From a78e53d2a1fa596616483d53cd2a686613c38db7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: theagora <agoradao@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2022 15:14:08 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/9] 0x16 Archive past _heros posts in _0x15

---
 ...09-08-04-LeoTolstoy-a1_c-speech-in-stockholm-peace-congress.md | 0
 ...019-10-27-PhilosophicalSociety-a1_l-the-general-equivalence.md | 0
 ...-JairoMonterojo-a1_r-why-we-oppose-nato-sanctions-on-russia.md | 0
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 rename _collections/_heros/{ => _0x15}/1909-08-04-LeoTolstoy-a1_c-speech-in-stockholm-peace-congress.md (100%)
 rename _collections/_heros/{ => _0x15}/2019-10-27-PhilosophicalSociety-a1_l-the-general-equivalence.md (100%)
 rename _collections/_heros/{ => _0x15}/2022-07-26-JairoMonterojo-a1_r-why-we-oppose-nato-sanctions-on-russia.md (100%)

diff --git a/_collections/_heros/1909-08-04-LeoTolstoy-a1_c-speech-in-stockholm-peace-congress.md b/_collections/_heros/_0x15/1909-08-04-LeoTolstoy-a1_c-speech-in-stockholm-peace-congress.md
similarity index 100%
rename from _collections/_heros/1909-08-04-LeoTolstoy-a1_c-speech-in-stockholm-peace-congress.md
rename to _collections/_heros/_0x15/1909-08-04-LeoTolstoy-a1_c-speech-in-stockholm-peace-congress.md
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2019-10-27-PhilosophicalSociety-a1_l-the-general-equivalence.md b/_collections/_heros/_0x15/2019-10-27-PhilosophicalSociety-a1_l-the-general-equivalence.md
similarity index 100%
rename from _collections/_heros/2019-10-27-PhilosophicalSociety-a1_l-the-general-equivalence.md
rename to _collections/_heros/_0x15/2019-10-27-PhilosophicalSociety-a1_l-the-general-equivalence.md
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2022-07-26-JairoMonterojo-a1_r-why-we-oppose-nato-sanctions-on-russia.md b/_collections/_heros/_0x15/2022-07-26-JairoMonterojo-a1_r-why-we-oppose-nato-sanctions-on-russia.md
similarity index 100%
rename from _collections/_heros/2022-07-26-JairoMonterojo-a1_r-why-we-oppose-nato-sanctions-on-russia.md
rename to _collections/_heros/_0x15/2022-07-26-JairoMonterojo-a1_r-why-we-oppose-nato-sanctions-on-russia.md

From 48fa940776c9d64f8bb8f6ad6735277887a87cc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: theagora <agoradao@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2022 15:15:12 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 2/9] 0x16 Init commit _heros posts

---
 ...se-a1_l-dimensions-of-chinese-anarchism.md | 103 ++++++
 ...o-a1_c-rejectionary-anarchist-critiques.md | 316 ++++++++++++++++++
 ...22-10-09-Initium-a1_r-memory-is-freedom.md | 204 +++++++++++
 3 files changed, 623 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 _collections/_heros/2003-02-16-ChuckMorse-a1_l-dimensions-of-chinese-anarchism.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_heros/2013-10-09-Echo-a1_c-rejectionary-anarchist-critiques.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_heros/2022-10-09-Initium-a1_r-memory-is-freedom.md

diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2003-02-16-ChuckMorse-a1_l-dimensions-of-chinese-anarchism.md b/_collections/_heros/2003-02-16-ChuckMorse-a1_l-dimensions-of-chinese-anarchism.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/2003-02-16-ChuckMorse-a1_l-dimensions-of-chinese-anarchism.md
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title:  "中国无治主义观察"
+author: "查克·莫尔斯"
+date:   2003-02-16 12:00:00 +0800
+image:  https://i.imgur.com/qWaXmim.png
+#image_caption: ""
+description:   ""
+position: left
+---
+
+1905-1930年间，中国无治主义人士广泛影响了当时中国文化和政治领域。他们是这时期兴起的社会激进主义运动的中坚力量。他们的活动为后来几十年中国革命运动的发展刻下了不可磨灭的印记。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+德力克（Arif Dirlik）是为数不多的研究中国无治主义运动的英文论著学者之一。他在报章专栏和许多著作中发表过这方面的分析，其中最著名的有《中国革命历程中的无治主义》（Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution）。他还写过文章就激进政治和理论的现代困惑进行了探索。
+
+1997年5月19日，我采访了德力克先生。我的提问主要包括中国的无治主义，作为高校激进社会理论家的个人经历，以及他今后的研究工作计划。
+
+_问：大多数无治主义历史论著通常是先阐述无治主义思想原则，然后介绍身体力行这些原则的人的实践经历。您在《中国革命历程中的无治主义》一文中却采用了不同的方式。您认为中国无治主义人士集主体和客体于一身，他们既是广义中国革命运动进程的产物，又扮演雕琢缔造者的角色。您在论文中追溯了无治主义人士和革命运动之间的这种互动关系。为什么选择这样的演绎？是否中国无治主义人士确有其特点？还是它反映了您个人在广义研究方法上的一种取向？_
+
+答：是后面一个原因。我认为应该从历史的高度观察各种理念，思想论说或政治立场。在研究某个论说时，如果事先用理论原则设定框架，有可能会导致违反历史过程的推断。换句话说，你确定了理论原则，好像它们具有四海古今皆准的可行性，然后套用它们来分析具体个人。我认为这种方法使人们得出违反历史客观的判断，导致了我们都熟悉的“谁是谁不是真正的无治主义者”，或者“谁是谁不是真正的马克思主义者”等等说法。
+
+用这种方法，人们不可避免会想到“原教旨”这个极负面的问题。对知识界和政治界，它都是一个负面作用的概念。它还导致了某些宗派的产生。因为它提出了一个“真伪”的问题，却忽视了客观历史的演变。所以说，我这样演绎和中国的无治主义运动特征并无关系，而是我个人对历史和理论的知识取向。
+
+
+_问：与察尔（Peter Zarrow）先生写的《无治主义与中国政治文化》（Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture）一文不同的是，您并不强调道教和佛教对中国的无治主义思想建设的影响。为什么？_
+
+答：这里有一个方法论的问题。长期以来有一种把中国发生的所有新事物归功于中国传统的偏向，我更倾向于称之为“东方主义倾向”。这等于说中国从未发生过什么真正意义上的新事物，那里所有的现象都可以从中国传统中找到解释。
+
+我对这种中国历史论的观点是持怀疑态度的。不管大家承认与否，我认为中国社会和其他任何社会一样是不断发展变化的。我不愿意盲目地将中国兴起的无治主义，或马克思主义，或任何新理论归因于这个或那个中国传统。
+
+问题是中国传统过往以来被用来解释一切，从共产主义，马克思主义到无治主义。近来还流行用传统来解释中国发生的资本主义现象。当传统作为一种概念可以用来解释如此众多不同而且相互矛盾的现象时，我不知道这样的解释是否站得住脚。
+
+我是在研究社会革命理念的起源时开始接触到中国无治主义的。我认为它在当时的中国是一个激进和全新的概念。或许它中间有道教、佛教甚至通过托尔斯泰带去的基督教思想的影子。然而我关注的主要是中国知识界通过对无治主义理论的认识得到的各种新观念，其中主要就有社会革命的理念。因此，我觉得强调这一点有助于解释它的某些特征。
+
+另外，我们必须注意区分的是，历史对于现时的规定性（或限定性）作用并不等于把历史视作一个思想宝库可以从中抽提现成东西对付任何现今的问题。毫无疑问，某些中国无治主义人士确实受到过道学和佛学的启示，比如当时最有影响力的刘师培以及石富（Shi Fu）。但这并不是说道教和佛教奠定和构筑了中国的无治主义，它应该是一个双向作用的过程。换句话说，无治主义理念有助于他们从新解读中国的传统思想，相反地，也有一个从道教和佛教理念视角解读无治主义的事实。对我来讲重要的是这种互动作用。我不赞同一种观点说中国人多少无意识地受到这个或那个传统思想的支配然后形成了他们对无治主义的认识。
+
+
+_问：您说过中国民族主义的兴起实际上为无治主义引入中国创造了很多理论和政治条件。这个观点乍看来似乎有些矛盾。您如何解释？_
+
+答：其实这是我个人对民族主义的特殊理解。民族主义表现出来的负面问题显然是令人担忧的，但实际上最初时它却是一个相对比较激进的理念。当时它提出了全新的国家概念，全新的国家舆社会关系的概念，以及公民政治角色的新构思。从这个意义上讲，它彻底抛弃了早先那种认同王权合法性甘愿接受消极政治子民角色的觉悟形式，反其行之要求公民积极地参预政治。除了公民问题之外，民族主义还就国家和社会关系提出了一套社会规则的新观念，谁应该参预政治，符合怎样条件的人可以参预政治，哪些因素会抗拒阻碍政治参预等等。正如我在书中提到的，从某种意义上说，这些改变直接引入了社会革命的问题。
+
+中国的情况还有一个因素。历史巧合让民族主义意识和且称之为超国家的新型乌托邦主义同时出现在中国。这样就好象是说，国家建设成为首要任务，但却不是最终目的；建立国家和稳定的社会秩序后，将来还要有一个超越民族主义的问题。
+
+说来确实有些诡秘。我记得在书中称之为民族主义的反衬点。假如你还记得，书中关于刘师培的一段明显反映了无治主义人士之间的分歧。当时有人就感觉到民族主义提出的新问题虽然为无治主义铺垫了基础，但同时也带来了新的威胁。比如说，刘师培等人就准确看到了一点：相对皇权社会的专制君主理论而言，民族主义对于社会的渗透性要有力和强烈的多。就这一点说，无治主义却是反对渗透性民族主义社会而宣称坚持社会自治的。
+
+虽然我不希望过于推而广之，但如此认识民族主义可能为我们研究另外一些现象时提供一个有效的思考方法。也就是说，民族主义曾经代表了新的政治形式，提出了新问题，要求新的解决办法，以及它对社会主义和无治主义的兴起有过一定推动作用。也许不仅仅在中国是这样。
+
+
+_问：克鲁泡特金（Kroptkin）的理论被认为是与其他无治主义理论相对立的。是什么特殊原因使得克鲁泡特金思想在当时的中国显得特别有感召力或影响力？_
+
+答：可能有两个原因。第一，整个克氏无治主义理论围绕的一个中心议题是关于变革社会的工程计划，而社会革命问题正是中国激进人士当时最关注的焦点。从这里就可以看到为什么他们会感到克氏理论比较其它无治主义理论更加贴切相关。另外一个有趣的原因是中国知识界在世纪转换初时极其重视社会达尔文主义。当时中国的社会达尔文主义者几乎全盘接纳了欧美关于所谓循进发展社会的思想，认为一个社会之所以循进发展，是因为在生存的冲突中它是胜者，从而进一步得出，在这样一个竞争和冲突的新世界里，谁失败了，谁就要灭亡。美洲印第安人和非洲人的遭遇使当时的中国人特别担忧。有些中国人坚信这两个被他们称之为黑种人和红种人的族群注定要完全消失。
+
+因此，面对这场新世界的斗争，中国必需强盛起来，可是这个基于冲突论的世界认识观有一个缺点，就是它展现的不是一个令人满意的世界。这时他们发现克鲁泡特金的理论提出，有益于人类进步的并不是冲突和竞争，而是社团互助。这为中国知识分子提供了一个极有说服力的反论，同时它也应合了我上面提到的他们对乌托邦的内心趋向。
+
+
+_问：克鲁泡特金和瑞可勒斯（Reclus）对中国无治主义人士来说非常重要，但他们两位同时也有明显的欧洲中心主义的思想倾向，至少表现在他们的世界历史认识观上。中国无治主义人士是否注意到这点，或者有意试图开辟另一条途径？_
+
+答：我不认为是这样。当时在巴黎的中国无治主义人士对这点并没有太在意。从克氏和瑞氏二人和东京人的来往方式上看不到他们提到亚洲或中国时有任何欧洲中心论的表述。
+
+虽然现时我们对欧洲中心主义非常敏感，但巴黎的中国无治主义人士比任何当时在欧洲的人都更深切地体会到什么是中国传统。有人提出要进行一场反孔革命。可以说，对欧洲的认识提高了他们拒绝和否定中国传统落后于欧洲现状的激情。
+
+我觉得刘师培的情况有些不同，他对中国历史的评价是很高的。而且托尔斯太对他可能有重大影响。刘师培反对的并不是欧洲，他的论点主要是针对欧洲人代表的新型政治观和经济发展思想提出的。
+
+
+_问：反对满清政府的革命大联盟曾暗示过一种反满州人的种族主义立场。中国的无治主义人士对此的反对态度非常坚决。这是否反映了他们有意建立一个无治主义的种族观念？_
+
+答：我没有观察到任何这方面的意向。我认为他们之所以反对这种反满族主义是因为他们觉得它偏离了重要的政治主题。换一句说话，问题不在于满州，而在集权化的国家政治制度，在这个前提下，种族歧视作为一个议题的提出本身偏离了国家这个根本性问题。
+
+
+_问：在欧美，女权主义和无治主义的关系一直是不很融洽和复杂的，但中国的无治主义表面上看来似乎是和女权主义和谐相容的，而且从来没有成为无治主义运动中的一个争议性问题。女权主义如此轻易地融合于中国的无治主义运动，这是为什么？_
+
+答：回答这个问题前，我想先澄清一下女性问题和女权主义这两个不同的概念。把中国无治主义人士，包括何珍（He Zhen）等人，描述成女权主义者是多少有些误导的：很符合当前的时髦，但我的观点是，当时的关注焦点与其说是某项明确的女权主义议程，不如说是女性受压迫的问题。
+
+这么说吧，无治主义人士在涉及妇女问题时，话题几乎总是由家庭这个压迫机制引起。他们始终对这个问题非常关切，由此我认为是家庭问题的检讨带入了这个在1920年代受到中国社会广泛关注的妇女问题。
+
+
+_问：您写过这样的话：您希望重温和检讨中国无治主义的历史能够有利于一个更加民主的社会主义制度的出现或者说重现。您是否有意参预无治主义运动的再次振兴或卷土重来？_
+
+答：当我开始研究中国无治主义运动时，我已感觉到无治主义从广泛意义上说有重新兴起的迹象。当时我希望把书写这本书作为对它的一种贡献。到80年代中国革命目标承诺的告终失败越来越明显时，我发现无治主义为它的错失为何提供了一个很有意义的批判性透视景象。而且，无治主义思想实在充满了珍贵而深刻的观点理念，让它重放光彩并将它引入论坛前台自然是极有意义的事。
+
+
+_问：您毫不隐讳自己是中国革命运动研究的激进学者，而且在美国一间资本主义高等学府的世界帝国主义研究中心任全职教授。您如何会被这样环境接受？您是否受到过任何压力让您的工作比较非政治化或者非激进化？如果没有，这种学府和激进社会批判人士之间的关系说明了什么？_
+
+答：矛盾重重啊（笑）……没有，我从来没有受到过来自工作上的压力要我中和政治倾向。如果说有什么压力的话，那也是间接的；您知道，当有人问你：“你在研究什么？”如果我回答：“我正在写一本关于中国无治主义的书”，这时他们通常会说的只有：“哦”。让你感到你在做一件边缘性工作或是在玩游戏。这种压力我不在乎。
+
+我觉得我还是很幸运的。你知道，我的一些朋友因为是激进人士吃过苦。在薪水或类似事情上会有微小的歧视迹象，但我不肯定是应该把它归咎于我是一个激进学者，还是由于我来自第三世界的原因。也许有多种原因。
+
+人们常常忘记精英学府格外需要激进人士这样一个事实。因为精英学府致力于传播给学生尽可能广博的知识面，使得他们能够在社会上发挥运作，不允许他们培养出来的人是学识狭隘不知马克思主义或无治主义为何物的无知二流人物。这也许是为什么精英学府比无名大学更能容忍激进人士的原因。这就是我在说“矛盾重重”时脑海里想到的？
+
+从某种意义上说，这也是美国教育制度的强势所在。相比之下，中国教育制度把一切政治不利的东西拒于门外，导致的结果是培养出来的大批人除了填塞给他们的思想意识之外对世界一无所知。我们这里的控制方法要巧妙得多，在目前的情势下，只要你不是活动分子，不会有严重的处罚。
+
+我们这里的权力架构非常机智。比如十年前，中央情报局有人来找我。他们是来学校招募人员的，而且特别对我的学生感兴趣，因为他们发现这些学生了解马克思主义，无治主义等等，如果你需要精辟明智的分析人员，他们必需博学多才，对这些问题有认识。我想这是这里的权力机构和中国或前苏联机构的不同之处，他们那里不受认可的知识就被仍到一边，而不是被利用起来全面地了解世界。
+
+
+_问：您刚刚出版了一本关于后殖民主义的书叫做《后殖民主义气氛》（The Postcolonial Aura）。这本书和你的中国无治主义研究有什么联系？还有，请您解释一下您关于后殖民主义和后革命时代的讨论。_
+
+答：在《后殖民主义气氛》中，我试图讨论第三世界知识分子的问题。近来有很多关于欧洲中心论以及欧美对其它世界压迫的关注，却忽略了塑造今日世界过程中资本主义的重要性，忽略了这些受到质疑的欧美价值观很多实际上是通过资本主义被传输到世界各地的事实。在我看来，就资本主义被全球化来说，这个全球化过程得以实现的帮凶是第三世界的知识分子，专业人员，国家等等，因此对权力和权威的批判仅仅局限于批判欧洲中心论或欧美对世界的操控是不完全的，还应该包括检讨第三世界知识分子，专业人员，国家，权力机构等等。这是我写这本书的目的。
+
+至于后革命时代问题，它源于我对后殖民主义概念的历史好奇：世界进入后殖民主义至今已有一段时间了，为什么到1980年代末期它变得对我们如此具有时代感？说到底，在60年代激进运动风起云涌时，多数第三世界国家已经是后殖民了，或摆脱殖民统治胜利在望了，可当时出现了持续的激进主义运动，而1980或1990年代却没有发生。接下来的问题就是：差别在哪里？现时如今这里发生了什么？为什么突然大家都在讨论后殖民主义？而不是殖民主义，操控或资本主义等等？
+
+最受大众瞩目的流行倾向，尤其在美国，是对种族，对种族内部关系，政治身份特性等等概念的专注焦虑，并趋于质疑甚至拒绝团体身份的可能性。对我来说，没有团体身份意识的政治活动是没有太大意义的，尤其是革命运动。正是团体身份概念的削弱丧失，以及上面提到的环境，使我坚信我们面临的不仅仅是后殖民时代，而且是一个后革命时代。
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2013-10-09-Echo-a1_c-rejectionary-anarchist-critiques.md b/_collections/_heros/2013-10-09-Echo-a1_c-rejectionary-anarchist-critiques.md
new file mode 100644
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@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title:  "抗拒性无治主义批判"
+author: "回音"
+date:   2013-10-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image:  https://i.imgur.com/mnETqqU.jpg
+image_caption: "抗拒你想抗拒的一切，哪怕它就在本文当中。"
+description:   ""
+position: center
+---
+
+无治主义者们常常在很多事情上闹翻：如何组织（或不组织）、哪些行动（或不行动），甚至什么是他们的终极目标。
+
+够了！咱要无治！
+
+不要把这当成是团结无治主义者的号召，无论佢们是左翼或后左翼，甚至是那些以无治主义闪亮榜样呈现在我们眼前的自由主义“无治主义者”们。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+相反，这恰是号召团结的反面。这是号召抗拒。我们不需要团结，相反，我们需要辨别并剖析等级制理论，去除使之飘忽的一切，然后重组之，以便为我们所用。
+
+这便是抗拒性无治主义。
+
+我们可能会把这个当成无治主义者的常识，因为佢们反对等级。不过，我们（包括我自己）经常犯下不便过问而人云亦云的错误。“这个理论抬高部分人凌驾于他人之上了吗？”或者“这个理论有益于我吗？我的朋友？我的社群？”
+
+如果抬高任何人（不管是多数还是少数）而使之高人一等，那么这理论从本质上就是等级制的，因为有的人被定为“更重要”而被赋予得势与压迫的权力，而那些被当成“不重要”的人则被剥夺以致遭受压迫。
+
+这是我们必当永不团结的原因，我们必当永不全盘接受被安排。
+
+一些人可能会说这是对自我理论的“再创”，佢们说对了一部分。然而，这和宣扬自我理论之间的区别在于抗拒性无治主义不再接受任何一个主义了。这意味追求完美理论可能永无止境。每个理论都有缺点，它们中大多数都包涵着某种形式的等级制——不管是有利于资本统治所有人的选择资产阶级统治无产阶级的资本主义，还是有利于资本仍统治所有人的无产阶级统治资产阶级的无产阶级专政。
+
+这就是每个理论都必须处于永恒的动态当中，致力去除自身疑难与缺陷的原因。它永远不会完美，因为它总会有些等级制或者一些防不胜防的弱点，但是关键在于去持续地改变它，直到你无法从中发现弱点；在于持续检视它、并把它传给他人批判它改变它；在于邀请你的同志来批判它从而让你仍能继续改变它；在于假如经过所有这些发现了它的无效，便抛开它并重新开始。
+
+要弄明白的一点是，这不是让你去接受的理论——很明显，这般行动是与之相悖的。而我则相反，把它想成一个引导你去发展自己的自我理论的指南，让你有幸实现你自己的自由，而非被什么人强加给的“你的自由”。
+
+我已概述了源于我称为“抗拒性无治主义”的结论。这些结论将欢迎他人来批判，解构，或者最好是抗拒我的理论。这些理论在很多方面上和其他例如Wolfi Landstreicher和Alfredo M. Bonanno等深刻影响我的无治主义者的理论完全一致，毕竟我化用了佢们的观点。但这并不意味着我相信佢们的观点是完美无暇的，我只在特定话题上同意佢们。所以这里有一部分是我的原创思想，其他则是我对他人理论的理解。
+
+我想给这篇文章一个小提要，让人可以跳到不同章节、了解预期内容。我提出的所有批判与论述将基于展现为什么我反对的事物是等级制、压迫性的，或者它们如何错判压迫。首先，我将批判资本，及其左翼观点。随后，我将批判经济，不论共产主义或资本主义。解构批判经济后，我将批判工作。我也计划批判国家的观点。随后，我将解释为什么我相信一切组织，哪怕是革命组织，都本质上是压迫性的，而这则又引向对所有文明的批判。最后，我将就压迫究竟是什么上提出我的观点。文章一小节将用于讨论身分政治。之后，会对意识形态做一些讨论。然后，我会提出一些我之于无治主义是什么的见解。
+
+让我们开始吧。
+
+
+### 消灭资本
+
+这里我只讨论资本的眼前问题，但在整篇文章中我会解释压迫的每个组成部分如何与压迫的对立面关联起来。
+
+左翼对资本有非常明确的概念，反过来则让佢们确定谁被压迫、谁没被压迫。左翼相信无产阶级是被压迫者，而任何其他斗争在阶级斗争面前都是次要的。
+
+这一切都源自且指向我相信是对资本的片面理解。举个例子，让我们检视一下左翼的结论以便推导出佢们的假设。首先，佢们以资本来定义压迫（或者相反，佢们认为无产阶级为控制资本所做的斗争是最重要的斗争，所有其他形式的压迫全都让位于阶级压迫）。如果你不控制资本，那么你就是无产阶级一员，于是你在阶级术语上正遭受压迫。
+
+当然，无产阶级是遭受阶级压迫的，但其原因则与左翼提出的略有不同。
+
+左翼的方法似乎有一条明确的路线：被压迫的阶级必须掌控资本。左翼或多或少把最终目标想成让所有人控制资本，不过佢们是否凭借国家，某种过渡期，甚至直接达到这一步，佢们都想让每个人都有资本在手。这点可以从马克思和Jules Guesde在其文献记录《The Programme of the Parti Ouvrier》中的言论看出：“生产者只有在掌握生产资料时才是自由的”。这明确证明了马克思主义者把资本的所有权视作无产阶级自由的条件。但是左翼无治主义者又怎么想呢？
+
+在克鲁泡特金的《面包与自由》（La Conquête du Pain／The Conquest of Bread）的一个章节当中有个例子，他在那章说道大众是贫乏的，“......因为生产所需的一切——土地，矿产，公路，食物，处所，教育，知识——全都被极少数人掌握着......”我想这里需要指出的是，克鲁泡特金被视为无治共产主义之父。
+
+这两股独立的左翼流派都得出资本是通往自由的关键，这点显示左翼们觉得为达成无产阶级的自由，资本必须被控制。
+
+现在看，这个结论表面上是自恰的。如果所有人都能接触并掌控资本，就没有人能压迫任何人了。这似乎好得面面俱到。
+
+现在，忽略掉这个（会在整篇文章里不时出现的）想法的其他后果，我们转向一个问题：那些我们之中不想继续再做奴隶，在资本下工作的人呢？那些我们之中想要自由的人呢？
+
+很多人会马上把“在革命之后，工人掌控资本之后，佢们仍是资本的奴隶”抛诸脑后。
+
+但是，事实就是这样。左翼对阶级压迫的回答有个问题——如果有人选择不在资本底下工作，佢们会因不再为生产商品工作而遭受压迫。相反，如果佢们乐意在家外工作——当作玩乐——且仍然有产出；佢们将会被当作不为社群福祉工作而得不到社群帮助，并可能就此死去。资本提供着强制工作，因而压迫着工人，让佢们无法选择放弃工作。如果这么做，佢们会被视作没有完成必需工作量。
+
+必需工作量这个概念从何而来的呢？
+
+我们能从许多左翼思想家的观点里找到这个概念。克鲁泡特金在《面包与自由》里多次表明工人只需每天工作4到5个小时，然后就可以获准休憩（玩乐）时间。
+
+这强制劳动不是几乎和巴枯宁的奴隶制概念如出一辙吗？你有必需工作量意味着有人必须强迫你去完成它，而这强迫一方最有可能就是社群本身。
+
+有人可能会说，“资本在如共产主义般的后资本主义社会怎么会直接意味着强制劳动？社群为什么会强制个人去工作？”
+
+这是因为资本选择了统治阶级和服务阶级（这个主题会在几个章节里详细解释）。共产主义下，资本完好无损地留存着，而无产阶级则身兼统治阶级和服务阶级（注意，“统治阶级”并不意味着佢们统治着资本和其他从属阶级，相反，佢们从属于资本，并统治着其他从属阶级）。我们于是可以推断：社群会统治个人以让佢们工作，并把这当成是在确保所有人都和社群中人工作得一样多，让佢们自己觉着平等；社群就是一群强制执行“所有人都得和佢们一样达成必需工作量”这一想法的人。
+
+如果工人决定蔑视资本的重要性，就像佢们认定它要为佢们所受压迫直接负责那样，佢们便不再能从允许“生产资料”支配自己生命的行为中获利了。而这利并非真的利益，相反，它单纯只是个获准，其内容为“获准你活下去”。然而，工人是被获准作为奴隶而活着，而这活法在许多层面上就是生命之缺失。
+
+佢们选择不向资本卑躬屈膝，资本便选择夺走佢们的生命。
+
+这就是资本在左翼体制里如何无法受控制的例子，比如“左翼共产主义”（我把这个词用来区分左翼所提倡的共产主义和后左翼所提倡的我称为“后左翼共产主义”的共产主义）。现在，让我们看一看在当今的资本主义体制，资本为什么无法受控制。
+
+左翼们说，资产阶级控制了资本，而佢们又压迫无产阶级以增加自己的利润。那么，如果无产阶级不去崇拜资本并且不为商品生产工作时，佢们就会挨饿。
+
+很明显，无产阶级没有控制资本；不过我们再来观察资产阶级：“佢们控制着资本”这一观念截然有悖于“佢们必须向资本卑躬屈膝”这一观念。
+
+我相信佢们必定如此。当然，佢们从对资本的崇拜当中获益更多，但不管怎样，佢们崇拜它的样子特别像牧师崇拜其神明。“牧师受益于其崇拜”这一事实并不意味着佢们控制着自己的神明。
+
+如果资产阶级的一员决定不再崇拜资本，佢就失掉了佢的生产能力以及其权力基础而一路跌入无产者的阶级。
+
+给无产阶级的选项是被奴役或死亡。给资产阶级的选项是死亡或奴役人。这引入了资产阶级保卫资本的主题。
+
+因而，资本从未被，也不会被控制。“我们能控制它”的观点只是个幻象。
+
+所有分析误解“我们必须控制资本”的原因是它们全都假设资本不是文明的积极参与者。我更多把资本视为一个积极参与者，一个有生命的存在，而非无生命的物体。它可能不具有自己的意识，但是它创造出了一个让它成为生活必需品的结构。人们从它的创造中获利，反过来，人们也积极展示它的力量，并炫耀佢们的成功以维持人们为之工作——因为佢们相信自己有朝一日也会成功。
+
+这么说来，资本不单存在着，还存活着。因为资本是实体，我们以两种方式看待它：以“常规”方式来看，它是我们所摧毁资本的形式（相当于压迫手段的私有财产或生产资料本身）；以“新”方式来看，它是你所消灭资本的载体（一个以创造阶级来维护自身的压迫手段所构成的集合体）。
+
+可能有人会说把资本当成活物是错的，因为把无生命物体（私有财产或者生产资料）称为活物似乎并不唯物主义，让事情唯心起来。
+
+对那些如此说的人们，你们必须理解：我并不把资本当成真正活的存在，但其存在本身就导致他人仿佛受其命令一样与之互动，而仿佛它是在自主行动一样。
+
+所以，正因为它可被视作活物，作为神来之笔，它创造了资产阶级——佢们的存在保护着资本，而反过来，资本也会帮助佢们。现在，得考虑一些关于资产阶级的真相了。佢们不仅以身为资产阶级的方式帮助资本。佢们亦为资本提供了用以维持自己的工具。所有这些工具都源于维护佢们因资本崇拜而获利的资产阶级愿望。
+
+这就是为什么我必须要消灭资本——只要还活着，作为一个压迫的实体，它就会找到压迫人的方法。这让无治与共产主义无法达成。
+
+我拒绝在资本前卑躬屈膝；我希望所有人也都会这么做。
+
+所以，结合我已提出的所有观点，我们视资本并非一个工具，而是能为自己利益行动的实体。它想方设法创造出维护它的阶级并让佢们获利，让佢们有理由去维护它。因为它有创造统治阶级的能力，它还能保证它在任何体制下生存。最后，它必须被消灭，因为它本质上是压迫的实体。
+
+
+### 没有经济即是好经济
+
+让我们先偏题定义一下什么是经济吧。经济就是在文明或者社会之内对财富的分配。
+
+左翼只在对资本主义经济——而非整个经济——的批评里点名经济。佢们的信念是：如果我们把经济变成一种更平等主义的分配形式就可以相当奏效。
+
+然而这是错的。而这也并不是因为资本家们会让你相信（因为佢们在反复地说我认为全人类都晓得的是谎话的“这没法奏效”）。
+
+不，这问题在更深处：经济（不管它如何被调治）是与平等相悖的。.
+
+经济有两个问题：它确立的权力基盘，以及它对生产而非财富如何被分配（然而，想资本主义和共产主义向我们所展示的那样，这也是个问题）的依赖。
+
+经济创造出了某物有某程度价值的观念。为举例我就用物品1，2，3的说法吧，物品1最有价值，物品3最低贱。
+
+如果生产方在生产物品1，那么佢们就会自动拥有比生产物品2的那些比生产物品3的人更多财富的人更多的财富。怎么说来，生产物品1的人会蒸蒸日上，而比其他两群生产者有更多可支配财富。
+
+因为生产者拥有更多财富，佢们便能让人为其工作，不够这经济体制是不是“共产主义”的。佢们将有机会挥霍，但是总有人必须生产商品，所以别人亦受制于那人而也必须生产。
+
+佢们还能够许诺着他人如果为其工作就会被给予更多财富运营。当然，这会以资本主义收尾，只不过不一定是我们当今的那个资本主义。它最有可能同（（虽然是别的话题里的）用语上自相矛盾的）“无治资本主义”的理论靠得更近。因而，如果经济存在，资本主义亦然。
+
+另一个经济的问题是它必需化了商品的生产。如果商品不被产出，那么它们大概就不会有价值，而经济也不会运行：因为没有财富或价值可分配，经济便不再有目的从而立即不存于世。
+
+在本章和下一章（我将在此检视工作之概念）之间批判生产。
+
+生产的问题之一是：它是资本程序的一分子，这意味着它是一个需要资本存在的程序。这很简单把——为了生产，你必须拥有用来生产的工具，而它们明显就是生产资料（压迫资料）。如果社群正控制着压迫资料，个人会被压制而被视为比社群更“轻”，而这一点对共产主义来说是反论性的。
+
+那么，当然，在一个点上我同意托洛茨基：“生产引起阶级和阶级之分”，在他的《1905》里言及。
+
+生产除了依赖着强制劳动已达成目标额，价值的创造者之一。当物品被授予价值时，经济便立时诞生了。我们没有理由容许这事发生，因为我们会开启进一步压迫的大门。
+
+这是个很小的概念。因此，如果共产主义会实现，经济必须被毁灭。
+
+经济是不平等之工具，不管是因为有人可能积累更多财富来用作对抗他人的杠杆，或者是因为生产的本质问题。所以如果我们要称自己为无治主义者，我们必当废除它。我们还必当废除财富，它总是创造出经济。财富只是个概念，它没有真正的物质根基。所以，如果我们要摧毁财富，我们是在摧毁一个概念而非有形的物件或结构。
+
+
+### 废除职场
+
+让我们跳到与工作之概念和它与生产的关系吧。生产以以下方式与工作有所关联：它基于所需达到的目标额，因而人是被迫着工作到份额达成的。当然，肯定有某些人强制佢们，而这便塑造了等级制。
+
+这把我们引向工作：它是什么？我（还有很多后左翼者）会回答那是强制劳动：强制生产。为什么我们感到它不令人愉快？左翼者们告诉我们革命之后的工作会是好玩的，但说真的，工作从不会好玩。工作总是约束性的——你可以做其他更值得你花时间的事情。比如说，如果你有个，打个比方，机器组装的工作，而你恨它，你会怎么做？很重要的你被迫生产的东西是什么？
+
+你真正享受的是什么？
+
+你应该出去玩乐，如果那玩乐是绘画就做吧。如果那玩乐是锻炼就做吧。但是，永不——决不——工作。
+
+工作是让你保持忙碌的方式。如果你不忙，你就有更多时间去为自己考虑，有更多时间去看你、你的朋友甚至不与你相干的他人在哪里被压迫。所以我们是工作来被转移注意的。
+
+那么，让我们恐惧于行动出于两个原因。在资本主义社会里，我们恐惧于行动反抗我们的压迫者因为我们恐惧于丢掉工作、把我们自己投进饥饿与贫穷。在仍存在着工作的共产主义社会里，如果有人叛逆佢们感到的来自社群的压迫，佢会被逐出其岗位，然后随着佢们没有为社群做贡献这一事被引为一咎，佢们会被断掉供给而忍饥挨饿。
+
+工作的另一个问题是它总是以生产为目的。如果你没在生产什么，那么你会被视为没用。问题在于生产强制你受奴役（不过，这奴隶制是是基于目标额），所以生产必须不存于世，而工作亦必须不存于世。正是因为目标额——如果谁没有达到目标额，那么佢就会被惩罚。再说一次，佢们会被迫忍饥挨饿。
+
+工作最后的问题是：它把我们变为区区自愿。它把我们变为劳动力的数额，而我们事实上是的非质性的存在。马克思和恩格斯在共产党宣言里差一点就告知了这一点，他们在这作品中说：“无产阶级......找到了工作才能存生，其劳动力增加资本才能找到工作劳动者的阶级。这些必须一点一点地把自己卖出的劳动者们，是货物......”他们只是没发觉到无论工作是怎样被组织的，它仍让我们成为资源而非人类。如果人类除了数额什么也不是，那么伦理、道德、情绪和其他一大堆事物都点儿都不重要了。把人类量化事实上否定了工作：为什么我们要为支撑单纯是数额的人们而工作？
+
+工作已想方设法把左翼思想感染个透。克鲁泡特金多次写道，所有人都必须每天工作4到5个小时，然后佢们便会被批与休闲时间。他说，这会让佢们从社群那里得到佢们的所需。这劳动是奴隶制，因为人必须工作，否则对佢的威胁就来了。
+
+左翼者们在义务政治的层面上为工作争辩——这当然实际意味着佢们相信这么做、那么做是我们的义务。在工作的背景下，这意味着佢们相信我们必须工作，在一个后“革命”的社会里。佢们认为我们必须为社群做贡献。我们必须有生产力。
+
+虽然我同意我愿人们做贡献，但是我不相信佢们必须做。我相信佢们会做从而因此受益于社群。而且，些许地因为互助是我们演化方式的一部分，我们故能就此生存下去。
+
+我提议的工作的替代品是玩乐。我必须说我同意这想法。这理解起来有点难。人们通常会问的第一个的问题是，“我们不已经玩过了吗？”
+
+首先，我想问这些人我们何时玩乐。在工作之后，吃饭，睡觉，干家务？这留给我们很多的少数自己的时间。
+
+我们于是到了真正的问题：我们在罕少的时间里感到的快乐是用来戏弄我们，让自己相信在感受真正快乐的。这不可能。直到我们晓得快乐是对我们永久自由的补偿，我们都不能说我们了解何为真正的快乐，正相反，我们只是被给到了它的一点点味道。
+
+另一个我们玩乐时间方面的问题是这时间正被量化——我们数着我们玩乐了多少，为了搜集时间做了我们能做的一切。但这意味着我们在量化一个质性的实体——而工作其所为便是如此。
+
+这是我们一定要拥有永久玩乐的原因之一——直到我们做到了，我们都不能晓得什么是真正的玩乐。
+
+另一个对永久玩乐持批评态度的东西可能会说，没人工作的话什么事都做不了。
+
+不对。首先，说这话的人受了玩乐无法导致新物体的制成或造出的印象的影响。
+
+举例来说，玩乐对我而言应该是造枪。我想象别人应该会烹饪来玩乐。一些人则会做园艺。玩乐并不得是没用的——你可以作什么出来。很多人都是如此。所以如果一个人玩乐就什么事都做不了的想法是从何而来的呢？在我能解释的范围内，它来自基于工作的社会的框架下的“玩乐”的概念。玩乐只是我们堆起来去量化和储存的休闲时间，在工作的框架之内。它是个卖给我们的工具，而非来自我们之内的东西。所以我们被教导道“玩乐是消耗性的”，因为我们只能接触到消耗性的玩乐。
+
+然而我想做枪。我想做园艺。我想烹饪。我想搞搞汽车。我不需要被迫着去做这些事，因为我想做，所以我为什么要被强迫去做它们，被强迫去完成目标额呢？
+
+于是便有人试图告诉我们，如果所有人一直都玩乐，工作伦理就不存于世了。这论述出人意料地常见。.
+
+我告诉佢们，为什么要工作伦理？这是我们该失去的东西。当然，我们有类似锻炼的那种人们所说的该有工作伦理才能做的事，但是真的，为什么你不乐意却还要做它呢？而，当然，如果你乐意于它，它就不是工作，而单纯是玩乐。
+
+
+### 不需国家——只要自由
+
+对不同的人来说，国家是不同的东西。于我而言，它代表着一大堆事物。不是个能被构建成良善的单一玩意儿。我就从说说在左翼视角下的国家为何物开始把。
+
+对左翼来说，国家被视作阶级压迫的器官。我们可以从托洛茨基在《1905》所说的“......国家是阶级压迫的器官”发觉这点。这是个挺妙的分析，左翼作出的。它很明显在压迫工人阶级。毋庸置疑。
+
+但是还有对国家的其他定义。我以这种（在其他我将会使用的方式中的）方式看待国家：国家单纯是个压迫那些提出异议的人的集体。我们可以在很多例子中发觉这一点：反对越南战争的抗议者被枪击，中国公民在天安门大屠杀中被杀死，苏联和它的古拉格。这一点有许多例子。
+
+另一个看待它的方式是国家是让平等之齿轮无法转动的胶水。我的意思是，国家推进了同性恋恐惧、跨性别恐惧、酷儿恐惧、种族歧视、阶级歧视、体能歧视和其他许多压迫性的观念。构成国家的人们事实上可以相信人们应该享有比佢们推出的政策更多的自由（哪怕我不相信这是真的）。所以为什么佢们不推出实际上对人们有益的政策呢？
+
+那是因为佢们必须勾引反动派。那些相信人们不应该与佢们所选择的人结婚，相信女性贞节的人，声称种族不是社会所构架的人。这些人是国家支持的对象。而正因国家支持佢们，它常规化了这些观点。国家正在造出日益强大的希望压制他人的自由的人组成的基本盘。所以它是在给自己挖一个自己永无法离开的反动的坑。
+
+假设它真的爬出了那坑，它仍是反对自由的。哪怕它不会推行出于维持自己高人一等的权力的政策（比如说更大的警力，更高的监听强度，反异议人士法律），还有什么完美、直接民主的“人人有票投”的实体，它仍会压制投票中的少数派。我们中的很多都试着认出来的一条论述是，“国家是好的因为它做了多数人想让它做的！
+
+哪怕那是对的，那也是不受欢迎的，因为少数派会继续被压迫。
+
+进一步说，国家保护着资本。你能想象在资本主义下烧毁一座工厂吗？想象那反弹。你被投进监狱，大概永不会回来，在“恐怖主义”罪名下。现在，如果在社会主义体制（我用的定义是共产主义的仍有国家的较低阶段）或者无产阶级专制下做这个，你还是会被监禁，甚至入狱，因为“攻击无产阶级的成果”。
+
+国家也被用作把人们去激进化的手段，通过给人“进步”的幻象。它给了做了些好事的改革，然而人们看到了这改革并先从引起改革的问题想起。然而，更多场合下佢只是试图用透明胶带维持着世界使其不散架，同时也让它保持恭顺。
+
+国家还可以被单纯看作压迫的器官（我相信这是个全面正确的定义）。这和我之前提到的的定义（压迫那些提出异议的人的集体）有所区别，这在于我早先定义里的国家能没有压迫而生存，但哪怕如此它仍以不允许佢们退出佢们已被指命去担当的角色的方式压迫着那些支撑它的人们。
+
+
+### 组织与无治
+
+组织对个体来说单纯是坏的。有很多理由支持这一点。拳头击出，佢们压抑着个体的行为。佢们为两个理由这么做。首先，佢们试图得到公众支持。积极支持烧毁银行和工厂，摧毁单植物农田或杀死条子的组织被公众积极地回避掉。哪怕公众并不真正相信这些行为是错的，这也是生活在一个预期你本质和平的社会里的一部分。还有，通过拥有熟人成员支持暴力行动的组织通常会被渗透并破坏。所以佢们做尽了一切去止我们的同志于暴力行动，哪怕做到提醒国家那步那么远。佢们这么做的第二个原因是保持其对他人的控制。某人被控制得越久，事情就越“平常”，于是更不会被反抗。
+
+那么，限制个体行动是坏的原因是它限制了个体的自由。我们不应该限制任何在为自由的战斗当中的人，而如果我们如此做了，我们就是在做极度错误糟糕的事。如果这事一旦发生，我们应该被剥去作为无治主义者的身份，并且被消灭。
+
+另一个问题是，组织是等级制的。哪怕自下而上的组织都是等级制的，而，虽然比自上而下的组织更好，它仍是等级制的。无治主义组织建立起等级制——只为了消灭等级制。然而，还有社会惯性的存在。
+
+我用“社会惯性”来指代与科学惯性（物质抵御运动状态改变的倾向）非常相似的概念。社会有着维持原样，试图不改变而存续的倾向。当然有很多因素影响了这惯性，像是国家（让作为社会有伦理变得更难）。正因为社会的这个特性，创造出等级制让最终废止它甚至更难。
+
+得晓得的事情是，如果哪团体有确定的领导，那个团体就是组织。我因而是反领导的。有些人（包括过去的我）曾说“但是领导和统治者之间有区别！”对了。像很多人说过的那样，统治者是强加其意识的人，而领导是则单纯说佢们相信什么该做然后人们就会做之的人，问题在于领导常常转为统治者。另外，哪怕佢们没有做，佢们也在创造出一个“愿要”的等级制——意味着佢们没有强加其观点于那些尚未加入自己（直到佢们的组织得势）的人，但人一旦加入便必须跟随佢们。
+
+另一个问题是领导者倾向于导向教条主义。佢们黏在意识形态上，总是试图强加其观点并建立基于佢们对于社会秩序应该是什么想法的社会。
+
+另一个避免组织的理由是它们有改良主义的倾向。单纯为改革而非叛乱而战。佢们可能一两种方法做到这点：做那种经典定义里的改革，意味着在资本主义之内改革。佢们可能还会为单纯意味着资本和压迫的重组的左翼“革命”而战，而非它们的废止。基于单一的阶级利益，佢们单纯是在尝试重组，而非为所有人的永不被他人强制的自由而战。
+
+
+### 呼唤终局：结束文明
+
+何为文明？对它都有什么印象？
+
+如果我们看文明的词典定义，它说：[文明是]人类文明的一个高级阶段，在那高水平的文化、科学、工业、政府已被达到。
+
+这个方式定义的文明有几个问题。首先，这个定义以假设“进步”的伪概念为始，说道“人类文明的高级阶段”。进步因为一些原因，是错的。其一，它是欧洲中心的假设社会移动在线性路程上的观点。然而，就如我们所见，许多社会和文化移动在其他不同的路径上。比方说，我们可以检视西方和极西方社会。欧洲人与印加人的冲突。
+
+我们只需要一个例子来证明进步的概念是错的。印加人有一个，就我们目前所知而言，没有货币和市场的系统。佢们仍有经济，因为佢们仍为生产所涉及，但佢们的生产引起了巨大的盈余而非亏损。另一方面，欧洲社会既有市场又有货币，而许多人忍饥挨饿。同一时间段的不同社会之间的区别显示了社会并不一定在一道轴上移动。
+
+进步这概念还是种族歧视的，因为它总是把欧洲社会假设为所有社会之峰。当然，有人会提到佢们如何把比欧洲社会更高尚的社会称作“更为文明”，但是佢们只是在把佢们的见解基于佢们理解中的自己的社会。
+
+当这定义继续说道“高水平的文化”，我们正面对着更多的种族主义。文化是主观的，意味着文明的无论高低的水平都不存在。如果我们采纳“高水平文明”的概念，我们就推想着欧洲文化而非洲或美洲文化或其他非欧洲文化，虽然这些之中没有一个是正确答案，因为没有文明能有比另一个更高的水平。
+
+那么这定义继续讨论工业，这被同一本词典定义为“系统的工业或劳动”。这很好地与生产相匹配，就像工作总是以生产某物件为目的那样。而这就是我们了解工业生产对自由有害这一点的方式。
+
+还用得着讨论政府吗？
+
+现在，我已经言及了词典定义有误的原因。让我们掘入文明的本质吧。
+
+文明作为让人们可以聚集成城并形成专门职业的持久的权力基盘——农业（这意味着农业是文明的基本单位）——的结果而现身。一些人因为自己的权力基盘更大而跃入上流，而佢们成为了领导者和统治者。
+
+一些人说，我们只见证了欧洲人占绝大多数的文明，而以它为我们的唯一指导，我们不晓得是否一切文明都是坏的。
+
+然而，随着对新世界的发现，我们发现了其他文明。拥有征服和等级制的支配网络的阿兹特克帝国就是文明的一个例子。同样涉及征服（虽然那本质上是偏经济的）印加人也是文明的不赖例子（虽然，对印加偏心地说，佢们虽有严格的等级制，佢们有让所有人生存的足够资源）。
+
+注意一下农业是生产的另一形式这一事实。
+
+文明是我们社会的现形组织方式，但是更定义性地说，文明是一组结晶结构，个体与社群都必须在其之内以其所定的方式工作。
+
+如果我们看看前文明史，我们会发现更多的个人自由与社群主义。比如说，在旧石器时代，我们会发现更多社会平等。男女们同等地在（John Chales Chasteen描述为非定居社会的）狩猎采集者社会里参与对食物的获取。然后就有了半定居社会，它把人们出于土壤需要更新而时时迁出迁入的农业城市。然后就有了文明（，定居文明之一种）。
+
+在我们更进一步前，我想说清楚我不想新所有定居文明都是文明，但是目前所有定居文明都有文明的特征。
+
+文明在个人与社群的生活方式之上而兴，而亡。它直接开始瓦解社会平等。举例：随着农业（像我之前说的，文明的基本单位）的推行，男女开始拥有不同的社会角色：男人，种植、生产食物；女人，照顾家人。它开始从有善的竞争转变为我们如今所见的更灾难性、更危险的竞争：追求尊位的竞争。另外，它还给我们全部以压迫逻辑——因为若无压迫就不存在文明。我们因而有几个攻击文明的方式：攻击结构，攻击尊位竞争，攻击农业与压迫。
+
+对食物的种植会就此不再存在，如果我们想要过得舒适。但是它应该是一个你出于享受（如果你预计为社群而做），或需要，而非出于不过是被资本主义式的老板或者共产主义式的社群被压迫而去做的事。我们不会允许社群被置于个人之上。
+
+对植物的种植与农业之间的区别在于农业不过是是一股生产力量，而对食物的种植是你出于需要或喜好而做的事情但并非生产（因为它并不是强迫或基于目标额的）。
+
+所以，我们把文明视作是依赖资本、基于其对生产资料的依赖而存续的。
+
+如果我们要真正理解文明，特别是要去攻击它，就必须学会识别文明的结构。国家、商业、（非生命形式的）资本之类的都是这些结构的例子。但是去辨识它们的最简单方法是对自己说，“这个结构以某种方式强迫了个人或社群去被它框在它之内吗？”
+
+我在这已谈到和将要谈到的每一个结构都是文明的一部分而必须被毁灭。
+
+这些结构可以是从类似父权的非物理的权力结构到塑造个人和其社群的物理结构。当然，在有物理结构的情况下，你必须考虑你要追猎谁，如果你打算追猎。如果有人烧了你的学校，我就失去了去充分地生存以至于能抵抗现行制度的能力。这并不是说人们不能伤害学校，相反，佢们应该小心注意或考虑到当自己伤害学校或者其他哪个物理结构时对他人造成的影响，因为这可能让另一个反叛者无法反叛。另一方面，非物理的结构不会受到一点关照——它们只会单纯地被毁灭掉。
+
+互助是结束尊位竞赛的大好方法，因为你征服了这竞赛本身。另外，在你需要帮助的时候你还会从他人那里得到得更多。另外一个即诶速尊位竞赛的方法是消灭与之相关的结构（比如工作之结构，或者物理的工作）。
+
+对农业的攻击可以凭多个方法做到，从开始去搞一个你自己的小花园到烧掉农场——多到把它们一个一个列出来、试一试都没意思了。我得说的全部就是：拿出创造力来！创造力是我们斗争的关键。当然对待压迫亦然——付出多少代价都与之作战。
+
+这不是对原始地存在的呼唤，而相反，是对超越文明的呼唤。对从文明世界解脱的呼唤。我们不需要那些结构以舒服地生活——当然，在它们被毁灭之后，我们只会更舒服！
+
+
+### 忘掉教条，自己回答
+
+我们都晓得把一点坚持到底的人，佢紧抓越来越多的稻草，试图证明佢的意识形态是对的，佢作出了正确的决定。这常见于许多人，正因佢们试图坚持佢们自无治主义和共产主义之始就传承着的观点。在佢们极力以自己以为与其意识形态相符的补丁填补我们所认为的洞时，佢们过时（或只是离题）的理论开始苦伤着佢们。
+
+例如马克思主义者和国家。佢们直到它是压迫性的，但佢们不关心。马克思主义者所在乎的一切只是在共产主义的达成的背后的科学。但是这些都不是我所指的问题——只要国家插手着达成共产主义的过程，那么达成任何哪怕与共产主义相去甚远的东西都不可能。
+
+这是因为它，作为一个压迫性实体，会引得某些人（比如说前述的富人）极度地被压迫，而出于复仇政治，国家单纯只会保持压迫这些人。
+
+还有，国家本质上就是保护对非生命和有生的资本的，而只要资本资本存活、存在，就没有共产主义，而它会让无治无法达成这点也它大爷的清楚得很。
+
+马克思主义者只会以一句“但我们的国家不会！”来反驳。
+
+这并不是论述。
+
+这是意识形态的本质。它强令我们留驻在为死透了的理论辩护而不顾其纰漏与无足轻重的永久状态下。我将继续谈谈马克思主义者——佢们说读资本论的一至三章对于革命来说必不可少。然而，为什么我需要去弄清楚数学才能晓得资本主义是错的？而马克思的“资本主义会被自己压垮”不已被证明定然是错的了吗？——它总是还有升级和补丁。这不就是个不去成为反叛者的借口吗？
+
+这就是为什么意识形态是错的——它本质上就是教条的。
+
+另一个要避免意识形态的原因是它与组织的关系。如果你不在一个组织之内，你可以随意发展你自己的自我理论，拥有你自己的行动。你是解脱于组织力图加于你的意识形态的。意识形态是组织的一个成因，因为它让它们围绕着特定的平台，然后试图运行其组织的平台（而正因佢们的平台必须考虑组织，佢们会试图去运作组织来自助）。
+
+
+### 之于无治主义，我是什么
+
+我把自己视作处于未定态；我不会说我是个人主义者或社群主义者，我不认为自己是左翼或后左翼（虽然其他人可能会这么定义我，哪怕是正确地）。我不希望用意识形态定义自己——相反，我希望自己能比自己的诸意识形态名词更棒。我还觉得做到这点最好方法是从不用那些名词限制自己，而是简单地说，“我是无治主义者。”这么做让我成为一个破坏偶像主义者。
+
+我感觉说出这一点这很重要，因为人们常常问我是什么来揣测我相信什么。但是——我不相信具体的意识形态，除了那些能解放我的。而这也可能改变，不管是因为我的想法或是状态的改变。我的理论不会留下一个，而这就是我永恒地拒绝它们的原因。我消灭了我的自成的形象。
+
+所以，之于无治主义，我单纯只是一个为自己的自由奋斗的人类。作为破坏偶像的无治主义者，一个抗拒者，而这一切都是一样的——就只是无治主义者。
diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2022-10-09-Initium-a1_r-memory-is-freedom.md b/_collections/_heros/2022-10-09-Initium-a1_r-memory-is-freedom.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c7c893b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_heros/2022-10-09-Initium-a1_r-memory-is-freedom.md
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title:  "记忆就是自由本身"
+author: "端传媒"
+date:   2022-10-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image:  https://i.imgur.com/B8mbOvt.jpg
+image_caption: "“我父亲经历的流亡，塑造了我和我的孩子，如影随形，尽管我们身处不同的时代。⋯⋯只有将我、我父亲和我儿子三代人的命运，与那些素不相识的人的命运连为一体，我才有一个合适的理由，说出心里要说的话。”"
+description:   "今年7月，艾未未出版回忆录《千年悲欢》（时报出版）。8月13日，他受邀在台北飞地书店与媒体人张洁平连线视讯对话，亦是关于此书的首场全球连线直播分享。"
+position: right
+---
+
+“意识形态像一道强光，个人记忆就像是无影灯下的影子……”
+
+“如果我们不能完整表述、追溯到底、批判思考、甚至反复谈论……”
+
+“所谓的自由是完全没有意义的。”
+
+<!--more-->
+
+他在回忆录《千年悲欢》中写道：
+
+“徐警官总结：‘你将用你的生命为你的每句话付出代价。依你的这些言论在文革，可以枪毙你一百次。’⋯⋯那天晚上，时间在我脑海中往回延伸，我不由得想到父亲，意识到我对他的了解是多么不完整。徐预审的话并不夸张，我是否会为活在不同的时代而感到庆幸呢？父亲经历的年代要更艰难，有太多人为他们说过的话付出了生命代价。而我从来没有问过他是怎么想的，甚至没想过，他用一只眼看到的世界是怎样的。现在，我为自己与父亲间无法逾越的那一道沟壑感到遗憾，这让我彻夜难眠。这之后，我萌生了写一本书的念头，为的是不让艾老有同样的遗憾。”
+
+在这本书中，他述说的，正是“意识形态像一道强光，个人记忆就像是无影灯下的影子一样不存在”时，那些残缺的、同时代人的记忆。
+
+
+### 不留下这本书，就非常的失职
+
+以下为对谈纪录。张=张洁平；艾=艾未未
+
+_张：想先问问未未，在你被监禁时起心动念写这样一本书之前，作为一个艺术家，你想过要写自己的回忆录吗？你读其他艺术家的回忆录吗？如果你想过写自己的回忆录，你曾经想要怎么定位它？_
+
+艾：我是2011年被秘密关押81天，时间很短，我现在也觉得有点遗憾，他们应该多关我一些时间。当时他们告诉我。我可能会被判十年以上。我当然认为他们不是在诈，而是确有这个可能，因为我认识的、联系的一些人至今还在服刑的或消失了再没出现的都很多。
+
+所以当时有个简单的念头，就是我这一生过得怎么样？我觉得确实要被判，因为我的活动确实有影响力，影响了一个政权、影响了对它的评价。但我有两件遗憾的事儿，一个是对我父亲的了解是非常不确定跟不详尽的。不确定是因为在那样的时代我父亲并不会去讲自己的事，我也不会去问，虽然一起生活，但我们都相敬如宾，虽然我所有的遭遇都源自于他的遭遇，但实际上我对他非常不了解，我从来没有正面地问过他一个问题——这是我非常遗憾的：你怎么会跟人生活几十年，但对他身上发生的从来没有关心过。
+
+这可能是我个人的问题，也可能不是。因为我和许多朋友聊过天，我经常会问，你们祖上的爷爷奶奶是什么人呢？他们都知道自己爷爷奶奶有很复杂的故事，有的是地主、有的是资本家，还有很多是跟著国民党去了台湾的。我说那你能知道更多吗？几乎每个人都说他们从来没有问过、家里从来没有说过。这个遗憾当然没有办法弥补，我父亲1996年就过世了。
+
+第二个遗憾对我来说更大一点，就是如果我会被判刑十几年，公安人员告诉过我，我出来以后母亲肯定不在了，儿子也不认识我（因为我被关的时候儿子才刚过2岁）。这个话对我打击比较大，如果我不在他们身边十几年，基本上那个血缘关系都会被切断了。所以我想写一本书，既能把我跟我父亲的书讲清楚，又能为我儿子留下记录，尽管我儿子未来生活的时代跟我是完全不同的，甚至他可能完全没有兴趣读这样的书，但这是我的责任：如果我不留下这本书，就非常的失职吧。所以我就留下了这本书。
+
+_张：你写这本书的时候你父亲已经去世了，而你写的是两代人的经历，你已经来不及做很多细致的口述历史，那在这种状况下，你要找回父亲的历史、重溯自己的经历时你做了哪些准备？这些素材和史料你要如何确保是可信的？_
+
+艾：这个事情比较有趣，因为根据我的经验，在中国市面上存在的、关于现在的史料绝大多数是不准确的，甚至是歪曲的，这显然不是我可以依靠的资料。比较有幸的是我父亲在20岁左右就开始写诗，诗是一个没有任何障碍与遮掩地表露了他的心情与感受的载体，而且他又是一个用白话写诗、非常激情、天真的一个诗人。所以我有幸读了父亲在1930年以后（那时候在国民党监狱）到1957年之前，这二十多年的自述诗。之后又有二十多年的流放、沉默期，而那时候又刚好我跟他生活在一起。
+
+现在关于他的生活资料有很多，是作为一种“爱国主义”宣传的文学资料，比如哪一天到了马赛、巴黎，研究者记录的非常准确。甚至不是关于我父亲的事，是关于从清末（因为他是1910年生）、到民国、到延安、到中共建国、到政治运动、反右与文革，再续上了之后跟我的生活。我必须尊重中国发生过什么，因为只有这样才能解释他的情形，这个问题必须要厘清楚。这整个过程我们大概做了100万字的第一版，就把中国历次的政治运动、社会变化记录下来，后来又压缩到最后的20万字。
+
+_张：你刚刚说父亲留下了大量的诗作作为可依赖的素材，那想问有日记吗？因为书中有提到很多第一人称的很小的细节，那些我也很好奇：是来自于什么样的档案？_
+
+艾：他没有日记，不过也有很少去南美洲旅行的笔记，但很少，因为是在流亡，很多手稿已经不存在了。但他有对自己早年的回忆，这个回忆也是我的（资料）基础。
+
+
+### 不被允许看到的档案
+
+_张：整理父子两代人的历史，你觉得最困难的地方是什么？是史料的残缺，还是什么？_
+
+艾：史料的残缺当然是不可回避的问题，我父亲是作家协会的头，我就让我母亲跟作家协会说父亲死了，那他一定有一份档案，是每个中共高级干部都有的（甚至普通国家公职人员都有的）。既然他死去这么多年了，国家也对他很敬重，那我希望能看到这份档案，因为里面有历次中央政府对他做出的评价，比如被批判为右派，一定有很多人对他揭发、甚至是自己交代的材料。
+
+所以这份档案应该是非常厚重的，有详实的资料可以了解中共文艺界以及我父亲的经历。但我母亲被正告说，“你是永远不可能看到这份档案的”，这份档案是一个高度机密的材料。我知道这是不可能的，但我还是得试一下。是很大的缺陷，但其实也没有，因为我了解当时很多跟他同代的人的经历，我是生长在那里的，所以我对那个气息非常了解。
+
+_张：所以官方档案是不是就完全没有看到过？_
+
+艾：嗯，那是不允许看到的。
+
+_张：那你刚刚说官方档案里写过的一些思想检讨，是有一个神秘的空间保存著的是吗？_
+
+艾：那是当然的，因为我在二手市场经常买到其他人的档案，很吃惊其他人很重要的档案是被当做废纸卖掉的，我看到一个医生的档案，在西北，清楚地说了他如何从东北到了西北做了医生，哪一次在他那很小的诊所里说了哪一句话，说这句话的时候同时有几个病人对他揭发都表示了他说那句话时候的情形，如果档案上有一个错字，都会看到有更改，还有画押，“这个更改是依据揭发者本身做的”。非常严谨。
+
+我想这份档案是从苏联或者日本学习的，就是一个非常普通的人，西北农村的一个大夫，说的哪句话，都做了很细致的档案记录。我相信我父亲的档案应该丰富一百倍，我想看，但也不想看，因为我觉得里面有很多东西是我根本不愿意看到的。
+
+_张：你在德国一定去过史塔西档案馆（Stasi Records Archive）对不对？_
+
+艾：我没有去过，但我知道。档案馆会揭示很多历史中的东西。我觉得中共档案是永远不可能公开的。因为他们会定期地销毁很多档案。
+
+
+### 我们比孤立的个体更加孤立
+
+_张：明白，这个书里涉及到了很多你跟父亲的经历，你在这个整理的过程中，对父亲艾青的认识，经历了怎样的过程？与以往的认识有没有变化？_
+
+艾：两点，一是整理本身就是发现的过程，甚至你整理一个自己存放的东西，一间抽屉、一个屋子，都会发现很多意想不到的东西。那整理他人的时候，还是有所发现。但是实际上，这个整理只是把语序、语境整理得更加合理，我不愿意用我的方法来重新解释他的生活，因为究竟我不是他，我不是生活在那个年代，我不在这个位置上所以不能这么做。我只能将他和我的联系梳理出来。
+
+_张：做完这百万字的整理、写完回忆录后，你会怎样评价你的父亲艾青？_
+
+艾：每个人都要想这个问题吧，因为每个人都生活在时代的框架中，我的评价必须是以他的方式完成对他的评价，他所处的时代、语境、遇到了什么。今天我们面临的危险是今天以我们的道德标准来评价前人，我们也可以管这个叫“cancel culture”，就是把以前的雕像、史实重新以今天的价值观整理，甚至是清肃，这是很危险的。因为我们要时刻认识到我们生活的现在也是暂时的空间与阶段，实际上我们没有任何权力对任何事情做出结论的。
+
+至于怎么评价艾青，我在书里写了几点，我很难用一句话来评价。
+
+_张：是的，您非常少下直接的评价，但为读者展开了很多脉络，可以让读者来评价。我自己看这个书的时候有个好奇的地方是，你跟你父亲的角色在书里是非常突出的，但是整个家庭包括家族（家庭里的其他人），很少在你的回忆录中出现，这是一个叙事的安排，还是真实生活里就是这么isolated？如果是后者，这与人们对中国传统生活的认知很不同，你怎么理解这件事呢？_
+
+艾：这样说吧，我们比孤立的个体更加孤立。现在我在西方很常被问，对家的认识是什么。我父亲是在流亡之中去了延安，然后莫名其妙他们取得了政权，然后他又成了政权的异见分子。在我出生那年我们已经被送到了新疆，接受再教育。你想现在很多人谈到新疆，对维吾尔人的处置的方式，其实很多人忽略了中共不止对维吾尔族人，还有对自己的汉人，甚至是高官，在取得政权之前就是用同一种方法训练、控制，这是他的立国之本，从来没有改变过，只是到现在才被提出来。
+
+所以我⋯⋯不知道什么叫家，因为家这个概念是与私有财产、记忆有关，但在中共控制的这几年，其实没有人有私有财产，都是公有的一部分；你也没有隐私，没有可以区分你和另一个人关系的记忆，你没有属于你个人的记忆。当这个范畴都不存在的时候，不管你在新疆还是河北、江西，每个人的生活都像部队里的生活一样，是非常具有统一化的。
+
+
+### 家？一个篮子里的几颗洋葱
+
+_张：您刚刚说的对家的感受在过去几十年有变化吗？_
+
+艾：没有，到今天也没有。因为我很早就离开了北京，去了纽约待了12年，但也不能称之为家，虽然我是上了“贼船”的人，但“认贼作父”我也没做到。然后回了中国，又是一个和中国毫无关系的人，我跟中国所有价值，不论是传统还是现代的，我都不认同。我再次了解中国的时候是做一些古董的收藏，可以让我理解远久的历史。然后我又开始做建筑，让我再次了解到现实政治的情形。由于互联网可以给我一个发表观点的机会，所以我又成了今天的艾未未。
+
+_张：您这么重视父子三代人，比如在意把自己跟父亲的历史留给儿子，让自己儿子明白这个血缘的历史曾经这么存在过；但你又不会用家的框架来理解对吗？_
+
+艾：这样说吧，我们就是放在一个篮子里的几颗洋葱，或者土豆，家不家的不重要。比如我父亲并不知道我上学几年级，我也不知道他的生日是什么，我儿子到今天也不会叫我父亲，只叫我名字艾未未。所以我们的关系很近但又相对陌生。
+
+_张：那你去到欧洲之后，包括在中国、欧洲各地，你会认识到这个状态是很特殊的吗？_
+
+艾：我不觉得这是特殊的，就像你现在在台湾，之前在香港，去香港前在中国，但你还是有一种中国文化的依托吧？包括开书店也是。但我走得比较extreme，反差比较大，从新疆到了北京以后去了纽约，然后又回到北京，不得已的情形下去了欧洲，在德国落了脚，但不适应，又去了英国，儿子在那里读书。
+
+那又不是我理想的地方，我就搬去了葡萄牙，开始种地跟盖房子。这让我感觉好一点。我在葡萄牙的菜市场里，一个女士走来问我：未未，你去了那么多地方，为什么最后搬到这个小镇子上。我想这就是我搬过来的理由吧，我想弄清楚我为什么搬过来。实际上我们通常知道做事情的理由并不是真的有，而是要做了以后或过程中才会发现的。这是我对我人生的一个很好的经验吧，我必须要在那儿创造一些困难和障碍，当我应对时我才会发现我存在的价值。
+
+_张：因为你在欧洲待了这么长时间，至少在“家”这个小集体的概念里，应该很多地方都有家的传承，你会对跟你非常不同的人与家的形态感到好奇、并去研究为何如此不一样吗？_
+
+艾：我觉得这是明显的现象，在欧洲所有人都会有自己的祖父祖母，会三代人甚至四代人一起去海边、去生长的小村子小镇子里，一起去餐厅。这个不难了解，也很容易认识到这个社会虽然经历巨大的动荡与革命，仍然还保留一些这个社会固有的东西。
+
+在中国大陆是不一样的，可以说已经在过去三十年完成了城市化的运动，即每个人都不止一次的搬了家；以及没有人有私产的，即没有人是有房子的，每个房子都是不同的城市和小区，是一样的，只是有贫富价钱的差距。这个东西经过那么多次的筛选与漂白之后，家的原始含义是完全不存在的。所以我到一个城市、即使是欧洲，也很喜欢去自由市场，因为可以看到过去五十年、一百年是什么样的，人们为什么设计了这个工具？这个工具怎么用？到今天已经没有用途了所以作为旧货卖出去。
+
+
+### 落笔那一刻，所在的位置
+
+_张：我看这本书的时候可以感觉到作者很自觉地把父子三代人的命运跟共和国的命运连在一起，但又很难感受到这是家族回忆录，因为就像刚刚说的篮子里的土豆一样，是相对独立的。我觉得这本书对于几代人的回忆录来说是蛮特别的事情。还有一个点是，艾未未这个名字，你的许多艺术作品、社会行动被中国以及世界很多人都知道，是从07以及08年你真的开始做很多公共参与与行动开始的。_
+
+我们会发现行动里“记忆”与“真相”是非常核心的主题。比如要恢复四川汶川地震中遇难学生的名单，看起来是很小的事情，但是在中国重重的体制障碍下你却要花巨大的精力、要付出巨大的牺牲才能恢复那些人的名字。记忆作为一种使命，记忆之忘却。这是你的一个母题吗？它源自哪里？
+
+艾：这样说吧，这实际上谈的是因果关系。可以说“我是创作的灵感，创作也是我的灵感”——由于我这样做了，才出现了我；并不是有了我，我才这样做了。所以说这些记忆是我在争取我个人成为个体的一个基本的、本质性的手段。如果没有这些通常称为正义、真实的追求的话，我是不存在的。实际上每个个体也是一样的，他在不同程度上，只有追求真实，可能包括爱与恨，在这样的过程中才会一次次认识到自己的存在。或者说魂不守舍，怎样才能招魂？
+
+_张：这本书对你存在的意义是什么，它有把这件事往前推一步吗？_
+
+艾：它没有往前推一步，但至少找到了写这本书落点的那一刻所在的位置。很多时候可能不是往前推一步而是往后退一步，我找到了某一刻我实在的位置。这个位置实际上是说，我们都想知道自己所在的位置是什么，比如你的飞地书店，你会想到书店的缘起、会吸引哪一类的人来；出版社，他们可能也在想要尊重哪一类的文字；每次这个行动都再一次表述了我们个人存在的价值观，表示我们的认同之处，甚至是批判性的、自我否定的一种可能，这种可能才构成了每一个个体、国家或社会的可能，没有这些我们就看不到这些特征。
+
+_张：你刚刚说透过这本书确定了落笔那一刻的位置，那倒推回一点，你曾经站过哪些不同的位置？_
+
+艾：如果看生命的过程，我其实大多数情况下都是被动的，比如我出生就必须跟我父亲去了新疆，在那里经历了我的童年和青年时代。然后莫名其妙地我们又回到了北京，进入了电影学院，这也是非常莫名其妙的，我对艺术本身没有太大的兴趣，只是因为我的家庭、我的父亲是诗人，这对我有一定的引导。
+
+假设他是个农民，可能对我的引导就少一点，因为我不会想去看人民怎么种棉花，我自己早期就在做这件事。在青春期的时候我就知道，我在中国会很危险，因为我比较反骨，所以我找了机会去了美国。但去了美国之后我又不认同美国的价值观，不认同美国梦之类的，所以我在那儿做了个流浪汉，读了三四所大学都没有毕业。我很容易拿到毕业证，但我看不起那个价值观，所以我就在社会上晃著比较好。
+
+但这个其实很悲苦的，没有生活来源、语言不同、生活习惯不一样，但我晃著还行的，因为可以街头画像、街头做点工，只要能交房费就行了，结果一晃十二年过去了。在我父亲去世之前，我在美国没事干，又不屑于回到中国，但我父亲住院可能就是我最后一个借口回中国。但回到中国又没事干，我就只能去古玩市场看古玩，用六年时间研究，过去这块土地上发生什么，也收藏了一些东西。当时我父亲已经去世了，我母亲很不高兴，这孩子就跟没去过美国一样，没有毕业证，没有身份，身无分文，十二年真是跟没去过一样，觉得我是很没出息的孩子。
+
+我确实没事做，因为我不想也没兴趣卷入中国的发展大潮。一怒之下我就说我搬出去，但属于三无人员，没地儿搬，所以我找了一个农村，有很大的自由度可以干一些违法的事情，比如我盖了一个违法的建筑，村长说你愿意盖就盖，我们不管，但是这是违法的。我想说这太好了，这样的违法太快乐了，就盖了这个房子。我想的是我盖了就算你拆了我也高兴过了，至少满足我想盖房子的可能。所有人都说艾未未你太傻了，盖了拆了不就没了吗？我说没了之前不还有吗。到今天还没有拆，公安对我还比较宽容，说你这房子就留著吧，所以这个房子现在还在，叫草场地，258号。
+
+这个地方没想到就成为了中国现代艺术的算是发源地吧。在那儿也有很多的工作室搬过去。大概是这些情形，包括我来了欧洲，也是被动的，我的理由是我儿子在外面读书，我必须让他安全，所以我来到了欧洲。要不然我可能还是在北京。
+
+
+### 争取自由的手段
+
+_张：书里印象很深一句，你说“被动塑造了主动性”，你刚刚说表面上看起来是随波逐流，想问这些主动性在之前的随波逐流里会体现在哪里？_
+
+艾：体现在你始终考虑这个被动性能寄在哪儿。如果我没有想写这本书，我的主动性就不存在；只有我写出这本书当年在新疆如何和我父亲生活，我的主动性才存在。我觉得大多数人都有他们的资源，但只想著主动，而没有想被动性是具有必然性的，包括我们人类如何出现在地球上、如何消失，这些事情实际上都是被动的，没有由人类自己做主的。
+
+现在很多人能看到他们事业有成、或推崇某种价值观，看起来很主动，但主要都是被动性在里面起到了作用。而如何能在被动性中、逆境中发现存在的可能，这就是我们通常说的，争取自由的手段。
+
+因为我是一个人，我很不满意我是一个艺术家，全世界都认为我是最活跃的艺术家，我很不满意这个位置。我觉得文字仍然是我非常在意的一种人类技巧，将思想用白纸黑字写下来，每句话都是清楚表示了你认可的状态，这东西是没法掩饰的。可能是受我父亲的影响吧，跟文字、文学有关的活动，仍然是人类最重要的活动。
+
+_张：而且在你写下来的这一刻，是你透过对被动性逻辑的分析掌握了主动。_
+
+艾：我觉得人类的思考是被动的，人类之所以能成为有智慧的人，是因为我们的处境和要面临的问题。文学本身，并不是你生下来会成为一个文学家，而是说你不断地将感受的能力和愿望，透过非常艰难的方式，一种书写的叙事的方式记录下来，这显然不是一个非常自然的行为。
+
+_张：你刚刚讲到了自由，我一直想问这个问题，人类因为这个经验引发思考是被动发生的，其实如果把这个记忆刻画出来，似乎会获得你存在的主动位置；你刚刚又讲到自由，所以我想问你觉得记忆与自由的关系是什么？_
+
+艾：我觉得记忆是人们的一种活动，这个活动并不一定是准确的，但这个努力是一种可以明确表述出来的，无论是对自我的、情感的、历史的记忆，实际上只是包含了你个人理解能力的一种记录，而这个记录能力是因人而异、因时而异的，会有变化的，如果没有变化就是一种教条。所以我觉得记忆本身就是自由，是争取自由的手段。
+
+如果我们不能完整表述、或追溯到底发生了什么，不能批判性思考、甚至反复地去谈同一个问题的话，实际上我们称之为自由的是完全没有意义的。这个意义完全体现在我们对自我的认识，以及在认识当中取得行动的能力。
+
+_张：那你作为一个艺术家的创作，除了写作之外，也会体现这个事情吗？_
+
+艾：那是当然。无论是做一顿饭，或是我跟你做一次谈话，我觉得都是具有挑战性的，都是可以别开生面，因为在这个过程中，都有相对拓展的空间。
+
+
+### 专制社会交流成本越来越高
+
+_张：未未我想插一个问，为什么这么喜欢谈话？因为我第一次认识艾未未、采访艾未未的时候，就是很多年前去他的草场地258号的家里采访，那时候印象很深刻的是他几乎不会拒绝任何采访，任何人想要采访他，理论上在那个时候都可以，所以你会接受大量的采访。你也不介意重复。_
+
+艾：迄今为止我做了有将近2000个采访。我说采访不是说简单的采访，是属于西方媒体的专访，昨天时代在头版第一条写的就是“艾未未与他的艺术与生命将会同归于尽”，他已经不需要说谁是艾未未了，中国人还是艺术家，而是直接说艾未未。这也就是说，这个人是不需要介绍的，已经变成公众的符号了；但这唯一被证明的只是已经被采访得太多了。
+
+我为什么喜欢采访，因为我刚跟我父亲去新疆的时候，我十岁，我发现农村里的这些人，二三十岁、四五十岁，都很喜欢问我问题，你父亲多大了、母亲去哪儿了、你想不想她啊？他们都愿意把生活里一些不愿意跟人说的事情跟我说，所以我最早时候就是一个倾听者，直到有一天我上了互联网之后，我发现很多人喜欢我的一些事，可能因为我口无遮拦，不太在意问题是不是有深度，或是不是比较幼稚的问题。
+
+但我认为没有幼稚的问题，只有幼稚的回答。我觉得交流是成本最低的事情，只用脑子，一张纸都没浪费；今天我又遇到了最好的时代，我随时可以跟任何人交流。
+
+_张：交流会带给你智识上的刺激吗？_
+
+艾：交流是人或者文明最重要的一个手段，虽然猫之间的交流也很多，他们都有自己的交流方式，而且非常美妙。作为人，我们都比较自恋，认为我们的交流更复杂一些，可以透过写码、文字、电影，或透过互联网上的推特、Instagram⋯⋯可以看出交流的丰富性是将个人的智慧或人类文明不断打造。只有专制社会交流成本才越来越高，像香港交流成本越来越高，中国的交流则基本是不可能了。
+
+其实我喜欢交流的很大程度是我发现为什么专制社会这么害怕交流，比如我的一句话、一个态度、一个表情或者一张裸体照片，在中国简直是大逆不道，他们觉得这太恐怖了，恐怖的连思想也不是，而是一种态度：我们是自由的，没有人能战胜我们自由的欲望。
+
+
+### 父亲与儿子：一起穿过的黑洞
+
+_张：艾老怎么看这本书？_
+
+艾：实际上我写这本书我觉得他爱读不读，只是我作为责任必须要写下来；我做现在这个采访他还必须要下到楼下餐厅里去，他刚才已经很埋怨了就说，要在餐厅里待两个小时。我说你随时可以回来啊。因为他已经非常反感我要说这么多话。他是第一个读完的，他写了一段话，大概意思是我记录了一段生活，这段生活将会影响到他对中国的认识。一代有一代人的事，所以我也很感谢我父亲没有告诉过我什么。
+
+_张：在书的最后，你说自己在欧洲的难民危机里，意识到只有将父子三代人的命运与素不相识的人的命运连为一体，才有一个合适的理由去表达。在写完这本书、你在欧洲又生活了七年之后，回头来看，这种命运连结你如何让它发生，你怎么去看自己后半生与艾老将会展开的欧洲经验呢？_
+
+艾：我先前说过我来欧洲是被动的，那个被动就像我们经常看到一盆热带雨林巴西的植物在欧洲市场上，当然我们可以盆栽它、放在家里，但我发现他们很难长好，空气、湿度、土壤品质都发生了变化。有两种情况，一种是生物特强，把原生植物都杀掉，但大多数情况下这种移植的植物都不能生长的；还有我发现把他们从盆栽放到土地里的时候，会好一些，风啊、水啊之类的可能性都有了，这些条件在屋子内是都没有的。
+
+我觉得我在欧洲就是在一个巨大的不自在当中，首先我必须理解欧洲是一个什么样的社会，他们的历史是什么？经过了怎样的挣扎演变至今。这也是我去到任何地方都会想到的问题，因为你不可能不想这样的问题。然后也不可能不去跟中国的文化有对应，因为我对中国应该算是了解吧——就算不了解也没时间了解了——我在中国生活过四十多年，由于我有美国的经验与欧洲的经验，所以对中国的了解都更深一些，包括我父母那代的经验，还有今天的一些事情，每天都在不断认证我的一些观点。
+
+但是对欧洲，我只有在15年出国以后，我觉得我才希望了解它：因为我一时回不去中国了。纽约是我没法不了解的，24岁到36岁都在。我了解欧洲是刚好在面临一些难民潮，帮助我了解了中东社会和难民社会，以及欧洲的文化。为了拍一部电影《human flow》，我们去了23个国家，访问了世界上40个最大的难民营，我个人采访了600多个难民，透过这种方法强制地让我了解欧洲或者中东的一些问题。说起来话比较长，总体来说是这样的。
+
+_张：这个过程艾老有参与吗？_
+
+艾：很不幸我必须带著他。他跟著我去了很多地方，黎巴嫩、巴西、墨西哥，他去的地方非常多，尽管他都不知道他去了哪里，但都是跟著我。有很多危险的地方，比如难民营、ASIS、还有墨西哥贩毒集团的地方，我们都一起去了。
+
+_张：所以这有点像当年你跟著你父亲去新疆？_
+
+艾：差不多，但当时我们都在一个地方，地下一个坑住了五年，是一个黑洞里。但他这是在非常多个黑洞里，穿来穿去。

