — including micro- and mini-UASs — offer a useful example of Russian thinking on unmanned systems. According to a range of Russian military analysis, UASs will be increasingly critical for future warfare because of their utility for aerial reconnaissance, target designation for artillery and other weapons systems, precision strike, attack assessment, survey of terrain to produce digital maps, logistics (such as moving cargo), aerial refueling, communications, and electronic warfare. While UASs were often utilized in the past for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike operations, they will likely be important for combined arms operations in the future — including a critical part of Russia’s reconnaissance-strike complex. As Russian president Vladimir Putin remarked:</p> +<h4 id="implications-for-extended-assurance-and-deterrence">Implications for Extended Assurance and Deterrence</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>The use of drones has become practically ubiquitous. They should be a must-have for combat units, platoons, companies and battalions. Targets must be identified as quickly as possible and information needed to strike must be transferred in real time. Unmanned vehicles should be interconnected, integrated into a single intelligence network, and should have secure communication channels with headquarters and commanders. In the near future, every fighter should be able to receive information transmitted from drones.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>U.S. strategists should also revisit whether there are more costs than benefits associated with its allies in Asia possessing nuclear weapons, namely South Korea, Japan, and Australia. The downsides include that this could undermine the global nonproliferation regime and increase the likelihood of nuclear use due to an accident. Historical records show that the United States had many “close calls” where the “accidental or unauthorized detonation” of a nuclear weapon was a real possibility. The upside is that Chinese conventional attack, and subsequent escalation to nuclear war, becomes less likely.</p> -<p>Numerous countries — including the United States — are pouring research and development resources into autonomous and unmanned systems. As Russian analysts recognize, for example, the U.S. Department of Defense and defense industry are working on such unmanned systems as the collaborative combat aircraft (including the Gambit, X-62 Vista, and XQ-58 Valkyrie), MQ-28 Ghost Bat, MQ-25 Stingray, MQ-1C Gray Eagle Extended Range, and loitering munitions such as the Phoenix Ghost and Switchblade lines. These efforts also include the development of AI so that unmanned systems can be entirely autonomous.</p> +<p>China’s growing conventional and nuclear capabilities in the Indo-Pacific have driven many in allied countries to question their current approaches. Many in South Korea are worried by the possibility that U.S. extended deterrence could fail. In their eyes, North Korea’s ability to hit any U.S. city could prevent U.S. assistance in the event of a restarted Korean war, making a South Korean nuclear deterrent the only guarantor of the country’s safety — a logic that applies to China as well. South Koreans are historically more open to the idea of developing a nuclear bomb than their Japanese counterparts, and in recent years that option has been discussed more frequently. In January 2023, President Yoon Suk Yeol commented that the nation may have to pursue nuclear weapons development or “demand redeployment of U.S. nuclear arms” to South Korea in response to the North Korean nuclear threat. According to a 2022 poll, 71 percent of South Koreans were in support of the nation pursuing its own nuclear weapons. The North Korean nuclear threat has also influenced thinking in this area. While no country has taken steps toward this option, what was once an unthinkable topic has now become more mainstream.</p> -<p>The Russian military is also working to develop future swarming tactics for UASs. A swarm involves a large number of drones flying in a coordinated fashion. The integration of AI would allow UASs to make decisions on their own. Swarms could be particularly beneficial for strike operations if UASs could independently search for — and destroy — targets and adapt quickly to evolving conditions. Russia has watched with interest the swarming programs of adversaries, including the United States and United Kingdom. Development efforts may focus on intensifying information exchange among UASs, reducing their dimensions, enhancing their maneuverability, and minimizing their construction costs.</p> +<p>In Japan, the specter of a rising China and the Trump administration’s unreliability undermined Tokyo’s faith in extended deterrence. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has done even more to drive the debate underway in Japan. And whereas advocates of pursuing a nuclear weapon are traditionally found on the far right, this formerly taboo opinion is becoming more mainstream, with Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, shortly before his death, publicly raising the idea of housing U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan (i.e. through a nuclear-sharing arrangement). While the current prime minister, Kishida Fumio, quickly rejected the suggestion, Kishida was also severely criticized for failing to “mention the [Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons] and for not clarifying Japan’s future role in nuclear disarmament” in the 2022 NPT Review Conference. It is important to note here that besides Russia’s invasion, China’s conventional buildup and increasingly aggressive foreign policy are likely driving most of Japanese anxiety. China’s nuclear buildup is probably only a secondary driver. Japan’s 2022 National Defense Strategy, for instance, discusses China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) network, aggressive activities around the Senkakus, and threat to Taiwan much more than its nuclear forces.</p> -<p>Russian assessments also conclude that the Russian military will need to improve its ability to counter unmanned systems. While Russia needs to develop and produce unmanned systems, so will its state and non-state adversaries. UASs will increasingly proliferate to state and non-state actors because the barriers to acquisition are so low. Many are inexpensive and commercially available. In addition, some Russian analysis suggests that advancements in engines, energy-saving technologies (such as high-energy solar arrays made from silicon, lithium, iron, and phosphate technologies), batteries, and lightweight material will increase the range, speed, and payload capacities of UASs.</p> +<p>While the Australian government maintains its firm stance on nuclear nonproliferation, the development of China’s military capacity has posed increasing security risks to the nation and prompted discussion on the strengthening of U.S. extended deterrence. Australian minister for defense Richard Marles expressed his concerns toward China’s use of force in the South China Sea and called for increased U.S. military presence as part of Australia’s new defense strategy. Some defense analysts have questioned U.S. extended deterrence and suggested the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons. A 2022 poll revealed that 36 percent of Australians were in favor of obtaining nuclear weapons — more than double the amount in a 2010 poll conducted on a similar (though differently phrased) question.</p> -<p>Russian assessments generally conclude that surface-to-air missiles and artillery are not cost effective against UASs. In addition, ground radar detection of micro- and mini-UASs will be difficult because UASs can hover for protracted periods and some types have a low Doppler frequency, making them difficult to detect. As one Russian assessment concludes, “The use of drones at all levels of armed formations, as well as the range of missions they perform, will constantly expand. This trend is expected to continue in the coming years. Thus, a program for designing and developing specialized radars and weapons of the given and prospective classes of micro- and mini-UAVs needs to be adopted.”</p> +<p>How can the United States deal with these growing concerns about U.S. extended deterrence? First, deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Asia is not the answer. At best, this has little impact on Beijing’s thinking, and at worst, it may enhance the legitimacy of China’s attacks on U.S. regional bases and even on Taiwan if nuclear weapons were discussed as an option for cross-strait stability. That leaves the software options of greater consultations and joint defense planning, which might reassure allies and partners of U.S. intentions even as they have minimal impact on Chinese contingency planning.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/60gS6uC.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.1: Russian Assessments of Vulnerable UAS Components.</strong> Source: Г.А. Лопин, Г.И. Смирнов, И.Н. Ткачёв [G.A. Lopin, G.I. Smirnov, and I.N. Tkachov], “Развитие Средств Борьбы С Беспилотными Летательными Аппаратами” [Development of Assets to Counter Unmanned Vehicles], Военная мысль [Military Thought] 32, no. 2 (June 2023): 58–67.</em></p> +<h4 id="implications-for-arms-control-approaches">Implications for Arms Control Approaches</h4> -<p>Consequently, Russia is working on possible solutions that target critical subsystems of UASs using advanced electronic warfare systems, lasers, microwave weapons, and acoustic weapons. As Figure 3.1 highlights based on one Russian analysis, electronic warfare may be particularly useful against UAS electronic assets and optoelectronic systems, lasers against all key subsystems, microwaves against electronic assets and optoelectronic systems, acoustics against engines and electronic assets, and strike against all major subsystems. Electronic warfare appears to be especially promising for Russian military analysts.</p> +<p>Political scientist Joseph Nye defines arms control as efforts between nations to “limit the numbers, types, or disposition of weapons.” There are two key data points that drive the following recommendations on the potential of arms control agreements with China. First, China’s participation in arms control regimes to date is largely driven by the belief that these arrangements give them a competitive edge. Granted, China’s participation in arms regimes is widely touted as a success story. In 1980, Beijing was essentially uninvolved in international arms control agreements, but by the late 1990s, its participation rate was on par with that of other major powers. China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1984, agreed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1992, helped negotiate the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in 1996, and signed and ratified the 1993 Chemical Weapons Ban Treaty.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Ey8LzKa.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.2: Russian Analysis of UASs to Counter Unmanned Systems.</strong> Sources: Мариам Мохаммад, В. Н. Похващев, Л. Б. Рязанцев [Mariam Mohammad, V.N. Pokhvashchev, and L.B. Ryazantsev], “К Вопросу Повышения Эффективности Противодействия Малоразмерным Беспилотным Летательным Аппаратам” [Improving the Efficiency of Countering Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles], Военная мысль [Military Thought] 31, no. 4 (December 2022), 71.</em></p> +<p>But given China’s different approach to nuclear weapons and conventional arms sales, China has sacrificed little in terms of potential power gains. It makes sense, therefore, for China to work to constrain the United States’ ability to leverage its advantages in these areas. Indeed, Chinese experts such as Tang Yongsheng, professor at the PLA National Defence University, have been direct about the strategy, arguing that China should “use the UN arms control and disarmament institutions to restrain U.S. arms development and deescalate the U.S.-China arms race.” China has gone further than current regimes, advocating for a complete ban and destruction of nuclear weapons and advocating for a global no-first-use treaty for nuclear states. Indeed, this self-serving approach to arms control best explains why China has more of a spotty record on export controls.</p> -<p>Russia has devoted research and development resources to examine various ways to counter UASs, such as installing miniature radars on UASs to double or triple the range for detecting incoming UASs. As Figure 3.2 highlights, this could include UASs operating in threatened sectors, while transmitters on antenna masts illuminate the reconnaissance area from protected positions.</p> +<p>Second, taking into account the modernization discussion in the first section, which argues that China has yet to deviate from its minimal-deterrent nuclear strategy and posture, there is likely no possibility of China joining bilateral arms control arrangements between Russia and the United States that focus on restricting the quantity of its nuclear weapons or the effectiveness of its delivery systems until Russia and the United States reduce their arsenals to China’s level. Fu Cong, the head of the arms control department of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explicitly stated that “China has no interest in joining the so-called trilateral negotiations, given the huge gap between the nuclear arsenal of China and those of the U.S. and the Russian Federation.” In the eyes of Chinese military strategists, arms control is generally seen as a tool by the strong to keep down the weak. This inherent suspicion is illustrated in the Science of Military Strategy, a core textbook for senior PLA officers, in which arms control is described as a “struggle” between self-interested great powers. Chinese leaders are particularly suspicious of U.S.-led arms control regimes, which Chinese strategists see as a “trap” designed to solidify U.S. nuclear dominance and undermine China’s nuclear deterrent. Indeed, China mostly uses arms control as a notion to protest against other countries’ arm deployment and development.</p> -<p><strong>Emerging Technologies</strong>: Another major theme of Russian military thinking is the growing importance of emerging technologies. As Russian strategic thinkers recognize, the United States and other NATO countries are investing in significant technological innovations. The previous section highlighted one area: unmanned systems. This section examines several others that Russian military thinkers believe may be important for future warfare.</p> +<p>This does not mean progress cannot be made, but U.S. objectives need to shift. First, to support the argument in the deterrence section about instability in conventional deterrence, the United States could consider asymmetric arms control arrangements, such as reductions in U.S. theater missile defense capabilities or even in the number of nuclear warheads, in exchange for demobilization of certain types and numbers of Chinese conventional missiles. Chinese interlocutors have often expressed interest in a U.S. statement of mutual vulnerability. What would make such a concession to China worthwhile to the United States? The United States could maintain that it possesses a strong nuclear capability, and that China would certainly suffer far more than the United States in any nuclear exchange, while also admitting at the same time that the United States is vulnerable to nuclear attack.</p> -<p>One emerging technology is the use of AI. According to some Russian analyses, AI will lead to the emergence of new forms of offense and defense, such as swarms, autonomous unmanned systems, global cyber operations, and missile defense. As one Russian assessment concludes, the future will likely include “the emergence of highly autonomous combat systems in all areas of armed struggle, the transition from individual tactical unit control (items of weapons, military, and specialized hardware) and tactical groups to control systems based on AI.” Russia is engaged in AI development in multiple areas, such as image identification, speech recognition, control of autonomous military systems, and information support for weapons.</p> +<p>China, the United States, and Russia have been focused on developing artificial intelligence (AI), but through different approaches. The Russian projects are directed at creating military hardware which relies on AI but leaves decisions entirely in human hands, while the U.S. approach is also more conservative, with the goal of producing computers that can assist human decisionmaking but not contribute on their own. China has the most aggressive approach, focusing on developing advanced AI that could contribute to strategic decisionmaking. In China’s 2017 New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, which lays out its goal of leading the world in AI by 2030, China aims to have AI systems that can outperform humans in complex, changing environments and that can process more battlefield information than humans. This would give the PLA a substantial advantage over its adversaries that have less ability to utilize information. Despite these lofty goals, much more research and development needs to be done before any existing AI system is advanced enough to advise battlefield operations.</p> -<p>Another example is hypersonic technology. Hypersonic weapons combine the speed and range of ballistic missiles with the low altitude and maneuverability profile of a cruise missile, making them difficult to detect and capable of quickly striking targets. As one Russian assessment concludes, future warfare will involve the “widespread proliferation of hypersonic weapons in the air environment and supersonic weapons in the marine environment.” The Russian military is particularly interested in hypersonic technology because hypersonic cruise and ballistic missiles can overcome an adversary’s integrated air and missile defense and destroy its retaliatory strike systems.</p> +<p>China understands that the proliferation of AI brings new risks and challenges to the global stage and wants to be in charge of setting the norms for this new technology. As such, China’s New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan calls on minimizing the risks of AI to ensure a “safe, reliable, and controllable” development of the technology. This includes formulating laws, regulations, ethical norms, and safety mechanisms for AI.</p> -<p>The Russian military is also interested in the future military application of other technologies, such as biotechnology, telecommunications, nanotechnology, quantum computing, stealth technology, laser weapons, and directed energy weapons.</p> +<p>Chinese officials have also expressed concerns about an AI arms race and emphasized the need for international cooperation and potential arms control. PLA scholars have indicated that they are concerned that AI “will lower the threshold of military action” because states may be more willing to attack each other with AI military systems due to lowered casualty risks. Chinese officials have also expressed that they are concerned about increased misperceptions through the use of these systems. China’s private sector, which plays a big role in developing a lot of AI systems — for example, Baidu makes autonomous vehicles, Alibaba Cloud is in charge of smart cities, and Tencent makes medical imaging — have also voiced their worries. Jack Ma, the chairman of Alibaba, explicitly stated at the 2019 Davos World Economic Forum that he was concerned that the global competition over AI could lead to war.</p> -<p>While this section highlights Russian interest in integrating emerging technology into its military, Russia is not a global leader in many of these technologies. Consequently, Moscow will likely lag behind such countries as the United States and China, which are pouring more money into the defense sector and have much greater capabilities. Russia has also suffered from a brain drain of talent in the technology sector. More founders of “unicorn” startups — privately held startup companies with a value of over $1 billion — leave Russia than any other country, according to one study. Another assesses that the Russian tech sector is hemorrhaging and is in danger of being “cut off from the global tech industry, research funding, scientific exchanges, and critical components.”</p> +<p>There may be more room to maneuver, therefore, to discuss how cyber warfare, counterspace capabilities, or AI-enabled systems could create crisis dynamics that neither side favors, and thus China may be willing to agree to mutual constraints in these areas to protect C2 and otherwise reduce the likelihood of accidents and miscalculation. For instance, the U.S. 2022 Nuclear Posture Review emphasizes the importance of keeping a human in the loop for nuclear employment and decisionmaking. This approach aims to maintain control and reduce risks associated with AI-driven systems. A general agreement with China on this matter could be useful in promoting transparency, trust, and stability between the United States and China. Given China’s concerns about AI arms races, misperceptions, and the potential for conflict, it is possible that it may be open to such an agreement, as it aligns with its security interests.</p> -<p><strong>Hybrid Warfare</strong>: Finally, Russian military thinkers assess that the future of warfare will include a combination of both state and non-state actors involved in regular and irregular operations, which may be best characterized as hybrid warfare. The concept of hybrid warfare has a long and rich tradition in Russian military thinking. Over the past several years, Russia has used government forces (such as special operations forces and intelligence units) and non-government forces (such as private military companies and Lebanese Hezbollah) to conduct extraterritorial actions. The Russian military may be cautious about leveraging some types of non-state or quasi-state actors in light of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s tension with the Russian military and insurrection against the Russian government in June 2023. But hybrid warfare will likely remain important for the Russian state. In fact, Russia’s challenges in conducting conventional warfare in Ukraine may increase Moscow’s proclivity for hybrid warfare, especially against the United States and other NATO countries that have superior conventional capabilities.</p> +<p>On space, China has been promoting the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty, which aims to prohibit the placement of weapons in outer space. China supports this treaty to prevent a space arms race. However, the United States opposes the agreement, as it believes the treaty lacks proper verification mechanisms and could potentially limit its ability to defend its space assets. Furthermore, the United States has been advocating for international norms and rules to regulate space activities, while Beijing has expressed reservations about this approach. China’s 2013 Science of Military Strategy prefers to argue that “seizing command of space and network dominance will become crucial for obtaining comprehensive superiority on the battlefield and conquering an enemy.” Despite these disagreements, reaching a consensus would be challenging but possible. As China and the United States consider space weaponization and threats to space assets, including satellite systems that support nuclear C2 on the ground, agreements on protecting these systems will become critical points for maintaining control over nuclear forces — something of mutual interest to both nations.</p> -<p>According to Russian analyses, future warfare will continue to involve non-state actors. After all, Russian analysts believe that such adversaries as the United States will utilize a wide range of non-state actors in the future to sow discord and instability. Based on the Ukraine case, Russian analyses also assume that adversaries such as the United States will use Western companies in multiple domains of warfare, including cyber (such as Microsoft and Amazon) and space (such as SpaceX, Hawkeye 360, and Maxar).</p> +<p>In addition to refining which capabilities to control and restrict, U.S. strategists should also consider whether bringing China into bilateral agreements currently in place with Russia is the right strategy. This largely depends on alliance dynamics between China and Russia. If it looks like the two countries might team up to promote their preferred norms, trilaterals may not be superior to two separate bilateral channels. However, if China’s participation will impose constraints on Russia or vice versa, or the two countries are so clearly in alignment that they concede deterrence is determined by the balance of U.S. forces against an aggregate of Chinese and Russian nuclear forces (such that then the United States is outnumbered and may have to make some concessions), trilateral and broader multilateral arrangements may be the optimal future modality.</p> -<h4 id="force-design-1">FORCE DESIGN</h4> +<p>Lastly, China tends to exploit gaps in the international order, making advances at the expense of others when international norms are not solid. Many of the main concepts central to arms control — such as what defines a strategic system, a deployed system, or a tactical nuclear weapon — are debatable. This ambiguity creates space for China to pursue its modernization goals with relatively less pushback and reputational costs. Even if China and the United States cannot agree on force posture, a first step in arms control should be to reach agreement about these fundamental concepts and their meanings and implications.</p> -<p>This section examines Russian thinking on force design, based in part on Russian assessments about the future of warfare. It focuses on several aspects of force design: land, air, maritime, cyber, and space. Chapter 4 then examines the challenges Moscow will likely face in implementing many of these changes.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion-2">Conclusion</h4> -<p>Russian military thinking about force design is based on an assumption that the United States — and NATO more broadly — will be Russia’s main enemy (главный враг) and greatest threat for the foreseeable future. Russian leaders have expressed concern about the expansion of NATO to Finland and Sweden, as well as the buildup of Western forces — especially U.S. forces — on NATO’s eastern flank. In addition, Russian political and military leaders assess that Russia’s struggles in Ukraine have been due to U.S. and broader NATO aid.</p> +<p>China’s nuclear modernization and buildup requires new thinking on deterrence, force posture, and arms control. However, it is not necessarily the case that the solutions of the past suit the challenges in store for the coming period between 2035 and 2050. A best-case scenario for U.S. and allied security is for Chinese nuclear doctrine and strategy to treat nuclear weapons as only relevant for nuclear deterrence, serving no war fighting use. As the United States considers changing its approach to its own nuclear modernization, extended deterrence, or arms control, a primary question should be how these changes might alter the role of nuclear weapons in China’s strategy. This does not need to be a two-peer competition, as this volume posits, but rather the United States could avoid creating a strategic adversary in Beijing altogether. Preventing a more permissive Chinese nuclear strategy should be the top priority of all efforts, even if it means living with a larger, more survivable Chinese nuclear arsenal.</p> -<p>Consequently, Russia has closely examined U.S. force design efforts, such as the U.S. Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030. Force Design 2030 is in some ways an odd concept for Moscow to examine since it focuses on fighting a maritime conflict in the Indo-Pacific. But there are some broader discussions of the importance of precision fires and logistics in a contested environment. As Force Design 2030 concludes, the future of the U.S. Marine Corps will center around such capabilities as:</p> +<h3 id="us-nuclear-policy-in-a-two-peer-nuclear-adversary-world">U.S. Nuclear Policy in a Two Peer Nuclear Adversary World</h3> <blockquote> - <p>Long-range precision fires; medium- to long-range air defense systems; short-range (point defense) air defense systems; high-endurance, long-range unmanned systems with Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Electronic Warfare (EW), and lethal strike capabilities; and disruptive and less-lethal capabilities appropriate for countering malign activity by actors pursuing maritime “gray zone” strategies.</p> + <h4 id="franklin-c-miller">Franklin C. Miller</h4> </blockquote> -<p>Russian military thinkers have also followed discussions about the U.S. military’s Joint Warfighting Concept and other efforts that outline U.S. views about future threats and force design. Russian analyses generally assume that the United States will attempt to conduct several actions that impact Russian force design:</p> +<h4 id="prologue-how-did-we-get-to-where-we-are">Prologue: How Did We Get to Where We Are?</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Destroy early warning systems, air defense, missile defense, electronic warfare, and long-range precision weapons systems and capabilities;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Destroy or disable critical civilian and government installations, as well as key parts of the defense industrial base;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Disrupt command and control systems; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Disrupt transport infrastructure facilities.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Beginning in the late 1940s, nuclear forces first dominated, and then were a dominating factor in, U.S. defense policy for over 40 years. As the Cold War ended, and the threat of al Qaeda and global terrorism emerged, the U.S. defense establishment turned its focus away from nuclear deterrence and the forces which it supported. Systems which were first built in the 1960s and were then modernized or replaced in the 1980s should have been similarly modernized or replaced beginning in the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, but they were not. As a result, as the Obama administration ended, the outgoing secretary of defense, the late Ashton Carter, observed:</p> -<p>The rest of this section examines five areas: land, air, maritime, space, and cyber.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>. . . the Defense Department cannot further defer recapitalizing Cold War-era systems if we are to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear force that will continue to deter potential adversaries that are making improvements in their air defenses and their own nuclear weapons systems. The choice is not between replacing these platforms or keeping them, but rather between replacing them and losing them altogether. The latter outcome would, unfortunately, result in lost confidence in our ability to deter. The United States cannot afford this in today’s security environment or in any reasonably foreseeable future security environment.</p> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Land</strong>: Russian force design in land warfare will likely focus on revitalizing the Russian army over the next five years. Russia’s offensive maneuver formations in Ukraine have been heavily weighted toward artillery, armor, support, and enablers rather than infantry. This structure has undermined Russia’s ability to operate in urban terrain, support armor with dismounted infantry, conduct effective combined arms operations, and control terrain. There have also been shortages of key personnel, from enablers to logistics. The BTG structure is likely better suited to small-scale wars than to a large-scale conventional war.</p> +<p>Concurrent with this neglect of force posture, the U.S. government failed to view nuclear deterrence policy as a major area of interest, and even the idea that a nuclear deterrent relationship with Russia, or even the small but growing nuclear forces of China or North Korea, required high-level attention attracted little support. Russia’s invasion of Crimea, North Korea’s continued expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and the emergence of the aggressive Xi Jinping as China’s next leader caused the Obama administration in mid-stream to rediscover the importance of nuclear deterrence. Successive U.S. administrations have continued on that path, but as they have done so, the global scene has become more unsettled.</p> -<p>Russian design of land forces may include several aspects, based on Russian military thinking.</p> +<h4 id="an-unsettling-echo-of-the-past">An Unsettling Echo of the Past</h4> -<p>First, there will likely be a continuing shift away from BTGs to divisions to prepare for deterrence and warfighting against NATO. In particular, the Russian army will likely continue to move away from battalion formations to infantry, marine, and airborne divisions. This would mark a significant shift away from the changes implemented under former minister of defense Anatoly Serdyukov, who scrapped the Soviet-era structure of the armed forces that included large divisions as part of the “New Look” reforms. A substantial number of Seryukov’s changes are likely to be reversed over the next several years.</p> +<p>By any reasonable measure, the world has become a more dangerous place over the past 10 years. Russia, China, and North Korea are increasingly dangerous. All three nations’ autocratic leaders seek to intimidate their democratically oriented neighbors, and all three harbor ambitions of imperial aggression.</p> -<p>For example, Russian military leaders have indicated an intention to create at least nine new divisions: five artillery divisions, including super-heavy artillery brigades for building artillery reserves; two air assault divisions in the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), bringing its force structure to roughly equal with Soviet times; and two motorized infantry divisions integrated into combined arms forces. The Ministry of Defense will likely transform seven motorized infantry brigades into motorized infantry divisions in the Western, Central, and Eastern Districts, as well as in the Northern Fleet. It will also likely expand an army corps in Karelia, across the border from Finland. In addition, each combined arms (tank) army may have a composite aviation division within it and an army aviation brigade with 80 to 100 combat helicopters under the control of ground force units — not the Russian Aerospace Forces. This decision was likely a result of the poor joint operations in Ukraine, especially air-land battle, though it does not fix poor coordination between Russian land and air forces.</p> +<p>A student of history would observe that the 2020s are eerily reminiscent of the 1930s. Adolf Hitler doubted the will of the Western democracies and went to war against them despite the advice of his military. (His claim that wherever the German language was spoken must be incorporated into the Nazi state resembles Putin’s claims about Russophone territory.) In Tokyo, Premier Togo Shigenori and his ruling clique were similarly convinced, in highly racist terms, that the United States and United Kingdom were weak, failing nations that lacked the will to defend themselves. Both Berlin and Tokyo were convinced that the internal domestic political divisions in the United States and United Kingdom would prevent any unity to rally against aggression. All of this rings true today, with the exception that Putin, Xi, and Kim Jong-un also possess nuclear weapons their twentieth-century forebears lacked. As a result, the United States’ credibility and its commitment to defend allies are once again being called into question by aggressive authoritarian regimes — but today these countries’ possession of nuclear weapons allows them to add a dangerous new element of intimidation and coercion.</p> -<p>As part of a restructuring plan, the military also re-established the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts as joint force strategic territorial units within the armed forces. This was another blow to the Serdyukov “New Look” reforms, since he had condensed six military districts into four, as well as changed their command-and-control relationships. The Western Military District’s failure during the invasion of Ukraine may have contributed to its downfall. The Russian military will also likely increase the number of contract service members, or kontraktniki (контрактники), and raise the age ceiling for conscription.</p> +<p>Putin, Xi, and Kim believe deeply in the political power of nuclear weapons. This is evidenced by their significant investment in the modernization and growth of their nuclear forces, for both long-range and theater/tactical purposes. It is made evident by their use of nuclear blackmail, in Xi’s case a more subtle exercise of that blackmail than Putin or Kim’s efforts; but in all three cases, such blackmail had an effect on regional politics and stability. None of them accepts traditional Western ideas of “strategic stability” (despite decades of well-meaning Westerners seeking to “educate” them). This can be seen in their continued embrace of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) equipped with multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs), their continued rejection of transparency, and their continued willingness to push the envelope with respect to state-sanctioned dangerous military activities and incidents at sea (despite Moscow and Beijing’s membership in accords which prohibit such reckless behavior). All of this is compounded by investments in massive conventional forces and offensive space and cyber capabilities.</p> -<p>Second, the Russian army may experiment with different formations at the tactical level, according to some Russian military thinkers. During the war in Ukraine, Russian infantry structures at the tactical level have evolved from deploying uniform BTGs as combined arms units to a stratified division by function into line, assault, specialized, and disposable troops. These infantry unit types might be formed into task-organized groupings in the future.</p> +<p>Accordingly, as the United States faces the present and the future, its overriding priority must be to protect U.S. and allied security and territorial integrity without having to fight a war. This means the United States must deter major aggression and blackmail by an enemy (or enemies) using conventional forces, nuclear forces, cyber forces, or space capabilities. That is the country’s deterrent task for today and for tomorrow.</p> -<p>For example, line units could be largely used for holding territory and conducting defensive operations, and they could be based on mechanized units. They may not receive specific assault training, ensuring that they are largely used for defensive tasks. Assault units might include battalion-sized forces that are essentially reinforced battalions with a focus on urban and rural assault operations, including VDV and naval infantry units. They would receive additional training, perhaps akin to U.S. or other light infantry forces, and would likely be a skilled and valuable asset. Specialized units, particularly infantry, could be generated through the normal Russian recruitment and training system, and they might include VDV or Spetsnaz. In ground combat, they would likely be held back from the front lines, fight from well-defended positions, and include snipers, artillery spotters, and support weapon operators. Disposable units might be drawn from local militias, private military companies, or under-trained mobilized Russian civilians. These forces might be assigned the initial advances to adversary positions and would likely be susceptible to high casualties. They could be used for skirmishing in order to identify adversary firing positions, which are then targeted by specialized infantry, or to find weak points in defenses that could be prioritized for assault.</p> +<h4 id="the-essence-of-deterrence-policy">The Essence of Deterrence Policy</h4> -<p>Third, the Russian army will likely attempt to restructure its units to allow for more mobility in the field. The Russian Ministry of Defense has already indicated a desire to focus on motorized rifle and air assault divisions. The evolution of Ukraine to a war of attrition has been costly for Russian ground forces. With the growth in non-contact warfare and long-range precision strike, concentrated forces are likely to be highly vulnerable in the future. Some solutions for Russian units may include greater autonomy among soldiers at the squad, platoon, and company levels; standardized equipment among forces to maximize interchangeability; and a clearer understanding of the commander’s intent before operations begin. Each of these groups should have its own artillery mortars, field guns, launchers, UASs, and additional equipment.</p> +<p>The Biden administration, in its October 2022 National Security Strategy, recognized the gravity of the threats facing the United States and its allies:</p> -<p>Fourth, Russian military thinkers have encouraged greater decentralization of Russian units, though this may be difficult in a military without a significant culture of delegation. Some assessments have concluded that Russian forces have lacked sufficient initiative in Ukraine because of poor training and command-and-control arrangements. As one assessment noted, Russian “commanders of primary tactical units (platoon, squad, crew, or team) have poor skills in organizing and performing independent actions. This, in turn, leads to the fact that when command and control is excessively centralized during combat, military units instinctively gather in dense combat formations, marching columns, and concentration areas.” These problems can lead to “sluggishness, situational blindness, and vulnerability of the tactical or operational groups. As a result, an adversary with low density and network-structured combat formations . . . has an undeniable advantage over such unwieldy, sluggish, and vulnerable groups.”</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Russia poses an immediate threat to the free and open international system, recklessly flouting the basic laws of the international order today, as its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has shown. The PRC, by contrast, is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Due to the over-centralization of Russia’s military command structure in the early stages of the war in Ukraine, Russian officers deployed increasingly close to the front — even for brief visits. This risky decision made them targets for Ukrainian strikes and resulted in high casualties among senior officers. The loss of senior- and mid-level officers, who played a large role in tactical operations, undermined command-and-control and initiative at lower-unit levels. One proposed solution in Russian military thinking is a reduction in the size of active tactical units on the battlefield. A frontal assault might involve a reinforced motorized rifle battalion with extended intervals between squad, platoon, and company formations. According to one proponent of this structure, “One of the new features of modern combined arms combat (combat operations) is the reduction of the main, active tactical unit on the battlefield while increasing the number of such units. The latter enjoy increased autonomy; in addition, they are homogeneous and independent, and horizontal coordination between them is important.”</p> +<p>These twin political challenges are made more fraught by the fact that, due to the buildup of its nuclear arsenal, China has now essentially joined Russia as a “nuclear peer” of the United States. (While some will point out that China’s strategic arsenal is today considerably smaller than that of the United States, two facts — that it (1) now fields an operational strategic nuclear triad and a large number of theater and tactical-range nuclear weapons, and (2) that it is continuing to deploy more nuclear weapons — certainly qualifies it to be a “nuclear peer” of the United States.) Never before in the nuclear age has the United States faced two potential nuclear peer adversaries, each of which can act alone or, potentially, in concert with the other. This is the reality of the “new nuclear world.”</p> -<p>Fifth, Russian land forces may struggle to restructure their relationship with non-state and quasi-state actors, including Russian private military companies. As already noted, Russian military analyses assume that Russia, like many of its competitors, will continue to work with irregular forces in future wars. Following Prigozhin’s insurrection in June 2023, however, the Russian military began an effort to reintegrate the Wagner Group and other contractors into the military. Following the death of Prigozhin in August 2023, almost certainly at Putin’s instruction, the Russian government will likely attempt to reign in the Wagner Group and other private military companies under tighter Russian command-and-control.</p> +<p>To preserve peace and prevent war, the United States must return to the fundamental constructs of deterrence policy. The basic and traditional deterrence policy construct holds for this new world: the leadership of potential aggressors must see the United States as capable of inflicting various amounts of unacceptable pain should they decide to attack the United States or its allies at any level. The 1983 Scowcroft Commission produced the best statement of this principle:</p> -<p><strong>Air</strong>: Force design in the air domain will also involve some reversals of reforms initiated by Serdyukov, as well as a major focus on UASs. Some of these changes are likely to be a reaction to problems encountered in Ukraine, while others are meant to deal with an expanded NATO viewed as a more significant threat and growing U.S. capabilities in global strike.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Deterrence is not and cannot be bluff. In order for deterrence to be effective we must not merely have weapons, we must be perceived to be able, and prepared, if necessary, to use them effectively against the key elements of [an enemy’s] power. Deterrence is not an abstract notion amenable to simple quantification. Still less is it a mirror of what would deter ourselves. Deterrence is the set of beliefs in the minds of the [enemy] leaders, given their own values and attitudes, about our capabilities and our will. It requires us to determine, as best we can, what would deter them from considering aggression, even in a crisis — not to determine what would deter us.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>In Ukraine, the Russian Aerospace Forces (Воздушно-космические силы, or VKS) has failed to achieve air superiority against a Ukrainian military with reasonable air defense capabilities, such as SA-10 and SA-11 surface-to-air missile systems, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), IRIS-T SL mobile air defense systems, and Patriot batteries. The success of Ukrainian air defenses, as well as the failure of Russian suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) operations to take out Ukrainian air defense capabilities, has deterred Russian aircraft from operating over most of Ukrainian-controlled territory. This means that Russia’s primary option to strike deep into Ukraine has been through cruise and ballistic missiles launched from Russia, Belarus, Russian-controlled territory in Ukraine, or maritime vessels in the Black Sea. In a war with U.S. and NATO forces, Russian air units would face an exponentially greater air defense threat.</p> +<p>To continue to deter effectively today and for the foreseeable future, the United States must credibly continue to hold at risk what potential enemy leaders value most: themselves, the security forces which keep them in power, their military forces, and their war-supporting industry.</p> -<p>As part of future restructuring, the Russian military has raised the possibility of increasing the size of the VKS by nine aviation regiments, including eight bomber regiments and one fighter regiment. This addition would come on top of three existing bomber regiments and six fighter regiments, as well as five mixed regiments with fighter and ground-attack units, four long-range bomber squadrons, and one expeditionary fighter squadron. In addition, the Russian Ministry of Defense created three new operational commands of aviation divisions within the Russian air force. This restructuring was a significant departure from the 2009 changes initiated by Serdyukov. He attempted to scrap the Russian air force’s regimental structure inherited from the Soviet Union and to transition to the airbase as the main structural unit composed of squadrons. But Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reversed several of Serdyukov’s decisions, and an aviation regiment became roughly comparable to an airbase in size.</p> +<p>As noted above, what has changed in this new world is the emergence of China as a second nuclear peer to the United States. Recognizing this, the United States needs, for the first time in the nuclear age, to be able to deter Russia and China simultaneously (not just sequentially). Dictators can act quickly and with great secrecy. The United States must be ever mindful of the possibility that, like Hitler and Stalin, Xi and Putin could unveil at any point, most dangerously in a crisis, a treaty of military and political alliance.</p> -<p>In addition, the Russian military will likely expand the use of UASs into the overall plan for structuring, staffing, training, and equipping air forces — as well as land and maritime forces. The Russians are not alone. The evolution of UASs is one of the most significant components of future force design, including with the U.S. focus on a range of unmanned systems such as the collaborative combat aircraft, loitering munitions, and fully autonomous UASs. UASs are likely to be a critical part of Russia’s reconnaissance-strike complex.</p> +<h4 id="from-policy-to-forces-why-a-triad">From Policy to Forces: Why a Triad?</h4> -<p>There are several Russian themes about unmanned systems and the future of warfare.</p> +<p>The United States’ continued investment in a strategic nuclear force based on a triad of land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and manned bombers equipped with either stand-off cruise missiles or gravity bombs remains, despite skepticism in some quarters, the optimal manner in which to deploy a nuclear deterrent. The triad started life, admittedly, as the offspring of the inter-service rivalries of the 1950s. During the 1960s, however, strategists recognized that the combination of three different basing modes, each with unique strengths and different but offsetting vulnerabilities, separate attack azimuths, and complementary alert postures, presented potential enemy offenses and defenses with insurmountable obstacles. All of this remains true today. As a result, the three-legged combination continues to provide maximum deterrent stability because an aggressor cannot pre-emptively destroy the triad or prevent the retaliation it could impose. Interestingly, while some U.S. critics deride the triad concept, it is worth noting that it has been copied by Russia, China, Israel, and India.</p> -<p>First, UASs may increasingly replace some types of missiles, artillery, and even fixed-wing aircraft for medium- and long-range strike for air, land, and maritime forces. UASs will likely be integrated into key areas of the force, including land forces described in the previous section. According to some Russian assessments, future UASs with advances in precision, speed, payload, and range will likely offer several advantages over manned fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters: low radar visibility, an ability to perform most of the combat flight in complete silence, relatively low cost, and no casualties. In addition, Russian military thinkers have also raised the possibility that UASs could operate in low Earth orbit, though it is unclear whether Russia has the technical capability to achieve this over the next three to five years. As one Russian analysis notes: “Unmanned aerospace attack weapons capable of operating both in air space and in outer space, performing numerous high-altitude maneuvers, will become widespread.”</p> +<h4 id="why-a-modernized-triad">Why a Modernized Triad?</h4> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OwfOBCl.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.3: Main Types and Payloads of Proposed Russian Cargo UASs.</strong> Sources: А. В. Топоров, М. С. Бондарь, Р. В. Ахметьянов [A.V. Toporov, M.S. Bondar, and R.V. Akhmetyanov], “Материально-техническая Поддержка В Бою И Операции: Проблемный Вопрос И Направления Его Разрешения” [Logistical Support in Combat and Operations: A Problem and Potential Solutions],” Военная мысль [Military Thought] 32, no. 2 (June 2023), 25.</em></p> +<p>As former secretary of defense Ash Carter’s comment indicates, the viability of the U.S. deterrent is slowly deteriorating. The Minuteman III ICBMs were first deployed in the 1970s. Their electronics, guidance systems, and motors have all been modernized several times over the last 50 years, but those options are no longer available to prolong their lifespan. The existing force will have to be retired within the next 10 years. The new Sentinel ICBM will replace the 450 Minuteman missiles on a one-for-one basis, thereby ensuring the continuation of a sovereign-based force which will possess high responsiveness and accuracy as well as rapid, secure communications. Ohio-class submarines, the first of which began its service in 1982, have served longer than any previous class of U.S. nuclear-powered submarine. A submarine’s safety is affected principally by the pressure its hull has endured throughout its lifetime and whether the equipment associated with the nuclear plant has become brittle. Based on these indicators, the Ohio-class submarines must be retired within the next 10 to 15 years. A “minimum of 12” Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) will begin replacing the 14 Ohio-class boats starting in the late 2020s. The bomber force consists of (modernized) 1960s-era B-52s and a small number of 1990s-era B-2s. The B-52s have been incapable for decades of penetrating heavily defended airspace and have been equipped with cruise missiles as a result. Those cruise missiles, however, entered into service in the early 1980s and had a designed service life of 10 years. They will not pose a credible threat by the end of this decade. A replacement cruise missile, the Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) cruise missile is scheduled to enter service in 2029–2030, thereby ensuring the B-52’s continued relevance. Only 19 stealth penetrating B-2 bombers exist, and these are scheduled to be replaced by 120 new penetrating B-21 bombers.</p> -<p>Second, Russia is interested in utilizing unmanned systems for military logistics in contested environments, though the Russian military has not yet operationalized this capability. An important goal is to develop and use UASs and other unmanned systems to deliver weapons, munitions, food, fuel, and other supplies to land, naval, and air forces. Used in this way, Russian forces would need to develop the necessary infrastructure, organizational structures, and processing systems to facilitate the use of UASs for logistics. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, there has been some Russian analysis about the different types and payloads necessary for cargo UASs.</p> +<p>Ever since the current strategic modernization program was first approved during the Obama administration, twin questions have been raised as to its affordability and its priority among other defense needs. The program is affordable. The Department of Defense (DOD)’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (basing its figures on a smaller DOD budget than exists today) stated:</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Seo3aZt.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.4: Diagram of the System for Cargo UASs.</strong> Sources: А. В. Топоров, М. С. Бондарь, Р. В. Ахметьянов [A.V. Toporov, M.S. Bondar, and R.V. Akhmetyanov], “Материально-техническая поддержка в бою и операции: проблемный вопрос и направления” [Logistical Support in Combat and Operations: A Problem and Potential Solutions], Военная мысль [Military Thought] 32, no. 2 (June 2023): 17–31.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>While estimates of the cost to sustain and replace U.S. nuclear capabilities vary . . . even the highest of these projections place the highpoint of the future cost at approximately 6.4 percent of the current DoD budget. Maintaining and operating our current aging nuclear forces now requires between two and three percent of the DoD budget and the replacement program to rebuild the triad for decades of service will peak for several years at only approximately four percent beyond the existing sustainment level of spending. This 6.4 percent of the current DoD budget required for the long-term program represents less than one percent of today’s overall federal budget.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>The use of UASs for logistics will require new organizational structures. There is some consideration of a new special-purpose logistics service for the Russian military, as highlighted in Figure 3.4.</p> +<p>Prioritizing nuclear modernization is not a real issue when one considers that nuclear deterrence fundamentally underwrites U.S. strategic interests and military missions around the world. To be sure, the United States is currently in urgent need of, among other things: deployed conventional prompt strike systems; rebuilt war reserve munitions stockpiles across the board for ground, air, and naval forces; more robust space offensive and defensive systems; advanced cyber warfare capabilities; and dramatically more tanker aircraft than today. All contribute to the United States’ ability to deter adventurism, aggression, and war. But their deterrent effect in a world defined by two nuclear peer states depends first and foremost on an unquestioned strategic nuclear deterrent.</p> -<p>Some Russian assessments judge that fixed-wing manned aircraft — especially fighter aircraft — may be less relevant in the future. As one Russian assessment concluded:</p> +<h4 id="how-much-is-enough">How Much Is Enough?</h4> -<blockquote> - <p>Unmanned aviation has gained prevalence in airspace over manned aviation in performing air reconnaissance and target acquisition. Special significance in performing strike missions both over the front line and in the depth of Ukrainian territory has been demonstrated by strike UAS capable of delivering considerable destruction to both small moving targets and large installations of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Deterring China and Russia simultaneously leads to a need for an increased level of U.S. strategic warheads: simple logic and arithmetic suggest that the force level enshrined in New START during the 2010s and designed for a world far different from today’s is insufficient for 2023 — let alone for later in this decade and on into the 2030s. Therefore, it follows that the current U.S. nuclear modernization plan itself is necessary but not sufficient. While the triad concept remains sound, the modernization plan was conceived to deal with a far less dangerous world. Within the next several years, either as a result of an ignominious early end to New START or its expiration in 2026, the United States will have to begin to deploy a larger deterrent force. For the near term, and probably through at least the mid-2030s, the United States will need to take warheads out of the “reserve hedge” and place them in the field. This will require increasing the loadout on the Minuteman 3 ICBM from one to two or three warheads (and in the future continuing this on the new Sentinel ground-based strategic deterrent ICBM system), increasing the loadout on the Trident II/D-5 SLBM up to eight (as well as restoring to operational status the four missile tubes on each Ohio-class submarine which were “neutered” under New START), and increasing to the maximum number possible the AGM-86B air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM-Bs) and B61-12 bombs assigned to the B-52s and B-2s. (The United States should also take steps to return to nuclear-capable status those B-52s “neutered” under New START, although there will not be sufficient LRSOs to arm them until the 2030s.) None of this can be achieved overnight. The United States can, however, begin to reach the levels required to deter Moscow and Beijing simultaneously by preparing now to upload and doing so after New START constraints have been removed. This will sustain deterrence through the 2030s as replacement systems come online. Assuming no diminution in the threat, and therefore the continued need to maintain those force levels in the 2030s and beyond, the United States can sustain deterrence by extending the modernization programs for the Columbia SSBN, B-21, and LRSO — building more than 12 Columbia SSBNs and more than 120 B-21s and ensuring that the Air Force has sufficient LRSOs to hang one on every mounting point on the B-52s and B-21s (which is not the current Air Force plan).</p> -<p>There is considerable Russian interest in such U.S. programs as the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) sixth-generation air superiority initiative, including a U.S. Air Force manned fighter aircraft and a supported unmanned collaborative combat aircraft using manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T). To compete with the U.S. B-21, Russia will still likely continue its future long-range aviation complex (Prospective Aviation Complex of Long-Range Aviation, or PAK DA) project, with a subsonic low-observable flying wing and stealth capabilities. Russia will also continue its next-generation Tu-160M Blackjack strategic bomber. Some Russian analyses on sixth-generation aircraft emphasize the importance of developing technology that increases stealth; maximizes networking capabilities; integrates highly sensitive sensors; and develops hypersonic modes of flight, including near-space entry capability. For Russia, a major component of sixth-generation fighters is the “system of systems” concept to integrate aircraft into a broader system of surface ships, ground forces, command centers, satellites, and other manned and unmanned aircraft.</p> +<p>Russia, China, and North Korea all have significant short-range and mid-range nuclear forces, and Putin and Kim often indulge in threats to use these systems. (As noted, Xi’s threats are more subtle but nevertheless real). The United States needs to have a clear range of options below the strategic level to deter the use of these weapons in wartime. The United States’ sub-strategic options outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Europe (where the country has NATO-deployed dual-combat aircraft) are confined to the W76-2 SLBM warhead. Having only one type of response option is never a sound deterrent approach; the United States needs to augment the W76-2 particularly for non-NATO contingencies. As a result, the country must proceed to develop and deploy a new sea-launched, nuclear-tipped cruise missile to bolster theater deterrence.</p> -<p><strong>Maritime</strong>: Unlike the army, the Russian navy remains largely intact. It lost the Black Sea flagship, the Moskva, and several auxiliaries. But Russia’s four fleets — the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific Fleets — and Caspian Flotilla are still in reasonable shape. Nevertheless, Russia’s future force design may evolve in several ways, based on a review of Russian military thinking.</p> +<p>Underwriting the weapons systems is an aging nuclear command and control structure which also must be upgraded and modernized.</p> -<p>First, Russian leaders have expressed an interest in strengthening Russian naval forces — including submarines — in response to growing tensions with the United States and NATO. The Ministry of Defense has announced a desire to create five naval infantry brigades for the navy’s coastal troops based on existing naval infantry brigades. This expansion followed Russia’s adoption of a new maritime doctrine in July 2022, which identified the United States and NATO as major threats. In addition, the doctrine expressed an interest in building modern aircraft carriers, though it also highlighted the challenges of Russia’s lack of overseas naval bases and the constraints on Russia’s shipbuilding industry because of the West’s economic sanctions. Senior Russian officials have identified nuclear-powered submarines as critical in future force design.</p> +<h4 id="how-much-is-too-much">How Much Is “Too Much”?</h4> -<p>Second, the Russian navy will likely increase the presence of unmanned maritime vessels as part of force design. As one assessment notes: “Direct armed confrontation between ships will become predominantly auxiliary in nature. In the Navy, similar to the Aerospace Forces, the proportion of surface and submarine unmanned ships, both attack and support (reconnaissance, EW [electronic warfare], communications, transport), will increase significantly.” Along these lines, navies will likely position their crewed vessels — such as frigates, cruisers, corvettes, patrol boats, and destroyers — outside of the range of enemy fire and serve as control centers and carriers for unmanned vessels and UASs. Future warfare in the naval domain will increasingly involve armed confrontation between unmanned ships and UASs, including in swarms.</p> +<p>The measure of whether the United States’ strategic nuclear force is sufficient should be whether it allows the country to hold at risk the valued assets of the Russian, Chinese, and North Korean leaderships and to maintain an adequate reserve force. The idea that the United States must maintain “parity” or rough equivalence with Russian or Chinese nuclear force levels should not be a factor in force sizing. As long as the United States is confident in its ability to cover its targets — and it can make that convincingly clear to potential adversaries — it should not enter into a competition to achieve numerical parity. It should be of no consequence if Moscow or Beijing (or both) seek to build and deploy forces which exceed U.S. levels; their ability “to make the rubble bounce” is not strategically significant and should not be perceived as such. The only area where parity or equality is required is in arms control — any treaty the United States enters into must provide the right to deploy the same force levels as the other treaty parties.</p> -<p><strong>Space and Cyber</strong>: Military space and counterspace capabilities fall under the Russian Space Forces, which sits within the VKS.</p> +<h4 id="integrated-deterrence">Integrated Deterrence?</h4> -<p>Russia will likely attempt to expand its counterspace capabilities, including kinetic physical weapons, such as direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons in low Earth orbit and co-orbital weapons; non-kinetic physical weapons, such as ground-based laser systems; electronic capabilities, including GPS jamming; and cyber intrusions. However, there is little evidence that Russia is likely to implement any major changes in force design in the space domain, and Russia has been hampered by sanctions and a loss of international partnerships and funding. One example of Russian struggles in the space domain was the August 2023 crash of the Luna-25 spacecraft, which was Russia’s first space launch to the moon’s surface since the 1970s.</p> +<p>While a robust strategic nuclear deterrent undergirds everything the United States undertakes around the world, it is a necessary but insufficient counter to potential aggression in a world in which Russia, China, and even several rogue states maintain capable conventional forces as well as offensive space and cyber capabilities. While those particular threats are not the subject, per se, of Project Atom’s work, it would be wrong not to comment on them, however briefly. A credible deterrent must provide responses to all forms of a potential enemy’s aggression.</p> -<p>Russia will likely attempt to expand its cyber capabilities under the GRU, SVR, and FSB, though Russia does not have a cyber command. The Presidential Administration and the Security Council coordinate cyber operations, but they are not a true cyber command. It is unclear whether Russia will create a veritable cyber command. What may be more likely is that Russian organizations, such as the GRU (including GRU Unit 26165, or the 85th Main Special Service Center), will recruit additional personnel, build new infrastructure, and increase their offensive cyber activities.</p> +<p>Given Russian and Chinese capabilities, the United States must continue to deploy powerful air, naval, and ground conventional forces, offensive and defensive counterspace systems, and world-class offensive and defensive cyber assets. There are significant gaps in these nonnuclear areas. For one, the United States currently lacks adequate offensive and defensive counterspace capability. In another example, given Moscow and Beijing’s extensive anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities designed to prevent U.S. naval forces from operating successfully in the Baltic and South China Seas, respectively, the United States requires but has not fielded the means — the Conventional Prompt Strike system — to destroy the A2/AD threat. While a joint Army and Navy program has developed this long-range conventional hypersonic missile, both service’s bureaucracies are treating deployment as a matter of routine business rather than an urgently needed requirement. Similarly, the Air Force tanker fleet is woefully inadequate to support a major war in the Pacific, let alone a world in which U.S. forces might have to fight in both Europe and Asia. The real issue in all of this is the non-responsive, process-oriented, and deeply risk-averse nature of the service bureaucracies — the organizations focus on numbers of platforms rather than needed capabilities, including for both cutting-edge technologies and mundane but essential items such as war reserve munitions. This problem is compounded by a defense-industrial base which has been deliberately allowed (even encouraged) to atrophy since the end of the Cold War and which requires major rejuvenation — a task in which the DOD and Congress must both play a role.</p> -<p>While a priority, Russian offensive cyber operations have failed to significantly blind Ukrainian command-and-control efforts or threaten critical infrastructure for a prolonged period. In the early phases of the invasion of Ukraine, for example, cyberattackers associated with the GRU, SVR, and FSB launched cyberattacks against hundreds of systems in the Ukrainian government and in Ukraine’s energy, information technology, media, and financial sectors. Examples of Russian malware have included WhisperGate/WhisperKill, FoxBlade (or Hermetic Wiper), SonicVote (or HermeticRansom), and CaddyWiper. But Russian cyber operations have failed to undermine Ukraine’s ability or will to fight, in part because of outside state and non-state assistance to Ukraine to identify cyber and electronic warfare attacks, attribute attacks to the perpetrators, and assist with remediation.</p> +<p>Finally, an effective deterrent requires integration of all of these military capabilities and, to a larger degree, integration of whole-of-government activities to deter aggression and prevent war. This is an area where the United States has not particularly excelled for decades; today, despite the administration’s rhetorical commitment to “integrated deterrence,” the DOD does not plan in an integrated manner. The bureaucratic barriers and baronial and territorial instincts of the various combatant command staffs have proved a major impediment to integrating regional and functional forces and even to planning most effectively for such employment — all despite well-meaning commitments at the four-star level in the Pentagon to create cross-cutting planning and operations. A failure to address this meaningfully will undercut U.S. combat capability globally. There are various ways to force the regional and functional combatant commands to plan in an integrated manner. All would be bureaucratically difficult to create, but the function is absolutely necessary.</p> -<p>In addition, a number of Russian military thinkers continue to focus on electronic warfare as a key aspect of force design. This includes using the electromagnetic spectrum — such as radio, infrared, and radar — to sense, protect, and communicate, as well as to disrupt or deny adversaries the ability to use these signals. The demand for electronic warfare products will also likely trigger a growing push for electronic warfare technologies, including AI, so that electronic warfare systems can operate in the dense radio-frequency environment of the battlefield.</p> +<p>Of all the various approaches, the best would be to build on the experience of the Omaha-based Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, which was co-located with Strategic Air Command from 1960 until the demise of both in 1992. A new Joint Strategic Planning Staff, reporting to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should be created to ensure the geographic combatant commanders’ war plans include not only air, ground, and maritime operations but also integrated space, cyber, and nuclear ones as well.</p> -<h4 id="conclusion-1">CONCLUSION</h4> +<h4 id="the-nuclear-weapons-complex">The Nuclear Weapons Complex</h4> -<p>As this chapter argued, most Russian military thinkers believe that while the nature of warfare remains the same, the character of warfare is evolving in such areas as long-range, high-precision weapons; autonomous and unmanned systems; emerging technologies, such as AI; and the utility of non-state and quasi-state actors in warfare. In these and other areas, Russian leaders assess that it will be critical to cooperate with other countries, especially China. In addition, Russian political and military leaders are committed to a major reconstitution of the Russian military — especially the Russian army — over the next several years. Russia is likely to adopt a force design that centers around the division, yet also attempt to create forces that are more mobile and decentralized.</p> +<p>In the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration advocated for the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. While never ratified by the U.S. Senate, the treaty’s existence and the administration’s view of the international security situation led it to slash funding for the agency responsible for the maintenance and production of U.S. nuclear weapons: the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The result over time was a production complex housed more often than not in World War II-era buildings, unable to produce new uranium pits or new warhead designs, and largely focused on the life extension of existing weapons. Funding increases beginning in 2020 and continuing today have been unable to significantly change the capabilities of the nuclear weapons complex. Construction of new facilities has been delayed, and costs have risen accordingly. To exacerbate the situation further, significant numbers of skilled and experienced workers and scientists are reaching retirement age, and the NNSA has been unable to attract and retain adequate numbers of replacements. All of this has led to a situation where, despite having stellar leadership today, the NNSA has become the single greatest impediment to modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent. A recent NNSA internal study observed: “On the current path, warhead modernization programs, facility construction, and capability recapitalization will continue to slip and, even worse, we may not be able to attract and retain the needed workforce.”</p> -<p>Achieving many of these goals will be challenging, if not impossible, as the next chapter explains. Russian leaders may want to make numerous changes, but they will be highly constrained. Russia faces a suite of financial, military, political, social, and other issues that will force political and military leaders to prioritize changes in force design. Building a bigger navy and air force will be expensive, as will increasing the size of Russian ground forces by 22 total divisions. Moscow plans to boost its defense budget in 2024 to roughly 6 percent of gross domestic product, up from 3.9 percent in 2023. But this increase will not be sufficient to implement all the changes Moscow’s leaders have discussed.</p> +<p>There may be no good answers to solving this crucial but seemingly intractable problem. Drawing on the work of the 2014 Mies-Augustine report, it is possible to advance several potential remedies:</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p>The NNSA should be removed from the Department of Energy (whose leadership’s focus has traditionally been on non-defense issues) and be made an independent agency;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The administration should accord the rebuilding of the nuclear weapons complex a “Moonshot-like” priority and act expeditiously to resolve the myriad problems which have made it a major vulnerability in the overall U.S. deterrent posture; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The administration should undertake the politically difficult but nonetheless necessary task of persuading Congress to remove NNSA funding from the Energy and Water Committees and place it under the Armed Services Committees.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>While it is impossible to predict with certainty how Russian leaders will prioritize force design changes, likely candidates are ones that are relatively cheap or essential to improve fighting effectiveness.</p> +<h4 id="allies-and-extended-deterrence">Allies and Extended Deterrence</h4> -<p>Russia will likely prioritize rebuilding its army, which suffered significant attrition during the war in Ukraine and failed in numerous areas such as combined arms operations. Russia’s army is essential to fight a protracted war in Ukraine and deter NATO. Indeed, it is difficult to envision Russia developing a modern force mix until it overhauls the army. Based on a review of Russian military assessments, it is reasonable to assume that the army will focus on restructuring its land forces around divisions; developing fires-centric capabilities, such as long-range artillery and laser-guided shells that maximize accuracy; and experimenting with tactical organizational structures that allow for greater mobility and autonomy against adversaries that have precision strike capabilities.</p> +<p>While somewhat of a truism, the fact is that the United States’ biggest single advantage over Russia, China, and North Korea in international affairs is that it has allies and they do not. The United States shares democratic forms of government and a strong belief in the Western liberal political tradition with those allies. It also has strong trading relationships. But a key factor which binds the United States’ European and Asia-Pacific allies is their perceived need for protection from blackmail, coercion, and attack from their nuclear-armed neighbors. Much of the concerns of U.S. allies faded after the end of the Cold War, only to return with heightened fears over the past four to five years, given Putin’s murderous aggression against Ukraine and nuclear threats, Xi’s many attempts to intimidate Tokyo, Canberra, Seoul, and Taipei, and Kim’s occasional outbursts. Reassuring allies that the United States can and will continue to protect them involves a mixture of diplomacy and demonstration of military capability; based on history and geography, the elements of that mixture are different in Europe than in the Asia-Pacific.</p> -<p>In the air domain, Russia will likely invest its limited resources in developing a broad suite of unmanned systems and long-range precision strike capabilities. UASs will likely be essential for future Russian warfighting to conduct a wide of missions, such as logistics in a contested environment, battlefield awareness, targeting for medium- and long-range fires, strike, information operations, and electronic warfare. In Ukraine, Russia increased the complexity, diversity, and density of UASs, with more lethal warheads and advances in noise reduction and counter-UAS capabilities. Russia will also continue to invest heavily in electronic warfare, based in part on successes of the Zhitel R330-Zh, Pole-21, and other systems in Ukraine.</p> +<p>EUROPE</p> -<p>In the maritime domain, Russia will likely focus on submarines and unmanned systems. Submarines are essential for Russia’s nuclear deterrence posture. Of particular focus may be construction of the Project 955A (Borei-A) class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, which are built at the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk. They are armed with Bulava submarine launched ballistic missiles, and Russia is continuing to develop technologies that reduce their acoustic signature. The Borei-class submarines will replace Russia’s ageing, Soviet-era Delta III-class and Delta IV-class ballistic missile submarines. More broadly, Russia is likely to prioritize maintenance of the nuclear triad, including its submarines, which is Moscow’s main guarantee of security with a degraded conventional land force.</p> +<p>Faced with the threat of invasion by a large Red Army following World War II, and confronting an unwillingness to pay the sums deemed necessary to provide a conventional force equal to it, the United States and its European allies formed a defensive alliance — NATO — and based its defense posture principally on the threat of a nuclear response. The purpose of NATO was simple: to prevent a third major conventional war which would devastate the homelands of the European members of the alliance. Beginning in the mid-1950s, the United States began deploying thousands of mid-range and short-range weapons to NATO Europe for potential use in wartime by both U.S. and allied forces. This demonstration of military capability contributed to an effective deterrent throughout the Cold War. In the 1960s, NATO governments increasingly evinced concern about how the Europe-based weapons might be used in wartime and pressed for a consultative mechanism on the topic, an arrangement the United States agreed to in 1967.</p> -<p>The Russian military will also likely focus on revitalizing its industrial base, with support from China, North Korea, Iran, and other countries. This means outsourcing some weapons systems (such as UASs) and components that Russian can’t manufacture in sufficient quantities or lacks the technology or parts. As the war in Ukraine highlighted, an important prerequisite for offense and defense is fires dominance. Russia will likely focus on building stockpiles of precision munitions for both Ukraine and NATO’s eastern front.</p> +<p>Over the past 55 years, allied governments and their polities have remained essentially supportive of NATO’s nuclear arrangements. The consultation process is long established and accepted. The size and scope of the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons has been reduced dramatically as a result of the end of the Cold War, and the lowered threat perception derived from the demise of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union led to calls from some quarters for their complete removal. However, as Russia’s aggressive nuclear diplomacy increased, coupled with its invasion of Georgia, its occupation of Crimea, and its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, there is a general acceptance of the value of and need for NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements. Indeed, Putin’s declarative threats against NATO have heightened a collective awareness among publics, politicians, and governments of the danger posed by Russia. Many are and will be watching carefully how the Biden administration deals with the war in Ukraine, including potential Russian use of nuclear weapons; any perceived weakness will inevitably undermine confidence in the United States’ commitment to defend NATO from Russian aggression. It will also be important politically, both within NATO’s European members as well as among political elites in Washington, for alliance members to meaningfully carry out their commitments to increase their own defense capabilities. Augmenting U.S. military prowess with increased allied conventional (particularly ground) forces, cyber capabilities, and, to some much smaller extent, space assets will be seen as key to success here.</p> -<p>The next chapter examines Russian challenges in implementing many of these reforms.</p> +<p>ASIA</p> -<h3 id="4-conclusion">4 CONCLUSION</h3> +<p>The United States’ extended deterrence posture in the Asia-Pacific has, mostly for historical reasons, been markedly different from that in NATO Europe. The possibility of war, except perhaps on the Korean peninsula, was largely discounted by regional allies historically. U.S. nuclear weapons had been deployed only in one Asia-Pacific allied nation, South Korea, and they were earmarked for wartime use solely by U.S. forces. With U.S. Navy aircraft carriers and patrol squadrons removed from nuclear roles at the end of the Cold War, the only U.S. non-strategic weapon available to the region was the nuclear-tipped Tomahawk SLCM, and it was retired without replacement by the Obama administration (over Japanese objections). Given the U.S.-centric nature of regional nuclear deployments, no consultative arrangements with Asian allies were ever created or sought.</p> -<p>This chapter focuses on implications for the United States and NATO and makes two main arguments. First, Russian views of the future of warfare and efforts to restructure the military will likely be shaped by a strong view that the United States and NATO represent a clear and present threat to Moscow. The West’s aid to Ukraine, expansion of NATO to Finland and likely Sweden, deployment of forces along NATO’s eastern flank, and continuing military buildup will likely increase Moscow’s perception of insecurity. Second, Moscow will likely face considerable challenges in implementing many of its changes. Moscow’s lagging economy, rampant corruption, strained defense industrial base, and stovepiped military structure will likely create significant hurdles in implementing Russian force design goals. Despite these challenges, Russia still possesses some formidable capabilities with its strategic forces, navy, and air force.</p> +<p>Within the last 15 years or so, however, the need for both diplomatic and hardware solutions has emerged. Successive governments in Japan have been increasingly unsettled by China’s provocative behavior in and around Japanese airspace and its maritime borders. The steady buildup of Chinese and North Korean nuclear forces has led to concerns in Tokyo that there are “holes” in the U.S. extended deterrence umbrella, and senior politicians have even floated the idea that Japan should become a nuclear weapons state. Similar sentiments have emerged in Seoul as well. The Obama administration sought to allay these concerns by establishing recurring nuclear policy discussions with both Japan and South Korea. While these discussions have been an important first step in restoring confidence in the extended deterrent, they are only that — a first step. Follow-on steps should include:</p> -<p>The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first examines the United States as Russia’s main enemy. The second section assesses challenges in implementing Russian force design. The third provides a brief summary.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>The United States should proceed with the development and deployment of SLCM-N aboard U.S. submarines.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) agreement should be expanded to include Japan and South Korea in a broad and loose alliance that features enhanced information and technology sharing, joint exercises, and joint planning conferences.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The United States should build a broad and loose alliance that also encourages allied development of conventional, cyber, and potentially space capabilities which are interoperable with and complementary to U.S. systems.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Finally, the United States must put to rest the notion, popular in some quarters, that it cannot successfully fight simultaneously in Europe and the Pacific. Europe is primarily a ground war augmented by allied air power; the Pacific is a maritime and air war. Space and cyber will occur on a global basis regardless of which adversary the United States faces. The United States can fight successfully in both theaters with allied help.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h4 id="russias-main-enemy">RUSSIA’S MAIN ENEMY</h4> +<h4 id="arms-control-and-its-future">Arms Control and Its Future</h4> -<p>The United States — and NATO more broadly — will likely remain Russia’s main enemy for the foreseeable future for at least two reasons.</p> +<p>The pursuit of arms control grew from a cottage industry in the 1970s into an area of major U.S. and international government focus in the 1980s, in many ways obtaining a position of primacy among national security theorists and even some practitioners. Along the way, a fundamental truth was lost. Arms control is a tool which can contribute to national and international security and to reduced tensions. Arms control is not and never can be a substitute for a strong deterrent capability. As the United States enters the world of two potential nuclear adversaries, it should do so with a deterrent force equal to that situation. While advocates of maintaining New START (or a follow-on keeping its limits) will oppose any attempt to move beyond its limits, such a point of view is dangerous. Deterrence should be the United States’ first priority. Arms control agreements can moderate the threat, but the United States cannot allow arms control to undercut what it needs for deterrence — nor does it have to (more on this below). Finally, looking to the future, the United States should broaden the focus on great power arms control beyond intercontinental weapons to include all nuclear weapons, including short- and medium-range weapons as well as exotic and long-range ones. The rationale for this should be clear: Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons threaten U.S. allies (whom the United States has committed to defend), and any initial use of nuclear weapons would almost certainly begin not through intercontinental strikes but as a result of nuclear use in a war which starts in the theater. It is intellectually dishonest to argue that arms control is an important element of moderating international conflict and then to ignore the weapons most likely to be used first in a war.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gc4xzNY.png" alt="image07" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4.1: Number of Soviet and Russian Soldiers Killed, 1950 to 2023.</strong> Source: Author’s compilation. See endnotes for more details.</em></p> +<p>Setting the above aside momentarily, it must be acknowledged that the future of arms control in the near term is bleak:</p> -<p>First, Russian political and military leaders assess that the country’s struggles in Ukraine have been largely due to U.S. and broader NATO assistance. As highlighted in Figure 4.1, the number of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine during the first year of the war was greater than the combined number of Russian soldiers killed in all Russian and Soviet wars since World War II. As one senior Russian diplomat remarked about Ukraine, “The United States became a direct participant of this conflict long ago, and they have long been waging a hybrid war against my country. Ukraine is only an instrument in their hands, a tip of the spear held by the US-led collective West. Their goal is to destroy a sovereign, independent Russia as a factor in international politics.” This view that the United States and NATO are direct participants in the Ukraine war will likely persist and shape Moscow’s views of the future of war and force design.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>It is difficult to conceive of how the United States can return to an arms control negotiation with Russia as long as Vladimir Putin remains its president.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The Chinese government has long been dismissive of entering arms talks (and views transparency and inspection regimes — both fundamental to a successful arms control accord — as weakness).</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>And disarmament is unrealistic and not in the cards. In this regard, it is instructive and curious that of the P5 countries, only the United States, the United Kingdom, and to some degree France are sensitive to the domestic and international criticism that they have not fulfilled their Article VI commitment of the Treaty on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (itself an ambiguous commitment based on the negotiating record and the U.S. government’s interpretation of it). Russia and China both appear impervious to such commentary, and international critics largely ignore Moscow and Beijing’s nuclear buildups.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Second, Russian leaders believe that the United States is expanding its influence, attempting to further encircle Russia, and trying to weaken Russia militarily, politically, and economically. NATO’s June 2022 summit in Madrid also unambiguously stated that the “Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense deployed or extended over 20,000 additional forces to Europe, bringing the total number of U.S. personnel in Europe to over 100,000. Examples included the deployment of an Armored Brigade Combat Team, a High-Mobility Rocket Artillery Battalion (HIMARS) battalion, and KC-135 refueling aircraft, among other forces. Other steps of concern to Russia have included:</p> +<p>Even before Russia destabilized Europe by invading Ukraine, the idea of arms control was under significant stress, as major actors showed an inclination to violate basic norms:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>A permanent forward station of V Corps Headquarters Forward Command Post, an Army garrison headquarters, and a field support battalion in Poland;</p> + <p>Under Putin, Russia has violated nine treaties and agreements which his predecessors had signed with the United States. In addition, Russian air and naval assets, as an element of state policy, routinely violate the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement and the 1989 Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The deployment of an additional rotational brigade combat team in Romania;</p> + <p>Chinese air and naval forces, as a matter of state policy, routinely violate the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea.</p> </li> +</ul> + +<p>Furthermore, difficulties have arisen when sensitive sources have uncovered cheating, but the United States cannot expose the offender or inform allies or the public due to concerns about “sources and methods.” Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is the poster child in this regard.</p> + +<h4 id="a-possible-way-forward">A Possible Way Forward</h4> + +<p>Beginning with two big “ifs” — if Putin is no longer ruling Russia in several years, and if Ukraine is able to successfully repel its Russian invaders to the degree it is prepared to sign a peace treaty with Moscow — it is possible to imagine a U.S.-Russian arms control treaty along the following lines:</p> + +<ul> <li> - <p>Enhanced rotational deployments in the Baltics;</p> + <p>Washington and Moscow would agree that all deployed air-, naval- and ground-launched nuclear weapons on both sides would be subject to a new quantitative agreement. This would include traditional intercontinental weapons, exotic intercontinental weapons such as the Poseidon/Status 6 system, mid- and short-range nuclear weapons (to include land mines), dual-capable aircraft and B-61s in NATO, and the United States’ SLCM-N.</p> </li> <li> - <p>An increase in the number of destroyers stationed at Rota, Spain, from four to six;</p> + <p>The agreement would permit complete freedom to mix; within the overall agreed cap, each side would be free to declare, and alter in the future, subject to notification and inspections, the composition of its nuclear forces.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The forward stationing of two F-35 squadrons in the United Kingdom;</p> + <p>Reporting and intrusive verification provisions similar to those found in START I would apply.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The forward stationing of an air defense artillery brigade headquarters, a short-range air defense battalion, a combat sustainment support battalion headquarters, and an engineer brigade headquarters in Germany; and</p> + <p>China would be welcome to join the treaty’s initial negotiations or to join it after its entry into force.</p> </li> <li> - <p>The forward stationing of a short-range air defense battery in Italy.</p> + <p>An entering rule for beginning negotiations would be that the negotiations would cover only nuclear weapons and dual-capable weapons systems; missile defense, offensive space systems, and offensive cyber systems — the inclusion of any of which would doom a successful conclusion and ratification — would be excluded.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>While these steps are a reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and entirely legitimate, they have increased Russian fears of encirclement. As Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu remarked at the December 2022 meeting of Russian’s Defense Ministry Board, “Of particular concern is the buildup of NATO’s advance presence near the borders of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus . . . to further weaken our country.” Shoigu also noted, “Considering NATO’s aspirations to build up its military capabilities close to the Russian border, as well as expand the alliance by accepting Finland and Sweden as new members, we need to respond by creating a corresponding group of forces in Russia’s northwest.”</p> - -<p>The result is that the Russia’s insecurity and animosity toward the West — and the United States in particular — will likely deepen. These sentiments will likely drive a desire to reconstitute the Russian military over the next several years, strengthen nuclear and conventional deterrence, and prepare to fight the West if deterrence fails. Russian military thinking on the future of warfare and force design is dominated by a view that the United States is — and will remain — Moscow’s primary enemy.</p> - -<h4 id="challenges-to-force-design">CHALLENGES TO FORCE DESIGN</h4> - -<p>Russia faces enormous challenges in implementing its force design, despite its ambitions. Russia’s military almost certainly lacks the caliber of some of the great historical Russian and Soviet military thinkers, such as Mikhail Tuchachevsky, Aleksandr Svechin, Vladimir Triandafilov, and Georgii Isserson. As noted earlier in this report, Russian military journals generally lack innovative thought and self-criticism, almost certainly a result of Russia’s increasingly authoritarian climate. In addition, Russia’s military has been unable to attract the best and brightest of young Russians in the face of competition from the civilian labor market, despite some pay raises.</p> - -<p>There are at least five additional challenges to Russian force design over the next several years.</p> - -<p>First, Russia’s deepening economic crisis will likely constrain its efforts to expand the quantity and quality of its ground, air, and naval forces. The war in Ukraine has fueled Russia’s worst labor crunch in decades; hundreds of thousands of workers have fled the country or have been sent to fight in Ukraine, weakening an economy weighed down by economic sanctions and international isolation. The country’s biggest exports — gas and oil — have lost major customers. Government finances have been strained and the ruble has decreased against the dollar. Numerous Western banks, investors, and companies have fled Russia and its financial markets. In addition, the International Monetary Fund has estimated that Russia’s potential growth rate — the rate at which it could grow without courting inflation — was around 3.5 percent before 2014, the year Russia seized Crimea, but fell to around roughly 0.7 percent in 2023 as productivity declined and the economy became increasingly isolated. The fall in exports, tight labor market, and increased government spending have worsened inflation risks.</p> +<p>Before entering into negotiations, the U.S. government would need to determine the size and composition of the nuclear arsenal it requires to have a successful deterrent against Russia and China both for itself and for its allies, and it would have to protect that number in the treaty’s outcome. While such an idea might appear farfetched and totally unrealistic, it is difficult to imagine any other negotiated approach which would provide security for the United States and its allies.</p> -<p>Russian force design will not be cheap. The Russian army wants to create new divisions and recruit additional soldiers, which will drive up costs because of salaries, signing bonuses, healthcare, lodging, food, equipment, and other factors. Russia will need to make military service more attractive. For example, housing remains a problem for Russian officers with families, and salaries have not kept pace with inflation for several years. The development and production of emerging technologies can be enormously expensive. So are major platforms, such as bombers, submarines, aircraft carriers, and fifth- and sixth-generation aircraft.</p> +<p>As a final note, it would be important for the United States, Russia, and China to seek, urgently and before additional tests might occur to validate a system’s reliability, a ban on fractional orbital bombardment systems. China’s deployment of such a system, allowing it to conduct an unwarned decapitation strike against its enemies’ nuclear command and control apparatus, would be a highly destabilizing act. Banning this highly dangerous technology before it reaches maturity would contribute to nuclear stability and inhibit its adoption by other nuclear powers.</p> -<p>Second, corruption remains rampant in the Russian military, which could undermine Moscow’s overall plan to structure, staff, train, and equip its forces. Corruption has long been a problem in the Russian military. In Ukraine, the Russian military has provided some soldiers on the front lines with ration packs that were seven years old, other soldiers have crowdsourced for body armor because Russian supplies dried up, some have sold fuel on the black market that was intended for Russian main battle tanks and other vehicles, and supply chains have failed. Russian morale likely has suffered. Russian soldiers have also engaged in false reporting, committed outright theft, overstated the number of enlistees in some units (and skimmed the difference), and conducted other forms of graft. Corruption in the Russian military is not surprising. According to some estimates, one-fifth or more of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s budget is siphoned off by officials. These factors help explain why former Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev referred to the Russian armed forces as a “Potemkin military.”</p> +<h4 id="conclusion-3">Conclusion</h4> -<p>Third, Russia’s defense industrial base will likely face at least two types of challenges which could impact force design. One is replacement of losses from the war in Ukraine. Russia has already expended significant amounts of precision-guided and other munitions in the Ukraine war, and many of its weapons and equipment have been destroyed or severely worn down. According to some estimates, for example, Russia lost approximately 50 percent of its modern T-72B3 and T-72B3M main battle tanks over the first year of the war, along with roughly two-thirds of its T-80BV/U tanks. A protracted war in Ukraine will likely compound these challenges. Replacing these losses will be necessary before implementing new initiatives or building new forces.</p> +<p>Students of U.S. history understand that the United States accepted its role as the protector of Western European and Asian-Pacific democracy with great reluctance. The role was thrust upon the United States in the wake of two world wars that devastated Europe and Asia, and in light of perceived threat of further invasion and conflict by Russia and China. Nuclear deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence have been fundamental to the United States’ success in this role.</p> -<p>Another challenge is that economic sanctions will likely create shortages of higher-end foreign components and may force Moscow to substitute them with lower-quality alternatives. These challenges could impact Russia’s ability to manufacture, sustain, and produce advanced weapons and technology. As Russia’s 2022 maritime doctrine concluded, one of the main risks to Russia’s maritime activities is “the introduction of restrictions, which include the transfer of modern technologies, deliveries of equipment and attraction of long-term investments, imposed by a number of states against Russian shipbuilding enterprises of the defense industrial complex and oil and gas companies.” Supply-chain problems have also delayed deliveries. Money to replace outdated machine tools and pay for research and development is lacking, while neglect of quality control is common. Continuing assistance from China, Iran, North Korea, and other countries could help ameliorate some of these challenges.</p> +<p>It is worth considering the number of times Europe’s great powers went to war with one another after 1648, the date when the Treaty of Westphalia ushered the modern nation-state into existence. From 1648 to 1800, there were at least seven significant wars. From 1800 to 1900, there were at least six significant wars, and that includes lumping all the Napoleonic Wars into one and similarly counting the three wars of Italian independence as one. In 1914, there was World War I, the “war to end all wars,” whose massive carnage and destruction of a generation of European males was not sufficient to prevent World War II.</p> -<p>Fourth, Russia may face a significant challenge because of growing civil-military tension. As Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington wrote in his book The Soldier and the State, “The military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society’s security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society.” The need to balance military institutions and societal forces is no less true for Russia today. It is conceivable that tension between the Russian military and population could worsen over time because of a protracted war in Ukraine, a languishing economy, and an increasingly authoritarian state.</p> +<p>Then, after 1945, a historic pause suddenly began. Did humankind change? Did the nature of governments change? No, the existence of nuclear weapons made war between the major powers too dangerous to contemplate as an instrument of prudent policy. As long as the United States maintains a strong deterrent, and as long as potential enemy leaders act rationally, it will be possible to prevent major war. Popularly appealing but ill-thought-out slogans such as “reducing the role of nuclear weapons” both threaten the basis of the United States’ policy success over the past many decades and appear risible in a world in which potential enemies have demonstrably increased their reliance on nuclear weapons and routinely employ nuclear blackmail to try to intimidate the United States and its allies.</p> -<p>The June 2023 rebellion led by Yevgeny Prigozhin was one indicator of domestic frustration, although it is difficult to assess the breadth and depth of popular anger. A reconstitution of the Russian military will likely require some level of support and sacrifice from the Russian population.</p> +<h3 id="deterring-two-peer-competitors-for-us-deterrence-strategy">Deterring Two Peer Competitors for U.S. Deterrence Strategy</h3> -<p>Fifth, Russia has struggled to coordinate strategy and operations across its services. Russian military exercises are often stovepiped, with poor coordination and limited jointness across the army, air force, and navy. The Russian military has failed to effectively conduct joint operations in Ukraine. These challenges raise major questions about whether the Russian military can create a truly joint force.</p> +<p><em>Time to Innovate</em></p> -<h4 id="conclusion-2">CONCLUSION</h4> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="leonor-tomero">Leonor Tomero</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>In the months before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, U.S. government assessments were generally accurate in predicting that Russian forces would invade Ukraine. But many were wrong in their assessment of the war’s outcome. Most assumed that Russian forces would defeat Ukrainian forces in a matter of days or weeks. But they overstated the effectiveness of Russian forces and understated the will to fight, combined arms capabilities, leadership, and morale of Ukrainian forces, political leaders, and the population. These errors may have occurred because it is generally easier to analyze tangible aspects of a military, such as doctrine and air, land, naval, cyber, and space capabilities, but much more difficult to assess the intangible aspects of warfare, including morale, will to fight, readiness, impact of corruption, and force employment.</p> +<p>Geopolitical reality and nuclear modernization in Russia and China will soon require the United States to deter two peer competitors. Meanwhile, dramatic technological changes are emerging from the commercial sector in areas related to deterrence. These changes include not only new nuclear dangers but more broadly increased risks of miscalculation and rapid escalation that could lead to nuclear war. The United States needs to adapt and strengthen its deterrence posture against these new challenges and use innovation for deterrence resilience to prevent nuclear war.</p> -<p>These analytical challenges raise important questions about how to assess Russian military reconstitution, views on the future of warfare, and force design. Moving forward, U.S. and allied policymakers should routinely ask and attempt to answer several questions regarding Russian views of warfare and force design:</p> +<p>Given the increasing threat environment and higher risks of inadvertent escalation, the core objective of future U.S. strategic deterrence should be to prevent nuclear war. This goal entails concurrently deterring conflict with Russia and China as early as possible by denying any potential adversary the benefit of attack while reducing the risk of escalation to nuclear weapons use. While nuclear deterrence remains central to national security, the United States should harness innovation to pursue a stable deterrence architecture that is more resilient against inadvertent escalation. This paper will examine:</p> -<ul> +<ol> <li> - <p>How will Russia attempt to improve the “intangibles” of warfare, such as the will to fight and readiness?</p> + <p>how increasing threats, technological disruption, and increased risk of miscalculation are impacting deterrence strategy, including why and how deterrence doctrine must evolve to address new threats and prevent nuclear war, such as the need to adapt nuclear deterrence strategy;</p> </li> <li> - <p>How will Russia prioritize its force design ambitions given its many competing needs?</p> + <p>how modernization should prioritize survivable nuclear forces and provide modern capabilities to move deterrence to the left, meaning strengthen deterrence earlier in a crisis or conflict, as well as why modernization should leverage innovation and emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, new space and cyber domains, and the private sector, to enhance deterrence and reduce the risk of miscalculation;</p> </li> <li> - <p>Can Russia continue to secure significant support from China, Iran, North Korea, and other countries for its military, including technology, weapons systems, and money? How might such support impact force design?</p> + <p>extended deterrence, including the importance of interoperability; and</p> </li> <li> - <p>Can Russia overcome historic problems, such as corruption? If so, how?</p> + <p>arms control, including applying emerging technologies.</p> </li> -</ul> +</ol> -<p>While there may be a temptation to examine Russian views of the future of warfare primarily through a Ukraine lens, this would be a mistake. The war in Ukraine has impacted Russian military thinking, but it is only one war at one point in time.</p> +<p>In summary, preventing nuclear war now demands a better understanding of emerging escalation pathways and a concerted effort to move deterrence to further “left” of nuclear weapons use. Incremental changes to twentieth-century architecture and Cold War strategy will not keep pace with technological change. To reliably deter U.S. adversaries, a modernized deterrence should recognize that emerging technologies and commercialization of outer space are critical to strategic stability and resilience. This requires harnessing new capabilities and private sector innovation to ensure resilience through survivability, adding decisionmaking time and opportunities for de-escalation, and undertaking rapid acquisition to reduce the risks of unintended nuclear war.</p> -<p>In his book Strategy, Russian military leader and theorist Alexander Svechin remarked that “each war has to be matched with a special strategic behavior; each war constitutes a particular case that requires establishing its own special logic instead of applying some template.” Svechin believed in the uniqueness of war. The challenge in understanding Russian thinking about the future of warfare is to step back and attempt to understand how Russian leaders view the evolving international environment and to how they can best maximize their security given the resources at their disposal.</p> +<h4 id="deterrence-strategy">Deterrence Strategy</h4> -<hr /> +<p>Adversary threats are shifting across several domains — nuclear, space, and emerging technologies — and, when combined with an increased risk of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation — could lead to nuclear war. To understand the requirements for deterrence strategy, it is critical to understand the scope of new threats.</p> -<p><strong>Seth G. Jones</strong> is senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, director of the International Security Program, and director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He focuses on defense strategy, military operations, force posture, and irregular warfare. He leads a bipartisan team of over 50 resident staff and an extensive network of non-resident affiliates dedicated to providing independent strategic insights and policy solutions that shape national security. He also teaches at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.</p>Seth G. JonesRussian leaders are committed to a reconstitution of the Russian military — especially the Russian army — over the next several years, though achieving this goal will be challenging. In addition, Russia views the United States as its main enemy for the foreseeable future.The Post-October 7 World2023-09-28T12:00:00+08:002023-09-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-post-october-7-world<p><em>On October 7, 2022, U.S.-China relations were reshaped with export controls on military AI, shifting global semiconductor manufacturing and distribution and complicating the global economy. This report outlines U.S. allies’ perspectives on “the new oil” in geopolitics.</em></p> +<p>INCREASING NUCLEAR THREATS</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>First, nuclear threats are growing, including in sheer numbers as well as increased likelihood of nuclear weapons use. China is adding hundreds of nuclear weapons and will reach at least 1,500 by 2035. China is aggressively modernizing its nuclear force, developing launch-on-warning capabilities, and diversifying its nuclear weapons, achieving a nascent nuclear triad. Combined with a new launch-under-attack posture that exacerbates time-pressure on Chinese decisionmakers and its persistent refusal to negotiate nuclear constraints or risk reduction, this expansion could increase the risks of miscalculation and of nuclear weapons use. China’s modernization implies new basing modes and a nuclear warfighting capability, which introduces risks of miscalculation not present in smaller, less ready forces.</p> -<h3 id="foreword">Foreword</h3> +<p>Meanwhile, Russia is taking more risks with nuclear weapons. It has implied that it may use nuclear weapons to sustain its illegal war against Ukraine. It is also expanding its numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and plans to deploy some of them in Belarus. Russia is developing novel nuclear weapons systems to overcome potential U.S. missile defenses and could rapidly upload nuclear weapons if and when New START terminates. Russian leadership is also increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons and dangerously has raised the specter of using nuclear weapons in Europe, increasing the risk of inadvertent escalation.</p> -<p><em>The Importance of Understanding Allied Perspectives</em></p> +<p>In addition, China and Russia have committed to a friendship “without limits.” While a formal alliance between Russia and China still seems unlikely today, they are cooperating more closely as their interests align to counter the United States. Russia and China are deepening economic and defense cooperation. For example, they have held bilateral summits, and Russia is supplying enriched uranium for China’s fast breeder reactors.</p> + +<p>These nuclear threats and the prospect of two nuclear peer adversaries are raising questions about whether the United States must match, or prepare to match, adversary advances qualitatively and quantitatively, whether it should increase its numbers of nuclear weapons, and whether it should develop new low-yield nuclear weapons. U.S. nuclear modernization could use open production lines and new investments to increase numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), bombers, and associated warheads. Admiral Charles Richard, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testified in March 2022 that more U.S. nuclear weapons may be needed. After Russia suspended New START, House Armed Services Committee chairman Mike Rogers stated, “All options must be on the table, including deploying additional nuclear forces and increasing the readiness of our nuclear triad.”</p> + +<p>THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL DISRUPTION ON DETERRENCE STRATEGY REQUIREMENTS</p> + +<p>Strategic threats are more complicated than just increasing the number and types of nuclear weapons. Considering the nuclear threat in a vacuum will lead to flawed recommendations. China and Russia are concurrently pursuing emerging and non-kinetic technologies, including cyberattacks, electronic warfare, and directed energy attacks. Both China and Russia have expanded and demonstrated counterspace capabilities, including anti-satellite weapons, that threaten U.S. and allied space assets. According to the 2020 U.S. Defense Space Strategy, “China and Russia each have weaponized space as a means to reduce U.S. and allied . . . freedom of operation in space.” In response, the United States in 2017 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2019 declared space a new warfighting domain.</p> + +<p>The Office of the Director of National Intelligence noted in its Global Trends 2040 report that “in this more competitive global environment, the risk of interstate conflict is likely to rise because of advances in technology and an expanding range of targets, new frontiers for conflict and a greater variety of actors, more difficult deterrence, and a weakening or a lack of treaties and norms on acceptable use.” Further increasing this risk, a strategic conflict with China or Russia could begin in the context of a regional conventional conflict and escalate rapidly in the space or cyber domains, leading to strategic effects such as targeting and potentially endangering and degrading strategic deterrence capabilities or critical infrastructure.</p> + +<p>In addition, China and Russia are taking a much broader view of conflict and using nontraditional tools, including disinformation, to attack U.S. political cohesion and decision space. They have demonstrated the willingness and capability to use emerging technology to disrupt the cohesion of the United States’ society and its constitutional democracy by interfering in elections (as Russia did in 2016 and 2020), targeting critical infrastructure, and sowing division. Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, former Air Force deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration, observed in 2021:</p> <blockquote> - <h4 id="gregory-c-allen">Gregory C. Allen</h4> + <p>We are having the wrong national-security debate in this country. Neither Russia’s nuclear arsenal, China’s rapidly modernizing nuclear force, or even North Korea’s advancing nuclear capability pose the most pressing existential threat to this nation. International and domestic disinformation campaigns targeting Americans is our most pressing and dire threat to the security of our republic.</p> </blockquote> -<p>October 7, 2022, was a turning point in the history of U.S.-China relations. On that day, the United States enacted a new set of export controls designed to choke off China’s access to the future of military artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities. In doing so, the October 7 regulations marked a reversal of nearly three decades of U.S. trade and technology policy toward China in at least two ways: First, rather than restricting exports to China on an end-use or end-user basis, the new regulations included many controls that applied to China as a whole. Second, the policy sought to degrade the peak technological capability of China’s AI and semiconductor industries. Fifteen years ago, such measures would have been almost unthinkable.</p> +<p>This use of new tools and the expanding reach of disinformation campaigns pose potentially enormous dangers to deterrence, which is fundamentally about using information to influence adversary behavior. Successful weaponization of social media could tempt U.S. adversaries to believe they can degrade, shape, or otherwise limit U.S. deterrence resolve, leading to dangerous new possibilities for miscalculation. In her seminal article, “Wormhole Escalation in the New Nuclear Age,” Dr. Rebecca Hersman, director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, stated:</p> -<p>Though the end target of the October 7 export controls was China’s military AI development, the means to that end was restricting U.S. exports of advanced semiconductor technology. As such, October 7 marks not only a turning point in geopolitical history, but also a turning point for the global semiconductor industry and the countries at the center of semiconductor value chains.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Adversaries can amplify effects, obscure attribution, and prime the information space to their advantage long before a crisis begins, as well as shape it during such a crisis. By promoting false narratives, flooding the information zone with contradictory claims, manipulating social and economic institutions, and instigating general or targeted social unrest, potential adversaries can break confidence in U.S. and allied institutions, increase distrust and confusion, and coerce desirable outcomes at lower levels of conflict.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Today, semiconductors are vital inputs not only to datacenters and smartphones, but also to cars, critical infrastructure, military systems, and even household appliances like washing machines. As the global economy has become more and more digitized, it has also grown more and more dependent upon chips. It is for good reason that national security experts routinely declare semiconductors to be “the new oil” when it comes to geopolitics and international security.</p> +<p>Nuclear experts such as Dr. Heather Williams of CSIS are exploring how social media may affect escalation and deterrence, and more focus is needed in this area. Attacks on U.S. deterrence resolve could be compounded by new vulnerabilities and attack surfaces in the space and cyber domains, sowing further confusion, targeting the Unted States’ will to fight, and degrading critical capabilities. These new attack vectors are expanding conflict and impacting deterrence in unprecedented ways that must be better understood. New ways to target and influence either senior decisionmakers or the broader public will affect deterrence credibility and strategy.</p> -<p>The United States is the overall leader in the global semiconductor industry, but other U.S. allies — particularly Japan, the Netherlands, Taiwan, South Korea, and Germany — also play critical roles. If other countries fill the gaps in the Chinese market left by the October 7 regulations, then the policy will most likely backfire. U.S. companies could suffer a huge loss of market share and revenue in China and in return for only a fleeting national security benefit.</p> +<p>THE INCREASED RISK OF MISCALCULATION AND INADVERTENT ESCALATION LEADING TO NUCLEAR WAR</p> -<p>Thus, the long-term success of the U.S. policy depends upon the actions of the governments in those other key countries. This was the inspiration behind this compendium of essays. Much has been written about the October 7 export controls in the United States, but too often the U.S. conversation suffers from a shortage of international perspectives, as well as a minimal understanding of the political and policy dynamics within those key U.S. allies.</p> +<p>The risk of miscalculation that led to near misses during the Cold War has not been sufficiently prioritized as a key consideration in deterrence strategy and has become an even greater danger today. The Cold War is replete with instances of close calls. Aside from the 1963 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the word came perilously close to nuclear war, examples of false warning triggering increased nuclear alerts include the 1979 U.S. false warning of a Soviet nuclear missile attack; the 1985 Able Archer exercise, whereby the Soviets mistook a NATO military exercise as initial steps of a nuclear invasion of the Soviet Union; and the 1995 Norwegian sounding rocket mistaken for U.S. nuclear missiles. Technology improvements and a few historic policy solutions such as the Hot Line and Open Ocean Targeting agreements contributed significantly to risk reduction. However, U.S. deterrence posture generally has, and continues to be, focused on intentional lethality, to the exclusion of unintentional escalation.</p> -<p>This compendium seeks to address that shortage. The Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at CSIS has assembled a distinguished group of international experts who have a rich understanding of both the global semiconductor industry and its geopolitical dimensions. Each of their essays provides an overview of the situation facing their home country or region in the post-October 7 era.</p> +<p>Today, new technologies and domains as well as risk-prone bravado from adversaries are increasing the risks of unintended escalation. In their book, The Age of AI, Henry Kissinger, Eric Schmidt, and Daniel Huttenlocher warn that “the current and foreseeable increased threat of inadvertent rapid escalation and miscalculation that could lead to nuclear use or large-scale nuclear war represent a renewed threat that was never adequately addressed.” Specifically, these risks are exacerbated by leaders who miscalculate or are willing to take more risks. Putin takes extreme risks. Examples range from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, to threatening the use of nuclear weapons, to expanding Russia’s reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons in its so-called “escalate-to-deescalate” doctrine, to suspending implementation New START. U.S. national defense must be resilient against Putin’s tendency to miscalculate.</p> -<h3 id="south-korean-perspective">South Korean Perspective</h3> +<p>Similarly, the risk of miscalculation in the context of a war with China over Taiwan is significant. China is fielding a nuclear triad and new launch-on-warning capabilities as a major departure from its decades-long minimum-deterrence strategy. China lacks the shared experience of the Cuban Missile Crisis and decades of effective nuclear arms control with the United States. This absence of shared understanding is exacerbated by China’s aggressive pursuit of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence.</p> -<p><em>South Korea Needs Increased (but Quiet) Export Control Coordination with the United States</em></p> +<p>Ambiguity and conflict in space imply unprecedented challenges for deterrence, due in part to the difficulty of attribution in the space and cyber domains, the reversibility of some forms of attack, the brittleness of legacy systems, and the potential for strategic attacks that materially degrade critical deterrence capabilities without any kinetic attack on the ground and, potentially, without loss of life, such as against space nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) capabilities. An adversary may attack assets in space in the context of a conventional war, but those could be perceived as escalatory if they targeted strategic assets such as nuclear command and control satellites (which currently provide tactical as well as strategic communications). In addition, attacks against space assets, such as the Global Positioning System could prove more escalatory than an adversary might intend, as many systems depend on it.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="wonho-yeon">Wonho Yeon</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>EVOLVING DETERRENCE DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY TO ADDRESS NEW THREATS AND PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR</p> -<h4 id="us-china-strategic-competition-and-us-china-policy">U.S.-China Strategic Competition and U.S. China Policy</h4> +<p>While the United States faces two peer competitors and new threats have increased the risk of nuclear war, nuclear deterrence doctrine and strategy have largely been static for over 40 years. Kissinger, Schmidt, and Huttenlocher note that “the management of nuclear weapons, the endeavor of half a century, remains incomplete and fragmentary” and that the “unsolved riddles of nuclear strategy must be given new attention and recognized for what they are: one of the great human strategic technical and moral challenges.”</p> -<p>Economic security can be defined as protecting a nation from external economic threats or risks. Response to military threats or dangers is the domain of traditional security, while economic security is about protecting a country’s economic survival and future competitiveness. Disruption of supply chains threatens the survival of a country, while the fostering of advanced technology determines future competitiveness. Thus, economic security strategy mainly deals with supply chain policies and advanced technology policies as core fields.</p> +<p>New threats require that the United States adapt its doctrine and strategy not just because of increased numbers, but more so because of new non-nuclear strategic capabilities that could precipitate a conflict much earlier in a crisis, nuclear conflict, or conventional war. Sputnik may have been the single greatest disruption to Cold War deterrence, dwarfing the supposed bomber and missile “gaps.” Today, the United States should focus not just on numerical gaps but on the emergence of the next Sputnik moment.</p> -<p>The goals of U.S. economic security policy are clear: to manage risk from China. In terms of supply chain resilience, it is about reducing dependence on China for critical goods, and in terms of the maintaining high-tech supremacy, it is about containing China’s rise. This view consistently appears in speeches and white papers including Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken’s May 2022 speech titled “The Biden Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” the White House’s National Security Strategy released in October 2022 and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s April 2023 speech at the Brookings Institution.</p> +<p>More specifically, the heightened nuclear threat in the context of the war in Ukraine and the increased risk of conflict over Taiwan, combined with a potential future in which neither Russia nor China participate in strategic stability and risk reduction through negotiation, demand a new deterrence strategy. Ignoring the need for this shift may mean that in a crisis or conventional conflict, the United States could suffer debilitating losses well before a nuclear conflict. As Dr. Rebecca Hersman stated, “Increasingly capable and intrusive digital information technologies, advanced dual-use military capabilities, and diffused global power structures will reshape future crises and conflicts between nuclear-armed adversaries and challenge traditional ways of thinking about escalation and stability” and “will require new concepts and tools to manage the risk of unintended escalation and reduce nuclear dangers.”</p> -<p>The strategic approach of the Biden administration toward China can be summarized as “invest,” “align,” and “compete.” “Invest” means strengthening domestic production capabilities by investing in key items with high supply chain vulnerabilities. The Biden administration also emphasizes “solidarity” with friendly nations. Ultimately, the goal is to build a strong and resilient high-tech industrial base that both the United States and like-minded partners can invest in and rely on. “Compete” refers to realizing the American vision and maintaining a competitive edge over China, which challenges the U.S.-led order. Specifically, the Trump administration’s bipartisan export control, import control, and investment screening policies are designed to keep China in check as a competitor and simultaneously strengthen efforts to create a new, transparent, and fair international economic partnership for a changing world.</p> +<p>The United States urgently needs to better understand how emerging technologies, cyber and social media, and space affect nuclear deterrence. At the 20th anniversary of Nunn-Lugar, late secretary of defense Ashton Carter noted “the nuclear systems that supported the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union were fundamentally social and human.” As another example of policymakers’ recognition of these new attack vectors, the FY 2022 National Defense Authorization Act mandated an independent review of the safety, security and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons (the so-called “new failsafe report”), which mandated an examination of potential cyber and other vulnerabilities.</p> -<p>In 2023, the United States began using the new phrase “de-risking” to describe its policy toward China. However, the U.S. government’s use of de-risking refers to China risk management in the broadest sense and does not imply a specific change in U.S. policy toward China. Diversification, selective decoupling, and full decoupling are all possible means of de-risking, and the United States has adopted a policy of selective decoupling. This can be read literally in the phrase “small yard, high fence” that National Security Advisor Sullivan emphasizes at every speech. The idea is to block Chinese access in selective areas.</p> +<p>A novel deterrence concept for reducing the risk of nuclear war starts with moving deterrence to the left, meaning strengthening deterrence well before the threat of nuclear war. While nuclear deterrence remains central to national security, the United States needs a more resilient and broader strategic deterrence strategy that prevents escalation earlier in a crisis or conflict. Because of the risk of rapid or inadvertent escalation in the modern strategic environment and because of the inability to ensure the United Sates will be able to “restore deterrence” once nuclear conflict begins, reducing the risk of nuclear war increasingly means reducing the risk of conventional war. Herman Kahn’s historic effort to strengthen nuclear deterrence by thinking “right of boom,” to consider the difference between potential aftermaths of nuclear war scenarios, has taken planning for nuclear warfighting to implausible extremes. As emerging technologies imply new counterforce vulnerabilities and escalation pathways, as well as opportunities to control these pathways, U.S. deterrence planning must extend just as far “left of boom” to prevent nuclear war.</p> -<p>As evidence of this, the United States has been building a high fence against China in certain areas. In particular, the United States is no longer willing to tolerate China’s rise in the high-tech sector. In a speech at the Special Competitive Studies Project Global Emerging Technologies Summit on September 16, 2022, Sullivan pointed out that the strategy of maintaining a certain gap with China is no longer valid and emphasized that the United States considers it a national security priority to widen the gap with China in certain science and technology fields as much as possible. Specifically, he mentioned computing-related technologies, biotechnology, and clean technology, but he also noted the strategic use of export controls. Indeed, the prevailing view among U.S. industry is that Sullivan’s statement guides current export controls.</p> +<p>ADAPTING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY</p> -<h4 id="semiconductors-a-key-item-for-economic-security">Semiconductors, A Key Item for Economic Security</h4> +<p>With regard to the narrower question of nuclear deterrence and strategy requirements to address two peer competitors, the United States should balance reflexive appetites for additional nuclear weapons with other measures and capabilities to deny adversaries any benefit from nuclear weapons use. Nuclear deterrence requirements must be distinguished from requirements to meet military objectives if deterrence fails. With 3,750 nuclear warheads in the U.S. nuclear stockpile (as of 2020), no changes are needed to deter both Russia and China. Referring to the U.S.-Russian nuclear balance, J. Robert Oppenheimer stated in 1953 that “Our twenty thousandth bomb will not in any deep strategic sense offset their two thousandth.” While the United States maintains rough parity with Russia today with regard to strategic nuclear weapons (and not with regard to nonstrategic nuclear weapons), there is no evidence that building up conveys any meaningful added capability that would be required either politically or militarily. Despite claims of a perceived deterrence gap requiring new low-yield nuclear weapons, there is no evidence of such a gap. The United States maintains a nuclear triad comprised of varied, complementary, and redundant capabilities, including a variety of low-yield options, such as air-launched and now sea-based options with deployment in 2019 of the W76-2 nuclear-capable submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM-N). There is no evidence that adding more low-yield options would deter adversaries from expanding their nuclear arsenals or considering the use of a low-yield nuclear weapons in the context of losing a conventional fight. While proponents of additional low-yield options point to thousands of Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons, this claim sidesteps that the main driver for Russia’s non-strategic arsenal is NATO’s conventional superiority.</p> -<p>One of the defining features of the international order in 2023 is the strategic competition between the United States and China over economic security. Moreover, as Secretary of State Blinken noted in an October 2022 speech at Stanford University, technology is at the heart of U.S.-China strategic competition. China’s rapid technological advancement has kept the United States on guard, and despite the various measures taken to date to keep China in check, the United States recognizes that China’s technological strengths pose a threat to U.S. national interests. For example, The Great Tech Rivalry: China vs. the U.S., published in December 2021 by the Belfer Center at Harvard University, with experts including Graham Allison, raises the possibility that China could overtake the United States in foundational technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), 5G, quantum communications, semiconductors, biotechnology, and green energy in the next decade.</p> +<p>In the case of a limited nuclear war escalating to a larger nuclear war, U.S. deterrence capability — including the numerical strength and reliability of its nuclear arsenal, with more than 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear weapons (and the capacity to upload in the absence of New START, and to keep production lines open) — is also beyond dispute. Therefore, nuclear deterrence does not require new or additional nuclear weapons.</p> -<p>Semiconductors are core components and a key enabler for these critical, emerging, and foundational technologies. Semiconductors are the quintessential dual-use product and have become one of the most important strategic assets for economic and national security. They enable nearly all modern industrial and military systems, including smartphones, aircraft, weapons systems, the internet, and the power grid. Furthermore, semiconductors are at the heart of all emerging technologies, including AI, quantum computing, the Internet of Things, autonomous systems, and advanced robotics, which will power critical defense systems as well as determine economic competitiveness. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that the country that leads the world in advanced semiconductor research and development (R&amp;D), design, and manufacturing will determine the direction of global hegemony. China’s efforts to develop all parts of the semiconductor supply chain are unprecedented in scope and scale. This is why there is bipartisan support for the United States to revitalize advanced semiconductor manufacturing and research as well as to maintain an advantage over China.</p> +<p>However, the question remains how many nuclear weapons would be needed to meet U.S. military objectives if deterrence fails (including, for example, counterforce targets and damage limitation objectives). Current numbers appear sufficient to fight one nuclear war while deterring another. No changes in U.S. numbers will be needed before the 2030s as China builds up its arsenal over a decade to its goal of at least 1,500 nuclear weapons by 2035. Nearing 2035, the current objectives for nuclear weapons employment in the event of escalation to a large-scale nuclear war with China and Russia may require higher numbers to cover additional targets. The value of meeting these objectives should be evaluated critically against adversary reactions to new capabilities.</p> -<h4 id="characteristics-of-the-semiconductor-industry-and-its-importance-to-the-south-korean-economy">Characteristics of the Semiconductor Industry and Its Importance to the South Korean Economy</h4> +<p>First, adding more low-yield nuclear options will not keep a limited nuclear war limited. Rather, it may lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons in the context of a regional war, risk normalizing planning for extensive, multi-round nuclear warfighting, and fail to prevent uncontrolled escalation. There is no evidence that additional low-yield options (including more prompt options for using low-yield nuclear weapons) would deter Russia from using low-yield nuclear weapons. Instead, managing deterrence of limited nuclear war requires credibly signaling that an adversary will not gain any military or political advantage from using nuclear weapons. Strong warnings from President Joe Biden and attention to the risk of miscalculation probably helped defuse the risk of Russian use of nuclear weapons in the fall of 2022. Adding ever more low-yield nuclear weapons cannot substitute for credible threats clearly communicated.</p> -<p>Phrases such as “oil of the twenty-first century,” “twenty-first century horseshoe nail,” and “heart of industry” have all been used to describe the importance of semiconductors. A range of recent activity also serves to demonstrate this importance, including the shortage of automotive semiconductors; the U.S. government’s 100-day supply chain review report; the demand for supply chain information from semiconductor companies; decisions by the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and Samsung to invest in foundries in the United States; Japan’s hosting of a TSMC fab and the launch of the Rapidus project; the U.S.-China conflict over Dutch company ASML’s extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography equipment; President Biden’s visit to the Samsung semiconductor plant in South Korea; and the launch of the South Korea-U.S.-Japan-Taiwan FAB4 consultation. The interest in reorganizing the global semiconductor supply chain has never been greater.</p> +<p>Second, beyond deterring limited nuclear war and because escalation beyond a limited war cannot be controlled reliably, the United States needs to consider the possible scenario of a large-scale nuclear war. This threat is not new. The new question is whether the United States should prepare for two large-scale nuclear wars (one with Russia and another with China, in the unlikely case of strategic alliance or in the case of opportunistic aggression). The author’s answer to this question is no, as it is not in any way realistic for the United States to fight two nuclear wars to acceptable outcomes — one large-scale nuclear war would end civilization as we know it. During a massive nuclear exchange with Russia (or China), a U.S. president would be faced with catastrophic loss of life, devastation, economic ruin, and humanitarian abyss. It is hard to imagine any likely geopolitical circumstance that would require a second, concurrent large-scale nuclear war. Amid or after a major nuclear war with Russia or China, it is highly unlikely that a U.S. president would have any plausible incentive to fight a second large-scale nuclear war. Thus, a scenario where the United States fights one nuclear war and deters another nuclear war is realistically sufficient. The specific assumptions that drive requirements for capabilities to employ large numbers of nuclear weapons against two peer competitors simultaneously should be assessed critically against alternatives (such as building up conventional capabilities) that may be more useful for deterring or fighting a war against China, Russia, or both.</p> -<p>Making a single semiconductor chip typically requires a production process that spans four countries. The three main parts of the semiconductor production process are design, manufacturing, and assembly, test, and packaging (ATP). Ninety percent of the value added in semiconductors occurs equally in the design and manufacturing stages, with 10 percent added in the ATP stage. In semiconductor manufacturing, where South Korea is particularly strong, there are three types of companies: integrated device manufacturers (IDMs) that do both design and manufacturing in-house, fabless companies that do only design, and foundries that do only contract manufacturing. IDMs are overwhelmingly strong in the memory market, while fabless companies and foundries are dominant in the system semiconductor market.</p> +<p>The United States needs a careful re-look at objectives (including counterforce targets and damage limitation). What classes of targets is the United States holding at risk? How much damage or what kind of destruction is needed, including for damage limitation? For how long are these effects needed and with what conventional or nuclear capabilities can they be delivered? Military capacity and options must be weighed against the political reality and likelihood of what a U.S. president would be inclined to do. Are nuclear weapons necessary for all current targets? If additional conventional weapons are needed, what kind and how many? What risks of arms-racing or escalation do new capabilities pose? These considerations need serious and informed debate and should not be papered over. If this review must be classified (because objectives and targets are classified), Congress and the public should ensure that it is done rigorously.</p> -<p>As new generations of semiconductors become smaller and more integrated, the complexity and cost of production increases, leaving only a few companies capable of continuous technological improvement. The memory chip manufacturing market has become an oligopoly, and the division of labor between design and manufacturing has accelerated in the system semiconductor market. The surging demand for semiconductors has led to a geographic spread of demand across the globe, while suppliers have become concentrated in specific countries and regions.</p> +<p>Preventing nuclear war demands that the United States address the risks of miscalculation and unintended escalation directly. Theories of victory in nuclear war must be balanced against this imperative. In the face of the renewed and dynamic risk of nuclear war, the United States must pursue creative solutions rather than become self-satisfied with decades-old answers that are now insufficient or ill-suited to new threats. The United States must question and assess the assumptions of deterrence to ensure they are adapted to new environments, new threats, and effective modern deterrence requirements and objectives beyond arithmetic and implausible political scenarios of two large-scale nuclear wars.</p> -<p>The concentration of the semiconductor supply chain is recognized as a risk. Major countries have recognized semiconductors, which are used in all high-tech devices, as a strategic asset and are competing fiercely to secure their domestic semiconductor technology and manufacturing base as part of their economic security. The United States has a strategy to raise its domestic production capacity as a proportion of global capacity to 30 percent from 12 percent through funding worth $52.7 billion over the next five years, while China is implementing a strategy to localize semiconductor production through full tax support and a national semiconductor fund. Elsewhere, Europe is planning to increase its share of global production to 20 percent by 2030 from the current 9 percent; Japan is strengthening its domestic manufacturing capabilities by attracting Taiwanese foundry TSMC and launching the Rapidus project, a 2-nanometer (nm) foundry; and Taiwan has established an Angstrom (Å) strategy for pre-empting sub-1 nm semiconductors as a consolidation strategy.</p> +<h4 id="modernization">Modernization</h4> -<p>South Korea ranks second in global semiconductor production and first in memory production, and the semiconductor industry serves as a core sector, leading the national economy in various fields such as exports and investment. In particular, South Korea’s semiconductor manufacturing capacity is 80 percent domestic and 20 percent overseas, generating most of the production and value added within the country and accounting for about 20 percent of total exports. In 2021, a particularly active year for investment, the industry generated KRW 52 trillion ($39.0 billion) in investment, accounting for about 55 percent of the country’s total manufacturing capital expenditure. In line with this, the government has strengthened the foundation for semiconductor growth by enacting a special law to protect and foster national high-tech strategic industries centered on semiconductors in August 2022; announced a $25 billion mega-cluster project in March 2023; and announced a semiconductor future technology roadmap in April 2023, declaring its intention to foster 45 core semiconductor technologies.</p> +<p>MODERNIZING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES BY PRIORITIZING SURVIVABILITY</p> -<h4 id="strengthening-us-checks-on-chinas-semiconductor-industry">Strengthening U.S. Checks on China’s Semiconductor Industry</h4> +<p>A strategy that drives higher numbers of vulnerable weapons is ill-suited to stable deterrence. Matching on number of silos and missiles will lead to a dangerous, expensive, and counter-productive arms race. The United States must move beyond nuclear modernization constrained to incremental changes to a twentieth-century construct of vulnerable platforms and architectures. In this context, silo-based ICBMs are more vulnerable than they were in the 1960s because they are use-or-lose weapons if attacked and drive short decision times.</p> -<p>Fundamentally, the South Korean government and semiconductor companies recognize that the demand for semiconductors will increase in the long term as the digital and green transformations accelerate, which will ultimately create opportunities for the South Korean economy. At the same time, however, the U.S. government’s tightening of sanctions against China poses a major risk to South Korea’s semiconductor industry.</p> +<p>While the United States may not need additional nuclear weapons, it does need new concepts and capabilities that are survivable for stable deterrence. When the triad was first deployed, strategic nuclear weapons platforms were survivable. Recognizing adversary advances in defensive capabilities and improved accuracy, the United States should adapt its modern nuclear forces to ensure they remain survivable. Modernization should prioritize survivable platforms and architectures to provide stability and resilience. The United States must think more creatively about basing modes and concepts of operation. Specifically, if additional platforms are needed, the United States should prioritize adding SSBNs and shift to, or at least include, the option of mobile ICBMs (that would be kept in garrison but could be flushed in a crisis or conflict), understanding potential escalation risks from flushing mobile missiles (as there would be with dispersing nuclear bombers or putting more SSBNs to sea). The United States must prioritize resilient and layered nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems. While much of the financial investments and planning focus on new platforms and warheads, the critical need to upgrade NC3 systems is usually less salient. U.S. nuclear modernization must also prioritize infrastructure resilience and more agility to adapt to new requirements.</p> + +<p>MODERN CAPABILITIES THAT MOVE DETERRENCE TO THE LEFT</p> + +<p>Modernization plans must account for historic changes beyond the growth of Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals that will impact deterrence well before consideration of using nuclear weapons. The United States must apply solutions to prioritize and adequately address the increased risk of miscalculation rather than further exacerbating this risk. The Cold War showed that deterrence architectures can be more or less stable against arms racing and in crises. Modernizing strategic deterrence by moving deterrence to the left requires building more stable architectures by using new capabilities including cyber, space, private sector innovation, and resilience, including rapid acquisition. Conversely, without these tools, vulnerabilities may emerge that threaten debilitating losses early in a conflict or result in the unproductive option of escalating to using nuclear weapons first. The United States should pursue the most stable deterrence architecture possible with the best available technology.</p> + +<p>INNOVATION</p> + +<p>New capabilities are transforming the battlefield, moving beyond modernization of the nuclear triad and beyond a twentieth-century construct. Ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee Adam Smith noted in a broader context that “we need to modernize deterrence by updating . . . the military to the modern fight: information systems, missiles, drones, missile defense, counter-drone — we need to get better at these things. Large legacy platforms still have a place, but they are not as invulnerable as they used to be.” Legacy systems may no longer be optimized or appropriate for effective nuclear deterrence, and new technologies offer new tools. Air Force chief of staff General Charles Q. Brown and commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps General David H. Berger wrote in a 2021 article that “without a fundamental reexamination of the concept of readiness, we will continue to spend limited resources on maintaining legacy capabilities, at the expense of investing in the modern capabilities the United States needs to compete with the People’s Republic of China and Russia.” This warning should be applied to strategic deterrence.</p> + +<p>“The threat that leaves something to chance” has been interpreted as nuclear threats that would lead to millions of civilian deaths. The United States should not be satisfied with an approach that unduly risks its national survival and endangers human civilization. The United States should prefer a strategic posture that is stabilizing, depends less on chance (or on Vladimir Putin or the Chinese Communist Party), and provides options other than rapid escalation toward nuclear war. To achieve a more modern and stable deterrence architecture, the United States should lead through innovation to create options that do not force escalation or lead to mass annihilation of civilians. U.S. deterrence that reflects U.S. values is inherently more credible than threats that do not. Schmidt notes that “the ability to innovate faster and better — the foundation on which military, economic, and cultural power now rest — will determine the outcome of the great-power competition between the United States and China.” He continues, “At stake is nothing less than the future of free societies, open markets, democratic government, and the broader world order. . . . Silicon Valley’s old mantra holds true not just in industry but also in geopolitics: innovate or die.” Innovation is the United States’ unique competitive edge vis-à-vis China and Russia.</p> + +<p>EMERGING TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE: NEW KEYS TO DETERRING CONVENTIONAL WAR AND TO PREVENTING ESCALATION</p> + +<p><em>Artificial Intelligence</em></p> + +<p>Being in a strategic competition with China and Russia means understanding and managing competition in AI and emerging technology. AI and machine learning (including machine reinforcement) could determine the outcome of a crisis or conflict early. Marc Andreesen, founder of a16z, stated in 2011: “Software is eating the world,” meaning that the virtual is displacing the material across the global economy. Trae Stephens, founder of the Founders Fund, more recently said that “software is finally eating the battlefield, whether the defense industry likes it or not.” Last year, Gilman Louie observed that “tomorrow it is real-time speed, algorithm warfare. It’s gonna be algorithms trying to outsmart the other algorithms. It’s gonna be machine-on-machine, algorithm-on-algorithm. Those are the systems of the future, and that requires total integration.” AI and machine learning offer new solutions. Quantum computing will also allow faster processing of even larger amounts of data. Eric Schmidt warned recently that a breakthrough in artificial general intelligence (AGI) — a more comprehensive AI, which is currently used to solve discrete problems — “could usher in an era of predominance not unlike the short period of nuclear superiority the United States enjoyed in the late 1940s.”</p> + +<p>AI and big data processing are key to enable faster and better information for decisionmakers, and support “information dominance.” Effective and rapid information could provide time warning of adversary action, holding them accountable and increasing options for de-escalation. Noting that the military currently processes 2 percent of the data it collects, General Glen VanHerck, commander of U.S. Northern Command, emphasized that “we can’t apply what I say are industrial age, industrial base processes to software-driven capabilities in today’s environment,” adding that “machines . . . can start counting numbers and tell you when there’s changes in . . . vehicles in a parking lot, vehicles in a weapons storage area.” The early impact of emerging technology on the battlefield is already becoming apparent; as Schmidt noted: “Ukraine offers a preview of future conflicts: wars that will be waged and won by humans and machines working together.”</p> + +<p><em>Space</em></p> + +<p>Second, space is a key tool for increasing survivability and transparency, reducing the risk of surprise in a crisis or conflict, and increasing accountability of U.S. adversaries. Cheaper and ubiquitous space imagery is a tool that has already transformed conflict with Russia. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the value of unclassified commercial imagery from space start-ups. Capella’s synthetic aperture radar imagery can see through clouds, and space imagery from Maxar and Planet have provided the world with irrefutable images of Russia’s brutal invasion and intent to subvert the global order, unifying U.S. and European allies, including by documenting advancing Russian tank columns and the evidence of Russia targeting Ukrainian civilian infrastructure such as apartments and hospitals. Drone- and space-provided images also showed columns of tanks stopped due to mechanical and logistical problems, laying bare Russia’s military readiness challenges. As another example of new tools giving the world sharable information, open-source analysis is providing rapid information, with Google Maps revealing the exact time that the Russian invasion began, even as Russia denied that they were invading Ukraine.</p> + +<p>To this end, the United States must innovate to adapt its space capabilities and architectures and make them more survivable. General John Hyten, former vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted the vulnerability of a “few juicy targets” in space and the need to change acquisition strategy and architectures. Making space resilient means using various orbits and more numerous, smaller and cheaper satellites at proliferated low Earth orbit (pLEO) to complicate attack options, and using both military and commercial systems for added layers of operational capability. The Space Development Agency, the U.S. Space Force, and the Missile Defense Agency are deploying a resilient missile warning and tracking constellation in pLEO and medium earth orbit and are developing cheaper and smaller payloads to provide a mesh-layer of redundancy. Moreover, Congress is rightly prioritizing tactically responsive launch and tactically responsive space capabilities. In addition, disaggregation (not comingling tactical and strategic communications capabilities on the same satellite) will also enable a more stable deterrence architecture that reduces the risk of inadvertent escalation.</p> + +<p><em>Private Sector</em></p> + +<p>Third, for both the space and cyber domains, an increasing share of the infrastructure necessary for strategic deterrence is owned by private sector companies, such as SpaceX and Google as well as hundreds of new start-ups such as Planet. For example, SpaceX has provided Ukraine with receivers and access to Starlink connectivity, though it also has sought to limit this access. The United States needs to partner with the private sector to move deterrence left of mass destruction. In The Age of AI, Kissinger, Schmidt, and Huttenlocher state that “the expertise required for technological preeminence is no longer concentrated in government. . . . [A] process of mutual education between industry, academia, and government can help . . . ensure that . . . AI’s strategic implications are understood in a common conceptual framework.” Creating the incentives and culture to leverage private sector innovation is crucial to national security. Former House Armed Services Committee chairman Mac Thornberry warned, “We need a culture of collaboration that opens new pathways to work with the private sector, relooks at our approach to interactions with outside organizations and reframes the department [Department of Defense] as open to sharing research and information rather than one that is uncooperative both internally and externally.”</p> + +<p>Leveraging private sector innovation requires processes for agile and rapid acquisition. Congress enabled the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct more rapid acquisition in section 804 of the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act. While the DOD is beginning to leverage transformational breakthroughs and innovation in the private sector for national security, sustained and focused senior leadership and new processes to break through legacy bureaucratic challenges will be required. General Hyten noted “the Department of Defense doesn’t know how to buy it [innovation]. We think we can buy software like we buy tanks.” Schmidt warned that “business as usual will not do. Instead, the U.S. government will have to overcome its stultified bureaucratic impulses, create favorable conditions for innovation. . . . It needs to commit itself to promoting innovation in the service of the country and in the service of democracy.” Pockets within the DOD, such as AFWERX, SPACEWERX, the Defense Innovation Unit, and the Space Development Agency, are establishing an innovative acquisition culture that incentivizes using private sector innovation, allowing early failure and learning, and prioritizing rapid acquisition. Continued focus and expansion of these models are necessary.</p> + +<h4 id="extended-deterrence-and-assurance-2">Extended Deterrence and Assurance</h4> + +<p>Alliance, like innovation, is at the core of the United States’ competitive edge and U.S. strength to address Russian and Chinese threats. Strengthening extended deterrence and alliances requires increasing partnership and interoperability with allied conventional deterrence capabilities. Allied and partner contributions to conventional deterrence, missile defense, and innovation significantly enhance deterrence and help move deterrence to the left to prevent a regional conventional war. For example, the European Union’s Innovation Fund could enhance deterrence and rapidly contribute new commercial and innovative capabilities. To better leverage U.S. international partnerships and to maximize capacity and redundancy for deterrence, the DOD should prioritize processes for enabling interoperability with European and Asian allies’ defense systems while safeguarding cybersecurity. Making progress on interoperability entails not only focused senior leadership but also overcoming deep-seated bureaucratic stumbling blocks, including overclassification and export control hurdles.</p> + +<p>Increased NATO and European cohesion in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and unified support for Ukraine, including significant funding and transfers of military equipment to Ukraine as well as financial sanctions on Russia, strengthen deterrence to protect NATO countries. These actions also strengthen deterrence in the Pacific as China assesses lessons learned with regard to potential implications of invading Taiwan. Japan and South Korea’s attendance at the 2022 NATO summit as observers and hosting of NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg in 2023 indicate opportunities for closer defense cooperation and strengthening unity among U.S. allies in the face of the growing Russian and Chinese threats.</p> + +<p>Credible assurance is a product of presidential and senior-level communication and engagement more than boutique capabilities. Consultation and understanding U.S. conventional and nuclear forces are key to credibility. Credible assurances to U.S. allies have been undermined by a range of actions, including (1) promising unnecessary and controversial new nuclear capabilities (such as the SLCM-N, which the Trump administration proposed and the Biden administration canceled); (2) focusing on unrealistic or difficult-to-execute new deployments of platforms that are unsuited to temporary forward deployment (such as promising forward deployment of nuclear-capable dual-capable aircraft to Asian allies); or (3) discussing new permanent stationing of forward-deployed nuclear weapons in allied territory in Asia (which would likely contravene the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). Instead, the United States should increase both tabletop exercises and joint military exercises; enable a better understanding of nuclear deterrence through deeper and frequent consultations; rely on and demonstrate eminently forward-deployable nuclear platforms such as B52s, B2s, the future B21s, and submarines; and increase joint senior public messaging to adversaries of allied unity (as Jens Stoltenberg has done within NATO).</p> + +<h4 id="arms-control-1">Arms Control</h4> + +<p>While future arms control would continue to significantly benefit national security and continues to be possible with effective U.S. and Russian (and Chinese) leadership, it seems unlikely absent a political breakthrough that would allow both effective international negotiations and domestic political support.</p> + +<p>The specific tool of arms control — meaning legally binding constraints on nuclear platforms — may no longer be available to maintain strategic stability, and New START may expire without any follow-on treaty. Russia suspended implementation of the New START, which expires in 2026, leading to the risk of an impending new era without verifiable nuclear weapons limits. It is unclear whether this latest development is a signal that Russia is gambling with New START to seek leverage in its losing war in Ukraine, or whether it is willing to abandon legally binding nuclear arms control as a tool for predictability for the first time in six decades. In the United States, arms control has become dangerously polarized, and the U.S. Senate no longer has the expertise and long-standing bipartisan agreement that arms control benefits national security.</p> + +<p>The United States must continue to press for follow-on nuclear weapons constraints on the total number of nuclear warheads (not just the number of platforms or the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons). However, it cannot count on New START or any future nuclear arms control agreement being in effect in the next few years, let alone in 2035, and should plan to prevent nuclear war in an environment without any legally binding or verifiable numerical limits.</p> + +<p>Therefore, the United States must reconsider arms control with a broader focus on avoiding a nuclear war, rather than a narrow focus on nuclear weapons. The P5 restated the Reagan-Gorbachev statement that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Recalibrating and expanding the scope of risk reduction should consider cross-domain arms control. Such an approach could include as examples: (1) constraining missile defenses that the United States would not pursue in exchange for constraints on Russia’s novel nuclear weapons; (2) defending priority critical infrastructure; (3) constraining the number or location of certain conventional capabilities in exchange for nuclear weapons constraints; and (4) pursuing dialog on understanding the implications and dangers of AI for NC3 systems.</p> + +<p>Increased investment in new commercial and innovative technologies, such as crypto and blockchain technology, that could be applied to verification should also be prioritized.</p> + +<h4 id="conclusion-4">Conclusion</h4> + +<p>In conclusion, new threats are rapidly materializing, including the risk of rapid escalation to nuclear war, requiring that the United States adapt and evolve deterrence strategy and modernization requirements. Making changes on the margins of twentieth-century deterrence architecture, including adding more nuclear missiles, especially lower-yield weapons, will not make the United States safer and could exacerbate the risks of a nuclear arms race and lower the threshold for nuclear weapons use. The United States must expand its focus from a narrow emphasis on nuclear strategy and nuclear weapons to take advantage of new tools and U.S. innovation as part of its modernization plans. The United States urgently needs more resilient and agile architectures and platforms for deterrence stability and more agile acquisition processes that leverage private sector innovation. As the land of SpaceX and Google, the United States’ competitive edge must enhance strategic deterrence and prevent the risk of nuclear war in a two-peer environment.</p> -<p>There have been two turning points in the U.S. government’s sanctions against China’s semiconductor industry. The first turning point was the semiconductor sanctions against Huawei in 2020. After the enactment of the Export Control Reform Act and the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act in 2018, the United States focused its regulatory efforts on China’s information and communications technology industry. The main targets were two 5G-related companies, Huawei and ZTE. In May and August 2020, the United States imposed semiconductor sanctions as part of its crackdown on Huawei. The U.S. Foreign Direct Product Rule prohibited any company from producing and providing semiconductors designed by Huawei and its subsidiary HiSilicon. Samsung and TSMC, for example, were directly affected by this measure and stopped doing semiconductor business with Huawei. Huawei, which held the top spot in terms global smartphone market share in 2020, has since all but exited the smartphone market due to a lack of access to advanced semiconductors. This made the U.S. government realize that China’s weakness lies in the semiconductor sector. Since then, the U.S. government has tightened its grip on China’s semiconductor industry through its own export control regulations, including on the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) in 2020, supercomputing CPU developer Tianjin Phytium Information Technology in 2021, and Yangtze Memory Technologies (YMTC) and Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE) in 2022.</p> +<h3 id="the-challenges-of-deterrence-reassurance-and-stability-in-a-world-of-growing-nuclear-competition">The Challenges of Deterrence, Reassurance, and Stability in a World of Growing Nuclear Competition</h3> -<p>The second turning point was a July 2022 TechInsights analysis about SMIC’s production of 7 nm chips. The article reported that SMIC had broken through the 10 nm barrier by incorporating multi-patterning technology using only older-generation deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography equipment without using EUV equipment, which was already under export control. The U.S. government responded immediately. As testified by U.S. semiconductor equipment companies such as Applied Materials, LAM Research, and KLA, the U.S. government extended the existing export ban on manufacturing equipment related to sub-10-nm processes to sub-14 nm processes. The report also seems to have prompted the United States to abandon its previous strategy of maintaining a two-generation technology gap with China in semiconductors and instead think about widening the gap as much as possible. In August 2022, shortly after the news of SMIC’s breakthrough, President Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act into law. One month later, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan gave a speech in which he stated that, for some technologies the United States will no longer use sliding-scale dynamic controls but rather static controls that prevent China from acquiring technology beyond what it has already acquired.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="jon-wolfsthal">Jon Wolfsthal</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>While most of the U.S. actions have been aimed at stopping China from catching up in the advanced semiconductor technology, South Korean semiconductor factories in China have also been affected. For example, in 2019, the United States blocked China from importing ASML’s EUV lithography equipment, which is needed to manufacture advanced logic semiconductors below the 10-nm technology node. While the target was probably Chinese foundry SMIC, SK Hynix, which produces DRAM memory semiconductors in China, was also banned in November 2021 from importing the EUV equipment needed to manufacture next-generation DRAM.</p> +<p>The future challenge of managing the risks inherent in the existence and possession of nuclear weapons and in competition among multiple nuclear armed states will be more complicated than those of the recent past. In many ways, these risks will be more difficult to manage than those faced during the Cold War. Having not one but two nuclear peer competitors, along with a host of smaller nuclear possessor states, will pose new burdens and dangers for the United States and its allies. Yet, despite these risks, the basic concept for how one may use nuclear weapons to deter aggression (nuclear and otherwise) against the United States and its allies has not changed. To deter, one needs to be able to deny an adversary the thing they hope to gain through aggression or punish them so that the gains of an aggression are outweighed by the cost. Deterring means knowing what your adversary values, holding those things at risk, and making clear your ability and willingness to follow through on those threats. This was true even before nuclear weapons were invented.</p> -<p>In recent years, the intensity of U.S. checks against China in the semiconductor sector has increased. Such restrictions are no longer limited to 10 nm advanced semiconductors but are beginning to resemble broader sanctions. A prime example is the CHIPS and Science Act, which took effect in early August 2022. The new law aims to inject $52.7 billion into the domestic semiconductor industry to encourage companies to build and expand domestic manufacturing capacity, but one of its key provisions prohibits investments in China involving logic semiconductors below the 28 nm technology node for 10 years for companies that benefit from U.S.-government subsidies. In the memory sector, the March 2023 release of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for national security guardrails also prohibits investments in NAND memory above 128 layers and DRAM memory below 18 nm. In order to extend the investment restrictions to all future semiconductors, the United States also defined “semiconductors critical to national security” for the first time. This includes compound semiconductors, photonic semiconductors, and semiconductors for quantum communications. In summary, the U.S. measures appear to have been designed to allow China to grow to the level of technology it has achieved, but not beyond. The Chinese government strongly criticized the legislation, calling it a product of a “Cold War approach with a zero-sum mentality.”</p> +<p>Even sound deterrence policy comes with grave risks. Deterrence can fail — and can do so with global consequences. Thus, there is an inherent risk to over-relying on nuclear weapons for deterrence. Aside from the prospects that a country just gets it wrong or miscalculates, or a leader proves incapable of handling a crisis with rational precision, arms races are costly and pose significant risks through both escalation and misunderstandings. One country’s rational nuclear strategy can look highly threatening and destabilizing to another. Arms racing and instability also bring a greater pace of nuclear operations, which in turn increases the risk of nuclear accidents that can have unimaginable consequences. And managing relationships in a time of tension when nuclear weapons are a feature of state competition is inherently unpredictable. Every clash of forces has a nuclear tint and every confrontation can become a nuclear test of wills. Thus, the United States has a strong incentive as a status-quo power to avoid constructs that rely on matching both Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities at the same time as a recipe for stable deterrence. It does not appear strategically necessary, nor does it offer anything in terms of stability or broader security.</p> -<p>Another example is the United States’ use of multilateral platforms. The United States also utilizes the Wassenaar Arrangement to contain China. On August 12, 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added gallium oxide-diamond, used in ultra-wide bandgap semiconductors, and electronic CAD software for integrated circuit development to its list of export-controlled technologies. These technologies were included in the list agreed to at the December 2021 Wassenaar Arrangement meeting and are part of the U.S. strategic effort to contain China’s advances in semiconductor technology. In addition, the United States is seeking to designate advanced etching equipment needed to manufacture advanced NAND memory chips as a strategic item through the Wassenaar Arrangement. If this equipment is designated as an export control item, Samsung and SK Hynix, which produce NAND memory in China, could be severely impacted in their ability to produce next-generation products.</p> +<p>Put simply, ensuring credible deterrence of both Russia and China does not appear to require holding all Russian or Chinese nuclear weapons at risk simultaneously. Doing so may be useful for other purposes, such as nuclear war fighting, damage limitation, or alliance management (in some but not all cases). But unless there is evidence that Russia or China values its nuclear weapons more than other assets (such as regime survival, economic centers, and broader elements of state control), then holding Moscow and Beijing’s nuclear weapons at risk one for one is not needed for effective deterrence.</p> -<p>In addition, the Netherlands and Japan have announced that they will impose export controls on DUV-related equipment in 2023, following persuasive efforts by the United States. If the equipment and materials needed for the sub-28 nm process, including DUV equipment, cannot be easily procured in China, South Korean semiconductor companies will no longer be able to manufacture semiconductors in China.</p> +<p>While the need to match both states at once is in question, there is little doubt that U.S. allies will be looking to Washington for enhanced reassurances about the United States’ ability and commitment to protect them in this new, more complex environment. U.S. nuclear weapons and pledges to rely on nuclear use in the face of extreme threats will likely be part of any U.S. strategy. However, relying predominantly on additional U.S. nuclear capabilities to do so — either in increased numbers or type — will likely prove ineffective. Nuclear weapons reassurance has limits, especially when the main concern about the United States is focused on its willingness to provide defense, not its ability to do so. Put simply, a credibility problem cannot be solved only with capabilities. Thus, for both nuclear deterrence and reassurance purposes, investments in current and projected U.S. nuclear forces over the next few decades appear analytically sufficient, if not excessive.</p> -<h4 id="the-us-governments-technical-redline-south-koreas-perspectives-on-the-october-7-regulations">The U.S. Government’s Technical Redline: South Korea’s Perspectives on the October 7 Regulations</h4> +<p>Alliance management, including credible extended deterrence, has always relied on much more than nuclear weapons, or military forces overall. Deterrence is about both capabilities and commitment to act in the face of threats. The possible rise of a new near-peer competitor in China, combined with the continued dangers posed by a revanchist Russia, will demand more (politically and financially) from U.S. reassurance and alliance management strategy. If U.S. alliances are to continue to benefit both allied and U.S. security, the United States will need to do more to enhance its military and its non-military means of reassuring Washington’s allies of its willingness and capability to defend them. On the military side, these goals will require greater investments in conventional and non-conventional military capabilities — including cyber, space, intelligence, and command, control, and communications (C3) — and could create additional cost constraints on the U.S. defense budget, which is already rapidly approaching $1 trillion per year. And nuclear weapons will continue to be an important component in these efforts. However, it would be ineffective and counterproductive for the United States to rely predominantly on nuclear capabilities to address the requirements for extended deterrence, or indeed to depend solely on its military strength for allied management. The reality is that the United States relies more on its allies today than ever before for its economic, technical, political, and cultural strength. The United States and its allies have never been more reliant on each other, and the loss of any one major U.S. ally could irreparably damage the safety, security, and prosperity of the American people. This reality — U.S.-allied interdependence — should be a key part of U.S. alliance management strategy, especially for states who worry that the United States might abandon them in a crisis.</p> -<p><strong>1. How long can South Korea enjoy a reprieve from export controls?</strong></p> +<p>Lastly, the United States continues to have a strong continued incentive to reduce the role nuclear weapons play globally, to impose costs on states who seek to use their nuclear weapons for coercion or blackmail, and to prevent nuclear proliferation to both U.S. adversaries and allies. The growing emphasis on “responsible nuclear behavior” by the United States is a continued recognition of this reality. Both for hard self-interest and for the ways pursing a less nuclear world can enhance allied cohesion and cooperation and U.S. global leadership, continuing to champion the vision of disarmament and the near-term effort to prevent proliferation will continue to pay benefits for U.S. and allied security. That such efforts appear harder to achieve now than in the past should not, in itself, undermine the support for these important objectives.</p> -<p>Given that China (including Hong Kong) accounts for 60 percent of South Korea’s semiconductor exports each year, the most direct impact on the South Korean economy is the restrictions on the Chinese semiconductor industry announced by the BIS on October 7, 2022. This measure includes three main parts: new export controls targeting semiconductors of certain performance levels and supercomputers containing these chips; new controls targeting the activities of U.S. persons supporting China’s semiconductor development and equipment used to manufacture certain semiconductors; and measures to minimize the short-term disruptions of these measures on the supply chain.</p> +<p>The United States and its allies will continue to face military threats in the coming decades, and thus will rely on military means for defense and deterrence. For the foreseeable future, it is also clear that the country will rely on nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of U.S. security and of its extended deterrent commitments. But longer-term security will require far more than maintaining certain nuclear capabilities, and nuclear weapons may not be very well suited in scenarios where U.S. allies are uncertain, and U.S. adversaries undermine U.S. interests. For example, if and when the United States loses its conventional superiority in East Asia, the threat to use nuclear weapons to respond to nonnuclear scenarios may be seen as less credible to both adversaries and allies alike, regardless of how many nuclear weapons the United States possesses. Threats to escalate to the nuclear level against a nuclear armed opponent are harder to make credible. Thus, to enhance security, the United States and its allies and partners should sustain a broader set of military, economic, political, and diplomatic capabilities to ensure it retains the ability to deter adversary decision making and reassure partners in a variety of scenarios. At the same time, U.S. strategy should also remember that nuclear weapons can also work against U.S. and allied interests, and that proliferation can threaten U.S. military and technological superiority in a number of ways. One need to look no further than the way Russia has used nuclear threats to deter greater U.S. involvement in Ukraine to see that deterrence and coercion can work against U.S. and allied interests. As such, there remains a strong interest for the United States to reduce the global role played by nuclear weapons and to continue to slow or reverse their vertical and horizontal spread.</p> -<p>The United States was concerned that the measures could impact the global semiconductor supply chain by causing immediate production disruptions for companies producing semiconductors in China. As a result, foreign companies producing semiconductors in China — Samsung, SK Hynix, and TSMC — were granted a one-year reprieve to utilize U.S.-made equipment and U.S. technicians. In other words, how long South Korean companies can continue to operate semiconductor factories in China depends on how long they are able to get a reprieve from the October 7 regulations.</p> +<p>Thus, the needs of deterrence and nuclear reassurance need to be balanced against the risk that nuclear overreliance can create risks of escalation, pre-emption, crisis instability, and arms race instability. Nothing is cost-free. In addition, the extent to which the United States emphasizes its nuclear commitments to allies could further enhance domestic demands for independent nuclear capabilities if and when U.S. commitments are seen as being less credible. To the extent that these tools of nuclear reassurance further normalize nuclear reliance, U.S. efforts to reassure could erode norms against proliferation and nuclear possession.</p> -<p>Given that granting the exception was a temporary action, it is not surprising that it could end at any time. No one knows for sure, but the clue may be found in Section 5949 of the United States’ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023. This provision has two main parts. It prohibits certain Chinese semiconductor companies from participating in the U.S. government procurement market, and it also prohibits foreign companies whose products use certain Chinese chips as components from participating in the U.S. government procurement market. However, the timetable for implementation of these provisions offers a hint as to when exceptions to the October 7 regulations will end.</p> +<p>There are some who discount or reject the serious risks that come with reliance on nuclear deterrence. This stance belies the imperial evidence of near-misses, accidents, averted escalation, and the ever-present risk of miscalculation. These dangers were constant features of the Cold War, and historical research indicates that Soviet fear of U.S. superiority and aggression was a more dominant factor in the Soviet Union’s nuclear procurement than ambitions of territorial aggression. Thus, it remains important for the United States to continue to evaluate the missions assigned to nuclear weapons and consider reducing or replacing them with more credible and effective capabilities where practicable.</p> -<p>Section 5949 first requires the Federal Acquisition Security Council to submit recommendations to minimize supply chain risks applicable to federal government procurement of semiconductor products and services, as well as suggestions for regulations implementing the restrictions, for which it provides a two-year window. Then, within three years, specific regulations must be written to prohibit Chinese semiconductor companies from participating in U.S. government procurement markets, with implementation to begin five years later.</p> +<h4 id="background">Background</h4> -<p>In brief, whether and when the October 7 regulations are strictly enforced on South Korean fabs in China is likely to be tied to how the United States builds its diversification strategy and what specific rules it writes to reduce its dependence on China. In return, it will determine whether South Korean companies can continue to produce semiconductors in China. In the worst-case scenario, South Korea’s semiconductor fabs in China will be forced to exit the country in three to five years when they need to upgrade their equipment.</p> +<p>The United States maintains nuclear weapons to deter nuclear and other attacks on the United States and its friends and allies around the world. Should deterrence fail, the president has directed the U.S. military to be able to employ nuclear weapons in order to achieve certain outcomes. These deterrence goals can be broken down into three main components: core nuclear deterrence (deterring nuclear use against the United States), extended nuclear deterrence (deterring nuclear use against U.S. allies and partners), and what this paper refers to as “expanded” nuclear deterrence (deterring nonnuclear attacks against the United States and its allies and partners). Core deterrence — deterring nuclear attacks on the United States and its allies — is a widely accepted mission for nuclear weapons and has received sustained political and policy support in the United States. It has been highly credible for decades and mostly stable. Extended nuclear deterrence is also a long-standing and sustained U.S. policy and forms a key part of U.S. alliance commitments. Even so, there have always been questions about the credibility of these commitments. Pledging to risk yourself for another state is not a common act in geopolitical affairs. Yet extended deterrence is widely credited as having reduced, but not eliminated, the demand for independent nuclear capabilities among U.S. allies, a key benefit of U.S. alliance efforts over decades. A more nuclear world is a less stable one for all, especially the United States. The credibility of these extended deterrence commitments is a function of both U.S. capability and projected intent to follow through on pledges and legal obligations to protect allies. There are times when capability has been in doubt, just as there are times when intent has been seen as less dependable.</p> -<p><strong>2. Is the United States’ technical redline likely to change?</strong></p> +<p>The definition of expanded nuclear deterrence has changed over time but has predominantly focused on use of nuclear weapons to respond to large-scale conventional attacks (or other attacks) that threaten the existence of the United States or its allies that cannot be deterred or defeated solely through conventional and other means. The relative emphasis on this aspect of U.S. policy has ebbed and flowed over time and remains the subject of debate both among allies and inside U.S. policy circles. During the 1950s and 1960s, extended deterrence led the United States to deploy a wide variety of nuclear weapons in Europe and develop a nuclear ladder of escalation due to the perceived conventional inferiority to Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of both the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union saw Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton withdraw and destroy most U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons from around the world. As the perceived threat has changed, U.S. capabilities and deployment strategy have also changed.</p> -<p>South Korean companies are also interested in whether the U.S. technological redlines will change. As semiconductor technology advances, the definition of “high technology” changes. In fact, when the U.S. government enacted the CHIPS Act in August 2022, no memory-related technical redlines were announced, and in logic semiconductors alone, investments in Chinese production facilities below the 28-nm technology node are prohibited. On October 7, the BIS export control regulations set technical red lines for NAND memory above 128 layers, for DRAM below 18 nm, and for logic FinFET and GAAFET technologies.</p> +<p>Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has relied less on nuclear weapons, both because it has not needed to do so and because it recognized that doing so would increase the demand for nuclear weapons by some states, as well as their incentive to use weapons early. The threat to use nuclear weapons first has been less credible because it has been less necessary. But even when the perceived need was higher, there have always been questions about the willingness of a U.S. president to use nuclear weapons first (or at all) against a nuclear adversary to protect U.S. allies. The United States has never had to prove that it would trade Boston for Berlin, but there has never been an instance where U.S., European, and adversary leaders all believed the United States would take such a step with absolute certainty. For the most part, U.S. decisionmakers have preferred to leave these questions unanswered and have taken the lack of an attack against U.S. allies as evidence — in the absence of conclusive proof — that these threats are effective. That the threat was even remotely credible was seen as enough to justify its continuation.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sMUeBIM.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Technical Thresholds Released in Recent U.S. Acts and Regulations.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> +<p>While nuclear weapons clearly influence adversary and allied behavior, there has been an overconfidence in the role deterrent commitments have had over time and overreliance on nuclear weapons — particularly in the role of expanded nuclear deterrence — can be detrimental to U.S. security. It is understandable that the United States might seek to rely on nuclear weapons to counter larger conventional threats if it has no alternatives, yet doing so is less credible than conventional countermeasures and raises questions about credibility that can never be satisfied. And over time, U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons informs decisions by other states to increase their own nuclear and conventional military capabilities. It seems at least likely, if not probable, that China’s long-delayed decision to seek nuclear parity with the United States is driven by a desire to no longer be potentially vulnerable to coercion from expanded nuclear deterrence by Washington. The United States is already in an action-reaction cycle with China, just as it has been with Russia for decades. Ignoring this reality will make it much harder to find stable outcomes.</p> -<p>With the release of the CHIPS Act Notice of Funding Opportunity on February 28, 2023, it was confirmed that the definition of leading-edge tech eligible for priority grant funding will be different than the red lines in the October 7, 2022, export control regulations. NAND memory was set to be above 200 layers, DRAM memory was set to be 13 nm or less, and logic semiconductors was set to be less than 5 nm. Within the framework of U.S.-China strategic rivalry, this sparked optimism among South Korean companies on the potential revision of technological boundaries by the United States.</p> +<h4 id="bilateral-deterrence-vs-the-three-body-problem">Bilateral Deterrence vs. the “Three-Body Problem”</h4> -<p>However, on March 21, 2023, when the CHIPS Act’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the national security guardrails was released, the technical red lines were once again reaffirmed at the same technical level set on October 7, 2022. This was a clear confirmation that the United States currently has no plans to modify its technical thresholds aimed at curbing China’s semiconductor industry in the foreseeable future, which led to disappointment among South Korean companies.</p> +<p>U.S. nuclear forces will remain directly relevant to preventing nuclear attack by Russia, China, and North Korea. Understanding the nature of each adversary, identifying how they are likely to act in various situations, and being able to maintain the key tenets of deterrence through denial or punishment remain key parts of any U.S. nuclear strategy toward these states.</p> -<h4 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h4> +<p>However, due to the fallible nature of deterrence (it works until it fails) and the humanity-changing consequences of any future nuclear use, the United States should remain committed to and enhance its efforts to engage Russia, China, and North Korea to reduce the number of nuclear weapons all states possess as its works toward broader multilateral efforts to eliminate all nuclear weapons under effective verification. Nothing suggests this process will be easy or quick, but neither are the demands of deterrence and defense. But nuclear deterrence is an unstable and ultimately unreliable means to an end — security — and should not be seen as a means unto itself. Alternatives to permanent nuclear constructs must be part of a balanced approach to stability and security.</p> -<p>In general, South Korea holds a supportive stance regarding the United States’ approach to China’s semiconductor industry. Semiconductor technology lies at the core of advanced and emerging technologies that can be converted to military use. Therefore, South Korea aligns itself with the U.S. endeavors to restrict the transfer of semiconductor technology to countries of concern.</p> +<p>To date, U.S. nuclear strategy has focused predominately on deterring nuclear use by the Soviet Union, and later the Russian Federation. The focus on Russia was due to the global competition between these two states, Russia’s ability to threaten U.S. allies and trading partners, and the comparative size of their nuclear and other military capabilities. This size factor should not be discounted; in a world where the Soviet Union’s leaders viewed their nuclear-peer status as a key part of their global position, holding Soviet nuclear forces at risk developed into a key feature of deterrence. (They cared about them, so the United States held them at risk.)