From 62988b5461d0b0d315c86604fc73650143585d89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: theagora <agoradao@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2022 15:16:20 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 3/9] 0x16 Init commit _columns posts

---
 ...10-13-is-china-coordinating-with-russia.md | 128 ++++++++++++++++++
 ...matters-rather-than-silence-of-majority.md | 115 ++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 243 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2022-10-13-is-china-coordinating-with-russia.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2022-10-19-voice-of-dissent-matters-rather-than-silence-of-majority.md

diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-10-13-is-china-coordinating-with-russia.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-10-13-is-china-coordinating-with-russia.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..071c35a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-10-13-is-china-coordinating-with-russia.md
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "北京“策应”莫斯科？"
+author: "成朝庭"
+date  : 2022-10-13 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/WtB7BzG.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "美国能否分化中俄？俄罗斯会否厌倦依赖中国？而北京是否后悔支持莫斯科？"
+---
+
+2022年9月9日，中国人大委员长栗战书在会见俄罗斯国家杜马领导人时表示，“中方理解并支持俄罗斯针对乌克兰问题采取的措施，并从不同方面予以策应”。
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+2019年6月初，中国最高领导人率领高达上千人的庞大代表团访问俄国，签署了30份重要文件，尤其是《中俄发展新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系声明》和《中俄加强当代全球战略稳定声明》两份重要声明，使得中俄接近、联合甚至结盟抗美的声调极为高涨。2021年1月2日，中国外交部长王毅在接受新华社和中央广播电视总台联合采访时称“中俄战略合作没有止境，没有禁区，没有上限”。2022年2月4日，俄罗斯总统普京来到北京参加冬奥会开幕式，两国发表了《关于新时代国际关系和全球可持续发展的联合声明》。
+
+在这份里程碑似的声明中，两国展露了全面合作对抗西方的势头，不但在意识形态上共同反对西方垄断民主标准，而且在地缘政治上“背靠背”地互相支持：北约东扩是普京眼中的头号威胁，北京力挺莫斯科，首次公开反对北约继续扩张；而美国的印太战略让北京忧心忡忡，于是莫斯科投桃报李，反对美国纠集盟友推行印太战略；中俄双方还共同强烈谴责美国、英国和澳大利亚建立“三边安全伙伴关系”（AUKUS）。观察家们普遍认为，中俄之间的战略协作，让两国在西方尤其是美国霸权面前更有底气。于是，北京冬奥会甫一结束，普京就做出了挥军侵乌的大动作。
+
+自乌克兰战争爆发以来，中国的真实态度和实际立场引人关注。尽管北京的官方表态面面俱到，但实际上更多站在俄罗斯一边，认为是美国和北约的进逼挑衅迫使俄罗斯奋起反击。在中国官媒和受到严格控制的社交媒体上，充斥着对俄罗斯的同情支持及对美国和北约的谴责。中国还通过向俄罗斯输送经济利益来表达战略支持，自乌克兰战争爆发以来，中国对俄罗斯的进口从2022年2月的60多亿美元猛增到2022年5月的约100亿美元（根据德国基尔世界经济研究所-IfW 在2022年9月8日一场学术报告的数据，该报告会名为《乌克兰战争：中国是赢家？》）。在西方对俄严厉经济制裁的情况下，中国的输血对维持俄罗斯战争机器运转尤为重要。2022年9月9日，中国排名第三的领导人、全国人大委员长栗战书在会见俄罗斯国家杜马领导人时表示，“中方理解并支持俄罗斯针对乌克兰问题采取的措施，并从不同方面予以策应”。“策应”一词可以理解为通过采取协调一致的行动进行支持，因此这是一份十分重要的立场宣示，表明中国在乌克兰战争中并非中立，而是坚定地站在俄罗斯一边。
+
+由此可见，中国和俄罗斯联手对抗欧美的态势越来越明显。这不但是欧亚大陆（俄中）与跨大西洋体系（欧美）的地缘政治对抗，也是俄罗斯“主权民主”与中国“人民民主”联手挑战西方“自由民主”的意识形态竞争。那么，历史上有着复杂关系的中俄两国如何结成了事实上的同盟？中俄联盟是否有牢固的基础？具有什么性质和哪些特征？本文将回顾中俄历史上的恩怨情仇，探究中俄联盟的现状，以揭示其实质驱动力，并评估其未来走向，从而回答上述问题。
+
+
+### 历史视角下的中俄恩怨情仇
+
+> 2013年，“一带一路”战略横空出世，中国携庞大资本经略欧亚。这实质是北京趁俄国衰弱之际，全面接收苏联解体后的欧亚大陆地缘政治遗产。
+
+从中国人的视角看，历史上的沙俄是一个极富侵略性的帝国。沙俄总共从中国攫取了150万平方公里土地，其后继者苏联一手策动了外蒙古独立，使得中国又丧失了150万平方公里领土，总计造成300万平方公里领土损失。俄国和日本，是近现代以来对中国伤害最大的两个帝国主义强权。但日本在二战战败后，被迫全部吐出了侵占的中国领土，而俄国占领中国土地以及外蒙古独立的事实已经合法化和永久化。
+
+继承沙俄的苏联，同样是一个扩张欲望永无止境的超级强权，在1969年中苏爆发激烈边境战斗后，两国关系跌入冰点，苏联随即在中苏边境陈兵百万，强大的装甲集群一周之内就能直捣北京。更加可怕的是，苏联强硬派认真地准备对华发动毁灭性的核打击，以“一劳永逸地消除中国威胁”。为此，苏联征询当时同样与中国处于敌对状态的美国的意见。时任美国总统尼克松意识到，如果允许苏联对中国进行核打击，那么“整个世界就会跪倒在北极熊面前，而只要美国反对，苏联就不敢轻易动用核武器”。因此，美国向苏联表达了反对对华核打击的立场。回顾这段惊心动魄的历史，公正的人们必须承认，是美国挽救了面临核打击灭顶之灾的中国。
+
+而对苏联及其后继者俄罗斯联邦而言，中国实际上是一个忘恩负义的狡猾角色。作为世界上首个社会主义国家，苏联在1917年十月革命后遭到欧美孤立，于是把目光转向了东方。彼时的中国作为帝国主义体系的薄弱环节，就成为苏联打破地缘政治封锁的切入口和输出意识形态革命的目的地。如果说中国革命是一项前途未卜的风险投资，那么苏联实际上是那个天使投资人。国共两党都大量接受了苏联的经济、政治、军事和人才援助。国民党方面，赫赫有名的黄埔军校，是苏联帮助建立的，北伐战争也有苏联军事顾问参与指挥。中国共产党早期是共产国际的一个支部，来自莫斯科的支持，不但是党生存和发展的重要保障，也是党领导人合法性的必要来源。
+
+1949年中华人民共和国成立后，中苏结盟。在第一个五年计划期间，苏联向中国提供了大规模援助，包括156项工矿业工程，相当于手把手帮助中国实现了工业化。今天，中国自豪地宣称拥有全球最完备的工业体系，是举世无双的制造业超级大国，但第一桶金是俄国人给的，是俄国人帮助中国建立了重工业体系。更为重要的是，苏联还对中国的核武器研制提供了最初的宝贵支持。然而，斯大林死后中苏关系逐渐破裂，双方爆发了激烈的意识形态争执，进而发展到严重的军事对抗。面对苏联红军百万雄师，毛深为忧惧，转而靠拢美国，对苏联反戈一击。
+
+尽管普京“大帝”在中国拥有上至国家领导人、下至贩夫走卒的大量崇拜者，但曾经哀叹苏联解体是“二十世纪最大地缘政治灾难”并图谋恢复帝国的他，能不对“阴险”的“中国朋友”心生怨恨并充满防范？如今，中国由于近四十年来实行改革开放政策而使得国力大幅提升，从而信心倍增，放弃了邓的“韬光养晦”、江的“闷声发大财”和胡的“不折腾”，转而在地缘政治上采取“奋发有为”姿态。2013年，“一带一路”战略横空出世，中国携庞大资本经略欧亚。这实质是北京趁俄国衰弱之际，全面接收苏联解体后的欧亚大陆地缘政治遗产。难以想象，在当年苏联全盛时期，还有哪个大国可以在欧亚大陆腹地这样大举拓展。即便只是贸易和投资，也是不可想象的，因为经济必然与政治挂钩，何况是大规模基础设施建设。北京明确宣称，“一带一路”是当今最受欢迎的国际公共产品，其雄图远略和庞大资源，使普京的“欧亚经济联盟”相形见绌，这实际上是对俄国大国雄心的重大打击。
+
+诚然，国际关系是复杂而变幻莫测的，十九世纪的英国政治家巴麦尊勋爵（Lord Palmerston）有一句名言“我们没有永远的盟友，也没有永远的敌人，但英国的利益是永恒不变的，我们这些人的职责就是为国家谋求这些利益。”这句话虽被庸俗化为“没有永久的朋友，也没有永久的敌人，只有永久的利益”而广为流传，倒也道出了现实主义国际关系理论的一个基本准则，即在无政府的国际丛林中，只有权力（尤其是军事权力）才是国家安全的最重要保障，而国家领导人的愿望和意图并不重要，因为主观意愿是多变而不可靠的。
+
+无论是历史上的沙俄、苏联，还是今日的俄罗斯联邦和中华人民共和国，其外交战略和政策都高度属于现实主义类型。因此，需要从冷酷无情的现实主义视角来审视中俄关系，才能明白其实质。尽管俄国的经济总量只相当于中国的广东省，但仍然拥有强大的军力，尤其是其核武库匹敌美国，足以毁灭世界多次。因此，只有俄国的军事实力尤其是核力量严重削弱，才不会构成对中国的根本威胁，才可能真正成为令人放心的伙伴。而这对野心勃勃扩张成性的俄国来说，几乎是天方夜谭。
+
+与基辛格齐名的美国战略家布热津斯基（Zbigniew Brzezinski）曾说，“作为美国的伙伴，俄国太虚弱了；作为美国的病人，俄国又太强壮了。”而对当今中国而言，作为盟友，俄国在军事上显然太强悍了，有能力直接威胁中国的生存；作为伙伴，俄国在经济上又太虚弱了，不能与美国这个数十年来的科技来源和巨大市场相提并论。如果中国与俄国结盟，俄国必然要求北京在经济上输血，而虚弱的俄国经济，有可能成为拖累中国的巨大负担。但如果美国全面与中国“脱钩”，那么中国将至少丧失一个最大的外汇顺差来源，北京是否有能力对包括俄国在内的“一带一路”沿线国家持续输血，要打一个很大的问号。
+
+归根到底，中俄两国接近的驱动力在于：当前，中俄两国都面临美国（和西方）的强大压力，被迫抱团取暖。但是，两国的情况又有很大的不同。俄国之所以遭到西方制裁，直接原因是2014年吞并了克里米亚和2022年的大举入侵。尽管普京作风粗暴、手腕凌厉，但其实是以攻为守。然而，中国与美国的矛盾，却是崛起国与霸权国之间的结构性冲突。北京一方面指责华盛顿咄咄逼人的战略打压，强调中国无意谋求霸权，无意挑战现有国际秩序；但另一方面，北京并不打算放弃以“一带一路”为代表的宏大战略，而且已经逐渐从项目驱动式运作升级为机制化管理。北京还强调要为世界贡献“中国方案”，输出“公共产品”。与俄国处于守势的战略地位迥然不同的是，中国作为崛起强国，实际上是以守为攻，是改变现存国际秩序的一方，这导致美国不断指责中国是“修正主义”强权大国。
+
+
+### 牢固但非对称的联盟
+
+> 由于中国在经济和技术上的优势日益突出，北京-莫斯科轴心明显是一个实力不对称的联盟。中国致力于将俄罗斯变成一个可靠的能源、原材料供应方和工业产品市场。……迄今为止，克里姆林宫仍然认为这种合作对其有利，因为它减少了俄罗斯对欧洲市场的依赖。
+
+尽管历史上的中俄关系充满恩怨情仇，但自苏联解体以来，莫斯科和北京的关系却持续向好。2021年11月，波兰最大智库、对前苏联地区和中国素有研究的波兰东方研究中心发表了一份名为《北京-莫斯科轴心：非对称联盟的基础》的研究报告。这份长达104页的报告在全面深入地评估了中俄关系后得出结论：莫斯科和北京之间的联系从未像今天这样密切和热烈，事实上已经是非正式联盟；这种和睦关系是由两国政治领导人三十年来不断努力加强相互联系，深化政治、军事、经济和意识形态方面的合作而产生的。
+
+该报告认为中俄联盟的基础在于两国统治精英都深信：他们不但在战略利益上根本一致，而且在意识形态上也相当接近。因此，这种联盟的性质远远超出了单纯的战术上的权宜之计，尽管它并不是没有内部矛盾。
+
+这个联盟的建设早在20世纪90年代初就开始了，但从那时起它的强度一直在波动。每当莫斯科与美国发生对抗时，它就会加速，而每当华盛顿似乎准备纵容莫斯科的地缘政治野心时，它就会松懈下来。2012年是一个重要的分水岭：在克里姆林宫认为美国（时任民主党政府）对俄政策的主要目的是民主化和政权更迭之后，北京就成为克里姆林宫不可或缺和不可替代的伙伴。2012年也恰逢中国共产党迎来新任最高领导，他对内反腐集权，对外推行“奋发有为”的外交政策。最终，中俄关系在2012年至2018年期间达到了非正式联盟的水平，当时两个大国都与美国发生了公开冲突，双方都意识到了这场冲突的长期性和结构性特点。
+
+的确，在地缘政治上俄中两国均与西方有巨大矛盾：莫斯科视北约和欧盟东扩为其国家安全的巨大威胁（抑或帝国野心的重大障碍），而北京则对华盛顿纠集盟友推行印太战略如鲠在喉。因此，中俄联盟的基础是两国在全球舞台上的战略利益趋同。通过同时采取进取性的政策——俄罗斯在欧洲，中国在印太地区——两国可以迫使美国和西方分散其有限的资源，从而赢得竞争优势。在意识形态方面，两国都是西方眼中的异类，都面临“自由民主”普世价值的巨大压力。若一个奉行西式“自由民主”体制的乌克兰在经济发展和社会进步等方面取得成功，将是对俄罗斯人民的巨大吸引，从而构成对莫斯科威权统治的重大威胁；同样的，北京也在意识形态上充满危机感，对“颜色革命”严加防范，也不会允许台湾这个华人社会以其“自由民主”体制长期拒绝其统治，因为这不但违背其地缘政治利益，也挑战其意识形态命脉。
+
+乌克兰战争爆发后，西方致力于孤立俄罗斯，拜登发誓要将普京变成国际社会的“贱民”。中国尽管由于美国的警告没有向俄罗斯提供军事援助，但却在经济和舆论上对俄罗斯大力“策应”。凡此种种，都给世人呈现了中俄非正式联盟的事实，令人不得不佩服波兰学者作为前苏东社会主义阵营成员，对中俄关系的认识之深和先见之明。
+
+俄罗斯对当今国际秩序深为不满，因为自苏联解体以来，俄罗斯不但未能从全球化浪潮中获益，相反其政治经济地位不断下降，只能靠提供廉价能源和展示残存军力来勉强支撑大国地位。因此，俄罗斯是全球化的大输家，称其是一个“有核武器的大号沙特阿拉伯”并不为过。是故，俄罗斯强烈希望改变冷战结束后以美国为中心的国际秩序，已经成为现存国际秩序的解构者，破坏力极大，这次乌克兰战争即为明证。
+
+与俄罗斯迥然不同的是，中国是冷战结束后这一波全球化的巨大（或许是最大）赢家。在2001年加入WTO后，中国成功地融入了世界资本主义体系，迅速变成“世界工厂”，实现了前所未有的大规模经济发展。如果说俄罗斯是因地位沉沦而倍感屈辱，那么中国则是因没有获得与其不断增长的经济实力相称的政治地位而心怀不满。因此，两国都对美国主导、西方支配的现有国际秩序发起了挑战，因而都被美国视为“修正主义”强权。
+
+中国与俄罗斯有四千多公里的漫长边境，对北京来说，维持与莫斯科的良好关系对其北部、西部乃至整个中亚地区的稳定至关重要，从而使其有可能集中精力与华盛顿在印太地区展开竞争，并为那里可能发生的军事冲突做好准备。中国处于欧亚大陆和印太海域之间，只有西北方向的“塞防”无后顾之忧，才能在东南方向的“海防”大有作为，才不至于两线作战而顾此失彼。随着中国进入与西方的结构性冲突，俄罗斯已成为北京正在构建的以中国为中心秩序的主要支柱之一，可以提供具有战略意义的能源、原材料和关键军事技术。
+
+莫斯科和北京也在努力削弱跨大西洋的关系，绕过欧盟，优先与德国和法国接触。俄罗斯主要活跃在安全领域，而中国（至少到目前为止）则主要在经济领域发力。莫斯科企图分化欧美，诱导柏林和巴黎对华盛顿“战略自治”，并在欧盟国家内部扶持极右翼政治力量。北京在经济领域追求类似的目标，试图通过向欧盟提供市场准入来阻止美欧之间形成共同的对华战略。然而，俄罗斯悍然侵乌反而促成了欧美的空前团结，北约也借此摆脱所谓“脑死亡”状态而满血复活；而中国与欧盟历经七年共35轮谈判才达成的《中欧全面投资协定》（CAI），也因北京制裁欧盟政客和学术机构而被欧洲议会冻结。
+
+波兰东方研究中心的报告认为，一方面中俄正日益结成牢固联盟，另一方面双方并非没有矛盾。两国都希望避免过度依赖对方，并努力通过发展与第三方的关系来创造替代方案。俄罗斯与中国两个带有敌意的邻国（印度和越南）交好，其出售给印度的武器通常比售华军火高一个等级，这无疑引起了北京的不安。中俄之间可能出现的紧张关系还包括中亚，这是俄罗斯的传统“势力范围”，但近年来中国在该地区的影响力越来越大。然而，由于两国之间密切的交流，尤其是最高领导人之间的频繁会晤，这种潜在的紧张关系已被成功化解。与共同战略利益的重要性相比，莫斯科和北京都认识到这些矛盾是次要的，因此双方偶尔的利益不匹配并没有损害非正式联盟关系。
+
+由于中国在经济和技术上的优势日益突出，北京-莫斯科轴心明显是一个实力不对称的联盟。中国致力于将俄罗斯变成一个可靠的能源、原材料供应方和工业产品市场，这符合沃勒斯坦（Immanuel Wallerstein）世界体系理论中的“中心-外围”分工模式。迄今为止，克里姆林宫仍然认为这种合作对其有利，因为它减少了俄罗斯对欧洲市场的依赖。然而，俄罗斯也试图将其对中国的依赖降到最低，特别是通过限制中国投资来防止其获得俄战略资产，以及在原苏联地区采取贸易保护主义（通过欧亚经济联盟和国家进口替代计划）。但是，在乌克兰战争爆发后，俄罗斯遭受西方空前严厉的制裁，形势比人强，因而不可避免地在经济上更加依赖中国。
+
+但是，俄罗斯在军事领域（核武器、部分军工科技和军队实战经验）、核能、航空航天和外交方面残存的优势，部分弥补了这种对中国有利的不对称关系。此外，由于俄罗斯具有战略意义的能源和原材料可以通过陆路进入中国，从而绕过美国海军在危机时可能封锁的海上供应路线（规避“马六甲困局”），也使得莫斯科对北京的讨价还价能力得以增强。
+
+对莫斯科而言，中俄联盟不可或缺，因为没有中国的支持，它就没有能力继续对西方采取对抗性政策。莫斯科接受与北京合作的不对称性，认为西方而非北京才是对其国内政治体系稳定的持久威胁。它还意识到，随着中美冲突的加剧，由于其军事和能源资产，它作为北京盟友的价值也水涨船高，因此希望中美战略竞争态势能够继续下去。
+
+普京一意孤行发动了乌克兰战争，在不断遭受重大军事挫折后，他不但没有选择及时止损，反而如同一个赌徒那样加仓投入。2022年9月21日，普京宣布全国“局部动员”，要接着把这场战争打下去。因此，只要普京还继续执掌克里姆林宫，俄罗斯与西方的分裂就不会被修复，对中国的不对称依赖就将继续加强。
+
+美国卡内基国际和平基金会的研究员亚历山大·加布耶夫（Alexander Gabuev）指出：俄罗斯在乌克兰战争后已经被孤立，正变成一个巨大的欧亚版伊朗；其传统盟友印度越来越靠拢美国的“印太战略”和其他“志同道合”的国家，与俄罗斯渐行渐远；中国于是成为俄罗斯进出口的主要伙伴和首要外交盟友，重要地位不可代替。如果说世界正无可挽回地进入第二次冷战（欧美 vs. 俄中），那么莫斯科与北京的地位正好移形换位：第一次冷战期间中苏结盟，莫斯科是当仁不让的老大哥，但这一次它必须接受成为北京小伙伴的现实。
+
+
+### 自由霸权造就的事实联盟
+
+> 究竟是对美国物质力量的疑惧，还是对美国输出普世价值观和自由民主意识形态的怨恨，造就了欧亚大陆上的中俄威权联盟？
+
+北京-莫斯科轴心或中俄联盟，已经成为当今世界的一个基本事实。两国对美国的共同疑惧和怨恨，则是催生这个不对称但却相当牢固联盟的主要驱动力。然而，究竟是对美国物质力量的疑惧，还是对美国输出普世价值观和自由民主意识形态的怨恨，造就了欧亚大陆上的中俄威权联盟？现实主义者争辩说，美国在欧亚大陆西东两端的地缘政治压力迫使两国除了“背靠背”联合抗美外别无选择，因此采取了一系列地缘政治行动来打破围堵。进入2022年以来，局势发展更是一日千里。俄罗斯在乌克兰方向发动进攻，以图遏止欧洲-大西洋体系的不断东扩；而中国则积极准备武统台湾，如若成功，美国势力将会被逐出印太地区。但自由主义者却有另外一种解释：作为一个“自由主义利维坦”（美国国际关系学者伊肯伯里G. John Ikenberry提出的概念），美国在世界上推行自由民主体制，维护“基于规则的国际秩序”，给奉行“对内镇压”和“对外扩张”的中俄威权政体造成了生死存亡的威胁，因而迫使两国联手应对。
+
+美国弗吉尼亚大学政治学教授约翰·欧文（John M. Owen）认为，单纯的现实主义观点并不能解释中俄合作不断加强的事实。冷战结束后，美国的物质力量其实相当稳定，既没有衰落也没有崛起；俄罗斯因转型失败而衰落；而中国则一直在崛起。按照现实主义的观点，在这种情况下俄美应当联手抗中，因为俄国弱势、美国停滞而中国强势。上一次类似剧本发生在冷战期间的1970年代初，美国因陷入越战泥潭而不能自拔，但勃列日涅夫治下的苏联实力却达到巅峰状态，中国在三大国中最弱，于是尼克松和毛泽东决定捐弃前嫌、联手抗苏。对于正在浮现的“冷战2.0”，美国进攻性现实主义代表人物米尔斯海默（John Mearsheimer）大声疾呼应联俄制华，但现实发展却未能如米氏所愿，反而是中俄联手抗美。由此可见，重视力量对比的现实主义理论对此现实缺乏解释力。
+
+欧文认为，是另两个因素促成和加深了中俄合作：首先，美国是一个持久的自由主义霸权，是自由主义思想力量和强大物质力量的复合体，这使得美国对任何专制政权都构成威胁。美国物质力量、威望以及制定和执行规则的能力的结合，使得它在国际体系中拥有强制力、议程设置和偏好选择权力，追随者拥戴它，拒绝者憎恨它。其次，普京领导下的俄罗斯政权二十多年来与自由民主渐行渐远，因此对自由主义霸权越来越恐惧，从而愿意与奉行市场列宁主义的中国结盟。欧文指出，在自由主义的欧美和非自由主义的俄中之间存在一条意识形态鸿沟，双方都倾向于抱团取暖，而难以跨越鸿沟合作。有几类定性证据支持这些判断：（1）北京和莫斯科关于自由民主威胁的私下和公开声明；（2）2014年乌克兰危机后中俄双边合作的具体深化；（3）莫斯科和北京努力对抗自由主义霸权在其所在地区的蔓延；（4）邻国的反自由主义精英倾向于与中国或俄罗斯更多合作。欧文认为，只要美国厌倦了扮演自由主义霸权的角色（比如特朗普式的民粹主义和民族主义上台），或者“中国模式”变得如此强势，以至于威胁到普京政权，那么中俄合作的动力就会消退。
+
+欧文的论述以一种细致入微的方式解释了北京-莫斯科轴心的真正驱动力，反过来，这个轴心作为一个拥有巨大实力的“威权主义”联盟，也对欧美构成了地缘政治和意识形态双重挑战。俄罗斯用“主权民主”来对抗它眼中的西方“自由民主”意识形态扩张，大举入侵乌克兰更是打破了欧美倡导的“以规则为基础的自由国际秩序”，极大地冲击了冷战后形成的地缘政治格局。中国宣示其“人民民主”拥有制度优势，在疫情中表现尤为明显。横空出世近十年的“一带一路”在欧亚大陆和印太地区也得到长足发展，展示了北京惊人的地缘经济实力和不断增强的地缘政治影响力。由于地缘政治竞争和意识形态对抗本质上是零和博弈，所以压倒了中美之间密切的经贸联系，使其难以成为两国关系的压舱石。
+
+
+### 中俄联盟的未来
+
+> 莫斯科声称“主权民主”，北京主张“人民民主”，两者都对西方的“自由民主”深感厌恶，都对美国力量支持下的普世价值充满疑惧。但实际上，两国并没有相同的政权类型或意识形态。
+
+冷战结束三十余年来，中俄越走越近，已经形成一个对抗欧美的事实联盟。虽然不对称，但却相当牢固。不过，这个联盟是否真的“无上限”？美国能否分化中俄？克里姆林宫是否终将厌倦对中国的依赖？而北京最终是否会后悔对莫斯科的支持？这些问题将决定二十一世纪的世界格局和人类命运。
+
+莫斯科声称“主权民主”，北京主张“人民民主”，两者都对西方的“自由民主”深感厌恶，都对美国力量支持下的普世价值充满疑惧。但实际上，两国并没有相同的政权类型或意识形态。俄罗斯是一个伪装成民主制度、以普京个人为中心的贪腐国家，但至少表面上还在实行多党民主制，而且也不再具备前苏联那种输出共产主义的意识形态雄心。即便是亚历山大·杜金这位有普京“大脑”之称的激进战略家，他的格局也仅限于鼓吹“新欧亚主义”以及“多极化”这种地区性而非普世性的意识形态。历史上的俄罗斯本是一个欧洲强国，俄罗斯大部分精英仍然对西方文明和欧洲生活方式充满向往。因此，强人普京之后的俄罗斯，仍然有可能实施西式民主制度。但对于今日中国，西方几乎已经达成共识，即“和平演变”希望已经完全破灭，对华“融入”政策非但没有促使中国向西方“自由民主”体制靠拢，反而帮助它成为一个拥有强大实力的制度性对手，一个用数字科技高度武装的极权大国，甚至是一个倡导用“人类命运共同体”来取代美国“新罗马世界帝国”霸权的新兴超级大国。
+
+除了中俄之间在政治体制上的差异，把中俄捆绑对待也不符合美国的地缘政治传统。美国百年来的国策始终是防止在欧亚大陆出现有敌意的霸权大国或联盟，所以美国一直灵活运用“扶弱抑强、分而治之”的外交手腕来促进欧亚大陆的多样化，最新的案例就是支持较弱的乌克兰抵抗其强邻俄罗斯的入侵。布热津斯基在其名著《大棋局》中警告美国决策者，如果欧亚大陆上形成敌视美国的中-俄-伊朗“反霸”联盟，这将是对美国最危险的地缘政治场景。因此，美国是否会长期维持同时遏制俄中两国的战略，非常值得怀疑。
+
+美国前总统特朗普本人曾多次表达对普京的钦慕，其外交战略一度有强烈的“联俄制华”倾向。2019年5月初，美国国务院政策规划部主任斯金纳博士（Kiron Skinner）把与中国的权力竞争称为“一场与一个真正不同的文明和不同意识形态之间的战斗，这是美国从未经历过的。中国（对美国）构成独一无二的挑战......因为北京政权不是西方哲学和历史的子孙......（美苏）冷战只是西方大家庭内部的争斗，而即将到来的对华冲突将是美国首次面对一个非白种人大国权力竞争者。”各界（包括中国官方）都猛烈抨击斯金纳女士作为非裔美国人居然发表了如此种族主义言论，但这又何尝不是特朗普政府向俄国人的表白：“我们都是白种人，欢迎回归西方文明大家庭，不要当中国的小伙伴。” 实际上，这就是典型的“联俄制华”地缘政治战略。
+
+但无奈美国国内传统反俄势力过于强大，使得特朗普一直无法有效实施战略转向。有鉴于此，尽管普京也有改善对美关系的愿望，奈何落花有意流水无情，他也只能耐心等待美国国内斗争中亲俄派压制反俄派那一天能尽快到来。但普京的希望破灭了，在2021年的选举中，对俄极端强硬派拜登战胜特朗普入主白宫（米尔斯海默2022年6月15日在德国柏林的一次演讲中表示拜登是对俄极端强硬派），扭转了“美国优先”这一民粹主义和民族主义外交政策，重新推行克里姆林宫眼中咄咄逼人的“自由主义霸权”外交。拜登政府相信，美国及其盟友有足够的硬实力来推行对俄中的双重遏制战略。白宫国家安全顾问杰克·沙利文（Jake Sullivan）指出，即使是一个更加团结的中俄轴心，也会在华盛顿及其在欧洲和亚太地区盟友的经济、外交和军事能力面前相形见绌。普京深感在拜登任上俄美关系好转无望，这或许是他最终决定入侵乌克兰的一个重要因素。倘若那位钦慕他的特朗普先生成功连任，普京也许不至于绝望到发动战争。
+
+历史在加速重演，一个对西方充满敌意的中俄联盟正浮现在欧亚大陆，拜登政府似乎也接受了这一现实。但近年来崭露头角的美国新锐外交政策学者哈尔·布兰兹（Hal Brands） 却认为，莫斯科和北京最终将爆发严重的全面利益冲突，因为自命不凡的俄国人不会喜欢生活在北京设计的、以中国为中心的世界中。毕竟俄罗斯历史上虽然一直落后于西方，但却自认为领先于东方。这在苏联解体前是一个事实，但苏联解体后俄罗斯的激进转型却失败了，经济和社会发展大幅倒退。俄罗斯选择了普京，但克格勃特工出身的他推行“特务治国”，暗杀和窃听大行其道，离法治和民主越来越远。因此，普京并没有让俄罗斯变得真正强大，他的崛起是以俄国衰落为代价的。而与俄罗斯“休克疗法”迥然不同的是，中国的改革开放选择了渐进式转型，成功地融入了世界资本主义经济体系，成为冷战后全球化浪潮中的大赢家。在加入WTO后，中国经济飞速发展，如今一个广东省就相当于俄罗斯全国GDP。但是，如果莫斯科对西方不能平等相待充满怨恨，又如何肯长期屈居昔日小伙伴北京之下？
+
+而北京方面并非不清楚俄军侵乌乃不义之战，因为这践踏了中国长久以来最珍视的国际政治原则，即国家主权不容外国侵犯。北京之所以支持莫斯科，是将后者视为实现自身安全和战略利益的工具，指望它能替自己挡西方子弹，俄罗斯政策精英们对此心知肚明。北京正在利用莫斯科急需出售能源的机会来获得大量折扣，不再那么容忍俄罗斯与其两个带有敌意邻国（印度和越南）的密切关系。此外，在中亚这个俄罗斯传统势力范围，北京最近也获得了重大进展，莫斯科不得不对它阻挠了25年之久的中-吉-乌铁路放行。因此，后普京时代的俄国统治精英最终可能会得出结论：采取不偏不倚的政策，即与中国和西方都保持富有成效的关系，才最符合其利益。莫斯科最终会认识到，通过克制其在欧洲的侵略冲动，它可以提升国际地位，增加对其他大国（包括中国）的影响力。
+
+而对于中国的对俄政策，耶鲁大学的历史和全球事务教授奥德·韦斯特德（Odd Arne Westad）认为，北京终将后悔对莫斯科的支持，下一次中俄分裂是可能的。他指出，当今中俄关系类似二十世纪初的德意志帝国和奥匈帝国。当时的德国，就像今天的中国，是一个正在崛起的大国，对国际秩序愤愤不平。而德国的盟友奥匈帝国就像今天的俄罗斯一样，是一个正在衰落的帝国，充满内忧外患。直到1914年夏天，德国领导人都相信，他们可以通过管理奥匈来实现自己的利益。但事与愿违，奥匈陷入一系列事端，并将德国拉下水，由此爆发了二十世纪的“万恶之源”——第一次世界大战。因此，中国应当格外小心，才不至于重蹈德意志帝国覆辙。
+
+对中国来说，与欧美的关系其实比与俄罗斯的关系更重要。毕竟，中国与欧美经贸往来的规模和深度都远远超过中俄贸易。当克里姆林宫要求兑现“无上限”友谊承诺时，中南海一定会考虑与欧美的关系不要受到牵连，因而难以全力援俄。全球化的大赢家和优等生中国，为什么要被失败的差生俄罗斯拖下水呢？更何况俄军在乌克兰损兵折将、败相已露。既然第一次冷战期间的中苏友谊只维持了十来年就破裂，双方走到兵戎相见，那又有什么理由认为第二次冷战时期的中俄联盟将永远坚如磐石？
+
+
+### 结语
+
+虽然美国是促成中俄联盟的重要因素，但单纯的美国物质权力或思想权力都不足以构成北京-莫斯科轴心的真正驱动力。对美国作为自由主义思想和霸权力量复合体的共同防范，才是中俄联盟得以形成的真正原因。反过来，北京-莫斯科轴心也对欧美构成了地缘政治和意识形态双重挑战，在乌克兰战争之后表现得愈加明显。这使得欧美空前团结起来，北约也满血复活。
+
+俯瞰世界格局，我们就会发现“欧洲-大西洋”体系和“印太战略”正在“自由民主”的旗帜下集结；而俄罗斯的“主权民主”和中国的“人民民主”也正在欧亚大陆上加紧构筑“背靠背”的战略联盟。但北京-莫斯科轴心是一个非对称联盟，与第一次冷战正好相反，莫斯科不得不接受成为北京小伙伴的苦涩现实。
+
+由于拜登政府推行同时遏制中俄的战略，短期之内看不到中俄联盟破裂的迹象。除非华盛顿放弃推行自由民主普世价值，否则美国难以实施现实主义式的“联俄制华”战略转向。但这并不表示中俄联盟永远牢不可破，自命不凡的俄国精英可能终将厌倦对中国的依赖。而北京也可能最终发现：只有富强而先进的欧美，而非落后又虚弱的俄国，才能提供中国所需的资本、市场和科技；只有在国际体系中处于领导地位的西方，而非遭到孤立的俄国，才能给予中国渴盼的认可。因此，不能排除在某个时机北京削减甚至放弃对莫斯科的支持。国际政治风云变幻，充满了不确定性，一场乌克兰战争，使得欧美对阵中俄的博弈大大加速，从而不可避免地影响历史进程和我们每一个人的命运。
+
+（成朝庭，人文社会科学网络社区“文社”发起人，国际政治经济研究者，坐标德国柏林）
+
+<!--END-->
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "“有声音”胜于“大多数”"
+author: "韩大狗"
+date  : 2022-10-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/mZHCyQH.jpg
+#image_caption: "中共不能顺理成章地宣称自己就是“全体人民”……"
+description: "2022年10月13日，北京市四通桥上发生一起抗议行动。由於後續大批模仿、暗語，中国政府在网络平台上实行高強度噤声管制。在海外，本次事件抗议者受到中国异见人士声援，被称为“新坦克人”。部分媒体亦将其称为“Bridge Man”，即“桥人”。——维基百科"
+---
+
+10月13日，中共二十大开幕前3天，一位市民在北京海淀区交通干道四通桥上悬挂起两条横幅：“不要核酸要吃饭/不要封控要自由/不要谎言要尊严/不要文革要改革/不要领袖要选票/不做奴才做公民”和“罢课罢工罢免独裁国贼习近平”。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+四通桥位于北京北三环西侧，临近中国人民大学、北京理工大学等多所高校。这里虽然是交通要道，但与天安门、西单、北京大学等“敏感”地点不同，没有重大抗议事件的历史，因此也没有被有关部门重点防范。
+
+这次抗议是一次典型的“孤狼”行动，没有聚集的人群，没有组织策划，没有事先声张，连悬挂的横幅也是手写而成。也因此，甚至连当时前往现场执勤的警察都显得有些不知所措，网络上甚至流传了一段看上去由警车内部拍摄的视频，足见警务人员在现场时的新鲜感。
+
+> 抗议者将矛盾毫不含糊地指向了中国政府的最高领导人习近平本人。这在共和国历史上几乎是绝无仅有的。
+
+四通桥的抗议行动是中国近年来罕见的引起轰动的政治抗议。尤其引人注目的是，与普通的维权抗议不同，这次的抗议者将矛盾毫不含糊地指向了中国政府的最高领导人习近平本人。这在共和国历史上几乎是绝无仅有的，也因此引发了舆论的广泛关注。海外社交媒体普遍将抗议者称为“勇士”，而此前在中国大热的歌曲《孤勇者》也被赋予了新的含义，成为对抗议者的赞扬。
+
+中国政府对此高度警觉。在事发之后几个小时，立刻传出北京各地招募“看桥人”，以防再有人悬挂横幅的消息。在社交媒体上，审查部门严防死守。而“北京”、“海淀”、“桥”、甚至“勇敢”，都成为了被审查的敏感词，在微博上只有蓝V帐号（机构和媒体帐号）可以发布这些字眼。之后几天，微信平台将发布了四通桥横幅相关内容的帐号一律封禁，并且与此前常见的“禁言三天”的处理不同，涉事帐号一律永久注销，处理极为严厉。
+
+由于中国国内迅速而高效的审查，这一事件只在部分人之中流传。但其轰动程度毫无疑问已经超过了大多数突发性政治事件。无论在意义还是视觉上，四通桥事件都是近年中国零星的抗议事件中令人最为印象深刻的一幕。但同时，抗议者孤注一掷、有如血书般的横幅，也仿佛在提醒人们，政治行动的空间是多么的狭小。在国家权力巨大的压力之下，个体的抗议仿佛飞蛾扑火，注定以悲剧作为结局。
+
+但是，我们真的可以否定这种“作死”式抗争的意义吗？在无法开展政治行动的中国、无法靠政治行动改变丝毫的处境下，抗议有什么用？它对中国政府的执政到底有什么样的影响？
+
+![image1](https://i.imgur.com/TfShkgr.jpg)
+▲ 合成网图
+
+
+### 涟漪：海内外连锁抗议
+
+> 这种对四通桥抗议者的声援，对很多人而言，也是第一次用激烈的线下反抗行动参与政治。
+
+毫无疑问，这次抗议的直接推手，是中国政府严酷的“动态清零”政策。在一切为“清零”让路的方针下，中国的经济遭受了巨大的打击，工作单位停发工资、裁员、乃至倒闭都成为一种“疫情”之下的“新常态”。
+
+而二十大前，“动态清零”政策变本加厉，大有以“清零”为大会献礼的意思。随着大会临近，各地方政府也不再掩饰“献礼”的意图，清零政策执行越严厉，就意味着对中央越忠诚。因此，虽然中国政府历来惯于让人们相信“上面的意图是好的，只是下面执行出了问题”，但在“动态清零”问题上，还是有越来越多的人意识到，这一政策的根本问题出自中央，尤其是出自最高层。
+
+不难理解，中国政府对四通桥抗议的严肃对待，一方面是因为二十大开幕前夕这一尤为敏感的时间节点，另一方面也是因为中国政府认为这一抗议行动会带来强烈的群众反响，甚至引起效仿。而这一预期很快得到了证实。
+
+在四通桥抗议横幅出现后的几天里，中国国内和海外华人群体中出现了大量的声援行动。在国外，芝加哥大学、斯坦福大学、牛津大学等众多高校出现了疑似为中国留学生创作的涂鸦和海报，表示对四通桥抗议者的支持；在国内，类似的抗议标语在西安交通大学、深圳中学等多处被发现；即使在严加防范的北京，也有人在公共厕所中写下了“反独裁”、“反核酸”的口号。
+
+这种对四通桥抗议者的声援，对很多人而言，也是第一次用激烈的线下反抗行动参与政治。
+
+![image2](https://i.imgur.com/SsVGH9F.jpg)
+▲ 事发之后，有推特网友发布照片指，北京中国电影资料馆男厕内被喷上“反独裁、反核酸”的抗议口号。
+
+
+### 一言一行的意念消除
+
+> 近年来，中国对一切所谓“舆情事件”的重视程度，显然超出了以投资理性为基础的理论的预期。
+
+类似这样的“孤狼”抗议者引起大规模反响的案例，虽然在情理之中，但其实并不多见。在中国，维稳工作的重点一直放在所谓的“群体性事件”，即大规模、有组织的集会式抗议上。而对于这样孤立的个人抗议行为，一般被认为不会对政局稳定造成实质性的影响。
+
+从理性角度来说，这样的判断是成立的。在威权巨大的压迫之下，本来就只有少数真正将生死置之度外之人能够站出来悬挂一两个抗议横幅；而几条标语对于中国政府强大的维稳能力而言，其挑战不值一提。
+
+当然，政府有足够的理由担心零星的模仿会导致事态的扩大，但即使事态真发展到“群体性事件”的地步，国家机器仍然掌握强大的暴力权力——正如1989年6月的新闻播音员所说：“如果我们的铁骑继续前进，这个螳臂挡车的歹徒，难道能够阻挡得了吗？”
+
+然而另一方面，这次孤立的、没有形成群体行动的个人抗议，却又似乎的确触及到了中国共产党执政的根本问题。在政治学中，有一个长久以来困扰研究者和观察者的问题：如果强大的国家机器可以用暴力压服一切反抗，它为何还需要深入介入人们一言一行的意见表达？换句话说，如果坦克可以踏平六四事件那样大规模的抗议人群，为何中共仍然会为一次“孤狼”式的抗议标语而胆战心惊？
+
+事实上，像中国政府一样，细致审查和管理人民的每一次意见表达，在威权国家之中，是少见的。即使号称强硬的俄罗斯普京政权，在言论管制和意见表达上，也远逊色于中国，不仅给大规模抗议行动留下了空间，像四通桥事件这样的孤狼式抗议更是家常便饭。这部分是因为，即使俄罗斯这样的大国，其国家权力和对社会的渗透程度也没有达到中国的程度。
+
+但更重要的是，细致管理人民的一言一行，对于政府的支出和收益而言，是不划算的。如果政府的终极目标只是掌握政权，保持权力，则不必在孤立的意见表达上大做文章。几年前，在中国研究领域，也曾经出现过一个颇为主流的理论，认为中国的言论审查，都以阻止群体性事件为主要目的；如果不会形成危及社会稳定的群体性事件，则审查并不会十分严格。
+
+然而近几年来，中国对一切所谓“舆情事件”的重视程度，显然超出了这种以投资理性为基础的理论的预期。对于任何事件，无论规模，只要可能造成负面的舆论反应，都会被“一刀切”阻断传播。“舆情事件”这一概念最重要的一个特征，就是它并不在意人们会否在线下形成群体性事件，而是仿佛一个事件只要在网络上被大量讨论，就已经危害到了公共安全。
+
+四通桥抗议事件同样如此。中国政府最恐惧的，似乎并不是人们集会抗议的可能，而是从根源上阻断有关这一事件的一切讨论。近年来，人民网等众多官方媒体纷纷成立“舆情分析”智库，从这些智库发布的报告看，官方的关注点绝不仅仅在于哪些事件可能导致群体性事件。
+
+相反，这些舆情分析全面搜集社会各角落对大事小情的反馈，意图从根本上控制“舆情”的走向，试图让人们的每一个表达都符合“正确”的价值观。这种从意念上而非行动上消除事件影响的做法，近年来已经成为中国政府与其他威权国家的一个巨大不同。
+
+![image3](https://i.imgur.com/XTyOXv8.jpg)
+▲ 身在海外的华人对抗议事件给予更大规模的声援，有人在学校贴出印有示威者抗议标语的中英对照文宣。
+
+
+### 破坏“全体人民共同意愿”的统治根基
+
+> 中国共产党的“民意”是不能量化的，因为“人民”是一个被召唤出来的抽象概念，只有全部而彻底的民众支持，才能够满足共产党对其合法性的宣称。
+
+这一不同的一大原因在于，中国不仅仅是一个理性的威权国家，也是一个“非理性”的意识形态国家。中国共产党执政的根基，在于声称自己站在历史的正确一边，声称自己代表了全体人民的总意志。如果说普京还可以通过操控选举数据声称自己的权力是由多数人赋予的，那么“多数”这个概念在中国则并不具有任何法理效益。
+
+比如此次二十大开幕后，中国的官方发言人就表示“习近平说出了中国十四亿人的心声”。而类似关于“中国共产党代表了全体中国人意愿”的宣言，在官方人士口中屡见不鲜。对于中国共产党而言，“人民”要么是一个百分之百的整体，要么就不存在。
+
+本质上，中国共产党无法从西方一般理解的“民意”或“舆论”（public opinion）中获取合法性。这种西方意义上的“民意”，来自于多数的授权，来自于对支持与否的量化。但中国共产党的“民意”是不能量化的，因为“人民”是一个被召唤出来的抽象概念，只有全部而彻底的民众支持，才能够满足共产党对其合法性的宣称，因为哪怕少了百分之一、万分之一，也不是“全体人民”了。
+
+也因此，每一个破坏了全部而彻底的支持的民意表达，都必然会破坏对于这种“全体人民”的想象，而从根本上动摇中国共产党执政合法性的宣称。
+
+无论表示抗议的标语、口号，无论多么孤立、多么缺乏组织，对于中国而言，其意义都与在俄罗斯、白俄罗斯、乃至伊朗等地，有着本质的不同。在中国，这些抗议的口号、甚至网络上出现的讨论，破坏的都不仅仅是数量层面上的民意支持，更是一个形而上学的整体，而中国共产党正是依靠对这个形而上学整体的宣称才具有合法性。
+
+这种整体人民的观念，也从一个侧面解释了中国对于选举的恐惧。虽然不断有西方的中国研究学者公布调查报告显示，中国仍有多数人口对政府持信任态度，甚至积极支持中共执政，但这种支持却并不能称为中共执政的合法性来源。这绝不仅仅是因为中共恐惧开放选举和民意统计后的滑坡效应，更是因为中共所需要的民意，绝不是“多数”就可以满足的。只有当“民意”表现为一个牢不可破的整体，中共才能筑牢它的意识形态基础。
+
+这种整体观念是中共的优势所在，却也是其巨大的弱点。其优势在于，只要“共产党代表全体人民”的假象仍然存在，中共的任何行为都可以不计后果，可以将社会随意宰割。它可以声称“江山就是人民，人民就是江山”，这句话意味着，它不需要对真正的人民负责，因为它自己就是“人民”。
+
+但另一方面，它必须时刻如坐针毡，因为只要有一点反对的声音出现，它的统治基础就称不上牢固。
+
+![image4](https://i.imgur.com/P8KWgWc.jpg)
+▲ 海外华人声援，贴出印有关于国家主席习近平的标语。
+
+
+### 发声，是质性的区别
+
+> 在中国，量化的民意不具有意义。有意义的是“有声音”和“没有声音”这种质性的区别。
+
+这样的意识形态框架对中国人而言意味着什么——让自己的声音被听到，在中国远比在其他威权国家更困难，却也更重要。
+
+中国政府远比其他国家更加在意对人们日常一言一行的管理，甚至不惜花费巨大代价只为终止一些对孤立事件的民间讨论。与普京等声称自己的权力来自“多数人”支持的威权政府不同，在中国，量化的民意不具有意义。有意义的是“有声音”和“没有声音”这种质性的区别。
+
+如果没有人发声，即使有多于50%的人反对，反对者也仍然是零，中国政府的支持者仍然是“全体人民”；但如果不断有人发声，即使还有多于50%的人支持现政权，政府也不能理所当然地声称自己代表了全部十四亿人。
+
+因为这一层逻辑存在，每一次被传播出来的反对声音，即使从实际的政治权力角度而言或许并无巨大影响，但却都是在动摇中国政府的意识形态根本。如果中国不能顺理成章地宣称自己就是“全体人民”、代表了人民的总体意志，中国最终将沦落为与俄罗斯、伊朗一样，只依靠暴力进行统治，而不再身披华丽的合法性外衣。
+
+当然，这绝不意味着利维坦就会失败，因为即使只依靠暴力，中国政府仍然具有哪怕俄罗斯也无法比拟的强大强权。但如果能够继续不断出现零星的“舆情事件”，哪怕不是四通桥这样直接触碰政权本身的事件，也仍然意味着戳破“全体人民的意愿”这一神话的希望。
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file