</p> -<p>However, the perception of threats to economic security varies by country. Especially in the case of the semiconductor industry, where a clear division of roles exists, countries’ economic security interests are bound to differ. In this regard, the United States, with its strength in design and equipment, and South Korea, with its strength in manufacturing, are bound to have different perspectives on semiconductor risk management.</p> +<p>Over time, deterrence efforts have expanded to include possible threats from China and more recently North Korea. However, due to the mismatch in defense, and particularly nuclear capabilities, between these states and the United States, successive U.S. presidents and their military and civilian advisers have agreed that the nuclear and conventional capabilities needed to address the potential threat from Moscow has been adequate to handle any realistic contingency from Beijing or Pyongyang. Also, while it is clear that North Korea’s leaders view their nuclear forces as keys to survival and power, nuclear weapons have not been seen as central to Chinese leaders’ status or control. The growth of China’s conventional and nuclear capabilities demands that the United States constantly reassess these conclusions, which could lead to new requirements. North Korea, even with its growing nuclear forces, will not be in a position to challenge the United States conventionally, so it poses a different kind of deterrent challenge beyond the scope of this paper.</p> -<p>In the short term, South Korean industry and policymakers broadly believe that the U.S. export control policies will delay the rise of Chinese semiconductor capabilities. For example, some analysts have reported that South Korea would have already been overtaken by China in the NAND memory sector without the recent U.S. export controls against China.</p> +<p>CHINA</p> -<p>However, South Korea also believes that if the current situation continues, companies will suffer greatly in the medium to long term. While South Korea and the United States share the same policy goals, it is more important for South Korea to consider China’s strategy since it is directly exposed to Chinese competition in the memory chip market. China will continue to pursue an import substitution strategy and will strategically use indigenous products if the technology gap between foreign and indigenous products is not large. Thus, South Korea needs to widen the technology gap to the point where China cannot substitute imports with indigenous semiconductors. This is exactly the same objective as the United States’ China strategy elaborated by National Security Advisor Sullivan. However, South Koreans are generally more concerned than Americans about losing a huge market that brings a steady cash flow that is also essential for R&amp;D.</p> +<p>There is mounting concern over China’s growing conventional and nuclear capabilities and its more assertive behavior in East Asia. It appears (and China’s lack of direct engagement and discussion leaves some motives to guesswork) that China has determined that possessing a larger nuclear force, perhaps even similar in size and composition to that of Russia or the United States, is required to assert a position of global power and influence. The growth in China’s forces has led some U.S. strategists to worry that the United States must increase its nuclear forces to maintain effective deterrence of Beijing and reassure nervous allies. However, the fundamental requirements for deterrence — the ability to hold what Chinese leaders value at risk or deny them the thing they may seek to achieve through means of force — do not change just because China has more nuclear weapons, unless, of course, the United States determines that nuclear weapons are what China values most and that each weapon must be held at risk to make deterrence credible. There are strong reasons to doubt that this is the case. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the United States will need to significantly alter its nuclear force structure to maintain effective nuclear and extended deterrence vis-à-vis China in the coming decade or beyond. Enhanced conventional investment to ensure China does not believe it can beat U.S. and allied forces is likely to be an even more relevant factor in stability and deterrence in East Asia. Of course, it should also not be taken for granted that what the United States has today will be enough to deter Chinese aggression in the future. Significant investments in both direct diplomacy and engagement with China are a must, as are greater investments in intelligence and analytic capabilities to understand Chinese thinking, behavior, and decisionmaking.</p> -<p>China (including Hong Kong) currently accounts for 60 percent of global semiconductor consumption. At the heart of this demand is the domestic electronic device manufacturing industry, which consumes most semiconductors. In this respect, neither the United States nor its allies can suddenly replace China. The United States has a number of world-class fabless companies, but China is ultimately the biggest consumer of the chips they sell. If China, which sees Western pressure as unfair, aggressively tries to replace its demand for semiconductors with homegrown semiconductors, companies such as Samsung and SK Hynix will not be able to secure stable cash flows, limiting their ability to invest in R&amp;D and to reorganize their supply chains. Although the United States, Europe, and Japan have announced plans to support these companies in their market, the loss of the Chinese market cannot be offset by such subsidies.</p> +<p>Why? Because deterrence is not static. Having high confidence in what U.S. adversaries care about and being able to credibly (both in terms of capability and intent) hold them at risk (deterrence by punishment) or deny them those things (deterrence by denial) are basic requirements of deterrence. Before spending hundreds of billions on nuclear weapons that may not add to deterrence, the United States would do better to spend the money needed to hire more Chinese language and military and economic experts who can help understand and interpret Chinese actions and intentions. There is currently a serious shortfall of experienced, trained, and informed analysts on nuclear deterrence, strategy, and stability issues. The community of experts is a fraction of what it was during the Cold War, and greater investments in this area are critically needed. There is and will be a continuing need to reevaluate the credibility of deterrence commitments (nuclear and nonnuclear) and to constantly reassess what adversaries value.</p> -<p>South Korea wants close policy coordination with the United States. If the U.S. government’s real goal is to get South Korean fabs out of China, the United States needs to support a gradual and managed exit while maintaining a certain level of sales in China. Exit planning needs to be a bilateral effort. It should be aligned with the U.S. and South Korean semiconductor strategies and be carefully prepared by calculating revenue flows over time as well as accounting for global semiconductor market shocks. Both countries should also plan how to support the industry in the event of Chinese retaliation during the exit process.</p> +<p>There is also today a tendency in the United States to assume that China will behave in ways similar to the Soviet Union in the Cold War. This forgets that the United States did not correctly assess Soviet actions or intentions then, that the two are very different states, and that the nature of the U.S. relationship with China today is very different from the U.S.-Soviet ties in the 1950s to 1980s. The United States and the Soviet Union had few economic or cultural ties, whereas the United States and China are economically interdependent and millions of Americans claim Chinese ancestry. The United States and the Soviet Union did not have any significant trade or technical interactions, and Europe had very little at all. By comparison, China, the United States, and Europe are all economically and financially interdependent, which increases the levers to influence policy and actions as well as the costs of conflict, competition, and war.</p> -<p>South Korea also prefers to keep its discussions with the United States low-key. Since semiconductor export controls are being used as a key tool in strategic competition, they can easily get into the spotlight and could be used in domestic politics in both the United States and South Korea. They should not be readily used to stir up unnecessary anti-Chinese sentiment without understanding the semiconductor industry. In terms of being unobtrusive, South Korea favors a solution that utilizes existing U.S. regulations rather than a newly created device. One such measure is the Validated End User list. However, many experts are skeptical that the list can fundamentally outpace the October 7 regulations.</p> +<p>RUSSIA</p> -<p>Interestingly, the United States’ use of excessive China containment measures has acted as an incentive for South Korea to join U.S.-led plurilateral frameworks such as FAB4 or any potential iteration of the multilateral semiconductor export control regime. South Korea believes that a forum such as FAB4, if properly utilized, can help moderate the level of U.S. containment of China and ultimately minimize damage to South Korean semiconductor companies. By participating as a key member of a group that brings together global semiconductor manufacturing powerhouses, South Korean input into important decisionmaking processes can reduce uncertainty for the South Korean semiconductor industry.</p> +<p>Deterring Russian nuclear attack against the United States or its allies and partners remains a major U.S. objective, but one the United States understands well and remains highly capable of achieving. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that Russia remains highly deterred from taking action against the United States and its allies, and especially nuclear action. If one assumes that Russia leaders will remain rational, holding Russian nuclear forces and other means of military and state control at risk, combined with other non-nuclear means of state influence, should continue to be sufficient to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies. Moreover, while Russia is likely to value its nuclear forces more in the decades to come, especially now that its conventional forces have proven to be ineffective in Ukraine and elsewhere, it remains far from certain that Putin and Russian leaders value nuclear force above financial or other means of political and state control. As such, nuclear weapons will remain a part of but by no means the most important or most dominant feature of U.S. deterrence and reassurance strategy.</p> -<p>Following the release of the October 7 regulations, the United States accelerated discussions with the Netherlands and Japan to harmonize semiconductor equipment export control measures. In the first half of 2023, the Netherlands and Japan eventually tightened their semiconductor equipment export controls. South Korea, one of the countries most affected by the measures, was not included in the discussions and was left in the dark about what decisions were being made. This should never happen again. As a key stakeholder in the semiconductor supply chain, South Korea should participate in export control discussions from the outset. South Korea needs to reduce uncertainty by making and implementing decisions together with its key partners, protecting not only its own technology but also that of its partners.</p> +<p>Reassurance of U.S. allies in Europe in the face of a less stable and predictable Russia — especially one that is less invested in the global financial system and less interdependent with Europe — will remain a major U.S. political and strategic challenge. Since the invasion of Ukraine, however, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have responded remarkably well, with increased investments in European defense, the strongest U.S. leadership in NATO in a generation, and the enlargement of NATO to include Finland and soon Sweden, which both represent major additions to the ability of Europe to deter and respond to Russian aggression. These challenges will continue as long as Russia remains a non-status quo state and will require constant attention and political commitments from the United States. In addition, the United States has let much of its nuclear and Russian expertise erode over the past 30 years, and government investment in experts who understand nuclear weapons, stability, risk reduction, and negotiations as well as the Russian language and Russian economic and political factors is sorely needed. The United States’ overestimation of Russia’s conventional military capabilities, and indeed Putin’s flawed decisionmaking in deciding to invade Ukraine, demonstrates that the United States has gaps in its ability to accurately predict what Russia is and what it may do.</p> -<p>Simultaneously, South Korea should endeavor to ensure that the United States realizes that South Korean semiconductor firms in China solely produce memory chips, which are fundamentally different from logic chips. Logic semiconductors have both legacy and advanced semiconductors, and all of them are marketable depending on their usage. However, memory chips are not marketable unless they are advanced memory chips. If you cannot produce advanced memory in China, you cannot keep your factories operating in China. In addition, unlike most advanced logic semiconductors, such as AI chips, which are subject to export controls, the United States does not consider memory semiconductors to be subject to export controls. South Korea, however, will also have to think about how to fundamentally address the concern of technology leakage of advanced equipment from fabs in China.</p> +<p>RUSSIA-CHINA COLLABORATION?</p> -<p>Again, policymakers need to think about why the semiconductor industry has become oligopolized. This phenomenon happened not only in the semiconductor manufacturing industry but also in the semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry and the semiconductor components and materials industry. The answer is simple. Recent technological development requires an astronomical investment of money, and few companies can raise such funds. In other words, when seeking to widen the technology gap to guarantee a country’s advantage, securing a stable flow of funds is as crucial as preventing technology leakage. South Korea thinks a balanced approach is needed for the United States to succeed in its China policy. The core of the U.S. and South Korean strategy should be to widen the technology gap through a combination of export controls and utilization of the Chinese market. The widening of the technological gap must be accomplished simultaneously in two directions: by locking down Chinese capabilities and by developing advanced technologies. The United States should not only focus on export controls to close China’s semiconductor production capacity but also figure out how to capitalize on the Chinese market, the world’s largest consumer of semiconductors, at the same time. Now is the time to find a win-win strategy between the United States and South Korea based on an accurate understanding of the semiconductor industry. In particular, it is important to keep in mind that even the slightest policy failure is unforgivable, given the ongoing dynamics of U.S.-China strategic competition.</p> +<p>Deterring one state is hard. Deterring two states at the same time is even harder. But what about two states working in concert? The concern that Russia and China might somehow coordinate their nuclear attacks or threats is gaining attention in the U.S. nuclear community. Simply put, does the potential for collaboration between Moscow and Beijing extend so far that the United States must be prepared to fight two nuclear wars — one against Russia and another against China — at the same time?</p> -<h3 id="german-perspective">German Perspective</h3> +<p>There is no indication that the coordination of policy or closer relationship between Russia and China has developed into a full-fledged nuclear alliance. If there were credible and convincing evidence that Russia-China relationship had changed to such a degree that this were likely, then it could lead to a determination that the United States might have to match both Russia and China at the same times as part of a damage limitation or warfighting strategy. It is hard to overstate the global and strategic consequences of such a determination. Moreover, seeking to maintain dual parity with both countries could, in turn, lead Russia and China to each build up individually to restore their own parity with the United States — a cycle that could lead to a global arms race of unparalleled scope. However, as there is as yet no indication that the nature of the relationship between the two states is anywhere close to one that would involve joint nuclear war fighting, or indeed putting one state at risk for the benefit of the other. The relationship, as of today and for the foreseeable future, remains highly transactional. Any suggestions that the Russia-China relationship has evolved to this level requires the highest level of scrutiny both for its consequences but also for how it would go against many hundreds of years of political history between the two states.</p> -<p><em>A German Foreign Policy and Export Control Overhaul Is Underway</em></p> +<p>In sum, as indicated under President Biden, it would appear that the United States can deter nuclear use by Russia and China without needing to match the combined nuclear forces of each. Of course, a future president might determine that U.S. nuclear forces need to be configured in a way to hold all nuclear forces in both Russia and China at risk at the same time for other reasons. Those needs cannot be discounted, but that would be distinct from any deterrence requirements. The financial and security implications of having to match the nuclear arsenals of both countries at the same time would be significant, and any allied demands or presidential determination along those lines would have to be balanced against the financial and opportunity costs. Options for dealing with such requirements, including reducing reliance on land-based systems, increasing less vulnerable submarine-based nuclear options, and further enhancing nonnuclear options that can replace nuclear missions, would also have to be part of those deliberations. Likewise, to the extent that reassurance of allies is a major driving force in U.S. nuclear requirements, other factors, including economic, geopolitical, technical, and domestic political factors, must also be taken into account. It should be recognized within the nuclear security and deterrence communities that there is a limit to what can be accomplished by seeking to compensate for a lack of confidence in U.S. intent with enhanced nuclear capability.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="julian-ringhof-and-jan-peter-kleinhans">Julian Ringhof and Jan-Peter Kleinhans</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Reassuring of allies in a world with more than one nuclear peer will clearly be among the more difficult challenges for the United States. As relative U.S. power and influence wanes, the United States’ commitments to its allies will come increasingly into question. To address this, the United States must continue to encourage allies to take on a greater portion of conventional deterrence and defenses capabilities; improve alliance military integration and economic and diplomatic coordination; maintain unified policies designed to protect territorial integrity and the global rule of law; and develop more nuanced strategies for deterring key dangers without overextending U.S. capabilities. This is a tall order and goes well beyond nuclear strategy. The risk, however, is that in such an environment U.S. policymakers will assign to nuclear weapons more missions to which they are not well suited, enhancing the perceived value and utility of nuclear weapons.</p> -<p>German foreign policy is going through a sea change. As a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine and China’s rise and increasing political assertiveness, Germany is reconfiguring its security and economic policies toward de-risking its ties with autocratic states and closing the ranks with its democratic allies. Since the country’s semiconductor industry was hardly affected by the United States’ October 7 export controls, the measures have triggered little debate in Germany. Nevertheless, Germany’s export controls vis-à-vis China have already become more restrictive in recent years, and discussions on new approaches to German and European export controls are gaining momentum in Berlin and Brussels.</p> +<p>In an era where U.S. assurances are seen more skeptically, there will temptation for allies to pursue their own nuclear capabilities and for the United States to tolerate or even accept such trends. U.S. policy needs to anticipate this and develop more holistic approaches that discourage and increasingly stigmatize the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by more states, friends and foes alike. This requires the United States to invest more heavily in developing effective arms control strategies that consider trade-offs between categories of weapons — nuclear and nonnuclear — and set strategic priorities for negotiated agreements. Determining what the United States is trying to do (e.g., increase decision time, reduce the risk of battlefield nuclear use, and enhance crisis stability) and developing the means to verify commitments that can achieve those goals should be far higher priorities than they are today. This should include a willingness of the United States and its allies to more openly consider constraints on Western defense and nuclear capabilities if they can achieve valuable and verified constraints on the part of major adversaries. Just as arms control should not become a means unto itself, nuclear and conventional force modernization should not be an end, but a means to an end — achieving enhanced stability and security. Pursuing military capabilities without an integrated diplomatic and arms control strategy is a recipe for a never-ending arms race and crisis instability.</p> -<h4 id="germanys-ongoing-foreign-policy-rehaul-and-the-wandel-of-wandel-durch-handel">Germany’s Ongoing Foreign Policy Rehaul and the Wandel of Wandel durch Handel</h4> +<h4 id="force-structure-and-modernization">Force Structure and Modernization</h4> -<p>German foreign policy is going through a sea change — called a Zeitenwende by German chancellor Olaf Scholz in a February 2022 speech.</p> +<p>The nuclear triad is a misnomer. The United States currently maintains a nuclear pentad, with five distinct platforms for delivering nuclear weapons: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), air-launched cruise missiles, air-dropped gravity bombs on strategic bombers, and air dropped-gravity bombs on shorter-range fighter/bomber aircraft. All aspects of this pentad of nuclear delivery platforms are in the process of being replaced with modern versions with life-extended warheads and nuclear explosive packages.</p> -<p>The principal cause of this new era is the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine launched in 2022, which was a watershed moment for Germany in many ways. After decades of negligence, the war was a wake-up call for Germany to reinvest in its military and security partnerships. But beyond this remarkable shift in Germany’s defense policy, the outbreak of the war and Putin’s subsequent weaponization of Germany’s fossil-fuel dependency on Russia was also a reckoning for Germany’s perception of the interconnected relationship between its policies on economics, trade, foreign affairs, and national security.</p> +<p>This program is more than adequate to ensure the United States has a diverse and survivable nuclear force for core and extended nuclear deterrence for decades to come, assuming there is general consistency — as there has been for decades — in presidential employment guidance. Far more pressing are long overdue investments in nuclear command and control and early warning capabilities and efforts to carry out long-term warhead surveillance and nuclear infrastructure modernization to maintain the United States’ nuclear weapons. As long as the United States determines that it needs nuclear weapons for its defense and the defense of others, those weapons need to be safe, secure, and effective. Moreover, great efforts must continue to be made and enhanced to ensure that the United States can communicate with its allies and its adversaries in a crisis as needed and to ensure that nuclear weapons are only used when legally authorized by the commander in chief.</p> -<p>Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany’s foreign policy dogma involved inducing beneficial political change in authoritarian regimes through increased trade — Wandel durch Handel (“change through trade”).</p> +<p>There is little potential in today’s political and financial environment to debate the prospects for major changes in U.S. force structure. While adjustments to the forces may be made over time due to operational, cost, or technical factors (it is unlikely that the current program of record will come in anywhere close to on schedule or at estimated costs), the reality is the United States will likely continue to maintain all five current modes for nuclear employment. Those are more than sufficient to deter and, if necessary, carry out current or prospective U.S. presidential employment guidance. There are no compelling military or strategic rationales for pursuing other modes of employment, with a few exceptions discussed before on modernization. That being said, if there were a political opening to discuss strategic costs and benefits for U.S. force structure, there are strong arguments for the United States to move away from large silo-based ICBM forces, which risk creating escalatory pressures in a conflict, since these are easily targeted by an enemy and risk putting pressure on a U.S. president to use or lose these force in a crisis. Despite arguments from states that host ICBMs, these systems are the least stabilizing and most vulnerable part of the U.S. nuclear force.</p> -<p>After the invasion, a new foreign policy consensus emerged that this policy had not only failed, but backfired, threatening Germany’s own economic security and stability. German foreign minister Annalena Baerbok said in August 2022 that Germany “must put an end to the self-deception that we ever received cheap gas from Russia. . . . We paid for Moscow’s gas supply with security and independence,” (author’s translation).</p> +<p>It remains unclear whether the size of U.S. nuclear forces will need to change as China’s force grows. However, the capabilities the United States will need to have to reassure allies in East Asia remains a complex question. There is a strong numerical component to the perception that the United States is capable and prepared to protect U.S. allies in the face of a rising China. This is also the case vis-à-vis Russia. The question of “rough parity” may become more acute if and when China’s forces come within range of the United States’ deployed arsenal. However, this is not the case now, nor will it be for perhaps the next decade, with China having perhaps 400 total weapons to the United States’ 1,500 to 2,000 deployed nuclear weapons and just under 4,000 total weapons. Yet numbers may not resolve this debate. Already there are strong U.S. advocates for a new nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) in order to reassure allies. The United States retired the previous version of the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear in 2009. While it is understandable that analysts who want to reinforce U.S. alliances and reassure allies would seek a capability-based solution, there is a lack of a compelling military or force-exchange argument for these weapons. This is why the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the secretary of defense have advised the current administration not to pursue the SLCM-N. Instead, the main case for the SLCM-N rests on the argument that the United States must do something new to demonstrate its commitment to allies and its ability to act quickly in the region in the face of growing Chinese military capabilities.</p> -<p>The war and its economic ramifications have fueled a reconfiguration of Germany’s approach to the nexus between trade and security policy, driving efforts toward de-risking and diversifying Germany’s trade relationships, particularly vis-à-vis autocratic states. Moreover, the war also has showed that both the European Union and its democratic allies are more capable than expected of acting cooperatively and decisively during security crises. The allied response has also showed that Western economic and technological strongholds are key assets to degrading the economic and military capacity of an aggressor through decisive and coordinated sanctions.</p> +<p>In the absence of a clear military case for nuclear SCLMs, however, the United States should instead work with allies on a broader range of deterrence and reassurance options — nuclear and nonnuclear — to determine if other forms of reassurance may be equally or more credible than new nuclear weapons without the commensurate costs and risk associated with developing and deploying yet another new nuclear system. It is worth noting that U.S. allies will continue to ask for whatever options might be available for the United States, particularly if they do not have to pay for or face the consequences of those procurement decisions. To determine how valuable such systems might be for deterrence, it would be useful for U.S. allies to be asked to invest in the development and procurement of those systems to determine where they actually sit on these countries’ lists of defense priorities. There should be little debate that the United States should continue to work to reassure its allies. However, U.S. actors have a responsibility to understand that much of the doubt among U.S. allies comes not from the range of U.S. nuclear or conventional military capabilities, but due to domestic political and geostrategic factors. There would seem to be little the United States can do with a SLCM-N to address those doubts and concerns. For now, the United States seems to have found a mix of interoperability with Japan and enhanced nuclear communication and coordination with South Korea that may provide time for the United States and its allies to find more effective and less nuclear-focused options to enhance reassurance and defense.</p> -<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the most significant cause of new thinking in German foreign policy, but it is far from the only one. The Covid-19 pandemic revealed that a lack of resilience and diversity in key supply chains, such as medical products or semiconductors for Germany’s automotive industry, is a significant risk for economic and political stability. Additionally, the change in leadership in both Germany and the United States brought about a new era in U.S.-German relations. U.S.-German relations had suffered significantly during the Trump administration and were arguably at the lowest point in decades, but relations quickly improved once President Biden was elected. Even before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, there was clear rapprochement between Germany and the United States. The compromise over the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline, struck in July 2021, while Angela Merkel was still chancellor, was a clear signifier of improving U.S.-German ties.</p> +<p>Beyond deterrence and reassurance, it remains possible that a future U.S. president may determine that it is important for the United States to hold all Chinese nuclear forces at risk, for either force-exchange or nuclear war-fighting reasons. The determination of what U.S. nuclear weapons are for and when they might be used is exclusively the president’s decision. To prepare for this option, without having to pursue it prematurely, the United States should continue to invest in a flexible and responsive nuclear infrastructure. Investments to date have not been adequate, nor is the defense-industrial capacity in place to quickly and safely ensure the United States can respond to geopolitical developments. Instead, the United States has chosen to prioritize new delivery systems — a balance that risks leaving it with fewer deployed weapons than it might need as well as a less than responsive infrastructure. In short, there is not enough money, people, and capable companies to go around. At the same time, the need to upgrade U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (C3) systems remains both relevant and pressing. Instead of making nuclear planning decisions on the basis of numbers alone, the United States should adopt a nuclear strategy that ensures the survivability of forces, as well as the responsiveness of people and facilities, and invests needed resources in broader forms (mostly nonnuclear) of defense, deterrence, and reassurance. A wide variety of options for pursuing this exists.</p> -<p>However, from a German perspective, it is the Biden administration’s handling of Russia’s war and U.S. cooperation with Germany and key allies in response to the war that has had the most significant positive impact on U.S.-German relations. Close transatlantic cooperation in the development and enforcement of sanctions against Russia and Belarus, and even more importantly on weapons delivery to Ukraine, has fueled the rebuilding of trust and close cooperation.</p> +<p>In short, the United States, for now and the foreseeable future, has a nuclear force capable of deterring China and reassuring allies, but over time this may not be true and should be routinely reassessed. The balance that needs to be struck cannot be defined now but should include a healthy dose of skepticism regarding the role that enhanced capabilities (especially nuclear) can provide, instead relying on a more tailored and nuanced set of defense, deterrence, and reassurance strategies.</p> -<p>In particular, the German government appreciates that the Biden administration has avoided public criticism of German decisions and has given Berlin some room for maneuvering even when decisions have been controversial and may have affected the United States, including Scholz’s reluctance to deliver Leopard tanks to Ukraine unless the United States similarly contributed Abrams tanks. Meanwhile, there is strong alignment on key security topics such as the conditions and timeline for Ukraine’s NATO accession. Although there is some fundamental skepticism toward certain U.S. hegemonic policies, as well as a residual level of distrust toward the United States across several parties and at the working level in German ministries, the U.S.-German relationship is arguably in the best shape of all of Germany’s key relationships with allies at the moment. And crucially, beyond improved trust and closer cooperation on European security matters, there are also clear signs of greater alignment regarding China policies, exemplified by Germany’s increasing military presence in the Indo-Pacific announced in June 2023 by German defense minister Boris Pistorius. More importantly, Germany’s first China strategy, published in July 2023, shows a clear shift in Germany’s China policy and a clear positioning of Germany on the U.S. side in the U.S.-China rivalry. The policy states that, “Germany’s security is founded on . . . the further strengthening of the transatlantic alliance . . . and our close partnership, based on mutual trust, with the United States. China’s antagonistic relationship with the United States runs counter to these interests.”</p> +<p>It also remains important to keep in mind the significant expense associated with nuclear modernization. While a price tag of some $50 billion a year is small compared with an overall defense budget rapidly approaching $1 trillion per year, the long-term sustainability of such a program over the next 30 years — especially given the likelihood of cost overruns and project delays — cannot be assumed. There is renewed evidence that, in fact, the cost of U.S. nuclear modernization does compete with other defense priorities and obligations. The pronounced necessity for the United States to provide cluster munitions to Ukraine due to an acute shortage of even basic 155 mm artillery shells shows that U.S. defense investments may need to be dramatically realigned given actual defense conditions globally. The costs of nuclear weapons must also be considered, as voices within the U.S. domestic political scene call increasingly for the government to do less abroad and more at home, calls that stem from both the conservative and progressive sides of the political spectrum. It is just as common to hear unilateralist Republicans call for more fire stations at home as it is to hear similar statements from extremely progressive voices, echoing the old “guns versus butter” debate. Supporters of the nuclear modernization program like to point to what they call a consensus for nuclear modernization, but there remains a real prospect that this “consensus” is fragile, as it exists inside a very narrow band and can change rapidly. Should support for nuclear programs change, three options in particular should be considered:</p> -<p>Germany’s view on China, also long characterized by the Wandel durch Handel dogma under various Merkel governments, had already evolved toward greater skepticism during the later parts of Merkel’s reign. The Chinese acquisition of German robotics leader Kuka in 2015 led to growing awareness and concerns in German politics about Beijing’s ambitions to become the global powerhouse of future technologies. As a result, Berlin pushed the European Commission to launch an EU-wide investment screening mechanism, which was then introduced in the European Union in 2019. Also in 2019, the Federation of German Industries called upon Germany and the European Union “to counter problems with the state-dominated Chinese economy” and first coined the language that China represented both “a partner and systemic competitor” to Germany and Europe.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Reduce the ICBM buy and consider multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs). It remains unclear why the United States needs to maintain 450 ICBM silos from a deterrence perspective. The idea that a widely dispersed set of ICBMs complicates targeting by an adversary is not unreasonable, but the distinction between 300 and 450 seems far from critical in this case. Moreover, unlike in the Cold War, it is not credible to be concerned that the difference between 300 and 450 aim points will prove a tipping point for a state in deciding whether or not to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike.</p> -<p>This concept, that China is at once partner, competitor, and systemic rival, then featured centrally in the European Commission’s strategic outlook on China in 2019 and became an EU mantra for engaging with China. And although Merkel still pushed through an EU principle agreement on investment with China — the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) — at the end of 2020, despite wide criticism including from the Biden administration, the CAI’s ratification was put on immediate hold as part of the Scholz government’s coalition agreement. As a result, increasingly difficult conditions for German companies in China, Beijing’s greater assertiveness in foreign and trade policy — including economic coercion against Lithuania in 2021 — and the change in German government in 2021 have led to significant changes in Germany’s views of and policy toward China, culminating in the Scholz government’s China strategy.</p> + <p>Moreover, the impetus for moving to single-warhead ICBMs was part of a negotiating process with Russia that sought to reduce its reliance on MIRVed ICBMs. That decision has already been made, and Russia has invested heavily in and is deploying such weapons. While it would be more stabilizing in a crisis for both the United States and Russia to have ICBMs with single reentry vehicles, the importance of doing so is no longer as relevant as it was in the 1990s when the concept was developed. Thus, the United States should consider the option of deploying fewer ICBMs and equipping some with multiple reentry vehicles. A reasonable option could be 300 ICBMs with some combination of one or two reentry vehicles. This option may prove valuable if ICBM production is affected by challenges such as slipping timelines or cost increases.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Invest in mobile ICBMs. If the United States plans to continue to consider its nuclear forces as retaliatory and wants to ensure their ability to survive a first strike, the option of mobility should be considered. If cost is not an issue, then there is all the more reason to consider whether the United States should pursue a mobile ICBM program instead of or as a partial replacement for the planned ICBM modernization program. Systems could be kept in bastions during normal times and scrambled as a signal in times of crisis. Such system could be far more survivable than fixed ICBMs. The cost implications are not insignificant and should be studied. This is also an important issue in the highly unlikely but not fully dismissible case that U.S. ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) become more vulnerable due to advances in anti-submarine warfare capabilities enhanced by underwater drones and artificial intelligence. Mobility and survivability for U.S. ICBMs would seem to be justified and are worth considering, especially if they could result in a smaller production run for missiles.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Consider expanded Columbia-class submarine buys in lieu of ICBM construction. U.S. submarines remain highly survivable and critical elements for deterrence. They are more stabilizing than ICBMs because they are hard to target and do not need to be used early in a conflict. As the U.S. need to reassure allies increases, there may be a greater need to enable port visits for U.S. SSBNs to U.S. allies. In a future where U.S. requirements for deterrence or reassurance increase, building a larger SLBM force — with equal or reduced loading of weapons — may make sense.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>The China strategy clearly spells out, for the first time, many of the risks China and its policies pose to Germany’s security and economic development, as well as the global order. It emphasizes that although the German-Sino relationship remains a combination of partnership, competition, and systemic rivalry, “China’s conduct and decisions have caused the elements of rivalry and competition in our relations to increase in recent years.” It is hence the stated goal of the Scholz government to de-risk and diversify from China in critical areas and to work together closely within the European Union and with allies to foster innovation and strengthen supply chains in key technologies, protect critical infrastructure, and prevent the drain of security and human rights–sensitive technologies to China. Green technologies, telecommunications, semiconductors, and artificial intelligence (AI) are specifically mentioned.</p> +<p>Overall, the United States should prioritize, to the extent that such trade-offs prove necessary, its submarine and bomber development programs and stockpile stewardship and surveillance programs over the ICBM modernization effort. ICBMs remain the most vulnerable and arguably the least stabilizing leg of the nuclear force structure, and their reduction and even elimination would not inherently undermine U.S. deterrence goals, depending on broader employment guidance and geopolitical circumstances. There also remain questions about the eventual scope of the B-21 bomber acquisition program. There are hopes that this effort will not replicate the B-2 effort that sought to purchase 100 bombers and ended with only one-fifth of that fleet, but the significant costs of the program suggest that there remain long-term obstacles to the program reaching its full size.</p> -<h4 id="germanys-export-control-policy-to-date-semi-restrictive-multilateralist-and-human-centered">Germany’s Export Control Policy to Date: Semi-restrictive, Multilateralist, and Human-Centered</h4> +<p>Also, the United States should avoid the tendency to develop nuclear weapons systems solely as part of either an arms control or reassurance strategy. The temptation to develop a SLCM-N in order to provide enhanced assurance to East Asian allies in ineffective, counterproductive, and anachronistic. Dubbed “shiny object reassurance,” the idea that the deterrence credibility of the United States is significantly enhanced if it buys a dedicated nuclear system for the protection of allies lacks evidence and does not withstand serious scrutiny.</p> -<p>Germany’s export control policy has for a long time been somewhat particular. For historic reasons, weapons exports generally, similar to the defense industry, have been perceived rather critically by broad parts of the German population and across most political parties. This is particularly true for the parties left of center, such as the Social Democratic Party, the Greens, and the Left. Accordingly, German export control policy with regards to conventional weapons exports has been comparatively restrictive for decades. Germany’s export control policy has been closely anchored in the four multilateral regimes as a result, whereby Germany has — according to officials — often pushed for new listings and advocated for broadening the membership of multilateral regimes, such as India joining the Wassenaar Arrangement in 2017.</p> +<p>As the United States pursues nuclear modernization, it is critical that U.S. nuclear policy and investments not be made in a vacuum or in isolation from other critical components of U.S. military and diplomatic strategy. The Biden administration’s decision to approach the Nuclear Posture Review and National Defense Strategy as a cohesive process was a step in the right direction, but it still drew upon stovepipes within the nuclear process to inform its policies. Instead, a broader frame is needed for future strategic planning. As the United States pursues these strategies, there are certain guidelines that should be followed, including investments in three key areas:</p> -<p>As noted in Germany’s China strategy, the German government generally has interpreted the EU arms embargo against China strictly and will continue to do so. The embargo has been in place since 1989 as a result of the violent suppression of protests in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. As a result, conventional weapons exports from Germany to China have been largely restricted for decades and will certainly not become less restrictive under the current Scholz government. But in recent years, beyond conventional weapons exports, exports of dual-use items to China have also become more restricted. According to private sector representatives, licensing applications for dual-use exports to China are being scrutinized more closely by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, and fewer licenses are being granted. German officials interviewed for this project confirmed that German dual-use export control policy toward China has become more restrictive since 2018.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Ensure the integrated foundations of deterrence. The key to a stable deterrent dynamic is ensuring the combined capabilities of the United States and its allies conventional and nonnuclear, nonconventional capabilities (e.g., space, cyber, AI, and non-kinetic), and political strategies are sufficient to deny China (and to a lesser extent Russia) the ability to unilaterally undermine the security of U.S. allies and partners without facing significant consequences that put the success of any such attack in doubt.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Enhance U.S. intelligence and broader analytical understanding of Russian and Chinese goals, objectives, and priorities to inform both U.S. deterrence and diplomatic strategy. If the goal of U.S. nuclear forces is to, inter alia, hold key targets that Russia and China value at risk, then it needs to have high confidence that it knows what those military targets are and the ability to put them at risk through a variety of means. It remains far from certain that either state (especially China) views its strategic nuclear assets as among its most valued targets.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Enhance the ability of the United States to use nonnuclear and nonmilitary means to influence Russian and Chinese behavior and actions. There are far more opportunities to influence China, given that it is far more economically integrated into the world system now than the Soviet Union was during the Cold War. These opportunities should be emphasized, and a broader deterrence and influence strategy should be developed to lessen the need to rely on either conventional or nuclear response options.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>This more restrictive policy is the result of increasing concern regarding German dual-use exports directly contributing to China’s military modernization or to infringements on human rights due to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) increasing assertiveness internationally and domestic backsliding on civil and political rights. Unlike the October 7 measures, this change toward a more restrictive export control policy vis-à-vis China should therefore not be viewed as a strategic shift toward slowing down China’s ability to develop foundational technologies, but rather as an effort to narrowly prevent very concrete contributions to further military rearmament or internal oppression.</p> +<h4 id="extended-deterrence-and-assurance-3">Extended Deterrence and Assurance</h4> -<p>Germany currently maintains a very narrow national control list of around 20 dual-use technologies that are not listed multilaterally — and hence not on the common European list — and is generally opposed to unilateral measures, including by the United States. This is in part because Germany believes such unilateral measures are ineffective in the long run and finds most of these measures in violation of international trade law. But it is also because Germany is concerned with how such measures may be perceived by third countries. For Germany, one of the key values of adhering closely to multilateral agreements and export control lists, rather than implementing national or minilateral measures, is the legitimacy multilaterally agreed restrictions have in countries that are not members of these regimes. There remains great concern in the current German government that new unilateral or minilateral measures would feed into the narrative spun by China that the West is seeking to contain the technological development of developing countries through export restrictions. Given the importance the Scholz government has attributed to working more closely with countries in the Global South, and avoiding any further alienation, any non-multilateral export control measures aimed at China must be weighed carefully against the damage such measures may have on relations with developing countries.</p> +<p>As discussed above, the United States should seek to sustain its core and extended nuclear deterrence commitments and capabilities. Doing so enhances U.S. and allied security and supports broader goals of preventing nuclear proliferation. Core nuclear and extended nuclear deterrence are seen as credible and stabilizing in normal times and as long as broader deterrence holds.</p> -<h4 id="germanys-role-in-the-semiconductor-supply-chain-chips-for-das-auto-and-supplying-the-suppliers">Germany’s Role in the Semiconductor Supply Chain: Chips for Das Auto and Supplying the Suppliers</h4> +<p>The effort to use nuclear weapons to deter nonnuclear threats by nuclear-armed states, however, especially against allies, is seen by many as less credible and creates certain risks, including what is widely known as a commitment trap. By saying that the United States might be willing to use nuclear weapons in certain scenarios, the pressure to follow through on those pledges if those circumstances come to pass is significant. The long-standing debate over the value of trying to deter nonnuclear threats through the use of nuclear weapons is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon. While it remains possible that a stated willingness to use nuclear weapons first in certain nonnuclear scenarios may influence a nuclear-armed adversary’s course of action, U.S. policies that include options for first use can also make it more politically acceptable for U.S. adversaries to do the same (see Russian threats and justifications as one example). It is hard to determine the net effect of first-use options by the United States, but it would seem useful to consider not only whether ambiguity or possible first-use options might contribute to deterrence but also look at broader secondary and follow-on effects and how they impact U.S. security objectives. And as discussed above, determining on balance if the costs of such commitments are worth the benefits relies on subjective analysis. There is no question that allies want the United States to be ready and to project a willingness to use nuclear weapons early in a crisis. The maintenance of first-use options is driven mainly by a strong set of allied views that the adoption of more restrictive declaratory policies would undermine the goal of deterrence. Allied views on such issues were formed largely during the Cold War, based mainly on a logic that nuclear use would ensure the conflict is between the United States and its opponent and not fought only on allied territory. This logic still holds for many supporters of the status quo. That desire needs to be balanced against the very real evidence that being willing to resort to early and first use may have negative implications for crisis stability and arms racing, especially when combined with missile defenses and other strategic nonnuclear capabilities. Just as allied views need to be taken into account for many security issues, they should not be seen as absolute, as in the case of the decision to provide cluster munitions to Ukraine.</p> -<p>Germany’s semiconductor industry is one of the largest in Europe. It is also home to the largest regional cluster in Europe, dubbed “Silicon Saxony.” Below is a brief overview of companies headquartered in Germany that are active in the semiconductor value chain.</p> +<p>What is clear is that there is no one-size-fits-all policy for providing assurances to allies and partners. Just as the United States has pursued tailored deterrence with regards to its adversaries, it must pursue tailored and expanded reassurance with regards to its allies, and this must include more than just nuclear or military components. An enhanced set of reassurance initiatives that focus on economic, political, technical, cultural, people-to-people, and other ties is critical to reinforcing extended reassurance in the coming decades. Moreover, in the defense and security spaces, it is clear that what works in Japan, as evidenced by their newly adopted defense policy and expanded conventional, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and space investments, may not be as effective in South Korea, and vice versa.</p> -<p><strong>Semiconductor Suppliers:</strong> Infineon, Germany’s largest integrated device manufacturer (IDM) and semiconductor supplier, focuses mainly on power semiconductors, microcontrollers, and analog chips. It is among the leading automotive chip suppliers globally. Another example of a semiconductor supplier is Bosch, which focuses on automotive chips, sensors, and micro-electromechanical systems. Beyond these two companies, Germany’s semiconductor supplier ecosystem is dominated by smaller players, such as Elmos (automotive chips) and Semikron Danfoss (power semiconductors), among others. Similar to their peers in the United States, Japan, and other European member states, many German IDMs follow a “fab-lite” business model, outsourcing wafer fabrication for some types of chips (such as microcontrollers) to foundries, such as the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), while producing other chip types in house. This also explains why TSMC’s investment in Germany is backed by Infineon, Bosch, and Dutch semiconductor designer and manufacturer NXP — all of which are already customers of the Taiwanese contract manufacturer. Importantly, German semiconductor suppliers are not active in memory chips or most types of processors, such as for smartphones, laptops, servers, or machine learning. This is also reflected in Germany’s foundry ecosystem that, beyond U.S.-headquartered Globalfoundries in Dresden, consists of smaller specialty foundries, such as X-Fab and UMS.</p> +<p>Given the trajectory of Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear and other defense capabilities, the United States should be guided by three main objectives in managing its alliance relationships:</p> -<p><strong>Equipment Suppliers:</strong> With companies such as Aixtron, AP&amp;S, SÜSS MicroTec, and Zeiss, Germany is home to several semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) suppliers for wafer and photomask fabrication as well as back-end manufacturing (assembly, test, and packaging). While German SME suppliers do not have the same scale as some foreign firms, such as Dutch company ASML, Japan’s Tokyo Electron, or the United States’ Applied Materials, they still control a market-leading position in certain segments of the SME market: Aixtron is a leading supplier of deposition equipment for power semiconductors and LEDs; Zeiss has a leading position in photomask inspection, metrology, and repair equipment; and ERS Electronic, whose acquisition by a Chinese investor was blocked by the German government in 2022, is a leading supplier of wafer bonding solutions.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Strengthen the credibility of core and extended nuclear deterrence;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Enhance nonnuclear defense and deterrence capabilities through greater investments, integration, and cooperation with and among allies (U.S.-Japan defense planning offer an attractive model); and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Reduce, to the extent possible, the role of nuclear weapons in deterring nonnuclear threats and reinforce the barriers to acquisition of nuclear weapons or nuclear latency by allies.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p><strong>Component Suppliers:</strong> One of the strong suites of Germany’s semiconductor ecosystem is equipment component suppliers — companies that develop parts, subsystems, and components for SME suppliers and fabs. Some of the more well-known examples include Zeiss developing and manufacturing the projection optics for ASML’s lithography machines and Trumpf supplying the laser for ASML’s extreme ultra-violet (EUV) lithography machines. But beyond these often-cited examples are many smaller, lesser-known German component suppliers with strong market positions in their respective niches. Examples include Berliner Glas (acquired by ASML), Feinmetall, FITOK, Jenoptik, Nynomic, Physik Instrumente, Pink, and Pfeiffer Vacuum, among others, often with substantial business in China.</p> +<p>This last point remains critical. With a few exceptions in the 1950s and 1960s, the United States has remained committed to a basic axiom that the consequences of more countries acquiring nuclear weapons are negative for U.S. and global security and stability. Proliferation increases the risk of nuclear use, theft, and broader proliferation. All of these make it harder to maintain U.S. power and influence and the stability that has brought with it unparalleled American prosperity. The temptation to accept the acquisition of nuclear weapons by U.S. friends and allies is a siren song that should be resisted at all costs.</p> -<p><strong>Chemical, Material, and Wafer Suppliers:</strong> Because of its long history in chemistry and materials sciences, Germany is also home to large semiconductor-grade chemical suppliers, such as Merck KGaA, BASF, and Wacker Chemie. German Siltronic is among the leading silicon wafer suppliers globally; its planned acquisition by Taiwanese competitor Globalwafers was denied by the German government in 2022.</p> +<p>It is appropriate for arms control to be considered in the context of broader deterrence and allied management policy. NATO itself has integrated deterrence and arms control as integral components of security for the alliance. The same concept holds true for U.S. allies in East Asia, as well as for U.S. security on its own.</p> -<h4 id="impact-of-october-7-on-germany-a-near-miss">Impact of October 7 on Germany: A Near Miss</h4> +<h4 id="arms-control-2">Arms Control</h4> -<p>The impact of the October 7 controls on Germany’s semiconductor industry was rather limited, mainly for three reasons.</p> +<p>It is commonly stated today that arms control is either a policy of the past or that arms control is not possible without willing partners. Rumors of arms control’s demise remain premature, but it is accurate that effective arms control agreements are not possible without willing partners. That does not mean the work of thinking about, planning for, and pursuing arms control begins only when another country decides it is ready to talk. The United States continues to have a strategic incentive to develop and pursue policies that reduce the role of nuclear weapons in ways that enhance U.S. and allied security, predictability, and stability. Being committed to nuclear engagement and arms control shows the rest of the world, and importantly U.S. allies, that it is taking a balanced approach to security and threat management. Support for arms control has been and remains a valuable component of alliance management strategy. While defense procurements and deployments, as well as changes in policy, can influence alliance management and deterrent policies, arms control strategies and approaches can as well, including ones that help shape the strategic political and diplomatic landscape. By demonstrating over and over that the United States is the one interested in pursuing practical and serious arms control efforts to reduce nuclear risks and pursue reductions, it can either convince Russia and China to engage or demonstrate that it is Moscow and Beijing, not Washington, that is the obstacle to progress. Both goals are in the U.S. and allied interest. This approach is also a key component in demonstrating what the United States now calls “responsible nuclear behavior,” with important implications for its global diplomatic strategy.</p> -<p>First, as mentioned before, German semiconductor suppliers are not producing high-performance processors nor the AI accelerators that were impacted by the U.S. controls (if the German supplier also has U.S. content in their products). As an example, the U.S. export controls were not even discussed in Infineon’s investor call on November 16, 2022.</p> +<p>The United States must remain active in developing bilateral and multilateral strategies for how arms control can enhance U.S. and allied security, alliance management, and deterrence. This includes doing complicated analysis on what adjustments the United States and its allies would be prepared to make in order to find agreement with Russia or China, for example, on changes to their military capabilities. Knowing what the United States would want Russia and China do to, and for what purpose as part of constraint agreements, is a key component, currently lacking from U.S. strategy. This was the type of net assessment that was inherent in the negotiation and adoption of the U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile, Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty (SALT) I, and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces agreements.</p> -<p>Second, German chemical and material suppliers were largely unaffected because the controls did not extend to these technologies. As an example, German wafer supplier Siltronic stated in its investor call on October 28, 2022, that it “studied the new U.S. export rules and the impact to [their] China activities in great detail” and emerged “without any negative implications.”</p> +<p>In order to develop and shape the diplomatic landscape for future arms control with Russia and China, the United States and its allies should:</p> -<p>Third, while there was the potential for some impact on German equipment and component suppliers, this was quite limited — especially in comparison to their Dutch peers, such as ASM International. This is partially because the types of equipment or components produced by these companies are not addressed by the controls or because these companies’ production and research takes place outside of the United States. As an example, Aixtron — one of Germany’s largest SME suppliers by revenue — stated in its investor call on October 27, 2022:</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>seek concepts that make nuclear weapons use less likely and less acceptable;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>enhance decision times for leaders on all aides;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>find ways to reduce the possible incentives for states to use nuclear weapons easily in a crisis or under threat of nuclear attack;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>create predictability in nuclear force structure changes that can reduce the pressure to pursue worst- case planning on all sides;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>ensure that arms control and reduction requirements are factored into procurement and modernization decisions (contract adjustments that include opt-outs for procurement by the Department of Defense and National Nuclear Security Administration);</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>do not pursue modernization to enhance arms control prospects. Be prepared to adjust modernization efforts as part of negotiated agreements or new arrangements if possible, and develop and pursue proposals for them before modernization programs come to an end; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>pursue broader public diplomacy efforts to demonstrate that the United States is seeking stability and security through arms control as well as defense and modernization efforts.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<blockquote> - <p>. . . our market segment of [metal organic chemical vapor deposition] tools for compound semiconductors is not affected [by the U.S. controls]. Even if we were a U.S.-based company, we would not be affected by these rules. We have also checked that none of our active customers are on the expanded entity list. Furthermore, we do not expect negative implications on our supply chain for U.S. based parts, some of which we are using in our tools. Overall, we do not expect that this has an impact on our business behavior.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Based on current trends, it will be exceedingly hard for the United States to negotiate and adopt legally binding agreements with Russia that limit the size of each country’s strategic nuclear forces for several years. Likewise, China’s refusal to engage in direct strategic stability discussions with the United States suggests that any such efforts with Beijing will take longer to achieve. It may be possible that China will refuse any such engagement until its modernization efforts reach a level that gives Beijing confidence that it is able to maintain a fully survivable retaliatory capability that can withstand U.S. attack and U.S. and allies middle defense efforts.</p> -<p>In essence, while German companies, especially the ones with production or research and development in the United States, were certainly scrambling to understand the potential impact of U.S. controls, there has not been a lot of impact so far, particularly compared to South Korean memory chip suppliers or Japanese and Dutch equipment suppliers.</p> +<p>In this environment, the United States and its allies should pursue two strategies. The first is to be prepared to pursue arms control negotiations and reductions with either or both states if and when possible. This means investing in the people, technologies, and analysis to support rapid restart of arms control if and when geostrategic circumstances allow. The United States was not properly organized and prepared in the 1980s and 1990s when negotiating opportunities presented themselves, and any potential future capability gaps should be avoided. National and regional circumstances can change without warning, and the United States needs to be prepared to respond quickly on complicated diplomatic issues in the same way it seeks the ability to be able to respond to unpredictable military developments. The United States should be prepared to lead in these efforts and, even if not convinced that U.S. and allied adversaries will follow suit, should consider steps that do not significantly compromise U.S. and allied security in order to create global political and other pressure on adversaries in other ways. A prime example is the issue of transparency, where the United States can continue to demonstrate its commitment to predictability by sharing the size and general disposition of its nuclear forces and contrast its behavior with that of China and Russia, who refuse even the most basic steps toward predictability and transparency. Other steps, such as the anti-satellite direct ascent policy, offer examples where the United States loses little but can use the moral and political upper hand to contrast behavior among nuclear states.</p> -<h4 id="deafening-silence-reactions-to-october-7-by-policymakers-and-businesses">Deafening Silence: Reactions to October 7 by Policymakers and Businesses</h4> +<p>The development of serious, strategic, and viable arms control initiatives requires a whole-of-government effort within the United States. However, the knowledge and skill sets needed to develop, assess, and pursue such programs are in short supply. The retirement of an entire generation of U.S. experts and officials who pursued and implemented arms control in in the late twentieth-century means that the U.S. government and security community lack the necessary skills and experience to effectively pursue constructive arms control. Likewise, the political space to consider or even propose legal agreements to enhance U.S. security with Russia and China is hard to find. The political environment for restraint has always been hard, but the domestic political landscape has made it — and indeed many things that could benefit U.S. security — harder to pursue. The political will to pursue a balanced approach to security will clearly involve defense and deterrent investments, but the United States should also make investments in the ability to understand Russian and Chinese thinking and strategy, develop effective verification approaches, and pursue coordinated diplomatic strategies to achieve effective outcomes, whether normative, legal, or otherwise.</p> -<p>Because most of Germany’s semiconductor technology suppliers were not directly or substantially impacted by the U.S. controls and the subsequent and complementary measures by the Netherlands and Japan, public reactions from policymakers, businesses, and industry associations as well as from think tanks have been almost nonexistent.</p> +<p>At a time when the United States is spending $50 billion per year on nuclear weapons alone, not including associated strategic programs, the investment in the future people, skills, technology, and analytical capacity needed in the sphere is unfathomably small. This mismatch will create a self-fulfilling policy outcome, where every problem has a nuclear solution but the ability to pursue offramps to arms race instability and de-escalation approaches has disappeared or largely atrophied. Likewise, the need for a robust civil society and academic and policy community outside government to inform, drive, and, when appropriate, support U.S. government efforts is also acute. A shortage of investment and career opportunities within the broader nuclear security and arms control field will deprive the U.S. government of a historical source of thinking and analysis on these important issues. Investments from both government and private foundations are needed to address these shortfalls.</p> -<p>For comparison, the reaction to the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act included hearings in the German parliament, assessments and policy recommendations from leading German industry associations and think tanks, and substantial media coverage. This starkly contrasts with the October 7 controls. While there has been some media coverage, the various industry associations have stayed quiet, there have been no parliamentary hearings, and think tanks have published limited public analyses — even at the European level.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion-5">Conclusion</h4> -<p>However, some German semiconductor technology suppliers have seemed to “de-risk” by accelerating an “in China, for China” business strategy, potentially as a reaction to the October 7 controls. This is something that the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association warned against in their public comment to the U.S Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, stating that “the combination of uncertainty driven by complexity leads foreign companies to often design out or avoid U.S.-origin or U.S. company branded content to ‘de-risk.’” Merck is a useful example among many. The company recently stated that they “are trying to limit . . . imports of important raw materials from other countries into China, especially from the U.S.,” instead seeking to create “a China-for-China approach, so that also the vast majority of products we are going to produce in China is actually supposed to be for the Chinese market.”</p> +<p>The world faces a complex and extended period of global competition where the demands of managing nuclear risk will continue to grow. Understanding the limits of U.S. nuclear capabilities in both deterring adversaries and reassuring allies is a key part of getting this critical issue right. There are things the U.S. nuclear arsenal can do and some things it cannot, and nothing (just as in life) is cost-free. The balance — between (1) using U.S. nuclear weapons to deter and reassure while (2) seeking a change in global strategic conditions to permit a broader effort to curb proliferation and pursue nuclear restraint, reductions, and eventually elimination — needs to be kept in mind as the United States and its friends, allies, and partners navigate this complex era. Nuclear skepticism is needed to balance faith in nuclear deterrence. Investments in non-nuclear and even non-military approaches to both reassurance and deterrence, as well as serious efforts to reinvigorate arms control, will be as important as investments in new nuclear weapons and their associated delivery systems. A failure to pursue all of these approaches together will lead to negative outcomes for U.S. security and global stability.</p> -<h4 id="the-future-of-german-export-control-policy-more-european-more-minilateralist-and-more-restrictive">The Future of German Export Control Policy: More European, More Minilateralist, and More Restrictive?</h4> +<hr /> -<p>Although public reactions to and debates on the U.S., Dutch, and Japanese measures have been sparse in Germany, it appears that there is an ongoing change in thinking in the German government. This change in thinking related to export controls seems to have largely resulted from engagement within the G7 (where economic security and export controls featured prominently under the 2022 Japanese presidency), development of Germany’s China strategy, and accelerating EU discussions on economic security and export controls. Three trends can be observed when looking to the future of German export control policy.</p> +<p><strong>Heather Williams</strong> is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a senior associate fellow with the European Leadership Network, and a member of the Wilton Park Advisory Council.</p> -<p>First, to German government representatives and officials, the Dutch decision, which was interpreted by officials to be primarily the result of U.S. pressure, according to interviews for this project, has illustrated that European coordination and solidarity in export control policy must be improved so that individual member states are less exposed to external pressure. Although the 2021 EU export control regulation significantly improved coordination of measures between member states, there appears to be an acknowledgement in German ministries that it would serve Germany and the European Union’s interests to develop a more coherent approach among member states. This would not only strengthen member states’ positions vis-à-vis third countries such as the United States and China but also improve the effectiveness of European export controls.</p> +<p><strong>Kelsey Hartigan</strong> is the deputy director of the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) and a senior fellow with the International Security Program at CSIS. In this role, she is responsible for managing the country’s preeminent national program for developing the next generation of nuclear experts.</p> -<p>Second, within Germany’s China strategy, the Scholz government specifically acknowledges that China’s military-civil fusion policy must be taken into account in Germany’s export control policy. To the authors’ knowledge, this was not a publicly stated consideration previously in German export control policy and could hint at a more restrictive export control policy vis-à-vis China that may also cover items that are less immediate inputs to final defense technologies. Interestingly, the China strategy also mentions that “longer-term security risks for Germany, the EU and their allies, created by the export of new key technologies” require an adjustment of national and international export control lists. This is particularly interesting because this wording reflects parts of the Dutch government’s justification for its controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing. Furthermore, this wording and justification could certainly be interpreted as a nod to the fact that economic security considerations — “longer-term security risks” — should now play a role in European export control policy. At the very least, it suggests that security risks have grown in regards to China and certain technologies.</p> +<p><strong>Lachlan MacKenzie</strong> is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p> -<p>Third, there is an acknowledgment in Germany that multilateral regimes, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, are currently not sufficiently functional. Importantly, Germany does not attribute these problems just to Russia’s membership but also to other dynamics at play, including time-consuming decisionmaking processes that fail to keep pace with technological developments. While there is consensus in Germany and the European Union that the Wassenaar Arrangement and the three other regimes must remain the central pillars of German and EU export control policy because of the effectiveness of multilateral export control regimes and the legitimacy these regimes have internationally, discussions are currently ongoing in Germany on how these multilateral regimes can be improved and, where necessary, complemented without further undermining them. What these improvements and complementary measures should look like from Germany’s perspective is not currently clear. But based on Germany’s China strategy, it appears that Germany does see “strengthened cooperation in the field of export controls between the G7 and further partners” as one path to improve Germany’s security and reduce risks emanating from China.</p> +<p><strong>Robert M. Soofer</strong> is a senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he leads its Nuclear Strategy Project. He is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies, teaching courses in nuclear strategy, missile defense, and arms control.</p> -<h3 id="japanese-perspective">Japanese Perspective</h3> +<p><strong>Thomas Karako</strong> is a senior fellow with the International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at CSIS, where he arrived in 2014. His research focuses on national security, missile defense, nuclear deterrence, and public law.</p> -<p><em>Japan Embraces its Strategic Indispensability in Alliance with the United States</em></p> +<p><strong>Oriana Skylar Mastro</strong> is a center fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, where her research focuses on Chinese military and security policy, Asia-Pacific security issues, war termination, nuclear dynamics, and coercive diplomacy. She is also the courtesy assistant professor in the political science department at Stanford University and a non-resident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. She continues to serve in the United States Air Force Reserve, for which she works as an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) to the Policy and Posture Branch Chief at INDOPACOM J5, Camp Smith, Hawaii.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="kazuto-suzuki">Kazuto Suzuki</h4> -</blockquote> +<p><strong>Frank Miller</strong> served from January 2001 to March 2005 as a special assistant to President George W. Bush and as senior director for defense policy and arms control on the National Security Council staff. At the White House he was responsible for a wide range of presidential policy initiatives related to nuclear deterrence policy, strategic arms reductions, national space policy, defense trade reform, land mines, and transforming the U.S. and NATO militaries. He directed interagency support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.</p> -<h4 id="introduction">Introduction</h4> +<p><strong>Leonor Tomero</strong> served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from January 2021–October 2021, supporting the under secretary of defense for policy and the assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans, and capabilities by developing strategies, informing policies, and conducting oversight of nuclear deterrence policy, arms control and missile defense policy.</p> -<p>In the 1980s, Japan’s semiconductor industry held a 50 percent share of the global market. However, in the U.S.-Japan trade friction, Japanese semiconductors were criticized for being supported by unfair government spending, which lasted 10 years after the U.S.-Japan semiconductor trade agreement was implemented in 1986.</p> +<p><strong>Jon Wolfsthal</strong> is an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He served from 2014 to 2017 as special assistant to former U.S. president Barack Obama as senior director for arms control and nonproliferation at the National Security Council. In that post, he was the most senior White House official setting and implementing U.S. government policy on all aspects of arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear policy.</p>Heather Williams, et al.How can the United States deter two peer competitors? To assist U.S. policy makers in addressing this question, the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) invited a group of experts to develop competing strategies for deterring Russia and China through 2035.Prime The Innovation System2023-09-29T12:00:00+08:002023-09-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/priming-the-innovation-system<p><em>In an age when innovation is the primary engine for accelerating national competitiveness and strength, the United States needs to make significant and sustained investments to raise its game.</em></p> -<p>The semiconductor industry in Japan has been in decline since then and currently holds only a 10 percent share of the global market. In order to recover from this decline, the Japanese government began making major moves in 2021 to reinvigorate the semiconductor industry. These moves were triggered by Covid-19, which led to semiconductor supply shortages and significantly impacted various economic activities. Furthermore, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, in Japanese minds, has suggested that there is a possibility of a Taiwan contingency that could have serious impacts on the global semiconductor supply chain.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>However, although there are calls in Japan for the revitalization of the semiconductor industry, the issue has not been discussed in conjunction with security concerns, namely the rise of China’s military. China’s military rise has been recognized in Japan in terms of pressure in the gray zone over the Senkaku Islands and issues related to a Taiwan contingency, but the improvements in China’s military capabilities have been largely perceived as inevitable and related to China’s technological development.</p> +<p>To secure the economic and geopolitical advantage in the twenty-first century, the United States needs a technology strategy that reflects new realities, learns from the past, and is committed for the long term.</p> -<p>In this context, the tightening of U.S. restrictions on semiconductor exports to China in October 2022 came as a great shock to Japan. Even though the White House had provided the information several weeks prior to the announcement, the fact that the announcement did not give enough time to scrutinize the impact of the measure was a surprise to the Japanese community. However, the October 7 measures provided some relief to the Japanese semiconductor industry because they only limited advanced semiconductors at the 14- and 16-nanometer nodes or narrower, which are not manufactured in Japan.</p> +<p>The United States has long been the global leader in advanced technology. But accelerating global competition — especially from China — and a diminished U.S. ability to invent, produce, and refine new high-tech products means that we cannot take this position for granted.</p> -<h4 id="review-of-japans-semiconductor-strategy">Review of Japan’s Semiconductor Strategy</h4> +<p>Recognizing that an effective innovation system is a strategic priority, Congress in 2022 passed bipartisan legislation including the CHIPS and Science Act to renew the nation’s infrastructure, reshore advanced manufacturing networks, and accelerate the commercialization of green and emerging technologies.</p> -<p>Japan’s semiconductor policy has been characterized as a state-oriented policy since the success of the ultra-LSI development project in the 1970s made Japan a semiconductor superpower surpassing the United States. This success created an illusion that if Japanese companies worked together to develop an industrial strategy, Japan’s advantage would be rock solid. Therefore, even after the 1986 Japan-U.S. semiconductor trade agreement, the semiconductor strategy continued under the leadership of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, at the time known as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry), and “all-Japan” projects such as ASUKA and MIRAI were launched. However, these projects were not successful because the semiconductor manufacturing companies did not send their best personnel to the projects and instead looked to their competitors.</p> +<p>These measures are a continuation of a long and effective tradition of U.S. policies and partnerships to support science, technology, and innovation.</p> -<p>One of the reasons for the failure of this semiconductor strategy was the failure to recognize structural changes in semiconductor manufacturing driven by the industry’s bifurcation into design and manufacturing with the advent of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and the development of the global horizontal division of labor. Even amid these structural changes, Japan has maintained vertical integration — the semiconductor sector was treated as a part of the electronics industry. Furthermore, amid strong competition, companies were not able to substantially invest in the semiconductor sector, which accounted for only a part of their businesses. As a result, it was not realistic for a single company to continue to cover the huge amount of capital required, and such depressed capital investment could no longer keep pace, which resulted in Japan losing its global competitiveness in semiconductors.</p> +<p>In forging the innovation system for the twenty-first century, policymakers need to make sure that they apply the positive lessons from the past. Importantly, these include sustained policy commitment followed by significant public support for the development of new technologies.</p> -<p>In order to rebuild the industry, the Japanese government decided to restructure its semiconductor strategy in the 2020s. For one thing, Japan will strengthen its competitiveness in areas where it still has strengths, such as semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials, and in 2021, the advanced semiconductor manufacturing act was enacted to provide subsidies to the semiconductor industry. This subsidy will not only attract Taiwan’s TSMC to Japan but will also launch LSTC, a joint research institute between TSMC and the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), as well as provide ¥330 billion ($2.26 billion) in subsidies to Rapidus, a group of 10 private companies that will cooperate in the development of semiconductors. Rapidus is a foundry that takes a different approach than previous METI-led projects in that it is a consortium of companies that will work together to promote Japan’s participation in the manufacture of cutting-edge semiconductors under the slogan “Beyond 2 nano.”</p> +<h3 id="government-role-in-the-innovation-system">Government Role in the Innovation System</h3> -<p>Thus, rather than regaining its former glory, Japan has been in the process of reassessing the importance of its semiconductor industry in the modern global marketplace in light of its past failures and has been completely reconfiguring its semiconductor strategy.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>“Government has played an important role in the technology development and transfer in almost every U.S. industry that has become competitive on a global scale.”</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="the-impact-of-the-october-7-controls">The Impact of the October 7 Controls</h4> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="vernon-ruttan-technology-growth-and-development">Vernon Ruttan, Technology Growth and Development</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>When the United States announced tighter restrictions on semiconductors from China, Japan was surprised, not so much by the direct impact on Japan’s semiconductor industry, but rather by the fact that the United States had made a full-fledged change in its approach to export controls, using the export control system to pressure specific countries rather than focusing on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).</p> +<p>The foundations of the American innovation system can be found in the U.S. Constitution, which calls for patents to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Patents turn ideas into property that their owners can further develop in cooperation with others. To further promote coordination and interoperability, the Constitution also gives Congress the power to “fix the standard of weight and measurement.”</p> -<p>There was a concern that Japan would need to change its long-standing commitment to the nonproliferation of WMDs and, furthermore, that it might create a situation where Japan would have to consider using export controls for strategic purposes in the future.</p> +<p>Throughout its history, the United States has developed successful industrial policies to respond to national needs and new global realities.</p> -<p>The reason for this concern was that Japan had already experienced an instance of export controls being used for national strategic purposes. When tensions between Japan and South Korea rose in 2019 over the issue of ex-consignment, Japan changed its export control system with punitive intent for South Korea, removing it from the “White Country” category (now Category A) and increasing the effort needed to export fluoride. Japan also took measures to make exporting more difficult by changing three items, including hydrogen fluoride, from a general license to an individual license. These measures caused a strong backlash in South Korea, resulting not only in a decrease in exports from Japan but also in a strengthening of South Korea’s domestic production capabilities. Japan has officially attributed this to inadequacies in South Korea’s export control system, but the measures continued even after South Korea strengthened its export control system. They remained unchanged until President Yoon Suk Yeol was finally inaugurated and improved relations between the two countries were established.</p> +<p>In the modern context, industrial policy refers to active government support for the development of technologies that are deemed strategically important. This support has also taken the form of broader government investments in research and education followed by procurement. One recent successful U.S. industrial policy is the Trump administration’s effort to develop and produce vaccines during the coronavirus pandemic.</p> -<p>The strengthening of U.S. export controls against China was not necessarily seen as a desirable outcome, as such economic pressure by means of export controls is perceived as likely to not only have a limited effect but could also improve other countries’ capabilities in the semiconductor sector vis-à-vis Japan. However, Japan accepted the measures under the assumption that there are no factories in Japan that make such advanced semiconductors and that therefore Japanese factories would not be directly affected. In addition, the fact that the October 7 measure was limited to “U.S. persons” meant that it was not directly applicable to companies based in Japan. Likewise, even if they used U.S. products or technologies subject to the re-export controls, firms would not be subject to the controls if their exports to China were limited to general-purpose semiconductors. The general response has been to wait and see how the U.S. regulations are implemented. Instead, the extended use of such export controls as a means of exerting economic pressure in the future has been seen as more problematic.</p> +<p>Some orthodox economists deride industrial policies, seeing them as aid to businesses unable to successfully compete. In some cases, efforts to support ailing firms have failed. But in many of these cases, their inability to compete is rooted in the policies and market protection of other nations, or is simply the result of ineffective management. The Obama administration’s effort to resuscitate General Motors and Chrysler is one example where changes in management and re-capitalization proved hugely successful.</p> -<h4 id="us-determination-impacted-japanese-thinking">U.S. Determination Impacted Japanese Thinking</h4> +<h3 id="roots-of-innovation-policy">Roots of Innovation Policy</h3> -<p>However, the assumption that Japan would not be affected was naive, as the U.S. industry quickly began to criticize Japanese and Dutch semiconductor equipment manufacturers, which are not subject to re-export restrictions, for unfairly benefiting from the measure. Japanese companies such as Tokyo Electron and other semiconductor equipment manufacturers make equipment using their technology rather than relying on U.S. technology, and in the Netherlands, ASML is the only company in the world that makes extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography equipment, which is essential for the production of the most advanced semiconductors. If these devices are exported to China and it develops better design capabilities, it will be able to make advanced semiconductors even if the United States stops exporting designs and software.</p> +<p>American industrial policy has a strong track record of supporting innovation and enabling new technologies through long-term policy continuity and support. This strategy has been successful. Indeed, many of these technologies have fundamentally transformed the U.S. economy.</p> -<p>This has led the United States to urge Japan and the Netherlands not to export semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China. Both Japan and the Netherlands are allies of the United States and, like the United States, do not consider it desirable for China to increase its military capabilities by acquiring advanced semiconductors. However, China’s semiconductor market is the fastest-growing such market in the world, and it would be a great blow to Japanese and Dutch companies to lose this lucrative market. Although the United States emphasized that it was only regulating advanced semiconductors in China and not legacy or foundational semiconductors, both Japan and the Netherlands were hesitant to restrict the interests of private companies for political purposes.</p> +<h4 id="foundations-of-innovation">Foundations of Innovation</h4> -<p>As a result, Japan, the United Sates, and the Netherlands agreed to strengthen export controls, and Japan decided to add 23 new items, including semiconductor manufacturing equipment, to the list of items subject to export controls. However, unlike the United States, there were legal difficulties in establishing an export control system with the ability to target particular countries for the purposes of national security, since the export control system was designed to be prevent proliferation of WMDs. Therefore, the newly added items likely will require an export license for all destinations, but certain measures will be taken, such as not issuing licenses to China, on an operational basis.</p> +<p>The earliest call for a U.S. industrial policy dates back to shortly after the nation’s founding. In 1791, Alexander Hamilton, the first secretary of the treasury, approached Congress with his Report on the Subject of Manufactures. Breaking with those who thought the United States should remain an agricultural nation, the report outlined a strategy to develop manufacturing. Its goals were to reduce dependency on Britain and ultimately build the material base for an independent national defense.</p> -<p>For Japan, it was not a surprise that the United States took the position of thoroughly blocking advanced semiconductor exports to China, but it is nonetheless important to understand the determination of the United States to do so. During the Trump administration, economic coercion against China, particularly additional tariffs on China and protectionist measures under the guise of security under Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act, was seen as policy pursued by domestic hardliners against China or as an effort to preserve domestic jobs, not a policy driven by security concerns. However, the Biden administration’s October 7 controls signaled a full-fledged U.S. commitment to maintaining its technological superiority and preventing China’s military buildup, even at the expense of domestic industry.</p> +<p>Since then, Hamilton’s call has been realized in an effective and evolving U.S. industrial policy. Throughout its history, the United States has used these policies to spur important innovations that have enhanced its security and technological leadership.</p> -<h4 id="reactions-in-japan">Reactions in Japan</h4> +<h4 id="the-postwar-strategy">The Postwar Strategy</h4> -<p>Japanese business groups such as Keidanren or Keizai Doyukai (the Japan Association of Corporate Executives) or industry groups such as the Semiconductor Equipment Association of Japan have not expressed any explicit opposition or opinions regarding the agreements that the Japanese government has reached with the United States and the Netherlands. Nor has the issue been taken up in the Diet. In Japan, the government can enforce export controls through ministerial ordinances, and public lobbying is not a common practice. As a result, semiconductor export control issues are often resolved through direct dialogue between the government, industry associations, and individual companies.</p> +<p>The pace of technological change picked up in the years following World War II. At that time, the U.S. manufacturing base was robust, having geared up for war production and postwar reconstruction.</p> -<p>In this context, it is noteworthy that Japan has spent more than six months since October 7 negotiating with the United States. Naturally, China is a huge market with respect to semiconductor manufacturing equipment, which is the target of the regulations, and there is a large market to be lost by tightening export controls. In addition, in the case of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, it is not possible to define specifications by channel length, as is the case with semiconductors themselves, and it is necessary to carefully determine what type of equipment would be subject to export controls. Therefore, as the Japanese government continued its negotiations with the United States, it engaged in a series of negotiations with Japanese industry associations and individual companies to reach a consensus on which products would be subject to the restrictions.</p> +<p>But, as President Truman’s advisor Vannevar Bush pointed out at the time, the nation’s research base needed to be strengthened. To address this need, the U.S. government invested heavily in basic research, including through the creation of the National Science Foundation and the expansion of the National Laboratory system. It also actively recruited leading scientists and engineers from Europe.</p> -<p>The result of these negotiations was an agreement in May 2023 and the implementation of stricter export controls in July. In Japan, this issue is more of a process of making adjustments so that it does not contradict its own interests too much and acknowledging the importance of the security measures pursued by the United States without it becoming a major issue. The process is not necessarily satisfactory for companies exporting semiconductor manufacturing equipment, but there was a general consensus that the measures were a necessity for improving national security.</p> +<p>This strategy contributed to new technological innovations that helped win the Cold War. Moreover, the new information and communications technologies generated by this strategy transformed the U.S. economy and underpin its economic leadership today.</p> -<h4 id="japans-dilemma">Japan’s Dilemma</h4> +<h4 id="capitalizing-on-us-research">Capitalizing on U.S. Research</h4> -<p>How will the October 7 measures and the subsequent framework of tighter restrictions on semiconductor exports to China by Japan, the United States, and the Netherlands affect Japan’s geoeconomic strategy going forward? The first key question will be the extent to which China will take retaliatory measures. For example, from August 1, China will tighten its controls on gallium and germanium exports. What is important about this response is that China is also strengthening export controls for “security” reasons. While this measure does not target any particular country, it is believed that China sees Japan as a weaker link in the containment policy against it, as the measure came just after Japan tightened its export controls. China will also strengthen export controls for commercial drones, in which China holds a large majority share in the global market, on the grounds of “security.” Additionally, there is a strong possibility that China will continue to use such export controls as a means of economic coercion in the future. Japan is trying to avoid risk by reducing its dependence on China in accordance with the Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA), but now that the “export control war” between the United States and China has begun, a response is required as soon as possible.</p> +<p>In the 1970s and 80s, Japan emerged as a major competitor in technology development and manufacturing. In response, new U.S. policies sought to more efficiently connect the research advances made at U.S. universities into development and commercialization of new competitive products by the private sector.</p> -<p>Second, even though the Chinese economy is slowing down, China is still a very attractive market for Japanese companies. Likewise, there are still many items that are dependent on procurement from China. Even if Japan were to diversify its supply chain in accordance with the ESPA, it would be a great burden for companies to procure more expensive items from other countries when they could procure them at a lower price from China. Such actions that go against economic rationality are difficult for companies to explain to their shareholders and stakeholders. In this sense, the government’s decision to strengthen export controls will facilitate companies’ decisionmaking and give them guidance for avoiding risks.</p> +<p>Together, these public-private partnerships promote cooperation across the innovation system. Widely seen as best practices in innovation policy, many have been adapted around the world. For example, countries as diverse as India and the United Kingdom have adopted or adapted Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) in an attempt to engage innovative small businesses more effectively in their national economies.</p> -<p>Based on these strategic conflicts, Japanese companies are expected to take actions that are not economically rational and are likely to incur the risk of economic harassment by China. It is important for the government to draw up a clear strategy and provide predictability to companies in order to encourage such actions. At the same time, even if the government makes a decision, there can be a variety of risks involved in doing business with China. It is up to companies to decide how to respond to such risks, and there will be a limit to how much they can rely on the government.</p> +<h4 id="an-ecosystem-approach-to-innovation">An Ecosystem Approach to Innovation</h4> -<h4 id="what-should-the-japanese-government-do">What Should the Japanese Government Do?</h4> +<p>Throughout this postwar period, U.S. innovation strategy has relied on a relatively simple linear model of innovation.</p> -<p>Under these circumstances, what should Japan do in the future, especially in the semiconductor field? First, Japan must protect its superior technologies and companies from foreign investment, especially from China, as it did with the acquisition of JSR, a major semiconductor materials company, by the Japan Investment Corporation ( JCI), a government-affiliated fund. To this end, in addition to investment screening based on the current Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law, Japan should also consider the introduction of an investment screening system similar to the U.S. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) as well as measures such as delisting, as was the case with the acquisition of JSR.</p> +<p>This model concentrated on public funding of basic research at the front end. From there, private actors would take the lead in applying that research to new products and bringing them to the market.</p> -<p>Second, it is necessary to further strengthen initiatives such as Rapidus and LSTC, the joint research institute with TSMC, which are currently being promoted with government involvement. The semiconductor industry is fundamentally an equipment industry, and it is not possible to maintain competitiveness without renewal of equipment through a continuous cycle of new investment. In addition, semiconductor research and development require enormous resources, and it is difficult to ask private companies to have the financial strength to make continuous investments. In this sense, the government must be fully involved. The era of neoliberalism, in which government intervention in the market was undesirable, is over. Japan is now in an era in which the government is involved in the market — maintaining, nurturing, and protecting strategic industries. The private sector needs to be aware that it, alongside the government, stands at the forefront of national economic security.</p> +<p>Through the years, our understanding of the innovation process has advanced. Instead of a linear process, innovation is now understood as an “ecosystem” in which various networks each play a role in developing new technologies and bringing them to market. For innovation to move at its full potential, each of these networks need to operate individually as well as connect with the other networks through partnerships across the innovation ecosystem.</p> -<p>Third is the need to secure human resources in the semiconductor industry. The semiconductor manufacturing business has long received an inadequate amount of investment, not only in Japan but also in the United States and Europe, and even if the Japanese government provides leverage to the semiconductor industry, there is still a shortage of human resources. In Japan, the opening of TSMC’s plant in Kumamoto Prefecture has led to a strain on highly skilled personnel from all over the country, causing problems such as skyrocketing wages and a shortage of personnel in the Kyushu industry. A similar situation is also occurring in Hokkaido, where Rapidus is expanding. Universities and technical colleges in Kyushu and Hokkaido are working on how to resolve this shortage of human resources, but these efforts are insufficient. The government as a whole should improve the supply of semiconductor human resources and actively attract human resources from India and other countries with strong semiconductor design capabilities.</p> +<ol> + <li> + <p>Research Networks</p> -<p>The United States is prepared to use its technology and economy as weapons in its strategic competition with China. Japan, as an ally and a strategic security partner, has no choice but to support the U.S. policy toward China while balancing its own economic interests and strategic rivalry in semiconductors. Regardless of Japan’s desires, technology and the economy have become strategic tools. The best way to develop some advantage in this situation is for Japan to establish its “strategic indispensability” by refining its own technology and acquiring international competitiveness, thereby increasing its ability to resist coercion from other countries. In this sense, a modern security strategy must recognize that it is not only the government, military, and diplomatic authorities — but also business and enterprises — that must achieve the nation’s strategic goals together. In this sense, Japan’s economic security strategy is more effective when the government and businesses have less friction on economic security issues.</p> + <p>American universities, research institutes, and national labs are rich sources of new ideas and concepts.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Financial Networks</p> -<h3 id="dutch-perspective">Dutch Perspective</h3> + <p>Banks, venture capital funds, and other sources of capital provide the wherewithal for entrepreneurs to fund and develop these concepts into products and services for the market.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Entrepreneurial Networks</p> -<p><em>How the Netherlands Followed Washington’s October 7 Export Restrictions</em></p> + <p>Start-ups, innovative firms, and small and medium manufacturers are key actors in the innovation system, drawing on new ideas, seeking funding, and driving innovation to the marketplace.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Educational and Training Networks</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="rem-korteweg">Rem Korteweg</h4> -</blockquote> + <p>Universities, colleges, and vocational institutes provide the skills and workforce needed by industry to scale up and produce new products and services.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Manufacturing and Distribution Networks</p> -<h4 id="introduction-1">Introduction</h4> + <p>Firms that make innovative products and services and find and develop markets are an integral part of the innovation system. R&amp;D and manufacturing are tightly intertwined — it is often not possible to design a product without understanding how it could be manufactured. Feedback from manufacturers and markets provides important feedback and financial returns for other stakeholders within the innovation system.</p> + </li> +</ol> -<p>This chapter looks at the development of Dutch semiconductor export control policies in response to growing U.S.-China tensions and the October 7, 2022, export restrictions.</p> +<h4 id="a-complete-ecosystem">A Complete Ecosystem</h4> -<p>The Dutch reaction to the October 7 controls is embedded in a growing deterioration of Dutch relations with China, several years of intense U.S.-Dutch diplomacy about semiconductor export policies, and a Dutch ambition to preserve its unique position in the global semiconductor value chain.</p> +<p>A healthy innovation ecosystem contains strong, dynamic, and distributed networks, with effective connections across networks. These make the system more resilient, more adaptive, and more capable of making use of the knowledge within the system — especially when compared to more planned systems. American traditions in individual initiative and entrepreneurship, combined with what Alexis de Tocqueville called “the spirit of association,” give the United States an innate advantage in building these innovation networks.</p> -<p>While the Dutch semiconductor industry includes more than 300 companies, the new policies were mainly related to advanced lithography and semiconductor manufacturing machinery. One Dutch company, ASML, plays a crucial role here.</p> +<h3 id="todays-challenges">Today’s Challenges</h3> -<h4 id="the-netherlands-role-in-the-semiconductor-supply-chain">The Netherlands’ Role in the Semiconductor Supply Chain</h4> +<p>Emerging challenges have the potential to disrupt the United States’ innovation system. Understanding these challenges will be key to restoring U.S. leadership in innovation.</p> -<p>A conservative estimate by the Dutch government puts the Dutch semiconductor industry at more than 300 companies, employing around 50,000 people and generating €30 billion ($32.46 billion) in revenue annually. However, the overarching semiconductor ecosystem in the Netherlands is probably larger. For example, lithography machine manufacturer ASML says its supply chain in the Netherlands relies on more than 100 small and medium-sized enterprises.</p> +<h4 id="the-loss-of-manufacturing">The Loss of Manufacturing</h4> -<p>Dutch semiconductor firms are predominantly active in machinery and equipment, chip design, and the production of leading-edge as well as legacy semiconductors. One of the unique characteristics of the Dutch ecosystem is that it brings together government, knowledge institutions and technical universities, and private companies to drive innovation, with a demonstrated history of success. According to the central bank of the Netherlands, in December 2022, the semiconductor industry accounted for 24 percent of the market capitalization of the Amsterdam stock exchange.</p> +<p>Over the past few decades, U.S. companies embraced outsourcing to capitalize on lower wages in Mexico and especially East Asia with the goal of lowering costs and increasing short-term shareholder returns. This has degraded U.S. manufacturing capabilities.</p> -<p>According to the Netherlands branch organization of the semiconductor industry, “on average 85% of the integrated circuits in all electronic devices worldwide, are made on machines designed and manufactured in the Netherlands.” ASML sits at the apex of the Dutch semiconductor ecosystem, given its global market dominance in the field of advanced semiconductor lithography machines. Currently, its leading-edge technology is extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography, for which it has a monopoly. Other notable companies include NXP, ASM International, BE Semiconductors, STMicroelectronics, and Axelera AI. Yet because of ASML’s outsized importance to the global semiconductor value chain, this company is also the focal point for how the Netherlands deals with the geopolitics of the semiconductor industry and how it developed its export control regime. That regime took shape in a context of changing relations with China.</p> +<p>Without a strong domestic manufacturing network, which is a close complement to research and commercialization activities, the entire domestic innovation system becomes less effective. For example, the drive by U.S. firms to offshore manufacturing of display screens to East Asia, combined with South Korea’s strategic investments in its domestic R&amp;D and manufacturing systems, led to the loss of the U.S. display industry to South Korea.</p> -<h4 id="changing-views-on-chinas-economic-ambitions">Changing Views on China’s Economic Ambitions</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9Woda9v.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p>The Netherlands was slow to come to terms with China’s economic challenge, but when it did, things moved quickly. In 2019, the Netherlands published a new China policy paper. In the paper, which could not be called a strategy due to intergovernmental disagreements about its scope, the government took a much more critical view of China than it did in the previous edition from 2013. Instead of prioritizing the economic promise that access to China’s market offered, the 2019 paper sought to strike a balance between working with China and scrutinizing it. The main tagline of the document became “open where possible, protective where needed, and based to a greater extent on reciprocity.” It also gave the necessary political cover for the development of a Dutch investment screening mechanism.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/C0wFIG0.png" alt="image02" /></p> -<p>When the China policy paper was taking shape, concerns about China’s human rights record and regional security — not its economic activities — dominated discussions in the Dutch parliament. But gradually relations between Beijing and The Hague started to deteriorate. In a new low, a Dutch parliamentarian and a high-ranking diplomat were sanctioned by the Chinese government and received travel bans in 2021 because of their criticism of human rights violations in Xinjiang.</p> +<h4 id="the-china-challenge">The China Challenge</h4> -<p>The Covid-19 pandemic put the issue of undesired economic dependencies with China into focus. In 2020, while the Netherlands struggled to contain infections, a diplomatic row erupted over the Dutch decision to change the name of its trade and investment office in Taiwan to the Netherlands Office Taipei. China’s Global Times newspaper reported that the move might have repercussions for China’s provision of medical aid and face masks to the Netherlands. It set off alarm bells in the Dutch parliament and focused minds on the issue of economic coercion. Could China leverage its growing economic footprint against Dutch foreign policy or security interests? Chinese investments in Dutch companies, including in the semiconductor sector, became suspect. For instance, the Netherlands blocked the Chinese takeover of semiconductor firm SmartPhotonics in 2020 and helped put together a public-private consortium to keep this technology in Dutch hands. In the same period, a backlash against Huawei — driven by security concerns about the possibility of Chinese espionage or sabotage — led to its exclusion from the Dutch 5G telecom infrastructure market. In November 2019, the government decided that telecom providers could only use “trusted suppliers” in critical parts of the 5G backbone. Later, in 2021, Huawei confirmed it had been excluded. And in the European Union, the Netherlands spearheaded an EU initiative to scrutinize and limit investments by foreign state-owned enterprises in the single market. In 2023, the China policy paper was updated. Unsurprisingly, it placed a much stronger emphasis on “protection.”</p> +<p>China has implemented a focused strategy to become a manufacturing powerhouse and innovation leader. It has massively increased its spending on R&amp;D — now second only to the United States — and importantly, much more of its R&amp;D budget is focused on applied rather than basic research.</p> -<p>Various parliamentary motions were put forward to shape a new China policy, but most were directed at preventing certain Chinese investments in Dutch critical infrastructure or reducing dependencies on Chinese imports. For instance, in October 2021 a motion called for reducing Dutch and European strategic dependencies on “authoritarian states, mainly China” as this would increase the effectiveness of Dutch and European human rights policies. The following month, parliament adopted a motion calling for “an ambitious plan to reduce the dependency of Dutch consumers and producers on China.” And in May 2023, a cross-party motion called for greater government action, including a credible timeline, to reduce Dutch exposure to “problematic dependencies in critical materials, chips, semiconductors and high-tech products” from China. De-risking, if not decoupling, was widely embraced by the Dutch parliament, but it was focused on Chinese inbound investments and dependencies on Chinese imports, not on Dutch exports that could give China a strategic industrial edge. That would change with U.S. action.</p> +<p>In addition, China is pursuing determined policies to ensure its dominance in artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, and quantum computing. It is especially focused on advanced semiconductor manufacturing, which the Chinese government correctly sees as a critical enabling technology for both civilian and military applications. China’s goal is to create a world-class high-tech manufacturing sector that is not reliant on inputs from other countries, and ultimately to make other countries dependent on its outputs.</p> -<h4 id="initial-responses">Initial Responses</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/PyEDSGZ.png" alt="image03" /></p> -<p>The October 7 measures had an impact on Dutch companies, particularly ASML. U.S. employees of Dutch semiconductor firms were covered by the new legislation, as was U.S. content in semiconductor technologies used by Dutch semiconductor firms. This meant that their products became susceptible to export restrictions. A number of Dutch companies — such as ASML, ASM, and NXP — were affected further because they have U.S. subsidiaries.</p> +<h4 id="meeting-the-challenges">Meeting the Challenges</h4> -<p>ASML generates approximately 15 percent of its revenue in China. In response to the U.S. measures, the company has transferred some of its repair and maintenance activities to China. This allows it to continue to service the lithography machines that it has previously sold to Chinese customers. But there is no doubt that the U.S. measures have had a chilling effect on ASML’s business in China.</p> +<p>Being a global hub for innovation has conferred innumerable geopolitical and commercial benefits for the United States over the last century. But without a concerted effort to match its innovation policy to the challenges of today, the United States will not enjoy those same benefits in the century to come. And it risks ceding them to geopolitical rivals with different visions of global order.</p> -<p>Across the political spectrum, there is wide-ranging interest in the new U.S. regulations. In mid-October, the government organized a confidential briefing for parliament on the new measures. But already in September 2022, when news was starting to spread about pending U.S. export controls on semiconductors, questions were being asked in the Dutch parliament. The pro-EU party Volt Netherlands asked the ministers of foreign affairs, economic affairs, and international trade whether new U.S. export controls would influence Dutch and European “digital autonomy,” and therefore needed to be assessed on its geopolitical merits (which is one component of the European Union’s ambition to develop its economic “strategic autonomy”). The government responded with an emphatic yes, adding the following:</p> +<p>To maintain its lead in innovation, the United States has to invest in and maintain the ecosystem supporting R&amp;D, workforce development, and the manufacture of new products and services for the global market. Fortunately, the Biden administration has passed several important pieces of legislation recommitting to U.S. leadership in the twenty-first century, though much of the resources are yet to be committed to those efforts.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>Due to its strategic importance and the globalized structure of the value chain, semiconductor technology plays a key role in geopolitical affairs and thus for the “open strategic autonomy” of the EU. The government is therefore committed to remaining an international leader in this area in the future. This requires a geopolitical consideration, in which good cooperation with like-minded partners is of great importance.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>While these efforts are promising initial steps to prime American innovation, sustained follow-through is needed. As a start, Congress now needs to make good on the important initiatives it has recently passed and appropriate the funds to sustain and grow a competitive economy for the twenty-first century. The money appropriated (actual dollars released) for innovation initiatives in the CHIPS and Science Act has so far fallen far short of the amounts authorized (dollars promised). This represents a concerning trend that could cause these programs to underperform their potential.</p> -<p>In a separate note, Volt Netherlands complained that the October 7 export controls served U.S. interests and unduly damaged ASML without giving the company adequate compensation. Instead, the party called for a stronger and more coherent European approach to semiconductors. It reflected earlier criticism by some academics who suggested that the Netherlands was becoming increasingly vulnerable to U.S. extraterritorial legislation in high-tech fields.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/1LlkqLL.png" alt="image04" /></p> -<p>In December 2022, ASML CEO Peter Wennink was critical of the new U.S. export restrictions. He said that ASML had already paid a price by no longer being able to export its most advanced EUV lithography machines to China and that restricting less-advanced deep ultraviolet (DUV) immersion technologies would go a step too far. He also said that EUV export restrictions were benefiting U.S. semiconductor firms that were still able to trade with China and that DUV technology had already proliferated widely, including to China. Meanwhile the Dutch government was mulling over its response.</p> +<h4 id="renewing-american-innovation">Renewing American Innovation</h4> -<h4 id="no-export-licenses-for-euv-technology">No Export Licenses for EUV Technology</h4> +<p>In an era when allies and rivals are making major investments to capture leading positions in powerful new technologies, the United States needs to upgrade its own policy structures and make large and sustained investments in R&amp;D and in its industrial infrastructure, building out the innovation ecosystem.</p> -<p>The Dutch response to the October 7 controls cannot be understood without giving due regard to the previous years of U.S.-Netherlands cooperation on semiconductor export policy. In the run-up to October 7, the Biden administration had continued the Trump administration’s earlier campaign to restrict ASML’s export of lithography machines to China.</p> +<p>The United States has set the global standard for fostering innovation multiple times in its history, and there is every reason to believe that it is capable of doing so again. But doing so will require both effective long-term planning and the financial commitments to realizing those plans. The future of the global order, and the United States’ leading role in it, depends on the success of these efforts.</p> -<p>EUV machines are covered by the Wassenaar Arrangement. In late 2018, under the terms of the arrangement, ASML asked for an export license for two EUV machines to China. The intended customer was most likely the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), which the United States would later designate as a military end user and add to its Entity List. Because the United States is member to the Wassenaar Arrangement, it received information of the intended sale. The United States initially tried to block the sale itself, but the content requirement that would allow the United States to do so was not met. A number of rounds of diplomacy between the Netherlands and the United States followed. In June 2019, then secretary of state Mike Pompeo visited The Hague and pointed out that the sale of EUV technology to China was undesirable. According to reports, during Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s visit to the White House in July 2019, he was given an intelligence report on the implications of China’s use of ASML’s EUV technology. The Dutch government did not renew ASML’s export license. But ASML, like similar firms around the world, continued to sell its less-advanced DUV immersion technology machines to Chinese customers, including to SMIC.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Meanwhile, the policy cogs in The Hague were churning. A new, more restrictive export policy for semiconductor technology was in the making. On October 10, 2020, more than a year after Rutte’s visit to the White House, the Netherlands Ministry of Defence published an internal semiconductor strategy. The strategy underlined ASML’s key position in the field of lithography machines and the ability of EUV technology to produce the most advanced chips. It also warned that the most advanced chips are most likely to be used in the most advanced military systems.</p> +<p><strong>Sujai Shivakumar</strong> is the Director and Senior Fellow, Renewing American Innovation Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p>Sujai ShivakumarIn an age when innovation is the primary engine for accelerating national competitiveness and strength, the United States needs to make significant and sustained investments to raise its game.In The Shadow Of Ukraine2023-09-29T12:00:00+08:002023-09-29T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/in-the-shadow-of-ukraine<p><em>Russian leaders are committed to a reconstitution of the Russian military — especially the Russian army — over the next several years, though achieving this goal will be challenging. In addition, Russia views the United States as its main enemy for the foreseeable future.</em></p> -<p>With the EUV machines, the strategy stated, China could aim to increase its ability to produce advanced chips and make headway to develop its own indigenous semiconductor industry. The semiconductor strategy also flagged China’s ambition to be a military superpower by 2049. Crucially, the Ministry of Defence concluded the following (author’s translation):</p> +<excerpt /> <blockquote> - <p>The chance that a NATO member state will have to defend itself against advanced indigenously-produced weapon systems in the future will increase considerably when EUV machines are exported, especially if China sells such weapon systems to third parties. In addition, the export of advanced technology may lead to undesirable economic dependencies in the (near) future. Finally, our most important strategic security partner, the United States, has made an emphatic appeal to the Netherlands not to export EUV technology to China.</p> + <p>“Each war has to be matched with a special strategic behavior; each war constitutes a particular case that requires establishing its own special logic instead of applying some template.”</p> </blockquote> -<p>The Ministry of Defence continued: “From the perspective of Dutch military and security interests in the medium and long term, it is important that the Netherlands does not grant ASML an export license for the supply of EUV machines to China and that this unique technology is protected as much as possible.” The Defence Ministry’s strategy provided a clear justification for not awarding the export license to ASML, but it came more than a year after U.S. pressure on the Dutch.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="aa-svechin">A.A. Svechin</h4> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="from-euv-to-duv">From EUV to DUV</h4> +<h3 id="executive-summary">EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</h3> -<p>While EUV exports to China were now off the table, the focus fell on ASML’s less advanced, but still very sophisticated, DUV immersion technology machines. Together with U.S. etching and deposition equipment, Chinese engineers had been able to use DUV technology to make several innovative breakthroughs and develop advanced semiconductors of their own.</p> +<p>This report asks two main questions: how is the Russian military thinking about the future of warfare, and how is the Russian military thinking about force design over the next five years? As used here, force design includes the overall plan for structuring, staffing, training, and equipping military forces, including in the maritime, land, air, cyber, and space domains. Since the goal of this analysis is to better understand Russian military thinking, this report relies primarily on Russian military journals and other sources, supplemented by interviews with U.S., European, and Ukrainian officials.</p> -<p>Feeling the increased pressure, ASML tried to get a carve-out for its lithography machines in November 2020 from the U.S. Export Control Reform Act. Importantly, regarding DUV, ASML stated that “as deep ultraviolet (“DUV”) lithography systems have become trailing edge, DUV technology has been decontrolled from national security requirements including multilateral controls and for many years has been extensively shipped globally, including to China.” ASML’s argument was basically that the technology had already proliferated widely, and that therefore export restrictions on this technology would be meaningless. Conversations with Dutch policymakers at the time confirmed the impression that the Hague considered DUV to be less sensitive than EUV.</p> +<p>The report has several findings.</p> -<p>The dynamic changed with the October 7 regulation. With the new controls, the United States emphasized that it saw export restrictions on semiconductor technology as part of its overall geopolitical competition with Beijing and its strategic posturing in the Asia-Pacific. In that context, the United States was intent on preserving its technological edge, including by reducing China’s access to high-end lithography machines. The Biden administration now needed to convince the Netherlands to see the issue the same way.</p> +<p>First, Russian military thinking is dominated by a view that the United States is — and will remain — Moscow’s main enemy (главный враг) for the foreseeable future. This view of the United States as the main enemy has increased since the 2022 invasion, with significant implications for the future of warfare and force design. Russian political and military leaders assess that Russian struggles in Ukraine have been largely due to aid from the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which Russian leaders interpret as direct participation in the war. In addition, Russian leaders believe that the United States is attempting to expand its power, further encircle Russia, and weaken Russia militarily, politically, and economically. These sentiments make Russia a dangerous enemy over the next five years and will likely drive Moscow’s desire to reconstitute its military as rapidly as possible, strengthen nuclear and conventional deterrence, prepare to fight the West if deterrence fails as part of a strategy of “active defense” (активная оборона), and engage in irregular and hybrid activities.</p> -<p>An intensive amount of diplomacy ensued in 2022. Deputy Secretary of Commerce Don Graves visited the Netherlands in June 2022 to speak with the Dutch government and ASML about new export controls. In the wake of the October 7 regulation, a bipartisan delegation from the U.S. Senate visited the Netherlands on November 4, 2022. According to Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s social media feed, their discussions included “stability in the Indo-Pacific,” which makes it highly likely that semiconductor supply chains were discussed. That same month, Under Secretary for Commerce Alan Estevez and Tarun Chhabra, senior director for technology and national security at the National Security Council, traveled to the Netherlands to discuss the October 7 measures, their implications for Dutch semiconductor firms, and the desire to expand export licensing to include DUV technology. This was most likely the preparatory meeting for the January 2023 bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Rutte and President Biden.</p> +<p>Second, Russian analyses generally conclude that while the nature of warfare — its essence and purpose — is unchanging, the character of future warfare will rapidly evolve in ways that require adaptation. This report focuses on four categories of interest to Russia: long-range, high-precision weapons; autonomous and unmanned systems; emerging technologies; and the utility of hybrid and irregular warfare. In these and other areas, Russian leaders assess that it will be critical to cooperate with other countries, such as China and Iran.</p> -<p>Meanwhile, policymakers in the Netherlands were keeping up. On December 1, 2022 — almost two months after October 7 — the government published new guidelines for the export of dual-use semiconductor technologies. The Netherlands formulated three criteria on the basis of which export licenses in semiconductor technologies would be assessed:</p> +<p>Third, Russian political and military leaders are committed to a major reconstitution of the Russian military — especially the Russian army — over the next several years, though achieving this goal will be challenging. Force design may evolve in the following areas:</p> -<ol> +<ul> <li> - <p>Preventing Dutch goods from contributing to undesirable end uses, such as a military application or weapons of mass destruction</p> + <p>Land: Russian force design in land warfare will likely include an attempt to reconstitute the Russian army over the next five years. In particular, the army will likely continue to shift to a division structure, though it is unclear whether Russia can fill the ranks of larger units. These changes are a sharp divergence from the changes implemented under former minister of defense Anatoly Serdyukov. In addition, the Russian military has indicated a desire to restructure the army to allow for more mobility and decentralization in the field in response to the United States’ and NATO’s long-range precision strike capabilities.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Preventing unwanted strategic dependencies</p> + <p>Air: Force design in the air domain will likely involve some reversals initiated by Serdyukov, as well as a major focus on unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). For example, the Russian military wants to increase the size of the Russian Aerospace Forces beyond the current force structure. Future developments may also include the use of UASs for logistics in contested environments, which will require new organizational structures.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Preserving Dutch technological leadership and Western standards</p> + <p>Maritime: The Russian military has expressed a desire to expand its naval forces in response to growing tensions with the United States and NATO. The Russian Ministry of Defense has outlined the creation of five naval infantry divisions for the navy’s coastal troops. In addition, the Russian navy will likely increase the presence of unmanned maritime vessels as part of force design and focus on the development, production, and use of submarines.</p> </li> -</ol> + <li> + <p>Space and Cyber: The Russian military will attempt to further develop its space and cyber capabilities, including offensive capabilities. It will also likely attempt to expand the size and activities of Russian Space Forces and a range of Russian cyber organizations, such as the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU), Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and Federal Security Service (FSB), though it will likely struggle in such areas as space because of Western sanctions.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>On January 17, 2023, Prime Minister Rutte arrived at the White House to meet President Biden. The meeting came on the heels of Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida’s visit to Washington on January 13. It had all the hallmarks of an attempt by the United States to choreograph a diplomatic agreement on new export restrictions with the Japanese and the Dutch. On January 27, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met Dutch and Japanese counterparts in a trilateral setting to coordinate a new set of policies.</p> +<p>Russia retains a significant arsenal of nuclear weapons, a relatively strong navy and air force that remain largely intact, and a reasonably good relationship with China and other countries, such as Iran, that could provide a much-needed jump start.</p> -<p>It would be six weeks later, on March 8, 2023, that the first details of the new Dutch policy emerged. While specific details remained unclear, the Netherlands announced that it would expand its export licensing requirements for semiconductor technologies. DUV immersion technology was explicitly mentioned. The technology that previously was considered “trailing edge” was now thrust into the limelight.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, Russia faces a suite of financial, military, political, social, and other issues that will force political and military leaders to prioritize changes in force design. Building a bigger navy and air force will be expensive, as will increasing the size of Russian ground forces. While it is impossible to predict with certainty how Russian leaders will prioritize force design changes, likely candidates are ones that are relatively cheap or essential to improve fighting effectiveness.</p> -<p>In an attempt to explain why it had decided to widen the scope of its export policies beyond EUV, the government said semiconductor technology continues to evolve, thereby necessitating a continuous review to what extent these technologies impact international security. The government also stressed that this meant it would scrutinize technologies that were not previously covered by export controls. “Given the technological developments and the geopolitical context,” the Dutch government concluded, “it is necessary in the name of (inter)national security to expand the existing export control of specific semiconductor production equipment,” (author’s translation). The note did not mention China, nor did it refer to pressure from the United States. The government did say it would use an EU directive that allows national restrictions in the export of dual-use goods in the interest of preserving public security.</p> +<p>In the land domain, for example, the Russian army may prioritize restructuring its land forces around divisions, strengthening its defense industrial base to develop and produce precision munitions and weapons systems for a protracted war, and experimenting with tactical units to allow for greater mobility and autonomy against adversaries that have precision strike capabilities. Russia will likely rely on such countries as China, Iran, and North Korea for some weapons systems and components.</p> -<p>Then, on June 23, 2023, the government announced the details of its expanded export licensing requirements for the semiconductor industry. They included EUV lithography and two types of DUV immersion lithography machines. But besides these technologies, which heavily focused on ASML, other parts of the Dutch semiconductor industry were also affected. Systems and technologies for atomic layer deposition, epitaxy, and deposition were also included in the new rules, which impacted ASM International, among other companies.</p> +<p>However, a successful reconstitution of the military and a redesign of the force, especially the army, will be difficult for several reasons.</p> -<p>The accompanying explanatory note said that these technologies warrant export licensing because they “can create risks for public security, including international peace and stability.” Aside from the possibility that the technologies can be used for advanced military equipment, the government argued that the “uncontrolled export [of these technologies] . . . can have significant implications for the public security interests of the Netherlands and its allies in the long term.” This is an open-ended formulation, which contains an explicit reference to the security of allies, like the United States. The government justified the new export regime by saying it is a proportional measure given the Netherlands’ unique position in the global semiconductor value chain — a position it wants to preserve.</p> +<p>First, Russia’s deepening economic crisis will likely constrain its efforts to expand the quantity and quality of its ground, air, and naval forces. The war in Ukraine has fueled Russia’s worst labor crunch in decades, and the Russian economy has been stressed by low growth, a decrease in the ruble against the dollar, and inflation. Second, corruption and graft remain rampant in the Russian military, which could undermine Moscow’s overall plan to effectively structure, staff, train, and equip its forces. Third, Russia’s defense industrial base will likely face challenges because of the war in Ukraine. Russia has already expended significant amounts of precision-guided and other munitions in the Ukraine war, and many of its weapons systems and equipment have been destroyed or severely worn down. Economic sanctions may create shortages of higher-end foreign components and force Moscow to substitute them with lower-quality alternatives. Fourth, Russia could face a significant challenge because of growing civil-military friction. Tension between the Russian military and population could worsen over time because of a protracted war in Ukraine, a languishing economy, and an increasingly authoritarian state. A reconstitution of the Russian military will likely require some level of support and sacrifice from the Russian population.</p> -<p>The measures came into effect on September 1, 2023, though ASML indicated it would continue to ship DUV machines to China under existing licenses until January 1, 2024. In anticipation of the new measures, Chinese customers stockpiled ASML’s equipment. In the first half of the year, demand surged as ASML’s sales to China increased 64.8 percent year on year to $2.58 billion. As could be expected, Chinese government media warned that the new Dutch measures would be costly.</p> +<h3 id="1-introduction">1 INTRODUCTION</h3> -<h4 id="conclusion-1">Conclusion</h4> +<p>The Russian military has faced a wide range of shortcomings following its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Examples include a failure to conduct effective joint and combined arms operations, low morale of soldiers, inadequate leadership, poor logistics support to combat forces, and erroneous intelligence analyses. These problems have occurred despite considerable efforts by the Russian military to examine the future of war and to design a force capable of conducting effective conventional and hybrid operations. Russia’s challenges in Ukraine have also severely undermined its security position. Finland and Sweden have opted to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the West has imposed economic sanctions against Russia (including its defense industry), and the United States and other Western countries have provided significant military, economic, and political support to Ukraine.</p> -<p>Dutch semiconductor export controls were developed in response to unilateral U.S. measures combined with Washington’s diplomatic efforts to cajole the Netherlands to toughen its approach to high-tech semiconductor exports. Though the Netherlands has gone to great lengths to avoid the impression that U.S. pressure alone was the reason why new export restrictions were imposed following October 7, policymakers in The Hague have effectively been playing catch-up with Washington.</p> +<p>These challenges have enormous implications for the future of the Russian military in an increasingly competitive security environment. After all, if the Russian military has struggled against Ukraine, how might Russia fare in a future war with the United States and other NATO countries?</p> -<p>The United States may have nudged the Netherlands in a certain direction; initially to block EUV exports to China, and later to focus more on DUV technology. But given more time, policymakers in the Netherlands claim, the Dutch would have reached the same conclusions by themselves. This aligns with public statements by Dutch ministers insisting that the Netherlands makes its own decisions. Within Dutch business circles, however, it is widely believed that U.S. pressure was the dominant factor that led to Dutch action. Indeed, without the unilateral U.S. measures and Washington’s diplomatic campaign, it is questionable whether the Netherlands would have adopted the enhanced export licensing regime it did. The Netherlands developed an export control regime that addressed U.S. concerns about high-tech exports to China, but only after the United States took the first step — although the Netherlands did design a policy that fit the Dutch and European political and regulatory context.</p> +<h4 id="research-design">RESEARCH DESIGN</h4> -<p>One of those specific characteristics has been that The Hague would not agree to blanket restrictions, but would take a case-by-case, country-agnostic approach, avoiding singling out China. Even though the mood in the Netherlands is shifting toward taking a tougher line against China’s assertive industrial and technological ambitions, the Netherlands does not see the “China challenge” in the same way as the United States.</p> +<p>To better understand Russian military thinking, this report asks two sets of questions. First, how is the Russian military thinking about the future of warfare? Second, how might the Russian military evolve its force design over the next five years? As used here, “force design” includes the overall plan for structuring, staffing, training, and equipping military forces, including maritime, land, and air forces. Force design directly affects manpower policies and retention goals. It also impacts “force structure,” which includes the number and type of combat units a military can sustain, the forces a military has available, how they are equipped, and how they are organized.</p> -<p>This raises a number of important questions. Transatlantic unity is a Dutch security interest, particularly in light of the Russian threat to European security. However, the country’s trade relationship with China is substantial. The Netherlands therefore aims to walk a fine line between preserving its economic ties with China as much as possible while sustaining its deep economic and security relationship with Washington. The Netherlands has always been a staunch transatlantic ally, but it wants to avoid being drawn into a U.S.-China geopolitical stare-down that would hurt the country’s economic interests. The new semiconductor export regime shows how difficult this is likely to be.</p> +<p>To answer the main questions, this report uses a mixed-methods approach. First, the research involved a compilation and translation of primary- and secondary-source Russian analyses of warfare and force design across multiple domains of war. Examples included Военная Мысль [Military Thought] and Вестник Академии Военных Наук [Journal of the Academy of Military Sciences]. A limited number of analytical opinion and commentary in such publications as Военно-промышленный курьер [Military-Industrial Courier], Красная звезда [Red Star], TASS, and others were also included.</p> -<p>One of the main concerns emerging from the new Dutch export control regime is that Chinese ambitions to substitute ASML’s kit with indigenous lithography technology will now become a national Chinese obsession. This obviously has short-term commercial implications, but it could also make Dutch-Chinese relations more tense and spur a program of domestic Chinese innovation that might ultimately put the Dutch semiconductor industry at a disadvantage. This could undermine the unique position in the field of semiconductor equipment that it wishes to preserve.</p> +<p>While reviewing these documents is important, there are some limitations. For example, the quality of Russian military journals has declined over time — especially following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Articles frequently lack innovative thought. Part of the reason may be because Russian military thinkers have few incentives to write critical and reflective pieces during a war that has gone poorly for the Russian military and in a country that has become increasingly totalitarian and wary of any criticism — explicit or implicit. In addition, this analysis uses only unclassified material. An assessment on Russian military thinking with access to classified information and analysis would still face information hurdles and gaps in knowledge. But a reliance on open-source information presents even greater hurdles. Nevertheless, taking precautionary steps — such as qualifying judgments where appropriate and identifying gaps in information — still leads to a useful understanding of Russian thinking on the future of warfare and force design.</p> -<p>Another concern is that the new policy will be implemented on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. In practice, this means that the United States and the Netherlands will continue to have an intensive dialogue about semiconductor export licensing. Each time a company applies for an export license, U.S. officials will be ready to weigh in with an opinion on the technology to be exported and the end user involved.</p> +<p>Second, this report benefited from interviews with numerous government and subject matter experts. One example was a trip to NATO’s eastern flank — including Finland, the Baltics, and Poland — to talk with military, political, and intelligence officials about how Russian military leaders view the future of warfare and force design. The report also benefited from interviews with officials from the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada, the United States, Ukraine, Finland, Estonia, Poland, and NATO, as well as discussions with a range of subject matter experts from such organizations as the Polish Institute of International Affairs, the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.</p> -<p>The Hague expects around 20 export license requests annually based on its June 23 export regime. But it is plausible that additional measures will be put in place in the next few years. Currently, the trend is toward a more — not less — restrictive attitude to exporting to China. For example, in its 2022 annual report, the Dutch military intelligence agency MIVD warned extensively about China’s economic and technological ambitions. “China” and its derivatives were mentioned 96 times, which was only surpassed by mentions of Russia. Economic security is of increasing concern.</p> +<h4 id="organization-of-the-report">ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT</h4> -<p>Similarly, implementation of the new inbound investment screening law will start in 2023. Chinese investments will receive a lot of attention. On May 31, 2023, the Netherlands designated semiconductor technology as “very sensitive” under the recently enacted Dutch foreign direct investment screening regime, meaning it will receive the highest degree of investment scrutiny. In August 2023, the United States adopted an executive order to screen certain outbound investments. There is a growing possibility that the European Union and its member states could move in a similar direction and adopt an outbound investment screening mechanism of its own. So far, the Netherlands has taken a lukewarm approach. But the mood is shifting. The upcoming parliamentary elections on November 22, 2023, may well put a new Dutch government in office that embraces a tougher line on exports to, and investments in, China’s high-tech sectors. Should an outbound investment screening policy be adopted, implementing it along with a toughened export control regime will require substantially more government resources to increase economic intelligence, as well as underscore the need for more transatlantic coordination.</p> +<p>The rest of this report is divided into the following chapters. Chapter 2 examines the historical evolution of Russian thinking about the future of warfare and force design. Chapter 3 analyzes contemporary Russian thinking about the future of warfare and force design. Chapter 4 provides an overview of challenges that the Russian military may face in implementing these changes.</p> -<p>Given the differences in government capacity between the Netherlands and the United States, the different transatlantic economic and security interests at stake, and the need for the Netherlands to be able to make autonomous decisions regarding the export of critical technologies, The Hague would be well advised to consider the following recommendations:</p> +<h3 id="2-the-historical-context">2 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT</h3> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Increase its economic intelligence capabilities and its economic security apparatus.</strong> If the Netherlands wants to preserve its unique position in the global semiconductor value chain, it should make commensurate investments to increase government capacity to monitor, screen, and understand how semiconductor technology is impacting geopolitics. It should not be dependent on the United States for this. Some promising but limited steps have been taken. For instance, the government is increasing its technical expertise and hiring more staff to oversee export controls, and diplomats dealing specifically with economic security have been posted in Beijing and Taipei. But more should be done, particularly in the area of improving its economic intelligence capabilities. With its unique position comes unique responsibility.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Embed Dutch efforts in a broader European initiative to preserve and grow a strategic semiconductor ecosystem.</strong> The EU Chips Act is a good start, but more action will be needed. Export controls are a national competence, albeit embedded in EU legislation. European countries that are key nodes in ASML’s supply chain, most notably Germany, must be made aware of how the October 7 measures necessitate stronger European cooperation and coordination. Similarly, the Netherlands must understand that ASML is not just a Dutch champion, but also a European one. The Hague has announced that it will publish a national technology strategy by the end of 2023. Paradoxically, that strategy should make a strong case for European technology cooperation.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>This chapter briefly examines the evolution of Russian views on warfare and force design from the end of the Cold War to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It is not meant to be a comprehensive examination of historical trends in Russian views on warfare and force design, but rather is intended to establish a baseline for analyzing Russia today. Consequently, it focuses on three developments that are representative of the evolution of Russian military thinking on future warfare: precision weapons and related concepts, such as the reconnaissance-strike complex and reconnaissance-fire complex; force design, including the creation of battalion tactical groups (BTGs); and irregular and hybrid warfare.</p> -<p>Unsurprisingly, the Netherlands wants to develop a multilateral framework within which to coordinate new export policies for sensitive dual-use technologies. It has no interest in keeping this a bilateral Dutch-U.S. affair and having its arms twisted repeatedly by Washington. Traditionally, the Netherlands has sought security in multilateralism, and in light of the June 23 Dutch export controls it has promised to put new ideas forward in the Wassenaar Arrangement. However, The Hague is clear about the limitations of the current Wassenaar Arrangement; decisions are made by consensus, and current geopolitical tensions mean Russia’s membership of Wassenaar frustrates effective decisionmaking. From this perspective, a new multilateral “Wassenaar-like” arrangement appears desirable. Yet the politics are tricky. If such an arrangement were to exclude Russia and China, as it would most likely do, it will be seen as a U.S.-inspired, anti-Chinese technology bloc. It would make Dutch — and European — efforts to manage tensions with China while not siding explicitly with Washington increasingly complicated. So a smaller framework with a more limited scope could offer the best way forward. It could focus on one or a number of key technologies instead of the full range of dual-use technologies. For example, a first step could be to bring the main semiconductor machine manufacturing economies — including Japan, the United States, South Korea, the Netherlands, Germany, and the European Union — together to discuss common export policies and develop a common understanding of how the geopolitics of semiconductor technology is changing. Without such multilateral action, the Netherlands may be left to play catch-up with Washington for some time.</p> +<p>The rest of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first examines the evolution in Russian thinking about precision weapons and related developments. The second section outlines the evolution of Russian force design. The third assesses Russian thinking about hybrid and irregular warfare. The fourth section provides a brief conclusion.</p> -<h3 id="taiwanese-perspective">Taiwanese Perspective</h3> +<h4 id="precision-weapons">PRECISION WEAPONS</h4> -<p><em>Geopolitical Challenges Should Not Dilute Taiwan’s Focus on Mastering Advanced Technologies and Critical Applications</em></p> +<p>Beginning in the 1970s, Soviet military thinkers were at the forefront of grappling with the implications of technological innovations on warfare, what some called the Military-Technical Revolution (MTR). One of the most influential figures was Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Union. According to Ogarkov, emerging technologies made it possible to see and strike deep in the future battlefield. These advances required organizational and conceptual changes to adjust force design and structure in each military service.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="chau-chyun-chang">Chau-Chyun Chang</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Among the most significant advances were long-range, high-precision weapons, which could increase the potential for attacking an adversary’s command-and-control facilities and lead to a compressed sensor-to-shooter kill chain. By the 1980s, the debate about the impact of the MTR led to the development of several concepts: deep operations battle, the reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire complexes; and operational maneuver groups. In a 1983 article in Red Star, Ogarkov concluded that there were significant changes afoot in warfare because of “precision weapons, reconnaissance-strike complexes, and weapons based on new physical principles.” In a 1984 interview with Red Star, he noted that “the development of conventional means of destruction . . . is making many kinds of weapons global” and is triggering a rise “in the destructive potential of conventional weapons, making them almost as effective as weapons of mass destruction.”</p> -<h4 id="introduction-2">Introduction</h4> +<p>After the end of the Cold War, Russian views on the future of warfare and force design were significantly impacted by a close examination of U.S. wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, the Balkans, and other areas, as well as Moscow’s own experience in Chechnya, Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine. Russian military thinkers paid close attention to U.S. military operations and strategic thinking. The First Gulf War (1990–1991) and Second Gulf War (2003) were, in many ways, watershed moments for the Russian military. According to Russian analyses, the United States’ technological superiority over the Iraqi military overwhelmed the numerical advantages of the Iraqi military. As one assessment concluded, “Reconnaissance, fire, electronic, and information warfare forces of different branches and arms of the service were integrated the first time ever into a shared spatially distributed reconnaissance and strike system making wide use of modern information technologies and automated troops and weapons control systems.”</p> -<p>Since the Trump administration initiated a trade war with China in 2018, the United States has been continuously escalating its policy of containment toward China in the economic realm. Under the Biden administration, the trade war has evolved into a technology war, elevating economic issues to the level of values and ideology and treating economic security as a matter of national security. The United States has increasingly tightened its grip on China’s technological industry, collaborating with allies to jointly block and restrict China’s access to technology, equipment, and talent. The United States has actively promoted precise controls through the concept of “high fences around small yards” and established a new normal of “selective decoupling” between the U.S. and Chinese economies, while avoiding a complete decoupling.</p> +<p>The U.S. military began with a massive attack by some of the latest electronic warfare capabilities and then launched, in parallel, an offensive by the U.S. Air Force and sea-based cruise missiles, reinforced with reconnaissance strike aircraft and artillery barrages.</p> -<p>Through the fabless manufacturing model, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry has propelled the development of the upstream integrated circuit (IC) design and downstream packaging and testing industries. In 2022, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry achieved a production value of $162.3 billion, making it the global leader in the foundry and packaging/testing industries, and the second-largest in terms of overall production value and design. As the U.S.-China tech war intensifies, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which produces over 90 percent of the world’s advanced chips, has become a strategic focal point in a new cold war between the United States and China. This article explores how TSMC and the Taiwanese government are responding to the changing geopolitics through multilateral cooperation with the United States, Japan, and the European Union to enhance semiconductor supply chain resilience. These efforts are aiming to strike a balance between national security and industry development, allowing the semiconductor industry to continue serving as Taiwan’s “guardian mountain.”</p> +<p>In these operations, the U.S. military effectively used technologies to conduct non-contact warfare (бесконтактная война) in which much of the fighting would take place using stand-off precision weapons. Medium- and long-range strikes from air, maritime, land, cyber, and even space-based platforms aided ground forces. As Major General Vladimir Slipchenko argued, for example, new technologies increased the importance of precision-guided weapons (or высокоточное оружие) and increased the role of airpower and the information components of war (including psychological operations, electronic warfare, and cyber warfare). The origins of Russian approaches toward non-contact warfare stem, in part, from the leading Russian military theorists inspired by the intellectual legacy of Ogarkov’s revolution in military affairs.</p> -<h4 id="taiwans-response-to-us-export-controls-on-china-and-the-chips-act">Taiwan’s Response to U.S. Export Controls on China and the CHIPS Act</h4> +<p>Integrating these technologies into warfare would also require an evolution in concepts. One of the most important was an evolution in the reconnaissance strike complex (or разведивательно-ударный комплех) for stand-off strike, which involved the need to collect real-time intelligence and quickly push information to air, ground, and maritime units for strikes. A major goal of the reconnaissance strike complex was to improve command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) on the battlefield to facilitate the coordinated employment of high-precision, long-range weapons linked to real-time intelligence data.</p> -<p>Since the initiation of the trade war with China by the Trump administration in March 2018, the technology war led by the Biden administration has continued to escalate, with the United States implementing an expanding series of export control measures. Prior to 2022, the United States had successively added Fujian Jinhua, Huawei, and the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) to the Entity List, and through adjustments to the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR), it restricted Huawei and its affiliated companies (such as HiSilicon Semiconductor) from using software and technology on the U.S. Commerce Control List, thereby limiting the design and production of their products. Additionally, without U.S. licenses, U.S. companies were prohibited from selling advanced semiconductor technologies and equipment with process nodes of 10 nanometers (nm) and below to SMIC, hampering its progress in advanced processes.</p> +<p>Russian operations in Syria underscored the growing importance of precision strike to support ground force advances and to hit adversary logistics hubs and other targets. A growing reliance on long-range strike requires sufficient stockpiles of munitions (especially precision-guided munitions); an arms production capacity able to produce munitions in sufficient quantities; adequate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to identify potential targets; and an all-domain command-and-control system that allows users to quickly take advantage of real-time intelligence.</p> -<p>In 2022 and beyond, the United States has adopted more flexible export control measures against China from various angles, particularly in the semiconductor field. For instance, in August 2022, the United States targeted advanced technologies below the 5 nm node for multilateral export controls based on the consensus reached in the Wassenaar Arrangement. The same month, the U.S. government unilaterally implemented control measures on GPU chips, restricting U.S. suppliers, such as Nvidia and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), from selling chips used in artificial intelligence (AI) and supercomputers to China. Furthermore, it also imposed restrictions on KLA, Lam Research, and Applied Materials regarding selling semiconductor manufacturing equipment used in the production of 14 nm logic chips to China.</p> +<p>Russia integrated its air operations into a reconnaissance-strike complex. The Russian military heavily relied on medium-range and long-range strike from air, land, and maritime platforms and systems to help ground forces take — and retake — territory. Moscow combined air operations with ground-based fires and sea-launched stand-off weapons. At the tactical level, Russia attempted to establish kill chains that flowed from sensors to warfighters. In addition, Russia took advantage of the relatively permissive environment in Syria to test and refine this concept, integrating strikes from fixed-wing aircraft with unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), such as the Orlan-10, Forpost, and Eleron-3SV; electronic warfare; space-based systems; and other ISR platforms and systems.</p> -<p>On October 7, 2022, the United States expanded its export restrictions on Chinese chips and equipment by modifying the Export Administration Regulations through an announcement by the Bureau of Industry and Security under the U.S. Department of Commerce. The main objective of these restrictions is to limit China’s capabilities in advanced computing chips, supercomputer development and maintenance, and advanced semiconductor manufacturing, thus initiating a new wave of export controls on China. The new rules leverage the United States’ dominant position by prohibiting foreign manufacturing facilities that use U.S. equipment and technology from selling relevant products to China. Additionally, the Netherlands and Japan also announced new export control measures regarding advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment necessary for the production of logic chips below the 14 nm node in January 2023. Future export control measures may continue to escalate and involve a broader range of control tools to maintain the United States’ leading position rather than just following principles that lead by multiple generations.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Y9xYjcp.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>A Forpost from Russia’s Baltic Fleet flies overhead in the Kaliningrad region.</strong> Source: Russian Ministry of Defense.</em></p> -<p>Furthermore, recognizing the lack of advanced domestic semiconductor manufacturing capacity as a national security issue amid the U.S.-China tech war and the post-pandemic chip shortage, the United States enacted the CHIPS and Science Act to enhance domestic semiconductor chip production and research capabilities, reducing dependence on other countries for manufacturing. The CHIPS Act also provides a 25 percent investment tax credit for semiconductor manufacturing companies, narrowing the cost gap between investments in the United States and overseas. In relation to these subsidies, the Department of Commerce has released details of the CHIPS Incentives Program for commercial fabrication facilities and has proposed national security guardrails. The proposed guardrails are meant to ensure that the technology and innovation funded by the CHIPS Act are not used by hostile countries (including China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) for malicious actions against the United States or its allies and partners.</p> +<p>However, there were challenges with the reconnaissance-strike complex. To begin with, Russia lacked sufficient numbers of precision-guided munitions. Roughly 80 percent of ordnance dropped over the first few months of the war in Syria were unguided bombs from Su-24s and Su-25s. In addition, the only dedicated airborne ISR assets that the Russian air force maintained in Syria were a small number of IL-20 Coots and the intermittent presence of a Tu-214R ISR testbed aircraft. The Russian air group’s pool of potential intelligence collectors was further thinned by a shortage of targeting pods that impaired the ability of Russian fighters to provide the kind of nontraditional ISR that Western militaries possess. The Russian air force could not match the 1:2 ISR-to-strike sortie ratio maintained by U.S. and coalition air forces in Iraq and Syria, much less the 4:1 ratio that NATO executed over Afghanistan.</p> -<p>The guardrails provision, which restricts chip production, research, or technology licensing in China, has sparked opposition from various sectors, as it affects market layout and the existing operational plans of companies. The Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) in the United States believes that the guardrails proposed by the Department of Commerce go beyond the scope of the CHIPS Act. The SIA argues that the proposed regulations overly expand restrictions from joint research and technology licensing to include general business activities such as patent licensing and participation in standard-setting organizations, which will impact industry and market development. The SIA suggests that subsidies under the CHIPS Act should prioritize activities related to national and economic security, but the current scope is too broad and ambiguous.</p> +<p>In addition, most Russian sorties in Syria were still deliberately planned missions. The Russian air force did not effectively operationalize the processes necessary to react on the fly to unexpected battlefield emergencies and was unable to take full advantage of its reconnaissance-strike complex. Russia failed to conduct the ground-directed dynamic targeting that has come to define most Western air operations.</p> -<p>The South Korean government, along with its companies, and Taiwanese manufacturers believe that (1) the provision of revenue sharing is not a commonly used norm to attract foreign investment, as it requires the disclosure of commercially sensitive information, and (2) revenue sharing may affect subsidized companies’ operational plans in China. Instead, they propose ensuring that overseas facilities can operate normally. They will continue to negotiate with the United States and hope that an optimal balance can be achieved through negotiations. Otherwise, the CHIPS Act will become too complex and interdependent to be implemented.</p> +<h4 id="force-design">FORCE DESIGN</h4> -<h4 id="impact-on-taiwanese-industries-and-countermeasures">Impact on Taiwanese Industries and Countermeasures</h4> +<p>Based on the Russian military’s views about the future of warfare, Russian force design evolved through the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russian thinkers based force design, in part, on a strategy of active defense (активная оборона). The concept of a strong defense has a long and rich tradition in Russian military thinking, including from such individuals as Alexander Svechin. It involved integrating preemptive measures and — if that failed — denying an opponent a decisive victory in the initial period of war by degrading their effort and setting the conditions for a counteroffensive. The strategy privileged a permanent standing force, arrayed as high-readiness operational formations in each strategic direction.</p> -<p>The United States has shifted its focus from targeting specific companies through entity lists to controlling technologies and setting thresholds for U.S. suppliers. By implementing control measures at the source, the scope of the measures has expanded to include not only Chinese companies but also foreign companies operating in China. Rather than imposing a complete export ban, the current series of high-tech control measures implemented by the United States requires manufacturers to undergo review.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/lLteJwp.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2.1: Example of a Russian Battalion Tactical Group.</strong> Sources: Mark Galeotti, Armies of Russia’s War in Ukraine (New York: Osprey, 2019), 40; and Dmanrock29, “Russian Battalion Tactical Group,” Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0).</em></p> -<p>Foreign companies in China, such as Samsung, SK Hynix, and TSMC, obtained temporary general licenses for six months after the implementation of the October 7 controls to prevent disruptions in their supply chains for goods produced in China but ultimately destined for customers outside of China. However, after the expiration of the temporary licenses, these measures will increase compliance costs for pertinent companies and potentially lead to their withdrawal from China. The World Bank said the ongoing trade war is creating non-tariff barriers, which will result in fragmenting markets and supply chains, as well as reducing collaboration and knowledge sharing in technology innovation. Therefore, it is likely that the link between the U.S. and Chinese semiconductor industries will weaken, leading to fragmented standards, differentiated supply chains, and a potential slowdown in global semiconductor technological diffusion and innovation.</p> +<p>One important period in force design was defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov’s “New Look” reform beginning in 2008, which led to one of the most radical changes in the Russian military since World War II. The goal was to create a flexible, professional army in a permanent combat-ready state that was able to mount a spectrum of operations from small-scale interventions to high-end warfare. Serdyukov reduced the size of the armed forces from 1.13 million to 1 million by 2012, and he decreased the size of the officer corps as well. As Serdyukov put it, “our army today is reminiscent of an egg which is swollen in the middle. There are more colonels and lieutenant colonels than there are junior officers.” Overall, the division gave way to a smaller, more flexible structure at the battalion level.</p> -<p>The United States is expanding its export controls on China in the semiconductor manufacturing and supercomputer industries, indicating a shift in the U.S. regulatory mindset. This not only slows down China’s progress in advanced technology research and innovation but also extends the impact to well-established mature-process (16 nm or larger) industries in China, potentially even leading to their downgrading. This measure has prompted Chinese companies to shift their focus toward mature-process capacity development. It is expected that China’s mature-process capacity will significantly increase in the coming years.</p> +<p>The reforms led to the dismissal of 200 generals, and the military cut nearly 205,000 officer positions. Before the reforms, the Russian order of battle resembled a smaller Soviet one, with 24 divisions, 12 independent brigades, and two separate external task forces deployed to Armenia and Tajikistan. However, only six divisions — five motor rifle divisions and a tank division — were at full strength and operational. Russian leaders believed that a smaller but better-equipped and -trained military could handle a range of conflicts. This process took place largely between 2008 and 2012. The army’s fighting force comprised 4 tank brigades, 35 motor rifle brigades and a cover, or fortification, brigade, supported by 9 missile, 9 artillery, 4 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, 9 air defense, and 10 support brigades. This left the army with 85 brigades, 40 of which were frontline combat units.</p> -<p>The United States aims to restrict the operational planning of international companies in China by implementing export controls and the provision of guardrails. Faced with production restrictions and increased geopolitical risks, it is anticipated that international companies will adjust their China footprint by shifting investment focus back to their home countries or diversifying regional investments. International integrated circuit design companies, driven by customer demands and autonomous risk-mitigation factors, are also gradually transferring mature-process orders to non-China foundries. In the short term, this shift benefits non-China foundries, but in the long term, they will still have to face the low-cost competition from Chinese counterparts who have made significant investments in mature processes. This situation creates a complex landscape of short-term opportunities and long-term challenges for non-China foundries.</p> +<p>Around 2015, however, the Russian military partially revived larger formations geared for major wars. In 2016, the military reactivated the First Tank Army in the Western Military District, including two reestablished divisions of long and revered history: the 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division and a reformed 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motorized Rifle Division that had been the first converted to a brigade.</p> -<p>Many technology companies have utilized the six-month grace period provided by temporary general licenses to shift their supply chain operations outside of China, but it is not technically or financially feasible for some other companies. Therefore, they actively seek potential alternatives, such as arguing that their products should be classified outside of the scope of the new restrictions. The feasibility of such claims may be tested in court by the Bureau of Industry and Security. Another potential point of contention is the FDPR, which determines whether a product is truly a “direct product” of U.S.-defined “technology” and “software” under the Export Administration Regulations.</p> +<p>The Russian military eventually adopted a force structure that could deploy as BTGs, or as the entire formation, such as a regiment or brigade. BTGs were combined arms units, which were typically drawn from all-volunteer companies and battalions in existing brigades. They were task-organized motorized rifle or tank combat entities designed to perform semi-independent combined arms operations. The goal was for Russians to deploy meaningfully sized field forces drawn from “kontraktniki” (or контрактники) — professionals who were better trained than conscripts and legally deployable abroad. While the structure of the BTGs varied somewhat based on operational needs and available personnel, most included roughly 600 to 800 soldiers. As highlighted in Figure 2.1, they were generally mechanized battalions, with two to four tank or mechanized infantry companies and attached artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, electronic warfare, and rear support platoons. The support platoon generally consisted of motor transport, field mess, vehicle recovery, maintenance, and hygiene squads. The result was a somewhat self-sufficient ground combat unit with disproportionate fire and rear support. Most BTGs had sufficient ammunition, food, and fuel in high-intensity combat for one to three days before needing logistics support.</p> -<p>Taiwan’s semiconductor industry has developed over 40 years and has established more than 1,000 related companies in its supply chains, making it one of the most efficient global production clusters. In response to U.S. requirements, TSMC plans to invest $40 billion to build two wafer fabs in Arizona. This investment is a result of confirming local customer demands in the United States and having long-term contracts in place. Customers and the U.S. federal government have committed to sharing part of the costs to enhance return on investment. However, TSMC currently faces challenges, such as rising costs in construction and operation, which will reduce profitability. Additionally, the eligibility requirements for subsidies under the U.S. CHIPS Act, difficulties in attracting global talent to work in the United States, and the complexities of managing U.S. employees pose further obstacles for TSMC.</p> +<h4 id="hybrid-warfare">HYBRID WARFARE</h4> -<p>The primary applications of TSMC’s advanced processes, including high-performance computing (HPC) chips for AI and supercomputers, are within the scope of the current export restrictions. In the first quarter of 2023, these HPC applications accounted for 44 percent of TSMC’s revenue. However, related restricted companies such as Nvidia have indicated the availability of alternative downgraded products for sustained export to China. In the short to medium term, it is not expected to significantly impact the revenue of TSMC. If the scope of the restrictions is expanded in order to prevent any loopholes and includes other advanced process chips (such as mid-range GPUs and HPC chips used in consumer products), it will affect TSMC’s revenue from advanced process manufacturing and weaken its capability to invest in advanced processes in the long run.</p> +<p>Finally, Russia relied on a mix of regular and irregular actions — or hybrid warfare (гибридная война). As used here, irregular warfare refers to activities short of regular (or conventional) warfare that are designed to expand a country’s influence and weaken its adversaries. Examples include information and disinformation operations, cyber operations, support to state and non-state partners, covert action, espionage, and economic coercion. In addition, hybrid warfare involves the combination of regular and irregular warfare.</p> -<p>TSMC announced that it is building additional mature-node capacity outside of Taiwan. In Japan, TSMC and its Japanese partners are building a specialty technology fab which will utilize 12 nm, 16 nm, and 22 nm/28 nm process technologies. Volume production is scheduled for late 2024. TSMC is also considering building a second fab in Japan, as long as customer demand and the level of government support makes sense. TSMC announced that it will jointly invest in European Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (ESMC) with Robert Bosch (Bosch), Infineon, and NXP to establish a €10 billion ($10.8 billion) 12-inch (300-millimeter) wafer fab in Dresden, Germany. TSMC will invest €3.5 billion ($3.8 billion) alongside an allocated €5 billion ($5.4 billion) of support from the German government. TSMC will hold 70 percent of the shares and other companies will each hold 10 percent of the shares. Construction will begin in 2024, with first production expected to begin in 2027. In China, TSMC is expanding 28 nm capacity in Nanjing as planned to support local customers and continues to fully follow all rules and regulations.</p> +<p>State and non-state partner forces played a critical role in conducting ground operations — including fire and maneuver — with outside training, advising, and assistance efforts. In Syria, for example, Russia benefited from competent and well-trained Lebanese Hezbollah forces, which were well equipped and had significant experience fighting highly capable Israel Defense Force units in 2006 in Lebanon. Hezbollah forces were tactically and operationally proficient at cover and concealment, fire discipline, mortar marksmanship, and coordination of direct-fire support, which were helpful for their involvement in the Syrian war. Moscow also worked with militias whose members were recruited from Iraq, Palestinian territory, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other locations.</p> -<p>TSMC’s overseas investments have sparked debates in Taiwan regarding whether it is “hollowing out Taiwan” or pursuing “global expansion.” TSMC continues its research and development of 3 nm (N3), 2 nm (N2), and 1 nm (N1) advanced processes in Taiwan. It is expected to advance to N3E, an enhanced version of N3, in the second half of 2023, with the N2 process entering risky production trials in the second half of 2024 and reaching mass production in 2025. As for location, TSMC plans to establish N2 fabs in Hsinchu’s Baoshan and the Central Taiwan Science Park, and even the N1 process is planned to be located in Longtan, Taoyuan. Therefore, TSMC’s Taiwan headquarters will continue to maintain its leadership in process technology and keep the most advanced technologies and research capabilities in Taiwan to ensure Taiwan’s global leadership position and alleviate concerns of “hollowing out Taiwan.”</p> +<p>Russia also leveraged private military companies (PMCs), such as the Wagner Group, which trained and advised Syrian army units and a number of pro-Assad and foreign militias fighting for the regime, including the 5th Corps and Shia militias such as the Palestinian Liwa al-Quds. PMCs provided training to other Russian-backed Syrian militias, such as Sayadou Da’esh (Islamic State Hunters), which emerged in early 2017 and was deployed to protect installations in and around Palmyra, including the military airport and oil and gas fields. Other Russian PMCs, such as Vegacy Strategic Services, conducted smaller training missions for pro-regime militia forces, such as Liwa al-Quds. In addition, PMCs engaged in some urban clearing operations. Wagner Group forces, for example, participated in operations at Latakia, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and greater Damascus, as well as the counteroffensive to retake Palmyra in 2016 and 2017.</p> + +<p>More broadly, Moscow expanded its overseas use of PMCs to over two dozen countries, such as Ukraine, Libya, Sudan, Mali, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, and Venezuela. These countries spanned Africa, the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Russian PMCs cooperated closely with the Russian government, including various combinations of the Kremlin, Ministry of Defense, Foreign Intelligence Service, and Federal Security Service. PMCs performed a variety of tasks, such as combat operations, intelligence collection and analysis, protective services, training, site security, information operations, and propaganda to further Moscow’s interests.</p> + +<h4 id="conclusion">CONCLUSION</h4> + +<p>By Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the military had become a partial-mobilization force. Its leaders hoped to have more forces and equipment, reduced staffing and costs, and the ability to generate substantial combat power on short notice. The Russian military had also shed much of its Soviet legacy. It was ostensibly well suited to short, high-intensity campaigns defined by a heavy use of artillery and precision weapons, bolstered by such concepts as the reconnaissance-strike complex and reconnaissance-fire complex. The military could also conduct hybrid warfare by combining regular and irregular operations. Russian leaders were bolstered by the military’s success in helping the Bashar al-Assad government retake much of its territory in Syria. As would soon become clear, however, the Russian military was unprepared — at least initially — for a conventional war of attrition.</p> + +<h3 id="3-the-future-of-warfare-and-russian-force-design">3 THE FUTURE OF WARFARE AND RUSSIAN FORCE DESIGN</h3> + +<p>This chapter asks two questions: how is the Russian military thinking about the future of warfare, and how might the Russian military evolve its force design over the next five years? The chapter makes two main arguments based on a review of Russian documents, supplemented by interviews. First, Russian analyses generally conclude that while the nature of warfare — its essence and purpose — is unchanging, the character of future warfare is rapidly evolving in ways that may force Moscow to adapt more quickly. Of particular interest to Russian military thinkers is the continuing growth in precision weapons; autonomous and unmanned systems; specific emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI), stealth, and electronic warfare; and hybrid warfare.</p> + +<p>Second, Russian political and military leaders are committed to a major reconstitution of the Russian military — especially the Russian army — over the next several years, making Russia a serious threat. Future force design will likely focus on deterring and — if deterrence fails — fighting the United States and NATO if necessary. According to Russian assessments, the Russian military is considering evolving force design in several areas:</p> + +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Land</strong>: Russian force design in land warfare will likely include a continuing shift to divisions, although it is unclear whether the army can sufficiently fill the ranks of larger units. These changes mark a major shift away from the changes implemented under former minister of defense Anatoly Serdyukov. In addition, Russia will likely attempt to restructure its forces to allow for more mobility and decentralization in the field in response to U.S. and NATO long-range precision strike capabilities.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Air</strong>: Force design in the air domain will likely involve some reversals initiated by Serdyukov, as well as a major focus on unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). For example, the Russian military will likely attempt to increase the size of the Russian Aerospace Forces. The Russian military may also partially restructure its air forces to incorporate a significant increase in the use of UASs. Future developments may include the use of UASs for logistics in contested environments, which will require new organizational structures.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Maritime</strong>: Russia may expand its naval forces in response to growing tensions with the United States and NATO. The Ministry of Defense has expressed an interest in creating five naval infantry divisions for the navy’s coastal troops based on existing naval infantry brigades.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Space and Cyber</strong>: The Russian military will continue to develop its offensive space and cyber capabilities, including its electronic warfare capabilities. It will also likely try to expand the size and activities of the Russian Space Forces and a range of Russian cyber organizations, such as the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU), Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and Federal Security Service (FSB). But Russia will likely face serious challenges in implementing some of these changes, especially to the Russian Space Forces, because of Western sanctions and other factors.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<p>Russia will likely face significant challenges in making all — or even most — of these changes, as outlined in the next chapter. Consequently, Russia will need to prioritize which steps it takes, as discussed in the last section of this chapter.</p> -<p>Talent development is key to TSMC’s success. TSMC has hired more than 900 U.S. employees to date in Arizona and more than 370 in Japan. In addition to providing extensive training program for new overseas employees, many of them are brought to Taiwan for “hands-on” experience in fabs so that they can further their technical skills. Talent cultivation is vital to support TSMC’s future expansion of its global footprint, and pertinent assistance provided by host countries at both the local and central levels will bring positive impacts for building robust, localized semiconductor ecosystems.</p> +<p>The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first examines Russia’s current thinking about the future of warfare. The second section assesses Russian thinking about force design. The third focuses on how Russia may prioritize among force design options.</p> -<h4 id="taiwanese-government-strategies-and-actions-in-response-to-us-policy">Taiwanese Government Strategies and Actions in Response to U.S. Policy</h4> +<h4 id="the-future-of-warfare">THE FUTURE OF WARFARE</h4> -<p>Taiwan’s high-tech industry holds a crucial position in the global supply chain. While some exported goods have commercial applications, they can also be used for military purposes. To fulfill international responsibilities and protect the export interests of Taiwanese manufacturers, the Taiwan government established the Strategic High-tech Commodities Management System on July 1, 1995 under the “Regulations Governing Export and Import of Strategic High-tech Commodities,” which was enacted on March 31, 1994. Export controls for semiconductor wafer fabrication process technology were implemented in accordance with the Wassenaar Arrangement.</p> +<p>Russian military thinking generally assumes that the character of warfare is rapidly evolving, though the nature of warfare remains a violent struggle between opponents. If there were any doubts before, the war in Ukraine has been a stark reminder. “War,” Carl von Clausewitz writes, “is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.” War is still nasty and brutish. By contrast, the character of warfare — including the conduct of warfare, the speed and complexity of tactical decisionmaking, and the technology and weapons systems that militaries use and need — is evolving. In particular, technology is advancing in such areas as robotics, sensors, AI, cyber, space, long-range precision strike, hypersonics, and advanced communications, command, and control. There will also be an overload of information available to military and intelligence personnel that will be collected by space-based, aerial, ground, surface, sub-surface, and cyber sensors.</p> -<p>A significant portion of production equipment, technology, and products in the semiconductor industry is subject to controls. Export of semiconductor wafer manufacturing equipment falls under the “Export Control List for Dual Use Items and Technology and Common Military List” and requires applying for an export license. The exporter must also specify the wafer size and process technology level in the export license.</p> +<p>Overall, there are several themes about the future of warfare in Russian military thinking: contact versus non-contact warfare, autonomous and unmanned systems, technological innovation, and hybrid warfare. These are not meant to be exhaustive, but rather representative of some of the most important themes debated by Russian military thinkers.</p> -<p>Regarding applications for Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturers to invest in China, the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) has issued the “Operational Guidelines for Key Technology Review and Supervision of Investment in Foundry, Integrated Circuit Design, Integrated Circuit Packaging, Integrated Circuit Testing, and LCD Panel Plants in Mainland China.” These guidelines include several key points. First, for new foundries, an overall quota-control approach should be adopted, with a maximum limit of three 12-inch fabs approved for investment. There are no quantity restrictions for mergers, acquisitions, or investment in mainland China’s foundries. Second, the invested process technology must be one generation behind the company’s most advanced technology in Taiwan. And third, the applicant must be a Taiwanese foundry company.</p> +<p><strong>Contact vs. Non-Contact Warfare</strong>: There remains a tension in Russian military thinking between the future prevalence of contact warfare (контактная война) and non-contact warfare (бесконтактная война). On the one hand, numerous Russian military thinkers believe that warfare involving long-range precision weapons will become ubiquitous. On the other hand, many also believe that warfare will still involve violent contact between opposing ground forces that fight for control of territory. Russian military thinkers appear to be grappling with how to fight for control of territory while dealing with an adversary’s long-range precision strike.</p> -<p>Concerns about TSMC investing overseas and potentially “hollowing out” Taiwan have prompted the MOEA to promote amendments to Article 10-2 of the Statute for Industrial Innovation, commonly known as the Taiwan Chip Act. This amendment aims to provide tax incentives to Taiwanese companies that hold critical positions in the international supply chain, with the main goal of encouraging research and development in Taiwan and enhancing the country’s industrial research capabilities to maintain its leading position. The Taiwan Chip Act, dubbed the “largest investment incentive in history,” includes forward-looking innovative research and development incentives, which account for 25 percent of the expenses incurred. Additionally, the purchase of new machinery or equipment for advanced manufacturing processes is eligible for a 5 percent deduction, reducing the amount of corporate income tax payable for the current year.</p> +<p>Russian military analysts generally agree that there will be a continuing development of advanced precision weapons that allow for a “high level of target destruction.” The goal of non-contact warfare is to destroy the adversary’s will and ability to fight at a distance before any contact occurs — or, at the very least, to strike fixed-wing aircraft, air defense systems, and other targets and weaken the adversary’s ability to hit back or defend itself. Conducting these types of attacks will increasingly require good intelligence about the adversary’s locations, plans, and intentions.</p> -<p>To safeguard Taiwan’s competitiveness and economic interests in the high-tech industry and prevent China from stealing technology and poaching Taiwanese talent, the Taiwanese government announced amendments to the National Security Act on June 8, 2022. The revised law incorporates protection for trade secrets related to national core critical technologies under Article 3, aiming to deter malicious talent poaching and unauthorized outflow of key core technologies to competitors such as China. Furthermore, the Cross-Strait Relations Act and the National Security Act were simultaneously amended and announced on June 8, 2022, adding provisions that individuals, corporations, groups, or other institutional members engaged in national core critical technology businesses under the commission, subsidy, or investment of government agencies or organizations must obtain approval through a review process coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior and other government agencies before going to China. The same applies to those who have terminated their commission, subsidy, or investment or have resigned within three years.</p> +<p>The importance of long-range air, ground, and naval fires in Ukraine has reinforced the need to continue developing precision capabilities and the reconnaissance-strike complex (разведивательно-ударный комплех) and reconnaissance-fire complex (разведивательно-огновой комплех). After all, Russian forces have failed to conduct dynamic targeting in Ukraine and to quickly move from sensor to shooter in a kill chain. Ukraine has also demonstrated that long-range precision strike may require large volumes of munitions when facing an adversary with good — or reasonably good — air defense capabilities.</p> -<p>In March 2022, the U.S. government proposed the formation of the Chip 4 Alliance, also known as Chip 4, with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. After the passage of the CHIPS Act, the United States actively accelerated the alliance’s promotion. The United States claims that Chip 4 will provide a platform for governments and companies to discuss and coordinate supply chain security, semiconductor talent, research and development, and subsidy policies. The United States’ potential intention may be to form an “anti-China alliance” by jointly promoting semiconductor exports and technology control measures with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In summary, the United States plans to bring governments and companies together under the alliance framework. With Japan’s competitive advantage in semiconductor equipment and materials, Taiwan’s complete semiconductor industry clusters, and South Korea’s leading position in memory, Chip 4 will enable the United States to view Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan as part of its semiconductor strategic influence. According to an analysis by the Korea Times, the United States’ preparations for Chip 4 may appear to be aimed at countering China’s semiconductor rise, but its true purpose could be to buy time and strengthen U.S. chip manufacturer Intel. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s MOEA has proposed two major directions under the Taiwan Initiative for Chip 4 focusing on semiconductor supply chain collaboration and resilience as well as ensuring the security of vital chip supplies.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, Ukraine has highlighted the persistence of contact warfare and the need to fight for control of physical territory. As one Russian analysis concludes, “There is no reason to expect that [long-range precision weapons] will render useless the more advanced forms and methods of contact warfare. . . . The supporters of this theory spread false information, arguing that modern and, above all, future wars will only be non-contact.” Warfare will still hinge, in part, on the struggle for territorial control that involves the use of brute force among armies.</p> -<p>The semiconductor industries in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are closely intertwined with the Chinese market, making it impractical to form an alliance that completely cuts off the semiconductor supply chain to China. In practice, relevant companies are caught between the U.S.-China confrontations. Companies need to devote extra resources to develop downgraded products to comply with U.S. policy restrictions to maintain their position in the Chinese market. On the other hand, companies also need to endure unfair competition brought by the Chinese government through the Dual Circulation as well as looming retaliations. Additionally, the semiconductor supply chains of South Korea and Taiwan have been engaged in mutual competition with their U.S. counterparts for years. South Korea and Taiwan collectively hold over 80 percent of the global chip manufacturing market, making it essential to properly safeguard their critical intellectual property rights and corporate value. It is not feasible for them to become mere followers of the U.S. semiconductor industry monopoly within the framework of Chip 4, and there are significant concerns regarding the goals and benefits of establishing Chip 4.</p> +<p>The broader debate about contact and non-contact warfare has at least three implications. First, Russia and its partners (such as China) will be in a race with its adversaries (such as the United States) to develop precision weapons that are faster, stealthier, longer range, and carry a higher payload. Examples include the use of more advanced seekers, improved surface material on missiles, laser guidance, anti-jamming capabilities, sensors, and robust algorithms for precision strike. Second, the growth in precision weapons will present significant dangers to ground forces, which will be exposed to saturation from medium- and long-range strikes. As discussed later in this chapter, ground forces will likely need to be more mobile and decentralized. Third, Russian assessments conclude that the military needs to expedite defensive measures to protect civilian and military targets. One area is integrated air and missile defense to defend against incoming stand-off weapons. Another is denial and deception (maskirovka, or маскировка) to make it more difficult for adversaries to identify and hit targets, including the use of concealment, thermal camouflage, anti-thermal material, imitation with decoys and dummies, denial, disinformation, and other tactics, techniques, and procedures.</p> -<p>Facing the changing geopolitics, Taiwanese companies expect the Taiwanese government to fully grasp the evolution of foreign policies, communicate promptly with industry players, and devise strategies to adapt to the changing global supply chain. This includes comparing and analyzing the geo-economic strategies of various countries and examining the compatibility and responsiveness of Taiwan’s own strategies, ensuring the indispensability of relevant industries in Taiwan within the global supply chain. Furthermore, the government should address the requirements for Taiwan’s supply chain autonomy and resilience. It should carefully evaluate national security and domestic and international needs and assist relevant businesses in implementing decentralized layouts to maintain the position of Taiwanese businesses in the global supply chain.</p> +<p><strong>Autonomous and Unmanned Systems</strong>: Russian assessments of the future of war assume a growing role for all types of unmanned systems — air, land, surface, and sub-surface. The importance of unmanned systems also means that a key aspect of future warfare will be countering these systems.</p> -<h4 id="conclusion-and-recommendations">Conclusion and Recommendations</h4> +<p>UASs — including micro- and mini-UASs — offer a useful example of Russian thinking on unmanned systems. According to a range of Russian military analysis, UASs will be increasingly critical for future warfare because of their utility for aerial reconnaissance, target designation for artillery and other weapons systems, precision strike, attack assessment, survey of terrain to produce digital maps, logistics (such as moving cargo), aerial refueling, communications, and electronic warfare. While UASs were often utilized in the past for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike operations, they will likely be important for combined arms operations in the future — including a critical part of Russia’s reconnaissance-strike complex. As Russian president Vladimir Putin remarked:</p> -<p>The United States’ efforts to contain China’s rise through export controls and restructuring the global semiconductor industry are unlikely to yield substantial results in the long run. Imposing restrictions on the semiconductor industry will only push China toward self-reliance and accelerate the development of its domestic semiconductor industry. This may lead to Beijing successfully developing advanced semiconductor manufacturing processes and even constructing an independent semiconductor industry supply chain free from U.S. technology. U.S. containment of China will be effective only in the short to medium term, and industry analysts are optimistic that China will eventually break through the U.S. blockade to establish its own advanced semiconductor industry.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>The use of drones has become practically ubiquitous. They should be a must-have for combat units, platoons, companies and battalions. Targets must be identified as quickly as possible and information needed to strike must be transferred in real time. Unmanned vehicles should be interconnected, integrated into a single intelligence network, and should have secure communication channels with headquarters and commanders. In the near future, every fighter should be able to receive information transmitted from drones.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>China is actively seeking breakthroughs in U.S. technology restrictions through independent innovation. Some Chinese companies are shifting toward the open-source RISC-V architecture, fearing the loss of access to Intel x86 and ARM instruction set architectures. Over half of the 22 premier members of the RISC-V International Association are Chinese enterprises and research institutions. Chinese companies account for nearly half of the association’s 3,180 members. Several large Chinese companies have already released RISC-V chips, formed a new international grouping, and demonstrated China’s ability to overcome U.S. technology restrictions.</p> +<p>Numerous countries — including the United States — are pouring research and development resources into autonomous and unmanned systems. As Russian analysts recognize, for example, the U.S. Department of Defense and defense industry are working on such unmanned systems as the collaborative combat aircraft (including the Gambit, X-62 Vista, and XQ-58 Valkyrie), MQ-28 Ghost Bat, MQ-25 Stingray, MQ-1C Gray Eagle Extended Range, and loitering munitions such as the Phoenix Ghost and Switchblade lines. These efforts also include the development of AI so that unmanned systems can be entirely autonomous.</p> -<p>Experts believe that completely isolating U.S. technology and talent from the Chinese semiconductor market may cause the United States to lose its strategic weapon of using technology to constrain China. It could also result in companies participating in the U.S. blockade losing access to the Chinese market. Overall, U.S. policy toward China is based on an illusion, which is the root cause of the ineffectiveness of U.S. policies toward China. Therefore, some experts suggest that to contain China it would be more effective to let China rely on Western chips and technology.</p> +<p>The Russian military is also working to develop future swarming tactics for UASs. A swarm involves a large number of drones flying in a coordinated fashion. The integration of AI would allow UASs to make decisions on their own. Swarms could be particularly beneficial for strike operations if UASs could independently search for — and destroy — targets and adapt quickly to evolving conditions. Russia has watched with interest the swarming programs of adversaries, including the United States and United Kingdom. Development efforts may focus on intensifying information exchange among UASs, reducing their dimensions, enhancing their maneuverability, and minimizing their construction costs.</p> -<p>However, as the scope of the U.S. blockade on the Chinese semiconductor industry expands, it is described as casting a “silicon curtain” over China. The global semiconductor production chain will be divided into two poles: China and non-China. Taiwan mainly serves U.S. customers through foundry services, and in the future, convincing U.S. customers to place orders at the higher-priced Arizona fabs will be an operational challenge that TSMC needs to overcome. China is the largest semiconductor market globally, but the United States dominates critical semiconductor technology, equipment, and materials, and its international political influence far exceeds that of China. Finding a balance in the technology war between the United States and China will be a crucial issue for Taiwanese companies to address.</p> +<p>Russian assessments also conclude that the Russian military will need to improve its ability to counter unmanned systems. While Russia needs to develop and produce unmanned systems, so will its state and non-state adversaries. UASs will increasingly proliferate to state and non-state actors because the barriers to acquisition are so low. Many are inexpensive and commercially available. In addition, some Russian analysis suggests that advancements in engines, energy-saving technologies (such as high-energy solar arrays made from silicon, lithium, iron, and phosphate technologies), batteries, and lightweight material will increase the range, speed, and payload capacities of UASs.</p> -<p>The United States, Japan, and Europe have attracted major domestic and foreign manufacturers to invest in research and development and establish fabs through semiconductor policies, aiming to build resilient supply chains. TSMC, considering the evolving government policies, overall economic environment, customer demands, and market trends in the United States, Japan, and Europe, has announced plans to establish fabs in Arizona in the United States, Kumamoto in Japan, and Dresden in Germany, taking a global perspective on investment projects. However, the challenges faced by TSMC in setting up overseas plants require cooperation between TSMC and pertinent central and local governments — whether the goals set by various countries can be achieved in the future remains to be seen. For example, the cost of investing in the United States is 50 to 70 percent higher than in Taiwan. The CHIPS Act alone is definitely not enough to compensate for this difference, especially because many peripheral suppliers cannot apply the CHIPS Act at all. Therefore, accelerating the promotion of the Taiwan-U.S. double taxation agreement has become the general expectation of Taiwanese industries.</p> +<p>Russian assessments generally conclude that surface-to-air missiles and artillery are not cost effective against UASs. In addition, ground radar detection of micro- and mini-UASs will be difficult because UASs can hover for protracted periods and some types have a low Doppler frequency, making them difficult to detect. As one Russian assessment concludes, “The use of drones at all levels of armed formations, as well as the range of missions they perform, will constantly expand. This trend is expected to continue in the coming years. Thus, a program for designing and developing specialized radars and weapons of the given and prospective classes of micro- and mini-UAVs needs to be adopted.”</p> -<p>The geopolitical factors and regulatory supervision triggered by the U.S.-China tech war and various countries’ semiconductor bills will continue to reshape the global semiconductor industry’s landscape. The decisionmaking process for multinational corporations’ investment layouts has shifted from traditional considerations such as production costs, market attractiveness, technological support, and talent supply based on market dynamics and business realities to decisions made under the interference and restrictions of international relations and geopolitics. This is likely to significantly dampen the competitiveness of related industries. The Taiwanese semiconductor industry approaches geopolitical rivalry more discreetly. Even when forced to comply with relevant regulatory measures and respond to political pressures, the focus should still be on the deployment of advanced technologies and critical applications. By mastering more core technologies, Taiwan can maintain its global competitiveness and preserve its critical position in the global semiconductor industry.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/60gS6uC.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.1: Russian Assessments of Vulnerable UAS Components.</strong> Source: Г.А. Лопин, Г.И. Смирнов, И.Н. Ткачёв [G.A. Lopin, G.I. Smirnov, and I.N. Tkachov], “Развитие Средств Борьбы С Беспилотными Летательными Аппаратами” [Development of Assets to Counter Unmanned Vehicles], Военная мысль [Military Thought] 32, no. 2 (June 2023): 58–67.</em></p> -<h3 id="european-union-perspective">European Union Perspective</h3> +<p>Consequently, Russia is working on possible solutions that target critical subsystems of UASs using advanced electronic warfare systems, lasers, microwave weapons, and acoustic weapons. As Figure 3.1 highlights based on one Russian analysis, electronic warfare may be particularly useful against UAS electronic assets and optoelectronic systems, lasers against all key subsystems, microwaves against electronic assets and optoelectronic systems, acoustics against engines and electronic assets, and strike against all major subsystems. Electronic warfare appears to be especially promising for Russian military analysts.</p> -<p><em>Current EU Regulations Struggle to Adapt to a Post-October 7 World</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Ey8LzKa.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.2: Russian Analysis of UASs to Counter Unmanned Systems.</strong> Sources: Мариам Мохаммад, В. Н. Похващев, Л. Б. Рязанцев [Mariam Mohammad, V.N. Pokhvashchev, and L.B. Ryazantsev], “К Вопросу Повышения Эффективности Противодействия Малоразмерным Беспилотным Летательным Аппаратам” [Improving the Efficiency of Countering Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles], Военная мысль [Military Thought] 31, no. 4 (December 2022), 71.</em></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="francesca-ghiretti-and-antonia-hmaidi">Francesca Ghiretti and Antonia Hmaidi</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Russia has devoted research and development resources to examine various ways to counter UASs, such as installing miniature radars on UASs to double or triple the range for detecting incoming UASs. As Figure 3.2 highlights, this could include UASs operating in threatened sectors, while transmitters on antenna masts illuminate the reconnaissance area from protected positions.</p> -<h4 id="introduction-3">Introduction</h4> +<p><strong>Emerging Technologies</strong>: Another major theme of Russian military thinking is the growing importance of emerging technologies. As Russian strategic thinkers recognize, the United States and other NATO countries are investing in significant technological innovations. The previous section highlighted one area: unmanned systems. This section examines several others that Russian military thinkers believe may be important for future warfare.</p> -<p>In the European Union, export control regulations have become an increasingly pressing issue, especially since the Netherlands decided to expand its national export controls to “certain types of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment” by using articles 9 and 10 of the European Union’s 2021 regulation on dual-use export controls. While the new expansion of Dutch export controls does not officially target China, the process of adoption and the technology they focus on leave little doubt over who is the target. The Dutch expansion of export controls partially aligns with the United States’ new export controls adopted on October 7, which explicitly target China, and Japan’s new export controls, which do not.</p> +<p>One emerging technology is the use of AI. According to some Russian analyses, AI will lead to the emergence of new forms of offense and defense, such as swarms, autonomous unmanned systems, global cyber operations, and missile defense. As one Russian assessment concludes, the future will likely include “the emergence of highly autonomous combat systems in all areas of armed struggle, the transition from individual tactical unit control (items of weapons, military, and specialized hardware) and tactical groups to control systems based on AI.” Russia is engaged in AI development in multiple areas, such as image identification, speech recognition, control of autonomous military systems, and information support for weapons.</p> -<p>The issue of new export controls is twofold: China and the United States are engaged in a deepening great power competition that, for better or for worse, involves Europe as well. Technology plays a major role in that competition, but Europeans are traditionally not used to using protective measures strategically.</p> +<p>Another example is hypersonic technology. Hypersonic weapons combine the speed and range of ballistic missiles with the low altitude and maneuverability profile of a cruise missile, making them difficult to detect and capable of quickly striking targets. As one Russian assessment concludes, future warfare will involve the “widespread proliferation of hypersonic weapons in the air environment and supersonic weapons in the marine environment.” The Russian military is particularly interested in hypersonic technology because hypersonic cruise and ballistic missiles can overcome an adversary’s integrated air and missile defense and destroy its retaliatory strike systems.</p> -<p>The European Union has mostly been relying on traditional, multilateral dual-use export controls such as the Wassenaar Arrangement. Unfortunately, export controls under Wassenaar are unlikely to be expanded since Russia is a member and will block any such expansion. A proliferation of different export control regimes in the world, but especially within the European Union, which is possible under EU law, would be dangerous for EU unity, create gaps in the control of exports, and not help Brussels or national capitals to address the new challenges posed by the systemic competition between the United States and China, nor the role technology plays within it.</p> +<p>The Russian military is also interested in the future military application of other technologies, such as biotechnology, telecommunications, nanotechnology, quantum computing, stealth technology, laser weapons, and directed energy weapons.</p> -<h4 id="the-changing-eu-assessment-of-china">The Changing EU Assessment of China</h4> +<p>While this section highlights Russian interest in integrating emerging technology into its military, Russia is not a global leader in many of these technologies. Consequently, Moscow will likely lag behind such countries as the United States and China, which are pouring more money into the defense sector and have much greater capabilities. Russia has also suffered from a brain drain of talent in the technology sector. More founders of “unicorn” startups — privately held startup companies with a value of over $1 billion — leave Russia than any other country, according to one study. Another assesses that the Russian tech sector is hemorrhaging and is in danger of being “cut off from the global tech industry, research funding, scientific exchanges, and critical components.”</p> -<p>The European Union has been rethinking its foreign and security policy in a context of tension and uncertainties. The elements that led to the rethinking are known: the Covid-19 pandemic, the tensions between the United States and China, and the war in Ukraine. To that, one might add the tensions with the Trump administration for the tariffs introduced in 2018 and 2020 on steel and aluminum (suspended since October 2021) and China’s frequent use of coercive economic practices. The result is an unofficial shift in the European Union’s approach to China. In the 2019 EU-China Strategic Outlook, the European Union adopted a three-part framework that views China as partner, economic competitor, and systemic rival. That framework remains in effect, and the European Union is still actively seeking to find areas of cooperation and collaboration with China. However, the “partner” element of the relationship has become more difficult to carry on.</p> +<p><strong>Hybrid Warfare</strong>: Finally, Russian military thinkers assess that the future of warfare will include a combination of both state and non-state actors involved in regular and irregular operations, which may be best characterized as hybrid warfare. The concept of hybrid warfare has a long and rich tradition in Russian military thinking. Over the past several years, Russia has used government forces (such as special operations forces and intelligence units) and non-government forces (such as private military companies and Lebanese Hezbollah) to conduct extraterritorial actions. The Russian military may be cautious about leveraging some types of non-state or quasi-state actors in light of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s tension with the Russian military and insurrection against the Russian government in June 2023. But hybrid warfare will likely remain important for the Russian state. In fact, Russia’s challenges in conducting conventional warfare in Ukraine may increase Moscow’s proclivity for hybrid warfare, especially against the United States and other NATO countries that have superior conventional capabilities.</p> -<p>Hence, there is a slow reckoning that the “competitor” and “systemic rival” elements have become more predominant in the bilateral relationship than “partner.” The European Council conclusion of June 30 mentions the European Union’s intentions to “continue to reduce critical dependencies and vulnerabilities, including in its supply chains” and “de-risk and diversify where necessary and appropriate.” Two reasons make this important. First, it shows that the European Council views elements of European economic security, such as de-risking and diversifying, as core goals for the relationship with China. Second, through the use of the word “continue,” it demonstrates that the effort to increase the European Union’s resilience vis-à-vis China is not new and preceded both the European Council’s conclusions on China and the EU Economic Security Strategy from June 2023.</p> +<p>According to Russian analyses, future warfare will continue to involve non-state actors. After all, Russian analysts believe that such adversaries as the United States will utilize a wide range of non-state actors in the future to sow discord and instability. Based on the Ukraine case, Russian analyses also assume that adversaries such as the United States will use Western companies in multiple domains of warfare, including cyber (such as Microsoft and Amazon) and space (such as SpaceX, Hawkeye 360, and Maxar).</p> -<h4 id="the-eu-toolbox-for-economic-security">The EU Toolbox for Economic Security</h4> +<h4 id="force-design-1">FORCE DESIGN</h4> -<p>A few weeks before the publication of the European Council’s conclusions, the European Commission and the European External Action Service articulated the EU Economic Security Strategy in a joint communication that presented yet another three-pronged approach: promote, protect, and partnership. Many of the policies and measures — the so-called toolbox — listed in the communication have already been presented or adopted by the European Union in past months and years. Table 1 attempts to organize them in the three approaches identified, though there will be some overlap that is not reflected.</p> +<p>This section examines Russian thinking on force design, based in part on Russian assessments about the future of warfare. It focuses on several aspects of force design: land, air, maritime, cyber, and space. Chapter 4 then examines the challenges Moscow will likely face in implementing many of these changes.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2EHI2qj.png" alt="image02" /> -<img src="https://i.imgur.com/BTol23e.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: The European Union’s Economic Security Toolbox: Promote, Protect, and Partnership.</strong> Source: Authors’ analysis.</em></p> +<p>Russian military thinking about force design is based on an assumption that the United States — and NATO more broadly — will be Russia’s main enemy (главный враг) and greatest threat for the foreseeable future. Russian leaders have expressed concern about the expansion of NATO to Finland and Sweden, as well as the buildup of Western forces — especially U.S. forces — on NATO’s eastern flank. In addition, Russian political and military leaders assess that Russia’s struggles in Ukraine have been due to U.S. and broader NATO aid.</p> -<p>Semiconductor export controls will be an important trial by fire for the new EU Economic Security Strategy as well as for assessing how successful the European Union can be as a strategic actor, but it will not be the last test the strategy faces. By the end of 2023, the European Commission has pledged to do the following:</p> +<p>Consequently, Russia has closely examined U.S. force design efforts, such as the U.S. Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030. Force Design 2030 is in some ways an odd concept for Moscow to examine since it focuses on fighting a maritime conflict in the Indo-Pacific. But there are some broader discussions of the importance of precision fires and logistics in a contested environment. As Force Design 2030 concludes, the future of the U.S. Marine Corps will center around such capabilities as:</p> <blockquote> - <p>review the existing Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation . . . fully implement the EU’s export control regulation on dual use and make a proposal to ensure its effectiveness and efficiency . . . [and] propose an initiative to address security risks related to outbound investments.</p> + <p>Long-range precision fires; medium- to long-range air defense systems; short-range (point defense) air defense systems; high-endurance, long-range unmanned systems with Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Electronic Warfare (EW), and lethal strike capabilities; and disruptive and less-lethal capabilities appropriate for countering malign activity by actors pursuing maritime “gray zone” strategies.</p> </blockquote> -<p>Embedding export controls in a larger economic security strategy and basing them on the list of critical technologies the European Commission is currently identifying could increase member states’ buy-in, decrease potential blowback, and ensure uniform application across the European Union. But that is not an easy outcome based on the current state of the European Union, and member states especially, on this issue. There are three primary areas that may challenge the European Union’s ability to use semiconductor export controls strategically: (1) the current design of EU export controls, (2) the European Union’s focus on legacy semiconductors, and (3) disagreement with the United States over the October 7 export controls.</p> +<p>Russian military thinkers have also followed discussions about the U.S. military’s Joint Warfighting Concept and other efforts that outline U.S. views about future threats and force design. Russian analyses generally assume that the United States will attempt to conduct several actions that impact Russian force design:</p> -<p><strong>Current EU export controls are not up for the challenge of critical emerging technologies such as semiconductors, but an expansion is tricky.</strong></p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>Destroy early warning systems, air defense, missile defense, electronic warfare, and long-range precision weapons systems and capabilities;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Destroy or disable critical civilian and government installations, as well as key parts of the defense industrial base;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Disrupt command and control systems; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Disrupt transport infrastructure facilities.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>EU export controls are still narrow in scope and cover only dual-use goods, and in theory member states have given the mandate to the European Commission to expand the list of items included in the export controls to harmonize it with multilateral agreements such as Wassenaar. The traditional interpretation of this statute would suggest that the commission should not make amendments to the list beyond that purpose; for example, it should not amend it in line with the new Dutch export controls on semiconductors or similar nationally adopted export controls in the future. However, the commission could test the flexibility of the mandate.</p> +<p>The rest of this section examines five areas: land, air, maritime, space, and cyber.</p> -<p>Other member states could follow the Netherlands, which used article 9, and use the procedure envisioned in article 10 to themselves adopt the same export controls at the national level. The European Commission and the Netherlands can incentivize the adoption of cohesive lists via dialogues and diplomatic engagement.</p> +<p><strong>Land</strong>: Russian force design in land warfare will likely focus on revitalizing the Russian army over the next five years. Russia’s offensive maneuver formations in Ukraine have been heavily weighted toward artillery, armor, support, and enablers rather than infantry. This structure has undermined Russia’s ability to operate in urban terrain, support armor with dismounted infantry, conduct effective combined arms operations, and control terrain. There have also been shortages of key personnel, from enablers to logistics. The BTG structure is likely better suited to small-scale wars than to a large-scale conventional war.</p> -<p>Alternatively, following an internal risk assessment and the publication of the list of critical technologies in September, the European Commission could interpret its mandate broadly and make the case to change the list to protect those technologies. According to the potential risks identified in the internal assessment, the commission will propose different measures, among them potentially the expansion of the list of items subject to export controls. In that instance, however, at least informal support from member states would be required. In fact, member states can revoke the mandate given to the commission via a qualified majority vote, which is likely to happen if member states perceive the actions from the commission as a “power grab” of a national competence. Furthermore, even if the commission expands the list of items, the competence for licensing stays with member states, and they would not be forced to screen the items in the list proposed by the commission but would be strongly encouraged to adapt national licensing accordingly.</p> +<p>Russian design of land forces may include several aspects, based on Russian military thinking.</p> -<p>A lack of strategic and cohesive expansion of export controls by the European Union and member states would leave the block vulnerable not only to the export of sensitive technologies, but also to being pushed around by great power competition instead of setting its own agenda. Nonetheless, the formal process to expand export controls is only one of the many obstacles the European Union faces when thinking about export controls. The others include the difficulty in separating commercial and military uses of emerging technologies and the complexity of supply chains for these technologies, which makes controlling such components exceedingly difficult.</p> +<p>First, there will likely be a continuing shift away from BTGs to divisions to prepare for deterrence and warfighting against NATO. In particular, the Russian army will likely continue to move away from battalion formations to infantry, marine, and airborne divisions. This would mark a significant shift away from the changes implemented under former minister of defense Anatoly Serdyukov, who scrapped the Soviet-era structure of the armed forces that included large divisions as part of the “New Look” reforms. A substantial number of Seryukov’s changes are likely to be reversed over the next several years.</p> -<p>Commercial and dual-use technology is increasingly difficult to keep apart, making the strict division the European Union’s export controls currently relies on not fit for purpose. With China’s expanding definition of security, progressing military-civil fusion, and the “all-of-nation system” to address technology bottlenecks, “strategic technology” is everything China’s state needs to survive, according to the Chinese Communist Party. The party’s goal is for all strategic technologies to be produced indigenously in China to secure supply chains against sanctions and the effects of export controls. New technologies further blur the lines between military, commercial, and dual use. Semiconductors are inherently dual-use, and while there are some semiconductors that are specifically made for the military, such as radiation-hardened semiconductors, which more easily fall in the list of controllable items, off-the-shelf semiconductors are becoming more powerful and increasingly can be used for military purposes, making targeted export controls ever more difficult and less effective. Commercial technologies such as artificial intelligence and off-the-shelf semiconductors are increasingly being used in the military sector.</p> +<p>For example, Russian military leaders have indicated an intention to create at least nine new divisions: five artillery divisions, including super-heavy artillery brigades for building artillery reserves; two air assault divisions in the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), bringing its force structure to roughly equal with Soviet times; and two motorized infantry divisions integrated into combined arms forces. The Ministry of Defense will likely transform seven motorized infantry brigades into motorized infantry divisions in the Western, Central, and Eastern Districts, as well as in the Northern Fleet. It will also likely expand an army corps in Karelia, across the border from Finland. In addition, each combined arms (tank) army may have a composite aviation division within it and an army aviation brigade with 80 to 100 combat helicopters under the control of ground force units — not the Russian Aerospace Forces. This decision was likely a result of the poor joint operations in Ukraine, especially air-land battle, though it does not fix poor coordination between Russian land and air forces.</p> -<p>The European Union plays an important role in semiconductor supply chains, but this activity is not equally distributed among all EU member states, making coordination of policies more challenging. Overall, the European Union is a net importer of integrated circuits and a net exporter of production equipment. On materials needed for semiconductors such as silicon and gallium, the European Union is again a net importer.</p> +<p>As part of a restructuring plan, the military also re-established the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts as joint force strategic territorial units within the armed forces. This was another blow to the Serdyukov “New Look” reforms, since he had condensed six military districts into four, as well as changed their command-and-control relationships. The Western Military District’s failure during the invasion of Ukraine may have contributed to its downfall. The Russian military will also likely increase the number of contract service members, or kontraktniki (контрактники), and raise the age ceiling for conscription.</p> -<p>While a lot of the semiconductor supply chain is concentrated in Germany and the Netherlands, other EU member states play a role as suppliers or in some applications and research. The Netherlands, with ASML and ASM International, hosts world-leading companies, which, in the case of ASML, have a monopoly on specific advanced machinery, specifically extreme ultraviolet lithography. Germany plays a dual role, as a supplier of key chemicals, optics, and materials for both tool producers and chipmakers and as an important supplier of niche semiconductors. Mentor Graphics, a U.S.-headquartered subsidiary of German industrial giant Siemens, is one of only three producers of electronic design automation software, with a market share of roughly 20 percent.</p> +<p>Second, the Russian army may experiment with different formations at the tactical level, according to some Russian military thinkers. During the war in Ukraine, Russian infantry structures at the tactical level have evolved from deploying uniform BTGs as combined arms units to a stratified division by function into line, assault, specialized, and disposable troops. These infantry unit types might be formed into task-organized groupings in the future.</p> -<p><strong>The European Union’s strength is in legacy semiconductors not directly impacted by recent U.S. export controls.</strong></p> +<p>For example, line units could be largely used for holding territory and conducting defensive operations, and they could be based on mechanized units. They may not receive specific assault training, ensuring that they are largely used for defensive tasks. Assault units might include battalion-sized forces that are essentially reinforced battalions with a focus on urban and rural assault operations, including VDV and naval infantry units. They would receive additional training, perhaps akin to U.S. or other light infantry forces, and would likely be a skilled and valuable asset. Specialized units, particularly infantry, could be generated through the normal Russian recruitment and training system, and they might include VDV or Spetsnaz. In ground combat, they would likely be held back from the front lines, fight from well-defended positions, and include snipers, artillery spotters, and support weapon operators. Disposable units might be drawn from local militias, private military companies, or under-trained mobilized Russian civilians. These forces might be assigned the initial advances to adversary positions and would likely be susceptible to high casualties. They could be used for skirmishing in order to identify adversary firing positions, which are then targeted by specialized infantry, or to find weak points in defenses that could be prioritized for assault.</p> -<p>Europe also has an important role in research and development (R&amp;D). Belgium-based Institut de Microélectronique et Composants is an R&amp;D center collaborating with semiconductor firms worldwide. While Europe is very good at research and innovation, it is so far much less successful in translating this to industrial benefits. Very few chips today are designed or manufactured without U.S.-origin intellectual property.</p> +<p>Third, the Russian army will likely attempt to restructure its units to allow for more mobility in the field. The Russian Ministry of Defense has already indicated a desire to focus on motorized rifle and air assault divisions. The evolution of Ukraine to a war of attrition has been costly for Russian ground forces. With the growth in non-contact warfare and long-range precision strike, concentrated forces are likely to be highly vulnerable in the future. Some solutions for Russian units may include greater autonomy among soldiers at the squad, platoon, and company levels; standardized equipment among forces to maximize interchangeability; and a clearer understanding of the commander’s intent before operations begin. Each of these groups should have its own artillery mortars, field guns, launchers, UASs, and additional equipment.</p> -<p>The European Union currently holds roughly 10 percent of global chipmaking revenue, which is concentrated in power and industrial semiconductors. The most important European companies include the Netherlands’ NXP Semiconductors, Swiss-headquartered STMicro, Germany’s Infineon and X-FAB Silicon Foundries, and Austria’s AMS AG. These are focused on larger node sizes, analog chips, power semiconductors, sensors, and micro-electronic mechanical systems. Demand for these semiconductors is set to grow, especially with the green transition. While these semiconductors are often called legacy because they do not need to use small node sizes (and often even cannot use small node sizes due to physical properties), there is a lot of innovation happening, especially process innovation. As a result, China is increasingly competing with European semiconductor companies in areas of traditional European strength.</p> +<p>Fourth, Russian military thinkers have encouraged greater decentralization of Russian units, though this may be difficult in a military without a significant culture of delegation. Some assessments have concluded that Russian forces have lacked sufficient initiative in Ukraine because of poor training and command-and-control arrangements. As one assessment noted, Russian “commanders of primary tactical units (platoon, squad, crew, or team) have poor skills in organizing and performing independent actions. This, in turn, leads to the fact that when command and control is excessively centralized during combat, military units instinctively gather in dense combat formations, marching columns, and concentration areas.” These problems can lead to “sluggishness, situational blindness, and vulnerability of the tactical or operational groups. As a result, an adversary with low density and network-structured combat formations . . . has an undeniable advantage over such unwieldy, sluggish, and vulnerable groups.”</p> -<p>Regarding important consumers of semiconductors, Europe has a strong industrial base, with 37 percent of European semiconductor demand coming from the automotive industry and 25 percent coming from industrial manufacturing. Communications accounts for a further 15 percent, driven by European telecommunication equipment companies Nokia and Ericsson. Europe currently does not have a strong consumer electronics industry, one of the key direct consumers of current-generation chips.</p> +<p>Due to the over-centralization of Russia’s military command structure in the early stages of the war in Ukraine, Russian officers deployed increasingly close to the front — even for brief visits. This risky decision made them targets for Ukrainian strikes and resulted in high casualties among senior officers. The loss of senior- and mid-level officers, who played a large role in tactical operations, undermined command-and-control and initiative at lower-unit levels. One proposed solution in Russian military thinking is a reduction in the size of active tactical units on the battlefield. A frontal assault might involve a reinforced motorized rifle battalion with extended intervals between squad, platoon, and company formations. According to one proponent of this structure, “One of the new features of modern combined arms combat (combat operations) is the reduction of the main, active tactical unit on the battlefield while increasing the number of such units. The latter enjoy increased autonomy; in addition, they are homogeneous and independent, and horizontal coordination between them is important.”</p> -<p>Furthermore, power semiconductors and other wide-band gap semiconductors have very clear military applications, making them dual-use. Additionally, new materials such as silicon carbide and gallium nitrate are used both for dual-use chips and for some military components such as radars.</p> +<p>Fifth, Russian land forces may struggle to restructure their relationship with non-state and quasi-state actors, including Russian private military companies. As already noted, Russian military analyses assume that Russia, like many of its competitors, will continue to work with irregular forces in future wars. Following Prigozhin’s insurrection in June 2023, however, the Russian military began an effort to reintegrate the Wagner Group and other contractors into the military. Following the death of Prigozhin in August 2023, almost certainly at Putin’s instruction, the Russian government will likely attempt to reign in the Wagner Group and other private military companies under tighter Russian command-and-control.</p> -<p>The EU Chips Act is an EU policy aimed at strengthening the European Union as a chip producer while also addressing shortages and improving coordination. While it makes EU funding available, its most important provision makes it possible for EU member states to subsidize semiconductor companies in their own countries. Since the European Union is a single market, there are usually clear limits to subsidizing industries internally, but these have been effectively halted for semiconductor companies, provided they will build a “first-in-its-class” facility in Europe. This currently mostly applies to manufacturing and has the goal of increasing the European Union’s share of global semiconductor revenue to 20 percent. For instance, Germany is subsidizing an Intel fab in Magdeburg with $10 billion, 30 percent of the overall investment costs. This fab is set to house Intel’s most advanced manufacturing processes.</p> +<p><strong>Air</strong>: Force design in the air domain will also involve some reversals of reforms initiated by Serdyukov, as well as a major focus on UASs. Some of these changes are likely to be a reaction to problems encountered in Ukraine, while others are meant to deal with an expanded NATO viewed as a more significant threat and growing U.S. capabilities in global strike.</p> -<p><strong>Europe does not completely buy into the arguments for the United States October 7 export controls.</strong></p> +<p>In Ukraine, the Russian Aerospace Forces (Воздушно-космические силы, or VKS) has failed to achieve air superiority against a Ukrainian military with reasonable air defense capabilities, such as SA-10 and SA-11 surface-to-air missile systems, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), IRIS-T SL mobile air defense systems, and Patriot batteries. The success of Ukrainian air defenses, as well as the failure of Russian suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) operations to take out Ukrainian air defense capabilities, has deterred Russian aircraft from operating over most of Ukrainian-controlled territory. This means that Russia’s primary option to strike deep into Ukraine has been through cruise and ballistic missiles launched from Russia, Belarus, Russian-controlled territory in Ukraine, or maritime vessels in the Black Sea. In a war with U.S. and NATO forces, Russian air units would face an exponentially greater air defense threat.</p> -<p>EU member states and officials are not happy with the United States’ unilateral imposition of extraterritorial sanctions and export controls. This became an especially important point when Trump reneged on the Iran deal, thus forcing European companies to halt their Iran business or try to completely separate their business with Iran from the rest of the world.</p> +<p>As part of future restructuring, the Russian military has raised the possibility of increasing the size of the VKS by nine aviation regiments, including eight bomber regiments and one fighter regiment. This addition would come on top of three existing bomber regiments and six fighter regiments, as well as five mixed regiments with fighter and ground-attack units, four long-range bomber squadrons, and one expeditionary fighter squadron. In addition, the Russian Ministry of Defense created three new operational commands of aviation divisions within the Russian air force. This restructuring was a significant departure from the 2009 changes initiated by Serdyukov. He attempted to scrap the Russian air force’s regimental structure inherited from the Soviet Union and to transition to the airbase as the main structural unit composed of squadrons. But Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reversed several of Serdyukov’s decisions, and an aviation regiment became roughly comparable to an airbase in size.</p> -<p>The United States’ October 7 controls received mixed reactions in Europe. Many countries, as well as Brussels, have increasingly recognized the risks of the relationship with China, and they do not wish for European technology to contribute to China’s military modernization nor its repressive surveillance programs. At the same time, while the European Union sees China as a systemic rival, it does not see China as a security threat. The European Union still wants to construct a positive agenda with China, and from several conversations with EU officials it is clear that the bloc does not want to adopt policies, especially economic security policies, that explicitly target China. This difference is at the core of obstacles to transatlantic coordination on economic security policies, including export controls.</p> +<p>In addition, the Russian military will likely expand the use of UASs into the overall plan for structuring, staffing, training, and equipping air forces — as well as land and maritime forces. The Russians are not alone. The evolution of UASs is one of the most significant components of future force design, including with the U.S. focus on a range of unmanned systems such as the collaborative combat aircraft, loitering munitions, and fully autonomous UASs. UASs are likely to be a critical part of Russia’s reconnaissance-strike complex.</p> -<p>Most EU companies do not produce the cutting-edge chips covered under the October 7 controls. The pressure has thus been most acutely felt by equipment manufacturers. Since the United States did not originally invoke the Foreign Direct Product Rule on semiconductor manufacturing equipment, EU companies are less affected. Interviewees — including figures from EU companies and research organizations — frequently pointed out the administrative burden these export controls put on European actors. Out of necessity, many EU companies have become experts at U.S. export control law.</p> +<p>There are several Russian themes about unmanned systems and the future of warfare.</p> -<p>European stakeholders are concerned by the unintended consequences of U.S. export controls. China is already increasing investment in nonrestricted sectors such as legacy chips, areas of strength for Europe. U.S. export controls are seen as further encouraging China’s drive toward self-reliance in technology, hurting European businesses in China if they do not indigenize their entire supply chains. During the last Trade and Technology Council, held in Sweden, parties expressed that they “share concerns about the impact of non-market economic policies, on the global supply of semiconductors, particularly in legacy chips.”</p> +<p>First, UASs may increasingly replace some types of missiles, artillery, and even fixed-wing aircraft for medium- and long-range strike for air, land, and maritime forces. UASs will likely be integrated into key areas of the force, including land forces described in the previous section. According to some Russian assessments, future UASs with advances in precision, speed, payload, and range will likely offer several advantages over manned fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters: low radar visibility, an ability to perform most of the combat flight in complete silence, relatively low cost, and no casualties. In addition, Russian military thinkers have also raised the possibility that UASs could operate in low Earth orbit, though it is unclear whether Russia has the technical capability to achieve this over the next three to five years. As one Russian analysis notes: “Unmanned aerospace attack weapons capable of operating both in air space and in outer space, performing numerous high-altitude maneuvers, will become widespread.”</p> -<p>There is also worry about possible retaliation from China against the European Union or member states, should they implement export controls similar to those adopted by the United States. In July, China announced the introduction of new licenses for the export of gallium and germanium starting in August. The two metals are needed for the production of semiconductors and electronic components.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/OwfOBCl.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.3: Main Types and Payloads of Proposed Russian Cargo UASs.</strong> Sources: А. В. Топоров, М. С. Бондарь, Р. В. Ахметьянов [A.V. Toporov, M.S. Bondar, and R.V. Akhmetyanov], “Материально-техническая Поддержка В Бою И Операции: Проблемный Вопрос И Направления Его Разрешения” [Logistical Support in Combat and Operations: A Problem and Potential Solutions],” Военная мысль [Military Thought] 32, no. 2 (June 2023), 25.</em></p> -<p>Furthermore, EU companies and politicians are increasingly worried about the United States’ approach. The decision by the United States to engage with the Netherlands directly, instead of with the European Union, has been criticized. Belgian prime minister Alexander De Croo, for instance, argued that the United States making deals with individual countries instead of the European Union as a whole makes these countries vulnerable to “bullying” by the United States.</p> +<p>Second, Russia is interested in utilizing unmanned systems for military logistics in contested environments, though the Russian military has not yet operationalized this capability. An important goal is to develop and use UASs and other unmanned systems to deliver weapons, munitions, food, fuel, and other supplies to land, naval, and air forces. Used in this way, Russian forces would need to develop the necessary infrastructure, organizational structures, and processing systems to facilitate the use of UASs for logistics. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, there has been some Russian analysis about the different types and payloads necessary for cargo UASs.</p> -<h4 id="the-eu-specific-risk">The EU-Specific Risk</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Seo3aZt.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3.4: Diagram of the System for Cargo UASs.</strong> Sources: А. В. Топоров, М. С. Бондарь, Р. В. Ахметьянов [A.V. Toporov, M.S. Bondar, and R.V. Akhmetyanov], “Материально-техническая поддержка в бою и операции: проблемный вопрос и направления” [Logistical Support in Combat and Operations: A Problem and Potential Solutions], Военная мысль [Military Thought] 32, no. 2 (June 2023): 17–31.</em></p> -<p>On the one hand, targeting key countries may appear to be a faster and efficient solution. After all, why wait for the slow process of EU coordination when you only really need a handful of member states? And this may actually be a preferred solution for those member states who do not want to adopt extra export controls when they have no relevant interests or are not directly involved in semiconductors. It is also a good way to get the ball rolling, and then maybe other member states and the European Union as a whole will follow, which is likely to be the outcome of these new rounds of export controls.</p> +<p>The use of UASs for logistics will require new organizational structures. There is some consideration of a new special-purpose logistics service for the Russian military, as highlighted in Figure 3.4.</p> -<p>However, such an approach presents two very specific issues for the European Union. Firstly, if the controls introduced at the state level vary greatly, gaps and blind spots are likely to emerge. With the single market, nonrestricted goods can flow internally, and thus goods could be exported via other countries. Secondly, single member states can be exposed and singled out. In fact, it is undeniable that one member state has less negotiating power than the whole of the European Union, and by being bilaterally targeted, it is also deprived of the protection the bloc can provide. Furthermore, possible eventual retaliation could be targeted at one member state rather than the whole of the European Union, leaving the state exposed to economic coercion.</p> +<p>Some Russian assessments judge that fixed-wing manned aircraft — especially fighter aircraft — may be less relevant in the future. As one Russian assessment concluded:</p> -<p>As China has been shown to target the weakest link, this can facilitate the emergence of internal divisions and self-interest in EU member states who may not be willing to take a hit to protect another member state. The EU Anti-Coercion Instrument partially addresses this issue, but does not do so entirely. That is probably one of the reasons why The Hague has kept communication and coordination with Brussels open throughout the process — to avoid being isolated as the sole culpable actor in case of economic coercion.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Unmanned aviation has gained prevalence in airspace over manned aviation in performing air reconnaissance and target acquisition. Special significance in performing strike missions both over the front line and in the depth of Ukrainian territory has been demonstrated by strike UAS capable of delivering considerable destruction to both small moving targets and large installations of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure.</p> +</blockquote> -<h4 id="a-constructive-eu-economic-security-agenda-beyond-export-controls">A Constructive EU Economic Security Agenda beyond Export Controls</h4> +<p>There is considerable Russian interest in such U.S. programs as the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) sixth-generation air superiority initiative, including a U.S. Air Force manned fighter aircraft and a supported unmanned collaborative combat aircraft using manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T). To compete with the U.S. B-21, Russia will still likely continue its future long-range aviation complex (Prospective Aviation Complex of Long-Range Aviation, or PAK DA) project, with a subsonic low-observable flying wing and stealth capabilities. Russia will also continue its next-generation Tu-160M Blackjack strategic bomber. Some Russian analyses on sixth-generation aircraft emphasize the importance of developing technology that increases stealth; maximizes networking capabilities; integrates highly sensitive sensors; and develops hypersonic modes of flight, including near-space entry capability. For Russia, a major component of sixth-generation fighters is the “system of systems” concept to integrate aircraft into a broader system of surface ships, ground forces, command centers, satellites, and other manned and unmanned aircraft.</p> -<p>While the European Union is firmly in the U.S. camp when it comes to security, EU leaders also want to maintain a clear difference from the United States when it comes to economics and dealing with China. While the United States views China as a threat to national security, European perceptions of China remain based on the three-pronged approach of partner, economic rival, and systemic rival, with oscillations within this spectrum based on events and member states’ preferences. On top of this, the European Union and member states are still digesting the possibility and need to strategically use measures such as export controls.</p> +<p><strong>Maritime</strong>: Unlike the army, the Russian navy remains largely intact. It lost the Black Sea flagship, the Moskva, and several auxiliaries. But Russia’s four fleets — the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific Fleets — and Caspian Flotilla are still in reasonable shape. Nevertheless, Russia’s future force design may evolve in several ways, based on a review of Russian military thinking.</p> -<p>Those two elements will have an impact beyond export controls on the broader economic security agenda. That is why the European Union’s own list of critical technologies and its risk assessment are key to the construction of an effective EU economic security agenda. They provide evidence and a logic to the expansion and strategic use of measures such as export controls. Those two steps will largely determine the direction of the economic security strategy and provide solid guidelines for the adoption, update, and implementation of the policies mentioned as well as others. In the economic security strategy, Brussels has already identified four macro risks — to (1) the resilience of supply chains, including energy security; (2) the physical and cybersecurity of critical infrastructure; (3) technology security and leakage; and (4) the weaponization of economic dependencies or economic coercion — but these need further elaboration regarding the specific risks they entail, their potential impact, and the likelihood of their occurrence.</p> +<p>First, Russian leaders have expressed an interest in strengthening Russian naval forces — including submarines — in response to growing tensions with the United States and NATO. The Ministry of Defense has announced a desire to create five naval infantry brigades for the navy’s coastal troops based on existing naval infantry brigades. This expansion followed Russia’s adoption of a new maritime doctrine in July 2022, which identified the United States and NATO as major threats. In addition, the doctrine expressed an interest in building modern aircraft carriers, though it also highlighted the challenges of Russia’s lack of overseas naval bases and the constraints on Russia’s shipbuilding industry because of the West’s economic sanctions. Senior Russian officials have identified nuclear-powered submarines as critical in future force design.</p> -<p>Although Brussels’ assessment is going to be key, the risk assessment of member states is also going to be fundamental for the success of the EU Economic Security Strategy. Member states know better than Brussels what risks they face and will better foresee how to prepare and respond to them. And in most instances, member states are the only ones that can implement economic security measures. The two levels then can debate which instances need a national response and which are better addressed by the European Union as a whole and in coordination with partners.</p> +<p>Second, the Russian navy will likely increase the presence of unmanned maritime vessels as part of force design. As one assessment notes: “Direct armed confrontation between ships will become predominantly auxiliary in nature. In the Navy, similar to the Aerospace Forces, the proportion of surface and submarine unmanned ships, both attack and support (reconnaissance, EW [electronic warfare], communications, transport), will increase significantly.” Along these lines, navies will likely position their crewed vessels — such as frigates, cruisers, corvettes, patrol boats, and destroyers — outside of the range of enemy fire and serve as control centers and carriers for unmanned vessels and UASs. Future warfare in the naval domain will increasingly involve armed confrontation between unmanned ships and UASs, including in swarms.</p> -<p>If the European Union is able to use the Dutch expansion of export controls to adopt a more strategic approach to economic security, it could position itself better in the new world of great power competition and build its own agenda-setting power.</p> +<p><strong>Space and Cyber</strong>: Military space and counterspace capabilities fall under the Russian Space Forces, which sits within the VKS.</p> -<h3 id="united-states-perspective">United States Perspective</h3> +<p>Russia will likely attempt to expand its counterspace capabilities, including kinetic physical weapons, such as direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons in low Earth orbit and co-orbital weapons; non-kinetic physical weapons, such as ground-based laser systems; electronic capabilities, including GPS jamming; and cyber intrusions. However, there is little evidence that Russia is likely to implement any major changes in force design in the space domain, and Russia has been hampered by sanctions and a loss of international partnerships and funding. One example of Russian struggles in the space domain was the August 2023 crash of the Luna-25 spacecraft, which was Russia’s first space launch to the moon’s surface since the 1970s.</p> -<p><em>Export Controls as an Instrument of Foreign Policy</em></p> +<p>Russia will likely attempt to expand its cyber capabilities under the GRU, SVR, and FSB, though Russia does not have a cyber command. The Presidential Administration and the Security Council coordinate cyber operations, but they are not a true cyber command. It is unclear whether Russia will create a veritable cyber command. What may be more likely is that Russian organizations, such as the GRU (including GRU Unit 26165, or the 85th Main Special Service Center), will recruit additional personnel, build new infrastructure, and increase their offensive cyber activities.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="emily-benson-and-catharine-mouradian">Emily Benson and Catharine Mouradian</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>While a priority, Russian offensive cyber operations have failed to significantly blind Ukrainian command-and-control efforts or threaten critical infrastructure for a prolonged period. In the early phases of the invasion of Ukraine, for example, cyberattackers associated with the GRU, SVR, and FSB launched cyberattacks against hundreds of systems in the Ukrainian government and in Ukraine’s energy, information technology, media, and financial sectors. Examples of Russian malware have included WhisperGate/WhisperKill, FoxBlade (or Hermetic Wiper), SonicVote (or HermeticRansom), and CaddyWiper. But Russian cyber operations have failed to undermine Ukraine’s ability or will to fight, in part because of outside state and non-state assistance to Ukraine to identify cyber and electronic warfare attacks, attribute attacks to the perpetrators, and assist with remediation.</p> -<h4 id="introduction-4">Introduction</h4> +<p>In addition, a number of Russian military thinkers continue to focus on electronic warfare as a key aspect of force design. This includes using the electromagnetic spectrum — such as radio, infrared, and radar — to sense, protect, and communicate, as well as to disrupt or deny adversaries the ability to use these signals. The demand for electronic warfare products will also likely trigger a growing push for electronic warfare technologies, including AI, so that electronic warfare systems can operate in the dense radio-frequency environment of the battlefield.</p> -<p>Export controls have long played a central, albeit relatively quiet, role as an instrument of foreign policy. In short, export controls are regulations and laws implemented by governments to restrict and monitor the export of certain goods, technologies, and services from one country to another. Governments have used them extensively throughout history to control the outflow of critical technologies. The primary objective of export controls is to protect national and international security by preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While export controls are not a panacea to achieve non-proliferation and other strategic objectives, they are a useful tool in denying or delaying the ability of foreign actors to obtain technology needed to advance weapons programs.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion-1">CONCLUSION</h4> -<p>Multilateralism is key to the effectiveness of controls. If one country produces an item that can be used in a foreign military context and regulates the outflow of those products, but other producers do not, then the likelihood of backfilling — the practice of others supplying to meet the now unfilled demand — weakens the controls. It can also depress the revenue of domestic suppliers of those critical inputs. Therefore, multilateralizing controls can be a determinant factor in whether or not export controls succeed.</p> +<p>As this chapter argued, most Russian military thinkers believe that while the nature of warfare remains the same, the character of warfare is evolving in such areas as long-range, high-precision weapons; autonomous and unmanned systems; emerging technologies, such as AI; and the utility of non-state and quasi-state actors in warfare. In these and other areas, Russian leaders assess that it will be critical to cooperate with other countries, especially China. In addition, Russian political and military leaders are committed to a major reconstitution of the Russian military — especially the Russian army — over the next several years. Russia is likely to adopt a force design that centers around the division, yet also attempt to create forces that are more mobile and decentralized.</p> -<p>In recent decades, the United States has been at the forefront of export control policy. In the aftermath of World War II, the U.S. Export Control Act of 1949 established the modern U.S. system for controlling dual-use goods. During the Cold War, the United States established the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) that brought together 17 mostly European countries as well as Japan and Turkey. COCOM was characterized primarily by “East versus West” competition during the Cold War. This manifested in broad geographic-based controls, as participating members believed that certain items allowed for export to the Soviet Union would likely leak to the Russian military. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, COCOM ceased functioning in March 1994. As a replacement, allies sought a more liberal export control system that would benefit the private sector and warm relations with former adversaries.</p> +<p>Achieving many of these goals will be challenging, if not impossible, as the next chapter explains. Russian leaders may want to make numerous changes, but they will be highly constrained. Russia faces a suite of financial, military, political, social, and other issues that will force political and military leaders to prioritize changes in force design. Building a bigger navy and air force will be expensive, as will increasing the size of Russian ground forces by 22 total divisions. Moscow plans to boost its defense budget in 2024 to roughly 6 percent of gross domestic product, up from 3.9 percent in 2023. But this increase will not be sufficient to implement all the changes Moscow’s leaders have discussed.</p> -<p>After the Cold War, in 1996, the United States and allies stood up the Wassenaar Arrangement, the successor to COCOM. Whereas COCOM was colored by strategic policymaking among member states aimed at delaying Warsaw Pact military capabilities, the intention for the Wassenaar Arrangement was to stand up a regime aimed at preventing the destabilizing accumulation of conventional arms and dual-use goods, or those with both civilian and military applications, in a country-agnostic fashion. The Wassenaar Arrangement control list functions somewhat like an export control constitution for member states. Most member states build their domestic control lists to align with the Wassenaar Arrangement list. This legal reliance can make it difficult, if not impossible, for countries to promulgate controls that exceed the items covered by the Wassenaar Arrangement list.</p> +<p>While it is impossible to predict with certainty how Russian leaders will prioritize force design changes, likely candidates are ones that are relatively cheap or essential to improve fighting effectiveness.</p> -<p>Since the inception of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the geostrategic threat environment has changed substantially, begging fundamental questions about the suitability of the arrangement for the contemporary era. The Wassenaar Arrangement is a consensus-based organization that includes Russia, and while Russia has long played a complicated role inside the organization, it has become increasingly obstreperous since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, essentially halting new additions to the control list. Concurrently, an exponential growth in digitization obscures the ability in some cases to work through an institution that was largely built for the hardware era. Further compounding problems is that the regime is not geographically tailored. This feature cripples it from carrying out controls specifically aimed at China at a time when China is pursuing a doctrine of civil-military fusion. These factors have led to calls to establish a new export control regime or, at a minimum, to rethink many of the core functions of the Wassenaar Arrangement and allied approach to export controls.</p> +<p>Russia will likely prioritize rebuilding its army, which suffered significant attrition during the war in Ukraine and failed in numerous areas such as combined arms operations. Russia’s army is essential to fight a protracted war in Ukraine and deter NATO. Indeed, it is difficult to envision Russia developing a modern force mix until it overhauls the army. Based on a review of Russian military assessments, it is reasonable to assume that the army will focus on restructuring its land forces around divisions; developing fires-centric capabilities, such as long-range artillery and laser-guided shells that maximize accuracy; and experimenting with tactical organizational structures that allow for greater mobility and autonomy against adversaries that have precision strike capabilities.</p> -<p>In addition to changes in the “protect” side of the agenda, the “promote” pillar is also changing with the renewed use of industrial policy. In August 2022, the United States passed the $52 billion CHIPS and Science Act package. The European Union has since passed the $46.7 billion (€43.9 billion) EU Chips Act, while South Korea’s K-Chips Act expands tax deductions on investments into the semiconductor industry. The simultaneous expansion of the “promote” and “protect” pillars of an international policy is reshuffling supply chains, infusing geopolitical risk calculations into decisionmaking, and calling into question the foundations of the multilateral approach to managing strategic trade.</p> +<p>In the air domain, Russia will likely invest its limited resources in developing a broad suite of unmanned systems and long-range precision strike capabilities. UASs will likely be essential for future Russian warfighting to conduct a wide of missions, such as logistics in a contested environment, battlefield awareness, targeting for medium- and long-range fires, strike, information operations, and electronic warfare. In Ukraine, Russia increased the complexity, diversity, and density of UASs, with more lethal warheads and advances in noise reduction and counter-UAS capabilities. Russia will also continue to invest heavily in electronic warfare, based in part on successes of the Zhitel R330-Zh, Pole-21, and other systems in Ukraine.</p> -<p>This confluence of factors — a hobbled multilateral export control regime, the need to recover domestic production capacity, and national security concerns about chip-driven weapons — has led the United States to assume, as it has done in the past, a leadership role in designing and enforcing export controls for allied producers of advanced technology. In promulgating the October 7 controls, the United States has once again significantly retooled the global export control landscape. In moving export controls to the forefront of the international agenda, the United States is communicating that export control cooperation is in most cases a prerequisite for deeper integration of high-tech sectors such as semiconductors.</p> +<p>In the maritime domain, Russia will likely focus on submarines and unmanned systems. Submarines are essential for Russia’s nuclear deterrence posture. Of particular focus may be construction of the Project 955A (Borei-A) class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, which are built at the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk. They are armed with Bulava submarine launched ballistic missiles, and Russia is continuing to develop technologies that reduce their acoustic signature. The Borei-class submarines will replace Russia’s ageing, Soviet-era Delta III-class and Delta IV-class ballistic missile submarines. More broadly, Russia is likely to prioritize maintenance of the nuclear triad, including its submarines, which is Moscow’s main guarantee of security with a degraded conventional land force.</p> -<h4 id="the-october-7-export-controls">The October 7 Export Controls</h4> +<p>The Russian military will also likely focus on revitalizing its industrial base, with support from China, North Korea, Iran, and other countries. This means outsourcing some weapons systems (such as UASs) and components that Russian can’t manufacture in sufficient quantities or lacks the technology or parts. As the war in Ukraine highlighted, an important prerequisite for offense and defense is fires dominance. Russia will likely focus on building stockpiles of precision munitions for both Ukraine and NATO’s eastern front.</p> -<p>In a September 2022 speech previewing the administration’s thinking on controls, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan explained that “export controls can be more than just a preventative tool.” Rather than maintaining the status quo of using export controls to delay foreign adversaries from gaining advanced technology, the United States needed instead to adjust controls to gain “as large a lead as possible.” Onlookers have broadly observed that this speech acknowledged a U.S. shift away from simply “delaying” foreign military capabilities to one of “degrading” them.</p> +<p>The next chapter examines Russian challenges in implementing many of these reforms.</p> -<p>Chinese military acquisition contracts show that China is using U.S. chips in military applications, including hypersonic missile and nuclear weapons simulation. Expanding export controls to cover advanced chips is predicated on the idea that allies should not export items to certain countries where such items could be used against them in a military conflict. The U.S. response has centered around expanding controls on its own exports and securing buy-in from other countries that maintain chokepoints over the supply chain.</p> +<h3 id="4-conclusion">4 CONCLUSION</h3> -<p>On October 7, 2022, the United States announced a new tranche of controls aimed at constraining Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities. First, the October 7 controls added several advanced-node chips used for AI development and supercomputers to the Commerce Control List (CCL). The controls also implemented rules on all related software, components, and semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) that meet certain criteria. Not only did the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) add these items to the CCL, expanding the Export Administration Regulations, but the BIS also included “deemed export” rules, which ban the transfer of controlled items and data to foreign nationals within the United States. The October 7 regulations also include “U.S. persons” rules, creating new licensing requirements for employees of U.S.-headquartered firms working to service covered technology. These rules extend to foreign nationals working in China even if they are not U.S. citizens.</p> +<p>This chapter focuses on implications for the United States and NATO and makes two main arguments. First, Russian views of the future of warfare and efforts to restructure the military will likely be shaped by a strong view that the United States and NATO represent a clear and present threat to Moscow. The West’s aid to Ukraine, expansion of NATO to Finland and likely Sweden, deployment of forces along NATO’s eastern flank, and continuing military buildup will likely increase Moscow’s perception of insecurity. Second, Moscow will likely face considerable challenges in implementing many of its changes. Moscow’s lagging economy, rampant corruption, strained defense industrial base, and stovepiped military structure will likely create significant hurdles in implementing Russian force design goals. Despite these challenges, Russia still possesses some formidable capabilities with its strategic forces, navy, and air force.</p> -<p>As acknowledged in Sullivan’s September 2022 speech, the aim of these controls is to limit the advance of Chinese semiconductor production past a certain threshold. The BIS threshold for the controls is logic chips produced using the 16-nanometer (nm) process node or lower (generally, the lower the node number, the more advanced the chip), short-term memory chips (DRAM) of 18 nm node or lower, and long-term memory chips (NAND), or 128 layers or higher. There are further rules surrounding the export of node-agnostic SME, which is manufacturing equipment used in the production of chips both above and below the node limit. Under the new rules, node-agnostic equipment can only be exported to factories that only produce older models of chips, also known as legacy chips. Foundries that produce more advanced chips will now face a “presumption of denial,” meaning BIS operates under the assumption that related licenses will not be granted.</p> +<p>The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first examines the United States as Russia’s main enemy. The second section assesses challenges in implementing Russian force design. The third provides a brief summary.</p> -<p>William A. Reinsch, the former Commerce Department undersecretary in charge of the BIS, has surmised that that, without explicitly acknowledging it, the bureau has likely ended the policy of trying to identify “reliable” end users in China, as a result of China’s pursuit of civil-military fusion and crackdown on the due diligence firms operating in China that provide vital assessments of end-user reliability. If that is the case, this would mark a significant U.S. reversion toward an export control regime that more clearly parallels U.S. policy toward Warsaw Pact members under COCOM.</p> +<h4 id="russias-main-enemy">RUSSIA’S MAIN ENEMY</h4> -<p>In conjunction with the announcement of the new export controls on October 7, the BIS unveiled two new Foreign Direct Product Rules (FDPRs). The FDPR provides the United States with the means to claim extraterritorial legal authority over items with U.S. inputs, including design. The legal basis for these rules has recently surfaced as a statutory tool included in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA). The updated rules allow the United States to promulgate and enforce the extraterritorial application of U.S. export control rules by enabling the United States to claim jurisdiction over items containing U.S. inputs. The FDPR is distinct in that it applies when there is not necessarily any U.S. physical content but the item is produced on U.S. machinery or embodies U.S. technology.</p> +<p>The United States — and NATO more broadly — will likely remain Russia’s main enemy for the foreseeable future for at least two reasons.</p> -<p>A recent wave of FDPRs accelerated with the Trump administration’s use of the rules to close a loophole in export controls on Huawei. The FDPR has also featured prominently in the Biden administration’s response to Russia’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine and has been used to exercise jurisdiction over consumer product supply chains that contain U.S. inputs, although certain countries have received broad exemptions. The two recent October 7 FDPRs apply to items used for advanced computers and supercomputing. The FDPRs attempt to preemptively address loopholes in the controls that would allow items containing U.S. technology to be exported to China from another country. This affects foreign firms such as ASML, which use U.S. software and components to develop advanced extreme ultraviolet (EUV) and deep ultraviolet (DUV) machines. This new FDPR meant that the United States could have exercised extraterritorial enforcement of controls if the Dutch government did not reach an affirmative decision to pursue licensing policy changes that align with the U.S. rules.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gc4xzNY.png" alt="image07" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4.1: Number of Soviet and Russian Soldiers Killed, 1950 to 2023.</strong> Source: Author’s compilation. See endnotes for more details.</em></p> -<h4 id="the-us-role-in-global-semiconductor-supply-chains">The U.S. Role in Global Semiconductor Supply Chains</h4> +<p>First, Russian political and military leaders assess that the country’s struggles in Ukraine have been largely due to U.S. and broader NATO assistance. As highlighted in Figure 4.1, the number of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine during the first year of the war was greater than the combined number of Russian soldiers killed in all Russian and Soviet wars since World War II. As one senior Russian diplomat remarked about Ukraine, “The United States became a direct participant of this conflict long ago, and they have long been waging a hybrid war against my country. Ukraine is only an instrument in their hands, a tip of the spear held by the US-led collective West. Their goal is to destroy a sovereign, independent Russia as a factor in international politics.” This view that the United States and NATO are direct participants in the Ukraine war will likely persist and shape Moscow’s views of the future of war and force design.</p> -<p>The United States’ powerful position in the global semiconductor industry affords it significant geopolitical leverage over chip supply chains. The United States is responsible for 39 percent of the total value of the supply chain, and U.S. firms accounted for 47 percent of sales in 2019. The United States maintains a dominant position throughout several points of semiconductor supply chains. It particularly excels in electronic design automation (EDA), core intellectual property (IP), and some advanced SMEs. It controls 55 percent of overall chip design, 61 percent of logic chip design, and nearly 100 percent of high-end CPUs, GPUs, and FPGAs (advanced logic chips). It further controls 41.7 percent of the overall SME market, including major portions of vital technologies, including deposition (63.8 percent), etch and clean (53.1 percent), process control (71.2 percent), symmetric multi-processing (SMP) (67.5 percent), and ion implanters (90.1 percent). According to CSIS analysis, 11 of these advanced SMEs have no foreign substitutes.</p> +<p>Second, Russian leaders believe that the United States is expanding its influence, attempting to further encircle Russia, and trying to weaken Russia militarily, politically, and economically. NATO’s June 2022 summit in Madrid also unambiguously stated that the “Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense deployed or extended over 20,000 additional forces to Europe, bringing the total number of U.S. personnel in Europe to over 100,000. Examples included the deployment of an Armored Brigade Combat Team, a High-Mobility Rocket Artillery Battalion (HIMARS) battalion, and KC-135 refueling aircraft, among other forces. Other steps of concern to Russia have included:</p> -<p>Despite a dominant position in the overall market and control of critical chokepoints, the United States has several vulnerabilities. In terms of fabrication capacity, the United States has experienced a significant decline in recent years, dropping from 40 percent of total fabrication in 1990 to 12 percent in 2020, a trend the CHIPS and Science Act hopes to reverse. The United States maintains little to no capacity to produce extreme ultraviolet scanners (EUVs), argon fluoride scanners (ArFs), krypton fluoride scanners (KrFs), and wafers, as well as medium to low ability to produce other forms of lithography equipment.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>A permanent forward station of V Corps Headquarters Forward Command Post, an Army garrison headquarters, and a field support battalion in Poland;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The deployment of an additional rotational brigade combat team in Romania;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Enhanced rotational deployments in the Baltics;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>An increase in the number of destroyers stationed at Rota, Spain, from four to six;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The forward stationing of two F-35 squadrons in the United Kingdom;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The forward stationing of an air defense artillery brigade headquarters, a short-range air defense battalion, a combat sustainment support battalion headquarters, and an engineer brigade headquarters in Germany; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>The forward stationing of a short-range air defense battery in Italy.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Production of advanced SME, namely lithography equipment such as EUV and DUV scanners and ArF immersion scanners, is located outside of the United States, primarily in Japan and the Netherlands. Dutch company ASML maintains a near monopoly over EUV technology, while Japan leads in key areas of material and chemical production. Failure to secure buy-in from these two countries risked depressing the efficacy of chip controls while creating new market opportunities for foreign firms to fill space that U.S. firms had previously occupied.</p> +<p>While these steps are a reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and entirely legitimate, they have increased Russian fears of encirclement. As Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu remarked at the December 2022 meeting of Russian’s Defense Ministry Board, “Of particular concern is the buildup of NATO’s advance presence near the borders of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus . . . to further weaken our country.” Shoigu also noted, “Considering NATO’s aspirations to build up its military capabilities close to the Russian border, as well as expand the alliance by accepting Finland and Sweden as new members, we need to respond by creating a corresponding group of forces in Russia’s northwest.”</p> -<h4 id="unilateral-changes-form-a-trilateral-outcome">Unilateral Changes Form a Trilateral Outcome</h4> +<p>The result is that the Russia’s insecurity and animosity toward the West — and the United States in particular — will likely deepen. These sentiments will likely drive a desire to reconstitute the Russian military over the next several years, strengthen nuclear and conventional deterrence, and prepare to fight the West if deterrence fails. Russian military thinking on the future of warfare and force design is dominated by a view that the United States is — and will remain — Moscow’s primary enemy.</p> -<p>After months of negotiations, reports emerged in January 2023 that the United States had secured an arrangement with Japan and the Netherlands to align their licensing policies on advanced semiconductor exports. Due to the sensitivity of the issues and fear of Chinese retaliation, details about the possible “agreement” have been sparse. In March 2023, Japan announced that they would control 23 separate types of advanced SMEs, including ArF immersion scanners. However, there are important differences between the U.S. and Japanese policies. For example, Japanese nationals working on advanced semiconductor projects in other countries do not face the same restrictions as U.S. nationals, making the Japanese controls potentially more forgiving than their U.S. counterparts.</p> +<h4 id="challenges-to-force-design">CHALLENGES TO FORCE DESIGN</h4> -<p>On March 8, 2023, the Netherlands announced new controls to align with the October 7 controls. In a letter to the Dutch parliament, Dutch trade minister Liesje Schreinemacher explained that the Netherlands would restrict the sale of DUV technology and place such products on a national control list. On June 30, the Dutch government officially published their export control measures, which will require authorization for the export of certain high-level technologies, such as DUV machines, starting on September 1. Minister Schreinemacher commented, “We’ve taken this step on national security grounds.”</p> +<p>Russia faces enormous challenges in implementing its force design, despite its ambitions. Russia’s military almost certainly lacks the caliber of some of the great historical Russian and Soviet military thinkers, such as Mikhail Tuchachevsky, Aleksandr Svechin, Vladimir Triandafilov, and Georgii Isserson. As noted earlier in this report, Russian military journals generally lack innovative thought and self-criticism, almost certainly a result of Russia’s increasingly authoritarian climate. In addition, Russia’s military has been unable to attract the best and brightest of young Russians in the face of competition from the civilian labor market, despite some pay raises.</p> -<p>A commonality between the Japanese and Dutch controls is that they remain country-agnostic. This largely aligns with their preference to adhere to the World Trade Organization’s non-discrimination principles and fear of Chinese economic retaliation. Nevertheless, these controls do represent a significant expansion in Dutch and Japanese export control and licensing policy. Furthermore, the three countries have taken extra steps to affirm both their preference for multilateral controls and the national security justifications for taking these actions. The Dutch indicated that they would submit these updates to the Wassenaar Arrangement, although the chances of Russia blocking the updates remain all but certain.</p> +<p>There are at least five additional challenges to Russian force design over the next several years.</p> -<h4 id="shortcomings-of-the-us-policy">Shortcomings of the U.S. Policy</h4> +<p>First, Russia’s deepening economic crisis will likely constrain its efforts to expand the quantity and quality of its ground, air, and naval forces. The war in Ukraine has fueled Russia’s worst labor crunch in decades; hundreds of thousands of workers have fled the country or have been sent to fight in Ukraine, weakening an economy weighed down by economic sanctions and international isolation. The country’s biggest exports — gas and oil — have lost major customers. Government finances have been strained and the ruble has decreased against the dollar. Numerous Western banks, investors, and companies have fled Russia and its financial markets. In addition, the International Monetary Fund has estimated that Russia’s potential growth rate — the rate at which it could grow without courting inflation — was around 3.5 percent before 2014, the year Russia seized Crimea, but fell to around roughly 0.7 percent in 2023 as productivity declined and the economy became increasingly isolated. The fall in exports, tight labor market, and increased government spending have worsened inflation risks.</p> -<p>While the October 7 controls were designed to stem the outflow of U.S.-produced items to China under the assessment that China was using U.S. inputs in military applications, the controls also expose certain drawbacks.</p> +<p>Russian force design will not be cheap. The Russian army wants to create new divisions and recruit additional soldiers, which will drive up costs because of salaries, signing bonuses, healthcare, lodging, food, equipment, and other factors. Russia will need to make military service more attractive. For example, housing remains a problem for Russian officers with families, and salaries have not kept pace with inflation for several years. The development and production of emerging technologies can be enormously expensive. So are major platforms, such as bombers, submarines, aircraft carriers, and fifth- and sixth-generation aircraft.</p> -<p><strong>CLARIFYING THE NATIONAL SECURITY JUSTIFICATIONS</strong></p> +<p>Second, corruption remains rampant in the Russian military, which could undermine Moscow’s overall plan to structure, staff, train, and equip its forces. Corruption has long been a problem in the Russian military. In Ukraine, the Russian military has provided some soldiers on the front lines with ration packs that were seven years old, other soldiers have crowdsourced for body armor because Russian supplies dried up, some have sold fuel on the black market that was intended for Russian main battle tanks and other vehicles, and supply chains have failed. Russian morale likely has suffered. Russian soldiers have also engaged in false reporting, committed outright theft, overstated the number of enlistees in some units (and skimmed the difference), and conducted other forms of graft. Corruption in the Russian military is not surprising. According to some estimates, one-fifth or more of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s budget is siphoned off by officials. These factors help explain why former Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev referred to the Russian armed forces as a “Potemkin military.”</p> -<p>Firms and foreign partners alike remain wary about the U.S. explanation undergirding the controls. The United States claims that it has irrefutable evidence that China is using Western-made technology in its military programs. Providing additional details, where possible, and enhancing communication among allies will secure more durable buy-in throughout the value chain.</p> +<p>Third, Russia’s defense industrial base will likely face at least two types of challenges which could impact force design. One is replacement of losses from the war in Ukraine. Russia has already expended significant amounts of precision-guided and other munitions in the Ukraine war, and many of its weapons and equipment have been destroyed or severely worn down. According to some estimates, for example, Russia lost approximately 50 percent of its modern T-72B3 and T-72B3M main battle tanks over the first year of the war, along with roughly two-thirds of its T-80BV/U tanks. A protracted war in Ukraine will likely compound these challenges. Replacing these losses will be necessary before implementing new initiatives or building new forces.</p> -<p><strong>EFFECTS ON U.S. FIRMS</strong></p> +<p>Another challenge is that economic sanctions will likely create shortages of higher-end foreign components and may force Moscow to substitute them with lower-quality alternatives. These challenges could impact Russia’s ability to manufacture, sustain, and produce advanced weapons and technology. As Russia’s 2022 maritime doctrine concluded, one of the main risks to Russia’s maritime activities is “the introduction of restrictions, which include the transfer of modern technologies, deliveries of equipment and attraction of long-term investments, imposed by a number of states against Russian shipbuilding enterprises of the defense industrial complex and oil and gas companies.” Supply-chain problems have also delayed deliveries. Money to replace outdated machine tools and pay for research and development is lacking, while neglect of quality control is common. Continuing assistance from China, Iran, North Korea, and other countries could help ameliorate some of these challenges.</p> -<p>Policymakers have always had to walk a fine line when it comes to export controls because they inherently restrict revenue for domestic firms, which often rely on export-derived income to invest in next-generation research and development). This remains true for the October 7 controls. Firms impacted immediately include Nvidia, AMD, KLA, and Lam. LAM warned that they face a loss of up to $2.5 billion in 2023, while KLA expects losses of $600–900 million. Applied Materials also anticipates first-quarter losses of nearly $400 million. Furthermore, the imposed loss of market share naturally creates new market opportunities for foreign entrants not otherwise subject to similar controls, making it even more important to multilateralize the controls.</p> +<p>Fourth, Russia may face a significant challenge because of growing civil-military tension. As Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington wrote in his book The Soldier and the State, “The military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society’s security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society.” The need to balance military institutions and societal forces is no less true for Russia today. It is conceivable that tension between the Russian military and population could worsen over time because of a protracted war in Ukraine, a languishing economy, and an increasingly authoritarian state.</p> -<p><strong>CHINESE RETALIATION</strong></p> +<p>The June 2023 rebellion led by Yevgeny Prigozhin was one indicator of domestic frustration, although it is difficult to assess the breadth and depth of popular anger. A reconstitution of the Russian military will likely require some level of support and sacrifice from the Russian population.</p> -<p>Two other drawbacks center around Chinese responses to the controls via retaliation and indigenization. In May 2023, China banned the use of Micron chips in critical infrastructure. Micron relies on China for 20 percent of sales but claims that it will endure the effects of this policy change. In July 2023, China further retaliated by implementing new licensing requirements on gallium and germanium, two critical inputs for semiconductor production. China has over 86 percent of the world’s low-purity gallium production capacity and over 67 percent of the world’s refined germanium production, meaning prices for those inputs will spike without the commensurate onboarding of additional production capacity in allied economies.</p> +<p>Fifth, Russia has struggled to coordinate strategy and operations across its services. Russian military exercises are often stovepiped, with poor coordination and limited jointness across the army, air force, and navy. The Russian military has failed to effectively conduct joint operations in Ukraine. These challenges raise major questions about whether the Russian military can create a truly joint force.</p> -<p>The United States and its allies have long recognized this retaliation capability, particularly following similar restrictions on Chinese rare-earth mineral exports to Japan roughly a decade ago. Despite precedence and the obvious likelihood of Chinese retaliation, many policymakers and experts were surprised by the recent announcement and have vowed to pursue additional “de-risking” policies. However, it is relatively easy to scale up production capacity outside of China, indicating that the Chinese restrictions serve mostly as a “warning shot.” Furthermore, previous CSIS work has demonstrated the inefficacy of Chinese economic coercive measures, finding that China’s attempts at saber-rattling typically contravene its objectives by dissuading countries from deeper economic engagement with China.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion-2">CONCLUSION</h4> -<p><strong>DESIGNING OUT: INDIGENIZATION AND DUAL SUPPLY CHAINS</strong></p> +<p>In the months before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, U.S. government assessments were generally accurate in predicting that Russian forces would invade Ukraine. But many were wrong in their assessment of the war’s outcome. Most assumed that Russian forces would defeat Ukrainian forces in a matter of days or weeks. But they overstated the effectiveness of Russian forces and understated the will to fight, combined arms capabilities, leadership, and morale of Ukrainian forces, political leaders, and the population. These errors may have occurred because it is generally easier to analyze tangible aspects of a military, such as doctrine and air, land, naval, cyber, and space capabilities, but much more difficult to assess the intangible aspects of warfare, including morale, will to fight, readiness, impact of corruption, and force employment.</p> -<p>Designing out — developing supply chains free of U.S. inputs — has long been a hedging strategy against foreign regulations, as witnessed with commercial satellites during the 1990s. In the wake of the trade war with China under the Trump administration, companies began to implement an “in China, for China” strategy in which firms would produce locally for domestic consumption and free of U.S. inputs. As Sarah Bauerle Danzman and Emily Kilcrease, two export control and investment screening experts at the Atlantic Council and the Center for New American Security, respectively, write, “The recent unprecedented expansion of extraterritorial rules in U.S. export controls turbocharges these concerns, heightening the risk that other countries or firms will ice out U.S. suppliers as a matter of protecting their autonomy and preserving their ability to sell globally — including in China.” Indeed, the Chinese government has pressured domestic firms to accelerate indigenization efforts to de-risk from foreign exposure. Huawei recently announced that it has created software for all chips above 14 nm, providing a Chinese alternative to companies who previously acquired foreign products.</p> +<p>These analytical challenges raise important questions about how to assess Russian military reconstitution, views on the future of warfare, and force design. Moving forward, U.S. and allied policymakers should routinely ask and attempt to answer several questions regarding Russian views of warfare and force design:</p> -<p>China is also attempting to strengthen supply chains not subject to export controls. The National Silicon Industry Group, China’s largest silicon wafer producer, recently announced attempts to increase capacity from 300,000 wafers per month to 1.2 million, allowing it to cover domestic needs and become the sixth-largest wafer producer worldwide. This shift aligns with broader Chinese efforts to pursue a “dual circulation” agenda that seeks to build more autonomous and domestic supply chains in China free of international dependencies, but it could also indicate the Chinese weaponization of trade via overcapacity. Either way, a loss of U.S. market share means less visibility into Chinese high-tech industries over time and a drop in revenue for firms seeking to retain a competitive edge.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>How will Russia attempt to improve the “intangibles” of warfare, such as the will to fight and readiness?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>How will Russia prioritize its force design ambitions given its many competing needs?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Can Russia continue to secure significant support from China, Iran, North Korea, and other countries for its military, including technology, weapons systems, and money? How might such support impact force design?</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>Can Russia overcome historic problems, such as corruption? If so, how?</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p><strong>CLOSING LOOPHOLES: WHACK-A-MOLE AND THE CLOUD</strong></p> +<p>While there may be a temptation to examine Russian views of the future of warfare primarily through a Ukraine lens, this would be a mistake. The war in Ukraine has impacted Russian military thinking, but it is only one war at one point in time.</p> -<p>In addition to ongoing attempts to attract additional countries to join the new U.S. export control policy, the United States is concluding its formalization of the October 7 rules. In June 2023, reports emerged that new controls from BIS could be announced as soon as the end of summer, which would close October 7 loopholes. For example, Nvidia produced the A800 AI chip, which is its A100 chip engineered to reduce the interconnect speed to comply with the regulations. While some observers regard this as “out-engineering” the controls, this also reflects insufficient thresholds that could be broadened to accommodate the A800 chips, although broadening the scope would result in additional revenue hits for the firms affected. Circumvention is also likely occurring via the provision of cloud services to Chinese companies, which allow access to controlled chips. Overall, the U.S. government needs to contend with innovation “whack-a-mole,” in which mitigating one problem means another pops up elsewhere. This means that export control rules should be flexible and updated frequently to achieve their intended objectives.</p> +<p>In his book Strategy, Russian military leader and theorist Alexander Svechin remarked that “each war has to be matched with a special strategic behavior; each war constitutes a particular case that requires establishing its own special logic instead of applying some template.” Svechin believed in the uniqueness of war. The challenge in understanding Russian thinking about the future of warfare is to step back and attempt to understand how Russian leaders view the evolving international environment and to how they can best maximize their security given the resources at their disposal.</p> -<p><strong>SECURING ADDITIONAL PARTNERS</strong></p> +<hr /> -<p>While Japanese and Dutch cooperation has enhanced the efficacy of these controls, there are growing calls for additional partners, such as South Korea, to join. South Korean firms Samsung and SK Hynix maintain a major share of the memory chip market, controlling over 70 percent of DRAM market share in 2021, and 53 percent of the NAND market (along with Japanese company Kioxia). Memory chips play an important role in AI, meaning that they may be critical to national security. For example, Samsung currently supplies Nvidia with high-bandwidth memory chips for their A100 AI chip.</p> +<p><strong>Seth G. Jones</strong> is senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, director of the International Security Program, and director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He focuses on defense strategy, military operations, force posture, and irregular warfare. He leads a bipartisan team of over 50 resident staff and an extensive network of non-resident affiliates dedicated to providing independent strategic insights and policy solutions that shape national security. He also teaches at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.</p>Seth G. JonesRussian leaders are committed to a reconstitution of the Russian military — especially the Russian army — over the next several years, though achieving this goal will be challenging. In addition, Russia views the United States as its main enemy for the foreseeable future.The Post-October 7 World2023-09-28T12:00:00+08:002023-09-28T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-post-october-7-world<p><em>On October 7, 2022, U.S.-China relations were reshaped with export controls on military AI, shifting global semiconductor manufacturing and distribution and complicating the global economy. This report outlines U.S. allies’ perspectives on “the new oil” in geopolitics.</em></p> -<p>Securing buy-in from South Korea would enhance the credibility of the U.S. export controls but could come at significant cost to South Korean firms, who maintain major operations in China. As of the summer of 2023, the United States granted South Korea a one-year waiver extension that permits South Korean firms to continue operating in China. The private sector views perennial waiver extensions as unreliable, subject to change, and responsible for infusing the industry with added uncertainty. (BIS undersecretary Alan Estevez has said that the waivers will likely be extended “for the foreseeable future.”)</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Another complicating factor is China’s ban on Micron’s memory chips, which has left a supply gap that Samsung and SK Hynix could fill, although the U.S. government is urging against backfilling. South Korea’s vice minister of trade commented, “Regarding what the U.S. tells us to do or not to do, it is actually up to our companies. Both Samsung and SK Hynix, with global operations, will make a judgment on this.” Regardless, the extraterritorial application of controls and attempts to reduce South Korean chip investment in China has put South Korea in a geopolitically awkward position of having to choose a partner amid U.S.-China tensions. The United States should not underplay what it is asking of its allies.</p> +<h3 id="foreword">Foreword</h3> -<h4 id="building-a-sufficient-promote-agenda">Building a Sufficient “Promote” Agenda</h4> +<p><em>The Importance of Understanding Allied Perspectives</em></p> -<p>When coupled with an expanded domestic industrial policy, the combination of domestic incentives and additional — and sometimes extraterritorial — restrictions can frustrate the private sector and allies. As the definition of national security continues to expand to include economic security concerns, skeptics of the Biden administration’s expanded use of controls argue that protectionism and economic considerations are the true drivers of this policy. Given the growing importance of AI in national security, the security justifications of controlling the export of advanced AI chips is clear, but the administration should do a better job communicating its underlying security concerns, particularly to combat the notion that these controls are driven primarily by domestic economic considerations.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="gregory-c-allen">Gregory C. Allen</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>These policies do not materialize in a vacuum. Allies have witnessed the expanded use of the FDPR under the Biden administration and are weary of becoming subject to those rules. Other policies that can be viewed as coercive — or at least demanding — remain fresh. These include attempts to encourage a “rip and replace” policy of Huawei components from critical infrastructure, or the Treasury Department’s sanctions that resulted in a 15 percent price spike of aluminum products in a week. It was also only a decade ago that the United States threatened the vitality of the European financial markets during the “de-SWIFT” policy that sought to induce the European Union to adopt the U.S. stance on Iran. Given that relations with Russia are not likely to improve in the near future and that tensions with China will continue to climb, it is incumbent on the United States to build a trade policy that can offset costs and more effectively secure long-term allied buy-in.</p> +<p>October 7, 2022, was a turning point in the history of U.S.-China relations. On that day, the United States enacted a new set of export controls designed to choke off China’s access to the future of military artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities. In doing so, the October 7 regulations marked a reversal of nearly three decades of U.S. trade and technology policy toward China in at least two ways: First, rather than restricting exports to China on an end-use or end-user basis, the new regulations included many controls that applied to China as a whole. Second, the policy sought to degrade the peak technological capability of China’s AI and semiconductor industries. Fifteen years ago, such measures would have been almost unthinkable.</p> -<h4 id="conclusion-2">Conclusion</h4> +<p>Though the end target of the October 7 export controls was China’s military AI development, the means to that end was restricting U.S. exports of advanced semiconductor technology. As such, October 7 marks not only a turning point in geopolitical history, but also a turning point for the global semiconductor industry and the countries at the center of semiconductor value chains.</p> -<p>Having secured Japanese and Dutch alignment on U.S. export controls, the United States seems once again to have taken the lead on establishing a new export control regime — or, in this case, a “mini-regime” of three unilateral policy changes. In short, U.S. leadership and external action-forcing events such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Chinese pursuit of civil-military fusion have propelled producers of advanced technology into a new chapter of export control cooperation. This is evidenced not only in the Japanese and Dutch adoption of additional controls but also in allies’ focus on the utility of controls as an instrument of foreign policy in the G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué, the EU Economic Security Strategy, and Germany’s new Strategy on China. However, new controls come with pronounced risks, serious geopolitical downsides, and steep economic costs. If the United States and its friends are building a new export control architecture, they need to account for — and try to mitigate — these distinct challenges to prevail.</p> +<p>Today, semiconductors are vital inputs not only to datacenters and smartphones, but also to cars, critical infrastructure, military systems, and even household appliances like washing machines. As the global economy has become more and more digitized, it has also grown more and more dependent upon chips. It is for good reason that national security experts routinely declare semiconductors to be “the new oil” when it comes to geopolitics and international security.</p> -<hr /> +<p>The United States is the overall leader in the global semiconductor industry, but other U.S. allies — particularly Japan, the Netherlands, Taiwan, South Korea, and Germany — also play critical roles. If other countries fill the gaps in the Chinese market left by the October 7 regulations, then the policy will most likely backfire. U.S. companies could suffer a huge loss of market share and revenue in China and in return for only a fleeting national security benefit.</p> -<p><strong>Gregory C. Allen</strong> is the director of the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> +<p>Thus, the long-term success of the U.S. policy depends upon the actions of the governments in those other key countries. This was the inspiration behind this compendium of essays. Much has been written about the October 7 export controls in the United States, but too often the U.S. conversation suffers from a shortage of international perspectives, as well as a minimal understanding of the political and policy dynamics within those key U.S. allies.</p> -<p><strong>Wonho Yeon</strong> is a research fellow and the Head of the Economic Security Team at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP).</p> +<p>This compendium seeks to address that shortage. The Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at CSIS has assembled a distinguished group of international experts who have a rich understanding of both the global semiconductor industry and its geopolitical dimensions. Each of their essays provides an overview of the situation facing their home country or region in the post-October 7 era.</p> -<p><strong>Jan-Peter Kleinhans</strong> is the director of Technology and Geopolitics at Stiftung Neue Verantwortung (SNV), a nonpartisan, nonprofit, independent tech policy think tank in Berlin.</p> +<h3 id="south-korean-perspective">South Korean Perspective</h3> -<p><strong>Julian Ringhof</strong> was a policy fellow with the European Power program at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).</p> +<p><em>South Korea Needs Increased (but Quiet) Export Control Coordination with the United States</em></p> -<p><strong>Kazuto Suzuki</strong> is a professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Tokyo, Japan, and director of the Institute of Geoeconomics at International House of Japan.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="wonho-yeon">Wonho Yeon</h4> +</blockquote> -<p><strong>Rem Korteweg</strong> is a senior research fellow at the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands. He works on Europe’s strategic role in the world, with a specific focus on the intersection between trade, foreign policy, and security.</p> +<h4 id="us-china-strategic-competition-and-us-china-policy">U.S.-China Strategic Competition and U.S. China Policy</h4> -<p><strong>Chau-Chyun Chang</strong> currently serves as senior strategy executive director, Sustainability in the Industry, Science and Technology International Strategy Center (ISTI) of the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI)</p> +<p>Economic security can be defined as protecting a nation from external economic threats or risks. Response to military threats or dangers is the domain of traditional security, while economic security is about protecting a country’s economic survival and future competitiveness. Disruption of supply chains threatens the survival of a country, while the fostering of advanced technology determines future competitiveness. Thus, economic security strategy mainly deals with supply chain policies and advanced technology policies as core fields.</p> -<p><strong>Francesca Ghiretti</strong> is an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). She is an expert in economic security, EU-China relations and the Belt and Road Initiative.</p> +<p>The goals of U.S. economic security policy are clear: to manage risk from China. In terms of supply chain resilience, it is about reducing dependence on China for critical goods, and in terms of the maintaining high-tech supremacy, it is about containing China’s rise. This view consistently appears in speeches and white papers including Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken’s May 2022 speech titled “The Biden Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” the White House’s National Security Strategy released in October 2022 and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s April 2023 speech at the Brookings Institution.</p> -<p><strong>Antonia Hmaidi</strong> is an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), where she works on China’s pursuit of tech self-reliance (especially in areas like semiconductors and operating systems), its internet infrastructure, and disinformation and hacking campaigns.</p> +<p>The strategic approach of the Biden administration toward China can be summarized as “invest,” “align,” and “compete.” “Invest” means strengthening domestic production capabilities by investing in key items with high supply chain vulnerabilities. The Biden administration also emphasizes “solidarity” with friendly nations. Ultimately, the goal is to build a strong and resilient high-tech industrial base that both the United States and like-minded partners can invest in and rely on. “Compete” refers to realizing the American vision and maintaining a competitive edge over China, which challenges the U.S.-led order. Specifically, the Trump administration’s bipartisan export control, import control, and investment screening policies are designed to keep China in check as a competitor and simultaneously strengthen efforts to create a new, transparent, and fair international economic partnership for a changing world.</p> -<p><strong>Emily Benson</strong> is the director of the Project on Trade and Technology and a senior fellow of the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS, where she focuses on trade, investment, and technology issues primarily in the transatlantic context.</p> +<p>In 2023, the United States began using the new phrase “de-risking” to describe its policy toward China. However, the U.S. government’s use of de-risking refers to China risk management in the broadest sense and does not imply a specific change in U.S. policy toward China. Diversification, selective decoupling, and full decoupling are all possible means of de-risking, and the United States has adopted a policy of selective decoupling. This can be read literally in the phrase “small yard, high fence” that National Security Advisor Sullivan emphasizes at every speech. The idea is to block Chinese access in selective areas.</p> -<p><strong>Catharine (Katya) Mouradian</strong> is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Project on Trade and Technology at CSIS.</p>Gregory C. Allen, et al.On October 7, 2022, U.S.-China relations were reshaped with export controls on military AI, shifting global semiconductor manufacturing and distribution and complicating the global economy. This report outlines U.S. allies’ perspectives on “the new oil” in geopolitics.The Ideology Of Putinism2023-09-27T12:00:00+08:002023-09-27T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-ideology-of-putinism<p><em>Since Putin’s early days and throughout much of his rule, there has been a deliberate effort at a state-promoted vision of Russia rooted in Soviet and imperial Russian history.</em></p> +<p>As evidence of this, the United States has been building a high fence against China in certain areas. In particular, the United States is no longer willing to tolerate China’s rise in the high-tech sector. In a speech at the Special Competitive Studies Project Global Emerging Technologies Summit on September 16, 2022, Sullivan pointed out that the strategy of maintaining a certain gap with China is no longer valid and emphasized that the United States considers it a national security priority to widen the gap with China in certain science and technology fields as much as possible. Specifically, he mentioned computing-related technologies, biotechnology, and clean technology, but he also noted the strategic use of export controls. Indeed, the prevailing view among U.S. industry is that Sullivan’s statement guides current export controls.</p> -<excerpt /> +<h4 id="semiconductors-a-key-item-for-economic-security">Semiconductors, A Key Item for Economic Security</h4> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>One of the defining features of the international order in 2023 is the strategic competition between the United States and China over economic security. Moreover, as Secretary of State Blinken noted in an October 2022 speech at Stanford University, technology is at the heart of U.S.-China strategic competition. China’s rapid technological advancement has kept the United States on guard, and despite the various measures taken to date to keep China in check, the United States recognizes that China’s technological strengths pose a threat to U.S. national interests. For example, The Great Tech Rivalry: China vs. the U.S., published in December 2021 by the Belfer Center at Harvard University, with experts including Graham Allison, raises the possibility that China could overtake the United States in foundational technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), 5G, quantum communications, semiconductors, biotechnology, and green energy in the next decade.</p> -<p>In the 1990s, Boris Yeltsin sponsored a search for an idea of what Russia could be. He never found it. When he became president in 2000, Vladimir Putin presented himself not as an ideologue but as a modernizer — neither anti-Soviet, as far as the past was concerned, nor anti-American or anti-European, as far as the future was. And yet, undercurrents of what we see today in Putin’s Kremlin have long been visible in initiatives like the restoration of the Soviet national anthem, the creation of the patriotic youth group “Nashi,” or the ever-expanding cult of the Great Patriotic War. Such initiatives, even when directed by the presidential administration, have not entirely been of the state’s making. An important role has been played by the so-called ideological entrepreneurs, individuals operating in the gray zone of the Putin regime. Yet such initiatives have also been a response to popular demand for economic, political, and historical stability, linking continuity with the past to visions of cultural achievement and the image of a strong Russian state. Such patriotism has manifested itself in pride, grievance, and a nostalgia for the Soviet Union, much of it fueled by the repudiation of Russia’s “Western experience” in the 1990s.</p> +<p>Semiconductors are core components and a key enabler for these critical, emerging, and foundational technologies. Semiconductors are the quintessential dual-use product and have become one of the most important strategic assets for economic and national security. They enable nearly all modern industrial and military systems, including smartphones, aircraft, weapons systems, the internet, and the power grid. Furthermore, semiconductors are at the heart of all emerging technologies, including AI, quantum computing, the Internet of Things, autonomous systems, and advanced robotics, which will power critical defense systems as well as determine economic competitiveness. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that the country that leads the world in advanced semiconductor research and development (R&amp;D), design, and manufacturing will determine the direction of global hegemony. China’s efforts to develop all parts of the semiconductor supply chain are unprecedented in scope and scale. This is why there is bipartisan support for the United States to revitalize advanced semiconductor manufacturing and research as well as to maintain an advantage over China.</p> -<p>The use of ideology by the Putin regime admits several interpretations. One popular approach claims that contemporary regimes in the Putinist mold have limited need for ideology. An alternative argument is that the rudiments of an ideology have been consistently projected into Russian society for the sake of particular actions, as with the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine: the war has allowed Putin to enforce his ideological aims with the repressive apparatus of a police state. Yet another interpretation is that at some point something snapped in Putin, and he changed from being a self-dealing modernizer and cynical “political technologist” to a purveyor of ideology, convinced that Russia was encircled by the West and that it had to unite the peoples of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia into a Slavic whole — or that he had to save some Russian essence from the decadence and foreign policy aggression of the West.</p> +<h4 id="characteristics-of-the-semiconductor-industry-and-its-importance-to-the-south-korean-economy">Characteristics of the Semiconductor Industry and Its Importance to the South Korean Economy</h4> -<p>This report argues that Vladimir Putin’s regime does have an ideology. As the authors show, from the start of his rule over two decades ago, the Kremlin has made serious, consistent, and increasing investments in promoting certain values. Borrowing heavily from czarist and Soviet themes, as well as other intellectual sources like the twentieth-century radical right, Putinism elevates an idea of imperial-nationalist statism amplified by Russian greatness, exceptionalism, and historical struggle against the West. Notable throughout this period has been the Kremlin’s attention to education and memory politics, accompanied by a growing emphasis and reactionary in nature, on what the Kremlin describes as traditional values. Since the mid-2010s this was followed by a shift in focus from narratives and monuments alone to establishing and funding public engagement with these narratives. Phases marked by the more active promotion of these ideas coincide with external and internal challenges to the regime, often triggered by color revolutions in Russia’s “near abroad,” domestic protests, or the wars Putin started. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and its radical break with the West have prompted the regime to mount a more sustainable ideology-building effort.</p> +<p>Phrases such as “oil of the twenty-first century,” “twenty-first century horseshoe nail,” and “heart of industry” have all been used to describe the importance of semiconductors. A range of recent activity also serves to demonstrate this importance, including the shortage of automotive semiconductors; the U.S. government’s 100-day supply chain review report; the demand for supply chain information from semiconductor companies; decisions by the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and Samsung to invest in foundries in the United States; Japan’s hosting of a TSMC fab and the launch of the Rapidus project; the U.S.-China conflict over Dutch company ASML’s extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography equipment; President Biden’s visit to the Samsung semiconductor plant in South Korea; and the launch of the South Korea-U.S.-Japan-Taiwan FAB4 consultation. The interest in reorganizing the global semiconductor supply chain has never been greater.</p> -<p>A common critique of the Putin regime’s attachment to ideology is that Russian politicians do not live by the piety, collectivism, and traditional values they espouse. But ideologues can be hypocrites. One can use “ideology” in the Althusserian sense to denote the “imagined existence of things,” meaning the ideologue need not believe the espoused ideas; the ideology is useful for the production of practices and rituals. Especially when viewed through the lens of its cultural and historical politics, the Russian government, is an excellent example of this theory. The Kremlin has established a wide range of government-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to promote a presentist view of the past, in which Russia is always threatened by a nefarious West, internal enemies abound, and Russia’s sacrifices and glories make it a global great power. Across after-school clubs, children’s holiday camps with battle reenactments and historical disinformation lessons, Immortal Regiment processions, the wearing of St. George’s ribbons, and “Victory Dictation,” a range of initiatives has been designed to enshrine practices and rituals that are only superficially commemorative. In fact, they enforce a set worldview or ideology. Even if elites do not start as true believers, their heavy-handed inculcation, repetition, and blocking of other views over many years ensures that they absorb at least some of these beliefs.</p> +<p>Making a single semiconductor chip typically requires a production process that spans four countries. The three main parts of the semiconductor production process are design, manufacturing, and assembly, test, and packaging (ATP). Ninety percent of the value added in semiconductors occurs equally in the design and manufacturing stages, with 10 percent added in the ATP stage. In semiconductor manufacturing, where South Korea is particularly strong, there are three types of companies: integrated device manufacturers (IDMs) that do both design and manufacturing in-house, fabless companies that do only design, and foundries that do only contract manufacturing. IDMs are overwhelmingly strong in the memory market, while fabless companies and foundries are dominant in the system semiconductor market.</p> -<p>Statism is a key pillar of Putin’s ideology, which includes deference to a strong, stable state, allowing Russians to be Russians; such statism is based on exceptionalism and traditional values. Another pillar is anti-Westernism, when combined with Russian exceptionalism, promotes a messianic notion of Russia as a great power and civilization state, guarding a Russo-centric polyculturalism, traditional family and gender roles, and guarding against materialism and individualism. The needs of the state and the collective must come first. The plasticity of these narratives should not be confused for the malleability of the ideology’s core elements. They are more a way of selling or packaging the policy to different audiences. New twenty-first-century ideologies are not so much focused on grand narratives or text-based worldviews. Instead, they reflect the fragmentation and eclecticism of the digital age. That this ideology is not spelled out in philosophical texts but most often absorbed through signs, symbols, and popular culture makes it both malleable and easily digestible for less-educated people.</p> +<p>As new generations of semiconductors become smaller and more integrated, the complexity and cost of production increases, leaving only a few companies capable of continuous technological improvement. The memory chip manufacturing market has become an oligopoly, and the division of labor between design and manufacturing has accelerated in the system semiconductor market. The surging demand for semiconductors has led to a geographic spread of demand across the globe, while suppliers have become concentrated in specific countries and regions.</p> -<p>The reigning ideology extends beyond memory politics, encompassing policies intended to protect religious believers from offense, to stigmatize regime opponents with Western connections as “foreign agents,” and even to criminalize those who deny Russia’s great power status by in any way tarnishing the Soviet victory in 1945. Russian doctrines and strategies are an official guidebook to this ideology and of its evolution into something more specific and more actionable. The Kremlin actively promotes the fundamental Russian identity of the nations of the Russian Federation, a historically rooted system that unites spiritual, moral, cultural, and historical values.</p> +<p>The concentration of the semiconductor supply chain is recognized as a risk. Major countries have recognized semiconductors, which are used in all high-tech devices, as a strategic asset and are competing fiercely to secure their domestic semiconductor technology and manufacturing base as part of their economic security. The United States has a strategy to raise its domestic production capacity as a proportion of global capacity to 30 percent from 12 percent through funding worth $52.7 billion over the next five years, while China is implementing a strategy to localize semiconductor production through full tax support and a national semiconductor fund. Elsewhere, Europe is planning to increase its share of global production to 20 percent by 2030 from the current 9 percent; Japan is strengthening its domestic manufacturing capabilities by attracting Taiwanese foundry TSMC and launching the Rapidus project, a 2-nanometer (nm) foundry; and Taiwan has established an Angstrom (Å) strategy for pre-empting sub-1 nm semiconductors as a consolidation strategy.</p> -<p>Will this ideology-building effort help keep Putin in power? This report suggests that it could. Conditions remain generally favorable for the Kremlin; large segments of Russian society endorse its narratives because they retain post-Soviet nostalgia, are convinced of their country’s great power status, or are responsive to the socially conservative agendas of Putin’s Kremlin. It is hard to see where challenges to the Putinist ideology could emerge in Russia. Societal resistance to Kremlin propaganda has remained marginal, even during more liberal periods. An alternative pro-Western identity able to challenge the Kremlin’s propaganda has failed to emerge and is less likely following the massive exodus of Russian liberals as a result of the Ukraine war. The Kremlin has directed particular ideology-promotion efforts toward societal segments where it senses vulnerability, such as young people, who are known to be among the most pro-Western groups in Russia.</p> +<p>South Korea ranks second in global semiconductor production and first in memory production, and the semiconductor industry serves as a core sector, leading the national economy in various fields such as exports and investment. In particular, South Korea’s semiconductor manufacturing capacity is 80 percent domestic and 20 percent overseas, generating most of the production and value added within the country and accounting for about 20 percent of total exports. In 2021, a particularly active year for investment, the industry generated KRW 52 trillion ($39.0 billion) in investment, accounting for about 55 percent of the country’s total manufacturing capital expenditure. In line with this, the government has strengthened the foundation for semiconductor growth by enacting a special law to protect and foster national high-tech strategic industries centered on semiconductors in August 2022; announced a $25 billion mega-cluster project in March 2023; and announced a semiconductor future technology roadmap in April 2023, declaring its intention to foster 45 core semiconductor technologies.</p> -<h4 id="the-rudiments-of-soviet-ideology">The Rudiments of Soviet Ideology</h4> +<h4 id="strengthening-us-checks-on-chinas-semiconductor-industry">Strengthening U.S. Checks on China’s Semiconductor Industry</h4> -<p>In Russia, post-Soviet society did not start with a clean slate. Many Soviet citizens embraced ideas and beliefs as a collective body, which shaped their perceptions of themselves and of the world around them. When the Soviet system collapsed, its ideological legacy lingered on.</p> +<p>Fundamentally, the South Korean government and semiconductor companies recognize that the demand for semiconductors will increase in the long term as the digital and green transformations accelerate, which will ultimately create opportunities for the South Korean economy. At the same time, however, the U.S. government’s tightening of sanctions against China poses a major risk to South Korea’s semiconductor industry.</p> -<p>This legacy included a sense of exceptionalism. The Soviet Union conceived of itself as a mighty superpower, a huge country with nuclear weapons that was globally feared and respected and with only one competitor, the United States. In the late Soviet Union, propaganda tended to portray the West (and the United States in particular) as “the Other” against which it built the Soviet collective identity, presenting the Soviet system as the most viable alternative to most things “Western” (or “capitalist”). A sense of belonging to a mighty superpower compensated Soviet citizens for the difficulties present in their daily lives. This stress on exceptionalism also borrowed from Russia’s century-old tradition of paternalism and statism (“государственность”): belief in the supremacy of a unified state as the highest governing principle and the ultimate source of political authority coupled with opposition to any constraints on the state, whether through law, civil society, or formal institutions. For the ethnic Russians at the core of the Soviet Union, a leading position within the system furnished an extra source of collective pride and self-respect, a substitute for other perks such as the republican level structures within the Soviet Union granted to other Soviet republics.</p> +<p>There have been two turning points in the U.S. government’s sanctions against China’s semiconductor industry. The first turning point was the semiconductor sanctions against Huawei in 2020. After the enactment of the Export Control Reform Act and the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act in 2018, the United States focused its regulatory efforts on China’s information and communications technology industry. The main targets were two 5G-related companies, Huawei and ZTE. In May and August 2020, the United States imposed semiconductor sanctions as part of its crackdown on Huawei. The U.S. Foreign Direct Product Rule prohibited any company from producing and providing semiconductors designed by Huawei and its subsidiary HiSilicon. Samsung and TSMC, for example, were directly affected by this measure and stopped doing semiconductor business with Huawei. Huawei, which held the top spot in terms global smartphone market share in 2020, has since all but exited the smartphone market due to a lack of access to advanced semiconductors. This made the U.S. government realize that China’s weakness lies in the semiconductor sector. Since then, the U.S. government has tightened its grip on China’s semiconductor industry through its own export control regulations, including on the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) in 2020, supercomputing CPU developer Tianjin Phytium Information Technology in 2021, and Yangtze Memory Technologies (YMTC) and Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE) in 2022.</p> -<p>The collapse of the Soviet Union, defeat in the Cold War, and loss of Russia’s superpower status led to a sudden and traumatic disappearance of many important composites in the Soviet collective identity. Particularly painful was a perceived loss of great power status. Post-Soviet Russia lost much of its influence on the international stage and faced economic misery of the 1990s. It even had to accept aid from its former enemy — the United States. For many, this was a national trauma. Most Russian respondents (about 70 percent) to a survey at the time recognized their country’s loss of its great power status. A popular saying many people at the time repeated like a mantra expressed their frustration: “What a great country did we lose!” (“Какую страну потеряли!”). Widespread anxiety and resentment shaped post-Soviet Russian politics, in which Soviet elites and institutions continued to play a prominent role.</p> +<p>The second turning point was a July 2022 TechInsights analysis about SMIC’s production of 7 nm chips. The article reported that SMIC had broken through the 10 nm barrier by incorporating multi-patterning technology using only older-generation deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography equipment without using EUV equipment, which was already under export control. The U.S. government responded immediately. As testified by U.S. semiconductor equipment companies such as Applied Materials, LAM Research, and KLA, the U.S. government extended the existing export ban on manufacturing equipment related to sub-10-nm processes to sub-14 nm processes. The report also seems to have prompted the United States to abandon its previous strategy of maintaining a two-generation technology gap with China in semiconductors and instead think about widening the gap as much as possible. In August 2022, shortly after the news of SMIC’s breakthrough, President Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act into law. One month later, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan gave a speech in which he stated that, for some technologies the United States will no longer use sliding-scale dynamic controls but rather static controls that prevent China from acquiring technology beyond what it has already acquired.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/m5lCDDO.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Muscovites wait in line to buy bread amid the economic crisis that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, December 1993.</em></p> +<p>While most of the U.S. actions have been aimed at stopping China from catching up in the advanced semiconductor technology, South Korean semiconductor factories in China have also been affected. For example, in 2019, the United States blocked China from importing ASML’s EUV lithography equipment, which is needed to manufacture advanced logic semiconductors below the 10-nm technology node. While the target was probably Chinese foundry SMIC, SK Hynix, which produces DRAM memory semiconductors in China, was also banned in November 2021 from importing the EUV equipment needed to manufacture next-generation DRAM.</p> -<p>Even with the arrival of market economics, post-Soviet Russia failed to break with its Soviet past. Many grassroots movements that emerged in the new Russia remained retrospectively oriented, whether they were post-Soviet populists, left-wing movements passionate about egalitarian justice, or neo-Eurasianists and nationalists focused on Russia’s past greatness. The same was true for the Kremlin. As liberals lost influence in the Russian government, emphasis fell on the Soviet legacy, sugarcoating the Soviet past and adopting more imperial conceptualizations of the new Russian state, which was increasingly characterized as a homeland for Russians and Russian speakers across the territory of the former Soviet Union. These factors provided fertile ground for Vladimir Putin’s ideology building and for the assertive foreign policy that accompanied it.</p> +<p>In recent years, the intensity of U.S. checks against China in the semiconductor sector has increased. Such restrictions are no longer limited to 10 nm advanced semiconductors but are beginning to resemble broader sanctions. A prime example is the CHIPS and Science Act, which took effect in early August 2022. The new law aims to inject $52.7 billion into the domestic semiconductor industry to encourage companies to build and expand domestic manufacturing capacity, but one of its key provisions prohibits investments in China involving logic semiconductors below the 28 nm technology node for 10 years for companies that benefit from U.S.-government subsidies. In the memory sector, the March 2023 release of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for national security guardrails also prohibits investments in NAND memory above 128 layers and DRAM memory below 18 nm. In order to extend the investment restrictions to all future semiconductors, the United States also defined “semiconductors critical to national security” for the first time. This includes compound semiconductors, photonic semiconductors, and semiconductors for quantum communications. In summary, the U.S. measures appear to have been designed to allow China to grow to the level of technology it has achieved, but not beyond. The Chinese government strongly criticized the legislation, calling it a product of a “Cold War approach with a zero-sum mentality.”</p> -<h4 id="putinist-ideology-in-the-making">Putinist Ideology in the Making</h4> +<p>Another example is the United States’ use of multilateral platforms. The United States also utilizes the Wassenaar Arrangement to contain China. On August 12, 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added gallium oxide-diamond, used in ultra-wide bandgap semiconductors, and electronic CAD software for integrated circuit development to its list of export-controlled technologies. These technologies were included in the list agreed to at the December 2021 Wassenaar Arrangement meeting and are part of the U.S. strategic effort to contain China’s advances in semiconductor technology. In addition, the United States is seeking to designate advanced etching equipment needed to manufacture advanced NAND memory chips as a strategic item through the Wassenaar Arrangement. If this equipment is designated as an export control item, Samsung and SK Hynix, which produce NAND memory in China, could be severely impacted in their ability to produce next-generation products.</p> -<p>Until recently, the Kremlin’s political legitimacy did not require a coherent ideology. A more sustained effort at developing one emerged after a surge in protests in 2011 and 2012 and suddenly increased with the start of the 2022 war in Ukraine. However, since Putin’s early days and throughout much of his rule, there has been a deliberate effort at a state-promoted vision of Russia rooted in Soviet and imperial Russian history.</p> +<p>In addition, the Netherlands and Japan have announced that they will impose export controls on DUV-related equipment in 2023, following persuasive efforts by the United States. If the equipment and materials needed for the sub-28 nm process, including DUV equipment, cannot be easily procured in China, South Korean semiconductor companies will no longer be able to manufacture semiconductors in China.</p> -<p><strong>THE 2000S: NATIONAL CONSOLIDATION AROUND A STRONG, STABLE STATE</strong></p> +<h4 id="the-us-governments-technical-redline-south-koreas-perspectives-on-the-october-7-regulations">The U.S. Government’s Technical Redline: South Korea’s Perspectives on the October 7 Regulations</h4> -<p>For Putin, “the history man,” the importance of history was apparent from the start. At first, the goal seems to have been primarily a means to an end. Reactionary and liberal groups clashed in their visions of what direction Russian society should take; Putin, once he took power, aimed to unite a divided and beleaguered country, offering a mutually agreeable interpretation of the end of the Soviet era and reasons for pride based on historical themes and motifs. This early emphasis on patriotism lacked strong ideological content. Beyond calling for Russia’s stabilization and revival, the invocation of history as the basis for national identity in a culturally diverse country included ethnic and religious minorities, while still celebrating the dominant ethnic Russian (русский) and Orthodox Christian culture. As former minister of culture Vladimir Medinskii has argued, this was about the “identity of Russian [российского] society, in which respect for the heroic past . . . has played the part of a unifying force.” Exemplifying this emphasis on unity, the Day of the October Revolution (November 7) was replaced with a new state holiday, the Day of National Unity, in 2004. Using cultural memory to bring a divided nation together, the government promoted a vision of Russia that most people could support and adopted a mélange of popular historical narratives. These narratives appealed to as many ideologies and political persuasions as possible: imperialists, Communist nostalgists, supporters of a strong state, and ethno-nationalists. This was further illustrated by the selective appropriation of Soviet symbols, such as the State Coat of Arms and the Soviet National Anthem, which Putin reintroduced in late 2000.</p> +<p><strong>1. How long can South Korea enjoy a reprieve from export controls?</strong></p> -<p>This vision of Russia was also soon reflected in history textbooks. In 2001, the Kremlin convened a government committee to analyze the content of textbooks and teachers’ books recent Russian history. Its goal was to reassert control over the textbook market. The committee ordered that the “many negative descriptions that appeared in textbooks in the 1990s” be replaced by a vision of Russian history promoting “patriotism, citizenship, national self-consciousness, and historical optimism,” and it removed several books from the officially approved list.</p> +<p>Given that China (including Hong Kong) accounts for 60 percent of South Korea’s semiconductor exports each year, the most direct impact on the South Korean economy is the restrictions on the Chinese semiconductor industry announced by the BIS on October 7, 2022. This measure includes three main parts: new export controls targeting semiconductors of certain performance levels and supercomputers containing these chips; new controls targeting the activities of U.S. persons supporting China’s semiconductor development and equipment used to manufacture certain semiconductors; and measures to minimize the short-term disruptions of these measures on the supply chain.</p> -<p>The emphasis on unity, continuity, and pride crystallized around the value of “thousand-year-old” Russian statehood, a central element of national identity, and around the idea of a “strong state” as the source of Russia’s past and future greatness. Already in late 1999, Putin published an article “Russia at the Turn of Millenium,” where he laid out his vision for the country. Rejecting both the dogma of Communism but also Western-style democracy, he offered that Russia would seek a third way that would rely on its traditions of a strong state. “For Russians, a strong state is not an anomaly which should be got rid of. Quite the contrary, they see it as a source and guarantor of order and the initiator and main driving force of any change.” Putin further articulated these themes in his 2003 presidential address to the Federal Assembly. Warning about the threats of state disintegration, Putin stressed the “truly historic feat” of “retaining the state in a vast geographic space” and of “preserving a unique community of peoples while strengthening the country’s position in the world.” Moving away from Yeltsin’s portrayal of the Soviet disintegration as the “foundational act” of the new Russia, Putin presented it as a sudden “catastrophe,” a disruption of Russia’s “great power” status and the “thousand-year-old” Russian strong state. Also reflective of this growing emphasis on the role of statehood in Russian history was the 2008 state TV show “Name of Russia,” launched to determine the most notable figure in Russian history through a nationwide vote. Of the twelve historical figures selected to be voted on, nine were statesmen, ranging from Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great to Lenin and Stalin. The winner of the competition was Alexander Nevsky, a prince who battled against European invvaders for the sake of preserving Russian statehood and the Orthodox Christian faith.</p> +<p>The United States was concerned that the measures could impact the global semiconductor supply chain by causing immediate production disruptions for companies producing semiconductors in China. As a result, foreign companies producing semiconductors in China — Samsung, SK Hynix, and TSMC — were granted a one-year reprieve to utilize U.S.-made equipment and U.S. technicians. In other words, how long South Korean companies can continue to operate semiconductor factories in China depends on how long they are able to get a reprieve from the October 7 regulations.</p> -<p>This move from repentance to pride, from division to unity, and from the birth of a new democratic Russia to the portrayal of Russian statehood as a millennial tradition explains the mythic place of the Great Patriotic War, as the Soviet fight against Nazism from 1941 to 1945 came to be known in Soviet history books. It would become the keystone of the Putinist ideology. The sole truly unifying element among the many polarizing chapters of Russia’s history, the Great Victory is one of the few topics on which most Russians (about 80–90 percent) have consistently felt pride over the years. Most political actors, from liberals to Communists and nationalists, agreed on the significance of the victory in Russian history. The Kremlin used a triumphalist narrative of the Great Patriotic War to create a post-Soviet Russian identity. The 2005 Victory Day parade, when celebrations reached a previously unseen scale, was a turning point in this regard.</p> +<p>Given that granting the exception was a temporary action, it is not surprising that it could end at any time. No one knows for sure, but the clue may be found in Section 5949 of the United States’ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023. This provision has two main parts. It prohibits certain Chinese semiconductor companies from participating in the U.S. government procurement market, and it also prohibits foreign companies whose products use certain Chinese chips as components from participating in the U.S. government procurement market. However, the timetable for implementation of these provisions offers a hint as to when exceptions to the October 7 regulations will end.</p> -<p>In the mid-2000s, a series of color revolutions shook the post-Soviet space (Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005). The remarks of President George W. Bush — who welcomed color revolutions — and U.S. initiatives in support of popular movements against authoritarian regimes suggested that a country like Belarus could be next. These developments convinced Putin that the United States actively promoted regime change across the region, including in Russia. By 2005, state-linked media openly claimed that Russia was the target of a new Cold War, waged “by political provocation, played out with the help of special operations, media war, political destabilization, and the seizure of power by an aggressively activated minority . . . with the help of velvet, blue, orange, etc. revolutions.”</p> +<p>Section 5949 first requires the Federal Acquisition Security Council to submit recommendations to minimize supply chain risks applicable to federal government procurement of semiconductor products and services, as well as suggestions for regulations implementing the restrictions, for which it provides a two-year window. Then, within three years, specific regulations must be written to prohibit Chinese semiconductor companies from participating in U.S. government procurement markets, with implementation to begin five years later.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Kremlin used a triumphalist narrative of the Great Patriotic War to create a post-Soviet Russian identity.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>In brief, whether and when the October 7 regulations are strictly enforced on South Korean fabs in China is likely to be tied to how the United States builds its diversification strategy and what specific rules it writes to reduce its dependence on China. In return, it will determine whether South Korean companies can continue to produce semiconductors in China. In the worst-case scenario, South Korea’s semiconductor fabs in China will be forced to exit the country in three to five years when they need to upgrade their equipment.</p> -<p>These concerns added a “Thermidorian” dimension to the evolving statist narratives Putin was promoting, a growing anti-revolution orientation and a focus on deepening the state’s hold over society. Putin’s chief political strategist, Vladislav Surkov, developed the notion of “sovereign democracy,” which made the correct use of Russian history (including in education) a matter of vital national interest, aimed at fostering anti-Western sentiment through an increase in state propaganda and the repression of NGOs and human rights activists. Common themes included the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in unifying the Russian people and the vision of Russia as a “besieged fortress” historically under attack by the West. Kremlin policies increasingly promoted Russia’s national interests as the main “standard of the truth and reliability of historical work” — to cite one of Russia’s main pro-Kremlin officials. The 2009 National Security Strategy warned against “attempts to revise the history of Russia, her role and place in world history,” which could negatively influence the country’s national security. “Securitization” — a process of aligning Russian culture and history with “security” matters — was proceeding apace. One example is the emergence of the St. George’s ribbon as a commemorative symbol of the Great Patriotic War in reaction to the 2003-2004 Orange Revolution. Since 2014, it has denoted support for Russian aggression against Ukraine.</p> +<p><strong>2. Is the United States’ technical redline likely to change?</strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Cl96648.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ A shop window is decorated with a sticker reading “May 9” in the colors of Saint George’s ribbon ahead of the Victory Day in Moscow, May 2023.</em></p> +<p>South Korean companies are also interested in whether the U.S. technological redlines will change. As semiconductor technology advances, the definition of “high technology” changes. In fact, when the U.S. government enacted the CHIPS Act in August 2022, no memory-related technical redlines were announced, and in logic semiconductors alone, investments in Chinese production facilities below the 28-nm technology node are prohibited. On October 7, the BIS export control regulations set technical red lines for NAND memory above 128 layers, for DRAM below 18 nm, and for logic FinFET and GAAFET technologies.</p> -<p>The color revolutions of the mid-2010s, which featured active youth protest participation, also drew the regime’s attention to the indoctrination of youth. This resulted in Surkov launching a number of pseudo-grassroots youth movements such as Nashi, the “Democratic Anti-Fascist Youth Movement ‘Ours!’,” and the Molodaya Gvardiya) aimed at co-opting young Russians. The focus on youth drew more attention to education. By 2005, the standardization of education had become one of the four national projects overseen by Dmitry Medvedev, then one of Putin’s key allies and subsequently the Russian placeholder president. A number of new movements were established, such as the historical memory project (which lay dormant until 2012). In 2007, a new teacher’s manual created by order of the presidential administration presented Russia as having to retain its sovereignty against a predatory West, urging teachers to interpret Stalin’s repressions as a necessary evil, and portrayed the Soviet collapse as a tragic mistake that hindered Russia’s progress. The teacher’s manual was soon followed by a controversial history textbook, which justified Stalin’s purges as “the requirements of modernization in a situation of scarce resources.”</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/sMUeBIM.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: Technical Thresholds Released in Recent U.S. Acts and Regulations.</strong> Source: Author’s analysis.</em></p> -<p><strong>THE 2010S: THE CONSERVATIVE TURN AND DEEPENING ENGAGEMENT</strong></p> +<p>With the release of the CHIPS Act Notice of Funding Opportunity on February 28, 2023, it was confirmed that the definition of leading-edge tech eligible for priority grant funding will be different than the red lines in the October 7, 2022, export control regulations. NAND memory was set to be above 200 layers, DRAM memory was set to be 13 nm or less, and logic semiconductors was set to be less than 5 nm. Within the framework of U.S.-China strategic rivalry, this sparked optimism among South Korean companies on the potential revision of technological boundaries by the United States.</p> -<p>Despite the Kremlin’s best efforts at offering a unifying narrative for various social groups throughout the 2000s, liberals proved disloyal to Putin. Among Russian middle-class urbanites, counterstreams and ongoing modernization in Russian society led to a growing dissatisfaction with the lack of political change, culminating in pro-democracy protests that spread in major Russian cities through 2011 and 2012. This brought ideology building to the forefront, as the government needed new means of political legitimization to justify its increasingly authoritarian style of governing. But contrary to the 2000s, when Surkov’s eclectic approaches flirted with various societal groups, the “betrayal” of the liberals made Putin turn to his more conservative political base. This conservative shift was expedited by a drop in foreign direct investment and energy prices, as well as by the general knock-on effects from the 2008 global financial crisis, which engendered a shift away from the earlier paradigm of economic openness, encouraging the regime to shore up its domestic legitimacy by leaning further into an ideological project.</p> +<p>However, on March 21, 2023, when the CHIPS Act’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the national security guardrails was released, the technical red lines were once again reaffirmed at the same technical level set on October 7, 2022. This was a clear confirmation that the United States currently has no plans to modify its technical thresholds aimed at curbing China’s semiconductor industry in the foreseeable future, which led to disappointment among South Korean companies.</p> -<p>Having realized that there were limits to how much Western-themed modernization Russia was able to achieve without reforming the existing political arrangements, the Kremlin looked more and more to the past — and “tradition” — for inspiration about what Russia was and what it should be. The Kremlin based its arguments on conservative Christian values in opposition to the overly liberal and morally decadent West, with its emphasis on issues of gender and sexual minorities’ rights. The so-called conservative turn seen from 2012 onward drew on preexisting initiatives, bringing them from the background to center stage. The emphasis on national identity became much more pronounced. Putin began his third term in 2012 with a long essay on the “national question,” claiming that Russia-ness is a cultural identity derived from the civilizational greatness of the ethnic Russian people, whose mission is to unify the rest of society around its historical values. Since 2012 the frequency of the term “morality” (“нравственность”) and of the adjective “spiritual” (“духовный”) in Putin’s speeches has spiked.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h4> -<p>The Russian Orthodox Church played a more prominent role by being increasingly present at state ceremonies at all levels, and in ever-closer interactions with state structures. Patriarch Kirill’s concept of traditional values guided the Kremlin’s “conservative turn” and its search for a new Russian identity. Patriarch Kirill even described Putin as being a “God’s miracle,” and the World Russian People’s Council, linked to the Russian Orthodox Church, gave its first award to the Russian president for the preservation of Russia’s “great power statehood.” The Russian Orthodox Church gained access to the prisons and to the army, and it tried to access the school system. Yet apart from the growing role of the Church, state discourse on these topics mostly echoed Soviet approaches. The conservative “turn” co-existed with a “re-turn” to many Soviet practices.</p> +<p>In general, South Korea holds a supportive stance regarding the United States’ approach to China’s semiconductor industry. Semiconductor technology lies at the core of advanced and emerging technologies that can be converted to military use. Therefore, South Korea aligns itself with the U.S. endeavors to restrict the transfer of semiconductor technology to countries of concern.</p> -<p>Due to the perceived failures of Surkov’s “managed democracy,” Vyacheslav Volodin — who had “a reputation for a more heavy-handed approach” — succeeded him as deputy chief of staff. Sophisticated boutique projects were replaced by increased repression. The focus on “foreign agents” and “defending Russian cultural traditions,” prominent in the 2012 Pussy Riot case for instance, sought to delegitimize liberal political opposition by rendering it not just wrong but foreign, Western, un-Russian. By casting all uprisings or popular revolutions as geopolitical interference, officials and state media embraced the narrative of external actors interfering in Russia’s internal affairs and claimed that protesters were being paid by Western institutions. In response to these trumped-up threats, the Kremlin expelled the U.S. Agency for International Aid, passed a law demanding that entities receiving foreign funding register as “foreign agents,” and added new restrictions on protest participation and freedom of speech — including repressive blogging laws, restrictions on media ownership, and legislation banning “extremist” views and the perceived rehabilitation of Nazism. In 2013, the Kremlin replaced the news agency RIA Novosti with Rossiya Segodnya, headed by Dmitrii Kiselev; sacked Galina Timchenko, the editor of the independently minded Lenta news portal; attacked the opposition TV channel Dozhd; and pressured advertisers to pull out and rendered the channel unviable on television. The 2013 law banned the promotion of “non-traditional relationships” to minors; its deliberate vagueness ensured its potential for wide applicability.</p> +<p>However, the perception of threats to economic security varies by country. Especially in the case of the semiconductor industry, where a clear division of roles exists, countries’ economic security interests are bound to differ. In this regard, the United States, with its strength in design and equipment, and South Korea, with its strength in manufacturing, are bound to have different perspectives on semiconductor risk management.</p> -<p>The government’s grip on the interpretation of history and the educational system also deepened dramatically. The State Program for Patriotic Education budget is indicative of these changes: between 2011 and 2016 it more than doubled, reaching 1.67 billion rubles. Furthermore, the salaries of state officials and administrators working in the cultural sphere almost tripled. In 2012, Putin founded the Russian Military Historical Society, which spent a lot of time and funds on commemorating Russian soldiers who served in the First World War — a sign of militarism spreading beyond just the cult of the Great Patriotic War. The Russian Historical Society, headed by Sergey Naryshkin, now head of foreign intelligence, embarked on the creation of a new “rethought” unified history textbook to substitute for the 65 official high school textbooks on Russian history. It developed a unified Historical and Cultural Standard and Concept of Teaching History at School, with which all history textbooks would have to comply, and released three official lines of history textbooks. The updated editions published in 2016 were even more explicit in their anti-Western and anti-revolution orientation, portraying Russia as rebuffing past assaults from the aggressive West — whether from thirteenth-century Teutonic knights, from forces defeated by Russian prince Alexander Nevsky, from German fascists, or, more recently, from “the U.S.-led united anti-Russian front aiming to punish Russia” for “defending” Ukraine. Due to the Kremlin’s fear of anything involving revolutions, even the 1917 October Revolution now tended to be presented as being partly the product of Western interference. In a 2017 state TV series, Russian revolutionaries were shown to have the backing of German financiers.</p> +<p>In the short term, South Korean industry and policymakers broadly believe that the U.S. export control policies will delay the rise of Chinese semiconductor capabilities. For example, some analysts have reported that South Korea would have already been overtaken by China in the NAND memory sector without the recent U.S. export controls against China.</p> -<p>The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and aggression against the Donbas region accelerated the militarization of Russian society. The idea of Russia being surrounded by enemies like the West on the outside and by a “fifth column” on the inside has been increasingly filtered through national institutions like schools, the military, the media and the Russian Orthodox Church, fostering a sense of living in a “besieged fortress” among Russians. More assertive international stances in Ukraine and Syria brought a shift in the “memory discourse” at home, moving it from defensive to more offensive framings. Where previously Russia had been defending its historical memory at home or in lands it thought it was entitled to influence (the “Russian world”), it now revived the Soviet claim to great power status, returning to being a global player and a competitor against the United States. From this juncture, an emphasis on Russia’s great power status featured prominently in the Kremlin’s official narratives. This period saw the emergence of a cultural decolonization narrative, which argued that Russia was defending not just itself but others from being colonized by Western “militant secularism” or alien values and worldviews with no respect for tradition.</p> +<p>However, South Korea also believes that if the current situation continues, companies will suffer greatly in the medium to long term. While South Korea and the United States share the same policy goals, it is more important for South Korea to consider China’s strategy since it is directly exposed to Chinese competition in the memory chip market. China will continue to pursue an import substitution strategy and will strategically use indigenous products if the technology gap between foreign and indigenous products is not large. Thus, South Korea needs to widen the technology gap to the point where China cannot substitute imports with indigenous semiconductors. This is exactly the same objective as the United States’ China strategy elaborated by National Security Advisor Sullivan. However, South Koreans are generally more concerned than Americans about losing a huge market that brings a steady cash flow that is also essential for R&amp;D.</p> -<p>The first attempts at codifying an official ideology were beginning. The 2014 Information Security Doctrine sparked numerous discussions of how to defend the Russian information space against historical falsification, including raising a battalion to defend history. Also in 2014, the Kremlin introduced the Fundamental Principles of Legislation of the Russian Federation on Culture, which set out the next stage of Russian cultural policy: broadly, what to promote, why, and how. Originally, the Ministry of Culture, with personal input from Medinskii, wrote the first drafts of the principles, the text boldly declaring that “Russia is not Europe” and asserting that only cultural products that were politically useful should and would be supported. It abounded in historicism, arguing that the purpose of promoting cultural education was to create a common worldview among the Russian people. Its second aim was to create a spiritual-cultural matrix for the nation, a “cultural consciousness.” Despite the Ministry of Culture having liberally sprinkled the text with quotations from Putin, the president’s team blocked and disowned the draft. A presidential administration working group eventually rewrote the principles from scratch, producing a more sober and less politicized view of Russian cultural policy. Yet Medinskii had the last word. The updated version, released in 2023, is essentially what he wrote in 2014.</p> +<p>China (including Hong Kong) currently accounts for 60 percent of global semiconductor consumption. At the heart of this demand is the domestic electronic device manufacturing industry, which consumes most semiconductors. In this respect, neither the United States nor its allies can suddenly replace China. The United States has a number of world-class fabless companies, but China is ultimately the biggest consumer of the chips they sell. If China, which sees Western pressure as unfair, aggressively tries to replace its demand for semiconductors with homegrown semiconductors, companies such as Samsung and SK Hynix will not be able to secure stable cash flows, limiting their ability to invest in R&amp;D and to reorganize their supply chains. Although the United States, Europe, and Japan have announced plans to support these companies in their market, the loss of the Chinese market cannot be offset by such subsidies.</p> -<p>In 2014, the Kremlin floated the notion of “Novorossiya,” a term associated with the reign of Catherine the Great and the extension of Russian control to southern Ukraine. This marked a departure from the previous focus on “gathering the Russian peoples” abroad. For example, after uniting overseas and domestic Russian Orthodox Church, the Kremlin established the Russkii Mir (“Russian World”) foundation in 2007 to propagate Russia’s worldview and appeal to those with cultural, religious, ethnic, even intellectual ties to Russia. The Kremlin also toyed with political conceptions of Eurasia, as evidenced by the establishment of the Eurasian Union in 2011. In 2014, there was a shift, as the Kremlin hoped that ethnic Russians in that region, as well as Russian speakers or others presumed to feel closer to Russia than to Ukraine, would warm to a twenty-first century Novorossiya, facilitating the Crimea-style incorporation of Ukrainian territory into the Russian Federation. None of this came to pass, and at the time the notion of Novorossiya could have been dismissed as extremist fantasy, especially as the intervention in Syria saw a return to Kremlin conceptualization of Russia’s role as that of a culture with global reach, rather than anything defined in purely ethnic terms. Novorossiya was, however, an ideological experiment to which Putin would return in 2022, once the initial plan to capture Kyiv failed. The exact territories designated as Novorossiya in 2014 would be illegally annexed in September 2022, though only parts of them were under the control of the Russian military. The ideological fantasies of 2014 had a shaping influence on Russia’s policies — actual and aspirational — in 2022 and 2023.</p> +<p>South Korea wants close policy coordination with the United States. If the U.S. government’s real goal is to get South Korean fabs out of China, the United States needs to support a gradual and managed exit while maintaining a certain level of sales in China. Exit planning needs to be a bilateral effort. It should be aligned with the U.S. and South Korean semiconductor strategies and be carefully prepared by calculating revenue flows over time as well as accounting for global semiconductor market shocks. Both countries should also plan how to support the industry in the event of Chinese retaliation during the exit process.</p> -<p>Another important development around this time was the shift in focus from narratives and monuments to funding and setting up (often stealthily) movements, initiatives, clubs, camps, battle reenactments, and historical tourism to encourage engagement with these narratives. These included the reintroduction of patriotic activities at schools and in extracurricular activities for children and teenagers, as well as the propagandist effort to revalorize the military services and the army, granting greater rights to Cossacks, who formed vigilante militia groups to patrol Russian towns. Spending on events that required public engagement, such as “mobilization” and “competitions,” more than tripled since 2016. One example is the emergence of a system of multimedia historical parks entitled “Russia — My History,” which showcase a Kremlin-friendly take on all of Russian history — from ancient times to the present. The first park opened in Moscow on November 4, 2013, and by 2023, there were 24 parks, spreading from the North Caucasus to the Far East. One of the key messages promoted by the exhibits is that Russia is strong when it is united around a powerful leader, and when it is not, it is vulnerable to external manipulation and aggression. A particularly large section is devoted to Putin’s presidency.</p> +<p>South Korea also prefers to keep its discussions with the United States low-key. Since semiconductor export controls are being used as a key tool in strategic competition, they can easily get into the spotlight and could be used in domestic politics in both the United States and South Korea. They should not be readily used to stir up unnecessary anti-Chinese sentiment without understanding the semiconductor industry. In terms of being unobtrusive, South Korea favors a solution that utilizes existing U.S. regulations rather than a newly created device. One such measure is the Validated End User list. However, many experts are skeptical that the list can fundamentally outpace the October 7 regulations.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The ideological fantasies of 2014 had a shaping influence on Russia’s policies — actual and aspirational — in 2022 and 2023.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Interestingly, the United States’ use of excessive China containment measures has acted as an incentive for South Korea to join U.S.-led plurilateral frameworks such as FAB4 or any potential iteration of the multilateral semiconductor export control regime. South Korea believes that a forum such as FAB4, if properly utilized, can help moderate the level of U.S. containment of China and ultimately minimize damage to South Korean semiconductor companies. By participating as a key member of a group that brings together global semiconductor manufacturing powerhouses, South Korean input into important decisionmaking processes can reduce uncertainty for the South Korean semiconductor industry.</p> -<p>As discussed above, the Kremlin has also become more vigorous in its efforts to form and influence a younger audience, which it has often struggled to convince of its vision of Russia — particularly after Surkov’s dismissal and the ensuing disappearance of Nashi and other state-sponsored youth movements. Whereas earlier budgets privileged commemorations and monuments, the 2016 plan allocated more than a third of the State Program for Patriotic Education budget for “youth military preparation” (such as the Young Army Movement), reflecting a broader shift toward mobilizational activities in which the state’s role was less overt. The Kremlin had learned to tap into organic apolitical everyday forms of patriotism, imbuing them with a politicization they did not previously possess.</p> +<p>Following the release of the October 7 regulations, the United States accelerated discussions with the Netherlands and Japan to harmonize semiconductor equipment export control measures. In the first half of 2023, the Netherlands and Japan eventually tightened their semiconductor equipment export controls. South Korea, one of the countries most affected by the measures, was not included in the discussions and was left in the dark about what decisions were being made. This should never happen again. As a key stakeholder in the semiconductor supply chain, South Korea should participate in export control discussions from the outset. South Korea needs to reduce uncertainty by making and implementing decisions together with its key partners, protecting not only its own technology but also that of its partners.</p> -<p><strong>THE 2020S: CONSOLIDATING THE IDEOLOGY</strong></p> +<p>Simultaneously, South Korea should endeavor to ensure that the United States realizes that South Korean semiconductor firms in China solely produce memory chips, which are fundamentally different from logic chips. Logic semiconductors have both legacy and advanced semiconductors, and all of them are marketable depending on their usage. However, memory chips are not marketable unless they are advanced memory chips. If you cannot produce advanced memory in China, you cannot keep your factories operating in China. In addition, unlike most advanced logic semiconductors, such as AI chips, which are subject to export controls, the United States does not consider memory semiconductors to be subject to export controls. South Korea, however, will also have to think about how to fundamentally address the concern of technology leakage of advanced equipment from fabs in China.</p> -<p>Under Putin, the Kremlin’s history and memory politics evolved in response to internal and external challenges but remained somewhat malleable. In the 2020s, Putin’s decision to stay in power indefinitely and Russia’s 2022 war in Ukraine necessitated a more systematic approach to ideology promotion. For years, the regime prepared the ground, after which it made its move.</p> +<p>Again, policymakers need to think about why the semiconductor industry has become oligopolized. This phenomenon happened not only in the semiconductor manufacturing industry but also in the semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry and the semiconductor components and materials industry. The answer is simple. Recent technological development requires an astronomical investment of money, and few companies can raise such funds. In other words, when seeking to widen the technology gap to guarantee a country’s advantage, securing a stable flow of funds is as crucial as preventing technology leakage. South Korea thinks a balanced approach is needed for the United States to succeed in its China policy. The core of the U.S. and South Korean strategy should be to widen the technology gap through a combination of export controls and utilization of the Chinese market. The widening of the technological gap must be accomplished simultaneously in two directions: by locking down Chinese capabilities and by developing advanced technologies. The United States should not only focus on export controls to close China’s semiconductor production capacity but also figure out how to capitalize on the Chinese market, the world’s largest consumer of semiconductors, at the same time. Now is the time to find a win-win strategy between the United States and South Korea based on an accurate understanding of the semiconductor industry. In particular, it is important to keep in mind that even the slightest policy failure is unforgivable, given the ongoing dynamics of U.S.-China strategic competition.</p> -<p>The 2020 revision of the Russian constitution through amendments extending Putin’s term limits until 2036 (essentially making him a lifelong ruler) deepened the trend toward traditionalism by formally incorporating new ideological dimensions into the constitution. These dimensions included the mention of trust in God, transferred by ancestors; the importance of memory politics, revering the Fatherland defenders’ memory and protecting a Kremlin-approved version of the historical truth (i.e., one that opposed the European convictions that the Soviet Union was one of the initiators of World War II); and repositioning Russian from a national language to “the language of the state-forming nation, being a part of multi-national union of equal nations of Russia” in an appeal to Russian nationalism. The 2021 National Security Strategy focused even more insistently on “the defence of traditional Russian spiritual-moral values, culture and historical memory” as a national priority.</p> +<h3 id="german-perspective">German Perspective</h3> -<p>Yet it was the 2022 war and subsequent radical break with the West that triggered the most dramatic shift toward systematic ideology building. In an effort to justify Russia’s confrontation with the West, conservative themes (as evidenced by explicitly homophobic and transphobic rhetoric) have taken a more central position in Putin’s statements leading up to and in support of the war. Since early 2022, Russian officials, realizing the need to offer a coherent explanation to justify Putin’s perpetual hold on power and to sustain the war and associated costs, repeatedly offered to remove the constitutional ban on state ideology. A special presidential decree introduced in January 2022 listed the country’s main traditional spiritual and moral values: patriotism, service to the fatherland and responsibility for its fate, high moral ideals, the priority of the spiritual over the material, collectivism, historical memory, and the unity of the peoples of Russia.</p> +<p><em>A German Foreign Policy and Export Control Overhaul Is Underway</em></p> -<p>Since the Kremlin views Russian youth as a vital part of this effort, it has massively increased its patriotic education campaigns since 2022. For high school students, a new state-organized movement for children, mimicking the Soviet Pioneers, has been established. New legislation requires every school in Russia to have a counselor to facilitate the “civic” and “patriotic” upbringing of students. In September 2022, all schools were instructed to begin holding a flag-raising ceremony every week. Simultaneously, high schools also introduced a new extracurricular class called “Conversations about Important Things” designed to promote “traditional” and “patriotic” values (such as “national consolidation,” self-sacrifice and heroism, solidarity, and authority of the state) and boost national pride among the students. The first in the series of these “conversations” was symbolically taught by Putin himself on September 1, 2022. To ensure standardization of the content, the Ministry of Education publishes a list of themes for each week of the school year with suggested lesson plans, including videos and slides. Lectures available online show teachers how to conduct the classes.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="julian-ringhof-and-jan-peter-kleinhans">Julian Ringhof and Jan-Peter Kleinhans</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Starting in September 2023, high school history classes will be taught using a single standardized textbook with the Crimean bridge on its cover — authored by presidential aide Vladimir Medinskii, who some have described as a “nationalist enamored of classicism and traditional values,” and rector of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations Anatoly Torkunov. In this book, all of Russia’s contemporary history since the Stalin period has been rewritten to fit the official line. For example, the book describes the Brezhnev era of stagnation as the “welfare revolution” and blames Gorbachev for the collapse of the Soviet Union; its last chapters devoted to the events in Ukraine are titled “The U.S. Pressure on Russia,” “Opposition to the West’s Strategy toward Russia,” “Falsification of History,” “Revival of Nazism,” “Ukrainian Neo-Nazism,” “Coup in Ukraine 2014,” “Return of Crimea,” “Ukraine is a Neo-Nazi State,” “SMO and the Russian Society,” “Russia is a Country of Heroes,” and so on.</p> +<p>German foreign policy is going through a sea change. As a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine and China’s rise and increasing political assertiveness, Germany is reconfiguring its security and economic policies toward de-risking its ties with autocratic states and closing the ranks with its democratic allies. Since the country’s semiconductor industry was hardly affected by the United States’ October 7 export controls, the measures have triggered little debate in Germany. Nevertheless, Germany’s export controls vis-à-vis China have already become more restrictive in recent years, and discussions on new approaches to German and European export controls are gaining momentum in Berlin and Brussels.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EtdM58l.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ Russian schoolboys parade a Russian flag during a state-wide ceremony marking the beginning of the school year in Moscow, September 2023.</em></p> +<h4 id="germanys-ongoing-foreign-policy-rehaul-and-the-wandel-of-wandel-durch-handel">Germany’s Ongoing Foreign Policy Rehaul and the Wandel of Wandel durch Handel</h4> -<p>The Kremlin actively engages with youth at the university level. The Ministry of Education has introduced a new concept of teaching history in universities effective September 2023. Covering ancient Russia to modern Russia, it ends with the 2022 war and promotes a pseudo-history, projection of current politics overtly onto the distant past. One of the goals is to indoctrinate students with the idea that “throughout Russian history, a strong central government has been of paramount importance for the preservation of national statehood.” Another university-level course, “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood” is offered beginning in September 2023, which is designed by a specially launched group, “Russia’s DNA,” led by presidential administration-linked political technologist Andrey Polosin. Analogous to the Soviet ideology-building course “Scientific Communism,” this course is meant to determine those “value constants” that are characteristic of Russia as a unique civilization. It includes four sections: “history” (memory politics based on a mythologized official version of history); “cultural codes” (cross-generational transfer of “spiritual and moral” traditional values); “Russia in the world” (stressing isolationism, anti-Westernism, and national superiority); and “vision of the future” (in light of the above). These four sections are developed by Vladimir Medinskii, Mikhail Piotrovsky, Sergey Karaganov, and Mikhail Kovalchuk, apparatchiks notorious for embracing Kremlin thinking.</p> +<p>German foreign policy is going through a sea change — called a Zeitenwende by German chancellor Olaf Scholz in a February 2022 speech.</p> -<p>The effort to foster an official ideology goes beyond school textbooks and extends to culture more broadly — as reflected in the rewritten principles of Russian State Cultural Policy. It depicts the need for culture to serve as an instrument of the state and for the furtherance of state power at home and abroad. Since May 2023, the state has held twice as many military-patriotic events as in the previous year, totaling 1.5 million in one year. These include festivals, historical reenactment clubs, military history tours for children, student discussion societies, and more. The state is also actively funding pop culture films, TV series, and books, as well as presidential grants to promote certain patriotic initiatives. These are complemented by omnipresent propagandistic coverage on prime-time political shows, for which the presidential administration often delivers guides and talking points.</p> +<p>The principal cause of this new era is the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine launched in 2022, which was a watershed moment for Germany in many ways. After decades of negligence, the war was a wake-up call for Germany to reinvest in its military and security partnerships. But beyond this remarkable shift in Germany’s defense policy, the outbreak of the war and Putin’s subsequent weaponization of Germany’s fossil-fuel dependency on Russia was also a reckoning for Germany’s perception of the interconnected relationship between its policies on economics, trade, foreign affairs, and national security.</p> -<h3 id="the-tenets-of-the-ideology">The Tenets of the Ideology</h3> +<p>Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany’s foreign policy dogma involved inducing beneficial political change in authoritarian regimes through increased trade — Wandel durch Handel (“change through trade”).</p> -<p>By 2022, Putin had been in power for over two decades. What had emerged both in foreign policy and in domestic politics was a system — less orderly and structured perhaps than in Soviet times, and more dependent on the personality of the autocrat, but a system, nevertheless. Apart from the security services, the army, the regular doling out of financial privileges to elite actors, and the Russian Orthodox Church, Putin’s system has not been codified in institutions; much of it depends on proximity to Putin and on patronage networks within the government. To this unsystematic system, ideology is essential. It provides a sense of meaning, of continuity, and of ritual to Russian politics — not just a way of making sense of the world, which was a strong point of Marxism-Leninism, but a way for Russians to make sense of Russia. In the absence of political parties, of real elections, of a political order grounded in procedure and constitutionalism, ideology is the connecting link. This ideology is not spelled out in philosophical texts as Marxism-Leninism had been. It can be absorbed through signs, symbols, and popular culture, making it malleable and accessible to less intellectual and less literate individuals. This population need not give its complete assent to the ideology cobbled together in Putin’s two decades of rule. They can give it partial assent, or simply live in its ambiance. Its very pervasiveness, much like the slogans and language of Soviet communism (in the early Soviet Union) or the iconography of czarist Russia, imply that the ideology is too widespread to be untrue.