From a1bacb8b5526f4f41e3e2c44d0d499ee578c312e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: theagora <agoradao@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2022 15:17:45 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 4/9] =?UTF-8?q?0x16=20VOL.22=20=C2=A9=20MMXXII?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

---
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 _data/archives.yml | 3 +++
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/_config.yml b/_config.yml
index 6a43187f..42ff83c9 100644
--- a/_config.yml
+++ b/_config.yml
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 title: The Republic of Agora
-description: UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.21 © MMXXII
+description: UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.22 © MMXXII
 baseurl: "/pen0" # the subpath of your site, e.g. /blog
 url: "https://agorahub.github.io" # the hostname & protocol, e.g. http://example.com
 google_analytics: 'UA-166928354-2' # agorahub-pen0
diff --git a/_data/archives.yml b/_data/archives.yml
index 83140491..245d879c 100644
--- a/_data/archives.yml
+++ b/_data/archives.yml
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+- name: VOL.21
+  repo: https://gitlab.com/agora0/pen/0x15
+  site: https://agora0.gitlab.io/pen/0x15
 - name: VOL.20
   repo: https://gitlab.com/agora0/pen/0x14
   site: https://agora0.gitlab.io/pen/0x14

From 4495e47bc452dfc9306e8ca9f906afeebb94de91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hokoi <hokoeye@pm.me>
Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 03:28:35 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 5/9] C2: Initial commit HKers articles, 0x16 Oct.28

---
 .../_hkers/2022-10-07-ukraines-resilience.md  |  54 +++++
 .../_hkers/2022-10-19-ccp-inc-in-greece.md    | 215 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 269 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-10-07-ukraines-resilience.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2022-10-19-ccp-inc-in-greece.md

diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-10-07-ukraines-resilience.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-10-07-ukraines-resilience.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c26c5e13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-10-07-ukraines-resilience.md
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Ukraine’s Resilience
+author: Frederick W. Kagan and Mark Polyak
+date  : 2022-10-07 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LurAofH.jpg
+#image_caption: 
+description: Ukraine’s Resilience Transcends the Battlefield
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_Ukraine has shocked the world by withstanding the February 2022 Russian invasion and then reversing it around Kyiv in April and Kharkiv in September._ <excerpt/> _Ukrainian society has rallied in an equally remarkable way. A series of recent polls suggests that the war has actually increased the Ukrainian people’s trust in their local and national government and largely want the international community to empower them and their government to rebuild their shattered country rather than to do it for them._
+
+Ukraine confronted the Russian invasion on an already-weak footing. Economic challenges exacerbated by COVID held Ukrainians’ attention more than the Russian occupation of Crimea and Donbas or even the threat of Russian invasion in [a July-August 2021 National Democratic Institute poll](https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/July%202021%20_bi-annual%20survey%20-%20public.pdf). Respondents had somewhat more trust in local government than in national government and its agencies, but little confidence in any.
+
+A September 2022 [Ipsos survey shows](https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/ukraine-resilience-monitor) some of the ways in which Ukrainians have suffered from the invasion. Unemployment has risen across the country and especially in frontline cities. Ukrainians who have not been displaced have suffered significant income loss. Residents of cities at or near the frontlines suffer from serious degradation of essential services, including access to safe drinking water, hot water, and heat.
+
+![image1](https://i.imgur.com/N774fre.jpg)
+_▲ __Employment has plummeted in frontline cities.___
+
+![image2](https://i.imgur.com/IWacJBO.jpg)
+___▲ Frontline cities have experienced the sharpest job loss.___
+
+But Ukraine has shown remarkable resilience in the face of a Russian attack that has deliberately targeted economic and infrastructure facilities throughout the country and not only near the front lines. The Ipsos poll shows that the majority of employed Ukrainians in major unoccupied cities surveyed are still receiving their salaries on time and, for those that are delayed, the delays are usually less than two weeks. These data suggest that Ukrainians have managed to maintain a largely functional economic and financial system despite their pre-war challenges and the ravages of a brutal invasion.
+
+![image3](https://i.imgur.com/gZOFSx6.jpg)
+_▲ __Ukrainians who stayed in frontline cities either don’t have any income or have experienced significant income loss.___
+
+![image4](https://i.imgur.com/SOgpefN.jpg)
+_▲ __Most of Mykolaiv’s residence don’t have access to safe drinking water.___
+
+Ukraine has also managed to avoid nationalizing or seriously unbalancing its economy even as it has mobilized for war. Nearly 65% of employed respondents work in private enterprises, with 48% either self-employed or employed at small or medium-sized businesses. The survey naturally does not capture the proportion of Ukrainians currently serving with the armed forces, but the results clearly show that a private economy providing normal services continues to operate despite the horror of war and the rigors of mobilization.
+
+Ukrainians are also finding ways to keep essential services functional in key frontline cities despite constant Russian attacks. Over 99% of respondents had access to electricity, including 100% in Kharkiv. Fewer than 7% had lost access to gas. Over 90% had internet access and over 98% had mobile phone service. Over 80% of residents of Lviv, Kyiv, Dnipro, and Kharkiv reported that they had access to safe drinking water, although only 26% of Mykolayiv inhabitants said the same. The figure for Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, is remarkable. Russian forces remained within artillery range of Kharkiv until September and have constantly attacked it with artillery shells, multiple-launch rocket systems, and long-range precision munitions since February. Russian attacks regularly damage key infrastructure nodes especially in frontline cities, but Ukrainians are managing to repair and keep their systems operating remarkably well despite these attacks.
+
+![image5](https://i.imgur.com/Vi0H9Vx.jpg)
+_▲ __Whether they are on the frontlines or in the rear cities, most people are getting their salaries.___
+
+![image6](https://i.imgur.com/bYGVXAk.jpg)
+_▲ __If people do experience a delay in their salary, it mostly comes within a week or two.___
+
+The most important and promising fact emerging from this survey is that Ukrainians are doing this. The international aid and donor communities are providing aid now and studying Ukraine’s needs in preparation to help with post-war reconstruction but have not taken over operation or repair of major infrastructure. Ukrainians are doing that for the most part by themselves.
+
+Ukrainians expect to keep doing it themselves, moreover, empowered by the international community but not replaced by it. Asked whether their own local or national government, their own civil society, or international organizations should be responsible for reconstruction large majorities preferred Ukrainian local or national government. That finding is remarkable considering the apparently waning trust in governmental institutions that had characterized pre-war Ukraine. It suggests that Ukrainians want to rebuild a self-sufficient functioning state and do not want to become wards of the international community. It suggests that they want to believe that their government can serve them despite its present and historical challenges and limitations.
+
+Ukraine’s challenges remain immense and must be confronted with clear eyes and no illusions. The indications that Ukrainians want their government to work do not mean that it can or will, or even that they think it will. Unemployment remains far too high, and Ukraine will require large infusions of cash and reconstruction aid in the coming months and years to rebuild what the Russians have destroyed. Success is by no means guaranteed.
+
+But there is reason for hope in a very dark time. Ukrainians have fought the Russian army and are driving it back with Western weapons and cash, but no Western soldiers. They are keeping their economy alive with Western money but their own expertise and ingenuity. Ukraine has shown in this terrible trial by fire its determination to make itself free and functional. That is an effort worth investing in.
+
+---
+
+__Frederick W. Kagan__ is the Director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.
+
+__Mark Polyak__ is the President of Analytics at Ipsos North America.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-10-19-ccp-inc-in-greece.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-10-19-ccp-inc-in-greece.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b75602a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-10-19-ccp-inc-in-greece.md
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : CCP Inc. In Greece
+author: Briana Boland, et al.
+date  : 2022-10-19 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/JmdJoPM.jpg
+image_caption: "China’s State Grid took a 24 percent stake in the Greek natural power grid operator ADMIE in 2016."
+description: "State Grid and China’s Role in the Greek Energy Sector"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_How did a China’s core state-owned enterprise gain a foothold in Greece’s electricity sector?_ <excerpt/> _This case study examines the “CCP Inc.” ecosystem of Chinese officials, state-owned enterprises, policy banks, and private firms that helped State Grid Corporation of China (State Grid) and other Chinese companies gain a stake in the national electric grid and renewable energy projects in Greece. State Grid is the world’s largest utility company, pursuing an international strategy of expansion that both implements and informs Beijing’s policy goals for global energy infrastructure. By investigating how State Grid acquired a stake in Greece’s national power grid operator, the Chinese financing and energy sector business deals that followed State Grid’s investment, and the constraints that limited State Grid’s later efforts to expand its control over Greece’s electric grid, this case study offers insight to the role of state-owned enterprises in the global reach of China’s state capitalist system._
+
+### Introduction
+
+In order to further explore the “CCP Inc.” framework of Chinese state capitalism, this report examines the illustrative case of State Grid Corporation of China’s (State Grid; 国家电网) initial investment in Greece’s energy sector and its attempts to expand its reach in the country’s electric grid. State Grid’s entrance into the Greek power market — and more particularly, its causes and consequences — demonstrates the considerable power of the CCP Inc. ecosystem to promote Chinese interests in critical overseas markets, beyond what pure state planning could reasonably achieve. As this case study will illustrate, the CCP Inc. ecosystem can enable greater contributions to Chinese political and economic interests than central government directives alone — even as its blurring of the lines between private and state interests can also present political problems for Chinese businesses.
+
+“CCP Inc.” represents an evolution from the past “China Inc.” framework for examining China’s economic statecraft, which focused on the relatively clear lines between the global activities of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government planning directives, such as national five-year plans and foreign policy initiatives like the “Going Out” strategy to encourage outbound investment. Over the past decade, Chinese state capitalism has evolved into a more complex ecosystem of SOEs, private and hybrid-owned companies, Chinese policy banks, diplomatic actors, and state planners pursuing a mix of national and commercial interests. The CCP Inc. framework examines these added layers of political and commercial actors on top of analyses of the government initiatives, SOEs, and national champions that have traditionally been the central focuses in scholarship on China’s economic statecraft.
+
+In this complex CCP Inc. ecosystem, the interactions and motivations of Chinese state and commercial actors are not always easily observable. Therefore, this series of case studies examines the circumstances of certain international investments and business deals for insight into how CCP Inc. operates in practice. Some conduits of state influence are clear, such as in diplomatic support for business deals. In other cases, outside observers must rely on indirect evidence, such as suspiciously generous financial arrangements or actions by CCP Inc. actors that are not motivated by obvious economic considerations. In Greece, for example, State Grid was able to massively outbid its commercial opponents, while pursuing a national footprint that aligned both with its own business goals and with central government priorities.
+
+The case of State Grid’s investment in Greece is an important example of how the CCP Inc. ecosystem has enabled Chinese companies, regulators, banks, and officials to cooperate in pursuit of common commercial and economic goals. Contemporary Sino-Greek economic cooperation is anchored in Greece’s decades-long debt challenges. In the aftermath of the 2008–2009 financial crisis, the Greek and Chinese governments began to accelerate the development of investment plans into Greece — and Chinese companies became a key source of financing. In 2016, State Grid took a 24 percent stake in the Greek national power grid operator, ADMIE (the shortened and anglicized version of the original Greek name for the firm, also known as IPTO). The investment was, at the time, the second-largest Chinese investment in Greece, with State Grid significantly outbidding competitors in early offerings for a stake in ADMIE.
+
+A key reason for State Grid’s interest in ADMIE was the Greek grid operator’s position in emergent interconnections between international power grids across the Mediterranean, which was aligned with the company’s vision for an interconnected global grid and was discussed in high-level meetings about the ADMIE stake. After State Grid’s initial investment, ADMIE formed new partnerships with Chinese banks, while other Chinese companies made major investments in the Greek energy sector and Chinese firms enjoyed strong diplomatic support for their ventures in Greece. However, State Grid ultimately fell short in its ambitions to expand its footprint in Mediterranean super grids, demonstrating how pushback against CCP Inc. can constrain major SOEs like State Grid. In fact, some features of CCP Inc. that serve to support Chinese companies — namely, state backing and connections to Chinese banks — can also become a liability by reinforcing perceptions of Chinese companies as offshoots of the Chinese government.
+
+This case study proceeds in three parts. Chapter 1 examines State Grid’s entry into the Greek power grid as a minority shareholder in the national grid operator, ADMIE. Chapter 2 expands the aperture to examine how private Chinese renewable energy companies followed State Grid into the Greek power sector. Finally, Chapter 3 reflects on what State Grid’s entry into the Greek market tells us about SOEs in the CCP Inc. framework, and how State Grid’s challenges in expanding its role in the Greek electric grid reflect the limitations of CCP Inc.
+
+
+### State Grid’s Entry into the Greek Energy Sector
+
+#### How Greek Debt and Chinese Shipping Interests Anchored China’s Economic Expansion in Greece
+
+Sino-Greek economic partnership grew rapidly in the 2000s and 2010s, driven chiefly by Greece’s desire for expanded economic partners amid financial troubles, along with the Chinese government’s recognition of the geostrategic opportunities accompanying commercial engagement with a nation that links Europe to the eastern Mediterranean and to the Eurasian continent. In 2008–2009, the global financial crisis caused severe economic stagnation, accelerating the country’s debt crisis by further constraining Greece’s already impaired ability to pay its debts. With the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) growing ever more wary of Greece’s ability to recover, the government needed additional partners. As a result, the Greek government was highly receptive to Chinese investment.
+
+For its part, the Chinese government had long sought further entry points into the European market. For China, Greece’s geographic and political position vis-à-vis the European Union created strong incentives for Chinese companies to gain a foothold in the country as a route through which to access the broader European market. Politically, tensions between Greece and the European Union during Greece’s period of financial crisis created openings for Chinese investments that might have been met with more pushback in other parts of the European Union. Geographically, Greece’s position at the crux of Euro-Asian Sea and land routes presented a critical pull.
+
+In the years after the global financial crisis, the IMF, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission — collectively called the “troika” — required Greece to undergo a series of privatizations as a precondition for receiving bailout money. Among the most significant of these privatizations concerned the port of Piraeus, one of the fastest-growing seaports in Europe, which required external investment to achieve its economic potential and help restore Greece’s maritime economy. Ultimately, Piraeus found the needed funding through China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO).
+
+COSCO is one of China’s oldest and largest SOEs — indeed, it traces its institutional legacy directly to China’s original 53 core SOEs, dating back to the 1950s. It has, in its various incarnations, been one of the central government’s key tools for managing China’s trade since the Mao Zedong era. Throughout its history, COSCO has remained closely affiliated with central planners, including the State Council and the National Development Reform Commission (NDRC) today — not merely in the official bureaucratic hierarchy, but in its regular planning and operations.
+
+In 2009, COSCO began a two-phase investment in the port of Piraeus, which would transfer majority ownership of the port to the SOE and would ultimately be labeled by Chinese and European commentators alike as China’s flagship investment in Greece. Under COSCO’s ownership, Piraeus has acted as a beachhead for further Chinese business to enter the Greek market. In 2018, Huawei won the contract to redesign the port’s network infrastructure, while in 2019, COSCO subsidiary OceanRail Logistics acquired Piraeus Europe Asia Rail Logistics (PEARL), and with it, access to run rail in Europe. Moreover, following COSCO’s success in Piraeus, a growing number of Chinese companies went on to offer investments across a range of sectors, including energy — a traditionally sensitive sector given the national security implications of foreign involvement in essential services, such as electricity provision.
+
+Following COSCO’s acquisition of Piraeus, the next major Chinese investment in Greece would come from another of China’s original 53 core SOEs: State Grid. Like COSCO, State Grid plays a critical role in China’s central economic planning and international economic statecraft; its acquisition of stakes in the Greek national grid operator served both Greek needs for financing and Chinese interests in gaining a foothold in a country at the center of an emerging international cluster of electric grid interconnections.
+
+#### Background on State Grid and Its Role in China’s International Electricity Strategy
+
+State Grid is a behemoth even among China’s central SOEs. By far the larger of China’s two main grid companies, it is the world’s largest utility company, managing power supply to roughly 88 percent of China and covering over 1.1 billion people across 26 provinces. With $613.8 billion (¥4.1 trillion) in total assets as of 2020 — including $46.9 billion (¥316.7 billion) in foreign assets — State Grid is one of the largest companies in the world. Internationally, it ranks as the world’s third-largest company by revenue, surpassed only by Amazon and Walmart.
+
+With its staggering scale and resources — not to mention its central role in China’s economy — State Grid’s investment decisions are central drivers of China’s energy and industrial outlooks. Most recently, in January 2022, State Grid chairman Xin Bao’an confirmed that in 2022, the company would invest $85.9 billion (¥579.5 billion) domestically, of which $74.3 billion (¥501.2 billion) would go directly to domestic grid upgrades in pursuit of developing a “modern” (i.e., more stable, resilient, and efficient) grid. The amount, while massive, is well within State Grid’s financial means, as it saw $440.0 billion (¥3.0 trillion) in operating income and $7.5 billion (¥50.8 billion) of pure profit in 2021. These figures give just a small window into the SOE’s economic weight.
+
+Politically, State Grid has a long history of being able to leverage both its size and its core role in the economy for behind-the-scenes negotiations with officials in Beijing. Indeed, its sizable investments in grid upgrades strongly tend toward upgrades that will increase revenues, rather than those that will only advance Beijing’s goals. A notable demonstration of this fact is the contrast with its smaller counterpart, China Southern Power Grid (Southern Grid), which manages power supply to just under 12 percent of China’s territory, all in five southern provinces — notably including industrial powerhouse Guangdong. Despite powerful regional interests in coal-fired power, Southern Grid has demonstrated far greater clean energy ambitions than State Grid, both in terms of scale and in terms of timeline for clean energy substitutions. Perhaps most notably, Southern Grid plans for 60 percent of power generated in its service territory to come from non-fossil sources by 2025, compared to State Grid’s targets of 20 percent by 2025 and 25 percent by 2030.
+
+In contrast, State Grid has, both directly and indirectly, delayed efforts to decarbonize electricity generation — chiefly because these efforts depend critically on fundamental reforms to the current power market regime, a regime from which State Grid benefits massively. An example of State Grid’s dilatory effects on these reforms: One of the primary objectives of China’s 2002 power reforms was for grid companies to divest assets beyond their core business and provide for a clear assessment of the true costs of power transmission and distribution. In the 20 years since, contra Beijing’s reform agenda, State Grid has leveraged its enormous profits from monopolistic market control to systematically accrue new assets in areas such as real estate, media, and finance, making key elements of the 2002 reforms — including electricity pricing reforms — all but impossible. China’s 2015 power market reforms, meanwhile, aimed to introduce private companies into the electricity sales market as a means to increase competition and efficiency — a reform that would massively benefit renewables. But industry insiders have consistently argued that State Grid subsidiaries continue to enjoy unfair advantages, including exclusive data and capital access, to exclude other players from the market. Where the political importance of Xi’s dual carbon goals has forced compliance by virtually every power and resource company in China, State Grid stands alone in being able to meaningfully slow-walk or otherwise resist more substantive green transformation efforts. Central policymakers themselves maintain the same assessment, as demonstrated by their ongoing — and slow-going — attempts to gain greater control over State Grid since 2019.
+
+True to its independent nature, State Grid’s overseas expansion has largely been motivated by its economic interests, often buoyed — but generally not driven and rarely constrained — by Beijing’s political goals. State Grid’s primary interest in overseas investment has long stemmed from the fact that China’s relatively rigid electricity pricing system offers far lower returns than those available in countries with liberalized power markets. Multiple analyses in the late 2010s found that State Grid earned double-digit average return on equity (ROE) on foreign assets, which was estimated to be three to five times higher than the ROE on its domestic assets. Meanwhile, demonstrating why State Grid is so reticent to financially depend on its core business, in 2020 the company reportedly lost as much as $1.67 billion on its core domestic operations — but it still saw a nearly $193 million profit thanks to the massive profitability of its financial, industrial, and service-sector subsidiaries. State Grid has also historically used international investment to help build economies of scale it could apply in its home market; for example, the company’s strong international presence enabled it to build ultra-high voltage (UHV) power lines abroad, where pricing systems supported such development. This helped to drive down costs for its in-house UHV technologies, which it later employed in domestic projects once costs were sufficiently manageable.
+
+Meanwhile, on the political front, State Grid’s successful overseas investments have allowed it to portray itself as a world-class investor, grid operator, and international standard-setter. This reputation — particularly as Beijing promotes the “Going Out” strategy to encourage outbound investment and Chinese-led standard setting — has helped to significantly strengthen State Grid’s domestic bargaining position, both with other companies and with the central government.
+
+From the government’s vantage point, State Grid remains — despite its outsized independent power — a highly valuable asset in promoting the state’s strategic interests. Most notable among these strategic interests is State Grid’s ability — and aligned goals — to promote international grid interconnections with Chinese firms and technologies, playing a central role in their construction and operation. Promoting Chinese involvement in global grid infrastructure directly aligns with Xi Jinping’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as well as Beijing’s “Going Out” strategy — and aligns just as well with State Grid’s commercial aims.
+
+#### China’s International Electricity Strategy
+
+Today, China’s grid development vision is largely encapsulated in Xi’s Global Energy Interconnection (GEI) initiative (全球能源互联网), first introduced to the United Nations in 2015. The GEI initiative aims to promote interconnection of the world’s power grids in multiple continents and to invest in clean energy supplies and energy efficiency. State Grid is closely connected to this initiative: from the GEI initiative, the Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization (GEIDCO) was born — an organization that partners with the United Nations and other companies to promote the GEI initiative. State Grid itself is a lead sponsor of GEIDCO, and the organization’s chairman is former State Grid CEO Liu Zhenya.
+
+Connecting electric grids creates operational advantages and serves as an avenue for political power projection. A cross-border transmission line between different national or regional grids — an interconnector — can enhance electricity reliability and support a greener grid. In the continental United States, for example, many energy analysts advocate for interconnecting the three different grid regions across the country (currently, the western states, eastern states, and Texas are disconnected from each other). Though hardly a mainstream political issue, calls for grid interconnection are being amplified by the increased prevalence of extreme climate events; risks of severe blackouts, such as the February 2021 outages following winter storm Uri in Texas, can be mitigated by more robust grid interconnections, which provide backup sources of power generation.
+
+In Europe, the interconnector debate is focused on increasing international interconnections as a key route to achieving energy and climate goals, and the European Union has set a target of 15 percent grid interconnection by 2030. Larger grids mitigate issues for intermittent renewables like wind and solar; if the sun is not shining or the wind is not blowing in one part of the grid, other power sources can compensate. Given that electricity, unlike oil or gas, can travel through interconnectors almost instantaneously, larger grid connections provide more flexibility in dealing with supply issues and can create more efficiency in power distribution. Politically, connecting grid communities across nations can also build cross-border solidarity and help promote social and economic benefits. One of the key interconnectors discussed in this report seeks to connect Cyprus to the EU grid, promoting both integration with other EU countries and reliability of power on the island nation.
+
+However, interconnecting grids also involves technical and political risks. International and interregional transmission lines, if damaged, can cause far-reaching disruptions. Related critical infrastructure, such as healthcare and telecommunications, can be brought down, giving significant political leverage to countries that have ownership over interconnectors. Given the critical role of power grids, integration in international grid projects is an avenue for a country like China to both expand economic ties and increase the strength of its position in dealing with other states. Along with Beijing’s promotion of international electricity infrastructure projects, China is also playing a central role in setting global electricity standards and has become the manufacturing base for key components in large-scale electricity transmission systems.
+
+![image1](https://i.imgur.com/RPIxSKK.png)
+_▲ __Figure 1: State Grid’s Global Footprint.__ Source: [Overseas Projects, State Grid Corporation of China](http://www.sgcc.com.cn/html/sgcc_main/col2017041864/column_2017041864_1.shtml)._
+
+As of 2022, State Grid holds stakes in companies in Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Oman, the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, Chile, Brazil, and Greece, and has invested in projects in nearly 40 countries (see Figure 1). State Grid has also expanded to include 20 representative and subsidiary overseas offices, including State Grid Europe, Ltd., the vehicle for the company’s engagement with Greece. The dual corporate and government strategy of promoting grid integration and interconnection, evident in State Grid’s efforts to expand around the globe, provides the backdrop for the company’s pursuit of engagement in the Greek electricity sector.
+
+The background of State Grid’s size, China’s international electricity strategy, and a baseline of deepening Sino-Greek ties is important context for viewing State Grid’s engagement in Greece. Even before the company gained a stake in Greece’s grid operator, a CCP Inc. ecosystem of Chinese actors was already deepening bilateral relations and promoting global energy interconnection, including COSCO, GEIDCO, and Chinese officials. State Grid’s remarkable size and influence within the Chinese political system later made the company a central player in the CCP Inc. ecosystem’s engagement with Greece’s energy sector, starting with its investment in ADMIE.
+
+#### State Grid’s Interests in Greece’s Power Sector
+
+In the power sector, a combination of Greece’s willingness to welcome Chinese shareholders and its position at the center of emerging European and Euro-Asian grid interconnectors provided more than ample reason for State Grid to explore potential investment opportunities. This exploration was given clear motive by the fact that State Grid’s profits in mainland China are tightly bound by regulations aiming to minimize electricity cost pass-throughs to end users, while profits in liberalized European markets would be sizable.
+
+Many Greek islands also offer favorable environments for renewable energy generation through both solar and wind power, two industries in which private Chinese companies have significant advantages and interests in expanding overseas. The fact that the power grid for these islands is connected to themainland and the rest of Europe means that Chinese renewable energy investments will contribute to the European Union’s green goals, making it unlikely that they would become stranded assets once built — unlike investments in, say, coal plants.
+
+Greece, like Portugal and Italy before it, was politically receptive to State Grid’s investment during a time of financial need. However, not all European countries were as willing to offer Chinese SOEs such direct inroads to enter their power grids. In Germany, for example, State Grid attempted to buy a 20 percent stake in regional transmission system operator 50Hertz in 2018, which elicited a rare intervention by the German government to prevent the sale due to concerns over Chinese control of key technologies.
+
+In October 2016, State Grid beat out European competitors to purchase a minority stake in ADMIE, the Greek electric grid operator. State Grid secured a 24 percent stake in ADMIE and installed its own management team in the company, giving the SOE its first major foothold in Greece. ADMIE, in turn, soon gained access to needed financing through new deals with Chinese policy banks. State Grid has since attempted to further expand its role in the Greek electric grid — not under direct state guidance, but by and large for its own commercial interests, which it justifies at home by demonstrating alignment with broader state economic goals. However, State Grid later faced pushback in Greece over concerns about conflicts of interest and the company’s close ties to the Chinese government, underlining how scale and CCP Inc. connections can also constrain international expansion.
+
+#### State Grid’s Entrance to Greece via ADMIE
+
+State Grid’s investment in ADMIE was enabled both by its own vast resources and by its existing footprint in Europe. In October 2017, State Grid finalized its takeover of a minority stake in ADMIE for €320 million ($361.6 million). That sum, then the second-largest Chinese investment in Greece, reflected State Grid’s deep pockets and willingness to spend large sums on international projects. In a previous tender or a 66 percent stake in ADMIE — before Greek authorities lowered the stake offered to 24 percent — Greek media reported that State Grid was willing to pay well over €600 million ($796.8 million), while itsmain European competitor, Terna, could only bid around €300 million ($398.4 million).
+
+Competing with State Grid for stakes in ADMIE was not the first time that Terna had encountered the Chinese SOE. State Grid’s bid in ADMIE came shortly after obtaining 25 percent of REN, a Portuguese grid operator, and 35 percent of CDP Reti, an Italian holding company with shares in two Italian energy companies, Snam and Terna. Greece was the next step in State Grid’s objective to build out a Mediterranean power network — and State Grid’s existing footprint in Europe also directly impacted its bid for a stake in ADMIE; the Chinese SOE only qualified for the bid in the first place because of its existing stake in European companies, a prerequisite for bidding, according to EU rules.
+
+State Grid’s investment in ADMIE reflected both the strengths of its regional corporate strategy and its alignment with Chinese state interests. At the time, its other investments in Europe opened doors for State Grid by allowing it to qualify for the ADMIE bid. Broader Chinese interests also helped secure the agreement. Ahead of the ADMIE investment, Greek newspapers reported that during one of Greek prime minister Alexis Tspiras’s visits to China, Chinese contacts had expressed interest in working with Greece to develop its renewable energy and to invest in Greece’s efforts at interconnecting the island’s power to the mainland’s power grid. During the same meeting, these unspecified “Chinese contacts” — unconfirmed but highly likely to have included State Grid representatives — also expressed an interest in acquiring a stake in Public Power Corporation (PPC), the Greek SOE charged with energy distribution and the 100 percent owner of ADMIE before State Grid’s investment.33 On top of this context of broader Chinese engagement, State Grid’s ability to so significantly outbid its rivals would have made it politically and financially all but impossible for ADMIE and the Greek government to turn down State Grid’s tender.
+
+![image2](https://i.imgur.com/YbdLMGt.png)
+_▲ __Figure 2: ADMIE and State Grid in the CCP Inc. Ecosystem.__ Source: Authors’ research based on multiple sources cited throughout the report. Note: The arrow marking State Grid’s expression of interest in PPC is based on the assumption that State Grid was the “Chinese contact” discussed in a Greek media report about the matter, which is unconfirmed._
+
+Despite being a minority stakeholder, State Grid has been actively involved in ADMIE’s affairs. In addition to gaining seats on the ADMIE board of directors, State Grid has installed its own personnel in several key managerial positions, including a vice CEO and CFO. Through this arrangement, State Grid can participate in the daily operations of ADMIE, especially those pertaining to technology innovation and power grid development. The terms of its original purchase also gave State Grid the right of first offer for ADMIE’s future share offerings, prompting some suspicion by Greek media that State Grid’s minority stake was just a precursor to the company’s fuller control of ADMIE.
+
+State Grid’s investment in ADMIE was followed by a cascade of Chinese policy banks engaging with ADMIE and the broader Greek energy sector, underlining the connection between SOE deals and access to Chinese state-backed financing. In November 2017, ADMIE and China Development Bank signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the aim of giving “access to new financing lines” as part of the 2017–2019 Greece-China Action Plan. In May 2018, ADMIE signed a €199 million ($235.0 million) loan contract with Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and Bank of China, offering unspecified financing for ADMIE over a five-year period. Manousos Manousakis, chairman and CEO of ADMIE, described the 2018 loan as“a clear example of the benefits resulting from the presence of State Grid Corporation of China as a strategic investor in ADMIE [that] leads to an acceleration of big projects such as the interconnections of the Cyclades islands and Crete.”
+
+Later in 2020, several national Greek banks joined the China Development Bank to issue a €400 million ($456 million) loan to ADMIE. ADMIE highlighted the loan as the first example of cooperation between Greek and Chinese financial institutions in the Greek market. Along with State Grid’s willingness to offer a higher tender for a stake in ADMIE compared to European competitors, the succession of ADMIE deals with Chinese banks represents a benefit of accepting State Grid’s bid to become a shareholder. Without access to inside information, it is often impossible to verify whether access to policy bank financing is explicitly promised or offered in major deals with Chinese companies. Whether or not access to policy bank financing was part of the State Grid-ADMIE deal, ADMIE’s subsequent access to financing is a latent advantage of dealing with companies in the CCP Inc. ecosystem. International companies and governments, observing a pattern of business deals being followed by increased access to Chinese banks, may well bake in expectations of future access to financing when choosing their preferred partners.
+
+The first stage of State Grid’s involvement in Greece — namely, its successful acquisition of a stake in ADMIE — demonstrates multiple key benefits of the CCP Inc. ecosystem. First, State Grid built its market entry on a foundation of deepening bilateral ties and the flagship COSCO investment in Piraeus, expanding its corporate footprint in line with the broader trend of deepening Sino-Greek economic relations. Second, State Grid’s massive — and directly state-enabled — scale allowed the company to open further doors with existing European connections (via investments in Portugal and Italy), while its massive capital pool — which would be inconceivable for a company without its degree of domestic government support — enabled it to outbid erstwhile competitors. Finally, the support of other Chinese market players also helped facilitate State Grid’s acquisition. This support included the political connections that gave State Grid a platform to speak with a visiting Greek prime minister and the policy banks that opened financing for ADMIE after its deal with State Grid.
+
+Ultimately, State Grid did not achieve all of its goals in Greece. In particular, the company was shut out of cross-Mediterranean interconnector projects and has not succeeded in increasing its shares in ADMIE. However, buoyed by CCP Inc., State Grid succeeded in its core goal of building itself a secure foothold in Greece’s electricity sector — and a foundation from which to pursue further European expansion. Moreover, that success has since fed back into the CCP Inc. ecosystem: following State Grid’s investment in ADMIE, other Chinese companies have also initiated major investments in the Greek energy sector. The next section will examine these other Chinese business developments in Greece’s energy sector, which — while not officially tied to State Grid — demonstrate how CCP Inc. has successfully broadened the scope of China’s energy engagement in Greece to a degree unlikely to have been possible without the network advantages of CCP Inc.
+
+
+### Broader Chinese Investments in the Greek Energy Sector
+
+The CCP Inc. ecosystem extends beyond the relations of a single SOE to Chinese banks, policy initiatives, and diplomatic officials; a key element of CCP Inc. is the interconnectivity between Chinese firms, including those that are state-owned, those that are privately owned, and those that have “mixed ownership,” with both private and state capital. In the case of Greece’s energy industry, a number of other Chinese companies have invested in the sector, drawing on some of the same advantages of the CCP Inc. ecosystem evident in State Grid’s dealings with ADMIE. Though these business deals have yet to carry out the promises of initial announcements, the investments still demonstrate how different Chinese companies can benefit from the same CCP Inc. ecosystem, tying state bank financing and diplomatic support to commercial projects. Among the Chinese investments in Greece’s energy sector post-2016, two stand out: China’s first major investments in wind and solar power generation in Greece, which are explored in turn below.
+
+Taken individually, different Chinese investments in electric power generation could be seen as independent investments in a new market, unrelated to State Grid’s role in Greece’s electricity transmission system. Viewing the Greek electricity sector more comprehensively, however, reveals indirect connections between State Grid’s expansion and the energy generation ventures of other Chinese companies. Further, different Chinese business deals can be traced back to the same events in the diplomatic timeline of Sino-Greek engagement. In this context, Chinese companies have become increasingly ingrained in the business of both energy generation and energy transmission in Greece since 2016, even though State Grid has not significantly expanded its own footprint further beyond its 24 percent stake in ADMIE.
+
+#### Wind Power Cooperation with Copelouzos Group
+
+In November 2017 — the year after State Grid won the tender for a 24 percent stake in ADMIE — the Chinese state-owned coal and power giant Shenhua Group (中国神华) purchased a 75 percent stake in four wind parks under development by the Greek Copelouzos Group (Copelouzos). The purchase came after Shenhua Group and Copelouzos signed an MoU in May 2017 for cooperation on green projects, involving a total investment of just over $3 billion. The MoU was arrived at during Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras’s visit to Beijing in May 2017, and the November purchase was settled as one of a number of deals signed between Chinese and Greek officials, as well as heads of major enterprises, under the 2017–2019 Greece-China Action Plan.
+
+At the time of Shenhua Group’s purchase of the 75 percent stake in Copelouzos wind farms (via its subsidiary, Shenhua Renewables), the group was also planning to purchase further Copelouzos assets — though initial momentum ultimately fell short, similar to the case of State Grid. Shenhua Group had initially planned to join PPC (the state-owned Greek power company from which State Grid purchased its stake in ADMIE) and Copelouzos as a partner in their joint company, PPC Solar Solutions. The partnership of Shenhua Group would have brought a Chinese shareholder into another of PPC’s subsidiaries, alongside State Grid’s role in ADMIE. In September 2017, Shenhua Group signed an MoU with PPC for cooperation in power generation, renewable energy projects, research and development, gas infrastructure, and more. However, media reported in 2020 that PPC Solar Solutions had agreed to terminate its joint venture with Copelouzos. At the time, the venture was still 49 percent owned by PPC and 51 percent owned by Copelouzos, indicating that Shenhua Group had never gained a leadership stake.
+
+Teasing out Shenhua Group’s cooperation with Copelouzos is further complicated by the fact that in November 2017, Shenhua Group merged with the state-owned China Guodian Corporation (中国国电集团) to form a new company: China Energy Investment Corporation (国家能源集团, aka CHN Energy). In 2018, Copelouzos Group again signed a cooperation agreement with CHN Energy, which has taken over the 75 percent stake in four Copelouzos wind farms. Echoing statements around State Grid’s investment in ADMIE, Copelouzos Group president Dimitris Copelouzos stated at the time: “We are confident that this cooperation will act as a catalyst for the completion of major investment and promote the energy industry of Greece, in addition to the development of cooperation between Greek and Chinese companies in many sectors of the economy.” CHN Energy also expressed interest in acquiring lignite coal-fired power plants in Megalopoli in southern Greece and in Meliti in northern Greece; however, the sale ultimately did not go through. Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’s unexpected announcement in September 2019 that Greece would transition away from coal by 2028 further tamped down Chinese interest in investing in Greek coal mines.
+
+The developments of Shenhua Group’s — and then CHN Energy’s — collaboration with the Copelouzos Group provide additional data points in the larger story of Sino-Greek energy cooperation. Viewed as part of the same CCP Inc. ecosystem as State Grid’s investment in ADMIE, the business deals demonstrate a trend of broadening Chinese involvement in the Greek electric grid. However, Shenhua Group and CHN Energy’s cooperation with Copelouzos Group also featured more promises and statements of intent than actual concrete projects — another trend across recent Sino-Greek energy ties.
+
+#### China’s First “Greenfield” Investment in Greek Solar Power: The MINOS Plant
+
+Further data points for the trend of expanding engagement in the energy sector can be found in China’s efforts to build solar power facilities in Greece, along with further instances of business agreements that have yet to translate into complete projects. In 2019, on the heels of Shenhua Group’s investment in Greek wind energy, several Chinese companies — including state-owned bank ICBC — undertook the financing, design, and construction of Greece’s first concentrating solar power (CSP) plant, the MINOS 50 MW plant on the island of Crete. The MINOS solar plant marked the first “greenfield” project undertaken by Chinese companies in Greece and was hailed by Chinese media as a model for the integration of finance and industry in China’s international investments. Cosin Solar (可胜技术), one of the Chinese companies contracted for the project, described MINOS as “the first CSP project whose whole life cycle is totally designed, manufactured, constructed, financed, and operated by Chinese companies in the international market.”
+
+The plant is, in fact, a joint venture between UK-based Nur Energie and Greek oil and energy firm Motor Oil Hellas, with Greek firm Prenecon taking part in construction. However, a consortium of Chinese companies, led by China Energy Engineering Group (中国能建葛洲坝国际集团) and Cosin Solar, were selected as the engineering, procurement, and construction contractors for the project, while ICBC provided project financing. This consortium includes a mix of both state-owned firms (like China Energy Engineering Group) and privately owned firms (like Cosin Solar). In terms of political promotion, the MINOS solar plant was given prime billing, both as a result of the 17+1 China- Eastern Europe cooperation framework and as a model BRI project. In the highest possible sign of diplomatic support, the chairmen of ICBC, China Energy Engineering Group, Nur Energie, and the CEO of Prenecon signed the MINOS agreement in front of Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Mitsotakis.
+
+#### The Trend of Diplomatic Support for Chinese Projects in CCP Inc.
+
+CHN Energy’s wind power deals and the MINOS solar project, though yet to be completed, demonstrate several key elements of the CCP Inc. ecosystem. The interplay of financing by state banks, the collaboration between public and private Chinese companies, and the provision of diplomatic support for the project all represent conduits of state support. In particular, the element of diplomatic support for specific industrial projects is prominent in Sino-Greek business relations, as outlined in Figure 3. The strong diplomatic attention to business deals is an important element of the CCP Inc. ecosystem, and often the most visible testament to state support for commercial projects.
+
+![image3](https://i.imgur.com/wMdlAAu.png)
+_▲ __Figure 3: Chinese Diplomatic Engagement with the Greek Energy Sector.__ Source: Authors’ research based on multiple sources. Please see the endnotes for complete references._
+
+In addition to CHN Energy-Copelouzos wind cooperation and the MINOS solar plant, a number of other Chinese companies have engaged in energy sector projects or cooperation agreements, including China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC), CMEC subsidiary SUMEC Group, and China Three Gorges Corporation (CTG). Though these deals were not all tied directly to State Grid, they are important data points for understanding successes — and shortfalls — of overall engagement by Chinese companies in the Greek energy sector. The depth and breadth of Chinese companies’ engagement with Greece’s grid has risen significantly over the past decade with aid from the CCP Inc. ecosystem’s combination of state financing, diplomatic advocacy, and connectivity between Chinese companies.
+
+That said, Chinese investment in the Greek energy sector has also hit numerous stumbling blocks. Shenhua Group’s cooperation with the Copelouzos Group resulted in an important wind energy investment but has yet to live up to promises of broader joint projects, and a number of other deals involving Chinese companies in the Greek energy sector have failed to move forward. State Grid, too, has faced difficulties in expanding its role in Greece beyond its initial investment in ADMIE. These challenges illuminate how the CCP Inc. ecosystem can also generate constraints for the firms within it. The connections between diplomatic support, state financing, and SOEs and private Chinese companies evident in the Greek energy sector may have supported the projects’ development, but they also reinforced perceptions of disparate deals as interconnected and closely tied to the Chinese state. The third chapter of this report reflects on how these interrelated strengths and liabilities of CCP Inc. have impacted State Grid’s efforts to expand its footprint beyond its initial investment in ADMIE.
+
+
+### The Strengths and Constraints of SOEs in the CCP Inc. Ecosystem
+
+#### Examining SOEs as Policymaking Actors in CCP Inc.
+
+The Xi Jinping era has seen the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) increase its reach into the private sector, blurring lines between privately owned and state-owned companies; meanwhile, the CCP has also endeavored to tighten its control over SOEs (an effort State Grid continues to resist). On the other side of the equation, efforts by State Grid and other Chinese SOEs to gain footholds in the Greek electric grid underline the leading role that SOEs continue to play in China’s economic statecraft. Notably, China’s SOEs have been growing stronger over time thanks to a decades-long trend of consolidation, which has seen major Chinese SOEs merged into even more massive conglomerates — one such case being the merger of Shenhua Group and the Guodian Corporation, noted in Chapter 2. The result has been that China’s surviving SOEs are increasingly stable and well resourced, with the capability to undertake a range of global infrastructure, energy, and technology projects. Unlike either private multinationals that are beholden to shareholders and quarterly results cycles or foreign SOEs that are focused on national service provision (e.g., Amtrak), China’s SOEs can bring unparalleled scale to international projects.
+
+State Grid’s own involvement in the Greek energy sector reflects both state and commercial interests, shedding valuable insight on the interplay between SOEs and the government in the broader CCP Inc. ecosystem. First, State Grid’s international expansion strongly aligns with the Chinese government’s policy goals — a fact it has used to bolster its own domestic political position. Along with major national initiatives such as the BRI and the “Going Out” strategy, State Grid plays a leading role in carrying out Xi’s GEI initiative. But State Grid is far from merely a vehicle for implementing Beijing’s policies; as noted in Chapter 1, State Grid launched its European strategy in large part to pursue the higher profits offered by international projects. State Grid regularly discusses the profit motives of ensuring “stable income” from international assets in its corporate documents — in addition, of course, to comments on the need to support national foreign policy initiatives like the BRI.
+
+Despite its independent strength and ability to push back on certain domestic reform efforts, even State Grid remains subject to important conduits for Chinese state influence. Among the most important is, quite simply, Beijing’s ability to support State Grid’s pursuit of international business — particularly through the likes of diplomatic engagements and state policy bank financing. For such support to materialize, State Grid must play within certain political boundaries and ensure its efforts genuinely support Beijing’s goals. More broadly, Beijing directly incorporates SOEs into its national policy objectives, creating commercial incentives to feed into policymaking in Beijing and try to shape the policy landscape in favorable ways. While much China scholarship has characterized SOEs as politically passive entities under state control, scholars studying the pluralization of political decisionmaking in China advocate for greater attention to, and analysis of, SOEs’ role in policy planning and government decisionmaking. The case of State Grid and other Chinese companies’ entry into the Greek power sector strongly supports the need for more nuanced and detailed understanding of SOE-government feedback loops.
+
+To that point: State Grid has a history of influencing policy debates within China. As outlined in Chapter 1, over the past 20 years, State Grid has expanded its assets contrary to government reform efforts, and over the past decade it has become a major obstacle to government efforts to reduce carbon emissions. Meanwhile, the company has also injected its own interests into policy initiatives. For example, within China in 2000–2009, State Grid promoted UHV technology — at the time untested — to solve the policy issue of power shortages. UHV was a solution that made far more sense from a profit-making perspective than a public policy perspective: namely, State Grid could profit from becoming a standard-setter in a cutting-edge technology, though in practice UHV would serve as a distraction — and take finite financing and resources — from critical demand-side reforms that policymakers rightly saw as the most important solution at hand. State Grid pushed its UHV technology through government meetings, company investments, and company-funded research and feasibility studies, ultimately selling the solution to relevant policymakers at the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), and the State Environmental Protection Administration (the predecessor of today’s Ministry of Ecology and Environment). Just as State Grid promoted its own interests into domestic UHV policy, the firm worked to influence foreign policy efforts in favor of its international interests.
+
+Meanwhile, the strong connection between State Grid and the GEI initiative provides a clear picture of the other side of the policy feedback loop connecting commercial and political incentives. In its own company reports, State Grid is explicit in stating that one of its main goals is to serve the CCP’s political and foreign policy agenda, particularly the BRI and the “Going Out” strategy, as well as to help other Chinese firms establish themselves in the international market. State Grid’s close association with the GEI initiative as the force behind GEIDCO also provides a conduit into a more specified policy initiative.
+
+The GEI initiative serves China’s industrial policy both commercially, by promoting specific technologies that would benefit Chinese companies, and diplomatically, by offering an avenue for China to promote its climate leadership. While the GEI initiative provides a policy umbrella for State Grid’s international ventures — along with the BRI and the “Going Out” strategy — State Grid, in turn, plays an important role in promoting the initiative and guiding its specific goals. The GEI initiative, in turn, serves Chinese companies’ commercial interests by driving market interest in certain grid technologies, such as UHV transmission lines. As most of the world’s UHV lines are in China and were constructed by Chinese companies, China holds a key competitive advantage over the technology.
+
+In its own words, State Grid states that “in implementing the national “going out” development strategy, [State Grid Corporation of China] has clearly defined the strategic goal of “going out” with UHV technology, and has striven to promote the global application of UHV transmission technology, specifications, and standards.” Given this synergy of commercial and policy interests, both the pursuit of business gains and the pursuit of CCP goals can credibly be called driving forces behind State Grid’s overseas investment strategy.
+
+State Grid’s investment in ADMIE was more than just an individual business deal; it built on years of Chinese efforts to make inroads into the Greek market, starting with COSCO’s investment in the port of Piraeus. The completion of the COSCO deal opened doors for State Grid representatives to meet with Greek officials in bilateral diplomatic events and allowed ADMIE to access Chinese bank financing.
+
+However, the headwinds facing State Grid’s role in ADMIE illuminate how the SOE’s involvement in the CCP Inc. ecosystem also served as a constraint. The same connections to diplomatic support, financing, and other Chinese companies that advance Chinese business interests in the CCP Inc. ecosystem also reinforce overseas perceptions that all Chinese companies — even private ones — are tightly connected with each other and, most importantly, with the Chinese government. This, in turn, has at times piqued suspicions that Chinese companies’ business activities are simply extensions of political activities — catalyzing pushback against Chinese market actors and the projects they pursue.
+
+#### Constraints in CCP Inc.: State Grid’s Challenges in Expanding Its Footprint in Greece
+
+State Grid’s acquisition of stakes in ADMIE, and ADMIE’s subsequent access to Chinese bank financing, initially indicated momentum for State Grid’s ambitions to expand its role in Greece’s electric grid. But over the longer term, ADMIE’s relationship with its minority shareholder became more complicated. While State Grid’s initial interest in ADMIE demonstrated a broader vision for investments in grid interconnectors and renewable energy, its ability to execute this vision has run up against Greek pushback to Chinese investments and conflict of interest concerns. Most notably, since 2017, State Grid has sought unsuccessfully to expand its share in ADMIE; been thwarted in efforts to gain additional stakes in ADMIE-related subsidiary companies; and ultimately lodged protests against ADMIE over the tenure of its current CEO. While the CCP Inc. ecosystem helped State Grid enter the Greek power market, it has since constrained its ability to expand.
+
+![image4](https://i.imgur.com/qqDJlHa.png)
+_▲ __Figure 4: PPC, ADMIE, and Their Subsidiaries.__ Source: Authors’ research based on multiple sources cited throughout the report. The label for the PPC-HEDNO relationship is from [Philip Chrysopoulos, “Greece Sells 49% of Public Power Corporation HEDNO to Australian Company,” Greek Reporter, September 11, 2021](https://greekreporter.com/2021/09/11/hedno/)._
+
+During Xi’s November 2019 visit to Greece, State Grid directly expressed interest in expanding the company’s stake in ADMIE. In 2020, however, the Covid-19 pandemic stalled talks between Beijing and Athens, and in the two years since, no sale of additional shares has been completed. In January 2021, Greece barred State Grid from participating in the prospective sale of a 49 percent stake in the Greek distribution network operator HEDNO (Greek: DEDDIE), another subsidiary of ADMIE parent company PPC, due to concerns over conflict of interest — concerns driven by the perception that connections between Chinese entities (the other party being undisclosed) were too strong, which prompted State Grid to lodge a formal complaint. In an instance of CCP Inc. connectivity backfiring on Chinese companies, another undisclosed Chinese company was also barred from participating in the HEDNO tender, an episode that European researchers have described as “precedent” for Chinese SOEs being treated as connected rather than separate entities. The perception of interconnection will remain a structural risk for Chinese companies’ investments abroad — particularly where these connections are perceived as posing not only market risks, but also political risks due to connections with, and influence by, the Chinese government.
+
+As of this writing, State Grid technically remains in contention to gain a stake in the ADMIE subsidiary Ariadne Interconnector, which is responsible for connecting the island of Crete to the grid of mainland Greece. The tender process has dragged on for years, ever since State Grid first expressed interest in the Ariadne Interconnector during Xi’s visit to Greece in November 2019. State Grid’s ability to participate in the Ariadne Interconnector so far is particularly significant due to the project’s links to the broader EuroAsia Interconnector, a planned linkage of Greece to the grids of Cyprus and Israel.
+
+According to Greek media reporting ahead of the State Grid-ADMIE deal, an important aspect of State Grid’s interest in ADMIE ties to Greece’s planned position in new electric interconnector lines that would link international electric grids. The European Union has long worked toward improving cross-border electricity connection for a more secure, reliable, and sustainable electricity supply, and Greece itself has plans to connect the power grids across its islands. In 2017, State Grid had expressed its support for the EuroAsia Interconnector, a major electricity interconnector between Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and Europe — labeled an “electricity highway” — connecting the three countries’ grids. The project is aimed at remedying the isolation of Cyprus’s grid from the rest of the European Union, bolstering energy security for all three nations and as well as Europe’s ability to support a green grid, as discussed in Chapter 1.
+
+![image5](https://i.imgur.com/pxG6jyC.png)
+_▲ __Figure 5: Proposed Route of the EuroAsia Interconnector.__ Source: [EuroAsia Interconnector homepage](https://euroasia-interconnector.com/); [Ariadne Interconnection homepage](https://www.ariadne-interconnection.gr/en#exelixi)._
+
+However, State Grid’s interest in the EuroAsia Interconnector has not still translated into a significant role in the project. In 2018, the section of the interconnector that ADMIE was involved in was ultimately spun off into a national project, the Ariadne Interconnector. The Ariadne Interconnector will connect the large island of Crete to mainland Greece and Europe in order to avert electricity shortages on Crete and take advantage of Crete’s favorable environment for renewable power sources.
+
+Though State Grid expressed interest as far back as 2019 in acquiring up to 20 percent of shares in Ariadne (a 100 percent subsidiary of ADMIE), at the time of this report‘s publication, the deal has yet to go through. In June 2022, the European Commission and the Greek Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE) approved the tender for the sale of a stake in Ariadne, after years of delays because State Grid’s involvement with ADMIE required Greece’s energy regulator to turn to the European Commission for a green light. Some media reports on the matter have described concerns from the European Commission about further Chinese involvement in strategic assets, but the full details behind the delays have not been publicly explained.
+
+In another instance of tension between State Grid and ADMIE, in February 2022, the tenure of the current president and managing director of ADMIE, Manousos Manousakis, was renewed, despite protests by State Grid. According to Greek media reports, State Grid’s complaints stem from displeasure with its lack of participation in Ariadne’s contractor agreements and the technical side of the project. The issue was even reportedly the subject of discussion during an April 2022 meeting between Chinese ambassador Xiao Juncheng and Greece’s minister of energy, Kostas Skekras. The Ariadne Interconnector is the largest electricity project that Greece has taken on; these reports suggest State Grid is dissatisfied with its small role in the project. However, given that media reports cite EU concerns about China’s control over Greece’s electric grid as one reason that Ariadne was spun off from the EuroAsia Interconnector in the first place, State Grid’s efforts to increase its control over the project could well prove counterproductive.
+
+This reflection on CCP Inc. in Greece’s energy sector suggests that the source of the ecosystem’s strengths — namely, its interconnectedness — is also the source of considerable long-term risks and potential liabilities for its constituent enterprises. State Grid’s ties to the Chinese state and its prominent role within the CCP Inc. ecosystem make it subject to suspicions directed at the Chinese state capitalist apparatus more broadly. Wherever international perceptions of and policies toward the Chinese state continue to sour, it will become increasingly difficult for Chinese companies to balance the strengths and liabilities of their involvement in the CCP Inc. ecosystem — in which, at this stage, they have little choice but to be perceived as participating.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+The evolution of Chinese companies’ involvement in the Greek energy sector underscores both the strengths and limitations of the CCP Inc. system. The case of Chinese investment into Greece’s energy sector, as well as COSCO’s preceding investments in Piraeus, shows how the CCP Inc. ecosystem has both supported and hindered the foreign business ventures of private, hybrid, and state-controlled Chinese companies. The specific case of State Grid provides insight into a critical type of actor in the CCP Inc. ecosystem: namely, a major SOE that both implements and informs policy, and thereby a key player in Chinese state capitalism’s ability to exercise global reach.
+
+Among the greatest strengths of CCP Inc. is the capacity for state support to overcome geopolitical barriers that private firms would be hard-pressed to hurdle alone. From former prime minister Alexis Tpiras’s meetings with State Grid officials during visits to Beijing, to Xi Jinping’s flagship 2019 Greece visit, diplomatic support for Chinese commercial projects in Greece has been strong.
+
+Another great strength of CCP Inc. is its capacity to leverage public funding for ventures that might struggle using private funding alone — and, at times, to open public funding opportunities that simply would not otherwise exist. For example, ADMIE’s ability to access Chinese policy bank financing in the wake of State Grid’s investment underlined the interplay between Chinese state financiers and enterprises. This advantage is also not mutually exclusive with other advantages, such as diplomatic support: as explored in Chapter 2, many Chinese companies — both state-owned and private — simultaneously benefited from diplomatic support, bank financing, and their connections with each other.
+
+As for State Grid itself, the company’s original capacity to win a stake in ADMIE was enabled by both its existing footprint in Europe and its deep pockets, bolstered by access to cheap government policy bank funding. As a massive and complex SOE, State Grid can both draw on the support of the Chinese state and simultaneously lobby to embed its own commercial interests in official policy. The company’s own corporate strategy underlines that it is an enterprise with global ambitions and — with the backing of CCP Inc. — the state-empowered scale to pursue them.
+
+However, the case of the Greek energy sector also reveals constraints on State Grid and other CCP Inc. actors. Misgivings about Chinese control over critical electricity infrastructure ultimately limited State Grid’s ability to embed itself in critical international electricity interconnectors. In other words, the very same strong state support that helped propel State Grid’s initial investment in ADMIE, as well as the many other Chinese investments in the Greek energy sector, became a liability by making commercial Chinese actors difficult to distinguish, politically, from the Chinese state.
+
+One key mission of the CCP Inc. project is to examine how the United States and market economy allies can effectively respond to new challenges posed by China’s evolving state capitalist system. The case of Greece — a market economy with a democratic system — provides insight into how concerns over the risks of CCP Inc. can limit its reach. European misgivings about China’s role in critical electricity infrastructure appear to have played a key role in preventing State Grid from expanding its stake in ADMIE and gaining involvement in the EuroAsia Interconnector, though neither Greek officials nor corporate documents state it so directly.
+
+On the other hand, Greece’s energy sector was able to genuinely benefit from Chinese investments in renewable energy at a time of national financial difficulty. China’s leading position in renewable energy technologies puts it in a position to play a key role in proliferating much-needed clean energy infrastructure. As countries around the world pursue a transition to clean energy, both the CCP Inc. ecosystem and the comparative advantages of Chinese firms in various clean energy technologies put China in a highly competitive market position. Understanding how actors within the CCP Inc. ecosystem interact and play off of — and into — Chinese government policy will be critical for countries that turn to China for the technology and infrastructure necessary for the energy transition.
+
+---
+
+__Briana Boland__ is a research associate with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, Briana worked as a political risk analyst at Dentons, where she researched China’s economic policy and shifting trends in U.S.-China relations for firm leadership and international clients.
+
+__Cory Combs__ is an associate director at Trivium China, where he covers the intersection of climate and industrial policy for a range of public and private sector clients.
+
+__Jude Blanchette__ holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS. Blanchette is a public intellectual fellow at the National Committee on United States-China Relations and serves on the board of the American Mandarin Society. He is also a senior advisor at Martin+Crumpton Group, a geopolitical risk advisory based in Arlington, Virginia.
+
+__Andrew Polk__ is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS and is the cofounder and head of economic research at Trivium China, a Beijing-based strategic advisory firm. Before founding Trivium, Polk was China director at Medley Global Advisors, where he advised asset managers and hedge funds on developments in China’s economy and financial markets.