</p> +<p>After the invasion, a new foreign policy consensus emerged that this policy had not only failed, but backfired, threatening Germany’s own economic security and stability. German foreign minister Annalena Baerbok said in August 2022 that Germany “must put an end to the self-deception that we ever received cheap gas from Russia. . . . We paid for Moscow’s gas supply with security and independence,” (author’s translation).</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Putin’s system has not been codified in institutions; much of it depends on proximity to Putin and on patronage networks within the government. To this unsystematic system, ideology is essential.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>The war and its economic ramifications have fueled a reconfiguration of Germany’s approach to the nexus between trade and security policy, driving efforts toward de-risking and diversifying Germany’s trade relationships, particularly vis-à-vis autocratic states. Moreover, the war also has showed that both the European Union and its democratic allies are more capable than expected of acting cooperatively and decisively during security crises. The allied response has also showed that Western economic and technological strongholds are key assets to degrading the economic and military capacity of an aggressor through decisive and coordinated sanctions.</p> -<p>Rather than representing an organic whole, the Kremlin ideology originally came together as bricolage, taking relevant parts from different movements like the communist and far-right heritages, while subordinating them to imperial-nationalist statism. While condemning anything related to revolution and not explicitly endorsing Stalinism, Putinism gradually rehabilitated Stalin as a “state-builder”: concepts like the “fifth column” were borrowed directly from the Stalin-era Great Terror period. During the so-called Russian Spring of 2014, the Kremlin borrowed some ideological currents from imperial nationalists, particularly with its tales of restoring Novorossiya, the areas of Ukraine conquered by Catherine the Great. It also incorporated elements of Eurasianism, Sovietism, anti-Westernism, and subversive takes on the liberal Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. This ideology’s eclecticism mirrors the fragmentation of the digital age.</p> +<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the most significant cause of new thinking in German foreign policy, but it is far from the only one. The Covid-19 pandemic revealed that a lack of resilience and diversity in key supply chains, such as medical products or semiconductors for Germany’s automotive industry, is a significant risk for economic and political stability. Additionally, the change in leadership in both Germany and the United States brought about a new era in U.S.-German relations. U.S.-German relations had suffered significantly during the Trump administration and were arguably at the lowest point in decades, but relations quickly improved once President Biden was elected. Even before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, there was clear rapprochement between Germany and the United States. The compromise over the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline, struck in July 2021, while Angela Merkel was still chancellor, was a clear signifier of improving U.S.-German ties.</p> -<p>However, the malleability of these narratives should not imply a malleability of the core elements of the ideology. They are more a way of selling, or packaging, the policy to different audiences so they accept the dogma. While there is no single idea that unites the Kremlin ideology (though statism comes close to being one), a set of core underlying elements has been maintained and reinforced over time through a series of patriotic organizations, initiatives, and youth movements. In other words, these are consistent ideological tenets used to make sure that the narrative reflects the meaning the Kremlin wants to put forth. As Mikhail Suslov, a professor of cross-cultural and regional studies, puts it: “Such ideas as a strong state, anti-Westernism, vulnerability of the “us-community,” the concept of strong ties between the ruler and the “grassroots” are inscribed into the general communitarian assumption, that different communities have different, historically unchangeable sets of values, which define our individual identities.” Accordingly, even if Putinism is not a monolithic and systematic ideology, there is no major discrepancy among its central elements.</p> +<p>However, from a German perspective, it is the Biden administration’s handling of Russia’s war and U.S. cooperation with Germany and key allies in response to the war that has had the most significant positive impact on U.S.-German relations. Close transatlantic cooperation in the development and enforcement of sanctions against Russia and Belarus, and even more importantly on weapons delivery to Ukraine, has fueled the rebuilding of trust and close cooperation.</p> -<p>The domestic component of this ideology comprises six key tenets. First is the imperative of a strong, stable state that allows Russians to be Russians (based on exceptionalism and traditional values), to preserve their unique or exceptional way of life (whatever that might mean) and to live out their patriotism, whether it extends back into the past or is a matter of celebrating contemporary Russia. At its core is statism, a tenacious attachment to statehood. According to the dominant ideology, Putin did not build the state, nor is it a foundational constitution or set of institutions. Instead, the state is the physical form of Russia’s “historical essence” which has persevered for over “a thousand years.” Putin restored the state that has brought peace, prosperity, and harmony to Russia.</p> +<p>In particular, the German government appreciates that the Biden administration has avoided public criticism of German decisions and has given Berlin some room for maneuvering even when decisions have been controversial and may have affected the United States, including Scholz’s reluctance to deliver Leopard tanks to Ukraine unless the United States similarly contributed Abrams tanks. Meanwhile, there is strong alignment on key security topics such as the conditions and timeline for Ukraine’s NATO accession. Although there is some fundamental skepticism toward certain U.S. hegemonic policies, as well as a residual level of distrust toward the United States across several parties and at the working level in German ministries, the U.S.-German relationship is arguably in the best shape of all of Germany’s key relationships with allies at the moment. And crucially, beyond improved trust and closer cooperation on European security matters, there are also clear signs of greater alignment regarding China policies, exemplified by Germany’s increasing military presence in the Indo-Pacific announced in June 2023 by German defense minister Boris Pistorius. More importantly, Germany’s first China strategy, published in July 2023, shows a clear shift in Germany’s China policy and a clear positioning of Germany on the U.S. side in the U.S.-China rivalry. The policy states that, “Germany’s security is founded on . . . the further strengthening of the transatlantic alliance . . . and our close partnership, based on mutual trust, with the United States. China’s antagonistic relationship with the United States runs counter to these interests.”</p> -<p>This claim can be seen as analogous to the state construction in which Stalin was engaged during the first half of the twentieth century. It also parallels the powerful empire assembled by the Romanov dynasty over the course of three centuries. This is the pedigree Putin has accorded himself in a political order increasingly obsessed with historical precedent and historical narrative. Since the people seek a strong state — in this ideological schema — they provide the popular will and popular consent with which Putin governs Russia. Central to this presentation is the use of more extreme voices and a view of Putin as a moderator between conflicting positions — Putin as the common-sense voice. All this frames a self-reinforcing popular sovereignty of a kind that did not exist in the 1990s.</p> +<p>Germany’s view on China, also long characterized by the Wandel durch Handel dogma under various Merkel governments, had already evolved toward greater skepticism during the later parts of Merkel’s reign. The Chinese acquisition of German robotics leader Kuka in 2015 led to growing awareness and concerns in German politics about Beijing’s ambitions to become the global powerhouse of future technologies. As a result, Berlin pushed the European Commission to launch an EU-wide investment screening mechanism, which was then introduced in the European Union in 2019. Also in 2019, the Federation of German Industries called upon Germany and the European Union “to counter problems with the state-dominated Chinese economy” and first coined the language that China represented both “a partner and systemic competitor” to Germany and Europe.</p> -<p>Second, Putin tends to present Russia as under threat. The most potent threat is chaos: a potential for dissolution that, historically speaking, is not a figment of Putin’s imagination. Twice in the twentieth century, the Russian or Soviet state collapsed. When the Russian empire fell apart, years of civil war ensued. The Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991 led to anarchy and impoverishment for many Russians, a view of the 1990s that is fundamental to the Putin myth. Despite being handpicked as Yeltsin’s successor in 1999, Putin has fostered an image of the so-called “wild” 1990s as a dark and disastrous period for Russians. The propagandists, many of whom were among the main proponents of Russia’s liberal path in the 1990s, have conflated the humiliations felt by ordinary people with those felt by the state. By losing a viable state, the Russian people were at sea — and subject to outside intervention in their economy and culture. Foreigners came to steal what they could steal, forcing their foreign ways onto unsuspecting Russians. In these difficult years, the loss of statehood was alleged to be equal to the loss of cultural selfhood. The consistent emphasis on Russia being besieged and in a permanent state of war with the West allows the Kremlin to instill a sense of existential urgency to justify the need to foster national unity.</p> +<p>This concept, that China is at once partner, competitor, and systemic rival, then featured centrally in the European Commission’s strategic outlook on China in 2019 and became an EU mantra for engaging with China. And although Merkel still pushed through an EU principle agreement on investment with China — the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) — at the end of 2020, despite wide criticism including from the Biden administration, the CAI’s ratification was put on immediate hold as part of the Scholz government’s coalition agreement. As a result, increasingly difficult conditions for German companies in China, Beijing’s greater assertiveness in foreign and trade policy — including economic coercion against Lithuania in 2021 — and the change in German government in 2021 have led to significant changes in Germany’s views of and policy toward China, culminating in the Scholz government’s China strategy.</p> -<p>The sense of threat ties deeply into the third tenet of official Russian ideology, anti-Westernism. Here the West occupies a paradoxical position. It is an object of desire and contempt. Very much the legacy of the Soviet period, the West plays the role of “other” in this version of Russian identity. Key to this attitude is the contention that the West (often embodied by the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or Anglo-Saxons) wants to destroy Russia. Yet in this narrative, the West is both menacing and declining. The United States is divided, because elites have taken over the country, because these elites have embroiled it in one unnecessary foreign war after another, and because an unstable madness lies at the heart of both the American economy and the American body politic. Europe may be less unstable and less mad, but it too is worthy of contempt because of its slavish adherence to the United States. Europe is nothing more than a cover for U.S. power and it would have a better future if it would break free from its American overlords. If it does not, it will go down with the American ship.</p> +<p>The China strategy clearly spells out, for the first time, many of the risks China and its policies pose to Germany’s security and economic development, as well as the global order. It emphasizes that although the German-Sino relationship remains a combination of partnership, competition, and systemic rivalry, “China’s conduct and decisions have caused the elements of rivalry and competition in our relations to increase in recent years.” It is hence the stated goal of the Scholz government to de-risk and diversify from China in critical areas and to work together closely within the European Union and with allies to foster innovation and strengthen supply chains in key technologies, protect critical infrastructure, and prevent the drain of security and human rights–sensitive technologies to China. Green technologies, telecommunications, semiconductors, and artificial intelligence (AI) are specifically mentioned.</p> -<p>The anger at the United States is long-running, with roots in the Cold War. More recently, it was a response to U.S. involvement in the Balkan wars since the early 1990s and in particular to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s decision to bomb Yugoslavia in 1999, frequently called the “first сolor revolution.” Evgeny Primakov, whose tenure as foreign minister foreshadowed much of the discussions around multipolarity common to Kremlin discourse today, famously performed a U-turn in his plane over the Atlantic when he heard of the decision. In this narrative scheme, the “last” color revolution was Euromaidan in 2014, when Russia finally responded to the years of Western interference in its self-proclaimed sphere of interest.</p> +<h4 id="germanys-export-control-policy-to-date-semi-restrictive-multilateralist-and-human-centered">Germany’s Export Control Policy to Date: Semi-restrictive, Multilateralist, and Human-Centered</h4> -<p>Cultural conservatism, the will to avoid a hedonism that is Western in origin, is the fourth tenet of official ideology. Russians are conscious of their own cultural roots, the argument goes, whereas some Europeans have lost theirs, as reflected by their embrace of homosexuality, feminism, trans rights, multiculturalism, and “militaristic secularism,” not to mention their subservience to the United States. Russians are different, proponents of the ideology argue, or at least they should be. They may not be churchgoers, but they would like to think of themselves as churchgoers. They do not subscribe to a nontraditional understanding of gender or sexuality, seeing the heterosexual nuclear family as the norm. Putin speaks for these Russians. He also speaks for their patriotism and their love of country, whether this love is rooted in the Russian language, in Russian culture, or in Russian (and at times Soviet or neo-Soviet) historical memory — the narrative of victimization and heroism that is presumed to describe modern Russian history. A doctrinal assertion of these reactionary sentiments is contained within the Russian National Security Strategy. It affirms the importance of resisting cultural colonization, which is presented as a grave or even existential threat to the Russian nation. The threat can only be resisted by preserving and strengthening Russian identity.</p> +<p>Germany’s export control policy has for a long time been somewhat particular. For historic reasons, weapons exports generally, similar to the defense industry, have been perceived rather critically by broad parts of the German population and across most political parties. This is particularly true for the parties left of center, such as the Social Democratic Party, the Greens, and the Left. Accordingly, German export control policy with regards to conventional weapons exports has been comparatively restrictive for decades. Germany’s export control policy has been closely anchored in the four multilateral regimes as a result, whereby Germany has — according to officials — often pushed for new listings and advocated for broadening the membership of multilateral regimes, such as India joining the Wassenaar Arrangement in 2017.</p> -<p>From this doctrine stems the emphasis on Russia’s exceptionalism and an argument that Russia is, in fact, a civilization-state. Superficially integrating elements of “Clash of Civilizations” argument, this point relates directly to racial and fascistic thinking that was propagated since the 1920s via the teachings of Ivan Il’in, Alexander Dugin, Eurasianists, and interwar emigre thinking resurrected in the 1990s. The title of the group, “Russia’s DNA,” developing the course on “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood,” points to national or even racial thinking connected to the ostensibly “cultural” notion of civilization. This civilizational thinking is highly important for Russia’s current war in Ukraine, as it helps justify the human sacrifice for the sake of something higher — like the state or civilization.</p> +<p>As noted in Germany’s China strategy, the German government generally has interpreted the EU arms embargo against China strictly and will continue to do so. The embargo has been in place since 1989 as a result of the violent suppression of protests in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. As a result, conventional weapons exports from Germany to China have been largely restricted for decades and will certainly not become less restrictive under the current Scholz government. But in recent years, beyond conventional weapons exports, exports of dual-use items to China have also become more restricted. According to private sector representatives, licensing applications for dual-use exports to China are being scrutinized more closely by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, and fewer licenses are being granted. German officials interviewed for this project confirmed that German dual-use export control policy toward China has become more restrictive since 2018.</p> -<p>The final core tenet is the cult of the Great Patriotic War. Politicians’ uses and abuses of the Great Patriotic War as a talking point are rooted in its sincere resonance and emotional power among ordinary Russians. The Kremlin has spent billions of rubles convincing people of the relevance of the Great Patriotic War to Russia’s current political identity and its right to great power status. Since 2014, a preoccupation with the Great Patriotic War and the war against Ukraine have been deliberately conflated, through the combined use of the St. George’s ribbon. It was worn on Victory Day to remember veterans, printed on the Luhansk and Donetsk “people’s referenda” in 2014 and tied onto the helmets of the Russian soldiers who attacked Kyiv in 2022. Anyone who doesn’t agree with the Russian view of World War II or with Russia’s right to a sphere of influence similar to that which the Soviet Union had after 1945 is dismissed as a Nazi, since they “wish to overturn” the results of the Great Patriotic War. Underpinning the Kremlin’s actions and propaganda in relation to Ukraine since 2014 is the assertion that Russia must control Ukraine — because Nazis will return, because of its historical right endowed by 1945, because of the West using it to destroy Russia again. These narratives persevere to this day and have become an anchored frame through which many Russians understand, or at least justify, the carnage and destruction in Ukraine.</p> +<p>This more restrictive policy is the result of increasing concern regarding German dual-use exports directly contributing to China’s military modernization or to infringements on human rights due to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) increasing assertiveness internationally and domestic backsliding on civil and political rights. Unlike the October 7 measures, this change toward a more restrictive export control policy vis-à-vis China should therefore not be viewed as a strategic shift toward slowing down China’s ability to develop foundational technologies, but rather as an effort to narrowly prevent very concrete contributions to further military rearmament or internal oppression.</p> -<h4 id="sources-of-ideological-resilience-and-weaknesses">Sources of Ideological Resilience and Weaknesses</h4> +<p>Germany currently maintains a very narrow national control list of around 20 dual-use technologies that are not listed multilaterally — and hence not on the common European list — and is generally opposed to unilateral measures, including by the United States. This is in part because Germany believes such unilateral measures are ineffective in the long run and finds most of these measures in violation of international trade law. But it is also because Germany is concerned with how such measures may be perceived by third countries. For Germany, one of the key values of adhering closely to multilateral agreements and export control lists, rather than implementing national or minilateral measures, is the legitimacy multilaterally agreed restrictions have in countries that are not members of these regimes. There remains great concern in the current German government that new unilateral or minilateral measures would feed into the narrative spun by China that the West is seeking to contain the technological development of developing countries through export restrictions. Given the importance the Scholz government has attributed to working more closely with countries in the Global South, and avoiding any further alienation, any non-multilateral export control measures aimed at China must be weighed carefully against the damage such measures may have on relations with developing countries.</p> -<p>As shown above, the Putinist ideology is essentially in place. The 2022 effort was an intensification of the Kremlin’s two-decade-long piecemeal endeavor to promote specific narratives in Russian society. Will the 2022 war undermine or deepen Putin’s ideology building?</p> +<h4 id="germanys-role-in-the-semiconductor-supply-chain-chips-for-das-auto-and-supplying-the-suppliers">Germany’s Role in the Semiconductor Supply Chain: Chips for Das Auto and Supplying the Suppliers</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Underpinning the Kremlin’s actions and propaganda in relation to Ukraine since 2014 is the assertion that Russia must control Ukraine — because Nazis will return, because of its historical right endowed by 1945, because of the West using it to destroy Russia again.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Germany’s semiconductor industry is one of the largest in Europe. It is also home to the largest regional cluster in Europe, dubbed “Silicon Saxony.” Below is a brief overview of companies headquartered in Germany that are active in the semiconductor value chain.</p> -<p><strong>FACTORS HELPING PUTIN’S IDEOLOGY-BUILDING EFFORT</strong></p> +<p><strong>Semiconductor Suppliers:</strong> Infineon, Germany’s largest integrated device manufacturer (IDM) and semiconductor supplier, focuses mainly on power semiconductors, microcontrollers, and analog chips. It is among the leading automotive chip suppliers globally. Another example of a semiconductor supplier is Bosch, which focuses on automotive chips, sensors, and micro-electromechanical systems. Beyond these two companies, Germany’s semiconductor supplier ecosystem is dominated by smaller players, such as Elmos (automotive chips) and Semikron Danfoss (power semiconductors), among others. Similar to their peers in the United States, Japan, and other European member states, many German IDMs follow a “fab-lite” business model, outsourcing wafer fabrication for some types of chips (such as microcontrollers) to foundries, such as the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), while producing other chip types in house. This also explains why TSMC’s investment in Germany is backed by Infineon, Bosch, and Dutch semiconductor designer and manufacturer NXP — all of which are already customers of the Taiwanese contract manufacturer. Importantly, German semiconductor suppliers are not active in memory chips or most types of processors, such as for smartphones, laptops, servers, or machine learning. This is also reflected in Germany’s foundry ecosystem that, beyond U.S.-headquartered Globalfoundries in Dresden, consists of smaller specialty foundries, such as X-Fab and UMS.</p> -<p>First, Putin’s ideological effort is successful because it relies on deeply entrenched cultural tendencies in Russian society. In Russia, coming up with an alternative notion of identity has proved an impossible task, as shown by the failed liberal effort in the 1990s. Instead, Putin chose an easy route by promoting many quasi-Soviet and even pre-Soviet czarist narratives and themes. Moreover, the state has co-opted (often in a disguised manner) genuine grassroots patriotic initiatives. As a result, Russians often saw these initiatives as coming from the people, rather than state-originated (e.g., the Immortal Regiment). This effort — a project of over 20 years — is unlikely to face serious resistance now.</p> +<p><strong>Equipment Suppliers:</strong> With companies such as Aixtron, AP&amp;S, SÜSS MicroTec, and Zeiss, Germany is home to several semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) suppliers for wafer and photomask fabrication as well as back-end manufacturing (assembly, test, and packaging). While German SME suppliers do not have the same scale as some foreign firms, such as Dutch company ASML, Japan’s Tokyo Electron, or the United States’ Applied Materials, they still control a market-leading position in certain segments of the SME market: Aixtron is a leading supplier of deposition equipment for power semiconductors and LEDs; Zeiss has a leading position in photomask inspection, metrology, and repair equipment; and ERS Electronic, whose acquisition by a Chinese investor was blocked by the German government in 2022, is a leading supplier of wafer bonding solutions.</p> -<p>Reinforcing this is Russians’ predisposition toward justifying some or all of the narratives propagated by the state, in no small part because of their near-ubiquity and the cognitive dissonance required to live in Russia while going against the mainstream worldview. Polls show that while Russians are unexceptional in terms of benign patriotism, since the 1990s (well before Putin) they have been outliers in terms of “blind and militant” patriotism: the belief that one should support one’s country even if it is wrong and that one’s country should follow its own interest even if harms others. Under Putin, this has been reinforced by constant securitization of pro-Kremlin narratives, portraying any questioning of them as a threat to Russian traditions and national identity, and shifting the perspective from one of Russian aggression to one of preemptive Russian defense. That is how the “let there be no war” narrative — one of the most common toasts at family parties — became a justification for starting a war.</p> +<p><strong>Component Suppliers:</strong> One of the strong suites of Germany’s semiconductor ecosystem is equipment component suppliers — companies that develop parts, subsystems, and components for SME suppliers and fabs. Some of the more well-known examples include Zeiss developing and manufacturing the projection optics for ASML’s lithography machines and Trumpf supplying the laser for ASML’s extreme ultra-violet (EUV) lithography machines. But beyond these often-cited examples are many smaller, lesser-known German component suppliers with strong market positions in their respective niches. Examples include Berliner Glas (acquired by ASML), Feinmetall, FITOK, Jenoptik, Nynomic, Physik Instrumente, Pink, and Pfeiffer Vacuum, among others, often with substantial business in China.</p> -<p>Second, the flexibility of Putin’s ideology-building effort helps it accommodate change and appeal to different constituencies. Rather than trying to make everyone a true believer in its worldview, the Kremlin and state-aligned propaganda seek a spectrum of acceptable outcomes (apathy, loyal neutrality, “my country right or wrong,” passive support, etc.). They therefore offer a menu of options all pointing to the same conclusion (“Kremlin knows best,” “West out to get us,” “I can’t influence anything anyway,” etc.) but via different arguments (“the West is Russophobic,” “even worse than Russia,” “Ukrainians have been brainwashed by the West, we must save them,” “Ukrainians are traitors and Nazis who must be punished,” etc.). Russians — many of whom are already inclined to accept much of the Kremlin’s policies by default — can then choose the propaganda lines that resonate with them and help rationalize the Kremlin’s actions (especially when reinforced by negative incentives like memory laws, vilification of alternative views of history, and so on). This diffuse penetrating aspect of Putin’s ideology appears to be highly effective.</p> +<p><strong>Chemical, Material, and Wafer Suppliers:</strong> Because of its long history in chemistry and materials sciences, Germany is also home to large semiconductor-grade chemical suppliers, such as Merck KGaA, BASF, and Wacker Chemie. German Siltronic is among the leading silicon wafer suppliers globally; its planned acquisition by Taiwanese competitor Globalwafers was denied by the German government in 2022.</p> -<p>Third, the lack of a futuristic vision for Russia is often named as one of the main weaknesses of Putin’s ideological narratives. Even if true, that would hardly be unique to Russia: many other autocratic regimes lack a vision of the future as well. But, in fact, the Kremlin does offer a futuristic vision in the form of restoration and nostalgic anticipation: the future will be better because it will look more like the past, and Russia will restore its pride and the good things that it lost. The motif of an assertive Russia is a motif tied to Russia’s place in the twenty-first-century international landscape, in which the decline of the United States and Europe will make way for the rise of Russia and of its partner, China. In this sense, the Kremlin ideology combines both resentment-based and affirmative elements mutually reinforcing each other.</p> +<h4 id="impact-of-october-7-on-germany-a-near-miss">Impact of October 7 on Germany: A Near Miss</h4> -<p>The Kremlin also offers a broader vision of Russia’s role in the world and even a sense of mission: helping other countries to avoid U.S. cultural colonization (as in the 2021 National Security Strategy) and neoliberal hegemony (as in the 2023 Foreign Policy Concept). This is not fully detached from reality: Putin’s proposed vision of a multipolar world order has some truth to it, though his vision may contain the seeds of its own destruction, as it could spark resentment and disillusionment if Russia fails to secure a position akin to that of the Soviet Union or of a major global player.</p> +<p>The impact of the October 7 controls on Germany’s semiconductor industry was rather limited, mainly for three reasons.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Kremlin does offer a futuristic vision in the form of restoration and nostalgic anticipation: the future will be better because it will look more like the past, and Russia will restore its pride and the good things that it lost.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>First, as mentioned before, German semiconductor suppliers are not producing high-performance processors nor the AI accelerators that were impacted by the U.S. controls (if the German supplier also has U.S. content in their products). As an example, the U.S. export controls were not even discussed in Infineon’s investor call on November 16, 2022.</p> -<p>Fourth, the share of groups that favor modernization along Western lines keeps shrinking in Russia. These are liberal Russians with pro-Western and anti-war attitudes, who have higher levels of impersonalized trust, and who possess an ability to build horizontal networks found disproportionately among younger Russians and white-collar middle-class groups.</p> +<p>Second, German chemical and material suppliers were largely unaffected because the controls did not extend to these technologies. As an example, German wafer supplier Siltronic stated in its investor call on October 28, 2022, that it “studied the new U.S. export rules and the impact to [their] China activities in great detail” and emerged “without any negative implications.”</p> -<p>There are simply too few younger Russians to reconfigure the country’s trajectory, even if they somehow manage to resist the state’s hardening propaganda effort and repressive apparatus. In the 2019 census, those aged 15–29 made up only 16.5 percent of the population, and they typically have lower rates of political participation. According to the polls, only about 20 percent of people aged 14–29 are interested in politics, and only 7 percent consider actively participating in Russia’s political life in the future. They follow news and discuss political topics roughly half as often, and vote in elections three times less, than older age cohorts. As a result, in the last decade, despite their growing dissatisfaction, young people’s share in opposition protests has remained fairly stable at about 20 to 30 percent, below that of older generations. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has mobilized significant resources to shape young people’s political thought and social values. While there is little compelling evidence these efforts have succeeded — and analysts have observed an active opposition-minded youth minority emerging in Russian regions — the Kremlin appears to have convinced young people not to hope for anything better. As a recent analysis by Félix Krawatzek states:</p> +<p>Third, while there was the potential for some impact on German equipment and component suppliers, this was quite limited — especially in comparison to their Dutch peers, such as ASM International. This is partially because the types of equipment or components produced by these companies are not addressed by the controls or because these companies’ production and research takes place outside of the United States. As an example, Aixtron — one of Germany’s largest SME suppliers by revenue — stated in its investor call on October 27, 2022:</p> <blockquote> - <p>Across all focus groups, young Russians are united in their view that they are powerless to influence their country’s development . . . There is no positive, forward-looking momentum and participants complain about lacking any possibility to realise a future they themselves desire. The youth of Russia were already affected by this situation before the war. And whereas some may see the war as a moment of national revival and strength, many of those that took part in our focus groups will feel increasingly isolated.</p> + <p>. . . our market segment of [metal organic chemical vapor deposition] tools for compound semiconductors is not affected [by the U.S. controls]. Even if we were a U.S.-based company, we would not be affected by these rules. We have also checked that none of our active customers are on the expanded entity list. Furthermore, we do not expect negative implications on our supply chain for U.S. based parts, some of which we are using in our tools. Overall, we do not expect that this has an impact on our business behavior.</p> </blockquote> -<p>Russia’s nascent middle class has been repressed and co-opted by the Kremlin since the early 2010s. By 2018, about 50 percent of Russia’s middle class worked for the state. A product of the growing nationalization of the Russian economy, these numbers are likely much higher today. These trends are further exacerbated by a huge ongoing exodus of more pro-Western groups from Russia. The total number of Russians having fled the country since 2022 has reached one million people, and the majority of them are younger (80–90 percent under the age of 45) and hold more liberal attitudes. Even before the war, pro-Western liberal groups in Russia made up less than 7 or 8 percent of the population. Their mass departure will further silence liberal voices, making pro-Kremlin narratives even more dominant.</p> - -<p>The transformative effect of a protracted war of conquest, involving the entire society in a vicious circle of sacrifices and crimes, could lead to eventual demodernization. In the war’s aftermath, Russians may grow even more distrustful of liberals who have chosen “a wrong side in the war,” or “supported weapons supplies to Ukraine.” Current polling suggests that only 6.8 percent of Russians would like a pro-Western government.</p> +<p>In essence, while German companies, especially the ones with production or research and development in the United States, were certainly scrambling to understand the potential impact of U.S. controls, there has not been a lot of impact so far, particularly compared to South Korean memory chip suppliers or Japanese and Dutch equipment suppliers.</p> -<p>Fifth, in Russia’s case economic decline may help the Kremlin’s ideology-building effort. During periods of turmoil people often need to feel a sense of connection to something greater than themselves, a historical continuity and communion — through religion, an ethnic group, a nation, or a state. In Russia, these trends tend to manifest in the form of post-Soviet nostalgia. When the economy was doing badly (in the 1998, 2008–09, and 2021 crises), societal preference for a return to a Soviet-style economy tended to increase. This was most strongly the case in 1998: after the financial crisis, post-Soviet nostalgia reached levels still unbeaten during Putin’s reign. In subsequent years, memories of the 1990s — enhanced by propaganda as a time of lawlessness and misery — became entrenched. They could be seen as a reflection of what life in the West, under democracy and market capitalism, was like, however little that period in Russia reflected actual Western norms.</p> +<h4 id="deafening-silence-reactions-to-october-7-by-policymakers-and-businesses">Deafening Silence: Reactions to October 7 by Policymakers and Businesses</h4> -<p>Should Russia’s economy stagnate or decline in the next few years, the demand for belonging to a greater community might increase. Westernized liberal opposition in Russia may not be the beneficiary, given the tendency among some of its leading figures (with a notable exception of opposition leader Navalny himself) to reject any form of nationalism, to conflate it with extremism, and instead to advocate for maximal individualism and universal global values. Russian liberals failed to offer a competitive vision of a Russian national community even when such an effort was state sponsored by Yeltsin’s Kremlin. Putinist ideology, however, recognizes a general suspicion of the West and can cater to a demand for an explicitly Russian political community.</p> +<p>Because most of Germany’s semiconductor technology suppliers were not directly or substantially impacted by the U.S. controls and the subsequent and complementary measures by the Netherlands and Japan, public reactions from policymakers, businesses, and industry associations as well as from think tanks have been almost nonexistent.</p> -<p><strong>FACTORS UNDERMINING PUTIN’S IDEOLOGY-BUILDING EFFORT</strong></p> +<p>For comparison, the reaction to the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act included hearings in the German parliament, assessments and policy recommendations from leading German industry associations and think tanks, and substantial media coverage. This starkly contrasts with the October 7 controls. While there has been some media coverage, the various industry associations have stayed quiet, there have been no parliamentary hearings, and think tanks have published limited public analyses — even at the European level.</p> -<p>There are several war-related factors that may constrain the Kremlin’s ideology-building effort. First, Putinist narratives generally do not mobilize people. In fact, societal political passivity has been one of the main assets allowing Putin to sustain his hold on power. In the periods when the Kremlin needed mobilization (be it the 2022 war effort or support for Donbas “separatists” in 2014), it relied on more extreme peripheral ideologues catering to different tastes — Dugin, Strelkov, or more recently Z bloggers and Prigozhin. As Prigozhin’s mutiny and the subsequent arrest of Igor Strelkov attest, the use of such figures causes difficulties and conflicts within the elite. Without them, as long as Russia is seemingly at peace, the Kremlin can still rely on silent, acquiescent, apolitical Russian citizens, but a passive population will not come out to support Putin. As the Kremlin demands more and more sacrifices from ordinary people during wartime, it might require a base of support that is more active and less apt to pose a threat to regime security. Creating such a base will likely be a challenge. It remains to be seen whether this ideology can actually mobilize people successfully.</p> +<p>However, some German semiconductor technology suppliers have seemed to “de-risk” by accelerating an “in China, for China” business strategy, potentially as a reaction to the October 7 controls. This is something that the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association warned against in their public comment to the U.S Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, stating that “the combination of uncertainty driven by complexity leads foreign companies to often design out or avoid U.S.-origin or U.S. company branded content to ‘de-risk.’” Merck is a useful example among many. The company recently stated that they “are trying to limit . . . imports of important raw materials from other countries into China, especially from the U.S.,” instead seeking to create “a China-for-China approach, so that also the vast majority of products we are going to produce in China is actually supposed to be for the Chinese market.”</p> -<p>Second, while they acquiesce to the Kremlin’s ideology, Russians often express the desire to dissociate from the state. They are not eager to commit huge sacrifices on its behalf. Surveys show, for example, that Russians (and especially younger groups) demonstrate a high degree of individualism, distrust of the state in its practical (rather than symbolic) form, and adaptability. For example, in a 2018 survey almost half of respondents said they prefer to be independent of the state (to be self-employed or start their own business) and about 60 percent would want their children to become successful private owners or entrepreneurs. Even if Russians acquiesce to state-promoted ideological narratives, they might reject them under other circumstances, raising doubts as to the longevity of the ideology.</p> +<h4 id="the-future-of-german-export-control-policy-more-european-more-minilateralist-and-more-restrictive">The Future of German Export Control Policy: More European, More Minilateralist, and More Restrictive?</h4> -<p>For example, the incursion of war into Russians’ lives may shift the tide. Russians tend to accept state-promoted initiatives as long as these do not interfere with their personal well-being. Polls have shown, for example, a marked decline in war support among those Russians who live in the regions neighboring Ukraine (and are more affected by war realities, such as military raids and drone attacks). If the Ukrainian army is successful in its incursions into Russia’s territory, this might weaken the Kremlin’s ideology-building effort.</p> +<p>Although public reactions to and debates on the U.S., Dutch, and Japanese measures have been sparse in Germany, it appears that there is an ongoing change in thinking in the German government. This change in thinking related to export controls seems to have largely resulted from engagement within the G7 (where economic security and export controls featured prominently under the 2022 Japanese presidency), development of Germany’s China strategy, and accelerating EU discussions on economic security and export controls. Three trends can be observed when looking to the future of German export control policy.</p> -<p>Third, the deficiencies in the state’s response to the war “coming home,” and its failures to equip soldiers, have necessitated a growth in grassroots communities, such as the relatives and volunteers (especially women) who fundraise and donate supplies to the Russian military in Ukraine — from sewing medical underwear to funding drones. The volunteers involved in crowdfunding or collecting donations for soldiers may have little concern for the Ukrainians being maimed and killed by their loved ones, but they are not necessarily pro-war. More often they are motivated by helping their relatives survive. Consequently, they are also critical of the state, bemoaning the lack of food supplies and equipment that they try to mitigate. These war-support communities are mushrooming and likely to expand further. Russian aggression against Ukraine shows little sign of relenting, and the Russian Ministry of Defense is consistently slow to meet the needs of its own troops.</p> +<p>First, to German government representatives and officials, the Dutch decision, which was interpreted by officials to be primarily the result of U.S. pressure, according to interviews for this project, has illustrated that European coordination and solidarity in export control policy must be improved so that individual member states are less exposed to external pressure. Although the 2021 EU export control regulation significantly improved coordination of measures between member states, there appears to be an acknowledgement in German ministries that it would serve Germany and the European Union’s interests to develop a more coherent approach among member states. This would not only strengthen member states’ positions vis-à-vis third countries such as the United States and China but also improve the effectiveness of European export controls.</p> -<p>Fundraising and volunteer groups represent a form of community activism that has been growing every year as an essential response to the reduced role of government. Years of reductions in state benefits and support have inured the population to the reality of Russia as an “empire of austerity.” Even mobilized soldiers accept that the state will provide only mediocre and insufficient equipment, medicine, and conditions: “no one will take care of you except yourself” is a maxim that applies just as well to those fighting a war at the state’s request as to pensioners struggling to access healthcare. For now, fundraising or volunteering helps stabilize the regime because it allows people to substitute for the deficiencies of the state. However, in the long term their self-organizing capacity represents one of the challenges for the Kremlin, because it could be put to different uses in the future, should a different popular political force emerge.</p> +<p>Second, within Germany’s China strategy, the Scholz government specifically acknowledges that China’s military-civil fusion policy must be taken into account in Germany’s export control policy. To the authors’ knowledge, this was not a publicly stated consideration previously in German export control policy and could hint at a more restrictive export control policy vis-à-vis China that may also cover items that are less immediate inputs to final defense technologies. Interestingly, the China strategy also mentions that “longer-term security risks for Germany, the EU and their allies, created by the export of new key technologies” require an adjustment of national and international export control lists. This is particularly interesting because this wording reflects parts of the Dutch government’s justification for its controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing. Furthermore, this wording and justification could certainly be interpreted as a nod to the fact that economic security considerations — “longer-term security risks” — should now play a role in European export control policy. At the very least, it suggests that security risks have grown in regards to China and certain technologies.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RGP2c7Z.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ Russian volunteers prepare a camouflage for helmets planned to be sent to the Russian army fighting in Ukraine, September 2023.</em></p> +<p>Third, there is an acknowledgment in Germany that multilateral regimes, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, are currently not sufficiently functional. Importantly, Germany does not attribute these problems just to Russia’s membership but also to other dynamics at play, including time-consuming decisionmaking processes that fail to keep pace with technological developments. While there is consensus in Germany and the European Union that the Wassenaar Arrangement and the three other regimes must remain the central pillars of German and EU export control policy because of the effectiveness of multilateral export control regimes and the legitimacy these regimes have internationally, discussions are currently ongoing in Germany on how these multilateral regimes can be improved and, where necessary, complemented without further undermining them. What these improvements and complementary measures should look like from Germany’s perspective is not currently clear. But based on Germany’s China strategy, it appears that Germany does see “strengthened cooperation in the field of export controls between the G7 and further partners” as one path to improve Germany’s security and reduce risks emanating from China.</p> -<p>Fourth, a competing alternative in the form of Russian ethno-nationalism may be in the making. The concurrent official idealization and tangible failure of the state have spurred a popular resentment that nationalist figures, both pro- and anti-war, have used to their advantage. Prigozhin’s June 2023 uprising offers the best illustration in that regard. Ethno-nationalism is a weak spot for Putinist ideology and one that it struggles to fully placate. Ethno-nationalism is a more mobilizational ideology. It could be a challenge to Putin’s ideology-building, chipping away at the notion that Russia is polycultural (as opposed to “inauthentic” Western multiculturalism) and that its strength lies in an innate diversity organized around a Russian civilizational identity and values. However, the rise of ethnonationalism is more likely to happen if Russia is defeated in Ukraine.</p> +<h3 id="japanese-perspective">Japanese Perspective</h3> -<p>Another political force with even greater social appeal is leftist agenda, including social justice and welfare state. Polls reveal that preferred political values for Russians are order and justice, which leaves an opportunity for other groups to exploit this agenda.</p> +<p><em>Japan Embraces its Strategic Indispensability in Alliance with the United States</em></p> -<h4 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h4> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="kazuto-suzuki">Kazuto Suzuki</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Putinism appears to have a firm ideological grip on Russia today. It springs from two decades of increasingly concerted ideological efforts aimed at unifying Russian opinion in support of the Kremlin. Current rewriting of Russian history — from textbooks to pop culture to faux-grassroots social movements — hearkens back to the exceptionalist grandeur of the Soviet era, or even to the dynastic Romanov empire, and has been an active government project for over a decade. The Kremlin’s attention to education and memory politics, accompanied by a growing emphasis on traditional values and commitment to a great power future for Russia, contributed to the spread of beliefs that resonated with Russian society long before Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.</p> +<h4 id="introduction">Introduction</h4> -<p>This process shows signs of accelerating. The 2022 war marked a real turning point: the protected zones of the 2010s, such as academia, education, publishing, high culture, are now under assault as is the entire “Westernizer” wing of the intelligentsia. The flexibility of Putin’s ideology machine and the simplicity of the narratives it spreads suggest that Putinism is not going anywhere soon and may become further entrenched in the Russian social sphere.</p> +<p>In the 1980s, Japan’s semiconductor industry held a 50 percent share of the global market. However, in the U.S.-Japan trade friction, Japanese semiconductors were criticized for being supported by unfair government spending, which lasted 10 years after the U.S.-Japan semiconductor trade agreement was implemented in 1986.</p> -<hr /> +<p>The semiconductor industry in Japan has been in decline since then and currently holds only a 10 percent share of the global market. In order to recover from this decline, the Japanese government began making major moves in 2021 to reinvigorate the semiconductor industry. These moves were triggered by Covid-19, which led to semiconductor supply shortages and significantly impacted various economic activities. Furthermore, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, in Japanese minds, has suggested that there is a possibility of a Taiwan contingency that could have serious impacts on the global semiconductor supply chain.</p> -<p><strong>Maria Snegovaya</strong> is a senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a postdoctoral fellow in Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.</p> +<p>However, although there are calls in Japan for the revitalization of the semiconductor industry, the issue has not been discussed in conjunction with security concerns, namely the rise of China’s military. China’s military rise has been recognized in Japan in terms of pressure in the gray zone over the Senkaku Islands and issues related to a Taiwan contingency, but the improvements in China’s military capabilities have been largely perceived as inevitable and related to China’s technological development.</p> -<p><strong>Michael Kimmage</strong> has wide-ranging academic, policy, and think tank experience. His expertise is on the former Soviet Union, the transatlantic relationship, and the history of U.S. foreign policy.</p> +<p>In this context, the tightening of U.S. restrictions on semiconductor exports to China in October 2022 came as a great shock to Japan. Even though the White House had provided the information several weeks prior to the announcement, the fact that the announcement did not give enough time to scrutinize the impact of the measure was a surprise to the Japanese community. However, the October 7 measures provided some relief to the Japanese semiconductor industry because they only limited advanced semiconductors at the 14- and 16-nanometer nodes or narrower, which are not manufactured in Japan.</p> -<p><strong>Jade McGlynn</strong> is a research fellow in the War Studies Department at King’s College London.</p>Maria Snegovaya, et al.Since Putin’s early days and throughout much of his rule, there has been a deliberate effort at a state-promoted vision of Russia rooted in Soviet and imperial Russian history.Euro SIFMANet STHLM Report2023-09-22T12:00:00+08:002023-09-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/euro-sifmanet-stockholm-report<p><em>Participants discussed the sanctions implementation in Sweden and how new EU sanctions imposed on Russia are challenging the Swedish system.</em></p> +<h4 id="review-of-japans-semiconductor-strategy">Review of Japan’s Semiconductor Strategy</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>Japan’s semiconductor policy has been characterized as a state-oriented policy since the success of the ultra-LSI development project in the 1970s made Japan a semiconductor superpower surpassing the United States. This success created an illusion that if Japanese companies worked together to develop an industrial strategy, Japan’s advantage would be rock solid. Therefore, even after the 1986 Japan-U.S. semiconductor trade agreement, the semiconductor strategy continued under the leadership of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, at the time known as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry), and “all-Japan” projects such as ASUKA and MIRAI were launched. However, these projects were not successful because the semiconductor manufacturing companies did not send their best personnel to the projects and instead looked to their competitors.</p> -<p>In early September 2023, the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies (CFCS) at RUSI, with the support of the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS), hosted a roundtable in Stockholm. Held under the Chatham House Rule, the roundtable, along with a series of one-to-one meetings, discussed the state of sanctions implementation in Sweden. The gatherings included representatives from national authorities with sanctions-related competences. These included, among others, the office of the Swedish sanctions coordinator, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Finance, Customs, the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP) and the National Board of Trade. This event is part of the in-country engagements conducted by the CFCS-led European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.</p> +<p>One of the reasons for the failure of this semiconductor strategy was the failure to recognize structural changes in semiconductor manufacturing driven by the industry’s bifurcation into design and manufacturing with the advent of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and the development of the global horizontal division of labor. Even amid these structural changes, Japan has maintained vertical integration — the semiconductor sector was treated as a part of the electronics industry. Furthermore, amid strong competition, companies were not able to substantially invest in the semiconductor sector, which accounted for only a part of their businesses. As a result, it was not realistic for a single company to continue to cover the huge amount of capital required, and such depressed capital investment could no longer keep pace, which resulted in Japan losing its global competitiveness in semiconductors.</p> -<p>The discussion opened with the introduction of two key facts: 97% of the Swedish population supports sanctions; and trade with Russia prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine represented less than 2% of Swedish trade. These figures exemplify the commitment of the country to maintain an effective sanctions regime that affects an already-limited exposure to Russia. In fact, participants pointed out that prior to February 2022, the Swedish economy was already decoupling from Russia, aiming to minimise its most exposed connection: oil dependency.</p> +<p>In order to rebuild the industry, the Japanese government decided to restructure its semiconductor strategy in the 2020s. For one thing, Japan will strengthen its competitiveness in areas where it still has strengths, such as semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials, and in 2021, the advanced semiconductor manufacturing act was enacted to provide subsidies to the semiconductor industry. This subsidy will not only attract Taiwan’s TSMC to Japan but will also launch LSTC, a joint research institute between TSMC and the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), as well as provide ¥330 billion ($2.26 billion) in subsidies to Rapidus, a group of 10 private companies that will cooperate in the development of semiconductors. Rapidus is a foundry that takes a different approach than previous METI-led projects in that it is a consortium of companies that will work together to promote Japan’s participation in the manufacture of cutting-edge semiconductors under the slogan “Beyond 2 nano.”</p> -<p>Once the new set of EU sanctions was imposed on Russia, the rush to implement it at a national level was confronted by the complexity of the regime’s “unprecedented” scale. This new context sent the Swedish system into shock and the capacity of authorities to respond and provide support to the relevant operators was overwhelmed. Furthermore, the Swedish system was challenged by the additional resource pressures resulting from its presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2023. Under this landscape, Swedish authorities identified a series of deficiencies that limited their capability to implement sanctions more effectively. These are described further below.</p> +<p>Thus, rather than regaining its former glory, Japan has been in the process of reassessing the importance of its semiconductor industry in the modern global marketplace in light of its past failures and has been completely reconfiguring its semiconductor strategy.</p> -<h3 id="the-swedish-sanctions-framework">The Swedish Sanctions Framework</h3> +<h4 id="the-impact-of-the-october-7-controls">The Impact of the October 7 Controls</h4> -<p>The Swedish Act on Certain International Sanctions (1996:95) contains the country’s regulation for the implementation of EU and UN sanctions regimes. As participating authorities pointed out, Sweden does not have its own national sanctions policy.</p> +<p>When the United States announced tighter restrictions on semiconductors from China, Japan was surprised, not so much by the direct impact on Japan’s semiconductor industry, but rather by the fact that the United States had made a full-fledged change in its approach to export controls, using the export control system to pressure specific countries rather than focusing on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).</p> -<p>Within the country’s framework, the MFA serves as the coordinating body and distributes responsibilities among the relevant agencies but possesses limited powers. Participants highlighted the nature of the Swedish government as a reason for the particular relationship between ministries and agencies. In Sweden, while agencies sit within specific ministries, “ministerial rule” over agencies is prohibited. This particular characteristic of Sweden means that a minister does not have the power to intervene directly in an agency’s day-to-day operations or instruct agencies on individual matters.</p> +<p>There was a concern that Japan would need to change its long-standing commitment to the nonproliferation of WMDs and, furthermore, that it might create a situation where Japan would have to consider using export controls for strategic purposes in the future.</p> -<p>With responsibilities distributed among different authorities and a lack of real coordination power overseeing implementation, the country’s architecture of competent authorities was unanimously labelled as “fragmented”. Each authority recognised its limited competences, the extent of which is still unclear and only now being assessed. Several participants agreed that the lack of a centralised sanctions authority hinders the effective implementation of sanctions in Sweden. Representatives from the MFA noted that while this framework might have worked in the past, it is no longer fitting for the demands of the current sanctions regime against Russia. A new sanctions coordinator was appointed in August 2023 that sits within the MFA, but the lack of executive capabilities persists.</p> +<p>The reason for this concern was that Japan had already experienced an instance of export controls being used for national strategic purposes. When tensions between Japan and South Korea rose in 2019 over the issue of ex-consignment, Japan changed its export control system with punitive intent for South Korea, removing it from the “White Country” category (now Category A) and increasing the effort needed to export fluoride. Japan also took measures to make exporting more difficult by changing three items, including hydrogen fluoride, from a general license to an individual license. These measures caused a strong backlash in South Korea, resulting not only in a decrease in exports from Japan but also in a strengthening of South Korea’s domestic production capabilities. Japan has officially attributed this to inadequacies in South Korea’s export control system, but the measures continued even after South Korea strengthened its export control system. They remained unchanged until President Yoon Suk Yeol was finally inaugurated and improved relations between the two countries were established.</p> -<p>Furthermore, the complexities of EU sanctions regulations and the guidance provided present great difficulties for national operators. The Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) noted that the technical complexities and varying interpretation created confusion about the practical application of sanctions. However, the MFA explained it does not have competency to interpret sanctions and struggles to clarify the rules to other authorities and businesses, limiting itself to the wording of the European Commission guidance and identifying the authority that will assume a specific competency.</p> +<p>The strengthening of U.S. export controls against China was not necessarily seen as a desirable outcome, as such economic pressure by means of export controls is perceived as likely to not only have a limited effect but could also improve other countries’ capabilities in the semiconductor sector vis-à-vis Japan. However, Japan accepted the measures under the assumption that there are no factories in Japan that make such advanced semiconductors and that therefore Japanese factories would not be directly affected. In addition, the fact that the October 7 measure was limited to “U.S. persons” meant that it was not directly applicable to companies based in Japan. Likewise, even if they used U.S. products or technologies subject to the re-export controls, firms would not be subject to the controls if their exports to China were limited to general-purpose semiconductors. The general response has been to wait and see how the U.S. regulations are implemented. Instead, the extended use of such export controls as a means of exerting economic pressure in the future has been seen as more problematic.</p> -<p>Participants added that fragmentation does not only occur among authorities, but also within the MFA itself. While the sanctions coordinator does sit with the MFA sanctions teams, most sanctions are managed by different geographical departments. This means that the MFA as a whole does not have the full picture of the sanctions-related challenges that Sweden faces. The limited number of staff dedicated to sanctions at the ministry also hinders its effectiveness to manage this dual task of policy and implementation.</p> +<h4 id="us-determination-impacted-japanese-thinking">U.S. Determination Impacted Japanese Thinking</h4> -<p>The national framework thus faces real weaknesses to implement sanctions, but authorities added that these are reinforced by the imbalances among EU member states. The different interpretation of sanctions rules at the domestic level is heightened when contrasted with the varying interpretations by authorities in other national jurisdictions within the EU. This lack of harmonisation has been identified in previous engagements of SIFMANet in other European capitals and continues to pose a major challenge to the effectiveness of the EU sanctions regime.</p> +<p>However, the assumption that Japan would not be affected was naive, as the U.S. industry quickly began to criticize Japanese and Dutch semiconductor equipment manufacturers, which are not subject to re-export restrictions, for unfairly benefiting from the measure. Japanese companies such as Tokyo Electron and other semiconductor equipment manufacturers make equipment using their technology rather than relying on U.S. technology, and in the Netherlands, ASML is the only company in the world that makes extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography equipment, which is essential for the production of the most advanced semiconductors. If these devices are exported to China and it develops better design capabilities, it will be able to make advanced semiconductors even if the United States stops exporting designs and software.</p> -<h3 id="implementing-sanctions-and-export-controls">Implementing Sanctions and Export Controls</h3> +<p>This has led the United States to urge Japan and the Netherlands not to export semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China. Both Japan and the Netherlands are allies of the United States and, like the United States, do not consider it desirable for China to increase its military capabilities by acquiring advanced semiconductors. However, China’s semiconductor market is the fastest-growing such market in the world, and it would be a great blow to Japanese and Dutch companies to lose this lucrative market. Although the United States emphasized that it was only regulating advanced semiconductors in China and not legacy or foundational semiconductors, both Japan and the Netherlands were hesitant to restrict the interests of private companies for political purposes.</p> -<p>Despite the aforementioned structural complications, Sweden benefits from a robust and experienced financial system on which it relies to implement sanctions, as well as well-developed export controls. Before addressing the functionality of these, Swedish authorities agreed that the most relevant incentive in the country to comply with sanctions is the risk of reputational damage. With high domestic levels of support for Ukraine, the reputational risk of continuing trade with Russia has led to increasing financial and trade disengagement since 2014. Swedish businesses voluntarily decided to sever ties with Russia and impose on themselves high compliance standards – including overcompliance in many cases.</p> +<p>As a result, Japan, the United Sates, and the Netherlands agreed to strengthen export controls, and Japan decided to add 23 new items, including semiconductor manufacturing equipment, to the list of items subject to export controls. However, unlike the United States, there were legal difficulties in establishing an export control system with the ability to target particular countries for the purposes of national security, since the export control system was designed to be prevent proliferation of WMDs. Therefore, the newly added items likely will require an export license for all destinations, but certain measures will be taken, such as not issuing licenses to China, on an operational basis.</p> -<p>Beyond these voluntary measures, Swedish banks are obliged to conduct financial screening for direct and indirect trade with sanctioned entities. Representatives from the FSA described banks and their financial infrastructure as strong and experienced in regard to sanctions. However, the financial supervisor explained that other sectors – such as the insurance sector – faced greater difficulties, struggling with sanctions screening, identifying assets and lacking a governance body.</p> +<p>For Japan, it was not a surprise that the United States took the position of thoroughly blocking advanced semiconductor exports to China, but it is nonetheless important to understand the determination of the United States to do so. During the Trump administration, economic coercion against China, particularly additional tariffs on China and protectionist measures under the guise of security under Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act, was seen as policy pursued by domestic hardliners against China or as an effort to preserve domestic jobs, not a policy driven by security concerns. However, the Biden administration’s October 7 controls signaled a full-fledged U.S. commitment to maintaining its technological superiority and preventing China’s military buildup, even at the expense of domestic industry.</p> -<p>While the FSA is charged with supervision, the authority does not investigate individual sanctions breaches and instead aims to ensure overall compliance capabilities in the sector. In 2021, the FSA conducted an inspection of one of Sweden’s largest banks from a governance perspective, checking the existence of a governance structure and its risk assessment. The supervisor expressed its satisfaction with the lack of pushback from obliged entities, who share the mission of sanctions and agree on the importance of their effective implementation. In this context, the FSA has exchanged daily updates and dialogues with businesses. However, the FSA does not have a self-reporting mechanism and declared that if a business detects a client evading or breaching sanctions, it is not clear to whom it should report the incident. A reason for this is that, currently, anti-money laundering and sanctions are separate areas, and the agency has the mandate only for the former.</p> +<h4 id="reactions-in-japan">Reactions in Japan</h4> -<p>Regarding export controls, Sweden has a long-running system to supervise military and dual-use goods exports. The ISP is the agency in charge of monitoring compliance and licensing. ISP representatives stated that the producers of these goods have ample experience with the controls in place, as well as the geopolitics involved in this sector. However, representatives from the agency highlighted that with the expansion of the sanctions regime against Russia, export controls now affect companies with no prior experience of these procedures and with which the agency has not traditionally worked. The ISP requires a valid reason from these entities to maintain their activity in Russia in order to grant them a licence, but their lack of experience overwhelmed the ISP’s capabilities, which had to introduce them into the basic legal framework. To facilitate this process, the ISP makes use of its standard outreach programme, which has now expanded its content and counts with a mechanism to self-report breaches.</p> +<p>Japanese business groups such as Keidanren or Keizai Doyukai (the Japan Association of Corporate Executives) or industry groups such as the Semiconductor Equipment Association of Japan have not expressed any explicit opposition or opinions regarding the agreements that the Japanese government has reached with the United States and the Netherlands. Nor has the issue been taken up in the Diet. In Japan, the government can enforce export controls through ministerial ordinances, and public lobbying is not a common practice. As a result, semiconductor export control issues are often resolved through direct dialogue between the government, industry associations, and individual companies.</p> -<p>Furthermore, for those goods that do not fall within the purview of the ISP, the mandate lies with the National Board of Trade. This agency grants exemptions for those who meet the necessary requirements but has no mandate on enforcement. Representatives from both agencies also noted a fragmentation in the Swedish context for cases where the same exporting entity requires an exemption from both the ISP and National Board of Trade, which as independent agencies need to coordinate with each other.</p> +<p>In this context, it is noteworthy that Japan has spent more than six months since October 7 negotiating with the United States. Naturally, China is a huge market with respect to semiconductor manufacturing equipment, which is the target of the regulations, and there is a large market to be lost by tightening export controls. In addition, in the case of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, it is not possible to define specifications by channel length, as is the case with semiconductors themselves, and it is necessary to carefully determine what type of equipment would be subject to export controls. Therefore, as the Japanese government continued its negotiations with the United States, it engaged in a series of negotiations with Japanese industry associations and individual companies to reach a consensus on which products would be subject to the restrictions.</p> -<p>Participants also emphasised the fact that many businesses operating in Sweden are companies with international presence. Their cross-border operations make these entities subject to the different interpretation of EU sanctions by different member states. Again, this presents a major challenge for businesses aiming to comply with sanctions and for authorities seeking to support their efforts.</p> +<p>The result of these negotiations was an agreement in May 2023 and the implementation of stricter export controls in July. In Japan, this issue is more of a process of making adjustments so that it does not contradict its own interests too much and acknowledging the importance of the security measures pursued by the United States without it becoming a major issue. The process is not necessarily satisfactory for companies exporting semiconductor manufacturing equipment, but there was a general consensus that the measures were a necessity for improving national security.</p> -<h3 id="investigations-into-sanctions-violations">Investigations into Sanctions Violations</h3> +<h4 id="japans-dilemma">Japan’s Dilemma</h4> -<p>Sweden benefits from high levels of compliance in a domestic landscape favourable to sanctions. However, if sanctions violations were to take place, Swedish authorities do not have the capacity to build an adequate response. Participating law enforcement officials explained that sanctions violations are criminalised in Sweden and can be prosecuted with penalties ranging from fines to imprisonment. However, the current legislation does not criminalise attempts to violate sanctions. This will be remedied by the upcoming EU directive to criminalise sanctions violations.</p> +<p>How will the October 7 measures and the subsequent framework of tighter restrictions on semiconductor exports to China by Japan, the United States, and the Netherlands affect Japan’s geoeconomic strategy going forward? The first key question will be the extent to which China will take retaliatory measures. For example, from August 1, China will tighten its controls on gallium and germanium exports. What is important about this response is that China is also strengthening export controls for “security” reasons. While this measure does not target any particular country, it is believed that China sees Japan as a weaker link in the containment policy against it, as the measure came just after Japan tightened its export controls. China will also strengthen export controls for commercial drones, in which China holds a large majority share in the global market, on the grounds of “security.” Additionally, there is a strong possibility that China will continue to use such export controls as a means of economic coercion in the future. Japan is trying to avoid risk by reducing its dependence on China in accordance with the Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA), but now that the “export control war” between the United States and China has begun, a response is required as soon as possible.</p> -<p>In the meantime, Swedish law enforcement requires someone to report a sanctions breach to initiate an investigation but has received very few tips in the past year. As a consequence, according to authorities there are no ongoing criminal investigations, which reflects a low risk of violations being detected. Representatives from Customs noted that the agency has the mandate to investigate and did initiate a process against a company. The case reached the prosecution phase, but there was ultimately not enough evidence for a conviction. Customs expressly pointed to the lack of a formal end-user documentation to prove a crime throughout the supply chain.</p> +<p>Second, even though the Chinese economy is slowing down, China is still a very attractive market for Japanese companies. Likewise, there are still many items that are dependent on procurement from China. Even if Japan were to diversify its supply chain in accordance with the ESPA, it would be a great burden for companies to procure more expensive items from other countries when they could procure them at a lower price from China. Such actions that go against economic rationality are difficult for companies to explain to their shareholders and stakeholders. In this sense, the government’s decision to strengthen export controls will facilitate companies’ decisionmaking and give them guidance for avoiding risks.</p> -<p>Authorities again highlighted that while they each have a piece of the puzzle, they suffer from the lack of a centralised authority to see the full picture.</p> +<p>Based on these strategic conflicts, Japanese companies are expected to take actions that are not economically rational and are likely to incur the risk of economic harassment by China. It is important for the government to draw up a clear strategy and provide predictability to companies in order to encourage such actions. At the same time, even if the government makes a decision, there can be a variety of risks involved in doing business with China. It is up to companies to decide how to respond to such risks, and there will be a limit to how much they can rely on the government.</p> -<p>This fragmented framework also impacts asset confiscation in the country. Swedish authorities do not have the power to freeze assets just because an individual or an entity is designated. They require a criminal investigation, and no authority has been tasked with going after the assets. In a visual example of this, participants mentioned that in the case of yachts, it is the duty of the boat club where the yacht is docked to prevent its departure.</p> +<h4 id="what-should-the-japanese-government-do">What Should the Japanese Government Do?</h4> -<h3 id="tackling-circumvention">Tackling Circumvention</h3> +<p>Under these circumstances, what should Japan do in the future, especially in the semiconductor field? First, Japan must protect its superior technologies and companies from foreign investment, especially from China, as it did with the acquisition of JSR, a major semiconductor materials company, by the Japan Investment Corporation ( JCI), a government-affiliated fund. To this end, in addition to investment screening based on the current Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law, Japan should also consider the introduction of an investment screening system similar to the U.S. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) as well as measures such as delisting, as was the case with the acquisition of JSR.</p> -<p>Sweden benefits from the reputational pressures noted above to limit its exposure to sanctions violations. However, participating authorities emphasised that these risks are not only linked to direct connections with Russia, but also indirect exports and transactions through complex corporate schemes or the involvement of third-party jurisdictions. At present, circumvention is one of the main concerns in relation to sanctions in the country.</p> +<p>Second, it is necessary to further strengthen initiatives such as Rapidus and LSTC, the joint research institute with TSMC, which are currently being promoted with government involvement. The semiconductor industry is fundamentally an equipment industry, and it is not possible to maintain competitiveness without renewal of equipment through a continuous cycle of new investment. In addition, semiconductor research and development require enormous resources, and it is difficult to ask private companies to have the financial strength to make continuous investments. In this sense, the government must be fully involved. The era of neoliberalism, in which government intervention in the market was undesirable, is over. Japan is now in an era in which the government is involved in the market — maintaining, nurturing, and protecting strategic industries. The private sector needs to be aware that it, alongside the government, stands at the forefront of national economic security.</p> -<p>Following increasing media reporting of Swedish trade flows to third countries suspected of facilitating circumvention, supported by reporting from the security authorities, Sweden is in the process of establishing a task force to prevent this practice. The risk of circumvention has led Swedish banks to block activities and transactions beyond what is mandated by sanctions, engaging in overcompliance. Non-financial businesses are also wary of their trade partners, but authorities understand that their due diligence capacities have a limit.</p> +<p>Third is the need to secure human resources in the semiconductor industry. The semiconductor manufacturing business has long received an inadequate amount of investment, not only in Japan but also in the United States and Europe, and even if the Japanese government provides leverage to the semiconductor industry, there is still a shortage of human resources. In Japan, the opening of TSMC’s plant in Kumamoto Prefecture has led to a strain on highly skilled personnel from all over the country, causing problems such as skyrocketing wages and a shortage of personnel in the Kyushu industry. A similar situation is also occurring in Hokkaido, where Rapidus is expanding. Universities and technical colleges in Kyushu and Hokkaido are working on how to resolve this shortage of human resources, but these efforts are insufficient. The government as a whole should improve the supply of semiconductor human resources and actively attract human resources from India and other countries with strong semiconductor design capabilities.</p> -<p>In this regard, authorities note that there is not much a Swedish business can do beyond its due diligence duties and demanding that a third-party operator declare in writing that the products it is purchasing will not be sent to Russia. Participants added that large companies – especially those whose trade involves US components – might have the additional incentive of fearing being sanctioned by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control, but this will not necessarily be the case for small or medium-sized enterprises. In the case of military or dual-use goods, the ISP does have the power to stop a transaction and report to the prosecutor.</p> +<p>The United States is prepared to use its technology and economy as weapons in its strategic competition with China. Japan, as an ally and a strategic security partner, has no choice but to support the U.S. policy toward China while balancing its own economic interests and strategic rivalry in semiconductors. Regardless of Japan’s desires, technology and the economy have become strategic tools. The best way to develop some advantage in this situation is for Japan to establish its “strategic indispensability” by refining its own technology and acquiring international competitiveness, thereby increasing its ability to resist coercion from other countries. In this sense, a modern security strategy must recognize that it is not only the government, military, and diplomatic authorities — but also business and enterprises — that must achieve the nation’s strategic goals together. In this sense, Japan’s economic security strategy is more effective when the government and businesses have less friction on economic security issues.</p> -<p>To tackle circumvention, participants from the National Board of Trade stated that there is sufficient knowledge that it is taking place through Sweden – a fact that is likely to be underlined in a forthcoming report it is due to publish – and sufficient resources and investigation powers should be allocated to tackle this practice. Still, the MFA noted that to achieve such increase in resources, authorities need actual evidence of circumvention – a major challenge given the deficiencies described above. Representatives from the MFA argued that among the reasons for this weakness to counter circumvention are insufficient information sharing among authorities and the lack of a coordination body to identify the real challenges.</p> +<h3 id="dutch-perspective">Dutch Perspective</h3> -<p>Although not directly related to sanctions, participants added that certain measures currently underway could be helpful for the more effective implementation of sanctions, such as foreign direct investment screening or increased export controls. A participant highlighted that recognising that these issues are interconnected is key to developing a comprehensive economic security strategy in Sweden.</p> +<p><em>How the Netherlands Followed Washington’s October 7 Export Restrictions</em></p> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="rem-korteweg">Rem Korteweg</h4> +</blockquote> -<p>Among the member states visited by SIFMANet, Sweden stands out as one of the countries most committed to the effective implementation of sanctions across the public and private sectors. Despite the efforts of authorities and businesses to comply even beyond what is mandated by EU regulations, the complexities of the sanctions regime and the ever-changing risks posed by Russia’s circumvention operations pose a major challenge to the success of sanctions.</p> +<h4 id="introduction-1">Introduction</h4> -<p>The deterrence of reputational risks attached to persisting trade flows with Russia are a beneficial starting point for Sweden’s sanctions efforts, but much must be improved in the country’s implementation framework. Most importantly, to mitigate the fragmentation of sanctions-related responsibilities, coordination must be improved. As some observed, like Sweden itself, its sanctions response represents “an archipelago” that needs unifying. The recently appointed sanctions coordinator must play an enhanced role to cover the gaps in the MFA’s capabilities in this regard. Participants were also largely sympathetic to the idea of a centralised advice provider to alleviate the MFA’s burden and its limited guidance powers. This centralised role could be assumed by an institution such as Business Sweden.</p> +<p>This chapter looks at the development of Dutch semiconductor export control policies in response to growing U.S.-China tensions and the October 7, 2022, export restrictions.</p> -<p>Investigative powers into sanctions violations and circumvention are also lacking in Sweden. The upcoming EU directive criminalising sanctions violations will improve enforcement, but authorities must ensure that they are fit to implement the new rules. Additionally, information sharing must be promoted at a domestic and international level. The lack of harmonisation across member states has been repeatedly observed by this project and continued efforts should be dedicated to overcome the challenges posed by this weakness of the EU sanctions regime.</p> +<p>The Dutch reaction to the October 7 controls is embedded in a growing deterioration of Dutch relations with China, several years of intense U.S.-Dutch diplomacy about semiconductor export policies, and a Dutch ambition to preserve its unique position in the global semiconductor value chain.</p> -<hr /> +<p>While the Dutch semiconductor industry includes more than 300 companies, the new policies were mainly related to advanced lithography and semiconductor manufacturing machinery. One Dutch company, ASML, plays a crucial role here.</p> -<p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Analyst at the Centre for Financial Crime &amp; Security Studies at RUSI, focusing on sanctions and counter threat finance. He is part of Project CRAAFT (Collaboration, Research and Analysis Against Financing of Terrorism) and Euro SIFMANet (European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network).</p>Gonzalo SaizParticipants discussed the sanctions implementation in Sweden and how new EU sanctions imposed on Russia are challenging the Swedish system.Post-Prigozhin RU In Africa2023-09-20T12:00:00+08:002023-09-20T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/post-prigozhin-russia-in-africa<p><em>Any changes in Wagner’s command and control following Prigozhin’s presumed death do not necessarily mean that Russia is abandoning the Wagner model altogether, given the significant geopolitical and economic benefits that it provides for the Kremlin in Africa.</em></p> +<h4 id="the-netherlands-role-in-the-semiconductor-supply-chain">The Netherlands’ Role in the Semiconductor Supply Chain</h4> -<excerpt /> +<p>A conservative estimate by the Dutch government puts the Dutch semiconductor industry at more than 300 companies, employing around 50,000 people and generating €30 billion ($32.46 billion) in revenue annually. However, the overarching semiconductor ecosystem in the Netherlands is probably larger. For example, lithography machine manufacturer ASML says its supply chain in the Netherlands relies on more than 100 small and medium-sized enterprises.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Dutch semiconductor firms are predominantly active in machinery and equipment, chip design, and the production of leading-edge as well as legacy semiconductors. One of the unique characteristics of the Dutch ecosystem is that it brings together government, knowledge institutions and technical universities, and private companies to drive innovation, with a demonstrated history of success. According to the central bank of the Netherlands, in December 2022, the semiconductor industry accounted for 24 percent of the market capitalization of the Amsterdam stock exchange.</p> -<p>From the Central African Republic (CAR) to Libya, through Mali and Sudan, Russia has been consistently gaining ground across Africa over the past decade. Moscow owes its successes on the continent in large part to one man, the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, who until recently led the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company (PMC).</p> +<p>According to the Netherlands branch organization of the semiconductor industry, “on average 85% of the integrated circuits in all electronic devices worldwide, are made on machines designed and manufactured in the Netherlands.” ASML sits at the apex of the Dutch semiconductor ecosystem, given its global market dominance in the field of advanced semiconductor lithography machines. Currently, its leading-edge technology is extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography, for which it has a monopoly. Other notable companies include NXP, ASM International, BE Semiconductors, STMicroelectronics, and Axelera AI. Yet because of ASML’s outsized importance to the global semiconductor value chain, this company is also the focal point for how the Netherlands deals with the geopolitics of the semiconductor industry and how it developed its export control regime. That regime took shape in a context of changing relations with China.</p> -<p>Prigozhin sensed better than anyone else in Moscow the strategic and lucrative opportunities that the resource-rich and politically fragile spots across Africa could bring to Russia. Dubbed “Putin’s chef,” Prigozhin moved from the actual catering business into the PMC business. In Africa, he made tailormade recipes for the Kremlin’s various targets, while using some signature ingredients such as security protection, election meddling, and disinformation campaigns to the benefit of local partners in exchange for deals for access to natural resources, including oil, gold, diamonds, and uranium.</p> +<h4 id="changing-views-on-chinas-economic-ambitions">Changing Views on China’s Economic Ambitions</h4> -<p>After years of the Kremlin enjoying the plausible deniability granted by the Wagner Group’s murky legal status, the June 2023 armed mutiny led by Prigozhin against the Russian government exposed the intricacies of the relationship between the PMC and Moscow, including the latter’s dependence on the Wagner chief to gain influence and control over different African governments.</p> +<p>The Netherlands was slow to come to terms with China’s economic challenge, but when it did, things moved quickly. In 2019, the Netherlands published a new China policy paper. In the paper, which could not be called a strategy due to intergovernmental disagreements about its scope, the government took a much more critical view of China than it did in the previous edition from 2013. Instead of prioritizing the economic promise that access to China’s market offered, the 2019 paper sought to strike a balance between working with China and scrutinizing it. The main tagline of the document became “open where possible, protective where needed, and based to a greater extent on reciprocity.” It also gave the necessary political cover for the development of a Dutch investment screening mechanism.</p> -<p>The elimination of Prigozhin now raises a new set of questions: How will his demise affect Russia’s clout in Africa? Will Prigozhin’s killing create a power vacuum within Wagner, as well as in the African countries where the PMC has been prominent? Will new faces emerge to assume control of Prigozhin’s formidable multimillion-dollar legacy? And does Russia’s Ministry of Defense, or others from the security apparatus, have the means to take over Wagner’s activities while the war in Ukraine is still ongoing?</p> +<p>When the China policy paper was taking shape, concerns about China’s human rights record and regional security — not its economic activities — dominated discussions in the Dutch parliament. But gradually relations between Beijing and The Hague started to deteriorate. In a new low, a Dutch parliamentarian and a high-ranking diplomat were sanctioned by the Chinese government and received travel bans in 2021 because of their criticism of human rights violations in Xinjiang.</p> -<p>So far, fluid battlegrounds and embattled regimes across Africa such as the CAR, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Sudan suggest that Russia’s appeal as a security guarantor and military partner remains intact, irrespective of the fate of the Wagner Group. One reason for this — as the authors of this piece have argued earlier — is that Russia’s provision of regime survival packages in this destabilized region “supersedes any other potential gains from traditional cooperation agreements advanced by Western partners, which are usually based on institutional capacity building instead of securing the authorities themselves.”</p> +<p>The Covid-19 pandemic put the issue of undesired economic dependencies with China into focus. In 2020, while the Netherlands struggled to contain infections, a diplomatic row erupted over the Dutch decision to change the name of its trade and investment office in Taiwan to the Netherlands Office Taipei. China’s Global Times newspaper reported that the move might have repercussions for China’s provision of medical aid and face masks to the Netherlands. It set off alarm bells in the Dutch parliament and focused minds on the issue of economic coercion. Could China leverage its growing economic footprint against Dutch foreign policy or security interests? Chinese investments in Dutch companies, including in the semiconductor sector, became suspect. For instance, the Netherlands blocked the Chinese takeover of semiconductor firm SmartPhotonics in 2020 and helped put together a public-private consortium to keep this technology in Dutch hands. In the same period, a backlash against Huawei — driven by security concerns about the possibility of Chinese espionage or sabotage — led to its exclusion from the Dutch 5G telecom infrastructure market. In November 2019, the government decided that telecom providers could only use “trusted suppliers” in critical parts of the 5G backbone. Later, in 2021, Huawei confirmed it had been excluded. And in the European Union, the Netherlands spearheaded an EU initiative to scrutinize and limit investments by foreign state-owned enterprises in the single market. In 2023, the China policy paper was updated. Unsurprisingly, it placed a much stronger emphasis on “protection.”</p> -<p>However, a series of signs, including Russia’s military shortcomings in Ukraine, Russia’s inability to stop drone attacks on Moscow, and domestic fissures regarding Wagner’s future, might negatively impact the perception of the Kremlin as a guarantor of security and stability across Africa. As the dust keeps settling, this analysis looks at the possible directions of Wagner and its operations in Africa in a post-Prigozhin world, concluding with recommendations for U.S. and Western policymakers.</p> +<p>Various parliamentary motions were put forward to shape a new China policy, but most were directed at preventing certain Chinese investments in Dutch critical infrastructure or reducing dependencies on Chinese imports. For instance, in October 2021 a motion called for reducing Dutch and European strategic dependencies on “authoritarian states, mainly China” as this would increase the effectiveness of Dutch and European human rights policies. The following month, parliament adopted a motion calling for “an ambitious plan to reduce the dependency of Dutch consumers and producers on China.” And in May 2023, a cross-party motion called for greater government action, including a credible timeline, to reduce Dutch exposure to “problematic dependencies in critical materials, chips, semiconductors and high-tech products” from China. De-risking, if not decoupling, was widely embraced by the Dutch parliament, but it was focused on Chinese inbound investments and dependencies on Chinese imports, not on Dutch exports that could give China a strategic industrial edge. That would change with U.S. action.</p> -<h3 id="recapping-prigozhins-multimillion-dollar-operations-in-africa">Recapping Prigozhin’s Multimillion-Dollar Operations in Africa</h3> +<h4 id="initial-responses">Initial Responses</h4> -<p>On August 21, video footage of Prigozhin, allegedly recorded in Mali, emerged on social media, in which he pledged to make “Russia even greater on every continent and Africa even freer.” Two days later — and two months after his failed armed mutiny — Prigozhin died in a plane crash along with other senior figures from Wagner, including Dmitry Utkin, long believed to be the founder of the PMC, and Valery Chekalov, who reportedly managed Prigozhin’s oil, gas, and mineral businesses in Africa and the Middle East.</p> +<p>The October 7 measures had an impact on Dutch companies, particularly ASML. U.S. employees of Dutch semiconductor firms were covered by the new legislation, as was U.S. content in semiconductor technologies used by Dutch semiconductor firms. This meant that their products became susceptible to export restrictions. A number of Dutch companies — such as ASML, ASM, and NXP — were affected further because they have U.S. subsidiaries.</p> -<p>While Prigozhin’s summer 2023 odyssey from Ukraine’s Bakhmut to Russia’s Rostov-on-Don (with a brief layover in Belarus) and back to Africa ultimately ended with his demise, it is not yet clear if the fall of 2023 will be fatal for the Wagner Group itself, which has now lost nearly all members of its senior leadership. Following the mutiny in June, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reassured African allies that Moscow would not withdraw Wagner mercenaries from the continent, and sources close to Prigozhin have also argued that Russia is heavily dependent on the PMC’s assets abroad and thus their removal would cause “a rapid compression of Russian influence” in Africa.</p> +<p>ASML generates approximately 15 percent of its revenue in China. In response to the U.S. measures, the company has transferred some of its repair and maintenance activities to China. This allows it to continue to service the lithography machines that it has previously sold to Chinese customers. But there is no doubt that the U.S. measures have had a chilling effect on ASML’s business in China.</p> -<p>Indeed, starting from the late 2010s, Wagner has become firmly entrenched in different parts of the continent, and particularly in the countries that have created political headaches for international organizations and the Western bloc. The CAR is the most prominent case of the Wagner entrenchment in Africa, where the PMC arrived in 2018 at the invitation of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra. As Touadéra has recently explained, he was desperate to find outside assistance to quell the civil war, and Russia was the only country willing to send weapons and fighters (the latter being Wagner mercenaries). In an interview, he said, “I asked all my friends, including in the United States, including France. . . . I need to protect the population. I need to protect the institutions of the republic. I asked everyone for help, and was I supposed to refuse the help from those who wanted to help us?” In exchange for providing personal security, military training, and combat assistance, the PMC has gained direct access to the CAR’s natural resources, including the Ndassima gold mining site, which, according to a recent CSIS study, Wagner-linked operatives had significantly expanded by 2023. Some estimates claim that Wagner could gain as much as $1 billion in annual mining profits in the CAR alone, which would help the Kremlin mitigate the damages of Western sanctions.</p> +<p>Across the political spectrum, there is wide-ranging interest in the new U.S. regulations. In mid-October, the government organized a confidential briefing for parliament on the new measures. But already in September 2022, when news was starting to spread about pending U.S. export controls on semiconductors, questions were being asked in the Dutch parliament. The pro-EU party Volt Netherlands asked the ministers of foreign affairs, economic affairs, and international trade whether new U.S. export controls would influence Dutch and European “digital autonomy,” and therefore needed to be assessed on its geopolitical merits (which is one component of the European Union’s ambition to develop its economic “strategic autonomy”). The government responded with an emphatic yes, adding the following:</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bhQ9cEP.jpg" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ A Russian flag hangs on the monument of the Russian “instructors” (i.e., Wagner mercenaries) in Bangui, CAR, during a march in support of Russia’s presence, March 2023.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>Due to its strategic importance and the globalized structure of the value chain, semiconductor technology plays a key role in geopolitical affairs and thus for the “open strategic autonomy” of the EU. The government is therefore committed to remaining an international leader in this area in the future. This requires a geopolitical consideration, in which good cooperation with like-minded partners is of great importance.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>In addition to the CAR, Moscow has taken advantage of the West’s absence or contested presence in different regions and countries across the continent, including in Libya, Mali, and Sudan, among others. In Libya — “a potential energy giant on Europe’s doorstep” — around 1,000 Wagner mercenaries have remained on the ground, providing combat assistance to strongman General Khalifa Haftar in eastern Libya in his fight against the internationally recognized government based in Tripoli. By supporting General Haftar, the PMC has put itself in a position to control Libyan oil production in the country’s southwestern fields, thus curbing the European Union’s potential to invest in Libyan energy infrastructure to pivot away from Russian gas.</p> +<p>In a separate note, Volt Netherlands complained that the October 7 export controls served U.S. interests and unduly damaged ASML without giving the company adequate compensation. Instead, the party called for a stronger and more coherent European approach to semiconductors. It reflected earlier criticism by some academics who suggested that the Netherlands was becoming increasingly vulnerable to U.S. extraterritorial legislation in high-tech fields.</p> -<p>In Mali, the Wagner forces have reportedly been present since December 2021, providing protection to the military junta that took power in 2020 and receiving $10 million per month for their services. Starting in 2022, following President Emmanuel Macron’s decision to withdraw French troops from Mali due to major disagreements between the French government and the Malian military junta, Wagner began further strengthening its positions in the country. The arrival of Wagner-linked geologists and lawyers also suggests that, similar to Wagner’s arrangements in the CAR, Russia has secured mining concessions in exchange for providing the junta with the PMC’s services.</p> +<p>In December 2022, ASML CEO Peter Wennink was critical of the new U.S. export restrictions. He said that ASML had already paid a price by no longer being able to export its most advanced EUV lithography machines to China and that restricting less-advanced deep ultraviolet (DUV) immersion technologies would go a step too far. He also said that EUV export restrictions were benefiting U.S. semiconductor firms that were still able to trade with China and that DUV technology had already proliferated widely, including to China. Meanwhile the Dutch government was mulling over its response.</p> -<p>Sudan constitutes another noteworthy case of the Wagner deployment. In 2017, then president Omar al-Bashir signed several important deals with the Kremlin, including an agreement to set up a Russian naval base at Port Sudan, which would give Russia access to the Red Sea, as well as a gold mining contract between M Invest, a Prigozhin-owned company, and the Sudanese Ministry of Minerals. Following the ousting of President al-Bashir in 2019 and the ongoing political-military turmoil in the country, various sources have claimed that, through Libya, Wagner has provided military assistance and equipment to Sudan’s paramilitary forces and their leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo in his fight over the country’s civilian leadership. According to international observers, the Wagner Group’s main goals in Sudan have been to ensure Moscow’s uninterrupted access to Sudanese gold reserves, the third largest in Africa; to finance its war effort in Ukraine; and to build a naval base at Port Sudan, which would only become possible after the restoration of the Sudanese civilian leadership.</p> +<h4 id="no-export-licenses-for-euv-technology">No Export Licenses for EUV Technology</h4> -<p>These cases demonstrate Prigozhin’s mastery of exploiting fragile states and governments on the continent, making Wagner indispensable to regime survival and national security, and bringing significant geopolitical and economic gains to the Kremlin. Now, with his death, the future of Wagner is murky, as is the future of many companies across Africa linked to or owned by the late Prigozhin. At this time, any possible answers to the question of succession are highly speculative and problematic.</p> +<p>The Dutch response to the October 7 controls cannot be understood without giving due regard to the previous years of U.S.-Netherlands cooperation on semiconductor export policy. In the run-up to October 7, the Biden administration had continued the Trump administration’s earlier campaign to restrict ASML’s export of lithography machines to China.</p> -<h3 id="dissolved-or-restructured-wagner-without-prigozhin">Dissolved or Restructured? Wagner without Prigozhin</h3> +<p>EUV machines are covered by the Wassenaar Arrangement. In late 2018, under the terms of the arrangement, ASML asked for an export license for two EUV machines to China. The intended customer was most likely the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), which the United States would later designate as a military end user and add to its Entity List. Because the United States is member to the Wassenaar Arrangement, it received information of the intended sale. The United States initially tried to block the sale itself, but the content requirement that would allow the United States to do so was not met. A number of rounds of diplomacy between the Netherlands and the United States followed. In June 2019, then secretary of state Mike Pompeo visited The Hague and pointed out that the sale of EUV technology to China was undesirable. According to reports, during Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s visit to the White House in July 2019, he was given an intelligence report on the implications of China’s use of ASML’s EUV technology. The Dutch government did not renew ASML’s export license. But ASML, like similar firms around the world, continued to sell its less-advanced DUV immersion technology machines to Chinese customers, including to SMIC.</p> -<p>It comes as no surprise that the process of “deliberate wrongdoing” that ultimately ended with Prigozhin’s demise was initiated two months before the plane crash. It started with an effort to deflect blame from the Wagner mercenaries in Rostov-on-Don entirely to the PMC boss and thus plant the seeds of disagreement between the Wagner leadership and its fighters. In the days after Prigozhin’s failed uprising, sources close to the Kremlin were encouraging the PMC forces to join the Russian Ministry of Defense, arguing that they had not done “anything reprehensible,” as they had been merely following the orders of their commander.</p> +<p>Meanwhile, the policy cogs in The Hague were churning. A new, more restrictive export policy for semiconductor technology was in the making. On October 10, 2020, more than a year after Rutte’s visit to the White House, the Netherlands Ministry of Defence published an internal semiconductor strategy. The strategy underlined ASML’s key position in the field of lithography machines and the ability of EUV technology to produce the most advanced chips. It also warned that the most advanced chips are most likely to be used in the most advanced military systems.</p> -<p>These statements prepared the ground for President Vladimir Putin’s closed-door meeting with Prigozhin and Wagner fighters on June 29. Two weeks later, in a rare interview with Russian newspaper Kommersant, Putin shared some important insights from that meeting. He said that the ordinary members of the PMC were “dragged into” the mutiny and seemed to agree with his suggestion to serve under the guidance of a senior Wagner commander Andrei Troshev, also known as “Sedoi” (denoting “gray hair” in Russian). As Putin explained, “He is the person under whose command Wagner fighters have served for the last 16 months. . . . They could all gather in one place and continue to serve. And nothing would change for them. They would be led by the same person who had been their real commander all along.” The president also claimed that while many in the room seemed keen to accept the offer, Prigozhin rejected his proposal.</p> +<p>With the EUV machines, the strategy stated, China could aim to increase its ability to produce advanced chips and make headway to develop its own indigenous semiconductor industry. The semiconductor strategy also flagged China’s ambition to be a military superpower by 2049. Crucially, the Ministry of Defence concluded the following (author’s translation):</p> -<p>But since August 23, the talks regarding a new Wagner chief have resumed, with the Russian state media placing a reinvigorated emphasis on the candidacy of Troshev. Sources close to the Wagner Group have also confirmed these rumors. Troshev fought in Afghanistan and Chechnya and has received the highest honorary title, Hero of the Russian Federation, for his participation in the military operation in Syria. The deaths of both Prigozhin and Utkin have made him the only remaining senior Wagner commander. Yet the same sources also claim that the only Wagner personnel who will serve under Troshev’s leadership will be those fighters who agree to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense and who remain in Russia. This interesting detail may point to the Kremlin’s decision to divide Wagner into several groups, each with different country or regional heads.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>The chance that a NATO member state will have to defend itself against advanced indigenously-produced weapon systems in the future will increase considerably when EUV machines are exported, especially if China sells such weapon systems to third parties. In addition, the export of advanced technology may lead to undesirable economic dependencies in the (near) future. Finally, our most important strategic security partner, the United States, has made an emphatic appeal to the Netherlands not to export EUV technology to China.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Indeed, besides Troshev as a potential successor to Prigozhin, other names have also been circulating inside Russia, including those of Alexander Kuznetsov, Andrey Bogatov, and Anton Yelizarov, all three belonging to the PMC’s current command structure. Denis Korotkov, a Russian journalist investigating the work of the Wagner Group, believes that the division of power between different commanders within the PMC might be a possibility, arguing that even if Troshev is nominally elected as the new Wagner boss (as Utkin was for many years), he will never be the “manager” of the group (as Prigozhin actually dealt with the financial, organizational, and political aspects of the PMC). Other sources have pointed to a Wagner takeover by the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service, notably via its deputy chief, Andrei Averyanov. At the Russia-Africa summit held in Saint Petersburg, Russia, this July, President Touadéra was introduced to Averyanov — instead of Prigozhin. By contrast, according to recent news reports, for some in the Wagner Group there is still hope that the PMC can exist autonomously under command of Prigozhin’s son Pavel, without it being subsumed within the Russian Ministry of Defense.</p> +<p>The Ministry of Defence continued: “From the perspective of Dutch military and security interests in the medium and long term, it is important that the Netherlands does not grant ASML an export license for the supply of EUV machines to China and that this unique technology is protected as much as possible.” The Defence Ministry’s strategy provided a clear justification for not awarding the export license to ASML, but it came more than a year after U.S. pressure on the Dutch.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CDMvuUs.jpg" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ A group of men in military uniforms arrives at the Federal Military Memorial Cemetery in the Moscow region, where the Wagner military commander Dmitry Utkin’s funeral is held, August 2023.</em></p> +<h4 id="from-euv-to-duv">From EUV to DUV</h4> -<p>The question of the successor will also inevitably impact continuity of the ongoing Wagner operations in Africa. Some Russian experts believe that because Prigozhin was instrumental in developing strong personal ties with different regimes across the continent, it will not be possible to simply replace him with a new boss. “He was the only one crazy enough to make it work,” argued a longtime Prigozhin acquaintance in a Financial Times exclusive. Wagner-linked Telegram channels have also reported that the group is now facing a “very tough competition” from Russia’s Ministry of Defense and National Guard in Africa and the Middle East, as these two state entities plan to gradually assume control over the PMC’s local operations. While Wagner’s current leadership will continue negotiations with the Russian government, it is not yet known if and in what numbers Wagner mercenaries will remain in Africa.</p> +<p>While EUV exports to China were now off the table, the focus fell on ASML’s less advanced, but still very sophisticated, DUV immersion technology machines. Together with U.S. etching and deposition equipment, Chinese engineers had been able to use DUV technology to make several innovative breakthroughs and develop advanced semiconductors of their own.</p> -<p>Yet changes in Wagner’s command and control do not necessarily mean that Russia is abandoning the PMC model altogether, given that it provides significant political and economic benefits that are particularly important amid the war in Ukraine and Western economic sanctions. After reports of Prigozhin’s death, CSIS’s Catrina Doxsee said that “Moscow is unlikely to dismantle Wagner’s operational infrastructure in host countries, as it would be difficult to rebuild the same relationships, knowledge, and systems that Wagner personnel have established over the years.” Therefore, according to Doxsee, it is more likely that Moscow will install a new Wagner leadership that will be more tightly controlled than the deceased Prigozhin-Utkin duo, and maintain relative continuity of mid- to lower-level Wagner personnel on the ground. A recent statement by a CAR official close to President Touadéra confirms as much, with the official claiming that, even with Prigozhin gone, Wagner will remain in the CAR “thanks to our agreement with the Kremlin.” According to Doxsee, it is also possible that Wagner entities could be merged with another PMC such as Convoy, a relatively new group led by Sergey Aksyonov, a pro-Russia leader in Crimea, and Konstantin Pikalov, who formerly worked closely with Prigozhin and oversaw much of Wagner’s activity in Africa.</p> +<p>Feeling the increased pressure, ASML tried to get a carve-out for its lithography machines in November 2020 from the U.S. Export Control Reform Act. Importantly, regarding DUV, ASML stated that “as deep ultraviolet (“DUV”) lithography systems have become trailing edge, DUV technology has been decontrolled from national security requirements including multilateral controls and for many years has been extensively shipped globally, including to China.” ASML’s argument was basically that the technology had already proliferated widely, and that therefore export restrictions on this technology would be meaningless. Conversations with Dutch policymakers at the time confirmed the impression that the Hague considered DUV to be less sensitive than EUV.</p> -<p>Irrespective of the fate of the most famous Russian PMC, there seems to be a consensus regarding Russia’s reputation as a security guarantor to its African partners. For instance, Russian political scientist Aleksei Makarkin has argued that even if Wagner is ultimately replaced with new mercenary companies more tightly linked to the Russian Ministry of Defense, this will not alter Moscow’s current position on the continent. Instead, for many in the region, Wagner has been perceived not as a PMC but as a representative of the Russian state itself. In the eyes of African leaders, Russia, and not the Wagner Group, has been their loyal military-security partner throughout all these years. But besides loyalty, these events have exposed Russia’s inherent instability and unpredictability, stressing for African governments the risks of overreliance on a single partner. Alternatively, for many fragile regimes, there might also be a strengthened fear factor — now that African countries with Wagner presence have seen what the Kremlin can do to those who turn back or revolt, they might feel even more intimidated and sign new security agreements with Russia, making even bigger economic concessions to the Kremlin.</p> +<p>The dynamic changed with the October 7 regulation. With the new controls, the United States emphasized that it saw export restrictions on semiconductor technology as part of its overall geopolitical competition with Beijing and its strategic posturing in the Asia-Pacific. In that context, the United States was intent on preserving its technological edge, including by reducing China’s access to high-end lithography machines. The Biden administration now needed to convince the Netherlands to see the issue the same way.</p> -<h3 id="what-now-recommendations-to-western-policymakers">What Now? Recommendations to Western Policymakers</h3> +<p>An intensive amount of diplomacy ensued in 2022. Deputy Secretary of Commerce Don Graves visited the Netherlands in June 2022 to speak with the Dutch government and ASML about new export controls. In the wake of the October 7 regulation, a bipartisan delegation from the U.S. Senate visited the Netherlands on November 4, 2022. According to Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s social media feed, their discussions included “stability in the Indo-Pacific,” which makes it highly likely that semiconductor supply chains were discussed. That same month, Under Secretary for Commerce Alan Estevez and Tarun Chhabra, senior director for technology and national security at the National Security Council, traveled to the Netherlands to discuss the October 7 measures, their implications for Dutch semiconductor firms, and the desire to expand export licensing to include DUV technology. This was most likely the preparatory meeting for the January 2023 bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Rutte and President Biden.</p> -<p>While the Putin administration is trying to reconfigure Russia’s current PMC model, there might be a brief window of opportunity for U.S. and Western policymakers to attempt a dialogue with different African leaders and dislodge Russian influence. This section lays out recommendations to the Western policy community to take advantage of Russia’s Wagner conundrum and counter the Kremlin’s influence on the continent. For more, see earlier CSIS analysis by the authors — “Russia Is Still Progressing in Africa. What’s the Limit?” — for broader sets of recommendations to U.S. and European policymakers to counter Russian political, economic, and military-security entrenchment in Africa.</p> +<p>Meanwhile, policymakers in the Netherlands were keeping up. On December 1, 2022 — almost two months after October 7 — the government published new guidelines for the export of dual-use semiconductor technologies. The Netherlands formulated three criteria on the basis of which export licenses in semiconductor technologies would be assessed:</p> -<ul> +<ol> <li> - <p>Devise a security cooperation package that is tailored to the needs of African partners while still observant of transatlantic values.</p> - - <p>Prigozhin possessed a remarkable ability to grasp key security concerns of different leaders and regimes across Africa and promptly offered services that would temporarily solve their immediate problems. Building on the authors’ previous analysis, for an alternative Western offer to be competitive, cooperation should principled, but less transactional. It should remain motivated by shared values, with Western security assistance ultimately serving political objectives that are aligned with the transatlantic community’s values. Recommendations from that analysis still hold: “due diligence should be conducted upstream through arms control policies and downstream through accompaniment and monitoring — not during the negotiation phase or political engagement, so as to alleviate the sentiment that Western support is a politically motivated bargaining chip.”</p> + <p>Preventing Dutch goods from contributing to undesirable end uses, such as a military application or weapons of mass destruction</p> </li> <li> - <p>Actively expose atrocities committed by the Wagner Group on the continent.</p> - - <p>The West should continue to expose the widespread atrocities and human rights abuses committed by Wagner paramilitaries in Africa. To do so, the West should also invest more resources in establishing and supporting reliable, Africa-based media outlets that promote local voices and perspectives on important regional issues.</p> + <p>Preventing unwanted strategic dependencies</p> </li> <li> - <p>Preserve an ability to act against traditional and potential new threats in Africa.</p> - - <p>Contrary to Prigozhin’s claims that Wagner has been making African nations “freer,” Russia’s continued advances on the continent are in fact risk multipliers, with the most prominent one being rising levels of terrorism in the countries where Russia, including Wagner fighters, is present. According to the Global Terrorism Index, 48 percent of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2022, with three of the top 10 countries — Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — all having some sort of Wagner presence. The ongoing uncertainty regarding the future of the PMC may fuel further instability and insecurity on the continent. Facing these potential new threats implies that the West should retain certain capabilities in the region. This includes defensive equipment and airlift options to protect both Western citizens and African partners in the case of serious violent outbreaks — such as a recent violent outbreak in Niger — as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to disclose intelligence on Wagner’s (or its future replacement’s) nefarious activities on the continent to partners in Africa and to dissuade them from working with Russian PMCs.</p> + <p>Preserving Dutch technological leadership and Western standards</p> </li> - <li> - <p>Engage with African partners to develop their energy infrastructure and natural resources in a mutually beneficial way.</p> +</ol> - <p>As the cases of the Wagner deployment in the CAR, Libya, Mali, and Sudan have shown, Wagner’s goal in Africa is not only to provide military training and security assistance to the continent’s fragile regimes, but to sign exclusive energy and mining deals aimed at exploiting African natural resources. These practices should be exposed to establish a counternarrative against Wagner disinformation campaigns, which argue that all Western activities in Africa are grounded in neocolonialism, while eliding the economically exploitative nature of Wagner’s (and, by extension, Russia’s) own investments on the continent. Recently, Moscow has also been pushing toward the development of nuclear energy to meet the region’s growing economic needs. As Western countries are playing catch-up with regards to energy diplomacy in Africa, it is high time for them to redouble their efforts and offer fair, cooperation-based energy deals, with attractive incentives and targeted capacity building. This approach will help counter Russia’s widespread use of propaganda that depicts Western countries as plundering the continent’s resources for their own prosperity and economic well-being.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>On January 17, 2023, Prime Minister Rutte arrived at the White House to meet President Biden. The meeting came on the heels of Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida’s visit to Washington on January 13. It had all the hallmarks of an attempt by the United States to choreograph a diplomatic agreement on new export restrictions with the Japanese and the Dutch. On January 27, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met Dutch and Japanese counterparts in a trilateral setting to coordinate a new set of policies.</p> -<hr /> +<p>It would be six weeks later, on March 8, 2023, that the first details of the new Dutch policy emerged. While specific details remained unclear, the Netherlands announced that it would expand its export licensing requirements for semiconductor technologies. DUV immersion technology was explicitly mentioned. The technology that previously was considered “trailing edge” was now thrust into the limelight.</p> -<p><strong>Mathieu Droin</strong> is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he focuses on transatlantic European security and defense.</p> +<p>In an attempt to explain why it had decided to widen the scope of its export policies beyond EUV, the government said semiconductor technology continues to evolve, thereby necessitating a continuous review to what extent these technologies impact international security. The government also stressed that this meant it would scrutinize technologies that were not previously covered by export controls. “Given the technological developments and the geopolitical context,” the Dutch government concluded, “it is necessary in the name of (inter)national security to expand the existing export control of specific semiconductor production equipment,” (author’s translation). The note did not mention China, nor did it refer to pressure from the United States. The government did say it would use an EU directive that allows national restrictions in the export of dual-use goods in the interest of preserving public security.</p> -<p><strong>Tina Dolbaia</strong> is a research associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS, where she examines and analyzes political, economic, and security developments in Russia and Eurasia.</p>Mathieu Droin and Tina DolbaiaAny changes in Wagner’s command and control following Prigozhin’s presumed death do not necessarily mean that Russia is abandoning the Wagner model altogether, given the significant geopolitical and economic benefits that it provides for the Kremlin in Africa.A Democratic Resilience Centre2023-09-19T12:00:00+08:002023-09-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/a-democratic-resilience-centre<p><em>Disinformation and other non-military aggression by Russia and other countries is dangerously undermining Western democracies. But despite the seriousness of such threats, the UK and its democratic allies are poorly protected against them. The UK and the US should lead the establishment of a Democratic Resilience Centre for NATO member states and likeminded countries.</em></p> +<p>Then, on June 23, 2023, the government announced the details of its expanded export licensing requirements for the semiconductor industry. They included EUV lithography and two types of DUV immersion lithography machines. But besides these technologies, which heavily focused on ASML, other parts of the Dutch semiconductor industry were also affected. Systems and technologies for atomic layer deposition, epitaxy, and deposition were also included in the new rules, which impacted ASM International, among other companies.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>The accompanying explanatory note said that these technologies warrant export licensing because they “can create risks for public security, including international peace and stability.” Aside from the possibility that the technologies can be used for advanced military equipment, the government argued that the “uncontrolled export [of these technologies] . . . can have significant implications for the public security interests of the Netherlands and its allies in the long term.” This is an open-ended formulation, which contains an explicit reference to the security of allies, like the United States. The government justified the new export regime by saying it is a proportional measure given the Netherlands’ unique position in the global semiconductor value chain — a position it wants to preserve.</p> -<p>The illegal invasion of Ukraine has shattered European security and marked a new stage of Russian aggression, which has grown steadily during Vladimir Putin’s two decades in power. But Putin’s aim is not simply to take Ukraine. We are facing a dictator ready to use armed force to redraw the map of Europe. He displays contempt for international institutions, humanitarian law and rules of military conflict. He wants to destroy the unity of the West and trust in our democratic institutions. And 18 months after the invasion, there is no sign that his strategic aims have changed.</p> +<p>The measures came into effect on September 1, 2023, though ASML indicated it would continue to ship DUV machines to China under existing licenses until January 1, 2024. In anticipation of the new measures, Chinese customers stockpiled ASML’s equipment. In the first half of the year, demand surged as ASML’s sales to China increased 64.8 percent year on year to $2.58 billion. As could be expected, Chinese government media warned that the new Dutch measures would be costly.</p> -<p>Putin and other autocrats pose a long-term threat – and the next US and UK governments will inherit the Ukraine conflict and wider Russian aggression. They will also be confronted with growing assertiveness from China and need to find the right approach in both the Indo-Pacific and Europe to ensure stability and secure their democracies at home.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion-1">Conclusion</h4> -<p>We must arm ourselves with traditional and new capabilities to fully defend our democratic way of life, which is why the UK is adopting “an integrated approach to deterrence and defence” across all domains and the US Department of Defense is pursuing “integrated deterrence” involving all government agencies.</p> +<p>Dutch semiconductor export controls were developed in response to unilateral U.S. measures combined with Washington’s diplomatic efforts to cajole the Netherlands to toughen its approach to high-tech semiconductor exports. Though the Netherlands has gone to great lengths to avoid the impression that U.S. pressure alone was the reason why new export restrictions were imposed following October 7, policymakers in The Hague have effectively been playing catch-up with Washington.</p> -<p>As part of this defence of the homeland, we propose a new Democratic Resilience Centre jointly established and led by the UK and the US, and open to all NATO countries wishing to opt in, to strengthen defence against existing and future threats below the threshold of armed military violence. The Centre could also act as a forerunner to a fully-fledged NATO body. It would not only collectively monitor threats and share best practices, but also advise on action and develop new strategies, including military operational responses to counter threats.</p> +<p>The United States may have nudged the Netherlands in a certain direction; initially to block EUV exports to China, and later to focus more on DUV technology. But given more time, policymakers in the Netherlands claim, the Dutch would have reached the same conclusions by themselves. This aligns with public statements by Dutch ministers insisting that the Netherlands makes its own decisions. Within Dutch business circles, however, it is widely believed that U.S. pressure was the dominant factor that led to Dutch action. Indeed, without the unilateral U.S. measures and Washington’s diplomatic campaign, it is questionable whether the Netherlands would have adopted the enhanced export licensing regime it did. The Netherlands developed an export control regime that addressed U.S. concerns about high-tech exports to China, but only after the United States took the first step — although the Netherlands did design a policy that fit the Dutch and European political and regulatory context.</p> -<h3 id="the-threat-against-western-democracies">The Threat Against Western Democracies</h3> +<p>One of those specific characteristics has been that The Hague would not agree to blanket restrictions, but would take a case-by-case, country-agnostic approach, avoiding singling out China. Even though the mood in the Netherlands is shifting toward taking a tougher line against China’s assertive industrial and technological ambitions, the Netherlands does not see the “China challenge” in the same way as the United States.</p> -<p>Democracy is the foundation that has allowed the UK and its Western allies to thrive, and the way of life democracy enables is cherished by our citizens. Indeed, for five decades after the end of the Second World War, democracy and the market economy advanced, mostly hand in hand, in countries around the world – first in Western Europe and North America, and then in other countries too. But the last two decades have been a more turbulent ride: according to Freedom House’s 2023 Freedom in the World Index, during the past 17 years, each year has seen more countries reduce democracy and freedom than improve it.</p> +<p>This raises a number of important questions. Transatlantic unity is a Dutch security interest, particularly in light of the Russian threat to European security. However, the country’s trade relationship with China is substantial. The Netherlands therefore aims to walk a fine line between preserving its economic ties with China as much as possible while sustaining its deep economic and security relationship with Washington. The Netherlands has always been a staunch transatlantic ally, but it wants to avoid being drawn into a U.S.-China geopolitical stare-down that would hurt the country’s economic interests. The new semiconductor export regime shows how difficult this is likely to be.</p> -<p>And perhaps most alarmingly for us in the UK and the wider Western family, our democracies are under duress too. Many of us may have become too complacent about our democratic systems, taking them for granted and assuming they’ll continue to exist no matter what, simply because we prefer democracy over autocracy. But democracy is not an indestructible construct, and in the past few years it has come under attack in a wide range of Western countries, including the UK and the US.</p> +<p>One of the main concerns emerging from the new Dutch export control regime is that Chinese ambitions to substitute ASML’s kit with indigenous lithography technology will now become a national Chinese obsession. This obviously has short-term commercial implications, but it could also make Dutch-Chinese relations more tense and spur a program of domestic Chinese innovation that might ultimately put the Dutch semiconductor industry at a disadvantage. This could undermine the unique position in the field of semiconductor equipment that it wishes to preserve.</p> -<p>Some of the most egregious examples are well-known, including Russia’s efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential campaign through malign-influence campaigns and cyber interference, its suspected interference in UK referendum campaigns, its interference in the 2017 French presidential campaign and its malign-influence campaigns targeting Ukraine. Russia even staged a malign-influence campaign against NATO’s 2023 summit in Vilnius. But attacks on Western democracies take place on a regular – indeed daily – basis. Disinformation (deliberate falsehoods) is disseminated by news sources and social media accounts linked to regimes hostile to the West, and disinformation and misinformation (accidental falsehoods) shared by groups and ordinary citizens in Western countries are amplified by the same outlets and social media accounts. Citizens already struggle to distinguish between truth and falsehoods, and that will become more challenging still as AI-aided images, videos and sound clips continue to make their way more widely into the public domain.</p> +<p>Another concern is that the new policy will be implemented on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. In practice, this means that the United States and the Netherlands will continue to have an intensive dialogue about semiconductor export licensing. Each time a company applies for an export license, U.S. officials will be ready to weigh in with an opinion on the technology to be exported and the end user involved.</p> -<p>We don’t know whether such malign-influence campaigns can change the outcome of our elections, just as we don’t know whether cyber interference can produce such results. What matters, though, is that these efforts undermine citizens’ trust in our democratic institutions. That trust and belief in our democratic values is worth defending as the foundation for our societies. Already in 2016, before the presidential election that year – and long before the Senate enquiry into Russian meddling – 55% of US citizens believed Russia was meddling in the election campaign.</p> +<p>The Hague expects around 20 export license requests annually based on its June 23 export regime. But it is plausible that additional measures will be put in place in the next few years. Currently, the trend is toward a more — not less — restrictive attitude to exporting to China. For example, in its 2022 annual report, the Dutch military intelligence agency MIVD warned extensively about China’s economic and technological ambitions. “China” and its derivatives were mentioned 96 times, which was only surpassed by mentions of Russia. Economic security is of increasing concern.</p> -<p>But the subversion of democracies doesn’t stop at malign-influence campaigns and election interference. Even before these became acute, it already involved a wide range of other practices, ranging from intellectual-property theft from Western universities and the strategic acquisition of cutting-edge technology to weaponisation of migrants. The International Centre for Migration Policy Development found that Russia has increased the number of flights to Belarus from the Middle East and Africa in an attempt to push up the number of migrants trying to get into to the EU in an effort to destabilise the grouping. The race for a Covid-19 vaccine saw China, Russia and North Korea hack Western university labs and pharmaceutical companies to steal their vaccine designs. According to recent media reports, scientists from at least 11 UK universities may have unwittingly contributed to Iran’s drone programme through research projects. And the UK Parliament, the heart of our democracy, has been targeted by a string of influence and espionage operations, including one allegedly involving a young parliamentary researcher arrested earlier this year.</p> +<p>Similarly, implementation of the new inbound investment screening law will start in 2023. Chinese investments will receive a lot of attention. On May 31, 2023, the Netherlands designated semiconductor technology as “very sensitive” under the recently enacted Dutch foreign direct investment screening regime, meaning it will receive the highest degree of investment scrutiny. In August 2023, the United States adopted an executive order to screen certain outbound investments. There is a growing possibility that the European Union and its member states could move in a similar direction and adopt an outbound investment screening mechanism of its own. So far, the Netherlands has taken a lukewarm approach. But the mood is shifting. The upcoming parliamentary elections on November 22, 2023, may well put a new Dutch government in office that embraces a tougher line on exports to, and investments in, China’s high-tech sectors. Should an outbound investment screening policy be adopted, implementing it along with a toughened export control regime will require substantially more government resources to increase economic intelligence, as well as underscore the need for more transatlantic coordination.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Many of us may have become too complacent about our democratic systems, taking them for granted and assuming they’ll continue to exist no matter what</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Given the differences in government capacity between the Netherlands and the United States, the different transatlantic economic and security interests at stake, and the need for the Netherlands to be able to make autonomous decisions regarding the export of critical technologies, The Hague would be well advised to consider the following recommendations:</p> -<p>Our adversaries and strategic competitors know that to achieve their goals – putting us on the backfoot, dividing Europe and sidelining multilateral bodies, the EU and international law – they have to outpace us in military capability and, equally importantly, undermine the functioning of our open society and our citizens’ faith in it. They are operating deliberately in the greyzones between war and peace, between international legality and organised crime. This was dramatically illustrated by the Russian nerve agent attack in Salisbury and the disgraceful Russian disinformation campaign that followed it.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>Increase its economic intelligence capabilities and its economic security apparatus.</strong> If the Netherlands wants to preserve its unique position in the global semiconductor value chain, it should make commensurate investments to increase government capacity to monitor, screen, and understand how semiconductor technology is impacting geopolitics. It should not be dependent on the United States for this. Some promising but limited steps have been taken. For instance, the government is increasing its technical expertise and hiring more staff to oversee export controls, and diplomats dealing specifically with economic security have been posted in Beijing and Taipei. But more should be done, particularly in the area of improving its economic intelligence capabilities. With its unique position comes unique responsibility.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Embed Dutch efforts in a broader European initiative to preserve and grow a strategic semiconductor ecosystem.</strong> The EU Chips Act is a good start, but more action will be needed. Export controls are a national competence, albeit embedded in EU legislation. European countries that are key nodes in ASML’s supply chain, most notably Germany, must be made aware of how the October 7 measures necessitate stronger European cooperation and coordination. Similarly, the Netherlands must understand that ASML is not just a Dutch champion, but also a European one. The Hague has announced that it will publish a national technology strategy by the end of 2023. Paradoxically, that strategy should make a strong case for European technology cooperation.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>On its own, no single act of greyzone aggression poses an existential threat to a Western country, but in combination, these acts chip away at our open societies’ ability to function and thrive. This matters to NATO, even though it is an alliance with a long-standing focus on military threats. As the Alliance notes in its 2022 Strategic Concept:</p> +<p>Unsurprisingly, the Netherlands wants to develop a multilateral framework within which to coordinate new export policies for sensitive dual-use technologies. It has no interest in keeping this a bilateral Dutch-U.S. affair and having its arms twisted repeatedly by Washington. Traditionally, the Netherlands has sought security in multilateralism, and in light of the June 23 Dutch export controls it has promised to put new ideas forward in the Wassenaar Arrangement. However, The Hague is clear about the limitations of the current Wassenaar Arrangement; decisions are made by consensus, and current geopolitical tensions mean Russia’s membership of Wassenaar frustrates effective decisionmaking. From this perspective, a new multilateral “Wassenaar-like” arrangement appears desirable. Yet the politics are tricky. If such an arrangement were to exclude Russia and China, as it would most likely do, it will be seen as a U.S.-inspired, anti-Chinese technology bloc. It would make Dutch — and European — efforts to manage tensions with China while not siding explicitly with Washington increasingly complicated. So a smaller framework with a more limited scope could offer the best way forward. It could focus on one or a number of key technologies instead of the full range of dual-use technologies. For example, a first step could be to bring the main semiconductor machine manufacturing economies — including Japan, the United States, South Korea, the Netherlands, Germany, and the European Union — together to discuss common export policies and develop a common understanding of how the geopolitics of semiconductor technology is changing. Without such multilateral action, the Netherlands may be left to play catch-up with Washington for some time.</p> + +<h3 id="taiwanese-perspective">Taiwanese Perspective</h3> + +<p><em>Geopolitical Challenges Should Not Dilute Taiwan’s Focus on Mastering Advanced Technologies and Critical Applications</em></p> <blockquote> - <p>“… strategic competitors test our resilience and seek to exploit the openness, interconnectedness and digitalisation of our nations. They interfere in our democratic processes and institutions and target the security of our citizens through hybrid tactics, both directly and through proxies. They conduct malicious activities in cyberspace and space, promote disinformation campaigns, instrumentalise migration, manipulate energy supplies and employ economic coercion. These actors are also at the forefront of a deliberate effort to undermine multilateral norms and institutions and promote authoritarian models of governance.”</p> + <h4 id="chau-chyun-chang">Chau-Chyun Chang</h4> </blockquote> -<p>Defending our countries against such threats should be NATO’s fourth pillar, alongside deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. Indeed, the Alliance’s members must build societal resilience into every aspect of government and civil society. That’s why integrated defence and deterrence are indispensable.</p> +<h4 id="introduction-2">Introduction</h4> -<p>In recent years, different NATO member states and partners have launched agencies and initiatives including Finland’s Hybrid Centre of Excellence, Sweden’s Psychological Defense Agency, Australia’s University Foreign Interference Taskforce, the UK Research and Innovation Agency’s Trusted Research initiative and the UK government’s Counter Disinformation Unit. In the US, if adopted, the Gray Zone Defense Assessment Act proposed by four Republican and Democratic members of the House of Representatives will, among other things, require the US Secretary of State and the US Director of National Intelligence to conduct an annual assessment of the greyzone threats posed by regimes hostile to the West. In April last year, the House passed a resolution introduced by Representatives Mike Turner and Gerry Connolly – two former presidents of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly – calling on NATO to establish a centre for democratic resilience at its headquarters. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly has also endorsed the proposal.</p> +<p>Since the Trump administration initiated a trade war with China in 2018, the United States has been continuously escalating its policy of containment toward China in the economic realm. Under the Biden administration, the trade war has evolved into a technology war, elevating economic issues to the level of values and ideology and treating economic security as a matter of national security. The United States has increasingly tightened its grip on China’s technological industry, collaborating with allies to jointly block and restrict China’s access to technology, equipment, and talent. The United States has actively promoted precise controls through the concept of “high fences around small yards” and established a new normal of “selective decoupling” between the U.S. and Chinese economies, while avoiding a complete decoupling.</p> -<p>At the Vilnius Summit this July, NATO’s member states built on Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty – its so-called resilience article – and agreed on a set of “Alliance Resilience Objectives”. Resilience, the Allies said in their final communiqué:</p> +<p>Through the fabless manufacturing model, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry has propelled the development of the upstream integrated circuit (IC) design and downstream packaging and testing industries. In 2022, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry achieved a production value of $162.3 billion, making it the global leader in the foundry and packaging/testing industries, and the second-largest in terms of overall production value and design. As the U.S.-China tech war intensifies, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which produces over 90 percent of the world’s advanced chips, has become a strategic focal point in a new cold war between the United States and China. This article explores how TSMC and the Taiwanese government are responding to the changing geopolitics through multilateral cooperation with the United States, Japan, and the European Union to enhance semiconductor supply chain resilience. These efforts are aiming to strike a balance between national security and industry development, allowing the semiconductor industry to continue serving as Taiwan’s “guardian mountain.”</p> -<blockquote> - <p>“… [is] an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and the effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks, and vital in our efforts to safeguard our societies, our populations and our shared values.”</p> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="taiwans-response-to-us-export-controls-on-china-and-the-chips-act">Taiwan’s Response to U.S. Export Controls on China and the CHIPS Act</h4> -<p>They continued:</p> +<p>Since the initiation of the trade war with China by the Trump administration in March 2018, the technology war led by the Biden administration has continued to escalate, with the United States implementing an expanding series of export control measures. Prior to 2022, the United States had successively added Fujian Jinhua, Huawei, and the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) to the Entity List, and through adjustments to the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR), it restricted Huawei and its affiliated companies (such as HiSilicon Semiconductor) from using software and technology on the U.S. Commerce Control List, thereby limiting the design and production of their products. Additionally, without U.S. licenses, U.S. companies were prohibited from selling advanced semiconductor technologies and equipment with process nodes of 10 nanometers (nm) and below to SMIC, hampering its progress in advanced processes.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>“The Resilience Objectives will strengthen NATO and Allied preparedness against strategic shocks and disruptions. They will boost our national and collective ability to ensure continuity of government and of essential services to our populations, and enable civil support to military operations, in peace, crisis and conflict. Allies will use these objectives to guide the development of their national goals and implementation plans, consistent with their respective national risk profile. We will also work towards identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies, including with respect to our critical infrastructure, supply chains and health systems.”</p> -</blockquote> +<p>In 2022 and beyond, the United States has adopted more flexible export control measures against China from various angles, particularly in the semiconductor field. For instance, in August 2022, the United States targeted advanced technologies below the 5 nm node for multilateral export controls based on the consensus reached in the Wassenaar Arrangement. The same month, the U.S. government unilaterally implemented control measures on GPU chips, restricting U.S. suppliers, such as Nvidia and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), from selling chips used in artificial intelligence (AI) and supercomputers to China. Furthermore, it also imposed restrictions on KLA, Lam Research, and Applied Materials regarding selling semiconductor manufacturing equipment used in the production of 14 nm logic chips to China.</p> -<p>Democracies are worth defending – and must be determined to defend themselves. This is embedded at the heart of NATO, with its founding treaty enshrining the values of democracy, freedom, peace, the rule of law and collective security. It embodies UK and US internationalism at its best.</p> +<p>On October 7, 2022, the United States expanded its export restrictions on Chinese chips and equipment by modifying the Export Administration Regulations through an announcement by the Bureau of Industry and Security under the U.S. Department of Commerce. The main objective of these restrictions is to limit China’s capabilities in advanced computing chips, supercomputer development and maintenance, and advanced semiconductor manufacturing, thus initiating a new wave of export controls on China. The new rules leverage the United States’ dominant position by prohibiting foreign manufacturing facilities that use U.S. equipment and technology from selling relevant products to China. Additionally, the Netherlands and Japan also announced new export control measures regarding advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment necessary for the production of logic chips below the 14 nm node in January 2023. Future export control measures may continue to escalate and involve a broader range of control tools to maintain the United States’ leading position rather than just following principles that lead by multiple generations.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Our values, institutions and free and fair elections are what sets us apart from non-democratic countries, and they are as important to protect as our territory</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Furthermore, recognizing the lack of advanced domestic semiconductor manufacturing capacity as a national security issue amid the U.S.-China tech war and the post-pandemic chip shortage, the United States enacted the CHIPS and Science Act to enhance domestic semiconductor chip production and research capabilities, reducing dependence on other countries for manufacturing. The CHIPS Act also provides a 25 percent investment tax credit for semiconductor manufacturing companies, narrowing the cost gap between investments in the United States and overseas. In relation to these subsidies, the Department of Commerce has released details of the CHIPS Incentives Program for commercial fabrication facilities and has proposed national security guardrails. The proposed guardrails are meant to ensure that the technology and innovation funded by the CHIPS Act are not used by hostile countries (including China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) for malicious actions against the United States or its allies and partners.</p> -<p>Yet NATO still lacks a central site to aid member states’ democratic resilience. (NATO has a Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga and an Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Vilnius, but these are set up to have an academic focus, not an operational one.) Through such a centre, countries could share best practices and threat evaluations, collectively monitor threats, and develop new strategies – including military strategies with operational responses – to counter them.</p> +<p>The guardrails provision, which restricts chip production, research, or technology licensing in China, has sparked opposition from various sectors, as it affects market layout and the existing operational plans of companies. The Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) in the United States believes that the guardrails proposed by the Department of Commerce go beyond the scope of the CHIPS Act. The SIA argues that the proposed regulations overly expand restrictions from joint research and technology licensing to include general business activities such as patent licensing and participation in standard-setting organizations, which will impact industry and market development. The SIA suggests that subsidies under the CHIPS Act should prioritize activities related to national and economic security, but the current scope is too broad and ambiguous.</p> -<h3 id="a-democratic-resilience-centre">A Democratic Resilience Centre</h3> +<p>The South Korean government, along with its companies, and Taiwanese manufacturers believe that (1) the provision of revenue sharing is not a commonly used norm to attract foreign investment, as it requires the disclosure of commercially sensitive information, and (2) revenue sharing may affect subsidized companies’ operational plans in China. Instead, they propose ensuring that overseas facilities can operate normally. They will continue to negotiate with the United States and hope that an optimal balance can be achieved through negotiations. Otherwise, the CHIPS Act will become too complex and interdependent to be implemented.</p> -<p>We propose a Democratic Resilience Centre jointly established and led by the UK and the US, and open to all NATO member states wishing to opt in. The Centre would help participating countries strengthen their defence against existing and future threats below the threshold of armed military violence. Its mission should be to protect the wider Western alliance’s democratic values, political institutions, elections and open societies, which are the basis of the freedom and opportunities that our citizens prize. The Centre, which could be housed at the National Defense University in Washington or at a UK institution such as RUSI or the UK Defence Academy, would be open to any ally or partner, and its core staff would be drawn from civil servants and military and intelligence officials from participating countries, working there on rotation or secondment from their home institutions. They could be joined by experts from academia, think tanks, NGOs and the private sector.</p> +<h4 id="impact-on-taiwanese-industries-and-countermeasures">Impact on Taiwanese Industries and Countermeasures</h4> -<p>In practical terms, the Centre would collect and share best practices and other crucial knowledge (including national case studies) among participating countries. Such expertise can come not just from different parts of a country but from countries otherwise considered weak, either because they’re small or have a fragile economy or because they face extremely serious threats. Montenegro, for example, has experiences with Russian systematic subversion that others could learn from.</p> +<p>The United States has shifted its focus from targeting specific companies through entity lists to controlling technologies and setting thresholds for U.S. suppliers. By implementing control measures at the source, the scope of the measures has expanded to include not only Chinese companies but also foreign companies operating in China. Rather than imposing a complete export ban, the current series of high-tech control measures implemented by the United States requires manufacturers to undergo review.</p> -<p>This body of knowledge would include both the threats themselves and the military strategies and operational responses required to counter them. In addition to assembling and sharing expertise, the Centre would also be able to assist participating countries in identifying greyzone aggression by adversaries and proxies and – if asked – to advise them on suitable response strategies. Such operational responses stand to become a crucial resource that allies can adapt and adopt. The Centre would also be able to monitor operations, document and analyse them in real time, and arm our legislators, armed forces, law enforcement, emergency services, educators and information regulators with tools to improve our societies’ resilience to such activities and to fight back using methods appropriate for democracies. The Centre would not only signal to our rivals and adversaries that we will defend ourselves against all forms of aggression, but also set an example to allies who have so far refused to take this threat seriously.</p> +<p>Foreign companies in China, such as Samsung, SK Hynix, and TSMC, obtained temporary general licenses for six months after the implementation of the October 7 controls to prevent disruptions in their supply chains for goods produced in China but ultimately destined for customers outside of China. However, after the expiration of the temporary licenses, these measures will increase compliance costs for pertinent companies and potentially lead to their withdrawal from China. The World Bank said the ongoing trade war is creating non-tariff barriers, which will result in fragmenting markets and supply chains, as well as reducing collaboration and knowledge sharing in technology innovation. Therefore, it is likely that the link between the U.S. and Chinese semiconductor industries will weaken, leading to fragmented standards, differentiated supply chains, and a potential slowdown in global semiconductor technological diffusion and innovation.</p> -<p>The Centre would, in other words, focus on threats that are extremely serious but have until now been so hard to quickly identify and classify that they have mostly gone unaddressed. Our countries should be on high alert ahead of the next UK general election and the US presidential election in 2024, and this is the time to launch democratic resilience work together to better protect our democratic values and systems.</p> +<p>The United States is expanding its export controls on China in the semiconductor manufacturing and supercomputer industries, indicating a shift in the U.S. regulatory mindset. This not only slows down China’s progress in advanced technology research and innovation but also extends the impact to well-established mature-process (16 nm or larger) industries in China, potentially even leading to their downgrading. This measure has prompted Chinese companies to shift their focus toward mature-process capacity development. It is expected that China’s mature-process capacity will significantly increase in the coming years.</p> -<p>The establishment of such a Centre would require broad political consensus within the countries involved, based on a clear focus on external challenges to our democracies. It would only help our adversaries if such a proposal were to become a focus of dispute between the major parties. This means that issues relating to the domestic governance of elections – for example, boundary demarcation and claims of electoral fraud – would be beyond its scope. Nor would the proposed Centre have the authority to comment publicly on specific events. Instead, its primary focus would be to work with governments to help develop their capacity for enhancing resilience against external attacks.</p> +<p>The United States aims to restrict the operational planning of international companies in China by implementing export controls and the provision of guardrails. Faced with production restrictions and increased geopolitical risks, it is anticipated that international companies will adjust their China footprint by shifting investment focus back to their home countries or diversifying regional investments. International integrated circuit design companies, driven by customer demands and autonomous risk-mitigation factors, are also gradually transferring mature-process orders to non-China foundries. In the short term, this shift benefits non-China foundries, but in the long term, they will still have to face the low-cost competition from Chinese counterparts who have made significant investments in mature processes. This situation creates a complex landscape of short-term opportunities and long-term challenges for non-China foundries.</p> -<p>The Centre would be consistent with NATO intent but would allow leading partners to move faster than the 31 NATO countries can move together. At the same time, these countries would be welcome to join at any point, and would add momentum and capability to the Centre’s work. The Centre could act as a forerunner for a fully-fledged NATO body that could also take on Alliance functions within the NATO structure.</p> +<p>Many technology companies have utilized the six-month grace period provided by temporary general licenses to shift their supply chain operations outside of China, but it is not technically or financially feasible for some other companies. Therefore, they actively seek potential alternatives, such as arguing that their products should be classified outside of the scope of the new restrictions. The feasibility of such claims may be tested in court by the Bureau of Industry and Security. Another potential point of contention is the FDPR, which determines whether a product is truly a “direct product” of U.S.-defined “technology” and “software” under the Export Administration Regulations.</p> -<p>If we let hostile regimes’ aggression continue to undermine our societies, we face a reality where our citizens can no longer trust our societies’ institutions, where our companies and research institutions continue to be harmed in ways that also harm the rest of society, and where citizens lose faith in our elections. Our values, institutions and free and fair elections are what sets us apart from non-democratic countries, and they are as important to protect as our territory.</p> +<p>Taiwan’s semiconductor industry has developed over 40 years and has established more than 1,000 related companies in its supply chains, making it one of the most efficient global production clusters. In response to U.S. requirements, TSMC plans to invest $40 billion to build two wafer fabs in Arizona. This investment is a result of confirming local customer demands in the United States and having long-term contracts in place. Customers and the U.S. federal government have committed to sharing part of the costs to enhance return on investment. However, TSMC currently faces challenges, such as rising costs in construction and operation, which will reduce profitability. Additionally, the eligibility requirements for subsidies under the U.S. CHIPS Act, difficulties in attracting global talent to work in the United States, and the complexities of managing U.S. employees pose further obstacles for TSMC.</p> -<p>With threats increasing and instability growing, the US and the UK can together defend our democracies and help other countries do so themselves. The Democratic Resilience Centre could be a community of cutting-edge expertise from the military, civil service, emergency response, preparedness, civil society, human rights, business operations and media communities – and its doors would be open to all NATO members wanting to strengthen their capabilities and keep our countries safe.</p> +<p>The primary applications of TSMC’s advanced processes, including high-performance computing (HPC) chips for AI and supercomputers, are within the scope of the current export restrictions. In the first quarter of 2023, these HPC applications accounted for 44 percent of TSMC’s revenue. However, related restricted companies such as Nvidia have indicated the availability of alternative downgraded products for sustained export to China. In the short to medium term, it is not expected to significantly impact the revenue of TSMC. If the scope of the restrictions is expanded in order to prevent any loopholes and includes other advanced process chips (such as mid-range GPUs and HPC chips used in consumer products), it will affect TSMC’s revenue from advanced process manufacturing and weaken its capability to invest in advanced processes in the long run.</p> -<hr /> +<p>TSMC announced that it is building additional mature-node capacity outside of Taiwan. In Japan, TSMC and its Japanese partners are building a specialty technology fab which will utilize 12 nm, 16 nm, and 22 nm/28 nm process technologies. Volume production is scheduled for late 2024. TSMC is also considering building a second fab in Japan, as long as customer demand and the level of government support makes sense. TSMC announced that it will jointly invest in European Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (ESMC) with Robert Bosch (Bosch), Infineon, and NXP to establish a €10 billion ($10.8 billion) 12-inch (300-millimeter) wafer fab in Dresden, Germany. TSMC will invest €3.5 billion ($3.8 billion) alongside an allocated €5 billion ($5.4 billion) of support from the German government. TSMC will hold 70 percent of the shares and other companies will each hold 10 percent of the shares. Construction will begin in 2024, with first production expected to begin in 2027. In China, TSMC is expanding 28 nm capacity in Nanjing as planned to support local customers and continues to fully follow all rules and regulations.</p> -<p><strong>John Healey</strong> is the Labour MP for Wentworth and Dearne, and has been an MP continuously since 1 May 1997. He has been Shadow Secretary of State for Defence since 2020.</p> +<p>TSMC’s overseas investments have sparked debates in Taiwan regarding whether it is “hollowing out Taiwan” or pursuing “global expansion.” TSMC continues its research and development of 3 nm (N3), 2 nm (N2), and 1 nm (N1) advanced processes in Taiwan. It is expected to advance to N3E, an enhanced version of N3, in the second half of 2023, with the N2 process entering risky production trials in the second half of 2024 and reaching mass production in 2025. As for location, TSMC plans to establish N2 fabs in Hsinchu’s Baoshan and the Central Taiwan Science Park, and even the N1 process is planned to be located in Longtan, Taoyuan. Therefore, TSMC’s Taiwan headquarters will continue to maintain its leadership in process technology and keep the most advanced technologies and research capabilities in Taiwan to ensure Taiwan’s global leadership position and alleviate concerns of “hollowing out Taiwan.”</p> -<p><strong>Elisabeth Braw</strong> is a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she focuses on deterrence against emerging forms of aggression, such as hybrid and grey zone threats. She is also a columnist with Foreign Policy, where she writes on national security and the globalised economy.</p>John Healey and Elisabeth BrawDisinformation and other non-military aggression by Russia and other countries is dangerously undermining Western democracies. But despite the seriousness of such threats, the UK and its democratic allies are poorly protected against them. The UK and the US should lead the establishment of a Democratic Resilience Centre for NATO member states and likeminded countries.Seller’s Remorse2023-09-18T12:00:00+08:002023-09-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/sellers-remorse<p><em>Russia’s role as a major global arms supplier is under threat. This report analyzes how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the concomitant Western sanctions have affected the status of its role.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>The Russian arms export industry has been declining in its international competitiveness since the early 2010s due to previous packages of Western sanctions aimed at deterring third countries from purchasing Russian weapons, as well as the efforts by China and India to strengthen their domestic arms production. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent sanctions have aggravated these issues by straining Russia’s defense production capacity, negatively affecting the reputation of Russian arms, and complicating payment options for the Kremlin’s existing customers. Russia is struggling to meet its arms sales commitment to its partners, calling into question its reliability.</em></p> +<p>Talent development is key to TSMC’s success. TSMC has hired more than 900 U.S. employees to date in Arizona and more than 370 in Japan. In addition to providing extensive training program for new overseas employees, many of them are brought to Taiwan for “hands-on” experience in fabs so that they can further their technical skills. Talent cultivation is vital to support TSMC’s future expansion of its global footprint, and pertinent assistance provided by host countries at both the local and central levels will bring positive impacts for building robust, localized semiconductor ecosystems.</p> + +<h4 id="taiwanese-government-strategies-and-actions-in-response-to-us-policy">Taiwanese Government Strategies and Actions in Response to U.S. Policy</h4> + +<p>Taiwan’s high-tech industry holds a crucial position in the global supply chain. While some exported goods have commercial applications, they can also be used for military purposes. To fulfill international responsibilities and protect the export interests of Taiwanese manufacturers, the Taiwan government established the Strategic High-tech Commodities Management System on July 1, 1995 under the “Regulations Governing Export and Import of Strategic High-tech Commodities,” which was enacted on March 31, 1994. Export controls for semiconductor wafer fabrication process technology were implemented in accordance with the Wassenaar Arrangement.</p> + +<p>A significant portion of production equipment, technology, and products in the semiconductor industry is subject to controls. Export of semiconductor wafer manufacturing equipment falls under the “Export Control List for Dual Use Items and Technology and Common Military List” and requires applying for an export license. The exporter must also specify the wafer size and process technology level in the export license.</p> -<p>While Moscow still retains its competitiveness in areas such as missile and air defense systems, aircraft, armored vehicles, naval systems, and engines, recent trends suggest that Russian arms exports in virtually all of these major weapons categories will decline. Available evidence also signals that Russia’s biggest customers, including India and China, will most likely become less reliant on Russian arms exports due to ongoing import substitution and diversification efforts in these countries, which have been strengthened since 2022 because of the growing instability of Russia’s defense industrial base affecting Russian arms deliveries worldwide. Therefore, Russia will struggle to compete for sales in the high-value market for advanced military systems. However, Moscow will likely continue to maintain its strong position in the lower-cost market, as Russian systems remain widely used, relatively reliable, and not cost prohibitive. While those deliveries will likely have little monetary value and thus limited ability to insulate Russia’s declining arms export industry, they will continue to bring diplomatic benefits to the Kremlin, particularly in Africa.</p> +<p>Regarding applications for Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturers to invest in China, the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) has issued the “Operational Guidelines for Key Technology Review and Supervision of Investment in Foundry, Integrated Circuit Design, Integrated Circuit Packaging, Integrated Circuit Testing, and LCD Panel Plants in Mainland China.” These guidelines include several key points. First, for new foundries, an overall quota-control approach should be adopted, with a maximum limit of three 12-inch fabs approved for investment. There are no quantity restrictions for mergers, acquisitions, or investment in mainland China’s foundries. Second, the invested process technology must be one generation behind the company’s most advanced technology in Taiwan. And third, the applicant must be a Taiwanese foundry company.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>Concerns about TSMC investing overseas and potentially “hollowing out” Taiwan have prompted the MOEA to promote amendments to Article 10-2 of the Statute for Industrial Innovation, commonly known as the Taiwan Chip Act. This amendment aims to provide tax incentives to Taiwanese companies that hold critical positions in the international supply chain, with the main goal of encouraging research and development in Taiwan and enhancing the country’s industrial research capabilities to maintain its leading position. The Taiwan Chip Act, dubbed the “largest investment incentive in history,” includes forward-looking innovative research and development incentives, which account for 25 percent of the expenses incurred. Additionally, the purchase of new machinery or equipment for advanced manufacturing processes is eligible for a 5 percent deduction, reducing the amount of corporate income tax payable for the current year.</p> -<p>This report examines historical trends in Russia’s arms exports, including the impacts of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions regime on its arms sales globally. Recent trends have not been favorable to Moscow. It has been losing old markets, and its weapons have become less desirable to potential purchasers due in part to new, technologically superior alternatives. While Moscow has generally been considered the second-largest arms exporter following the United States, recent data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that France surpassed Russia in the years 2021 and 2022 as the world’s second-largest arms exporter, and China may also outstrip Russia in the near future.</p> +<p>To safeguard Taiwan’s competitiveness and economic interests in the high-tech industry and prevent China from stealing technology and poaching Taiwanese talent, the Taiwanese government announced amendments to the National Security Act on June 8, 2022. The revised law incorporates protection for trade secrets related to national core critical technologies under Article 3, aiming to deter malicious talent poaching and unauthorized outflow of key core technologies to competitors such as China. Furthermore, the Cross-Strait Relations Act and the National Security Act were simultaneously amended and announced on June 8, 2022, adding provisions that individuals, corporations, groups, or other institutional members engaged in national core critical technology businesses under the commission, subsidy, or investment of government agencies or organizations must obtain approval through a review process coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior and other government agencies before going to China. The same applies to those who have terminated their commission, subsidy, or investment or have resigned within three years.</p> -<p>Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has dramatically accelerated these trends by putting an additional strain on its industrial base and technological capacity, damaging the reputation of Russian weapons as high-quality and durable products and undermining its credibility as a reliable arms supplier. While Moscow will likely remain a major arms exporter in the next few years, its international position will keep deteriorating. Russia’s decline in global market share, however, predates the war in Ukraine. U.S. sanctions against the Russian defense sector after 2014 and the implementation of the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) increased the potential costs — both economic and diplomatic — of buying Russian arms. Now, with the need to sustain a massive war effort in the face of unprecedented Western sanctions, Russia’s defense industrial capacity has been significantly strained — the Kremlin has even been forced to buy back Russian-made weapons systems, spare parts, and components from some of its purchasing countries.</p> +<p>In March 2022, the U.S. government proposed the formation of the Chip 4 Alliance, also known as Chip 4, with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. After the passage of the CHIPS Act, the United States actively accelerated the alliance’s promotion. The United States claims that Chip 4 will provide a platform for governments and companies to discuss and coordinate supply chain security, semiconductor talent, research and development, and subsidy policies. The United States’ potential intention may be to form an “anti-China alliance” by jointly promoting semiconductor exports and technology control measures with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In summary, the United States plans to bring governments and companies together under the alliance framework. With Japan’s competitive advantage in semiconductor equipment and materials, Taiwan’s complete semiconductor industry clusters, and South Korea’s leading position in memory, Chip 4 will enable the United States to view Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan as part of its semiconductor strategic influence. According to an analysis by the Korea Times, the United States’ preparations for Chip 4 may appear to be aimed at countering China’s semiconductor rise, but its true purpose could be to buy time and strengthen U.S. chip manufacturer Intel. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s MOEA has proposed two major directions under the Taiwan Initiative for Chip 4 focusing on semiconductor supply chain collaboration and resilience as well as ensuring the security of vital chip supplies.</p> -<p>Thus, it is likely that Moscow’s share of the global arms market will deteriorate further. This has significant foreign policy ramifications for Russia and other arms-producing countries. Arms sales have been a major tool of Russian foreign policy, as the sale of weapons to another countries helps build longer-term strategic partnerships. Former U.S. assistant secretary of state Andrew Shapiro outlined the critical role arms transfers can play in binding countries:</p> +<p>The semiconductor industries in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are closely intertwined with the Chinese market, making it impractical to form an alliance that completely cuts off the semiconductor supply chain to China. In practice, relevant companies are caught between the U.S.-China confrontations. Companies need to devote extra resources to develop downgraded products to comply with U.S. policy restrictions to maintain their position in the Chinese market. On the other hand, companies also need to endure unfair competition brought by the Chinese government through the Dual Circulation as well as looming retaliations. Additionally, the semiconductor supply chains of South Korea and Taiwan have been engaged in mutual competition with their U.S. counterparts for years. South Korea and Taiwan collectively hold over 80 percent of the global chip manufacturing market, making it essential to properly safeguard their critical intellectual property rights and corporate value. It is not feasible for them to become mere followers of the U.S. semiconductor industry monopoly within the framework of Chip 4, and there are significant concerns regarding the goals and benefits of establishing Chip 4.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>One way to conceptualize the transfer of an advanced defense system, such as a fighter aircraft, is to think about the sale of a new smartphone. When someone buys a smartphone, they are not simply buying a piece of hardware; they are buying a system that includes the operating system; the system’s software for email, photos, and music; as well as access to many other available applications. Therefore, an individual is in fact entering into a relationship with a particular smartphone company over the life of that phone. Similarly, when a country buys a fighter jet or other advanced defense system from a U.S. company, they are not just getting the hardware; they are buying a larger system, one that will need to be updated and repaired throughout its lifespan, which in the case of a fighter jet can be as long as 40 years. This means that in purchasing the hardware, the buyer is actually committing to a broader long-term relationship with the United States.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Facing the changing geopolitics, Taiwanese companies expect the Taiwanese government to fully grasp the evolution of foreign policies, communicate promptly with industry players, and devise strategies to adapt to the changing global supply chain. This includes comparing and analyzing the geo-economic strategies of various countries and examining the compatibility and responsiveness of Taiwan’s own strategies, ensuring the indispensability of relevant industries in Taiwan within the global supply chain. Furthermore, the government should address the requirements for Taiwan’s supply chain autonomy and resilience. It should carefully evaluate national security and domestic and international needs and assist relevant businesses in implementing decentralized layouts to maintain the position of Taiwanese businesses in the global supply chain.</p> -<p>Similarly, Russian arms sales have helped cement the Kremlin’s relationships around the world. For instance, a major reason for Indian reticence to sanction or critique Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is that New Delhi and Moscow have a long-term diplomatic partnership rooted in India’s dependence on Russia’s defense sector.</p> +<h4 id="conclusion-and-recommendations">Conclusion and Recommendations</h4> -<p>Indeed, for years, Russia has serviced both ends of the global arms market. It has produced high-end systems, such as advanced aircraft, air defense, and modern battle tanks for its larger and wealthier clients, while also being the supplier of choice to the lower-end market, producing relatively inexpensive, yet reliable systems to lower-income countries. This report highlights that Russia is getting squeezed out of the higher-end market, as sanctions, questions of reliability and performance, and doubts about the existing Russian production capacity are causing the Kremlin to lose its international market share. However, Moscow may prove more resilient at the lower end of the market. Russia’s ability to provide low-quality weapons systems and its willingness to do so with limited strings attached, especially related to human rights and end-use requirements, can make it an attractive partner, particularly to conflict-affected countries and autocratic regimes, including in Africa. Additionally, the militaries of many countries often have a long history of engagement with the Russian or Soviet defense industrial sector and have immense familiarity with Russian-origin equipment. While the Russian defense industry is expected to struggle to supply its forces fighting in Ukraine, the diplomatic importance of maintaining defense industrial ties, particularly with African states and other long-standing partners, will likely ensure that Moscow will continue to meet the demands of its loyal customers.</p> +<p>The United States’ efforts to contain China’s rise through export controls and restructuring the global semiconductor industry are unlikely to yield substantial results in the long run. Imposing restrictions on the semiconductor industry will only push China toward self-reliance and accelerate the development of its domestic semiconductor industry. This may lead to Beijing successfully developing advanced semiconductor manufacturing processes and even constructing an independent semiconductor industry supply chain free from U.S. technology. U.S. containment of China will be effective only in the short to medium term, and industry analysts are optimistic that China will eventually break through the U.S. blockade to establish its own advanced semiconductor industry.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Russia is getting squeezed out of the higher-end market, as sanctions, questions of reliability and performance, and doubts about the existing Russian production capacity are causing the Kremlin to lose its international market share.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>China is actively seeking breakthroughs in U.S. technology restrictions through independent innovation. Some Chinese companies are shifting toward the open-source RISC-V architecture, fearing the loss of access to Intel x86 and ARM instruction set architectures. Over half of the 22 premier members of the RISC-V International Association are Chinese enterprises and research institutions. Chinese companies account for nearly half of the association’s 3,180 members. Several large Chinese companies have already released RISC-V chips, formed a new international grouping, and demonstrated China’s ability to overcome U.S. technology restrictions.</p> -<p>Moreover, Western nations, which often produce expensive, higher-end systems, are not well positioned to take advantage of the market gap. The U.S. defense industry, for instance, focuses its efforts on meeting the high-end needs of the U.S. military and rarely focuses on lower-cost systems. The United States, in contrast to Russia and other competitors, also does not have flexible financing mechanisms for lower- or middle-income countries. Instead, it provides security assistance in the form of grants that are used to procure from the U.S. defense companies. However, this funding is rarely flexible enough to seize new opportunities, as it would have to be redirected from one recipient country to another, forcing difficult trade-offs. Congress could allocate more funding to the Department of State, which oversees the Foreign Military Financing program, or the Department of Defense, which in the last decade has established its own security assistance funding program. But U.S. transfers come with conditions attached, and, inevitably, Russia provides weapons to countries to which the United States will be unwilling to transfer weapons. Nevertheless, there may be opportunities for Washington to incentivize countries to move off of Russian equipment by providing targeted assistance or through other security assistance programs, such as the Excess Defense Articles program, which provides for transfer of older U.S. military equipment to partners.</p> +<p>Experts believe that completely isolating U.S. technology and talent from the Chinese semiconductor market may cause the United States to lose its strategic weapon of using technology to constrain China. It could also result in companies participating in the U.S. blockade losing access to the Chinese market. Overall, U.S. policy toward China is based on an illusion, which is the root cause of the ineffectiveness of U.S. policies toward China. Therefore, some experts suggest that to contain China it would be more effective to let China rely on Western chips and technology.</p> -<p>Should Moscow lose its dominant position in its major foreign arms markets, Russia’s entire defense sector will be negatively impacted. While revenues from arms trade constitute a relatively small part of the Russian state budget, foreign sales help fund its defense sector and incentivize further innovation. It also forces Russia’s military industrial base to meet the higher standards often demanded by a purchasing country with significant leverage on the Kremlin, such as India or China. Therefore, examining where and in what capacity Moscow will continue its arms trade is central to understanding its international standing as well as the state of its military research and development (R&amp;D) sector going forward.</p> +<p>However, as the scope of the U.S. blockade on the Chinese semiconductor industry expands, it is described as casting a “silicon curtain” over China. The global semiconductor production chain will be divided into two poles: China and non-China. Taiwan mainly serves U.S. customers through foundry services, and in the future, convincing U.S. customers to place orders at the higher-priced Arizona fabs will be an operational challenge that TSMC needs to overcome. China is the largest semiconductor market globally, but the United States dominates critical semiconductor technology, equipment, and materials, and its international political influence far exceeds that of China. Finding a balance in the technology war between the United States and China will be a crucial issue for Taiwanese companies to address.</p> -<p>This report analyzes how the changes in Russia’s defense industrial capacity, as a result of Western sanctions and embargoes, affect its status as the second-largest supplier in the global arms trade, which it has kept in the last decades. It first overviews the historical dynamics of Russian arms sales, starting from the collapse of the Soviet Union to before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Then it outlines key trends observed in Russian arms exports amid the war in Ukraine and the allied sanctions regime. The report then examines Moscow’s most exported weapons categories and top purchasing countries before analyzing possible future trends in Russian arms sales and making policy recommendations for Western policymakers.</p> +<p>The United States, Japan, and Europe have attracted major domestic and foreign manufacturers to invest in research and development and establish fabs through semiconductor policies, aiming to build resilient supply chains. TSMC, considering the evolving government policies, overall economic environment, customer demands, and market trends in the United States, Japan, and Europe, has announced plans to establish fabs in Arizona in the United States, Kumamoto in Japan, and Dresden in Germany, taking a global perspective on investment projects. However, the challenges faced by TSMC in setting up overseas plants require cooperation between TSMC and pertinent central and local governments — whether the goals set by various countries can be achieved in the future remains to be seen. For example, the cost of investing in the United States is 50 to 70 percent higher than in Taiwan. The CHIPS Act alone is definitely not enough to compensate for this difference, especially because many peripheral suppliers cannot apply the CHIPS Act at all. Therefore, accelerating the promotion of the Taiwan-U.S. double taxation agreement has become the general expectation of Taiwanese industries.</p> -<h3 id="historical-dynamics-of-russian-arms-sales">Historical Dynamics of Russian Arms Sales</h3> +<p>The geopolitical factors and regulatory supervision triggered by the U.S.-China tech war and various countries’ semiconductor bills will continue to reshape the global semiconductor industry’s landscape. The decisionmaking process for multinational corporations’ investment layouts has shifted from traditional considerations such as production costs, market attractiveness, technological support, and talent supply based on market dynamics and business realities to decisions made under the interference and restrictions of international relations and geopolitics. This is likely to significantly dampen the competitiveness of related industries. The Taiwanese semiconductor industry approaches geopolitical rivalry more discreetly. Even when forced to comply with relevant regulatory measures and respond to political pressures, the focus should still be on the deployment of advanced technologies and critical applications. By mastering more core technologies, Taiwan can maintain its global competitiveness and preserve its critical position in the global semiconductor industry.</p> -<p>Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian arms transfers came to a brief halt. However, exports to large purchasers such as India and China resumed in 1992 and, by the end of the 1990s, Russia reestablished itself as one of the top arms-exporting nations in the world. And while its overall capacity to export arms was comparable to that of the United States (see Figure 1), its overall volume of transfers translated into a much larger amount of hardware exported abroad because of the relative cheapness of Russian equipment compared to Western alternatives.</p> +<h3 id="european-union-perspective">European Union Perspective</h3> -<p>Arms sales comprise a relatively small amount of Russia’s overall trade. According to Russian media sources, in the last 10 years, revenue from arms transfers constituted around $14–15 billion per year, or only 2 to 5 percent of its overall exports. But while the arms trade has hardly been a significant source of revenue, Russia has relied on it as a soft-power tool to build patronage networks and advance its economic and strategic objectives around the globe. In the 2000s, Moscow began expanding its role as an exporter of choice for revisionist and rogue leaders, such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. Russia’s arms transfers to Syria spiked from 2010 to 2013 as the West imposed arms embargoes on Damascus. These policies contributed to a successful expansion of Russia’s arms trade by the late 2000s (see Figure 1).