From ab1b748f592d634068b075dbe118e6f01057101d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: theagora <agoradao@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2022 03:23:46 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 6/9] 0x16 Add _columns posts, Nov.07

---
 ...0-we-may-suffer-what-they-are-suffering.md | 81 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../2022-10-31-limerick-poems-on-times.md     | 76 +++++++++++++++++
 ...ussian-invasion-of-ukraine-october-2022.md | 56 +++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 213 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2022-10-30-we-may-suffer-what-they-are-suffering.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2022-10-31-limerick-poems-on-times.md
 create mode 100644 _collections/_columns/2022-11-05-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-october-2022.md

diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-10-30-we-may-suffer-what-they-are-suffering.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-10-30-we-may-suffer-what-they-are-suffering.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9935ef7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-10-30-we-may-suffer-what-they-are-suffering.md
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "他们经历的，我们也可能经历"
+author: "维舟"
+date  : 2022-10-30 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/v8UCBeQ.png
+image_caption: "“你可能会以为这是哪个年月的逃荒。”"
+description: ""
+---
+
+这几天，数万富士康工友逃离郑州，步行回乡回家。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+就在几天前，除了一些私下流传的小道消息，外界对郑州疫情仍所知极少，至于富士康工厂里发生了什么，就更不得而知了。
+
+郑州这一波疫情起初只有零星爆发。10月13日，富士康厂区开始封锁，虽然每天都有人感染，但不得旷工。
+
+富士康对郑州有着非同寻常的重要意义，此前两年多，哪怕疫情最吃紧的时候，据说这家工厂都没有停工过。但这次，可能也正因为了不想停产，阳性就转运，剩下的继续干活，又没做好封闭式管理，终于爆了。
+
+据《飞越梦工厂》记述，在恐慌蔓延之后，工友们开始口口相传，厂子围墙边有一处无人看管的“狗洞”可以钻出去。就这样，在得不到基本生存保障的情况下，人们为了活命而逃离。很多人说，再也不来郑州了。
+
+![image1](https://i.imgur.com/6z61XAc.jpg)
+
+这些本来就在郑州没有家的年轻人，唯一的退路就是回乡，此时，还是父母那句老话：“儿啊，钱没有挣到没有关系，先回来吧，留得青山在不怕没柴烧。”
+
+![image2](https://i.imgur.com/U9LObvT.jpg)
+
+10月底的中原大地，已进入初冬，他们依靠着求生本能，朝着家的方向一直走。那是他们支撑他们活下去的希望。 
+
+考虑到他们原本每天要在一个狭小的地方遵守严格的生产纪律，这其实是一次骤然降临的瓦解，就好像原本支撑你生活的拱顶突然消失，每个人被迫以最原始的手段自谋生路——他们之所以要徒步回乡，是因为郑州通过各地的所有公共交通均已停运。
+
+![image3](https://i.imgur.com/NpblaMf.png)
+
+工资不要，行李不要，人们只带着最简单的生存装备，靠自己的两条腿离开。有人总结了“默认的逃亡规则”：“走高速、不进村、不进城，不见人，不连累任何人，到所属地界主动联系120报备。”
+
+有个女孩子写道：“走了九个小时，第一次佩服自己的勇气，凌晨踏过河流，走过坟岗，穿过树林。”只是靠着“老百姓帮老百姓”的底层互助，他们才得以走完了这段漫长的返乡路。
+
+![image4](https://i.imgur.com/zIm8Vu4.jpg)
+
+看到这些，很难不动容。这种旅途流离的苦楚，对现代人而言相当陌生，也因此很自然地唤起人们对1942年逃荒的记忆。尽管如此，这两者之间仍然有着本质差别：那时的逃荒是离弃家园，而这次是重返，当然，那时的饥民还不至于被视为一种外来的威胁，沿途受到各种码的监控。
+
+![image5](https://i.imgur.com/b9xH66d.jpg)
+
+并不是所有人都同情他们。微博上“沙漠里的经纬线”说：
+
+> 年初吉林一大学的学生怕感染，哭天喊地，犹如惊恐的小鸡仔；现在富士康的人，害怕感染没人管，不惜徒步走几十上百公里回家，很多评论说累死也比在里面感染强。
+
+> 两个群体都是二十岁上下的年轻人，谈病毒色变，无论知识的多寡，对病毒的认知出奇一致。
+
+> 年轻人已经废了。
+
+我想，在同一个行为背后，完全可能存在着相去甚远的各种动机。也许是有年轻人“谈病毒色变”，但更多的人怕的未必是病毒本身，而是出于对身处险境的本能感知。
+
+代入他们的处境想一想，在里面不知道会不会被感染，就算不感染，一天天的连吃喝都不能得到保障，更不清楚接下来情况是否还会恶化，那么在还能走的时候赶紧走，是再正常不过的求生欲。就算你不害怕病毒本身，但留下来很可能陷入更不利的处境。
+
+批评者忽略了一点：当人们无法免于匮乏和恐惧时，仅仅要求个体“理性坚强”，还鞭挞做不到的人“废了”，这不仅冷酷，而且残忍，因为这根本无视了个体真实、具体的困境。
+
+按理来说，“真实的生活”似乎是最直白无隐的，但实际上，由于种种原因，它却是经常被无视的。也是这几天，在谈到郑州疫情时，有人这样提醒：“抖音是记录美好生活的，不是记录真实生活的。”
+
+正如T.S.艾略特所言：“人类无法承受太多真实。”真实的事物有时令人不快，因为它往往和既有认知不符；但在看到他人的苦难时，重要的不是抨击他们，而是先去理解他们，设身处地想想他们是否还有更好选择。
+
+虽然远隔千里，但我很能体会那种滋味，因为河南当下发生的，很像上海封城各种场景的重演。郑州人也说，这是郑州最接近上海封城的一次。
+
+我也清楚，现实中人与人之间地域、经历、观念等种种差异，会将我们分离开。很大程度上是因为今年春的封城，上海高校在河南滑档，录取分数线大降，我甚至还听说这样的故事：有男生考了590分，本可进上海不错的大学，但被姐姐坚决阻止，因为她厌恶上海在防疫中表现出来的“买办城市”底色。最终他去了郑州大学。
+
+现实表明，上海人经历的，河南人也可能经历；反过来河南人正在经历的，我们也都有可能会经历。这是需要我们共同面对的时代。
+
+张丰在《就这样沉默地走在中原大地上》中说得对，“几乎中国人要受的苦，河南人都要受一遍，而且河南人往往又是最苦的”，他说：“在这样的逃难场景中，我看到了父母和祖辈的命运，也看到了自己，我没有办法不身临其境。”
+
+常有人说，没办法，等全国都轮一遍就知道了。确实，从某种意义上说，疫情是一次“无知之幕”的全民体验：无论贫富，每个人都清楚地知道，自己即便暂得安宁，但不要心存侥幸，同样的境况完全有可能轮到自己。
+
+不过，说实话，就算这样，我也并不乐观——并不是体会过了，人们就能醒悟过来，产生同样的反思了，毕竟人的观念、性情、经历和处境千差万别，更有甚者，不少人即便在看到他人的苦难之后，也无所触动，只是庆幸没有落到自己头上。
+
+要产生对他人处境的共情，首先要能“看见”：长久以来，我们都习惯了宏大叙事，那势必会遮蔽微弱的个体。德国诗人布莱希特曾说过：“我们只看到聚光灯下，却看不到黑暗中人。”很多人的生活，正是在得不到曝光机会的黑暗之中。
+
+中国人很能忍，即便承受了这些，时过境迁之后，往往也不愿提起，仿佛那是搅扰自己当下生活的幽灵——“都过去了，说这些还有什么用？”这是人们挂在嘴边的常用语。
+
+但我想说，这些是有意义的。我们要活下来，保存这些记忆，直到我们亲口将它讲述。就像琼·迪迪翁那句名言，“我们为了活着而给自己讲故事”，这些记忆不仅会塑造每个人自己，也会借由这些共同的经历，塑造一群不一样的我们。
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-10-31-limerick-poems-on-times.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-10-31-limerick-poems-on-times.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..398a0137
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-10-31-limerick-poems-on-times.md
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "时代的打油诗"
+author: "小游"
+date  : 2022-10-31 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/5CzpUOy.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+---
+
+<!--more-->
+
+### 《瞧！那个皇帝没穿衣服》
+
+> `2022年10月18日`
+
+瞧！那个皇帝没穿衣服
+
+那是孩子才被允许的
+
+振聋发聩的诚实
+
+⠀
+
+人们认为
+
+应当交换会心一笑的眼神
+
+彼此在沉默中达成聪明的共识
+
+戳破共享的缄默
+
+徒增成熟的烦恼
+
+⠀
+
+不必说出大家心知肚明的事
+
+不必重复后果不佳的真实
+
+鄙夷的顺从已经足够
+
+无用的勇敢不受正视
+
+⠀
+
+瞧！那个皇帝没穿衣服
+
+那是成人眼中
+
+鲁莽又轻率的不懂事
+
+⠀
+### 《基本国策》
+
+> `2022年9月13日`
+
+每一代人
+
+总会遇到属于他的基本国策
+
+有人被捆在黄土地
+
+有人被锁上了子宫
+
+⠀
+
+还有人
+
+嘴里长出了棉签
+
+每天开口
+
+却说不出话
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-11-05-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-october-2022.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-05-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-october-2022.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..27b85702
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-05-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-october-2022.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "俄乌战争・十月战局"
+author: "当代张敬轩"
+date  : 2022-11-05 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/8IN7wLr.jpg
+#image_caption: "（2022年10月2日—31日）"
+description: "俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略战争，目的是把作为德、法等帝国主义国家附属国的乌克兰的全部或局部重新纳入俄罗斯帝国主义的控制下，乃至于进一步变成殖民地。"
+---
+
+十月俄乌战局，由于秋雨无路季以及俄军部署调整，又陷入一种僵局。10月2日—5日，乌军利用俄军调整部署、收缩防御而顾此失彼之机，在赫尔松州北部发动第三次成功的进攻战役，收复因古列茨河与第聂伯河之间约2000平方公里地区。然而俄军成功避免灾难性崩溃，建立了第二条防线，此后转入对峙。十月间，乌军共收复2535平方公里领土，约为沦陷区的四十分之一。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+乌军总体上仍掌握着战争的主动权。俄军则通过向前线补充兵力和调整部署初步稳住阵脚，试图以防御削弱乌军的主动权，还利用导弹和无人机对乌克兰后方的电力、燃料等战略设施展开战略轰炸，试图削弱乌克兰的战争潜力。目前来看，俄军的努力在本月收到一些成效，但不能完全扭转被动的局面。
+
+### 一、本月战局进展
+
+#### 1、赫尔松方向
+
+2022年10月1日乌军哈尔科夫战役军团在北线攻占利曼（红利曼），结束了利曼战役。俄军在利曼战役中和战役后，不得不收缩赫尔松占领区的防线，把部分兵力抽调去增援利曼方向。俄军的撤退本来是有计划的，然而乌军显然发现了协调中的漏洞，遂调动合成机械化部队展开打击。10月2日，乌军赫尔松战役军团的几个装甲合成营突入俄军战线后方20公里以上，大大动摇了俄军的防御。俄军不得不留下部分殿后分队，主力全线后撤，至10月5日放弃了在因古列茨河上长期坚守的桥头堡阿尔汉格尔斯克（非俄罗斯同名城市）、大亚历山德罗夫卡、达维季夫布里德等镇。赫尔松州北部乌军同8月底在因古列茨河东岸建立桥头堡小地的兵团遂宣告会师。然而，在后续交战中，俄军成功建立了第二道防线，阻止了乌军向别里斯拉夫、新卡霍夫卡的突击，并利用无路季成功把乌军拖入对峙。乌军在这次战役中，也未能攻占斯尼古尔列夫卡镇，更别说赫尔松市了。
+
+有消息称，乌军最高统帅部担心攻城带来的巨大伤亡，有意通过消耗战来逼迫俄军主动撤退。然而，俄军出于政治考虑，并不愿意放弃已经“公投入俄”的赫尔松州首府赫尔松市，遂采取了迁民而走的办法，强制赫尔松等地居民迁往俄联邦境内，从而减少了前线的后勤压力。
+
+#### 2、哈尔科夫方向
+
+乌军哈尔科夫战役军团在占领利曼后，用数日时间扫荡了奥斯基列河东岸的俄军据点，而后继续向东，进攻斯瓦托沃至克列缅纳一线的俄军。然而俄军已从后方调来了新锐部队，得以守住这一线，并在卢甘斯克州同哈尔科夫州、顿涅茨克州的边界上同乌军转入对峙。
+
+#### 3、顿巴斯方向
+
+俄军此前在顿巴斯方向上还能展开战术进攻，本月初也继续对巴赫穆特（阿尔焦姆斯克）、阿夫季耶夫卡发动着战术进攻。然而，乌军在10月中旬投入旅级的预备队，在这两个战场相继展开战术反击，迅速挫败了俄军的进攻，导致俄军月余来战果几乎全部失去。此后，双方在这一方向上也转入了对峙。
+
+#### 4、俄军战略轰炸
+
+本月，乌军反而首先对俄罗斯发动了战略打击。10月7日，乌军打击了位于俄罗斯本土腹地（卡卢加州）的沙伊科夫卡空军基地，自称毁伤图22M轰炸机多架。10月8日，乌军疑似以自爆卡车的方式打击了连接俄联邦本土（库班地区）和克里姆半岛的刻赤海峡大桥，中断了铁路和公路交通。俄联邦虽在数日内就用应急手段恢复了铁路和公路的运行，但距离完全修复大桥仍为时尚早，运输能力也因此大受影响。
+
+10月8日，俄军改任空天军总司令苏洛维金大将为“特别军事行动”总指挥。新官上任三把火，苏洛维金上台后于10月10日开始大幅强化对乌克兰的战略轰炸。10月10日，俄军使用陆海空三基平台，向乌克兰各主要城市发射了大约100枚精确制导导弹，并且在时隔数月后首次打击了乌克兰西部纵深的利沃夫、捷尔诺波尔等地。此后连续数日，俄军每天都使用20—30枚精确制导导弹对乌克兰重要目标（如发电站）进行打击，此外每天还使用数十架伊朗开发的自杀式无人机对相对脆弱的目标（如变电站）进行打击，主要对象是乌克兰的电力系统和能源系统。俄军的攻击受到一定的成效，迫使乌克兰从10月20日起在全国范围内实施电力统制、严格限制“非必要用电”、以避免电网崩溃和大规模停电。然而，终因俄军储备的精确制导导弹数量有限、无力持续以10月10日的密集频次展开打击，加之乌军又在西方帮助下强化了防空系统，故而对乌克兰战争潜力的破坏仍属有限。10月31日，俄军又对乌克兰各大城市展开了规模较大的攻击，据称发射精确制导导弹50枚，乌军宣称击落其中44枚。
+
+俄军扩大战略轰炸后，乌军也不甘示弱，集中力量，使用导弹、远程炮兵、无人机等对俄边境地区后勤设施比较密集的别尔哥罗德州（当然还有顿巴斯二傀儡政权和克里木半岛等境内）展开了战略轰炸。俄本土的别尔哥罗德州也被乌军打得频频停电、停课。10月29日，乌军集中力量打击了黑海舰队位于克里姆半岛的海军基地，至少重创一艘扫雷舰。俄联邦怒而宣布撕毁黑海运粮协定。然而由于乌克兰运粮船得到了土耳其海军的护航，俄军无如之何，不久只得托辞土耳其保证检查乌克兰运粮船，又恢复了黑海运粮协定。
+
+
+### 二、战争现状
+
+目前，秋雨导致的无路季已近尾声，冬季战局正拉开序幕。比起无路季之前，俄军的态势有所好转。10月4日，俄国防部宣布30万动员计划已完成20万，此后大概是整顿了一番乱象，至10月28日宣布完成30万动员计划，称其中8.2万人已补充到前线、其余21.8万人正在后方接受训练。至此，俄军前线兵力有所恢复，然而比起乌军来说仍是压倒性少数。同时，在后方训练的俄军动员兵也无法迅速补充到前线，而必须训练成新的部队或兵团。此外，俄联邦与白俄罗斯的卢卡申科政权在10月10日宣布成立俄白区域联合部队。尽管俄军早已进驻白俄罗斯、今年年初还从白境内出发侵略乌克兰，然而此举无疑把白军完全置于俄军的控制之下，主要目的似乎是为了进一步控制白军，并利用白俄罗斯的人力、设置和储备武器，用于组建俄军的动员部队，至于再次从白俄罗斯境内对乌克兰发动进攻的可能性则不大。
+
+虽然美国面临中期选举、英国则出现了一年三相的不稳政局，但是西方对乌克兰的军事、经济援助仍然继续，而且短期内不会停止。西方的能源危机也已经缓解，冬季不太可能出现经济崩溃。另一方面，俄罗斯的经济也承受住了制裁的重压，短期内依然呈现平稳局面。因此，战争在短期内也就不会停止。
+
+
+### 三、战争趋势
+
+因为战争在短期内不可能停止，所以冬季战局也就拉开了帷幕。冬季交战对于双方的后勤是更大的考验，准备更充足的一方无疑会取得更大的优势。另一方面，乌军若不能有效利用这个冬季，俄军在来年春天就有可能重新夺回战争的主动权。到那时，战争就可能变得更加复杂。
+
+[![image1](https://i.imgur.com/0t3R2Pk.png)](https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/580682442)
+▲ 原载《知乎》链接。
+
+<!--END-->
\ No newline at end of file

From ecbe44ef6aebe794b292dc58b706bab465640a38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hokoi <hokoeye@pm.me>
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2022 10:05:54 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 7/9] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x16 Nov.09

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 .../2022-10-31-irans-drones-in-ukraine.md     |  36 +++
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+---
+layout: post
+title : China’s Approach To Taiwan
+author: Bonny Lin, et al.
+date  : 2022-10-03 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/uCtXZQc.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Surveying the Experts: China’s Approach to Taiwan"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_As China’s recent unprecedented military exercises around Taiwan demonstrated, the Taiwan Strait is a major flashpoint that threatens to undermine regional and global stability. Yet crucial questions remain about the dynamics shaping the Taiwan Strait. What is China’s approach to Taiwan and how long is Beijing willing to wait for Taiwan’s unification? Will China use significant military force against Taiwan, and when? How does Beijing view the potential of U.S. intervention in a Taiwan contingency?_
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+To shed light on these questions, ChinaPower polled 64 leading experts on the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, and cross-Strait relations. The experts polled include 28 former high-level U.S. government (USG) officials from both Democrat and Republican administrations, as well as 23 former USG policy and intelligence analysts and 13 top experts from academia and think tanks. Responses were collected from August 10–September 8, 2022, amid the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. Key takeaways from the survey are shown below.
+
+
+### Key Takeaways
+
+![image1](https://i.imgur.com/XnPdbOf.png)
+_▲ __Key Takeaways.__ [PDF of the full feature](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1AtwXW_iVJ2_50NKnpPgBshj2NUb_uTVf/view?usp=sharing); [Summary of the survey findings](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1S1pNtqcoHLBj1o1fEVfKj2QC5KlC92pc/view?usp=sharing); [PDF of the survey questionnaire](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GeBPnqHuNHhjIULrtdK9_3DHwovNKl-9/view?usp=sharing)._
+
+#### China’s Strategy for Taiwan
+
+At the most basic level, China’s overall approach to Taiwan hinges on two main questions: does China have a clear strategy to achieve unification and how patiently is it willing to wait? The experts polled by our survey broadly believe that Beijing does not have a strategy and that it is willing to wait to achieve unification — but not forever.
+
+Asked whether Beijing has “a coherent internal strategy and roadmap, with concrete stages and actionable next steps,” 80 percent of respondents said “no.” There was no significant difference in responses to this question based on the identity of the respondents: former senior USG officials and other respondents broadly agree on the matter.
+
+![image2](https://i.imgur.com/MJnHB61.png)
+_▲ __China lacks a coherent strategy for Taiwan.__ Question: “Does Beijing have a coherent internal strategy and roadmap, with concrete stages and actionable next steps, to achieve peaceful unification with Taiwan?”_
+
+The general assessment that China lacks a coherent strategy is a reflection of public opinion polls in Taiwan, which consistently show that Taiwan’s citizens are not interested in unification with China. Under President Tsai Ing-wen, Taipei has also rejected China’s proposed “one country, two systems” offer and watched as Beijing cracked down on Hong Kong and reversed promises of autonomy for the Chinese special administrative region. China’s inability to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwan government and people has led Beijing to increasingly leverage coercive tools against the island, including threats to use significant military force. These dynamics raise serious questions as to whether China has a coherent strategy for peaceful unification with Taiwan.
+
+Linked to China’s overall strategy are Beijing’s assessments of the necessary conditions for unification with the island. Only 10 percent of respondents think Beijing’s approach is to push for unification “at the earliest possible opportunity.” The overwhelming majority (84 percent) of respondents say “Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently.” For this group, there is likely an assessment that Beijing is willing to wait because the conditions — political, economic, or military — are not yet optimal for China to achieve peaceful or forceful unification. Only 6 percent believe Beijing is willing to permanently accept the status quo — wherein Taiwan is self-governed but Taipei has not declared independence — and none of the 64 respondents think that China would ever accept Taiwan independence.
+
+![image3](https://i.imgur.com/JKLw5BA.png)
+_▲ __Beijing is willing to wait for Taiwan’s unification, but not forever.__ Question: “For Beijing, is there any other acceptable outcome for Taiwan aside from unification?”_
+
+#### China’s Timeline for Unification
+
+Some of the most hotly debated questions revolve around China’s timeline for unification. These questions are crucial, since a desire by Beijing to stick to a certain timeline could compel China to ramp up coercive measures or even military attacks to achieve its objectives.
+
+When asked if Beijing has set a “hard internal deadline for resolving the Taiwan issue,” 44 percent of respondents said Beijing has set a hard deadline to achieve unification by 2049. This is not an arbitrary year. Authoritative Chinese sources, including the 2022 white paper on Taiwan, have closely linked Taiwan’s unification with the concept of “national rejuvenation” — a nebulous goal that Chinese leaders aim to achieve by 2049 to mark the centennial of the PRC’s founding.
+
+Some experts believe that 2049 is only a soft benchmark for China and not a hard deadline. As a result, some selected 2072 as the hard deadline for China to achieve unification, believing that 50 years from 2022 is the longest time China could give itself. Others (42 percent) selected the option that Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible.
+
+![image4](https://i.imgur.com/TyMvLMO.png)
+_▲ __Divided views on China’s deadlines for unifying Taiwan.__ Question: “Has Beijing set a hard internal deadline for resolving the Taiwan issue?”_
+
+Since experts do not formulate their assessments in a vacuum, the poll sought to gauge whether China’s recent unprecedented military exercises around Taiwan reflect changes in Beijing’s timelines. A large majority (80 percent) believe that the recent exercises do not indicate that China is accelerating its timeline for using large-scale military force against Taiwan. Notably, however, 29 percent of former senior USG officials believe the exercises do indicate a timeline shift while only 14 percent of other respondents hold that view.
+
+![image5](https://i.imgur.com/r6nemOH.png)
+_▲ __China’s August 2022 military exercises do not indicate an acceleration of plans to use force.__ Question: “Do China’s unprecedented August 2022 military exercises against Taiwan indicate that Beijing is accelerating its timeline for using large-scale military force (i.e., a blockade or invasion) against the island?”_
+
+#### Xi Jinping’s Third Term
+
+China’s approach toward Taiwan over the next five years will be heavily shaped by Chinese leader Xi Jinping. He is China’s most powerful leader in generations, and he has abolished the two term limit on his power. Xi is set to begin his third five-year term in October 2022.
+
+Under Xi, China has significantly ramped up pressure on Taiwan. There has been U.S. and international media speculation that the year 2027 — which will mark the end of Xi’s third term and also the centennial of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) — is a likely time period by which Xi will decide to use force against Taiwan to achieve unification. Xi’s own statements have also been interpreted by some as an indication that he seeks to resolve the Taiwan issue under his watch. In 2013 and 2019, Xi commented that the Taiwan issue should not be passed down from generation to generation. Yet he has been careful to not explicitly and publicly specify a date by which China needs to unify with Taiwan or use force against the island.
+
+The experts polled by our survey broadly rejected the idea that China must act against Taiwan by 2027. About 83 percent of respondents assess that China does not plan to use significant kinetic military force against Taiwan by 2027.
+
+![image6](https://i.imgur.com/7gNiVcH.png)
+_▲ __Few expect China to use significant force against Taiwan by 2027.__ Question: “There has been speculation by the media and some analysts that China plans to use significant kinetic military force against Taiwan by 2027. Do you believe this is true?”_
+
+China’s lack of a plan to use significant military force against Taiwan does not mean that Beijing will sit idly by. Indeed, 79 percent of respondents assess that Xi will move beyond a more passive focus on deterring perceived Taiwan independence and instead prioritize making progress toward peaceful unification during his third term. This means that Beijing will need to be much more active — and likely more coercive — toward Taiwan to create the conditions for unification. This could involve more unilateral moves on Beijing’s end to impose its sovereignty and control over the island.
+
+Only 9 percent of respondents believe that Xi feels China has exhausted all peaceful options and will feel compelled in his third term to unify Taiwan through coercive measures or military force. This corresponds closely to the 9 percent that believe Beijing will seek unification at the earliest possible opportunity (See above in the section on “China’s Strategy for Taiwan”).
+
+![image7](https://i.imgur.com/5jurd3P.png)
+_▲ __Xi Jinping will prioritize making progress on peaceful unification.__ Question: “What do you assess as Xi Jinping’s main priority for Taiwan after the 20th Party Congress, during his next term (2022-2027)?”_
+
+#### The Risk of a Taiwan Contingency
+
+As cross-Strait tensions have flared in recent years, so has the likelihood of a military conflict or accident. Three of the survey’s questions sought to gauge experts’ assessments about the risks of various military contingencies in the next ten years. Their responses indicate a belief that a full amphibious invasion of Taiwan is possible — but more unlikely than not — while a more limited Chinese use of force and a military accident are fairly likely.
+
+Asked how likely it is that China will engage in an amphibious invasion of Taiwan in the next ten years, 63 percent of experts responded that it is possible. Another 27 percent feel an invasion is unlikely. Only 8 percent think an invasion is likely.
+
+Based on responses to other questions in the survey, these results indicate that most experts do not believe China proactively seeks to invade Taiwan in the next ten years. Instead, Beijing could feel compelled to do so if China views Taiwan or the United States as crossing unacceptable redlines.
+
+![image8](https://i.imgur.com/HZy3VaM.png)
+_▲ __An amphibious invasion of Taiwan is possible in the next 10 years.__ Question: “Within the next ten years, how likely is it that China will engage in an amphibious invasion of Taiwan with the goal of gaining control of Taipei?”_
+
+While experts were unsure about the likelihood of an amphibious invasion, they were much more willing to believe that in the next 10 years China would “deliberately escalate its use of force short of invasion,” for example by blockading Taiwan. A slight majority believe that such a scenario is either likely (30 percent) or very likely (22 percent). However, a plurality (44 percent) still view this as possible. Only 5 percent believe it is unlikely and no experts believe it is not at all likely.
+
+Respondents were even more likely to think that an “unintended military accident or collision will take place in or near the Taiwan Strait.” While a plurality (39 percent) still believe an accident or collision is possible, 34 percent believe such a scenario is likely and 22 percent believe it is very likely. Only 5 percent believe it is unlikely and no experts believe it is not at all likely. Notably, there were not major differences in views between former senior officials and other respondents.
+
+![image9](https://i.imgur.com/gwd3A2Y.png)
+_▲ __Other Taiwan contingencies are more likely than an invasion.__ Question: “Within the next 10 years, how likely is it that ____ ?”_
+
+#### Potential Chinese Responses to U.S. and Taiwan Actions
+
+Also important to China’s plans for Taiwan is how China might respond to potential U.S. and Taiwan actions. Beijing could feel that it must respond by using military force. Respondents largely agree that China would invade if Taiwan declared independence and that Beijing would respond strongly and negatively if Washington dropped its long-held approach of strategic ambiguity.
+
+Over the years, Beijing has repeatedly made known its objection to Taiwan independence. The PLA’s unprecedented August 2022 exercises were targeted at deterring “separatist activities” on the island, and Beijing has taken other measures such as sanctioning Taiwan officials that it has labeled “independence diehards.”
+
+Survey respondents appear to take Beijing’s concerns seriously. More than three-quarters of the experts polled said that China would invade Taiwan immediately (within six months) if Taipei declared independence. There was little variation in this belief among different groups of respondents. Compared to other respondents, former senior USG officials were only slightly more likely to say China would invade (79 percent versus 75 percent). Even among the 23 percent that do not believe China would invade Taiwan immediately, some still believe that China could use significant force against Taiwan. This could involve launching a blockade or engaging in unprecedented, large military exercises targeting Taiwan.
+
+![image10](https://i.imgur.com/ANabW1k.png)
+_▲ __China would invade Taiwan immediately if Taipei declared independence.__ Question: “If Taipei declared independence, would Beijing invade Taiwan immediately (within the next six months)?”_
+
+Respondents were somewhat more sanguine about how Beijing would respond to a decision by Washington to end its long-held policy of strategic ambiguity — a policy wherein the United States does not say whether or not it would come to Taiwan’s defense. None of the polled experts believe China would respond to an end of strategic ambiguity by immediately invading Taiwan. Instead, 64 percent of polled experts expect that China would “respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis.” An additional 31 percent say that China would instead “respond negatively in a more limited way,” mainly lodging diplomatic protests.
+
+Only two respondents believe that an official U.S. policy shift to defend Taiwan would deter China from using force against Taiwan, and only one respondent assesses that China would not respond to the U.S. policy change. As shown in the next section, most experts do not believe ending U.S. strategic ambiguity would deter China from using force against Taiwan because Beijing already assumes that the U.S. military would come to Taiwan’s defense. Instead, Beijing is likely to view a change in U.S. policy as further provocation and as an effort to support Taiwan independence.
+
+![image11](https://i.imgur.com/dPwlfgB.png)
+_▲ __China would provoke a crisis if the United States ends strategic ambiguity.__ Question: “How would Beijing respond if the United States ended its policy of strategic ambiguity in favor of strategic clarity to defend Taiwan?”_
+
+#### Chinese Thinking on U.S. Resolve
+
+Experts polled in this survey think Beijing already assumes the United States will intervene militarily to defend Taiwan. Many also believe that Chinese leaders fear the U.S. still has a military advantage. 
+
+Survey participants were asked to assess how far Beijing expects the United States would be willing to go to defend Taiwan in the event of an unprovoked Chinese invasion of Taiwan. They were given multiple options ranging from providing no support for Taiwan to bearing any military costs to defend the island. None of the experts assess that China believes Washington will provide no support or simply stop at political and economic aid. All respondents think China believes the United States would be willing to also deploy troops in Taiwan’s defense.
+
+Experts diverge, however, on how far the United States would be willing to go to defend Taiwan. About 30 percent believe China assesses the United States is willing to deploy troops to defend Taiwan but is not willing to bear significant costs. Most respondents (66 percent) think Beijing has assessed that the United States is willing to go further by bearing substantial costs but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. The remaining 5 percent think China sees the U.S. as willing to risk any cost, including a global war and attacks on the continental United States.
+
+![image12](https://i.imgur.com/0QK1acg.png)
+_▲ __Beijing expects U.S. military intervention in a conflict over Taiwan.__ Respondents unanimously believe Beijing expects the United States is willing to provide political and economic support and deploy forces to defend Taiwan, but they differ over what the United States is willing to bear._
+
+Importantly, these responses were specifically about a scenario in which the PLA launches an “unprovoked” invasion. If Taiwan were to provoke a Chinese attack by unilaterally declaring independence or by escalating through a preemptive military strike, Washington may be far less willing to come to Taiwan’s aid. Beijing is aware of this, and a different scenario would therefore likely be interpreted differently by Chinese leaders.
+
+The widespread belief that China anticipates a U.S. military response is notable given that most respondents also think Beijing is uncertain about its capabilities vis-à-vis the United States. In the context of a Chinese amphibious invasion scenario in the next five years, about 41 percent believe Beijing is uncertain about U.S. capabilities but think Beijing “has confidence in its growing military capabilities.” This reflects the fact that China has invested significant resources to train and modernize the PLA.
+
+![image13](https://i.imgur.com/h3GoOMb.png)
+_▲ __Beijing is uncertain about its military capabilities.__ Question: “If China invaded Taiwan between now and 2027, does Beijing believe the United States has the military capability to defend Taipei and prevent China from executing a successful amphibious invasion?”_
+
+At the same time, the PLA has not engaged in a major conventional conflict since the China-Vietnam war in 1979 and an amphibious invasion of Taiwan would amount to an extremely complex and difficult military operation. Most respondents (55 percent) consequently think that Beijing believes the United States still has a military advantage, indicating a belief that the United States and its allies could mount a considerable defense of Taiwan. Only 2 percent say that Beijing believes the United States could not repel a Chinese invasion.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+The results of this survey offer valuable insights into the thinking of many of the leading experts on cross-Strait dynamics and Indo-Pacific security issues — including those who have shaped not only public discourse but also U.S. government policy. Taken together, their views suggest a consensus along the following lines:
+
+1. China is determined to unify with Taiwan, but Beijing does not have a coherent strategy. Experts in the poll unanimously agree that Beijing will not accept Taiwan’s independence. At the same time, most experts assess that China does not have a coherent strategy for unification.
+
+2. China is willing to wait to unify with Taiwan, and the August 2022 exercises are not an indicator of accelerated PRC timelines. Most respondents believe Beijing is willing to wait decades — or even indefinitely — to achieve its goals. Experts are split nearly evenly over whether China has set a hard deadline to achieve unification by 2049 or whether it is willing to wait indefinitely. Only a small share of experts believe China has a hard deadline to unify Taiwan in the next 15 years or less. Most do not view China’s unprecedented military exercise in August 2022 as an indicator that China has accelerated its timeline to use force against Taiwan.
+
+3. Xi Jinping feels there are still avenues to peaceful unification. A large majority of experts believe Xi will prioritize making progress on peaceful unification during his third term (2022–2027). Few experts — and no former senior U.S. government officials — believe Xi has concluded that China has exhausted all peaceful options. Most respondents reject speculation that Xi intends to use force against Taiwan by 2027.
+
+4. The potential for a military crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait is very real. While very few think a full amphibious invasion of Taiwan is likely in the next ten years, a majority say it is possible. Other scenarios short of an invasion — such as a blockade or a military accident or collision — are likelier than not in the next decade.
+
+5. China would immediately invade if Taiwan declared independence. Experts were largely in agreement that a declaration of independence would provoke an invasion. China would respond more limitedly — but still negatively and strongly — to an ending of U.S. strategic ambiguity, likely by provoking a crisis.
+
+6. China assumes that the United States would intervene in a Taiwan conflict. Experts in the survey unanimously agree that Beijing assumes the U.S. military would deploy forces to intervene and defend Taiwan in a conflict, and a slight majority of experts think Beijing still worries that the United States has a military edge. Accordingly, almost no respondents believe that ending the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity would deter China from using force against Taiwan, since Beijing already assumes Washington will intervene.
+
+
+### Survey Participants
+
+A total of 64 respondents participated in this survey. The individuals listed below gave permission to publicly acknowledge their participation. An additional four respondents participated but did not wish for their names to be listed publicly.
+
+_Jeff Benson, Jude Blanchette, Dennis J. Blasko, Richard Bush, Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Elbridge Colby, Zack Cooper, Ralph Cossa, John K. Culver, Fiona Cunningham, Richard Danzig, Brian Davis, Gerard DiPippo, Lukas Filler, David Finkelstein, Michele Flournoy, M. Taylor Fravel, Bonnie Glaser, Michael J. Green, Derek Grossman, Kristen Gunness, Paul Haenle, Ryan Hass, Paul Heer, Lonnie Henley, Charles Hooper, Russell Hsiao, Michael A. Hunzeker, Christopher Johnstone, Shirley Kan, Ivan Kanapathy, Isaac Kardon, David Keegan, Scott Kennedy, William Klein, Matthew Kroenig, Roderick Lee, Kenneth Lieberthal, Bonny Lin, Shirley Lin, Oriana Skylar Mastro, Evan Medeiros, Lyle Morris, Dan Peck, Shelley Rigger, J. Stapleton Roy, David Sacks, Brent Sadler, Chad Sbragia, Andrew Scobell, David B. Shear, Thomas Shugart, David Stilwell, Mark Stokes, Robert Sutter, Scott Swift, Kharis Templeman, Christopher Twomey, James Winnefeld, Joel Wuthnow_
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-10-31-irans-drones-in-ukraine.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-10-31-irans-drones-in-ukraine.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-10-31-irans-drones-in-ukraine.md
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Iran’s Drones In Ukraine
+author: Katherine Zimmerman and Cleary Waldo
+date  : 2022-10-31 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/hizsWbV.jpg
+image_caption: "A Shahed-136 drone attacking Kyiv, 17 Oct., 2022."
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_The Russian military has attacked multiple Ukrainian cities with Iranian drones in recent weeks. The use of Iranian drones in Ukraine has sparked concern over the deepening Iranian-Russo ties and the maturity of Iran’s drone program. But for Iran, Ukraine serves as another battlefield to live-test its drone fleet against U.S.- and NATO-provided defensive systems._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+Tehran has placed itself firmly in the Kremlin’s camp since the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Part of that is driven by the punishing sanctions regime that weighs heavily on both economies and part by a shared interest in weakening the U.S. and NATO. But the nature of Iran’s support shifted when Tehran supplied drones and then began training Russian forces on their use. Reports of the deal surfaced in midsummer and by August, Iranian drones were in Ukraine. The precise terms remain unclear, but Iranian drones offset surveillance demands on the Russian air force and may backfill rapidly depleting missile stockpiles. For Iran, the deal generates cash or repays a debt — but more significantly places its drones in yet another theater.
+
+Drones already provide Iranian forces and regional proxies with critical capabilities, including aerial surveillance and short- and long-range strikes. Their smaller size makes them hard to see on radar, and they are difficult to hit because they fly low and slow — exploiting a gap in defense systems. Some drones function as precision munitions such as the Shahed-136, which earned the moniker of a “kamikaze” drone. Though individual drones carry a relatively low payload, drone swarm technology, which the Iranian military showcased in late 2021, can combine their firepower. The Shahed-136’s mobile, truck-mounted launchers present similar challenges to detection as did Iraq’s Scud launchers in the first Gulf War. Moreover, Iran sources some drone components from commercially available engines and other dual-use technologies, complicating efforts to prevent parts procurement. Indeed, Tehran has called drones “the main pillar of wars of the future” and asserted they will play an increasingly prominent role in its military posture.
+
+The advancement in Iran’s drone threat should be no surprise. While Iranian military drills and reporting may inflate capabilities, Iranian drones have proved their worth in active conflicts. Yemen’s Houthis began using Iranian-sourced drones in 2016. They used a short-range drone to target Patriot air defense systems within the country, neutralizing them before firing missiles at the location. They also used these drones for cross-border attacks against Saudi military and oil infrastructure. Iran introduced longer-range designs that the Houthis tested against Saudi targets, and the first known Shahed-136 surfaced in Yemen by September 2020. Houthi-launched drones and missiles probe Saudi air defenses, primarily Patriot air defense systems, to reveal vulnerabilities that they can then exploit. Iranian drone performance in the Yemen conflict almost certainly has fed back into future development cycles.
+
+This feedback cycle makes Russia’s use of Iranian drone technology worrisome. The drones themselves are unlikely to yield strategic shifts in the Ukraine war. The Russian military is attacking civilian and infrastructure targets with drones to break the will of the Ukrainian people, but these attacks seem to have only further inured Ukrainians to Russian brutality. The Ukrainian military is shooting down more than 70 percent of the Shahed-136 drones, using anti-drone techniques developed on the fly. Defensive layers include radar to identify potential drone threats, fighter jet patrols, ground-fired anti-aircraft missiles and even machine-gun fire. The U.S. and NATO supplied Ukraine with anti-drone systems, including the mobile VAMPIRE system, to aid in defense against Russian attacks.
+
+While the U.S. and NATO will reap the benefits of the Ukrainian military’s experience, so, too, will Iran. Iranians operating the drones from Crimea have front-row seats and can report back which drone attacks have penetrated which defenses, and where gaps in any defense systems may exist. Iran’s next generation of drones will be that much more difficult to stop.
+
+The variety of ways in which the Ukrainian military has thwarted Russian drone attacks is a testament to the array of defenses at its disposal. But it also speaks to the ad hoc nature of the response, revealing vulnerabilities to increasingly sophisticated — and field-tested — Iranian technology, and it exposes an asymmetry in defending against the threat. Scrambling fighter jets to shoot down drones as the U.S. did in September is not a sustainable response. Nor, as the Saudis have learned, is firing million-dollar Patriot missiles.
+
+The U.S. and NATO must commit to advancing their anti-drone capabilities and slowing Iran’s drone program. The Defense Department’s initial steps to develop a strategy and the technologies to support it are positive but remain insufficient as modern warfare moves faster than defense procurement cycles. Congress could help. Funding the military’s efforts to address this growing threat is one way. Another is focusing on the Iranian drone procurement network and those who operate the drones. Sanctioning entities within this network will make it harder for Iran to obtain necessary components. So, too, would ensuring the proper authorities to attack the production cycle through cyber or other means are in place.
+
+Iran’s drone threat is rising, and it’s only a matter of time until the U.S. military, not the Ukrainians, will need to defend against it.
+
+---
+
+__Katherine Zimmerman__ is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and an adviser to its Critical Threats Project.
+
+__Cleary Waldo__ is a master’s candidate at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-07-russian-air-war-in-ukraine.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-07-russian-air-war-in-ukraine.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-07-russian-air-war-in-ukraine.md
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Russian Air War In Ukraine
+author: Justin Bronk, Nick Reynolds and Jack Watling
+date  : 2022-11-07 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/nDspEKl.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_Further Western support is needed to ensure that Kyiv can counter Moscow's updated approach to the air war in Ukraine._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+- Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted significantly more extensive fixed-wing strike operations during the first days of the invasion than has been previously documented, while Ukrainian ground-based air-defence (GBAD) capabilities were suppressed by initial attacks. 
+
+- During this period, Ukrainian fighter aircraft inflicted some losses on VKS aircraft but also took serious casualties due to being totally technologically outmatched and badly outnumbered.
+
+- Russian fighters have remained highly effective and lethal against Ukrainian aircraft near the frontlines throughout the war, especially the Su-35S with the R-77-1 long-range missile and, in recent months, the Mig-31BM with the R-37 very long-range missile.
+
+- From early March, the VKS lost the ability to operate in Ukrainian-controlled airspace except at very low altitudes due to its inability to reliably suppress or destroy increasingly effective, well-dispersed and mobile Ukrainian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
+
+- Russian GBAD has also been highly effective since March, especially the long-range S-400 SAM system supported by the 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude long-range surveillance radar system.
+
+- Numerous MANPADS provided to Ukrainian troops and later mobile air-defence teams meant that low-altitude Russian fixed-wing and rotary penetrating sorties beyond the frontlines proved to be prohibitively costly during March, and ceased by April 2022.
+
+- Throughout the war, most Russian airstrikes have been against pre-designated targets with unguided bombs and rockets. The Su-34 fleet has regularly also fired stand-off missiles such as the Kh-29 and Kh-59 against fixed targets, and Su-30SM and Su-35S fighters have regularly fired Kh-31P and Kh-58 anti-radiation missiles to suppress and target Ukrainian SAM radars.
+
+- Without air superiority, Russia’s attempts at strategic air attack have been limited to expensive cruise and ballistic missile barrages at a much more limited scale. These failed to achieve strategically decisive damage during the first seven months of the invasion. However, the latest iteration is a more focused and sustainable bombardment of the Ukrainian electricity grid, blending hundreds of cheap Iranian-supplied Shahed-136 loitering munitions against substations with continued use of cruise and ballistic missiles against larger targets.
+
+- The West must avoid complacency about the need to urgently bolster Ukrainian air-defence capacity. It is purely thanks to its failure to destroy Ukraine’s mobile SAM systems that Russia remains unable to effectively employ the potentially heavy and efficient aerial firepower of its fixed-wing bomber and multi-role fighter fleets to bombard Ukrainian strategic targets and frontline positions from medium altitude, as it did in Syria. 
+
+- It follows that if Ukrainian SAMs are not resupplied with ammunition, and ultimately augmented and replaced with Western equivalents over time, the VKS will regain the ability to pose a major threat.
+
+- In the short term, Ukraine also needs large numbers of additional man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) and radar-guided anti-aircraft guns, such as the Gepard, to sustain and increase its ability to intercept the Shahed-136s and protect its remaining power infrastructure and repairs to damaged facilities.
+
+- In the medium term, Ukraine needs cost-effective ways to defend itself against the Shahed-136. One option could be compact radar and/or laser ranging and sighting systems to allow numerous existing anti-aircraft guns to be much more accurate and effective against them. 
+
+- The Ukrainian Air Force fighter force needs modern Western fighters and missiles to sustainably counter the VKS. Russian pilots have been cautious throughout the war, so even a small number of Western fighters could have a major deterrent effect.
+
+- Any Western fighter supplied in the short–medium term needs to be capable of dispersed operations using mobile maintenance equipment and small support teams, and flying from relatively rough runways, to avoid being neutralised by Russian long-range missile strikes.
+
+
+### Introduction
+
+When Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, it initiated the first large-scale peer conflict in Europe since the Second World War. The stakes are extremely high, as the outcome of the war will define not only the future of Ukraine and of Russia, but also the global geopolitical system.
+
+Unsurprisingly, therefore, there has been an unprecedented degree of sustained global public, political, military and media interest driving external analysis of the war. Since the start of the invasion, military analysis in both public and professional communities has focused heavily on Russia’s employment of ground forces. This is logical since the Russian Ground Forces have done by far the most damage, possess most of Russia’s conventional firepower and are the most important component of Russian military capability. By contrast, Russian Aerospace Forces’ (VKS) fixed-wing and helicopter operations during the conflict have remained more sparsely documented and only partially understood outside those Ukrainian Air Force, Navy and Army personnel directly involved in countering their operations day-to-day.
+
+External analysts, including the lead author of this report, have so far focused on trying to explain the apparent absence of a large-scale air campaign or strategically significant results achieved by the VKS. The pervasive use by both sides of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) – usually called ‘drones’ – and UAVs – also usually called ‘drones’ – carrying modern cameras, and the ubiquitous presence of smartphones among troops, has ensured that detailed footage of the ground war has been captured and broadcast in unprecedented detail throughout the war. By contrast, the combat air environment is inherently much harder to film due to the speeds, distances and altitudes involved. Consequently, much of what is known about the air war over Ukraine has been gleaned from isolated clips filmed from the ground, and carefully selected footage collated and released by both the Ukrainian and Russian Ministries of Defence as part of information operations. Therefore, while analysts have been able to observe fragments of the air war, and to track competing kill/loss claims and count wreckage on both sides, there has so far been very little granular information available in the public domain about the actual Russian air war over Ukraine.
+
+This report sets out to start the process of uncovering how Russia’s VKS has operated over Ukraine between the start of the invasion in February and late October 2022. It is based on fieldwork conducted in Ukraine in August and October 2022, which included interviews with Ukrainian Air Force officers working in both the aviation and air-defence branches, interviews with senior intelligence officers and military scientists, and examination of captured and recovered Russian weapons systems. To protect sources, the interview subjects have been anonymised and precise dates and locations are not disclosed. The interviews were, of necessity, conducted with Ukrainian officials and officers but not Russian ones and, consequently, they represent an incomplete view from only one side of the air war. To guard against over-reliance on single sources, most of the interviews were conducted with multiple individuals representing different parts of their services. Where possible, information has also been cross-referenced between different interviews, and also evaluated against externally available footage and existing open-source intelligence data.
+
+Chapter I provides details of the operations undertaken by the fixed-wing fighter, fighter-bomber and attack aircraft of the VKS. There were significant changes in objectives, tactics, operational intensity and weapons use at various phases of the war, so this chapter takes a chronological approach to explain their evolution over time. Chapter II examines Russian attack aviation (helicopter gunship) operations during the war. Chapter III examines the Russian long-range precision-strike campaign, looking at the patterns of use, targets and some characteristics of the cruise and ballistic missiles Russia has used to bombard Ukraine. It also provides some analysis of the Iranian-supplied Shahed-136 (called Geran-2 by Russia) loitering munitions (often inappropriately called ‘kamikaze drones’) that have been extensively used against Ukrainian infrastructure since September 2022. Finally, the report concludes with an analysis of the main priorities for aid that Ukraine needs from its international partners to improve its air-defence capabilities. There are several areas that are already becoming critical requirements if Ukraine is to sustain the battlefield momentum that it has won over Russia at such a devastating cost since February 2022.
+
+The report deliberately avoids giving detailed descriptions of Ukrainian air combat and ground-based air-defence (GBAD) tactics, operations and losses to protect Ukrainian operational security. As such, it does not attempt to give a comprehensive or final account of the air war, but rather to usefully increase Western understanding of the use of Russian airpower during the conflict within the bounds of what can be verified and publicly discussed at this stage.
+
+
+### I. Russian Fixed-Wing Combat Operations
+
+THE IMPACT OF hundreds of Russian cruise and ballistic missile strikes across Ukraine and the ill-fated air-assault operation at Hostomel Airport dominated the external view of Russian air operations during the initial week of the invasion. Ukrainian fast jets flew several visible combat air patrols (CAPs) over Kyiv and other cities, but various viral pieces of footage claiming to show air-to-air combat between Russian and Ukrainian jets were quickly recognisable as fakes created using commercial flight simulator software. This led several commentators, including the lead author of this paper, to put forward various theories for the apparent absence of VKS activity during the first week of the invasion. The VKS had deployed a fast-jet force of around 350 modern combat aircraft for operations in Ukraine; so the lack of a publicly visible air campaign came as a major surprise to most analysts. The tentative conclusions reached by this author in March about the lack of VKS capacity to mount complex, large-scale operations still hold today, but early analysis was wrong about the lack of significant Russian air activity in the early days of the war. This chapter explains how, in fact, the VKS mounted significant strike and offensive counter-air operations during this period, and the Ukrainian Air Force engaged in numerous air-to-air clashes to oppose it.
+
+During the first week of the invasion, Russian electronic warfare using jamming equipment and E-96M aerial decoys were highly effective in disrupting Ukrainian GBAD. S-300 and SA-11 ‘Buk’ radar-guided surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems were particularly badly affected in the north of the country, especially to the north of Kyiv along the Hostomel/Irpin and Chernihiv axes. Cruise and ballistic missile strikes had also damaged or destroyed multiple long-range early warning radars throughout the country, and destroyed various Ukrainian SAM sites in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts in the south. The physical destruction, along with the electronic disruption and suppression of SAM systems in the north and northeast, left the Mikoyan Mig-29 and Sukhoi Su-27 fighters of the Ukrainian Air Force with the task of providing air defence over most of the country for the first few days of the war. The Ukrainian air defences progressively recovered as jammed and damaged radar systems were reset and assets were rapidly repositioned during the second and third days. After that, the Air Force and air defence infrastructures worked in tandem. Deconfliction between aircraft and GBAD was coordinated by time until 3 March, after which deconfliction began to be coordinated by space because of friendly fire incidents. In other words, SAM systems and combat aircraft sorties began to be deconflicted by being allocated separate operational areas.
+
+While Ukrainian GBAD units were electronically degraded and trying to reorganise and recover from physical strikes, Russian GBAD units inside Ukraine were also suffering from major limitations. Mobile air-defence assets, such as the short-range SA-15 ‘Tor’ and medium-range SA-17 ‘Buk’, had been sent into Ukraine with no functional communications plan. They were also advancing out of sequence and often separated from the formations that they were supposed to protect; and they were operating under very restrictive rules of engagement which instructed them to assume anything flying was Russian. The inability of radar-guided SAMs on either side to perform as anticipated during the first week and a half meant that fixed-wing aircraft on both sides had remarkable freedom to penetrate significant distances across the rapidly changing frontlines. This would quickly cease to be the case from early March, when both sides’ GBAD reorganised and became far more effective.
+
+At the start of the invasion, Russian Sukhoi Su-34 ‘frontal bomber’ and Su-30SM and Su-35S multi-role fighter aircraft flew around 140 sorties per day, conducting fighter sweeps and strike sorties up to 300 km inside Ukrainian territory at altitudes of between 12,000 ft and 30,000 ft. During the first three days, the primary targets of these VKS strikes were Ukrainian air defences. Over 100 fixed long-range radar installations, bases, munitions storage sites and positions occupied by mobile long- and medium-range SAM systems were attacked, with Russian fixed-wing sorties concentrating their activities along the routes intended to be used by airborne and helicopter assault forces.
+
+Notably, all the medium- and high-level strikes were conducted against pre-designated locations that had been extensively mapped by Su-24MR reconnaissance bombers. The Ukrainian Air Force observed that the latter constantly flew two–four sorties per day at medium to high altitude along Ukraine’s borders from early February to the end of April. Su-34s carried out the bulk of the strikes with multiple unguided FAB-500 and OFAB-250 bombs, and, during the first week, typically operated at medium altitudes of around 12,000 ft.
+
+Most of these medium-level daylight strikes were carried out by single aircraft, with fewer than 25% of strikes conducted by pairs or larger formations; and none were observed that involved more than six aircraft in a strike package. This contributed to inconsistent damage results as well as inefficient battle damage assessment (BDA), meaning that follow-up strikes were seldom carried out. Nevertheless, VKS fixed-wing air strikes were effective in the south, where, in conjunction with cruise and ballistic missiles, attacks badly degraded the limited Ukrainian Air Force and Naval air-defence capacity deployed in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. However, most of the targets hit were static radars and outdated S-125 (SA-3) SAM sites, and the only serious damage was to Ukrainian mobile SAM systems against trailer and truck-mounted S-300PS/PT units that either received too little warning to be able to move, or were stuck due to lack of spare parts.
+
+Russian Su-35S and Su-30SM fighters flew numerous high-altitude CAPs at around 30,000 ft in support of the medium-altitude Russian strike aircraft operating widely during the first three days. They scored multiple air-to-air kills against Ukrainian Mig-29 and Su-27 fighters, as well as against low-flying Su-24 and Su-25 attack aircraft that were conducting strikes with unguided bombs and rockets against Russian military convoys on the Kyiv axes.
+
+![image1](https://i.imgur.com/EFR5rLM.png)
+▲ Circuit boards and tail fin from an R-77-1 air-to-air missile.
+
+Ukrainian pilots confirm that Russia’s Su-30SM and Su-35S completely outclass Ukrainian Air Force fighter aircraft on a technical level. The long range and good look-down, shoot-down performance of their N011M Bars and N035 Irbis-E radars, and the much longer reach and active-radar guidance capability of the R-77-1 air-to-air missile compared with the semi-active R-27R/ER available to Ukrainian fighters, are the most important aspects of this technical overmatch. Throughout the war, Russian fighters have frequently been able to achieve a radar lock and launch R-77-1 missiles at Ukrainian fighters from over 100 km away. Even though such shots have a low probability of kill, they force Ukrainian pilots to go defensive or risk being hit while still far outside their own effective range, and a few such long-range shots found their mark. Furthermore, the R-77-1’s active radar seeker, combined with the modern N011M and N035 radars, give Russian fighters the ability to launch missiles in track-while-scan (TWS) mode, meaning that Ukrainian pilots are unlikely to get warning from their radar-warning receivers (RWRs) that they have been launched on until the missile itself goes active a few seconds before it hits. In contrast, the R-27R/ER missiles that Ukrainian fighters are armed with require a single target track (STT) lock to be maintained by the launching fighter’s own radar throughout a missile engagement. This means that Russian pilots receive an RWR warning when a Ukrainian pilot launches a radar-guided missile at them, and that if the Ukrainian fighter even briefly loses radar lock during missile flight, due to either side manoeuvring, deploying countermeasures or electronic warfare, then the missile will miss.
+
+![image2](https://i.imgur.com/NrEIHZR.png)
+▲ Internal view of R-77-1 air-to-air missile section showing rear fin control actuators.
+
+This deeply unequal radar and missile performance compared with Russian fighters, as well as being tactically outnumbered by up to 15:2 in some cases, forced Ukrainian pilots to fly extremely low to try to exploit ground clutter and terrain masking to get close enough to fire before being engaged.30 This was still highly dangerous, and flying low further increased the range discrepancy between the effective ranges of Russian and Ukrainian air-to-air missiles, since Russian fighters were at higher speeds and high altitude, giving their missiles much more energy at launch.
+
+![image3](https://i.imgur.com/TB0O4uG.png)
+▲ Section of casing from R-77 warhead showing expanding rod and pre-formed shrapnel sections.
+
+Despite these disadvantages, aggressive Ukrainian tactics and good use of the low-level terrain during the first days of the invasion led to multiple claims and several likely kills against Russian aircraft, although Ukrainian fighters were often shot down or damaged in the process. After three days of skirmishing in which both sides lost aircraft, there was a notable pause in Russian strike and fighter sorties venturing deep behind Ukrainian lines, which lasted for several days. As such, during the latter half of the first week, Su-34 and Su-35S pairs instead conducted numerous standoff launches against suspected Ukrainian radars and bases using Kh-31, Kh-58 and Kh-59 missiles.
+
+In early March, however, Russian SAM defences rapidly became much better coordinated and the threat from long-range S-400 ‘Triumph’ SAM systems based in Belarus and Crimea forced Ukrainian aircraft to fly at extremely low altitude – below 100 ft – for most of their sorties on the northern and southern axes. The threat from these long-range SAMs was compounded by the presence of a Russian S-band 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude radar in Belarus covering the Kyiv axis, and another in the south (which was later destroyed near Nova Kakovkha). These mobile radar systems were introduced in 2018, and have allowed Russian forces to track Ukrainian fixed-wing and rotary sorties at altitudes as low as 15 ft at well over 150 km. Given the method of operation of the Podlet-K1, it is unlikely to be capable of successfully supplying the high-resolution data required for terminal guidance illumination of low-flying targets at longer ranges. The success on various occasions of low-flying Ukrainian fighters in ambushing Russian high-altitude patrols during the first week of the war in areas covered by the Podlet K-1 system would suggest it only gives a relatively low-resolution tracking capability. On the other hand, this may simply indicate a poor dissemination of surveillance information from the radar to the Il-20M ‘Coot’ airborne command post and relay aircraft passing information from ground networks to patrolling Russian fighters. However, Podlet-K1 was designed to allow modern S-300 variants and the S-400 system to fire long-range missiles at a detected target, relay mid-course updates on the target movements to the missiles while in flight, and hence guide the missile close enough to detect and lock on to the aircraft in question with its own active radar seeker head as it descends from a high apex. The confident Ukrainian attribution of the loss of several aircraft to S-400 missile engagements while flying at very low altitude and at significant distances would, therefore, seem to suggest that longer-ranged missiles fired by these SAM systems do indeed possess a post-apex lock-on capability as previously theorised.
+
+On the Donbas front and in the south, a similar task was performed by A-50M/U Mainstay AWACS aircraft which flew an average of two–three sorties per day, providing higher-resolution early warning and vector information on low-flying Ukrainian aircraft in those sectors. However, the effectiveness of A-50M as a force multiplier has been limited throughout the war by two factors. First, Ukrainian forces have found A-50 to be fairly easy to degrade via electronic attack, and report consistent success in doing so. Second, because the Russian air operation is subordinated to the Ground Forces, surveillance information is not typically relayed directly between A-50M and fighters on CAP or to long-range GBAD units such as S-400 batteries. Instead, information is normally relayed via the military district command post or a combined arms army command post, then either directly or via an Il-20M relay aircraft to the GBAD units and fighter patrols. This significantly slows the rate of data transfer and limits the VKS’s ability to use A-50M/U to directly guide weapon engagements by GBAD assets or fighters.
+
+Following the first chaotic week of the invasion, it was becoming increasingly clear that Russian ground forces on the Kyiv and Kharkiv axes had become bogged down amid fierce Ukrainian resistance and Russian logistics difficulties. The airborne assault on Hostomel Airport had been repulsed by Ukrainian rapid reaction forces, and suddenly Russian forces had to adapt to a new plan. However, they had no coherent communications plan; many units had not exchanged encryption keys and had a shortage of trained radio operators. Furthermore, some radios were found to contain cheap Chinese substitute components lacking military-grade encryption, and so jamming resistance became a critical issue. The electronic warfare capabilities that had been initially very effective in degrading Ukrainian SAM systems were also causing serious electronic fratricide problems and thus compounding an increasingly critical communications breakdown among Russian ground force elements.
+
+Russian ground forces being unable to effectively communicate now became a greater threat to the Russian operation than Ukrainian SAM systems, so their electronic warfare assets began to greatly scale back their operations after the first two days. This allowed newly relocated Ukrainian SAM systems to regain much of their effectiveness, although it took time to repair or adapt to much of the damage to key radar systems for early warning and long-range missile guidance. In the first week of March, however, Ukrainian SAMs began to inflict significant losses on Russian attack sorties.
+
+The most effective Ukrainian SAMs against Russian fixed-wing aircraft have consistently been SA-11 ‘Buk’ systems operating transporter-erector launcher and radar (TELAR) vehicles as individual pop-up threats rather than as formed batteries alongside the usual target-acquisition radar and command vehicles. Alongside the longer-ranged S-300PS/PT and S-300V SAMs that had escaped destruction during the initial wave of strikes, the SA-11s quickly made Russian medium- and high-altitude operations prohibitively dangerous on the Kyiv and Kharkiv axes. At the same time, the VKS received new targeting priorities as it was swiftly becoming clear to the Russian leadership that the original military plan to rapidly seize Kyiv and other key cities and overthrow the Ukrainian government had failed. Therefore, the main VKS air effort was switched from attacks on Ukrainian air-defence capabilities to attempts to support the ground forces directly.
+
+With Ukrainian GBAD capabilities rapidly recovering from initial suppression and damage, they took over as the primary arm responsible for repelling the VKS near the frontlines from 3 March. The failure of Russia’s initial strike campaign to destroy the bulk of Ukraine’s medium-range SA-11 and SA-8 SAMs meant that as the VKS was re-tasked to attack Ukrainian Army positions in aid of the ground offensive, its pilots were forced to abandon flying at medium or high altitudes when penetrating Ukrainian airspace. At very low level, radar-guided SAM systems have a comparatively short effective range due to clutter and the curvature of the earth blocking their radar field of view to the target. Therefore, the final days of February and the first week of March saw the VKS conduct around 140 sorties per day, using Su-25, Su-30SM and Su-34 aircraft to conduct strikes at 500 ft or below using unguided bombs and rockets on Ukrainian positions. Once again, the sorties were flown as singles or pairs rather than larger formations.
+
+While flying low did reduce losses from radar-guided SAMs, it also brought Russian jets into the range of the thousands of man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) that had been widely issued to Ukrainian troops. The results were predictable, with at least eight assorted Su-25, Su-30 and Su-34 jets being shot down by MANPADS in a week. These strikes were also significantly less accurate than the medium-level bombing that had been conducted in the first few days and in Syria, since they were also conducted with unguided bombs and rockets. At very low levels pilots have only seconds to visually acquire, identify and then manoeuvre their aircraft to accurately drop weapons on targets. In this case, the targets were Ukrainian forces which were frequently well dug in and operating many of the same vehicles and weapons as Russian forces. A lack of up-to-date maps also compounded low-level navigation and target-recognition difficulties for Russian pilots. Consequently, penetrating daylight low-level strikes achieved little serious damage against Ukrainian forces and the concept of operations was rapidly judged to be unsustainable by experienced VKS fixed-wing pilots, who quickly began to refuse to fly missions beyond Ukrainian lines.
+
+The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence15Bronk with Reynolds and Watling very low levels pilots have only seconds to visually acquire, identify and then manoeuvre their aircraft to accurately drop weapons on targets. In this case, the targets were Ukrainian forces which were frequently well dug in and operating many of the same vehicles and weapons as Russian forces. A lack of up-to-date maps also compounded low-level navigation and target-recognition difficulties for Russian pilots. Consequently, penetrating daylight low-level strikes achieved little serious damage against Ukrainian forces and the concept of operations was rapidly judged to be unsustainable by experienced VKS fixed-wing pilots, who quickly began to refuse to fly missions beyond Ukrainian lines. In response, the VKS shifted its penetrating sorties to night attacks from 9 March 2022. Since most Ukrainian MANPADS operators lacked night-vision goggles at this time, initial VKS losses were greatly reduced by operating in darkness. However, the only one of its fast jet fleets with cockpit equipment and appropriate training for contested low-level night operations was the Su-34s. Consequently, the Su-34 fleet bore the brunt of the remaining penetrating strike operations flown by the VKS before they were curtailed in April. As before, the primary armament remained heavy loads of FAB-500, or mixed OFAB-250 and OFAB-100 unguided bombs, although the Kh-29T/L standoff missile and Kh-31P anti-radiation missile (ARM) began to see increasing use for specific targets and suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD). With the difficulties of target acquisition and accurate attacks at low level compounded by flying at night, the general targeting profile also changed. Unable to accurately hit Ukrainian military units, the VKS defaulted to simply bombarding besieged cities as it had in Syria, except at night and from low level. Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv and Mariupol were all heavily bombed by the Su-34s during this period, since Russia was desperately looking to make symbolic progress as the Battle for Kyiv increasingly swung in Ukraine’s favour.
+
+Throughout March, Su-35S and Su-30SM fighters continued to conduct CAPs between 30,000 and 50,000 ft, but generally without entering Ukrainian-controlled airspace. Instead, they acted as a deterrent to Ukrainian attack sorties, but were also tasked to conduct SEAD operations. To this end, their CAPs were used as bait to try to make Ukrainian SAM systems turn on their radars to fire at them. If SA-11s or other SAMs did try to engage them, the Flankers would fire Kh-31P and, later, older Kh-58 ARMs at long ranges to home in on the radar emissions, and then turn away. Meanwhile Su-25 singles or pairs flown by experienced crews would fly in at low altitude to try to find and kill the SAM with rockets while it was suppressed. However, there were few Russian pilots capable of low-level destruction of enemy air defences (DEAD) sorties in an Su-25 with unguided rockets, and those that could frequently paid for their bold tactics by being hit with MANPADS from Ukrainian troops. Ukrainian Air Force aviation and air-defence commanders confirmed in multiple interviews that while Ukraine has lost a number of SA-11 and SA-8 SAMs to the many Kh-31P and Kh-58s fired since the invasion, none of the low-level Su-25 DEAD rocket attacks was successful.
+
+After the collapse of the Kyiv axes in April, Russian forces were reorganised and concentrated against Ukrainian positions in Donbas and in the southeast in the surrounded city of Mariupol. This allowed far better coordination of Russian aircraft, long-range strike capabilities, electronic warfare assets and GBAD with ground operations. Alongside continued heavy use of Kh-31P and Kh-58 ARMs by VKS fighters, Russian troops also began to effectively coordinate operations with hunting complexes of Orlan-10 UAVs to force Ukrainian SAM systems to unmask and then suppress them for long enough using electronic warfare attack to designate individual SAMs for accurate artillery and missile strikes. This rapidly forced medium-range Ukrainian Air Force SA-11 ‘Buk’ and short-range Ukrainian Army SA-8 ‘Osa’ SAM systems to operate further back from the frontlines to reduce loss rates, and allowed Russian aircraft a significant degree of freedom to operate at medium and high altitudes in the vicinity of the frontlines. Nevertheless, actual penetrations of Ukrainian lines to conduct strikes with fixed-wing aircraft on targets other than Ukrainian Army positions rapidly decreased due to persistent losses during even low-altitude night-time operations by Su-34s against cities such as Kharkiv, which involved very limited penetration distances. Instead, the Su-34 fleet began to regularly employ Kh-29T/L tv/laser-guided missiles for standoff attacks from medium altitude at distances of 8–15 km against fixed targets from mid-April. During this period, Russia also used 16 Tu-22M3 ‘Backfire’ bombers to drop heavy unguided bombs on the besieged Azovstal steel works in Mariupol from medium altitude by day on 21 April, in addition to repeated attacks by Su-34s carrying sticks of heavy FAB-500 unguided bombs.
+
+A notable feature of VKS fixed-wing strike operations from February to April was that BDA was poor. The primary assessment metric was whether crews reported hitting the target upon landing, and orbital imagery assessment was used to then confirm damage observed as expected. This meant that in most cases where damage was only superficial or had actually failed to hit the intended targets, follow-up sorties were not flown. A marked tendency to overstate successes has been a consistent feature of Russian intelligence and military BDA and planning cycles during the period leading up to and then during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. This is an almost unavoidable consequence of the way that the Russian political system works, where reporting what seniors wish to hear, reinforcing their previous decisions and inflating successes, is an absolute prerequisite for promotion to higher rank.
+
+In the war to date, Russian Su-25SM/SM3 ground-attack aircraft have been used differently from the rest of the VKS fixed-wing fleet, being generally tasked with operations against Ukrainian Army targets at grid locations supplied by friendly assets on or near the frontlines. The deepest recorded strikes using unguided lofted rocket attacks by Su-25 formations were less than 100 km from the Russian frontlines, and most involved far shorter penetrations of Ukrainian lines. Su-25 sorties remained almost exclusively at low altitudes below 1,000 m and often at less than 100 m, especially close to the frontlines during rocket attacks or if patrolling for targets. MANPADS have been the primary threat for the Su-25, due to the need to regularly cross parts of the frontlines during such operations. However, their defensive aids suites have performed consistently well against most MANPADS; the losses have come from repeat exposure in areas with high concentrations of MANPADS teams, rather than a high probability of kill during individual engagements.
+
+From September 2022, the launch of the Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson and subsequent counter-offensive in the Kharkiv region in the northeast granted Ukraine the initiative and has forced the Russian Army to go on the defensive across almost the whole of its remaining frontlines. In the air too, Ukraine has been able to significantly attrit and subsequently impose a degree of suppression on Russian GBAD using the Western-suppled AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation (HARM) missile. As such, Ukrainian Su-25 and Su-24 attack aircraft have become increasingly active, conducting regular standoff rocket attacks and even bombing runs against Russian positions in Kherson and Kharkiv. This has forced the VKS to adopt an increasingly defensive posture. The VKS has divided the Ukrainian/Russian lines into eight zones and maintains a regular posture of a pair of Su-35S fighters or Mikoyan Mig-31BM interceptors in each one. Without regular tanker support – which the VKS does not provide to fighter units due to limited capacity and prioritising the strategic bomber force – times on station for these CAPs are unlikely to exceed two hours, so at minimum this posture requires around 96 sorties per day to sustain in daylight. However, these patrols have proven highly effective against Ukrainian attack aircraft and fighters, with the Mig-31BM and R-37M long-range air-to-air missile being especially problematic. The VKS has been firing up to six R-37Ms per day during October, and the extremely high speed of the weapon, coupled with very long effective range and a seeker designed for engaging low-altitude targets, makes it particularly difficult to evade. The long range of the R-37M, in conjunction with the very high performance and high operating altitude of the Mig-31BM also allows it significant freedom to menace Ukrainian aircraft near the frontlines from outside the range of Ukrainian defences. The VKS has also started employing the R-37M from at least a few of its Su-35S fighters, which not only increases the reach of the latter in combat but may also suggests Russian stocks of the R-37M are in little danger of running out.
+
+![image4](https://i.imgur.com/2zzOuTc.png)
+▲ MiG-31 BM carrying R-77-1 and R-37M missiles taking part in operations in Ukraine.
+
+Despite the demands for close air support from the Russian Army which has been forced to retreat from Kharkiv oblast and parts of Luhansk and Kherson, the strike tempo being flown by the VKS Su-25 and Su-34 fleets has not noticeably increased. The Su-25 force continues to conduct regular standoff rocket attacks, but these are only capable of producing a barrage effect in a rough area. The lack of targeting pods and multi-role expertise across the Russian fighter fleets leaves the Su-34 fleet as the only VKS element theoretically capable of conducting effective standoff dynamic targeting against Ukrainian forces moving in the open. The VKS is almost certainly anxious to minimise further losses of these expensive and complex aircraft, after losing at least 17 since February. Therefore, footage of Su-34s conducting unguided bombing runs over the frontlines at low level – exposing them to a high degree of risk from MANPADS and ground fire – suggests a degree of desperation. It may be that stocks of Kh-29T/L and other standoff missiles are running low, or that the Su-34s are struggling to accurately find and hit Ukrainian battlefield targets without coming in very low and getting close enough to visually identify them. There have also been several crashes in the VKS Su-25, Su-30 and Su-34 fleets during non-combat-related accidents since early September. Each one may be individually explained by bird strikes, pilot error or technical failures. However, collectively they suggest that eight months of war have taken a toll in terms of accumulated airframe and aircrew fatigue. Tired aircrew, ground personnel and continuing operational demands for support from the ground forces that force normal maintenance, leave and overhaul periods to be ignored are all likely to be contributing factors. In particular, the ground-attack-focused Su-25 and Su-34 fleets have both taken much heavier losses than the fighter fleets, with 23 of the former and 17 of the latter confirmed lost from pre-war fleets of around 110 modernised Su-25SM/SM3s and 130 Su-34(M)s. This will have further increased the burden of an operating tempo far in excess of peacetime expectations on the aircraft and pilots that remain.
+
+In summary, the VKS conducted a more significant fixed-wing strike campaign during the initial days of the invasion than has previously been documented by external analysts. The ground-based Ukrainian air-defence network was initially suppressed by electronic attacks, decoy use and physical strikes, and this allowed Russian aircraft to attack more than 100 targets deep inside Ukraine. Ukrainian Air Force fighter aircraft bore the brunt of the air-defence task until the SAM systems and radars of the GBAD network had been relocated and reset sufficiently to take over primary responsibility at the beginning of March. The great disparity in technical capabilities and numbers between Ukrainian Air Force fighters and Russian ones meant that while Ukrainian fighter pilots were able to inflict some losses on Russian aircraft using aggressive low-level tactics, they also took many losses in return. However, once the SA-11 and S-300 SAM systems began to operate effectively, Russian strike aircraft were forced to operate at low altitudes when penetrating Ukrainian-controlled airspace, and Russian fighters had to stand off to patrol at high altitudes. Russia’s inability to effectively conduct DEAD against Ukrainian SAM systems has so far denied them the ability to control the airspace over most of Ukraine. The VKS has used Kh-29 and Kh-59 missiles to hit fixed targets from standoff ranges, usually using the Su-34 fleet. It has also used the Su-35S and Su-30SM fleets to fire large numbers of Kh-31P and Kh-58 anti-radiation missiles to suppress Ukrainian radar-guided SAMs, though this has failed to produce many actual kills. However, Russian close air support efforts have generally been limited to low-level unguided bombing runs and unguided rocket barrages, which have failed to inflict decisive damage on Ukrainian ground forces and have led to sustained losses to MANPADS among the Su-25 and Su-34 fleets. On the other hand, Russian high-altitude fighter CAPs with Su-35S and more recently with Mig-31BM interceptors are continuing to shoot down significant numbers of Ukrainian ground attack aircraft near the frontlines from distances that render them all but immune to return fire.
+
+
+### II. Russian Attack Helicopter Employment and Performance
+
+Alongside the Su-34 frontal bomber fleet, the dominant ground-attack platform in the Russian air campaign has been the Ka-52 ‘Alligator’ attack helicopter. Alongside Mi-28 ‘Havok’ and Mi-24/35 ‘Hind’ gunships, the Ka-52 fleet conducted aggressive hunter-killer sorties at very low altitude against Ukrainian forces during the early months of the war. These sorties were generally flown in pairs and used a combination of unguided rockets and cannon fire against troop concentrations and soft-skinned vehicles, and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) against armoured vehicles and other hardened targets. In Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts in the south, where Ukrainian air defences took particularly heavy damage in initial strikes on 24 February, hunter-killer sorties from Ka-52s were observed penetrating up to 50 km into Ukrainian-controlled territory during late February and into early March. Ka-52s and Mi-24s also escorted the Mi-8/17 transport helicopters carrying Russian airborne troops into Hostomel Airport on the first day of the invasion, with at least one Mi-24 being shot down by a Javelin anti-tank missile used in direct attack mode and a Ka-52 force landing after taking small arms fire.
+
+During the battle for Kyiv, Mi-24 and Mi-28 gunships operated alongside the Ka-52 in the hunter-killer role at night, as well as in daylight. However, typically night operations of this kind have been flown by the Ka-52 fleet due to their superior night-vision equipment. It is also likely that the doctrinally established role for Ka-52 – to provide support to Russian special operations forces including in adverse conditions and at night – meant that a much greater proportion of Ka-52 aircrew were trained and current in low-level night operations compared with in the Hind and Havok fleets. However, following the Russian retreat from Kyiv in April, penetration distances and the number of hunter-killer sorties began to diminish rapidly across all the gunship fleets. Heavy losses taken during daylight operations, especially among experienced crews, created a dynamic whereby Russian rotary crews became very hesitant to cross the Ukrainian frontlines from April.
+
+Russian helicopter (and fixed-wing attack jet) defensive aids suites combining missile-approach warning sensors and countermeasures-dispensing programmes have functioned reasonably well throughout the conflict, succeeding in decoying many incoming missiles. However, the sheer number of MANPADS fired at them during penetrating sorties ensured that many hits were still scored. Furthermore, at several points during early March and later in Donbas, Russian helicopters failed to dispense flares when engaged by MANPADS. This suggests that either they had run out already during that sortie, or potentially supply chain issues were forcing crews to fly with their defensive aids suites set to semi-automatic or manual modes to reduce consumption rates at the cost of reduced effectiveness. The British Starstreak and the American Javelin anti-tank missile (used in direct-attack mode) have been particularly effective against all Russian helicopters as they are immune to being decoyed by flares or chaff countermeasures. However, these weapons require a significantly greater level of operator training and are more expensive and scarcer than normal MANPADS. Javelin has also largely been saved for attacks on Russian tanks.
+
+After heavy initial losses, Russian helicopters almost solely engaged in attacks with unguided rockets from behind the Russian frontlines during the Russian offensive in Donbas between April and July, and in defensive operations against Ukrainian counter-offensives in Kherson and Kharkiv since September. During these indirect rocket attacks, Russian helicopters typically approach a target area while flying at below 200 ft, then pitch up to between 15 and 30 degrees and fire S-8 and S-13 unguided rockets in a lofted trajectory against known concentrations of Ukrainian forces in a general grid square. Immediately after firing all their rockets in a salvo, they turn away while dropping countermeasures without crossing their own lines. The accuracy that can be obtained using these tactics is generally poor, sufficient only to force Ukrainian forces in the open to take cover, or to fix dug-in units in place until the impacts subside. In Donbas, both Ka-52 and Mi-24s also regularly conduct these indirect attacks at night to keep Ukrainian troops awake. In general, however, Russian helicopters have struggled to conduct low-altitude sorties at night outside the areas of Donbas, occupied by Russian proxy forces since 2014 and thus well known to them. Russian maps of most of Ukraine as provided to all troops are often decades out of date and helicopter crews are no exception, making low-level flight at night very hazardous since obstacles are unlikely to be mapped.
+
+ATGMs are sometimes also used by gunships to attack Ukrainian positions, or vehicles that can be spotted and identified without crossing the lines. However, Russian gunships face a notable disadvantage when operated in this manner since they have very poor vibration dampening. This means that the gyro-stabilisation of internal optics struggles to produce a clear picture at high magnification levels, making acquisition, positive identification and precise laser or command-wire guidance at longer ranges very challenging. This limits the practical range of Russian helicopter-launched ATGMs, and forces them to expose themselves to potential attack by MANPADS, Javelin in direct attack mode, and ground-launched ATGMs by firing from close to the frontlines. The final penetrating hunter-killer sorties were conducted by Ka-52s in June 2022.
+
+Confirmed losses of Russian gunships at the time of writing, where wreckage has been positively identified, include eight Mi-24/35 ‘Hind’, six Mi-28 ‘Havok’ and 23 Ka-52 ‘Alligator’ helicopters. The true total is undoubtedly higher, but Stijn Mitzer and Joost Olieman’s numbers in the Oryx blog also include several helicopters destroyed on the ground or in accidents, and the overall proportions are likely to be fairly representative. What stands out is that the Ka-52 fleet has taken a disproportionate number of losses compared with the other gunship types operated by Russia.
+
+There are several reasons that are likely to have contributed to this. First, the Ka-52 has seen more intensive use than the other fleets, both by day and especially at night, on all fronts in Ukraine. Second, the Ka-52 has notable deficiencies in armour protection compared with other Russian attack helicopters, especially the engine compartments, which have no armour plating at all – leaving them potentially vulnerable to damage from even small arms fire. Third, the Ka-52 uses a different ATGM from the Mi-28 and Mi-24/35; the 9K121 Vikhr uses a laser beam-riding guidance system with the seeker on the missile mounted at the rear facing backwards rather than in the nose like a traditional laser seeker. In other words, the seeker on the Vikhr looks back at the helicopter to ‘see’ the laser guidance beam, rather than looking for a laser spot reflected off the target. This makes it almost impossible to jam in flight and also cheaper than comparable traditional ATGMs. However, it also means that the Ka-52 cannot drift more than a few degrees per second to the left, right, up or down while guiding the missile in flight, or the laser beam from the helicopter will move outside the field of view of the seeker and guidance will fail. The result has been that Ukrainian troops have been able to shoot down Ka-52s using wire-guided Stugna anti-tank missiles on several occasions, when the helicopters were hovering almost stationary attempting to identify and guide their Vikhr missiles to targets near the frontlines.
+
+![image5](https://i.imgur.com/gj8vcTc.png)
+▲ S-8 unguided rockets ready for loading on to a Kamov Ka-52 attack helicopter for standoff attacks against Ukrainian positions.
+
+Multiple Ka-52 airframes have also been recovered after being shot down in a condition that suggests poor maintenance and crew training are problems. Modern encrypted radio sets have been found without the encryption keys needed to use them, and in others the radar and other sensors have been found either in the stowed position or with pins or covers still fitted that prevent them from working.
+
+In summary, the Russian attack helicopter fleet was initially used to conduct aggressive hunter-killer sorties behind Ukrainian frontlines, with penetration depths of up to 50 km relatively common. However, losses to MANPADS were heavy and so Russian tactics shifted during March, with penetrating sorties becoming less and less common; they were replaced by rocket ‘lofting’ attacks from a safe distance. Since April, Russian attack helicopters have been used extremely cautiously, with a heavy reliance on standoff rocket attacks rendering them little more than flying rocket artillery assets. Despite this cautious approach, they continue to be shot down regularly by Ukrainian frontline units using MANPADS, Javelin and, occasionally, ATGMs.
+
+
+### III. Russia’s Long-Range Strike Campaign: Cruise Missiles, Ballistic Missiles and Loitering Munitions
+
+The Russian invasion began with a heavy cruise and ballistic missile barrage, the opening salvo in a sustained long-range precision-strike campaign which averaged around 24 missiles per day for the first three months of the war. From 24 February to the end of May, more than 2,000 3M-54 Kalibr, Kh-101, Kh-55, Kh-555 and other cruise missiles were fired into Ukraine, usually in salvos of 4–12 at once. The Kalibrs are fired from naval ships and submarines in the Black Sea, while the Kh-101, Kh-55 and Kh-555 are typically launched from Tu-95 strategic bombers from inside Russian airspace. Around 240 9M720 and 9M723 ballistic missiles were also fired from Iskander-M ground-based launchers at around 160 targets.
+
+Russian land-attack cruise missiles and ballistic missiles have performed well throughout the conflict, with most impacting within 3–10 m of their intended aiming points, except when degraded by Ukrainian electronic warfare assets. Furthermore, during the initial strikes, Ukrainian air defences were themselves degraded by electronic warfare and most were relocating during the early salvos to avoid being destroyed so only succeeded in intercepting a small proportion of the incoming cruise missiles. Intercepting Russian Tochka-U and Iskander ballistic missiles has proven very difficult throughout the conflict due to a lack of suitable interceptor missiles and the short range of potential coverage for each system against such threats. Iskander 9M723 is especially problematic for Ukrainian air defences due to its quasi-ballistic manoeuvring capabilities and the fact that it launches six penetration aids to generate additional radar returns and electronic warfare effects during its terminal phase.
+
+The primary Russian long-range strike objective during the first three days was to degrade and destroy Ukrainian air-defence capabilities. As such, Russian strikes overwhelmingly targeted air-defence sites including fixed radars, fixed S-125 (SA-3) SAM sites, command centres, airbases, ammunition storage sites and known long-range S-300 mobile SAM sites. Most of these represented fixed targets that Russia had been able to identify and integrate into a strike plan during the months leading up to the invasion. Conventional methods for locating targets included orbital reconnaissance and electronic and signals intelligence (ELINT and SIGINT) aircraft such as Su-24MR ‘Fencer-E’ and Il-20 ‘Coot’ aircraft conducting standoff reconnaissance flights to map Ukraine’s defences. However, perhaps Russia’s most important source of targeting information for the opening and subsequent stages of its strike campaign remains human intelligence (HUMINT). The Russian ‘special services’ including the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Federal Security Service (FSB) and Main Directorate of the General Staff (GU) run active teams and officers who control networks of recruited assets, including important regional and national politicians and military officers inside Ukraine. Controlling Ukraine has been one of Russia’s longest running foreign policy goals, and thorough penetration of its government and security apparatuses has been a task for the Russian special services ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As such, Russia has had access to detailed information about the workings of the Ukrainian state and military for decades, which provides a rich source of data for planning and targeting long-range strikes against fixed defence sites, bases and important infrastructure nodes.
+
+Despite detailed Russian target lists and heavy firepower, Ukrainian air defences were on alert on the 24 February and, after receiving urgent warnings from partner states, relocated most of their mobile air-defence systems shortly before their positions were struck by the first wave of Russian missiles. Consequently the losses among mobile assets were light, consisting of a number of S-300PS/PT SAM transporter erector launchers (TELs) that could not be moved in time due to insufficient warning and poor chassis serviceability. However, many static early warning radars were hit and at least temporarily knocked out. Several older static SA-3 SAM sites were destroyed. The Russian missile (and fixed-wing) strikes were most effective in the southern Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions where warning times were lower than in Donbas or in the north and many units had older, less serviceable equipment. Strikes on Ukrainian Air Force airbases and ammunition stowage also caused limited damage due to timely dispersal of airworthy Ukrainian aircraft to smaller bases and relocation of most ammunition stocks in the hours prior to the invasion.
+
+![image6](https://i.imgur.com/mM4czEV.jpg)
+▲ Penetration aid from a Russian 9M723 Iskander ballistic missile.
+
+The opening salvos exhibit one of the clearest features of Russia’s long-range strike campaign against Ukrainian military targets during the war. The Russian military and intelligence services collectively demonstrated an ability to collect detailed information about Ukrainian air-defence target locations. This was then used by each Military District command centre to develop a coherent target list according to the overarching plan at the operational level, which was then used to assign targets to individual strike assets serving each of the four main operational directions. The missiles themselves generally hit the aiming points assigned to them with sufficient precision, and the opening salvo was well coordinated with electronic warfare effects to ensure almost all of them got through the largely blinded and suppressed Ukrainian air defences. However, in many cases the targets of each strike had moved by the time the missiles hit their designated aiming points.
+
+After the initial salvos failed to destroy Ukrainian air-defence capability on 24 February, the Russian target detection, tracking and fire-mission assignment process was not fast enough to stay ahead of continued Ukrainian dispersal and shoot-and-scoot tactics. For example, HUMINT on a Ukrainian air-defence position located by GU assets would be passed into the ‘Akatsiya’ strategic command architecture in Moscow, then integrated into the next 24 hours strike plan at Military District command-centre level, and assigned to a strike asset. This process takes at least 48 hours and sometimes significantly longer to result in a strike. As such, when used against mobile targets the Russian long-range strike complex has consistently generated accurate strikes using expensive cruise and ballistic missiles (or long-range rocket artillery) on the exact positions long since vacated by Ukrainian systems.
+
+Having failed to achieve a quick military victory in the first few days, Russian long-range strike assets were re-tasked in early March from Ukrainian air-defence sites to infrastructure and government targets. These included transmission towers for Ukrainian television and radio in Kyiv, Vinnytsia and other cities, and attacks on internet and mobile phone infrastructure. These strikes were coupled with a significant increase in the already-intensive Russian offensive cyber campaign against Ukraine. There were also sporadic strikes on government buildings and symbolic civilian targets such as Kharkiv University, which caused many civilian casualties and increased refugee flows out of the country. The primary aim appears to have been to degrade Ukrainian government public messaging and coordination capacity in the hope that Ukrainian resistance and political unity might still fracture and allow a pro-Russian takeover. Targeting buildings with governmental, security and cultural importance in cities with large cruise and ballistic missile warheads also served to increase the pressure on President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian public by raising the spectre of massive damage and civilian casualties in besieged cities if fighting continued. Strikes were also directed at important Ukrainian defence industry factories to reduce the capacity to produce, maintain, modernise and repair domestically manufactured equipment, as well as targeting a training and assembly base for Western volunteer fighters in Lviv on 13 March. While significant damage was done, it did not have decisive results due to the scale of Western support, the volume of captured Russian military equipment, ammunition and spares available to Ukrainian forces, and the rapid dispersal of many previously centralised facilities to reduce their vulnerability to further attacks.
+
+The weight of fire that Russia could sustain limited the overall effectiveness of this approach, since aside from large broadcast towers, physically destroying a critical mass of communications equipment in a country the size of Ukraine would require attacking a huge number of relatively small targets. By mid-March the VKS fixed-wing fleet was flying almost no penetrating sorties by day, and those that were being flown were exclusively low-level flights to drop unguided bombs on area targets in support of the ground forces. Large-scale cyber attacks also failed to have a decisive effect as Russia had been conducting sustained cyber warfare against Ukraine since 2014, so most key networks were heavily defended, with attention given to backing up critical data with help from allies. This left only Russia’s cruise and ballistic missile arsenals available to conduct deep strikes across most of Ukraine.
+
+Russia also relies heavily on its long-range precision-strike arsenal for conventional and tactical nuclear deterrent capability against NATO under the doctrine of non-contact warfare. With the Russian Army increasingly bogged down and overstretched in Ukraine, and a strategy of brinkmanship from President Vladimir Putin predicated on intimidating the West into abandoning or at least limiting its military assistance, Russia cannot afford to fire its entire stockpile. Therefore, Russia’s military leadership began to plan for a new set of targeting criteria that could deliver a greater strategic effect with the limited number of total missiles available.
+
+The next major Russian bombardment strategy was instigated in June, with several weeks of daily strikes against Ukrainian fuel storage facilities, refineries and key railway infrastructure. This could potentially have had a very serious effect on the Ukrainian population and the war effort over time if it had been conducted on a large scale from the outset. However, two major factors conspired to reduce its impact to a manageable level.
+
+First, Ukrainian air defences had, by this stage, been reorganised and redeployed to provide much more effective coverage against cruise missiles around key cities and facilities. Whereas during March and April interception rates had been around 20–30%, by mid-June they were roughly 50–60%. The SA-11 ‘Buk’ SAM systems provided the bulk of the anti-aircraft threat near the frontlines to keep Russian fast jets and helicopters flying low or further back behind Russian lines. The long-range S-300PS/PT and S-300V1 SAM systems are more capable against cruise missiles and Tochka-U ballistic missiles than SA-11, and provide coverage over a wider area. They are also more valuable and less mobile than SA-11 so it made less sense to risk having them destroyed by Russian SEAD/DEAD efforts by deploying them close to the frontlines. Therefore, Ukraine’s S-300 systems were primarily deployed to defend cities and infrastructure, and have proven highly effective against all types of Russian cruise missiles, especially when supplied with early warning information of launches from either Ukrainian sensors or partners.
+
+![image7](https://i.imgur.com/6UYeU3S.png)
+▲ Russian 3M-54 Kalibr cruise missile shot down in Kyiv oblast late October 2022.
+
+Second, Russia was already running uncomfortably low on missile stocks given its requirements to maintain a contingency stockpile to deter NATO and the heavy expenditure from February to June. Despite benefiting from an impressive degree of component modularity and commonality between different missile types, including between cruise missiles such as 3M-54 Kalibr and ballistic missiles such as 9M723, Russian industrial production capacity is very limited compared with the rate at which they have been expended. For example, the modernised 9M723 Iskander production line has a monthly output capacity of six missiles. Effective sanctions enforcement to complicate Russian acquisition of Western micro-electronics would make their sustainment problems considerably worse given the heavy reliance on US, Taiwanese and other Western chips in all their standoff missiles. As a result of these shortages, firing rates of Russia’s standard long-range land-attack missiles were lower from June to September than the 24 per day average in the first three months of the war. In combination with a revitalised Ukrainian air-defence capability, this lower rate of fire has hampered the ability of Russian long-range strikes to prevent Ukraine steadily gaining the initiative in the war during this period. However, during this period Russia’s stockpile limitations and inadequate production capacity for traditional cruise and ballistic missile types led to several significant actions on the part of the Russian military leadership.
+
+![image8](https://i.imgur.com/OjhCJlo.png)
+▲ 9M723 Iskander ballistic missile remains with penetration aid (decoy) dispenser tubes visible. The R-77-1 air-to-air missile is also visible (left).
+
+First, Russian forces began firing large numbers of other long-range missile types in the land-attack role. Older Kh-22 ‘Kitchen’ anti-ship missiles have been fired into Ukraine throughout the conflict, but as early as mid-March Russia also began launching the relatively new, supersonic and hugely expensive P-800 ‘Oniks’ anti-ship missile from its ‘Bastion-P’ systems in Crimea. However, the radar-guided terminal-homing capabilities of anti-ship missiles are not optimised for attacking ground targets, and so offer not only reduced precision compared with dedicated land-attack weapons when used in that role, but can also sometimes home in on the wrong target once they go active. One likely case was the devastating attack on a shopping centre in Kremenchuk in July 2022 where a Kh-22 apparently missed its intended target nearby and instead homed in on the large radar reflection of the shopping centre’s flat metal walls and roof. Russia also began to regularly use its S-300V1 and S-300VM tracked long-range SAM systems in the land-attack role, especially in the south near Kherson. Both versions fire the 5V55 missile which was designed to have a secondary land-attack capability for self-defence of the S-300V1. In the land-attack role, it has a ballistic trajectory with a maximum range of 82 km. Its high supersonic speed makes it impossible to intercept with current Ukrainian air-defence systems and it delivers a large 130-kg high-explosive fragmentation warhead. However, it is a very inaccurate weapon, being purely ballistic with no terminal homing capabilities against ground targets, and so Russian forces generally use them as indiscriminate bombardment weapons against cities – especially Mykolaiv. Russian industry has also opened a new production facility to recondition and return old stocks of Tochka-U ballistic missiles to usable condition to supplement dwindling 9M720/723 Iskander-M stocks and production capacity.
+
+The second significant consequence of Russia’s ineffective (albeit very destructive) initial standoff missile campaigns and limited remaining stockpiles was a deal with Iran to supply large numbers of Shahed-136 loitering munitions and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) support to teach Russian units to assemble and use them. The first Shahed-136 (Russian name, ‘Geran-2’) attacks were recorded by Ukrainian air defenders in mid-September, with attacks against Odesa alongside Iranian-supplied armed Mohajer-6 UAVs. An IRGC training group protected by an FSB security detail was identified and monitored by Ukrainian intelligence services, and destroyed with a precision artillery strike in Kherson around this time. Unfortunately this did not end the Russian acceptance and ramp-up process for large-scale Shahed-136 use as a long-range strike weapon.
+
+The Shahed-136 itself is a propeller-powered missile with a warhead capacity of 20–40 kg, depending on fuel load, desired range and consequent centre of gravity limitations. It has a maximum range of well in excess of 1,000 km and typically cruises at around 150–170 km/h. Guidance is provided using a mixture of inertial navigation and civilian GPS receivers with some features to improve jamming resistance, allowing it to hit fixed aiming points, but not moving targets. The accuracy is sufficient to produce multiple hits on a single building, and the Shahed-136 can also bank to circle around a target upon arrival to perform a steep (>70-degree) terminal dive from a specific bearing programmed before launch. A modified version equipped with specialist seeker heads and datalinks can apparently hit moving targets if designated by a more sophisticated UAV such as the Orlan-10, although these modifications significantly increase the price and are not common. The basic Shahed-136/Geran-2 is a relatively simple, cheap and precise weapon for use against fixed targets for which Iran can supply components and Russia could license manufacture in very large quantities. This makes it an important medium- and long-term component in Russia’s current long-range strike strategy against Ukraine.
+
+![image9](https://i.imgur.com/YkxguzD.png)
+▲ Wing-tip section from a destroyed Shahed-136.
+
+The new Russian strategy opened with a barrage of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles against targets in multiple Ukrainian cities, including in central Kyiv on 10 October. This time, cruise missiles were launched alongside tens of Shahed-136 loitering munitions. More than half the total incoming weapons were shot down by Ukrainian air defences, but those that got through still inflicted serious damage and multiple civilian casualties. Despite Putin claiming that the strikes in cities were a one-off retaliation for an explosion on the Kerch Bridge the previous week, the new strategy – to target electricity infrastructure – was already being prepared before the bridge was bombed. On 9 October a new commander of the Russian military campaign against Ukraine, General Segey Surovikin, was appointed. Notorious for the brutality of the campaign he ran in Syria in his previous role as the commander of the VKS, Surovikin was appointed to implement a strategy that many of the more extreme Russian political and media commentators have been urging for months – to deprive the Ukrainian civilian population of light and heating as winter approaches via large-scale strikes on infrastructure.
+
+Since 10 October, Ukraine has seen multiple daily waves of Shahed-136s fired against electricity substations, infrastructure-control offices and facilities across most of the country. The relatively small warhead is less suitable than cruise missiles or ballistic missiles for destroying large or hardened targets. Therefore, the expensive Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles and 9M723 Iskander, drawn from increasingly depleted stocks, have been simultaneously used to hit power stations and other large electricity-related targets. Most of the Shahed-136s that are launched are being shot down by Ukrainian fighters, SAMs, MANPADS teams and anti-aircraft gunfire. However, they are being used in large enough numbers already – with more than 400 fired since mid-September – that they are draining Ukraine’s air-defence missile stocks in an alarming way, and still each day some get through to their targets.
+
+In summary, Russia’s long-range missile campaign has gone through several phases. The opening salvoes targeted Ukrainian Air Force air-defence capabilities and stockpiles. Strikes subsequently focused on Ukrainian defence industry, communications infrastructure and small numbers of symbolic buildings in key cities. After the Russian ground campaign refocused on offensive operations in Donbas, fuel storage, refineries and railway infrastructure became primary targets for long-range strikes. However, in each of these cases Russia was unable to generate a critical concentration of strikes to have decisive effects on Ukraine’s ability to continue fighting. Under General Surovikin the strategy has changed again. Iranian-supplied loitering munitions and more expensive traditional precision-strike weapons are now being used in tandem to systemically target critical civilian electricity infrastructure. The multiple daily air-raid alarms disrupt work and sleep patterns and cause fear and anxiety for people who had hoped the threat to their homes was receding. More worryingly, temporary blackouts that grow more frequent each day across many of Ukraine’s key cities after just three weeks of this new strike campaign suggest that it poses a major threat to Ukraine’s ability to keep its people warm and safe during the coming winter months. It is unlikely to change Russia’s battlefield fortunes in Ukraine, but the latest iteration of Russia’s long-range strike efforts is causing major problems and generating new requirements for Ukrainian air-defence equipment.
+
+
+### IV. The Need for More Western Aid to Improve Ukrainian Air Defence
+
+After the success of the Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kharkiv, its subsequent recapture of Lyman and continued pressure in Luhansk and Kherson, Russia is faced with the prospect of military defeat on the ground in 2023. Partial Russian mobilisation will take several months to produce even barely competent new troops to augment battered regular units, let alone entire new formations. The task will be especially difficult given that the instructors and experienced officers Russia would normally count on to train new conscripts are largely either stuck trying to hold the frontlines in Ukraine or have become casualties. In response to the lack of viable options on the ground, Russia’s leaders have turned to renewed long-range bombardment against civilian critical utilities. The plan is to cause enough civilian suffering that the Zelensky government is either forced to negotiate ceasefire terms or face major civil unrest that delays preparations for a renewed counter-offensive push to liberate the remaining occupied territories of Ukraine in spring 2023.
+
+Russia’s air and missile strike operations between February and August 2022 failed to produce decisive effects against Ukrainian target sets that ranged from air defences to communications, military industry, transport and fuel infrastructure. The failure of the VKS to mount an effective SEAD/DEAD campaign in the face of effective, dispersed Ukrainian Air Force GBAD operations cost it the ability to operate above very low altitude in Ukrainian airspace. This was critical in allowing the Ukrainian Air Force fighter and ground-attack fleets to survive and continue to contest control of the air and attack Russian ground forces, despite being completely outmatched at a technical level. Meanwhile, the large number of MANPADS provided to Ukrainian troops and later mobile air-defence teams near the frontlines meant that even very low altitude VKS fixed-wing penetrations proved prohibitively costly in March, and ceased by April 2022. In consequence, Russia has not been able to effectively employ the potentially heavy and efficient aerial firepower of its fixed-wing Su-34 ‘frontal bomber’ and multi-role fighter fleets by bombing Ukrainian strategic targets, except during the first few days of the invasion. Instead, Russia’s attempt at strategic air attack has been limited to expensive cruise and ballistic missile barrages at a much more limited scale. These barrages have nevertheless caused major damage and have killed many Ukrainian citizens. Fortunately, Russia’s limited stockpiles and production capacity of standoff missiles prevented adequate concentration or sustainment of effects against communications, transport or fuel infrastructure target sets. However, this should not lead to Western complacency about the need to urgently bolster Ukrainian air-defence capacity.
+
+The Russian adoption of the Iranian Shahed-136 as a cheap weapon able to conduct large-scale, sustained precision strikes on civilian infrastructure and other fixed, non-hardened targets marks a key change in the character of the air war. Ukrainian air defences are currently shooting down the majority of incoming Shahed-136s and around half of the cruise missiles fired by Russia using a combination of SAMs, fighters with R-73 air-to-air missiles, mobile MANPADS teams and anti-aircraft guns. However, most of these interceptions use munitions that are far more expensive and are available for Ukraine in more limited quantities than the Shahed-136 is likely to be for Russia. Western SAM systems that have been supplied so far have proven highly effective against incoming cruise missiles, including the stealthy Kh-101, but have been supplied with inadequate ammunition for Ukrainian usage rates even though they are not being used against Shahed-136. MANPADS are effective and relatively efficient against Shahed-136 and cruise missiles when they pass within range of mobile air-defence teams. However, the numbers required are large due to short range and the need to defend cities and infrastructure across Ukraine, in addition to protecting frontline troops from Russian attack aviation and UAVs. Due to its relatively small size, shape, low altitude flight and low speed, legacy Soviet and Russian self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (SPAAGs) such as Shilka and Tunguska also struggle to reliably shoot down the Shahed-136, although the German Gepard is highly effective. After two weeks of sustained Russian attacks on electrical infrastructure, new deliveries of equipment and systems specifically tailored to efficiently providing defence against Shahed-136 attacks are already one of Ukraine’s top priorities in terms of support from its international partners. The weapon is simple and not especially difficult to intercept, but most of the current means of doing so are too expensive or draw on unacceptable numbers of weapons required for other defence tasks to provide an adequate medium-term solution.
+
+In the short term, therefore, Ukraine urgently requires deliveries of large numbers of additional MANPADS for mobile and static air-defence teams, and many modern SPAAGs such as the Gepard, LvKv 90 or Skyranger as possible. It also requires additional supplies of night-vision goggles to enable MANPADS teams to operate effectively at night. Additional ammunition and more launchers for the highly effective IRIS-T SLM and NASAMS systems are also critical to enable the Ukrainian Air Force to defend remaining electricity infrastructure and protect repair work from higher-end cruise missile attacks. With rolling blackouts already affecting much of the country and the weather already getting cold, the urgency of these requirements is hard to overstate. Neither MANPADS or SPAAGs should be considered politically sensitive as they are fundamentally defensive weapons needed to protect civilian infrastructure that do not require the absolute latest in cutting-edge technology to be effective. Rapidly gifting even small inventories of stored MANPADS and SPAAGs currently offers European states that wish to support Ukraine but face political difficulties in delivering longer-ranged offensive weapons or heavy armoured vehicles to make a real difference now.
+
+In the medium term, Ukraine needs a way to produce or at least procure and operate efficient defence systems against Shahed-136 and other UAVs at scale. Countries that have significant experience defending against multiple relatively slow loitering munitions and UAVs such as South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Israel would make sense in terms of potential sources of ideas and subsystems, even if politically they were unwilling to directly supply Ukrainian forces. In general, gun systems are preferred over missiles where possible due to the much lower cost per engagement and higher availability of ammunition compared with SAMs and MANPADS. A relatively simple new product that combined a small counter-UAV AESA radar with an attachable predictive aiming reticule sight is one option that, if possible, would offer a way to significantly enhance the capability of Ukraine’s many traditional anti-aircraft guns such as ZSU-2-23 and 14.5-mm/12.7-mm heavy machine guns against Shahed-136.
+
+Ukraine also needs a way to resupply its Soviet-made and domestically upgraded S-300 and SA-11 ‘Buk’ SAM systems in both the anti-missile and battlefield anti-aircraft/counter UAV role. Eight months of high-intensity combat have consumed unprecedented and unforeseen quantities of interceptor missiles, and Western allies have few ways to supply more directly or indirectly. Western militaries have invested very little in production of medium- and short-range GBAD systems since the end of the Cold War due to overwhelming air superiority in every conflict since then. This means that production is now having to ramp up from a very low level and existing inventories are too small to meet Ukraine’s needs. This will make it impossible to replace the large number of remaining S-300, SA-11, SA-15 ‘Tor’ and SA-8 ‘Osa’ systems operated by Ukraine directly in the medium term, let alone expand coverage. Therefore, it would seem sensible for Ukrainian industry to work with industrial partners in Western countries to set up new manufacturing lines as fast as possible for key SAM system ammunition such as the 5V55 missile for S-300PS/PT and S-300V1, and the 9M38 missile for the SA-11 ‘Buk’. This would have the side benefit of greatly improving Western familiarity with missile families that in various derivations are still in widespread use by adversaries including Russia, China and Iran.
+
+If Ukrainian SAMs are allowed to run out of ammunition, then not only will Ukrainian infrastructure and other key target sets become dramatically more vulnerable to Russian missile strikes, but the Russian VKS fixed-wing fleet would suddenly again be able to start penetrating deep into Ukrainian-controlled airspace at medium and high altitudes. Russian fighters retain the capability to dramatically overmatch Ukrainian ones if allowed to roam freely at high altitude, as has been shown by their lethality against Ukrainian Air Force jets conducting low-level operations against Russian positions in Kherson in recent weeks. In addition to the radar performance and missile range advantages that have always been a factor, the VKS Su-35S and Mig-31BM fleets can now draw on a lot of live air-to-air combat experience from conducting continuous CAPs close to Russia’s own borders. As such, the underwhelming VKS fighter performance during the first days of the invasion is unlikely to be repeated if Ukrainian SAMs are starved of ammunition to the point that they can no longer deter Russian fixed-wing incursions. Furthermore, despite the relatively poor operational-level coordination between different Russian fast-jet fleets, and limited close air support capabilities against organic battlefield targets in contested environments, the experience of rebel groups and the Islamic State in Syria should remind those quick to dismiss the VKS of how much firepower they can and regularly do apply to fixed targets if allowed to operate freely at medium altitudes. The inability of the Russian Air Force to coordinate large-scale complex SEAD/DEAD operations to neutralise Ukraine’s ground-based air-defence network has been the key factor that has prevented it from being one of the main threats to Ukraine’s war effort so far. It is vital that the West does not lose sight of the fact that it must help Ukraine to keep that air-defence network supplied and reinforce it, otherwise that situation could change fairly rapidly in the coming months.
+
+The Ukrainian Air Force also urgently needs more Western weapons that can enhance the standoff lethality of its existing attack jet fleet in a similar manner as the AGM-88 HARM was integrated to allow SEAD strikes against Russian SAMs. Due to the very serious threat from Russian long-, medium- and short-range GBAD systems and Russian fighter patrols, Ukrainian attack aircraft must fly very low when anywhere near the frontlines and still regularly suffer losses. Very low-level approaches to target areas make detecting and designating for laser-guided weapons or achieving electro-optical or infra-red lock-on against targets almost impossible due to the very short period and range within which they appear within the pilots’ field of view. Clearly, the more standoff range can be offered, the more losses will be minimised. Candidate weapons must be able to be programmed with the release and target parameters before being loaded onto the jet, since Western smart munitions are unlikely to be able to exchange data directly with existing Ukrainian aircraft avionics. They would need to have sufficiently capable automated target detection and attack capabilities to reliably detect and destroy Russian ground vehicles themselves when delivered roughly to the right target area. Since these weapons would primarily be needed to counter Russian mass as mobilised formations appear on the frontlines in spring 2023, suitable munitions would also need to exist in Western stockpiles in large numbers. Such a demanding list of criteria leaves a very small number of potential options, with the American CBU-105 Sensor Fused Weapon being one potential option worth exploring. If it could be released by Ukraine’s Su-24 bombers in a lofted profile from a fast low-altitude pop-up delivery, then guided to a more precise aim point by pre-programmed GPS coordinates, the multiple anti-armour homing skeet submunitions would be devastating against Russian vehicle concentrations.
+
+In the medium term, Ukraine needs new fighter aircraft able to meet Russian fighters on more equal terms as soon as possible, especially if providing sufficient ammunition to maintain frontline SAM coverage proves difficult. The enduring threat from Russian long-range S-400 SAMs, especially when cued in by radars capable of tracking them at low altitudes from long ranges such as the 48Ya6 Podlet-K1, is likely to force Ukrainian fighters to operate at low level as part of standard tactics. The effective range of air-to-air missiles is inherently tied to launch altitude and speed of both the aircraft firing and its target. As such, any new fighter for the Ukrainian Air Force needs to come equipped with a missile capable of offering the greatest possible effective range under low-altitude, subsonic launch conditions. Electronic warfare capabilities to reduce the effectiveness of Russian radars at longer ranges would also be highly beneficial, as would a radar designed to be resilient against the Khibny jamming pods that Russian fighters typically fly with over Ukraine. Aside from improved air-to-air performance, the main Ukrainian operational priority is for an aircraft capable of operating from dispersed, relatively basic airbases to prevent them being located and rapidly destroyed by Russian long-range missile strikes. This entails an ability to be serviced with limited personnel and heavy equipment, and to operate from relatively rough and short runway surfaces. Anti-shipping capabilities are also required. Any new fighters also need to be able to generate high sortie rates from both an availability and affordability perspective, since the Ukrainian economy has been devastated by the Russian invasion and new fighters are competing with a huge range of other requirements. As a long-term plan, the Ukrainian Air Force wants to operate a split fleet of a single engine light multi-role fighter and a longer-ranged twin engine fighter for greater air-defence persistence. However, in the short term, even a tiny number of modern Western fighters would be a huge boost to Ukraine’s ability to continue deterring the VKS from penetrating its skies.
+
+The decision to supply a Western fighter would inherently be heavily influenced, and most likely ultimately decided, by political factors. In the long term, US-supplied aircraft are likely to form a large part of the Ukrainian Air Force inventory due to political, industrial and financial considerations. However, while Ukrainian airbases are still at high risk of Russian missile strikes, the long, high-quality runways and large hangers with extensive ground support equipment required to operate most US fighters would be difficult to build without being observed and hit. It is worth noting that of the currently available Western fighter aircraft that could possibly be suppled, the Swedish Saab Gripen C/D offers by far the most suitable candidate in terms of operational requirements. It was designed from the outset for ease of maintenance, and can be refuelled, re-armed and given basic maintenance by teams of just six ground crew using two vehicles on small airbases or highways in cold weather. Moreover, only one of each crew needs to be a highly trained maintainer; the rest can be conscripts or even troops. Conceptually, the Swedish Air Force has always emphasised low-level air superiority tactics from dispersed bases, in a similar manner to how the Ukrainian Air Force currently operates, and so the Gripen was designed with ground support equipment and maintenance requirements compatible with that approach. The electronic warfare suite on the Gripen C/D is also optimised specifically for countering Russian fighter and SAM radars. Other factors that make Gripen particularly suited to Ukrainian operational needs are that it can fire the very long-range European Meteor missile, which, thanks to its ramjet propulsion design, is less adversely affected by being launched from low and slow than traditional rocket-powered missiles such as R-27 or AIM-120 AMRAAM, and Gripen was also designed from the outset with an anti-ship capability.
+
+Since April, VKS pilots have been extremely reluctant to aggressively fight their way into Ukrainian airspace due to the losses taken during early attempts. The threat of Ukrainian SAM and MANPADS engagements has shaped the behaviour and constrained the effectiveness of Russian pilots significantly. Therefore, even a few modern Western fighters with long-range missiles able to meet the Russians on technically equal or even superior terms would likely have a disproportionate deterrent effect.
+
+Western military aid has quite rightly concentrated on equipping and supporting the Ukrainian ground forces until now. Ukraine has so far managed to hold its own in the air domain, largely using its own equipment. However, there is a real danger that this success leads to Western complacency about the threat that the VKS can still pose to Ukrainian forces, infrastructure and cities if given an opening. Ukraine now needs rapid deliveries of SAM launchers and missile ammunition, SPAAGs and ideally Western fighter aircraft to prevent a sustained strike campaign that could, if unopposed, thwart the dominant battlefield momentum that Ukrainian troops have fought so hard to win.
+
+---
+
+__Justin Bronk__ is the Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology in the Military Sciences team at RUSI. His particular areas of expertise include the modern combat air environment, Russian and Chinese ground-based air defences and fast jet capabilities, unmanned combat aerial vehicles and novel weapons technology.
+
+__Nick Reynolds__ is the Research Analyst for Land Warfare at RUSI. His research interests include land power, wargaming and simulation. Prior to joining RUSI he worked for Constellis.
+
+__Jack Watling__ is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute. Jack works closely with the British military on the development of concepts of operation, assessments of the future operating environment, and conducts operational analysis of contemporary conflicts.