</p> +<p><em>Current EU Regulations Struggle to Adapt to a Post-October 7 World</em></p> -<p>However, the upward trend started to change in the last decade. While the Kremlin’s official reports claim that the level of arms sales have remained stable over the last 10 years, alternative sources suggest that growth in Russian arms sales has slowed down, especially following the 2014 Russia-Ukraine war. According to SIPRI, between 2012 and 2016, Russian arms exports grew by only 4.7 percent, compared to a global average of 8.4 percent, a decline when adjusted for inflation. This occurred despite the fact that the global arms trade kept growing, reaching its highest level since the end of the Cold War in 2019.</p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="francesca-ghiretti-and-antonia-hmaidi">Francesca Ghiretti and Antonia Hmaidi</h4> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9yddcft.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Russia’s Arms Sales Compared to the United States, France, and China, 1992–2022.</strong> Source: <a href="https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php">“Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Transfers Database, June 2023</a>.</em></p> +<h4 id="introduction-3">Introduction</h4> -<p>As mentioned above, Russian arms exports were negatively impacted due to pressure from the West on third countries not to buy Russian arms following its invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Subsequent years have witnessed an even more pronounced decrease in Russian arms sales. Moscow’s share of global arms exports fell from an average of 22 percent between 2013 and 2017 to 16 percent between 2018 and 2022, a 31 percent decrease. Meanwhile, the market share of Russia’s immediate competitors grew. While Russian arms exports nearly matched U.S. arms exports in 2011 and were distributed to 35 different countries, they had fallen by nearly 70 percent by 2022, with deliveries to just 12 countries. As the gap between Russia and the United States, the world’s largest arms supplier, significantly widened, the gap between Russia and France, the third-largest arms supplier, narrowed. Eventually, as Figure 1 demonstrates, in 2021 and 2022, France even surpassed Russia. If this trend continues over the next few years, Russia risks falling behind China as well, currently the fourth-largest arms supplier.</p> +<p>In the European Union, export control regulations have become an increasingly pressing issue, especially since the Netherlands decided to expand its national export controls to “certain types of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment” by using articles 9 and 10 of the European Union’s 2021 regulation on dual-use export controls. While the new expansion of Dutch export controls does not officially target China, the process of adoption and the technology they focus on leave little doubt over who is the target. The Dutch expansion of export controls partially aligns with the United States’ new export controls adopted on October 7, which explicitly target China, and Japan’s new export controls, which do not.</p> -<p>A number of factors have contributed to the decline in the Kremlin’s arms trade in the last five years, including an increased focus of Russia’s defense industry on fulfilling domestic orders, as well as important steps taken by Russia’s key arms purchasers toward indigenization of weapons production and diversification of arms imports. Another important factor contributing to the decline has been the imposition of CAATSA, which the U.S. Congress passed in 2017 in response to Russia’s 2014 Crimea annexation and meddling in the 2016 U.S. elections. Section 231 of CAATSA authorized secondary sanctions on countries engaged in “significant transactions” with Russia’s defense sector. This provision, while sparingly enforced, still deterred many potential purchasers from concluding big-ticket arms deals with Moscow. Russian officials even acknowledged that sanctions were posing difficulties for Moscow’s arms exports and potential clients.</p> +<p>The issue of new export controls is twofold: China and the United States are engaged in a deepening great power competition that, for better or for worse, involves Europe as well. Technology plays a major role in that competition, but Europeans are traditionally not used to using protective measures strategically.</p> -<p>Turkey is one example of CAATSA enforcement. In 2017, President Erdoğan brokered a $2.5 billion deal with Russia for the purchase of the S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. Turkey then accepted the first of the four missile batteries in July 2019, despite warnings from the United States and other NATO allies. Subsequently, Washington sanctioned Turkey’s Defense Industry Agency (SSB) for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction with Rosoboronexport, Russia’s main arms export entity. The sanctions included a ban on all U.S. export licenses and authorizations to SSB, as well as asset freezes and visa restrictions on SSB’s president and other officers. Ankara was also removed from the U.S. F-35 program. Along with Turkey, the only other country sanctioned to date has been China. In a largely symbolic move, the United States sanctioned the Chinese Equipment Development Department and its director for engaging in “significant transactions” with Rosoboronexport for purchasing two S-400 SAM systems and 10 Sukhoi fighter aircraft in late 2017 after CAATSA had entered into force.</p> +<p>The European Union has mostly been relying on traditional, multilateral dual-use export controls such as the Wassenaar Arrangement. Unfortunately, export controls under Wassenaar are unlikely to be expanded since Russia is a member and will block any such expansion. A proliferation of different export control regimes in the world, but especially within the European Union, which is possible under EU law, would be dangerous for EU unity, create gaps in the control of exports, and not help Brussels or national capitals to address the new challenges posed by the systemic competition between the United States and China, nor the role technology plays within it.</p> -<p>Despite not being consistently enforced — for example, in the view of its strategic partnership with India, the United States waived sanctions on New Delhi despite it purchasing five S-400 SAM systems from Russia in 2018 — CAATSA had a chilling effect on many smaller Russian arms purchasers. Naturally, there are many factors that go into a country’s arms acquisition decisions, making it difficult to pinpoint the exact impact of CAATSA sanctions on decisionmaking. Nevertheless, the potential threat of U.S. sanctions has given U.S. diplomats a powerful tool to push against Russian arms purchases in a number of countries. In recent years, states such as Egypt, the Philippines, and Indonesia have scaled down or canceled orders of Russian weapons in the face of potential CAATSA sanctions. For example, Indonesia acknowledged that it abandoned its plan to acquire Russian Su-35 aircraft due to the threat of sanctions and considered purchasing U.S. and French systems instead. Thus, CAATSA punitive measures worked best when complemented with other incentives. The combination of suitable, competitively priced Western alternatives to meet buyers’ security needs with the threat of sanctions is particularly effective in dissuading countries from purchasing Russian arms. In sum, CAATSA has increased the potential costs of purchasing Russian weapons and has contributed to the decline of the profile of Moscow’s arms purchasers.</p> +<h4 id="the-changing-eu-assessment-of-china">The Changing EU Assessment of China</h4> -<h3 id="key-trends-following-russias-2022-invasion-of-ukraine">Key Trends following Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine</h3> +<p>The European Union has been rethinking its foreign and security policy in a context of tension and uncertainties. The elements that led to the rethinking are known: the Covid-19 pandemic, the tensions between the United States and China, and the war in Ukraine. To that, one might add the tensions with the Trump administration for the tariffs introduced in 2018 and 2020 on steel and aluminum (suspended since October 2021) and China’s frequent use of coercive economic practices. The result is an unofficial shift in the European Union’s approach to China. In the 2019 EU-China Strategic Outlook, the European Union adopted a three-part framework that views China as partner, economic competitor, and systemic rival. That framework remains in effect, and the European Union is still actively seeking to find areas of cooperation and collaboration with China. However, the “partner” element of the relationship has become more difficult to carry on.</p> -<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent sanctions have aggravated issues faced by the Kremlin’s arms exports industry, including significantly straining Russia’s defense production capacity, negatively affecting the reputation of Russian arms, and complicating payment options for Moscow’s existing customers.</p> +<p>Hence, there is a slow reckoning that the “competitor” and “systemic rival” elements have become more predominant in the bilateral relationship than “partner.” The European Council conclusion of June 30 mentions the European Union’s intentions to “continue to reduce critical dependencies and vulnerabilities, including in its supply chains” and “de-risk and diversify where necessary and appropriate.” Two reasons make this important. First, it shows that the European Council views elements of European economic security, such as de-risking and diversifying, as core goals for the relationship with China. Second, through the use of the word “continue,” it demonstrates that the effort to increase the European Union’s resilience vis-à-vis China is not new and preceded both the European Council’s conclusions on China and the EU Economic Security Strategy from June 2023.</p> -<h4 id="strained-defense-production-capacity">Strained Defense Production Capacity</h4> +<h4 id="the-eu-toolbox-for-economic-security">The EU Toolbox for Economic Security</h4> -<p>Due to the protracted nature of the war in Ukraine, Russia’s defense production has substantially increased since 2022. However, the war has forced the Russian arms industry to refocus inwards by prioritizing supplies for its own armed forces. There have been reports in the Russian media that the fulfillment of some export contracts is being delayed — such as aircrafts for Algeria and artillery systems for Vietnam — to prioritize production for Russia’s own armed forces.</p> +<p>A few weeks before the publication of the European Council’s conclusions, the European Commission and the European External Action Service articulated the EU Economic Security Strategy in a joint communication that presented yet another three-pronged approach: promote, protect, and partnership. Many of the policies and measures — the so-called toolbox — listed in the communication have already been presented or adopted by the European Union in past months and years. Table 1 attempts to organize them in the three approaches identified, though there will be some overlap that is not reflected.</p> -<p>The lack of excess production capacity has contributed to Moscow’s declining position in arms exports. This production crunch has created additional security risks for Russia’s remaining customers, forcing them to diversify their suppliers. For instance, since the invasion began in 2022, Vietnam, a country historically highly reliant on imports of Russian arms and spare parts, has found its national security jeopardized by the lack of reliability of Russian deliveries. It has sought to increase domestic production, building armored vehicles, small arms, as well as drones and anti-ship missiles. Additionally, Vietnam has begun exploring alternative suppliers of military hardware, including European nations, the United States, Israel, India, Turkey, South Korea, and Japan.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/2EHI2qj.png" alt="image02" /> +<img src="https://i.imgur.com/BTol23e.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Table 1: The European Union’s Economic Security Toolbox: Promote, Protect, and Partnership.</strong> Source: Authors’ analysis.</em></p> -<p>Furthermore, in a radical turn of events, Russia has now begun to try to purchase back much-needed military components and technology from countries such as India and Myanmar. In late 2022, Russian tanks manufacturer Uralvagonzavod reportedly imported $24 million worth of military products that it had previously produced for Myanmar’s armed forces, including sighting telescopes and cameras for installation in tanks. In August and November 2022, Russia also purchased six components related to night-vision sight for its ground-to-air missiles from the Indian Ministry of Defense. This reflects Moscow’s struggles to domestically produce critical defense equipment as a result of sanctions.</p> +<p>Semiconductor export controls will be an important trial by fire for the new EU Economic Security Strategy as well as for assessing how successful the European Union can be as a strategic actor, but it will not be the last test the strategy faces. By the end of 2023, the European Commission has pledged to do the following:</p> -<h4 id="negative-demonstration-effects">Negative Demonstration Effects</h4> +<blockquote> + <p>review the existing Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation . . . fully implement the EU’s export control regulation on dual use and make a proposal to ensure its effectiveness and efficiency . . . [and] propose an initiative to address security risks related to outbound investments.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>For years, the fact that Russian-made weapons were tried and tested in combat was good for marketing purposes. Syria, for instance, became an advertisement for the efficacy of Russian arms, helping Moscow boost its status as a major arms producer and exporter. The invasion of Ukraine was similarly supposed to allow Russia’s new generation of weapons to be “tested in combat conditions.” However, contrary to Syria, the war in Ukraine undermined the reputation of many Russian weapons systems, often demonstrating their ineffectiveness and obsolescence. For example, a sizable share of Russian tanks and other armored vehicles have turned out to be particularly susceptible to modern anti-tank weapons used by the Ukrainian armed forces. Other instances include Russia’s theoretically superior (in terms of technology and quantity) fighter jets and helicopters being shot down by Ukrainian ground-based air-defense systems; the loss of Russian SAM systems to Ukrainian air strikes; and reports of high failure rates for Russian missiles.</p> +<p>Embedding export controls in a larger economic security strategy and basing them on the list of critical technologies the European Commission is currently identifying could increase member states’ buy-in, decrease potential blowback, and ensure uniform application across the European Union. But that is not an easy outcome based on the current state of the European Union, and member states especially, on this issue. There are three primary areas that may challenge the European Union’s ability to use semiconductor export controls strategically: (1) the current design of EU export controls, (2) the European Union’s focus on legacy semiconductors, and (3) disagreement with the United States over the October 7 export controls.</p> -<p>While such Russian military struggles may often have more to do with the poor personnel training or deficiencies with command and control, they nevertheless create the perception of a deficient Russian military system and provide more reasons for prospective buyers to look elsewhere. This is particularly true for Russian-made aircraft and air defense systems because these weapons have historically been the most exported arms categories for Moscow and therefore their less than desirable performance record on the battlefield in Ukraine could potentially affect their export rates going forward.</p> +<p><strong>Current EU export controls are not up for the challenge of critical emerging technologies such as semiconductors, but an expansion is tricky.</strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Xw5SuDt.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ A man walks past a destroyed Russian helicopter in Kyiv, Ukraine, in May 2022.</em></p> +<p>EU export controls are still narrow in scope and cover only dual-use goods, and in theory member states have given the mandate to the European Commission to expand the list of items included in the export controls to harmonize it with multilateral agreements such as Wassenaar. The traditional interpretation of this statute would suggest that the commission should not make amendments to the list beyond that purpose; for example, it should not amend it in line with the new Dutch export controls on semiconductors or similar nationally adopted export controls in the future. However, the commission could test the flexibility of the mandate.</p> -<h4 id="sanctions-and-sanctions-linked-payment-issues">Sanctions and Sanctions-Linked Payment Issues</h4> +<p>Other member states could follow the Netherlands, which used article 9, and use the procedure envisioned in article 10 to themselves adopt the same export controls at the national level. The European Commission and the Netherlands can incentivize the adoption of cohesive lists via dialogues and diplomatic engagement.</p> -<p>Following the 2022 invasion, CAATSA has been reinvigorated, inflicting further chilling effects on the remaining purchasers of Russian weapons. As a result, by 2023, Russia had a very low level of pending deliveries. Some potential purchases appear to be on hold, as importers fear falling afoul of U.S. sanctions. For instance, while Turkey has signed a deal with Russia to buy a second batch of S-400 SAM systems, no new developments have yet been observed in this regard. The Philippines has also canceled a contract for 16 Mi-17 helicopters to avoid U.S. sanctions. In 2022, Russia made no deliveries to Egypt and its volume of deliveries to China fell substantially.</p> +<p>Alternatively, following an internal risk assessment and the publication of the list of critical technologies in September, the European Commission could interpret its mandate broadly and make the case to change the list to protect those technologies. According to the potential risks identified in the internal assessment, the commission will propose different measures, among them potentially the expansion of the list of items subject to export controls. In that instance, however, at least informal support from member states would be required. In fact, member states can revoke the mandate given to the commission via a qualified majority vote, which is likely to happen if member states perceive the actions from the commission as a “power grab” of a national competence. Furthermore, even if the commission expands the list of items, the competence for licensing stays with member states, and they would not be forced to screen the items in the list proposed by the commission but would be strongly encouraged to adapt national licensing accordingly.</p> -<p>Furthermore, the trade of combat aircraft and helicopters, Russia’s main arms exports since 1992, also appears to be affected. Between 2018 and 2022, trade in this area accounted for roughly 40 percent of Russian arms sales. But by the end of 2022, Moscow had pending deliveries for only 84 combat aircraft and helicopters, as opposed to the United States and France, which had 1,371 and 210, respectively. Standing orders are similarly low when it comes to SAM systems and tanks, for which Russia has 13 and 444 pending deliveries, respectively. In addition, Russia currently has no known artillery orders, while South Korea, for example, has 1,232 orders on file. One exception is Russian-origin engines, exports of which increased in 2022, in large part due to Chinese reliance on Russian engines discussed in the following sections of this report.</p> +<p>A lack of strategic and cohesive expansion of export controls by the European Union and member states would leave the block vulnerable not only to the export of sensitive technologies, but also to being pushed around by great power competition instead of setting its own agenda. Nonetheless, the formal process to expand export controls is only one of the many obstacles the European Union faces when thinking about export controls. The others include the difficulty in separating commercial and military uses of emerging technologies and the complexity of supply chains for these technologies, which makes controlling such components exceedingly difficult.</p> -<p>Sanctions have also led to a reduction in Russia’s client base when it comes to providing components and repair services. While no country among those that sanctioned Russia was a major buyer of Russian weapons, a number of them, such as Greece, Finland, Cyprus, and countries in Central and Eastern Europe, had continued to use Soviet- and Russian-style systems and thus consistently relied on Russian-manufactured components and repair services. Moscow lost these markets in 2022.</p> +<p>Commercial and dual-use technology is increasingly difficult to keep apart, making the strict division the European Union’s export controls currently relies on not fit for purpose. With China’s expanding definition of security, progressing military-civil fusion, and the “all-of-nation system” to address technology bottlenecks, “strategic technology” is everything China’s state needs to survive, according to the Chinese Communist Party. The party’s goal is for all strategic technologies to be produced indigenously in China to secure supply chains against sanctions and the effects of export controls. New technologies further blur the lines between military, commercial, and dual use. Semiconductors are inherently dual-use, and while there are some semiconductors that are specifically made for the military, such as radiation-hardened semiconductors, which more easily fall in the list of controllable items, off-the-shelf semiconductors are becoming more powerful and increasingly can be used for military purposes, making targeted export controls ever more difficult and less effective. Commercial technologies such as artificial intelligence and off-the-shelf semiconductors are increasingly being used in the military sector.</p> -<p>Further impact from sanctions appears through Russia’s lack of access to high-tech components. A recent CSIS report highlighted Russia’s struggle to import much-needed components and spare parts, such as optical systems, bearings, machine tools, engines, and microchips. In the eyes of many current and potential buyers, this limitation creates risks for a sustainable long-term defense partnership. Even prior to 2022, Moscow struggled to develop military R&amp;D, and this trend is likely to worsen in the future. For example, the latest Russian aircraft designs are incapable of achieving the fifth-generation benchmark and have fallen behind even countries such as China. These challenges will be worsened by the ongoing war. Russia already has suspended the contract for the supply of two Ka-32 helicopters to Serbia, allegedly due to Western sanctions and war-related shortages of military equipment. Going forward, Russia will find it increasingly difficult to deliver updates to the weaponry, components, and infrastructure of its customers as long as the sanctions remain in place.</p> +<p>The European Union plays an important role in semiconductor supply chains, but this activity is not equally distributed among all EU member states, making coordination of policies more challenging. Overall, the European Union is a net importer of integrated circuits and a net exporter of production equipment. On materials needed for semiconductors such as silicon and gallium, the European Union is again a net importer.</p> -<p>These risks are further exacerbated by Moscow’s de facto disconnect from the international financial system, which makes it hard for its clients to pay for Russian arms supplies. Moscow’s current customers are forced to find alternative schemes, including transitioning to payments in national currencies. As a result, Russia’s supplies of defense equipment to India, for instance, have stalled recently due to the fear of sanctions, as both countries have struggled to find an alternative payment solution. While India is reluctant to settle payments in U.S. dollars or Chinese yuan, Russia has turned down India’s request to make payments in rupees, which is not a fully convertible currency.</p> +<p>While a lot of the semiconductor supply chain is concentrated in Germany and the Netherlands, other EU member states play a role as suppliers or in some applications and research. The Netherlands, with ASML and ASM International, hosts world-leading companies, which, in the case of ASML, have a monopoly on specific advanced machinery, specifically extreme ultraviolet lithography. Germany plays a dual role, as a supplier of key chemicals, optics, and materials for both tool producers and chipmakers and as an important supplier of niche semiconductors. Mentor Graphics, a U.S.-headquartered subsidiary of German industrial giant Siemens, is one of only three producers of electronic design automation software, with a market share of roughly 20 percent.</p> -<h3 id="top-arms-exports-from-russia">Top Arms Exports from Russia</h3> +<p><strong>The European Union’s strength is in legacy semiconductors not directly impacted by recent U.S. export controls.</strong></p> -<p>Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has exported a wide range of weapons systems, with aircraft, missiles, armored vehicles, ships, and air defense systems being the top five weapons categories from 1992 to 2022 in terms of the volume of transfers, based on the SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIV) database (see Figure 2). The TIV figures represent “the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer” and they therefore “are best used as the raw data for calculating trends in international arms transfers over periods of time, global percentages for suppliers and recipients, and percentages for the volume of transfers to or from particular states.” Interestingly, per the TIV database, demand for Russian-made engines has increased significantly since the early 2010s, with this component gradually becoming central to Russia’s arms exports. Between 2017 and 2022, engines were one of the most exported weapons categories, only second to aircraft in terms of TIV, and they even surpassed the volume of aircraft transfers in 2022, according to SIPRI.</p> +<p>Europe also has an important role in research and development (R&amp;D). Belgium-based Institut de Microélectronique et Composants is an R&amp;D center collaborating with semiconductor firms worldwide. While Europe is very good at research and innovation, it is so far much less successful in translating this to industrial benefits. Very few chips today are designed or manufactured without U.S.-origin intellectual property.</p> -<p>This section examines the Kremlin’s most exported weapons and technologies and the areas where Russia has retained a competitive edge. It also analyzes the impact of the Ukraine war and the 2022 sanctions regime on Russia’s likelihood to prioritize defense production for its own armed forces over defense exports. Overall, current trends, including the volume of pending deliveries Russia had by the end of 2022, suggest that Russian arms exports in virtually all major weapons categories will continue to decrease.</p> +<p>The European Union currently holds roughly 10 percent of global chipmaking revenue, which is concentrated in power and industrial semiconductors. The most important European companies include the Netherlands’ NXP Semiconductors, Swiss-headquartered STMicro, Germany’s Infineon and X-FAB Silicon Foundries, and Austria’s AMS AG. These are focused on larger node sizes, analog chips, power semiconductors, sensors, and micro-electronic mechanical systems. Demand for these semiconductors is set to grow, especially with the green transition. While these semiconductors are often called legacy because they do not need to use small node sizes (and often even cannot use small node sizes due to physical properties), there is a lot of innovation happening, especially process innovation. As a result, China is increasingly competing with European semiconductor companies in areas of traditional European strength.</p> -<h4 id="aircraft">Aircraft</h4> +<p>Regarding important consumers of semiconductors, Europe has a strong industrial base, with 37 percent of European semiconductor demand coming from the automotive industry and 25 percent coming from industrial manufacturing. Communications accounts for a further 15 percent, driven by European telecommunication equipment companies Nokia and Ericsson. Europe currently does not have a strong consumer electronics industry, one of the key direct consumers of current-generation chips.</p> -<p>Aircraft exports make up around 50 percent of Russia’s total arms trade. Moscow offers different Soviet-era and more advanced aircraft to its customers, including MiG-29 fighter jets; Su-27, Su-30, and Su-35 fighters; and Yak-130 jet trainers, among others. Deliveries have historically gone primarily to India, China, Vietnam, Algeria, Egypt, and a number of other countries across the globe.</p> +<p>Furthermore, power semiconductors and other wide-band gap semiconductors have very clear military applications, making them dual-use. Additionally, new materials such as silicon carbide and gallium nitrate are used both for dual-use chips and for some military components such as radars.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RF3CGQY.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Top Russian Arms and Technology Exports, 1992–2022.</strong> Source: “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” SIPRI.</em></p> +<p>The EU Chips Act is an EU policy aimed at strengthening the European Union as a chip producer while also addressing shortages and improving coordination. While it makes EU funding available, its most important provision makes it possible for EU member states to subsidize semiconductor companies in their own countries. Since the European Union is a single market, there are usually clear limits to subsidizing industries internally, but these have been effectively halted for semiconductor companies, provided they will build a “first-in-its-class” facility in Europe. This currently mostly applies to manufacturing and has the goal of increasing the European Union’s share of global semiconductor revenue to 20 percent. For instance, Germany is subsidizing an Intel fab in Magdeburg with $10 billion, 30 percent of the overall investment costs. This fab is set to house Intel’s most advanced manufacturing processes.</p> -<p>The Su-35 is Russia’s most advanced fourth-generation fighter jet to date, often described by the Russians as “fourth generation++,” meaning that due to the extent of its upgrades the plane’s attributes have been pushed well beyond standard fourth-generation capabilities. Yet, even before the February 2022 invasion, the Kremlin was having difficulty finding buyers for its Su-35, in large part due to CAATSA, which played an important role in deterring large arms importers such as Algeria, Egypt, and Indonesia from acquiring the plane. While Russia has delivered the Su-35s to China and is now expected to sell them to Iran, low production rates, aggravated by the need to prioritize war-related production, as well as ongoing war and sanctions, will make it increasingly difficult for Moscow to manufacture new batches of the Su-35 for export purposes or provide necessary maintenance and upgrades. According to the available Russian open-source estimates, Russia allegedly was able to produce only five Su-35 aircraft in 2021, with a goal to deliver seven more by the end of 2022.</p> +<p><strong>Europe does not completely buy into the arguments for the United States October 7 export controls.</strong></p> -<p>In addition to the Su-35s, Moscow has also been marketing two new fifth-generation fighters, the Su-57 and Su-75 Checkmate, intended to compete with the U.S.-made F-22 and F-35 combat aircraft, respectively. However, with Russian aviation becoming one of the industries hardest hit by the war and export control restrictions, experts believe Moscow’s capacity to finish and mass produce such high-tech fighters will be significantly curtailed in the near term. While the Russian air force has recently claimed that it received a new batch of the Su-35 fighters — albeit without specifying the exact number — and was on track toward acquiring the Su-57 aircraft within a year, analysts still question the Kremlin’s ability to produce enough to export abroad.</p> +<p>EU member states and officials are not happy with the United States’ unilateral imposition of extraterritorial sanctions and export controls. This became an especially important point when Trump reneged on the Iran deal, thus forcing European companies to halt their Iran business or try to completely separate their business with Iran from the rest of the world.</p> -<h4 id="engines">Engines</h4> +<p>The United States’ October 7 controls received mixed reactions in Europe. Many countries, as well as Brussels, have increasingly recognized the risks of the relationship with China, and they do not wish for European technology to contribute to China’s military modernization nor its repressive surveillance programs. At the same time, while the European Union sees China as a systemic rival, it does not see China as a security threat. The European Union still wants to construct a positive agenda with China, and from several conversations with EU officials it is clear that the bloc does not want to adopt policies, especially economic security policies, that explicitly target China. This difference is at the core of obstacles to transatlantic coordination on economic security policies, including export controls.</p> -<p>Russia started selling engines in significant volumes in the early 2010s. In 2022, engines accounted for 32 percent of Moscow’s total arms trade, making them the most exported Russian equipment. There is a particularly high demand on Russian-made engines for military aircraft. According to Rosoboronexport, a Russian state agency dealing with defense-related exports and imports, Moscow offers the following main aircraft engine types for sale:</p> +<p>Most EU companies do not produce the cutting-edge chips covered under the October 7 controls. The pressure has thus been most acutely felt by equipment manufacturers. Since the United States did not originally invoke the Foreign Direct Product Rule on semiconductor manufacturing equipment, EU companies are less affected. Interviewees — including figures from EU companies and research organizations — frequently pointed out the administrative burden these export controls put on European actors. Out of necessity, many EU companies have become experts at U.S. export control law.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>the AI-222-25 engine, used to power the Yak-130 training aircraft, which the Russians have claimed can replicate characteristics of some fourth- and fifth-generation fighter aircraft;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>the AL-31F, installed on the Su-27, Su-30, and Su-33 fighters;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>the AL-41F-1S, used to power fourth-generation aircraft such as the Su-35; and</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>the RD-33 and its variation RD-33MK, designed for the MiG-29 and MiG-35 fighters.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>European stakeholders are concerned by the unintended consequences of U.S. export controls. China is already increasing investment in nonrestricted sectors such as legacy chips, areas of strength for Europe. U.S. export controls are seen as further encouraging China’s drive toward self-reliance in technology, hurting European businesses in China if they do not indigenize their entire supply chains. During the last Trade and Technology Council, held in Sweden, parties expressed that they “share concerns about the impact of non-market economic policies, on the global supply of semiconductors, particularly in legacy chips.”</p> -<p>China has been one of the key recipients of Russian-made aircraft engines such as the RD-33MK and AL-31F, which have been installed on the Chinese-made fighters as well as imported Russian fighters. However, as discussed in the next section, since the start of the 2022 invasion, Beijing has been concerned with Moscow’s capacity to produce and deliver capable aircraft engines on time, as the inability to do so would have a devastating impact on the Chinese aviation industry, which remains highly dependent on Russian-made engines. Indeed, Russia has been facing issues with engine production for some time and especially since 2014 due to its reliance on Ukrainian manufactures such as Motor Sich and Zorya-Mashproekt, which used to provide key components in Russia’s engine production. It is likely that the 2022 sanctions regime will further limit the Kremlin’s ability to build high-quality aircraft engines in the foreseeable future, forcing China to take concrete steps toward indigenization of the engine industry.</p> +<p>There is also worry about possible retaliation from China against the European Union or member states, should they implement export controls similar to those adopted by the United States. In July, China announced the introduction of new licenses for the export of gallium and germanium starting in August. The two metals are needed for the production of semiconductors and electronic components.</p> -<h4 id="missiles-and-air-defense-systems">Missiles and Air Defense Systems</h4> +<p>Furthermore, EU companies and politicians are increasingly worried about the United States’ approach. The decision by the United States to engage with the Netherlands directly, instead of with the European Union, has been criticized. Belgian prime minister Alexander De Croo, for instance, argued that the United States making deals with individual countries instead of the European Union as a whole makes these countries vulnerable to “bullying” by the United States.</p> -<p>After aircraft, missiles and air defense systems have been Russia’s most widely exported systems since 1992. SIPRI differentiates between these two weapons categories. It defines missiles as “(a) all powered, guided missiles and torpedoes with conventional warheads, and (b) all unpowered but guided bombs and shells. This includes man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and guided anti-tank missiles.” Under the air defense systems, SIPRI includes “(a) all land-based surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, and (b) all anti-aircraft guns with a caliber of more than 40 mm or with multiple barrels with a combined caliber of at least 70 mm.” For the purposes of this paper, these two categories are discussed together.</p> +<h4 id="the-eu-specific-risk">The EU-Specific Risk</h4> -<p>Russia offers a wide range of air defense systems to its customers, such as upgraded versions of the S-300, as well as the newer and more advanced S-350, S-400, and Pantsir SAM systems. Before the Ukraine war, the Kremlin sold these systems to a number of countries globally, including S-300s to China, Algeria, Vietnam, and Azerbaijan; S-400s to India, Turkey, and China; and Pantsir-S1s to Algeria, Serbia, the United Arab Emirates, and Syria, among others. In 2019 — amid major defense agreements, which also included a $2 billion arms deal signed between Moscow and Ankara on the delivery of S-400 SAM systems — Dmitry Shugaev, director of Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, declared that the share of air defense systems in Russian arms exports had grown to 20 percent within a year.</p> +<p>On the one hand, targeting key countries may appear to be a faster and efficient solution. After all, why wait for the slow process of EU coordination when you only really need a handful of member states? And this may actually be a preferred solution for those member states who do not want to adopt extra export controls when they have no relevant interests or are not directly involved in semiconductors. It is also a good way to get the ball rolling, and then maybe other member states and the European Union as a whole will follow, which is likely to be the outcome of these new rounds of export controls.</p> -<p>Yet this trend was negatively affected by the 2022 invasion and concomitant sanctions regime. Based on SIPRI estimates, Moscow had only 13 pending deliveries of its SAM systems by the end of 2022, while the United States, Israel, and Germany had 40, 26, and 25, respectively. Naturally, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine can in large part explain Moscow’s low volume of pending deliveries last year. Since the start of the invasion, Russia has expended thousands of missiles and lost at least 130 air defense systems in Ukraine that, together with the allied export restrictions, have strained its defense industrial capacity to manufacture extra systems for export. However, despite sanctions and the remarkable performance of Ukraine’s air defenses, Moscow has been able to access much-needed Western and Chinese components to sustain current systems and manufacture new missiles and air defense systems — and has inflicted significant damage to Kyiv. Going forward, it is likely that Russia will prioritize war-related defense production over export-related manufacturing, yet it may still sell some missiles and other air defense systems in much lower volumes to states vital to Russian foreign policy (such as China) or to its satellite regimes (such as Belarus).</p> +<p>However, such an approach presents two very specific issues for the European Union. Firstly, if the controls introduced at the state level vary greatly, gaps and blind spots are likely to emerge. With the single market, nonrestricted goods can flow internally, and thus goods could be exported via other countries. Secondly, single member states can be exposed and singled out. In fact, it is undeniable that one member state has less negotiating power than the whole of the European Union, and by being bilaterally targeted, it is also deprived of the protection the bloc can provide. Furthermore, possible eventual retaliation could be targeted at one member state rather than the whole of the European Union, leaving the state exposed to economic coercion.</p> -<h4 id="armored-vehicles">Armored Vehicles</h4> +<p>As China has been shown to target the weakest link, this can facilitate the emergence of internal divisions and self-interest in EU member states who may not be willing to take a hit to protect another member state. The EU Anti-Coercion Instrument partially addresses this issue, but does not do so entirely. That is probably one of the reasons why The Hague has kept communication and coordination with Brussels open throughout the process — to avoid being isolated as the sole culpable actor in case of economic coercion.</p> -<p>Russia exports a wide variety of armored vehicles, including different models of the T-72 and T-90 main battle tanks (MBTs); BMP-2 and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs); and BTR-80 and BTR-82A armored personnel carriers (APCs). Prior to the 2022 invasion, Russian-made tanks, and especially modernized versions, enjoyed popularity among Moscow’s loyal customers. For instance, the T-90s, first introduced in 1992 and incorporating the best design principles from the previous T-72 and T-80 MBTs, have been purchased by a number of countries across the world, including in the former Soviet Union (e.g., Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan), Africa (e.g., Algeria and Libya), and South and Southeast Asia (e.g., India, Myanmar, and Vietnam). India and Algeria have been particularly important purchasers of Russian armored vehicles, and especially the T-90s. At one point, Russian tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod may have been the most active tank factory in the world due to large export orders coming from these two countries.</p> +<h4 id="a-constructive-eu-economic-security-agenda-beyond-export-controls">A Constructive EU Economic Security Agenda beyond Export Controls</h4> -<p>The ongoing war in Ukraine, resulting in significant losses of armored vehicles, is likely keeping Uralvagonzavod even busier. Russia has lost at least 2,000 tanks of various kinds — two-thirds of its fleet, by some estimates — which is putting a significant strain on Uralvagonzavod’s capacity to refurbish old MBTs and manufacture new ones for both war- and export-related purposes. In the summer of 2022, Russian news agencies wrote that Rosoboronexport had rolled out the export version of Russia’s “cutting-edge” T-14 Armata MBT developed by Uralvagonzavod — thus implying that the country’s chief tank manufacturer had enough capacity to produce advanced MBTs amid sanctions and the war — but evidence recently emerged suggesting that Uralvagonzavod might actually be facing significant issues with its production capacity. Allegedly, the factory reimported components originally made on its premises, including 6,775 sighting telescopes and 200 cameras for installation in tanks, from Myanmar in December 2022. This fact, coupled with sanctions and a weak performance of Russian tanks on the battlefield in Ukraine, already resulted in lower volumes of armor-related exports and pending deliveries (444 tanks on order) from Russia by the end of 2022, especially when compared to the volume of pending deliveries for U.S., Chinese, and South Korean tanks (634, 717, and 990, respectively). This trend will likely continue in the foreseeable future, especially as China, Russia’s chief competitor in cost-effective MBTs, ramps up its own tank production.</p> +<p>While the European Union is firmly in the U.S. camp when it comes to security, EU leaders also want to maintain a clear difference from the United States when it comes to economics and dealing with China. While the United States views China as a threat to national security, European perceptions of China remain based on the three-pronged approach of partner, economic rival, and systemic rival, with oscillations within this spectrum based on events and member states’ preferences. On top of this, the European Union and member states are still digesting the possibility and need to strategically use measures such as export controls.</p> -<h4 id="naval-systems">Naval Systems</h4> +<p>Those two elements will have an impact beyond export controls on the broader economic security agenda. That is why the European Union’s own list of critical technologies and its risk assessment are key to the construction of an effective EU economic security agenda. They provide evidence and a logic to the expansion and strategic use of measures such as export controls. Those two steps will largely determine the direction of the economic security strategy and provide solid guidelines for the adoption, update, and implementation of the policies mentioned as well as others. In the economic security strategy, Brussels has already identified four macro risks — to (1) the resilience of supply chains, including energy security; (2) the physical and cybersecurity of critical infrastructure; (3) technology security and leakage; and (4) the weaponization of economic dependencies or economic coercion — but these need further elaboration regarding the specific risks they entail, their potential impact, and the likelihood of their occurrence.</p> -<p>Although ships remain among the top five most exported Russian weapons categories, Moscow has not made any deliveries of large vessels for four consecutive years. Instead, it has placed an emphasis on the development of smaller vessels able to carry a variety of missiles, such as the Project 22800 Karakurt corvettes and Project 22160 patrol ships. However, area specialists note that the Russian shipbuilding industry’s aging infrastructure, which in 2022 was also cut off from access to advanced Western components and humiliated by the sinking of the Moskva missile cruiser, will likely further hinder Moscow’s naval exports. In addition to ships, Russia is also facing issues marketing its Kilo-class attack submarines. While experts believe the Russian-made submarines retain significant undersea capabilities, such as launching effective conventional cruise missile and undersea infrastructure attacks against adversary fleets, the war and sanctions seem to be impacting Moscow’s defense industrial capacity to manufacture submarines for export purposes. A recent example, also discussed in the next section, includes India choosing Germany over Russia to coproduce new submarines, allegedly due to the growing unpredictability of arms exports from Moscow amid sanctions and the invasion.</p> +<p>Although Brussels’ assessment is going to be key, the risk assessment of member states is also going to be fundamental for the success of the EU Economic Security Strategy. Member states know better than Brussels what risks they face and will better foresee how to prepare and respond to them. And in most instances, member states are the only ones that can implement economic security measures. The two levels then can debate which instances need a national response and which are better addressed by the European Union as a whole and in coordination with partners.</p> -<h3 id="russias-key-export-destinations">Russia’s Key Export Destinations</h3> +<p>If the European Union is able to use the Dutch expansion of export controls to adopt a more strategic approach to economic security, it could position itself better in the new world of great power competition and build its own agenda-setting power.</p> -<p>Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has exported its arms to around 100 countries worldwide, with India, China, Algeria, Vietnam, and Egypt composing the top five purchasers of Russian weapons systems throughout this time (see Figure 3). According to Paul Schwartz, a non-resident senior associate with CSIS, “Russian arms sales are very diverse but also concentrated. Diverse because Russia has exported arms to nearly 100 countries since 2000 and highly concentrated because its top 10 arms clients traditionally account for the vast majority of Russian arms sales in any given year.” This section analyzes Moscow’s chief arms markets and how the ongoing war in Ukraine together with the allied sanctions and export regulations are impacting Russia’s ability to remain the key supplier of weapons and technology to those countries.</p> +<h3 id="united-states-perspective">United States Perspective</h3> -<p>To its customers, Russia’s arms have remained attractive for several reasons. First, for many countries, they are buying what they know. Past purchases have created a path for dependence. For long-time purchasers of Soviet weapons, costs of training and maintenance requirements of Russian weapons are much lower. Second, Russian military hardware has often been cheaper and easier to operate and maintain than Western analogues. Third, Russia has tended to offer generous financing, such as loans with extended repayment plans. This is in stark contrast to the United States, which lacks flexible financing mechanisms that are often necessary for lower-income purchasers. Fourth, Russia is a more straightforward seller, due in part to the lack of bureaucratic or legislative oversight that countries such as the United States require to ensure proper end user and human rights conditions. This enables Russia to make deals more quickly and with fewer conditions than Western nations. Finally, in contrast to U.S. arms sales, Russia has remained attractive to non-democratic regimes due to its willingness to sell weapons without stressing democratic values, human rights records, or internal political situations, as Western countries often do.</p> +<p><em>Export Controls as an Instrument of Foreign Policy</em></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/a2vlXMJ.png" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Top Recipients of Russian Weapons Systems, 1992–2022.</strong> Source: “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” SIPRI.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <h4 id="emily-benson-and-catharine-mouradian">Emily Benson and Catharine Mouradian</h4> +</blockquote> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YHOVruz.png" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Top Recipients of Russian Weapons Systems, 2022.</strong> Source: “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” SIPRI.</em></p> +<h4 id="introduction-4">Introduction</h4> -<p>In recent years, Russia has been forced to increasingly concentrate on the states interested in lower-cost systems (up to $300 million), such as South Africa, Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Angola, and Eritrea, among others. Low (and at times insignificant) volumes of sales with these countries, coupled with Moscow’s deepening isolation from the Western nations and their allies, can largely explain why, by the end of 2022, 91 percent of all Russian arms exports were flowing to just four countries: India, China, Belarus, and Myanmar (see Figure 4).</p> +<p>Export controls have long played a central, albeit relatively quiet, role as an instrument of foreign policy. In short, export controls are regulations and laws implemented by governments to restrict and monitor the export of certain goods, technologies, and services from one country to another. Governments have used them extensively throughout history to control the outflow of critical technologies. The primary objective of export controls is to protect national and international security by preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While export controls are not a panacea to achieve non-proliferation and other strategic objectives, they are a useful tool in denying or delaying the ability of foreign actors to obtain technology needed to advance weapons programs.</p> -<p>In the near term, available evidence suggests that Russia’s biggest customers, including India and China but also Algeria and Egypt, will most likely strive to become less reliant on Russian arms exports due to ongoing import substitution or diversification efforts in these countries and risk of sanctions. Since February 2022, such efforts have been aggravated by the growing instability of Russia’s defense industrial base, affecting the quality and frequency of Russian arms deliveries worldwide. While it is likely that Moscow will continue selling older Russian equipment and technology to a number of conflict-affected countries or authoritarian regimes across Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union, those deliveries will have limited ability to insulate Russia’s declining arms export industry.</p> +<p>Multilateralism is key to the effectiveness of controls. If one country produces an item that can be used in a foreign military context and regulates the outflow of those products, but other producers do not, then the likelihood of backfilling — the practice of others supplying to meet the now unfilled demand — weakens the controls. It can also depress the revenue of domestic suppliers of those critical inputs. Therefore, multilateralizing controls can be a determinant factor in whether or not export controls succeed.</p> -<h4 id="india">India</h4> +<p>In recent decades, the United States has been at the forefront of export control policy. In the aftermath of World War II, the U.S. Export Control Act of 1949 established the modern U.S. system for controlling dual-use goods. During the Cold War, the United States established the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) that brought together 17 mostly European countries as well as Japan and Turkey. COCOM was characterized primarily by “East versus West” competition during the Cold War. This manifested in broad geographic-based controls, as participating members believed that certain items allowed for export to the Soviet Union would likely leak to the Russian military. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, COCOM ceased functioning in March 1994. As a replacement, allies sought a more liberal export control system that would benefit the private sector and warm relations with former adversaries.</p> -<p>With a 9 percent share of total global arms imports, India has been the world’s largest purchaser of major weapons systems between 1992 and 2022. Russia has been its biggest supplier throughout this time, followed by France and the United States. Yet Moscow’s exports to New Delhi began to steadily decline from 2014. Russia’s share of total Indian arms imports fell from 64 percent in 2013–2017 to 45 percent in 2018–2022. A number of factors have affected Moscow’s position as New Delhi’s key arms supplier, including growing competition from other exporter countries, India’s plan to reinvigorate its domestic arms production, and, most recently, the constraints on Russia’s military industrial complex induced by the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and subsequent sanctions.</p> +<p>After the Cold War, in 1996, the United States and allies stood up the Wassenaar Arrangement, the successor to COCOM. Whereas COCOM was colored by strategic policymaking among member states aimed at delaying Warsaw Pact military capabilities, the intention for the Wassenaar Arrangement was to stand up a regime aimed at preventing the destabilizing accumulation of conventional arms and dual-use goods, or those with both civilian and military applications, in a country-agnostic fashion. The Wassenaar Arrangement control list functions somewhat like an export control constitution for member states. Most member states build their domestic control lists to align with the Wassenaar Arrangement list. This legal reliance can make it difficult, if not impossible, for countries to promulgate controls that exceed the items covered by the Wassenaar Arrangement list.</p> -<p>Recent years have seen India increase attempts to diversify its arms imports away from Russia and engage more closely with major Western suppliers, including EU countries and the United States, among others. For instance, arms exports from France rose by 489 percent between the two five-year periods, 2013–2017 and 2018–2022, based on SIPRI estimates. Such a significant increase in sales has in large part been attributed to France landing several big-ticket arms deals with India, including the 2016 $8.8 billion inter-government agreement, within which Paris delivered 36 Rafale fighter jets to New Delhi by December 2022. Besides France, Germany has also made steps to expand ties with India on weapons procurement and counter Russia as a major arms supplier to the South Asian nation. In June 2023, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding that is expected to be followed by a multibillion-euro deal, according to which Berlin and New Delhi will co-produce six submarines for the Indian navy. Submarines will be built under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Make in India” initiative, designed to reduce military imports and increase domestic procurement and production. Similar to its EU partners, the United States has also expressed its readiness to reinforce “the major defense partnership” and support India’s ambitious goal of turning into a significant arms exporter in the near future by fast-tracking “technology cooperation and co-production in areas such as air combat and land mobility systems; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; munitions; and the undersea domain.” According to a Reuters exclusive, the Biden administration is set to allow General Electric, a U.S.-based conglomerate, to produce jet engines in India for Indian combat aircraft.</p> +<p>Since the inception of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the geostrategic threat environment has changed substantially, begging fundamental questions about the suitability of the arrangement for the contemporary era. The Wassenaar Arrangement is a consensus-based organization that includes Russia, and while Russia has long played a complicated role inside the organization, it has become increasingly obstreperous since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, essentially halting new additions to the control list. Concurrently, an exponential growth in digitization obscures the ability in some cases to work through an institution that was largely built for the hardware era. Further compounding problems is that the regime is not geographically tailored. This feature cripples it from carrying out controls specifically aimed at China at a time when China is pursuing a doctrine of civil-military fusion. These factors have led to calls to establish a new export control regime or, at a minimum, to rethink many of the core functions of the Wassenaar Arrangement and allied approach to export controls.</p> -<p>New Delhi’s efforts at bolstering codevelopment and coproduction of defense systems with its Western partners have intensified against the backdrop of a declining Russian military industrial complex, strained by the allied sanctions and the ongoing invasion. The struggles of Russia’s military industrial complex could in turn have a significant impact on India’s defense sector. According to various estimates, around 60 to 85 percent of major weapons systems in the Indian military originate from Russia. For instance, 97 percent of India’s MBTs are Russian-made variants (2,418 T-72s and 1,200 T-90s). Furthermore, more than half of India’s combat-capable aircraft come from Russia, including 263 Su-30MKIs, between 50 to 146 MiG-21s (based on different estimates), and over 100 MiG-29s. New Delhi also possesses seven Russian Kilo-class submarines and three S-400 missile defense systems. All these weapons require regular maintenance and upgrades, which India worries Moscow may be unable to provide.</p> +<p>In addition to changes in the “protect” side of the agenda, the “promote” pillar is also changing with the renewed use of industrial policy. In August 2022, the United States passed the $52 billion CHIPS and Science Act package. The European Union has since passed the $46.7 billion (€43.9 billion) EU Chips Act, while South Korea’s K-Chips Act expands tax deductions on investments into the semiconductor industry. The simultaneous expansion of the “promote” and “protect” pillars of an international policy is reshuffling supply chains, infusing geopolitical risk calculations into decisionmaking, and calling into question the foundations of the multilateral approach to managing strategic trade.</p> -<p>In May 2022, New Delhi reportedly suspended plans to upgrade its Su-30MKIs with Russian assistance, instead aiming to equip the fleet with indigenous products, including Indian-made radar and avionics, to reduce dependence on Moscow. In March 2023, the Indian Air Force (IAF) declared that Russia would be unable to meet arms delivery commitments for the current year due to the war and sanctions. The IAF also stated that the invasion had a significant impact on its arms supplies, causing it to slash projected capital expenditure on modernization for FY 2024 by nearly a third compared to the previous fiscal year. Besides India’s aviation and air defense sectors, it has also been reported that New Delhi’s plans to lease another Russian nuclear attack submarine could be delayed beyond the planned 2025 delivery date due to the ongoing war. Furthermore, according to some recent reports, beyond Russia’s inability to deliver new systems, it has been repurchasing spare parts for tanks and missiles that it had originally exported to India. Even when Russia is able to meet its delivery commitments — such as deliveries of S-400 systems in 2022 — other issues arise, including finding a payment mechanism for India that would not violate U.S. sanctions.</p> +<p>This confluence of factors — a hobbled multilateral export control regime, the need to recover domestic production capacity, and national security concerns about chip-driven weapons — has led the United States to assume, as it has done in the past, a leadership role in designing and enforcing export controls for allied producers of advanced technology. In promulgating the October 7 controls, the United States has once again significantly retooled the global export control landscape. In moving export controls to the forefront of the international agenda, the United States is communicating that export control cooperation is in most cases a prerequisite for deeper integration of high-tech sectors such as semiconductors.</p> -<p>Despite these challenges, Russian officials continue to claim that the Russo-Indian defense partnership is not affected by the war and sanctions. In February 2023, Vladimir Drozhzhov, deputy head of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, declared that Moscow and New Delhi are in talks over additional Su-30MKI fighter jets, which will be produced under a Russian license in India and will cost New Delhi $1.4 billion. Rosoboronexport has also announced that Russia is ready to produce Ka-226T helicopters together with Indian defense companies as part of the “Make in India” initiative. However, none of these plans have thus far been crystallized. In fact, according to scholars Vasabjit Banerjee and Benjamin Tkach, in the short run, India will most likely focus on partnering with countries that have experience manufacturing spare parts and upgrades for Russian-origin weapons. These may include Israel, Bulgaria, and Poland, among others. In the long run, New Delhi will “move ahead with its stated intention of developing a stronger indigenous defense industry.” Siemon Wezeman, a senior researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Program, also believes that issues with the quality of Russian arms deliveries together with India’s ongoing import diversification efforts and pivot to domestic production will most likely contribute to Russia losing India as its chief arms importer in the coming decade.</p> +<h4 id="the-october-7-export-controls">The October 7 Export Controls</h4> -<h4 id="china">China</h4> +<p>In a September 2022 speech previewing the administration’s thinking on controls, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan explained that “export controls can be more than just a preventative tool.” Rather than maintaining the status quo of using export controls to delay foreign adversaries from gaining advanced technology, the United States needed instead to adjust controls to gain “as large a lead as possible.” Onlookers have broadly observed that this speech acknowledged a U.S. shift away from simply “delaying” foreign military capabilities to one of “degrading” them.</p> -<p>China has been the second-largest importer of Russian arms and equipment since 1992, yet the nature and type of deliveries have changed significantly over this time. In the early 2000s, Russian arms played a central role in the development and modernization of the Chinese military, and particularly its navy and air force. Beijing purchased numerous classes of missiles, aircraft, and submarines from Moscow, including the S-300 surface-to-air missiles, Su-27S and Su-30MKI fighter aircraft, and Project 636 Varshavyanka submarines. Even though those systems were capable, they still represented “Russia’s older, second-best ones and did not include more-advanced technologies.”</p> +<p>Chinese military acquisition contracts show that China is using U.S. chips in military applications, including hypersonic missile and nuclear weapons simulation. Expanding export controls to cover advanced chips is predicated on the idea that allies should not export items to certain countries where such items could be used against them in a military conflict. The U.S. response has centered around expanding controls on its own exports and securing buy-in from other countries that maintain chokepoints over the supply chain.</p> -<p>After 2006, Russian exports to China started to decrease (but remained significant) for multiple reasons. A decline in part resulted from Moscow’s growing frustration with Beijing’s continued attempts to steal Russian military technology and intellectual property, especially in aerospace, through espionage and hacking as well as by reverse-engineering Russian equipment to produce Chinese equivalents. For instance, China developed its own J-11 fighter jet and the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile based on Russian prototypes, the Su-27 fighter jet and S-300 missile system, respectively. In 2019, in a rare public display of frustration, Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec accused Beijing of copying “aircraft engines, Sukhoi planes, deck jets, air defense systems, portable air defense missiles, and analogs of the Pantsir medium-range surface-to-air systems.” Consequently, as China’s domestic defense industry continued to develop, in large part thanks to the earlier Russian arms exports, it became less willing to purchase older Russian-made technology, instead focusing on acquiring newer and more advanced Russian weapons such as the Su-35S combat aircraft and S-400 air defense system.</p> +<p>On October 7, 2022, the United States announced a new tranche of controls aimed at constraining Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities. First, the October 7 controls added several advanced-node chips used for AI development and supercomputers to the Commerce Control List (CCL). The controls also implemented rules on all related software, components, and semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) that meet certain criteria. Not only did the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) add these items to the CCL, expanding the Export Administration Regulations, but the BIS also included “deemed export” rules, which ban the transfer of controlled items and data to foreign nationals within the United States. The October 7 regulations also include “U.S. persons” rules, creating new licensing requirements for employees of U.S.-headquartered firms working to service covered technology. These rules extend to foreign nationals working in China even if they are not U.S. citizens.</p> -<p>Furthermore, starting from 2014 when the West first imposed sanctions against Moscow, followed by the 2022 allied sanctions regime, the nature of the Sino-Russian defense partnership has changed, with Beijing becoming a vital source of components and spare parts that the Kremlin has often been unable to officially obtain from the Western nations, such as machine tools and microchips. In recent reports, Ukrainian experts and officials have argued that Chinese-made components are now discovered in captured Russian navigation systems, drones, and tanks. According to Vladyslav Vlasiuk, a senior adviser in President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s office, Ukraine now finds “less Western-made components” and instead more Chinese components. As the war continues, Russian dependence on Chinese-made spare parts will likely grow, even if a significant share of these components turns out to be defective or of lower quality.</p> +<p>As acknowledged in Sullivan’s September 2022 speech, the aim of these controls is to limit the advance of Chinese semiconductor production past a certain threshold. The BIS threshold for the controls is logic chips produced using the 16-nanometer (nm) process node or lower (generally, the lower the node number, the more advanced the chip), short-term memory chips (DRAM) of 18 nm node or lower, and long-term memory chips (NAND), or 128 layers or higher. There are further rules surrounding the export of node-agnostic SME, which is manufacturing equipment used in the production of chips both above and below the node limit. Under the new rules, node-agnostic equipment can only be exported to factories that only produce older models of chips, also known as legacy chips. Foundries that produce more advanced chips will now face a “presumption of denial,” meaning BIS operates under the assumption that related licenses will not be granted.</p> -<p>At the same time, even though Beijing has strengthened domestic defense production and reduced arms deliveries from Moscow, it still relies on imports of the most advanced Russian weapons systems and technologies, especially in the aviation sector. For instance, between 2018 and 2022, 83 percent of Chinese arms imports came from Russia, with most deliveries consisting of helicopters and engines for aircraft that China has had difficulties producing. The key issue for Beijing remains the development of powerful fighter engines, as Moscow has so far managed to protect its advanced technology from being copied by China. Additionally, according to area experts, it is difficult to reverse-engineer this equipment. Up to 40 percent of China’s air force fleet depends on Russian-made engines, which will create issues for Beijing if Russia becomes unable to provide these parts for the Chinese aviation industry due to the ongoing sanctions and war in Ukraine. This may incentivize China to redouble its efforts to produce combat aircraft and engines. In fact, Beijing has already made strides in recent years in developing advanced aircraft, such as the J-16 and J-20 fighters, and has even provided upgrades to its engines. For instance, it modernized its WS-10 engines to power the J-20 aircraft. However, Chinese efforts in this area are still limited due to the lack of domestic expertise; Beijing reportedly has struggled to develop its WS-15 engine, which is expected to give the J-20 supercruise capability. Going forward, China may leverage Russia’s growing economic and security dependence to in turn gain access to long-desired Russian engine technology. Therefore, benefits derived from existing arms trade between the two countries may be greater for Beijing than for Moscow in the near term.</p> +<p>William A. Reinsch, the former Commerce Department undersecretary in charge of the BIS, has surmised that that, without explicitly acknowledging it, the bureau has likely ended the policy of trying to identify “reliable” end users in China, as a result of China’s pursuit of civil-military fusion and crackdown on the due diligence firms operating in China that provide vital assessments of end-user reliability. If that is the case, this would mark a significant U.S. reversion toward an export control regime that more clearly parallels U.S. policy toward Warsaw Pact members under COCOM.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Going forward, China may leverage Russia’s growing economic and security dependence to in turn gain access to long-desired Russian engine technology.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>In conjunction with the announcement of the new export controls on October 7, the BIS unveiled two new Foreign Direct Product Rules (FDPRs). The FDPR provides the United States with the means to claim extraterritorial legal authority over items with U.S. inputs, including design. The legal basis for these rules has recently surfaced as a statutory tool included in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA). The updated rules allow the United States to promulgate and enforce the extraterritorial application of U.S. export control rules by enabling the United States to claim jurisdiction over items containing U.S. inputs. The FDPR is distinct in that it applies when there is not necessarily any U.S. physical content but the item is produced on U.S. machinery or embodies U.S. technology.</p> -<p>Overall, it is expected that the Sino-Russian defense industrial partnership will continue. Yet Moscow’s technological utility to Beijing will be significantly weakened due to Russia’s impaired defense production capacity and China’s strengthened emphasis on indigenizing production and increasing its self-reliance.</p> +<p>A recent wave of FDPRs accelerated with the Trump administration’s use of the rules to close a loophole in export controls on Huawei. The FDPR has also featured prominently in the Biden administration’s response to Russia’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine and has been used to exercise jurisdiction over consumer product supply chains that contain U.S. inputs, although certain countries have received broad exemptions. The two recent October 7 FDPRs apply to items used for advanced computers and supercomputing. The FDPRs attempt to preemptively address loopholes in the controls that would allow items containing U.S. technology to be exported to China from another country. This affects foreign firms such as ASML, which use U.S. software and components to develop advanced extreme ultraviolet (EUV) and deep ultraviolet (DUV) machines. This new FDPR meant that the United States could have exercised extraterritorial enforcement of controls if the Dutch government did not reach an affirmative decision to pursue licensing policy changes that align with the U.S. rules.</p> -<h4 id="africa">Africa</h4> +<h4 id="the-us-role-in-global-semiconductor-supply-chains">The U.S. Role in Global Semiconductor Supply Chains</h4> -<p>Russia has been the chief arms supplier to Africa, surpassing U.S., European, and Chinese arms deliveries in the region by a significant margin for well over a decade. For instance, between 2018 and 2022, Moscow accounted for 40 percent of African imports of major weapons systems, which exceeded the continent’s combined arms imports from the United States (16 percent), China (9.8 percent), and France (7.6 percent) during the same time period. There are a number of reasons that explain the dependency of African countries on Russian-made weapons and equipment. Modern Russian arms are usually cheaper — at least in the shorter term — than their Western alternatives and are compatible with Soviet-era stocks retained by many states in the region due to the strong military-security ties shared between Africa and the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. Additionally, unlike major Western arms suppliers, the Kremlin does not make its arms deliveries contingent upon adherence to human rights principles or respecting the rule of law. Russia has sent weapons to different conflict-affected countries in Africa where the United States and its allies have usually avoided such exports, including Libya, Mali, Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR), among others. Yet, while Moscow sells its weapons to a number of countries across the continent, these deliveries are usually marginal in value and resemble more military assistance than arms trade, according to SIPRI’s Siemon Wezeman. Although these sales may have little monetary value, they have significant diplomatic and geopolitical value, as they have helped solidify Russia’s relationship with many African countries.</p> +<p>The United States’ powerful position in the global semiconductor industry affords it significant geopolitical leverage over chip supply chains. The United States is responsible for 39 percent of the total value of the supply chain, and U.S. firms accounted for 47 percent of sales in 2019. The United States maintains a dominant position throughout several points of semiconductor supply chains. It particularly excels in electronic design automation (EDA), core intellectual property (IP), and some advanced SMEs. It controls 55 percent of overall chip design, 61 percent of logic chip design, and nearly 100 percent of high-end CPUs, GPUs, and FPGAs (advanced logic chips). It further controls 41.7 percent of the overall SME market, including major portions of vital technologies, including deposition (63.8 percent), etch and clean (53.1 percent), process control (71.2 percent), symmetric multi-processing (SMP) (67.5 percent), and ion implanters (90.1 percent). According to CSIS analysis, 11 of these advanced SMEs have no foreign substitutes.</p> -<p>Russia has only two sizable arms importers in Africa: Algeria and Egypt. From 1992 onwards, both countries have been among the top five purchasers of Russian military equipment and technology globally, with Egypt replacing Algeria as Russia’s third-largest arms market during the last five years. Overall, Algeria has accounted for 8 percent of total Russian arms exports since 1992, while Egypt has accounted for 3 percent, based on the SIPRI data. Both states have signed several multimillion-dollar agreements with Moscow to purchase Russian-made defense technology and equipment, including combat aircraft, armor, and air defense systems, thus making their militaries dependent on Russian arms deliveries, maintenance, and upgrades. Egypt retains obsolete Soviet-era systems, such as the MiG-21 aircraft first issued in the 1950s, yet it has also made steps toward upgrading its aging fleet with somewhat newer Russian equipment, including the fourth-generation MiG-29M aircraft, Ka-52 attack helicopters, and the S-300 missile defense system. By contrast, Algeria has purchased more modern and advanced Russian weapons, including the Pantsir-S1 air defense system, the latest versions of the T-90 MBT, and Kilo-class submarines.</p> +<p>Despite a dominant position in the overall market and control of critical chokepoints, the United States has several vulnerabilities. In terms of fabrication capacity, the United States has experienced a significant decline in recent years, dropping from 40 percent of total fabrication in 1990 to 12 percent in 2020, a trend the CHIPS and Science Act hopes to reverse. The United States maintains little to no capacity to produce extreme ultraviolet scanners (EUVs), argon fluoride scanners (ArFs), krypton fluoride scanners (KrFs), and wafers, as well as medium to low ability to produce other forms of lithography equipment.</p> -<p>Both countries buy from other countries as well. For instance, Egypt has sourced combat aircraft from France, submarines from Germany, and unmanned aerial vehicles from China. Furthermore, Egypt receives $1.3 billion in U.S. security assistance annually. The Egyptian Ministry of Defense has also assembled certain types of weapons locally, including over 1,000 M1A1 MBTs from U.S.-supplied kits. Similarly, since the early 2010s, Algeria has begun to diversify its arms imports and has made investments toward strengthening the domestic defense industry, leading to joint ventures with several Western arms exporters, including a deal with Italy to produce seven modern helicopters and agreements with Germany to deliver a tank assembly plant and armor personnel carriers.</p> +<p>Production of advanced SME, namely lithography equipment such as EUV and DUV scanners and ArF immersion scanners, is located outside of the United States, primarily in Japan and the Netherlands. Dutch company ASML maintains a near monopoly over EUV technology, while Japan leads in key areas of material and chemical production. Failure to secure buy-in from these two countries risked depressing the efficacy of chip controls while creating new market opportunities for foreign firms to fill space that U.S. firms had previously occupied.</p> -<p>Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and the allied sanctions regime have further pressured the two countries to lessen defense ties with Russia. In 2022, amid a rising fear of Western sanctions, Egypt rejected a deal to buy Russian Su-35 combat aircraft, which later were purchased by Iran. Algeria also finds itself in a political-security conundrum. In 2021, it reportedly signed a deal worth more than $7 billion with Moscow to purchase Su-57 fighter jets, air defense systems, and other advanced Russian equipment, with deliveries expected in the next several years. However, with Russia depleting its stockpile of arms and facing challenges to produce advanced weapons systems, Algeria worries Moscow may not be able to provide new arms deliveries or necessary upgrades for its existing Russian-made defense inventories. This has allegedly forced the Algerian authorities to raise the army’s budget to a record $23 billion to find alternative suppliers, including France and Brazil.</p> +<h4 id="unilateral-changes-form-a-trilateral-outcome">Unilateral Changes Form a Trilateral Outcome</h4> -<p>Despite the increased unpredictability of a long-term defense partnership with contemporary Russia, as mentioned above, smaller scale African purchasers of Russian weaponry will likely continue to place orders with Russian firms. Sudan and the CAR fit this description. Both countries have established defense partnerships with Moscow, including particularly well-publicized contracts with the Wagner Group (though the future of this private military company and its operations around the world, including in Africa, is now in question following Wagner chief Prigozhin’s death in August 2023). Both the CAR and Sudan are countries experiencing intense domestic instability and violence, which give added urgency to their purchasing of Russian matériel. In the case of Sudan, Russia has accounted for around 45 percent of Sudanese arms imports since 1997. The CAR’s volume is much smaller, with only 5 percent of arms deliveries coming from Moscow (although it should be noted that the volume of major arms imports to the CAR has been historically low due to the country’s inability to purchase advanced weapons and related matériel and the United Nations’ arms embargo imposed on the republic since 2013). However, in both countries, the major value for Russia is not the financial scale of these transactions but the political influence and Russian access to key natural resources these defense partnerships enable — particularly within the context of utilizing extractive industries, including gold and diamond mining, to evade international sanctions.</p> +<p>After months of negotiations, reports emerged in January 2023 that the United States had secured an arrangement with Japan and the Netherlands to align their licensing policies on advanced semiconductor exports. Due to the sensitivity of the issues and fear of Chinese retaliation, details about the possible “agreement” have been sparse. In March 2023, Japan announced that they would control 23 separate types of advanced SMEs, including ArF immersion scanners. However, there are important differences between the U.S. and Japanese policies. For example, Japanese nationals working on advanced semiconductor projects in other countries do not face the same restrictions as U.S. nationals, making the Japanese controls potentially more forgiving than their U.S. counterparts.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/AuTrmtC.png" alt="image06" /> -<em>▲ A Russian armored personnel carrier seen driving in the streets of the capital Bangui during the delivery of Russian-made armored vehicles to the CAR army in October 2020.</em></p> +<p>On March 8, 2023, the Netherlands announced new controls to align with the October 7 controls. In a letter to the Dutch parliament, Dutch trade minister Liesje Schreinemacher explained that the Netherlands would restrict the sale of DUV technology and place such products on a national control list. On June 30, the Dutch government officially published their export control measures, which will require authorization for the export of certain high-level technologies, such as DUV machines, starting on September 1. Minister Schreinemacher commented, “We’ve taken this step on national security grounds.”</p> -<p>A more complicated example is oil-rich Angola, which since 1993 has imported around 37 percent of its arms from Moscow, including Mi-171Sh helicopters and Su-30K fighter jets. Russia’s relations with post-independence Angola go back to the Soviet period, when Moscow backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) during the resource-rich country’s fight for decolonization. Angola will likely continue its partnerships with Russia, as the country hosts Wagner Group mercenaries, and an early 2023 visit by Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov indicated the launch of a potential deal to build a Russian nuclear power plant in the country. However, in December 2022, Angola had already announced its interest in purchasing weapons from the United States, despite a previous 2019 announcement that the country would be constructing factories for the domestic production of Russian weapons. This stated desire to purchase American weaponry comes in the wake of increasing defense ties between Angola and the United States such as Angola’s March 2022 participation in a U.S.-led maritime exercise, and a November 2022 high-level visit to Angola by General Michael Langley, the commander of United States Africa Command — demonstrating that the contest between Washington and Moscow for influence in the country remains more open-ended than history would suggest.</p> +<p>A commonality between the Japanese and Dutch controls is that they remain country-agnostic. This largely aligns with their preference to adhere to the World Trade Organization’s non-discrimination principles and fear of Chinese economic retaliation. Nevertheless, these controls do represent a significant expansion in Dutch and Japanese export control and licensing policy. Furthermore, the three countries have taken extra steps to affirm both their preference for multilateral controls and the national security justifications for taking these actions. The Dutch indicated that they would submit these updates to the Wassenaar Arrangement, although the chances of Russia blocking the updates remain all but certain.</p> -<p>It is likely that these trends will only intensify going forward. According to Bhaso Ndzendze, an associate professor at the University of Johannesburg, while the Kremlin will continue selling its arms to conflict-affected countries across Africa, those deliveries will likely be limited to obsolete Soviet-era equipment, such as Soviet-era tanks, and cheaper weapons, including battle rifles, grenades, and signal and communications systems. Therefore, such sales will remain marginal in terms of their direct monetary value. However, such limited defense relationships will most likely continue to yield significant geopolitical benefits for the Kremlin in the region. At the same time, the two key arms importers on the continent, Egypt and Algeria, will probably proceed with their efforts to diversify away from Russia, thus impacting the share of Russian arms exports globally. However, the large quantities of previously acquired Russian equipment in both countries are likely to sustain ties at some level.</p> +<h4 id="shortcomings-of-the-us-policy">Shortcomings of the U.S. Policy</h4> -<h4 id="southeast-asia-the-cases-of-vietnam-and-myanmar">Southeast Asia: The Cases of Vietnam and Myanmar</h4> +<p>While the October 7 controls were designed to stem the outflow of U.S.-produced items to China under the assessment that China was using U.S. inputs in military applications, the controls also expose certain drawbacks.</p> -<p>Both Vietnam and Myanmar have existing defense partnerships with Russia, and the future course of these relationships could serve as an important indicator of the Russian defense industry’s international reach post-2022.</p> +<p><strong>CLARIFYING THE NATIONAL SECURITY JUSTIFICATIONS</strong></p> -<p>In the context of what many believe to be China’s increasingly aggressive behavior in the South China Sea, Vietnam has leaned into international arms imports to support its military’s efforts to deter potential Chinese military action. Having launched a brief invasion of Vietnam in 1979, China remains an ongoing security concern for the government in Hanoi, as described in a noteworthy and long-awaited defense white paper released by the Vietnamese government in 2019. While Russia has historically been Vietnam’s primary arms provider, the government in Hanoi has increasingly tried to diversify its supply of defense systems, including from Israel, Canada, Spain, the Netherlands, and South Korea. Notably, during a widely publicized presidential visit to Vietnam in 2016, President Barack Obama announced an end to the United States’ Cold War–era arms embargo on the country, which some analysts perceived as part of a broader U.S. strategy to strengthen ties with Hanoi as a potential counter to Chinese efforts at hegemony in the Indo-Pacific, despite U.S. claims to the contrary. For instance, in 2021, the United States transferred a refurbished Hamilton-class Coast Guard cutter to the Vietnamese navy.</p> +<p>Firms and foreign partners alike remain wary about the U.S. explanation undergirding the controls. The United States claims that it has irrefutable evidence that China is using Western-made technology in its military programs. Providing additional details, where possible, and enhancing communication among allies will secure more durable buy-in throughout the value chain.</p> -<p>However, given the scale of Vietnam’s purchases going back to the emergence of post-Soviet Russia in 1991, the country will remain dependent on Moscow for spare parts, technology upgrades, and long-term maintenance arrangements for already purchased systems. Since 1995, an overwhelming 82 percent of Vietnam’s arms imports have originated from Russia. These purchases have included everything from aircraft and air defense systems to critical components and systems needed to maintain these weapons. The Vietnamese military reportedly has 1,383 Russian MBTs in its reserves, ranging from long-outdated models such as the T-34 to the newer and more advanced T-90S. The Vietnamese air defense reserves include the Russian S-300 system, with the Su-30MK2 acting as a key model within Hanoi’s reserve of fighter jets. There have long been reports that Vietnam is interested in acquiring more advanced Russian fighter jets, such as the Su-35 or even the Su-57.</p> +<p><strong>EFFECTS ON U.S. FIRMS</strong></p> -<p>But despite Vietnam’s long-held dependence on Russia for military equipment, it has recently announced new plans to develop the country’s domestic defense industry, including reforms of the General Department of Defence Industry, a state-owned conglomerate. Additionally, in December 2022, Hanoi organized its first-ever international defense exhibition, which observers interpreted as a major push by the Vietnamese leadership to expand the country’s range of foreign defense partnerships away from Russia. Given Russia’s expanded domestic defense needs to supply its war in Ukraine, combined with the ongoing risk of Russian defense production bottlenecks caused by international sanctions, these moves by Hanoi to diversify its means of defense procurement away from Russian firms appear well timed.</p> +<p>Policymakers have always had to walk a fine line when it comes to export controls because they inherently restrict revenue for domestic firms, which often rely on export-derived income to invest in next-generation research and development). This remains true for the October 7 controls. Firms impacted immediately include Nvidia, AMD, KLA, and Lam. LAM warned that they face a loss of up to $2.5 billion in 2023, while KLA expects losses of $600–900 million. Applied Materials also anticipates first-quarter losses of nearly $400 million. Furthermore, the imposed loss of market share naturally creates new market opportunities for foreign entrants not otherwise subject to similar controls, making it even more important to multilateralize the controls.</p> -<p>As with Vietnam, Russian defense firms have an established export relationship with the military of Myanmar, which rules the country. Russia has been second to China in terms of defense-related exports to Myanmar since 1995, accounting for 35 percent of arms deliveries. Like Russia, Myanmar faces its own set of international sanctions due to the ruling military junta’s coup and human rights violations in the ongoing civil war. Myanmar’s military junta remains interested in Russian weaponry and combat know-how to assist in its efforts to crush opposition to its 2021 coup and help fight various armed resistance groups that oppose the central government. Myanmar’s political isolation and ongoing domestic turmoil limit the country’s defense import options, making continued reliance on Russian weapons, technology, and upgrades likely over the medium term.</p> +<p><strong>CHINESE RETALIATION</strong></p> -<p>In 2023, Russia reportedly requested to buy back matériel it had sold to Myanmar in order to help fill supply gaps related to Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine. Russian tank producer Uralvagonzavod apparently purchased $24 million worth of military components, including an estimated 6,775 sighting telescopes and 200 cameras. This purchase is logical, given the Russian military’s now well-known challenge of replacing their previously Western-supplied optical systems. Sanctions enforcers should track Myanmar as a potential source of needed components for the Russian military and continue to crack down on existing loopholes that enable these kinds of defense-related transactions by the military leadership.</p> +<p>Two other drawbacks center around Chinese responses to the controls via retaliation and indigenization. In May 2023, China banned the use of Micron chips in critical infrastructure. Micron relies on China for 20 percent of sales but claims that it will endure the effects of this policy change. In July 2023, China further retaliated by implementing new licensing requirements on gallium and germanium, two critical inputs for semiconductor production. China has over 86 percent of the world’s low-purity gallium production capacity and over 67 percent of the world’s refined germanium production, meaning prices for those inputs will spike without the commensurate onboarding of additional production capacity in allied economies.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion-and-policy-recommendations">Conclusion and Policy Recommendations</h3> +<p>The United States and its allies have long recognized this retaliation capability, particularly following similar restrictions on Chinese rare-earth mineral exports to Japan roughly a decade ago. Despite precedence and the obvious likelihood of Chinese retaliation, many policymakers and experts were surprised by the recent announcement and have vowed to pursue additional “de-risking” policies. However, it is relatively easy to scale up production capacity outside of China, indicating that the Chinese restrictions serve mostly as a “warning shot.” Furthermore, previous CSIS work has demonstrated the inefficacy of Chinese economic coercive measures, finding that China’s attempts at saber-rattling typically contravene its objectives by dissuading countries from deeper economic engagement with China.</p> -<p>Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian military industrial complex has faced the dual challenge of supplying the Kremlin’s troops for the war in Ukraine while circumventing international sanctions to gain access to critical components required to maintain the necessary levels of production. As Russian defense firms are forced to prioritize supplying the war effort, they are facing the inevitable choice between expending critical components and resources on fulfilling contracts for the Russian Ministry of Defense and using those same inputs for the production of weapons systems ordered by customers abroad. To add to the Russian defense industry’s troubles, Russia’s often lackluster performance on the battlefield in Ukraine, in comparison to the fierce resistance of Ukrainian troops armed with cutting-edge Western systems, serves as a powerful global advertising campaign in favor of Western arms over their Russian competitors.</p> +<p><strong>DESIGNING OUT: INDIGENIZATION AND DUAL SUPPLY CHAINS</strong></p> -<p>However, the challenges facing Moscow’s arms industry predate the February 2022 invasion, which has in fact aggravated already existing problems within a domestic sector declining in its international competitiveness. Russia’s post-Soviet arms sales began to decrease in the early 2010s due to Western sanctions on third countries purchasing Russian weapons, a collapse in the purchasing power of particular countries such as Venezuela, and the efforts of the massive Chinese and Indian markets to strengthen their domestic arms production, increase arms exports (especially in the case of China), and diversify international partnerships.</p> +<p>Designing out — developing supply chains free of U.S. inputs — has long been a hedging strategy against foreign regulations, as witnessed with commercial satellites during the 1990s. In the wake of the trade war with China under the Trump administration, companies began to implement an “in China, for China” strategy in which firms would produce locally for domestic consumption and free of U.S. inputs. As Sarah Bauerle Danzman and Emily Kilcrease, two export control and investment screening experts at the Atlantic Council and the Center for New American Security, respectively, write, “The recent unprecedented expansion of extraterritorial rules in U.S. export controls turbocharges these concerns, heightening the risk that other countries or firms will ice out U.S. suppliers as a matter of protecting their autonomy and preserving their ability to sell globally — including in China.” Indeed, the Chinese government has pressured domestic firms to accelerate indigenization efforts to de-risk from foreign exposure. Huawei recently announced that it has created software for all chips above 14 nm, providing a Chinese alternative to companies who previously acquired foreign products.</p> -<p>To be clear, Russia is still competitive in areas such as missile and air defense systems, aircraft, armored vehicles (including different models of battle tanks), submarines, and engines. Current trends, however, indicate that Russian arms exports in virtually all major weapons categories will continue to decrease.</p> +<p>China is also attempting to strengthen supply chains not subject to export controls. The National Silicon Industry Group, China’s largest silicon wafer producer, recently announced attempts to increase capacity from 300,000 wafers per month to 1.2 million, allowing it to cover domestic needs and become the sixth-largest wafer producer worldwide. This shift aligns with broader Chinese efforts to pursue a “dual circulation” agenda that seeks to build more autonomous and domestic supply chains in China free of international dependencies, but it could also indicate the Chinese weaponization of trade via overcapacity. Either way, a loss of U.S. market share means less visibility into Chinese high-tech industries over time and a drop in revenue for firms seeking to retain a competitive edge.</p> -<p>China’s rise as a competitive arms manufacturer represents one of the largest challenges to the Russian defense industry. Chinese defense technology is increasingly on par with Russian exports and proves to be a particularly challenging competitor for Russian arms exports in less wealthy regional markets such as Africa. Given Russia’s growing macroeconomic and political-security dependence on China after the launch of the 2022 invasion, it has significantly less leverage to resist China’s long-term efforts at acquiring — or stealing — highly protected Russian defense technology. Increasingly, reports are emerging about Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) arresting Russian scientists for allegedly spying for Beijing. These high-profile charges may serve as a signaling mechanism to warn Russia’s defense industry workers to be on guard when collaborating with China and that Russian intelligence will be watching.</p> +<p><strong>CLOSING LOOPHOLES: WHACK-A-MOLE AND THE CLOUD</strong></p> -<p>But while the Kremlin may have qualms about its defense industry’s vulnerability to Chinese penetration, Russian weapons manufacturers will nonetheless be increasingly dependent on the Chinese and Indian markets, as the two Asian powers remain among the small circle of countries that are still purchasing Russian arms in bulk. Russia will try to maintain its existing defense export markets, leveraging its long-standing diplomatic and military relationships in the Global South and offering unique security partnerships via investment deals and contracts with Russian private military companies such as the Wagner Group (or its alternatives). Moscow will likely maintain a role as the chief supplier to rogue states, as countries locked out of the global arms market will often find Russia a willing supplier.</p> +<p>In addition to ongoing attempts to attract additional countries to join the new U.S. export control policy, the United States is concluding its formalization of the October 7 rules. In June 2023, reports emerged that new controls from BIS could be announced as soon as the end of summer, which would close October 7 loopholes. For example, Nvidia produced the A800 AI chip, which is its A100 chip engineered to reduce the interconnect speed to comply with the regulations. While some observers regard this as “out-engineering” the controls, this also reflects insufficient thresholds that could be broadened to accommodate the A800 chips, although broadening the scope would result in additional revenue hits for the firms affected. Circumvention is also likely occurring via the provision of cloud services to Chinese companies, which allow access to controlled chips. Overall, the U.S. government needs to contend with innovation “whack-a-mole,” in which mitigating one problem means another pops up elsewhere. This means that export control rules should be flexible and updated frequently to achieve their intended objectives.</p> -<p>However, despite the Russian defense industry’s existing vulnerabilities, the experience of fighting the war in Ukraine under international sanctions may lead to the emergence of important innovations that Russia can then market to Global South purchasers as a competitive alternative to Western technologies. For example, Russia’s effective use of kamikaze drones, in particular the Lancet, may turn out to be a future Russian defense industry success. Russia is already expanding its domestic production of attack drones, and the intermittent hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia demonstrate that states can overpower their regional rivals with effectively deployed, low-cost drone technology. Russian drones could become a weapon of choice for lower-budget militaries or proxy forces such as those funded by Iran throughout the Middle East.</p> +<p><strong>SECURING ADDITIONAL PARTNERS</strong></p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The experience of fighting the war in Ukraine under international sanctions may lead to the emergence of important innovations that Russia can then market to Global South purchasers as a competitive alternative to Western technologies.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>While Japanese and Dutch cooperation has enhanced the efficacy of these controls, there are growing calls for additional partners, such as South Korea, to join. South Korean firms Samsung and SK Hynix maintain a major share of the memory chip market, controlling over 70 percent of DRAM market share in 2021, and 53 percent of the NAND market (along with Japanese company Kioxia). Memory chips play an important role in AI, meaning that they may be critical to national security. For example, Samsung currently supplies Nvidia with high-bandwidth memory chips for their A100 AI chip.</p> -<p>With those considerations in mind, there are ways for the West to further accelerate and deepen existing negative trends in Russia’s arms exports:</p> +<p>Securing buy-in from South Korea would enhance the credibility of the U.S. export controls but could come at significant cost to South Korean firms, who maintain major operations in China. As of the summer of 2023, the United States granted South Korea a one-year waiver extension that permits South Korean firms to continue operating in China. The private sector views perennial waiver extensions as unreliable, subject to change, and responsible for infusing the industry with added uncertainty. (BIS undersecretary Alan Estevez has said that the waivers will likely be extended “for the foreseeable future.”)</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>Play the long game.</strong> Recognize that shifting nonaligned countries away from Russian military equipment is a long-term diplomatic effort that requires not just pursuing sales but strengthening bilateral relationships between countries. Deepening dialogue and developing strategic partnerships with major regional players who continue to maintain close ties with Russia will allow the West to assess opportunities for more attractive substitutes or diversification options for arms supply. Recent engagement with India offers one successful example in that regard.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Develop a targeted strategy to squeeze Russian arms sales, including through the allocation of new security assistance funding for this effort.</strong> The United States should seek to engage countries that buy Russian weapons and highlight that doing business with the Russian defense industry would merit U.S. sanctions and offer an alternative. For some countries, this may mean pushing that country to buy from the United States or allied countries. For others, the United States could offer security assistance to help acquire U.S.-origin systems. Given the need and demand, this may merit additional congressional funding for State or Defense Department security assistance programs. However, there are a number of countries to which, due to foreign policy concerns, the United States would not be willing to transfer weapons. Nevertheless, Washington should still press these states that a step toward rebuilding relations and trust with the United States begins by foregoing future arms purchases.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Highlight Russia’s military failures with the states dependent on Russian equipment.</strong> In many of the countries where Russia still maintains a competitive advantage, perceptions of the war often stem from a gap in knowledge about Ukraine, which Russia fills with its wartime propaganda. The West could help amplify Ukraine’s position in these countries and undermine Russia’s by coordinating messaging and public diplomacy.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Close sanctions loopholes when they emerge and be willing to sanction countries for buying Russian weapons</strong>. Sanctions enforcement agencies remain grossly understaffed and underresourced. Their capacity is not remotely sufficient for the economic warfare mission that policymakers have thrust upon them. Likewise, these agencies do not receive the information flow to execute their mission. The internet has incredible open-source resources, far too few of which make it to enforcement offices. Instead, these offices rely on highly classified information from the intelligence community. The classified nature of such information makes it difficult to speak about, but it also leaves gaps in coverage. Additionally, the United States should be less reticent to sanction countries for buying Russian arms. While there will be hard cases, such as India, sanctioning countries, even partners, such as Turkey, sends a signal to others that buying Russian weapons comes with significant additional economic costs beyond what is needed to pay for the specific system. The threat of sanctions has clearly deterred states from purchasing Russian arms, and the United States needs to make countries understand that it is willing to deploy sanctions.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Closely monitor Russian efforts to buy back Russian-made or licensed equipment from partner countries.</strong> A recent news report highlighted efforts from Moscow to buy back weapon components, especially those used in tank and missile production, from its current customers such as India and Myanmar, showcasing war- and sanctions-induced struggles faced by Russian defense industry. If true, this could also point to a potential path for Russia to augment its own struggling domestic defense industrial production by outsourcing production to partners through providing licenses to them to manufacture certain arms and components. For instance, Moscow has given permission to New Delhi to manufacture T-90 tanks, as well as MiG-21 and MiG-23/27 fighters. Considering Russia’s outstanding equipment shortages, the Kremlin could conceivably seek to buy back some of those weapons and systems. While there is no evidence that Russia has thus far attempted to do this, New Delhi’s desire to access or lease advanced foreign technology to boost its domestic defense industry, coupled with Moscow’s readiness to provide more relaxed rules for technology transfers, make such cooperation probable. Likewise, the Kremlin may introduce or revisit its licensing deals with other partners such as China or Iran. Therefore, Western policymakers should closely monitor Russia’s licensing agreements with its militarily capable partners, including India, as well as China and Iran, and develop targeted solutions highlighted above to avert such future scenarios.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Finally, continue supplying to Ukraine.</strong> As CSIS has argued earlier, it should remain a priority for the West to provide Ukraine with continuous supplies of higher-end military equipment at a pace that exceeds Russia’s production rate. Attrition will make it harder for Russia to simultaneously maintain domestic production while exporting arms globally. Additionally, the West should consider granting Ukrainian manufacturers rights to use selected Western technologies for licensed domestic production of selected weapons systems, component parts, and/or ammunition needed to wage the ground war in Ukraine.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Another complicating factor is China’s ban on Micron’s memory chips, which has left a supply gap that Samsung and SK Hynix could fill, although the U.S. government is urging against backfilling. South Korea’s vice minister of trade commented, “Regarding what the U.S. tells us to do or not to do, it is actually up to our companies. Both Samsung and SK Hynix, with global operations, will make a judgment on this.” Regardless, the extraterritorial application of controls and attempts to reduce South Korean chip investment in China has put South Korea in a geopolitically awkward position of having to choose a partner amid U.S.-China tensions. The United States should not underplay what it is asking of its allies.</p> + +<h4 id="building-a-sufficient-promote-agenda">Building a Sufficient “Promote” Agenda</h4> + +<p>When coupled with an expanded domestic industrial policy, the combination of domestic incentives and additional — and sometimes extraterritorial — restrictions can frustrate the private sector and allies. As the definition of national security continues to expand to include economic security concerns, skeptics of the Biden administration’s expanded use of controls argue that protectionism and economic considerations are the true drivers of this policy. Given the growing importance of AI in national security, the security justifications of controlling the export of advanced AI chips is clear, but the administration should do a better job communicating its underlying security concerns, particularly to combat the notion that these controls are driven primarily by domestic economic considerations.</p> + +<p>These policies do not materialize in a vacuum. Allies have witnessed the expanded use of the FDPR under the Biden administration and are weary of becoming subject to those rules. Other policies that can be viewed as coercive — or at least demanding — remain fresh. These include attempts to encourage a “rip and replace” policy of Huawei components from critical infrastructure, or the Treasury Department’s sanctions that resulted in a 15 percent price spike of aluminum products in a week. It was also only a decade ago that the United States threatened the vitality of the European financial markets during the “de-SWIFT” policy that sought to induce the European Union to adopt the U.S. stance on Iran. Given that relations with Russia are not likely to improve in the near future and that tensions with China will continue to climb, it is incumbent on the United States to build a trade policy that can offset costs and more effectively secure long-term allied buy-in.</p> + +<h4 id="conclusion-2">Conclusion</h4> + +<p>Having secured Japanese and Dutch alignment on U.S. export controls, the United States seems once again to have taken the lead on establishing a new export control regime — or, in this case, a “mini-regime” of three unilateral policy changes. In short, U.S. leadership and external action-forcing events such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Chinese pursuit of civil-military fusion have propelled producers of advanced technology into a new chapter of export control cooperation. This is evidenced not only in the Japanese and Dutch adoption of additional controls but also in allies’ focus on the utility of controls as an instrument of foreign policy in the G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué, the EU Economic Security Strategy, and Germany’s new Strategy on China. However, new controls come with pronounced risks, serious geopolitical downsides, and steep economic costs. If the United States and its friends are building a new export control architecture, they need to account for — and try to mitigate — these distinct challenges to prevail.</p> <hr /> -<p><strong>Max Bergmann</strong> is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> +<p><strong>Gregory C. Allen</strong> is the director of the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> -<p><strong>Maria Snegovaya</strong> is a senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS and a postdoctoral fellow in Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.</p> +<p><strong>Wonho Yeon</strong> is a research fellow and the Head of the Economic Security Team at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP).</p> -<p><strong>Tina Dolbaia</strong> is a research associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS, where she examines and analyzes political, economic, and security developments in Russia and Eurasia.</p> +<p><strong>Jan-Peter Kleinhans</strong> is the director of Technology and Geopolitics at Stiftung Neue Verantwortung (SNV), a nonpartisan, nonprofit, independent tech policy think tank in Berlin.</p> -<p><strong>Nick Fenton</strong> is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS, where he supports the program’s event management, outreach, and research agenda.</p>Max Bergmann, et al.Russia’s role as a major global arms supplier is under threat. This report analyzes how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the concomitant Western sanctions have affected the status of its role.Degradation Everywhere2023-09-18T12:00:00+08:002023-09-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/degration-everywhere<p><em>Situated on the front line of the war in Ukraine, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant poses ongoing risks. These relate not only to the threat of Russian sabotage, but also to the gradual deterioration of the facility under the extreme operating conditions.</em></p> +<p><strong>Julian Ringhof</strong> was a policy fellow with the European Power program at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).</p> -<excerpt /> +<p><strong>Kazuto Suzuki</strong> is a professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Tokyo, Japan, and director of the Institute of Geoeconomics at International House of Japan.</p> -<p>Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the safety of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants and facilities has been a source of concern. Ukraine hosts four operational nuclear power plants (NPP), including Europe’s largest – the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). It is also home to Europe’s most infamous NPP, at Chornobyl – the site of the major 1986 disaster which saw the eventual displacement of 350,000 people and resulted in the spread of radioactive particles around the world. The continued occupation of the ZNPP by Russian forces and its precarious location on the front line of the war have raised fears across Europe and around the world of a repeat of the 1986 Chornobyl disaster. There have been a number of inflection points over the last year and a half when concerns over the potential for a large-scale radioactive disaster at the ZNPP have reached fever pitch – most recently in early July, in light of warnings from both the Russians and the Ukrainians that the other side was preparing an imminent attack on the plant. While the potential for an engineered incident or attack resulting in radioactive release at the ZNPP cannot be ruled out, the more salient and probable – yet less headline-grabbing – threat to the ZNPP is the slow degradation of the plant’s systems and the consequent safety and economic implications of this chronic deterioration.</p> +<p><strong>Rem Korteweg</strong> is a senior research fellow at the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands. He works on Europe’s strategic role in the world, with a specific focus on the intersection between trade, foreign policy, and security.</p> -<p>Ultimately, while the ZNPP remains under occupation by Russian forces – who have shown little consideration for human life, nuclear safety or international law – the potential for the site to be used as a giant dirty bomb cannot and should not be ruled out. Moscow may decide to purposefully engineer a malfunctioning of key safety systems or strike parts of the facility to release radioactive material into the surrounding areas. The fact that the facility is on the front line of a military conflict and is already operating under exceptional stress – to its key operating systems (namely, water and electricity supply) as well as to its Ukrainian staff (who have faced harassment and are working in an active warzone) – also means that it would be relatively easy for Russia to write off an engineered incident as a no-fault accident or to place blame on the Ukrainian military or personnel. The ongoing military activity in the vicinity of the ZNPP also raises the possibility that key systems and equipment at the plant could be damaged in a strike.</p> +<p><strong>Chau-Chyun Chang</strong> currently serves as senior strategy executive director, Sustainability in the Industry, Science and Technology International Strategy Center (ISTI) of the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI)</p> -<p>Most nuclear experts agree that, under the ZNPP’s current operating conditions, any radioactive release in case of an attack or accident at the site would not equate to the 1986 Chornobyl disaster. An incident on the scale of the 2011 accident at Japan’s Fukushima-Daiichi NPP is a more appropriate comparison, but also unlikely under the current circumstances. However, depending on the scale and nature of the actual incident, as well as the efforts put into managing the emergency, there is some risk of radioactive release. Such a release of radioactivity – or fears of a release – could be weaponised by Russian forces to tie up Ukrainian military resources in responding to the radioactive contamination, to prevent access to the facility by advancing Ukrainian troops, as well as to sow widespread panic among the Ukrainian population. Threats to cause an incident or exacerbate one, or offers to stop one from happening or from escalating, could also be used by Moscow to create leverage and secure concessions from Ukraine and its allies elsewhere in the conflict – either on the battlefield or in the diplomatic space.</p> +<p><strong>Francesca Ghiretti</strong> is an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). She is an expert in economic security, EU-China relations and the Belt and Road Initiative.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Under the current circumstances, the plant is likely to be more useful to Moscow as a source of leverage and a means of sowing public anxiety than as a giant dirty bomb</code></em></strong></p> +<p><strong>Antonia Hmaidi</strong> is an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), where she works on China’s pursuit of tech self-reliance (especially in areas like semiconductors and operating systems), its internet infrastructure, and disinformation and hacking campaigns.</p> -<p>Yet, causing an incident at the facility while they continue to occupy it would presumably make little sense for Russia. However, this is not – as some have pointed out – because an accident at the ZNPP would put parts of Russia’s territory and population at risk. Moscow is not known for its concern for the general Russian population, and blaming Ukraine for an accident – as Moscow undoubtedly would – would likely only galvanise support for the invasion among the Russian population. And, as mentioned earlier, an incident at the ZNPP does not necessarily need to result in major radioactive spread.</p> +<p><strong>Emily Benson</strong> is the director of the Project on Trade and Technology and a senior fellow of the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS, where she focuses on trade, investment, and technology issues primarily in the transatlantic context.</p> -<p>If Russian forces wanted to continue operating at or around the ZNPP, generating an incident at the facility would leave Moscow having to deal with at least some of the clean-up of the released radiological material – tying up resources and making operation around the facility more challenging. Depending on the nature of the incident, the plant may also be left inoperable, thus undermining reported Russian intentions to eventually connect the ZNPP to the Crimean and Russian energy grid (although plans to do so appear to have stalled or to have been abandoned for the time being). Russia would instead be left with a huge, damaged installation in need of repair or decommissioning. Under the current circumstances, the plant is thus likely to be more useful to Moscow as a source of leverage to extract concessions from Ukraine and its partners and to sow public anxiety than as a giant dirty bomb.</p> +<p><strong>Catharine (Katya) Mouradian</strong> is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Project on Trade and Technology at CSIS.</p>Gregory C. Allen, et al.On October 7, 2022, U.S.-China relations were reshaped with export controls on military AI, shifting global semiconductor manufacturing and distribution and complicating the global economy. This report outlines U.S. allies’ perspectives on “the new oil” in geopolitics.The Ideology Of Putinism2023-09-27T12:00:00+08:002023-09-27T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/the-ideology-of-putinism<p><em>Since Putin’s early days and throughout much of his rule, there has been a deliberate effort at a state-promoted vision of Russia rooted in Soviet and imperial Russian history.</em></p> -<p>However, that calculation will almost certainly change in the instance of a Russian withdrawal from the ZNPP. On their departure, Russian forces will have little incentive to leave the plant operational and plenty of reasons to engineer an incident at the site. In addition to the strain on military and economic resources from having to deal with a radioactive release, as well as the implications for freedom of military movement at and around a contaminated facility, a damaged ZNPP would in turn leave Kyiv managing a massive piece of damaged critical infrastructure, with significant long-term safety and economic implications.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>In fact, there may not be a need for Russia to engineer a system malfunction or directly attack the ZNPP to turn the site into an economic liability and safety hazard for Ukraine after its recapture. A year and a half of military occupation is threatening to do that already. NPPs are robust things, with multiple redundancies and safety systems built in to keep them operating safely under extreme conditions. But no NPP is built to withstand extended operations in an active warzone. The ZNPP has had to put up with mine explosions and fire; it is regularly disconnected from the external power grid; it has been depending on a backup water supply for months; some of its reactors have been held in hot shutdown for months (well beyond the regulatory time limits for operation in this state); and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported on shortages of maintenance staff and supply chain challenges. At a recent meeting with journalists in early September, Petro Kotin – the head of Ukraine’s nuclear energy utility Energoatom – noted: “It is degradation everywhere … Everything is degraded – equipment, components and personnel. Everything is in very bad condition”. At a press conference on 11 September, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi noted his concerns over “technical issues that are starting to arise”, appearing to suggest that some may be related to the long-term shutdown of the plant.</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There is no guarantee that Russia will not attack or otherwise seek to generate a radiological release at the plant, despite it not being in Moscow’s interest</code></em></strong></p> +<p>In the 1990s, Boris Yeltsin sponsored a search for an idea of what Russia could be. He never found it. When he became president in 2000, Vladimir Putin presented himself not as an ideologue but as a modernizer — neither anti-Soviet, as far as the past was concerned, nor anti-American or anti-European, as far as the future was. And yet, undercurrents of what we see today in Putin’s Kremlin have long been visible in initiatives like the restoration of the Soviet national anthem, the creation of the patriotic youth group “Nashi,” or the ever-expanding cult of the Great Patriotic War. Such initiatives, even when directed by the presidential administration, have not entirely been of the state’s making. An important role has been played by the so-called ideological entrepreneurs, individuals operating in the gray zone of the Putin regime. Yet such initiatives have also been a response to popular demand for economic, political, and historical stability, linking continuity with the past to visions of cultural achievement and the image of a strong Russian state. Such patriotism has manifested itself in pride, grievance, and a nostalgia for the Soviet Union, much of it fueled by the repudiation of Russia’s “Western experience” in the 1990s.</p> -<p>Should the military situation around the ZNPP ease enough in the future to allow the facility’s reactors to be brought out of their shutdown state and to begin generating energy again, a thorough inspection and servicing of the facility will be necessary. This will be a massive undertaking. The site is a massive complex; in addition to its six reactors, auxiliary buildings and other support and staff infrastructure, it also hosts a dry spent fuel storage site and a training facility. The whole of the site will have to go through a demining operation, and its reactors will need to undergo a top-to-bottom review to ensure that all is in working order.</p> +<p>The use of ideology by the Putin regime admits several interpretations. One popular approach claims that contemporary regimes in the Putinist mold have limited need for ideology. An alternative argument is that the rudiments of an ideology have been consistently projected into Russian society for the sake of particular actions, as with the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine: the war has allowed Putin to enforce his ideological aims with the repressive apparatus of a police state. Yet another interpretation is that at some point something snapped in Putin, and he changed from being a self-dealing modernizer and cynical “political technologist” to a purveyor of ideology, convinced that Russia was encircled by the West and that it had to unite the peoples of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia into a Slavic whole — or that he had to save some Russian essence from the decadence and foreign policy aggression of the West.</p> -<p>Some have even suggested that the site may not be redeemable at all after the occupation, which would require the decommissioning of the NPP. This may become true, depending on the length of the occupation and the state in which the Russian occupiers leave the site. This, too, would incur significant costs; while decommissioning costs for nuclear facilities depend on a range of factors, the IAEA estimates that the decommissioning of a single nuclear power reactor, including costs for associated waste management, comes with a price tag of between $500 million and $2 billion and typically takes 15 to 20 years. These figures, combined with the rendering inoperable of a facility that – prior to the large-scale invasion of Ukraine – was responsible for 25% of the country’s energy supply, would have colossal economic implications for post-war Ukraine, which will already be facing massive reconstruction costs and logistical challenges.</p> +<p>This report argues that Vladimir Putin’s regime does have an ideology. As the authors show, from the start of his rule over two decades ago, the Kremlin has made serious, consistent, and increasing investments in promoting certain values. Borrowing heavily from czarist and Soviet themes, as well as other intellectual sources like the twentieth-century radical right, Putinism elevates an idea of imperial-nationalist statism amplified by Russian greatness, exceptionalism, and historical struggle against the West. Notable throughout this period has been the Kremlin’s attention to education and memory politics, accompanied by a growing emphasis and reactionary in nature, on what the Kremlin describes as traditional values. Since the mid-2010s this was followed by a shift in focus from narratives and monuments alone to establishing and funding public engagement with these narratives. Phases marked by the more active promotion of these ideas coincide with external and internal challenges to the regime, often triggered by color revolutions in Russia’s “near abroad,” domestic protests, or the wars Putin started. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and its radical break with the West have prompted the regime to mount a more sustainable ideology-building effort.</p> -<p>Ultimately, trying to predict Russian thinking in Ukraine is a fool’s errand. There is no guarantee that Russia will not attack or otherwise seek to generate a radiological release at the ZNPP, despite it not being in Moscow’s interest; in fact, in the event of a Russian withdrawal from the ZNPP, the risk of sabotage at the site will be acute. Ukraine’s allies in the UK, the US, Europe and elsewhere should continue to remain ready to support Ukraine in case of an emergency and radiological release at the ZNPP, through the supply of CBRN equipment and training as requested by Kyiv, as well as the provision of mental health support. They should also continue to make clear that any incident at the ZNPP resulting from Russian action (or inaction) will not go unanswered, and coordinate with Ukraine on an appropriate and credible deterrent and plan of response. Yet, while an engineered incident at the ZNPP remains possible, the massive strain on economic resources – as well as the longer-term safety implications – resulting from the degradation of the ZNPP’s systems are a certainty. As such, it is critical that the response of Ukraine’s partners to the situation at the ZNPP includes allocating the economic resources and technical assistance that will be needed following de-occupation to ensure the safe operation of Europe’s largest NPP.</p> +<p>A common critique of the Putin regime’s attachment to ideology is that Russian politicians do not live by the piety, collectivism, and traditional values they espouse. But ideologues can be hypocrites. One can use “ideology” in the Althusserian sense to denote the “imagined existence of things,” meaning the ideologue need not believe the espoused ideas; the ideology is useful for the production of practices and rituals. Especially when viewed through the lens of its cultural and historical politics, the Russian government, is an excellent example of this theory. The Kremlin has established a wide range of government-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to promote a presentist view of the past, in which Russia is always threatened by a nefarious West, internal enemies abound, and Russia’s sacrifices and glories make it a global great power. Across after-school clubs, children’s holiday camps with battle reenactments and historical disinformation lessons, Immortal Regiment processions, the wearing of St. George’s ribbons, and “Victory Dictation,” a range of initiatives has been designed to enshrine practices and rituals that are only superficially commemorative. In fact, they enforce a set worldview or ideology. Even if elites do not start as true believers, their heavy-handed inculcation, repetition, and blocking of other views over many years ensures that they absorb at least some of these beliefs.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Statism is a key pillar of Putin’s ideology, which includes deference to a strong, stable state, allowing Russians to be Russians; such statism is based on exceptionalism and traditional values. Another pillar is anti-Westernism, when combined with Russian exceptionalism, promotes a messianic notion of Russia as a great power and civilization state, guarding a Russo-centric polyculturalism, traditional family and gender roles, and guarding against materialism and individualism. The needs of the state and the collective must come first. The plasticity of these narratives should not be confused for the malleability of the ideology’s core elements. They are more a way of selling or packaging the policy to different audiences. New twenty-first-century ideologies are not so much focused on grand narratives or text-based worldviews. Instead, they reflect the fragmentation and eclecticism of the digital age. That this ideology is not spelled out in philosophical texts but most often absorbed through signs, symbols, and popular culture makes it both malleable and easily digestible for less-educated people.</p> -<p><strong>Darya Dolzikova</strong> is a Research Fellow with RUSI’s Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme. Her work focuses on understanding and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including proliferation financing and other illicit trade by actors of proliferation concern. Her research areas include the Iranian nuclear programme and related diplomacy, Iranian and North Korean proliferation-related sanctions evasion, as well as other issues concerning nuclear technology and proliferation.</p>Darya DolzikovaSituated on the front line of the war in Ukraine, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant poses ongoing risks. These relate not only to the threat of Russian sabotage, but also to the gradual deterioration of the facility under the extreme operating conditions.Arctic Geopolitics2023-09-14T12:00:00+08:002023-09-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/arctic-geopolitics<p><em>Tensions in the Arctic among great powers have increased since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But the unique status of the Norwegian archipelago Svalbard complicates this broad geopolitical framing of the region.</em></p> +<p>The reigning ideology extends beyond memory politics, encompassing policies intended to protect religious believers from offense, to stigmatize regime opponents with Western connections as “foreign agents,” and even to criminalize those who deny Russia’s great power status by in any way tarnishing the Soviet victory in 1945. Russian doctrines and strategies are an official guidebook to this ideology and of its evolution into something more specific and more actionable. The Kremlin actively promotes the fundamental Russian identity of the nations of the Russian Federation, a historically rooted system that unites spiritual, moral, cultural, and historical values.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Will this ideology-building effort help keep Putin in power? This report suggests that it could. Conditions remain generally favorable for the Kremlin; large segments of Russian society endorse its narratives because they retain post-Soviet nostalgia, are convinced of their country’s great power status, or are responsive to the socially conservative agendas of Putin’s Kremlin. It is hard to see where challenges to the Putinist ideology could emerge in Russia. Societal resistance to Kremlin propaganda has remained marginal, even during more liberal periods. An alternative pro-Western identity able to challenge the Kremlin’s propaganda has failed to emerge and is less likely following the massive exodus of Russian liberals as a result of the Ukraine war. The Kremlin has directed particular ideology-promotion efforts toward societal segments where it senses vulnerability, such as young people, who are known to be among the most pro-Western groups in Russia.</p> -<p>The Arctic is increasingly viewed as an arena for power projection and spillover from conflicts elsewhere. In this regard, the Svalbard archipelago is an important case study because it has economic, scientific, political, and security implications for states in the High North, the United States, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. Svalbard’s unique status as a sovereign territory of Norway with provisions for foreign nationals, Russia’s presence on the territory and its interests at sea, as well as the archipelago’s proximity to critical Russian military locations make Svalbard a potential geopolitical flash point. This brief examines the geopolitics of Svalbard and the security implications for Norway, the United States, and NATO. Through close examination of the archipelago, the authors aim to contribute to a more granular understanding of Arctic geopolitics and how NATO and the United States can best prepare for heightened geopolitical tensions in the region.</p> +<h4 id="the-rudiments-of-soviet-ideology">The Rudiments of Soviet Ideology</h4> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>In Russia, post-Soviet society did not start with a clean slate. Many Soviet citizens embraced ideas and beliefs as a collective body, which shaped their perceptions of themselves and of the world around them. When the Soviet system collapsed, its ideological legacy lingered on.</p> -<p>The emphasis on cooperation that has long characterized Arctic politics has deteriorated. During the Cold War, despite the geographical proximity between NATO member Norway and the Soviet Union, a geopolitical equilibrium ensured that interstate clashes in the Arctic were practically nonexistent. In fact, both sides pursued significant scientific collaboration in the region. The early 2000s saw rapid growth in Arctic interest and engagement among Arctic states, including Russia, on everything from economic development to climate research. However, simultaneously, Russia has increased its military presence and activity in the North. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, security affairs in the Arctic became more tense, with the final remnants of regional cooperation evaporating after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Moreover, some see Russian overtures to deepen ties with China as strengthening Beijing’s claim of being a “near-Arctic” state and thus posing a challenge to the seven other Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States).</p> +<p>This legacy included a sense of exceptionalism. The Soviet Union conceived of itself as a mighty superpower, a huge country with nuclear weapons that was globally feared and respected and with only one competitor, the United States. In the late Soviet Union, propaganda tended to portray the West (and the United States in particular) as “the Other” against which it built the Soviet collective identity, presenting the Soviet system as the most viable alternative to most things “Western” (or “capitalist”). A sense of belonging to a mighty superpower compensated Soviet citizens for the difficulties present in their daily lives. This stress on exceptionalism also borrowed from Russia’s century-old tradition of paternalism and statism (“государственность”): belief in the supremacy of a unified state as the highest governing principle and the ultimate source of political authority coupled with opposition to any constraints on the state, whether through law, civil society, or formal institutions. For the ethnic Russians at the core of the Soviet Union, a leading position within the system furnished an extra source of collective pride and self-respect, a substitute for other perks such as the republican level structures within the Soviet Union granted to other Soviet republics.</p> -<p>This growing geopolitical tension in the region warrants closer scrutiny by European High North countries, the NATO alliance, and the United States. Few case studies embody this development better than Svalbard, a Norwegian archipelago with an area about twice the size of Belgium and located approximately 650 kilometers north of the Norwegian mainland and just 1,000 kilometers from the North Pole. An analysis of the links between geography and power politics around Svalbard — Norway’s northernmost territory, with a unique political and economic status — reveals the complexity of the geopolitical competition in the Arctic, and how simple depictions of conflict/no-conflict scenarios can be unhelpful.</p> +<p>The collapse of the Soviet Union, defeat in the Cold War, and loss of Russia’s superpower status led to a sudden and traumatic disappearance of many important composites in the Soviet collective identity. Particularly painful was a perceived loss of great power status. Post-Soviet Russia lost much of its influence on the international stage and faced economic misery of the 1990s. It even had to accept aid from its former enemy — the United States. For many, this was a national trauma. Most Russian respondents (about 70 percent) to a survey at the time recognized their country’s loss of its great power status. A popular saying many people at the time repeated like a mantra expressed their frustration: “What a great country did we lose!” (“Какую страну потеряли!”). Widespread anxiety and resentment shaped post-Soviet Russian politics, in which Soviet elites and institutions continued to play a prominent role.</p> -<p>Svalbard’s unique regional position is especially pertinent. The archipelago has significant strategic importance, as its location could be crucial to controlling access to and from Russia’s Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula, which houses Russia’s strategic nuclear submarines. Waters around Svalbard also contain plentiful fish stocks, such as cod and shrimp, and extensive deposits of metal minerals. Melting ice will gradually improve access to some of these resources and may facilitate an increase in shipping activity in this part of the Arctic.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/m5lCDDO.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Muscovites wait in line to buy bread amid the economic crisis that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, December 1993.</em></p> -<p>In this regard, Russia is particularly attentive to the implications of climate change for the commercial development of the Northern Sea Route, which offers a shortcut for vessels traveling between Europe and Asia, primarily along the Russian Arctic coast. However, even in the Arctic, where a melting icescape presents new opportunities for states to maneuver, overly broad framings of the geopolitical rivalry term are often too simplistic. Instead, it is imperative to more closely examine specific cases of geopolitical competition and rivalry in the North.</p> +<p>Even with the arrival of market economics, post-Soviet Russia failed to break with its Soviet past. Many grassroots movements that emerged in the new Russia remained retrospectively oriented, whether they were post-Soviet populists, left-wing movements passionate about egalitarian justice, or neo-Eurasianists and nationalists focused on Russia’s past greatness. The same was true for the Kremlin. As liberals lost influence in the Russian government, emphasis fell on the Soviet legacy, sugarcoating the Soviet past and adopting more imperial conceptualizations of the new Russian state, which was increasingly characterized as a homeland for Russians and Russian speakers across the territory of the former Soviet Union. These factors provided fertile ground for Vladimir Putin’s ideology building and for the assertive foreign policy that accompanied it.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The archipelago has significant strategic importance, as its location could be crucial to controlling access to and from Russia’s Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula, which houses Russia’s strategic nuclear submarines.</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="putinist-ideology-in-the-making">Putinist Ideology in the Making</h4> -<p>Both scholarly and journalistic works tend to misunderstand the sovereignty of Svalbard and its associated geopolitical dimensions. Despite Norway having “full and absolute sovereignty” over Svalbard, according to the Svalbard Treaty, misconceptions abound regarding Svalbard as a “shared space” or Svalbard’s legal status being ambiguous. Another dubious claim is that the “Norwegian interpretation of the Svalbard treaty is disputed by its other signatories.” Moreover, some argue the archipelago is shrouded in “NATO ambiguity” and question whether it is covered by the alliance’s territorial security guarantee.</p> +<p>Until recently, the Kremlin’s political legitimacy did not require a coherent ideology. A more sustained effort at developing one emerged after a surge in protests in 2011 and 2012 and suddenly increased with the start of the 2022 war in Ukraine. However, since Putin’s early days and throughout much of his rule, there has been a deliberate effort at a state-promoted vision of Russia rooted in Soviet and imperial Russian history.</p> -<p>Statements such as these are inaccurate and obscure the legal and political situation surrounding Svalbard. They seem to confuse the ambiguity concerning the archipelago’s maritime zones with a more fundamental dispute about Norwegian sovereignty of the territory writ large and — unintentionally or deliberately — amplify a narrowly circumscribed issue while ignoring other geopolitical dimensions concerning Svalbard.</p> +<p><strong>THE 2000S: NATIONAL CONSOLIDATION AROUND A STRONG, STABLE STATE</strong></p> -<p>One way to overcome this inaccuracy is to examine the more tangible geopolitical dimensions of Svalbard in international politics. These include (1) explicit challenges to Norwegian policies on land, (2) disagreement over the legal status (sovereign rights) of the maritime zones, and (3) the potential military use of Svalbard in a larger conflict with Russia.</p> +<p>For Putin, “the history man,” the importance of history was apparent from the start. At first, the goal seems to have been primarily a means to an end. Reactionary and liberal groups clashed in their visions of what direction Russian society should take; Putin, once he took power, aimed to unite a divided and beleaguered country, offering a mutually agreeable interpretation of the end of the Soviet era and reasons for pride based on historical themes and motifs. This early emphasis on patriotism lacked strong ideological content. Beyond calling for Russia’s stabilization and revival, the invocation of history as the basis for national identity in a culturally diverse country included ethnic and religious minorities, while still celebrating the dominant ethnic Russian (русский) and Orthodox Christian culture. As former minister of culture Vladimir Medinskii has argued, this was about the “identity of Russian [российского] society, in which respect for the heroic past . . . has played the part of a unifying force.” Exemplifying this emphasis on unity, the Day of the October Revolution (November 7) was replaced with a new state holiday, the Day of National Unity, in 2004. Using cultural memory to bring a divided nation together, the government promoted a vision of Russia that most people could support and adopted a mélange of popular historical narratives. These narratives appealed to as many ideologies and political persuasions as possible: imperialists, Communist nostalgists, supporters of a strong state, and ethno-nationalists. This was further illustrated by the selective appropriation of Soviet symbols, such as the State Coat of Arms and the Soviet National Anthem, which Putin reintroduced in late 2000.</p> -<h3 id="context-political-history-of-svalbard">Context: Political History of Svalbard</h3> +<p>This vision of Russia was also soon reflected in history textbooks. In 2001, the Kremlin convened a government committee to analyze the content of textbooks and teachers’ books recent Russian history. Its goal was to reassert control over the textbook market. The committee ordered that the “many negative descriptions that appeared in textbooks in the 1990s” be replaced by a vision of Russian history promoting “patriotism, citizenship, national self-consciousness, and historical optimism,” and it removed several books from the officially approved list.</p> -<p>The origin of Svalbard’s unique legal status may be traced to its role as a locus for commerce and trade centuries ago. Initially named Spitsbergen by the Dutch explorer Willem Barentsz in the sixteenth century, the archipelago was renamed Svalbard by Norway in 1925, while Spitsbergen is now the name of the archipelago’s largest island. Only in the early twentieth century, when promising discoveries of coal were made and mines were established, were negotiations opened to establish an administration of the Svalbard archipelago, at first driven by Norway’s wish to define the territory’s legal status after the dissolution of its union with Sweden in 1905. Although various models were discussed before World War I, postwar negotiations in 1920 resulted in the Spitsbergen Treaty (here referred to as the Svalbard Treaty), which confirmed Norway’s sovereignty over the territory.</p> +<p>The emphasis on unity, continuity, and pride crystallized around the value of “thousand-year-old” Russian statehood, a central element of national identity, and around the idea of a “strong state” as the source of Russia’s past and future greatness. Already in late 1999, Putin published an article “Russia at the Turn of Millenium,” where he laid out his vision for the country. Rejecting both the dogma of Communism but also Western-style democracy, he offered that Russia would seek a third way that would rely on its traditions of a strong state. “For Russians, a strong state is not an anomaly which should be got rid of. Quite the contrary, they see it as a source and guarantor of order and the initiator and main driving force of any change.” Putin further articulated these themes in his 2003 presidential address to the Federal Assembly. Warning about the threats of state disintegration, Putin stressed the “truly historic feat” of “retaining the state in a vast geographic space” and of “preserving a unique community of peoples while strengthening the country’s position in the world.” Moving away from Yeltsin’s portrayal of the Soviet disintegration as the “foundational act” of the new Russia, Putin presented it as a sudden “catastrophe,” a disruption of Russia’s “great power” status and the “thousand-year-old” Russian strong state. Also reflective of this growing emphasis on the role of statehood in Russian history was the 2008 state TV show “Name of Russia,” launched to determine the most notable figure in Russian history through a nationwide vote. Of the twelve historical figures selected to be voted on, nine were statesmen, ranging from Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great to Lenin and Stalin. The winner of the competition was Alexander Nevsky, a prince who battled against European invvaders for the sake of preserving Russian statehood and the Orthodox Christian faith.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gMLB5aF.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Figure 1: Svalbard in the European High North.</em></p> +<p>This move from repentance to pride, from division to unity, and from the birth of a new democratic Russia to the portrayal of Russian statehood as a millennial tradition explains the mythic place of the Great Patriotic War, as the Soviet fight against Nazism from 1941 to 1945 came to be known in Soviet history books. It would become the keystone of the Putinist ideology. The sole truly unifying element among the many polarizing chapters of Russia’s history, the Great Victory is one of the few topics on which most Russians (about 80–90 percent) have consistently felt pride over the years. Most political actors, from liberals to Communists and nationalists, agreed on the significance of the victory in Russian history. The Kremlin used a triumphalist narrative of the Great Patriotic War to create a post-Soviet Russian identity. The 2005 Victory Day parade, when celebrations reached a previously unseen scale, was a turning point in this regard.</p> -<p>After affirming Norway’s full and absolute sovereignty and responsibility for managing the islands, the treaty attempts to secure the economic interests of foreign nationals as a key objective. This was done by including provisions on equal rights and nondiscrimination in the most relevant economic activities at the time. For example, Norway may not treat other nationals less favorably than its own citizens in certain areas, and taxes levied on Svalbard in connection with mining may be used solely for local purposes. Moreover, the islands may not be used for “warlike purposes,” and no military fortifications may be built on the islands.</p> +<p>In the mid-2000s, a series of color revolutions shook the post-Soviet space (Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005). The remarks of President George W. Bush — who welcomed color revolutions — and U.S. initiatives in support of popular movements against authoritarian regimes suggested that a country like Belarus could be next. These developments convinced Putin that the United States actively promoted regime change across the region, including in Russia. By 2005, state-linked media openly claimed that Russia was the target of a new Cold War, waged “by political provocation, played out with the help of special operations, media war, political destabilization, and the seizure of power by an aggressively activated minority . . . with the help of velvet, blue, orange, etc. revolutions.”</p> -<p>The Soviet Union was not present during the treaty negotiations due to its ongoing civil war, so the one concern at the time was whether the Soviets would challenge the treaty, given their geographic proximity to the area and claims of historic use. In 1924, however, the Soviet government unconditionally and unilaterally recognized Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago and acceded to the treaty in 1935. The Soviet Union made several attempts to gain special status on Svalbard in the aftermath of World War I and later in 1944 with a suggestion by Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov to Norwegian foreign minister Trygve Lie that the treaty should be scrapped in favor of a bilateral arrangement. However, Norway firmly rejected this suggestion.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Kremlin used a triumphalist narrative of the Great Patriotic War to create a post-Soviet Russian identity.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>International economic interest in Svalbard plummeted before World War II, and soon only Norwegian and Soviet mining companies conducted economic activities there. Consecutive Norwegian governments have sought to maintain the Norwegian population on the islands, predominantly by subsidizing coal mining with the state-owned company Store Norske and supporting the islands’ largest community, Longyearbyen. Similarly, successive governments in Moscow sought to maintain a sizeable Soviet population through the state-owned mining company Arktikugol in the company towns Barentsburg, Pyramiden, and Grumant — of which only Barentsburg is active today.</p> +<p>These concerns added a “Thermidorian” dimension to the evolving statist narratives Putin was promoting, a growing anti-revolution orientation and a focus on deepening the state’s hold over society. Putin’s chief political strategist, Vladislav Surkov, developed the notion of “sovereign democracy,” which made the correct use of Russian history (including in education) a matter of vital national interest, aimed at fostering anti-Western sentiment through an increase in state propaganda and the repression of NGOs and human rights activists. Common themes included the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in unifying the Russian people and the vision of Russia as a “besieged fortress” historically under attack by the West. Kremlin policies increasingly promoted Russia’s national interests as the main “standard of the truth and reliability of historical work” — to cite one of Russia’s main pro-Kremlin officials. The 2009 National Security Strategy warned against “attempts to revise the history of Russia, her role and place in world history,” which could negatively influence the country’s national security. “Securitization” — a process of aligning Russian culture and history with “security” matters — was proceeding apace. One example is the emergence of the St. George’s ribbon as a commemorative symbol of the Great Patriotic War in reaction to the 2003-2004 Orange Revolution. Since 2014, it has denoted support for Russian aggression against Ukraine.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zFJKUTh.jpg" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ View of the abandoned ex-Soviet miners village Pyramiden in front of the Nordenskioldbreen glacier on Svalbard.</em></p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Cl96648.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ A shop window is decorated with a sticker reading “May 9” in the colors of Saint George’s ribbon ahead of the Victory Day in Moscow, May 2023.</em></p> -<h3 id="a-changing-landscape-the-geopolitical-relevance-of-svalbard">A Changing Landscape: The Geopolitical Relevance of Svalbard</h3> +<p>The color revolutions of the mid-2010s, which featured active youth protest participation, also drew the regime’s attention to the indoctrination of youth. This resulted in Surkov launching a number of pseudo-grassroots youth movements such as Nashi, the “Democratic Anti-Fascist Youth Movement ‘Ours!’,” and the Molodaya Gvardiya) aimed at co-opting young Russians. The focus on youth drew more attention to education. By 2005, the standardization of education had become one of the four national projects overseen by Dmitry Medvedev, then one of Putin’s key allies and subsequently the Russian placeholder president. A number of new movements were established, such as the historical memory project (which lay dormant until 2012). In 2007, a new teacher’s manual created by order of the presidential administration presented Russia as having to retain its sovereignty against a predatory West, urging teachers to interpret Stalin’s repressions as a necessary evil, and portrayed the Soviet collapse as a tragic mistake that hindered Russia’s progress. The teacher’s manual was soon followed by a controversial history textbook, which justified Stalin’s purges as “the requirements of modernization in a situation of scarce resources.”</p> -<p>As interest in Arctic issues has risen over the last decades, Svalbard and its special legal provisions, economic history, and geostrategic location have received considerable attention. Three specific geopolitical dimensions warrant further examination from both Norwegian and Transatlantic observers.</p> +<p><strong>THE 2010S: THE CONSERVATIVE TURN AND DEEPENING ENGAGEMENT</strong></p> -<h4 id="1-challenges-to-norwegian-svalbard-policies">1. Challenges to Norwegian Svalbard Policies</h4> +<p>Despite the Kremlin’s best efforts at offering a unifying narrative for various social groups throughout the 2000s, liberals proved disloyal to Putin. Among Russian middle-class urbanites, counterstreams and ongoing modernization in Russian society led to a growing dissatisfaction with the lack of political change, culminating in pro-democracy protests that spread in major Russian cities through 2011 and 2012. This brought ideology building to the forefront, as the government needed new means of political legitimization to justify its increasingly authoritarian style of governing. But contrary to the 2000s, when Surkov’s eclectic approaches flirted with various societal groups, the “betrayal” of the liberals made Putin turn to his more conservative political base. This conservative shift was expedited by a drop in foreign direct investment and energy prices, as well as by the general knock-on effects from the 2008 global financial crisis, which engendered a shift away from the earlier paradigm of economic openness, encouraging the regime to shore up its domestic legitimacy by leaning further into an ideological project.</p> -<p>While Norway’s sovereignty over Svalbard is undisputed, there have been debates since 1920 about how Norway adheres to the treaty and implements its provision. As the sovereign, Norway regulates all activities in the archipelago, but citizens and companies from a number of other countries operate there. Over time, the critique from some treaty signatories over alleged treaty breaches has grown as Norway has implemented stricter environmental regulations, increased the coordination of research activities, and limited certain types of activities, especially with concern for the fragile environment on the archipelago.</p> +<p>Having realized that there were limits to how much Western-themed modernization Russia was able to achieve without reforming the existing political arrangements, the Kremlin looked more and more to the past — and “tradition” — for inspiration about what Russia was and what it should be. The Kremlin based its arguments on conservative Christian values in opposition to the overly liberal and morally decadent West, with its emphasis on issues of gender and sexual minorities’ rights. The so-called conservative turn seen from 2012 onward drew on preexisting initiatives, bringing them from the background to center stage. The emphasis on national identity became much more pronounced. Putin began his third term in 2012 with a long essay on the “national question,” claiming that Russia-ness is a cultural identity derived from the civilizational greatness of the ethnic Russian people, whose mission is to unify the rest of society around its historical values. Since 2012 the frequency of the term “morality” (“нравственность”) and of the adjective “spiritual” (“духовный”) in Putin’s speeches has spiked.</p> -<p>The complaints have primarily come from the Soviet Union and, later, Russia — the only country with a sizeable albeit declining population and distinct communities in the archipelago. These complaints have focused on Russian companies not being allowed to use helicopters beyond mining activities, expansion of environmental regulation, creation of national parks, and questions concerning the use of a satellite station for military purposes. One additional issue that has attracted Chinese interest in Svalbard has been Norwegian efforts through the Norwegian Polar Institute to better coordinate research in Ny-Ålesund, a small research settlement on the island of Spitsbergen. Here, China expressed concerns over whether Norway was overreaching in regard to its treaty obligations to foreign entities. As China has increasingly engaged with Arctic politics and governance, it has also become increasingly concerned with its “rights” and “interests” on Svalbard. This is reflected in China’s 2018 Arctic policy, which, despite its status as a near-Arctic state, invokes provisions of the Svalbard Treaty six times to legitimize certain Chinese rights in the Arctic writ large.</p> +<p>The Russian Orthodox Church played a more prominent role by being increasingly present at state ceremonies at all levels, and in ever-closer interactions with state structures. Patriarch Kirill’s concept of traditional values guided the Kremlin’s “conservative turn” and its search for a new Russian identity. Patriarch Kirill even described Putin as being a “God’s miracle,” and the World Russian People’s Council, linked to the Russian Orthodox Church, gave its first award to the Russian president for the preservation of Russia’s “great power statehood.” The Russian Orthodox Church gained access to the prisons and to the army, and it tried to access the school system. Yet apart from the growing role of the Church, state discourse on these topics mostly echoed Soviet approaches. The conservative “turn” co-existed with a “re-turn” to many Soviet practices.</p> -<p>Another challenge has been Russian complaints about Norway using Svalbard for military purposes in breach of Article 9 of the treaty, which states, “Norway undertakes not to create nor to allow the establishment of any naval base in the territories specified in Article 1 and not to construct any fortification in the said territories, which may never be used for warlike purposes.” The Norwegian coast guard docks in Longyearbyen to resupply, and the Norwegian navy sends a frigate to Svalbard regularly to highlight Norwegian sovereignty and capability in the area. Russia, in turn, argues this is a challenge to the Svalbard Treaty, though the treaty does not hinder Norway having military presence on or around the archipelago as long as the purpose is not “warlike.” Russian sensitivities to the question of military activity on Svalbard relate not only to the treaty but primarily to the proximity of Svalbard to the Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula and its strategic position to defend Arctic territory and project power in the Greenland, Iceland, and United Kingdom–Norway (GIUK-N) gap.</p> +<p>Due to the perceived failures of Surkov’s “managed democracy,” Vyacheslav Volodin — who had “a reputation for a more heavy-handed approach” — succeeded him as deputy chief of staff. Sophisticated boutique projects were replaced by increased repression. The focus on “foreign agents” and “defending Russian cultural traditions,” prominent in the 2012 Pussy Riot case for instance, sought to delegitimize liberal political opposition by rendering it not just wrong but foreign, Western, un-Russian. By casting all uprisings or popular revolutions as geopolitical interference, officials and state media embraced the narrative of external actors interfering in Russia’s internal affairs and claimed that protesters were being paid by Western institutions. In response to these trumped-up threats, the Kremlin expelled the U.S. Agency for International Aid, passed a law demanding that entities receiving foreign funding register as “foreign agents,” and added new restrictions on protest participation and freedom of speech — including repressive blogging laws, restrictions on media ownership, and legislation banning “extremist” views and the perceived rehabilitation of Nazism. In 2013, the Kremlin replaced the news agency RIA Novosti with Rossiya Segodnya, headed by Dmitrii Kiselev; sacked Galina Timchenko, the editor of the independently minded Lenta news portal; attacked the opposition TV channel Dozhd; and pressured advertisers to pull out and rendered the channel unviable on television. The 2013 law banned the promotion of “non-traditional relationships” to minors; its deliberate vagueness ensured its potential for wide applicability.</p> -<p>Similar complaints have come from Russia concerning the Norwegian satellite station located on Svalbard, one of the largest in the world, which has prompted Russia to question whether the data gathered are being used for warlike purposes. Norway is obviously sensitive to such protests given its treaty obligations in Svalbard and the broader long-standing but fragile tranquility that has existed in the Arctic region. However, Norway has consistently manifested its treaty obligations to limit military activity for warlike purposes on Svalbard.</p> +<p>The government’s grip on the interpretation of history and the educational system also deepened dramatically. The State Program for Patriotic Education budget is indicative of these changes: between 2011 and 2016 it more than doubled, reaching 1.67 billion rubles. Furthermore, the salaries of state officials and administrators working in the cultural sphere almost tripled. In 2012, Putin founded the Russian Military Historical Society, which spent a lot of time and funds on commemorating Russian soldiers who served in the First World War — a sign of militarism spreading beyond just the cult of the Great Patriotic War. The Russian Historical Society, headed by Sergey Naryshkin, now head of foreign intelligence, embarked on the creation of a new “rethought” unified history textbook to substitute for the 65 official high school textbooks on Russian history. It developed a unified Historical and Cultural Standard and Concept of Teaching History at School, with which all history textbooks would have to comply, and released three official lines of history textbooks. The updated editions published in 2016 were even more explicit in their anti-Western and anti-revolution orientation, portraying Russia as rebuffing past assaults from the aggressive West — whether from thirteenth-century Teutonic knights, from forces defeated by Russian prince Alexander Nevsky, from German fascists, or, more recently, from “the U.S.-led united anti-Russian front aiming to punish Russia” for “defending” Ukraine. Due to the Kremlin’s fear of anything involving revolutions, even the 1917 October Revolution now tended to be presented as being partly the product of Western interference. In a 2017 state TV series, Russian revolutionaries were shown to have the backing of German financiers.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/aKZeMgq.jpg" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ Telecommunications domes of KSAT, Kongsberg Satellite Services, on a mountain near Longyearbyen.</em></p> +<p>The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and aggression against the Donbas region accelerated the militarization of Russian society. The idea of Russia being surrounded by enemies like the West on the outside and by a “fifth column” on the inside has been increasingly filtered through national institutions like schools, the military, the media and the Russian Orthodox Church, fostering a sense of living in a “besieged fortress” among Russians. More assertive international stances in Ukraine and Syria brought a shift in the “memory discourse” at home, moving it from defensive to more offensive framings. Where previously Russia had been defending its historical memory at home or in lands it thought it was entitled to influence (the “Russian world”), it now revived the Soviet claim to great power status, returning to being a global player and a competitor against the United States. From this juncture, an emphasis on Russia’s great power status featured prominently in the Kremlin’s official narratives. This period saw the emergence of a cultural decolonization narrative, which argued that Russia was defending not just itself but others from being colonized by Western “militant secularism” or alien values and worldviews with no respect for tradition.</p> -<p>While complaints such as these from Russia or China do not directly erode Norwegian sovereignty, the sum of the complaints could amount to a larger challenge to how Norway adheres to the treaty. In addition, Russia — if it wanted to escalate a conflict while retaining some form of plausible deniability — could initiate actions to undermine Norwegian sovereignty using these complaints as justification. Notably, the Russian consul general in Barentsburg recently led a highly symbolic military-style parade that involved a helicopter and dozens of vehicles waving Russian flags to mark the anniversary of the Soviet Union’s defeat of Nazi Germany. Albeit primarily done as a way to get attention by the new director of the Russian state-owned mining company Trust Arktikugol, Ildar Neverov, this event does highlight the increasingly tense relations on Svalbard.</p> +<p>The first attempts at codifying an official ideology were beginning. The 2014 Information Security Doctrine sparked numerous discussions of how to defend the Russian information space against historical falsification, including raising a battalion to defend history. Also in 2014, the Kremlin introduced the Fundamental Principles of Legislation of the Russian Federation on Culture, which set out the next stage of Russian cultural policy: broadly, what to promote, why, and how. Originally, the Ministry of Culture, with personal input from Medinskii, wrote the first drafts of the principles, the text boldly declaring that “Russia is not Europe” and asserting that only cultural products that were politically useful should and would be supported. It abounded in historicism, arguing that the purpose of promoting cultural education was to create a common worldview among the Russian people. Its second aim was to create a spiritual-cultural matrix for the nation, a “cultural consciousness.” Despite the Ministry of Culture having liberally sprinkled the text with quotations from Putin, the president’s team blocked and disowned the draft. A presidential administration working group eventually rewrote the principles from scratch, producing a more sober and less politicized view of Russian cultural policy. Yet Medinskii had the last word. The updated version, released in 2023, is essentially what he wrote in 2014.</p> -<p>Statements from Russia regarding Svalbard seem to continually support an underlying policy of strategic uncertainty concerning both challenges to Norwegian rules and regulations on Svalbard and Russia’s legal position when it comes to the maritime zones around Svalbard. At the same time, it is unlikely that undermining the Svalbard regime at large or dispelling the treaty itself is in Russia’s interest. Russian companies and actors respect Norwegian sovereignty and authority in practice. As the only other country with a sizable population on Svalbard and with interests in various economic activities ranging from coal mining to tourism and fisheries, the status quo suits Russian economic interests as well as Russia’s desire to ensure the Barents Sea region remains politically stable.</p> +<p>In 2014, the Kremlin floated the notion of “Novorossiya,” a term associated with the reign of Catherine the Great and the extension of Russian control to southern Ukraine. This marked a departure from the previous focus on “gathering the Russian peoples” abroad. For example, after uniting overseas and domestic Russian Orthodox Church, the Kremlin established the Russkii Mir (“Russian World”) foundation in 2007 to propagate Russia’s worldview and appeal to those with cultural, religious, ethnic, even intellectual ties to Russia. The Kremlin also toyed with political conceptions of Eurasia, as evidenced by the establishment of the Eurasian Union in 2011. In 2014, there was a shift, as the Kremlin hoped that ethnic Russians in that region, as well as Russian speakers or others presumed to feel closer to Russia than to Ukraine, would warm to a twenty-first century Novorossiya, facilitating the Crimea-style incorporation of Ukrainian territory into the Russian Federation. None of this came to pass, and at the time the notion of Novorossiya could have been dismissed as extremist fantasy, especially as the intervention in Syria saw a return to Kremlin conceptualization of Russia’s role as that of a culture with global reach, rather than anything defined in purely ethnic terms. Novorossiya was, however, an ideological experiment to which Putin would return in 2022, once the initial plan to capture Kyiv failed. The exact territories designated as Novorossiya in 2014 would be illegally annexed in September 2022, though only parts of them were under the control of the Russian military. The ideological fantasies of 2014 had a shaping influence on Russia’s policies — actual and aspirational — in 2022 and 2023.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While complaints such as these from Russia or China do not directly erode Norwegian sovereignty, the sum of the complaints could amount to a larger challenge to how Norway adheres to the treaty.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Another important development around this time was the shift in focus from narratives and monuments to funding and setting up (often stealthily) movements, initiatives, clubs, camps, battle reenactments, and historical tourism to encourage engagement with these narratives. These included the reintroduction of patriotic activities at schools and in extracurricular activities for children and teenagers, as well as the propagandist effort to revalorize the military services and the army, granting greater rights to Cossacks, who formed vigilante militia groups to patrol Russian towns. Spending on events that required public engagement, such as “mobilization” and “competitions,” more than tripled since 2016. One example is the emergence of a system of multimedia historical parks entitled “Russia — My History,” which showcase a Kremlin-friendly take on all of Russian history — from ancient times to the present. The first park opened in Moscow on November 4, 2013, and by 2023, there were 24 parks, spreading from the North Caucasus to the Far East. One of the key messages promoted by the exhibits is that Russia is strong when it is united around a powerful leader, and when it is not, it is vulnerable to external manipulation and aggression. A particularly large section is devoted to Putin’s presidency.</p> -<h4 id="2-challenges-to-norwegian-jurisdiction-around-svalbard">2. Challenges to Norwegian Jurisdiction around Svalbard</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The ideological fantasies of 2014 had a shaping influence on Russia’s policies — actual and aspirational — in 2022 and 2023.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>Second, there is an ongoing disagreement over the status of the maritime zones around the territory beyond 12 nautical miles from the archipelago’s shores. The question is whether the 200-nautical-mile maritime zone and the continental shelf around Svalbard are covered by the provisions in the 1920 Svalbard Treaty.</p> +<p>As discussed above, the Kremlin has also become more vigorous in its efforts to form and influence a younger audience, which it has often struggled to convince of its vision of Russia — particularly after Surkov’s dismissal and the ensuing disappearance of Nashi and other state-sponsored youth movements. Whereas earlier budgets privileged commemorations and monuments, the 2016 plan allocated more than a third of the State Program for Patriotic Education budget for “youth military preparation” (such as the Young Army Movement), reflecting a broader shift toward mobilizational activities in which the state’s role was less overt. The Kremlin had learned to tap into organic apolitical everyday forms of patriotism, imbuing them with a politicization they did not previously possess.</p> -<p>In recent years, the European Union, in particular, has been a proponent of the former view — that the fisheries protection zone (FPZ) and shelf are subject to Norwegian jurisdiction but that Norway must adhere to the Svalbard Treaty’s provisions. This issue came about because of a dispute between Norway and the European Union over the right to fish for snow crabs since 2015, which led to another dispute over cod quotas from 2020 that emerged as a result of Brexit. Russia has taken a different approach, maintaining a form of strategic ambiguity or uncertainty as to its position, while arguing that Norway could not establish any zone unilaterally and thus only, flag states have jurisdiction over fishing vessels in the FPZ. Regarding the shelf, however, Russia argues that it is covered by treaty provisions.</p> +<p><strong>THE 2020S: CONSOLIDATING THE IDEOLOGY</strong></p> -<p>There are two aspects of this dispute with potential to further intensify geopolitical competition in the region. The first relates to access to resources and possible attempts by fishing vessels from various countries to claim their treaty-protected rights, as exemplified with the European Union in the snow crab case. China, which has the world’s largest fishing fleet, could hypothetically also assert itself on this issue through possible Chinese claims to equal access to fishing rights, though no official attempts have been made so far.</p> +<p>Under Putin, the Kremlin’s history and memory politics evolved in response to internal and external challenges but remained somewhat malleable. In the 2020s, Putin’s decision to stay in power indefinitely and Russia’s 2022 war in Ukraine necessitated a more systematic approach to ideology promotion. For years, the regime prepared the ground, after which it made its move.</p> -<p>The second issue is the possible escalation of interactions in the FPZ between Russian vessels and the Norwegian coast guard. Although escalation when interacting with Russian fishing vessels is the primary concern, questions are increasingly being asked about the activities of Russian vessels at large in Norwegian waters. For example, in January 2022, one of the two subsea cables crucial for information technology on Svalbard was cut after Russian fishing vessels had been operating extensively in the area. Although Norwegian authorities have not publicly identified the perpetrator, many have speculated the incident is connected to Russian intelligence gathering and hybrid activity in the Norwegian Arctic. With the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea in September 2022, this issue became increasingly relevant in the Norwegian security and defense debate.</p> +<p>The 2020 revision of the Russian constitution through amendments extending Putin’s term limits until 2036 (essentially making him a lifelong ruler) deepened the trend toward traditionalism by formally incorporating new ideological dimensions into the constitution. These dimensions included the mention of trust in God, transferred by ancestors; the importance of memory politics, revering the Fatherland defenders’ memory and protecting a Kremlin-approved version of the historical truth (i.e., one that opposed the European convictions that the Soviet Union was one of the initiators of World War II); and repositioning Russian from a national language to “the language of the state-forming nation, being a part of multi-national union of equal nations of Russia” in an appeal to Russian nationalism. The 2021 National Security Strategy focused even more insistently on “the defence of traditional Russian spiritual-moral values, culture and historical memory” as a national priority.</p> -<p>Complicating the matter is the fact that both fishing and research vessels from Russia have access rights to Norwegian waters that are difficult to curtail. The fishing vessels’ ability to fish throughout the Barents Sea regardless of zonal boundaries constitutes one of the core pillars of the successful comanagement scheme of fisheries cooperation between Norway and Russia. The research vessels’ access to the Norwegian exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the FPZ, and the shelf rests on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Article 246, which states, “The coastal State should normally grant its consent” except in a few specific circumstances. In other words, the burden of proof concerning Russian vessels conducting illegal activities in Norwegian waters including the FPZ lies with Norwegian authorities. This creates a significant operational and bureaucratic hurdle for Norwegian law enforcement and limits Norway’s deterrence of Russian gray zone operations.</p> +<p>Yet it was the 2022 war and subsequent radical break with the West that triggered the most dramatic shift toward systematic ideology building. In an effort to justify Russia’s confrontation with the West, conservative themes (as evidenced by explicitly homophobic and transphobic rhetoric) have taken a more central position in Putin’s statements leading up to and in support of the war. Since early 2022, Russian officials, realizing the need to offer a coherent explanation to justify Putin’s perpetual hold on power and to sustain the war and associated costs, repeatedly offered to remove the constitutional ban on state ideology. A special presidential decree introduced in January 2022 listed the country’s main traditional spiritual and moral values: patriotism, service to the fatherland and responsibility for its fate, high moral ideals, the priority of the spiritual over the material, collectivism, historical memory, and the unity of the peoples of Russia.</p> -<p>Making inspections and possible arrests in Svalbard’s waters particularly sensitive is Russia’s refusal to acknowledge the FPZ as waters where Norway has the authority to inspect and arrest — although in practice Russian fishers generally accepts inspections by the Norwegian coast guard. Still, in a tenser security environment, the concern has been that Russia could claim that Norway is exceeding its jurisdiction if Norwegian authorities inspect and arrest a Russian vessel. In turn, Russia could respond by threatening to use military force, as it has previously hinted at when Russian fishing vessels were arrested in the FPZ by the Norwegian coast guard in the early 2000s.</p> +<p>Since the Kremlin views Russian youth as a vital part of this effort, it has massively increased its patriotic education campaigns since 2022. For high school students, a new state-organized movement for children, mimicking the Soviet Pioneers, has been established. New legislation requires every school in Russia to have a counselor to facilitate the “civic” and “patriotic” upbringing of students. In September 2022, all schools were instructed to begin holding a flag-raising ceremony every week. Simultaneously, high schools also introduced a new extracurricular class called “Conversations about Important Things” designed to promote “traditional” and “patriotic” values (such as “national consolidation,” self-sacrifice and heroism, solidarity, and authority of the state) and boost national pride among the students. The first in the series of these “conversations” was symbolically taught by Putin himself on September 1, 2022. To ensure standardization of the content, the Ministry of Education publishes a list of themes for each week of the school year with suggested lesson plans, including videos and slides. Lectures available online show teachers how to conduct the classes.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YYzxbNm.jpg" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ Monument to former Soviet head of government Vladimir Lenin in the miners’ town of Barentsburg.</em></p> +<p>Starting in September 2023, high school history classes will be taught using a single standardized textbook with the Crimean bridge on its cover — authored by presidential aide Vladimir Medinskii, who some have described as a “nationalist enamored of classicism and traditional values,” and rector of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations Anatoly Torkunov. In this book, all of Russia’s contemporary history since the Stalin period has been rewritten to fit the official line. For example, the book describes the Brezhnev era of stagnation as the “welfare revolution” and blames Gorbachev for the collapse of the Soviet Union; its last chapters devoted to the events in Ukraine are titled “The U.S. Pressure on Russia,” “Opposition to the West’s Strategy toward Russia,” “Falsification of History,” “Revival of Nazism,” “Ukrainian Neo-Nazism,” “Coup in Ukraine 2014,” “Return of Crimea,” “Ukraine is a Neo-Nazi State,” “SMO and the Russian Society,” “Russia is a Country of Heroes,” and so on.</p> -<h4 id="3-the-military-use-of-svalbard-in-an-east-west-conflict">3. The Military Use of Svalbard in an East-West Conflict</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/EtdM58l.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ Russian schoolboys parade a Russian flag during a state-wide ceremony marking the beginning of the school year in Moscow, September 2023.</em></p> -<p>Finally, the role Svalbard might play in a large-scale conflict that involves the Arctic cannot be ignored. Although Article 9 in the Svalbard Treaty states that the area should not be used for “warlike purposes” — which is not the same as a de-militarized zone — the degree of concern over the possible use of the archipelago for military purposes has historically fluctuated with the degree of East-West tension.</p> +<p>The Kremlin actively engages with youth at the university level. The Ministry of Education has introduced a new concept of teaching history in universities effective September 2023. Covering ancient Russia to modern Russia, it ends with the 2022 war and promotes a pseudo-history, projection of current politics overtly onto the distant past. One of the goals is to indoctrinate students with the idea that “throughout Russian history, a strong central government has been of paramount importance for the preservation of national statehood.” Another university-level course, “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood” is offered beginning in September 2023, which is designed by a specially launched group, “Russia’s DNA,” led by presidential administration-linked political technologist Andrey Polosin. Analogous to the Soviet ideology-building course “Scientific Communism,” this course is meant to determine those “value constants” that are characteristic of Russia as a unique civilization. It includes four sections: “history” (memory politics based on a mythologized official version of history); “cultural codes” (cross-generational transfer of “spiritual and moral” traditional values); “Russia in the world” (stressing isolationism, anti-Westernism, and national superiority); and “vision of the future” (in light of the above). These four sections are developed by Vladimir Medinskii, Mikhail Piotrovsky, Sergey Karaganov, and Mikhail Kovalchuk, apparatchiks notorious for embracing Kremlin thinking.</p> -<p>During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was particularly concerned about the possible military use of the archipelago, demanding strict adherence to the treaty’s ban on the use of the islands for warlike purposes including the establishment of fortifications or naval bases. If war were to break out, control over Svalbard would have been the primary motivation for the Soviets, both to limit NATO command and to use it as a base for Russian military forces in order to protect strategic submarines with nuclear ballistic missiles. This was the central component of the Soviet Union’s bastion defense concept.</p> +<p>The effort to foster an official ideology goes beyond school textbooks and extends to culture more broadly — as reflected in the rewritten principles of Russian State Cultural Policy. It depicts the need for culture to serve as an instrument of the state and for the furtherance of state power at home and abroad. Since May 2023, the state has held twice as many military-patriotic events as in the previous year, totaling 1.5 million in one year. These include festivals, historical reenactment clubs, military history tours for children, student discussion societies, and more. The state is also actively funding pop culture films, TV series, and books, as well as presidential grants to promote certain patriotic initiatives. These are complemented by omnipresent propagandistic coverage on prime-time political shows, for which the presidential administration often delivers guides and talking points.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nP2zgi3.jpg" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ Russian flags flying in the miners’ town of Barentsburg on May 7, 2022. Sign in foreground reads “our goal is communism” in Russian.</em></p> +<h3 id="the-tenets-of-the-ideology">The Tenets of the Ideology</h3> -<p>Increased Russian military activity in the European Arctic since 2005 has highlighted Svalbard’s geostrategic location. Although there are no military fortifications on the archipelago as per the Svalbard Treaty, the concern for Norway is that it would rapidly be subject to Russian attempts to control it if a full-scale conflict between NATO and Russia broke out. The archipelago’s proximity to the Russian Northern Fleet, located at Severomorsk in the Kola Peninsula, and Svalbard’s strategic position as a potential base for so-called antiaccess and area denial (A2AD) operations in the Barents Sea and the North Atlantic are still the primary drivers of Russian security interests in the region. Some are questioning whether Svalbard truly holds such a strategic position given the technological advancements in Russia’s long-range ballistic missiles and the change in defense concepts in the North. Regardless, it seems likely that Svalbard will remain a potential area for Russian power projection, as Russia will likely be intent on rebuilding its Arctic force posture and capabilities attrited in Ukraine and in response to Sweden and Finland’s NATO memberships.</p> +<p>By 2022, Putin had been in power for over two decades. What had emerged both in foreign policy and in domestic politics was a system — less orderly and structured perhaps than in Soviet times, and more dependent on the personality of the autocrat, but a system, nevertheless. Apart from the security services, the army, the regular doling out of financial privileges to elite actors, and the Russian Orthodox Church, Putin’s system has not been codified in institutions; much of it depends on proximity to Putin and on patronage networks within the government. To this unsystematic system, ideology is essential. It provides a sense of meaning, of continuity, and of ritual to Russian politics — not just a way of making sense of the world, which was a strong point of Marxism-Leninism, but a way for Russians to make sense of Russia. In the absence of political parties, of real elections, of a political order grounded in procedure and constitutionalism, ideology is the connecting link. This ideology is not spelled out in philosophical texts as Marxism-Leninism had been. It can be absorbed through signs, symbols, and popular culture, making it malleable and accessible to less intellectual and less literate individuals. This population need not give its complete assent to the ideology cobbled together in Putin’s two decades of rule. They can give it partial assent, or simply live in its ambiance. Its very pervasiveness, much like the slogans and language of Soviet communism (in the early Soviet Union) or the iconography of czarist Russia, imply that the ideology is too widespread to be untrue.</p> -<h3 id="threat-landscape-russia-vis-à-vis-norway-and-nato">Threat Landscape: Russia vis-à-vis Norway and NATO</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Putin’s system has not been codified in institutions; much of it depends on proximity to Putin and on patronage networks within the government. To this unsystematic system, ideology is essential.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>From the perspective of a Norwegian defense planner or policymaker, the main security concern in regard to Svalbard will undoubtedly remain Russia. Across all the geopolitical dimensions highlighted above, the Russian threat looms large since the military use of the archipelago is relevant only in a NATO-Russia conflict. It is rather unthinkable that other EU or NATO states would significantly impede Norway’s territorial sovereignty in the territory through either covert or military action. Moreover, other potential adversaries in a large-scale conflict (e.g., China) are too far removed from Svalbard to pose any short- to medium-term threat.</p> +<p>Rather than representing an organic whole, the Kremlin ideology originally came together as bricolage, taking relevant parts from different movements like the communist and far-right heritages, while subordinating them to imperial-nationalist statism. While condemning anything related to revolution and not explicitly endorsing Stalinism, Putinism gradually rehabilitated Stalin as a “state-builder”: concepts like the “fifth column” were borrowed directly from the Stalin-era Great Terror period. During the so-called Russian Spring of 2014, the Kremlin borrowed some ideological currents from imperial nationalists, particularly with its tales of restoring Novorossiya, the areas of Ukraine conquered by Catherine the Great. It also incorporated elements of Eurasianism, Sovietism, anti-Westernism, and subversive takes on the liberal Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. This ideology’s eclecticism mirrors the fragmentation of the digital age.</p> -<p>Small-scale challenges to Norwegian policy on land or jurisdiction at sea, however, include a range of actors that could pose a challenge other than just Russia. As mentioned, the most active challenge to the Norwegian position regarding maritime zones in recent years has come from the European Union and some of its member states: first, over access to snow crab fisheries and, second, over the share of cod quotas in the FPZ after Brexit. It is also possible to imagine countries other than Russia and EU member states, such as China, moving to challenge the Norwegian position or claiming equal rights to economic activity in the water column or on the shelf.</p> +<p>However, the malleability of these narratives should not imply a malleability of the core elements of the ideology. They are more a way of selling, or packaging, the policy to different audiences so they accept the dogma. While there is no single idea that unites the Kremlin ideology (though statism comes close to being one), a set of core underlying elements has been maintained and reinforced over time through a series of patriotic organizations, initiatives, and youth movements. In other words, these are consistent ideological tenets used to make sure that the narrative reflects the meaning the Kremlin wants to put forth. As Mikhail Suslov, a professor of cross-cultural and regional studies, puts it: “Such ideas as a strong state, anti-Westernism, vulnerability of the “us-community,” the concept of strong ties between the ruler and the “grassroots” are inscribed into the general communitarian assumption, that different communities have different, historically unchangeable sets of values, which define our individual identities.” Accordingly, even if Putinism is not a monolithic and systematic ideology, there is no major discrepancy among its central elements.