From a8a082574c9ccf917deefbdce0be191908200ad3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: theagora <agoradao@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2022 08:27:13 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 8/9] 0x16 Add _columns posts, Nov.18

---
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+---
+layout: post
+title : "戴，还是不戴？"
+author: "米拉·帕特尔、阿德里亚·罗伊乔杜里"
+date  : 2022-10-20 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Bh1HBKj.jpg
+image_caption: "为什么在一个多世纪里，头巾会成为伊朗政治的中心？"
+description: "沙王政权下的伊朗禁止戴头巾，1979年伊斯兰革命后的伊朗又强制戴头巾。在两伊战争期间，在伊朗，头巾又经历了又一次变化，变成了什叶派伊斯兰的象征。"
+---
+
+在22岁的玛莎·阿米尼因为头巾包得不够紧而被警方拘留并在拘留期间死去后的几周里，大规模的抗议席卷了伊朗所有大城市的街头。全国各地的示威者走上街头，高喊“女人、生活、自由”的口号。一些人脱掉头巾或剪掉头发，以此来表达对政府针对女性的严苛政策的公民不服从。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+这些抗议景象，与1979年伊斯兰革命期间伊朗街头发生的一场相似的起义形成了鲜明的对比。在1979年的抗议中，伊斯兰的头巾也起到了关键作用：女人们戴上头巾，来表达对伊朗第一任沙王礼萨·沙·巴列维的遮头禁令。
+
+在《重新思考全球姐妹情谊》（Rethinking Global Sisterhood）中，尼玛·纳西比（Nima Naghibi）写道，在沙王和伊斯兰共和国的统治下，伊朗女性都被视为“伊朗人民——沙王治下世俗的、现代的和西化的伊朗人民，或伊斯兰共和国治下伊斯兰的、现代的和反帝国主义的伊朗人民——的可见标志”。因此，头巾起到了验证世界观和体制的作用，它也因此而受到一系列来自男人的管制，这些男人认为自己能够控制女人的身体，因为那是他们掌握的权力的自然延伸。
+
+
+### 强制“脱头巾”的伊朗
+
+巴列维以以下两点而著称，一方面，他强调要建设一个不受伊斯兰神职人员影响的伊朗；另一方面，他极力鼓吹欧式的制度和生活方式。在这方面，他关于茁壮的政策起到极其重要的作用。他着手通过一些对伊朗人民日常生活影响深远的政策，把伊朗男女的外表给标准化和欧化了。
+
+![image1](https://i.imgur.com/nWPgN0M.png)
+▲ 礼萨·沙·巴列维和穆斯塔法·凯末尔·阿塔图克
+
+![image2](https://i.imgur.com/lzJldT0.png)
+▲ 身穿西服，头戴巴列维式帽子的伊朗男性
+
+伊朗研究学者胡尚·切哈比（Houchang Chehabi）在《把皇帝的新衣搬上舞台：礼萨沙王治下的着装规范和民族国家建设》（“Staging the Emperor’s New Clothes: Dress Codes and Nation Building Under Reza Shah”, 1993）一文中指出，1928年巴列维在掌权后通过的第一个着装规范规定“伊朗国内所有不需要穿与政府公务要求的特殊服饰的男性臣民都要统一着装”。这条1929年3月生效的法律把统一着装定义为巴列维式的帽子和欧式西服。唯一不需要统一着装的，是神职人员或参与宗教教学的人。此举也遭到了一些抵抗，特别是在部落地区，那里的人们更喜欢自己的传统服饰。
+
+![image3](https://i.imgur.com/waLF8hS.png)
+▲ 伊朗传统服饰示例
+
+同年，沙王也针对更加重要的头巾问题做了一些改革。他命令警察允许女性在公开场合不戴头巾。虽然这招来了神职人员的反对，但也得到德黑兰部分女性的支持。王后也开始不戴头巾公开露面。有一次，王后在库姆朝圣期间拜谒法蒂玛圣陵时虽然戴了头巾但没把脸遮住。为此，她遭到当地一位神职人员的严厉批评。次日，作为回应，巴列维公开殴打了那位神职人员。但此时，不戴头巾还没有成为国家政策。
+
+1934年6月，在正式出访当时正在大搞现代化改革的土耳其后，巴列维也开始在伊朗贯彻他在那里看到、学到的东西。切哈比写道，“礼萨沙王比计划待得更久，阿塔图克治下取得的社会和经济进步以及随之而来的女性对公共事务的参与让他艳羡不已”。
+
+![image4](https://i.imgur.com/fmKPvrR.png)
+▲ 军官、政府官员和他们不戴盖头的妻子们
+
+结果，从20世纪30年代中期起，他颁布了大量着装法令，这些法令中的第一条就是，政府的所有部长都要戴欧式毡帽。后来，1935年5月，政府扶持建立了一个女士中心（Ladies Centre），其主要目标，就是倡导女性脱掉头巾。结果，部长们和他们的代表每周都要和他们不戴头巾的妻子一起出席一次活动，女校里的老师和学生则不许戴头巾。1936年，在法律规定女人在公共场合戴盖头或围围巾属于犯罪行为的时候，强制脱头巾的政策达到了顶点。违抗这个规定的人会被逮捕并被强制扯去盖头或围巾。
+
+人们普遍认为，巴列维采取这些措施，是为了使伊朗现代化。与这种观点相反，一些学者相信，巴列维的政策大多出自其个人的考虑。在《背叛的许诺》（Promises of Betrayal）中，法兹勒·乔杜里（Fazle Chowdhury）解释说，巴列维的政策“和促使伊朗去和更加繁荣的国家竞争没什么关系，而更多的是为了解放他自己，仅仅是为了消除什叶派神职人员给他造成的压力。”
+
+与强制脱头巾相伴的，是其他许多为削弱神职人员而设计的措施，包括通过考试给他们颁发毛拉证，如果他们反对政府的政策，就不许他们传道等等。
+
+也许，最能证明这个君主政权对女性的冷漠的例子，是伊朗最后一位沙王在1973年接受的一次访谈。在访谈中他说女人“可能在法律眼中和男人平等，但恕我直言，在能力并非如此”。稍后他又补充说，“你们女人擅长勾心斗角，你们是邪恶的。你们每个人都这样。”
+
+在这个语境中，伊朗的许多女性并不认为强制脱头巾是为促进女性权利而设计的制度，相反，它不过是政教之间权力斗争中部署的一个武器。文化的规范、和政府执法的严苛又进一步加剧了她们对此政策的反对。而且，就像人类学家齐巴·米尔-侯赛尼（Ziba Mir-Hosseini）在2007年的一篇文章中指出的那样，强制脱头巾政策“对许多宗教和传统家庭出身的女性构成了限制，因为对她们来说，不戴盖头上学或出门就意味着违背主命。”
+
+在《从1800年到伊斯兰共和国的伊朗女性》（Women in Iran from 1800 to the Islamic Republic）中，人类学家罗伊斯·贝克（Lois Beck）说，虽然政府否认使用暴力来逼迫不服从的女性就范，但地方当局这么做也不会受到任何惩罚。此外，它还逼迫店主不许把东西卖给戴头巾的女性，不许司机载她们，并要求政府官员不许她们进办公室。贝克写道，“男女都被这些政策弄得苦不堪言，但首当其冲的是女性，她们第一次被要求在男人身边不戴头巾，并且往往不知道该穿什么、该做什么。”
+
+在上层阶级的女性接受此政策的同时，而处在经济社会底层的女性更喜欢把自己的头遮住。结果，贝克写道，头巾变成阶级区分和忠诚冲突的一个标志。人类学家法德瓦·金迪（Fadwa El Guindi）在《头巾：谦逊、隐私和抵抗》（Modesty, Privacy and Resistance）中指出，除此之外，头巾还变成“反对巴列维政权的一个象征”，女人们也因此而戴上头巾来表达对君主政权的抗议。
+
+
+### 革命后强制戴头巾的伊朗
+
+在最终推翻沙王的示威活动期间，成千上万名女性戴上头巾走上街头——头巾的遮盖既是在传达一个信息，又是一种对个人身份的自我保护。这些穿得一身黑在德黑兰街道上游行的女性，也成为新政权的重要标志。
+
+在1941年巴列维退位后，强制戴头巾不再是法律规定，虽然它背后的意识形态在巴列维时期一直未受触动。虽然戴头巾不再是犯罪，但它依然会阻碍个人社会阶层的上升。最终，头巾在伊朗又有了新的意义。就像米尔-侯赛尼写到的那样，“到20世纪70年代的时候，对许多女性来说，头巾代表巴列维王朝反对的东西；它从压迫的象征和落后的标记变成抗议和一种新的伊斯兰认同的标志。”
+
+就像伊朗的第一位最高领袖阿亚图拉·霍梅尼在1979年接受记者法拉奇访谈时说的那样，“在过去和现在，为革命做出贡献的女人，都是穿伊斯兰服饰的女人，而不是你们这种化着精致的妆、光着身子、拖着男人的尾巴到处跑的优雅女士。”
+
+新的意义，主要是通过两位前革命时期的理论家即阿亚图拉莫尔塔扎·穆塔哈里和阿里·沙里亚蒂的作品附加到头巾上的。穆塔哈里在作品中翻转了头巾的象征意义，把它从限制变成了保护。他解释说，头巾的真正目的不是把女性排除到社会之外，而是通过保护她们——防止别人把她们当作性物品来对待——为她们参与社会提供方便。沙里亚蒂则清晰地表明，他不信围绕头巾的宗教论证。相反，他把头巾从传统的象征变成了革命的象征。就像米尔-侯赛尼引用的那样，他说，“通过戴上头巾，这一代人想对西方殖民主义和欧洲文化说：‘五十年来你们千方百计地试图把我变成一个假西方人；但我要戴上头巾，对你们说不’”。
+
+在1979年伊斯兰革命期间，头巾代表了革命的本真性及其伊斯兰认同。中东专家萨纳姆·瓦吉尔（Sanam Vakil）在2011年出版的《伊朗伊斯兰共和国的女性与政治》（Women and Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran）中是这样描述的，“一大群女性紧握头巾支持革命”。
+
+![image5](https://i.imgur.com/ujQLgEC.png)
+▲ 1979年伊斯兰革命期间参与抗议的女性
+
+她补充说，她们中的“许多后来成为伊斯兰共和国的先驱”。
+
+在那些为支持革命而戴上头巾的人中，也有相信世俗原则和女性选择自由的女性。她们根本没料到在掌权后，霍梅尼的政权会强制所有女性戴头巾。
+
+霍梅尼的第一条法令要求工作场所戴头巾。作为回应，在1979年3月8日国际妇女节的时候，一些女性组织了一场游行。数千人走上街头用“选择穿什么是我们的自由”的口号来反对头巾。
+
+但这场游行丝毫没有改变政府的立场，后者于1981年颁布了强制戴头巾的法令。到1983年的时候，伊朗议会通过伊斯兰惩戒法，该法规定不戴头巾要挨74鞭。
+
+有趣的是，强制戴头巾的举措与两伊战争（1980-88）同时发生。伊斯兰研究教授法格赫·设拉兹（Faegheh Shirazi）在《被脱掉的头巾：现代文化中的头巾》（The Veil Unveiled: The Hijab in Modern Culture, 2001）中指出，之所以会这样，原因之一在于，这样做能够分散公众的注意力，把他们的目光从战争的恐怖转向更加可控的国内问题。她还指出，在此期间，头巾的语义学有了一个新维度，它在意识形态的维度上把伊朗和伊拉克区分开。换言之，头巾必须代表什叶派意识形态和文化。设拉兹写道，“在20世纪80年代之前，头巾被用来区分穆斯林女性和‘西方’洋娃娃，而在与伊拉克战争期间，头巾则被用来区分什叶派和逊尼派穆斯林。”
+
+因此，海报、公告牌甚至邮票都通过展示“理想的”女性来推动战争。戴头巾女人的海报随处可见——墙上、公共交通工具上、教育机构等等。设拉兹指出，“戴上头巾的伊朗女性代表士兵贞洁虔诚的女儿、妹妹、妻子和母亲”。她补充道，这些海报总会引用包括霍梅尼在内的多为什叶派伊玛目的话来赞美戴头巾的美德。
+
+米尔-侯赛尼指出，虽然国家的头巾政策具有压迫性，但直到20世纪90年代，人们才开始对此有所讨论。原因之一在于，在这个问题上，女性自己分裂了。一些人反对强制戴头巾，另一些人则对此表示欢迎，因为它给了她们进入公开领域的机会，而在此之前，这个领域一直为男人所支配。她写到，“如今，那些在前革命时期伊朗社会精英、西化的环境下永远没法出头的女性在头巾那里找到一种特殊的价值感，找到一块道德高地”。
+
+从20世纪90年代起，随着代际的过渡，新的态度才开始出现（甚至那些在革命期间欢迎强制戴头巾规定的女性也开始有了这样的态度）。此时，头巾又经历了一次变化，人们开始把它和狂信与国家意识形态联系起来。
+
+今天，头巾也代表伊斯兰共和国的绝对权力及其对人民的绝对控制。就像布鲁金斯学会的一份报告指出的那样，“对伊朗的年轻女性来说，强制戴头巾是这个看起来把人民的一切自我表达都定为犯罪的统治系统的又一表现。”除管制女性的着装外，国家还禁止她们跳舞、唱歌、玩音乐和与男人握手。
+
+根据一名伊朗教师的说法，头巾是国家控制人民的一种手段。她说，“国家什么都要管。他们告诉我们穿什么、教什么、怎么做。”对她来说，戴头巾是一种选择，但强调有那个选择的自由的重要性才是关键。
+
+“没有那个自由，人们就不能思考，不能形成意见。从很小的时候政府的政策就在灌输她们，如果她们试图抵抗或表现出她们个体的自我的话，那么，她们就会被视为威胁。”
+
+---
+
+Mira Patel, Adrija Roychowdhury, [“To vail or not to vail: Why the hijab has been central to Iranian politics for over a century”](https://indianexpress.com/article/research/to-veil-or-not-to-veil-why-the-hijab-has-been-central-to-iranian-politics-for-over-a-century-8209698/), The Indian Express, October 20, 2022. 翻译：王立秋。
+
+<!--END-->
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diff --git a/_collections/_columns/2022-11-14-will-turn-into-wildfire.md b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-14-will-turn-into-wildfire.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7342aa8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_columns/2022-11-14-will-turn-into-wildfire.md
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : "也會化做野火燒"
+author: "陶樂思"
+date  : 2022-11-14 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/nlbuyW2.jpg
+image_caption: "「若這歌被禁了，絕唱了，旋律給消滅了。樂器都弄碎了全部唱機燒了，也會化做野火燒。」"
+description: ""
+---
+
+昨日舉行的亞洲七人欖球賽（韓國仁川站），在參賽球隊進場播放國歌時，大會擺了個烏龍，播放了三年前香港反修例歌曲《願榮光歸香港》。
+
+<!--more-->
+
+今天收看過不同媒體的分析，我相信屬工作人員無心之失的機會十分高。但香港政府以及部份立法會議員卻暴跳魚類。向大會強烈抗議之餘，還要求徹查是否有人違反港區國安法。甚至要求解散香港的七人欖球隊。
+
+其實播錯國歌的事件在之前的體育賽事中也發生過，甚至不止一次。不過這次意外還有個巧合，就是香港隊打贏對手韓國隊，獲得仁川站比賽冠軍。這就耐人尋味了。因為有些「一廂情願」的人，會解讀為港隊受到《願榮光歸香港》這首歌的鼓舞，士氣大振之下贏了冠軍。這下就好了，香港精神、港人身份認同的力量原來這麼利害，怎教一些人不「震過貓王」。預料亂找替罪羊出氣的戲碼將層出不窮。
+
+在這件事中，我真的很有興趣知道誰犯了港區國安法。擺烏龍的韓國欖協職員？抑或贏了冠軍的香港七人欖球隊？抑或兩者皆是？而我卻認為是把小事化大的哪一群。正如上文說過，播錯國歌事件在之前的體育賽事中，不只發生過一次，但把事情看得很陰謀論，以致暴跳魚類要查這個查那個的，特區政府的反應則非常空前。而正正是這樣的反應對國家在國際社會的形象造成的損害，則難以估計。
+
+最後，我要把以下那段Rubberband《睜開眼》的歌詞，送給沉着應戰的一群和暴跳如雷的一群：
+
+「若這歌被禁了，絕唱了，旋律給消滅了。樂器都弄碎了全部唱機燒了，也會化做野火燒。」
+
+身體能被囚禁被殺死，歌曲也能在特定地域遭到禁播，但思想卻怎樣都無法被囚禁被殺死。無論有些人多麼渴望這樣做，多麼謂之暴跳如雷。
+
+<!--END-->
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From: hokoi <hokoeye@pm.me>
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2022 03:22:49 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 9/9] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x16 Nov.23