</p> -<p>Still, from a geopolitical perspective, Russia remains the primary security concern due to the high number of Russian fishing vessels operating in the zone each year in accordance with the comanagement regime of shared fish stocks in the Barents Sea. Despite the one-time issue over Chinese protests regarding research, the same conclusion holds for possible disputes on land over Norwegian policies and alleged violations of the Svalbard Treaty by Russian officials.</p> +<p>The domestic component of this ideology comprises six key tenets. First is the imperative of a strong, stable state that allows Russians to be Russians (based on exceptionalism and traditional values), to preserve their unique or exceptional way of life (whatever that might mean) and to live out their patriotism, whether it extends back into the past or is a matter of celebrating contemporary Russia. At its core is statism, a tenacious attachment to statehood. According to the dominant ideology, Putin did not build the state, nor is it a foundational constitution or set of institutions. Instead, the state is the physical form of Russia’s “historical essence” which has persevered for over “a thousand years.” Putin restored the state that has brought peace, prosperity, and harmony to Russia.</p> -<p>While the Russian geopolitical threat remains paramount, Chinese encroachments facilitated by an isolated Russia may complicate the Arctic security landscape in the longer term. The coast guard agencies of Russia and China recently signed a cooperation agreement on strengthening maritime law enforcement to great fanfare in Murmansk, a city on Russia’s western flank close to Norway. Moreover, when all other Arctic coast guard agencies suspended their participation in the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, Russia invited China to join the forum — clear signs of China’s expanding presence in the High North. As Iris A. Ferguson, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for arctic and global resilience, has put it, Chinese efforts aim “to normalize its presence and pursue a larger role in shaping Arctic regional governance and security affairs.”</p> +<p>This claim can be seen as analogous to the state construction in which Stalin was engaged during the first half of the twentieth century. It also parallels the powerful empire assembled by the Romanov dynasty over the course of three centuries. This is the pedigree Putin has accorded himself in a political order increasingly obsessed with historical precedent and historical narrative. Since the people seek a strong state — in this ideological schema — they provide the popular will and popular consent with which Putin governs Russia. Central to this presentation is the use of more extreme voices and a view of Putin as a moderator between conflicting positions — Putin as the common-sense voice. All this frames a self-reinforcing popular sovereignty of a kind that did not exist in the 1990s.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While the Russian geopolitical threat remains paramount, Chinese encroachments facilitated by an isolated Russia may complicate the Arctic security landscape in the longer term.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Second, Putin tends to present Russia as under threat. The most potent threat is chaos: a potential for dissolution that, historically speaking, is not a figment of Putin’s imagination. Twice in the twentieth century, the Russian or Soviet state collapsed. When the Russian empire fell apart, years of civil war ensued. The Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991 led to anarchy and impoverishment for many Russians, a view of the 1990s that is fundamental to the Putin myth. Despite being handpicked as Yeltsin’s successor in 1999, Putin has fostered an image of the so-called “wild” 1990s as a dark and disastrous period for Russians. The propagandists, many of whom were among the main proponents of Russia’s liberal path in the 1990s, have conflated the humiliations felt by ordinary people with those felt by the state. By losing a viable state, the Russian people were at sea — and subject to outside intervention in their economy and culture. Foreigners came to steal what they could steal, forcing their foreign ways onto unsuspecting Russians. In these difficult years, the loss of statehood was alleged to be equal to the loss of cultural selfhood. The consistent emphasis on Russia being besieged and in a permanent state of war with the West allows the Kremlin to instill a sense of existential urgency to justify the need to foster national unity.</p> -<h3 id="recommendations-for-us-policy">Recommendations for U.S. Policy</h3> +<p>The sense of threat ties deeply into the third tenet of official Russian ideology, anti-Westernism. Here the West occupies a paradoxical position. It is an object of desire and contempt. Very much the legacy of the Soviet period, the West plays the role of “other” in this version of Russian identity. Key to this attitude is the contention that the West (often embodied by the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or Anglo-Saxons) wants to destroy Russia. Yet in this narrative, the West is both menacing and declining. The United States is divided, because elites have taken over the country, because these elites have embroiled it in one unnecessary foreign war after another, and because an unstable madness lies at the heart of both the American economy and the American body politic. Europe may be less unstable and less mad, but it too is worthy of contempt because of its slavish adherence to the United States. Europe is nothing more than a cover for U.S. power and it would have a better future if it would break free from its American overlords. If it does not, it will go down with the American ship.</p> -<p>With its 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, the administration under U.S. president Joseph Biden sent a strong and clarifying signal that it would prioritize the region. The strategy effectively updates the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region and is organized around four pillars of action: security, climate change and environmental protection, sustainable economic development, and international cooperation and governance. Regarding the security pillar, the strategy aims to expand the military and civilian capabilities necessary to protect U.S. interests in the Arctic — for example, through increasing the U.S. Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet. While the strategy states that “the US seeks an Arctic region that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative,” it also recognizes that rising geopolitical tension, especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, may bring geopolitical competition to the Arctic in the future.</p> +<p>The anger at the United States is long-running, with roots in the Cold War. More recently, it was a response to U.S. involvement in the Balkan wars since the early 1990s and in particular to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s decision to bomb Yugoslavia in 1999, frequently called the “first сolor revolution.” Evgeny Primakov, whose tenure as foreign minister foreshadowed much of the discussions around multipolarity common to Kremlin discourse today, famously performed a U-turn in his plane over the Atlantic when he heard of the decision. In this narrative scheme, the “last” color revolution was Euromaidan in 2014, when Russia finally responded to the years of Western interference in its self-proclaimed sphere of interest.</p> -<p>With these considerations in mind, the United States should pursue the following course of action.</p> +<p>Cultural conservatism, the will to avoid a hedonism that is Western in origin, is the fourth tenet of official ideology. Russians are conscious of their own cultural roots, the argument goes, whereas some Europeans have lost theirs, as reflected by their embrace of homosexuality, feminism, trans rights, multiculturalism, and “militaristic secularism,” not to mention their subservience to the United States. Russians are different, proponents of the ideology argue, or at least they should be. They may not be churchgoers, but they would like to think of themselves as churchgoers. They do not subscribe to a nontraditional understanding of gender or sexuality, seeing the heterosexual nuclear family as the norm. Putin speaks for these Russians. He also speaks for their patriotism and their love of country, whether this love is rooted in the Russian language, in Russian culture, or in Russian (and at times Soviet or neo-Soviet) historical memory — the narrative of victimization and heroism that is presumed to describe modern Russian history. A doctrinal assertion of these reactionary sentiments is contained within the Russian National Security Strategy. It affirms the importance of resisting cultural colonization, which is presented as a grave or even existential threat to the Russian nation. The threat can only be resisted by preserving and strengthening Russian identity.</p> -<h4 id="1-push-for-a-coordinated-nato-approach-with-special-consideration-for-svalbard">1. Push for a coordinated NATO approach with special consideration for Svalbard.</h4> +<p>From this doctrine stems the emphasis on Russia’s exceptionalism and an argument that Russia is, in fact, a civilization-state. Superficially integrating elements of “Clash of Civilizations” argument, this point relates directly to racial and fascistic thinking that was propagated since the 1920s via the teachings of Ivan Il’in, Alexander Dugin, Eurasianists, and interwar emigre thinking resurrected in the 1990s. The title of the group, “Russia’s DNA,” developing the course on “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood,” points to national or even racial thinking connected to the ostensibly “cultural” notion of civilization. This civilizational thinking is highly important for Russia’s current war in Ukraine, as it helps justify the human sacrifice for the sake of something higher — like the state or civilization.</p> -<p>As previously noted, Svalbard’s geographical position could be central in controlling access to and from Russia’s Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula, which houses Russia’s fleet of nuclear submarines and is Washington’s primary focus in the High North. Thus, Washington needs to recognize that Svalbard represents a potential flash point in a looming Arctic power struggle and should work with Norway to tailor deterrence in a manner that minimizes the impact on the archipelago’s unique legal status. This approach should carefully balance a robust defensive posture while taking Svalbard’s status into account to minimize the risk of further military tensions.</p> +<p>The final core tenet is the cult of the Great Patriotic War. Politicians’ uses and abuses of the Great Patriotic War as a talking point are rooted in its sincere resonance and emotional power among ordinary Russians. The Kremlin has spent billions of rubles convincing people of the relevance of the Great Patriotic War to Russia’s current political identity and its right to great power status. Since 2014, a preoccupation with the Great Patriotic War and the war against Ukraine have been deliberately conflated, through the combined use of the St. George’s ribbon. It was worn on Victory Day to remember veterans, printed on the Luhansk and Donetsk “people’s referenda” in 2014 and tied onto the helmets of the Russian soldiers who attacked Kyiv in 2022. Anyone who doesn’t agree with the Russian view of World War II or with Russia’s right to a sphere of influence similar to that which the Soviet Union had after 1945 is dismissed as a Nazi, since they “wish to overturn” the results of the Great Patriotic War. Underpinning the Kremlin’s actions and propaganda in relation to Ukraine since 2014 is the assertion that Russia must control Ukraine — because Nazis will return, because of its historical right endowed by 1945, because of the West using it to destroy Russia again. These narratives persevere to this day and have become an anchored frame through which many Russians understand, or at least justify, the carnage and destruction in Ukraine.</p> -<p>Given the risk of the Kremlin using Article 9 of the Svalbard Treaty as pretext to escalate any expanded NATO presence, the alliance should credibly signal its intention to minimize capability development and military exercises in or around Svalbard. To avoid compromising overall deterrence, this restraint should be complemented by a strong amphibious force in mainland Norway, including through military exercises responding to conventional Russian escalation in or around Svalbard. Part of this effort could be built into NATO’s biannual Cold Response exercises, which Norway hosts to test allied troops’ ability to fight and survive in an Arctic environment. At the same time, clarifying that NATO’s Article 5 covers Svalbard as part of Norwegian territory is important to avoid any strategic ambiguity.</p> +<h4 id="sources-of-ideological-resilience-and-weaknesses">Sources of Ideological Resilience and Weaknesses</h4> -<p>A major diplomatic line of effort could also be achieving alliance-wide consensus on Svalbard Treaty applicability of Svalbard’s maritime zones. This means resolving the ongoing dispute between Norway and the European Union to avoid Russian exploitation of an allied rift possibly in favor of the Norwegian position.</p> +<p>As shown above, the Putinist ideology is essentially in place. The 2022 effort was an intensification of the Kremlin’s two-decade-long piecemeal endeavor to promote specific narratives in Russian society. Will the 2022 war undermine or deepen Putin’s ideology building?</p> -<h4 id="2-work-with-regional-allies-to-strengthen-resilience-of-critical-infrastructure-such-as-fiber-optic-cables-on-the-arctic-seabed">2. Work with regional allies to strengthen resilience of critical infrastructure, such as fiber-optic cables on the Arctic seabed.</h4> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Underpinning the Kremlin’s actions and propaganda in relation to Ukraine since 2014 is the assertion that Russia must control Ukraine — because Nazis will return, because of its historical right endowed by 1945, because of the West using it to destroy Russia again.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>A recent CSIS brief examining the Russian Arctic threat after the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine notes that Russia’s use of hybrid tactics in the region “seems to be increasing in both frequency and severity.” These fears are first perhaps best exemplified by the severing of a critical subsea information technology (IT) cable serving Svalbard while Russian fishing vessels were operating extensively nearby. Norwegian authorities have also arrested several Russian nationals for illegal photography across the country and have observed unannounced drone sightings over Svalbard. Western stakeholders seemed to acknowledge this vulnerability following the sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, especially given Norway’s importance as Europe’s main pipeline gas supplier. In fall 2022, Norway deployed its Home Guard to protect critical maritime infrastructure, a move that was supported by NATO ship patrols in the North Sea. The U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region also recognizes the need to address this risk, stating Washington’s intent to “make targeted investments to strategically enhance security infrastructure as required to enable these aims, while building the resilience of critical infrastructure to protect against both climate change and cyberattacks.”</p> +<p><strong>FACTORS HELPING PUTIN’S IDEOLOGY-BUILDING EFFORT</strong></p> -<p>Given the depleting effects of Western sanctions and the weakened state of Russia’s Arctic forces, if tensions between NATO and Russia continue to escalate, it would be reasonable to expect the Kremlin to increase its use of hybrid tactics around Svalbard, at least in the short- to medium-term. Sporadic ad hoc initiatives to counter Russian hybrid threats may thus fall short of the mark and would benefit from a more structured NATO approach. For example, NATO can facilitate regional tabletop exercises spanning the political and military spectrum that incorporate hybrid elements into conventional military scenarios. Other options include improved consultation and information-sharing channels between allies, government institutions, and the private sector to enhance initial detection and response to emerging hybrid crises.</p> +<p>First, Putin’s ideological effort is successful because it relies on deeply entrenched cultural tendencies in Russian society. In Russia, coming up with an alternative notion of identity has proved an impossible task, as shown by the failed liberal effort in the 1990s. Instead, Putin chose an easy route by promoting many quasi-Soviet and even pre-Soviet czarist narratives and themes. Moreover, the state has co-opted (often in a disguised manner) genuine grassroots patriotic initiatives. As a result, Russians often saw these initiatives as coming from the people, rather than state-originated (e.g., the Immortal Regiment). This effort — a project of over 20 years — is unlikely to face serious resistance now.</p> -<h4 id="3-establish-the-acceptable-scope-of-regional-governance-specifically-the-role-of-china">3. Establish the acceptable scope of regional governance, specifically the role of China.</h4> +<p>Reinforcing this is Russians’ predisposition toward justifying some or all of the narratives propagated by the state, in no small part because of their near-ubiquity and the cognitive dissonance required to live in Russia while going against the mainstream worldview. Polls show that while Russians are unexceptional in terms of benign patriotism, since the 1990s (well before Putin) they have been outliers in terms of “blind and militant” patriotism: the belief that one should support one’s country even if it is wrong and that one’s country should follow its own interest even if harms others. Under Putin, this has been reinforced by constant securitization of pro-Kremlin narratives, portraying any questioning of them as a threat to Russian traditions and national identity, and shifting the perspective from one of Russian aggression to one of preemptive Russian defense. That is how the “let there be no war” narrative — one of the most common toasts at family parties — became a justification for starting a war.</p> -<p>Finally, the United States should attempt to preserve what remains of the Arctic’s geopolitical exceptionalism — the increasingly tenuous status quo that has historically excluded hard security issues from regional governance. This should include building upon the resumption of limited work in the Arctic Council, announced in June 2022 by seven of the council’s eight member states — Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. Part of this effort should also address China’s growing ambitions in the Arctic and their implications for Svalbard. The United States should emphasize that China, as a near-Arctic state, is welcome to engage with regional stakeholders on environmental issues and sustainable economic development in the Arctic, including through its legitimate research activities on Svalbard.</p> +<p>Second, the flexibility of Putin’s ideology-building effort helps it accommodate change and appeal to different constituencies. Rather than trying to make everyone a true believer in its worldview, the Kremlin and state-aligned propaganda seek a spectrum of acceptable outcomes (apathy, loyal neutrality, “my country right or wrong,” passive support, etc.). They therefore offer a menu of options all pointing to the same conclusion (“Kremlin knows best,” “West out to get us,” “I can’t influence anything anyway,” etc.) but via different arguments (“the West is Russophobic,” “even worse than Russia,” “Ukrainians have been brainwashed by the West, we must save them,” “Ukrainians are traitors and Nazis who must be punished,” etc.). Russians — many of whom are already inclined to accept much of the Kremlin’s policies by default — can then choose the propaganda lines that resonate with them and help rationalize the Kremlin’s actions (especially when reinforced by negative incentives like memory laws, vilification of alternative views of history, and so on). This diffuse penetrating aspect of Putin’s ideology appears to be highly effective.</p> -<p>However, the United States and Norway should clearly signal that any undue Chinese encroachment into the governance and security affairs of the European High North will not be tolerated. It should be noted that the manifestation of Arctic geopolitical tension is not uniform across the circumpolar region. Rather, military activity in the Arctic is constrained to various subregions, most prominently the High North/North Atlantic region and the North Pacific/Bering Sea region. In the former, Russia’s military buildup of the Northern Fleet and surrounding forces factors into the Kremlin’s larger geostrategic competition with the West and is linked to nuclear deterrence capabilities and access to the Atlantic writ large. In the latter region, Russia’s military buildup contributes to increased bilateral cooperation with China and highlights the belated U.S. awakening to Arctic security and geopolitical issues on its northwestern periphery.</p> +<p>Third, the lack of a futuristic vision for Russia is often named as one of the main weaknesses of Putin’s ideological narratives. Even if true, that would hardly be unique to Russia: many other autocratic regimes lack a vision of the future as well. But, in fact, the Kremlin does offer a futuristic vision in the form of restoration and nostalgic anticipation: the future will be better because it will look more like the past, and Russia will restore its pride and the good things that it lost. The motif of an assertive Russia is a motif tied to Russia’s place in the twenty-first-century international landscape, in which the decline of the United States and Europe will make way for the rise of Russia and of its partner, China. In this sense, the Kremlin ideology combines both resentment-based and affirmative elements mutually reinforcing each other.</p> -<p>Although the actions and related effects of Chinese actors in the Arctic so far have been rather limited, China has increasingly attempted to gain a foothold and influence in various parts of the Arctic and in different branches of Arctic economic activity. China’s interests do not necessarily align with those of Western Arctic states, though when it comes to specific economic projects in the Arctic, Chinese investments and capital might still be in demand and warranted. The effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 are likely spur more China-Russia cooperation in the Arctic.</p> +<p>The Kremlin also offers a broader vision of Russia’s role in the world and even a sense of mission: helping other countries to avoid U.S. cultural colonization (as in the 2021 National Security Strategy) and neoliberal hegemony (as in the 2023 Foreign Policy Concept). This is not fully detached from reality: Putin’s proposed vision of a multipolar world order has some truth to it, though his vision may contain the seeds of its own destruction, as it could spark resentment and disillusionment if Russia fails to secure a position akin to that of the Soviet Union or of a major global player.</p> -<p>This risk of undue Chinese encroachment into the European High North is particularly acute in regard to the closer cooperation announced between the Chinese and Russian coast guards. China’s coast guard has displayed a tendency for aggressive behavior, exemplified by Chinese vessels recently blocking and threatening a Philippine patrol vessel in the South China Sea. China has developed expansive sovereignty claims over the South China Sea, most of which were rejected at a tribunal brought against China by the Philippines under UNCLOS in 2016 at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. A flotilla of Chinese vessels also recently entered a gas site operated by Vietnamese and Russian state firms in Vietnam’s EEZ. Similar Sino-Russian cooperation in the maritime domain has already manifested elsewhere in the Arctic region as the U.S. Coast Guard encountered Chinese and Russian warships operating together near Alaska on several occasions in recent years.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Kremlin does offer a futuristic vision in the form of restoration and nostalgic anticipation: the future will be better because it will look more like the past, and Russia will restore its pride and the good things that it lost.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>While unlikely in the short term, the Chinese and Russian coast guards could increase their presence in the Barents Sea in the long term, possibly using the legitimate presence of Chinese and Russian nationals and entities in or around Svalbard as pretext. This approach would not be dissimilar to Russian operations to protect Russian nationals in South Ossetia and Crimea. The United States and Norway should be cognizant of this dubious track record and clearly signal that any similar encroachments will not be tolerated in the waters around Svalbard.</p> +<p>Fourth, the share of groups that favor modernization along Western lines keeps shrinking in Russia. These are liberal Russians with pro-Western and anti-war attitudes, who have higher levels of impersonalized trust, and who possess an ability to build horizontal networks found disproportionately among younger Russians and white-collar middle-class groups.</p> -<h3 id="concluding-remarks">Concluding Remarks</h3> +<p>There are simply too few younger Russians to reconfigure the country’s trajectory, even if they somehow manage to resist the state’s hardening propaganda effort and repressive apparatus. In the 2019 census, those aged 15–29 made up only 16.5 percent of the population, and they typically have lower rates of political participation. According to the polls, only about 20 percent of people aged 14–29 are interested in politics, and only 7 percent consider actively participating in Russia’s political life in the future. They follow news and discuss political topics roughly half as often, and vote in elections three times less, than older age cohorts. As a result, in the last decade, despite their growing dissatisfaction, young people’s share in opposition protests has remained fairly stable at about 20 to 30 percent, below that of older generations. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has mobilized significant resources to shape young people’s political thought and social values. While there is little compelling evidence these efforts have succeeded — and analysts have observed an active opposition-minded youth minority emerging in Russian regions — the Kremlin appears to have convinced young people not to hope for anything better. As a recent analysis by Félix Krawatzek states:</p> -<p>Discussions of Arctic security often fail to examine specific issues of concern, exemplified by an often-counterproductive framing used to discuss the Svalbard archipelago. Research and discussions about such potential flashpoints and their related issues are needed to dispel commonly held misconceptions, especially when it comes to understanding sovereignty and sovereign rights, as well as distinguishing between different types of security threats and potential conflicts.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>Across all focus groups, young Russians are united in their view that they are powerless to influence their country’s development . . . There is no positive, forward-looking momentum and participants complain about lacking any possibility to realise a future they themselves desire. The youth of Russia were already affected by this situation before the war. And whereas some may see the war as a moment of national revival and strength, many of those that took part in our focus groups will feel increasingly isolated.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>As per the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, which Russia has acceded to and has not challenged, sovereignty over the area is undisputed. As part of Norwegian territory, Svalbard is also unequivocally covered by NATO’s Article 5. Given the heightened tensions between Russia and the West, Norway must work with the United States and other allies to clearly refute any misconceptions about NATO ambiguity on the archipelago. This work should start at home by cementing a shared understanding of the legal and political complexities of Svalbard issues within the alliance.</p> +<p>Russia’s nascent middle class has been repressed and co-opted by the Kremlin since the early 2010s. By 2018, about 50 percent of Russia’s middle class worked for the state. A product of the growing nationalization of the Russian economy, these numbers are likely much higher today. These trends are further exacerbated by a huge ongoing exodus of more pro-Western groups from Russia. The total number of Russians having fled the country since 2022 has reached one million people, and the majority of them are younger (80–90 percent under the age of 45) and hold more liberal attitudes. Even before the war, pro-Western liberal groups in Russia made up less than 7 or 8 percent of the population. Their mass departure will further silence liberal voices, making pro-Kremlin narratives even more dominant.</p> -<p>Arctic security studies often generalize, leading to sweeping conclusions that do not consider regional complexity and disparate security challenges north of the Arctic Circle. Closely examining specific Arctic environments such as Svalbard is necessary for a more granular understanding of regional geopolitics and how possible conflict scenarios might unfold in the North.</p> +<p>The transformative effect of a protracted war of conquest, involving the entire society in a vicious circle of sacrifices and crimes, could lead to eventual demodernization. In the war’s aftermath, Russians may grow even more distrustful of liberals who have chosen “a wrong side in the war,” or “supported weapons supplies to Ukraine.” Current polling suggests that only 6.8 percent of Russians would like a pro-Western government.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Fifth, in Russia’s case economic decline may help the Kremlin’s ideology-building effort. During periods of turmoil people often need to feel a sense of connection to something greater than themselves, a historical continuity and communion — through religion, an ethnic group, a nation, or a state. In Russia, these trends tend to manifest in the form of post-Soviet nostalgia. When the economy was doing badly (in the 1998, 2008–09, and 2021 crises), societal preference for a return to a Soviet-style economy tended to increase. This was most strongly the case in 1998: after the financial crisis, post-Soviet nostalgia reached levels still unbeaten during Putin’s reign. In subsequent years, memories of the 1990s — enhanced by propaganda as a time of lawlessness and misery — became entrenched. They could be seen as a reflection of what life in the West, under democracy and market capitalism, was like, however little that period in Russia reflected actual Western norms.</p> -<p><strong>Andreas Østhagen</strong> is a senior researcher at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute and an associate professor at Nord University.</p> +<p>Should Russia’s economy stagnate or decline in the next few years, the demand for belonging to a greater community might increase. Westernized liberal opposition in Russia may not be the beneficiary, given the tendency among some of its leading figures (with a notable exception of opposition leader Navalny himself) to reject any form of nationalism, to conflate it with extremism, and instead to advocate for maximal individualism and universal global values. Russian liberals failed to offer a competitive vision of a Russian national community even when such an effort was state sponsored by Yeltsin’s Kremlin. Putinist ideology, however, recognizes a general suspicion of the West and can cater to a demand for an explicitly Russian political community.</p> -<p><strong>Otto Svendsen</strong> is a research associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he provides research and analysis on political, economic, and security developments in Europe.</p> +<p><strong>FACTORS UNDERMINING PUTIN’S IDEOLOGY-BUILDING EFFORT</strong></p> -<p><strong>Max Bergmann</strong> is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at CSIS.</p>Andreas Østhagen, et al.Tensions in the Arctic among great powers have increased since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But the unique status of the Norwegian archipelago Svalbard complicates this broad geopolitical framing of the region.Greyzone Lawfare2023-09-13T12:00:00+08:002023-09-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/greyzone-lawfare<p><em>Russia’s likely use of the SPARTA IV, an alleged civilian vessel, to transport military materiel from Tartus, Syria to its port in Novorossiysk is yet another example of Moscow’s penchant for manipulating international law to satisfy its wartime agenda.</em></p> +<p>There are several war-related factors that may constrain the Kremlin’s ideology-building effort. First, Putinist narratives generally do not mobilize people. In fact, societal political passivity has been one of the main assets allowing Putin to sustain his hold on power. In the periods when the Kremlin needed mobilization (be it the 2022 war effort or support for Donbas “separatists” in 2014), it relied on more extreme peripheral ideologues catering to different tastes — Dugin, Strelkov, or more recently Z bloggers and Prigozhin. As Prigozhin’s mutiny and the subsequent arrest of Igor Strelkov attest, the use of such figures causes difficulties and conflicts within the elite. Without them, as long as Russia is seemingly at peace, the Kremlin can still rely on silent, acquiescent, apolitical Russian citizens, but a passive population will not come out to support Putin. As the Kremlin demands more and more sacrifices from ordinary people during wartime, it might require a base of support that is more active and less apt to pose a threat to regime security. Creating such a base will likely be a challenge. It remains to be seen whether this ideology can actually mobilize people successfully.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Second, while they acquiesce to the Kremlin’s ideology, Russians often express the desire to dissociate from the state. They are not eager to commit huge sacrifices on its behalf. Surveys show, for example, that Russians (and especially younger groups) demonstrate a high degree of individualism, distrust of the state in its practical (rather than symbolic) form, and adaptability. For example, in a 2018 survey almost half of respondents said they prefer to be independent of the state (to be self-employed or start their own business) and about 60 percent would want their children to become successful private owners or entrepreneurs. Even if Russians acquiesce to state-promoted ideological narratives, they might reject them under other circumstances, raising doubts as to the longevity of the ideology.</p> -<p>Less than a week after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced that his government would be utilising its power granted by the 1936 Montreux Convention to severely restrict the passage of military and auxiliary vessels through the Bosporus Strait.</p> +<p>For example, the incursion of war into Russians’ lives may shift the tide. Russians tend to accept state-promoted initiatives as long as these do not interfere with their personal well-being. Polls have shown, for example, a marked decline in war support among those Russians who live in the regions neighboring Ukraine (and are more affected by war realities, such as military raids and drone attacks). If the Ukrainian army is successful in its incursions into Russia’s territory, this might weaken the Kremlin’s ideology-building effort.</p> -<p>This closure should have prevented the movement of wartime vessels through the Bosporus, preventing illicit redeployment of any military materiel. However, as in the case of the SPARTA IV (IMO: 9743033), certain Russian vessels appear to continue regularly transiting the Bosporus with military materiel, in breach of international law.</p> +<p>Third, the deficiencies in the state’s response to the war “coming home,” and its failures to equip soldiers, have necessitated a growth in grassroots communities, such as the relatives and volunteers (especially women) who fundraise and donate supplies to the Russian military in Ukraine — from sewing medical underwear to funding drones. The volunteers involved in crowdfunding or collecting donations for soldiers may have little concern for the Ukrainians being maimed and killed by their loved ones, but they are not necessarily pro-war. More often they are motivated by helping their relatives survive. Consequently, they are also critical of the state, bemoaning the lack of food supplies and equipment that they try to mitigate. These war-support communities are mushrooming and likely to expand further. Russian aggression against Ukraine shows little sign of relenting, and the Russian Ministry of Defense is consistently slow to meet the needs of its own troops.</p> -<p>Using a diverse range of data sources, analytical techniques and intelligence methods for accurate data analysis, this open source intelligence (OSINT) investigation unearths the truth behind Russia’s attempt to manipulate international law to sustain its unjustified invasion of Ukraine.</p> +<p>Fundraising and volunteer groups represent a form of community activism that has been growing every year as an essential response to the reduced role of government. Years of reductions in state benefits and support have inured the population to the reality of Russia as an “empire of austerity.” Even mobilized soldiers accept that the state will provide only mediocre and insufficient equipment, medicine, and conditions: “no one will take care of you except yourself” is a maxim that applies just as well to those fighting a war at the state’s request as to pensioners struggling to access healthcare. For now, fundraising or volunteering helps stabilize the regime because it allows people to substitute for the deficiencies of the state. However, in the long term their self-organizing capacity represents one of the challenges for the Kremlin, because it could be put to different uses in the future, should a different popular political force emerge.</p> -<h3 id="to-and-from-russia-with-love">To and from Russia, with Love</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RGP2c7Z.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ Russian volunteers prepare a camouflage for helmets planned to be sent to the Russian army fighting in Ukraine, September 2023.</em></p> -<p>Automatic identification system (AIS) data provided by Geollect, a close partner of RUSI’s Open Source Intelligence and Analysis (OSIA) research group, and satellite imagery sourced by OSIA from Planet Labs, Maxar Technologies and Airbus Defence and Space confirms the SPARTA IV’s voyages between the ports of Tartus, Syria and Novorossiysk, Russia, and seemingly identifies some of the vessel’s intended cargo.</p> +<p>Fourth, a competing alternative in the form of Russian ethno-nationalism may be in the making. The concurrent official idealization and tangible failure of the state have spurred a popular resentment that nationalist figures, both pro- and anti-war, have used to their advantage. Prigozhin’s June 2023 uprising offers the best illustration in that regard. Ethno-nationalism is a weak spot for Putinist ideology and one that it struggles to fully placate. Ethno-nationalism is a more mobilizational ideology. It could be a challenge to Putin’s ideology-building, chipping away at the notion that Russia is polycultural (as opposed to “inauthentic” Western multiculturalism) and that its strength lies in an innate diversity organized around a Russian civilizational identity and values. However, the rise of ethnonationalism is more likely to happen if Russia is defeated in Ukraine.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/skRsfXV.jpg" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ Figure 1: The SPARTA IV’s journey between Tartus and Novorossiysk</em></p> +<p>Another political force with even greater social appeal is leftist agenda, including social justice and welfare state. Polls reveal that preferred political values for Russians are order and justice, which leaves an opportunity for other groups to exploit this agenda.</p> -<p>In 2023, the SPARTA IV has completed at least six voyages between Russia’s military ports in Tartus, Syria and Novorossiysk, Russia:</p> +<h4 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h4> -<ul> - <li> - <p>14 January 2023: The SPARTA IV’s first voyage from Tartus to Novorossiysk of 2023 began. After 11 days of sailing, it arrived in Novorossiysk on 25 January, where it stayed for 22 days before embarking on its return voyage.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>1 March 2023: The SPARTA IV again departed from Tartus and arrived in Novorossiysk five days later. On 30 March, it left the port to return to Tartus.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>8 April 2023: The SPARTA IV’s next voyage began, arriving in Novorossiysk on 15 April. It remained in port for 21 days before sailing back to Tartus on 6 May.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>16 May 2023: The SPARTA IV’s fourth departure from Tartus toward Novorossiysk began. It arrived on 6 June and stayed until 15 June, when it left for the return voyage and arrived back in Tartus on 21 June.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>15 July 2023: The ship was imaged by a high-resolution satellite tasked by Planet Labs. The resulting images likely show the ship unloading military material in Novorossiysk after another journey from Tartus.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>10 August 2023 (estimated): The SPARTA IV made a return trip to Tartus that was unable to be corroborated by AIS data. The vessel had a significant period of AIS darkness lasting for 292 hours off Lemnos in the Aegean Sea from 3 to 15 August. This signified a change in tradecraft, using much longer periods of AIS darkness to conceal movements. During this period of darkness, satellite imagery confirmed the SPARTA IV in the Tartus port from at least 7 to 10 August, before it sailed back toward Novorossiysk.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>Putinism appears to have a firm ideological grip on Russia today. It springs from two decades of increasingly concerted ideological efforts aimed at unifying Russian opinion in support of the Kremlin. Current rewriting of Russian history — from textbooks to pop culture to faux-grassroots social movements — hearkens back to the exceptionalist grandeur of the Soviet era, or even to the dynastic Romanov empire, and has been an active government project for over a decade. The Kremlin’s attention to education and memory politics, accompanied by a growing emphasis on traditional values and commitment to a great power future for Russia, contributed to the spread of beliefs that resonated with Russian society long before Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wjXL3iQ.jpg" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ Figure 2: 292 hours of AIS darkness</em></p> +<p>This process shows signs of accelerating. The 2022 war marked a real turning point: the protected zones of the 2010s, such as academia, education, publishing, high culture, are now under assault as is the entire “Westernizer” wing of the intelligentsia. The flexibility of Putin’s ideology machine and the simplicity of the narratives it spreads suggest that Putinism is not going anywhere soon and may become further entrenched in the Russian social sphere.</p> -<p>Critically, on each of these visits, the SPARTA IV only docked in Russia’s naval base terminals, despite claims from the vessel’s owner that it carries commercial goods.</p> +<hr /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/aM74noh.jpg" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ Figure 3: The SPARTA IV in Russia’s military ports in Tartus (top) and Novorossiysk (bottom)</em></p> +<p><strong>Maria Snegovaya</strong> is a senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a postdoctoral fellow in Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.</p> + +<p><strong>Michael Kimmage</strong> has wide-ranging academic, policy, and think tank experience. His expertise is on the former Soviet Union, the transatlantic relationship, and the history of U.S. foreign policy.</p> + +<p><strong>Jade McGlynn</strong> is a research fellow in the War Studies Department at King’s College London.</p>Maria Snegovaya, et al.Since Putin’s early days and throughout much of his rule, there has been a deliberate effort at a state-promoted vision of Russia rooted in Soviet and imperial Russian history.Euro SIFMANet STHLM Report2023-09-22T12:00:00+08:002023-09-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/euro-sifmanet-stockholm-report<p><em>Participants discussed the sanctions implementation in Sweden and how new EU sanctions imposed on Russia are challenging the Swedish system.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> -<h3 id="a-trojan-seahorse">A Trojan Seahorse</h3> +<p>In early September 2023, the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies (CFCS) at RUSI, with the support of the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS), hosted a roundtable in Stockholm. Held under the Chatham House Rule, the roundtable, along with a series of one-to-one meetings, discussed the state of sanctions implementation in Sweden. The gatherings included representatives from national authorities with sanctions-related competences. These included, among others, the office of the Swedish sanctions coordinator, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Finance, Customs, the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP) and the National Board of Trade. This event is part of the in-country engagements conducted by the CFCS-led European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.</p> -<p>Russia has consistently used the SPARTA IV as a reliable go-to vessel for sensitive maritime logistical operations.</p> +<p>The discussion opened with the introduction of two key facts: 97% of the Swedish population supports sanctions; and trade with Russia prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine represented less than 2% of Swedish trade. These figures exemplify the commitment of the country to maintain an effective sanctions regime that affects an already-limited exposure to Russia. In fact, participants pointed out that prior to February 2022, the Swedish economy was already decoupling from Russia, aiming to minimise its most exposed connection: oil dependency.</p> -<p>The SPARTA IV’s construction, certifications and capacity make it an excellent transit vessel for large military materiel, and it maintains reputational and business indicators of this behaviour.</p> +<p>Once the new set of EU sanctions was imposed on Russia, the rush to implement it at a national level was confronted by the complexity of the regime’s “unprecedented” scale. This new context sent the Swedish system into shock and the capacity of authorities to respond and provide support to the relevant operators was overwhelmed. Furthermore, the Swedish system was challenged by the additional resource pressures resulting from its presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2023. Under this landscape, Swedish authorities identified a series of deficiencies that limited their capability to implement sanctions more effectively. These are described further below.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/O6SEAoN.jpg" alt="image04" /> -<em>▲ Figure 4: The SPARTA IV</em></p> +<h3 id="the-swedish-sanctions-framework">The Swedish Sanctions Framework</h3> -<p>The vessel is a Russian-flagged general cargo ship weighing 8,870 deadweight tonnes and measuring 122 metres in length by 18 metres in breadth that can reach 14 knots. Its volumetric capacity, its two cranes capable of lifting up to “55 tons”, and the overall displacement imply that the ship could easily transport heavy military goods, such as battlefield T-90 tanks deployed in Syria on behalf of the Russian government.</p> +<p>The Swedish Act on Certain International Sanctions (1996:95) contains the country’s regulation for the implementation of EU and UN sanctions regimes. As participating authorities pointed out, Sweden does not have its own national sanctions policy.</p> -<p>For example, high-resolution satellite imagery over Tartus from 26 February 2022 seems to show 17 vehicles with measurements (approximately 8 m in length by 2.5 m in width) compatible with those of a KAMAZ-5350 tactical truck.</p> +<p>Within the country’s framework, the MFA serves as the coordinating body and distributes responsibilities among the relevant agencies but possesses limited powers. Participants highlighted the nature of the Swedish government as a reason for the particular relationship between ministries and agencies. In Sweden, while agencies sit within specific ministries, “ministerial rule” over agencies is prohibited. This particular characteristic of Sweden means that a minister does not have the power to intervene directly in an agency’s day-to-day operations or instruct agencies on individual matters.</p> -<p>The KAMAZ-5350 appears to measure 7.85 m in length, 2.5 m in width and 3.29 m in height, and has a volume of 64.56 m3. A refrigerated container of 40 tons measures 5.450 m (length), 2.285 m (width) and 2.160 m (height), for a volume of 26.89 m3. The ship can move up to 44 refrigerated containers with a total volume of 1,183 m3, equivalent to over 18 KAMAZ-5350s.</p> +<p>With responsibilities distributed among different authorities and a lack of real coordination power overseeing implementation, the country’s architecture of competent authorities was unanimously labelled as “fragmented”. Each authority recognised its limited competences, the extent of which is still unclear and only now being assessed. Several participants agreed that the lack of a centralised sanctions authority hinders the effective implementation of sanctions in Sweden. Representatives from the MFA noted that while this framework might have worked in the past, it is no longer fitting for the demands of the current sanctions regime against Russia. A new sanctions coordinator was appointed in August 2023 that sits within the MFA, but the lack of executive capabilities persists.</p> -<p>More recently, the SPARTA IV appeared to be loading or unloading dozens of military pieces in Tartus in early August.</p> +<p>Furthermore, the complexities of EU sanctions regulations and the guidance provided present great difficulties for national operators. The Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) noted that the technical complexities and varying interpretation created confusion about the practical application of sanctions. However, the MFA explained it does not have competency to interpret sanctions and struggles to clarify the rules to other authorities and businesses, limiting itself to the wording of the European Commission guidance and identifying the authority that will assume a specific competency.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/b0G7dyd.jpg" alt="image05" /> -<em>▲ Figure 5: Rendering the SPARTA IV’s cargo capacity</em></p> +<p>Participants added that fragmentation does not only occur among authorities, but also within the MFA itself. While the sanctions coordinator does sit with the MFA sanctions teams, most sanctions are managed by different geographical departments. This means that the MFA as a whole does not have the full picture of the sanctions-related challenges that Sweden faces. The limited number of staff dedicated to sanctions at the ministry also hinders its effectiveness to manage this dual task of policy and implementation.</p> -<p>Before its current route between Tartus and Novorossiysk, the SPARTA IV lived up to the claim it can “walk across three seas”, transporting cargo for Russia through the Arctic, Baltic and South Asian regions. Essentially, if the Russian Ministry of Defence needed maritime logistics somewhere, the SPARTA IV appeared nearby.</p> +<p>The national framework thus faces real weaknesses to implement sanctions, but authorities added that these are reinforced by the imbalances among EU member states. The different interpretation of sanctions rules at the domestic level is heightened when contrasted with the varying interpretations by authorities in other national jurisdictions within the EU. This lack of harmonisation has been identified in previous engagements of SIFMANet in other European capitals and continues to pose a major challenge to the effectiveness of the EU sanctions regime.</p> -<h3 id="treacherous-ties">Treacherous Ties</h3> +<h3 id="implementing-sanctions-and-export-controls">Implementing Sanctions and Export Controls</h3> -<p>The SPARTA IV’s engagement in military transport comes as no surprise; the ship’s ownership structure includes sanctioned Russian defence companies and ties to a preeminent Russian politician.</p> +<p>Despite the aforementioned structural complications, Sweden benefits from a robust and experienced financial system on which it relies to implement sanctions, as well as well-developed export controls. Before addressing the functionality of these, Swedish authorities agreed that the most relevant incentive in the country to comply with sanctions is the risk of reputational damage. With high domestic levels of support for Ukraine, the reputational risk of continuing trade with Russia has led to increasing financial and trade disengagement since 2014. Swedish businesses voluntarily decided to sever ties with Russia and impose on themselves high compliance standards – including overcompliance in many cases.</p> -<p>Oboronlogistics LLC, a Moscow-based company allegedly created to oversee logistics for the Russian Minstry of Defence, is the group owner of the SPARTA IV. The company has been sanctioned by the UK, the US, Canada, Australia and Ukraine for aiding Russia’s 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine. Notably, Oboronlogistics’ website features a video of the SPARTA IV loading military cargo.</p> +<p>Beyond these voluntary measures, Swedish banks are obliged to conduct financial screening for direct and indirect trade with sanctioned entities. Representatives from the FSA described banks and their financial infrastructure as strong and experienced in regard to sanctions. However, the financial supervisor explained that other sectors – such as the insurance sector – faced greater difficulties, struggling with sanctions screening, identifying assets and lacking a governance body.</p> -<p>The SPARTA IV is directly operated, managed and owned by the Novorossiysk-based SC-South LLC, an Oboronlogistics affiliate which is sanctioned by the UK, Ukraine and the US for delivering maritime goods on behalf of the Russian Ministry of Defence.</p> +<p>While the FSA is charged with supervision, the authority does not investigate individual sanctions breaches and instead aims to ensure overall compliance capabilities in the sector. In 2021, the FSA conducted an inspection of one of Sweden’s largest banks from a governance perspective, checking the existence of a governance structure and its risk assessment. The supervisor expressed its satisfaction with the lack of pushback from obliged entities, who share the mission of sanctions and agree on the importance of their effective implementation. In this context, the FSA has exchanged daily updates and dialogues with businesses. However, the FSA does not have a self-reporting mechanism and declared that if a business detects a client evading or breaching sanctions, it is not clear to whom it should report the incident. A reason for this is that, currently, anti-money laundering and sanctions are separate areas, and the agency has the mandate only for the former.</p> -<p>Another Oboronlogistics subsidiary, OBL-Shipping LLC, is the SPARTA IV’s technical manager. One of OBL-Shipping’s former shareholders was the Chief Directorate for Troop Accommodations JSC, the CEO and director of which was Timur Vadimovich Ivanov, Russia’s deputy defence minister. Ivanov is allegedly “responsible for the procurement of military goods and the construction of military facilities”, and has been sanctioned by the EU for financially benefiting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.</p> +<p>Regarding export controls, Sweden has a long-running system to supervise military and dual-use goods exports. The ISP is the agency in charge of monitoring compliance and licensing. ISP representatives stated that the producers of these goods have ample experience with the controls in place, as well as the geopolitics involved in this sector. However, representatives from the agency highlighted that with the expansion of the sanctions regime against Russia, export controls now affect companies with no prior experience of these procedures and with which the agency has not traditionally worked. The ISP requires a valid reason from these entities to maintain their activity in Russia in order to grant them a licence, but their lack of experience overwhelmed the ISP’s capabilities, which had to introduce them into the basic legal framework. To facilitate this process, the ISP makes use of its standard outreach programme, which has now expanded its content and counts with a mechanism to self-report breaches.</p> -<h3 id="uncharted-waters">Uncharted Waters?</h3> +<p>Furthermore, for those goods that do not fall within the purview of the ISP, the mandate lies with the National Board of Trade. This agency grants exemptions for those who meet the necessary requirements but has no mandate on enforcement. Representatives from both agencies also noted a fragmentation in the Swedish context for cases where the same exporting entity requires an exemption from both the ISP and National Board of Trade, which as independent agencies need to coordinate with each other.</p> -<p>As it continues to unfold, the case of the SPARTA IV reveals Russia’s continued willingness to bend international law and to prioritise military logistics over adherence to international agreements. The SPARTA IV is much more than a cargo vessel and is not operating alone; other vessels with similar patterns of life and ownership structures continue to illegally transit the Bosporus, likely carrying Russian military materiel into the Black Sea. These ships must and can be stopped.</p> +<p>Participants also emphasised the fact that many businesses operating in Sweden are companies with international presence. Their cross-border operations make these entities subject to the different interpretation of EU sanctions by different member states. Again, this presents a major challenge for businesses aiming to comply with sanctions and for authorities seeking to support their efforts.</p> -<p>Reporting on the SPARTA IV underscores OSINT’s ability to identify breaches of international law almost instantaneously, offering an opportunity for observation and identification to align with political will from Western governments to enforce compliance in real time.</p> +<h3 id="investigations-into-sanctions-violations">Investigations into Sanctions Violations</h3> -<hr /> +<p>Sweden benefits from high levels of compliance in a domestic landscape favourable to sanctions. However, if sanctions violations were to take place, Swedish authorities do not have the capacity to build an adequate response. Participating law enforcement officials explained that sanctions violations are criminalised in Sweden and can be prosecuted with penalties ranging from fines to imprisonment. However, the current legislation does not criminalise attempts to violate sanctions. This will be remedied by the upcoming EU directive to criminalise sanctions violations.</p> -<p><strong>Giangiuseppe Pili</strong> is an Assistant Professor in the Intelligence Analysis Program at James Madison University. He was a Research Fellow at Open Source Intelligence and Analysis at the Royal United Services Institute. He is an external member of Intelligence Lab – Calabria University and a former lecturer in intelligence studies.</p> +<p>In the meantime, Swedish law enforcement requires someone to report a sanctions breach to initiate an investigation but has received very few tips in the past year. As a consequence, according to authorities there are no ongoing criminal investigations, which reflects a low risk of violations being detected. Representatives from Customs noted that the agency has the mandate to investigate and did initiate a process against a company. The case reached the prosecution phase, but there was ultimately not enough evidence for a conviction. Customs expressly pointed to the lack of a formal end-user documentation to prove a crime throughout the supply chain.</p> -<p><strong>Jack Crawford</strong> is a transatlantic security specialist and Research Analyst with the Open Source Intelligence and Analysis research group. Prior to his current role, Jack acted as Research Assistant and Project Officer for the Proliferation and Nuclear Policy research group’s UK Project on Nuclear Issues.</p> +<p>Authorities again highlighted that while they each have a piece of the puzzle, they suffer from the lack of a centralised authority to see the full picture.</p> -<p><strong>Nick Loxton</strong> is Head of Intelligence Delivery at Geollect, responsible for bridging customer and client needs with the effective delivery of intelligence products. He is an ex-British Army officer, having served nearly nine years with The Rifles.</p>Giangiuseppe Pili, et al.Russia’s likely use of the SPARTA IV, an alleged civilian vessel, to transport military materiel from Tartus, Syria to its port in Novorossiysk is yet another example of Moscow’s penchant for manipulating international law to satisfy its wartime agenda.Decoding Emerging Threats2023-09-11T12:00:00+08:002023-09-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/decoding-emerging-threats<p><em>On 24 July 2023, RUSI and Estonia – with the co-sponsorship of the governments of Costa Rica and Vanuatu – organised a closed roundtable on “Decoding Emerging Threats: Ransomware and the Prevention of Cyber Crises”.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>The event took place on the sidelines of the negotiations of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies. The discussion gathered 30 participants (governmental and non-governmental organisations) at the Permanent Mission of Estonia to the UN for a dialogue on ransomware, crisis prevention and responsible cyber behaviour.</em></p> +<p>This fragmented framework also impacts asset confiscation in the country. Swedish authorities do not have the power to freeze assets just because an individual or an entity is designated. They require a criminal investigation, and no authority has been tasked with going after the assets. In a visual example of this, participants mentioned that in the case of yachts, it is the duty of the boat club where the yacht is docked to prevent its departure.</p> -<p>The first part of the dialogue discussed what constitutes the international peace and security threshold for ransomware incidents. The second part reflected on the implementation of existing norm that notes that states should respond to requests for assistance when facing a cyber incident. This report provides an overview of the main points raised during the workshop as well as recommendations for future dialogues.</p> +<h3 id="tackling-circumvention">Tackling Circumvention</h3> -<p>In recent years, ransomware incidents have captured the attention of both developed and developing economies. While incidents vary in complexity, when successful, they can deliver nation-wide crippling effects. As many cases have shown, governments have become a particular target of many ransomware groups, leaving departments, critical infrastructures, essential services and entire local governments unable to function.</p> +<p>Sweden benefits from the reputational pressures noted above to limit its exposure to sanctions violations. However, participating authorities emphasised that these risks are not only linked to direct connections with Russia, but also indirect exports and transactions through complex corporate schemes or the involvement of third-party jurisdictions. At present, circumvention is one of the main concerns in relation to sanctions in the country.</p> -<p>Within the context of the OEWG, several member states have highlighted the importance of recognising ransomware as an emerging threat in the context of international peace and security. While important, this also raises challenges, such as determining when and what qualifies as a ransomware incident beyond the criminal sphere.</p> +<p>Following increasing media reporting of Swedish trade flows to third countries suspected of facilitating circumvention, supported by reporting from the security authorities, Sweden is in the process of establishing a task force to prevent this practice. The risk of circumvention has led Swedish banks to block activities and transactions beyond what is mandated by sanctions, engaging in overcompliance. Non-financial businesses are also wary of their trade partners, but authorities understand that their due diligence capacities have a limit.</p> -<p>The objective of the event was threefold:</p> +<p>In this regard, authorities note that there is not much a Swedish business can do beyond its due diligence duties and demanding that a third-party operator declare in writing that the products it is purchasing will not be sent to Russia. Participants added that large companies – especially those whose trade involves US components – might have the additional incentive of fearing being sanctioned by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control, but this will not necessarily be the case for small or medium-sized enterprises. In the case of military or dual-use goods, the ISP does have the power to stop a transaction and report to the prosecutor.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Share/reflect on lessons learned from responding to and recovering from ransomware incidents.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Discuss how the OEWG’s work should/could reflect such a threat.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Examine how experiences of responding to and recovering from incidents could help shape future cooperative and coordinated responses.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>To tackle circumvention, participants from the National Board of Trade stated that there is sufficient knowledge that it is taking place through Sweden – a fact that is likely to be underlined in a forthcoming report it is due to publish – and sufficient resources and investigation powers should be allocated to tackle this practice. Still, the MFA noted that to achieve such increase in resources, authorities need actual evidence of circumvention – a major challenge given the deficiencies described above. Representatives from the MFA argued that among the reasons for this weakness to counter circumvention are insufficient information sharing among authorities and the lack of a coordination body to identify the real challenges.</p> -<p>While ransomware has been recognised in the 2023 Annual Progress Report (APR) – a consensus report annually discussed and negotiated by member states engaged in this process – one of the continuous challenges for the OEWG (and the future Programme of Action (PoA)) is to understand how to go beyond adding new emerging threats to the list and effectively address them in a constructive manner within the scope of the UN First Committee.</p> +<p>Although not directly related to sanctions, participants added that certain measures currently underway could be helpful for the more effective implementation of sanctions, such as foreign direct investment screening or increased export controls. A participant highlighted that recognising that these issues are interconnected is key to developing a comprehensive economic security strategy in Sweden.</p> -<p>During the discussions, the following indicators were considered when reflecting on when a ransomware incident could cross the international peace and security threshold: scale, scope and speed, impact, motivation and funding.</p> +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> -<p>Equally, representatives discussed the implementation of norm 13(h) on requests for assistance and how to foster coordination and collaboration to support ransomware recovery. The following priority areas emerged during the dialogue: ensure cross-government awareness of the criticality of the incident in a timely and effective manner; strengthen coordination among states providing and/or seeking to provide support to the victim state; and develop sustainable capacities for countries to proactively monitor and respond to incidents.</p> +<p>Among the member states visited by SIFMANet, Sweden stands out as one of the countries most committed to the effective implementation of sanctions across the public and private sectors. Despite the efforts of authorities and businesses to comply even beyond what is mandated by EU regulations, the complexities of the sanctions regime and the ever-changing risks posed by Russia’s circumvention operations pose a major challenge to the success of sanctions.</p> -<p>Overall, the workshop discussion illustrates that context-sensitive discussions can provide further understanding of the activities and challenges underpinning the practice of responsible behaviour in cyberspace by developed and developing countries as well as state and non-state actors. In exploring ransomware specifically, the dialogue engaged representatives in a detailed and practical assessment of lessons learned and the human, technological, contextual and procedural challenges involved in providing responses to large-scale incidents.</p> +<p>The deterrence of reputational risks attached to persisting trade flows with Russia are a beneficial starting point for Sweden’s sanctions efforts, but much must be improved in the country’s implementation framework. Most importantly, to mitigate the fragmentation of sanctions-related responsibilities, coordination must be improved. As some observed, like Sweden itself, its sanctions response represents “an archipelago” that needs unifying. The recently appointed sanctions coordinator must play an enhanced role to cover the gaps in the MFA’s capabilities in this regard. Participants were also largely sympathetic to the idea of a centralised advice provider to alleviate the MFA’s burden and its limited guidance powers. This centralised role could be assumed by an institution such as Business Sweden.</p> -<h3 id="from-crime-to-international-peace-and-security-when-and-where-to-draw-the-line">From Crime to International Peace and Security: When and Where to Draw the Line</h3> +<p>Investigative powers into sanctions violations and circumvention are also lacking in Sweden. The upcoming EU directive criminalising sanctions violations will improve enforcement, but authorities must ensure that they are fit to implement the new rules. Additionally, information sharing must be promoted at a domestic and international level. The lack of harmonisation across member states has been repeatedly observed by this project and continued efforts should be dedicated to overcome the challenges posed by this weakness of the EU sanctions regime.</p> -<p>Often ransomware is associated with criminal groups and activities. Criminal actors have made use of ransomware for multiple purposes such as financial gain, data theft and exfiltration, and disruption of operations and espionage, among others. However, as these groups have increasingly sought to disrupt public entities and critical services, additional considerations on what might differentiate the criminal and national security dimensions of ransomware require further attention. Countries such as Costa Rica, the US, the UK and others have already highlighted the risk that ransomware poses to national security. During the workshop, other states, such as El Salvador and Switzerland, also noted the high priority of ransomware within the international agenda and their own domestic cyber threat landscapes respectively.</p> +<hr /> -<p>For the past two years, member states have reiterated the importance of ransomware incidents within the context of the OEWG. However, the fact that, despite widespread reference to it, ransomware was only referenced in this year’s APR instead of last year’s, is perhaps indicative that there are elements that still merit further discussion. As cases, victim countries and tactics continue to evolve, states should consider what distinguishes the criminal and the international peace and security dimensions of ransomware incidents.</p> +<p><strong>Gonzalo Saiz</strong> is a Research Analyst at the Centre for Financial Crime &amp; Security Studies at RUSI, focusing on sanctions and counter threat finance. He is part of Project CRAAFT (Collaboration, Research and Analysis Against Financing of Terrorism) and Euro SIFMANet (European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network).</p>Gonzalo SaizParticipants discussed the sanctions implementation in Sweden and how new EU sanctions imposed on Russia are challenging the Swedish system.Post-Prigozhin RU In Africa2023-09-20T12:00:00+08:002023-09-20T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/post-prigozhin-russia-in-africa<p><em>Any changes in Wagner’s command and control following Prigozhin’s presumed death do not necessarily mean that Russia is abandoning the Wagner model altogether, given the significant geopolitical and economic benefits that it provides for the Kremlin in Africa.</em></p> -<p>During the first part of the discussion, member states and stakeholders were invited to reflect on what constitutes the international peace and security threshold for ransomware incidents. To kick off the dialogue, Costa Rica and Vanuatu shared their experiences of being at the forefront of disruptive and notorious ransomware incidents. Following that, other states and representatives engaged in the discussion, providing their own views on what should inform the delineation (or lack thereof) of the international peace and security threshold for assessing ransomware incidents.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>During the first part of the dialogue, participants addressed the following questions:</p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<ul> - <li> - <p>Incidents such as the one faced by Vanuatu and Costa Rica have shed important light on the disproportionate impact of ransomware on a national economy and government functions. From national experience, what is the internal “tipping point” when the incident shifts from criminal/law enforcement issue to a national security issue?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Based on those national experiences, what kinds of factors differentiate the prosecution of ransomware incidents within the criminal law from those that reach an international peace and security threshold?</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>What are potential qualifiers that could support future OEWG discussions?</p> - </li> -</ul> +<p>From the Central African Republic (CAR) to Libya, through Mali and Sudan, Russia has been consistently gaining ground across Africa over the past decade. Moscow owes its successes on the continent in large part to one man, the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, who until recently led the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company (PMC).</p> -<h4 id="international-peace-and-security-indicators-for-ransomware-incidents">International Peace and Security Indicators for Ransomware Incidents</h4> +<p>Prigozhin sensed better than anyone else in Moscow the strategic and lucrative opportunities that the resource-rich and politically fragile spots across Africa could bring to Russia. Dubbed “Putin’s chef,” Prigozhin moved from the actual catering business into the PMC business. In Africa, he made tailormade recipes for the Kremlin’s various targets, while using some signature ingredients such as security protection, election meddling, and disinformation campaigns to the benefit of local partners in exchange for deals for access to natural resources, including oil, gold, diamonds, and uranium.</p> -<p>The following indicators were highlighted by participants as potential determinants for differentiating the criminal scope from the national and international security scope of ransomware:</p> +<p>After years of the Kremlin enjoying the plausible deniability granted by the Wagner Group’s murky legal status, the June 2023 armed mutiny led by Prigozhin against the Russian government exposed the intricacies of the relationship between the PMC and Moscow, including the latter’s dependence on the Wagner chief to gain influence and control over different African governments.</p> -<p><strong>Scale, Scope and Speed</strong></p> +<p>The elimination of Prigozhin now raises a new set of questions: How will his demise affect Russia’s clout in Africa? Will Prigozhin’s killing create a power vacuum within Wagner, as well as in the African countries where the PMC has been prominent? Will new faces emerge to assume control of Prigozhin’s formidable multimillion-dollar legacy? And does Russia’s Ministry of Defense, or others from the security apparatus, have the means to take over Wagner’s activities while the war in Ukraine is still ongoing?</p> -<p>The first set of indicators raised by government representatives was scale, scope and speed. In the case of Costa Rica, for example, the fact that incidents hit “hard and fast” with more than 20 ministries targeted, with nine of them becoming severely impacted, clearly showcases the disproportionate reach and disruptive effects that ransomware may bring about in the public sector. For Vanuatu, the incident, which took place less than a month after the new government had been elected, affected a wide range of government entities, all gov.vu email and domains, as well as reportedly leaving citizens “scrambling to carry out basic tasks like paying tax, invoicing bills and getting licenses and travel visas”.</p> +<p>So far, fluid battlegrounds and embattled regimes across Africa such as the CAR, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Sudan suggest that Russia’s appeal as a security guarantor and military partner remains intact, irrespective of the fate of the Wagner Group. One reason for this — as the authors of this piece have argued earlier — is that Russia’s provision of regime survival packages in this destabilized region “supersedes any other potential gains from traditional cooperation agreements advanced by Western partners, which are usually based on institutional capacity building instead of securing the authorities themselves.”</p> -<p>Other participants noted that ransomware, although important, would be more clearly demarcated as an international peace and security issue when connected with critical infrastructure (CI) or disruption of essential services. Given the extensive references to CI in previous Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and OEWG reports, ransomware mitigation experiences would help states understand how CI norms are implemented, tested and challenged. It was also pointed out that ransomware incidents may raise questions related to the applicability of international law to cyberspace – for example, whether such an incident could entail a breach of sovereignty.</p> +<p>However, a series of signs, including Russia’s military shortcomings in Ukraine, Russia’s inability to stop drone attacks on Moscow, and domestic fissures regarding Wagner’s future, might negatively impact the perception of the Kremlin as a guarantor of security and stability across Africa. As the dust keeps settling, this analysis looks at the possible directions of Wagner and its operations in Africa in a post-Prigozhin world, concluding with recommendations for U.S. and Western policymakers.</p> -<p>Such an evidence and experience-based dialogue on scale, scope and speed indicators highlighted the different levels of prioritisation of the threat by governments. States present at the event that have not been severely affected by ransomware noted that there is little incentive for them to treat ransomware as a national security threat by default. Rather they assess it on a case-by-case basis – which shows that despite the agreement on indicators, views differ on the use of the threshold.</p> +<h3 id="recapping-prigozhins-multimillion-dollar-operations-in-africa">Recapping Prigozhin’s Multimillion-Dollar Operations in Africa</h3> -<p><strong>Impact</strong></p> +<p>On August 21, video footage of Prigozhin, allegedly recorded in Mali, emerged on social media, in which he pledged to make “Russia even greater on every continent and Africa even freer.” Two days later — and two months after his failed armed mutiny — Prigozhin died in a plane crash along with other senior figures from Wagner, including Dmitry Utkin, long believed to be the founder of the PMC, and Valery Chekalov, who reportedly managed Prigozhin’s oil, gas, and mineral businesses in Africa and the Middle East.</p> -<p>The discussion on scale, scope and speed is indissociable from the evaluation of the impact or effects of such incidents. In addition to economic loss and scale of disruption, states noted that they will consider incidents a national security concern when they have a “damaging and destabilising effect”, as well as when there is any threat to life. In the case of the latter, one participant suggested that “the impact of the incident matters more than the mechanism”.</p> +<p>While Prigozhin’s summer 2023 odyssey from Ukraine’s Bakhmut to Russia’s Rostov-on-Don (with a brief layover in Belarus) and back to Africa ultimately ended with his demise, it is not yet clear if the fall of 2023 will be fatal for the Wagner Group itself, which has now lost nearly all members of its senior leadership. Following the mutiny in June, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reassured African allies that Moscow would not withdraw Wagner mercenaries from the continent, and sources close to Prigozhin have also argued that Russia is heavily dependent on the PMC’s assets abroad and thus their removal would cause “a rapid compression of Russian influence” in Africa.</p> -<p>For Costa Rica, the scale of economic damage extends far beyond the requested amount for the ransom. Criminals initially asked for $10–20 million but attacks against the treasury resulted in an estimated loss of $38–62 million.</p> +<p>Indeed, starting from the late 2010s, Wagner has become firmly entrenched in different parts of the continent, and particularly in the countries that have created political headaches for international organizations and the Western bloc. The CAR is the most prominent case of the Wagner entrenchment in Africa, where the PMC arrived in 2018 at the invitation of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra. As Touadéra has recently explained, he was desperate to find outside assistance to quell the civil war, and Russia was the only country willing to send weapons and fighters (the latter being Wagner mercenaries). In an interview, he said, “I asked all my friends, including in the United States, including France. . . . I need to protect the population. I need to protect the institutions of the republic. I asked everyone for help, and was I supposed to refuse the help from those who wanted to help us?” In exchange for providing personal security, military training, and combat assistance, the PMC has gained direct access to the CAR’s natural resources, including the Ndassima gold mining site, which, according to a recent CSIS study, Wagner-linked operatives had significantly expanded by 2023. Some estimates claim that Wagner could gain as much as $1 billion in annual mining profits in the CAR alone, which would help the Kremlin mitigate the damages of Western sanctions.</p> -<p>As raised by Vanuatu, small island countries are even more susceptible to ransomware incidents – where the economic impacts can be comparable to those of natural disasters. Other states reiterated the importance of dealing not only with immediate unavailability of access to data but being more attentive to the medium to longer-term impacts such as the one highlighted by Vanuatu.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/bhQ9cEP.jpg" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ A Russian flag hangs on the monument of the Russian “instructors” (i.e., Wagner mercenaries) in Bangui, CAR, during a march in support of Russia’s presence, March 2023.</em></p> -<p><strong>Motivation</strong></p> +<p>In addition to the CAR, Moscow has taken advantage of the West’s absence or contested presence in different regions and countries across the continent, including in Libya, Mali, and Sudan, among others. In Libya — “a potential energy giant on Europe’s doorstep” — around 1,000 Wagner mercenaries have remained on the ground, providing combat assistance to strongman General Khalifa Haftar in eastern Libya in his fight against the internationally recognized government based in Tripoli. By supporting General Haftar, the PMC has put itself in a position to control Libyan oil production in the country’s southwestern fields, thus curbing the European Union’s potential to invest in Libyan energy infrastructure to pivot away from Russian gas.</p> -<p>Some states noted that carefully assessing and evaluating the motivations of malicious groups is fundamental to the classification of an incident as a national security threat. As highlighted by Costa Rica, the fact that the criminal group had been sending messages to the government saying that “we are determined to overthrow the government by means of a cyber attack, we have already shown you all the strength and power” was particularly illustrative of threat actor motivations when assessed in conjunction with the disruption caused and persistence of the activities conducted by the group.</p> +<p>In Mali, the Wagner forces have reportedly been present since December 2021, providing protection to the military junta that took power in 2020 and receiving $10 million per month for their services. Starting in 2022, following President Emmanuel Macron’s decision to withdraw French troops from Mali due to major disagreements between the French government and the Malian military junta, Wagner began further strengthening its positions in the country. The arrival of Wagner-linked geologists and lawyers also suggests that, similar to Wagner’s arrangements in the CAR, Russia has secured mining concessions in exchange for providing the junta with the PMC’s services.</p> -<p>In the case of Vanuatu, motivation and intention became evident because malicious actors not only harvested data but sought to use it as leverage to perpetrate other attacks. It shows that despite the criminal activities of extortion and exfiltration, these actors wanted not only to go after government services, but to exploit other sectors too.</p> +<p>Sudan constitutes another noteworthy case of the Wagner deployment. In 2017, then president Omar al-Bashir signed several important deals with the Kremlin, including an agreement to set up a Russian naval base at Port Sudan, which would give Russia access to the Red Sea, as well as a gold mining contract between M Invest, a Prigozhin-owned company, and the Sudanese Ministry of Minerals. Following the ousting of President al-Bashir in 2019 and the ongoing political-military turmoil in the country, various sources have claimed that, through Libya, Wagner has provided military assistance and equipment to Sudan’s paramilitary forces and their leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo in his fight over the country’s civilian leadership. According to international observers, the Wagner Group’s main goals in Sudan have been to ensure Moscow’s uninterrupted access to Sudanese gold reserves, the third largest in Africa; to finance its war effort in Ukraine; and to build a naval base at Port Sudan, which would only become possible after the restoration of the Sudanese civilian leadership.</p> -<p><strong>Funding</strong></p> +<p>These cases demonstrate Prigozhin’s mastery of exploiting fragile states and governments on the continent, making Wagner indispensable to regime survival and national security, and bringing significant geopolitical and economic gains to the Kremlin. Now, with his death, the future of Wagner is murky, as is the future of many companies across Africa linked to or owned by the late Prigozhin. At this time, any possible answers to the question of succession are highly speculative and problematic.</p> -<p>Representatives highlighted the importance of states effectively prosecuting criminal groups. If there are government links to funding groups that are conducting ransomware-as-a-service or other malicious activities, some participants stated that this relates more to the international security realm. Representatives recognised the added value of strategies to investigate groups by “following the money”. Further dialogue among states is required to better understand the relationship between criminal prosecution mechanisms and sanctions vis-à-vis the framework for responsible state behaviour.</p> +<h3 id="dissolved-or-restructured-wagner-without-prigozhin">Dissolved or Restructured? Wagner without Prigozhin</h3> -<p><strong>Reserving the Right Not to Define the Threshold</strong></p> +<p>It comes as no surprise that the process of “deliberate wrongdoing” that ultimately ended with Prigozhin’s demise was initiated two months before the plane crash. It started with an effort to deflect blame from the Wagner mercenaries in Rostov-on-Don entirely to the PMC boss and thus plant the seeds of disagreement between the Wagner leadership and its fighters. In the days after Prigozhin’s failed uprising, sources close to the Kremlin were encouraging the PMC forces to join the Russian Ministry of Defense, arguing that they had not done “anything reprehensible,” as they had been merely following the orders of their commander.</p> -<p>Representatives also noted that despite the importance of distinguishing criminal, national security and international peace and security dimensions of ransomware and other emerging threats, states might wish not to publicly indicate what the threshold is – and to therefore retain the option of determining what and when an incident meets the national security concern on a case-by-case basis. Determining the threshold might also be dependent on political prioritisation (or lack thereof) and/or level of capacity to do so.</p> +<p>These statements prepared the ground for President Vladimir Putin’s closed-door meeting with Prigozhin and Wagner fighters on June 29. Two weeks later, in a rare interview with Russian newspaper Kommersant, Putin shared some important insights from that meeting. He said that the ordinary members of the PMC were “dragged into” the mutiny and seemed to agree with his suggestion to serve under the guidance of a senior Wagner commander Andrei Troshev, also known as “Sedoi” (denoting “gray hair” in Russian). As Putin explained, “He is the person under whose command Wagner fighters have served for the last 16 months. . . . They could all gather in one place and continue to serve. And nothing would change for them. They would be led by the same person who had been their real commander all along.” The president also claimed that while many in the room seemed keen to accept the offer, Prigozhin rejected his proposal.</p> -<p>A decision to not determine the threshold provides strategic ambiguity for the state to respond to criminal groups or state-linked actors. At the same time, determining the threshold too clearly could signal permissibility – anything below the threshold would not be as strongly prosecuted.</p> +<p>But since August 23, the talks regarding a new Wagner chief have resumed, with the Russian state media placing a reinvigorated emphasis on the candidacy of Troshev. Sources close to the Wagner Group have also confirmed these rumors. Troshev fought in Afghanistan and Chechnya and has received the highest honorary title, Hero of the Russian Federation, for his participation in the military operation in Syria. The deaths of both Prigozhin and Utkin have made him the only remaining senior Wagner commander. Yet the same sources also claim that the only Wagner personnel who will serve under Troshev’s leadership will be those fighters who agree to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense and who remain in Russia. This interesting detail may point to the Kremlin’s decision to divide Wagner into several groups, each with different country or regional heads.</p> -<p>However, as discussed during the event, wherever the threshold may lie, the discussion should centre around when and under which circumstances criminal mechanisms should be complemented by international ones. Further dialogue on responses to ransomware would help determine what kinds of incidents relate to the scope of the OEWG. States should continue to review/share case studies to understand the evaluation and the consistency of indicators used for the assessment of ransomware incidents.</p> +<p>Indeed, besides Troshev as a potential successor to Prigozhin, other names have also been circulating inside Russia, including those of Alexander Kuznetsov, Andrey Bogatov, and Anton Yelizarov, all three belonging to the PMC’s current command structure. Denis Korotkov, a Russian journalist investigating the work of the Wagner Group, believes that the division of power between different commanders within the PMC might be a possibility, arguing that even if Troshev is nominally elected as the new Wagner boss (as Utkin was for many years), he will never be the “manager” of the group (as Prigozhin actually dealt with the financial, organizational, and political aspects of the PMC). Other sources have pointed to a Wagner takeover by the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service, notably via its deputy chief, Andrei Averyanov. At the Russia-Africa summit held in Saint Petersburg, Russia, this July, President Touadéra was introduced to Averyanov — instead of Prigozhin. By contrast, according to recent news reports, for some in the Wagner Group there is still hope that the PMC can exist autonomously under command of Prigozhin’s son Pavel, without it being subsumed within the Russian Ministry of Defense.</p> -<h3 id="enhancing-international-cyber-crisis-assistance-from-lessons-learned-to-effective-coordination-in-prevention-and-response">Enhancing International Cyber Crisis Assistance: From Lessons Learned to Effective Coordination in Prevention and Response</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/CDMvuUs.jpg" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ A group of men in military uniforms arrives at the Federal Military Memorial Cemetery in the Moscow region, where the Wagner military commander Dmitry Utkin’s funeral is held, August 2023.</em></p> -<p>In 2015, the consensus report of the UN GGE introduced a voluntary commitment from states to “respond to appropriate requests for assistance by another state whose critical infrastructure has been subject to malicious ICT [information and communications technology] acts” (norm 13(h)). Governments have been increasingly collaborating to respond to incidents in conflict and crisis scenarios as they relate to cyber activities. Across regions, they have been devising different models and strategic partnerships to strengthen approaches that can bolster resilience, enhance capacities and sustain responses.</p> +<p>The question of the successor will also inevitably impact continuity of the ongoing Wagner operations in Africa. Some Russian experts believe that because Prigozhin was instrumental in developing strong personal ties with different regimes across the continent, it will not be possible to simply replace him with a new boss. “He was the only one crazy enough to make it work,” argued a longtime Prigozhin acquaintance in a Financial Times exclusive. Wagner-linked Telegram channels have also reported that the group is now facing a “very tough competition” from Russia’s Ministry of Defense and National Guard in Africa and the Middle East, as these two state entities plan to gradually assume control over the PMC’s local operations. While Wagner’s current leadership will continue negotiations with the Russian government, it is not yet known if and in what numbers Wagner mercenaries will remain in Africa.</p> -<p>There are different types of assistance depending on the severity, type and context of a case. One dimension of requests for assistance, and perhaps more “traditionally” so, is tied to capacity building projects – concentrating in areas such as the development of national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and the establishment of early warning systems. However, the proliferation of large-scale incidents against multiple government bodies such as Costa Rica, Vanuatu, Montenegro, Moldova, Albania and other countries propelled discussions into a slightly different arena of transnational cooperation and rapid response mechanisms.</p> +<p>Yet changes in Wagner’s command and control do not necessarily mean that Russia is abandoning the PMC model altogether, given that it provides significant political and economic benefits that are particularly important amid the war in Ukraine and Western economic sanctions. After reports of Prigozhin’s death, CSIS’s Catrina Doxsee said that “Moscow is unlikely to dismantle Wagner’s operational infrastructure in host countries, as it would be difficult to rebuild the same relationships, knowledge, and systems that Wagner personnel have established over the years.” Therefore, according to Doxsee, it is more likely that Moscow will install a new Wagner leadership that will be more tightly controlled than the deceased Prigozhin-Utkin duo, and maintain relative continuity of mid- to lower-level Wagner personnel on the ground. A recent statement by a CAR official close to President Touadéra confirms as much, with the official claiming that, even with Prigozhin gone, Wagner will remain in the CAR “thanks to our agreement with the Kremlin.” According to Doxsee, it is also possible that Wagner entities could be merged with another PMC such as Convoy, a relatively new group led by Sergey Aksyonov, a pro-Russia leader in Crimea, and Konstantin Pikalov, who formerly worked closely with Prigozhin and oversaw much of Wagner’s activity in Africa.</p> -<p>Additionally, the use of malicious ICT tools in crises and conflict zones, such as in the case of Ukraine, has resulted in yet another set of modalities for cooperative activities and models that put considerable pressure on coordination and timeliness in response activities. Each of these types of activities, while complementary to one another, presents a diverse yet rich landscape of experiences related to this norm.</p> +<p>Irrespective of the fate of the most famous Russian PMC, there seems to be a consensus regarding Russia’s reputation as a security guarantor to its African partners. For instance, Russian political scientist Aleksei Makarkin has argued that even if Wagner is ultimately replaced with new mercenary companies more tightly linked to the Russian Ministry of Defense, this will not alter Moscow’s current position on the continent. Instead, for many in the region, Wagner has been perceived not as a PMC but as a representative of the Russian state itself. In the eyes of African leaders, Russia, and not the Wagner Group, has been their loyal military-security partner throughout all these years. But besides loyalty, these events have exposed Russia’s inherent instability and unpredictability, stressing for African governments the risks of overreliance on a single partner. Alternatively, for many fragile regimes, there might also be a strengthened fear factor — now that African countries with Wagner presence have seen what the Kremlin can do to those who turn back or revolt, they might feel even more intimidated and sign new security agreements with Russia, making even bigger economic concessions to the Kremlin.</p> -<p>With ransomware being one of the driving causes of some international assistance cases, the second part of the discussion began with contributions from Montenegro, the UK and Microsoft. They all provided initial remarks on how they have been cooperating and coordinating internationally to respond to such incidents.</p> +<h3 id="what-now-recommendations-to-western-policymakers">What Now? Recommendations to Western Policymakers</h3> -<p>Throughout the discussion, participants addressed the following questions:</p> +<p>While the Putin administration is trying to reconfigure Russia’s current PMC model, there might be a brief window of opportunity for U.S. and Western policymakers to attempt a dialogue with different African leaders and dislodge Russian influence. This section lays out recommendations to the Western policy community to take advantage of Russia’s Wagner conundrum and counter the Kremlin’s influence on the continent. For more, see earlier CSIS analysis by the authors — “Russia Is Still Progressing in Africa. What’s the Limit?” — for broader sets of recommendations to U.S. and European policymakers to counter Russian political, economic, and military-security entrenchment in Africa.</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Many state and non-state actors have actively supported other states in responding to and recovering from large-scale incidents. Based on this experience, what are the main lessons learned from that cooperation (what has worked/what needs to be done better)?</p> + <p>Devise a security cooperation package that is tailored to the needs of African partners while still observant of transatlantic values.</p> + + <p>Prigozhin possessed a remarkable ability to grasp key security concerns of different leaders and regimes across Africa and promptly offered services that would temporarily solve their immediate problems. Building on the authors’ previous analysis, for an alternative Western offer to be competitive, cooperation should principled, but less transactional. It should remain motivated by shared values, with Western security assistance ultimately serving political objectives that are aligned with the transatlantic community’s values. Recommendations from that analysis still hold: “due diligence should be conducted upstream through arms control policies and downstream through accompaniment and monitoring — not during the negotiation phase or political engagement, so as to alleviate the sentiment that Western support is a politically motivated bargaining chip.”</p> </li> <li> - <p>How can states better coordinate with each other and with non-governmental stakeholders when providing assistance?</p> + <p>Actively expose atrocities committed by the Wagner Group on the continent.</p> + + <p>The West should continue to expose the widespread atrocities and human rights abuses committed by Wagner paramilitaries in Africa. To do so, the West should also invest more resources in establishing and supporting reliable, Africa-based media outlets that promote local voices and perspectives on important regional issues.</p> </li> <li> - <p>From the perspective of countries that received assistance, what are some of the main points that should be considered for the enhancement of future rapid response actions?</p> + <p>Preserve an ability to act against traditional and potential new threats in Africa.</p> + + <p>Contrary to Prigozhin’s claims that Wagner has been making African nations “freer,” Russia’s continued advances on the continent are in fact risk multipliers, with the most prominent one being rising levels of terrorism in the countries where Russia, including Wagner fighters, is present. According to the Global Terrorism Index, 48 percent of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2022, with three of the top 10 countries — Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — all having some sort of Wagner presence. The ongoing uncertainty regarding the future of the PMC may fuel further instability and insecurity on the continent. Facing these potential new threats implies that the West should retain certain capabilities in the region. This includes defensive equipment and airlift options to protect both Western citizens and African partners in the case of serious violent outbreaks — such as a recent violent outbreak in Niger — as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to disclose intelligence on Wagner’s (or its future replacement’s) nefarious activities on the continent to partners in Africa and to dissuade them from working with Russian PMCs.</p> </li> <li> - <p>How should these experiences inform the implementation of “norm h” on requests for assistance?</p> + <p>Engage with African partners to develop their energy infrastructure and natural resources in a mutually beneficial way.</p> + + <p>As the cases of the Wagner deployment in the CAR, Libya, Mali, and Sudan have shown, Wagner’s goal in Africa is not only to provide military training and security assistance to the continent’s fragile regimes, but to sign exclusive energy and mining deals aimed at exploiting African natural resources. These practices should be exposed to establish a counternarrative against Wagner disinformation campaigns, which argue that all Western activities in Africa are grounded in neocolonialism, while eliding the economically exploitative nature of Wagner’s (and, by extension, Russia’s) own investments on the continent. Recently, Moscow has also been pushing toward the development of nuclear energy to meet the region’s growing economic needs. As Western countries are playing catch-up with regards to energy diplomacy in Africa, it is high time for them to redouble their efforts and offer fair, cooperation-based energy deals, with attractive incentives and targeted capacity building. This approach will help counter Russia’s widespread use of propaganda that depicts Western countries as plundering the continent’s resources for their own prosperity and economic well-being.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>Montenegro provided a thorough and detailed assessment of what requesting and receiving assistance looked like when it was hit by a major ransomware incident in August 2022. The incident reportedly affected 150 workstations across 10 government institutions. Overall, as highlighted during the meeting, the incident impacted CI, public services and other parts of the government, such as the prosecutor’s office and revenue and customs. At the time, France, the US, the UK, Estonia and others joined efforts to support Montenegro in the investigation.</p> +<hr /> -<p>Responding to and recovering from an incident of this scale extends far beyond having the technical capacities to do so. Participants noted the following priority areas.</p> +<p><strong>Mathieu Droin</strong> is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he focuses on transatlantic European security and defense.</p> -<h4 id="ensure-that-domestically-government-entities-are-aware-of-the-criticality-of-the-incident">Ensure that Domestically Government Entities are Aware of the Criticality of the Incident</h4> +<p><strong>Tina Dolbaia</strong> is a research associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS, where she examines and analyzes political, economic, and security developments in Russia and Eurasia.</p>Mathieu Droin and Tina DolbaiaAny changes in Wagner’s command and control following Prigozhin’s presumed death do not necessarily mean that Russia is abandoning the Wagner model altogether, given the significant geopolitical and economic benefits that it provides for the Kremlin in Africa.A Democratic Resilience Centre2023-09-19T12:00:00+08:002023-09-19T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/a-democratic-resilience-centre<p><em>Disinformation and other non-military aggression by Russia and other countries is dangerously undermining Western democracies. But despite the seriousness of such threats, the UK and its democratic allies are poorly protected against them. The UK and the US should lead the establishment of a Democratic Resilience Centre for NATO member states and likeminded countries.</em></p> -<p>Norm 13(h) on request for assistance assumes that countries are ready or aware of what kinds of support they might need. While that can be the case for some, depending on the scale and level of disruption from the incident, victim states might become overstretched in who they need to speak to. Some representatives also noted that sometimes the biggest challenge at the time of the incident is to convince other government stakeholders of the impact and criticality of an incident. In some cases, politicians remained agnostic about large-scale ransomware incidents until they started being reported and/or they discussed with national experts.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Other representatives noted that knowledge of the incident is also crucial if a malicious activity is emanating from the territory of a particular state. This is particularly relevant for demonstrating due diligence. As noted, and as further elaborated in UN GGE 2021, if the state whose territory might have been identified as the origin of malicious activity offers to provide assistance (or even requests to receive assistance), such support can “help minimise damage, avoid misperceptions, reduce the risk of escalation and help restore trust”.</p> +<p>The illegal invasion of Ukraine has shattered European security and marked a new stage of Russian aggression, which has grown steadily during Vladimir Putin’s two decades in power. But Putin’s aim is not simply to take Ukraine. We are facing a dictator ready to use armed force to redraw the map of Europe. He displays contempt for international institutions, humanitarian law and rules of military conflict. He wants to destroy the unity of the West and trust in our democratic institutions. And 18 months after the invasion, there is no sign that his strategic aims have changed.</p> -<h4 id="strengthen-coordination-among-and-within-states-providing-andor-seeking-to-provide-support-to-a-victim-state">Strengthen Coordination Among and Within States Providing and/or Seeking to Provide Support to a Victim State</h4> +<p>Putin and other autocrats pose a long-term threat – and the next US and UK governments will inherit the Ukraine conflict and wider Russian aggression. They will also be confronted with growing assertiveness from China and need to find the right approach in both the Indo-Pacific and Europe to ensure stability and secure their democracies at home.</p> -<p>Some participants noted that lack of coordination among donor countries can often lead to a duplication of assistance and different expectations depending upon the donor and recipient. This shows that even if the offer of support is abundant, a lack of coordination can become an extra burden for victim countries. One of the participants noted that, at a certain stage, 15 countries were providing support to Pacific Island countries on basic steps to set up and run their CERTs. While important, the offer is indicative of multiple funding channels and highlights the need for more joint efforts in capacity building to avoid duplication.</p> +<p>We must arm ourselves with traditional and new capabilities to fully defend our democratic way of life, which is why the UK is adopting “an integrated approach to deterrence and defence” across all domains and the US Department of Defense is pursuing “integrated deterrence” involving all government agencies.</p> -<p>The designation of a national coordination point from the victim country is equally important to facilitate deployment of crisis response support. This could be the national CERT or other nationally relevant designated entities. As the experiences shared in the room highlighted, the victim country is often faced with an increasing pressure of having to effectively respond both to the incident and to external requests. The national coordination point should be able to be “in the know” enough to coordinate with other government agencies on how to best direct external support for internal needs – but it does not necessarily need to be the most technical actor.</p> +<p>As part of this defence of the homeland, we propose a new Democratic Resilience Centre jointly established and led by the UK and the US, and open to all NATO countries wishing to opt in, to strengthen defence against existing and future threats below the threshold of armed military violence. The Centre could also act as a forerunner to a fully-fledged NATO body. It would not only collectively monitor threats and share best practices, but also advise on action and develop new strategies, including military operational responses to counter threats.</p> -<p>The UK proposed four points that should be considered by states in providing assistance:</p> +<h3 id="the-threat-against-western-democracies">The Threat Against Western Democracies</h3> -<ol> - <li> - <p>Whenever possible, avoid waiting for the crisis. Investments in resilience may need to come upfront but in the longer run they are more cost effective than remediation.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Devise models internally and internationally that can respond in an agile and timely manner. As one representative noted, states might seek to close memorandum of understandings with other strategic partners and gradually build their bilateral cooperation channels to have both the administrative and relational components in place to respond to any cyber crises.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>Horizon scanning can help states better understand their own national/regional threat landscape.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>On capacity building and the implementation of norm 13(h), donor countries need to better coordinate given the finite pool of resources. Furthermore, the establishment of embassy networks and cyber attachés can often significantly support cyber capacity building. However, it is crucial that the private sector is involved in assistance provision.</p> - </li> -</ol> +<p>Democracy is the foundation that has allowed the UK and its Western allies to thrive, and the way of life democracy enables is cherished by our citizens. Indeed, for five decades after the end of the Second World War, democracy and the market economy advanced, mostly hand in hand, in countries around the world – first in Western Europe and North America, and then in other countries too. But the last two decades have been a more turbulent ride: according to Freedom House’s 2023 Freedom in the World Index, during the past 17 years, each year has seen more countries reduce democracy and freedom than improve it.</p> -<h4 id="develop-capacity-for-proactive-monitoring-and-response">Develop Capacity for Proactive Monitoring and Response</h4> +<p>And perhaps most alarmingly for us in the UK and the wider Western family, our democracies are under duress too. Many of us may have become too complacent about our democratic systems, taking them for granted and assuming they’ll continue to exist no matter what, simply because we prefer democracy over autocracy. But democracy is not an indestructible construct, and in the past few years it has come under attack in a wide range of Western countries, including the UK and the US.</p> -<p>In Montenegro’s case, the 2022 ransomware incident led to the creation of multiple policies and bodies within the government, such as the Agency for Cybersecurity, and the publication of the 2022–2026 iteration of its national cyber security strategy focusing on capacity building and raising awareness among the government and population. Costa Rica and Vanuatu have had similar domestic shifts that have enhanced the visibility and understanding of how cyber incidents relate to national security. Other developing economies also shared their own experiences in establishing ICT-focused agencies – especially small island countries that are embedding cyber security within these broader initiatives.</p> +<p>Some of the most egregious examples are well-known, including Russia’s efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential campaign through malign-influence campaigns and cyber interference, its suspected interference in UK referendum campaigns, its interference in the 2017 French presidential campaign and its malign-influence campaigns targeting Ukraine. Russia even staged a malign-influence campaign against NATO’s 2023 summit in Vilnius. But attacks on Western democracies take place on a regular – indeed daily – basis. Disinformation (deliberate falsehoods) is disseminated by news sources and social media accounts linked to regimes hostile to the West, and disinformation and misinformation (accidental falsehoods) shared by groups and ordinary citizens in Western countries are amplified by the same outlets and social media accounts. Citizens already struggle to distinguish between truth and falsehoods, and that will become more challenging still as AI-aided images, videos and sound clips continue to make their way more widely into the public domain.</p> -<p>Other representatives raised the point that awareness of malicious ICT activities – be they ransomware or other attack types causing critical disruptions to a state – is primarily dependent on having the proper capacity to identify and respond. As noted, “capacity building is not just about awareness of an incident but providing the infrastructure and capability to respond” in the medium to long term.</p> +<p>We don’t know whether such malign-influence campaigns can change the outcome of our elections, just as we don’t know whether cyber interference can produce such results. What matters, though, is that these efforts undermine citizens’ trust in our democratic institutions. That trust and belief in our democratic values is worth defending as the foundation for our societies. Already in 2016, before the presidential election that year – and long before the Senate enquiry into Russian meddling – 55% of US citizens believed Russia was meddling in the election campaign.</p> -<p>This latter point was equally highlighted by several representatives. Many participants suggested that capacity building efforts often concentrate on training activities and exercises when certain countries are in need of IT equipment. Training, albeit important, is only one part of the solution. Having access to technology and the proper setup is equally crucial for countries to effectively implement and allocate the human resources that have been part of trainings and other capacity building efforts.</p> +<p>But the subversion of democracies doesn’t stop at malign-influence campaigns and election interference. Even before these became acute, it already involved a wide range of other practices, ranging from intellectual-property theft from Western universities and the strategic acquisition of cutting-edge technology to weaponisation of migrants. The International Centre for Migration Policy Development found that Russia has increased the number of flights to Belarus from the Middle East and Africa in an attempt to push up the number of migrants trying to get into to the EU in an effort to destabilise the grouping. The race for a Covid-19 vaccine saw China, Russia and North Korea hack Western university labs and pharmaceutical companies to steal their vaccine designs. According to recent media reports, scientists from at least 11 UK universities may have unwittingly contributed to Iran’s drone programme through research projects. And the UK Parliament, the heart of our democracy, has been targeted by a string of influence and espionage operations, including one allegedly involving a young parliamentary researcher arrested earlier this year.</p> -<h3 id="conclusion-and-reflections-for-future-dialogues">Conclusion and Reflections for Future Dialogues</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Many of us may have become too complacent about our democratic systems, taking them for granted and assuming they’ll continue to exist no matter what</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The inclusion of ransomware in the 2023 Annual Progress Report shows that states see this particular cyber threat as a shared concern. While far from being the only or the single most important threat, ransomware stands out because it has greatly affected developed and developing countries alike. As such, it can bring a diverse array of countries to the table for an informative and constructive dialogue on responsible state behaviour.</p> +<p>Our adversaries and strategic competitors know that to achieve their goals – putting us on the backfoot, dividing Europe and sidelining multilateral bodies, the EU and international law – they have to outpace us in military capability and, equally importantly, undermine the functioning of our open society and our citizens’ faith in it. They are operating deliberately in the greyzones between war and peace, between international legality and organised crime. This was dramatically illustrated by the Russian nerve agent attack in Salisbury and the disgraceful Russian disinformation campaign that followed it.</p> -<p>Additionally, representatives suggested that collaboration and exchanges on defining the impact of incidents as they relate to the economic, social and cultural dynamics of a country could help the identification of common approaches to impact measurement and interpretation. As the dialogue showed, ransomware can have disproportionate effects in developing economies. This is particularly the case with economic losses resulting from incidents. A regional or development-sensitive approach to impacts and emerging threats could positively contribute to further the understanding of how responsible state behaviour and implementation of the acquis relate to development and capacity builidng strategies.</p> +<p>On its own, no single act of greyzone aggression poses an existential threat to a Western country, but in combination, these acts chip away at our open societies’ ability to function and thrive. This matters to NATO, even though it is an alliance with a long-standing focus on military threats. As the Alliance notes in its 2022 Strategic Concept:</p> -<p>On cooperation during crises, it became clear that having the capacity to respond to a cyber crisis is not just a question of technology, infrastructure or human resources, but of having the appropriate mechanisms in place – and being capable of mobilising them in a timely manner. While procurement was often referred to as being time-consuming and slow, representatives suggested that it would be beneficial to have a network or an effort to map rapid-response teams/deployments and other capabilities that could be used in time of crises. Furthermore, cooperative crisis response strategies can be further enhanced when they are the result of a layered process where existing bilateral, multistakeholder and regional trust building efforts help speed up and enhance timely responses.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>“… strategic competitors test our resilience and seek to exploit the openness, interconnectedness and digitalisation of our nations. They interfere in our democratic processes and institutions and target the security of our citizens through hybrid tactics, both directly and through proxies. They conduct malicious activities in cyberspace and space, promote disinformation campaigns, instrumentalise migration, manipulate energy supplies and employ economic coercion. These actors are also at the forefront of a deliberate effort to undermine multilateral norms and institutions and promote authoritarian models of governance.”</p> +</blockquote> -<p>As the dialogue highlighted, a thorough discussion on ransomware can help untangle some important challenges facing the OEWG and broader international cyber cooperation – that is, what distinguishes a criminal approach from an international security approach; how crisis response and other international assistance experience can help inform future or existing norms; what kinds of capacities are required/expected in conducting response activities.</p> +<p>Defending our countries against such threats should be NATO’s fourth pillar, alongside deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. Indeed, the Alliance’s members must build societal resilience into every aspect of government and civil society. That’s why integrated defence and deterrence are indispensable.</p> -<p>Having a facilitated platform for exchange where stakeholders can participate and bring practical inputs is particularly useful to complement governments’ experiences in handling large-scale incidents. The OEWG, PoA and other multistakeholder spaces can and should support that continuation at the international level. An emerging model for non-political information exchange can help build trust, enhance transparency over responsible state behaviour, and serve as an example for other cyber-related international security threats.</p> +<p>In recent years, different NATO member states and partners have launched agencies and initiatives including Finland’s Hybrid Centre of Excellence, Sweden’s Psychological Defense Agency, Australia’s University Foreign Interference Taskforce, the UK Research and Innovation Agency’s Trusted Research initiative and the UK government’s Counter Disinformation Unit. In the US, if adopted, the Gray Zone Defense Assessment Act proposed by four Republican and Democratic members of the House of Representatives will, among other things, require the US Secretary of State and the US Director of National Intelligence to conduct an annual assessment of the greyzone threats posed by regimes hostile to the West. In April last year, the House passed a resolution introduced by Representatives Mike Turner and Gerry Connolly – two former presidents of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly – calling on NATO to establish a centre for democratic resilience at its headquarters. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly has also endorsed the proposal.</p> -<hr /> +<p>At the Vilnius Summit this July, NATO’s member states built on Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty – its so-called resilience article – and agreed on a set of “Alliance Resilience Objectives”. Resilience, the Allies said in their final communiqué:</p> -<p><strong>Louise Marie Hurel</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Cyber team at RUSI. Her research interests include incident response, cyber capacity building, cyber diplomacy and non-governmental actors’ engagement in cyber security.</p>Louise Marie HurelOn 24 July 2023, RUSI and Estonia – with the co-sponsorship of the governments of Costa Rica and Vanuatu – organised a closed roundtable on “Decoding Emerging Threats: Ransomware and the Prevention of Cyber Crises”.Coop. In Great Power Rivalry2023-09-11T12:00:00+08:002023-09-11T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/cooperation-in-great-power-rivalry<p><em>As one of the most harrowing crises in human history wound down over the Russian installation of missiles in Cuba, Nikita Khrushchev, the chairman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, wrote to President John F. Kennedy: “There is no evil without good. Evil has brought some good. The good is that now people have felt more tangibly the breathing of the burning flames of thermonuclear war and have a more clear realization of the threat looming over them if the arms race is not stopped.”</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>But arms alone were not on Khrushchev’s mind. “The people of the world,” he wrote in another letter, “expect from us energetic efforts aimed at the solution of urgent problems.” In these personal letters, Khrushchev beseeched the president and specified the issues that merited attention — including a nuclear test ban, the dissolution of hostile blocs, the peaceful settlement of differences over Germany, the threat of nuclear proliferation, and the admission of the People’s Republic of China into the United Nations.</em></p> +<blockquote> + <p>“… [is] an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and the effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks, and vital in our efforts to safeguard our societies, our populations and our shared values.”</p> +</blockquote> -<p>On June 10, 1963, President Kennedy responded publicly with one of the most eloquent speeches of his presidency. He began by addressing a topic “on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth is too rarely perceived.” The topic, he emphasized, was world peace. Peace had to be “the rational end of rational men.” And Americans had a vital stake in recognizing the legitimate security interests of their greatest adversary, the Soviet Union, even while they pursued their own interests and kept true to their own values. Kennedy then announced a series of steps he would take to mitigate tensions, open communication with the Kremlin, invigorate disarmament talks, prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and modulate harm to the environment. Nothing he would do, Kennedy emphasized, would endanger U.S. allies or injure U.S. interests.</p> +<p>They continued:</p> -<p>President Kennedy realized — as did Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard M. Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan — that in the midst of competition with a great power rival and an ideological foe, cooperation could augment U.S. wellbeing and security. Cooperation could boost U.S. interests, underscore American values, and enhance the country’s long-term ability to compete while showing sensitivity to an adversary’s vital interests and catering to the yearnings of people everywhere for peace. Rivalry, policymakers grasped, was not the end in itself. The Soviet Union had to be contained, but peace, prosperity, and freedom of the American people were the overriding goals; competitive impulses must not hinder concrete objectives.</p> +<blockquote> + <p>“The Resilience Objectives will strengthen NATO and Allied preparedness against strategic shocks and disruptions. They will boost our national and collective ability to ensure continuity of government and of essential services to our populations, and enable civil support to military operations, in peace, crisis and conflict. Allies will use these objectives to guide the development of their national goals and implementation plans, consistent with their respective national risk profile. We will also work towards identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies, including with respect to our critical infrastructure, supply chains and health systems.”</p> +</blockquote> -<p>Throughout the Cold War, without losing sight of the fundamental rivalry, U.S. presidents grasped the value of modulating competition and seeking cooperation with the Soviet Union in order to serve U.S. interests and values. They recognized that they must avoid nuclear conflict; control the spread of atomic weapons; preserve order; and promote the fiscal, financial, and economic health of the United States. In order to achieve these ends, cooperation assumed various forms, from formal agreements to informal understandings. U.S. officials signed numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties with the Soviet Union, including the Austrian State Treaty (1955), the Lacy-Zarubin cultural agreement (1958), the Antarctic Treaty (1959), the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), the Seabed Treaty (1971), the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on the High Seas and the Air Space Above Them (1972), the SALT and ABM treaties (1972), the Helsinki Accords (1975), and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (1987). The aims of these were to mitigate the arms race, modulate sources of friction, lessen the chances of confrontation, address shared problems, and build trust and understanding. U.S. policymakers also managed their containment policy adroitly to avoid challenging the adversary in areas that Kremlin leaders deemed vital to their security. In return, Soviet officials learned not to cross the United States’ own red lines — as Khrushchev did when he tried to sneak missiles into Cuba. Never again during the Cold War would Soviet leaders try to put nuclear weapons on the U.S. periphery; tacitly and informally, Kennedy returned the favor by secretly withdrawing U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey.</p> +<p>Democracies are worth defending – and must be determined to defend themselves. This is embedded at the heart of NATO, with its founding treaty enshrining the values of democracy, freedom, peace, the rule of law and collective security. It embodies UK and US internationalism at its best.</p> -<h3 id="the-onset-of-the-cold-war">The Onset of the Cold War</h3> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Our values, institutions and free and fair elections are what sets us apart from non-democratic countries, and they are as important to protect as our territory</code></em></strong></p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="competing-and-learning">Competing and Learning</h4> -</blockquote> +<p>Yet NATO still lacks a central site to aid member states’ democratic resilience. (NATO has a Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga and an Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Vilnius, but these are set up to have an academic focus, not an operational one.) Through such a centre, countries could share best practices and threat evaluations, collectively monitor threats, and develop new strategies – including military strategies with operational responses – to counter them.</p> + +<h3 id="a-democratic-resilience-centre">A Democratic Resilience Centre</h3> + +<p>We propose a Democratic Resilience Centre jointly established and led by the UK and the US, and open to all NATO member states wishing to opt in. The Centre would help participating countries strengthen their defence against existing and future threats below the threshold of armed military violence. Its mission should be to protect the wider Western alliance’s democratic values, political institutions, elections and open societies, which are the basis of the freedom and opportunities that our citizens prize. The Centre, which could be housed at the National Defense University in Washington or at a UK institution such as RUSI or the UK Defence Academy, would be open to any ally or partner, and its core staff would be drawn from civil servants and military and intelligence officials from participating countries, working there on rotation or secondment from their home institutions. They could be joined by experts from academia, think tanks, NGOs and the private sector.</p> + +<p>In practical terms, the Centre would collect and share best practices and other crucial knowledge (including national case studies) among participating countries. Such expertise can come not just from different parts of a country but from countries otherwise considered weak, either because they’re small or have a fragile economy or because they face extremely serious threats. Montenegro, for example, has experiences with Russian systematic subversion that others could learn from.</p> + +<p>This body of knowledge would include both the threats themselves and the military strategies and operational responses required to counter them. In addition to assembling and sharing expertise, the Centre would also be able to assist participating countries in identifying greyzone aggression by adversaries and proxies and – if asked – to advise them on suitable response strategies. Such operational responses stand to become a crucial resource that allies can adapt and adopt. The Centre would also be able to monitor operations, document and analyse them in real time, and arm our legislators, armed forces, law enforcement, emergency services, educators and information regulators with tools to improve our societies’ resilience to such activities and to fight back using methods appropriate for democracies. The Centre would not only signal to our rivals and adversaries that we will defend ourselves against all forms of aggression, but also set an example to allies who have so far refused to take this threat seriously.</p> + +<p>The Centre would, in other words, focus on threats that are extremely serious but have until now been so hard to quickly identify and classify that they have mostly gone unaddressed. Our countries should be on high alert ahead of the next UK general election and the US presidential election in 2024, and this is the time to launch democratic resilience work together to better protect our democratic values and systems.</p> + +<p>The establishment of such a Centre would require broad political consensus within the countries involved, based on a clear focus on external challenges to our democracies. It would only help our adversaries if such a proposal were to become a focus of dispute between the major parties. This means that issues relating to the domestic governance of elections – for example, boundary demarcation and claims of electoral fraud – would be beyond its scope. Nor would the proposed Centre have the authority to comment publicly on specific events. Instead, its primary focus would be to work with governments to help develop their capacity for enhancing resilience against external attacks.</p> + +<p>The Centre would be consistent with NATO intent but would allow leading partners to move faster than the 31 NATO countries can move together. At the same time, these countries would be welcome to join at any point, and would add momentum and capability to the Centre’s work. The Centre could act as a forerunner for a fully-fledged NATO body that could also take on Alliance functions within the NATO structure.</p> + +<p>If we let hostile regimes’ aggression continue to undermine our societies, we face a reality where our citizens can no longer trust our societies’ institutions, where our companies and research institutions continue to be harmed in ways that also harm the rest of society, and where citizens lose faith in our elections. Our values, institutions and free and fair elections are what sets us apart from non-democratic countries, and they are as important to protect as our territory.</p> + +<p>With threats increasing and instability growing, the US and the UK can together defend our democracies and help other countries do so themselves. The Democratic Resilience Centre could be a community of cutting-edge expertise from the military, civil service, emergency response, preparedness, civil society, human rights, business operations and media communities – and its doors would be open to all NATO members wanting to strengthen their capabilities and keep our countries safe.</p> + +<hr /> -<p>Cooperation evolved as Washington and Moscow recognized the vital interests of one another and accepted, however grudgingly, the results, precedents, and informal rules arising from their interactions, “especially those from their conflictual relations.” At the very onset of the Cold War, even as President Truman and his advisers embraced the doctrine of containment, they did not challenge the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Understanding its vital strategic importance to an emerging adversary, U.S. officials regarded Soviet behavior in this region as a litmus test of Soviet intentions elsewhere — a test the Kremlin woefully failed. Acquiescing to Soviet behavior in this region, Truman and his advisers defined their own vital security interests and identified the western zones of occupied Germany, France, and Britain as such.</p> +<p><strong>John Healey</strong> is the Labour MP for Wentworth and Dearne, and has been an MP continuously since 1 May 1997. He has been Shadow Secretary of State for Defence since 2020.</p> -<p>This assessment set the framework for the initiation of the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe and to integrate West Germany into an economic orbit that would resuscitate a region deemed vital to U.S. security. When Soviet leader Joseph Stalin made it clear that he would not tolerate any Western capitalist penetration of his zone of vital interests in Eastern Europe, the United States proceeded to focus on its core goals in the western part of the continent. Stalin challenged those efforts with a blockade of Berlin — parts of which were still occupied and governed by the British, French, and Americans — and the United States responded with an airlift. Stalin then backed down and ended the blockade rather than risk war, and the Truman administration acquiesced to Soviet consolidation of its own sphere of vital interest in Eastern Europe. Even when revolutions subsequently broke out in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Poland (1956), the Republican administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to intervene. Slowly, grudgingly, the two adversaries acknowledged the vital interests of one another and labored to establish formal and informal rules of behavior. Each grasped that it was engaged in a zero-sum strategic contest with the other yet recognized that direct confrontation did not serve the interests of either Washington or Moscow.</p> +<p><strong>Elisabeth Braw</strong> is a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she focuses on deterrence against emerging forms of aggression, such as hybrid and grey zone threats. She is also a columnist with Foreign Policy, where she writes on national security and the globalised economy.</p>John Healey and Elisabeth BrawDisinformation and other non-military aggression by Russia and other countries is dangerously undermining Western democracies. But despite the seriousness of such threats, the UK and its democratic allies are poorly protected against them. The UK and the US should lead the establishment of a Democratic Resilience Centre for NATO member states and likeminded countries.Seller’s Remorse2023-09-18T12:00:00+08:002023-09-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/sellers-remorse<p><em>Russia’s role as a major global arms supplier is under threat. This report analyzes how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the concomitant Western sanctions have affected the status of its role.</em> <excerpt></excerpt> <em>The Russian arms export industry has been declining in its international competitiveness since the early 2010s due to previous packages of Western sanctions aimed at deterring third countries from purchasing Russian weapons, as well as the efforts by China and India to strengthen their domestic arms production. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent sanctions have aggravated these issues by straining Russia’s defense production capacity, negatively affecting the reputation of Russian arms, and complicating payment options for the Kremlin’s existing customers. Russia is struggling to meet its arms sales commitment to its partners, calling into question its reliability.</em></p> -<p>This was highlighted during the Korean War, when the United States intervened militarily on the peninsula to thwart North Korea’s aggression against South Korea — an action that was interpreted in Washington as orchestrated by the Kremlin and designed to expand Communist influence and Soviet power. Yet when the new Communist regime in China intervened to aid North Korea, Truman and Eisenhower did not attack China directly lest Washington provoke Stalin to aid his new ally in Beijing. At the same time, Stalin tried to shroud his assistance to his Communist allies lest he provoke U.S. retaliation and a worldwide conflagration. Both Moscow and Washington were learning informal rules of behavior and carefully assessing the core interests and sensibilities of the other to avert a third world war. Such an outcome, leaders in both nations grasped, did not serve anyone’s interest. Prudent behavior had to temper strategic competition lest the competition itself undercut the most vital interests of both nations: avoiding World War III.</p> +<p>While Moscow still retains its competitiveness in areas such as missile and air defense systems, aircraft, armored vehicles, naval systems, and engines, recent trends suggest that Russian arms exports in virtually all of these major weapons categories will decline. Available evidence also signals that Russia’s biggest customers, including India and China, will most likely become less reliant on Russian arms exports due to ongoing import substitution and diversification efforts in these countries, which have been strengthened since 2022 because of the growing instability of Russia’s defense industrial base affecting Russian arms deliveries worldwide. Therefore, Russia will struggle to compete for sales in the high-value market for advanced military systems. However, Moscow will likely continue to maintain its strong position in the lower-cost market, as Russian systems remain widely used, relatively reliable, and not cost prohibitive. While those deliveries will likely have little monetary value and thus limited ability to insulate Russia’s declining arms export industry, they will continue to bring diplomatic benefits to the Kremlin, particularly in Africa.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Slowly, grudgingly, the two adversaries acknowledged the vital interests of one another and labored to establish formal and informal rules of behavior.</code></em></strong></p> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>Nonetheless, the strategic competition assumed a dynamic of its own as both sides believed they were engaged in an existential ideological struggle for the soul of humankind. No document better illustrated the U.S. view of the competition than NSC 68, the national security strategy statement written by Truman’s key advisers in the winter and spring of 1950, just preceding the outbreak of fighting in Korea. Paul Nitze, the head of the policy planning staff at the Department of State, was the principal author of that document. He believed that the Kremlin lusted for world domination and that the United States needed to reckon with the new totalitarian threat, a threat more dangerous to democratic capitalism than anything previously encountered. Nitze and his colleagues urged a massive military buildup of conventional and strategic weapons, including the development of a hydrogen bomb. They dwelled on the recent Soviet explosion of an atomic warhead and predicted that the Kremlin would have an arsenal of 200 atomic bombs by the mid-1950s. Nitze acknowledged that this buildup did not portend premeditated Soviet aggression. He worried, however, that Soviet atomic capabilities might neutralize the diplomatic shadows heretofore cast by the U.S. atomic monopoly. Enemies and allies might doubt U.S. willingness to risk nuclear war over limited issues (like the blockade of Berlin). Nitze believed that the United States had to undertake a host of risky new initiatives, like rearming West Germany and bringing it into the European Defense Community, signing a peace treaty with Japan, and thwarting the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia. These actions, Nitze insisted, required “an adequate military shield under which they can develop.” He wrote that “without superior aggregate military strength, in being and readily mobilizable, a policy of containment — which is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion — is no more than a policy of bluff.</p> +<p>This report examines historical trends in Russia’s arms exports, including the impacts of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions regime on its arms sales globally. Recent trends have not been favorable to Moscow. It has been losing old markets, and its weapons have become less desirable to potential purchasers due in part to new, technologically superior alternatives. While Moscow has generally been considered the second-largest arms exporter following the United States, recent data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that France surpassed Russia in the years 2021 and 2022 as the world’s second-largest arms exporter, and China may also outstrip Russia in the near future.</p> -<p>NSC 68 inaugurated a radical shift in U.S. military expenditures and catalyzed a vast acceleration of U.S. strategic air and atomic capabilities. The U.S. military budget more than tripled in a few short years and the number of atomic warheads in its arsenal increased from 110 in 1948 to 369 in 1950, then to 1436 in 1953. “The United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in a struggle for preponderant power,” insisted Truman’s policy planning staff. “To seek less than preponderant power would be to opt for defeat. Preponderant power must be the object of US policy.”</p> +<p>Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has dramatically accelerated these trends by putting an additional strain on its industrial base and technological capacity, damaging the reputation of Russian weapons as high-quality and durable products and undermining its credibility as a reliable arms supplier. While Moscow will likely remain a major arms exporter in the next few years, its international position will keep deteriorating. Russia’s decline in global market share, however, predates the war in Ukraine. U.S. sanctions against the Russian defense sector after 2014 and the implementation of the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) increased the potential costs — both economic and diplomatic — of buying Russian arms. Now, with the need to sustain a massive war effort in the face of unprecedented Western sanctions, Russia’s defense industrial capacity has been significantly strained — the Kremlin has even been forced to buy back Russian-made weapons systems, spare parts, and components from some of its purchasing countries.</p> -<h3 id="the-trajectory-of-cooperation-across-the-cold-war">The Trajectory of Cooperation across the Cold War</h3> +<p>Thus, it is likely that Moscow’s share of the global arms market will deteriorate further. This has significant foreign policy ramifications for Russia and other arms-producing countries. Arms sales have been a major tool of Russian foreign policy, as the sale of weapons to another countries helps build longer-term strategic partnerships. Former U.S. assistant secretary of state Andrew Shapiro outlined the critical role arms transfers can play in binding countries:</p> <blockquote> - <h4 id="ideas-and-initiatives">Ideas and Initiatives</h4> + <p>One way to conceptualize the transfer of an advanced defense system, such as a fighter aircraft, is to think about the sale of a new smartphone. When someone buys a smartphone, they are not simply buying a piece of hardware; they are buying a system that includes the operating system; the system’s software for email, photos, and music; as well as access to many other available applications. Therefore, an individual is in fact entering into a relationship with a particular smartphone company over the life of that phone. Similarly, when a country buys a fighter jet or other advanced defense system from a U.S. company, they are not just getting the hardware; they are buying a larger system, one that will need to be updated and repaired throughout its lifespan, which in the case of a fighter jet can be as long as 40 years. This means that in purchasing the hardware, the buyer is actually committing to a broader long-term relationship with the United States.</p> </blockquote> -<h4 id="the-eisenhower-administration">The Eisenhower Administration</h4> +<p>Similarly, Russian arms sales have helped cement the Kremlin’s relationships around the world. For instance, a major reason for Indian reticence to sanction or critique Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is that New Delhi and Moscow have a long-term diplomatic partnership rooted in India’s dependence on Russia’s defense sector.</p> + +<p>Indeed, for years, Russia has serviced both ends of the global arms market. It has produced high-end systems, such as advanced aircraft, air defense, and modern battle tanks for its larger and wealthier clients, while also being the supplier of choice to the lower-end market, producing relatively inexpensive, yet reliable systems to lower-income countries. This report highlights that Russia is getting squeezed out of the higher-end market, as sanctions, questions of reliability and performance, and doubts about the existing Russian production capacity are causing the Kremlin to lose its international market share. However, Moscow may prove more resilient at the lower end of the market. Russia’s ability to provide low-quality weapons systems and its willingness to do so with limited strings attached, especially related to human rights and end-use requirements, can make it an attractive partner, particularly to conflict-affected countries and autocratic regimes, including in Africa. Additionally, the militaries of many countries often have a long history of engagement with the Russian or Soviet defense industrial sector and have immense familiarity with Russian-origin equipment. While the Russian defense industry is expected to struggle to supply its forces fighting in Ukraine, the diplomatic importance of maintaining defense industrial ties, particularly with African states and other long-standing partners, will likely ensure that Moscow will continue to meet the demands of its loyal customers.</p> + +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Russia is getting squeezed out of the higher-end market, as sanctions, questions of reliability and performance, and doubts about the existing Russian production capacity are causing the Kremlin to lose its international market share.</code></em></strong></p> + +<p>Moreover, Western nations, which often produce expensive, higher-end systems, are not well positioned to take advantage of the market gap. The U.S. defense industry, for instance, focuses its efforts on meeting the high-end needs of the U.S. military and rarely focuses on lower-cost systems. The United States, in contrast to Russia and other competitors, also does not have flexible financing mechanisms for lower- or middle-income countries. Instead, it provides security assistance in the form of grants that are used to procure from the U.S. defense companies. However, this funding is rarely flexible enough to seize new opportunities, as it would have to be redirected from one recipient country to another, forcing difficult trade-offs. Congress could allocate more funding to the Department of State, which oversees the Foreign Military Financing program, or the Department of Defense, which in the last decade has established its own security assistance funding program. But U.S. transfers come with conditions attached, and, inevitably, Russia provides weapons to countries to which the United States will be unwilling to transfer weapons. Nevertheless, there may be opportunities for Washington to incentivize countries to move off of Russian equipment by providing targeted assistance or through other security assistance programs, such as the Excess Defense Articles program, which provides for transfer of older U.S. military equipment to partners.</p> + +<p>Should Moscow lose its dominant position in its major foreign arms markets, Russia’s entire defense sector will be negatively impacted. While revenues from arms trade constitute a relatively small part of the Russian state budget, foreign sales help fund its defense sector and incentivize further innovation. It also forces Russia’s military industrial base to meet the higher standards often demanded by a purchasing country with significant leverage on the Kremlin, such as India or China. Therefore, examining where and in what capacity Moscow will continue its arms trade is central to understanding its international standing as well as the state of its military research and development (R&amp;D) sector going forward.</p> + +<p>This report analyzes how the changes in Russia’s defense industrial capacity, as a result of Western sanctions and embargoes, affect its status as the second-largest supplier in the global arms trade, which it has kept in the last decades. It first overviews the historical dynamics of Russian arms sales, starting from the collapse of the Soviet Union to before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Then it outlines key trends observed in Russian arms exports amid the war in Ukraine and the allied sanctions regime. The report then examines Moscow’s most exported weapons categories and top purchasing countries before analyzing possible future trends in Russian arms sales and making policy recommendations for Western policymakers.</p> -<p>But the costs — both financial and environmental — of that policy were exorbitant. President Eisenhower believed that this trajectory portended financial ruin for the United States. “I most firmly believe,” Ike wrote a close friend in May 1952, “that the financial solvency and economic soundness of the United States constitute together the first requisite to collective security and the free world. That comes before all else.” The newly elected Republican president recognized that, locked in a Cold War with an inveterate enemy, the United States required military strength to support effective diplomacy, but he also believed that fiscal prudence and economic vitality were the foundations of national well-being. In pursuit of victory in a strategic competition, Eisenhower believed it was imperative not to undermine the pillars of the U.S. free enterprise system. With Stalin dead (in March 1953), he hoped there would be a chance for peace. Peace could be nurtured, Eisenhower declared in a famous speech, “not by weapons of war but by wheat and by cotton, by milk and by wool, by meat and by timber and by rice. These are words that translate into every language on earth. These are needs that challenge the world in arms.” If the United States and the Soviet Union could find areas to cooperate, Eisenhower continued, if Moscow and Washington could muster the courage to curb the arms race, they might generate the resources to fund reconstruction around the world, stimulate free and fair trade, and allow peoples everywhere to “know the blessing of productive freedom.”</p> +<h3 id="historical-dynamics-of-russian-arms-sales">Historical Dynamics of Russian Arms Sales</h3> -<p>Rejecting a strategy of rollback of Soviet power because it was too costly and too provocative, Eisenhower sought to contain Soviet and Communist expansion and to explore prospects for cooperation. Under his watch, however, the arms race intensified, new technologies spawned new weapons systems, the testing of atomic and hydrogen warheads approached catastrophic proportions, and crises percolated over the competitive thrusts of each side in Germany, Indochina, the Taiwan Straits, and the Middle East. But at the same time Eisenhower recognized the dangers that lurked in such competition and sought areas of cooperation. He put the finishing touches on a treaty that unified and neutralized Austria. He stunned observers at the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955 when he called upon both governments to share blueprints of their military establishments and allow aerial photography in order to build confidence that neither side was preparing a surprise attack. In 1959, he signed the Antarctic Treaty, obligating the 12 signatories to keep that continent demilitarized and free of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower also supported the negotiation and implementation of a bilateral cultural exchange agreement with the Soviet Union. For the first time, Soviet and U.S. educational, scientific, and athletic exchanges would take place under the official auspices of both governments. At the American National Exhibition in Sokolniki Park, the United States chose not to display its military prowess but to highlight the appeal of its culture of consumption.</p> +<p>Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian arms transfers came to a brief halt. However, exports to large purchasers such as India and China resumed in 1992 and, by the end of the 1990s, Russia reestablished itself as one of the top arms-exporting nations in the world. And while its overall capacity to export arms was comparable to that of the United States (see Figure 1), its overall volume of transfers translated into a much larger amount of hardware exported abroad because of the relative cheapness of Russian equipment compared to Western alternatives.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Rejecting a strategy of rollback of Soviet power because it was too costly and too provocative, Eisenhower sought to contain Soviet and Communist expansion and to explore prospects for cooperation.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Arms sales comprise a relatively small amount of Russia’s overall trade. According to Russian media sources, in the last 10 years, revenue from arms transfers constituted around $14–15 billion per year, or only 2 to 5 percent of its overall exports. But while the arms trade has hardly been a significant source of revenue, Russia has relied on it as a soft-power tool to build patronage networks and advance its economic and strategic objectives around the globe. In the 2000s, Moscow began expanding its role as an exporter of choice for revisionist and rogue leaders, such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. Russia’s arms transfers to Syria spiked from 2010 to 2013 as the West imposed arms embargoes on Damascus. These policies contributed to a successful expansion of Russia’s arms trade by the late 2000s (see Figure 1).</p> -<h4 id="the-kennedy-administration-and-the-appeal-of-détente">The Kennedy Administration and the Appeal of Détente</h4> +<p>However, the upward trend started to change in the last decade. While the Kremlin’s official reports claim that the level of arms sales have remained stable over the last 10 years, alternative sources suggest that growth in Russian arms sales has slowed down, especially following the 2014 Russia-Ukraine war. According to SIPRI, between 2012 and 2016, Russian arms exports grew by only 4.7 percent, compared to a global average of 8.4 percent, a decline when adjusted for inflation. This occurred despite the fact that the global arms trade kept growing, reaching its highest level since the end of the Cold War in 2019.</p> -<p>In his farewell address, Eisenhower did more than warn against a military-industrial complex. He underscored the importance of balance between competing impulses. He stressed that “disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose difference, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose.” He acknowledged disappointment. “As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war — as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy the civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years — I wish I could say that a lasting peace was in sight.”</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9yddcft.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Russia’s Arms Sales Compared to the United States, France, and China, 1992–2022.</strong> Source: <a href="https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php">“Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Transfers Database, June 2023</a>.</em></p> -<p>But it wasn’t. The Soviet threat mounted as the Kremlin capitalized upon its own scientific and technological accomplishments, built up its long-range strategic weapons, and exploited revolutionary ferment and decolonization in the Third World to promote its own interests and ideological appeal. Nobody took this competition more seriously than John F. Kennedy, the youthful Democratic candidate who defeated Richard M. Nixon, Eisenhower’s vice president, in the elections of 1960. “Let every nation know,” Kennedy declared in his inaugural address, that “we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” He was determined to meet the Soviet challenge in the Third World, thwart Soviet moves to bolster the legitimacy of the East German Communist regime, and reverse the perception of Soviet technological superiority stemming from its stunning launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957 and its ability to put the first man into space. Close to home, Kennedy aspired to eradicate the Communist regime in Cuba and prevent the Kremlin from stationing missiles and nuclear warheads there. But the confrontation with Khrushchev in October 1962 — and the realization that the two countries were indeed on the brink of nuclear war — chastened him.</p> +<p>As mentioned above, Russian arms exports were negatively impacted due to pressure from the West on third countries not to buy Russian arms following its invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Subsequent years have witnessed an even more pronounced decrease in Russian arms sales. Moscow’s share of global arms exports fell from an average of 22 percent between 2013 and 2017 to 16 percent between 2018 and 2022, a 31 percent decrease. Meanwhile, the market share of Russia’s immediate competitors grew. While Russian arms exports nearly matched U.S. arms exports in 2011 and were distributed to 35 different countries, they had fallen by nearly 70 percent by 2022, with deliveries to just 12 countries. As the gap between Russia and the United States, the world’s largest arms supplier, significantly widened, the gap between Russia and France, the third-largest arms supplier, narrowed. Eventually, as Figure 1 demonstrates, in 2021 and 2022, France even surpassed Russia. If this trend continues over the next few years, Russia risks falling behind China as well, currently the fourth-largest arms supplier.</p> -<p>Kennedy grasped that competition might be enduring, but that cooperation could serve U.S. interests. Nuclear testing was polluting the atmosphere and inspiring millions of people to protest the radiological fallout. The arms race was preposterously expensive. The struggles in the Third World were portentous. “The Family of Man,” he told a New York audience three weeks before his assassination in 1963, resides in more than 100 nations. “Most of its members are not white. Most of them are not Christians. Most of them know nothing about free enterprise. . . . Most of them are engulfed in anticolonial wars, or regional strife, or religious and ethnic conflict.” They are “not faring very well,” he concluded. And they could ensnare the United States and the Soviet Union into conflicts unrelated to their vital interests.</p> +<p>A number of factors have contributed to the decline in the Kremlin’s arms trade in the last five years, including an increased focus of Russia’s defense industry on fulfilling domestic orders, as well as important steps taken by Russia’s key arms purchasers toward indigenization of weapons production and diversification of arms imports. Another important factor contributing to the decline has been the imposition of CAATSA, which the U.S. Congress passed in 2017 in response to Russia’s 2014 Crimea annexation and meddling in the 2016 U.S. elections. Section 231 of CAATSA authorized secondary sanctions on countries engaged in “significant transactions” with Russia’s defense sector. This provision, while sparingly enforced, still deterred many potential purchasers from concluding big-ticket arms deals with Moscow. Russian officials even acknowledged that sanctions were posing difficulties for Moscow’s arms exports and potential clients.</p> -<p>Faced with these issues, Kennedy saw the appeal of détente, of cooperation. He negotiated a Limited Test Ban Treaty that prohibited testing in the atmosphere, in space, and beneath the seas. Its primary purpose, said the president, was “to halt or delay the development of an atomic capability by the Chinese Communists.” Khrushchev not only agreed that the two governments had a common interest in stopping China’s nuclear ambitions but also that the agreement augured well for the settlement of other issues. The test ban treaty, Khrushchev informed Kennedy, “could lead to a real turning point, and the end of the cold war.”</p> +<p>Turkey is one example of CAATSA enforcement. In 2017, President Erdoğan brokered a $2.5 billion deal with Russia for the purchase of the S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. Turkey then accepted the first of the four missile batteries in July 2019, despite warnings from the United States and other NATO allies. Subsequently, Washington sanctioned Turkey’s Defense Industry Agency (SSB) for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction with Rosoboronexport, Russia’s main arms export entity. The sanctions included a ban on all U.S. export licenses and authorizations to SSB, as well as asset freezes and visa restrictions on SSB’s president and other officers. Ankara was also removed from the U.S. F-35 program. Along with Turkey, the only other country sanctioned to date has been China. In a largely symbolic move, the United States sanctioned the Chinese Equipment Development Department and its director for engaging in “significant transactions” with Rosoboronexport for purchasing two S-400 SAM systems and 10 Sukhoi fighter aircraft in late 2017 after CAATSA had entered into force.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Kennedy grasped that competition might be enduring, but that cooperation could serve U.S. interests.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Despite not being consistently enforced — for example, in the view of its strategic partnership with India, the United States waived sanctions on New Delhi despite it purchasing five S-400 SAM systems from Russia in 2018 — CAATSA had a chilling effect on many smaller Russian arms purchasers. Naturally, there are many factors that go into a country’s arms acquisition decisions, making it difficult to pinpoint the exact impact of CAATSA sanctions on decisionmaking. Nevertheless, the potential threat of U.S. sanctions has given U.S. diplomats a powerful tool to push against Russian arms purchases in a number of countries. In recent years, states such as Egypt, the Philippines, and Indonesia have scaled down or canceled orders of Russian weapons in the face of potential CAATSA sanctions. For example, Indonesia acknowledged that it abandoned its plan to acquire Russian Su-35 aircraft due to the threat of sanctions and considered purchasing U.S. and French systems instead. Thus, CAATSA punitive measures worked best when complemented with other incentives. The combination of suitable, competitively priced Western alternatives to meet buyers’ security needs with the threat of sanctions is particularly effective in dissuading countries from purchasing Russian arms. In sum, CAATSA has increased the potential costs of purchasing Russian weapons and has contributed to the decline of the profile of Moscow’s arms purchasers.</p> -<p>Kennedy was not so certain, yet he too recognized that Moscow and Washington had mutual interests even as they competed for influence around the world. Consequently, the president responded positively to Khrushchev’s request to buy U.S. wheat, knowing that the deal also helped American farmers and the U.S. economy. More surprisingly, Kennedy also reversed his position on space exploration. Heretofore he had been eager to beat the Kremlin in the race to the Moon. But now he told a meeting of the UN General Assembly that the thaw in relations required new approaches — that the two nations should cooperate “to keep weapons of mass destruction out of outer space.” He continued, “if this pause in the Cold War leads to its renewal and not to its end, then the indictment of posterity will rightly point its finger at us all.”</p> +<h3 id="key-trends-following-russias-2022-invasion-of-ukraine">Key Trends following Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine</h3> -<p>When Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963, a more formal agenda of cooperation was evolving around arms control, nonproliferation, space, and trade. Even the friction over the interpretation of the rights of access to Berlin and the rules for quadripartite governance of East and West Germany receded once the East Germans built a wall in August 1961 to stop the outflow of refugees — and the Americans and West Germans did not tear it down. Officials in Moscow and Washington could not admit it publicly, but they shared a common interest in the division of Germany and the control of German power. Each side worried that a reunified Germany might again gather strength, tilt to one side or the other, and undermine the informal balance of power that had evolved.</p> +<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent sanctions have aggravated issues faced by the Kremlin’s arms exports industry, including significantly straining Russia’s defense production capacity, negatively affecting the reputation of Russian arms, and complicating payment options for Moscow’s existing customers.</p> -<h4 id="the-johnson-years-converging-interests-amid-new-geopolitical-turbulence">The Johnson Years: Converging Interests amid New Geopolitical Turbulence</h4> +<h4 id="strained-defense-production-capacity">Strained Defense Production Capacity</h4> -<p>Nonetheless, cooperation was halting. Lyndon Johnson, Kennedy’s successor, blamed Moscow for supporting the North Vietnamese Communists in their struggle to control all of Vietnam. And Kremlin leaders felt, as strongly as those in Washington, that they needed to bargain from a position of strength. Forced to back down and withdraw their missiles from Cuba, worried about the growth of Chinese adventurism, fearful of the ambitions of some West Germans to acquire nuclear weapons of their own, Soviet officials rebuffed overtures to negotiate and accelerated their buildup of strategic weapons, achieving virtual parity by the late 1960s or early 1970s.</p> +<p>Due to the protracted nature of the war in Ukraine, Russia’s defense production has substantially increased since 2022. However, the war has forced the Russian arms industry to refocus inwards by prioritizing supplies for its own armed forces. There have been reports in the Russian media that the fulfillment of some export contracts is being delayed — such as aircrafts for Algeria and artillery systems for Vietnam — to prioritize production for Russia’s own armed forces.</p> -<p>The United States was too enmeshed in the conflict in Indochina and too burdened by the expenses of that conflict to focus on matching the Soviet buildup in the mid-1960s. In fact, after Kennedy’s assassination, President Johnson’s worries gravitated increasingly to the behavior of Communist China. Beijing detonated its own atomic bomb in 1964, gradually escalated its assistance to the North Vietnamese Communists, and projected its influence into Southeast Asia and Africa at the expense of both its former Communist ally in Moscow and its capitalist imperialist adversaries in Paris, London, and Washington. Faced with China’s bellicose behavior, many of Johnson’s advisers now realized that Soviet and U.S. interests converged around the importance of thwarting the spread of nuclear weapons in an increasingly multipolar world. Faced with common danger, Moscow and Washington collaborated to ratify the non-proliferation treaty in 1968.</p> +<p>The lack of excess production capacity has contributed to Moscow’s declining position in arms exports. This production crunch has created additional security risks for Russia’s remaining customers, forcing them to diversify their suppliers. For instance, since the invasion began in 2022, Vietnam, a country historically highly reliant on imports of Russian arms and spare parts, has found its national security jeopardized by the lack of reliability of Russian deliveries. It has sought to increase domestic production, building armored vehicles, small arms, as well as drones and anti-ship missiles. Additionally, Vietnam has begun exploring alternative suppliers of military hardware, including European nations, the United States, Israel, India, Turkey, South Korea, and Japan.</p> -<p>By the late 1960s, officials on both sides of the Cold War realized that they were facing a turbulent new era. Each superpower felt beleaguered by restless allies who clamored for more autonomy, as well as by proud and adventurous leaders of newly independent nations in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East who wanted aid but were determined to pursue their own interests. In Western Europe, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) yearned to act more independently and challenged U.S. domination of the North Atlantic alliance. In the Communist world, Beijing denounced Moscow’s cowardly behavior and disloyalty, while ferment and rebellion seethed in Eastern Europe. Once again, the Kremlin decided to intervene militarily and clamp down on a rebellious satellite, this time Czechoslovakia.</p> +<p>Furthermore, in a radical turn of events, Russia has now begun to try to purchase back much-needed military components and technology from countries such as India and Myanmar. In late 2022, Russian tanks manufacturer Uralvagonzavod reportedly imported $24 million worth of military products that it had previously produced for Myanmar’s armed forces, including sighting telescopes and cameras for installation in tanks. In August and November 2022, Russia also purchased six components related to night-vision sight for its ground-to-air missiles from the Indian Ministry of Defense. This reflects Moscow’s struggles to domestically produce critical defense equipment as a result of sanctions.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Faced with common danger, Moscow and Washington collaborated to ratify the non-proliferation treaty in 1968.</code></em></strong></p> +<h4 id="negative-demonstration-effects">Negative Demonstration Effects</h4> -<p>Soviet actions and North Vietnamese defiance slowed Lyndon Johnson’s penchant to mitigate competition with his great power rival, but it did not end it. Committed to building a “Great Society” at home — a grand vision that included Medicare, Medicaid, and a host of other domestic programs — Johnson recognized that the United States could not easily bear the costs of a hugely expensive domestic agenda while engaged in an arms race with the Kremlin and a war in Vietnam. Johnson wanted to work with Khrushchev’s successors, Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin, to pursue mutual goals, like the outlawing of nuclear weapons in space and the nonproliferation of them on earth. He saw mutual advantage in cooperative efforts to deal with space biology and medicine, satellite communications, and the sharing of meteorological information. Bilateral agreements (1964) and an international treaty (1967) on these subjects were negotiated and signed, and Johnson would have done more if he had stayed in office and if the Kremlin had tempered its actions abroad. On signing the Outer Space Treaty on January 27, 1967, Johnson declared that the agreement “holds promise that the same wisdom and good will which gave us this space treaty will continue to guide us as we seek solutions to the many problems that we have here on this earth.” But beleaguered by domestic unrest and a tenacious adversary in Hanoi, Johnson decided not to run for reelection. His decision created havoc in the Democratic Party and enabled former vice president Richard Nixon to win the presidency in 1968.</p> +<p>For years, the fact that Russian-made weapons were tried and tested in combat was good for marketing purposes. Syria, for instance, became an advertisement for the efficacy of Russian arms, helping Moscow boost its status as a major arms producer and exporter. The invasion of Ukraine was similarly supposed to allow Russia’s new generation of weapons to be “tested in combat conditions.” However, contrary to Syria, the war in Ukraine undermined the reputation of many Russian weapons systems, often demonstrating their ineffectiveness and obsolescence. For example, a sizable share of Russian tanks and other armored vehicles have turned out to be particularly susceptible to modern anti-tank weapons used by the Ukrainian armed forces. Other instances include Russia’s theoretically superior (in terms of technology and quantity) fighter jets and helicopters being shot down by Ukrainian ground-based air-defense systems; the loss of Russian SAM systems to Ukrainian air strikes; and reports of high failure rates for Russian missiles.</p> -<h4 id="interest-driven-cooperation-during-the-nixon-administration">Interest-Driven Cooperation during the Nixon Administration</h4> +<p>While such Russian military struggles may often have more to do with the poor personnel training or deficiencies with command and control, they nevertheless create the perception of a deficient Russian military system and provide more reasons for prospective buyers to look elsewhere. This is particularly true for Russian-made aircraft and air defense systems because these weapons have historically been the most exported arms categories for Moscow and therefore their less than desirable performance record on the battlefield in Ukraine could potentially affect their export rates going forward.</p> -<p>Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his national security advisor, recognized that strategic competition and the arms race with Soviet Russia, if left unchecked, posed a grave threat to U.S. national security. Grappling with creeping inflation, a gold drain, budget deficits, and an unruly Congress, they realized that the United States could not bear the costs of an unrestricted arms race because the American people would not pay the price. Nixon believed that the relative military power of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union had been eroding since the early 1960s and would continue to decline because of public opinion and legislative constraints. He lamented, “We simply can’t get from Congress the additional funds needed to continue the arms race with the Soviet [Union] in either the defensive or offensive missile category.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/Xw5SuDt.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ A man walks past a destroyed Russian helicopter in Kyiv, Ukraine, in May 2022.</em></p> -<p>Seeking cooperation and negotiating a strategic arms limitation agreement and an anti-ballistic missile treaty therefore made sense. Nixon grasped that the United States and the Soviet Union were still locked in a strategic competition, but that each side had reason to curb the arms race, focus on rivals abroad (like China), and grapple with domestic problems and pressures. It made political and strategic sense to set limits and cooperate when competitive gains were unlikely, and when the other side might want an agreement as much as you did. With great fanfare, Nixon signed these treaties at a summit meeting in Moscow in May 1972.</p> +<h4 id="sanctions-and-sanctions-linked-payment-issues">Sanctions and Sanctions-Linked Payment Issues</h4> -<p>Nixon, however, also believed that the source of friction between the two countries was not armaments, but geopolitics. In February 1969, in one of his first meetings with the Soviet ambassador, he declared: “History makes clear that wars result from political differences and political problems.” Nixon worried that smaller nations might ensnare the two great powers in a confrontation unrelated to their vital interests. He also realized that freezing strategic arms and limiting defensive missiles alone would not end the rivalry. “It is incumbent on us, therefore . . . to de-fuse critical political situations such as the Middle East and Viet-Nam.” U.S. and Soviet diplomats labored to formulate rules of competition. At their summit meeting in 1972, Nixon and Brezhnev signed an agreement on the “Basic Principles” of their evolving cooperative relationship of détente. Despite their acknowledged differences in ideology, they would conduct their relations “on principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in mutual affairs, and mutual advantage.” They would seek to coexist and avoid actions designed to garner unilateral advantage. Most of all, “they would do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war.” To this end they signed, among other better-known accords like SALT and the ABM Treaty, an agreement to prevent incidents on the high seas and the skies above them, the aim of which was to avoid accidental confrontations that might precipitate war.</p> +<p>Following the 2022 invasion, CAATSA has been reinvigorated, inflicting further chilling effects on the remaining purchasers of Russian weapons. As a result, by 2023, Russia had a very low level of pending deliveries. Some potential purchases appear to be on hold, as importers fear falling afoul of U.S. sanctions. For instance, while Turkey has signed a deal with Russia to buy a second batch of S-400 SAM systems, no new developments have yet been observed in this regard. The Philippines has also canceled a contract for 16 Mi-17 helicopters to avoid U.S. sanctions. In 2022, Russia made no deliveries to Egypt and its volume of deliveries to China fell substantially.</p> -<p>In seeking to relax tensions and cooperate with their great power rival, Nixon and Kissinger never lost sight of the competitive underpinnings of the Soviet-U.S. relationship and its ideological foundations. While they signed additional multilateral treaties to eliminate biological weapons and to outlaw nuclear weapons from ocean floors, they assigned rather little importance to those agreements. They cared more about the bilateral trade agreement. They realized that more trade might allow the United States to exert more leverage. They knew that Brezhnev desired to promote commercial relations and to purchase U.S. wheat, and they hoped to exploit Soviet economic vulnerabilities and promote agricultural sales that would be popular in the American hinterland. When Senator Henry Jackson linked trade to the emigration of Russian Jews and when the administration poorly handled its first big grain deal, prospects for exploiting this leverage declined. But what all of this illustrated was that détente was regarded as a means to pursue fundamental interests when the United States’ competitive edge appeared to be eroding. Cooperation meant efforts to avoid war; mitigate tensions; reduce arms expenditures; thwart the acquisition of nuclear weapons by smaller powers; and make the seas, outer space, and Antarctica safe from nuclear weapons and environmental degradation. But it also involved linkage — efforts to leverage U.S. strengths against Soviet vulnerabilities.</p> +<p>Furthermore, the trade of combat aircraft and helicopters, Russia’s main arms exports since 1992, also appears to be affected. Between 2018 and 2022, trade in this area accounted for roughly 40 percent of Russian arms sales. But by the end of 2022, Moscow had pending deliveries for only 84 combat aircraft and helicopters, as opposed to the United States and France, which had 1,371 and 210, respectively. Standing orders are similarly low when it comes to SAM systems and tanks, for which Russia has 13 and 444 pending deliveries, respectively. In addition, Russia currently has no known artillery orders, while South Korea, for example, has 1,232 orders on file. One exception is Russian-origin engines, exports of which increased in 2022, in large part due to Chinese reliance on Russian engines discussed in the following sections of this report.</p> -<p>Détente and the relaxation of tensions initially involved very popular initiatives that garnered much praise in the United States and abroad. Nixon pursued détente with vigor because he believed it would redound to his popularity and help get him reelected. But his policies were also a calculated response to French and West German efforts to reconfigure relations between East and West. Those initiatives worried U.S. leaders because they reflected the desires of their allies to break out of the bipolar Cold War international order that reduced their freedom of action. These allies wanted to engage more freely with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. They desired to expand trade, investments, travel, and educational and cultural exchanges. West German leaders, in particular, pursued détente with the Kremlin and with their counterparts in East Berlin in order to overcome the division of their country and to allow families to reunite and see one another. In many ways, Nixon and Kissinger were playing catch-up. In order to retain allied cohesion, Nixon and Kissinger knew they needed to relax tensions and pursue détente with the Kremlin. Strategic calculations — the unity of NATO — required a more cooperative approach to the adversary in Moscow.</p> +<p>Sanctions have also led to a reduction in Russia’s client base when it comes to providing components and repair services. While no country among those that sanctioned Russia was a major buyer of Russian weapons, a number of them, such as Greece, Finland, Cyprus, and countries in Central and Eastern Europe, had continued to use Soviet- and Russian-style systems and thus consistently relied on Russian-manufactured components and repair services. Moscow lost these markets in 2022.</p> -<p>Nothing illustrates this better than the negotiations that led to the Helsinki accords of 1975, the high-water mark of cooperation during the Cold War. For decades the Kremlin had wanted an agreement that would ratify the territorial arrangements that grew out of World War II, including the division of Germany, the borders of Poland, the incorporation of the Baltic states inside the Soviet Union, and the dominant Soviet position over Eastern Europe. Neutral nations in Europe and some of their West European friends engaged the Kremlin in such talks and presented their own desires for more trade, cultural exchanges, and the protection of human rights in all prospective signatories of any agreements. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger were enthusiastic supporters of these negotiations, but they were carried along by the momentum of events. The Helsinki Final Act, signed by 35 nations, including the United States and Canada, contained four “baskets” of agreements. The Kremlin more or less got what it wanted in terms of ratifying borders (subject to peaceful change) but assented to demands to honor the rights of individuals; to allow for the freer flow of goods, investments, technology, people, and ideas; and to increase transparency and ease fears of a surprise attack by providing advanced notification of any sizeable troop movements.</p> +<p>Further impact from sanctions appears through Russia’s lack of access to high-tech components. A recent CSIS report highlighted Russia’s struggle to import much-needed components and spare parts, such as optical systems, bearings, machine tools, engines, and microchips. In the eyes of many current and potential buyers, this limitation creates risks for a sustainable long-term defense partnership. Even prior to 2022, Moscow struggled to develop military R&amp;D, and this trend is likely to worsen in the future. For example, the latest Russian aircraft designs are incapable of achieving the fifth-generation benchmark and have fallen behind even countries such as China. These challenges will be worsened by the ongoing war. Russia already has suspended the contract for the supply of two Ka-32 helicopters to Serbia, allegedly due to Western sanctions and war-related shortages of military equipment. Going forward, Russia will find it increasingly difficult to deliver updates to the weaponry, components, and infrastructure of its customers as long as the sanctions remain in place.</p> -<p>By the time the Helsinki Final Act was signed in August 1975, its critics in Washington were gaining traction. They mocked the human rights provisions, condemned the territorial concessions that catered to Moscow’s security demands, and warned against the growing military prowess of the country’s Cold War rival. They ridiculed the alleged naivete inherent to the cooperative thrust of these accords and warned against the growing Soviet military menace. They remonstrated against the burgeoning financial and commercial ties between East and West Europe and between East and West Germany. They predicted that these ties would lead to the Finlandization or neutralization of the United States’ West European allies and weaken the NATO alliance. Their allegations gained credence as the Soviet Union flouted the human rights provisions, deployed new weapons systems, supported leftist movements in Africa and Central America, and then deployed troops to Afghanistan to support a newly installed Communist government. The Soviet-American détente collapsed. Notional ideas about cooperating with a great power rival were challenged.</p> +<p>These risks are further exacerbated by Moscow’s de facto disconnect from the international financial system, which makes it hard for its clients to pay for Russian arms supplies. Moscow’s current customers are forced to find alternative schemes, including transitioning to payments in national currencies. As a result, Russia’s supplies of defense equipment to India, for instance, have stalled recently due to the fear of sanctions, as both countries have struggled to find an alternative payment solution. While India is reluctant to settle payments in U.S. dollars or Chinese yuan, Russia has turned down India’s request to make payments in rupees, which is not a fully convertible currency.</p> -<h4 id="reagan-and-the-end-of-the-cold-war">Reagan and the End of the Cold War</h4> +<h3 id="top-arms-exports-from-russia">Top Arms Exports from Russia</h3> -<p>Ronald Reagan won the presidency in 1980 condemning détente and promising a bolder, more assertive foreign policy. Quoting Eugene Rostow, Reagan declared that the Cold War was not over. The Soviet Union, he wrote, “is engaged in a policy of imperial expansion all over the world, despite the supposedly benign influence of Salt I, and its various commitments of cooperation in the name of détente.” Reagan wanted to repudiate Nixon’s treaties and Jimmy Carter’s follow-on initiatives. He wanted to build strength and negotiate a new set of agreements aimed at redressing the strategic balance (which he said was now in Russia’s favor) and reversing Soviet inroads in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and elsewhere.</p> +<p>Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has exported a wide range of weapons systems, with aircraft, missiles, armored vehicles, ships, and air defense systems being the top five weapons categories from 1992 to 2022 in terms of the volume of transfers, based on the SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIV) database (see Figure 2). The TIV figures represent “the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer” and they therefore “are best used as the raw data for calculating trends in international arms transfers over periods of time, global percentages for suppliers and recipients, and percentages for the volume of transfers to or from particular states.” Interestingly, per the TIV database, demand for Russian-made engines has increased significantly since the early 2010s, with this component gradually becoming central to Russia’s arms exports. Between 2017 and 2022, engines were one of the most exported weapons categories, only second to aircraft in terms of TIV, and they even surpassed the volume of aircraft transfers in 2022, according to SIPRI.</p> -<p>What Reagan did not see was the subversive role that détente had played in the Communist world. When oil prices skyrocketed in the 1970s, OPEC nations deposited their revenues in Western banks, and the latter made greater and greater loans to Communist governments in Eastern Europe. These regimes lusted for new money to develop industry and to finance their social welfare programs. Trade and debt increasingly bound East and West Germany, Eastern and Western Europe. Cooperation had not compromised Western values and interests but had promoted them by subverting Communist regimes and increasing their dependence on Western economic and financial ties. When oil prices plummeted in the mid-1980s and Soviet Russia could no longer underwrite the economic wherewithal of its East European subordinates, ferment grew and the Communist regimes tottered. The economic and financial ties spawned by the relaxation of tensions and the cooperative norms of intercourse and exchange catalyzed by détente exposed Communist governments in Eastern Europe to relentless pressure and agonizing choices when loans fell due and austerity loomed. The Kremlin would neither support their comrades financially nor intervene militarily to keep them in power. By the end of the 1980s, the East European Communist governments collapsed.</p> +<p>This section examines the Kremlin’s most exported weapons and technologies and the areas where Russia has retained a competitive edge. It also analyzes the impact of the Ukraine war and the 2022 sanctions regime on Russia’s likelihood to prioritize defense production for its own armed forces over defense exports. Overall, current trends, including the volume of pending deliveries Russia had by the end of 2022, suggest that Russian arms exports in virtually all major weapons categories will continue to decrease.</p> -<p>Reagan began his presidency watching the Polish regime succumb to Soviet pressure and remonstrating against the economic ties that bound West Germany to Soviet Russia. He finished his second term as president watching the Polish Communists prepare to relinquish power and observing the growing dependence of the Kremlin on West German loans — loans that in 1990 purchased Soviet acceptance of German unification inside NATO and the end of the Cold War in Europe. None of this would have happened had West Europeans and U.S. financiers forsaken détente; little of this could have been imagined without the work of human rights activists, nongovernmental organizations, and peace groups empowered by the Helsinki accords and inspired by the fear of nuclear war.</p> +<h4 id="aircraft">Aircraft</h4> -<p>Triumphalists in the United States declared that Reagan’s determination to build military strength, intimidate the Kremlin, and subvert Communism won the Cold War. They believed that his repudiation of détente and his commitment to a zero-sum competitive mindset vanquished an inveterate foe. Reagan, however, knew the story was far more nuanced. He realized that strength alone would not prevail. Although he believed from the outset that Communists lied, cheated, and wanted to rule the world, he recognized that Soviet leaders nonetheless had legitimate security imperatives. In a six-page letter to Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko in 1984, he added a hand-written postscript to make certain that his Soviet counterpart grasped his personal imprimatur: “In thinking through this letter,” Reagan wrote, “I have reflected at some length on the tragedy and scale of Soviet losses in wartime through the ages. Surely those losses which are beyond description must affect your thinking today. I want you to know that neither I nor the American people hold any offensive intentions toward you or the Soviet people. . . . Our constant &amp; urgent intention must be . . . a lasting reduction of tensions between us. I pledge to you my profound commitment to that end.”</p> +<p>Aircraft exports make up around 50 percent of Russia’s total arms trade. Moscow offers different Soviet-era and more advanced aircraft to its customers, including MiG-29 fighter jets; Su-27, Su-30, and Su-35 fighters; and Yak-130 jet trainers, among others. Deliveries have historically gone primarily to India, China, Vietnam, Algeria, Egypt, and a number of other countries across the globe.</p> -<p>To the American people, Reagan also spoke candidly along these lines, although all too frequently his conciliatory words were overshadowed by his tirades against an “evil empire.” But the belligerent rhetoric, Reagan knew, did not produce the results he yearned to achieve. In a major speech on January 16, 1984, he acknowledged that “Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosophies.” But, he then continued, “the fact that neither of us likes the other system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.” He therefore committed his administration to a policy “of credible deterrence, peaceful competition, and constructive cooperation.”</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RF3CGQY.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Top Russian Arms and Technology Exports, 1992–2022.</strong> Source: “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” SIPRI.</em></p> -<p>He stressed, “We want more than deterrence. We want genuine cooperation. We seek progress for peace. Cooperation begins with communication.”</p> +<p>The Su-35 is Russia’s most advanced fourth-generation fighter jet to date, often described by the Russians as “fourth generation++,” meaning that due to the extent of its upgrades the plane’s attributes have been pushed well beyond standard fourth-generation capabilities. Yet, even before the February 2022 invasion, the Kremlin was having difficulty finding buyers for its Su-35, in large part due to CAATSA, which played an important role in deterring large arms importers such as Algeria, Egypt, and Indonesia from acquiring the plane. While Russia has delivered the Su-35s to China and is now expected to sell them to Iran, low production rates, aggravated by the need to prioritize war-related production, as well as ongoing war and sanctions, will make it increasingly difficult for Moscow to manufacture new batches of the Su-35 for export purposes or provide necessary maintenance and upgrades. According to the available Russian open-source estimates, Russia allegedly was able to produce only five Su-35 aircraft in 2021, with a goal to deliver seven more by the end of 2022.</p> -<p>Reagan uttered these words before he met Mikhail Gorbachev. In fact, he gave Vice President George H. W. Bush a message to present to the incoming Soviet leader when they were scheduled to meet after the funeral of Chernenko in March 1985. “I bring with me, a message of peace,” Bush was scripted to say. “We know this is a time of difficulty; we would like it to be a time of opportunity.” Notwithstanding the differences in our systems and the competitive nature of our interactions, the United States and the Soviet Union must “compete and resolve problems in peaceful ways, and to build a more stable and constructive relationship.” Be assured, Bush was supposed to tell Gorbachev, “that neither the American government nor the American people has hostile intentions towards you.” Americans “recognize you have suffered a great deal, and struggled a great deal, throughout your history.” Opportunities for peace had been squandered in the past, but now they could be rekindled. The two governments could make serious headway. “We think it is a time to be more energetic, to tackle larger issues, to set higher goals. . . . We should strive to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.” We should aim for “a stable deterrence based on non-nuclear defense. . . . We should approach the other issues between us with the same energy and vision. We should seek to rid the world of the threat or use of force in international relations.”