---
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 .../_hkers/2022-11-15-ccp-inc-in-portugal.md  | 249 +++++++
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diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-07-france-strategic-review-2022.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-07-france-strategic-review-2022.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : France Strategic Review 2022
+author: SGDSN
+date  : 2022-11-07 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Ypnu8Rt.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_The last few years have brought tragedy back into our lives and questioned the destiny of our nation._ <excerpt/> _Exacerbated revisionist ambitions, uninhibited opportunism, the health and climate crises and the return of high-intensity warfare on European soil remind us of the profound interdependence between the national and international scenes, in the food, economic and energy fields. The question of our sovereignty and resilience in an interdependent world takes on a new twist._
+
+_Since 2017, France has chosen to reinvest in its armies, to deploy a French and European strategy of sovereignty in the face of an upheaval in global balances. The last two years have accelerated and intensified the transformations._
+
+_The fracturing of the world order brings with it challenges and risks that we must address if we are to retain our freedom. Faced with this phenomenon of globalised hybrid warfare, I therefore wanted a national approach in continuity with and in addition to the European Union’s strategic compass adopted under the French Presidency, and the NATO strategic concept launched at our request in 2019, which was also adopted this year._
+
+_Our findings and conclusions from 2017 remain relevant. We were not mistaken, so there is continuity in our vision, but continuity does not mean inertia in the face of an history that is hardening and accelerating. The time has come for a more comprehensive mobilisation to better equip us in all respects for the historic challenges of a world where strategic competition and confrontation are merging. It is a question of refining our analyses in order to draw operative conclusions._
+
+_By 2030, I want France to have consolidated its role as a balancing, united, radiant, influential power, a driving force for European autonomy and one that assumes its responsibilities by contributing, as a reliable and supportive partner, to the preservation of multilateral mechanisms based on international law._
+
+_The conclusions of the National Strategic Review make it possible to increase the independence and strength of our Nation in the new strategic context in which we live._
+
+> #### Emmanuel MACRON
+
+
+## Strategic Analysis
+
+> ### Assessment of the strategic environment
+
+1) Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 represents a strategic shift. On the one hand, combined with other structural developments, it confirms the observation of changes in the threat assessment described in the 2017 national defence and security strategic review, updated in 2021. On the other, it calls for an adaptation of our strategic response to build up our moral strength and resilience, consolidate our alliances and accelerate the modernisation of our defence mechanisms.
+
+2) Confirmation. As described in the 2017 strategic review, increased strategic competition, the weakening of the tools of the collective security architecture, the effects of intimidation or aggressive strategies, combining military and non-military actions, manipulation of information, and even nuclear threats for the purpose of intimidation, have become apparent to the world, and particularly to our fellow citizens. The disinhibition of global and regional powers pursuing revisionist agendas and opportunistic military policies is combined with a growing trend towards isolationism or identity-based withdrawal. In addition, the consequences of proliferation, technological or otherwise, and the persistence of the terrorist threat also remain prevalent. Other major global challenges likely to cause significant imbalance must be added to this picture, such as the impact of climate change: access to water, food insecurity, migration, demography, pandemics, etc.
+
+3) This observation requires us to rapidly adapt our global response, to accelerate our efforts to promote the emergence of a common and shared conception of European defence, as well as of its strategic autonomy, to modernise our national defence mechanisms, and to boost our moral strength, resilience and alliances. The war in Ukraine further justifies the decision of the President of France, made in 2017, to modernise our defence mechanisms.
+
+4) Consolidation. We must continue the efforts made while also accelerating, adapting and completing our strategic posture in the face of threats that are changing in pace, nature and space. Without replacing terrorism or crisis-management threats, these threats are part of a framework that is increasingly marked by the high intensity of potential confrontation between conventional forces and so-called “hybrid” (cyber, digital and space attacks) or — access denial strategies that challenge our interests (exploitation of the vulnerabilities of logistics flows or infrastructure, air and sea spaces).
+
+5) By strengthening its resilience, by giving itself the means to move towards a war economy, by adapting the areas in which it is present according to its strategic interests and by pivoting towards conflict in new areas and of high intensity, France takes a global approach to entirely fulfil its role as a balancing power and to promote a stable international order based on the respect of the law and on multilateralism. It also intends to support the strengthening of the sovereignty of its partners in order to enhance the stability and security of the regions concerned.
+
+6) This observation makes it all the more necessary to pursue our efforts to promote the emergence and implementation of a common and shared conception of European defence, as well as of its strategic autonomy, complementary to our active participation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and our various partnerships, while guarding against the side effects of the sometimes changing strategic or geographical priorities of these allies.
+
+7) Objectives. While they do not call into question the strategic analysis that has prevailed since 2017, the acceleration of the overall deterioration of our environment and the war in Ukraine nevertheless justify a reassessment of the current military programming law based adjusted and structuring strategic objectives (SO) described in this national strategic review.
+
+8) First, the fundamentals remain: France is and will remain a power with a robust and credible nuclear deterrent [SO no. 1], a structural asset for strategic dialogue and for the protection of our vital interests.
+
+9) At the other end of the spectrum, what sustains our model and gives it credibility is our moral strength: that of the French people, namely, that of a united and resilient France [SO no. 2], that of an economy capable of turning itself into a war economy [SO no. 3], that of leading cyber resilience [SO no. 4], which are the conditions that underpin national sovereignty.
+
+10) However, our weight in the world cannot be based on the principle of sovereignty alone. The principle of solidarity is essential, all the more so in a deteriorated context. France wants to be an exemplary and demanding ally within the Euro-Atlantic area [SO no. 5] while also being one of the driving forces for European strategic autonomy [SO no. 6] and a reliable partner in its diplomatic defence relations and, a credible provider of security [SO no. 7].
+
+11) Influence has been given a strategic function. This new function, now an essential part of the expression of power, is a key element of our ability to promote France’s interests and counter the actions of our competitors across the entire spectrum of hybridity.
+
+12) Supporting deterrence and backed by our moral strength, in support of our alliances and partnerships, our military capabilities enable us to have an operational impact that benefits our defence. Our military capabilities are based on sovereign capabilities, autonomy of assessment and appreciation — an essential step that gives meaning to acts and intentions —, anticipation and decision-making [SO no. 8], a willingness and ability to act in hybrid fields in the face of increasingly aggressive strategies and the will to bypass our competitors [SO no. 9], as well as a proven ability to conduct high-intensity military operations in extensive areas of conflict [SO no. 10].
+
+13) Perspectives. The strategic objectives thus described serve to structure a project, both political and military, for the development of the army model which will form part of the future programming law.
+
+14) This national strategic review explains the underlying factors that guide the work on reassessing the military programming law that is currently in progress. It offers an action-oriented consideration of the changes necessary in terms of, for example, moral strength, the resilience of the Nation through National Service (SNU), the war economy and with regard to the future armed forces model. Finally, it enables the principles on which these changes will be transcribed into the next military programming law (2024-2030) to be established.
+
+
+### 1. A WORLD OF RENEWED TENSION
+
+#### 1.1 FROM STRATEGIC COMPETITION TO STRATEGIC CONFRONTATION
+
+15) Identified in the 2017 national defence and security strategic review and then in the 2021 strategic update as a long-term trend, the renewal of the phenomenon of strategic competition is now taking place at both a global and a regional level, in configurations that expose us more visibly and are becoming more widespread. Revisionist ambitions have intensified, giving rise to numerous displays of uninhibited opportunism from the eastern Mediterranean to the Sahel and the Pacific. We are thus moving from latent competition to open confrontation on the part of Russia and, increasingly, to greater competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The pandemic, the climate crisis, the migration crises and the return of a high-intensity war on European soil remind us of the far-reaching interdependence between the national and international arenas, in the areas of politics, economics, energy and food. These crises illustrate how the fracturing of the world order can restrict our freedom of action. The 2022 national strategic review is therefore in line with and complementary to the European Union’s strategic compass and NATO’s strategic concept, which were adopted this year. It aims to apply these strategies while integrating our national characteristics.
+
+16) The practice of challenging and circumventing the international order, based on multilateralism and the rule of law, whether reflected in the United Nations, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) or in the reactivation of territorial disputes, is becoming more commonplace and diverse, and follows in the footsteps of past breaches (Helsinki principles, INF and Open Skies treaties, Budapest Memorandum, etc.). The body of agreements and laws built since the end of the Cold War is crumbling and, although the causes are not recent, this phenomenon has accelerated sharply since 2014. By way of illustration, out of the agreements that until recently maintained a balance in the Euro-Atlantic area, only the New START Treaty remains; furthermore, it is due to expire in 2026 without a clear successor. Bypassed and hollowed out if not denounced head-on, this arms control architecture is now more necessary and more weakened than at any time in almost forty years.
+
+#### 1.2 CRYSTALLISATION OF THE MAIN ANTAGONISMS
+
+> #### Russia: assumed revisionist ambitions
+
+17) Russia is pursuing a strategy that seeks to undermine European security, of which the war against Ukraine, launched on 24 February 2022, is the most open and brutal manifestation. During the implementation of its ambition of power conceived as an opposition to what Russia calls “the collective West”, Moscow had for a long time privileged a more indirect approach, focusing on undermining the West on a politico-diplomatic level: information warfare and interference, types of action whose perpetrator is difficult to name, search for transatlantic division, etc. Without having disappeared, this strategy is now accompanied by a desire to engage in a direct military confrontation, materialised by the war of aggression against Ukraine. Rewriting history and the national narrative, the Russian government is increasingly open about its imperial ambitions based on a balance-of-power approach.
+
+18) The future of Russian military power after this ordeal will be an important issue for the Atlantic alliance and Europe over the coming decades, as the strategic concept adopted at the Madrid summit and the strategic compass adopted under the French presidency of the Council of the EU (FPCEU) strongly underline. Regardless of the outcome of the war, it will have seriously debilitated the human and material potential of the Russian forces. The need to regenerate this potential will come up against the effects of sanctions on the Russian economy and defence technological and industrial base (DTIB), but should continue to be financed to a large extent. The weakening of its conventional forces over the long term could lead Moscow to privilege more indirect modes of confrontation while boosting the role of its non-conventional weapons in its strategy.
+
+19) In light of the split caused by the war and the irreversibility of Russia’s strategic choices, it is necessary to anticipate a confrontation with Moscow based on the trio of competition, challenge and confrontation, taking place over a long period of time, in multiple regions and spaces. This move towards confrontation is already taking place in Africa, through offensive diplomatic manoeuvres combined with anti-Western information-based attacks and the use of mercenaries. Moscow sees in this globalised hybrid war substantial leverage in external theatres and in environments where new types of action are now being taken. Thus, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Baltic area, the Balkans, and the North Atlantic, but also Africa and the Middle East, offer the possibility of prolonged confrontation and the risk of incidents that could escalate.
+
+> #### People’s Republic of China: the affirmation
+
+20) In addition to staying in power, the goal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is still to supplant the United States as the world’s leading power. Considering American power and the Western model to be in decline, the Chinese regime believes that Western leadership of the international order has weakened and that it can weaken it further by using its new influence. The CCP is therefore banking on the passivity of a majority of non-Western countries over the war in Ukraine to fuel a discourse that portrays an opposition based on “the West against the rest”. However, beyond ideology and the war in Ukraine, such questioning irrigates fields which are political (propaganda on the decline of the West), economic and technological (predation, trade war), military (growth of the nuclear arsenal, modernisation of the PLA, areas of support abroad) and diplomatic (a more assertive attitude in international forums, recourse to a bilateral balance of power or to alternative multilateral formats, such as the 14+1 or the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) in nature.
+
+21) The modernisation of China’s military apparatus continues and enables the PLA to support an increasingly assertive strategy, including on the military front, whether in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly with regard to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, or in other regions of the world where Chinese diplomacy calls to clients, especially in Africa. The political nature of the PLA and the civil-military integration deployed in the technological, economic and information fields enable an unprecedented scope of hybrid actions. The latter is only constrained in practice and, at this stage, by the PRC’s decision to challenge the international security architecture from the inside.
+
+22) The growing strategic convergence between the PRC and Russia opens up the prospect of greater contestation within international bodies, directed against the expression of Western objectives and offering opportunities for political alignment against the West and the United States in particular. The common desire to set aside or silence differences in order to challenge Western influence, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine, gives rise to occasional forms of cooperation. This situation is primarily visible at the diplomatic level and in information warfare. On a structural level, the imbalance in China-Russia relations in favour of Beijing is set to grow with the Ukrainian crisis. The political, strategic and technological implications could be enormous for global governance.
+
+23) Examining Western cohesion and the impact of sanctions against and embargoes on Russia over time will also provide the PRC with a valuable insight into the scope of economic coercion methods that could be used against it in a major crisis.
+
+#### 1.3 CONTESTED AND WEAKENED DEMOCRACIES IN THE BATTLE FOR INFLUENCE
+
+24) In a context of increasingly intense strategic competition and confrontation, the position of liberal democracies has been weakened because they defend an international order whose foundations (international law, multilateralism, values, etc.) are openly challenged by several states. This dynamic is sustained by resentment towards political legacies, sometimes colonial, and perceptions of unfair development, which dovetail with the consolidation of authoritarianism and illiberal regimes around the world. These dynamics make it more difficult to understand the changing environment of our operations and to anticipate crises.
+
+25) This situation manifests itself in the fields of influence and perception. Russian and Chinese operations in these areas seek to undermine our own political systems and national cohesion, while fuelling or even creating alignments against us, as the war in Ukraine demonstrates. Our opponents are counting on the discrediting of Western discourse based on humanist values, and asymmetry in the relationship with laws and in the respect for international humanitarian law.
+
+26) Our competitors use the law as a weapon against our interests to ensure their ascendancy. A tool of hybridity, the strategic use of laws (or lawfare) can be broken down into three major areas: the growing instrumentalisation by certain states of their own laws, in particular through extraterritoriality; the use, misuse or circumventing of international laws; and the exploitation of legal and judicial vulnerabilities resulting from our domestic laws or European commitments.
+
+27) Finally, Western states must consider the inevitability of technological catch-up and dissemination, which are now taking place. This form of technological equalisation helps to make numbers important again. By sometimes taking a more agile approach and having larger volumes, our strategic competitors have the capacity to tip the regional balance, such as Iran in the ballistics field. At the same time, multilateral regimes that fight against dissemination have become less effective, undermined from the inside by Russia in most cases. GAFAM, or other private players, are emerging as non-state players whose active or passive contribution must be included as input data as from the challenge phases.
+
+#### 1.4 CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RETURN OF NUCLEAR REALITY, HIGH INTENSITY AND HYBRIDITY
+
+28) Initial lessons from the war in Ukraine are characterised, in particular, by the threat of nuclear escalation and its trivialisation by a nuclear-weapon state. Combined with the collapse of arms control architecture and the persistence of proliferation crises, Russia’s use of nuclear rhetoric for offensive purposes in support of the invasion of Ukraine has the potential to undermine strategic balances and, in the longer term, to exacerbate proliferation. A successful coercive manoeuvre backed by nuclear weapons would set a dangerous precedent. Russian intimidation and threats of coercion under the shadow of nuclear weapons also undermine the efforts of the P5 states in the area of doctrinal transparency.
+
+29) The next-generation war waged by Russia is characterised by a return to an integral strategy combining far-reaching hybrid actions and high-intensity operations. The lessons of this major engagement under the nuclear umbrella of the aggressor underline the importance of perfect multi-domain operations, known as the multi-environment and multi-field manoeuvre (M2MC), as well as the need for joint action that is significant in terms of its mass and density. They also remind us of the need to create an international approach to strategic competition, allowing us to signal our determination, to prevent and channel the escalation options of competitors operating under different constraints and in different registers from our own.
+
+30) Nuclear multipolarity that has been relatively contained until now, could take a more deregulated form. This is due, in particular, to the undermining of the international frameworks and security guarantees, the expansion pathways of already established nuclear powers and the emboldening of regional players. On the one hand, the quantitative and qualitative growth of China’s nuclear arsenal, combined with Russia’s actions, could jeopardise further efforts to preserve nuclear arms control agreements governing the arsenals of the main holders. On the other, aside from the cases of North Korea and Iran, the non-proliferation regime could be subject to renewed tension. The proliferation of their delivery systems (ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, etc.), a hardening of military postures and the development of access denial capabilities will provide many regional powers with greater capacity to cause harm.
+
+31) Hybrid strategies have shown their impact on multiple theatres. Their effects continue to spread in Africa, the central and eastern Mediterranean, and the Indo-Pacific region. These strategies exploit the difficulty for Western states to provide an effective response that is compatible with respect for the political commitments, treaties and principles that underpin the international order. Using a variety of levers, they are adapted to the geography of the interests of the players implementing them, enabling these players to affect France’s interests at the lowest possible cost, in mainland France and its overseas territories, and abroad. Common spaces (cyber, space, seabed and, air and sea) are now the subject of a renewed competition for power. The actions that have already been taken in these spaces reflect the appropriation by all states of an approach that is applied to these spaces on the basis of the entire trio of competition, challenge and confrontation. Their operational and geographic importance is growing while the common rules governing them are insufficient, weakened or contested.
+
+32) In terms of hybridity, states are increasingly systematically using cyber as a weapon to defend their strategic interests or in the context of geopolitical tension. In addition to the development of offensive capabilities, sophisticated off-the-shelf, cyber-espionage weapons and tools are gradually being developed by private companies. This cyber-arms race increases the risk of escalation, the stages of which are not equally understood. Finally, cybercrime, a threat that has reached an unprecedented level of sophistication and disinhibition, constitutes a strategic challenge for our national security.
+
+#### 1.5 CRISIS AREAS AND REGIONAL OPPORTUNISM
+
+33) The refocusing of the United States on the strategic competition with the PRC is accompanied by a shake-up in the balance of power between regional powers. In the Near and Middle East, the diplomatic and military emboldening of certain regional powers is concomitant with the destabilisation of already fragile countries. The persistence of proliferation crises (Iran, North Korea, Syria in the case of chemical weapons) helps fuel these sources of regional destabilisation. These dynamics affect our strategic interests because they are accompanied by a rearrangement of intra-regional agreements, alliances and power relations. The distrust of the West and the laws it promotes provides the basis for Russia’s and the PRC’s policies of influence in Africa and the Near and Middle East. Within Europe itself, the Western Balkans are likely to be an area of fragility in the short term which these countries may seek to exploit to divide and weaken Europe.
+
+34) The international jihadist movement will continue to spread and pose a security challenge for the next decade, both for the West and for the fragile countries of the Muslim world, from Africa to Southeast Asia. Exploiting favourable conditions (poor governance, endemic corruption, lack of social justice, strategic competition), it will help fuel areas of crisis and destabilisation in the Levant, North Africa, the Sahel and West Africa, for which a military response, in support of local partners, will continue to be sought.
+
+35) The war in Ukraine is also a reminder of how regional crises and global challenges can interact and reinforce each other. Energy has once again become a key issue and a geostrategic lever. The — potentially changing — geography of producers and supply routes fuels energy rivalries that redraw the balance of power. The strategic nature of energy flows complicates the challenges of resource management as many terminals and pipelines (gas and oil) are located in areas of tension. Similarly, the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have highlighted the importance of food as a lever of influence and coercion for certain regimes. Food security has re-emerged as a domestic political stability imperative for many states. The acceleration of the effects of global warming, possibly coupled with a global food crisis, will exacerbate migration phenomena, manipulated or not, and create new areas of tension, likely to weigh on both Western cohesion and each country. Our overseas territories will be increasingly exposed to the security consequences of these underlying trends (increased predation, more violent and destructive natural disasters, migration pressure, etc.), which may require a greater commitment from the armed forces.
+
+36) The war in Ukraine also poses the risk of a return to state terrorism. It may be assumed that given Russia’s uninhibited actions, weapons of all kinds are being recovered in the Ukrainian theatre to serve proxy or terrorist groups. These weapons could be used against our interests, alongside a disinformation campaign.
+
+
+### 2. STRATEGIC SOLIDARITY FACED WITH THE CHALLENGE OF CONFRONTATION
+
+37) The acceleration of the risk of conflict and the rapid expansion of the fields of confrontation confirm the need for strategic alliances and the principle of solidarity that structures them. This strategic solidarity must be assessed according to whether France is the beneficiary, the sole provider or one of its components, whether within the EU, NATO or ad hoc coalitions, for example against Daech or in the Sahel-Saharan strip.
+
+38) The deterioration of the international environment, the risk of opportunistic strategies in the face of the stretching of our interests and the diversity of areas of action highlight the immense difficulty for France to respond alone to all the challenges (Eastern and Northern Europe, Mediterranean-Red Sea, Near and Middle East, Indo-Pacific, Africa, Arctic, etc.). The robustness of our partnerships, the maintenance of a high level of interoperability with the United States, and our ability to build permanent or temporary strategic alignments in a changing environment will more surely condition our global influence and our weight in the development of a more stable environment. They will also allow us to anticipate — and thus prevent — potential side effects of competition, or even rivalry between allies.
+
+#### 2.1 EUROPE AT A CROSSROADS TO BECOME A STRATEGIC PLAYER
+
+39) A great deal of progress has been made in recent years in the field of European defence, both in the area of capabilities — creation of the European Defence Fund (EDF), implementation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), strengthening of the European Capability Development Plan — and in the operational area with the creation of the European Peace Facility, or in the social area with the handling of migratory crises.
+
+40) The adoption of an ambitious strategic compass in March 2022 is a first step, symbolising a shared desire to strengthen coherence in defining and pursuing our strategic objectives. Its implementation will be key to strengthening the Union’s capacity to act by 2030, in particular in the operational area and in contested strategic spaces. Furthermore, the lifting of Denmark’s opt-out from the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is a positive signal.
+
+41) The development of a real politico-military action capability for Europe in its immediate environment remains an objective. In terms of capabilities, the decisions taken at the Versailles summit (10 and 11 March 2022) have made it possible to launch a new effort, which must be pursued with all European partners. A great deal of work will have to be done to continue to develop a common strategic culture, which is essential for the emergence of a European defence. The joint declaration of 21 September 2021 on a European strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and the adaptation of the European maritime system in the north-west Indian Ocean have the long-term objective of establishing the EU as a credible player and provider of maritime safety and security to the States of the region. This dynamic is already at work in the Arabian Gulf (EMASoH/AGENOR) and the Eastern Mediterranean (QUAD MEDOR).
+
+42) Deepening cooperation between the EU and NATO will be essential to further strengthen European strategic autonomy and the transatlantic relationship.
+
+43) Finally, our cooperation efforts on a European scale have been intensified, by focusing on a wider range of partners with whom large-scale sectoral cooperation has been launched, whether in terms of capabilities, operations or through the establishment of strategic partnerships.
+
+#### 2.2 AN ATLANTIC ALLIANCE STRENGTHENED IN THE CONTEXT
+
+44) NATO remains today the foundation and essential framework for Europe’s collective security. For the majority of our European partners, this observation is made with renewed force by the return of war to the continent and the open and lasting confrontation with Russia, as shown by Finland’s and Sweden’s applications for membership.
+
+45) The period opened in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and the maintenance of a conflict in the Donbass, tangible signals of growing Russian military aggression, which forced NATO to make a major effort to adapt. This collective awareness has manifested itself in increased investment, with a third of allies reaching or exceeding 2% of GDP in their defence budgets. This significant effort must be continued as part of a collective increase in power against opponents who unapologetically pursue their own interests. This development is beneficial in that it brings our European partners closer to our view that we must collectively take more responsibility for defence.
+
+#### 2.3 THE AMERICAN PIVOT
+
+46) For the United States, the PRC is the long-term strategic priority, with a fundamental shift starting in 2007. This focus permeates many areas of US policy, relations with traditional allies and its positioning in multilateral forums.
+
+47) Washington is perceived as being in search of a formula that will allow it to reduce its involvement in regional theatres that it now considers secondary (Africa, Middle East), while strengthening the security of its partners. This objective involves, for example, an effort to promote more integrated Middle Eastern partners (Abraham Accords) and to formalise agreements in ad hoc formats around energy, political and military projects (e.g. Pacific Islands Forum). This repositioning is already prompting states in the region to invest in managing their own security.
+
+48) Through the war in Ukraine, the United States has again emerged as the main provider of European security, through the scale of its reassurance efforts and military support to Ukraine. A potential weakening of US investment in areas of European interest (Africa, Middle East), which are more exposed to the unilateral aims of middle powers and the rise of anti-Western views, could affect our ability to make a lasting contribution to the security and stability of these regions.
+
+#### 2.4 OUR PARTNERSHIPS TO BE REINVENTED
+
+49) France, a balanced power, refuses to be locked in bloc geopolitics. It is important to maintain this long-standing and authentic position in the search for a balanced relationship with our allies. France has a long history of establishing strategic partnerships in its areas of interest, in which our partners must find security, stability and development.
+
+50) In Africa, we face major security and humanitarian challenges. The terrorist threat remains high in the Sahel-Saharan strip and is spreading towards the Gulf of Guinea. Russian actors, including the private military company Wagner, are carrying out actions that are contrary to our interests, while their involvement results in a deterioration of the security situation, the predation of economic resources, numerous abuses documented by the UN and the ever-greater fragility of the states that resort to them. The PRC has a stranglehold on infrastructure, the economy and debt, creating risks of dependency of our partners, as well as of espionage and restrictions on our operating environment.
+
+51) With the Latin American and Indo-Pacific regions, France can strengthen its cooperation and consolidate the relations of our overseas departments, regions and communities with their immediate environment.
+
+52) The ability of certain competitors to propose alternative models, most often based on a transactional approach and less governed by normative concerns, also has an impact, particularly on states under political, economic or food pressure.
+
+
+## Challenges
+
+> ### Reminder of national security interests and confirmation of strategic functions
+
+53) France’s interests include all factors that contribute to its security, prosperity and influence. In particular, a distinction should be made between:
+
+- the protection of the national territory, including the overseas territories, and of French nationals against external threats and attempts at internal destabilisation, including the terrorist threat;
+
+- the security of the EU Member States and the euro-atlantic area under the treaties by which we are bound;
+
+- the stability of our neighbourhood, given the immediate repercussions that any crisis emerging there would have on our own territory, both metropolitan and overseas;
+
+- freedom of access to common spaces (cyber, space, seabed, air-sea spaces, and the poles), which is now threatened by challenges to the rules-based international order and by approaches based on power.
+
+54) Defending these interests is now more complex because of the more systematic use of force and intimidation by some of our strategic competitors, and because of an international context that has been permanently damaged by the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine.
+
+55) France’s main lever for achieving this remains the long-term maintenance of its autonomy of decision and sovereign action in the face of all the threats that arise. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, the world’s seventh largest economy controlling the second largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ), a nuclear-weapon state, and a founding member and driver of European integration, France has essential tools to assert its interests on the international stage.
+
+56) However, the increasing number of constraints on our interests makes it more necessary than ever to have robust and sustainable means of action, adapted to recent developments in the world. Our defence apparatus contributes to this on several levels, as the basis of our independence and freedom of action in the world in the face of threats of all kinds.
+
+57) In this respect, the policies defined in 2013 and 2017 remain fully valid and their concrete implementation must be continued and accelerated.
+
+58) They establish that the defence of our security interests rests on three pillars: the strengthening of our strategic autonomy; the achievement of European sovereignty and the consolidation of our alliances; the preservation of a stable international order, based on respect for the law and multilateralism.
+
+59) In any case, it remains the ultimate responsibility of the President of the Republic to constantly assess the nature of our interests and the attacks that could be made on them.
+
+
+### 1. FRANCE’S SECURITY PRIORITIES
+
+#### 1.1 STRENGTHENING OUR STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
+
+60) Strategic autonomy is the sine qua non condition for the protection of our fundamental interests. At its core are the capacities for autonomous assessment, decision making and action.
+
+61) Our freedom of action and the protection of our fundamental interests are ensured first and foremost by the credibility of nuclear deterrence, the keystone of our defence strategy. The fundamental aim of deterrence is to prevent a major war that would threaten the survival of the nation by protecting France against any state-sponsored aggression against its vital interests and against any attempt at blackmail. In a more uncertain and complex world, where some countries are on a worrying trajectory of opacity and rapid growth of their nuclear arsenals, or even raise the spectre of using the weapon for intimidation or blackmail, maintaining the credibility of our deterrent over the long term remains essential.
+
+62) Our autonomy also depends on the strengthening of a credible, coherent and balanced armed forces model. This requires conventional forces whose size and equipment allow for a conventional-nuclear linkage that is sufficiently robust to preserve the President’s freedom of action and avoid a circumvention of deterrence from below.
+
+63) Strategic autonomy is also based on other factors: national cohesion, economic and industrial independence, securing our supplies, and international influence, particularly through strong diplomacy.
+
+#### 1.2 THE ACHIEVEMENT OF EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF OUR ALLIANCES
+
+64) The protection and promotion of our fundamental interests cannot be limited to the national level. We must continue to contribute actively to the defence of European interests and our collective security. These objectives require the strengthening of our international cooperation, partnerships and alliances, first and foremost within the EU and NATO, where we are bound by certain security guarantees (Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and Article 42-7 of the EU Treaty). Investing in ad hoc partnerships, already existing or to be created, will also allow us to forge common responses to certain challenges according to specific geographies.
+
+65) Beyond these commitments, our interests must be seen in light of the growing interweaving of the interests of European states, united in a common destiny. The return of approaches based on power and war to the European continent illustrates the importance of continuing and deepening integration among Europeans in order to foster:
+
+- the development of a common strategic culture in all fields (extension of the work undertaken in the 2022 strategic plan);
+
+- the ability of Europeans to defend their security interests against potential aggression, in particular in their immediate neighbourhood, including through the development of common defence capabilities allowing for greater interoperability;
+
+- joint European action in support of the international order based on law and multilateral management of global issues (United Nations, non-proliferation regimes, etc.);
+
+- the affirmation of the EU as a geopolitical actor.
+
+#### 1.3 THE DEFENCE OF A STABLE INTERNATIONAL ORDER BASED ON THE RULE OF LAW AND MULTILATERALISM
+
+66) In addition to our commitments to our EU partners and NATO allies, our interests must also take into account the states in our neighbourhood and those to which we are linked by partnerships or defence agreements. This concerns areas of the world where states are engaging in increasingly aggressive strategic competition, and where non-state groups may be able to directly threaten our citizens.
+
+67) As a balancing power, France has a duty to contribute to the stability and security of these regions. The location of some of our territories in these areas requires us to maintain our presence in all areas and gives us a particular legitimacy to act.
+
+
+### 2. EXPANSION OF STRATEGIC FUNCTIONS
+
+68) The various strategic functions to which the armed forces contribute, identified in the 2008 White Paper, have seen their relevance confirmed as the strategic environment has evolved. They cover knowledge-appreciation-anticipation, deterrence, protection-resilience, prevention, intervention, and now influence.
+
+69) Influence, in all its dimensions — diplomatic, military, economic, cultural, sporting, linguistic, informational — is an area of dispute, which requires a coordinated response. It is a new strategic function in its own right.
+
+70) Their proper structuring serves an integrated approach to respond to the evolving continuum of threats posed by our adversaries to our interests and values and those of our closest partners. In this respect, they remain dependent on our ability to ensure good coordination at both European and multilateral level.
+
+#### 2.1 KNOWLEDGE — APPRECIATION — ANTICIPATION
+
+71) The knowledge-appreciation-anticipation function feeds into all the other strategic functions. The maintenance of an autonomous capacity for assessment is a guarantee of sovereign decision making. It contributes directly to understanding the intentions of our competitors. While being a condition for the operational effectiveness of the forces, it contributes to the economy of the resources used.
+
+72) The five areas of this function are intelligence, knowledge of theatres of operation, diplomacy, foresight and anticipation, and information management. The recent crises and breakdowns as well as the extension of conflicts to new areas justify strengthening this function.
+
+73) The effort must focus on understanding the phenomena in order to anticipate and facilitate the reactivity of the decision. Faced with the pace of crises and escalation, but also with the saturation of irrelevant information or information manipulated by our competitors, collective effectiveness depends more and more on the ability to sort, prioritise and circulate intelligence as quickly as possible, in order to understand the phenomena it describes.
+
+74) The knowledge-appreciation-anticipation function has a strong partnership dimension. In order to maintain an autonomous assessment of the situation on priority issues, France must also rely on the assessment of its partners in addition to its own resources.
+
+#### 2.2 DETERRENCE
+
+75) Nuclear deterrence is based on its political, operational and technical credibility. In order to be solid, this credibility must continue to be based on an in-depth strategic culture, dynamic and cutting-edge scientific research, technical and operational know-how that is constantly maintained, strong industrial sovereignty, and understanding of the issues by our fellow citizens.
+
+76) The purpose of deterrence is to protect us from any state aggression against our vital interests, wherever it comes from and whatever its form, and it remains the ultimate guarantee of the Nation’s security, protection and independence. It ensures our autonomy of decision and freedom of action in the context of our international responsibilities at all times, including against attempts to blackmail us in the event of a crisis. By its existence, it contributes to the security of the Atlantic alliance and to that of Europe.
+
+77) The deterrence assets are being renewed while being maintained at a level of strict sufficiency. They must remain adapted to a wide variety of situations and continue to offer the Head of State a sufficiently wide range of mode of action. To achieve this, deterrence will continue to rely on the airborne and oceanic components. Bringing together three nuclear forces with their own characteristics, they allow, through their complementarity and their differentiated assets, a wide range of options and a high level of flexibility and responsiveness.
+
+#### 2.3 PROTECTION — RESILIENCE
+
+78) The implementation of a strategic function dedicated to protection-resilience is now essential. The notions of protection and resilience complement each other, with resilience being an indispensable prerequisite for ensuring the protection of the French people and the national territory and guaranteeing the continuity of the essential functions of the Nation. This function requires enhanced cooperation with our allies and partners.
+
+79) This protection function primarily concerns the national territory in metropolitan and overseas, as well as areas where French communities are heavily established or exposed abroad. This geographical dimension alone is no longer sufficient to respond to the nation’s vulnerabilities, given the dependence of our economy on strategic supplies and energy flows, as well as the hybrid strategies developed by France’s strategic competitors. The protection-resilience function must also include the new missions induced by the consequences of climate change and the degradation of biodiversity: food when used as a weapon, power and self-sufficiency, protection and security of value chains, assistance to our populations, securing territories and EEZ, considering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats, manipulation of information, etc.
+
+80) All state institutions contribute to the implementation of this function. For their part, the armed forces are permanently engaged on a daily basis to protect the national territory and the French people within the framework of their State action missions at sea or in the air, domestic missions and their own military operations. They ensure permanent air and maritime security postures (PASP and PMSP), which guarantee national sovereignty in air and maritime spaces, and help secure supply and communication routes. These day-to-day measures are reinforced according to the threat or particular events. The resurgence of unfriendly behaviour in our territorial approaches requires robust means of detection, remediation and response, including in space and in cyberspace. The capabilities of the armed forces thus need to be strengthened and structured as part of the overall state effort to deal with large-scale crises.
+
+#### 2.4 PREVENTION
+
+81) Prevention concerns both the national territory and France’s action outside its borders. Its implementation includes both the development of national and international standards and the fight against trafficking and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, for disarmament and peace-building. Supporting the stabilisation of states in crisis contributes to conflict prevention and limits the cost of further intervention. The prevention function is based on a wide range of potential crisis or escalation scenarios, covering the top end of the spectrum and competition between great powers, as well as the manifestations of rapidly changing conflict.
+
+82) The pre-positioning of military forces plays a key role in the exercise of the prevention function, as it does for other strategic functions. The presence of French military forces in third countries, in agreement with them, contributes directly to this objective.
+
+83) The security and defence cooperation mechanism is an indirect lever for preventing future crises. This cooperation takes the form of assistance to allied partner forces to provide them with the capabilities to assert their own sovereignty.
+
+84) The prevention function must be articulated with the intervention function. This articulation is embodied in the capacity to signify determination, clarify intentions and discourage opponents — including in the field of perceptions — to “win the war before the war”.
+
+#### 2.5 INTERVENTION
+
+85) The intervention function serves three purposes: to ensure the protection of our nationals abroad; to defend our priority interests and those of our partners and allies; and to live up to our international responsibilities.
+
+86) It gives France’s security the strategic depth it needs, but also the broader credibility it needs to ensure the reliability of its alliances and its ability to train in coalitions as a framework nation. While French armies retain a capacity to act alone, the normal framework for their engagement outside the territory is that of collective action.
+
+87) In addition to the resources necessary for the protection of the national territory, the armed forces have the capacity to engage in priority areas for the defence and security of France: the European periphery, the area from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, part of Africa — from the Sahel to equatorial Africa — the Arabian Gulf and the Indo-Pacific. France must now resolve the issue of the strategic extension of its forces, and therefore the use of support points to which the pre-positioned forces, the overseas sovereignty forces and its strategic partnerships are attached.
+
+88) The intervention function cannot be separated from the other functions, especially in a high-intensity engagement. Whether it is the knowledge-appreciation-anticipation function (anticipating and characterising threats to allow a wide range of options), prevention (the value of signalling our active deployments), protection-resilience (securing our supply chains) and deterrence (the concept of support between conventional posture and nuclear deterrence), the intervention function translates into multi-location and multi-field actions.
+
+#### 2.6 INFLUENCE
+
+89) The strategic function of influence aims to promote and defend the interests and values of France. This is an essential part of the expression of power. In this respect, France has many assets. It has a major political weight due to its seat as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), its status as nuclear-weapon state and its overseas presence, a complete army model and troops deployed on many continents, its economic attractiveness, the French language spoken by 300 million people, a positive image due to our cultural influence, global projection supported by the universality of the diplomatic, cultural and educational network, our security partnerships, etc.
+
+90) The new dimension given to the capacity to influence takes note of an acceleration and hardening of competition and contestation in all fields, particularly in that of perceptions. The aggressiveness shown by our competitors reminds us that nothing can be taken for granted: in addition to our diplomatic, economic and strategic interests, the new battles for influence involve our ability to maintain the French and European model and to ensure that France’s commitment on the international stage is understood and accepted. We therefore need to take on the balance of power more directly in this field to defend the national interest.
+
+91) Influence is first and foremost part of a long-term strategy. A global policy conducted and coordinated at the interministerial level, it relies on capacities that support and legitimise our positions and our action, which must be deployed in all possible fields (training of foreign military personnel and coordination of networks, contribution to university research, aid to economic development, etc.). It also requires knowledge of the levers of influence deployed by our partners, competitors and adversaries.
+
+92) Integral to the other strategic functions described in this review, the influence function must be embodied in a national influence strategy.
+
+93) Following on from the 2021 Roadmap for Influence, this national strategy will set the general framework for action by all the actors concerned, determine the intentions and provide guidance for the national sectoral and/or geographical strategies.
+
+94) This strategy will aim to:
+
+- defend France’s long-term interests as well as universal values, the application of international law, multilateralism and the preservation of common goods;
+
+- promote and enhance its commitments in all areas;
+
+- respond or retaliate to manoeuvres or to attacks, particularly in the information field, against our interests.
+
+
+### 3. IMPACTS OF THE RECENT CONTEXT ON FRANCE’S SECURITY INTERESTS
+
+95) The return of high intensity conflict, including on European territory, the increasingly unbridled expression of the desire for power on the part of our strategic competitors and the weakening of international regulatory frameworks constrain our choices and pose an unprecedented risk to France’s priority security interests.
+
+96) The attacks on our strategic autonomy are increasing. Our strategic competitors seek to make use of our dependencies, and to undermine our sovereign judgement and national cohesion in order to shape our understanding of situations and constrain our decisions.
+
+97) The achievement of European sovereignty is essential to the defence of our interests, particularly in this period marked by a tendency towards inward-looking isolation that deeply affects the major players in the international community. Our partnerships and alliances are both one of France’s main assets on the international scene and one of the targets favoured by our strategic competitors to weaken us. The COVID-19 pandemic and then the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine have demonstrated the centrality of our partnerships and alliances in developing a common understanding of the challenges and providing appropriate responses. The Strategic Compass for the European Union and the update of NATO’s Strategic Concept set out clear roadmaps, which must now be implemented.
+
+98) The defence of a stable international order, based on the rule of law and multilateralism, has underpinned our security and prosperity since 1945. The activism of revisionist powers and the project they are carrying out, centred on the balance of power and the fait accompli, is not acceptable: our security interests require ensuring the continuity of our strategic supplies, our freedom of action in the common spaces and our sovereignty in the digital space, as well as an ambitious commitment to arms control and non-proliferation. These objectives must be based on collective and respected rules.
+
+
+> ### General ambition for 2030
+
+99) France affirms its ambition to be a balancing power on the international scene by 2030, having strengthened its influence in its areas of interest. It aims to be a driving force for European strategic autonomy in a Europe capable of facing crises and implementing solutions that guarantee its own security, in particular through a credible European defence that complements the Atlantic alliance. Finally, it fulfils its security responsibilities by aiming to preserve effective multilateral mechanisms based on international law.
+
+100) This strategic ambition must be deployed through the prism of the fracturing of the world order, highlighted in particular by the war in Ukraine. This context calls into question the current French armed-forces model, which was designed according to a logic that was mainly expeditionary. This model in 2030 will have to provide France with the capacity to deal with the need for increased prevention and influence, a possible return to high-intensity interstate conflict, and the hybrid strategies deployed by our competitors.
+
+101) In 2030, France:
+
+- is capable of defending its metropolitan and overseas territory, and of protecting and involving its citizens. This permanent ambition is based on an independent, credible and coherent nuclear deterrent, the keystone of our defence policy, supported by robust conventional armed forces. Permanent security postures adapted to the threats and involving the internal security forces and a dynamic national resilience strategy also contribute to this;
+
+- contributes to the defence of Europe and to stability in the Mediterranean by having the capability to engage in high-intensity conflict. It can assume the role of a framework nation within a NATO, EU or ad hoc coalition;
+
+- acts in the framework of balanced partnerships, providing security, in an area stretching from sub-Saharan Africa to the Arabian Gulf, via the Horn of Africa. Together with its allies, it offers its partner armies a diversified and orchestrated range of courses and training. From a network of suitable support bases, it retains a capacity for intervention or coalition support;
+
+- contributes through its influence and with its partners to the stability of the Indo-Pacific area. In it, it defends its sovereignty and respect for international law;
+
+- ensures its freedom of action in common spaces (cyber, space, seabed, air and sea) and the security of its supply routes, together with its partners.
+
+102) To achieve this, France has set itself ten strategic objectives:
+
+- a robust and credible nuclear deterrent;
+
+- a united and resilient France;
+
+- an economy that contributes to the spirit of defence;
+
+- top-ranked cyber resilience;
+
+- France, an exemplary ally in the Euro-Atlantic area;
+
+- France, one of the drivers of European strategic autonomy;
+
+- France, a partner of reliable sovereignty and credible security provider;
+
+- guaranteed autonomy of assessment and decision-making sovereignty;
+
+- a capacity to defend and act in hybrid fields;
+
+- freedom of action and the ability to conduct military operations, including high-intensity operations, autonomously or in coalition, in all fields.
+
+
+## Ten Strategic Objectives
+
+> #### Strategic objective 1
+> ### A robust and credible nuclear deterrent
+
+103) The effectiveness of French deterrence policy depends on its political, operational and technical credibility. This is reflected in a demanding posture and long-term capability commitments, but also in the ability, which has been widely demonstrated since its inception, to adapt both doctrine and resources to the strategic context and its potential changes.
+
+104) France’s deterrence policy must therefore take into account the global trends that are unfolding in the technological field as well as through hybrid forms of conflict: on the one hand, the capability developments of our competitors (air and missile defences, space, hypervelocity weapons, underwater surveillance, etc.) must constantly inform our thinking on deterrence; on the other hand, the modes of hybrid action, already at work in peacetime, are likely to affect the environment — political, normative, informational, etc. — within which deterrence is exercised and must be the subject of constant reflection on the means of countering them.
+
+
+### 1. THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF THE FRENCH DETERRENT
+
+105) The conflict in Ukraine is an indication of the essential role our nuclear forces play in the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. It demonstrates the need to maintain a robust and credible nuclear deterrent to prevent a major war, guarantee France’s freedom of action and preserve its vital interests, which have a European dimension.
+
+
+### 2. MAINTAINING AN EFFECTIVE, INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN DETERRENT
+
+106) In this context, it is essential to maintain a credible deterrent, i.e. one that is legitimate, effective and independent, for the period to 2030 and beyond.
+
+107) Part of the challenge of preserving the legitimacy of deterrence is to redouble efforts to strengthen the strategic and deterrence culture, both nationally and within the EU and the Alliance, by enabling a wider public to understand deterrence issues.
+
+108) At the same time, in accordance with the principle of strict sufficiency, France will continue its action in favour of arms control, non-proliferation and strategic risk reduction.
+
+109) France has chosen to continue efforts to renew its two components and to ensure that the armed-forces model allows for a sufficiently robust mutual support of nuclear and conventional forces to preserve the freedom of action of the President of the Republic and to avoid circumventing deterrence from below. The war in Ukraine confirms the need to maintain a capacity to understand and constrain the risk of escalation. In addition, building national resilience to all threats will strengthen deterrence.
+
+110) Finally, the independence of the French deterrent must be perpetuated thanks to a reinforced monitoring of the fundamental and applied research teams, of the national industrial fabric linked to the deterrent and to a consolidation of the technical, industrial and operational know-how that is indispensable to it.
+
+
+> #### Strategic objective 2
+> ### A united and resilient France
+
+111) France must strengthen its resilience in the face of all the security challenges it is likely to face, whether military or non-traditional (information manipulation, climate change, resource predation, pandemics, etc.). This effort must be deployed in metropolitan and overseas France, particularly by promoting the spirit of defence and ensuring national cohesion.
+
+
+### 1. STRENGTHEN FRANCE’S CAPACITY FOR RESILIENCE, COLLECTIVELY AND IN DEPTH
+
+112) France is implementing its national resilience strategy (NRS). This aims to strengthen its ability to withstand any kind of damage to the normal life of the country. It allows for a precise and efficient connection with several mechanisms with similar objectives, adopted by both the EU and NATO.
+
+113) The NRS defines three fundamental objectives: to prepare the State in depth for crises; to develop human resources and material capacities to deal with them, by including an overall study on the question of strategic stocks and the diversification of supply sources; and to adapt public communication to the challenges of resilience. This strategy must now be extended to local and regional authorities, companies, associations and the public.
+
+
+### 2. PROMOTING A SUSTAINABLE SPIRIT OF DEFENCE IN SOCIETY AND THE STATE
+
+114) The individual moral strengths of the citizen, especially our youth, are the foundation of collective resilience. They should be strengthened in the educational field, in order to increase the skills that strengthen the resilience of society (transmission of republican values, first aid, etc.). As part of the interministerial dynamic, the armed forces contribute to the promotion of remembrance and help to spread the spirit of defence among young people. The ministries concerned will mobilise to support the ramping up of the universal national service (UNS) to provide a national pool of resilience. Finally, the overhaul of the reserve system will be undertaken globally beyond the National Guard (army and internal security forces).
+
+115) The attractiveness of the military must be strengthened, by supporting and compensating for the constraints of military life in order to consolidate the spirit of defence, forged as early as possible in the educational sphere, in concrete and rewarding approaches.
+
+116) Military uniqueness, which is essential to enable the armed forces to prepare and ensure the defence of the homeland and the higher interests of the Nation, must be preserved, particularly from the increasing normative pressure.
+
+
+### 3. DEVELOP SYNERGY BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ALL SERVICES OF THE STATE
+
+117) The prospect of a major crisis or even a high-intensity confrontation involving France makes it necessary to raise the level of ambition in terms of national resilience, in particular by developing a better understanding of mutual resilience between the armed forces and the nation.
+
+118) The armed forces are able to participate in the management of any major crisis with a high degree of responsiveness within the framework of a strengthened civil-military dialogue. The general economy of Operation Sentinel must be rethought in order to guarantee the freedom of action of the armed forces while responding to new security challenges. A renewal of the Operational Defence of the Territory (ODT) concept will also be undertaken.
+
+119) The commitment of the entire nation must be strengthened by increasing awareness of national defence and security issues among public officials, continuous training of crisis management actors, consolidation of the network of senior defence and security officials (SDSO), and the commitment of all ministries to ensure the support of armed forces engaged in a high intensity conflict.
+
+120) This synergy between a population imbued with the spirit of defence and public actors experienced in planning and crisis management will make it possible to strengthen national resilience in the fields of security, the economy, employment and social cohesion.
+
+
+> #### Strategic objective 3
+> ### An economy contributing to the spirit of defence
+
+121) Setting up an economy that contributes to the spirit of defence requires knowing how to mobilise all the resources of the Nation, in order to transform into a war economy, i.e. to organise itself so that French industry can support a war effort in the long term, in case of necessity for the armed forces or for the benefit of a partner.
+
+
+### 1. SECURING CRITICAL SUPPLIES AND MATCHING STOCKS TO PRODUCTION CAPACITY
+
+122) To sustain a war effort over the long term (high consumption of ammunition, attrition, etc.) the best compromise is to be sought by acting on three main levers: the constitution of strategic stocks (complete equipment but also raw materials and critical components); the relocation of the most sensitive production lines; and the diversification of supplies.
+
+123) In addition, joint stocks of components or raw materials could be set up on the initiative and under the responsibility of industry to support military industrial activities in the event of a conflict, or civilian activities in the event of an economic or health crisis. The development of recycling channels should also contribute to a circular economy, reducing the need for supply and contributing to sustainable development.
+
+124) Securing the supply of critical resources could benefit from European initiatives such as the RePowerEU action plan and its variations on raw materials (Raw Material Act) and on components (Chips Act), while respecting French sovereign interests and environmental requirements.
+
+125) In order to ensure the capacity of its government responsibilities, the State must be able to impose priorities or requisitions on the national market, depending on the evolution of the conflict.
+
+126) Since security stability is a condition for the sustainability of our society, the defence technological and industrial base (DTIB) must be able to benefit from favourable financing tools, including in the context of the development of sustainable finance. Thus, future standards for taxonomy or environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria should not discourage investment in defence industry companies.
+
+127) Finally, the health crisis and the Ukrainian conflict have shown the importance of having secure and redundant sources of supply. Thus, the relocation of production and recycling facilities on European and national territory must be encouraged and supported in order to remedy the most critical dependence on materials, components, etc. This is the subject of in-depth work in the context of the work on the war economy.
+
+
+### 2. REDUCING PRODUCTION AND SUPPORT CYCLES FOR THE GRADUAL RISE OF THE “WAR ECONOMY”
+
+128) In addition to the acquisition, over the next few years, of the most critical equipment necessary to face a high-intensity conflict or susceptible to rapid attrition, a war economy preparation plan is being developed in order to adapt the DTIB to the different geopolitical contexts in a gradual and adjustable manner.
+
+129) Taking into account these geopolitical contexts must also be reflected in the EU and NATO defence capability tools.
+
+
+### 3. IMPLEMENTING REGULATORY, NORMATIVE, PROCUREMENT AND SUPPORT PROCESS SIMPLIFICATIONS FROM A POINT OF VIEW OF RISK MANAGEMENT
+
+130) The increasing and proactive use of innovation and value analysis in the work between the Defence procurement agency and the armed forces must enable the forces to be equipped with the most appropriate solutions while taking an acceptable risk in use and achieving the best balance between operational gains, financial gains and time gains.
+
+
+> #### Strategic objective 4
+> ### First-rate cyber resilience
+
+131) In the face of strategic developments, the focus must be on improving our cyber resilience. There is no way to envisage a cyber shield that would thwart any cyber-attack on France, but strengthening its level of cyber security is essential to prepare the country for more threats. Similarly, the application of a deterrent approach in cyberspace that would force any attacker to restrain himself against France is illusory, but adopting response strategies that mobilise all the levers of the State, both European and international, makes it possible to make cyberattacks particularly costly for the attackers.
+
+132) This cyber resilience consists in having adapted and organised capacities, that can prevent or, if necessary, reduce the impact and duration of cyber-attacks against France, at least for the most critical functions.
+
+
+### 1. IMPROVING FRANCE’S CYBER RESILIENCE, A CONDITION OF SOVEREIGNTY
+
+133) The efforts undertaken in the public and private sectors must be amplified. Notwithstanding the important work already undertaken, the State’s cybersecurity has significant room for improvement. In some critical sectors, large-scale attacks are still plausible, even if the investments made under the France Recovery plan have considerably improved the level of cyber security. As for the systemic role of certain digital actors, it is still insufficiently taken into account.
+
+
+### 2. CONSOLIDATING THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH MODEL
+
+134) The fundamental achievements of the French model, established in 2008 and regularly reinforced and adapted, must be consolidated. The governance of the State’s digital security has been renovated and can now be deployed. The national capacity to design and implement public policies is illustrated by the creation of regional incident response teams (CSIRT), the opening of the Cyber Campus and the emergence of a cyber defence ecosystem in Rennes. Finally, following its presidency of the Council of the European Union, France is recognised by its peers as exemplary on cybersecurity issues. The challenge now is to ensure that the EU directives for mass cybersecurity adopted under the FPEU are implemented as soon as possible.
+
+
+### 3. INVESTING OVER THE LONG TERM TO REACH THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF CYBER RESILIENCE
+
+135) The level of cybersecurity of all public services needs to be raised significantly. This will necessarily involve investments to consolidate a homogeneous and secure digital base for the State and to strengthen institutions and administrations that are still too fragile.
+
+136) France’s action must be increased by relying on a dynamic public and private cyber ecosystem. The State cannot act alone on cybersecurity issues and must be able to mobilise all actors in the event of a major crisis. Particular attention will be paid to prevention and to assistance to all victims of malicious cyberattacks. Finally, this ecosystem must be based on a competitive national and European cyber defence industry.
+
+137) All actors in the digital world must be trained and made aware of the cyber risk. The aim is to mobilise the general public, systematically integrate it into educational curricula and strengthen the attractiveness of the professions in the sector. Efforts must also be made to ensure the accountability of digital service providers and the security of supply chains, particularly that of the State. Finally, France can support and encourage the emergence of robust and sovereign trustworthy offers at both national and European level.
+
+138) Lastly, France’s resilience depends on that of its European and international partners and on the security and stability of cyberspace as a whole. It is therefore necessary to contribute to raising the level of resilience of European and international institutions and of France’s partners, as well as to pursue the structuring of a European market for cybersecurity products and services. On the international scene, France must put forward proposals to control the trade and fight against the proliferation of cyber weapons, in particular through better use of export control tools for goods and technologies. In addition, a common standard for cyber crisis management, as well as cooperation and mutual assistance mechanisms, would enable states to avoid the risks of misunderstanding and uncontrolled escalation.
+
+
+> #### Strategic objective 5
+> ### France, an exemplary ally in the Euro-Atlantic area
+
+139) NATO is a political and military alliance that plays a key role in European security through its main mission of collective defence and, in particular, the assistance clause in Article 5 of the 1949 Treaty. The transatlantic link remains essential for the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and consequently that of France.
+
+
+### 1. CONTRIBUTING TO INCREASING THE OPERATIONAL ADDED VALUE OF THE ALLIANCE
+
+140) France will continue to contribute fully to all the missions of the Atlantic Alliance, assuming its role within the military structures and operations, as it is doing in the context of the war in Ukraine, in the Baltic States and in Romania. It will contribute to their responsiveness and adaptation.
+
+141) France wishes to confirm the Alliance’s key role in the defence of Europe. NATO strengthens the potential of armies and is the forum for addressing interoperability challenges as well as capability, technological and operational expectations.
+
+
+### 2. ENHANCE THE KEY AND UNIQUE ROLE OF FRANCE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE
+
+142) France intends to maintain a unique position within the Alliance. It has a demanding and visible position because of the specificity and independence of its defence policy, in particular because of its nuclear deterrent. On the strength of its operational credibility, its unique ability to act urgently at a high level and its financial contribution, which is among the largest in the Alliance, France intends to strengthen its influence and that of the European allies in order to weight with them on the major changes in NATO’s posture and the future of strategic stability in Europe.
+
+143) Concerned about the coherence and cohesion of the Alliance, France will continue to contribute in a proactive, realistic and sustainable way to the strengthening of the posture on the eastern flank — including as a framework nation — and to the adaptation of NATO’s command structure.
+
+
+### 3. DRIVING EU-NATO COOPERATION
+
+144) France is working to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance in a pragmatic approach to its role, which excludes an extension to other geographical areas and in particular the Indo-Pacific. The guarantee provided by NATO’s collective defence mission remains the central pillar of security in the Euro-Atlantic area.
+
+145) Defence investment, in line with the 2014 Wales Summit commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence, must continue to increase in Europe. This level should be seen as a floor to match the strategic disruption caused by the war in Ukraine and the capabilities needed by the European allies to ensure their security.
+
+146) This collective effort also involves the creation, at EU level, of the necessary incentives for capability and industrial cooperation between European states. These contribute to the strengthening of the continent’s resilience, which is essential for the Alliance’s effectiveness, but also for the sustainability of a robust, agile European DTIB (EDTIB) capable of meeting the operational needs of European armed forces.
+
+147) France supports a modernisation, widening and deepening of the EU-NATO partnership, to take account of the new security challenges facing Europe and the forthcoming accession of Finland and Sweden.
+
+
+> #### Strategic objective 6
+> ### France, one of the driving forces behind European strategic autonomy
+
+148) France and all European countries share the same security challenges. The adoption of an ambitious strategic compass in March 2022 and the major role played by the EU since the start of the war in Ukraine demonstrate both the power of our levers and the distance we still have to travel. It is necessary to bring about the emergence of a sovereign Europe, endowed with a common strategic culture, with a capacity for evaluation and autonomous action in the service of the shared interests of Europeans.
+
+
+### 1. COMING TOGETHER AROUND A EUROPEAN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
+
+149) France plays a key role in strengthening European sovereignty, notably through its triple membership of the EU, NATO and the UNSC.
+
+150) France is first of all working towards a convergence of views in the assessment of situations between Europeans, all of whom have different strategic cultures or political priorities.
+
+151) France then supports the renewal of the European partnership policy initiated with the adoption of the strategic compass. It goes hand in hand with the strengthening of the EU’s defence relations with countries in Africa and the Indo-Pacific and, in the case of the United States and the United Kingdom, with the implementation of balanced relations supported by regular and intensive defence and security dialogues. Increased, sustainable and durable EU-NATO complementarity must be sought. France must play a leading role in this, promoting closer cooperation in certain key areas, such as military mobility, cyber and hybrid threats.
+
+152) Finally, the EU’s cohesion in its support for Ukraine is a priority. It is imperative that Europeans remain united and proactive, both on sanctions and in support of the Ukrainian armed and security forces. The continuation of a high level of military assistance over time through the provision of equipment and appropriate training is crucial. This consistency is necessary for Europe to remain capable of influencing the resolution of the conflict.
+
+
+### 2. BRINGING EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES TO THE FORE
+
+153) The EU must continue on the path towards greater technological autonomy which goes hand in hand with the development of the European defence industry.
+
+154) European strategic autonomy depends on robust European defence industrial capabilities that meet its own needs. France supports the setting up of a short-term instrument for the joint acquisition of European equipment. It also supports the creation of a defence investment programme for the joint development and procurement of critical and innovative equipment. The central role of the European Defence Agency (EDA) must be reaffirmed and all existing instruments must be mobilised: the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Coordinated Annual Defence Review (CARD), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Hub for European Defence Innovation (HEDI). In addition, the provisions related to the social taxonomy must consider the specificity and needs of the EDTIB, which is a central component of European strategic autonomy.
+
+155) These efforts must be accompanied by structural and decisive progress in common capability projects with the objective of an independent EDTIB and common choices among Europeans.
+
+
+### 3. STRENGTHENING THE EU’S AND EUROPEANS’ OWN CAPACITY TO ACT
+
+156) Europe must be supported in its role as a global player, a credible defender of free access to contested spaces (sea, space, cyber, air, seabed) in the face of the hybrid strategies of its competitors. With the right strategies and capabilities, it is able to protect the citizens of the Member States, to interact and, where necessary, to intervene on all continents in strict compliance with the law.
+
+157) The Union’s normative power must be exploited as a lever of influence in a more competitive environment, in order to guard against hybrid threats and other forms of foreign interference, be it “lawfare”, commodity blackmail or information manipulation.
+
+158) In this sense, France supports the instruments developed by the European institutions: hybrid toolbox, foreign information manipulation and interference — FIMI — toolbow, anti-economic coercion regulation, etc.
+
+159) France is contributing to the development of a genuine EU STRATCOM, capable of positioning Europe and European action in relation to its citizens, their representatives, our partners and also our competitors.
+
+160) The EU must continue to build up its rapid deployment capability. It needs to be able to respond quickly and more robustly in less permissive environments. To this end, France is promoting more flexible decision-making with Article 44 of the EU Treaty and renewed decision-making and control structures (C2), as well as global mandates to act on a broad spectrum: advice, training, equipment, combat support. The Union must have the capacity to mobilise ad hoc formats when necessary, as France has already done with Takuba or EMASoH.
+
+161) France, given its geographical position, its industrial and military capabilities and its national know-how, contributes actively to the development of European airspace protection. Its deterrence is part of this.
+
+162) Finally, the European Intervention Initiative (EII) is the crucible for a common strategic culture and enhanced cooperation between its members. Launched in 2018, the format remains fully relevant today to support the increasing responsibility of Europeans in favour of their own security, resulting in operational commitments in which France can play the role of framework nation.
+
+
+> #### Strategic objective 7
+> ### France, a reliable sovereignty partner and credible security provider
+
+163) France is defending an ambitious strategic offer that translates into lucid, balanced and prioritised solidarity with its partners. In a context of exacerbated polarisation and competition, France’s offer to its partners must continue to be distinguished by its high added value and enable it not to be forced into alignment or marginalisation.
+
+
+### 1. ASSERTING ITSELF AS A LUCID PARTNER WITH HIGH ADDED VALUE
+
+#### 1.1 DEVELOPING AN INCLUSIVE STRATEGY IN EUROPE AND WITH THE US
+
+164) In Europe, France must both recast its relations with its traditional partners and develop an inclusive strategy towards other countries:
+
+- with Germany, France must deepen its relationship in order to continue to build European defence in the light of Germany’s recently expressed ambitions and the strategic and capability needs we have identified;
+
+- Italy and Spain are key partners, both in theatres of operation (Mediterranean, Middle East, Sahel) and in terms of capability cooperation;
+
+- with EU members, France must consolidate several of its strategic partnerships (Greece, Croatia) and, capability partnerships (Belgium) concluded recently, consolidate its links with certain partners (Quirinal Treaty with Italy, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain), and strengthen its operational cooperation on the basis of shared experiences in the Sahel and in Eastern Europe (countries involved in Operation Barkhane and Takuba TF);
+
+- with partners in the EU neighbourhood (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia), France must, preferably, contribute to their stability by capitalising on its economic aid and European programmes to support structural reforms;
+
+- with our allies, our space partnerships will be intensified;
+
+- after Brexit, a constructive dialogue on the basis of the bilateral treaties must be quickly re-established with the UK.
+
+165) With the United States, our strategic partnership will remain fundamental, and must remain ambitious, lucid and pragmatic.
+
+#### 1.2 CONTRIBUTING TO SECURITY IN AFRICA THROUGH BALANCED PARTNERSHIPS
+
+166) Faced with the evolution of the terrorist threat and the growing influence of our strategic competitors across the continent, France wishes to forge renewed partnerships in Africa based on African partners’ requests and by integrating more civilian based cooperation along a security, defence, diplomacy and development continuum, as declared in the summer of 2017. They should contribute to a better understanding of security issues and build, in the long term, a stronger strategic proximity with African armies that wish to do so, particularly in view of the renegotiation of several major treaties. Coordination with our European and international partners will continue to be essential in this regard.
+
+#### 1.3 ADOPTING AN AMBITIOUS PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE RED SEA
+
+167) Given the increased competition and militarisation in the Mediterranean-Red Sea continuum, France needs to strengthen its reassurance measures, support EU and NATO missions and operations, and enhance the effectiveness and level of capability cooperation with all countries in the area. The densification of certain strategic or reference partnerships will also enable France to guarantee its freedom of manoeuvre, the continuity of its supply chains and regional stability.
+
+#### 1.4 CONTRIBUTING TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURING FLOWS IN THE ARABIAN GULF
+
+168) A revitalisation of France’s partnerships in the Gulf is necessary to cope with the structuring of new strategic agreements, American disengagement and the increase in regional rivalries. France must be able, with and through its partners, to hinder and counter the destabilising activities of certain regional actors and to secure its own footprint, in particular by signing security arrangements in the fields of counter-terrorism, intelligence and armaments. France must also continue to support defence and security equipment procurement projects while strengthening the fight against the diversion of war materials, the dissemination of conventional weapons and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
+
+#### 1.5 ENHANCING OUR ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO MAINTAINING STRATEGIC STABILITY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
+
+169) France’s role as a balancing power in the Indo-Pacific must be reaffirmed. To this end, France is committed to building partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region, notably India, Australia and Japan, as well as Indonesia and Singapore. It develops its capacities of anticipation and strategic signalling, vis-à-vis its competitors, reaffirms and strengthens its position in the politico-military multilateralism of the region, by increasing its training capacity and, if necessary, by promoting the emergence of ad hoc structures. France will also promote the implementation of the EU’s strategy for the region and its partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
+
+
+### 2. PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE, THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE SPREAD OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
+
+170) France defends the centrality and credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the sustainability of the four multilateral export control regimes covering chemical and biological, nuclear, ballistic and conventional weapons.
+
+171) It is continuing to invest in the intelligence needed to hinder illicit or destabilising flows, with a particular focus on intangibles, which are particularly vulnerable to cyber actions, while developing countermeasures to CBRN threats in order to promote resilience in the face of possible attacks against its forces, interests or territory. It also strengthens its capacity for action to counteract these illicit or destabilising flows.
+
+
+> #### Strategic objective 8
+> ### Guaranteed autonomy of judgement and decision-making sovereignty
+
+172) In an increasingly competitive and complex international context, France must focus its efforts on raising its level of knowledge, understanding of competitors or adversaries, and anticipating their intentions. This performance requirement calls for developing the agile orientation of the intelligence services while preserving the universality and effectiveness of the diplomatic and consular network. It also requires continued investment in the technological capabilities to exploit the ever-increasing volume of data, in order to share relevant information with the decision-making and action levels in a timely manner.
+
+
+### 1. DEVELOPING AGILE INTELLIGENCE AND SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES
+
+173) Intelligence services have to monitor, analyse and understand an increasing number of geographical areas and issues. They must anticipate crises, technological and military capability disruptions, the terrorist threat, the CBRN threat, the defence and promotion of national economic and industrial interests, in particular DTIB companies, and the fight against hybrid or transversal threats. One of the decisive challenges is to articulate the continuation of their action in the fight against terrorism and in support of military operations, with reinvestment in areas of strategic rivalry, in particular continental Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
+
+174) The effectiveness and agility of the intelligence services depend on ambitious reforms, long-term investments and an acceleration of coordination and intelligence exchange loops, including with the armed forces in operations. The continuation of the in-depth transformations already underway — in particular the external security general directorate and the Military intelligence directorate, following the example of the international security general directorate — must be accompanied by an ambitious human resources policy in the intelligence professions, in order to attract, retain and develop a common culture and inter-service mobility. It is also essential to ensure the universality of the diplomatic network and to strengthen its means of analysis and anticipation.
+
+
+### 2. BUILDING TECHNICAL CAPACITY
+
+175) The preservation of French sovereignty in the face of technological change requires new investments in capabilities. The growing diversity of tools and the acceleration of technological advances offer new opportunities, provided that the necessary investments are made, according to a logic of mutualisation when the missions allow it. The reactivity of the knowledge-appreciation-anticipation function must be amplified by increased interconnection around secure communication tools, ensuring technical interoperability with the main foreign partners on a case-by-case basis, particularly within the EU and NATO.
+
+176) The new technical tools will have to use the potential of quantum computing and artificial intelligence.
+
+
+> #### Strategic objective 9
+> ### A capacity to defend and act in hybrid fields 
+
+177) France’s main strategic competitors use hybrid strategies, deliberately ambiguous combinations of direct and indirect, military and non-military, legal and illegal, and often difficult-to-attribute modes of action. These strategies can have important consequences for democracies as they aim to delegitimise them, weaken their moral strength and cohesion or reduce their economic and national defence potential.
+
+178) Faced with these threats and in order to defend its fundamental interests, France must perfect its organisation, be able to respond in all fields of hybridity and protect its most critical infrastructures.
+
+
+### 1. IMPROVING OUR ORGANISATION
+
+179) France must be capable of countering and controlling the effects of these hybrid aggressions, while respecting its principles and values. To achieve this, a more agile, responsive and integrated organisation will be adopted to identify, characterise, trigger appropriate protection mechanisms and develop responses in a more multi-sectoral approach. In line with the EU’s strategic compass and the NATO 2030 concept, France also relies on its allies and partners to benefit from leverage in its fight against hybrid threats.
+
+180) This organisation is based on a national strategy of influence which must include the actions carried out in a global approach and over time to enhance France’s commitments but also to respond or retaliate effectively to informational manoeuvres or attacks against its interests. It mobilises its public diplomacy, particularly in Africa. A strategic communication is developed in order to convey a coherent, credible and effective message to competitors, partners or allies and to national and international public opinion. It can be coordinated with allies.
+
+
+### 2. ACT
+
+181) In the field of the fight against information manipulation by foreign competitors, France must have a wide range of response options, beyond public attribution, as is the case in the cyber field. France is fighting against the use of law and norms as a strategic tool (lawfare) by its competitors. It supports the adoption of European tools to combat extraterritoriality. France is developing tools to fight back against private military companies, armed groups or militias used as intermediaries — proxies — by hostile powers in order to multiply their actions of contestation or competition, while maintaining plausible deniability. Dissemination of information, national or European sanctions, legal proceedings or even military actions may target these groups if they carry out activities detrimental to French interests or if they are responsible for human rights violations and war crimes.
+
+
+### 3. STRENGTHENING THE PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+182) In the face of hybrid threats, the protection of our critical infrastructures is a priority. Among them, underwater and space communication infrastructures require a special effort to develop the means of detection, characterisation, deterrence and even obstruction of malicious actions. Finally, France wishes to promote the development of leading French industrial players, world leaders in the field of submarine communication cables and space operations.
+
+
+> #### Strategic objective 10
+> ### Freedom of action and ability to conduct military operations, including high-intensity operations in all fields (multi-environment and multi-field)
+
+183) The freedom of action of the forces depends on the ability to anticipate, detect and appreciate the intentions of France’s adversaries. It underpins the national capacity to show determination, to discourage hostile action or prevent the imposition of a fait accompli, and to engage in confrontation if necessary. It allows for the robust backing of nuclear forces.
+
+184) It must be preserved from the competition phase onwards, in an ever-wider spectrum, because the strategies of France’s competitors and adversaries are expressed in a growing number of fields (outer space and cyber, seabed, electromagnetic and information fields).
+
+185) France must maintain and further develop its capacities to decide and command, to federate and mobilise, to act and last, to invest in common spaces and to face uninhibited competitors, taking into account its interests, its place on the international scene and its global ambition, but also its means. These capacities are necessarily differentiated according to the geographical areas and common spaces considered.
+
+
+### 1. DECIDING AND ORDERING
+
+186) France enjoys a complete and autonomous capacity for assessment and understanding as required to support political and military decisions. The armed forces have trained and deployable command capabilities to plan, conduct and control multi-environment and multi-field operations in autonomy and in coalition when France is a framework nation at the operational level. A permanent and agile reorganized command structure controls the day-to-day and contingency operations that contribute to safeguarding its strategic interests, its metropolitan and overseas territories, its aerospace, air and sea and aeronautical approaches, and its energy supplies.
+
+
+### 2. UNITING AND CONTRIBUTING
+
+187) In Africa, the Near and Middle East, and the Indian Ocean, France is able to mobilise or accompany its partners, to constrain or discourage an aggressor by offering a command and support capability to the forces. It honours its commitments there.
+
+188) In the Pacific zone, France has the means, in coordination with its partners, to discourage or hinder a competitor.
+
+189) In Central and South America, the Arctic and Antarctic, it preserves its freedom of action, the security of its flows and its interests.
+
+190) The armed forces are constantly working to develop and maintain interoperability with allies and partners.
+
+
+### 3. ACT AND LAST
+
+191) The armed forces protect the French people against a dangerous world, participate in their daily protection and contribute to the preservation of national interests. In particular, they hold permanent positions of deterrence, air safety and maritime protection and take part in missions on national territory (including DROM-COM with sovereignty forces) in addition to or in support of internal security or civil security forces.
+
+192) The armed forces are prepared for a major engagement and ready to engage in a high-intensity confrontation, particularly in the defence of the euro-atlantic area. They are able to deploy at short notice, able to enter first, with or without possible support from allied countries. They have the capabilities to protect themselves, to last and to cope with high attrition (air superiority and fire superiority). They are able to provide an allied country with the necessary support at short notice.
+
+193) They have diversified capabilities for deep strikes in the context of first entry, support to a coalition operation, retaliatory actions, or strategic warning. France is able to target and strike (kinetic or cyber) targets of interest.
+
+194) Armies have the capacity to generate and aggregate effects in a networked approach from the competition phase onwards across the entire spectrum of conflict, with in particular military and civilian, public and private, institutional and individual, national or allied contributions.
+
+
+### 4. INVESTING IN COMMON SPACES
+
+195) France is fully present and active in preserving its freedom of action and defending its interests in common spaces that are the object of power rivalries and renewed forms of conflict.
+
+196) Faced with strategic competitors, armies acquire and maintain their freedom of assessment and action in cyberspace.
+
+197) In space, France maintains its national strategic autonomy in terms of situation assessment, decision-making and the conduct of operations. It ensures its access to the space environment and to assert its interests in this environment, notably through the support of its partners.
+
+198) France has the capacity to autonomously monitor and understand actions on the seabed. By building on partnerships, it is able to discourage hostile action.
+
+
+### 5. DEALING WITH UNINHIBITED COMPETITORS
+
+199) The armed forces have the means of prevention, reporting and coercion to influence the strategic calculations of France’s competitors and adversaries and to win the battle of perceptions.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-15-ccp-inc-in-portugal.md b/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-15-ccp-inc-in-portugal.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2022-11-15-ccp-inc-in-portugal.md
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : CCP Inc. In Portugal
+author: Andrew Polk
+date  : 2022-11-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Vs7kBG3.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "China’s Investments in Financial Services and the Reach of the Chinese Communist Party in the Private Sector"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_How did an ecosystem of Chinese party-state actors enable a range of state-owned and private Chinese companies to embed themselves in Portugal’s financial system, creating a foothold to widen China’s presence within the country and beyond?_ <excerpt/> _The report specifically focuses on Fosun International Limited, a subsidiary of the Chinese conglomerate Fosun Group, which became a key source of foreign direct investment in Portugal through strategic acquisitions that opened market access for Chinese firms. Fosun’s investments in Portugal provide insight into the Chinese Communist Party’s activism in shaping the business environment for private sector players, as the company’s international strategy faced the challenge of balancing alignment with state goals against a regulatory crackdown on private sector outbound spending._
+
+### Introduction
+
+> In recent years, China’s unique brand of state capitalism has undergone profound changes at home and abroad. These have involved a widening array of state and non-state actors and an enhanced role for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in both top-down economic strategy and bottom-up business decisions for a range of companies.
+
+As previous reports in this series on the evolving Chinese economic model have detailed, this latest iteration of state-directed economic decisionmaking is most notable for the increasingly complex array of incentives and alignments between commercial and national strategic objectives that characterize outbound spending by Chinese companies today. This framework for conceptualizing, and responding to, the unique non-market aspects of China’s emerging global investment regime is best articulated as a shift from “China Inc.” to “CCP Inc.”
+
+“CCP Inc.” is comprised of an ecosystem of key state-owned and private commercial actors, state-owned financiers, government regulators, and CCP organs that are connected through an increasingly complex web of direct and indirect transactional, financial, strategic, operational, and political relationships. Importantly, these ecosystems operate both within the domestic commercial space, where they have been honed to provide integral support to state development goals, as well as in the international commercial space, where they provide a significant boost to the reach and economic influence of a given Chinese commercial entity, when compared with standalone private sector competitors from other countries.
+
+This case study explores how the CCP Inc. ecosystem has enabled a range of state-owned and private Chinese companies to embed into Portugal’s financial system with a view toward widening China’s financial presence within the country, in Europe more broadly, and in a range of other markets. This study focuses in particular on Fosun International Limited [复星国际有限公司] — a Hong Kong-listed subsidiary of the Shanghai-headquartered conglomerate Fosun Group and a key private sector player — which for many years has acted as a prominent source of foreign direct investment into Portugal’s financial sector, alongside and in concert with a range of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
+
+More specifically, this study will examine the role of two key Fosun subsidiaries in Portugal — insurer Fidelidade Companhia de Seguros, SA, (Fidelidade) and Banco Comercial Português (BCP Millennium) — and the role they have played in enabling the CCP Inc. ecosystem to engage in Portugal’s financial sector.
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/pMIFvQS.png)
+_▲ __Figure 1: Key Fosun Subsidiaries in Portugal.__ Source: [“Corporate Structure,” Fosun International](https://ir.fosun.com/en/investor-relations/fosun-ecosystem/corporate-structure/)._
+
+Further, this study will explore how Fosun — as a nominally private company — was both allowed and encouraged to invest heavily in a range of Portuguese assets as the contours of the CCP Inc. model have developed in recent years. Fosun’s success in aligning its investments within the parameters of the CCP Inc. framework is particularly notable given that its expansion in Portugal occurred at a time when outbound private investment by other major Chinese conglomerates was not only under scrutiny but also being actively reined in by senior Chinese officials, who had become acutely concerned about aggressive outbound spending by the Chinese private sector.
+
+This unique ability of Fosun to continue investing abroad at a time when private sector outbound spending was otherwise being actively curtailed speaks to one key aspect of the CCP Inc. model: private sector alignment with national strategic objectives. While such alignment has long been a part of the key performance indicators for China’s SOEs, the CCP’s activism in shaping the business environment for private sector players, as well as increasingly impacting the business strategies of private companies, is a more recent phenomenon. It is also foundational to the shift from the earlier “China Inc.” model to today’s “CCP Inc.” ecosystem. Nowhere is this more evident, at present, than in China’s domestic technology sector, specifically regarding platform economies, as the CCP has sought to bring the sector firmly in line with national governance objectives over the past several years.
+
+However, this dynamic is also apparent in China’s approach to outbound spending and specifically in recent investments in Portugal’s financial sector. As Portugal has become a critical node in China’s strategy for engaging with and investing in Europe over the past decade, Fosun and other companies’ ability to align with that geopolitical objective set the stage for some of the largest Chinese investments in the continent. Moreover, this occurred even as other private sector conglomerates were being pressured to divest a range of assets throughout the world, thanks to the CCP’s efforts to contain outbound spending and reduce those companies’ overall debt loads and related systemic debt risk.
+