</p> +<p>In addition to the Su-35s, Moscow has also been marketing two new fifth-generation fighters, the Su-57 and Su-75 Checkmate, intended to compete with the U.S.-made F-22 and F-35 combat aircraft, respectively. However, with Russian aviation becoming one of the industries hardest hit by the war and export control restrictions, experts believe Moscow’s capacity to finish and mass produce such high-tech fighters will be significantly curtailed in the near term. While the Russian air force has recently claimed that it received a new batch of the Su-35 fighters — albeit without specifying the exact number — and was on track toward acquiring the Su-57 aircraft within a year, analysts still question the Kremlin’s ability to produce enough to export abroad.</p> -<p>Reagan grasped that amid great power rivalry, even with an ideological adversary with great military capabilities, the ultimate goals were the peace and prosperity of the American people. Toward these ends, the United States had to compete, but it also had to cooperate. It had to acknowledge the legitimate strategic imperatives of an adversary while demanding respect for its own. It had to negotiate from strength, but it had to negotiate, build trust, and allow an adversary to save face. Coaxing and maneuvering an adversary to cooperate toward mutual goals was as important as competing on disputatious issues that had zero-sum outcomes.</p> +<h4 id="engines">Engines</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Reagan grasped that amid great power rivalry, even with an ideological adversary with great military capabilities, the ultimate goals were the peace and prosperity of the American people.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Russia started selling engines in significant volumes in the early 2010s. In 2022, engines accounted for 32 percent of Moscow’s total arms trade, making them the most exported Russian equipment. There is a particularly high demand on Russian-made engines for military aircraft. According to Rosoboronexport, a Russian state agency dealing with defense-related exports and imports, Moscow offers the following main aircraft engine types for sale:</p> -<p>Throughout the Cold War, through formal agreements and informal understandings, U.S. officials sought to cooperate with the Soviet Union because they grasped that the two adversaries had common interests, not the least of which was avoiding direct confrontation and nuclear war. When Ronald Reagan uniquely combined strength and understanding and when he fortuitously wound up negotiating with a Soviet leader no one could have imagined, his unique sensibilities and qualities produced almost unimaginable results — the end of the Cold War. This was a product of his strength, tenacity, and empathy. This was the consequence of understanding that rivalry did not trump interests; that rivalry was about competing for tangible goods and principles, and that oftentimes, cooperation was as instrumental as competition.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>the AI-222-25 engine, used to power the Yak-130 training aircraft, which the Russians have claimed can replicate characteristics of some fourth- and fifth-generation fighter aircraft;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>the AL-31F, installed on the Su-27, Su-30, and Su-33 fighters;</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>the AL-41F-1S, used to power fourth-generation aircraft such as the Su-35; and</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>the RD-33 and its variation RD-33MK, designed for the MiG-29 and MiG-35 fighters.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> +<p>China has been one of the key recipients of Russian-made aircraft engines such as the RD-33MK and AL-31F, which have been installed on the Chinese-made fighters as well as imported Russian fighters. However, as discussed in the next section, since the start of the 2022 invasion, Beijing has been concerned with Moscow’s capacity to produce and deliver capable aircraft engines on time, as the inability to do so would have a devastating impact on the Chinese aviation industry, which remains highly dependent on Russian-made engines. Indeed, Russia has been facing issues with engine production for some time and especially since 2014 due to its reliance on Ukrainian manufactures such as Motor Sich and Zorya-Mashproekt, which used to provide key components in Russia’s engine production. It is likely that the 2022 sanctions regime will further limit the Kremlin’s ability to build high-quality aircraft engines in the foreseeable future, forcing China to take concrete steps toward indigenization of the engine industry.</p> -<blockquote> - <h4 id="lessons-for-cooperation-among-great-powers-today">Lessons for Cooperation among Great Powers Today</h4> -</blockquote> +<h4 id="missiles-and-air-defense-systems">Missiles and Air Defense Systems</h4> -<p>When thinking about the new great power rivalry with China today, the Cold War experience offers critical lessons. Leaders in Washington and Beijing must realize, as did their predecessors during the Cold War, that even more important than the rivalry between them is the avoidance of direct confrontation and nuclear war. From their conflictual interactions, U.S. and Chinese officials must discover the red lines they must not cross, as did U.S. and Russian leaders during the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s. Like their predecessors, policymakers in both countries must learn to respect one another’s vital interests, modulate their ideological differences, and establish informal rules of competition. Should they fail to do so, they could find themselves going eyeball to eyeball, as happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. They also must recognize that, while competing, they must not lose sight of the goals they share — like preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; averting an arms race in outer space and Antarctica; protecting seabeds; promoting trade; thwarting the spread of infectious diseases; mitigating carbon emissions and greenhouse gases; and promoting transparency about the movements of naval vessels, aircraft, and troops. To achieve these objectives, U.S. and Chinese officials must cooperate.</p> +<p>After aircraft, missiles and air defense systems have been Russia’s most widely exported systems since 1992. SIPRI differentiates between these two weapons categories. It defines missiles as “(a) all powered, guided missiles and torpedoes with conventional warheads, and (b) all unpowered but guided bombs and shells. This includes man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and guided anti-tank missiles.” Under the air defense systems, SIPRI includes “(a) all land-based surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, and (b) all anti-aircraft guns with a caliber of more than 40 mm or with multiple barrels with a combined caliber of at least 70 mm.” For the purposes of this paper, these two categories are discussed together.</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Leaders in Washington and Beijing must realize, as did their predecessors during the Cold War, that even more important than the rivalry between them is the avoidance of direct confrontation and nuclear war.</code></em></strong></p> +<p>Russia offers a wide range of air defense systems to its customers, such as upgraded versions of the S-300, as well as the newer and more advanced S-350, S-400, and Pantsir SAM systems. Before the Ukraine war, the Kremlin sold these systems to a number of countries globally, including S-300s to China, Algeria, Vietnam, and Azerbaijan; S-400s to India, Turkey, and China; and Pantsir-S1s to Algeria, Serbia, the United Arab Emirates, and Syria, among others. In 2019 — amid major defense agreements, which also included a $2 billion arms deal signed between Moscow and Ankara on the delivery of S-400 SAM systems — Dmitry Shugaev, director of Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, declared that the share of air defense systems in Russian arms exports had grown to 20 percent within a year.</p> -<p>Today, these shared goals are far more compelling than during the Cold War because the economies of the United States and China are infinitely more interwoven and their prosperity so much more codependent than had been the case of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Moreover, the shared dangers that lie ahead — the threats emanating from climate change and pandemics, from cyberattacks and artificial intelligence — are so much more grave and more certain than ever before, arguably far graver than the threats either country presents to one another. So when thinking about the meaning of the Cold War rivalry for today’s challenges, three overriding lessons must not be forgotten: competition must be kept in bounds; ideological antipathy must be modulated; and cooperation must comprise an indispensable element of national security policy. A fourth, more surprising lesson — one that should generate optimism — is that cooperation, smartly pursued, can help lay the basis for victory in the rivalry itself. After all, cooperation not only structured the competitive landscape during the Cold War and reduced points of conflict and sources of friction; it also bought time during a critical period, 1965 to 1975, when the United States was beleaguered with social, political, and financial strife at home and a debilitating war in Indochina. That time helped the United States to heal, recalibrate, and triumph in a Cold War rivalry whose end hardly anyone had foreseen.</p> +<p>Yet this trend was negatively affected by the 2022 invasion and concomitant sanctions regime. Based on SIPRI estimates, Moscow had only 13 pending deliveries of its SAM systems by the end of 2022, while the United States, Israel, and Germany had 40, 26, and 25, respectively. Naturally, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine can in large part explain Moscow’s low volume of pending deliveries last year. Since the start of the invasion, Russia has expended thousands of missiles and lost at least 130 air defense systems in Ukraine that, together with the allied export restrictions, have strained its defense industrial capacity to manufacture extra systems for export. However, despite sanctions and the remarkable performance of Ukraine’s air defenses, Moscow has been able to access much-needed Western and Chinese components to sustain current systems and manufacture new missiles and air defense systems — and has inflicted significant damage to Kyiv. Going forward, it is likely that Russia will prioritize war-related defense production over export-related manufacturing, yet it may still sell some missiles and other air defense systems in much lower volumes to states vital to Russian foreign policy (such as China) or to its satellite regimes (such as Belarus).</p> -<hr /> +<h4 id="armored-vehicles">Armored Vehicles</h4> -<p><strong>Melvyn P. Leffler</strong> is emeritus professor of American history at the University of Virginia. He is the author of several books on the Cold War and on U.S. relations with Europe, including For the Soul of Mankind (Hill and Wang, 2007), which won the George Louis Beer Prize from the American Historical Association, and A Preponderance of Power (Stanford University Press, 1993), which won the Bancroft, Hoover, and Ferrell Prizes.</p>Melvyn P. LefflerAs one of the most harrowing crises in human history wound down over the Russian installation of missiles in Cuba, Nikita Khrushchev, the chairman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, wrote to President John F. Kennedy: “There is no evil without good. Evil has brought some good. The good is that now people have felt more tangibly the breathing of the burning flames of thermonuclear war and have a more clear realization of the threat looming over them if the arms race is not stopped.”No Place to Hide2023-09-08T12:00:00+08:002023-09-08T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/no-place-to-hide<p><em>What does the Tornado Cash case mean for how DeFi platforms can be held accountable under anti-money laundering and sanctions laws?</em></p> +<p>Russia exports a wide variety of armored vehicles, including different models of the T-72 and T-90 main battle tanks (MBTs); BMP-2 and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs); and BTR-80 and BTR-82A armored personnel carriers (APCs). Prior to the 2022 invasion, Russian-made tanks, and especially modernized versions, enjoyed popularity among Moscow’s loyal customers. For instance, the T-90s, first introduced in 1992 and incorporating the best design principles from the previous T-72 and T-80 MBTs, have been purchased by a number of countries across the world, including in the former Soviet Union (e.g., Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan), Africa (e.g., Algeria and Libya), and South and Southeast Asia (e.g., India, Myanmar, and Vietnam). India and Algeria have been particularly important purchasers of Russian armored vehicles, and especially the T-90s. At one point, Russian tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod may have been the most active tank factory in the world due to large export orders coming from these two countries.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>The ongoing war in Ukraine, resulting in significant losses of armored vehicles, is likely keeping Uralvagonzavod even busier. Russia has lost at least 2,000 tanks of various kinds — two-thirds of its fleet, by some estimates — which is putting a significant strain on Uralvagonzavod’s capacity to refurbish old MBTs and manufacture new ones for both war- and export-related purposes. In the summer of 2022, Russian news agencies wrote that Rosoboronexport had rolled out the export version of Russia’s “cutting-edge” T-14 Armata MBT developed by Uralvagonzavod — thus implying that the country’s chief tank manufacturer had enough capacity to produce advanced MBTs amid sanctions and the war — but evidence recently emerged suggesting that Uralvagonzavod might actually be facing significant issues with its production capacity. Allegedly, the factory reimported components originally made on its premises, including 6,775 sighting telescopes and 200 cameras for installation in tanks, from Myanmar in December 2022. This fact, coupled with sanctions and a weak performance of Russian tanks on the battlefield in Ukraine, already resulted in lower volumes of armor-related exports and pending deliveries (444 tanks on order) from Russia by the end of 2022, especially when compared to the volume of pending deliveries for U.S., Chinese, and South Korean tanks (634, 717, and 990, respectively). This trend will likely continue in the foreseeable future, especially as China, Russia’s chief competitor in cost-effective MBTs, ramps up its own tank production.</p> -<p>Last month, a federal court in Texas handed down its judgment in Van Loon v Treasury, upholding the Office for Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)’s groundbreaking decision to place Tornado Cash, a decentralised finance (DeFi) platform, under economic sanctions for its role in facilitating money laundering. The ruling suggests that, at least in the US, DeFi platforms will not be able to escape regulatory and legal liability just because of their decentralised nature.</p> +<h4 id="naval-systems">Naval Systems</h4> -<p>DeFi platforms, which allow users to directly transfer cryptoassets to one another without using an intermediary cryptoasset business, have exploded in popularity in recent years. Elliptic, a blockchain analytics company, has estimated that, between November 2019 and November 2021, “the total capital locked in DeFi services [grew] by more than 1,700% … to $247 billion”. This has led some to fear, and others to hope, that cryptoasset trading might escape the anti-money laundering (AML) and sanctions regulations that are being applied to the sector, due to the apparent lack of an intermediary that can be held accountable for the platform.</p> +<p>Although ships remain among the top five most exported Russian weapons categories, Moscow has not made any deliveries of large vessels for four consecutive years. Instead, it has placed an emphasis on the development of smaller vessels able to carry a variety of missiles, such as the Project 22800 Karakurt corvettes and Project 22160 patrol ships. However, area specialists note that the Russian shipbuilding industry’s aging infrastructure, which in 2022 was also cut off from access to advanced Western components and humiliated by the sinking of the Moskva missile cruiser, will likely further hinder Moscow’s naval exports. In addition to ships, Russia is also facing issues marketing its Kilo-class attack submarines. While experts believe the Russian-made submarines retain significant undersea capabilities, such as launching effective conventional cruise missile and undersea infrastructure attacks against adversary fleets, the war and sanctions seem to be impacting Moscow’s defense industrial capacity to manufacture submarines for export purposes. A recent example, also discussed in the next section, includes India choosing Germany over Russia to coproduce new submarines, allegedly due to the growing unpredictability of arms exports from Moscow amid sanctions and the invasion.</p> -<h3 id="background">Background</h3> +<h3 id="russias-key-export-destinations">Russia’s Key Export Destinations</h3> -<p>In August 2022, OFAC designated an entity it called “Tornado Cash” under the US cyber sanctions regime. OFAC alleged that this entity, a decentralised cryptoassets tumbler, had laundered in excess of $7 billion of cryptoassets on behalf of cyber-criminals and a hacking group sponsored by the North Korean government. A cryptoassets tumbler, sometimes called a mixer, allows users to send cryptoassets to a wallet address, where they are pooled with those sent by other users, before withdrawing cryptoassets of equivalent value from a different wallet address, in order to make them harder to trace.</p> +<p>Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has exported its arms to around 100 countries worldwide, with India, China, Algeria, Vietnam, and Egypt composing the top five purchasers of Russian weapons systems throughout this time (see Figure 3). According to Paul Schwartz, a non-resident senior associate with CSIS, “Russian arms sales are very diverse but also concentrated. Diverse because Russia has exported arms to nearly 100 countries since 2000 and highly concentrated because its top 10 arms clients traditionally account for the vast majority of Russian arms sales in any given year.” This section analyzes Moscow’s chief arms markets and how the ongoing war in Ukraine together with the allied sanctions and export regulations are impacting Russia’s ability to remain the key supplier of weapons and technology to those countries.</p> -<p>DeFi protocols work by using smart contracts – blockchain-based code that automatically executes when certain conditions are fulfilled. DeFi platforms often have a “frontend” – a website providing a user-friendly way to interact with the underlying protocol. Platforms usually also have a system of governance, often through allowing holders of “governance tokens” to vote on changes to the platform.</p> +<p>To its customers, Russia’s arms have remained attractive for several reasons. First, for many countries, they are buying what they know. Past purchases have created a path for dependence. For long-time purchasers of Soviet weapons, costs of training and maintenance requirements of Russian weapons are much lower. Second, Russian military hardware has often been cheaper and easier to operate and maintain than Western analogues. Third, Russia has tended to offer generous financing, such as loans with extended repayment plans. This is in stark contrast to the United States, which lacks flexible financing mechanisms that are often necessary for lower-income purchasers. Fourth, Russia is a more straightforward seller, due in part to the lack of bureaucratic or legislative oversight that countries such as the United States require to ensure proper end user and human rights conditions. This enables Russia to make deals more quickly and with fewer conditions than Western nations. Finally, in contrast to U.S. arms sales, Russia has remained attractive to non-democratic regimes due to its willingness to sell weapons without stressing democratic values, human rights records, or internal political situations, as Western countries often do.</p> -<p>In the case of Tornado Cash, smart contracts automatically execute when one of its wallet addresses receives a deposit of cryptoassets from a user. No human intervention beyond that of the user is required in the process, which is executed automatically by code. Tornado Cash is governed through a decentralised autonomous organisation (DAO), members of which hold “TORN” tokens. Though the active smart contracts cannot be amended or revoked, the DAO votes on issues like whether new smart contracts should be released, and maintains a “frontend” website. When new smart contracts are released, the website replaces its links to the old contracts.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/a2vlXMJ.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: Top Recipients of Russian Weapons Systems, 1992–2022.</strong> Source: “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” SIPRI.</em></p> -<h3 id="the-legal-arguments">The Legal Arguments</h3> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YHOVruz.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ <strong>Figure 4: Top Recipients of Russian Weapons Systems, 2022.</strong> Source: “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” SIPRI.</em></p> -<p>In making the designation, OFAC relied on provisions in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which authorises the US president, during a national emergency, to prohibit transfers or transactions, over which the US has jurisdiction, involving any foreign country or person, or their property. The US has used IEEPA to designate foreign cyber-criminals, the North Korean government and persons deemed to have given material assistance or provided financial or technological support to them.</p> +<p>In recent years, Russia has been forced to increasingly concentrate on the states interested in lower-cost systems (up to $300 million), such as South Africa, Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Angola, and Eritrea, among others. Low (and at times insignificant) volumes of sales with these countries, coupled with Moscow’s deepening isolation from the Western nations and their allies, can largely explain why, by the end of 2022, 91 percent of all Russian arms exports were flowing to just four countries: India, China, Belarus, and Myanmar (see Figure 4).</p> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">OFAC argued that even token holders who do not participate in governance votes are part of the association, because the value of their tokens stands to increase if the platform prospers</code></em></strong></p> +<p>In the near term, available evidence suggests that Russia’s biggest customers, including India and China but also Algeria and Egypt, will most likely strive to become less reliant on Russian arms exports due to ongoing import substitution or diversification efforts in these countries and risk of sanctions. Since February 2022, such efforts have been aggravated by the growing instability of Russia’s defense industrial base, affecting the quality and frequency of Russian arms deliveries worldwide. While it is likely that Moscow will continue selling older Russian equipment and technology to a number of conflict-affected countries or authoritarian regimes across Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union, those deliveries will have limited ability to insulate Russia’s declining arms export industry.</p> -<p>The plaintiffs argued that Tornado Cash was not an “entity” so could not be designated, on the basis that there had been no agreement between its alleged members to cooperate and thereby form an “association”. (In legal terminology, the requirements for the formation of a specific type of entity called an unincorporated association had not been met.) The plaintiffs argued that ownership of a TORN token is insufficient to establish agreement, highlighting that many token holders do not actively participate in the governance of the platform.</p> +<h4 id="india">India</h4> -<p>In reply, OFAC argued that “association” should be given its ordinary meaning, and so all that is required for Tornado Cash to be an “association” is that it is an organised body of individuals that furthers a common purpose. No mutual agreement is necessary, and OFAC argued that Tornado Cash satisfied the test because its founders, developers and members of the DAO (individuals who own at least one TORN token) had all acted to achieve the common purpose of “operating, promoting, and updating” the Tornado Cash platform. OFAC further argued that even token holders who do not participate in governance votes are part of the association, because the value of their tokens stands to increase if the platform prospers.</p> +<p>With a 9 percent share of total global arms imports, India has been the world’s largest purchaser of major weapons systems between 1992 and 2022. Russia has been its biggest supplier throughout this time, followed by France and the United States. Yet Moscow’s exports to New Delhi began to steadily decline from 2014. Russia’s share of total Indian arms imports fell from 64 percent in 2013–2017 to 45 percent in 2018–2022. A number of factors have affected Moscow’s position as New Delhi’s key arms supplier, including growing competition from other exporter countries, India’s plan to reinvigorate its domestic arms production, and, most recently, the constraints on Russia’s military industrial complex induced by the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and subsequent sanctions.</p> -<p>The court found Tornado Cash to be an “association”, agreeing with OFAC’s broader definition. Drawing attention to the specific roles of the founders, developers and the DAO, the court highlighted that “utilising this structure, Tornado Cash has been able to place job advertisements, maintain a fund to compensate key contributors, and adopt a compensation structure for relayers, among other things.” However, the court went further, saying that the Tornado Cash DAO has “through its voting members … demonstrated an agreement to a common purpose,” making the DAO is an unincorporated association.</p> +<p>Recent years have seen India increase attempts to diversify its arms imports away from Russia and engage more closely with major Western suppliers, including EU countries and the United States, among others. For instance, arms exports from France rose by 489 percent between the two five-year periods, 2013–2017 and 2018–2022, based on SIPRI estimates. Such a significant increase in sales has in large part been attributed to France landing several big-ticket arms deals with India, including the 2016 $8.8 billion inter-government agreement, within which Paris delivered 36 Rafale fighter jets to New Delhi by December 2022. Besides France, Germany has also made steps to expand ties with India on weapons procurement and counter Russia as a major arms supplier to the South Asian nation. In June 2023, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding that is expected to be followed by a multibillion-euro deal, according to which Berlin and New Delhi will co-produce six submarines for the Indian navy. Submarines will be built under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Make in India” initiative, designed to reduce military imports and increase domestic procurement and production. Similar to its EU partners, the United States has also expressed its readiness to reinforce “the major defense partnership” and support India’s ambitious goal of turning into a significant arms exporter in the near future by fast-tracking “technology cooperation and co-production in areas such as air combat and land mobility systems; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; munitions; and the undersea domain.” According to a Reuters exclusive, the Biden administration is set to allow General Electric, a U.S.-based conglomerate, to produce jet engines in India for Indian combat aircraft.</p> -<p>The plaintiffs also argued that Tornado Cash is not an organisation but autonomous software which cannot be the property of the Tornado Cash entity, because no one can prevent others from using the smart contracts and at least some are unalterable. In response, OFAC argued that smart contracts are kind of legally recognised contract (specifically, a unilateral contract), and that such contracts can be a kind of property.</p> +<p>New Delhi’s efforts at bolstering codevelopment and coproduction of defense systems with its Western partners have intensified against the backdrop of a declining Russian military industrial complex, strained by the allied sanctions and the ongoing invasion. The struggles of Russia’s military industrial complex could in turn have a significant impact on India’s defense sector. According to various estimates, around 60 to 85 percent of major weapons systems in the Indian military originate from Russia. For instance, 97 percent of India’s MBTs are Russian-made variants (2,418 T-72s and 1,200 T-90s). Furthermore, more than half of India’s combat-capable aircraft come from Russia, including 263 Su-30MKIs, between 50 to 146 MiG-21s (based on different estimates), and over 100 MiG-29s. New Delhi also possesses seven Russian Kilo-class submarines and three S-400 missile defense systems. All these weapons require regular maintenance and upgrades, which India worries Moscow may be unable to provide.</p> -<p>Again, the court agreed with OFAC. As Judge Pitman put it: “The fact that smart contracts [perform a task] without additional human intervention … or that they are immutable, does not affect its status as a type of contract and, thus a type of property …” As the smart contracts “provide Tornado Cash with a means to control and use crypto assets” and generate fees for the DAO, the association had a property interest in them.</p> +<p>In May 2022, New Delhi reportedly suspended plans to upgrade its Su-30MKIs with Russian assistance, instead aiming to equip the fleet with indigenous products, including Indian-made radar and avionics, to reduce dependence on Moscow. In March 2023, the Indian Air Force (IAF) declared that Russia would be unable to meet arms delivery commitments for the current year due to the war and sanctions. The IAF also stated that the invasion had a significant impact on its arms supplies, causing it to slash projected capital expenditure on modernization for FY 2024 by nearly a third compared to the previous fiscal year. Besides India’s aviation and air defense sectors, it has also been reported that New Delhi’s plans to lease another Russian nuclear attack submarine could be delayed beyond the planned 2025 delivery date due to the ongoing war. Furthermore, according to some recent reports, beyond Russia’s inability to deliver new systems, it has been repurchasing spare parts for tanks and missiles that it had originally exported to India. Even when Russia is able to meet its delivery commitments — such as deliveries of S-400 systems in 2022 — other issues arise, including finding a payment mechanism for India that would not violate U.S. sanctions.</p> -<h3 id="implications">Implications</h3> +<p>Despite these challenges, Russian officials continue to claim that the Russo-Indian defense partnership is not affected by the war and sanctions. In February 2023, Vladimir Drozhzhov, deputy head of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, declared that Moscow and New Delhi are in talks over additional Su-30MKI fighter jets, which will be produced under a Russian license in India and will cost New Delhi $1.4 billion. Rosoboronexport has also announced that Russia is ready to produce Ka-226T helicopters together with Indian defense companies as part of the “Make in India” initiative. However, none of these plans have thus far been crystallized. In fact, according to scholars Vasabjit Banerjee and Benjamin Tkach, in the short run, India will most likely focus on partnering with countries that have experience manufacturing spare parts and upgrades for Russian-origin weapons. These may include Israel, Bulgaria, and Poland, among others. In the long run, New Delhi will “move ahead with its stated intention of developing a stronger indigenous defense industry.” Siemon Wezeman, a senior researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Program, also believes that issues with the quality of Russian arms deliveries together with India’s ongoing import diversification efforts and pivot to domestic production will most likely contribute to Russia losing India as its chief arms importer in the coming decade.</p> -<p>The plaintiffs are likely to appeal the judgment to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. However, it chimes with other rulings at the district court level, suggesting an emerging judicial consensus. For example, in February 2023, a federal district court in California ruled that Ooki DAO was an unincorporated association, as it “existed for the purpose of running a business, and specifically, to operate and monetise the Ooki Protocol”. Token holders were deemed to have agreed to participate by exercising their voting rights.</p> +<h4 id="china">China</h4> -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The ability to prohibit transactions involving smart contracts is also a valuable tool for OFAC, as it makes it harder for sanctions to be circumvented</code></em></strong></p> +<p>China has been the second-largest importer of Russian arms and equipment since 1992, yet the nature and type of deliveries have changed significantly over this time. In the early 2000s, Russian arms played a central role in the development and modernization of the Chinese military, and particularly its navy and air force. Beijing purchased numerous classes of missiles, aircraft, and submarines from Moscow, including the S-300 surface-to-air missiles, Su-27S and Su-30MKI fighter aircraft, and Project 636 Varshavyanka submarines. Even though those systems were capable, they still represented “Russia’s older, second-best ones and did not include more-advanced technologies.”</p> -<p>The clearest implications, unsurprisingly, concern the US sanctions regime. Assuming that the judgment is affirmed and reflects the approach to be taken across the country, OFAC will be able to designate most if not all DAOs, as well as the relevant protocol’s founders and developers, without needing to show any agreement between them. All that must be shown is some common purpose, which will usually be an easy test to meet in this context.</p> +<p>After 2006, Russian exports to China started to decrease (but remained significant) for multiple reasons. A decline in part resulted from Moscow’s growing frustration with Beijing’s continued attempts to steal Russian military technology and intellectual property, especially in aerospace, through espionage and hacking as well as by reverse-engineering Russian equipment to produce Chinese equivalents. For instance, China developed its own J-11 fighter jet and the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile based on Russian prototypes, the Su-27 fighter jet and S-300 missile system, respectively. In 2019, in a rare public display of frustration, Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec accused Beijing of copying “aircraft engines, Sukhoi planes, deck jets, air defense systems, portable air defense missiles, and analogs of the Pantsir medium-range surface-to-air systems.” Consequently, as China’s domestic defense industry continued to develop, in large part thanks to the earlier Russian arms exports, it became less willing to purchase older Russian-made technology, instead focusing on acquiring newer and more advanced Russian weapons such as the Su-35S combat aircraft and S-400 air defense system.</p> -<p>The ability to prohibit transactions involving smart contracts is also a valuable tool for OFAC, as it makes it harder for sanctions to be circumvented. If wallet addresses and smart contracts are not the property of the designated entity, and so cannot be placed on the Specially Designated Nationals list, it could be possible to create a new “frontend” website to facilitate continued, lawful access to the smart contracts.</p> +<p>Furthermore, starting from 2014 when the West first imposed sanctions against Moscow, followed by the 2022 allied sanctions regime, the nature of the Sino-Russian defense partnership has changed, with Beijing becoming a vital source of components and spare parts that the Kremlin has often been unable to officially obtain from the Western nations, such as machine tools and microchips. In recent reports, Ukrainian experts and officials have argued that Chinese-made components are now discovered in captured Russian navigation systems, drones, and tanks. According to Vladyslav Vlasiuk, a senior adviser in President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s office, Ukraine now finds “less Western-made components” and instead more Chinese components. As the war continues, Russian dependence on Chinese-made spare parts will likely grow, even if a significant share of these components turns out to be defective or of lower quality.</p> -<p>More broadly, if the exercise of DAO voting rights qualifies as an agreement to cooperate, it will be relatively easy for regulators and law enforcement to establish the existence of an unincorporated association. As the Ooki DAO case shows, this may be critical for establishing that an entity falls within scope of a particular law or regulation, even if this is not required under IEEPA.</p> +<p>At the same time, even though Beijing has strengthened domestic defense production and reduced arms deliveries from Moscow, it still relies on imports of the most advanced Russian weapons systems and technologies, especially in the aviation sector. For instance, between 2018 and 2022, 83 percent of Chinese arms imports came from Russia, with most deliveries consisting of helicopters and engines for aircraft that China has had difficulties producing. The key issue for Beijing remains the development of powerful fighter engines, as Moscow has so far managed to protect its advanced technology from being copied by China. Additionally, according to area experts, it is difficult to reverse-engineer this equipment. Up to 40 percent of China’s air force fleet depends on Russian-made engines, which will create issues for Beijing if Russia becomes unable to provide these parts for the Chinese aviation industry due to the ongoing sanctions and war in Ukraine. This may incentivize China to redouble its efforts to produce combat aircraft and engines. In fact, Beijing has already made strides in recent years in developing advanced aircraft, such as the J-16 and J-20 fighters, and has even provided upgrades to its engines. For instance, it modernized its WS-10 engines to power the J-20 aircraft. However, Chinese efforts in this area are still limited due to the lack of domestic expertise; Beijing reportedly has struggled to develop its WS-15 engine, which is expected to give the J-20 supercruise capability. Going forward, China may leverage Russia’s growing economic and security dependence to in turn gain access to long-desired Russian engine technology. Therefore, benefits derived from existing arms trade between the two countries may be greater for Beijing than for Moscow in the near term.</p> -<p>Moreover, if smart contracts are the property of the DAO, they are essentially part of the DAO. This makes it easier to hold the DAO accountable for what the smart contract does – for example, if the DAO does not update the protocol to comply with AML regulations. The smart contract is effectively a service that the DAO provides, rather than something separate to which the DAO merely facilitates access.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Going forward, China may leverage Russia’s growing economic and security dependence to in turn gain access to long-desired Russian engine technology.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>With DeFi platforms the new frontier in crypto, the US courts have sent a signal that their founders, developers and DAO members cannot escape legal liability just because they are part of a decentralised structure. This signal, though unwelcome for some in the crypto industry, starts to close a potentially significant loophole that risked undercutting efforts to fight money laundering and other forms of illicit finance.</p> +<p>Overall, it is expected that the Sino-Russian defense industrial partnership will continue. Yet Moscow’s technological utility to Beijing will be significantly weakened due to Russia’s impaired defense production capacity and China’s strengthened emphasis on indigenizing production and increasing its self-reliance.</p> -<hr /> +<h4 id="africa">Africa</h4> -<p><strong>James Gillespie</strong> is an Associate Fellow in the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI, where his main research interests concern ransomware, illicit finance, and the use of sanctions in a cybersecurity context.</p>James GillespieWhat does the Tornado Cash case mean for how DeFi platforms can be held accountable under anti-money laundering and sanctions laws?Maritime Reserves2023-09-07T12:00:00+08:002023-09-07T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/maritime-reserves<p><em>This paper examines whether and how the Maritime Reserves can bring extra fighting power at an affordable cost.</em></p> +<p>Russia has been the chief arms supplier to Africa, surpassing U.S., European, and Chinese arms deliveries in the region by a significant margin for well over a decade. For instance, between 2018 and 2022, Moscow accounted for 40 percent of African imports of major weapons systems, which exceeded the continent’s combined arms imports from the United States (16 percent), China (9.8 percent), and France (7.6 percent) during the same time period. There are a number of reasons that explain the dependency of African countries on Russian-made weapons and equipment. Modern Russian arms are usually cheaper — at least in the shorter term — than their Western alternatives and are compatible with Soviet-era stocks retained by many states in the region due to the strong military-security ties shared between Africa and the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. Additionally, unlike major Western arms suppliers, the Kremlin does not make its arms deliveries contingent upon adherence to human rights principles or respecting the rule of law. Russia has sent weapons to different conflict-affected countries in Africa where the United States and its allies have usually avoided such exports, including Libya, Mali, Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR), among others. Yet, while Moscow sells its weapons to a number of countries across the continent, these deliveries are usually marginal in value and resemble more military assistance than arms trade, according to SIPRI’s Siemon Wezeman. Although these sales may have little monetary value, they have significant diplomatic and geopolitical value, as they have helped solidify Russia’s relationship with many African countries.</p> -<excerpt /> +<p>Russia has only two sizable arms importers in Africa: Algeria and Egypt. From 1992 onwards, both countries have been among the top five purchasers of Russian military equipment and technology globally, with Egypt replacing Algeria as Russia’s third-largest arms market during the last five years. Overall, Algeria has accounted for 8 percent of total Russian arms exports since 1992, while Egypt has accounted for 3 percent, based on the SIPRI data. Both states have signed several multimillion-dollar agreements with Moscow to purchase Russian-made defense technology and equipment, including combat aircraft, armor, and air defense systems, thus making their militaries dependent on Russian arms deliveries, maintenance, and upgrades. Egypt retains obsolete Soviet-era systems, such as the MiG-21 aircraft first issued in the 1950s, yet it has also made steps toward upgrading its aging fleet with somewhat newer Russian equipment, including the fourth-generation MiG-29M aircraft, Ka-52 attack helicopters, and the S-300 missile defense system. By contrast, Algeria has purchased more modern and advanced Russian weapons, including the Pantsir-S1 air defense system, the latest versions of the T-90 MBT, and Kilo-class submarines.</p> -<h3 id="executive-summary">Executive Summary</h3> +<p>Both countries buy from other countries as well. For instance, Egypt has sourced combat aircraft from France, submarines from Germany, and unmanned aerial vehicles from China. Furthermore, Egypt receives $1.3 billion in U.S. security assistance annually. The Egyptian Ministry of Defense has also assembled certain types of weapons locally, including over 1,000 M1A1 MBTs from U.S.-supplied kits. Similarly, since the early 2010s, Algeria has begun to diversify its arms imports and has made investments toward strengthening the domestic defense industry, leading to joint ventures with several Western arms exporters, including a deal with Italy to produce seven modern helicopters and agreements with Germany to deliver a tank assembly plant and armor personnel carriers.</p> -<p>The <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/integrated-review-refresh-2023-responding-to-a-more-contested-and-volatile-world/integrated-review-refresh-2023-responding-to-a-more-contested-and-volatile-world">Integrated Review Refresh (IR23)</a> describes a more contested and volatile world which may require greater defence capacity while funds remain tight. With a regular Naval Service that is already operating at or close to capacity, there is little scope to surge. This paper examines whether and how the Maritime Reserves (MR) can bring extra fighting power at an affordable cost.</p> +<p>Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and the allied sanctions regime have further pressured the two countries to lessen defense ties with Russia. In 2022, amid a rising fear of Western sanctions, Egypt rejected a deal to buy Russian Su-35 combat aircraft, which later were purchased by Iran. Algeria also finds itself in a political-security conundrum. In 2021, it reportedly signed a deal worth more than $7 billion with Moscow to purchase Su-57 fighter jets, air defense systems, and other advanced Russian equipment, with deliveries expected in the next several years. However, with Russia depleting its stockpile of arms and facing challenges to produce advanced weapons systems, Algeria worries Moscow may not be able to provide new arms deliveries or necessary upgrades for its existing Russian-made defense inventories. This has allegedly forced the Algerian authorities to raise the army’s budget to a record $23 billion to find alternative suppliers, including France and Brazil.</p> -<p>The paper finds that one of the strengths of the MR is the calibre of many of its personnel. However, they have suffered from a lack of clarity on their purpose for several years. This has been exacerbated by the decision to stop training altogether for four months in 2020/21 and then to reduce budgets for training, including reserve training days, by 30%. Recent moves to restore training budgets and publish the new “Maritime Reserves Orders 2023–24” have been welcomed, as has progress in building and reshaping capabilities, especially in information warfare.</p> +<p>Despite the increased unpredictability of a long-term defense partnership with contemporary Russia, as mentioned above, smaller scale African purchasers of Russian weaponry will likely continue to place orders with Russian firms. Sudan and the CAR fit this description. Both countries have established defense partnerships with Moscow, including particularly well-publicized contracts with the Wagner Group (though the future of this private military company and its operations around the world, including in Africa, is now in question following Wagner chief Prigozhin’s death in August 2023). Both the CAR and Sudan are countries experiencing intense domestic instability and violence, which give added urgency to their purchasing of Russian matériel. In the case of Sudan, Russia has accounted for around 45 percent of Sudanese arms imports since 1997. The CAR’s volume is much smaller, with only 5 percent of arms deliveries coming from Moscow (although it should be noted that the volume of major arms imports to the CAR has been historically low due to the country’s inability to purchase advanced weapons and related matériel and the United Nations’ arms embargo imposed on the republic since 2013). However, in both countries, the major value for Russia is not the financial scale of these transactions but the political influence and Russian access to key natural resources these defense partnerships enable — particularly within the context of utilizing extractive industries, including gold and diamond mining, to evade international sanctions.</p> -<p>Nevertheless, fundamental conceptual and structural problems remain; there is a lack of ambition in the published requirement for reserves across many parts of the MR. Furthermore, the mission outlined in this year’s orders focuses on reservists exclusively as augmentees (although there are, in practice, a few exceptions), something out of line with the UK’s major Five Eyes counterparts. It also goes against best practice in comparable areas in its sister services, most notably for the Royal Marines Reserve (RMR), whose nearest counterparts in airborne and special forces view collective capability as essential for delivering operational demands and building unit spirit.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/AuTrmtC.png" alt="image06" /> +<em>▲ A Russian armored personnel carrier seen driving in the streets of the capital Bangui during the delivery of Russian-made armored vehicles to the CAR army in October 2020.</em></p> -<p>A bolder vision is necessary. That means being clear about requirements, which must be grounded in a proper understanding of what a reservist can deliver well, what they can turn their hand to, and what is impractical. It is no criticism of dedicated full-time leadership to say that the reserves need a stronger voice across Navy Command to provide that understanding. As is now the case in the Army, RAF and Strategic Command, this should include a part-time volunteer reservist voice on the Navy Board and in other Naval Service headquarters and policy branches. The Royal Navy Reserve (RNR) still has a well-developed officer structure (unlike the RAF Reserves, who are having to rebuild theirs) which would facilitate this.</p> +<p>A more complicated example is oil-rich Angola, which since 1993 has imported around 37 percent of its arms from Moscow, including Mi-171Sh helicopters and Su-30K fighter jets. Russia’s relations with post-independence Angola go back to the Soviet period, when Moscow backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) during the resource-rich country’s fight for decolonization. Angola will likely continue its partnerships with Russia, as the country hosts Wagner Group mercenaries, and an early 2023 visit by Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov indicated the launch of a potential deal to build a Russian nuclear power plant in the country. However, in December 2022, Angola had already announced its interest in purchasing weapons from the United States, despite a previous 2019 announcement that the country would be constructing factories for the domestic production of Russian weapons. This stated desire to purchase American weaponry comes in the wake of increasing defense ties between Angola and the United States such as Angola’s March 2022 participation in a U.S.-led maritime exercise, and a November 2022 high-level visit to Angola by General Michael Langley, the commander of United States Africa Command — demonstrating that the contest between Washington and Moscow for influence in the country remains more open-ended than history would suggest.</p> -<p>Reserves could provide much greater affordable capacity in seagoing appointments and ashore. Seagoing reserves could be grown by recruiting officers with watchkeeping qualifications to crew offshore patrol and littoral vessels, and, with regular reserves, provide a surge capability in war to vessels in re-fit or as casualty replacements. Ashore, lessons from Ukraine suggest that growing a remotely-piloted aircraft division (RPAS) in HMS Pegasus (formerly the RNR Air Branch) from civilians skilled in operating drones would add significant value.</p> +<p>It is likely that these trends will only intensify going forward. According to Bhaso Ndzendze, an associate professor at the University of Johannesburg, while the Kremlin will continue selling its arms to conflict-affected countries across Africa, those deliveries will likely be limited to obsolete Soviet-era equipment, such as Soviet-era tanks, and cheaper weapons, including battle rifles, grenades, and signal and communications systems. Therefore, such sales will remain marginal in terms of their direct monetary value. However, such limited defense relationships will most likely continue to yield significant geopolitical benefits for the Kremlin in the region. At the same time, the two key arms importers on the continent, Egypt and Algeria, will probably proceed with their efforts to diversify away from Russia, thus impacting the share of Russian arms exports globally. However, the large quantities of previously acquired Russian equipment in both countries are likely to sustain ties at some level.</p> -<p>The decline in the number of pilots in HMS Pegasus has been driven by a combination of extreme pressure on flying hours and ever-increasing safety requirements from the Defence Safety Authority (DSA). This should be revisited, both to see whether small sums could significantly rebuild numbers of reserve pilots flying and whether DSA demands are truly necessary. The lack of surge capability means that the Naval Service would also struggle to expand its critical (and recently reduced) staffs.</p> +<h4 id="southeast-asia-the-cases-of-vietnam-and-myanmar">Southeast Asia: The Cases of Vietnam and Myanmar</h4> -<p>This paper identifies that there are some roles which need to be re-examined in light of the deteriorating security environment, such as protection of ports, coastal critical national infrastructure (including nuclear power stations) and the littoral, which are currently largely neglected. Recent reports of Russian activity in the North Sea highlight this. A reserve capability, including a substantial explosive ordnance disposal search element, including divers (a recently disbanded reserve capability, where safety considerations seem to be the driving force again) could provide a cost-effective solution, whether in the MR, the Coastguard or Army Reserves.</p> +<p>Both Vietnam and Myanmar have existing defense partnerships with Russia, and the future course of these relationships could serve as an important indicator of the Russian defense industry’s international reach post-2022.</p> -<p>For the Marines, the RMR could be structured for use as formed bodies, similar to 4 Para and the Australian 1 Commando Regiment and 131 Commando Squadron RE. This would provide scalability for a very fine but expensive regular force, greatly improving the offer to officers, who are only 65% recruited (with none aged under 30).</p> +<p>In the context of what many believe to be China’s increasingly aggressive behavior in the South China Sea, Vietnam has leaned into international arms imports to support its military’s efforts to deter potential Chinese military action. Having launched a brief invasion of Vietnam in 1979, China remains an ongoing security concern for the government in Hanoi, as described in a noteworthy and long-awaited defense white paper released by the Vietnamese government in 2019. While Russia has historically been Vietnam’s primary arms provider, the government in Hanoi has increasingly tried to diversify its supply of defense systems, including from Israel, Canada, Spain, the Netherlands, and South Korea. Notably, during a widely publicized presidential visit to Vietnam in 2016, President Barack Obama announced an end to the United States’ Cold War–era arms embargo on the country, which some analysts perceived as part of a broader U.S. strategy to strengthen ties with Hanoi as a potential counter to Chinese efforts at hegemony in the Indo-Pacific, despite U.S. claims to the contrary. For instance, in 2021, the United States transferred a refurbished Hamilton-class Coast Guard cutter to the Vietnamese navy.</p> -<p>Unlike the other two services and Strategic Command, the MR budget is delivered centrally within the Naval Service, and then through Commander Maritime Reserves (COMMARRES). Delivering it through the capability areas could protect them from savings measures made without knowledge of their impact on outputs, such as those in 2020. This would align the Royal Navy with the other services and Strategic Command. With this transfer should come a change in the chain of command to align with capability owners and away from COMMARRES, allowing the latter to focus on areas such as N1 personnel matters, selection and recruiting, where reserves must be distinctive. The Naval Service leadership is right to recognise that reserves are needed, but a wider vision and structural change that maximises their value and amplifies the reservist voice are essential.</p> +<p>However, given the scale of Vietnam’s purchases going back to the emergence of post-Soviet Russia in 1991, the country will remain dependent on Moscow for spare parts, technology upgrades, and long-term maintenance arrangements for already purchased systems. Since 1995, an overwhelming 82 percent of Vietnam’s arms imports have originated from Russia. These purchases have included everything from aircraft and air defense systems to critical components and systems needed to maintain these weapons. The Vietnamese military reportedly has 1,383 Russian MBTs in its reserves, ranging from long-outdated models such as the T-34 to the newer and more advanced T-90S. The Vietnamese air defense reserves include the Russian S-300 system, with the Su-30MK2 acting as a key model within Hanoi’s reserve of fighter jets. There have long been reports that Vietnam is interested in acquiring more advanced Russian fighter jets, such as the Su-35 or even the Su-57.</p> -<p>Building on recent progress, a bolder approach to the MR is recommended. This must identify the real need for maritime reserve forces, including scalability of both the Dark Blue and Lovat elements, at modest cost. A revised management structure and newly appointed senior part-time volunteer reserve officers in each of the major headquarters should be at the heart of this approach.</p> +<p>But despite Vietnam’s long-held dependence on Russia for military equipment, it has recently announced new plans to develop the country’s domestic defense industry, including reforms of the General Department of Defence Industry, a state-owned conglomerate. Additionally, in December 2022, Hanoi organized its first-ever international defense exhibition, which observers interpreted as a major push by the Vietnamese leadership to expand the country’s range of foreign defense partnerships away from Russia. Given Russia’s expanded domestic defense needs to supply its war in Ukraine, combined with the ongoing risk of Russian defense production bottlenecks caused by international sanctions, these moves by Hanoi to diversify its means of defense procurement away from Russian firms appear well timed.</p> -<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> +<p>As with Vietnam, Russian defense firms have an established export relationship with the military of Myanmar, which rules the country. Russia has been second to China in terms of defense-related exports to Myanmar since 1995, accounting for 35 percent of arms deliveries. Like Russia, Myanmar faces its own set of international sanctions due to the ruling military junta’s coup and human rights violations in the ongoing civil war. Myanmar’s military junta remains interested in Russian weaponry and combat know-how to assist in its efforts to crush opposition to its 2021 coup and help fight various armed resistance groups that oppose the central government. Myanmar’s political isolation and ongoing domestic turmoil limit the country’s defense import options, making continued reliance on Russian weapons, technology, and upgrades likely over the medium term.</p> -<p>Today, with war in Europe and growing tensions around the world, most of the UK’s European neighbours are seeking affordable ways to grow their defence capabilities against a background of economic stress. In most cases, this involves expanding their reserve forces. Moreover, the UK’s major Five Eyes partners (Australia, Canada and the US) already have a much larger proportion of their forces in their reserves, on the basis that they offer an inexpensive route to (lower readiness) capability, can bring in ideas and technologies, and link the regular armed forces to the wider nation.</p> +<p>In 2023, Russia reportedly requested to buy back matériel it had sold to Myanmar in order to help fill supply gaps related to Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine. Russian tank producer Uralvagonzavod apparently purchased $24 million worth of military components, including an estimated 6,775 sighting telescopes and 200 cameras. This purchase is logical, given the Russian military’s now well-known challenge of replacing their previously Western-supplied optical systems. Sanctions enforcers should track Myanmar as a potential source of needed components for the Russian military and continue to crack down on existing loopholes that enable these kinds of defense-related transactions by the military leadership.</p> -<p>The Defence Command Paper Refresh comments:</p> +<h3 id="conclusion-and-policy-recommendations">Conclusion and Policy Recommendations</h3> -<blockquote> - <p>The War in Ukraine has reminded the world that Reserves are essential both on and off the battlefield. Making the Armed Forces more capable and resilient, the Reserves deliver both mass and access to battle-winning specialist civilian capabilities that Regular forces cannot readily generate or sustain.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian military industrial complex has faced the dual challenge of supplying the Kremlin’s troops for the war in Ukraine while circumventing international sanctions to gain access to critical components required to maintain the necessary levels of production. As Russian defense firms are forced to prioritize supplying the war effort, they are facing the inevitable choice between expending critical components and resources on fulfilling contracts for the Russian Ministry of Defense and using those same inputs for the production of weapons systems ordered by customers abroad. To add to the Russian defense industry’s troubles, Russia’s often lackluster performance on the battlefield in Ukraine, in comparison to the fierce resistance of Ukrainian troops armed with cutting-edge Western systems, serves as a powerful global advertising campaign in favor of Western arms over their Russian competitors.</p> -<p>Reserve forces are not an entitlement. They exist to provide surge and/or niche capabilities to allow a service to meet its commitments in extremis, which they can often do at a much lower peacetime cost than regulars. Holding contingent mass and specialist skills in the reserves allows Defence to do more with less in conflict. Both are important at a time when the UK is facing a more “contested and volatile world”, as the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh (IR23) puts it, and given Defence’s financial constraints. This paper examines whether and how Maritime Reserves (MR) can better contribute to the Naval Service.</p> +<p>However, the challenges facing Moscow’s arms industry predate the February 2022 invasion, which has in fact aggravated already existing problems within a domestic sector declining in its international competitiveness. Russia’s post-Soviet arms sales began to decrease in the early 2010s due to Western sanctions on third countries purchasing Russian weapons, a collapse in the purchasing power of particular countries such as Venezuela, and the efforts of the massive Chinese and Indian markets to strengthen their domestic arms production, increase arms exports (especially in the case of China), and diversify international partnerships.</p> -<p>Against the background of the war in Ukraine, and after a loss of momentum in the rebuilding of Britain’s reserves, the UK armed forces took a fresh look at their reserves as part of the IR23. Previous RUSI papers have considered opportunities for the reserves to contribute to Army and RAF outputs. The Army and RAF each now have a seat on its service board occupied by a reservist with extensive experience of combining a civilian career with uniformed service. UK Strategic Command has also created a position for a senior one-star reservist with direct access to the commander to advise on its use of reserves. Reservists also head up the US and Canadian naval reserves, making the Royal Navy (RN) an outlier in this regard.</p> +<p>To be clear, Russia is still competitive in areas such as missile and air defense systems, aircraft, armored vehicles (including different models of battle tanks), submarines, and engines. Current trends, however, indicate that Russian arms exports in virtually all major weapons categories will continue to decrease.</p> -<p>The complexities of the maritime domain impose different challenges on RN planners, but the Naval Service has not engaged with or shaped the purpose of the reserves in the same way as the Army and the RAF, because of the absence of volunteer reserve voices in its structures. Consequently, the MR has had an extremely difficult time. A lengthy Maritime Reserves Directive was published in 2020, but the Reserve Forces and Cadets Association External Scrutiny Team (EST) observed that it was still not clear exactly what the Naval Service feels it needs its reserves for. The EST’s 2021 report states:</p> +<p>China’s rise as a competitive arms manufacturer represents one of the largest challenges to the Russian defense industry. Chinese defense technology is increasingly on par with Russian exports and proves to be a particularly challenging competitor for Russian arms exports in less wealthy regional markets such as Africa. Given Russia’s growing macroeconomic and political-security dependence on China after the launch of the 2022 invasion, it has significantly less leverage to resist China’s long-term efforts at acquiring — or stealing — highly protected Russian defense technology. Increasingly, reports are emerging about Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) arresting Russian scientists for allegedly spying for Beijing. These high-profile charges may serve as a signaling mechanism to warn Russia’s defense industry workers to be on guard when collaborating with China and that Russian intelligence will be watching.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>The RN’s intent is less clear to us. We were told that the requirement should be driven by the Service need but we are concerned that could lead to the feeling of the Reserve being considered purely as a commodity.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>But while the Kremlin may have qualms about its defense industry’s vulnerability to Chinese penetration, Russian weapons manufacturers will nonetheless be increasingly dependent on the Chinese and Indian markets, as the two Asian powers remain among the small circle of countries that are still purchasing Russian arms in bulk. Russia will try to maintain its existing defense export markets, leveraging its long-standing diplomatic and military relationships in the Global South and offering unique security partnerships via investment deals and contracts with Russian private military companies such as the Wagner Group (or its alternatives). Moscow will likely maintain a role as the chief supplier to rogue states, as countries locked out of the global arms market will often find Russia a willing supplier.</p> -<p>This concern followed the RN’s unilateral decision to stop all training for four months in 2020/21, prompting a former First Sea Lord to suggest that cutting the Naval Reserve “would be an insult to its members and a disaster for the Navy”. The speed at which some of the cuts had to be reversed suggested that the then Navy Board was unaware of the measure’s impact on operations.</p> +<p>However, despite the Russian defense industry’s existing vulnerabilities, the experience of fighting the war in Ukraine under international sanctions may lead to the emergence of important innovations that Russia can then market to Global South purchasers as a competitive alternative to Western technologies. For example, Russia’s effective use of kamikaze drones, in particular the Lancet, may turn out to be a future Russian defense industry success. Russia is already expanding its domestic production of attack drones, and the intermittent hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia demonstrate that states can overpower their regional rivals with effectively deployed, low-cost drone technology. Russian drones could become a weapon of choice for lower-budget militaries or proxy forces such as those funded by Iran throughout the Middle East.</p> -<p>In recent months, the 30% cut in training budgets has been reversed and new orders outlining the way forward for reserves have been published. While both are welcome improvements, this paper argues that they do not fully address the underlying problems with MR.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The experience of fighting the war in Ukraine under international sanctions may lead to the emergence of important innovations that Russia can then market to Global South purchasers as a competitive alternative to Western technologies.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>The Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) study called for objective measures to show the capabilities and costs of reserves, and Reserve Forces 2030 (RF30) identified Ministry of Defence (MoD) accounting as a critical impediment to change. While the Army has made some progress on costs since FR20, the Naval Service appears not to have made the same progress or published an understanding of what the MR can do. Nor has there been recognition of the benefits of senior part-time volunteer reserve (PTVR) representation in headquarters and policy centres, even though the Royal Navy Reserve (RNR) continues to have PTVR leadership at unit and branch level (unlike the Royal Marines Reserve (RMR) or much of the RAF Reserves). This paper offers some areas for consideration that may help planners find effective ways to harness the potential in an MR. Typically, such reserves are to fill gaps, either as individual augmentees or small units, or to provide surge support for specialist operational needs (limited, pre-defined, additional mass). Examples include:</p> +<p>With those considerations in mind, there are ways for the West to further accelerate and deepen existing negative trends in Russia’s arms exports:</p> <ul> <li> - <p>Those with previous service expertise and where RNR training can prevent skill fade (for example, the air branch, engineers or a resuscitated reserve divers branch).</p> + <p><strong>Play the long game.</strong> Recognize that shifting nonaligned countries away from Russian military equipment is a long-term diplomatic effort that requires not just pursuing sales but strengthening bilateral relationships between countries. Deepening dialogue and developing strategic partnerships with major regional players who continue to maintain close ties with Russia will allow the West to assess opportunities for more attractive substitutes or diversification options for arms supply. Recent engagement with India offers one successful example in that regard.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Develop a targeted strategy to squeeze Russian arms sales, including through the allocation of new security assistance funding for this effort.</strong> The United States should seek to engage countries that buy Russian weapons and highlight that doing business with the Russian defense industry would merit U.S. sanctions and offer an alternative. For some countries, this may mean pushing that country to buy from the United States or allied countries. For others, the United States could offer security assistance to help acquire U.S.-origin systems. Given the need and demand, this may merit additional congressional funding for State or Defense Department security assistance programs. However, there are a number of countries to which, due to foreign policy concerns, the United States would not be willing to transfer weapons. Nevertheless, Washington should still press these states that a step toward rebuilding relations and trust with the United States begins by foregoing future arms purchases.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Highlight Russia’s military failures with the states dependent on Russian equipment.</strong> In many of the countries where Russia still maintains a competitive advantage, perceptions of the war often stem from a gap in knowledge about Ukraine, which Russia fills with its wartime propaganda. The West could help amplify Ukraine’s position in these countries and undermine Russia’s by coordinating messaging and public diplomacy.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Close sanctions loopholes when they emerge and be willing to sanction countries for buying Russian weapons</strong>. Sanctions enforcement agencies remain grossly understaffed and underresourced. Their capacity is not remotely sufficient for the economic warfare mission that policymakers have thrust upon them. Likewise, these agencies do not receive the information flow to execute their mission. The internet has incredible open-source resources, far too few of which make it to enforcement offices. Instead, these offices rely on highly classified information from the intelligence community. The classified nature of such information makes it difficult to speak about, but it also leaves gaps in coverage. Additionally, the United States should be less reticent to sanction countries for buying Russian arms. While there will be hard cases, such as India, sanctioning countries, even partners, such as Turkey, sends a signal to others that buying Russian weapons comes with significant additional economic costs beyond what is needed to pay for the specific system. The threat of sanctions has clearly deterred states from purchasing Russian arms, and the United States needs to make countries understand that it is willing to deploy sanctions.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Where it would be too expensive or otherwise impossible for the regular service to develop a full-time, regular career path when only small numbers are needed (for example, maritime trade operations or elements of intelligence).</p> + <p><strong>Closely monitor Russian efforts to buy back Russian-made or licensed equipment from partner countries.</strong> A recent news report highlighted efforts from Moscow to buy back weapon components, especially those used in tank and missile production, from its current customers such as India and Myanmar, showcasing war- and sanctions-induced struggles faced by Russian defense industry. If true, this could also point to a potential path for Russia to augment its own struggling domestic defense industrial production by outsourcing production to partners through providing licenses to them to manufacture certain arms and components. For instance, Moscow has given permission to New Delhi to manufacture T-90 tanks, as well as MiG-21 and MiG-23/27 fighters. Considering Russia’s outstanding equipment shortages, the Kremlin could conceivably seek to buy back some of those weapons and systems. While there is no evidence that Russia has thus far attempted to do this, New Delhi’s desire to access or lease advanced foreign technology to boost its domestic defense industry, coupled with Moscow’s readiness to provide more relaxed rules for technology transfers, make such cooperation probable. Likewise, the Kremlin may introduce or revisit its licensing deals with other partners such as China or Iran. Therefore, Western policymakers should closely monitor Russia’s licensing agreements with its militarily capable partners, including India, as well as China and Iran, and develop targeted solutions highlighted above to avert such future scenarios.</p> </li> <li> - <p>Where specialist civilian skills would be available (for example, medics, cyber or media operations) or where skills developed in the military can be sustained in the commercial world (including, again, the air branch).</p> + <p><strong>Finally, continue supplying to Ukraine.</strong> As CSIS has argued earlier, it should remain a priority for the West to provide Ukraine with continuous supplies of higher-end military equipment at a pace that exceeds Russia’s production rate. Attrition will make it harder for Russia to simultaneously maintain domestic production while exporting arms globally. Additionally, the West should consider granting Ukrainian manufacturers rights to use selected Western technologies for licensed domestic production of selected weapons systems, component parts, and/or ammunition needed to wage the ground war in Ukraine.</p> </li> </ul> -<p>This paper examines wider opportunities that stem from both the recent limited experience of reserves undertaking many of the seagoing roles in coastal, fishery protection and littoral vessels and broader experiences from the past and of the UK’s allies today. Moreover, a number of maritime roles from which the Navy withdrew several decades ago, including protection of most ports and elements of coastal security, appear to pose serious potential threats. While such roles need not necessarily be forced onto the Naval Service, the paper examines whether the reserves could offer cost-effective options with a low peacetime cost that could be called out at scale and composed of people with local knowledge.</p> - -<p>Finally, the RMR, which makes up a quarter of the MR, has an extremely limited function in providing individual augmentees and specialists for the regular force. The Royal Marines are embarked on a journey to become a maritime force capable of special operations, which led to a (recently dropped) proposal to require reserve recruits to undergo the main element of the regular pathway. When the Army Reserves have special forces and airborne units, as well as a commando engineer squadron, all with capabilities as formed bodies at least at sub-unit level, the narrow and unambitious RMR role is worthy of broader examination.</p> - -<p>In considering opportunities and lessons for reserves, this paper focuses on the PTVR elements. The Naval Service has full-time reserve service (FTRS) personnel and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), who are technically civil servants, with 80% sponsored reservists. They provide logistics and operational support but offer no capacity to scale up in war. Both categories are largely ignored in this paper, although where FTRS and Additional Duties Commitment personnel are involved in reserve units and supporting structures, they are relevant to this paper.</p> - -<p>In terms of structure, Chapter I outlines the current state of the reserves and examines several roles where gaps exist. Chapter II looks at examples of the use of maritime reserves, including by the UK’s allies. Here, the main focus is the major Five Eyes countries, both because their potential adversaries are overseas, unlike the continental NATO partners, and because they share the UK’s tradition of voluntarism rather than conscription in uniformed services. Chapter III plots a way forward. The Maritime Reserve Organisation structure is shown in the Annex.</p> - -<h3 id="i-todays-maritime-reserves">I. Today’s Maritime Reserves</h3> - -<p>The MR are comprised of two elements: the RNR and the RMR, totalling approximately 2,800 trained personnel. This chapter explores what they do, how they are structured and operate, and how they compare to their major Five Eyes peers.</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FumuMrH.png" alt="image01" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 1: Maritime Reserves as a Percentage of Regular Maritime Forces.</strong> Sources: <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/232330/us-military-force-numbers-by-service-branch-and-reserve-component/">Statista, “Active and Reserve United States Military Force Personnel in 2021, by Service Branch and Reserve Component”</a>; <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/navy.html">Government of Canada, “Royal Canadian Navy”</a>; <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/accessing-information/annual-reports">Australian Government, Defence Annual Report 2021–22 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2022)</a>, p. 120, Table 6.14; <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/quarterly-service-personnel-statistics-2022/quarterly-service-personnel-statistics-1-october-2022">Ministry of Defence, “Quarterly Service Personnel Statistics 1 October 2022”</a>, last updated 15 December 2022. The above comparisons include US Marines and Royal Marines. Coastguard forces are excluded as they differ so much between countries. The Australian Commandos are also excluded as they are part of the Australian Army but are discussed in the paper as they make an interesting comparison.</em></p> - -<h4 id="the-royal-naval-reserve">The Royal Naval Reserve</h4> - -<p>The RNR currently has 14 regional units which support multiple specialisations, plus HMS Ferret and HMS Pegasus, which act as national sites for intelligence and aviation respectively. The capabilities are divided into three groups (plus a fourth for the RMR) and a headquarters function (see Annex).</p> - -<p>Each geographic unit typically has a range of skills, including seagoing general warfare support (principally for offshore patrol vessels) and battle staff and support functions, including for mine warfare, amphibious warfare and submarine operations. This is slowly changing as individual specialisations become more geographically focused to enable specialist training to take place at regional training centres, reducing wasted resources in terms of time and cost of travel. An example is the engineering branch now administered by HMS Vivid in Plymouth, with the (PTVR) Commanding Officer “double hatted” in command. Nevertheless, where geography requires it, general warfare individuals can become members of their nearest unit for representational purposes while engaged in a capability function centred elsewhere. While this is a step forward, the overall vision of the new MR document is now based on a strictly limited mission “to provide sufficient, capable and motivated personnel, at readiness to support RN operations around the globe”.</p> - -<p>Focusing on the provision of individual personnel is out of line with most other reserve services in major Five Eyes countries, and also specifically with comparable reserve organisations in the UK. In particular, this arrangement makes the “offer” for the RMR a quantum lower than the formed body capabilities of, for instance, special and airborne forces in the Army, where squadron-level capabilities are seen as essential.</p> - -<p>The RNR has a well-developed junior and middle-ranking officer corps, with those joining from civilian life (apart from certain professionally qualified officers like doctors and chaplains) doing either an eight-week course through Britannia Royal Naval College (BRNC) Dartmouth or a modular equivalent in units, at BRNC or elsewhere to fit their tighter civilian commitments.</p> - -<p>Like their Army counterparts, but unlike the current RAF, students joining University Royal Naval Units (URNUs) can offset part of the BRNC course against training at the URNU or basic training in their units. Almost all RNR units are commanded by PTVR officers. These officers manage with an exceptionally slim full-time cadre compared to the other services and recently suffered further reductions.</p> - -<p>At the higher ranks, the RNR is in a very different place from the other services. In the Navy, the senior officer with a specific volunteer reserve focus is a one-star appointment as Commander Maritime Reserves (COMMARRES), which has been filled by a succession of FTRS officers and regulars for many years. The new appointee does, however, have some PTVR experience from the beginning of her service. There is no senior PTVR representation in any command or policy branch outside COMMARRES’ staff, including 3 Commando Brigade. Despite this, MR officers have done well competing for the handful of “purple” posts outside the Naval Service, with a one-star officer responsible for implementing FR30 in the MoD, and a Captain RN (OF5) currently serving in Strategic Command.</p> +<hr /> -<p>In contrast, the comparable-sized RAF Reserve has a PTVR two-star officer on the Air Force Board Executive Committee, a PTVR one-star officer, and several PTVR half-star (OF5) officers in various headquarters and departments. The Army has a senior reservist in almost every single headquarters and policy branch, including two-star officers on the Executive Committee of the Army Board and its Field Army counterpart, the deputy commanders of divisions and brigades and staff officers in key branches from the Military Secretary’s department to Army Recruiting and Initial Training Command. It also has a reserve brigade (19 Light Brigade) commanded by a PTVR brigadier. These senior elements in critical structures are essential to ensuring the reserve voice is heard at a high-enough level to influence thinking in otherwise regular systems that are often inadequately aware of reserves.</p> +<p><strong>Max Bergmann</strong> is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</p> -<p>Strategic Command, which has the smallest reserve element of the four commands, also has a senior PTVR one-star position with direct access to the commander and has ensured that reserve officers are distributed widely throughout it.</p> +<p><strong>Maria Snegovaya</strong> is a senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS and a postdoctoral fellow in Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.</p> -<p>A small further difference to the disadvantage of MR units is that they do not have individual honorary officers as Army Reserve units have honorary colonels and Royal Auxiliary Air Force (RAuxAF) units have honorary air commodores. So, even this informal voice with access to power is not provided for MR units; instead, honorary officers are held in a pool by the regular service (although one or two have reserve service), administered by Naval Regional Commander Eastern, with a primary role of advising First Sea Lord and in many cases allocated to (regular) warships.</p> +<p><strong>Tina Dolbaia</strong> is a research associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS, where she examines and analyzes political, economic, and security developments in Russia and Eurasia.</p> -<p>Another key difference between the MR and those in the other commands is that their budget is held and delegated to units and heads of departments via MR HQ. In the other commands, the budgets are delegated to the relevant functional area. This connects the reserve component to capability, including those only required in war or major operations, without the link to functional areas. Elements that are not regularly used in peacetime may wither and gaps only become apparent when it is too late. After all, a crucial role of reserves is to provide elements of capability in warfighting that are not needed in peacetime, either at all or at the requisite scale, and so would be expensive to maintain in the regular service. This arrangement has arguably given reserves a safeguard at a time when their voice was lacking in all other parts of the Navy. However, if each regular headquarters and command had a senior reserve voice, as in the other services, the best of both worlds could be achieved.</p> +<p><strong>Nick Fenton</strong> is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS, where he supports the program’s event management, outreach, and research agenda.</p>Max Bergmann, et al.Russia’s role as a major global arms supplier is under threat. This report analyzes how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the concomitant Western sanctions have affected the status of its role.Degradation Everywhere2023-09-18T12:00:00+08:002023-09-18T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/degration-everywhere<p><em>Situated on the front line of the war in Ukraine, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant poses ongoing risks. These relate not only to the threat of Russian sabotage, but also to the gradual deterioration of the facility under the extreme operating conditions.</em></p> -<p>In combination, these factors mean that the various elements of the Naval Service have few institutional arrangements that bring understanding of reserve capabilities, strengths and shortcomings. The fact that the four-month training ban, when the then Navy Board was unable to easily see its impact even on current operations, had to be speedily partially unwound highlights the problem. In these regards, the RN is out of line with the Army, RAF, MoD and Strategic Command.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>The MR does have an officer development programme up to commander level and occasionally beyond. As with the Army Reserve, there is a bespoke reserve Intermediate Command and Staff Course (ICSC(MR)) for SO3/2 and Warrant Officers, then the Combined Reserve Advanced Command and Staff Course (ACSC(Reserve)) for senior SO2/SO1. The RMR typically attend the ICSC(Land Reserve). Unlike the Army Reserve, all MR officers must attend ACSC(Reserve), or the full course, to be substantially promoted to SO1. The Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) also takes OF5 MR from time to time. While laudable, there are weaknesses with the Combined Reserve ACSC(Reserve), which are examined more fully in an earlier paper in this series on the Army.</p> +<p>Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the safety of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants and facilities has been a source of concern. Ukraine hosts four operational nuclear power plants (NPP), including Europe’s largest – the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). It is also home to Europe’s most infamous NPP, at Chornobyl – the site of the major 1986 disaster which saw the eventual displacement of 350,000 people and resulted in the spread of radioactive particles around the world. The continued occupation of the ZNPP by Russian forces and its precarious location on the front line of the war have raised fears across Europe and around the world of a repeat of the 1986 Chornobyl disaster. There have been a number of inflection points over the last year and a half when concerns over the potential for a large-scale radioactive disaster at the ZNPP have reached fever pitch – most recently in early July, in light of warnings from both the Russians and the Ukrainians that the other side was preparing an imminent attack on the plant. While the potential for an engineered incident or attack resulting in radioactive release at the ZNPP cannot be ruled out, the more salient and probable – yet less headline-grabbing – threat to the ZNPP is the slow degradation of the plant’s systems and the consequent safety and economic implications of this chronic deterioration.</p> -<h4 id="seagoing-elements-of-the-rnr">Seagoing Elements of the RNR</h4> +<p>Ultimately, while the ZNPP remains under occupation by Russian forces – who have shown little consideration for human life, nuclear safety or international law – the potential for the site to be used as a giant dirty bomb cannot and should not be ruled out. Moscow may decide to purposefully engineer a malfunctioning of key safety systems or strike parts of the facility to release radioactive material into the surrounding areas. The fact that the facility is on the front line of a military conflict and is already operating under exceptional stress – to its key operating systems (namely, water and electricity supply) as well as to its Ukrainian staff (who have faced harassment and are working in an active warzone) – also means that it would be relatively easy for Russia to write off an engineered incident as a no-fault accident or to place blame on the Ukrainian military or personnel. The ongoing military activity in the vicinity of the ZNPP also raises the possibility that key systems and equipment at the plant could be damaged in a strike.</p> -<p>The RN does not have warships in a reserve fleet that reservists can crew in times of tension. Nevertheless, for reasons of cost and the capacity of its regular force size, the RN has vessels undergoing refit in which it has no/limited crews, as regular personnel are rightly concentrated in operational vessels. In war, it seems likely that such vessels would be accelerated back into service and a combination of volunteer reservists and ex-regulars with key skills could thus contribute to providing mass at sea.</p> +<p>Most nuclear experts agree that, under the ZNPP’s current operating conditions, any radioactive release in case of an attack or accident at the site would not equate to the 1986 Chornobyl disaster. An incident on the scale of the 2011 accident at Japan’s Fukushima-Daiichi NPP is a more appropriate comparison, but also unlikely under the current circumstances. However, depending on the scale and nature of the actual incident, as well as the efforts put into managing the emergency, there is some risk of radioactive release. Such a release of radioactivity – or fears of a release – could be weaponised by Russian forces to tie up Ukrainian military resources in responding to the radioactive contamination, to prevent access to the facility by advancing Ukrainian troops, as well as to sow widespread panic among the Ukrainian population. Threats to cause an incident or exacerbate one, or offers to stop one from happening or from escalating, could also be used by Moscow to create leverage and secure concessions from Ukraine and its allies elsewhere in the conflict – either on the battlefield or in the diplomatic space.</p> -<p>Currently, the “core” element of the RNR’s General Warfare Sea Specialisation is primarily composed of ratings because officers require a suite of skills deemed too difficult and too expensive to be taught ab initio and maintained in the time available for training reserve officers. The watchkeeping qualification for officers, for example, is now the same as for the Merchant Navy, and gaining it requires extensive seagoing experience. However, officers are used in three disciplines where the training burden is lower: mine warfare; submarine operations; and amphibious warfare. And while major warships may be too demanding for full reserve crews, coastal, fishery and littoral vessels are potentially more suitable and generally less complex if, as in the past, officer recruitment focused more heavily on those with the relevant civilian watchkeeping qualifications. When the RN took operational command of the Border Force afloat assets, some of the personnel provided for several months were reserves who acquitted themselves well. Experiments are now planned with RNR ratings in RMR teams providing protection for the RFA and supporting vessels.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Under the current circumstances, the plant is likely to be more useful to Moscow as a source of leverage and a means of sowing public anxiety than as a giant dirty bomb</code></em></strong></p> -<p>A positive development is the priority being given to officer recruiting (on target, unlike other ranks, which is running at about 50%) and phase-two training for general warfare officers in all three specialities. The potential for wider employment at sea is also being looked at. Nevertheless, the scope remains limited compared with the US and Canadian navies; allowing officers greater roles, including command of offshore patrol vessels as they do abroad, is outside the scope of current studies.</p> +<p>Yet, causing an incident at the facility while they continue to occupy it would presumably make little sense for Russia. However, this is not – as some have pointed out – because an accident at the ZNPP would put parts of Russia’s territory and population at risk. Moscow is not known for its concern for the general Russian population, and blaming Ukraine for an accident – as Moscow undoubtedly would – would likely only galvanise support for the invasion among the Russian population. And, as mentioned earlier, an incident at the ZNPP does not necessarily need to result in major radioactive spread.</p> -<h4 id="coastal-security-and-port-protection">Coastal Security and Port Protection</h4> +<p>If Russian forces wanted to continue operating at or around the ZNPP, generating an incident at the facility would leave Moscow having to deal with at least some of the clean-up of the released radiological material – tying up resources and making operation around the facility more challenging. Depending on the nature of the incident, the plant may also be left inoperable, thus undermining reported Russian intentions to eventually connect the ZNPP to the Crimean and Russian energy grid (although plans to do so appear to have stalled or to have been abandoned for the time being). Russia would instead be left with a huge, damaged installation in need of repair or decommissioning. Under the current circumstances, the plant is thus likely to be more useful to Moscow as a source of leverage to extract concessions from Ukraine and its partners and to sow public anxiety than as a giant dirty bomb.</p> -<p>Britain neglected coastal security in the build-up to the Second World War, leaving its coastline and nearby ships vulnerable to E-boats (see Chapter II). For an island nation that depends on the sea – approximately 95% of British goods (by weight) travel by sea – there is little clarity on who has responsibility for the protection of ports, save to state that it is not a task formally given to the RN. Few ports have been designated as strategic and thus warrant any form of naval protection. Moreover, while the coastguard, police and border force all have some maritime (or at least aquatic) responsibilities, none has any equipment publicly evident to deliver this, particularly at a scale to provide meaningful defence in the event of the UK being engaged in a war in Europe. Similarly, no evidence of exercises to protect any part of this critical national infrastructure (CNI) has been unearthed, except, perhaps, in the narrow area of cyber. Indeed, much of the UK’s wider CNI is coastal, including all its nuclear power stations, and similar points can be made about a lack of preparedness. Recent reports of Russian vessels carrying out “hostile” reconnaissance of UK waters and sub-sea infrastructure add a further dimension.</p> +<p>However, that calculation will almost certainly change in the instance of a Russian withdrawal from the ZNPP. On their departure, Russian forces will have little incentive to leave the plant operational and plenty of reasons to engineer an incident at the site. In addition to the strain on military and economic resources from having to deal with a radioactive release, as well as the implications for freedom of military movement at and around a contaminated facility, a damaged ZNPP would in turn leave Kyiv managing a massive piece of damaged critical infrastructure, with significant long-term safety and economic implications.</p> -<p>Should a requirement emerge to remedy this, the MR could be well placed to satisfy it in an affordable manner. Moreover, with only three naval bases for the RN’s warships and submarines, these sites are very vulnerable to attack. Each would benefit from more physical protection in the event of war, but the RN should consider how to distribute its ships to reduce their vulnerability, much as the RAF is doing for its aircraft, which are also grouped into very few locations in peacetime.</p> +<p>In fact, there may not be a need for Russia to engineer a system malfunction or directly attack the ZNPP to turn the site into an economic liability and safety hazard for Ukraine after its recapture. A year and a half of military occupation is threatening to do that already. NPPs are robust things, with multiple redundancies and safety systems built in to keep them operating safely under extreme conditions. But no NPP is built to withstand extended operations in an active warzone. The ZNPP has had to put up with mine explosions and fire; it is regularly disconnected from the external power grid; it has been depending on a backup water supply for months; some of its reactors have been held in hot shutdown for months (well beyond the regulatory time limits for operation in this state); and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported on shortages of maintenance staff and supply chain challenges. At a recent meeting with journalists in early September, Petro Kotin – the head of Ukraine’s nuclear energy utility Energoatom – noted: “It is degradation everywhere … Everything is degraded – equipment, components and personnel. Everything is in very bad condition”. At a press conference on 11 September, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi noted his concerns over “technical issues that are starting to arise”, appearing to suggest that some may be related to the long-term shutdown of the plant.</p> -<p>More widely, the UK lacks intelligence arrangements for coastal security beyond a few coastguard and border force clusters, as well as an element of satellite monitoring. If, for example, a yacht operator spotted a group of people offloading equipment in a marina which looked as if it could be heavy weaponry from a motor yacht, there is no avenue for them to report it aside from calling 999.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">There is no guarantee that Russia will not attack or otherwise seek to generate a radiological release at the plant, despite it not being in Moscow’s interest</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="mine-warfare">Mine Warfare</h4> +<p>Should the military situation around the ZNPP ease enough in the future to allow the facility’s reactors to be brought out of their shutdown state and to begin generating energy again, a thorough inspection and servicing of the facility will be necessary. This will be a massive undertaking. The site is a massive complex; in addition to its six reactors, auxiliary buildings and other support and staff infrastructure, it also hosts a dry spent fuel storage site and a training facility. The whole of the site will have to go through a demining operation, and its reactors will need to undergo a top-to-bottom review to ensure that all is in working order.</p> -<p>Until a generation ago, the RNR had its own ships, most of them River-class minesweepers operating as MCM10. When these were replaced with more capable, but also more complicated, Hunt-class mine countermeasure vessels (MCMs), the RNR continued with detachments of divers and a few personnel trained on the REMUS remote mine-hunting system. Today, all that remains are a few battle staff and watch officers. This seems to be a consequence of rising safety standards and a widespread belief that the current skills involved in the operational side of mine warfare are too complicated for reservists. However, this contrasts with the Army’s Royal Engineers’ view of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) work, where the reserve regiment (101 City of London Regiment) is similar in size to its regular counterpart (33 Engineer Regiment (EOD)). The Royal School of Military Engineering at Chatham and Minley, which has been repeatedly praised by the RFCA External Scrutiny Team for their success in making training reserve friendly, has recognised that the strongest requirement for a surge capability is in the search for mines and other EODs, the main focus for reserve training. At the same time, ex-regulars and those reservists who can take the time off can do the full regular course and offer the full range of skills including dismantling mines and suspected devices. Both regular and reserve IED teams and individuals were used on Operation Herrick in Afghanistan.</p> +<p>Some have even suggested that the site may not be redeemable at all after the occupation, which would require the decommissioning of the NPP. This may become true, depending on the length of the occupation and the state in which the Russian occupiers leave the site. This, too, would incur significant costs; while decommissioning costs for nuclear facilities depend on a range of factors, the IAEA estimates that the decommissioning of a single nuclear power reactor, including costs for associated waste management, comes with a price tag of between $500 million and $2 billion and typically takes 15 to 20 years. These figures, combined with the rendering inoperable of a facility that – prior to the large-scale invasion of Ukraine – was responsible for 25% of the country’s energy supply, would have colossal economic implications for post-war Ukraine, which will already be facing massive reconstruction costs and logistical challenges.</p> -<h4 id="information-warfare">Information Warfare</h4> +<p>Ultimately, trying to predict Russian thinking in Ukraine is a fool’s errand. There is no guarantee that Russia will not attack or otherwise seek to generate a radiological release at the ZNPP, despite it not being in Moscow’s interest; in fact, in the event of a Russian withdrawal from the ZNPP, the risk of sabotage at the site will be acute. Ukraine’s allies in the UK, the US, Europe and elsewhere should continue to remain ready to support Ukraine in case of an emergency and radiological release at the ZNPP, through the supply of CBRN equipment and training as requested by Kyiv, as well as the provision of mental health support. They should also continue to make clear that any incident at the ZNPP resulting from Russian action (or inaction) will not go unanswered, and coordinate with Ukraine on an appropriate and credible deterrent and plan of response. Yet, while an engineered incident at the ZNPP remains possible, the massive strain on economic resources – as well as the longer-term safety implications – resulting from the degradation of the ZNPP’s systems are a certainty. As such, it is critical that the response of Ukraine’s partners to the situation at the ZNPP includes allocating the economic resources and technical assistance that will be needed following de-occupation to ensure the safe operation of Europe’s largest NPP.</p> -<p>Information warfare (IW) is the fastest-growing element of the MR, although, as with other elements, figures are not published. This includes information operations, cyber, intelligence, media operations, maritime trade operations and communications technology. While IW has been part of an armed forces’ armoury since the dawn of time, as any reader of The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle knows, modern equipment and social media have taken it to a new level, as the war in Ukraine has shown. The RN has recognised their importance and that these skills should lie predominantly with the MR. Cyber offers an opportunity for the Navy and the MR to grow a key capability. The capability gap across government has led to a commitment to more reserves, although the difficulties in keeping quality operatives in regular service are still not fully acknowledged.</p> +<hr /> -<p>MR information operations are a national asset, with elements at Chicksands. Most personnel are at Portsmouth, where training and employment is managed by the single unit of HMS King Alfred that works closely with the new (Regular) Operational Advantage Centre (OAC) there. Like the General Warfare and Operations Support capabilities, the IW capability is commanded by a PTVR captain (OF5), with each of the six elements led by PTVR commanders (OF4). Tasking comes mostly through the (regular) OAC but into reservist teams, whose command and N1 (personnel) arrangements are handled by the PTVR commanders. This means that the people responsible for N1 issues, including supporting recruiting, individual appraisals and leading work, can bring their highly relevant civilian skills to the Naval Service.</p> +<p><strong>Darya Dolzikova</strong> is a Research Fellow with RUSI’s Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme. Her work focuses on understanding and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including proliferation financing and other illicit trade by actors of proliferation concern. Her research areas include the Iranian nuclear programme and related diplomacy, Iranian and North Korean proliferation-related sanctions evasion, as well as other issues concerning nuclear technology and proliferation.</p>Darya DolzikovaSituated on the front line of the war in Ukraine, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant poses ongoing risks. These relate not only to the threat of Russian sabotage, but also to the gradual deterioration of the facility under the extreme operating conditions.Arctic Geopolitics2023-09-14T12:00:00+08:002023-09-14T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/arctic-geopolitics<p><em>Tensions in the Arctic among great powers have increased since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But the unique status of the Norwegian archipelago Svalbard complicates this broad geopolitical framing of the region.</em></p> -<p>The arrangements for the six branches are different in this regard. In the case of cyber and communications technology, all recruits work in the industry and cyber applicants pass through a Defence-wide system for selection. In the case of media operations and intelligence, recruits have to pass an assessment and a useful proportion start with civilian skills. There is no separate selection for information and maritime trade operations, and recruits are trained from scratch, but a number bring valuable civilian backgrounds. This is a complicated area as these disciplines involve civilian-recognised skills but lack the professional structures which govern military personnel in areas like medicine and law. The RNR’s IW capability structure seems well designed to cope with it.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>Two further welcome features are that IW staff are all deployable (except some cyber staff) and some have been deployed abroad, and that the OAC actively looks to them and their unusual skills for guidance on future trends as technologies evolve.</p> +<p>The Arctic is increasingly viewed as an arena for power projection and spillover from conflicts elsewhere. In this regard, the Svalbard archipelago is an important case study because it has economic, scientific, political, and security implications for states in the High North, the United States, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. Svalbard’s unique status as a sovereign territory of Norway with provisions for foreign nationals, Russia’s presence on the territory and its interests at sea, as well as the archipelago’s proximity to critical Russian military locations make Svalbard a potential geopolitical flash point. This brief examines the geopolitics of Svalbard and the security implications for Norway, the United States, and NATO. Through close examination of the archipelago, the authors aim to contribute to a more granular understanding of Arctic geopolitics and how NATO and the United States can best prepare for heightened geopolitical tensions in the region.</p> -<h4 id="aviation">Aviation</h4> +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> -<p>Reformed in 1980, and now known as HMS Pegasus, the former RNR Air Branch has a mixture of pilots and other key aviation skills, although it currently has no remotely piloted air systems (RPAS) cadre or capability. It is entirely composed of ex-regulars. The organisation is commanded by a PTVR officer with full-time support and spends almost all its output on operations working in support of the fleet, rather than training itself. The unit operates as a pool providing personnel as needed by the Navy as individuals or small teams, but tasking is through its headquarters, rather than directly by the customer unit or organisation. This ensures that tasking is by people who understand the pressures of dual career service. Until the aircraft was retired, the air branch included Harrier pilots. By any standards, it offers access in peacetime and a surge capability in war for a range of expensive skills at very low cost, as it requires no training pipeline, just vastly cheaper routine training to maintain currency (or, where pilot skills are useful without current flying, none at all, such as inspection, classroom instruction and red teaming).</p> +<p>The emphasis on cooperation that has long characterized Arctic politics has deteriorated. During the Cold War, despite the geographical proximity between NATO member Norway and the Soviet Union, a geopolitical equilibrium ensured that interstate clashes in the Arctic were practically nonexistent. In fact, both sides pursued significant scientific collaboration in the region. The early 2000s saw rapid growth in Arctic interest and engagement among Arctic states, including Russia, on everything from economic development to climate research. However, simultaneously, Russia has increased its military presence and activity in the North. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, security affairs in the Arctic became more tense, with the final remnants of regional cooperation evaporating after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Moreover, some see Russian overtures to deepen ties with China as strengthening Beijing’s claim of being a “near-Arctic” state and thus posing a challenge to the seven other Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States).</p> -<p>However, ever-increasing safety requirements, combined with tightening flying budgets, mean very few now actually fly. The earlier RUSI paper on Air Reserves highlighted the growing evidence that an over-cautious safety regime, introduced since the Haddon-Cave report, was both reducing the appetite for sensible risk-taking in that service and hampering the growth of reserve capability through unrealistic requirements. The availability of reservists to help in the RN’s helicopter pilot training pipeline appears to continue to give it a higher level of resilience than its RAF counterpart by assisting with instruction, red teaming on simulators and paperwork.</p> +<p>This growing geopolitical tension in the region warrants closer scrutiny by European High North countries, the NATO alliance, and the United States. Few case studies embody this development better than Svalbard, a Norwegian archipelago with an area about twice the size of Belgium and located approximately 650 kilometers north of the Norwegian mainland and just 1,000 kilometers from the North Pole. An analysis of the links between geography and power politics around Svalbard — Norway’s northernmost territory, with a unique political and economic status — reveals the complexity of the geopolitical competition in the Arctic, and how simple depictions of conflict/no-conflict scenarios can be unhelpful.</p> -<h4 id="royal-marines-reserves">Royal Marines Reserves</h4> +<p>Svalbard’s unique regional position is especially pertinent. The archipelago has significant strategic importance, as its location could be crucial to controlling access to and from Russia’s Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula, which houses Russia’s strategic nuclear submarines. Waters around Svalbard also contain plentiful fish stocks, such as cod and shrimp, and extensive deposits of metal minerals. Melting ice will gradually improve access to some of these resources and may facilitate an increase in shipping activity in this part of the Arctic.</p> -<p>The RMR was established in 1948 with a limited role providing augmentees for the regular force. Today, the force is split into four units, each with an establishment of 155, spread over 22 locations. The regular RM are partially moving away from amphibious operations at scale towards a “future commando force”, capable of a range of “tier-two” special forces operations. A programme to bring reserve training in line with regular training was abandoned, presumably acknowledging the incompatibility of regular full-time training with demanding civilian employment. After a period of uncertainty over its future, it has continued to provide individual augmentees to regular units, both mainstream and those holding special skills.</p> +<p>In this regard, Russia is particularly attentive to the implications of climate change for the commercial development of the Northern Sea Route, which offers a shortcut for vessels traveling between Europe and Asia, primarily along the Russian Arctic coast. However, even in the Arctic, where a melting icescape presents new opportunities for states to maneuver, overly broad framings of the geopolitical rivalry term are often too simplistic. Instead, it is imperative to more closely examine specific cases of geopolitical competition and rivalry in the North.</p> -<p>While the mainstream RMR has such a limited role, UK Special Forces have two reserve Special Air Service (SAS) regiments, a small (RMR) Reserve Special Boat Service (SBS) detachment and a signals squadron, all integrated in the Special Forces Group. 16 Airborne Assault Brigade has a reserve infantry battalion and engineer and medical squadrons and is growing a reserve artillery battery. Apart from the SBS detachment, all have roles as formed bodies, mostly up to sub-unit level.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The archipelago has significant strategic importance, as its location could be crucial to controlling access to and from Russia’s Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula, which houses Russia’s strategic nuclear submarines.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>RMR premises are well resourced for facilities and supporting permanent staff structures, with each (company-sized) unit headed by a regular lieutenant colonel. These units contain many talented potential officers who serve as junior ranks, because the RMR’s traditional role – producing individual augmentees – is unambitious and offers little opportunity for command to junior officers; it is only 65% recruited officers, and none of the officers are under 30, unlike Army reserve officers. In comparison, the Army Commando unit (131 Squadron RE) has both a formed unit capability in providing a wide range of outputs, such as heavy plant, bridge building and demolitions, and a healthy officer cadre because it offers command opportunities, including for its commanding officer, who is always a reserve major. Both the RMR and 131 Squadron are struggling because of the cuts in Reserve Service Day (RSD) budgets, which were recently reversed, but commando training is at last starting again after a whole year’s pause.</p> +<p>Both scholarly and journalistic works tend to misunderstand the sovereignty of Svalbard and its associated geopolitical dimensions. Despite Norway having “full and absolute sovereignty” over Svalbard, according to the Svalbard Treaty, misconceptions abound regarding Svalbard as a “shared space” or Svalbard’s legal status being ambiguous. Another dubious claim is that the “Norwegian interpretation of the Svalbard treaty is disputed by its other signatories.” Moreover, some argue the archipelago is shrouded in “NATO ambiguity” and question whether it is covered by the alliance’s territorial security guarantee.</p> -<p>The RMR also contrasts sharply with its counterparts in the US and Australia. The US has a marine corps reserve division and Australia has a commando regiment (an amphibious unit in its army reserve). Both are constituted for use as formed bodies, as described in Chapter II.</p> +<p>Statements such as these are inaccurate and obscure the legal and political situation surrounding Svalbard. They seem to confuse the ambiguity concerning the archipelago’s maritime zones with a more fundamental dispute about Norwegian sovereignty of the territory writ large and — unintentionally or deliberately — amplify a narrowly circumscribed issue while ignoring other geopolitical dimensions concerning Svalbard.</p> -<h4 id="recruiting-and-training">Recruiting and Training</h4> +<p>One way to overcome this inaccuracy is to examine the more tangible geopolitical dimensions of Svalbard in international politics. These include (1) explicit challenges to Norwegian policies on land, (2) disagreement over the legal status (sovereign rights) of the maritime zones, and (3) the potential military use of Svalbard in a larger conflict with Russia.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/irSze0t.png" alt="image02" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 2: Maritime Reserves, Trained Strength 2014–23.</strong> Source: <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/quarterly-service-personnel-statistics-2023/quarterly-service-personnel-statistics-1-april-2023">MoD, “Quarterly Service Personnel Statistics, 1 April 2023”</a>, updated 22 June 2023.</em></p> +<h3 id="context-political-history-of-svalbard">Context: Political History of Svalbard</h3> -<p>After several years of steady progress, the coronavirus pandemic seriously hampered recruiting problems as the Army’s Defence Recruitment System bled across the other services in terms of public perceptions and Defence-wide mitigation measures. The 2021 training ban further worsened this for the MR. After protests in parliament and the media, training days specifically related to recruiting and basic training were restored, but the impact on trainees and potential recruits of discovering that their units had been suspended is not hard to imagine.</p> +<p>The origin of Svalbard’s unique legal status may be traced to its role as a locus for commerce and trade centuries ago. Initially named Spitsbergen by the Dutch explorer Willem Barentsz in the sixteenth century, the archipelago was renamed Svalbard by Norway in 1925, while Spitsbergen is now the name of the archipelago’s largest island. Only in the early twentieth century, when promising discoveries of coal were made and mines were established, were negotiations opened to establish an administration of the Svalbard archipelago, at first driven by Norway’s wish to define the territory’s legal status after the dissolution of its union with Sweden in 1905. Although various models were discussed before World War I, postwar negotiations in 1920 resulted in the Spitsbergen Treaty (here referred to as the Svalbard Treaty), which confirmed Norway’s sovereignty over the territory.</p> -<p>MR training suffers from the same issues that were extensively explored in the earlier paper on Army Reserves, which stressed the tension between a commitment to achieve similar standards against the requirement to deliver training appropriate for people with full-time, and often relevant, civilian jobs and skills. In the case of the MR, two additional factors compounded this: the 30% cut imposed on training budgets in 2021 (now reversed) and calls to reduce the number of permanent staff instructors in the RNR which, unlike the RMR, has always been leaner than other reserve units. However, more positively, emphasis is now placed on improving phase-two training for reserve general warfare officers, with two-week courses delivered in Cyprus or Gibraltar. Nevertheless, as previously described, the vision remains limited in this area.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/gMLB5aF.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Figure 1: Svalbard in the European High North.</em></p> -<p>The 2020 Maritime Reserves Directive states that the MR should “review reserves training and delivery” and “explore regionalisation of training in waterfront units for seamanship, whilst exploiting distributed and virtual learning across the Branches”.</p> +<p>After affirming Norway’s full and absolute sovereignty and responsibility for managing the islands, the treaty attempts to secure the economic interests of foreign nationals as a key objective. This was done by including provisions on equal rights and nondiscrimination in the most relevant economic activities at the time. For example, Norway may not treat other nationals less favorably than its own citizens in certain areas, and taxes levied on Svalbard in connection with mining may be used solely for local purposes. Moreover, the islands may not be used for “warlike purposes,” and no military fortifications may be built on the islands.</p> -<p>In principle, providing more training in RNR bases and regionally will help and is sensible, but it is difficult to see how it can work in practice with fewer permanent staff in those units.</p> +<p>The Soviet Union was not present during the treaty negotiations due to its ongoing civil war, so the one concern at the time was whether the Soviets would challenge the treaty, given their geographic proximity to the area and claims of historic use. In 1924, however, the Soviet government unconditionally and unilaterally recognized Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago and acceded to the treaty in 1935. The Soviet Union made several attempts to gain special status on Svalbard in the aftermath of World War I and later in 1944 with a suggestion by Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov to Norwegian foreign minister Trygve Lie that the treaty should be scrapped in favor of a bilateral arrangement. However, Norway firmly rejected this suggestion.</p> -<h4 id="terms-and-conditions-of-service-tacos">Terms and Conditions of Service (TACOS)</h4> +<p>International economic interest in Svalbard plummeted before World War II, and soon only Norwegian and Soviet mining companies conducted economic activities there. Consecutive Norwegian governments have sought to maintain the Norwegian population on the islands, predominantly by subsidizing coal mining with the state-owned company Store Norske and supporting the islands’ largest community, Longyearbyen. Similarly, successive governments in Moscow sought to maintain a sizeable Soviet population through the state-owned mining company Arktikugol in the company towns Barentsburg, Pyramiden, and Grumant — of which only Barentsburg is active today.</p> -<p>As with the Army and RAF, MR suffer from anomalies in their TACOS. Both RF30 and the 2021 Council of RFCA’s External Scrutiny Team report highlight the complexity of the various structures under which reservists can be engaged, which was dealt with more fully in the Army Reserves paper.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/zFJKUTh.jpg" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ View of the abandoned ex-Soviet miners village Pyramiden in front of the Nordenskioldbreen glacier on Svalbard.</em></p> -<h4 id="comparison-with-major-five-eyes-counterparts">Comparison with Major Five Eyes Counterparts</h4> +<h3 id="a-changing-landscape-the-geopolitical-relevance-of-svalbard">A Changing Landscape: The Geopolitical Relevance of Svalbard</h3> -<p>The UK MR is significantly smaller in absolute terms and as a proportion of the whole force than its major Five Eyes comparators, all of which, arguably, also have greater role clarity than the UK.</p> +<p>As interest in Arctic issues has risen over the last decades, Svalbard and its special legal provisions, economic history, and geostrategic location have received considerable attention. Three specific geopolitical dimensions warrant further examination from both Norwegian and Transatlantic observers.</p> -<ul> - <li> - <p><strong>US:</strong> The US Navy Reserve’s mission is clear: to provide strategic depth and deliver operational capabilities in times of peace or war, operating across all areas of the US Navy, as individuals and as units. These roles include flying, EOD, engineering, intelligence, logistics and medical. The US still has a significant fleet of retired vessels in reserve, but little is spent on maintaining them and working with them is not seen as a core function for the Navy Reserve. The US Coastguard Reserve has two main elements: pools of individuals operating in support of regular units; and self-contained port security units who are at 96 hours’ notice to defend US ports. They are also occasionally deployed abroad.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Canada:</strong> The Naval Reserve generates “trained individuals and teams for Canadian Forces operations, including domestic safety operations as well as security and defence missions, while at the same time supporting the Navy’s efforts in connecting with Canadians through the maintenance of a broad national presence”. The six (Kingston-class) maritime coastal defence vessels are mostly crewed by reservists.</p> - </li> - <li> - <p><strong>Australia:</strong> The roles of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve (RANR) are: to support and sustain contemporary Australian Defence Force (ADF) operations in which the navy may be engaged; to deliver fundamental inputs to capability and workforce surge capacity; and to provide a strategic resource that can meet the navy’s capability needs when circumstances require its call out. The RANR workforce covers all the branches in the regular navy, and provides a surge capability that can be called on quickly. To that end, it is primarily composed of ex-regular personnel but also includes directly recruited individuals with specialist skills that would otherwise be costly to generate and develop as part of the usual force generation process.</p> - </li> -</ul> +<h4 id="1-challenges-to-norwegian-svalbard-policies">1. Challenges to Norwegian Svalbard Policies</h4> -<h3 id="ii-the-historical-use-of-naval-reserves">II. The Historical Use of Naval Reserves</h3> +<p>While Norway’s sovereignty over Svalbard is undisputed, there have been debates since 1920 about how Norway adheres to the treaty and implements its provision. As the sovereign, Norway regulates all activities in the archipelago, but citizens and companies from a number of other countries operate there. Over time, the critique from some treaty signatories over alleged treaty breaches has grown as Norway has implemented stricter environmental regulations, increased the coordination of research activities, and limited certain types of activities, especially with concern for the fragile environment on the archipelago.</p> -<h4 id="first-world-war-the-rnr-and-rnvrs-success-after-a-reluctant-start-by-the-admiralty">First World War: The RNR and RNVR’s Success After a Reluctant Start by the Admiralty</h4> +<p>The complaints have primarily come from the Soviet Union and, later, Russia — the only country with a sizeable albeit declining population and distinct communities in the archipelago. These complaints have focused on Russian companies not being allowed to use helicopters beyond mining activities, expansion of environmental regulation, creation of national parks, and questions concerning the use of a satellite station for military purposes. One additional issue that has attracted Chinese interest in Svalbard has been Norwegian efforts through the Norwegian Polar Institute to better coordinate research in Ny-Ålesund, a small research settlement on the island of Spitsbergen. Here, China expressed concerns over whether Norway was overreaching in regard to its treaty obligations to foreign entities. As China has increasingly engaged with Arctic politics and governance, it has also become increasingly concerned with its “rights” and “interests” on Svalbard. This is reflected in China’s 2018 Arctic policy, which, despite its status as a near-Arctic state, invokes provisions of the Svalbard Treaty six times to legitimize certain Chinese rights in the Arctic writ large.</p> -<p>At the outset of the First World War, the RNR had 30,000 officers and men, drawn from the Merchant Navy and Britain’s fishing fleets. In addition, there was a substantial force in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) drawn from civilian life. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, was reluctant to use the RNR because of the importance of their civilian roles and the RNVR because of their lack of nautical training. However this was quickly overcome, and many RNR officers commanded destroyers and smaller vessels. Some went on to become pilots with the Royal Naval Air Service, but the bulk spent the war in small boat work, often in trawlers adapted for minesweeping and anti-submarine operations, and in motor torpedo boats. Some were involved in innovative roles, including the three Victoria Cross winners who served in Q-boats, the covertly armed merchantmen adapted to lure enemy submarines to destruction.</p> +<p>Another challenge has been Russian complaints about Norway using Svalbard for military purposes in breach of Article 9 of the treaty, which states, “Norway undertakes not to create nor to allow the establishment of any naval base in the territories specified in Article 1 and not to construct any fortification in the said territories, which may never be used for warlike purposes.” The Norwegian coast guard docks in Longyearbyen to resupply, and the Norwegian navy sends a frigate to Svalbard regularly to highlight Norwegian sovereignty and capability in the area. Russia, in turn, argues this is a challenge to the Svalbard Treaty, though the treaty does not hinder Norway having military presence on or around the archipelago as long as the purpose is not “warlike.” Russian sensitivities to the question of military activity on Svalbard relate not only to the treaty but primarily to the proximity of Svalbard to the Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula and its strategic position to defend Arctic territory and project power in the Greenland, Iceland, and United Kingdom–Norway (GIUK-N) gap.</p> -<p>RNVR officers seldom commanded ships, but officers and ratings served at sea in mixed crews. Many served in the Royal Naval Division which served with gallantry and took enormous casualties in Belgium and at Gallipoli. Yet, arriving in France for the Battle of the Somme, General Haig said that it “advanced further and took more prisoners than any other division”.</p> +<p>Similar complaints have come from Russia concerning the Norwegian satellite station located on Svalbard, one of the largest in the world, which has prompted Russia to question whether the data gathered are being used for warlike purposes. Norway is obviously sensitive to such protests given its treaty obligations in Svalbard and the broader long-standing but fragile tranquility that has existed in the Arctic region. However, Norway has consistently manifested its treaty obligations to limit military activity for warlike purposes on Svalbard.</p> -<p>Between them, the RNR and RNVR won two-fifths of all the Victoria Crosses awarded to the senior service, and reservist intelligence staff and cryptographers set the foundation for enduring IW support from the RNVR.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/aKZeMgq.jpg" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ Telecommunications domes of KSAT, Kongsberg Satellite Services, on a mountain near Longyearbyen.</em></p> -<h4 id="second-world-war-the-rnr-and-rnvr-were-key-to-developing-small-boat-capability">Second World War: The RNR and RNVR Were Key to Developing Small Boat Capability</h4> +<p>While complaints such as these from Russia or China do not directly erode Norwegian sovereignty, the sum of the complaints could amount to a larger challenge to how Norway adheres to the treaty. In addition, Russia — if it wanted to escalate a conflict while retaining some form of plausible deniability — could initiate actions to undermine Norwegian sovereignty using these complaints as justification. Notably, the Russian consul general in Barentsburg recently led a highly symbolic military-style parade that involved a helicopter and dozens of vehicles waving Russian flags to mark the anniversary of the Soviet Union’s defeat of Nazi Germany. Albeit primarily done as a way to get attention by the new director of the Russian state-owned mining company Trust Arktikugol, Ildar Neverov, this event does highlight the increasingly tense relations on Svalbard.</p> -<p>During the Second World War, both reserve branches served alongside their regular counterparts, together with the Royal Naval Volunteer (Supplementary) Reserve, a small new organisation open to civilians with existing and proven experience at sea as ratings or officers and composed of experienced yachtsmen; selection was based on a single extended interview. Its 3,000 places were filled within months of its announcement in November 1936, despite offering no pay, uniforms or formal training. After the outbreak of war, such officers were deployed in a variety of seagoing roles with much shorter training than the three months for most wartime entry officers. Intriguingly, some were at the cutting edge of innovation in small boat work, where, as arguably is the case today, the regular service had little bandwidth to focus. They included Lieutenant Commander Robert Hichens, DSO &amp; Bar, DSC &amp; Two Bars, who played a critical role in developing motor torpedo boats as a new capability; an area in which Britain started far behind the German E-boats as its emphasis was on blue water capital ships. Again, the RNR took commands in smaller vessels and were at the forefront of innovation. The attack on St Nazaire was executed by an elderly destroyer and 18 small craft. It achieved its objective, wrecking the world’s largest dock, albeit with terrible casualties. The mission leader, Commander Ryder VC, was a regular officer but almost all the officers under him, including small boat commanders, were reservists.</p> +<p>Statements from Russia regarding Svalbard seem to continually support an underlying policy of strategic uncertainty concerning both challenges to Norwegian rules and regulations on Svalbard and Russia’s legal position when it comes to the maritime zones around Svalbard. At the same time, it is unlikely that undermining the Svalbard regime at large or dispelling the treaty itself is in Russia’s interest. Russian companies and actors respect Norwegian sovereignty and authority in practice. As the only other country with a sizable population on Svalbard and with interests in various economic activities ranging from coal mining to tourism and fisheries, the status quo suits Russian economic interests as well as Russia’s desire to ensure the Barents Sea region remains politically stable.</p> -<p>Both the RNR and RNVR served as pilots in the Fleet Air Arm, in bomb disposal, intelligence, espionage, and in the new Commando and Beach Signal Section</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While complaints such as these from Russia or China do not directly erode Norwegian sovereignty, the sum of the complaints could amount to a larger challenge to how Norway adheres to the treaty.</code></em></strong></p> -<p>During the Second World War, the RNR won four Victoria Crosses and an RNVR pilot a fifth.</p> +<h4 id="2-challenges-to-norwegian-jurisdiction-around-svalbard">2. Challenges to Norwegian Jurisdiction around Svalbard</h4> -<p>The contribution to IW continued with specialists in codebreaking and intelligence. Meanwhile civilian intelligence staff and cryptographers, many of them bringing key skills from their day jobs, set the foundations for what became the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park after the war. Among other writers, Ian Fleming, author of the James Bond books, was employed in writing stories to deceive enemy intelligence.</p> +<p>Second, there is an ongoing disagreement over the status of the maritime zones around the territory beyond 12 nautical miles from the archipelago’s shores. The question is whether the 200-nautical-mile maritime zone and the continental shelf around Svalbard are covered by the provisions in the 1920 Svalbard Treaty.</p> -<h4 id="the-pivotal-role-of-interwar-reserves-in-scaling-up-the-us-marines-and-the-development-of-british-commandos">The Pivotal Role of Interwar Reserves in Scaling Up the US Marines and the Development of British Commandos</h4> +<p>In recent years, the European Union, in particular, has been a proponent of the former view — that the fisheries protection zone (FPZ) and shelf are subject to Norwegian jurisdiction but that Norway must adhere to the Svalbard Treaty’s provisions. This issue came about because of a dispute between Norway and the European Union over the right to fish for snow crabs since 2015, which led to another dispute over cod quotas from 2020 that emerged as a result of Brexit. Russia has taken a different approach, maintaining a form of strategic ambiguity or uncertainty as to its position, while arguing that Norway could not establish any zone unilaterally and thus only, flag states have jurisdiction over fishing vessels in the FPZ. Regarding the shelf, however, Russia argues that it is covered by treaty provisions.</p> -<p>The US Marine Corps expanded more than 30-fold during the Second World War from 15,000 active-duty members to nearly half a million, while remaining an exceptionally high-quality force. These figures, focused on the immediate pre-war regular strength, disguise the work of successive commandants from 1925 onward to build capability and mass in their reserves, despite severely limited funding. The US Marine Corps Reserve was greatly expanded by the 1938 Naval Reserve Act (still two years ahead of funding and mobilisation measures across the US armed forces); 70% of all US Marines serving in the Second World War came through it.</p> +<p>There are two aspects of this dispute with potential to further intensify geopolitical competition in the region. The first relates to access to resources and possible attempts by fishing vessels from various countries to claim their treaty-protected rights, as exemplified with the European Union in the snow crab case. China, which has the world’s largest fishing fleet, could hypothetically also assert itself on this issue through possible Chinese claims to equal access to fishing rights, though no official attempts have been made so far.</p> -<p>In contrast, the Royal Marines had no reserve force for bringing mass and civilian talent and ideas. Although they expanded, it was by a much smaller factor than their US equivalents. Lacking mass, the first large-scale operations to destroy coastal infrastructure were carried out by a Territorial Army unit under Naval direction, and the commando force was then set up within the Army, rather than the Royal Marines, although the latter soon developed their own raiding force, led initially by Herbert “Blondie” Hasler. Many of the Army members of the commando force originated in the Territorials (including Shimi Lovat, who was a reservist before and after his regular service), and many were drawn from the 10 territorial independent companies.</p> +<p>The second issue is the possible escalation of interactions in the FPZ between Russian vessels and the Norwegian coast guard. Although escalation when interacting with Russian fishing vessels is the primary concern, questions are increasingly being asked about the activities of Russian vessels at large in Norwegian waters. For example, in January 2022, one of the two subsea cables crucial for information technology on Svalbard was cut after Russian fishing vessels had been operating extensively in the area. Although Norwegian authorities have not publicly identified the perpetrator, many have speculated the incident is connected to Russian intelligence gathering and hybrid activity in the Norwegian Arctic. With the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea in September 2022, this issue became increasingly relevant in the Norwegian security and defense debate.</p> -<p>The RMR was formed in 1948 as the Royal Marine Forces Volunteer Reserve (RMFVR). The pattern of reservist officers driving innovation, as outlined in the two earlier papers in this series, was absent by default in the wartime Royal Marines as they had no pre-war reserve, unlike the Royal Navy and the US Marines.</p> +<p>Complicating the matter is the fact that both fishing and research vessels from Russia have access rights to Norwegian waters that are difficult to curtail. The fishing vessels’ ability to fish throughout the Barents Sea regardless of zonal boundaries constitutes one of the core pillars of the successful comanagement scheme of fisheries cooperation between Norway and Russia. The research vessels’ access to the Norwegian exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the FPZ, and the shelf rests on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Article 246, which states, “The coastal State should normally grant its consent” except in a few specific circumstances. In other words, the burden of proof concerning Russian vessels conducting illegal activities in Norwegian waters including the FPZ lies with Norwegian authorities. This creates a significant operational and bureaucratic hurdle for Norwegian law enforcement and limits Norway’s deterrence of Russian gray zone operations.</p> -<h4 id="the-rnr-minesweeping-194698">The RNR: Minesweeping, 1946–98</h4> +<p>Making inspections and possible arrests in Svalbard’s waters particularly sensitive is Russia’s refusal to acknowledge the FPZ as waters where Norway has the authority to inspect and arrest — although in practice Russian fishers generally accepts inspections by the Norwegian coast guard. Still, in a tenser security environment, the concern has been that Russia could claim that Norway is exceeding its jurisdiction if Norwegian authorities inspect and arrest a Russian vessel. In turn, Russia could respond by threatening to use military force, as it has previously hinted at when Russian fishing vessels were arrested in the FPZ by the Norwegian coast guard in the early 2000s.</p> -<p>The RNR was re-formed in 1946 with a primary role of operating minesweepers and small patrol boats – it absorbed the RNVR in 1958. There was no substantial reserve involvement in the Falklands War, but various ashore elements of the RNR were formed or expanded in the immediate aftermath, including the amphibious warfare and public affairs branches.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/YYzxbNm.jpg" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ Monument to former Soviet head of government Vladimir Lenin in the miners’ town of Barentsburg.</em></p> -<p>Just months after that war, the Royal Navy accepted a batch of Merchant Navy officers to serve as regular officers, with only three weeks of phase-one training at BRNC Dartmouth. They went on to do full warfare courses at HMS Collingwood, however. This offers a parallel with the handling of RNR officers in both wars, although the officers concerned were accepted as career RN officers.</p> +<h4 id="3-the-military-use-of-svalbard-in-an-east-west-conflict">3. The Military Use of Svalbard in an East-West Conflict</h4> -<p>In 1998, the last of the RNR minesweepers were decommissioned and reservists ceased to have their own vessels. Sweeping had been replaced by mine hunting, which was deemed too complex for reserve crews. Even the URNUs have much more recently lost most of their P2000 patrol boats.</p> +<p>Finally, the role Svalbard might play in a large-scale conflict that involves the Arctic cannot be ignored. Although Article 9 in the Svalbard Treaty states that the area should not be used for “warlike purposes” — which is not the same as a de-militarized zone — the degree of concern over the possible use of the archipelago for military purposes has historically fluctuated with the degree of East-West tension.</p> -<h4 id="the-gulf-iraq-and-afghan-wars-parallels-with-the-us-navy">The Gulf, Iraq and Afghan Wars: Parallels with the US Navy</h4> +<p>During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was particularly concerned about the possible military use of the archipelago, demanding strict adherence to the treaty’s ban on the use of the islands for warlike purposes including the establishment of fortifications or naval bases. If war were to break out, control over Svalbard would have been the primary motivation for the Soviets, both to limit NATO command and to use it as a base for Russian military forces in order to protect strategic submarines with nuclear ballistic missiles. This was the central component of the Soviet Union’s bastion defense concept.</p> -<p>In the 1991 Gulf War, 21,000 US naval reservists were called out. The Naval Reserve provided the US Navy’s only capability in many areas, including dedicated combat search and rescue, mobile inshore undersea warfare and logistic air transport. Most reservists augmented their regular counterparts. They came from all parts of the country, representing many specialities: medical; naval construction; cargo handling; mine warfare; naval control of shipping; intelligence; public affairs; and the chaplain corps.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/nP2zgi3.jpg" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ Russian flags flying in the miners’ town of Barentsburg on May 7, 2022. Sign in foreground reads “our goal is communism” in Russian.</em></p> -<p>Similar deployments took place in the operations in Iraq (from 2003) and Afghanistan (from 2001). Following 9/11, almost 7,000 US naval reservists were deployed in the first eight weeks alone.</p> +<p>Increased Russian military activity in the European Arctic since 2005 has highlighted Svalbard’s geostrategic location. Although there are no military fortifications on the archipelago as per the Svalbard Treaty, the concern for Norway is that it would rapidly be subject to Russian attempts to control it if a full-scale conflict between NATO and Russia broke out. The archipelago’s proximity to the Russian Northern Fleet, located at Severomorsk in the Kola Peninsula, and Svalbard’s strategic position as a potential base for so-called antiaccess and area denial (A2AD) operations in the Barents Sea and the North Atlantic are still the primary drivers of Russian security interests in the region. Some are questioning whether Svalbard truly holds such a strategic position given the technological advancements in Russia’s long-range ballistic missiles and the change in defense concepts in the North. Regardless, it seems likely that Svalbard will remain a potential area for Russian power projection, as Russia will likely be intent on rebuilding its Arctic force posture and capabilities attrited in Ukraine and in response to Sweden and Finland’s NATO memberships.</p> -<p>While much smaller, the RNR made significant contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Sierra Leone. These included pilots, two EOD diving teams (whose branch was subsequently disbanded), medical, intelligence and more.</p> +<h3 id="threat-landscape-russia-vis-à-vis-norway-and-nato">Threat Landscape: Russia vis-à-vis Norway and NATO</h3> -<h4 id="marines-and-commandos-the-uk-as-the-odd-one-out">Marines and Commandos: the UK as the Odd One Out</h4> +<p>From the perspective of a Norwegian defense planner or policymaker, the main security concern in regard to Svalbard will undoubtedly remain Russia. Across all the geopolitical dimensions highlighted above, the Russian threat looms large since the military use of the archipelago is relevant only in a NATO-Russia conflict. It is rather unthinkable that other EU or NATO states would significantly impede Norway’s territorial sovereignty in the territory through either covert or military action. Moreover, other potential adversaries in a large-scale conflict (e.g., China) are too far removed from Svalbard to pose any short- to medium-term threat.</p> -<p>In the 1991 Gulf War, the US Marine Reserves deployed in formed units, sending out a higher proportion of their reserves than any other service. The highest-scoring tank unit across all the allied forces was the 4th US Marine Reserve Tank Battalion, outshooting all their US and UK regular counterparts, using homemade fire control systems (many members were Microsoft employees).</p> +<p>Small-scale challenges to Norwegian policy on land or jurisdiction at sea, however, include a range of actors that could pose a challenge other than just Russia. As mentioned, the most active challenge to the Norwegian position regarding maritime zones in recent years has come from the European Union and some of its member states: first, over access to snow crab fisheries and, second, over the share of cod quotas in the FPZ after Brexit. It is also possible to imagine countries other than Russia and EU member states, such as China, moving to challenge the Norwegian position or claiming equal rights to economic activity in the water column or on the shelf.</p> -<p>Similarly, units across a full range of capabilities were deployed in the preparation for and during the Iraq War, with a larger percentage of US Marine Reserves committed than any other service. The most heavily used components were light armour, engineers, assault amphibious elements, air and land transport communications, medical and civil affairs. Reservist engineers built the longest bridge in the history of the Marine Corps, and reservist infantry and light armour units controlled whole provinces in the aftermath. The reserves were called out at the very beginning and took only five days to mobilise on average. They were crucial to the US contribution: “We could not have done what we did without the Reserves”, noted Lieutenant General James T Conway, Commanding General, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). In Afghanistan, the US Marine Reserves played a major role once again, operating as formed units.</p> +<p>Still, from a geopolitical perspective, Russia remains the primary security concern due to the high number of Russian fishing vessels operating in the zone each year in accordance with the comanagement regime of shared fish stocks in the Barents Sea. Despite the one-time issue over Chinese protests regarding research, the same conclusion holds for possible disputes on land over Norwegian policies and alleged violations of the Svalbard Treaty by Russian officials.</p> -<p>The Australian 1 Commando Regiment, which is part of their Army Reserve but has an amphibious role similar to marines in the US and the UK, repeatedly sent formed companies to Afghanistan. Their missions were population centric on several occasions, which involved deploying in remote and hazardous parts of the country, at risk from insurgent influence, and working to build the support of local communities for the Afghan National Security Forces and supporting International Security Assistance Force efforts to maintain security in the province. In this respect, they were similar to roles reportedly adopted by the US Green Berets and Britain’s SAS reserves.</p> +<p>While the Russian geopolitical threat remains paramount, Chinese encroachments facilitated by an isolated Russia may complicate the Arctic security landscape in the longer term. The coast guard agencies of Russia and China recently signed a cooperation agreement on strengthening maritime law enforcement to great fanfare in Murmansk, a city on Russia’s western flank close to Norway. Moreover, when all other Arctic coast guard agencies suspended their participation in the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, Russia invited China to join the forum — clear signs of China’s expanding presence in the High North. As Iris A. Ferguson, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for arctic and global resilience, has put it, Chinese efforts aim “to normalize its presence and pursue a larger role in shaping Arctic regional governance and security affairs.”</p> -<p>The RMR sent a steady trickle of individual augmentees, almost all junior ranks, to Iraq and Afghanistan. They served bravely and one, Lance Corporal Croucher, won a George Cross. Nevertheless, no formed units, even at platoon level, were deployed. While there are always national differences, it might seem at first blush that the UK’s marine reserve deployment might be somewhere in the scale of ambition between the US Marine Reserves and Australian Commandos in terms of size. In fact, they operated at a level well below both, with no formed element of any kind – a de facto verdict on regular confidence in the RMR officer corps on military operations, in contrast to their counterparts in other Five Eyes countries.</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">While the Russian geopolitical threat remains paramount, Chinese encroachments facilitated by an isolated Russia may complicate the Arctic security landscape in the longer term.</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="civil-assistance-key-skills">Civil Assistance: Key Skills</h4> +<h3 id="recommendations-for-us-policy">Recommendations for U.S. Policy</h3> -<p>During Operation Rescript, the British military operation to help tackle Covid-19, MR officers and ratings performed a range of useful and sometimes challenging roles, filling new posts, including assisting the Cabinet Office. Ministers repeatedly applauded the innovative ideas that reservists put forward. One example was RMR officer Carlo Contaldi, a professor of theoretical physics in his day job, who received an MBE for applying his civilian skills to tackling the pandemic. The additional capacity the reserves provided to the regular armed forces reduced the impact on regular personnel. The operation arguably illustrated that the regular services are stretched in coping with a major crisis well short of war. This includes the headquarters command functions which, along with shore billets, have been reduced even since the height of the pandemic to send more regular naval personnel to sea. Reserves could provide important crisis capacity that is otherwise lacking and ensure a better understanding of their contribution to naval activity.</p> +<p>With its 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, the administration under U.S. president Joseph Biden sent a strong and clarifying signal that it would prioritize the region. The strategy effectively updates the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region and is organized around four pillars of action: security, climate change and environmental protection, sustainable economic development, and international cooperation and governance. Regarding the security pillar, the strategy aims to expand the military and civilian capabilities necessary to protect U.S. interests in the Arctic — for example, through increasing the U.S. Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet. While the strategy states that “the US seeks an Arctic region that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative,” it also recognizes that rising geopolitical tension, especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, may bring geopolitical competition to the Arctic in the future.</p> -<h3 id="iii-a-new-way-forward-findings-recommendations-and-concluding-remarks">III. A New Way Forward: Findings, Recommendations and Concluding Remarks</h3> +<p>With these considerations in mind, the United States should pursue the following course of action.</p> -<p>The biggest challenge the Naval Service faces in relation to the Reserves lies in setting out an ambitious and lucid vision as to what is needed. Until recently, there was a lack of clarity. While the “Maritime Reserves Orders 2023–24” goes some way to deal with this, it has done so at the cost of lowering the level of ambition. IW, where the RNR is arguably forging ahead of its sister services, is an important exception.</p> +<h4 id="1-push-for-a-coordinated-nato-approach-with-special-consideration-for-svalbard">1. Push for a coordinated NATO approach with special consideration for Svalbard.</h4> -<p>The core element of general warfare has some plans to get more sailors to sea, including continuing with opportunities on offshore patrol vessels and RMR detachments on certain vessels (the latter will be section sized commanded by an NCO). But ideas for building up opportunities for officers are still at an early stage. Key watchkeeping qualifications are recognised across the naval/merchant marine divide, but the feeling remains that putting reservist officers into seagoing roles is hard. Yet, the RN took a large batch of Merchant Navy officers into seagoing ranks after the Falklands War, with only three weeks at Dartmouth. Officers are regularly employed in seagoing posts in the major Five Eyes countries and reservists command patrol vessels in Canada.</p> +<p>As previously noted, Svalbard’s geographical position could be central in controlling access to and from Russia’s Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula, which houses Russia’s fleet of nuclear submarines and is Washington’s primary focus in the High North. Thus, Washington needs to recognize that Svalbard represents a potential flash point in a looming Arctic power struggle and should work with Norway to tailor deterrence in a manner that minimizes the impact on the archipelago’s unique legal status. This approach should carefully balance a robust defensive posture while taking Svalbard’s status into account to minimize the risk of further military tensions.</p> -<p>There is a depressing parallel between the loss of the diving branch in general warfare and the collapse in the number of pilots still flying in what is now HMS Pegasus, although that organisation remains a centre of excellence in many other ways. Yet, the UK has one of the world’s leading aviation sectors and a large civilian diving sector associated with the hydrocarbon industry and, more recently, offshore wind. Both losses reflect the ever-increasing restrictions imposed by the Defence Safety Authority since the Haddon-Cave Report, which led to its founding, posing the question as to whether compromise can be found.</p> +<p>Given the risk of the Kremlin using Article 9 of the Svalbard Treaty as pretext to escalate any expanded NATO presence, the alliance should credibly signal its intention to minimize capability development and military exercises in or around Svalbard. To avoid compromising overall deterrence, this restraint should be complemented by a strong amphibious force in mainland Norway, including through military exercises responding to conventional Russian escalation in or around Svalbard. Part of this effort could be built into NATO’s biannual Cold Response exercises, which Norway hosts to test allied troops’ ability to fight and survive in an Arctic environment. At the same time, clarifying that NATO’s Article 5 covers Svalbard as part of Norwegian territory is important to avoid any strategic ambiguity.</p> -<p>The study also found that there remains little evidence that provision is being made for the potential threats to Britain’s “non-strategic” ports (most of them), coastal infrastructure or vulnerable cables, perhaps because, beyond the occasional survey ship, any such provision would be very expensive if provided by regulars.</p> +<p>A major diplomatic line of effort could also be achieving alliance-wide consensus on Svalbard Treaty applicability of Svalbard’s maritime zones. This means resolving the ongoing dispute between Norway and the European Union to avoid Russian exploitation of an allied rift possibly in favor of the Norwegian position.</p> -<p>The paper found an important, strong element in the newly constituted IW Capability Group, which forms one of four such groups under the new MR structure. With its PTVR leadership, both at OF5 overall and in of its branches, it is setting the pace. Having reservists with civilian professional expertise in its niche capabilities controlling the vital N1 aspects of the unit (assisting recruiting, selection, reporting, etc.) at a time when the other services have been slow to exploit IW opportunities from the civilian sector, is critical in explaining its healthy growth.</p> +<h4 id="2-work-with-regional-allies-to-strengthen-resilience-of-critical-infrastructure-such-as-fiber-optic-cables-on-the-arctic-seabed">2. Work with regional allies to strengthen resilience of critical infrastructure, such as fiber-optic cables on the Arctic seabed.</h4> -<p>In the case of the RMR, where more than a year was lost on Commando recruit courses while options were considered, it has simply reverted to the unambitious vision of a source of mostly other rank augmentees, which dates back to 1948, with no collective role beyond NCO-led (section-sized) detachments on ships.</p> +<p>A recent CSIS brief examining the Russian Arctic threat after the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine notes that Russia’s use of hybrid tactics in the region “seems to be increasing in both frequency and severity.” These fears are first perhaps best exemplified by the severing of a critical subsea information technology (IT) cable serving Svalbard while Russian fishing vessels were operating extensively nearby. Norwegian authorities have also arrested several Russian nationals for illegal photography across the country and have observed unannounced drone sightings over Svalbard. Western stakeholders seemed to acknowledge this vulnerability following the sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, especially given Norway’s importance as Europe’s main pipeline gas supplier. In fall 2022, Norway deployed its Home Guard to protect critical maritime infrastructure, a move that was supported by NATO ship patrols in the North Sea. The U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region also recognizes the need to address this risk, stating Washington’s intent to “make targeted investments to strategically enhance security infrastructure as required to enable these aims, while building the resilience of critical infrastructure to protect against both climate change and cyberattacks.”</p> -<p>The starting point must be a reassessment of the demand and where the MR can best contribute. While the Maritime Directive was developed “bottom-up”, a “top-down” demand signal is required. Central to this is that the Naval Service appears to be less reserve-aware than its sister services. To address this, evidence from other UK and allied services suggests the need to ensure the reserve voice is heard and understood throughout the RN’s structure. This requires an appropriately senior PTVR officer on the Navy Board so that a greater understanding of the MR and its relevant abilities/capabilities is not only readily available but always considered in the initial option mix.</p> +<p>Given the depleting effects of Western sanctions and the weakened state of Russia’s Arctic forces, if tensions between NATO and Russia continue to escalate, it would be reasonable to expect the Kremlin to increase its use of hybrid tactics around Svalbard, at least in the short- to medium-term. Sporadic ad hoc initiatives to counter Russian hybrid threats may thus fall short of the mark and would benefit from a more structured NATO approach. For example, NATO can facilitate regional tabletop exercises spanning the political and military spectrum that incorporate hybrid elements into conventional military scenarios. Other options include improved consultation and information-sharing channels between allies, government institutions, and the private sector to enhance initial detection and response to emerging hybrid crises.</p> -<p>But the Reserves also need to be seeded throughout the system (for example, 3 Commando Brigade could have a PTVR Colonel Deputy Commander [Reserve]), as is the case with almost every Army brigade that contains reservists. That would give the reserves a voice in the same way they have in UK Special Forces and airborne forces. These positions should be filled with bona fide reservists, not just ex-regulars on FTRS or equivalent part-time contracts. The US Marines have gone much further, with reservist brigades commanded by reservists, and the British Army has now also established something similar in its new PTVR-commanded 19 Light Brigade.</p> +<h4 id="3-establish-the-acceptable-scope-of-regional-governance-specifically-the-role-of-china">3. Establish the acceptable scope of regional governance, specifically the role of China.</h4> -<p>Some of these posts already exist in the RNR in the form of the three RNR Captains covering groups of capabilities, but such posts are all in COMMARRES’ chain of command instead of the relevant capability command or HQ. To support the focus on Reserve outputs, they need to be more closely connected to the Naval Service’s relevant commands. This would mean having reserve units and personnel working in and for capability pillars through the new policy posts and deputy commanders outlined above, while protection of the reserve identity and taking responsibility for crucial N1 issues, would come under the new board member and run horizontally across the model. This pattern exists in the Army and is developing steadily in the RAF and Strategic Command. While removing the capability strands from COMMARRES’ control, it would require strengthening the remaining command support function.</p> +<p>Finally, the United States should attempt to preserve what remains of the Arctic’s geopolitical exceptionalism — the increasingly tenuous status quo that has historically excluded hard security issues from regional governance. This should include building upon the resumption of limited work in the Arctic Council, announced in June 2022 by seven of the council’s eight member states — Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. Part of this effort should also address China’s growing ambitions in the Arctic and their implications for Svalbard. The United States should emphasize that China, as a near-Arctic state, is welcome to engage with regional stakeholders on environmental issues and sustainable economic development in the Arctic, including through its legitimate research activities on Svalbard.</p> -<p>Making the case for the Reserves is complicated in the Naval Service by the lack of a cost model. The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory’s model for cost comparison between regular and reserve Army sub-units could be applied to elements of the MR to enable decision-making on their roles, structure and resourcing. It would inform discussion about issues which default to a regular solution or, as may be the case of “non-strategic” ports, simply lead to avoiding the task.</p> +<p>However, the United States and Norway should clearly signal that any undue Chinese encroachment into the governance and security affairs of the European High North will not be tolerated. It should be noted that the manifestation of Arctic geopolitical tension is not uniform across the circumpolar region. Rather, military activity in the Arctic is constrained to various subregions, most prominently the High North/North Atlantic region and the North Pacific/Bering Sea region. In the former, Russia’s military buildup of the Northern Fleet and surrounding forces factors into the Kremlin’s larger geostrategic competition with the West and is linked to nuclear deterrence capabilities and access to the Atlantic writ large. In the latter region, Russia’s military buildup contributes to increased bilateral cooperation with China and highlights the belated U.S. awakening to Arctic security and geopolitical issues on its northwestern periphery.</p> -<h4 id="back-to-sea">Back to Sea</h4> +<p>Although the actions and related effects of Chinese actors in the Arctic so far have been rather limited, China has increasingly attempted to gain a foothold and influence in various parts of the Arctic and in different branches of Arctic economic activity. China’s interests do not necessarily align with those of Western Arctic states, though when it comes to specific economic projects in the Arctic, Chinese investments and capital might still be in demand and warranted. The effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 are likely spur more China-Russia cooperation in the Arctic.</p> -<p>Even without dedicated ships, a much larger component of reservists could ease peacetime pressures and ensure a modest degree of scalability in tension and war, when coastal vessels would need increased crew levels, all at low cost. And, while training from scratch may be too challenging, leveraging commercial sailing experience could reduce the training burden. Today’s Merchant Navy, although a tiny fraction of Britain’s fleet in the first half of the 20th century, is still significant, with predominantly British officers (although few British ratings). The UK also has a substantial ferry sector and offshore oil support vessels while the number of fishing vessels is expected to grow post-Brexit. While the merchant fishing command qualification (STCW-II/1 Skipper Unlimited [Fishing]) is more limited in scope than its worldwide ocean-going counterpart, it could be an appropriate way forward for offshore patrol vessel reserve officer watchkeeping and command appointments. However, the need to sustain seaborne traffic to support the UK even in times of war will mean many commercial sailors will be required to continue in their peacetime roles.</p> +<p>This risk of undue Chinese encroachment into the European High North is particularly acute in regard to the closer cooperation announced between the Chinese and Russian coast guards. China’s coast guard has displayed a tendency for aggressive behavior, exemplified by Chinese vessels recently blocking and threatening a Philippine patrol vessel in the South China Sea. China has developed expansive sovereignty claims over the South China Sea, most of which were rejected at a tribunal brought against China by the Philippines under UNCLOS in 2016 at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. A flotilla of Chinese vessels also recently entered a gas site operated by Vietnamese and Russian state firms in Vietnam’s EEZ. Similar Sino-Russian cooperation in the maritime domain has already manifested elsewhere in the Arctic region as the U.S. Coast Guard encountered Chinese and Russian warships operating together near Alaska on several occasions in recent years.</p> -<p>In the medium term, the MR could provide commanding officers for coastal vessels including offshore patrol vessels, as in Canada. The main argument against the use of reservists at sea is the increased complexity of modern warships. However, much equipment, from radios to sensors, is easier to operate than before, and many of the skills are comparable to ones common in civilian life, if they can be mapped. Furthermore, simulators greatly expand the opportunities for training on land and in modular packages.</p> +<p>While unlikely in the short term, the Chinese and Russian coast guards could increase their presence in the Barents Sea in the long term, possibly using the legitimate presence of Chinese and Russian nationals and entities in or around Svalbard as pretext. This approach would not be dissimilar to Russian operations to protect Russian nationals in South Ossetia and Crimea. The United States and Norway should be cognizant of this dubious track record and clearly signal that any similar encroachments will not be tolerated in the waters around Svalbard.</p> -<p>The bigger challenges are for training and gaining experience in command and senior engineering roles. The US and Canadian experience, and the RN’s successful experiment in 1982, may offer lessons (especially as frigates and destroyers then were arguably more complex than offshore patrol vessels today). Adopting Merchant Navy approaches might also offer solutions; instead of regionally based reserve ships that sit alongside for most of the year, allowing assets to be “sweated” at sea. The modern approach to ship crewing (for example, waterfront “squads”, rotating crews) could lend itself to the introduction of (largely) reserve crews that take their place in the rota for manning offshore patrol vessels, and vessels in refit, and provide scalability in war.</p> +<h3 id="concluding-remarks">Concluding Remarks</h3> -<p>There is also a case for considering more sponsored reserves – not like the RFA, who work full-time for Defence, but like the contracts for use of roll-on/roll-off ferries and (in the case of the RAF) tanker aircraft.</p> +<p>Discussions of Arctic security often fail to examine specific issues of concern, exemplified by an often-counterproductive framing used to discuss the Svalbard archipelago. Research and discussions about such potential flashpoints and their related issues are needed to dispel commonly held misconceptions, especially when it comes to understanding sovereignty and sovereign rights, as well as distinguishing between different types of security threats and potential conflicts.</p> -<h4 id="aviation-1">Aviation</h4> +<p>As per the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, which Russia has acceded to and has not challenged, sovereignty over the area is undisputed. As part of Norwegian territory, Svalbard is also unequivocally covered by NATO’s Article 5. Given the heightened tensions between Russia and the West, Norway must work with the United States and other allies to clearly refute any misconceptions about NATO ambiguity on the archipelago. This work should start at home by cementing a shared understanding of the legal and political complexities of Svalbard issues within the alliance.</p> -<p>HMS Pegasus is arguably a jewel in the UK armed forces’ crown. Its wide pool of skills is maintained on a very small budget. It has never recruited civilians because it has been able to fill its establishment entirely from pre-trained ex-regulars. The advent of RPAS and civilian drones that can be adapted for war, as Ukraine has shown, points to an opportunity to expand and develop new capabilities at low cost. Recruiting civilians as RNR reservists to fly and counter a range of drones would make military and economic sense, and with its current lead in reservist pilots, the Navy is well qualified to show the way.</p> +<p>Arctic security studies often generalize, leading to sweeping conclusions that do not consider regional complexity and disparate security challenges north of the Arctic Circle. Closely examining specific Arctic environments such as Svalbard is necessary for a more granular understanding of regional geopolitics and how possible conflict scenarios might unfold in the North.</p> -<p>However, the ever-increasing aviation safety burden, contributing to the severe reduction in the number of pilots actually flying, needs to be addressed. The Haddon-Cave report was a response to a tragic incident which many believe stemmed from the downgrading of the engineering function in the upper tiers of the RAF a few years earlier. As with many aspects of Defence, work is needed to ensure a balance between increasingly restrictive safety requirements and outputs. War is inherently risky, and trying to eliminate all risk from preparing for it will not end well. Perhaps the solution is to reopen the issues that Haddon-Cave studied.</p> +<hr /> -<h4 id="coastal-and-littoral-security-and-port-protection">Coastal and Littoral Security and Port Protection</h4> +<p><strong>Andreas Østhagen</strong> is a senior researcher at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute and an associate professor at Nord University.</p> -<p>With the return of great power competition and war in Europe, threats to the UK’s ports and wider coastal CNI have increased along with increased Russian activity in the UK’s littoral. The regular RN is stretched even at peacetime use levels, so any further demands for protection will add additional pressure on the force. Moreover, with RN assets concentrated on very few bases, the need to disperse and defend those additional locations in periods of heightened tension, let alone war, would be difficult with the current numbers. Similarly, coastal CNI will need additional protection, and it can be expected that more suspicious activity will occur in waters affecting the UK. How the Naval Service might respond to that is worth considering, especially given the importance the IR23 has placed on the maritime domain and resilience.</p> +<p><strong>Otto Svendsen</strong> is a research associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he provides research and analysis on political, economic, and security developments in Europe.</p> -<p>Should contingent mass be needed, reserves across Defence could offer a cost-effective solution, although this need not be RN reserves, with Coast Guard, Border Agency and Police as other options – or a new organisation perhaps along the lines of the old Royal Naval Auxiliary service. If the expertise needed is land-based (for example, defending the vulnerable and critical drainage systems of nuclear power stations), elements of the RNR or the RN ex-regular reserve could be placed under command of the Army, which has a regional command and control capability.</p> +<p><strong>Max Bergmann</strong> is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at CSIS.</p>Andreas Østhagen, et al.Tensions in the Arctic among great powers have increased since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But the unique status of the Norwegian archipelago Svalbard complicates this broad geopolitical framing of the region.Greyzone Lawfare2023-09-13T12:00:00+08:002023-09-13T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/greyzone-lawfare<p><em>Russia’s likely use of the SPARTA IV, an alleged civilian vessel, to transport military materiel from Tartus, Syria to its port in Novorossiysk is yet another example of Moscow’s penchant for manipulating international law to satisfy its wartime agenda.</em></p> -<p>As well as the threat to ports, infrastructure and underground cables, history suggests that sea lanes and port approaches are vulnerable to mines. Reserves could offer extra capacity for mine warfare, especially with the adoption of remotely operated systems and divers drawn from the oil industry. Such scalability, lacking today, may be needed at short notice in a crisis. In contrast, the Army provides an EOD surge capability in search through the reserves, while recognising that fewer reserves will be able to carry out the disable task. This is a cost-effective approach to scalability. As with flying reserves, this requires a re-examination of safety issues. Such roles could be given to the Army, Police or elements (such as intelligence) to the Coastguard but, to keep it affordable, the surge capability needs to come from part-time capability because it is not needed most of the time.</p> +<excerpt /> -<p>The Royal National Lifeboat Institution provides a standing example in which, where simple vessels are involved, part-time volunteers can operate as crews that respond at short notice.</p> +<p>Less than a week after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced that his government would be utilising its power granted by the 1936 Montreux Convention to severely restrict the passage of military and auxiliary vessels through the Bosporus Strait.</p> -<h4 id="information-warfare-1">Information Warfare</h4> +<p>This closure should have prevented the movement of wartime vessels through the Bosporus, preventing illicit redeployment of any military materiel. However, as in the case of the SPARTA IV (IMO: 9743033), certain Russian vessels appear to continue regularly transiting the Bosporus with military materiel, in breach of international law.</p> -<p>The establishment of the IW branch to unite a range of reserve IW capabilities under one command, including a fast-growing information element, is welcome. Moreover, PTVR leadership is key to ensuring that N1 issues such as support to recruiting, selection and assessing professional development are handled by people who understand the specialist skills involved. Closer links with universities that have strong maritime reputations, like Southampton and Liverpool, might assist capabilities like intelligence and maritime trade by further harnessing civilian expertise. An earlier Navy Board’s decision to close the URNU in Southampton, which was co-located with Europe’s top oceanographic department and elements of the Antarctic Survey, looks short-sighted. The case for transferring it back from Portsmouth Naval Base should be considered.</p> +<p>Using a diverse range of data sources, analytical techniques and intelligence methods for accurate data analysis, this open source intelligence (OSINT) investigation unearths the truth behind Russia’s attempt to manipulate international law to sustain its unjustified invasion of Ukraine.</p> -<p>More widely, however, this expanding area would benefit from explicitly broadening the MR’s mission from generating individuals to routinely fielding capability in teams. It is important that the current healthy relationship between the OAC and IW does not become assimilation, with all the implications that has for loss of understanding of reservist working patterns and the importance of distinctive N1 practices.</p> +<h3 id="to-and-from-russia-with-love">To and from Russia, with Love</h3> -<p>The government should consider relaunching an offshore coastal reserve to attract yacht operators, fishermen and others to provide human intelligence on coastal trafficking. This could either fall under MR or the Coastguard.</p> +<p>Automatic identification system (AIS) data provided by Geollect, a close partner of RUSI’s Open Source Intelligence and Analysis (OSIA) research group, and satellite imagery sourced by OSIA from Planet Labs, Maxar Technologies and Airbus Defence and Space confirms the SPARTA IV’s voyages between the ports of Tartus, Syria and Novorossiysk, Russia, and seemingly identifies some of the vessel’s intended cargo.</p> -<h4 id="royal-marines-reserve">Royal Marines Reserve</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/skRsfXV.jpg" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Figure 1: The SPARTA IV’s journey between Tartus and Novorossiysk</em></p> -<p>The (regular) Royal Marines are a high-quality force currently redefining their role. They enjoy a range of proprietary infrastructure (even separate officer training), going well beyond, for example, airborne forces, the bulk of whose training is at mainstream Army establishments. This makes them expensive, yet they lack scalability; the shortage of officers in the RMR and lack of a proper role means that even in extremis it can deliver little more than a pool of junior rank augmentees. If the regular Commando brigade requires rotation or regeneration, the RMR would be unable to deliver this at any scale.</p> +<p>In 2023, the SPARTA IV has completed at least six voyages between Russia’s military ports in Tartus, Syria and Novorossiysk, Russia:</p> -<p>Furthermore, in modern war with a near-peer enemy, equipped with armoured vehicles, large-scale minelaying capabilities and air assets, including drones, it is inevitable that there will be casualties at levels not experienced in the Gulf, Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. In Ukraine, officers on both sides are being disproportionately killed and wounded, so battlefield replacements will have to include officers as well as enlisted personnel. The shortage of junior officers in the current RMR calls into question their ability to provide battle casualty replacements, even in small numbers.</p> +<ul> + <li> + <p>14 January 2023: The SPARTA IV’s first voyage from Tartus to Novorossiysk of 2023 began. After 11 days of sailing, it arrived in Novorossiysk on 25 January, where it stayed for 22 days before embarking on its return voyage.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>1 March 2023: The SPARTA IV again departed from Tartus and arrived in Novorossiysk five days later. On 30 March, it left the port to return to Tartus.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>8 April 2023: The SPARTA IV’s next voyage began, arriving in Novorossiysk on 15 April. It remained in port for 21 days before sailing back to Tartus on 6 May.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>16 May 2023: The SPARTA IV’s fourth departure from Tartus toward Novorossiysk began. It arrived on 6 June and stayed until 15 June, when it left for the return voyage and arrived back in Tartus on 21 June.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>15 July 2023: The ship was imaged by a high-resolution satellite tasked by Planet Labs. The resulting images likely show the ship unloading military material in Novorossiysk after another journey from Tartus.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p>10 August 2023 (estimated): The SPARTA IV made a return trip to Tartus that was unable to be corroborated by AIS data. The vessel had a significant period of AIS darkness lasting for 292 hours off Lemnos in the Aegean Sea from 3 to 15 August. This signified a change in tradecraft, using much longer periods of AIS darkness to conceal movements. During this period of darkness, satellite imagery confirmed the SPARTA IV in the Tartus port from at least 7 to 10 August, before it sailed back toward Novorossiysk.</p> + </li> +</ul> -<p>Given that the RMR uses the same central infrastructure and has an expensive network of buildings and permanent staff (in the latter case in contrast to the RNR), it should be possible to produce fully-fledged reserve units at relatively low cost, drawing on the UK model provided by 131 Commando Squadron RE and 4 Para and looking to the Australian Commandos. This should entail structuring units to provide a second wave as formed bodies, initially at sub-unit level, but, if funds allowed growth, potentially developing to unit level at lower readiness. As the officer corps rebuilds, introducing reserve primacy for command, as happens today in the RNR – and Army Reserve – should be a priority. It is time for Defence to be clear about what it wants from the RMR and whether it needs scalability in a force whose forward role means that large elements could be lost in short order in heavy fighting. Defence’s needs may not match what is convenient for the (regular) Royal Marines in peacetime.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/wjXL3iQ.jpg" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ Figure 2: 292 hours of AIS darkness</em></p> -<h4 id="recruiting">Recruiting</h4> +<p>Critically, on each of these visits, the SPARTA IV only docked in Russia’s naval base terminals, despite claims from the vessel’s owner that it carries commercial goods.</p> -<p>Restoring the steady progress in MR growth in the five years since 2018 is crucial. The reserve estate, which is currently under another review, should also maintain a broad geographic spread of reserve training centres to maximise recruitment opportunities. The Maritime Reserve Centres also require realistic levels of permanent staff support to go alongside the commendable investments the Naval Service has made in its facilities. There must also be a sensible and ring-fenced recruiting budget.</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/aM74noh.jpg" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ Figure 3: The SPARTA IV in Russia’s military ports in Tartus (top) and Novorossiysk (bottom)</em></p> -<p>The delays in the Defence Recruitment System are problematic, but there is a danger that reserve recruitment takes second place to regulars, which does not work. And the local nature of reserves activity needs to be reflected in the new recruiting system, with arrangements in place to allow those with medical and dental issues to be addressed swiftly.</p> +<h3 id="a-trojan-seahorse">A Trojan Seahorse</h3> -<h4 id="training">Training</h4> +<p>Russia has consistently used the SPARTA IV as a reliable go-to vessel for sensitive maritime logistical operations.</p> -<p>The MR need reserve-friendly training with a higher proportion delivered either in-person in regional training centres or virtually as envisaged in the 2020 Directive. The new approach, involving more specialisation, should help, but two resourcing issues must be addressed: the requirement for adequate and prioritised permanent staff to provide local instruction and availability of individual equipment where training is to take place.</p> +<p>The SPARTA IV’s construction, certifications and capacity make it an excellent transit vessel for large military materiel, and it maintains reputational and business indicators of this behaviour.</p> -<h4 id="tacos">TACOS</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/O6SEAoN.jpg" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ Figure 4: The SPARTA IV</em></p> -<p>The MR should move in line with the other two services and extend reserve careers to age 60 with exemptions beyond that for those with key skills that do not require the same fitness levels.</p> +<p>The vessel is a Russian-flagged general cargo ship weighing 8,870 deadweight tonnes and measuring 122 metres in length by 18 metres in breadth that can reach 14 knots. Its volumetric capacity, its two cranes capable of lifting up to “55 tons”, and the overall displacement imply that the ship could easily transport heavy military goods, such as battlefield T-90 tanks deployed in Syria on behalf of the Russian government.</p> -<p>If the UK is to call on reserves routinely, the question of TACOS must be addressed. This should be led in the MoD as all three services’ reservists face similar issues. The RFCA EST recommends:</p> +<p>For example, high-resolution satellite imagery over Tartus from 26 February 2022 seems to show 17 vehicles with measurements (approximately 8 m in length by 2.5 m in width) compatible with those of a KAMAZ-5350 tactical truck.</p> -<blockquote> - <p>that RF30 takes forward, as a priority, work to simplify the TACOS available and guidelines, or policy (rules) for the appropriate TACOS to meet a given situation, i.e., RSDs for routine training; enhanced RSDs for short operational deployments (maximum 28 days) whether homeland resilience or DAOTO; and full mobilisation for longer deployments and more kinetic operations.</p> -</blockquote> +<p>The KAMAZ-5350 appears to measure 7.85 m in length, 2.5 m in width and 3.29 m in height, and has a volume of 64.56 m3. A refrigerated container of 40 tons measures 5.450 m (length), 2.285 m (width) and 2.160 m (height), for a volume of 26.89 m3. The ship can move up to 44 refrigerated containers with a total volume of 1,183 m3, equivalent to over 18 KAMAZ-5350s.</p> -<p>The review must ensure the outcome works for reservists, and also their families and employers, which is more complex than for regulars, who have no civilian employers and do not have to balance their off-duty family time with work in the same way.</p> +<p>More recently, the SPARTA IV appeared to be loading or unloading dozens of military pieces in Tartus in early August.</p> -<h4 id="strategic-reserves">Strategic Reserves</h4> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/b0G7dyd.jpg" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ Figure 5: Rendering the SPARTA IV’s cargo capacity</em></p> -<p>A further point is that it seems anomalous that COMMARRES has no responsibility for the Strategic Reserve of ex-regular personnel. If reserves are to play a larger role in the warfighting space, as RF30 envisages, then that should surely change.</p> +<p>Before its current route between Tartus and Novorossiysk, the SPARTA IV lived up to the claim it can “walk across three seas”, transporting cargo for Russia through the Arctic, Baltic and South Asian regions. Essentially, if the Russian Ministry of Defence needed maritime logistics somewhere, the SPARTA IV appeared nearby.</p> -<h4 id="honorary-officers">Honorary Officers</h4> +<h3 id="treacherous-ties">Treacherous Ties</h3> -<p>A final proposal is that the MR consider inviting members of their pool of prestigious honorary officers who are not attached to ships to each become honorary commodores for a reserve unit. This may require also recruiting a few more. In the Army and RAuxAF unit, honorary colonels and honorary air commodores provide an extra voice for each unit, with informal access to higher levels. At a time when the MR voice is so small in the wider Naval Service, this modest reform would seem overdue.</p> +<p>The SPARTA IV’s engagement in military transport comes as no surprise; the ship’s ownership structure includes sanctioned Russian defence companies and ties to a preeminent Russian politician.</p> -<h4 id="concluding-remarks">Concluding Remarks</h4> +<p>Oboronlogistics LLC, a Moscow-based company allegedly created to oversee logistics for the Russian Minstry of Defence, is the group owner of the SPARTA IV. The company has been sanctioned by the UK, the US, Canada, Australia and Ukraine for aiding Russia’s 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine. Notably, Oboronlogistics’ website features a video of the SPARTA IV loading military cargo.</p> -<p>The MR contain a great deal of talent, although, in the case of the RMR, much of it is in the lower ranks rather than the shrunken officer corps. The RNR’s new shape, especially in the IW domain, promises progress, but clear demand signals are needed for both the RNR and RMR to show how reserves can provide scalability at sea and on land as well as specialists. That will require reserve voices in the major centres of policy and command in the Naval Service, from the Navy Board down. Defence also needs to re-evaluate the balance between safety requirements and military needs across the armed forces. This would widen the range of options across the reserve forces.</p> +<p>The SPARTA IV is directly operated, managed and owned by the Novorossiysk-based SC-South LLC, an Oboronlogistics affiliate which is sanctioned by the UK, Ukraine and the US for delivering maritime goods on behalf of the Russian Ministry of Defence.</p> -<p>The threat to the UK is increasing, and growth in defence funding is unlikely to match it. Reserve forces offer a way of building extra capability at low cost. The UK is an island nation; reserve forces offer the naval service a critical link to the civilian world and the innovation it brings.</p> +<p>Another Oboronlogistics subsidiary, OBL-Shipping LLC, is the SPARTA IV’s technical manager. One of OBL-Shipping’s former shareholders was the Chief Directorate for Troop Accommodations JSC, the CEO and director of which was Timur Vadimovich Ivanov, Russia’s deputy defence minister. Ivanov is allegedly “responsible for the procurement of military goods and the construction of military facilities”, and has been sanctioned by the EU for financially benefiting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.</p> -<h3 id="annex-the-maritime-reserve-organisation">Annex: The Maritime Reserve Organisation</h3> +<h3 id="uncharted-waters">Uncharted Waters?</h3> -<p>This annex shows the organisation of the MR, with four sets of grouped capabilities and command support. The latter is extremely lean and would need strengthening, especially in the N1 personnel area, where the elements are to be distributed across the regular commands, as envisaged in the paper.</p> +<p>As it continues to unfold, the case of the SPARTA IV reveals Russia’s continued willingness to bend international law and to prioritise military logistics over adherence to international agreements. The SPARTA IV is much more than a cargo vessel and is not operating alone; other vessels with similar patterns of life and ownership structures continue to illegally transit the Bosporus, likely carrying Russian military materiel into the Black Sea. These ships must and can be stopped.</p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/3HDF98Q.png" alt="image03" /> -<em>▲ <strong>Figure 3: The Maritime Reserves Organisation.</strong> Source: Royal Navy, “Maritime Reserves Orders, 2023–24”. This was issued recently but has no publication date.</em></p> +<p>Reporting on the SPARTA IV underscores OSINT’s ability to identify breaches of international law almost instantaneously, offering an opportunity for observation and identification to align with political will from Western governments to enforce compliance in real time.</p> <hr /> -<p><strong>Julian Brazier</strong> is a former MP and government minister. A scholar in Maths and Philosophy at BNC Oxford, he worked in the City and in management consulting, co-authoring a major study comparing defence procurement in six NATO nations and Sweden. He served for 13 years as an officer in the TA, including five with Special Forces.</p> +<p><strong>Giangiuseppe Pili</strong> is an Assistant Professor in the Intelligence Analysis Program at James Madison University. He was a Research Fellow at Open Source Intelligence and Analysis at the Royal United Services Institute. He is an external member of Intelligence Lab – Calabria University and a former lecturer in intelligence studies.</p> + +<p><strong>Jack Crawford</strong> is a transatlantic security specialist and Research Analyst with the Open Source Intelligence and Analysis research group. Prior to his current role, Jack acted as Research Assistant and Project Officer for the Proliferation and Nuclear Policy research group’s UK Project on Nuclear Issues.</p> -<p><strong>Christopher Hockley</strong> is a former Flag Officer Reserves, Flag Officer Regional Forces and Flag Officer Scotland, Northern England and Northern Ireland who is now the Chief Executive of an MoD Employer Recognition Scheme’s Gold Award-winning Trust in Scotland. Until recently, he was the Vice Chair (Navy) for the Highland Reserve Forces and Cadets Association and is a current member of the UK Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team.</p>Julian Brazier and Christopher HockleyThis paper examines whether and how the Maritime Reserves can bring extra fighting power at an affordable cost. \ No newline at end of file +<p><strong>Nick Loxton</strong> is Head of Intelligence Delivery at Geollect, responsible for bridging customer and client needs with the effective delivery of intelligence products. He is an ex-British Army officer, having served nearly nine years with The Rifles.</p>Giangiuseppe Pili, et al.Russia’s likely use of the SPARTA IV, an alleged civilian vessel, to transport military materiel from Tartus, Syria to its port in Novorossiysk is yet another example of Moscow’s penchant for manipulating international law to satisfy its wartime agenda. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/hkers/2023-11-14-on-critical-minerals.html b/hkers/2023-11-14-on-critical-minerals.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..261e42ff --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2023-11-14-on-critical-minerals.html @@ -0,0 +1,414 @@ + + + + + + + + + + On Critical Minerals · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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On Critical Minerals

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Critical Minerals in the Energy Transition: Environmental and Human Security Risks

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Genevieve Kotarska and Lauren Young | 2023.11.14

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This paper explores the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction, how rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition will impact these risks, and what options exist for the UK to address these risks.

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Executive Summary

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Critical minerals are broadly defined as minerals that are of vital importance for technology, the economy and national security and are also subject to serious risks relating to the security of their supply. This paper uses the term “critical minerals” broadly, focusing on minerals considered to be of high criticality to the UK in particular. It recognises that this is not a fixed list, and that a country’s specific assessment will affect whether a mineral is considered critical.

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A dramatically increased supply of these minerals will be vital for the net zero transition – both in the UK and internationally – and to meet the target to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, set at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Paris Conference in 2015.

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Yet the extraction of critical minerals poses various environmental and human security risks, many of which pose a threat to the net zero transition, in the UK and globally. This paper explores the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction, how rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition will impact these risks, and what options exist for the UK to address these risks. It identifies key environmental risks as including the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to deforestation, pollution, soil degradation, water scarcity and biodiversity loss. In relation to human security, key risks identified include the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to human rights abuses, labour exploitation, crime, conflict and corruption. Where mining takes place on or near Indigenous lands, both environmental and human security risks are found to disproportionately affect already-disenfranchised communities.

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While a number of these risks are well established, there is a potential for burgeoning demand for critical minerals to accelerate potential harms. Such harms can occur in situations where rising demand pushes governments to remove or overlook relevant regulations; where new extractive operations open up in countries without mining histories, which lack the infrastructure or capacity to manage the associated risks; where harmful boom–bust cycles of extractive activity occur due to ongoing technological advances; and where a race to secure supplies of critical minerals exacerbates competition and geopolitical tensions.

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If the mining sector fails to address these risks as demand booms, public opinion across source and supply countries might turn against the net zero transition as the harms are perceived to outweigh the benefits. It is crucial that the UK leverages its unique position as an international trade, financial and mining hub to help the international community mitigate the risks posed in this regard.

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Based on the findings of this research, the authors suggest the following ways forward for consideration by the UK government, many of which are also applicable to other governments in the Global North:

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    Use its role as a mining and financial hub to improve regulation, standards and transparency in relation to investment in critical minerals based on key environmental priorities, for example, through the application of the Taskforce on Nature-Related Financial Disclosures, Science-Based Targets for Nature, Global Reporting Initiative and other similar initiatives, thereby supporting integration of high-quality targeted frameworks into this burgeoning sub-sector. This will reward and enhance uptake of best practice by businesses and support regulation in producer countries globally.

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    Develop an updated industrial strategy on critical mineral use specifically, to support the strategic acquisition and use of critical minerals and facilitate prioritisation across key industries should a shortage of critical minerals occur. This should be used alongside the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy to ensure that critical minerals are used strategically, particularly in the face of fluctuations in supply.

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    Given the criticality of the net zero transition and the minerals it requires, review domestic policies to maximise recovery of critical minerals that are already in consumer supply chains, in the form of waste. This would broaden opportunities for critical mineral sourcing aside from extraction via new mines. This should include prioritising the upscaling of the UK’s recycling capacity to facilitate the reuse of critical minerals, mindful of the fact that while recycling alone cannot meet demand for critical minerals, estimates suggest that recycling could meet 10% of global demand, while bringing jobs to the UK in support of the “levelling up” agenda.

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    Work with manufacturers on extended producer responsibility, right to repair and design-to-recycle best practice to move towards a circular economy and ensure that critical minerals are reused and recycled wherever possible, thereby reducing demand. This will help to reduce wastage of critical minerals and decrease pressure on supply chains.

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    Support improved consumer requirements for standards around the production of critical minerals. An example of this can be seen in the case of the 2023 EU Regulation on Deforestation-Free Products, which could be adapted for the critical mineral sector in the UK and more widely across the Global North.

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    Support governments in source countries to develop the infrastructure and capability to manage mining-related risks. This could involve providing development assistance to build capacity to apply regulation and best practice, while supporting initiatives that mainstream biodiversity, conservation and social justice into regulation. Such regulation should improve the development and practice of the mining sector in producer countries, in collaboration with other actors working in this area, such as relevant aid agencies and multilateral development banks.

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    Consider how to integrate innovative concepts and proposals that call for a paradigm shift in our approach to economic activity, human wellbeing and the natural world. This can be achieved through an approach which prioritises the pursuit of human and ecological wellbeing over material growth, and has the potential to help us better assess, understand and mitigate the environmental and social harms associated with the mining sector and other sectors dependent on natural resources.

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Introduction

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The UK, alongside many other countries, has committed to bringing the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2050. These commitments rely on the transition from an energy sector reliant on fossil fuels to one dominated by net zero or green technologies, particularly renewables. This transition depends on securing reliable supplies of critical minerals.

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The route to doing so is far from clear. To meet global decarbonisation commitments, an unprecedented scaling up of critical mineral production is required. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), by 2040 at least 30 times as much lithium, nickel and other key minerals could be required by the electric car and battery storage industries to meet global climate targets. In terms of rare earth elements (REEs), global demand is expected to expand by 300%–700% by 2040. In this context, demand for many critical minerals is set to outstrip supply, putting net zero targets at risk.

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Increasing extraction of critical minerals is therefore key, but is also set to have wide-ranging implications and present an array of environmental and human security risks of its own. Some of these risks are already recognised, while others are on the horizon. Of crucial relevance is the fact that critical mineral extraction is currently highly concentrated in a handful of countries and regions and that some of the key mineral-rich countries are fragile and conflict-affected states, or those with weak state capacity and high levels of corruption. Effective policies which actively account for these changing dynamics and address these risks are, therefore, crucial.

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From the UK perspective, adequately addressing these risks is essential both to mitigating the harms caused and securing sustainable supply chains, and to safeguarding the UK’s reputation on the global stage. The UK government has branded itself as a “clean energy superpower” and, as a global trade and financial hub, is home to some of the most prominent and profitable mining companies, as well as the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), of which the majority of large-scale mining companies are members. The UK is therefore in a unique position to galvanise action on environmental and human security risks relating to critical mineral extraction and to champion a just global energy transition.

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This paper examines existing and emergent environmental and human security risks associated with accelerating critical mineral extraction, and the options available to address these risks from a UK perspective. Specifically, this paper addresses three research questions:

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    What environmental and human security risks are associated with critical mineral extraction?

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    How will rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition impact these risks?

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    What options exist for the UK to address these risks?

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The overarching goal is to identify the key environmental and human security risks associated with the net zero transition and provide decision-makers in the mining sector and policy community with the knowledge they need to anticipate and more effectively mitigate these risks.

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It should be noted that there is currently no standard, internationally recognised definition of a critical mineral. Critical minerals are broadly understood as minerals of vital importance for technology, the economy and national security that are also subject to serious risks relating to their security of supply. In the UK, critical minerals are defined according to “economic vulnerability and supply risk”, which are caused by “combinations of factors including but not limited to rapid demand growth, high concentration of supply chains in particular countries, or high levels of price volatility”. Which minerals are defined as critical differs by country and varies over time. The UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy, for example, currently defines a cohort of 18 minerals with high criticality for the UK, as well as outlining a “watchlist” of five minerals deemed to be increasing in criticality. This paper therefore uses the term “critical minerals” broadly, focusing on minerals considered to be of high criticality to the UK in particular. It recognises that there is no fixed list, that minerals considered critical differ according to countries’ specific assessments, and that minerals such as copper and aluminium that are currently not considered critical are also vital for the net zero transition.

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Methodology

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The research for this paper was conducted between May and August 2023 and is based on analysis of primary and secondary data, including a rigorous review of open-source literature, semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, and the organisation of a virtual validation workshop.

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First, the authors conducted a review of the literature to assess existing knowledge of the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction. The review covered peer-reviewed academic research, policy briefs, articles and blogs by recognised experts, reports by NGOs, government documents and evaluations. Standard review search strings were used with defined inclusion criteria covering relevance and credibility, with focused searches of Google and Google Scholar conducted using combinations of selected keywords.

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Following this, the authors conducted semi-structured interviews with 22 participants from industry associations, government agencies, mining companies, NGOs and other parts of the private sector, as well as investigative journalists and academics, drawing on expert knowledge from a variety of sectors to target gaps identified in the existing literature. Interviewees were based in the UK, the US, Australia, Germany, Denmark, Chile and Sri Lanka, providing international and UK-specific expertise. Interviewees were selected based on their knowledge of the topic, with a snowball sampling method used to identify additional respondents. Questions were tailored to interviewees’ roles, responsibilities and expertise, with the aim of supplementing a lack of detailed published research with first-hand knowledge and experience. All interviews have been anonymised and all data that could lead to the identification of interviewees has been removed. The interview stage formed the foundation of the research, with non-academic literature used to validate and supplement findings from the interviews, where peer-reviewed research was unavailable.

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Last, findings were presented and analysed at a virtual workshop held on 15 August 2023, attended by 10 representatives of industry associations, government agencies, NGOs and the private sector, as well as investigative journalists and academics. Written feedback was provided by three additional representatives. The workshop was designed to allow discussion of key findings, as a validation exercise to strengthen the rigour of the research.

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Limitations and Scope

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The research design has several limitations. The first relates to the inability, within the available timeframe, to provide a detailed analysis of the risks relating to each individual critical mineral. Second, although interviewees were selected for their extensive experience on the topic, a degree of subjectivity is inevitable. This paper recognises that an interviewee’s understanding of the risks is shaped by their specific expertise, potentially leading them to perceive certain risks as more significant than others. Wherever possible, respondents’ views were corroborated by a published source or other respondent data.

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The third relates to the emerging nature of many of the risks identified, meaning there is limited peer-reviewed research available. Non-academic literature was used to validate and supplement findings from the interviews, where peer-reviewed research was unavailable. Equally, given that primary research for this paper comprises a limited number of semi-structured interviews, the findings can only be viewed as preliminary, with further research needed in the immediate future.

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Finally, this research focuses specifically on the risks relating to critical mineral extraction. The authors acknowledge that critical mineral processing and Chinese dominance in this area is an important part of the wider discussion on securing net zero supply chains, but examining this is beyond the scope of this paper.

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Structure

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Analysis of the findings is organised into three chapters. Chapter I provides a brief overview of existing and clearly recognised environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction. Chapter II builds on this to explore how changing patterns of demand triggered by the net zero transition are set to impact these risks. Chapter III considers the options available to address these risks from a UK perspective. The conclusion draws together the findings and presents a series of recommendations.

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I. Existing Risks Linked to Critical Mineral Extraction

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The environmental and human security risks linked to critical mineral extraction are not unique in and of themselves, with many associated with wider mining activities. Yet with exponential growth in demand for minerals for the net zero transition and the expected acceleration in critical mineral mining activities, these risks stand to intensify. This chapter provides a brief overview of existing, acknowledged risks linked to critical mineral extraction, which will serve as a foundation for subsequent chapters.

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Environmental Risks

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Critical mineral reserves are often located in remote, high-integrity, biodiversity-rich locations (see Figure 1), with their extraction posing direct risks to the environment. Many of these harms occur at the mine site itself, both through mineral extraction and the development of the required infrastructure to support it. Mining requires land use change, frequently resulting in deforestation and biodiversity loss. Around 1,600 mining operations are in key biodiversity areas and a further 2,000 in protected areas. In the context of critical minerals, 80% of cobalt and 54% of nickel are sourced from areas where biodiversity is at risk. The infrastructure required to support mining activities also presents environmental challenges. Crucially, the construction and maintenance of roads, ports, railway tracks and power lines can impact the wider landscape, often leading to further deforestation and habitat fragmentation. With the growth in demand for critical minerals, these risks could escalate in key locations.

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image01 +Figure 1: Selected Countries and Harms Associated with Mineral Mining for the Net Zero Transition. Source: Map adapted by the authors from Nat Lowrey, “A Material Transition: Exploring Supply and Demand Solutions for Renewable Energy Minerals”, War on Want, March 2021. Adapted with kind permission from War on Want.

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Sub-Saharan Africa has some of the world’s largest deposits of minerals essential to the net zero transition, including cobalt, graphite, lithium, nickel and REEs. An expanding rate of extraction of these minerals could exacerbate existing environmental problems. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, from 2010–20, the African continent witnessed the greatest annual rate of net forest loss of any region in the world. While some of this is attributed to agriculture and commercial logging, mining also played a key role; a 2022 study showed that mining was a significant direct driver of deforestation in Ghana and an indirect driver of deforestation in Gabon and Zambia. Given that Africa is home to significant reserves of manganese, platinum, cobalt and graphite, increased mining activity for critical minerals risks exacerbating deforestation in the region.

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Similar risks have been highlighted in other regions. In a prominent example, Indonesia has seen rapid expansion in mining activity targeting nickel and cobalt, which are commonly extracted together. This is negatively impacting both inland tropical forests and coastal mangrove forests – causing particular damage, in view of their high carbon storage capacities. Similar concerns have been raised in relation to critical mineral extraction in the Pacific Islands and Latin America. However, it is important to put these risks into a wider perspective. With any change of land use comes a degree of habitat degradation, with mines currently occupying just 1% of Earth’s land surface, whereas agriculture accounts for 38%.

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However, environmental risks linked to critical mineral and indeed all forms of mining go beyond those related to the direct footprint of a mine site itself. Risks relating to air, water and other forms of pollution are present in all stages of mine development, from pre-feasibility and feasibility to construction, operation, maintenance and closure of any mine. These risks apply in the extraction of critical minerals just as in the extraction of other major metals not currently deemed critical, such as gold, iron ore and copper. Separating the valuable fraction of mined material results in potentially hazardous waste. This includes waste rock, comprising the rocks removed to access the target mineral, and tailings, which are fine-grained waste from the crushing and processing of an ore. Such waste often contains dangerous levels of heavy metals, chemicals and radioactive components, and risks contaminating the local environment during storage or disposal. Other waste materials generated during the extraction process – for example, acidic waste water during lithium extraction (see Box 1) – also present a risk. Here, it is important to emphasise that the risk of pollution extends beyond the lifecycle of the mine, after closure. Mine abandonment, decommission and repurposing also create risks from the release of contaminants into the environment. Indirect environmental risks linked to critical mineral mining also derive from the water-intensive nature of much of this activity, which can lead to water shortages and water table depletion, threatening both species and habitats (see Box 1).

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Finally, the power used in extracting critical minerals itself contributes to global carbon emissions, although carbon emitted at the extraction stage of the supply chain is likely to be significantly lower than that emitted during the processing stages. Innovation is taking place in this area, with a fully electric mine in operation in Canada and mining companies investing in renewable power to support remote sites.

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Understanding these existing environmental risks is vital as critical mineral extraction accelerates to meet global decarbonisation commitments. As explored in Chapter II, the dynamics and context surrounding such extraction activity are likely to change as fluctuating demand for specific minerals reshapes and intensifies many of the risks we face today.

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Human Rights Abuses

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Human security risks associated with the extractive industry are also well established. In the context of critical minerals, these risks are clearly seen in cases such as artisanal cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – a country holding 75% of the world’s currently identified cobalt reserves, 15–20% of which is estimated to be mined artisanally. Here, artisanal cobalt miners face the threat of being beaten, tortured or killed by state and private security services. Poor working conditions present further risks, where artisanal miners work with no or insufficient personal protective equipment, ventilation or healthcare. Child labour is also a concern. Estimates of the number of children working in the DRC’s cobalt sector range from 4,500 to 40,000, some of whom are as young as six. Such child labour ranges from children helping their parents at weekends to those working as indentured servants. Despite attempts to formalise artisanal mining in the DRC, a range of studies highlight the limitations of bureaucratic formalisation in countries such as the DRC, where miners may lack the “resources and skills to participate effectively” in these processes.

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Beyond the DRC, child labour is reported in numerous other critical mineral extraction operations (see Figure 1), including tantalum supply chains in Mozambique, Burundi and Rwanda. Nickel mining in Guatemala has been linked to cases of murder, sexual violence and forced displacement, while mining for REEs in Myanmar has also been associated with wide-ranging human rights abuses. Abuses are commonly targeted at artisanal miners, labourers and local communities, provoking local-level conflict and community resistance, with resistance at times interrupting critical mineral mining operations’ ability to operate effectively.

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Further cases of weak enforcement of labour rights in relation to critical mineral mining can be seen in artisanal mining of cobalt and tin, as well as in the mining and processing of nickel. Such risks may be exacerbated as mining moves to previously untapped regions rich in critical minerals, particularly those with a track record of human and labour rights abuses. Saudi Arabia, for example, has untapped critical mineral reserves worth about $1.3 trillion, but a very poor track record in relation to human and labour rights. In January 2023, the UK announced its intention to deepen collaboration on critical minerals with Saudi Arabia, as part of its “plan to build partnerships around these vital resources across the world”. Human rights standards must be a key consideration in any future collaboration, and such partnerships are an opportunity for the UK to engage bilaterally and use its diplomatic and financial position to ensure human rights standards are upheld in critical mineral supply chains.

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As in the case of environmental risks, concerns relating to human rights and labour abuses in the critical minerals sector are not necessarily fundamentally different from those linked to the wider mining sector. However, contextual vulnerabilities – particularly in light of the high demand driving increased mining for critical minerals in areas with weak governance and/or no history of mineral extraction – could raise the risk of human rights abuses and exploitation, as discussed further in Chapter II.

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Corruption, Crime and Conflict

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Corruption in the extractive sector is widespread. In 2016, the OECD claimed that one in five cases of transnational bribery were linked to the extractive sector. High-profile cases involving mining and commodities giants such as Glencore illustrate the extent of the issue; in November 2022, for example, Glencore was ordered to pay £281 million in penalties after a Serious Fraud Office investigation revealed it had paid $29 million in bribes for preferential access to oil in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and South Sudan. Meanwhile, in Nigeria alone, an estimated $400 billion in oil revenues has been lost to corruption since 1960.

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Similar trends are emerging in relation to critical minerals. In June 2022, court auditors in the DRC pointed to over $400 million in missing tax advances and loans that state mining company Gecamines said it had paid to the national treasury. Gecamines holds minority stakes in several of the world’s largest copper and cobalt projects, both of which are key minerals for the net zero transition.

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In this context, a range of NGOs have raised the alarm over vulnerabilities to corruption in relation to critical mineral extraction specifically, and the potential for this to derail the energy transition. Key concerns here relate to the location of most current critical mineral reserves in a small number of developing and middle-income states, many characterised by weak governance, high levels of corruption and legacies of fragility and conflict. Here, recent research has flagged the risk of clean energy minerals being used for trade-based money laundering, and the risk that close links between politically exposed persons and commodity trading more broadly could implicate supply chains themselves in conflict finance. Meanwhile, artisanal and small-scale miners are flagged as potentially suffering high levels of exposure, particularly in cross-border mining hotspots. As noted in a 2022 report by Maha Rafi Atal, Stephanie Trapnell and Dieter Zinnbauer, “given the race for newer and more efficient clean energy technologies, there is an ongoing risk that weakly regulated mining is exploited for illicit profit, which may involve not only corruption, but also human trafficking and human rights abuses”.

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Efforts to tackle corruption must be central to discussions on supply chains, as critical mineral extraction presents a key revenue-generating opportunity for many states, with critical minerals comprising between 4% and 7% of mining revenue. As Liesbet Gregoir and Karel van Acker remind us, corruption, tax avoidance and government effectiveness “influence the potential of benefits returning to local communities”, which can in itself impact community support for mining projects, undermining supply chain security. Given the need to trade with these mineral-rich countries to achieve net zero, tackling corruption in critical mineral supply chains is crucial.

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Wider links to criminality and conflict traverse extractive industries and are well documented in relation to gold and diamond mining, but they also play out in the context of critical minerals. Organised criminal activity around the supply and trafficking of REEs has been reported in China, with authorities seizing multi-tonne consignments of REEs worth millions of dollars that were being illegally smuggled out of the country. In 2022, an AP investigation flagged the role of military-linked militias in human rights abuses linked to REE mining in Myanmar, with militias enforcing control in key areas and demanding a cut of the profits generated. Critical mineral-linked criminality is also prevalent in other regions; in 2022, a Chinese national was jailed in Nigeria after attempting to smuggle 25 tonnes of lithium-containing lepidolite out of the country. Lithium deposits in Mexico have similarly been reported to be at risk of criminal exploitation. Intersecting with critical human rights risks, this activity often leaves local communities at the mercy of profit-chasing criminal groups, enhancing their vulnerability to violence, displacement, extortion and labour exploitation.

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These points relate closely to risks around conflict financing. Just as gold, diamonds and gemstones are known to have been used to fund armed groups in key source countries globally, critical minerals are similarly associated with such activity. In Africa’s Great Lakes region, prominently, 3T mining (tin, tungsten and tantalum) has been linked to the operations of non-state armed groups and conflict financing, prompting the passage of associated conflict minerals legislation, including the EU’s 2021 Conflict Minerals Regulation. Here, interviewees expressed concern that the critical minerals boom could trigger new forms of localised conflict, especially in the case of extraction via artisanal and small-scale mining.

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On this point, it is important to note that critical minerals are generally less transportable than gold or diamonds and must be moved at much higher volumes to generate profits, limiting the appeal for many localised armed groups and criminal actors. Despite this, interviewees expressed concern about the risk of local-level conflict and criminal extortion. Meanwhile, the potential for critical minerals to support improved infrastructure and supplement existing revenues in supply countries is unlikely to mitigate in full the potential emergence of a new “resource curse”, unless more is done to address the human and environmental security risks highlighted in this paper, the impacts of which are felt most keenly at a local level. Indeed, localised tensions are known to be exacerbated by encroachment on community territory, human rights violations and environmental degradation associated with critical mineral mining, as seen in relation to lithium mining in Chile and nickel mining in Indonesia.

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These corruption, crime and conflict risks are likely to be exacerbated in the context of burgeoning demand for critical minerals and in the global rush to secure supply chains. With mineral-rich countries and mining companies looking to capitalise, this could serve to both deepen the impact of existing human and environmental security risks and jeopardise the transition to net zero as community resistance, local-level conflict and criminality impact the ability of mining companies to operate, undermining reliable supplies. Opportunities to mitigate these risks are discussed further in Chapter III.

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Indigenous Rights

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As indicated above, the brunt of many environmental and human security risks related to critical mineral extraction is borne by local communities. Indigenous communities are known to be particularly impacted: a recent study found that 54% of critical mineral mining projects are located on or near Indigenous land. In many cases, this puts Indigenous communities on the frontline of the effects of critical mineral extraction. While consultation is required, the standard of consent is not yet industry standard, with the ICMM specifying that members should “work towards obtaining consent of Indigenous Peoples” rather than requiring that they obtain it. Where resistance occurs, Indigenous Peoples have been subject to abuses including forced displacement, sexual violence, torture and murder. Mining has also been linked to the murder of land and environmental rights defenders in countries such as the Philippines, Mexico, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Ecuador.

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Even when not directly subject to abuse, Indigenous Peoples face indirect harms. Deforestation for nickel mining in Indonesia risks destroying the way of life of the nomadic O Hongana Manyawa tribe; water depletion from lithium mining in Chile continues to impact Indigenous ways of life; and nickel mining in Guatemala has destroyed natural resources vital to the livelihoods of many Indigenous Peoples. These are just a few examples of how critical mineral extraction is impacting Indigenous communities. With an absence of standards to ensure that Indigenous communities both consent to and benefit from mining activities, both Indigenous rights and land could be sacrificed in the name of the net zero transition. This outcome can be avoided if the risks identified here are properly addressed. Some possible ways forward are outlined in Chapter III.

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Box 1: The Lithium Triangle, Water Scarcity and Biodiversity Loss

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Lithium is a key component in lithium-ion batteries and is widely used in the batteries that power electric vehicles, smart devices, renewable power plants and other key technologies. With net zero targets fuelling skyrocketing demand for lithium, this demand is being met by a surge in extraction in countries such as Chile – the world’s second-largest lithium producer.

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The “Lithium Triangle” on the borders of Chile, Argentina and Bolivia, for example, is a region rich in lithium deposits. Within this, roughly a quarter of deposits lie beneath the Salar de Atacama salt flats in northern Chile. Often known as the Atacama Desert, this is one of the driest places on earth, with average annual precipitation of 1 mm. Access to water is limited, with available sources vital for local communities and their livelihoods, as well as local flora and fauna. Yet the mining of lithium in this region is increasingly serving to consume, contaminate and divert the scarce water resources available.

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Estimates suggest up to two million litres of saline groundwater (commonly known as brine) are needed to produce one tonne of lithium, with brine extraction the dominant method used – in which brine is extracted, concentrated in large evaporation pools and treated with sodium carbonate. Brine typically has a salt content higher than seawater and is therefore regulated separately from water. Brine is neither potable nor suitable for agricultural use. Beatriz Bustos-Gallardo, Gavin Bridge and Manuel Prieto note that “this distinction allows firms to frame brine pumping as an action independent from freshwater extraction, and claim it has no effect on the hydrogeological or ecological balance of the basin”. Yet research indicates that increased groundwater extraction for the lithium industry has contributed to water deficit in the Salar de Atacama, with the amount of water pumped out of the region increasing by 21% between 2000 and 2015.

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Concerns over the lithium industry’s contribution to water scarcity in the region have exacerbated tensions across local communities already facing the fallout from scarce rainfall and high rates of evaporation due to climate change. Meanwhile, key water sources that remain available for humans, livestock and crop irrigation have been contaminated by waste products of lithium extraction operations. In this context, many communities now rely on tankers delivering water. And while this situation has been triggered by expanding electric vehicle production at a global level, electric vehicles remain a rarity in Chile itself, highlighting the unequal distribution of harms and benefits in relation to critical minerals.

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Beyond these human impacts, lithium extraction is contributing to damage to the Atacama Desert’s unique biodiversity. The Laguna Santa Rosa Wetland, for example, is shrinking as a result of water scarcity, threatening the area’s 53 endemic species, 17 of which are classified as endangered. Other vulnerable species are also disappearing from the Atacama region, which is experiencing a significant reduction in plant cover, specifically algarrobo trees. Meanwhile, evaporation pools used in the extraction process are highly damaging to many bird species – flamingos in particular are misled by the large bodies of contaminated water.

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To meet global demand for lithium, the companies already operating in the Atacama salt flats have increased their activities, while companies not yet present are also showing interest in the region’s reserves. Chile is, however, in the process of reassessing its relationship with the environment. A new constitution that could have significantly affected the country’s extractive industries was rejected in a referendum in 2022. However, efforts to rewrite the constitution continue, with hopes among some that a new constitution will be accepted this year, which could have consequences for how extractive industries are able to operate in the country.

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Main source: Ingrid Garces and Gabriel Alvarez, “Water Mining and Extractivism of the Salar de Atacama, Chile”, WIT Transactions on Ecology and the Environment (Vol. 245, 2020), pp. 189–99.

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II. Elevated Demand and Rising Risks

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As highlighted in Chapter I, some of the key human and environmental security risks relating to critical mineral extraction align closely with those associated with the extractives sector at large. However, the forecasted boom in demand presents particular risks – many of which are under-acknowledged and understudied, and which will require specific mitigations. Indeed, as countries accelerate efforts to reach net zero, a massive uplift in critical mineral mining will be required to meet skyrocketing demand. Critical mineral demand for the production of electric vehicles, for example, is expected to increase almost 300 times between 2020 and 2050, to meet the IEA net zero scenario.

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In recognition of this, key consumer countries have been working to refine their strategic approach to securing critical mineral supply chains. These efforts can be seen in the US Critical Materials Strategy, the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy and the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, among others. However, few of these strategies adequately account for the particular environmental and human security risks likely to be presented as critical mineral extraction is scaled up. Nor has there been extensive research focused on the emergent risks across source countries in the face of unprecedented global demand. This chapter draws on both the limited existing literature and data from semi-structured interviews to harness current cross-sectoral knowledge on what can be anticipated in this regard.

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Fast-Tracking and Corner-Cutting

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Interviewees flagged that corner-cutting in the process of authorising mine permits is a key issue. This issue is especially acute given unprecedented demand – and the resulting competition likely to be created between countries seeking rapidly to secure supplies. Where such corner-cutting takes place, this will likely see an erosion of processes designed to limit the damage done by mining, including community engagement, the securing of prior informed consent that is given freely, and the undertaking of comprehensive social and environmental impact assessments.

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Currently, it takes between 10 and 20 years, depending on the context, to undertake the relevant assessments and obtain approvals required for a new mine. However, given the need for the energy transition to occur at speed, there is incentive for governments and companies to accelerate the process, which may motivate corner-cutting. The incentives to cut corners are likely to be higher in countries with high levels of corruption and low levels of government capacity, where the mine development process will be subject to lower levels of regulatory oversight. At a local level, corner-cutting is highly likely to exacerbate the human and environmental security risks outlined above, with local communities forced to absorb potential negative impacts resulting from time pressures on the energy transition.

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In some contexts, these pressures – combined with burgeoning critical mineral demand – may also motivate governments to remove some of the “red tape” that provides important protections for the environment, communities and workers, to increase production and attract investment. Such fast-tracking is already taking place, with incentives provided and regulatory requirements relaxed in countries such as the US, Australia, Brazil, Peru, the Philippines and South Africa.

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In the US, for example, the Thacker Pass lithium mine in Nevada is one of a number of critical mineral mines fast-tracked through approval processes in light of the “strategic” value of the support provided both to economic recovery and the expanding lithium-ion battery market. Its development has occurred despite the objections of Native American tribes, who claimed that they had not been properly consulted during the approval process, and who went on to launch legal action to challenge the mine’s approval.

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In Indonesia, the government’s efforts to increase foreign investment – including in nickel mining and processing – have had stark consequences. Specifically, in 2022, after more than two years of constitutional and legal challenges, the government of Joko Widodo passed the controversial Omnibus Law, revising over 70 existing laws, with the aim of removing red tape, improving the investment climate and creating jobs. The law has been extensively criticised for weakening protection for workers and the environment; of specific interest for this paper is the law’s requirement that only investments considered high risk must conduct an environmental impact study, replacing wider requirements under previous legislation.

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The move is likely to exacerbate existing environmental and human security issues relating to critical minerals. While Indonesian nickel production doubled between 2020 and 2022 and has continued to rise since, numerous cases have been reported of workers losing their lives and suffering serious health conditions, with thousands of hectares of rainforest destroyed and water and land polluted, at great cost to local communities and Indigenous populations. The Indonesian case highlights some of the risks associated with the critical mineral boom, with such dynamics likely to play out in many more cases as demand continues to increase. Ultimately, there is a risk of fast-tracking mines, cutting regulatory corners and removing red tape occurring at the cost of workers, local communities and the environment.

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Exploring New Mineral-Rich Regions

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Many of these concerns surrounding fast-tracking and corner-cutting are likely to be exacerbated in regions with unexplored critical mineral reserves, particularly in locations with no history of mineral mining. Such areas without previous experience of mining activity are likely to have lower levels of infrastructure, human population and activity in general, and are likely to have higher ecological integrity. Once a given mineral becomes more valuable, a higher incentive to build key infrastructure to extract that mineral is likely to have a significant impact on previously intact ecosystems.

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Meanwhile, in these locations, the minimal presence of industry to date is likely to be matched with underdeveloped governance and regulatory frameworks for mining activity. In the absence of mandatory social and environmental impact assessments, requirements to undertake community engagement or seek a social licence to operate, the likelihood of environmental and human security risks occurring rises. Increasing global demand for critical minerals intensifies these concerns, incentivising fast-paced mineral exploration and the identification of new reserves in countries without histories of large-scale mining or in areas beyond national jurisdiction (see Box 2).

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In 2012, for example, discoveries of mineral deposits in Malawi – a country with minimal prior history of mining – made it Africa’s largest source of REEs at that time. Those discoveries then mandated a rapid updating of the country’s Mining Act, a need to establish wider legal and institutional frameworks and, in the words of the then Minister of Natural Resources, Energy and Environment Cassim Chilumpha, a “crash program to train mining engineers, legal experts in mining and other related fields in the sector”. With many of the mines recently becoming operational, the contribution of mining to Malawi’s GDP is projected to increase from 1% to 6% by the end of 2023. Yet during the exploration phase and establishment of the mines and related infrastructure, the government has faced criticism for forcibly evicting villagers from their homes and for risking food and water security. Corruption has meant that Malawi has struggled to effectively address these issues, resulting in a situation where some local communities have denounced the mining sector and the lack of consultation, amid warnings that the country’s mining boom “will not necessarily translate into benefits for affected communities”.

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Concerns surrounding the Malawian experience extend to other countries in Africa, with low levels of exploration meaning that the full potential of the continent’s REEs reserves remains undetermined. As in the case of Malawi, there is concern over the initiation of potential extraction activities – of REEs and other critical minerals – in countries with high levels of corruption, weak governance and limited state capacity, where environmental protections and labour rights are likely to be weak or poorly enforced. Similar concern has been raised over the Middle East’s vast, undeveloped critical mineral resources, and the poor environmental and human rights record of many countries in that region. In locations with limited infrastructure, meanwhile, interviewees flagged further risks associated with the rapid development of infrastructure in new mining regions, noting the potential to facilitate the incursion of new licit and illicit industries, triggering further potential social and environmental harms.

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Boom and Bust

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Beyond those risks attributed to sudden mining booms in newly identified critical mineral-rich regions, there is growing concern around the implications of boom–bust cycles arising from the net zero transition. In the face of a sustained drive to advance green technologies and reduce the demand these exert on critical mineral supplies, future technological innovations and circular economies could rapidly and unexpectedly reduce demand for certain minerals.

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Beyond the inevitable disruption caused by a rapid scaling up and down of demand, interviewees emphasised the potential consequences in contexts where there is a lack of experience in properly closing mines at both the government and industry levels, with sudden, poorly managed mine closures presenting a range of environmental and human security risks. At the environmental level, storage of tailings (the waste products of mining and mineral processing) requires management long after a mine has ceased operating and, if not managed correctly, can have devastating environmental consequences. The 2015 Samarco Dam failure demonstrated the potential impact of the failure of tailings disposal dams. The incident resulted in a “tidal wave” of mining waste washing across the Brazilian landscape in what is considered Brazil’s worst environmental disaster. Although relating to iron ore – rather than critical minerals – the case illustrates the potential dangers arising should extraction activities unexpectedly wind down and tailings storage be mismanaged. Meanwhile, the adequate rehabilitation of mine sites, including reversal of the land use change that occurs with the establishment of a mine, is also a concern in the case of rapid boom–bust cycles. There are few examples globally of mine sites having been appropriately rehabilitated. That said, the majority of modern large-scale mines remain in operation, and mining companies increasingly have to provide financial assurance for mine rehabilitation to prevent mines being abandoned in the case of bankruptcy or similar events.

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At the human security level, beyond the health risks associated with scenarios such as those outlined above, there is also the question of social rehabilitation. Mining companies’ social licence to operate often rests on the benefits that mining activities purport to bring to local communities in the form of revenue and improved infrastructure. Historically, in a range of cases, closures of mines have led to communities abandoning settlements, leaving “ghost towns” in their wake. Although there are few examples relating to critical minerals specifically, the collapse of the diamond mining industry in the town of Kolmanskop in Namibia and the closure of platinum mining in Atok, Limpopo in South Africa are two wider examples.

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Increasing Geopolitical Competition

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Many of the aforementioned issues risk exacerbating the geopolitical tensions associated with the critical minerals boom. Indeed, some commentators have warned of the potential for critical minerals to spark a “new arms race” or a “new Cold War”, especially given the role of the defence sector in driving critical mineral demand and, notably, the US decision to use wartime powers to secure critical mineral supply chains. The 1950 Defense Production Act gives the US president the power to “shape national defense preparedness programs and to take appropriate steps to maintain and enhance the domestic industrial base”. The act was expanded in 2022 by President Joe Biden to support production of net zero technologies, and again in 2023 to facilitate funding for projects related to the production of minerals such as lithium, REEs and tantalum.

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Competition over critical minerals could also exacerbate tensions between great powers in the context of China’s dominant role in a range of critical mineral supply chains. While China’s dominance in the context of critical mineral processing is outside the scope of this paper, it is important to note that China also has significant critical mineral reserves, which are subject to the same risks as those highlighted in this paper. China is the largest importer of lithium, nickel, cobalt and manganese, has significant reserves of lead, selenium, tellurium, tin, zinc, graphite, lithium and titanium, and dominates lithium battery production. The country also dominates REE supply chains, accounting for 70% of global rare earth ore extraction and 90% of rare earth ore processing, following decades of state investment, export controls, cheap labour and low environmental standards.

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In this context, the US and its allies are increasingly looking to secure their own supplies to minimise potential supply chain vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, an international environment characterised by growing contestation over critical minerals, among other factors, could see mineral-rich source countries rendered increasingly vulnerable to great power meddling. Such a scenario – whether real or imagined – has already played out in Bolivia in 2019, when former president Evo Morales accused the US of orchestrating a coup to ensure access to Bolivia’s lithium reserves. Investigative journalism website Declassified has made similar allegations against the UK.

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Yet the likelihood of intensified great power competition over critical minerals is debated. Some commentators cite critical minerals’ relative abundance and recyclability, and the fact that, unlike with oil and gas, a break in constant supply is unlikely to spark immediate crisis. In this context, critical mineral competition is arguably unlikely, alone, to act as an impetus for all-out war. However, this does not rule out intensified competition, tension and violence at the local level – a scenario potentially amplified by the unequal burden of critical mineral demand from the Global North and countries such as China on source countries in the Global South, and the resultant environmental and social impacts on communities largely concentrated there.

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In this context of geopolitical competition it is important to note that the UK’s position has been weakened since leaving the EU. UK allies – such as the US and EU – are competing with both hostile states and allied states for access to critical minerals. The UK may struggle to leverage negotiating power following withdrawal from the EU and more work is needed to establish how the UK will address these geopolitical concerns.

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Box 2: Deep-Sea Mining Case Study

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Over millennia, deposits of critical minerals such as manganese, nickel and cobalt have built up in nodules on the ocean floor, thousands of metres below sea level. Deep-sea mining, proponents argue, is a means of sourcing critical minerals “responsibly, ethically, and with a minimal emissions load on the planet”, reducing the need for land-based mining and enabling countries such as the US to decrease their dependence on imported minerals. However, others caution that deep-sea mining may risk the destruction of deep-sea ecosystems (of which we have little understanding), and cause widespread pollution, the decimation of fish stocks and the disruption of deep-sea carbon storage. The lack of scientific data on the harms and benefits has prompted several countries to call for a moratorium on deep-sea mining.

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Crucially, deep-sea mining would largely take place in international waters, raising crucial legislative and regulatory questions. While the International Seabed Authority (ISA) will ultimately decide whether deep-sea mining goes ahead, decision-making has been delayed until 2025 after Costa Rica, Chile and France insisted that no permits be granted until a stronger regulatory landscape had been established. In the meantime, the ISA has issued contracts for exploratory work; as of November 2022, China held five of the 30 contracts issued.

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Should such activity go ahead, this “new potential extractive frontier” could have major geopolitical ramifications. China appears to be leading the race: as well as holding the greatest number of deep-sea mining exploration contracts, it has made funding for research in this area a national security and economic priority. Other issues arise from the fact that the US is not an ISA member state and is currently engaged in drafting parallel legislation. As well as limiting the US’s ability to influence global policy on deep-sea mining, this position also potentially disincentivises other countries to comply with theISA.

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Deep-sea mining in international waters throws up other issues of relevance, at times involving overlaps with other key areas, such as fisheries. Norway, for example, plans to deep-sea mine an area the size of Germany on its continental shelf, most of which lies outside Norway’s exclusive economic zone, potentially infringing UK fishing rights. Key parts of the seafood industry have called for a pause in deep-sea mining plans, as recent research has established that tropical tuna fishing grounds in the Pacific are likely to overlap with areas licensed for deep-sea mining. This, in turn, could impact coastal communities reliant on fishing, resulting in loss of livelihoods and community displacement, among other harmful impacts.

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More broadly, fundamental questions relevant to the ISA’s 2025 decision remain unanswered. As yet, the consequences of deep-sea mining of critical minerals for marine biodiversity and ecosystems are unquantified, while responsibility and payment of any compensation is yet to be determined. Additionally, as with much terrestrial mining, the equitable sharing of the benefits of such mining in international waters is far from uaranteed.

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III. The Road Ahead

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With the world’s attention on the net zero transition and with critical minerals playing a pivotal role in this transition, the international community – and the UK as a key financial and mining hub – has a unique opportunity to address the environmental and human security risks arising. As many of the risks identified are not unique to critical mineral mining, there are already a range of known options available. However, the rapid acceleration of critical mineral extraction could intensify existing challenges, necessitating a fundamental rethink of how to apply interventions and embrace emerging options in this space. This chapter uses both the limited available literature on this topic and data drawn from semi-structured interviews designed to gather insights from across a range of sectors, to consider the options available.

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A Governance Rethink

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In considering options to mitigate the environmental and human security risks outlined in this paper, interviewees stressed that a vast and complex regulatory landscape exists for mining companies, with country-level regulation often out of date and therefore lagging far behind best practice. Mining in the US, for example, is regulated by an 1872 mining law, despite new technological advancements and improved awareness of mining’s impacts. Outdated laws related to mineral extraction often fail to address the complexities and scale of modern-day mining and related harms, leaving mining companies to navigate a complex regulatory landscape.

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Numerous guidelines exist detailing best practice for companies and countries in relation to prior informed consent that is freely given, environmental protection, transparency and traceability, community engagement and other elements of due diligence designed to mitigate environmental and social harms. However, the majority of these standards are voluntary, meaning that they are inconsistently and often inadequately adopted across the sector. Both large-scale and smaller mining companies often do not apply best practice, as financial considerations are often prioritised. This situation is especially likely where mining occurs in countries with a weak regulatory environment.

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A concerted effort is needed to address this regulatory shortfall. First, best practice, such as International Finance Corporation Performance Standard 6 and practice aligned with science-based targets for nature (SBTN), should, as much as possible, be reflected in national regulations in relevant source countries. Second, improved consumer requirements are needed for standards around the production of critical minerals (as in the case of the 2023 EU Regulation on Deforestation-Free Products). Third, capacity of producer countries must be improved to apply regulation and best practice, with technical assistance provided to this end. Development assistance should also be provided to mineral-rich jurisdictions to establish appropriate in-country regulations and build capacity to implement such regulation effectively. An example of an impactful technical assistance initiative working to improve the mainstreaming of biodiversity into development and infrastructure practice can be seen in the Conservation, Mitigation and Biodiversity Offsets (COMBO) programme, with more initiatives of this type required.

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Improved practice and outcomes following mine development are likely to be stronger if these initiatives are led by governments and civil society, with sectoral initiatives often not aiming for the highest standards, given the need to integrate the views of many parts of industry. Business must be consulted, but should not necessarily be the sole source of information. The mining sector does, however, have an important role to play in applying regulation to achieve positive outcomes, particularly through initiatives such as the ICMM and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). These bodies have helped catalyse best practice across the industry and engage mining companies and other stakeholders to address the risks associated with the extractive sector. Innovations in mining also demonstrate the possibilities for progress, such as fully electric mines and the sequestration of carbon in tailings, but governments need to identify opportunities to support this work, rather than allowing the initiatives to remain voluntary. The investor community, meanwhile, has a crucial role to play, through initiatives such as the Taskforce on Nature-Related Financial Disclosures (TNFD), and should set targets and report against them to ensure positive outcomes following mine development.

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The Role of the UK

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The UK can play an important role in leading many of these efforts. The UK government has branded itself as a “clean energy superpower” and a leader in “the race towards net zero”, alongside a range of biodiversity commitments. The UK is also uniquely positioned to facilitate action in this area given its role as a global trade, commodities and financial hub. Beyond this, the country is a mining hub, with many of the most prominent and profitable mining companies registered in the UK, and it is also home to industry organisations such as the ICMM.

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The UK government should use its unique position in this field to convene regulatory and wider stakeholder communities, ensuring cross-sector buy-in, for example, through the TNFD and SBTN and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). The UK should also use its financial and diplomatic position to enter bilateral partnership discussions with governments, while using its convening power to bring stakeholders together to identify and apply meaningful multilateral solutions. The Forest, Agriculture and Commodity Trade (FACT) dialogue, for example, could act as a model for bringing together countries to discuss how to address critical mineral-related risks, recognising the global scale of the challenge and the need for involvement from supply and demand countries across both the Global North and the Global South. In these ways, the UK can impactfully support integration of high-quality targeted frameworks into this burgeoning sub-sector of mining. While the mining industry is aware of the need to make fundamental changes, and certain companies have made significant progress in key areas, industry-wide change is unlikely unless governments, consumers and investors across society demand it.

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Given the criticality of the net zero transition and the minerals it requires, the UK – along with other consumer countries – should also review domestic policies to maximise recovery of critical minerals that are already in consumer supply chains (even as waste). This would reduce waste and improve resilience in supply chains through the creation of an internal market. Interviewees criticised the UK’s current approach as being one of pursuing key net zero milestones in the wrong order, highlighting that the UK currently has a Critical Minerals Strategy but no targeted industrial strategy relating specifically to this area, effectively rendering the former strategy toothless. They also emphasised that there has been limited progress on ensuring that the Critical Minerals Strategy promotes environmental, social and governance standards, with individuals at the verification workshop calling for the government to urgently prioritise and take action on this. Establishing industry priorities in this space before securing critical mineral supply chains will be key to ensuring that critical minerals are used strategically, particularly in the face of fluctuations in supply. This may be done by establishing which industries should be prioritised in times of shortage: for example, energy, healthcare and transport.

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Broadening opportunities for sourcing, aside from extraction via new mines, should also be a future priority. Critical mineral recycling and extended producer responsibility would help minimise many of the risks discussed in this paper, and help in moving towards a circular economy. Currently, 0.5% of lithium and 0.2% of REEs are recycled globally, rising to 32% for cobalt and 60% for nickel. While recycling is not a short-term solution, as time is needed to build the necessary infrastructure, scientists estimate that with optimum recycling the US could meet 30%–40% of anticipated demand for critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel and graphite through recycling. The IEA estimates that recycling could meet 10% of global demand – with the benefits of recycling much higher for countries that have already embraced clean energy technologies. Given the pressures that increased demand will put on critical mineral supply chains in the coming years, investment in the necessary recycling infrastructure should be prioritised.

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Disposable e-cigarettes (vapes) highlight the need for forward-thinking, circular-economy-driven policies. The UK currently throws away 1.3 million disposable vapes every week, amounting to more than 65 million a year. The vapes that currently go to landfill each year contain lithium-ion batteries that contain enough lithium, if recycled, to produce 1,200 electric vehicle batteries. The IEA has warned of lithium shortages as soon as 2025, with lithium recycling a key avenue to securing supplies. While the recycling of lithium could currently only take place on a small scale, its value as an industry would grow exponentially as more lithium stock enters the economy. Given the potential of lithium recycling from products such as disposable vapes and the UK’s projected future lithium needs, policymakers should prioritise establishing infrastructure for critical mineral recycling, and recycling more broadly. To date, domestic progress has been slow. However, the UK’s first industrial-scale lithium-ion battery recycling facility received clearance to operate in 2023 with a forecasted processing capacity of up to 22,000 tonnes of lithium-ion batteries per year. Yet more needs to be done to reform waste management processes that do not maximise wider opportunities to recover critical minerals. Extended producer responsibility would also help prevent waste at the scale seen in the case of disposable vapes.

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The UK has regulations in place to encourage recovery, reuse and recycling of electrical and electronic equipment (EEE) and will consult on this in relation to critical minerals in 2023, as well as carrying out an assessment to consider the “circularity of critical minerals in the UK today as a baseline for future work”. However, other work in this area has recently been delayed, such as the extended producer responsibility scheme for packaging, with new rules to ensure packaging producers pay for the cost of recycling their packaging deferred from October 2024 to 2025. Experience of this type raises concerns that proactive steps to support the recycling and reuse of critical minerals could face the same hurdles. Meanwhile, disposable vape producers have already been criticised for not complying with EEE regulations, highlighting the ease with which manufacturers of other critical mineral-based products might avoid compliance.

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Given the urgency of the net zero transition, the government should prioritise and fast-track relevant policy initiatives, looking at all options to upscale the UK’s recycling capabilities. At the same time, it should work with manufacturers on extended producer responsibility, the right to repair and design-to-recycle best practice to ensure that critical minerals are reused and recycled wherever possible. The government should also work with manufacturers to reduce the critical mineral footprint in products, using the power of taxation where possible. Car manufacturers, for example, are increasing production of electric SUVs but these need larger batteries, and therefore more minerals and energy, than smaller electric vehicles. In response to this, Norway recently began taxing electric vehicles over a certain weight, a move designed to motivate car manufacturers to be more efficient with their mineral usage. These measures would all serve to reduce demand for critical minerals, thereby helping to secure supply for the industries that most need them. As well as helping to secure critical mineral supply chains, improved domestic recycling has the potential to create jobs and support UK economic growth.

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Social Awareness and Public Engagement

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To drive many of the necessary changes, attention to societal-level narratives is also required. Currently, the discourse on the renewable energy sector that critical minerals fuel is supportive: in 2022, polling published by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy showed that 88% of people in the UK support using renewable energy. Meanwhile, polling data by Ipsos and the Centre for Climate Change and Social Transformations showed that in October 2022, the majority of people in the UK continued to support most net zero policies, including electric vehicle subsidies, among others.

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However, as this paper has highlighted, critical mineral mining is associated with a number of environmental and human security risks. If these are left unmitigated, it could reduce support for the net zero transition both domestically and internationally. Given the benefits that critical minerals can bring to both net zero goals and local economies, interviewees stressed that efforts to garner widespread societal support are fundamental. The empowerment of local communities where mining is taking place and, more widely, of consumers of technology containing critical minerals are both key to ensuring public support for critical mineral mining, and can help facilitate a just transition to net zero.

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Community engagement and trust building are key to ensuring mining companies’ social licence to operate and that local communities are partners and beneficiaries of the mineral extraction process. This paper has highlighted the local harms that can occur. However, there are a few examples of mining companies actively prioritising community engagement and ensuring meaningful community oversight of mining activity and the associated benefits.

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Mining company Cameco, for example, engaged the English River First Nation (ERFN) in Canada as a partner in a uranium mining project and undertook several years of discussions before a collaborative agreement was signed in 2013 to formalise ERFN’s share of the mine’s benefits. The agreement set out Cameco’s obligations to workforce and business development, community investment and engagement and environmental stewardship, and committed to regular communications between the two parties to ensure mutual benefit, thereby sustaining “high levels of trust” built on “transparency and collaboration”.

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Similarly, lithium mining company Sales de Jujuy has been praised for “fostering mutually beneficial and understanding partnerships with localities” in Argentina and the Alaskan Red Dog Mine has brought “lasting and significant” benefits to local Indigenous communities, though these are “modest” in the context of the mine’s overall operations and profit.

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The impact of community engagement and trust building can also be seen in the UK context. Cornish Lithium has proactively engaged with the local community, organising community engagement events and Q&A sessions and launching a community fund to contribute to local clubs, charities and activity groups. This has helped to secure broad support, although concerns about the environmental impact and the potential for wealth from Cornwall’s lithium to be amassed elsewhere remain. In contrast, Cornish Tin Limited’s plans to explore for and extract tin, lithium, tungsten and other metals from the Wheal Vor tin mine have met local opposition, with a local newspaper noting that “there has yet to be a full public meeting where [locals’] questions can be put to Cornish Tin”. According to the British Geological Survey, areas of the UK from the Highlands to southwest England have the right geology for critical mineral mining, including of lithium. Meanwhile, the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy puts emphasis on growing domestic capabilities along the supply chain, which includes domestic mining. Garnering community support for onshore mining through community engagement is, therefore, crucial.

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While examples of mining companies actively engaging with communities are encouraging, this kind of best practice remains largely voluntary and is not the industry norm across companies or geographies. For this reason, governments should demand best practice on community engagement from companies operating in their territory, with the Global North supporting supply countries in the Global South to demand the same.

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Another key element is community empowerment to demand the local distribution of benefits. The potential for success in this area can be seen in the case of the Shetland Community Benefit Fund, an independent cooperative of local communities which is actively engaging with renewable energy companies to ensure that Shetland’s communities “benefit from commercial renewable energy developments in the islands”. Similarly, Community Power Cornwall calls for “the ownership and integration of renewable energy technologies into everyday lives and settings”, and develops community-owned renewable energy installations.

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This, in turn, links to the need for better public understanding and education on mining more broadly. Public awareness of the risks associated with critical mineral mining is key to driving progress on the consumer and investor requirements that are ultimately how a sector – and the governments that regulate the sector in producer countries – will be motivated to make change. Greater public understanding will empower communities to engage with the mining industry in an informed manner. Additionally, public understanding of the importance of critical minerals for the net zero transition will help to boost support for mining projects and reduce demand by ensuring consumers are more mindful about products that contain critical minerals. Equally, such understanding is likely to increase support for circular economy measures to reduce demand, such as design-to-recycle and the right to repair.

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Facilitating forums at which mining companies and local communities engage should be a UK priority, to ensure the economic and social viability of plans to mine critical minerals domestically. Internationally, cross-sector, multi-stakeholder coalitions can help to empower local communities whose views are often overlooked in the interests of mining companies, while promoting best practice across the critical mineral mining sector. Examples of this already exist, such as the Fair Cobalt Alliance and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which can act as models to replicate.

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Conclusion

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Critical minerals are essential for the net zero transition and for meeting the target set at the UNFCCC Paris Conference in 2015 to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Because of this, demand for these minerals is set to grow rapidly: the IEA projects that up to 28 million tonnes of minerals for green technology will be needed in 2040 – a significant increase from the 7 million tonnes currently mined each year.

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While their potential benefit is significant, this paper has explored the risks associated with critical minerals mining, covering both environmental and human security. At an environmental level, the paper finds key risks to include the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to deforestation, water scarcity, soil erosion, pollution and biodiversity loss. In relation to human security, key risks include the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to human rights abuses and labour exploitation, crime, corruption and conflict. These issues often intersect, with the biggest impact often felt by local communities, including Indigenous communities on or near whose land mineral reserves may be located.

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While many of these risks are already established, this paper highlights the potential for skyrocketing demand for critical minerals to accelerate these harms. This may occur where burgeoning demand incentivises governments to remove or overlook relevant regulations; mandates the opening up of new mining frontiers in countries without histories of extractive operations that lack the infrastructure or capacity to manage the associated risks; exacerbates boom–bust cycles of extractive activity; and increases geopolitical competition.

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These risks have very real consequences for the communities and environment they impact. However, the international community – and the UK as a key financial, trade and mining hub – has a range of opportunities to address the risks and minimise the damage associated with critical mineral extraction for the net zero transition. With the world’s attention on the energy transition, there is a prime opportunity to rethink the current approach and embrace emerging opportunities. Some of these opportunities are not novel in and of themselves but they do require a concerted, strengthened effort to achieve.

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Given the high-level focus of this research, this paper does not seek to make context-specific recommendations to address the challenges ahead. However, drawing on research findings, it offers the following overarching recommendations for potential ways forward for key stakeholders to consider. These recommendations are tailored to the UK specifically, in light of the country’s unique positioning to facilitate action in this area, as an international trade and financial hub and a mining hub in which many of the most prominent mining companies are registered. To effectively leverage this position to ensure a just transition to net zero and ensure that the actions and investments required attract long-term public legitimacy, the UK government should consider the benefits of the following, many of which are also applicable to other countries in the Global North:

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    Use its role as a mining and financial hub to improve regulation, standards and transparency in relation to investment in critical minerals based on key environmental priorities, for example, through the application of the TNFD, the SBTN, the GRI and similar initiatives, thereby supporting integration of high-quality targeted frameworks into this burgeoning sub-sector. This will reward and enhance uptake of best practice by businesses and support regulation in producer countries globally.

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    Develop an updated industrial strategy for critical mineral use specifically, to support the strategic acquisition and use of critical minerals and facilitate prioritisation across key industries should a shortage of critical minerals occur. This should be used alongside the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy to ensure that critical minerals are used strategically, particularly in the face of fluctuations in supply.

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    Given the criticality of the net zero transition and the minerals it requires, review domestic policies to maximise recovery of critical minerals that are already in consumer supply chains, in the form of waste. This would broaden opportunities for critical mineral sourcing aside from extraction via new mines. This should include prioritising the upscaling of the UK’s recycling capacity to facilitate the reuse of critical minerals, mindful of the fact that while recycling alone cannot meet demand for critical minerals, estimates suggest that recycling could meet 10% of global demand, while bringing jobs to the UK in support of the “levelling up” agenda.

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    Work with manufacturers on extended producer responsibility, right to repair and design-to-recycle best practice to move towards a circular economy and ensure that critical minerals are reused and recycled wherever possible, thereby reducing demand. This will help to reduce wastage of critical minerals and decrease pressure on supply chains.

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    Support improved consumer requirements for standards around the production of critical minerals. An example of this can be seen in the case of the 2023 EU Regulation on Deforestation-Free Products, which could be adapted for the critical mineral sector in the UK and more widely across the Global North.

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    Support governments in source countries to develop the infrastructure and capability to manage mining-related risks, providing development assistance to build capacity to apply regulation and best practice, while supporting initiatives that mainstream biodiversity, conservation and social justice into regulation which improves the development and practice of the mining sector in producer countries in collaboration with other actors working in this area, such as relevant aid agencies and multilateral development banks.

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    Consider how to integrate innovative concepts and proposals that call for a paradigm shift in our approach to economic activity, human wellbeing and the natural world – such as natural capital assessments through which we can better understand, measure and value human interdependencies with nature, and plan more sustainable management of natural resources – and wellbeing economics. This can be achieved through an approach which prioritises pursuit of human and ecological wellbeing over material growth and has the potential to help us better assess, understand and mitigate the environmental and social harms associated with the mining sector and other sectors dependent on natural resources.

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Genevieve Kotarska is a Research Fellow in the Organised Crime and Policing team at RUSI. Her research focuses on the community-level impacts of organised crime and terrorism and illicit trades such as drug, firearms and people trafficking.

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Lauren Young is a Research Fellow in the Organised Crime and Policing team at RUSI with expertise in wildlife crime and conservation.

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Red Lines And Red Crosses

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Si Horne | 2023.11.14

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International law fails to protect healthcare facilities in armed conflict. They need specific protection from harm.

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If there is one thing that the whole world could be said to have agreed on and united around, surely it is International Humanitarian Law (IHL), as encapsulated in the Geneva Conventions. They were signed by every single state, a feat only replicated a handful of times, mostly around another world-unifying issue: climate change. Even the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Chemical Weapons Convention have not reached that milestone.

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Yet, despite this universal rejection of attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure – especially, in the context of this Commentary, hospitals and healthcare workers – they occur daily. The World Health Organization monitors the extent of the problem, and at the time of writing, its dashboard stands at 855 attacks in 18 countries this year. This is almost certainly a gross underestimate, and only paints a broad-brush picture – while documenting 1,180 such attacks in Ukraine since January 2022, it does not convey that 190 of those facilities were completely destroyed. The vast majority of these attacks are intentional. During a period of analysis of attacks in Syria, 22% of all infrastructure damaged was healthcare-related, compared with only 3% for schools. This has led some to assert that the Red Cross is now the “Dread Cross” – a target rather than a protection – and that protecting hospitals requires a different approach.

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An important question is whether this is a problem for the international community at all. After all, the Geneva Conventions do not rule out an attack on a hospital. The law itself is simple – hospitals are protected – but this is caveated by “provided they are not military objectives”. The Conventions do not define all the circumstances in which hospitals lose their protection, but the International Committee of the Red Cross commentaries give illustrations: combatants setting up a firing position there; storing ammunition; sheltering troops; or using it as a “human shield”. This last is especially problematic. It is the nature of hospitals, when surrounded by fighting, to occupy a liminal space; they serve the health needs of anyone in need. Critically, they also have no power to reject combatants – so they can lose their protection because of an action over which they have no agency. This is something that current legal frameworks struggle to manage. Even when there are prosecutions, they are rarely successful. Indeed, some argue that focusing on accountability for war crimes through International Criminal Law may even be weakening some elements of the harder-to-prove IHL.

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Indeed, some argue that focusing on accountability for war crimes through International Criminal Law may even be weakening some elements of the harder-to-prove International Humanitarian Law

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Consider also the realities of military necessity. Close quarters fighting to rid a hospital of a prepared enemy force will be extremely challenging and costs many soldiers’ lives. It may significantly slow an advance (that may itself be time critical). It may allow the enemy to escape, regroup and attack elsewhere. These specific dangers may be overcome by a heavy bombardment that simply destroys the facility – but they are not the only relevant risks. The tactical advantage of an overwhelming attack comes with long-term operational and strategic costs that may be far greater.

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The commander may legally strike the hospital that has lost its protection only if the military advantage achieved will outweigh the expected collateral damage. But how well-informed are commanders about the extent of that collateral damage? They know of course that it will involve civilian casualties, as hospitals in conflict-affected areas are typically overcrowded with the most vulnerable sections of society, seeking either treatment or refuge. There will also be the staff tending to them. These represent the direct harm of the attack. But is that it? Hospitals take years to build, require enormous resources to stock, and replacement staff for those who have been killed, injured or driven away by the violence take time to train or recruit. The health economy loses a critical node and so, for years after, those who seek care may not be able to access it effectively. People will sicken and die from perfectly treatable conditions, for lack of ongoing management of their long-term health conditions and for loss of capacity to treat their new ones. This is the indirect harm and it is vast; for every one killed by the attack itself, at least 11 die of these indirect harms. The groups most affected by both are the children, women, elderly and ill – the same groups least able to flee to access healthcare elsewhere.

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There are other costs that are harder to quantify, but militarily may be even more apposite. It could conceivably be the best military solution, if the objective is to win the war, but it makes no sense at all if the objective is to win the peace. Victory achieved by destroying the capacity or will of the enemy to continue the fight only brings negative peace: the absence of fighting. It rarely lasts, because the capacity and will to fight can be regrown. As US counterinsurgency doctrine notes, “Kill[ing] 5 insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of 50 more, and loss of local support”. The rubble of a hospital is guaranteed to alienate the population, engendering a lasting sense of grievance that will fuel the will to fight again. Positive peace, where the factions share a sense of social justice such that neither wants nor needs to fight, is far more likely to persist. Access to healthcare is a key component of positive peace. If the commander knew that cumulative harms and grievance resulting from the hospital attack would also inspire their enemy to rise up again in five years and attack them even harder, would they still call in an airstrike? Or would they take the harder option and target the enemy at close quarters?

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Can you still bomb a hospital, while somehow mitigating these problems? We often hear that IHL-compliant warnings are given to evacuate areas before they are attacked. The reality is that this is a normally a facade. A UK hospital, such as the one in which the author works, could undoubtedly be evacuated completely – for example if there was a major fire – but patients would come to harm. New patients would die waiting for ambulances, as frontline vehicles were diverted to moving existing patients. The frail or critically ill may well die from interruption of their care. The entire regional health system would have to slash routine and emergency care to cope, which would severely degrade it for weeks or months. And all of this in a stable, developed, interoperable health system. If it were the only functioning hospital in a region, where would the patients go? If the ambulance system were weak and overwhelmed by conflict casualties, who would move them? For a significant number, these notifications will simply give advance warning of their death – either in the hospital, or without adequate care nearby. No one should ever believe that you can bomb a hospital in a way that does not have extensive, enduring impacts on the population served by it.

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Nor is this simply about influencing tactical decision-making. Degrading the health of a population has international consequences too

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Nor is this simply about influencing tactical decision-making. Degrading the health of a population has international consequences too. People who are unsafe and cannot access basic services will try to move. Mass refugee flows negatively impact health and stability in surrounding countries and so are generally detrimental to the interests of the wider international community.

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Ironically, it may be the approach of the international community that lies at the root of this problem. Evaluation of the ICRC Healthcare in Danger project suggests progress against its objectives of engagement, preparation and legislation; this is not a failure of advocacy on the part of such organisations. Nor is it (generally) the result of malfunctioning munitions, or human error. As then Médecins Sans Frontières International President Joanne Liu told the UN Security Council in 2016:

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On the third of May, this council unanimously passed Resolution 2286. You, the Council Members, pledged to protect civilians and the medical services they need to survive. You passed the resolution in the wake of the obliteration of Al Quds Hospital, in Aleppo by the Syrian government and its allies … Five months later, the resolution has plainly failed to change anything on the ground. This failure reflects a lack of political will.

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Accepting international laws that allow commanders to determine military necessity for themselves, using ill-informed collateral risk assessments to decide what is subjectively proportionate, may be facilitating attacks on healthcare rather than stopping them. Increasingly it seems more likely to be used as a framework for the subsequent justification of an attack, than as a protection to prevent one.

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So as conflicts affecting healthcare rage in 18 countries this year, what can be done to break this pattern? First, the international community can acknowledge the reality: healthcare is openly attacked during wars, and IHL does not currently offer meaningful protection to hospitals in high intensity conflict. Then it can ask how that can be changed. Perhaps the clue to one simple measure lies in the Chemical Weapons Convention, itself so close to complete international agreement. There are some weapons that must not be used. An additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions could, at the stroke of a pen, simply preclude the use of explosive weapons on hospitals. Hospitals could still be targeted if there was military necessity – and their use as command posts or ammunition dumps could still justify that – but it would have to be done by small arms, and line of sight. It would be bloody, but it would be the blood of combatants, not civilians. The infrastructure would remain, to treat the population afterwards. The staff will be alive to undertake their duties. Perhaps most importantly, it would not harden the will of the entire population against the attackers; it would leave space for lasting peace, rather than sowing the seeds of the next generation of conflict.

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Si Horne is the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. An Army Emergency Medicine doctor, he has supported operations in Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and South Sudan as well as serving as the Emergency Medicine lead for the Army.

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“Sewage Of The Cold War”

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China’s Expanding Narratives on NATO

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Philip Shetler-Jones | 2023.11.21

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Although China’s views on NATO have fluctuated since the early days of the Cold War, Beijing’s recent statements on the alliance have sharpened. This report argues that they amount to a “rhetorical attack” on the alliance’s legitimacy that can potentially undermine trust among its Asia-Pacific partners and, more broadly, confidence in Western ideas of collective security. The report offers recommendations for investments NATO should make in understanding, tracking, and countering Chinese narratives about the alliance.

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Summary

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    Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Sino-NATO relations have oscillated between adversary and ally.

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    Since 2019, Beijing’s communications on NATO have sharpened in ways that amount to a rhetorical attack on the alliance. This shift has coincided with intensified Sino-US competition, Chinese concerns about multilateral security associations in Asia, and closer Sino-Russia relations.

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    China’s recent critiques of NATO contend that the organization is an obsolete artifact of the Cold War and a belligerent force that undermines regional peace and stability. China’s rhetoric also portrays NATO’s partnerships as an illegitimate intrusion into the Asia-Pacific region.

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    Although the audience for China’s narrative on NATO may be as much domestic as foreign, if the message is not countered, it could undermine the alliance’s efforts to sustain and develop Indo-Pacific partnerships and erode support for alliances with the United States more generally.

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    NATO should, therefore, make proportionate investments to equip itself with mechanisms for monitoring, analyzing, and responding to China’s rhetorical attacks.

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Introduction

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Relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and NATO — the military alliance of 31 European and North American nations initially formed to defend against Soviet aggression — have dropped to their lowest point since the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. Simultaneously, the combination of intensified Sino-US competition, increased NATO attention to the PRC, Chinese concerns about multilateral security associations in Asia, and closer Sino-Russia relations have made Chinese attitudes toward NATO more relevant than ever. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the PRC’s communications on NATO have sharpened in ways that amount to a rhetorical attack on the alliance’s legitimacy. And with this rhetoric becoming increasingly hostile, it has the potential to undermine NATO partnerships and relationships not just in the Euro-Atlantic but also in the Indo-Pacific. This suggests a greater need to invest in countering negative narratives to the extent that they can potentially hurt the alliance — with priority given to specific messages and audiences and to relationships with partners in the Asia-Pacific region.

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The PRC’s ambitions and policies — particularly those viewed as “challenges” to the interests, security, and values of the NATO alliance in its 2022 Strategic Concept — are attracting much attention. But what the PRC says about NATO also deserves thoughtful consideration. Although Sino-NATO relations have fluctuated, alternating between opposition and alignment since early in the Cold War, Beijing’s harsh narratives on NATO have recently become more pronounced. On the eve of the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, an editorial in the Global Times, a daily tabloid affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party, used vivid language to warn against closer NATO relations with Asia-Pacific partners: “It’s an extremely unwise choice for any Asia-Pacific country and is bound to damage that country’s strategic trust with China, inevitably leading to consequences. . . . The sewage of the Cold War cannot be allowed to flow into the Pacific Ocean.”

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NATO should seek to understand, track, and counter such PRC narratives about the alliance for several reasons: first, these narratives can damage perceptions of NATO by its members and its partners, especially Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea (also known informally as the Asia-Pacific Four, or AP4); second, undermining trust in NATO is a proxy for undermining the principles of collective self-defense and collective security that underpin international security more widely; and third, for the United States and its bilateral allies in the Asia-Pacific region, attacks on NATO are an indirect way of attacking any alliance with the United States.

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This report examines the PRC’s attitudes toward NATO over time, with a focus on the 2020–2021 period following the debut of NATO’s official statements on the PRC and the periods following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the release of NATO’s Strategic Concept (which articulates a new position on China). The report reviews Chinese perceptions of NATO and identifies the main themes of contemporary Chinese discourse on the alliance. It then considers the intended audiences of PRC hostile narratives before turning to the strengths and vulnerabilities of NATO vis-à-vis these narratives. The report concludes with practical recommendations for the alliance.

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Sino-NATO Relations over Time

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Since 1949, Sino-NATO relations have fluctuated “between adversary to ally and back again.” Five distinct periods can be identified. After the initial period of early Cold War antipathy, a second period, beginning in 1972, saw China making “an active diplomatic effort to persuade Western European leaders to strengthen NATO” as a way of drawing Soviet strength away from its borders.

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However, the third period saw NATO cast in a new and dangerous light when a NATO bomb struck China’s embassy in Belgrade during the air campaign of the 1999 Kosovo war, resulting in the deaths of three Chinese nationals. The unfortunate accident had a strong, formative effect on the reputation of NATO in China that persists to this day. Official registration of protest over the bombing was accompanied by state-sanctioned expressions of anger against NATO — involving days of street demonstrations in several major Chinese cities — and the issuance of a rare government statement. On the day of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a PRC foreign ministry spokesperson told reporters that “NATO still owes the Chinese people a debt of blood.”

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The fourth period, following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and NATO’s mission to Afghanistan, was relatively benign despite the PRC’s opposition to NATO expansion and the Balkan interventions. The Afghanistan mission brought NATO to China’s borders, yet Beijing appeared to view the mission positively, whether out of genuine optimism that it would address the threat of Islamist terrorism or as a way of casting some legitimacy on its own counter-terrorism policies in its far western regions. In testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in April 2012, China expert Christina Lin pointed to a series of positive exchanges:

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In 2002, the Chinese ambassador in Brussels visited NATO headquarters with then SecGen Lord Robertson and explored ways for engagements, particularly in Afghanistan. . . . Following the visit of the Director General of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to NATO Headquarters in 2007, the political dialogue on [the] senior staff level [took] place on a rather regular basis. In May 2007, NATO Military Committee Chairman General Ray Henault expressed that in addition to political relations, NATO wants to establish direct ‘military-to-military’ relations with Chinese armed forces and shake off the embassy-bombing shadow.

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In 2008, the People’s Liberation Army Navy began cooperating with NATO navies on counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. And in 2011, the Global Times — known for its hawkish views on Chinese foreign policy — published a positive opinion piece about cooperation between NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

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The fifth (and current) period of Sino-NATO relations began in 2019. During this period, Beijing’s attitude toward NATO seems to have been formed in considerable part by the deterioration in both US-China and Europe-China relations over the preceding few years. The first time the significance of China’s rise appeared in an official NATO statement was in December 2019; the London Declaration, issued at the NATO Leaders Meeting, stated that Beijing’s “growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges.” Almost a year later, a report entitled “NATO 2030: United for a New Era,” produced by an independent panel of experts appointed by the NATO secretary general, identified China as a “systemic rival” and recommended that NATO “continue efforts to build resilience and counter cyber attacks and disinformation that originate in China.” At their June 2021 summit meeting in Brussels, alliance leaders reiterated and expanded on earlier statements: “China’s growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance. . . . China’s stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security.”

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Perhaps the biggest perceived affront to China has been its treatment in NATO’s Strategic Concept, a long-term strategy and planning document that was revised significantly in 2022 from its previous 2010 version. The document more clearly puts China and NATO in opposing positions: “The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our [NATO’s] interests, security and values.” The PRC is mainly covered in paragraphs 13 and 14. Paragraph 13 defines the problem:

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The PRC employs a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up. The PRC’s malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target Allies and harm Alliance security. The PRC seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains. It uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence. It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains. The deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests.

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Paragraph 14 lists the actions NATO plans to take:

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We remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance’s security interests. We will work together responsibly, as Allies, to address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security and ensure NATO’s enduring ability to guarantee the defence and security of Allies. We will boost our shared awareness, enhance our resilience and preparedness, and protect against the PRC’s coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance. We will stand up for our shared values and the rules-based international order, including freedom of navigation.

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All of this said, regardless of the period of relations, Chinese and NATO interests have at times aligned, proving that the relationship is not inherently antagonistic. Nor have China and NATO necessarily paid significant attention to one another over time. Aside from the Belgrade bombing, as Filip Šebok and Richard Q. Turcsányi noted in a paper for the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, NATO hardly featured in the PRC’s official communications until recently: “There were only 18 direct mentions of NATO in regular press conferences of [the] Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 2002 and 2020 — compared to 21 mentions of the Czech Republic, over 200 of Germany, and almost 5,000 of the US.”

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China’s Perceptions and Discourse

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Before analyzing what China has been saying about NATO in the last several years, it is worth exploring some of the perceptions behind Beijing’s rhetoric. According to a summary of a 2021 dialogue organized by the US-based Center for Strategic Decision Research and the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (closely affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army), Chinese perceptions could be roughly summarized as follows:

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    NATO is a Cold War organization that needs a threat to survive, and China is a convenient scapegoat. China’s military modernization gives NATO a pretext for higher military spending.

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    The United States dominates NATO and seeks to use it to turn Europeans, who are politically divided and militarily uneven, against China and to transition NATO from a regional to a global alliance.

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    Western initiatives are nothing but attempts to prevent China’s rise in terms of strategic capability. The United States has been criticizing China and applying double standards on its development of new hypersonic missiles, intermediate missiles, stealth aircraft, battlefield robotics, and cyber and space weapons, even as the United States and its allies are developing the same capabilities.

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    The West’s claims of security vulnerabilities and Chinese state interference are invoked for protectionist reasons and to give Western companies an unfair market advantage.

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    The United States and its allies are violating principles of state sovereignty and non-interference by condemning China and imposing sanctions on it for its internal behavior in, for example, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.

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    China’s rise, along with the emergence of other major powers, means that the Western-dominated multilateral system is obsolete and Western power will be reduced. Unwilling to accept this, the West has tried to revitalize the G-7 (an economic and political forum for advanced countries) by adding Australia, India, South Africa, and South Korea; and tries to use the Quad (a strategic security dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) and NATO global outreach to contain China’s legitimate rise. This effort is destabilizing global politics by dividing the world into new Cold War blocs.

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These perceptions both underlie PRC discourse on NATO and reflect the broad thrust of PRC foreign and security policy — which essentially opposes a US-led order that appears bent on containing China and instead seeks a new world order that facilitates acceptance of and respect for China’s leadership status.

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Obsolescence, Belligerence, Illegitimacy

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China’s underlying perceptions and declared foreign policy ambitions have coalesced in an overarching narrative that can be roughly summed up as follows: Although China is the future (ergo the West is the past), American primacy is threatened by China’s inevitable rise, and so the United States uses all means at its disposal — including alliances like NATO — to hype a China threat and contain China’s rise. In determining how to respond to this broad narrative, it helps to break down the elements of China’s messaging and discourse on NATO into three main categories: obsolescence, belligerence, and illegitimacy.

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OBSOLESCENCE: COLD WAR THINKING

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The PRC’s narrative of Western decline serves to support the domestic legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and gain external acceptance for China’s overseas power projection. In Beijing’s view, NATO is an emblem of Western decline and is attached to outmoded concepts and institutions, including, for example, so-called Cold War thinking. As Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian put it in April 2022, “NATO was born out of the Cold War and should have long become a past tense.” This interweaving of NATO with established PRC foreign policy narratives became even more evident in the remarks made by China’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Zhang Jun. At a UN Security Council briefing on Ukraine in June 2022, Zhang stated, “The Cold War ended a long time ago, It is necessary for NATO to reconsider its own positioning and its responsibilities, completely abandon the Cold-War mentality that is based on bloc confrontation, and strive to build a balanced, effective, and sustainable European security framework in line with the principle of indivisible security.”

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Beijing views obsolete thinking as afflicting NATO’s whole conceptual mindset, which, in turn, shapes its approach to China. In remarks in June 2022, the spokesperson of the Chinese mission to the European Union stated that “NATO’s so-called Strategic Concept, filled with Cold war thinking and ideological bias, is maliciously attacking and smearing China. We firmly oppose it.”

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These examples suggest that China objects to NATO’s perceived embodiment of two institutional and structural aspects of Cold War thinking: bloc formation and confrontation. The theme of illegitimate collective defense alliances and minilaterals (small groups of countries collaborating to achieve shared goals) is connected to the broader Chinese discourse on resisting attempts to contain the PRC. Beijing’s statements on the international order emphasize the centrality of the UN Security Council and imply that multilateral alliances based on the right of collective self-defense somehow lack legitimacy, despite the fact that Article 51 of the UN charter specifically validates the right of collective defense. As noted by the spokesperson of China’s mission to the EU, “NATO claims itself to be a defensive organization that upholds the rules-based international order, but it has bypassed the UN Security Council and waged wars against sovereign states, creating huge casualties and leaving tens of millions displaced.”

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Also implying a Western attachment to obsolete thinking, the PRC has talked of a needed evolution of security concepts from “absolute” security to “indivisible” security. In April 2022, General Secretary Xi Jinping highlighted the concept of indivisible security — the idea that no country should strengthen its own security at the expense of others — as a distinguishing feature in his proposed Global Security Initiative: “We should uphold the principle of indivisibility of security, build a balanced, effective and sustainable security architecture, and oppose the building of national security on the basis of insecurity in other countries.” According to the official concept paper published in February 2023, the initiative “aims to eliminate the root causes of international conflicts, improve global security governance, encourage joint international efforts to bring more stability and certainty to a volatile and changing era, and promote durable peace and development in the world.”

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Beijing is essentially touting a superior security order that will supersede the current, US-led order. Again, China asserts that, as an institution founded on collective defense, NATO has not been heeding the principle underlying the concept of indivisible security. (The Kremlin, incidentally, has also promoted this principle in the context of earlier European security cooperation agreements.) In remarks made on separate occasions, spokesperson Zhao and UN ambassador Zhang have issued the following warnings:

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NATO must immediately . . . renounce its blind faith in military might and misguided practice of seeking absolute security, halt the dangerous attempt to destabilize Europe and the Asia-Pacific, and act in the interest of security and stability in Europe and beyond.

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The Ukraine crisis has once again sounded alarm for the world. Security is indivisible. A blind faith in the position of strength, the expansion of military alliance, and the pursuit of one’s own security at the expense of the insecurity of other countries will inevitably lead to security dilemmas.

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The wider global economic disruption to energy, food, and fertilizer prices resulting from Russia’s war against Ukraine created another opportunity for the PRC to portray “United States-led Western countries” (in other words, NATO members) as irresponsible in pursuing their own security at the expense of others. A June 2022 article in the China Daily, owned by the Chinese Communist Party, contended that “United States-led Western countries were more busy sending shipments of lethal weapons to Ukraine and have imposed sanctions on Russia, risking the prolonged continuation of the conflict but leaving the world to foot the bill. Food prices have reached an all-time high, as Russian and Ukrainian grain exports are hindered by port disruptions and Western sanctions.”

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In response to consolidation of the European security order around NATO membership, Beijing seems intent on undermining alliance solidarity by implying that membership or partnership with NATO is somehow incompatible with good relations with the PRC. In a statement following the announcement of Finland’s decision to apply for NATO membership, spokesperson Zhao hinted at the damage NATO membership can cause countries’ bilateral relations with the PRC: “Finland’s application to NATO will bring new factor to bilateral ties with China.”

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BELLIGERENCE: STIRRING UP TROUBLE

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In the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Sino-Russian rapprochement began to change NATO’s attitude toward the PRC; at the same time, Beijing’s and Moscow’s narratives about NATO began to converge. On February 4, 2022, in a joint statement released when President Vladimir Putin was visiting Beijing, China and Russia signaled their opposition to further NATO expansion. Over the summer of 2022, the PRC’s messaging about the war emphasized elements of its critical stance toward NATO; moreover, its messages aligned with the Russian narrative that Washington was “the initiator and main instigator of the Ukrainian crisis.”

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In late June, inclusion of the AP4 countries in the NATO summit in Madrid prompted the PRC to portray the alliance as a source of danger for Asian security and as evidence of a developing Asian NATO. At a UN Security Council briefing on June 28, Zhang stated, “We firmly oppose certain elements clamoring for NATO’s involvement in the Asia Pacific, or an Asia Pacific version of NATO on the back of military alliances. The long-outdated Cold War script must never be re-enacted in the Asia Pacific. The kind of turmoil and conflict that are affecting parts of the world must not be allowed to happen in the Asia Pacific.”

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In a related statement, the PRC highlighted the long peace the Asia-Pacific region has experienced since the end of the Indo-China conflicts in the late 1970s and implied that Asian problems should be addressed by Asian actors. At a press conference on June 30, Zhao asserted, “The Asia-Pacific is one of the most peaceful and stable regions in the world and a promising land for cooperation and development. Any attempt to undermine its peace and stability and sabotage regional solidarity and cooperation will be unanimously rejected by the people in China and the rest of the Asia-Pacific.”

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By contrasting NATO’s supposed inherently aggressive character (and associating that with insecurity in Europe) with the idealized peace of Asia, China was subtly reinforcing its centrality in the region and making the case that NATO’s interest in the Indo-Pacific or Asia-Pacific represents a threat to regional security. Also in late June, the spokesperson of the Chinese mission to the EU said, “The Strategic Concept claims that other countries pose challenges, but it is NATO that is creating problems around the world. . . . Who’s challenging global security and undermining world peace? Are there any wars or conflicts over the years where NATO is not involved?”

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ILLEGITIMACY: BLOC FORMATION AND INTRUSION

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China’s main attack on NATO’s legitimacy is based on structural and geographic objections. The structural critique implies that blocs or even collective security alliances are inherently contrary to a just, democratic, and stable international order. The geographic critique implies that NATO is overstepping its bounds and entering a region where it has no right to be. Both lines are sometimes used in combination, as the spokesperson of the Chinese mission to the EU did when saying, “NATO claims that its defense zone will not go beyond the North Atlantic, but it has flexed its muscle in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years and sought to stir up bloc confrontation here, as it has done in Europe.”

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NATO’s current interest in the Indo-Pacific makes it a convenient emblem of a trend emerging in the Asian security structure that worries China: defense minilateralism. Until recently, the US-led security order in the region took a hub-and-spoke form, with an array of bilateral alliances connecting the United States to Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. However, these alliances have started to be overlaid with a latticework of new minilateral structures, some linking groups of Asian nations and others linking Asian, European, and North American countries. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to a speech by Secretary of State Antony Blinken in June 2022 with the following statement:

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The US administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy is self-contradictory: the US claims to promote the region’s “freedom and openness” as its goal, while in reality co-opting with allies to forge a “five-four-three-two-one” formation made up of the Five Eyes, the Quad, AUKUS, bilateral alliances and IPEF, forming exclusive “small circles” and forcing countries in the region to take sides. AUKUS helps Australia build nuclear-powered submarines and develops hypersonic weapons, pushing up the risk for a regional arms race. Under the pretext of fighting illegal fishing and keeping supply chains resilient, the Quad has vigorously pursued military cooperation and intelligence sharing. The US has also encouraged NATO’s involvement in the Asia-Pacific. These are all attempts to materialize an “Asia-Pacific version of NATO” and promote “integrated deterrence” against China.

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The PRC’s lumping together of other groupings and NATO seems aimed at delegitimizing not just collective security in the strict sense but any association of defense cooperation or collaboration, in particular those led by or including the United States. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release from February 2023 on the potential of political settlement of the Ukraine crisis asserted that “the security of a region should not be achieved by strengthening or expanding military blocs.” Beijing has even claimed that the United States wants to use NATO for “harming Europe.” The implication is that countries that ally with the United States are somehow either vassals or allowing themselves to be brainwashed or both. Perhaps because China perceives a lack of agency among smaller states, Beijing presumes what it sees as its own regional leadership would be an acceptable alternative to so-called US hegemony.

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The PRC insinuates geographic illegitimacy by arguing that an organization based on North Atlantic security is an alien intruder in the Asian region. The fact that the PRC held military exercises alongside Russia in the Euro-Atlantic in recent years, in the Mediterranean in 2015, and the Baltic region in 2017 has not prevented Beijing from criticizing NATO for “inserting itself” in Asia-Pacific affairs. As Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Wang Wenbin asserted, “NATO, a military organisation in the North Atlantic, has in recent years come to the Asia-Pacific region to throw its weight around and stir up conflicts. . . . NATO has messed up Europe. Is it now trying to mess up the Asia-Pacific and even the world?”

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The warning is not just directed at NATO itself, but also at NATO’s partners and others in the region. The Global Times editorial published just before NATO leaders met in Madrid in July 2022 made this abundantly clear. In addition to warning that “catering to NATO’s Asia-Pacificization is tantamount to inviting wolves into the house,” the editorial declared that doing so was “bound to damage [countries’] strategic trust with China.”

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Beijing’s narrative logic — which connects interference by non-Asians in regional security with the deliberate stirring up of tensions and propensity for war — reached its high point in the implication of an Asian NATO: China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted, “The US pushes NATO to insert itself in Asia-Pacific affairs, fan the ‘China threat’ narrative in the bloc’s new strategic concept, and include in its Madrid Summit such US allies in the Asia-Pacific as Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia, in a bid to build an ‘Asia-Pacific version of NATO,’ which would disrupt security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.” The use of scare quotes around “Asia-Pacific version of NATO” serves not only to cast doubt on the idea itself but also to give a misleading impression as to its origin. Neither NATO nor the United States has expressed an ambition to create an Asian NATO; in fact, they have made many statements to the contrary, clearly indicating that no such move is desired or intended. The idea of an Asian NATO is almost exclusively one that emanates, unconsciously or by design, from Chinese discourse.

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China’s Audiences

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Estimating the danger that PRC narratives pose to NATO requires some understanding of the target audiences. This section identifies audiences from Beijing’s likely perspective, assesses the effects on these audiences from NATO’s likely perspective, and weighs the importance of these effects.

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SPEAKING TO THOSE AT HOME AND ABROAD

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The wider world is not necessarily the PRC’s primary audience. Research suggests that the domestic audience is more important for China. As Šebok and Turcsányi stated in their NATO background paper, “Chinese actors try to follow its leaders’ instructions and wishes, and the Party overall is motivated by a desire to increase legitimacy vis-à-vis the Chinese domestic audience. These factors are increasingly contributing to the uncompromising posture of Chinese diplomacy abroad.” This is consistent with the larger pattern of PRC security policy and resource allocation, which suggests that internal threats to state security and the position of the PRC are higher priorities than foreign threats to the country. The message that outside powers are containing China and ganging up to prevent its rise is becoming more salient as internal questions inevitably arise about how many of China’s economic difficulties might be the result of choices by the current Communist Party leadership.

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The second audience is likely China’s partners, particularly Russia. Despite the negative impact Russia’s war has had on PRC interests (including food price inflation and exposing double standards on questions of national sovereignty), Beijing remains reluctant to appear as an unreliable friend. For Russia, there are potential benefits from reciprocal support on issues where their interests align. Writing presciently two decades ago, international security expert Richard Weitz observed that

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from Moscow’s perspective, periodically joining Beijing to denounce U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation elicits, at minimal cost, Chinese declarations against NATO enlargement and other Western policies the Russian government opposes. The appearance of an embryonic Russian-Chinese united front toward Japan also encourages Tokyo to moderate its claims of sovereignty over the Russian-occupied southern islands of the Kurile chain — Habomai, Shikotan, Etorofu, and Kunashiri, known in Japan as the “Northern Territories.

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Considering Japan has been, as Weitz notes, the target of three treaties between Moscow and Beijing (in 1896, 1924, and 1950), it must be discomforting for Tokyo to observe how “Chinese officials have expressed renewed support for Russia’s position on the Kurile issue.” Russia and Japan both claim sovereignty over the southern chain of the Kuril Islands. Moscow seized them during World War II, but Tokyo views them as Japan’s “Northern Territories.” Given Russia’s current weakened state due to the war with Ukraine and China’s support, Japan may be concerned about Chinese influence over any Moscow-Tokyo negotiations. Ironically, the more Sino-Russian relations align, the clearer it becomes for Asian and Euro-Atlantic partners that they share common security interests.

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The remaining international audience is probably next in terms of importance, particularly the broad segment sometimes described as the “Global South” or the “new nonaligned.” China claims moral leadership over this group of countries (albeit a role contested by India) and seeks to cultivate in this group a worldview that supports its strategic preferences on points such as countering American hegemony. Recent analysis suggests that Beijing invests heavily in messaging to African audiences and Arabic- and Spanish-speaking audiences, and the efforts have been relatively successful.

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WHERE CHINA’S AUDIENCES AND NATO’S INTERESTS INTERSECT

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Although the PRC seems to be giving more attention recently to reaching audiences abroad, when it comes to Euro-Atlantic audiences, its current approach to communications does not appear to be doing much to prevent a general trend of rising suspicion and hostility toward China. From NATO’s perspective, this wider world — particularly those regions where NATO seeks to sustain or develop its global partnerships — is the more important audience. It is when those partnerships happen to be in the Asia-Pacific that PRC narratives seem to come into the most direct conflict with NATO interests. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao has warned, albeit in reference to European enlargement, that “we advise relevant countries to exercise caution when developing relations with NATO.”

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This message may be aimed at impacting support for existing frameworks like the AP4, but also at impeding potentially wider NATO partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region. Some commentators suggest that “what China is really addressing is Southeast Asia and the broader region, and ASEAN [the Association of Southeast Asian Nations] in particular.” India’s preference for nonalignment may not be conducive to implementing the recommendation of the NATO 2030 report that “NATO should begin internal discussions about a possible future partnership with India,” but sooner or later, a NATO more oriented to the challenge of China will naturally look to partner in some form with India.

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From NATO’s perspective, the international audiences most relevant are likely existing and potential Indo-Pacific partners, especially segments of their public and elite who are sympathetic to the anti-imperialistic, anti-Western, and anti-American elements of PRC narratives. These audiences’ opinions have the potential to limit or reduce the willingness of states in the region to work with NATO and its partners.

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The question of how much impact PRC narratives have had to date on regional attitudes toward NATO is hard to judge, not least because it is difficult to find relevant studies or tracking efforts. For NATO policymakers concerned about Asia-Pacific partnerships, this might be a blind spot worth looking into.

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NATO’s Vulnerability

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An obvious NATO vulnerability with respect to PRC narratives is the diversity of views on China within the alliance. NATO allies were able to agree on language about China in the 2022 Strategic Concept, but as the 2022 US National Security Strategy acknowledges, “Allies and partners may have distinct perspectives on the PRC.” For instance, President Joe Biden has repeatedly voiced the United States’ commitment to defending Taiwan if it is attacked, but no other NATO ally has come close to saying this. Also, while the National Security Strategy stresses the need for supply chains that are less dependent on Chinese industry, German chancellor Olaf Scholz conveyed a different message by visiting China with a group of business leaders in November 2022 — the first G-7 leader to visit the country in three years.

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Meanwhile, France has long expressed its wish “to champion a third path in the Indo-Pacific.” In September 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron said, “We must also assert Europe’s independence in the confrontation between China and the United States. . . . We are not willing to have a strategy of confrontation with China in the Indo-Pacific. . . . We do not believe that alliances that have been established to deal with certain opposing interests should extend to the Indo-Pacific.” (Like German chancellor Scholz, President Macron also visited China, in April 2023, with a contingent of business leaders.) The French National Strategic Review 2022 makes it clear that “France is working to strengthen the European pillar of the [NATO] Alliance in a pragmatic approach to its role, which rules out an extension to other geographical areas and in particular the Indo-Pacific.”

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In sum, these different viewpoints indicate a lack of cohesion on China policy among NATO members; and this makes it easier for the PRC to argue that the United States is driving allies into opposition with China against the will and interests of policymakers or sections of their societies who would naturally prefer cooperative relations with Beijing.

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It is unclear whether NATO gives adequate attention to the power of PRC narratives, despite the recommendation of the NATO 2030 report to “enhance its understanding of China’s capabilities, activities, and intentions that affect Euro-Atlantic security, with a clear-eyed understanding of risk, threat, and opportunity.” If NATO officials monitor Chinese discourse, the outputs are not publicized. Any desire to shape narratives in the region does not appear to be matched by funding or capabilities. NATO communication seems to be mostly aimed at internal audiences, with only limited material designed for and directed at Asian partner audiences, let alone Chinese audiences. Although the inclusion of China in NATO’s Strategic Concept is significant, some observers may have expected a more pointed or operationally focused treatment of the PRC. Indeed, little remains of the practical proposals put forward in the NATO 2030 report. This makes one question whether the alliance has been too slow to act on the recommendation that “NATO must devote much more time, political resources, and action to the security challenges posed by China.”

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NATO’s communication in response to the PRC’s actions toward existing or potential NATO partners is not always consistent. As the scholar Jeffrey Michaels noted, NATO has expressed support for partners like Japan and South Korea with regard to their troubles with China and North Korea, but NATO “remained silent” when soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army killed Indian soldiers on their Himalayan frontier in 2020. A NATO communications policy might consider how such instances offer an opportunity to more proactively counter PRC narratives.

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Understandably, at this moment, NATO investment in strategic communications concentrates on Russia. However, it does not appear that the balance of strategic communications resources has been adjusted to make progress on the NATO 2030 report’s recommendations related to the PRC and to respond to the increasing alignment between Moscow and Beijing.

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Limitations of China’s Narratives

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PRC narratives about NATO have their limitations and vulnerabilities, too. Despite the suggestion in the Global Times editorial that “Washington’s strategic will is increasingly coercing and is kidnapping NATO,” the lengthening list of problems in PRC-Europe relations — the causes for which are independent of the US-PRC relationship — make Beijing’s narrative that NATO is merely a tool of American control over Europe harder to sustain. This is evidenced by the demise of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. After the EU imposed sanctions on China over the human rights abuses in the Xinjiang region in China’s northwest in March 2021, Beijing imposed sanctions on EU bodies, European Parliament members, and even think tank researchers.

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The PRC’s barely muted backing of Putin’s war in Ukraine has only clarified the dangers of Chinese foreign policy for Europeans. Beijing’s moves to cement the Sino-Russian bond have a retro look that appears to contradict the taunt that America and NATO are the ones mired in a “Cold War mentality.” The more PRC messages attack NATO, the more they remind their audiences that Beijing is aligned with Moscow. Beijing and Moscow’s “without limits” friendship and the PRC’s consistent parroting of Kremlin talking points throughout the conflict have damaged China’s relations with many countries in the EU. And the PRC’s refusal to condemn the invasion has surely called into question its commitment to the principles of noninterference, peaceful settlement of disputes, and respect for national sovereignty.

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As Ukraine succeeded in pushing back against Russia’s “special military operation” later in 2022, Beijing’s closeness to Moscow exposed some of the flaws in the logic of China’s strategic communications on NATO. China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s flagrant violation of national sovereignty may be a liability in terms of Beijing’s attempts to pose as a champion of peace and international law and UN Charter principles. As Putin switched strategy from regime change to forcible annexation, siding with Russia continued to put the PRC in an ever-diminishing minority in the UN General Assembly, as demonstrated by the October 12 vote on Russia’s annexation of parts of Ukraine — 143 members voted to condemn, 5 voted against, and 35 abstained (including China). If Russia’s war runs into further difficulties, Beijing’s embarrassment is likely to increase. Meanwhile, if NATO allies continue to appear to be alleviating the causes of worldwide repercussions of the war (price rises and shortages of food, fuel, and fertilizer), China will find it increasingly hard to convince the world that it can offer a superior model of security.

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Thinking Ahead and Recommendations

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NATO’s Strategic Concept expresses concern about the resilience of its allies against PRC actions that could undermine the coherence and strength of their societies, economies, and democratic institutions. NATO’s recent research suggests that the most efficient long-term strategy for dealing with PRC narratives “is to bolster the societal resilience of NATO member states and concentrate on shaping their own strategic narratives, which must transcend mere reactions to Chinese actions and offer alternative positive visions.” While the idea of offering alternative positive visions is sound, the alliance should look beyond the resilience of allies and take steps to better understand and, if necessary, neutralize sources of damage to the alliance inflicted via NATO’s partners and partnerships. The success of the Chinese narrative that the inherent right of collective self-defense and the organizations that uphold that right are illegitimate would represent not just a defeat for the principles NATO stands for but also a more general danger for global peace and stability.

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In addition, NATO should pay close attention to the effects of PRC narratives on the perceptions of Chinese citizens. Failure to do so would be shortsighted. It is not self-evident that the perceptions of the Chinese audience are either accurately represented by the messages of the PRC or beyond the influence of outside actors, including NATO’s own strategic communications. Although Sino-NATO relations are at a low today, channels for influence are not entirely foreclosed. On September 22, 2022, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg discussed Russia’s war against Ukraine during talks with Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting in New York. In February 2023, talks between NATO and PRC counterparts restarted after a pause that seemed to have been caused mainly by COVID-related restrictions. Chinese leadership can and will change eventually. NATO should take a long view and use the channels it still has with Chinese officials — and perhaps in a more limited way with ordinary Chinese people — to prepare for a day when the pendulum swings back in a positive direction.

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When it comes to external messages, PRC narratives smear NATO largely as a means of blackening the reputation of the United States and undermining strategically inconvenient norms like the inherent right to collective self-defense, including by China’s neighbors but also by countries in the Global South. The following recommendations therefore focus on that wider audience, where NATO has more immediate interests and influence.

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    NATO should commission a mechanism for analysis, with support from Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic specialists, to estimate the level of threat emanating from Russian and PRC strategic communications in order to guide the allocation of resources toward countering narratives that undermine or attack NATO in each case. The mechanism should dynamically track trends in PRC strategic communications related to NATO. The scope of tracking should go beyond covering the objectives and methods of PRC narratives by measuring the impact and results of PRC communications, based on differentiated audience analysis. Cooperation between the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and nascent counterparts in Asian partner nations may be leveraged to support such a mechanism. Collection of relevant information could be facilitated not just by NATO’s strategic partners in the region, such as the AP4, but also by other friends and partners whose populations are also important targets of influence (for example, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore).

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    After gaining a better understanding through the above measures, NATO should develop a strategic communications strategy that covers the Indo-Pacific, in consultation with the AP4 and other regional partners.

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    NATO should explore efforts to influence opinion in China about the alliance.

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While proposing a NATO communications policy for Asia is beyond the scope of this report, it is possible to suggest some messages that NATO should consider communicating to China and the region more broadly. Some are predicated on a determination of what the alliance wants to accomplish in the Indo-Pacific. The alliance’s objective in the region has not been clearly spelled out. Unlike the European Union and several Euro-Atlantic and Asian nations (for example, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, South Korea, and Japan), NATO has only produced a two-paragraph China policy (in the 2022 Strategic Concept), not an Indo-Pacific strategy.

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Notwithstanding the lack of an overarching strategy document, one major theme of a NATO communications strategy for the Indo-Pacific would likely be upholding the inherent right of states to collective self-defense. This right is a particularly important element of protection for smaller states against aggressive hegemony. Notably, this right exists for all states, not just UN members. It is logical that larger or stronger states seeking to intimidate and bully smaller states would try to attack this right or criticize states that are attempting to activate it by forming alliances or looser political or security associations. Steps should be taken to ensure that Russia and China do not succeed in drawing support to the argument that indivisible security effectively delegitimizes moves to put the right into practice.

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The PRC’s painting of “ganging up” or bloc formation as unnatural and illegitimate aims to discredit a long-standing right under international law that predates the UN Charter. This suggests a hegemonic mindset, which is ironic, considering one of China’s lines of attack against NATO is that it is a thinly veiled hegemonic project by the United States. When it comes to the Asian audience, themes of anti-hegemony and the sovereign equality of small states to larger states enjoy popular support, particularly among populations raised on a postcolonial narrative of national liberation.

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Finally, it may be possible to flip the PRC’s narratives by talking about the alliance more from the experience and perspective of smaller allies — for whom the right of collective self-defense offers the best protection against a large and periodically predatory neighbor. In particular, flipping the narrative about NATO might work best if the message about why the alliance continues to exist and why it seeks common cause with partners around the globe comes from more recent members, such as the Baltic states and central European nations, instead of the larger, longer- term allies.

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Philip Shetler-Jones is a senior research fellow at the International Security Studies Department of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, where he focuses on geopolitical relations in the Indo-Pacific region. Previously, he served as an officer in the UK Royal Marine Commandos; held positions at the United Nations and the European Union; and consulted for NATO, the Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe, the UK Ministry of Defence, and Chatham House.

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N. Korea’s Sanctions-Busting

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North Korea’s Diplomatic Sanctions-Busting Network Adapts to Changing Times

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Daniel Salisbury | 2023.11.22

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Pyongyang’s alleged decision to close around a quarter of its overseas missions reflects both the evolving sanctions-busting landscape and more concerning rapidly shifting geopolitical realities.

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Recently, signs have emerged that North Korea will shrink its diplomatic network. Outposts in Angola, Hong Kong, Spain and Uganda are among “as many as a dozen” missions – a quarter of North Korea’s network of around 50 – that are allegedly slated for closure. As well as assuming more traditional diplomatic functions, North Korea’s missions have played a wider range of roles in support of the country’s national interests, and have grown in importance as Pyongyang struggles with economic isolation and the extensive UN sanctions regime.

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As I outlined in a RUSI report published last year, North Korea’s embassies, consulates, trade offices and representative missions to international organisations – and the diplomats and intelligence officers that reside there – have played key roles in procuring technology for, and funding, Pyongyang’s nuclear, missile and military programmes. The closure of these missions likely reflects both a tactical-level evolution in North Korea’s sanctions-busting efforts as well as shifting geopolitical realities, with more strategic-level implications for the UN sanctions regime.

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From the Missions to the Missiles

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North Korea’s missions have been key nodes in its sanctions-busting efforts, providing the skeleton of a near-global presence that has been used extensively to undertake and support operations. These sanctions-busting roles have fallen into three main categories. First, the missions and the diplomats stationed there are involved in revenue-raising and – given that the revenue raised likely benefits North Korea’s weapons programmes – “proliferation financing”.

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This has included trade in sanctioned commodities, with diplomats supporting sanctioned coal and vanadium exports. Diplomats have also run overseas businesses and raised revenue by leasing diplomatic real estate or even by abusing diplomatic alcohol allowances. One of the most prevalent revenue-raising activities for North Korea has been arms sales. Representatives of North Korea’s arms-dealing entities have frequently been accredited as diplomats.

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Second, Pyongyang’s diplomats have acted as buyers, procuring a wide range of sanctioned goods for import to North Korea. Most concerningly, embassies and diplomatic networks have long procured technology for the country’s weapons programmes, with the embassies in Beijing, Berlin and Moscow being particularly active in this regard. In Moscow, a member of the Office of the Commercial Counsellor – a diplomat named O Yong Ho – sought to procure a range of goods for North Korea’s missile programmes, including aramid fibre, manufacturing equipment, a spinning nozzle, chemicals and stainless steel used in missile fuel production and the construction of submarine hulls. In 2018, a senior German intelligence official noted that the embassy in Berlin had been repeatedly used to acquire missile and nuclear-related technologies, many of which were so-called dual-use technologies of utility in civil and weapons programmes.

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Diplomats have also been involved in the procurement of intangible technologies – sensitive knowledge, information and even weapons designs. In 2011, representatives from North Korea’s Belarus Trade Office were caught in a sting operation seeking sensitive missile-related information in Ukraine. Additionally, in 2019, O Yong Ho procured CAD drawings for a Russian cruise missile. Diplomatic procurement efforts also involve much more benign goods – sanctioned luxury items and other commodities – which are scarce in North Korea and help maintain the court economy.

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North Korea’s missions have been key nodes in its sanctions-busting efforts, providing the skeleton of a near-global presence that has been used to undertake and support operations

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Third, the missions and their occupants have provided support to North Korea’s overseas business networks through providing use of bank accounts, hosting banking representatives, moving funds and even providing logistical support. As the UN Panel of Experts that monitors North Korea sanctions implementation noted in a 2017 report, Pyongyang’s missions “open accounts that, in effect, perform the services that a financial institution would”. Elsewhere, diplomats have smuggled gold and precious metals as a means of moving funds. Missions have also been closely connected to North Korea’s shipping networks.

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Missions Slated for Closure

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Personnel based at two of the missions slated for closure – those in Angola and Uganda –have been heavily involved in sanctioned activities. More recently, North Korea’s relationship with Angola – which dates to the early 1970s – has seen the embassy in Luanda host Pyongyang’s arms dealers. Two diplomats, who were concurrently acting as representatives of North Korean arms dealer Green Pine Associated Corporation, travelled from Angola to Sri Lanka multiple times to discuss Pyongyang’s refurbishment of naval patrol vessels between 2014 and 2016. One of these Green Pine representatives concurrently negotiated contracts, sourced parts and oversaw the refurbishment of the Angolan navy’s own patrol boats. North Korean business in the country also went beyond military equipment. The UN-sanctioned entity Mansudae Overseas Projects undertook 56 construction projects in Angola up until 2015, including the mausoleum that holds the remains of the country’s first president.

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According to the UN Panel, a Military Attaché and diplomats based at the embassy in Kampala, Uganda, oversaw North Korean training of Ugandan air force pilots, technicians and police between 2017 and 2018. Showcasing how North Korean diplomats operate transnationally, the Attaché – a Colonel in the Korean People’s Army – was described in correspondence as the representative of the North Korean armed forces in “Uganda and East Africa” and offered neighbouring South Sudan “Presidential Guard and special forces training” and “tank crew training” while based in Kampala.

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There is less evidence of sanctions-busting activities by the North Korean Consulate in Hong Kong, a third mission which currently looks slated for closure. However, the axis between the city and Macau has seen significant North Korean connections over the years. North Korea long sought to open a trade office in Hong Kong and to commence Air Koryo flights to the city while it was under British rule and prior to the Consulate opening in 1998. More recently, as research by RUSI’s OSIA research group has noted, Hong Kong and businesses there have been a crucial node in the networks undertaking illegal oil shipments to North Korea. The role of Hong Kong businesses in selling high-end chips as part of Russia’s illicit supply chains for military electronics also suggests that North Korea could usefully shop in the city.

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Adaptation in North Korea’s Networks

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Given the range of sanctions-busting activities that North Korean embassies have conducted, the closure of as many as a dozen missions at once is surprising. These steps come as Pyongyang is reopening to the world following nearly three years of Covid-19-induced border closures. They showcase adaptation in North Korea’s sanctions-busting networks in real time – a result of several shaping factors.

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The decision may have a cost-saving rationale. North Korea’s missions are allegedly self-financing, raising hard currency to cover their own operations and sending all surpluses back to Pyongyang. Perhaps these specific missions are not as profitable as they once were. Indeed, both the Angolan and Ugandan governments have taken steps to reduce their connections to North Korea since the mid-2010s. In early 2020, Angola repatriated almost 300 North Korean workers, many of them working in the medical sector. Uganda allegedly cut military ties with Pyongyang around 2016, but subsequent reports suggest cooperation continued past that date.

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Other diplomatic missions and actors can likely pick up the slack when these missions close, and potentially in a more cost-effective way. Nearby remaining missions may be designated by Pyongyang to provide coverage for business activities in these jurisdictions, just as the mission in Rome will provide diplomatic coverage in Spain following the closure of the mission in Madrid. North Korea’s diplomatic arms dealers in Africa already operate across borders, and representatives may be tasked to widen their remit.

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The open violation of the sanctions on Pyongyang by Russia could have a serious knock-on effect for the sanctions regime more broadly

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Other actors – those without diplomatic accreditation – may also pick up the slack. Indeed, diplomats may have a declining importance in North Korea’s sanctions-busting. Previously, as states around the world became hostile to North Korean business activities, diplomatic networks became more important. Diplomats had several “competitive advantages” over private individuals, largely stemming from the immunities and privileges afforded by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Diplomats cannot be arrested, and diplomatic properties and vehicles cannot be searched.

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However, efforts to recognise and address diplomatic sanctions-busting have intensified since 2016. Despite far-from-universal sanctions implementation, North Korea’s missions now likely attract interest from South Korean, Western and other intelligence agencies around the world. The use of local or third-country nationals, or indeed third-country passports obtained by North Koreans, could provide Pyongyang with less obvious means of conducting business than using diplomatic cover.

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Concurrently, newer sanctions-busting opportunities are likely more profitable than those facilitated by the missions. Although Pyongyang is not in a position to be picky over its revenue streams, the $1.7 billion of cryptocurrency stolen by North Korea-linked hackers in 2022, and the millions that can be gained remotely through IT outsourcing, likely far eclipse the amounts that can be generated by small-scale arms sales or construction contracts in sub-Saharan Africa.

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Indeed, recent geopolitical shifts may also provide more bountiful opportunities. North Korea’s normalising relationship with Russia, its alleged transfer of hundreds of containers of weaponry to support Moscow’s war in Ukraine, and the potential for other commercial opportunities may see North Korea’s diplomacy and energy more focused on this relationship. The open violation of the sanctions on Pyongyang by Russia – a UN Security Council permanent member which voted for the measures – could have a serious knock-on effect for the sanctions regime more broadly and its implementation around the world.

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Tactical Adaptation and Strategic Gloom

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Beyond their overt diplomatic function, North Korea’s missions and diplomats are persistent participants in – and coordinators holding together – the dark sanctions-busting economy that has kept the Kim regime afloat through almost two decades of sanctions.

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North Korea’s closure of many its missions reflects both tactical and strategic-level developments. The closures represent the tactical adaptation of North Korea’s networks, with the missions in question likely not as profitable as they used to be, and with new and more “remote-working” sanctions-busting operations perhaps proving more lucrative.

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However, strategic-level developments – notably Russia’s willingness to re-engage with North Korea – also help to account for Pyongyang’s declining need for these assets. The economic benefits of Russia’s arms purchases and broader re-engagement could far surpass the meagre revenue that can be raised through the missions slated for closure. Concerningly, this shift – and North Korea’s changing diplomatic priorities – also reflects a gloomy outlook for the UN sanctions regime.

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Daniel Salisbury is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is currently undertaking a three-year research project on arms embargos as part of a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship.

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N. Korea’s Sanctions-Busting

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Daniel Salisbury | 2023.11.22
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Pyongyang’s alleged decision to close around a quarter of its overseas missions reflects both the evolving sanctions-busting landscape and more concerning rapidly shifting geopolitical realities.

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