+This study proceeds in four chapters. The first chapter outlines the initial Chinese foray into Portugal as SOEs, and notably Fosun, played a key role in bailing out the country on the back of the European debt crisis that erupted in 2010. Importantly, these initial investments from 2011 to 2014 largely took place within the more well-known China Inc. model, whereby SOEs (primarily) invested in a foreign country to directly, and to a large extent overtly, support China’s geopolitical aims. However, these initial investments, particularly by Fosun, laid the groundwork for the more complex CCP Inc. ecosystem to deepen its presence within Portugal in the following years, especially as the importance of the Portuguese market and Sino-Portuguese relations became a linchpin in China’s Europe strategy amid increasing Sino-European tensions and European skepticism toward the CCP.
+
+The second chapter of this study examines the ways in which Fosun, in particular, used its initial investment in the Portuguese financial sector, a key element of China’s bailout of Portugal, to pave the way for additional Chinese investment and relationships within the sector. Through this investment, Fosun increasingly became part of a wider network of Chinese companies operating in the market while bolstering commercial and diplomatic ties with a key European partner.
+
+The third chapter steps back to examine the wider context in which Fosun’s investments took place. Key to this context was a concerted, protracted effort by senior Chinese officials to gain better control over outbound private sector spending, shore up financial stability, and ensure much closer alignment between private sector business operations and strategic objectives of the party-state. Private sector alignment is a key element of the CCP Inc. model, and Fosun’s ability to continue operating successfully within this narrower scope for maneuver not only epitomizes the CCP Inc. model at work but also underscores the pitfalls for nominally private Chinese companies of stepping outside of the CCP Inc. framework.
+
+The final chapter of this report concludes by highlighting the elements of Fosun’s use of the CCP Inc. model, via its two key Portuguese subsidiaries, to leverage its presence within the Portuguese financial sector to support China’s wider geopolitical and global commercial aims throughout Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) countries and Latin America.
+
+
+### Laying the Groundwork
+
+> #### The Contours of China’s Portugal Bailout
+
+Chinese companies began investing heavily in Portugal in 2011, when the country was facing mounting economic headwinds thanks to a decade of lackluster economic performance and associated debt accumulation, the lingering effects of the 2007–08 global financial crisis, and the subsequent debt crisis that metastasized throughout Europe in 2010–13.
+
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/wDNlnLT.png)
+_▲ __Figure 2: Annual Chinese Investment into Portugal, 2010–2021.__ Source: [“China Global Investment Tracker,” American Enterprise Institute](https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/)._
+
+The country’s challenges culminated in a €78 billion ($104 billion) economic bailout program lasting from 2011 to 2014 that was initiated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in conjunction with the European Central Bank (ECB) and European Commission, the three of which would colloquially come to be referred to as “the troika.” These funds provided to Portugal by the troika were part of the group’s wider European bailout program that ultimately amounted to close to €500 billion ($667 billion) and included a wide range of countries, most notably Greece, Ireland, Spain, Hungary, and Romania.
+
+The troika’s key stipulations around its bailout program for Portugal included the need for the Portuguese government to lower public debt and spending, introduce structural economic reforms, and privatize certain national assets, including stakes in national power companies. Additionally, Portugal’s domestic banks had significant exposure to the country’s economic challenges, which set the stage for Chinese companies — and Fosun in particular — to invest in state-owned assets in the financial sector.
+
+Ultimately, as part of the bailout, the Portuguese government opted to raise funds through the sale of stakes in electric utility company Energias de Portugal (EDP), grid operator Redes Energéticas Nacionais (REN), and Caixa Seguros e Saúde, the insurance arm of Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD), Portugal’s largest state bank. At the time, Caixa Seguros e Saúde enjoyed a 26 percent market share in the insurance sector, making it the country’s largest insurance group. Three major subsidiaries were at the core of the group: Fidelidade, Portugal’s largest insurer, health insurer Multicare, and travel and transport insurer Cares.
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/dclf8vY.png)
+_▲ __Figure 3: 2013 Makeup of Key Insurance Players in Fosun’s Portugal Deal.__ Source: Author’s research based on multiple sources._
+
+Chinese SOEs stepped in to undertake investments in the Portuguese power sector, and in late 2011, Portugal completed the sale of a 22 percent stake in EDP to the China Three Gorges Corporation (CTG) [中国长江三峡集团] for €2.7 billion ($3.8 billion), making the Chinese SOE the utility company’s largest shareholder. Months later, the State Grid Corporation of China [国家电网] purchased a 25 percent stake in power company REN for €390 million ($543 million).
+
+The Chinese government’s backing of these deals, and strong interest in pushing forward a commercial and bilateral relationship with Portugal at the time, was underscored by the premium that CTG offered on the EDP investment. The Chinese SOE outbid other interested parties by offering to purchase its stake in the Portuguese utility company at a 53 percent markup on EDP’s share prices at the time, bringing in an unexpectedly large revenue windfall for the embattled Portuguese government. This revenue generation was particularly important given the troika’s requirement that the Portuguese government raise at least €5.5 billion ($7.7 billion) via asset sales during the period of the bailout program. That goal would be aided considerably by Fosun’s €1 billion ($1.39 billion) investment in Caixa Seguros e Saúde, which is more commonly referred to by the brand name of its key subsidiary, Fidelidade, the largest and most important subsidiary of the group. Ultimately, the Chinese asset purchases detailed above would account for over 70 percent of the revenue generation requirements put in place by the troika around Portugal’s bailout program.
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/Uu6qcuM.png)
+_▲ __Figure 4: Key Dates in Timeline of IMF Portugal Bailout and Related Chinese Investments into Portugal.__ Source: Author’s research based on multiple sources cited throughout the report, as well as [“Portugal profile - Timeline,” BBC, May 18, 2018](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17761153)._
+
+As the economic bailout program from the IMF, ECB, and European Commission progressed, Portuguese authorities began the process of undertaking an equity sale in Caixa Seguros e Saúde throughout 2013. Lisbon contacted 66 potential investors and received five preliminary offers for the insurance group. Chinese conglomerate Fosun International Limited was one of two bidders selected to provide a final proposal, with the U.S. private equity firm Apollo Global Management tendering the other final offer. Fosun would go on to successfully win the bid and acquire an 80 percent stake in Fidelidade, Multicare, and Cares for €1 billion ($1.3 billion). Fosun’s financial adviser, Morgan Stanley, said the deal, which was financed in part by the Bank of China and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), was the largest acquisition between Chinese and European financial institutions since 2008. Importantly, Manuel Rodrigues, Portugal’s secretary of state for finance, said that Fosun won the deal over Apollo not only because of a better financial offer but also because Fosun promised it would not break up the insurer.
+
+The deal enabled Fosun to become the only major private sector Chinese player to participate in Portugal’s bailout. However, the deal progressed with clear backing at the highest levels of the Chinese party-state, with Chinese president Xi Jinping and Portuguese president Aníbal Cavaco Silva both on hand to witness the official closing of deal in Beijing in May 2014. According to Fosun, the deal also marked the first major outbound investment of a Chinese firm to acquire a foreign insurance company.
+
+This investment ultimately laid the groundwork for Fosun to further deepen its presence in the Portuguese financial sector and also set up future key investments in the sector by other Chinese players, namely state-owned UnionPay [中国银联], in 2018. It also further widened the reach of Chinese players in the power sector and enabled a foray into the Portuguese healthcare sector, among other key industries.
+
+Indeed, later in 2014, Fosun joined state-owned State Grid Corporation of China as an investor in the Portuguese grid operator REN by purchasing a 3.97 percent stake in the company. Later that year, through its newly acquired Fidelidade subsidiary, Fosun acquired a 96.07 percent stake in healthcare services provider Espírito Santo Saúde – SGPS, SA, which owned one of the largest private hospitals in Lisbon, Hospital da Luz.
+
+During this period, Fosun clearly indicated the strategic nature of its investments in Portugal as an anchor through which to pursue investments throughout Europe. In the press release announcing its acquisition of Espírito Santo Saúde, for example, Fosun directly stated:
+
+> Portugal is a very important market for Fosun and a strategic destination in Fosun’s global investment footprint. Fosun aspires to anchor from Portugal to seek and identify different investment opportunities within Portugal and in other parts of Europe, covering industries including real estate, leisure travel, healthcare, and consumer sectors.
+
+While such an approach would seem to be justified in terms of the company’s business strategy toward the European market, the approach paralleled a similar tack by Chinese officialdom. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlighted this approach after a 2013 meeting between then-foreign minister Yang Jiechi and Portuguese minister of state and foreign minister Paulo Portas, underscoring that Portas “welcomed more Chinese enterprises to invest in Portugal, noting that Portugal is willing to further advance the bilateral comprehensive strategic partnership and thereby promote the comprehensive development of EU-China ties.” This approach by Fosun similarly parallels that of Chinese SOE investments in Portugal, with CTG’s investment in EDP being undertaken in large part as an effort by the Chinese company to gain a foothold in the wider European renewable energy market — a goal that would be further underscored by CTG’s 2018 attempt to take full ownership of EDP and its renewable energy subsidiary.
+
+This wider strategic push by Chinese authorities and companies into the Portuguese market is highlighted by the fact that overall Chinese foreign direct investment in Portugal went from virtually zero in 2010 to €5.7 billion ($6.3 billion) by the end of 2016, with Fosun playing a critical role in some of the largest investments during this period, most notably in the financial services sector.
+
+As this study details, Fosun’s ongoing ability to deepen its investment presence within Portugal throughout this period was due in significant part to the company’s recognition of and integration into the evolving CCP Inc. model of outbound investment, especially as it was crystalizing in 2017–18. As such, the company’s direct connections — including through its leadership — to different elements of the CCP are important to note, as such associations work to reinforce alignment between official party and state bodies and private sector actors in China.
+
+Most importantly, Fosun’s founder and chairman, Guo Guangchang, has long-standing connections to various CCP institutions. Guo was a member of the 10th and 11th National People’s Congresses — China’s legislature — which ran from 2003 to 2008 and 2008 to 2013, respectively. He was also a member of the 9th (1998–2003) and 12th (2013–2018) National Committees of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference — China’s top political advisory body, which has a remit to undertake so-called United Front work to ensure alignment between the CCP and non-CCP groups, including the private sector. Guo is also a current member of the standing committee of the All-China Youth Federation, a CCP-led body affiliated with, among other groups, the Communist Youth League of China, a key power base of former CCP general secretaries Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao as well as the current premier, Li Keqiang.
+
+In addition to Guo, Fosun’s board features several other members with connections to the party-state. Co-CEO and executive director Chen Qiyu, for instance, was a member of the 12th and 13th standing committees of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Consultative Conference. Another co-CEO and executive director, Xu Xiaoliang, is a member of the Shanghai Youth Federation, Shanghai’s local chapter of the All-China Youth Federation. Meanwhile, non-executive director Zhang Shengman was previously a deputy director at the Ministry of Finance, and non-executive director Zhang Huaqiao is a former People’s Bank of China official and former non-executive director of the state-owned Sinopec Oilfield Service Corporation.
+
+These are just a handful of the key public affiliations that Fosun’s leadership has, or previously had, with institutions within the party-state system. And while such affiliations are not unusual among Chinese private sector executives, such associations and relationships could only have helped in Fosun’s successful navigation of and alignment within the CCP Inc. ecosystem in recent years.
+
+Ultimately, Fosun was well placed to play a key role in China’s strategic expansion within the Portuguese financial sector, for a range of reasons. As the next chapters of this study detail, the company was able to deftly execute that expansion — not only to its own advantage, but also in a way that enabled other Chinese entities, notably some key state-owned financial institutions, to deepen their presence within the country throughout the years following the initial bailout program.
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/z44Gv9U.png)
+_▲ __Figure 5: Selected Party and Government Affiliations of Fosun Board Members.__ Source: Author’s research based on multiple sources._
+
+
+### Fosun and CCP Inc.’s Growing Presence in the Portuguese Financial Sector
+
+Fosun’s initial investment in Fidelidade established a foundation through which the company would deepen its own ties, and widen the CCP Inc. network, within the Portuguese financial sector — as well as eventually act as a base of CCP Inc. connectivity throughout key BRI countries and Latin America. In coming years, these investments would enable deeper relationships for other Chinese SOEs, particularly UnionPay International and China Reinsurance Corporation (China Re), within Portugal, a process that continued to run in parallel to the wider CCP courting of Portugal as a key component in its strategy toward Europe.
+
+Following the initial Chinese bailout of Portugal, Fosun made one of its most critical investments when it purchased a sizable stake in Banco Comercial Português (BCP Millennium), Portugal’s largest private bank, in November 2016. Fosun signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with BCP Millennium to acquire a 16.67 percent stake for €174.6 billion ($193.2 billion) and signaled its intention to raise its stake to 30 percent over the years to come. The initial share purchase made the company BCP Millennium’s largest shareholder alongside Angolan state oil company Sonangol Group. Subsequently, Fosun acquired a 30 percent stake in multiple tranches over several years, upping its stake in the bank to 27 percent throughout 2017 and to 29.93 percent in 2020.
+
+As Fosun boosted its ownership of BCP Millennium, the bank also began to undertake a critical role in pushing forward Chinese commercial, policy, and geopolitical aims in Portugal. Critically, in May 2018, BCP Millennium acted as the intermediary for state-owned China Three Gorges Corporation (CTG) in its €9 billion ($10.6 billion) bid to take a controlling interest in utility company Energias de Portugal (EDP) as well as the company’s renewable energy arm, EDP Renováveis. CTG launched the bid as an all-cash tender offer for the outstanding shares that the Chinese SOE did not obtain in its 2011 investment in the company, looking to purchase the outstanding 76.7 percent at a 5 percent share-price premium over the €3.09 ($4.30) share price at the time.
+
+![image06](https://i.imgur.com/NJcn0T6.png)
+_▲ __Figure 6: Fosun’s Evolving Ownership Stake in BCP Millennium over Time.__ Source: Author’s research based on multiple sources._
+
+CTG’s bid was of particular importance at that time: it not only represented a major new push by a Chinese SOE into the European renewable energy market, but it came at a time when Chinese foreign direct investment into Europe had become increasingly controversial. EDP shareholders, led by activist investment firm Elliott Investment Management, which held a 2.9 percent stake in EDP at the time, eventually blocked the bid, arguing that Fosun undervalued CTG and citing a shareholder voting rights reform requirement, included by CTG as part of the takeover bid, as too onerous.
+
+Importantly, though, the potential transaction came in the wider context of increased Western skepticism around Chinese outbound investment and was under scrutiny from European and U.S. regulators. Indeed, the episode underscored a growing rift between Portuguese and other European governments over Chinese investment in Europe. Portugal’s then-prime minister António Costa indicated he had “no reservations” around the proposed takeover, even as German, French, and Italian regulators had moved to push forward a draft EU screening framework for investment into the bloc that would give EU regulators in Brussels the ability to weigh in on investments deemed “likely to affect security or public order in one or more member states.”
+
+While ultimately unsuccessful, BCP Millennium’s participation — and by extension Fosun’s participation — in facilitating the offer on behalf of CTG highlights a key example of the CCP Inc. ecosystem at work. The foothold of the nominally private Chinese company in the Portuguese financial sector was key to allowing CTG to push the bid forward. It reflected not only an effort to expand the reach of CCP Inc. into the Portuguese economy but also an attempt to further China’s foreign policy aims by boosting its presence in the European renewable energy market and trying to circumvent growing European skepticism toward Chinese investment in strategic European assets.
+
+But even as CTG’s takeover attempt faltered, BCP Millennium continued to act as a key conduit for a deepening Chinese presence in the Portuguese financial sector and the wider Portuguese economy. Indeed, throughout 2018, the bank’s ties to a number of Chinese financial institutions, and within Chinese financial markets, grew rapidly. In May of that year, BCP Millennium re-signed an MoU in Beijing with Chinese state-owned lender ICBC — one of the underwriters of Fosun’s initial Fidelidade investment in 2014 — which had initially been drawn up in 2010. BCP Millennium’s explicitly stated intention, and that of its major shareholder, Fosun International, in re-signing the MoU was to leverage the relationship to deepen economic ties between China and Portugal, using the latter as a key launching pad for deepening these same ties in Europe and Portuguese-speaking African countries. Indeed, the press statement accompanying the MoU signing stated:
+
+> [BCP Millennium] remains committed to being a relevant part of an international business platform between China/Macao, Portuguese speaking countries — namely in Africa — and Europe, in order to support trade activity and investment flows in those geographies . . . taking advantage of ICBC’s regional presence and influence as well as other potential synergies in cooperation with the bank’s principal shareholder, Fosun International.
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/d5s7OQs.png)
+_▲ __Figure 7: Key Fosun Acquisitions in Portugal over Time.__ Source: Author’s research based on multiple sources._
+
+Additionally, BCP Millennium signed an agreement in June 2018 to conduct renminbi clearing and settlement with the Bank of China Macao, which “reinforced the bank’s presence in the Chinese market” as it became “the first bank in Portugal to be considered a participating bank with access to Macao’s payments system.” Importantly, the Bank of China had been another major underwriter of Fosun’s initial Fidelidade investment, underscoring the long-standing relationship between Fosun, its Portuguese subsidiaries, and the Chinese lender. That same month, BCP Millennium officially signed an agreement with Alipay (the payment arm of China’s fintech giant Ant Group), pursuant to a March 2018 MoU, which allowed it to become the first bank to facilitate transactions between Portuguese merchants and Chinese travelers.
+
+Most notably, in December 2018, BCP Millennium signed an agreement with UnionPay International — a subsidiary of the state-owned payments provider China UnionPay — to become the first European bank to issue UnionPay bank cards, marking a major overseas expansion for the Chinese SOE.
+
+![image08](https://i.imgur.com/PwB9rbU.png)
+_▲ __Figure 8: Fosun Relationships with Other Chinese Entities in Portugal through Its BCP Millennium Subsidiary.__ Source: Author’s research based on multiple sources._
+
+The BCP Millennium agreement with UnionPay marked a particularly exceptional example of the CCP Inc. ecosystem in action. Not only did the agreement offer UnionPay — officially the largest global issuer of bank cards at the time but with little presence in the European Union — a key foothold in the European market, the deal also further underscored BCP Millennium’s place as a key touch point for a range of Chinese financial and non-financial institutions in Portugal. The unique placement of BCP Millennium as a key player in the Sino-Portuguese relationship was underscored in no uncertain terms by the fact that the deal with UnionPay International was signed as part of a state visit by Xi Jinping to Portugal in late 2018.
+
+During the trip, Xi Jinping and Portuguese prime minister António Costa signed several bilateral cooperation agreements, including a formal agreement for Portugal to sign onto the BRI. These agreements were paired with an additional announcement of 17 key commercial agreements in the areas of infrastructure, finance, automobiles, and science and technology, including the UnionPay International deal with BCP Millennium. Other key deals inked at the ceremony included a memorandum between telecommunications company Altice Portugal (formerly known as Portugal Telecom) and Huawei Technologies Company to strengthen cooperation on 5G frequency band licenses and an agreement to establish the STARlab project — a joint space and maritime technology laboratory between the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Portuguese aerospace and defense company Tekever, and Portugal’s Centre for Product Engineering and Development.
+
+Additionally, the international subsidiary of the state-owned China Oil and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO) signed an agreement with the Portuguese Trade and Investment Agency to establish the COFCO International Centre of Excellence for corporate shared services. Following the deal, the chairman and CEO of COFCO International stated that “Portugal’s positive approach towards international business, skilled human resources and strategic location were the main reasons for choosing Portugal over several other candidate locations.”
+
+The signing of the BCP Millennium agreement with UnionPay alongside such obviously important strategic agreements in the areas of technological infrastructure, aerospace and maritime research, and agribusiness underscores both the high-level Chinese government backing for the financial sector cooperation as well as its own strategic importance. Indeed, during a meeting with Portuguese president Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa on the same state visit, Xi highlighted China’s strategic approach to the bilateral relationship with Portugal by saying that “as a member of the European Union, Portugal has huge influence on Africa and many Portuguese-speaking countries, and is a key link in China’s economic internationalization strategy.”
+
+For its part, Fosun International indicated that the BCP Millennium tie-up with UnionPay International, first floated in late 2017, was a major milestone in the company’s push to “promote the synergy of various sectors such as banking, insurance, and health” within Portugal as the company moved to “fully mobilize resources to promote outstanding domestic [Chinese] financial enterprises, [including] . . . [the] Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China UnionPay, the China-Africa Fund, [and] the China-Portugal Fund.” Additionally, Fosun leadership indicated that “together with BCP, [the company would] help Chinese enterprises to go global, and jointly carry out cooperation in payments, investment, loan business, and other aspects.”
+
+Xi’s 2018 state visit to Portugal, and the wide array of commercial deals and relationships connected to that visit, represent a snapshot of CCP Inc. in action. While high-level state visits are used by many countries to help reinforce commercial ties, the highly strategic nature of each of the deals that were signed on Xi’s Portugal trip speaks to a more fundamental alignment between CCP strategic objectives and Chinese commercial interests abroad. It further underscores the incentives of a range of companies — including BCP Millennium’s Chinese parent, Fosun — to support official efforts to cement Portugal as a critical partner on the European continent and as a potential launching pad into the wider region.
+
+
+### Critical Context of Fosun’s Success with BCP Millennium
+
+Fosun and BCP Millennium’s success in enabling a wider CCP Inc. network of investment into Portugal is particularly notable considering that it came at a time when outbound investment by other private sector Chinese conglomerates was being actively reined in by Chinese authorities.
+
+Throughout 2017, Chinese officials had become increasingly concerned about soaring rates of outbound investment over the previous several years. For example, Vice Premier Liu He commissioned a study to examine the economic vulnerabilities created by such large outbound flows of direct investment, particularly in light of the role such investment played in bursting Japan’s economic bubble in the 1990s. According to media reports, the study included a recommendation to gain greater control over, and reduce the scale of, outbound investment by some of China’s largest private sector companies.
+
+Indeed, the topic of outbound investment, and its potential role in destabilizing the domestic financial system, reportedly emerged as a key topic of discussion at an April 2017 Politburo meeting. Importantly, China’s 25-member Politburo typically discusses key economic policy priorities at its monthly meetings once a quarter, in January, April, July, and October. And while the official readouts of the Politburo meeting and Politburo study session from that month do not explicitly mention the goal of reducing outbound spending by Chinese companies, they focus intensely on senior Chinese policymakers’ clear concern about reducing financial system volatility and instability, including vulnerabilities and potential spillover effects created by the Chinese financial system’s growing linkages with the global financial system.
+
+Critically, in the readout of the Politburo study session on financial security on April 26, 2017, Xi clearly stated that “financial security is an important part of national security and an important foundation for the stable and healthy development of the economy.”
+
+![image09](https://i.imgur.com/8WC9zxj.png)
+_▲ __Figure 9: Overall Chinese Outbound Investment 2010–2020.__ Source: [“走出去”公共服务平台 [“Going Out” Public Service Bulletin], 中华人民共和国商务部 [Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China], accessed November 10, 2022](http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tjsj/tjgb/)._
+
+These key Politburo meetings would ultimately set the stage for a prolonged, multiyear effort to de-risk the domestic Chinese financial system, part of which involved a crackdown on foreign and domestic financial activities by some of China’s largest private sector conglomerates, including the HNA Group, Dalian Wanda Group, Anbang Insurance Group, and Fosun Group.
+
+Prior to the crackdown on outbound investment deals, these four companies alone accounted for a whopping $57 billion in outbound spending from 2015 to mid-2017, representing a full 15 percent of all outbound spending by Chinese companies during this period. In June 2017, financial authorities specifically requested reports from banks on the overseas loans made to each of these companies, and over the following several years, scrutiny of the companies’ financial positions, and specifically their overseas spending and assets, ramped up.
+
+Ultimately, the State Council released a key set of opinions in August 2017 to codify and tighten the previously disparate rules around outbound investment by laying out specific areas of overseas direct investment that were encouraged, restricted, and prohibited. Encouraged investment areas included those in the services sector, in technology that would help to move China up the value chain, and for projects under the umbrella of the BRI. Restricted investment areas included real estate, hotels, cinemas, entertainment, sports clubs, and “investment platforms without specific industrial projects.” Meanwhile, prohibited investment areas included “investment involving the production of core technologies and products of the military” or “investments that endanger or may endanger the interests of the state” — a broad umbrella under which Xi had placed financial system stability just months before.
+
+Over the following several years, the four major private sector conglomerates that had been singled out by authorities for renewed scrutiny, including Fosun, would see a range of regulatory outcomes in terms of their ability to maintain and expand their respective portfolios of overseas assets, a process that further highlighted some key aspects of the emerging CCP Inc. framework at that time. Core among these was the need for nominally private sector entities to more clearly align with national strategic objectives in undertaking outbound spending.
+
+Within this context, then, it is notable that Fosun was able to continue deepening its ties in the Portuguese financial sector, through its Fidelidade subsidiary and related investment in BCP Millennium, over the course of 2017 and 2018. Indeed, of the four conglomerates that came under Beijing’s scrutiny, Fosun has seen by far the best regulatory outcomes and clearly maneuvered to get back into the good graces of senior policymakers. By comparison, Anbang Insurance Group (安邦保险集团) was taken over by the government in February 2018. The company’s non-core assets were wound down over the following three-year period of government receivership, and its founder and chairman, Wu Xiaohui, was handed an 18-year prison sentence for fraud. Meanwhile, on the very same day that Anbang’s government takeover was announced, Fosun announced plans to purchase a controlling interest in one of France’s oldest fashion design companies. For its part, HNA Group [海航集团] has been placed into bankruptcy and taken over by provincial authorities, while its chairman and CEO were both detained by authorities on suspicion of crimes in late 2021. Finally, Dalian Wanda’s [万达集团] overseas asset base is now a fraction of its peak, as the company shed assets amounting to $19.2 billion between mid-2017 and early 2019.
+
+Fosun’s success in navigating the regulatory crackdown, especially in comparison to its highly chastened peers, can be explained in part by the clear alignment between its investments in Portugal and Chinese policymakers’ objectives to leverage commercial and diplomatic relations with the country as an avenue for deepening commercial engagement and investment in Europe more broadly as well as to cultivate a key ally in mitigating rising European skepticism toward Chinese investment. Indeed, as internal concern around capital outflows via unruly overseas direct investment was beginning to percolate among the Chinese leadership in late 2016, Xi called directly for more Chinese investment in Portugal, going so far as to say that China would encourage expansion in areas including finance, insurance, and healthcare — areas in which Fosun was already the leading Chinese player in the country through its investments in Fidelidade and BCP Millennium.
+
+As the government’s crackdown on outbound investment and high debt levels among China’s private sector conglomerates moved forward, Fosun’s domestic messaging within China also began to align more closely with CCP and Chinese state priorities. As soon as July 2017, Fosun chairman Guo Guangchang began to publicly support Beijing’s tougher rules on overseas investments, citing a reduction in potential risks to financial security as one element of his support of the eradication of irrational outbound investment. Guo’s clear and public alignment with the new outbound investment framework, and his company’s subsequent ability to operate successfully within it, is particularly notable given the fates of the Anbang and HNA chairmen.
+
+Indeed, this alignment came not only on the back of the crackdown on overseas spending but also after Guo had previously been caught up in Xi’s sweeping anti-corruption crackdown on the financial sector. In late 2015, Guo was among several high-profile private sector Chinese executives that were subjected to anti-corruption investigations and temporarily went missing from public view. On December 10, 2015, local financial media reported that Fosun executives had been unable to reach Guo since noon that day. Guo’s sudden disappearance ultimately led to a brief suspension of trading for Fosun International shares on the Hong Kong exchange before he resurfaced on December 14, saying he had been assisting judicial authorities in their investigations but offering no further details. Some observers speculated that Guo’s detainment was related to his relationship with Yao Gang, vice chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, or Ai Baojun, vice mayor of Shanghai, both of whom were under investigation by anti-corruption authorities at the time. Such an experience may have heightened Guo’s political sensitivity and helped him shepherd Fosun successfully through the evolution of the CCP Inc. ecosystem in the following years.
+
+Additionally, after the crackdown on outbound spending, Fosun International began to more explicitly tie its outbound investment efforts to support of the BRI, with co-CEO Xu Xiaoliang saying in September 2017, just weeks after the release of the State Council’s opinions on outbound investment, that “now that we know what the government encourages and discourages, we have a clearer idea of where to expand our global footprint.” Guo further highlighted this point in a 2018 interview, stating: “Our overseas investments are approved by the Chinese government and the local governments, not just in Europe but globally” and “The Chinese government . . . support[s] the companies who respect the law.”
+
+![image10](https://i.imgur.com/3uXqOOW.png)
+_▲ __Figure 10: Timeline of the Regulatory Crackdown on Outward Direct Investment.__ Source: Author’s research based on multiple sources._
+
+In short order, these increased efforts at public alignment with the CCP’s enhanced oversight of outbound spending by nominally private sector Chinese conglomerates were overtly recognized. In December 2017, the CCP’s official mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, went so far as to publicly praise Fosun’s outbound investment activities in an op-ed, juxtaposing those efforts directly against other Chinese companies that had failed to realign to the emerging CCP Inc. model of outbound investment.
+
+The article highlighted the achievements of China’s ongoing investment presence beyond its borders, arguing:
+
+> Behind the dazzling achievements, some enterprises take advantage of the “going out” strategy to strengthen and refine their brands; however, some are involved in undesirable foreign investment behaviors.
+
+The article went on to call out Fosun’s investment in BCP Millennium as a model for other companies to emulate, highlighting the initial groundwork that the tie-up was already laying for UnionPay to expand in Europe:
+
+> Recently, BCP [Millennium], which has Fosun as an investor, reached a strategic cooperation agreement with UnionPay to jointly carry out UnionPay card issuance, innovative payment promotion, and other cooperation in Europe. This exemplifies Fosun’s successful practice of helping the Belt and Road Initiative and Chinese enterprises with their global layout.
+
+Finally, the article hit home the point that outbound investment by a range of Chinese companies can only succeed within the framework of overt policy support, stating:
+
+> Steady and positive “going out” is not possible without policy support and guidance. In the face of the excessively rapid growth of outbound foreign investment in fields such as real estate, hotels, cinemas, entertainment, and sports clubs in recent years, relevant regulatory authorities have provided risk warnings and adopted a series of policy measures. According to Guo Guangchang, chairman of Fosun International, “Capable government ensures effective markets. Stable, predictable, more transparent, and fairer policies can support real and legal foreign investment in line with the national strategy, which guarantees long-term and healthy development of companies.”
+
+The clear realignment of Fosun within the parameters of the CCP Inc. model not only allowed the company to gain high-level backing for its ongoing investments in the Portuguese financial sector throughout 2017 and 2018 but also underpinned increasing ties between Fosun-invested Portuguese companies and other major Chinese financial players along the BRI and into a wider range of international markets over the following years, as the next chapter of this report explores. Moreover, the ability of Fosun to continue operating within Europe and to deepen its ties — and those of the wider CCP Inc. ecosystem — is even more striking when considering the outcome of similar investments by the other nominally private sector Chinese conglomerates during this period of enhanced scrutiny. Most notable in this regard is the fate of HNA Group’s 2017 investment in Germany’s Deutsche Bank AG.
+
+In a move similar to that of Fosun’s investments in Fidelidade and BCP Millennium, HNA Group bought stakes in Deutsche Bank in February and March 2017, becoming one of the bank’s largest shareholders, with a 4.8 percent stake, worth just over €1 billion ($1.13 billion). Then, in May 2017, just around the time that Fosun was increasing its stake in BCP Millennium, HNA went on to boost its investment in Deutsche Bank further, ultimately taking on a near 10 percent stake in the German lender, making the Chinese conglomerate its largest shareholder.
+
+The parallels between the HNA and Fosun investments in key European financial players are particularly notable, not only for their similar timing but also given that HNA’s investment came as the German lender was struggling under the weight of an array of regulatory penalties and poor investment decisions from 2013 to 2016, requiring infusions of outside capital to help steady the bank in 2016 and 2017. These dynamics were similar to the challenges faced by a range of Portuguese financial institutions in the wake of the European debt crisis, which opened the door for the initial Fosun investment in Fidelidade and later BCP Millennium.
+
+![image11](https://i.imgur.com/sg4CMvZ.png)
+_▲ __Figure 11: Selected Major Overseas Investments by HNA 2015–2017.__ Source: Author’s research based on multiple sources cited throughout this report and others. Please reference the endnotes for complete additional citations._
+
+However, the ultimate fate of Fosun’s investments in Portugal could not have been more starkly different than that of HNA’s investment in Deutsche Bank. Indeed, rather than utilizing its position as a key shareholder in the German lender to enable a growing presence of the CCP Inc. ecosystem within the German economy and financial sector, as Fosun was able to achieve in Portugal, HNA quickly made an about-face on its German investment, selling down its stake to 8.8 percent in February 2018 and losing its status as the firm’s largest shareholder after less than a year in that position. While this initial paring of HNA’s stake in Deutsche Bank was widely attributed to the need to raise capital in order to address liquidity issues that the Chinese conglomerate was facing in early 2018, the company continued to sell off its stake in the coming years as Chinese officials demanded that the company wind down its non-core business lines and assets. Ultimately, HNA was effectively taken over by the provincial government of Hainan, where the group is based, which began the process of restructuring the group in late 2021.
+
+The juxtaposition of HNA’s failed overseas investments, as well as the forced spin-off of its foreign assets and its ultimate takeover by local authorities, against the ongoing flourishing of Fosun’s overseas expansion throughout this period throws into stark relief just how successful the latter company was in both recognizing and aligning with the rapid evolution of the CCP Inc. model during the 2017–18 time period. Fosun’s public and high-profile alignment with the concerted regulatory push to fully align overseas spending tightly with CCP and Chinese state strategic objectives was a critical element in its continued success investing abroad.
+
+Furthermore, Fosun’s overt drive to leverage its investments and business relationships in Portugal to open additional overseas business opportunities for a range of Chinese state and private companies — both within and beyond the financial sector — speaks to a clear recognition of the importance of the ecosystem aspect of the CCP Inc. model. Indeed, in this model the outbound spending and foreign commercial presence of a given company is not simply meant to boost that company’s bottom line, nor even to solely support China’s diplomatic and strategic objectives abroad. Importantly, such investments are also meant to boost commercial opportunities for other Chinese players in overseas markets.
+
+In this way, Chinese companies — both state-owned and nominally private — can swim in the wake of other Chinese companies’ success in penetrating foreign markets, and the relationships between these companies work to reinforce China’s overall foreign commercial presence. The People’s Daily article praising Fosun’s efforts to open a pathway for UnionPay International’s expansion in Europe makes this point explicit, and Fosun would go on to further internalize and execute on this element of the CCP Inc. model in future overseas operations alongside other key Chinese SOEs.
+
+
+### Building on Success
+
+> Fidelidade’s Presence beyond Portugal
+
+Following the increased scrutiny of outbound investment by nominally private Chinese companies in 2017, Fosun continued to deepen the alignment between its global investment portfolio and China’s national objectives, further integrating into the CCP Inc. model in the process. Another key tie-up came in 2019 when Fosun’s Fidelidade subsidiary entered into a strategic partnership with China Reinsurance Corporation (China Re) [中国再保险] to provide project financing and reinsurance for the BRI.
+
+In keeping with Fosun’s moves to align both messaging and investments with CCP priorities, the agreement was signed in April 2019 in Beijing at the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, a gathering that was widely seen as core to furthering China’s geopolitical and global commercial objectives at the time by seeking to redefine the BRI against growing global critiques of the effort. The initiative’s growing reputation as environmentally unfriendly, corrupt, and debt-fueled had led Chinese leadership to seek to recast the effort. This push fit within officials’ wider efforts to gain greater control over outbound spending as they sought “to exert more control over the program . . . including [with] clearer rules for state-owned-enterprises, restricting use of the BRI brand, and building overseas auditing and anti-corruption mechanisms.”
+
+Xi Jinping chaired the forum, which was attended by thousands of participants, many from the foreign business community, and dozens of foreign heads of state. Xi held a spate of bilateral meetings as part of the forum, including talks with President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa of Portugal, where Xi characterized the bilateral relationship as one of “prominent strategic significance, high complementarity in interests, and strong economic complementarity.” The readout of the meeting further underscored China’s view of Portugal as a key channel for stabilizing and improving broader relations with Europe, saying “it is believed that the Portuguese side will also continue to play an active role in maintaining the right direction of China-Europe relations.”
+
+Inking the Fidelidade partnership with China Re at the forum, therefore, worked to boost the prominence of the agreement, which was listed by Chinese state media as one of 17 key investment projects announced at the gathering. Reporting around the agreement further indicated that the primary area of focus for the partnership would be to enhance “reinsurance solutions for projects in Portugal, Spain, France, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde and Peru.” For its part, Fidelidade expressly stated that the partnership with this important SOE, the only state-owned reinsurer in China, would enable the Fosun-owned group to widen its reach throughout various geographies to “diversify its scope and develop new opportunities for international business growth, bolstering its offer to the Chinese community around the world.”
+
+Meanwhile, China Re’s publicity around the agreement further underscored that it would help to unlock new investment opportunities within China and around the world for Fidelidade, saying: “The two sides will also seek opportunities for cooperation in the construction of the Greater Bay Area of Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao, especially to exert the influence of Fidelidade Insurance Group of Portugal in Portuguese-speaking countries and provide professional services for Macao to exploit markets of Portuguese-speaking countries.” In addition, linked to the Fideldidade-China Re strategic cooperation was a separate effort between China and Angola to enact a strategic cooperation agreement with Fidelidade.
+
+![image12](https://i.imgur.com/f8WiP7K.png)
+_▲ __Figure 12: Key Fosun and Fidelidade Investments in Latin America 2019–2020.__ Source: [Margaret Myers, “Going Out, Guaranteed: Chinese Insurers in Latin America,” The Dialogue, January 2022](https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Chinese-Insurers-in-Latin-America-1.pdf)._
+
+While the establishment of its partnership with China Re appears to have been the marquee agreement that Fidelidade undertook in 2019, Fosun was simultaneously expanding its presence in a range of other markets around the world through its Fidelidade subsidiary with the express purpose of offering insurance support to Chinese projects, most notably throughout Latin America.
+
+That year, Fidelidade announced it would sell insurance in Chile “through a series of partnership agreements. Elsewhere in South America, the Portuguese company acquired 51 percent of Peruvian insurer La Positiva Seguros y Reaseguros, through its local subsidiary, and purchased an almost one-fourth ownership of Alianza Compañía de Seguros y Reaseguros in Bolivia.
+
+These investments were undertaken within the context of specific Chinese policies to leverage the insurance sector to support and stabilize a range of investment activities in Latin America, as emphasized in a January 2022 report on Chinese insurers in Latin America from the Inter-American Dialogue:
+
+> China’s top planners have noted the importance of enhanced insurance support for the country’s overseas operations in recent five-year plans and in policies toward Latin America. China’s 1+3+6 Cooperative Framework, introduced to the region by Xi Jinping in 2015, is among the Latin America-specific policies intended to boost funds, credit loans, and insurance to the region — in this case for project development in logistics, electricity, and information technology. . . . As Zhu Junsheng, deputy director of the Insurance Research Office of the Financial Research Institute of the Development Research Center of the State Council noted, Chinese infrastructure firms, insurers, and other actors are expected to increasingly work together to identify high-quality overseas projects and ‘increase the attractiveness of infrastructure projects to market funds.’
+
+These deepening investments and relationships, in both Latin America and BRI countries, that Fosun has pursued in recent years via its Fidelidade subsidiary show the ongoing and intensifying alignment of Fosun’s global commercial objectives with Chinese geopolitical and strategic interests. Additionally, the ever-growing roster of key SOE financial players with which Fosun and Fidelidade are partnering in these endeavors further highlights Fosun’s ability to leverage the CCP Inc. ecosystem to its advantage. That is especially true considering that over the past several years senior Chinese officials, including Xi Jinping, have repeatedly stated their view that the Portuguese relationship and market should be seen as a critical anchor for China’s growing commercial and diplomatic presence around the world.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+The ability of Chinese-invested companies such as Fidelidade and BCP Millennium to leverage their relationships with Chinese SOEs to expand into a wide range of markets around the world is a core component of the CCP Inc. ecosystem. Such cooperation allows for a wider array of relationship building, networking, and financial and policy support than any one company could achieve on its own.
+
+Equally as important, Fosun’s maneuvering to embed itself within the Portuguese financial sector through high-profile, strategic investments has allowed the company to act as one of the key anchors in the wider CCP Inc. approach to the Portuguese market. Indeed, the fact that this nominally private company worked to boost the presence of key state-owned actors within Portugal — including the China Three Gorges Corporation, UnionPay, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the Bank of China — rather than the other way around, speaks to the essence of the shift from “China Inc.” to “CCP Inc.” that has taken place in recent years and is ongoing today. Moreover, Fosun’s maneuvering to buoy the strategic national objective of developing commercial and diplomatic ties with Portugal as a jumping off point to pursue deeper engagement in European and other markets underscores how thoroughly the CCP has co-opted the Chinese private sector as the CCP Inc. model of economic governance has evolved.
+
+As this report has highlighted, these achievements are all the more remarkable given the fast-evolving nature of policies dictating outbound private sector Chinese investments at the time Fosun was pursuing its expansion into Portugal, especially in light of the failure of other private Chinese conglomerates to achieve similar alignment with national goals.
+
+Ultimately, this case study not only highlights some of the crucial elements of the CCP Inc. model in action but also underscores the still-evolving nature of that model. As state-owned and nominally private Chinese companies continue to widen their investment footprints throughout the global economy, it will be critical for policymakers and business leaders in Western countries to deepen their understanding of the contours of the CCP Inc. ecosystem as it has evolved to date. But additionally, to compete against the CCP Inc. ecosystem going forward, Western countries must also seek to anticipate how the ecosystem will become further refined and design forward-looking global trade and investment regimes robust enough to meet the challenge.
+
+---
+
+__Andrew Polk__ is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Freeman Chair in China studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the cofounder and head of economic research at Trivium China, a Beijing-based strategic advisory firm.
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Winter Wars Of 2022-2023
+author: Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul Cormarie
+date  : 2022-11-15 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/krOFsoB.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022-2023"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_It is obvious that the world now faces a wide range of potential wars and crises. What is far less obvious is the level of confrontation between the U.S. and its strategic partners with both Russia and China, the rising levels of other types of violence emerging on a global level, how serious these wars and crises can become, and what kind of future could eventually emerge out of so many different crises, confrontations and conflicts, and trends._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+This analysis explores the risk on the basis that war does not have to mean actual military conflict. Here, it is important to note that avoiding or minimizing combat is scarcely peace. As Sun Tzu pointed out in the Art of War well over 2,000 years ago, “war” does not have to involve the use of military force or any form of actual combat. His statement that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” applies to every form of major military confrontation and gray area warfare between opposing powers.
+
+It recognizes that it is all too easy to predict dire outcomes from the War in Ukraine, the current arms races with Russia and China, and growing levels of violence and confrontation between other states. There is still a case, however, for examining the broader impact of the war, the growing intensity of the arms races with Russia and China, and the current overall patterns of global conflict as the world enters the winter of 2022-2023. It is already clear that this will be a deeply troubled winter in many areas of the globe, that the level of confrontation between major powers has risen sharply, that they do seek to subdue the enemy without fighting, and their rivalry has become the equivalent of political and economic warfare.
+
+It is equally clear that the wide range of lower-level conflicts between other powers, their civil wars, and the abuses many governments commit against their own citizens are also intensifying, although many of these conflicts have been going on in some form for years or even decades. In far too many cases, the world is not moving toward peace. It is moving towards repression and war.
+
+Accordingly, this analysis argues that the world already faces a series of possible and ongoing “Winter Wars” in 2022-2023 that may not escalate to open military conflict but that are wars at the political and economic level and in competition to build-up more lethal military forces both for deterrence and to exert political leverage. It also shows that these “Wars” already pose serious risks and could escalate sharply and in unpredictable ways for at least the next five to ten years.
+
+The global list of wars that are ongoing in the winter of 2020-2023, and that seems likely to continue to affect global security in the future, that this study examines includes:
+
+- The “Winter War” in Ukraine
+
+- The “Winter War” between the West and Russia in Economics, Politics, and Energy
+
+- The “Winter War” in Conventional Force Modernization and Build-Ups by the U.S., NATO, and Russia
+
+- The “Winter War” in Nuclear Forces and Deterrence between the Major Powers
+
+- The “Winter War” in Precision Strike Capabilities, Air/Missile Defense and Emerging/Disruptive Technologies
+
+- The “Winter War” in Going from Cooperation and Competition with China to Confrontation and Active War Planning
+
+- The “Winter War” in the Middle East and the Gulf
+
+- The “Winter War” in the Koreas
+
+- The “Winter War” in Gray Area, Spoiler, and Proxy Warfare
+
+- The “Winter War” in Fragile, Divided, Authoritarian, and Undeveloped States
+
+The analysis warns that the world is not moving towards peace, that new forms of Cold War divide all the world’s major powers, and that far too few smaller states have solid levels of development, effective governance, and are moving toward peace and stability.
+
+
+### The “Winter War” in Ukraine
+
+At least one war has already escalated into a major conflict, and that involves fighting between Ukraine and Russia that seems almost certain to continue to escalate through the winter of 2022-2023. The Russian invasion of Ukraine that began in February 2022 began with what appeared to be a Russian effort to seize the entirety of Ukraine, became a war of attrition on the ground, and has now escalated to a strategic level.
+
+Ukraine, however, has had sufficient support from the West and other states to be able to defend against Russia to the point where it has forced Russia to mobilize. The U.S. alone has provided some $60 billion in arms, economic aid, and other support by early October 2022, and is fighting the equivalent of a proxy war against Russia. Britain, the EU, and several other strategic partners have been providing major aid to Ukraine as well, and while Russia may have tried mobilizing up to 300,000 troops in October, it had also mobilized a substantial part of the developed world against it in ways where their aid to Ukraine did far more to challenge Russia than any aspects of their normal defense spending and modernization of their forces.
+
+#### Tying Combat to Attacks on Ukrainian Civil Targets
+
+The U.S. and other supporters of Ukraine have waged an economic war of sanctions, and trade controls on Russia, as well as have provided economic and military aid to Ukraine, but Russia has responded more effectively in other ways with a combination of military escalation and an economic war over energy exports.
+
+Russia has escalated to conducting military attacks on Ukraine’s population and economic and military warfare against its infrastructure. Russia has adapted its past reliance on “General Winter” and “General Mud” to try to destroy Ukraine’s economy and its ability to resist. The War in Ukraine has escalated from fighting a land/air/missile battle for the control of the Eastern Ukraine to a Russian strategy designed to destroy enough of the Ukrainian economy and infrastructure to force the Ukrainian government to end the fighting in ways that leave Russia with significant territorial gains, and Ukraine with a crippled economy that will take years to repair and with an uncertain future political and economic stability.
+
+The cost of the expansion of Russian attacks to civil and critical infrastructure targets has already reached critical levels by the end of October 2022 and has briefly shut off the flow of water and electric power to the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv in early November. The Ukrainian government reported then that strikes on key electricity generating targets in Ukraine had destroyed almost a third of its electric and other power generating facilities and left at least 1.5 million Ukrainians without power. They deprived Kyiv of safe drinking water for at least several days. Ukraine may be able to repair part of its infrastructure and deploy more effective and air defenses in the months to come but this is uncertain.
+
+These Russia military attacks interacted with broader forms of economic warfare in Ukraine. They include attacks on Ukrainian grain exports and other targets that affect the entire Ukrainian economy. They have already levels of inflation that have reduced many Ukrainians to the poverty level and sharply increased Ukraine’s needs for economic aid as well as created a legacy that will require a massive post-war recovery program. Unless the Russian attacks halt or Ukraine is given a much larger set of missile and air defenses, they will create steadily growing problems in maintaining a decent life as winter progresses – often increasing poverty to the point where hard choices have to be made between “heat” and “eat.”
+
+While accurate cost and supply data are lacking, Russia’s purchase of low-cost precision-guided conventionally armed missiles and drones from Iran may allow Russia to both destroy such Ukrainian economic targets and to saturate the more advanced air/missile defense systems the U.S. is providing to Ukraine – systems which will only provide limited area coverage for much of the winter, and whose operation is substantially more costly than Russia’s missile strike forces.
+
+Such attacks may cumulatively limit internal Ukrainian popular support for the war, and sharply reduce Russian casualties and embarrassing military defeats. At a minimum, the new Russian tactics and missile strikes will extend the length and intensity of the fighting, sharply raise its cost of military and civil aid and the cost of any postwar recovery.
+
+They may well force Ukraine to compromise on a settlement or to fight a debilitating war indefinitely into the future and show NATO European states – especially those near the Russian border – that Russia still presents a major threat them regardless of the problems the fighting has revealed in its land forces. They also seem likely to make Russia steadily more reliant on such tactics in the future, and to continue to link the use of such missile and air attacks to the threat of escalating to theater nuclear warfare.
+
+#### Russian Realities Versus the Laws of War
+
+From another perspective, such Russian attacks provide all too clear a demonstration of the fact that future combat is likely to involve more intense and deliberate attacks on civilian targets in spite of the “laws” of war. The war in Ukraine is also scarcely unique. Virtually all recent lower-level conflicts have involved attacks on civil targets – often by terrorists or in internal civil conflicts, but also by states against states, regimes against parts of their own, or the factions in civil conflicts. With few exceptions, is also clear that the laws of war are unenforceable. Even most of the cases where the attackers lost the war did not result in any special punishment, and little real-world effort has been made to find more effective deterrents to such strikes on civilians.
+
+It is striking that Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu openly stated on November 1st, 2022, that Russia was deliberately targeting the Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure in a legitimate effort to reduce the country’s military capacity. He stated that, “With precision-guided strikes, we continue to effectively hit military infrastructure facilities, as well as facilities that affect the reduction of Ukraine’s military potential.” The most Shoigu did to imply any restraint was to state that, “Comprehensive measures are being taken to prevent the death of Ukrainian citizens.”
+
+One key legacy of the war in Ukraine from the fighting of 2022/2023 may well be that it demonstrates that relying on unenforceable laws of war to provide real-world security for civilians may sometimes have worse consequences for the civilians involved than having no laws at all.
+
+It is also a grim reality of modern warfare that other recent conflicts have shown almost any war fought in populated areas or cities involving key lines of communication or involving the use of artillery near population centers and critical infrastructure, will produce serious civilian casualties and amounts of damage to civilian facilities. The same is likely to be true of conflicts against terrorists, extremists, and any other faction that shelters in populated areas and use civilians as some form of shield.
+
+
+### The “Winter War” between the West Politics, and Energy
+
+It currently seems doubtful that any resolution of the war in Ukraine will produce any stable form of peace or fail to lead to enduring confrontation and between Russia and the West and a continuing risk of new forms of active conflict. The current confrontation has already escalated to the level of political and economic warfare and may well be followed by a struggle to modernize and reshape the military forces on each side that has both conventional and nuclear dimensions and gray area clashes and spoiler operations.
+
+#### War Without Combat
+
+Once again, it is important to note that avoiding or minimizing combat is scarcely peace. Russia and the West, are clearly seeking to “subdue the enemy without fighting.” The same is true of the current relations between the U.S. and its strategic partners and China.
+
+In practice, many “winter wars” are being fought on a political, economic, and ideological level – and by building up national military forces in ways that give them enough strategic leverage to force the opposing side to meet its opponents’ strategic goals without direct combat between them. The versions of these wars between are also generally being fought to change the political and economic behavior of other states rather than conquer them, to keep them from intimidating or forcing given patterns of action on other states, or to make them conform to international standards that are cooperative in nature. As such, some have a massive grand strategic impact on the world even though they are being fought without combat and an effort seeking to dominate or conquer the opponent.
+
+Other such wars are far more limited. For example, proxy wars can be fought in ways that involve indirect combat. Examples are proxy wars like the West’s military aid to Ukraine, and Russia’s use of mercenaries in Libya and “advisors” in Syria. More generally, they can be fought in the form of spoiler operations that push other parties into fighting, in the form of deployments and exercises that act as military threats, and by using military forces passively to exert political leverage and influence. In practice, military deterrence is simply another a form of warfare: it too exploits the competitive use of military forces to achieve as strategic objective without fighting.
+
+This is reflected in the fact that the war in Ukraine has created broad political and economic conflicts between Russia and much of the West. Both sides have steadily escalated their political and economic conflict since the start of the Ukraine conflict in February 2022. Putin has responded by mobilizing Russia, carrying out a major political campaign against the West, denouncing the U.S. and other states for supporting Ukraine, and accusing the United States and other Western powers of seeking to dominate Europe and isolate and dismember Russia.
+
+The West has responded by building up its military presence in the forward areas of NATO, denouncing Putin, seeking support from the UN in criticizing the Russian attack and conduct of a war in Ukraine with steadily increasing civilian casualties and damage. The West not only is fighting a proxy war against Russia, but it has also launched the equivalent of economic war against Russia, which included halting gas and other imports from Russia.
+
+The U.S., Canada, European NATO and EU states, and many other states are now providing arms transfers, security assistance, financial aid, and economic aid to Ukraine while simultaneously waging economic and political war directly against Russia. And, as noted previously, Russia is replying in kind. This form of economic and political warfare, and competing major military build-ups, seems certain to escalate steadily throughout the winter and may well continue for years to come.
+
+#### The Broader Forms of Economic and Political Warfare
+
+Neither Russia nor the West are currently winning the economic and political side of the Ukraine War, nor seem likely to emerge as the winner in the near future. On the one hand, it is all too clear that Putin sharply underestimated the economic and political reaction of Western and many other states prior to his invasion of the Ukraine. There is no doubt that the Russian people have suffered deeply from Western reactions and sanctions. As yet, however, there has been only limited Russian popular resistance to the war, and Putin has escalated his war fighting efforts in spite of Western political and economic reactions.
+
+On the other hand, the West has miscalculated as well. It began to implement major economic and political sanctions against Russia immediately after its invasion of the Ukraine. However, Western planners seem to have sharply underestimated Russia’s ability to survive them. They did not foresee the sustained and escalating impact Russia’s reactions would have on European and other energy supplies, on global food exports, on global political divisions, and on Russia’s actual military behavior.
+
+As of November 2022, the economic and political side of this war has escalated to the point where the West keeps adding sanctions and trade and investment barriers, including controls over the critical technologies, components, and materials similar to the war of sanctions against Iran and North Korea. Russia has replied in kind by using its gas exports to sustain its economy, and its ability to limit Ukrainian grain and other food exports by sea – measures that have sharply increased the cost of food to many other countries.
+
+Yet, Figure One shows that Russia has actually increased its exports to a number of countries that support Ukraine and has not suffered nearly as much as some planners initially estimated in developing sanctions.
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/j3JzRDK.png)
+_▲ __Figure One: Major Shifts in Russian Trade Patterns Caused by the Economic War over the Ukraine.__ Source: [Adapted from Lazaro Gamio and AnaSwanson, “How Russia Pays for War,” New York Times, October 30, 2022](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/10/30/business/economy/russia-trade-ukraine-war.html)._
+
+#### The Energy War as an Indicator of the Seriousness of Economic Warfare
+
+The trade war and political and economic sanctions are only a part of this story. Figure Two shows that Russia has successfully retaliated against NATO and the other outside powers supporting Ukraine by conducting an energy war that has done critical damage to many Western economies. This energy war has interacted with impact of COVID and other Western economic problems that COVID helped create. The end result is that the West may have suffered as much as Russia.
+
+Moreover, Russia has had some success in working with OPEC – and states as divided as Iran and Saudi Arabia – to place limits on global exports that help support its position. This has helped raise energy prices in virtually every Western and energy importing state and has succeeded in creating a level of inflation and other economic damage to the West which is roughly equivalent to the damage the West has done to Russia.
+
+The energy war has also had many negative impacts on the rest of the world. It has again interacted with the impact of COVID, an uncertain global financial situation, and the damage done by global climate change. It has helped create a broader global crisis in food supplies, the rising levels of international poverty now reported by the UN and World Bank, and internal and local wars on a global basis. It is all too clear from this aspect of the War in Ukraine that there is no global “village,” but there clearly is “globalism” in the form of vulnerability.
+
+There is no clear way to predict the future impacts of this energy warfare during the winter of 2022-2023, or how it may develop in the months and years that will follow. However, the war’s impact on Russian energy exports and the global cost of oil and gas has already been critical and may lead to major strategic changes in the flow of energy exports.
+
+However, the International Energy Agency (IEA) warned in the annual World Energy Outlook for October 2022 that,
+
+> The world is in the middle of a global energy crisis of unprecedented depth and complexity. Europe is at the center of this crisis, but it is having major implications for markets, policies and economies worldwide. As so often is the case, the poorest and most vulnerable are likely to suffer most. The strains did not begin with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but they have been sharply exacerbated by it. Extraordinarily high prices are sparking a reappraisal of energy policies and priorities. The Europe-Russia energy relationship lies in tatters, calling into question the viability of decades of fossil fuel infrastructure and investment decisions built on this foundation. A profound reorientation of international energy trade is underway, bringing new market risks even as it addresses longstanding vulnerabilities.
+
+> Many of the contours of this new world are not yet fully defined, but there is no going back to the way things were. And we know from past energy crises that the process of adjustment is unlikely to be a smooth one. That adjustment will also be taking place in the context of commitments made by governments to clean energy transitions. A central theme of this World Energy Outlook 2022 is how the levers of technological change and innovation, trade and investment and behavioral shifts might drive a secure transition towards a net zero emissions energy system, while minimizing the potential risks and trade-offs between various policy objectives.
+
+- Today’s energy crisis shares some parallels with the 1970s oil price shocks, but there are also important differences. The crises in the 1970s were concentrated in oil markets and the global economy was much more dependent on oil than it is today. However, the intensity of use of other fossil fuels has not declined to the same extent; for natural gas it has risen in many cases. The global nature of the current crisis, its spread across all fossil fuels and the knock-on effects on electricity prices are all warning signs of broader economic impacts.
+
+- The global energy crisis sparked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is having far-reaching implications for households, businesses and entire economies, prompting short-term responses from governments as well as a deeper debate about the ways to reduce the risk of future disruptions and promote energy security. This is a global crisis, but Europe is the main theatre in which it is playing out, and natural gas is center stage – especially during the coming northern hemisphere winter.
+
+- High energy prices are causing a huge transfer of wealth from consumers to producers, back to the levels seen in 2014 for oil, but entirely unprecedented for natural gas. High fuel prices account for 90% of the rise in the average costs of electricity generation worldwide, natural gas alone for more than 50%. The costs of renewables and carbon dioxide have played only a marginal role, underscoring that this is a crisis where energy transitions are the solution, rather than the problem.
+
+- Price and economic pressures mean that the number of people without access to modern energy is rising for the first time in a decade. Around 75 million people who recently gained access to electricity are likely to lose the ability to pay for it, and 100 million people may revert to the use of traditional biomass for cooking.
+
+- There remain huge uncertainties over how this energy crisis will evolve and for how long fossil fuel prices will remain elevated, and the risks of further energy disruption and geopolitical fragmentation are high. In all our scenarios, price pressures and a dim near-term outlook for the global economy feed through into lower energy demand than in last year’s Outlook.
+
+- With the loss of its largest export market in Europe, Russia faces the prospect of a much-diminished role in international energy affairs. 2021 proves to be a high-water mark for Russian export flows. Its share of internationally traded gas, which stood at 30% in 2021, falls to 15% by 2030 in the STEPS and to 10% in the APS. Importers in China have been actively contracting for liquefied natural gas, and there is no room in China’s projected gas balance for another large-scale pipeline from Russia.
+
+The trends in this energy war through early November 2022 are shown in Figure Two, and it is clear that the rise in energy prices through the late fall of 2022 illustrates the overall success of Russia’s ability to conduct economic warfare and the risks it may impose for the future. It should be stressed, however, that there is no way to predict the future extent to which Russia and OPEC states will cooperate, nor whether Russia may make a major effort to shift its energy exports from pipelines to northern Europe to pipelines to China and Turkey.
+
+Such shifts in Russian exports to China would take time to make and major new pipelines to China would be highly expensive, require gas exports to be liquified, and tie Russia to a single customer, and present potential issues in dealing with climate change to China.
+
+At the same time, estimates of future Chinese oil and gas demand by the International Energy Agency indicate that if Russia did shift its export capabilities to provide far larger exports to China, China would become a major Russian customer well beyond 2030. Moreover, any analyses of China’s strategic vulnerabilities do indicate that obtaining energy imports that did not pass through the Indian Ocean, Straits, and South China Sea could greatly reduce one of its key vulnerabilities.
+
+Some argue that there is one area where such a war might have global benefits, but such benefits are questionable. Some analysts also feel that the energy crisis may help speed reductions in the global use of fossil fuel as well. However, the IEA stressed in its October 2022 estimates that reaching zero emissions by 2050 would require clean energy investments higher than $4 trillion by 2030. It also estimated that currently planned investments would only reach half of that figure.
+
+![image02a](https://i.imgur.com/dxt4KIW.png)
+_▲ __Figure Two: The Impact of Russian Actions on Gas Supplies and World Energy Princes – Part One.__ Source: [IEA, World Energy Outlook 2022](https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2022/the-global-energy-crisis#abstract); [Adapted from Lazaro Gamio and AnaSwanson, “How Russia Pays for War,” New York Times, October 30, 2022](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/10/30/business/economy/russia-trade-ukraine-war.html)._
+
+![image02b](https://i.imgur.com/VwEAwgS.png)
+_▲ __Figure Two: The Impact of Russian Actions on Energy Exports and World Energy Prices – Part Two.__ Source: [IEA, World Energy Outlook 2022](https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2022/the-global-energy-crisis#abstract); [Adapted from Lazaro Gamio and AnaSwanson, “How Russia Pays for War,” New York Times, October 30, 2022](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/10/30/business/economy/russia-trade-ukraine-war.html)._
+
+
+### The “Winter War” in Conventional Build-Ups by the U.S., NATO, and Russia
+
+It is a matter of semantics as to whether an arms race should be described as political or as military warfare, and the answer is probably both. The same is true of arms control, which generally is as much a battle for political influence, and the ability to use military forces as political leverage, as any move towards peace and stability.
+
+In any case, the War in the Ukraine has already shown Russia and the world that Russian conventional military forces have serious weaknesses, has helped lead to a new and more proactive NATO strategy, and led key Western nations like Germany and Britain to call for major increases in military spending. It has also led the United States to put more emphasis on NATO at a time it sees China as its primary threat and adopt a strategy that calls for major new efforts in military reform and modernization.
+
+The U.S. made this clear in the new National Security Strategy that it issued in October 2022:
+
+> Alongside our allies and partners, America is helping to make Russia’s war on Ukraine a strategic failure. Across Europe, NATO and the European Union are united in standing up to Russia and defending shared values. We are constraining Russia’s strategic economic sectors, including defense and aerospace, and we will continue to counter Russia’s attempts to weaken and destabilize sovereign nations and undermine multilateral institutions. Together with our NATO Allies, we are strengthening our defense and deterrence, particularly on the eastern flank of the Alliance. Welcoming Finland and Sweden to NATO will further improve our security and capabilities. And we are renewing our focus on bolstering our collective resilience against shared threats from Russia, including asymmetric threats. More broadly, Putin’s war has profoundly diminished Russia’s status vis-a-vis China and other Asian powers such as India and Japan. Moscow’s soft power and diplomatic influence have waned, while its efforts to weaponize energy have backfired. The historic global response to Russia’s war against Ukraine sends a resounding message that countries cannot enjoy the benefits of global integration while trampling on the core tenets of the UN Charter.
+
+> While some aspects of our approach will depend on the trajectory of the war in the Ukraine, a number of elements are already clear. First, the United States will continue to support Ukraine in its fight for its freedom, we will help Ukraine recover economically, and we will encourage its regional integration with the European Union. Second, the United States will defend every inch of NATO territory and will continue to build and deepen a coalition with allies and partners to prevent Russia from causing further harm to European security, democracy, and institutions. Third, the United States will deter and, as necessary, respond to Russian actions that threaten core U.S. interests, including Russian attacks on our infrastructure and our democracy. Fourth, Russia’s conventional military will have been weakened, which will likely increase Moscow’s reliance on nuclear weapons in its military planning. The United States will not allow Russia, or any power, to achieve its objectives through using, or threatening to use, nuclear weapons. America retains an interest in preserving strategic stability and developing a more expansive, transparent, and verifiable arms control infrastructure to succeed New START and in rebuilding European security arrangements which, due to Russia’s actions, have fallen in to disrepair. Finally, the United States will sustain and develop pragmatic modes of interaction to handle issues on which dealing with Russia can be mutually beneficial.
+
+The new National Security Strategy also made it clear that the U.S was returning to a broader emphasis on supporting European security:
+
+> Europe has been, and will continue to be, our foundational partner in addressing the full range of global challenges. To effectively pursue a common global agenda, we are broadening and deepening the transatlantic bond – strengthening NATO, raising the level of ambition in the U.S.-EU relationship, and standing with our European allies and partners in defense of the rules-based system that underpins our security, prosperity, and values.
+
+> Today, Europe stands at the front lines of the fight to defend the principles of freedom, sovereignty, and non-aggression, and we will continue to work in lockstep to ensure that freedom prevails. America remains unequivocally committed to collective defense as enshrined in NATO’s Article 5 and will work alongside our NATO Allies to deter, defend against, and build resilience to aggression and coercion in all its forms. As we step up our own sizable contributions to NATO capabilities and readiness – including by strengthening defensive forces and capabilities, and upholding our long-standing commitment to extended deterrence – we will count on our Allies to continue assuming greater responsibility by increasing their spending, capabilities, and contributions. European defense investments, through or complementary to NATO, will be critical to ensuring our shared security at this time of intensifying competition. We stand behind NATO’s continued adaptation to modern security challenges, including its emphasis on defense in cyberspace, climate security, and the growing security risks presented by the PRC’s policies and actions.
+
+And the new U.S. strategy document described support of the Ukraine in terms close to support of continuing NATO aid at a level equivalent to proxy warfare:
+
+> Europe has been, and will continue to be, our foundational partner in addressing the full range of global challenges. To effectively pursue a common global agenda, we are broadening and deepening the transatlantic bond – strengthening NATO, raising the level of ambition in the U.S.-EU relationship, and standing with our European allies and partners in defense of the rules-based system that underpins our security, prosperity, and values. Today, Europe stands at the front lines of the fight to defend the principles of freedom, sovereignty, and non-aggression, and we will continue to work in lockstep to ensure that freedom prevails. America remains unequivocally committed to collective defense as enshrined in NATO’s Article 5 and will work alongside our NATO Allies to deter, defend against, and build resilience to aggression and coercion in all its forms.
+
+> As we step up our own sizable contributions to NATO capabilities and readiness – including by strengthening defensive forces and capabilities, and upholding our long-standing commitment to extended deterrence – we will count on our Allies to continue assuming greater responsibility by increasing their spending, capabilities, and contributions. European defense investments, through or complementary to NATO, will be critical to ensuring our shared security at this time of intensifying competition. We stand behind NATO’s continued adaptation to modern security challenges, including its emphasis on defense in cyberspace, climate security, and the growing security risks presented by the PRC’s policies and actions.
+
+#### Putting the Conventional Military Balance in Perspective
+
+As yet, there are no clear Russian plans to correct the many weaknesses the War in the Ukraine has revealed in its forces. It is clear, however, that Russia must be making such plans, and will take a much more competitive stance to shaping forces that can influence, deter, and – if necessary – fight NATO and Western supported countries. Putin’s speeches have made this all too clear, and Russia would in any case have to make major efforts to restructure and modernize its forces just to keep up with the many new advances in weaponry and military technology.
+
+The U.S., Canada, and NATO European states must make similar changes. They not only must compete with Russia, but also most must compensate for years of decline in the size of their forces, rates of modernization, and any real-world effort to improve interoperability either within their forces or by providing new forces and capabilities to match the changes in the most advanced national forces.
+
+The Russian invasion of the Ukraine has shown all too clearly that most NATO countries have underestimated the Russian threat and have taken excessive “peace dividends” in terms of cuts in their defense efforts since 1992. Most former Warsaw Pact states that are now in NATO, and on or near the borders of Russia have failed to properly convert and modernize their forces to fight as part of NATO.
+
+Moreover, most NATO countries also failed to take effective steps to correct this situation after Russia seized the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. They never met NATO’s goal of spending 2% of their GDP on military forces, and those that did found that this goal was too low to properly modernize, and maintain, readiness and force size. Seen with the hindsight provided by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO countries generally came closer to “farce” planning than force planning. So far, neither NATO nor any NATO country have made their plans to deal with this situation clearly. They do not publish meaningful force plans, net assessments, or projected budgets.
+
+As a result, there is no current way to know how well either Russia or NATO countries will engage in the “war” to modernize their forces and make them more effective, although Russia is clearly attempting to increase its influence and military role in Belarus and Moldova. The broad structure of U.S., European NATO, and Russian conventional military balance is shown in Figure Three, along with the forces of China which is the core of another winter war discussed later in this analysis.
+
+This kind of traditional comparison of personnel and major weapons strength does not, however, approach a meaningful net assessment. It does not cover the wide range of competition for economic power, dominance in technology, and the capability to fund military competition between the United State and its strategic partners, Russia, and China. This analysis is far too long to include in this analysis, but it is summarized in a different study entitled Major Powers and Strategic Partners: A Graphic Net Assessment.
+
+It does not reflect the scale and impact of the massive cuts in the military forces of the former Soviet Union as shrank to become Russia, or the equally serious cuts in the forces that NATO countries deployed in Europe in 1992. It only compares key elements of force size based on active personnel and major weapons platforms.
+
+This means that it does not compare training, other elements of readiness, sustainment and warfighting reserves, military industrial and technology bases, deployments and power projection capabilities, and interoperability. It also does not show comparative modernization and the massive shifts taking place in the role of battle management and secure communications, space, cyber, smart and long-range munitions, artificial intelligence, joint all-domain capabilities, and all the other emerging and disruptive technologies that are reshaping military forces on a global basis.
+
+Such force comparisons help put the military dimension of the winter wars in perspective, but they also have serious limits. In many ways, traditional force comparisons are the equivalent of the kind of military analysis that focus only on infantry and cavalry before World War I, or that ignored the new role of armor, air power, and changes in the role of sea power before World War II. Put generously, traditional military strength analysis probably only addresses about 20% of modern military capability, and much of the “war” in the restructuring of Russian and NATO conventional forces triggered by the ongoing war in Ukraine will parallel the changes triggered by shifts in nuclear forces, dual capable forces, and precision conventional strike capabilities discussed later in this analysis. They will play out over the coming decades as a revolution in military forces that no one can currently predict and fully characterize.
+
+![image03a](https://i.imgur.com/9llOGKe.png)
+_▲ __Figure Three: The Military Balance in 2021 – Part One.__ Source: Adapted from IISS, Military Balance 2022 with some minor adjustments using U.S. military data. Figures for all countries do not include reserve personnel by service, Coast Guard, coastal defense, and paramilitary forces; and 175,000 active personnel in Chinese strategic support forces._
+
+![image03b](https://i.imgur.com/CuyFX1l.png)
+_▲ __Figure Three: The Military Balance in 2021 – Part Two.__ Source: Adapted from IISS, Military Balance 2022 with some minor adjustments using U.S. military data. Figures for all countries do not include reserve personnel by service, Coast Guard, coastal defense, and paramilitary forces; and 175,000 active personnel in Chinese strategic support forces._
+
+#### The Ukraine War and the Conventional Arms Race
+
+At the same time, there are very real financial limits on what both sides can spend on improving and modernizing their conventional military forces, and the economic war between Russia and the West will have a major impact on their spending. The improvements in military capability that both sides must now make are also driven by the need to make very costly improvements in their military forces and will probably involve the need to higher percentages of total national GDPs over the period of a decade or more. This will inevitably increase the competition over military spending versus spending on civilian programs and needs.
+
+This is particularly true of Russia. The military and economic cost of the war in Ukraine alone has already reached levels which the Russian leadership almost certainly grossly underestimated in launching the conflict.
+
+The cost to Western states and their strategic partners of their military and economic support for Ukraine has also been far higher than political leaders anticipated in shaping their initial aid plans. The rises in prices for energy and other imports mentioned earlier have raised inflation to critical levels, and there already have been political calls for less aid to Ukraine and broader political indications that NATO countries are cutting back on their plans to modernize and improve their forces.
+
+Russia, however, is now far poorer than its Western challengers. Once again, the full range of trends involved is too complex to show in this analysis and is provided in a separate report called Major Powers and Strategic Partners: A Graphic Net Assessment. One metric alone, however, shows how serious the economic challenges Russia faces.
+
+The World Bank estimates that the U.S. alone had a GDP of $22.966 trillion in current dollars in 2021, the EU had a GDP of $17.089 trillion, and NATO estimates that NATO Europe and Canada had a GDP of some $22.687 billion. The World Bank estimates that Russia only had a GDP of $1.776 billion in 2021, which scarcely makes it an economic superpower in global terms. Unlike the U.S. its only major strategic partner is Belarus, which had a GDP of only $0.682 billion.
+
+Democracies do have to respond to popular civil demands by paying far more of their government income to meet civil needs, but NATO’s total estimated GDP in 2021 was $45,653 trillion, some 26 times the Russia GDP of $1.776 trillion.
+
+Unfortunately, there are no reliable ways to compare the publicly reported military spending of command economies like Russia or China – which often conceal key aspects of national security spending – with the relatively open and reliable reporting of Western states. If one looks at some of the best and most directly comparable estimates of military spending, however, NATO reports that the U.S. spent $793.99 billion on military forces in 2021, and NATO Europe spent $361.29 billion for a NATO total of some $1,096.6 billion. In contrast, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that Russia spent only $62.2 billion by the NATO definition of defense spending. This is only 5.7% of the reported total for NATO, which is 17 times the Russian figure.
+
+In practical terms, these GDP and military spending figures indicate that Russia is anything but a superpower in economic strength and military spending military. This becomes even more clear if one looks at the GDP and military spending of China and America’s key Asian strategic partners as additional standards of comparison.
+
+The World Bank estimated that China had a GDP of $17,734 billion in current dollars, while key Asian strategic partners like Japan had a GDP of $4,937 billion and South Korea had $1,799 billion. These figures show that the World Bank estimated that China’s GDP was almost exactly ten times larger than Russia’s. If one looks at the IISS military spending estimates, the IISS indicates that China’s official military spending figure was $207 billion and was $270 billion by NATO’s definition. The $270 billion figure indicates that China was spending 4.5 times as much on military forces as Russia.
+
+These comparisons are critical because it seems likely that the winter of 2022-2023 will mark the beginning of a lasting military confrontation between Russia and NATO, and a race to modernize and improve military forces that will last at least as long as Putin is in power. If the previous economic and military spending figures do represent real comparative power, they indicate that the funding of such a race to improve the military capabilities could sharply favor the West.
+
+They also illustrate why the U.S. and Western effort to support Ukraine is so important, and so cost-effective. The U.S. aloe had sent well over $50 billion in military, humanitarian, and civil aid by November 2022 – scarcely a minor sum – and it was clear that the Ukraine would be dependent on outside aid indefinitely to both continue fighting and recover from the war after any settlement. The cost to Russia, however, was far greater and placed a burden on a far weaker economy – to the point where it was pushing Russia into the status of a second level military power. At the same time, it sent a critical message to China about U.S. strength and resolve that was equally important.
+
+The U.S. national security strategy issued in October 2022 singled out China as the primary threat to the U.S., and several key U.S. security partners in NATO – notably Britain – have recently focused on China. Funding a “race” to modernize NATO will be limited by the fact that the U.S. and some strategic partners must also focus on China and other threats.
+
+Furthermore, some experts question whether the current estimates of Russian military spending are too low. Russia has the potential military advantage of unity and a totalitarian leadership that can exert direct control over a command economy and do so with far less need to respond to popular civil needs. Although Russia also has suffered major losses in the fighting in Ukraine and has used up many of its reserves of weapons, munitions, and parts.
+
+More broadly, NATO countries will enter the winter of 2022-2023 with major civil economic problems, and new popular demands for government spending that seem likely to limit member country military spending. NATO will also begin the broader Ukrainian War arms race having taken larger peace dividends over the last two decades, and with 30 (32?) member countries that have radically different force structures, poor overall interoperability, and radically different trends in real world force modernization.
+
+More broadly, the unclassified data on the Russia military industrial base, and many key elements of its national and military technology base, are very limited. While it is not clear that this is still the case, it is also important to remember that Cold War intelligence estimates of the military expenditures of the Soviet Union were later shown to be gross underestimates of the actual spending as the West gained access to the Soviet Union. The same was true of the Soviet Union’s military research and development activities, and the size and efficiency of its military industries – many of which provide to be far larger – and at the same time less efficient – than expert estimated during the Cold War.
+
+More data are available on the U.S. and Western military industrial base, and many key elements of its national and military technology base, but a close example indicates that many seemingly comparable data are not truly comparable, and that there are many gaps in coverage, particularly on actual programs, ongoing active activities, and any credible measures of effectiveness. It is also clear from the history of many national efforts that quantity is not a measure of quality.
+
+
+### The “Winter War”in Precision Strike Capabilities, Air/Missile Defense, and Emerging/Disruptive Technologies
+
+Here, it is also important to put any such arms races in the proper context. Advances in military technology will have their own influence and all of the world’s major powers will have to compete in making major expenditures on new military technology, weapons, and new forms of warfare.
+
+Russia and Ukraine have shown that new conventional weapons with precision strike capability, and advances in targeting and related forms of intelligence, can make a major difference in both military combat and in strike civilian targets. These weapons range from short-range systems like anti-tank missiles and drones to long range missiles and launch platforms ranging from hand-held weapons to theater-wide strike capabilities.
+
+The U.S. and a number of European states already have long-range precision conventional strike systems that can destroy critical infrastructure and high value targets, and all of the world’s major powers are working on the development of new longer-range ballistic, cruise, and new approach to strike technology. Other developments include other related advances in precision strike capabilities against critical civil and military systems, advances in many forms of targeting, and the deployment of steadily more to advanced 5th generation aircraft, in multi-platform weaponry.
+
+Almost inevitably, these advances in strike systems mean that missile and air defenses will be a matching source of competition, and another form of “war.” As is discussed shortly, the advances in precision strike also creates the risk that many new systems may acquire dual capability and nuclear warheads.
+
+Even the more advanced current defense systems like the Russian S-400 and the U.S. Patriot have serious increase limits and there are good reasons why Ukraine had steadily increased its calls for more advanced air and missile defenses, why Russia will seek to speed up the development of its new systems and why the U.S. and NATO Europe must now seriously consider major near-term investment in effective theater defenses.
+
+The war in Ukraine has also highlighted the vulnerability of existing armor, the need for more advanced artillery, the vulnerability of ships to missiles, and a host of other advances in secure communications, battle management, logistic support systems. They also interact with a wide range of new military technologies that affect the use of space, cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, and other emerging and “disruptive” technologies that can do far more to integrate every aspect of military operations and forms of joint all-domain operations.
+
+None of these advances are cheap, but some deployments have already begun, and they may amount to a near revolution in military force structures and operations over the coming decade. This means the competition in the development and deployment of high technology military capabilities and systems will be a form of “warfare” where selecting the right mix of improvements could give one side a major advantage in terms of both deterrence and strategic leverage in peacetime, and where making the right investments selectively will be critical in shaping both deterrence and the nature of any actual warfighting.
+
+The winter of 2022-2023 is not likely to produce major new developments in these areas, but each round of Russian missile attacks and every expansion of the target base does increase NATO’s need to move more quickly, invest more, and develop some coherent plans for deployment in all four areas. Like many other aspects of the “winter war,” the fighting already is a major catalyst in shaping global arms races and one where it seems less and less likely that the world will return to anything like the levels of pre-Ukraine War stability, peace dividends, and arms control that had
+existed since 1992.
+
+
+### The “Winter War” inRussia, US and Western, and Chinese Nuclear Forces
+
+These challenges will also be further increased by yet another form of winter war. Russia has raised the issue of tactical nuclear warfare in the Ukraine War, and this is only a small part of the near collapse of many forms of nuclear arms control, and a steadily heightening nuclear arms that has reached the point where the competition in global strategic weapons has shifted from a competition between the U.S. and Russia to one that includes China.
+
+In practice, Russia, the U.S., Britain, France, and China became involved in a major nuclear modernization effort long before the Ukraine War began. Here, a substantial amount of official unclassified data are available. The total nuclear weapons holdings of Russia, the U.S., Britain, France, and other powers are summarized in Figure Four. U.S. nuclear modernization plans are summarized in Figure Five, and Russian and Chinese plans are summarized in Figure Five.
+
+It should be stressed that the summaries in Figures Four, Five, and Six use unclassified material developed in 2021, and their contents may differ significantly from current intelligence estimates, as well as from outside analysts who produced Figures Four and Five, which include Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Robert Norris, and Amy F. Wolf of the Congressional Research Service.
+
+The data for China are particularly uncertain, since comparatively little unclassified detail is available on Chinese nuclear weapons developments. However, there have been reports that China has built three new fields of at least 250 new missile silos, and now has three new fast breeder reactors it can use to increase its production of Plutonium and nuclear weapons. Reports have also surfaced that China will actively participate in adapting different types of theater and tactical nuclear weapons to provide proven, functional nuclear warheads for the newer missile systems of Russia, China, and the U.S.
+
+As the data for 2022 in Figure Five show, the War in the Ukraine has given Russian nuclear efforts a new and higher profile. Its importance has also been highlighted by the fact Putin has talked about “dirty” radiological bombs and made repeated references to the use of theater nuclear weapons, in his public speeches on the Ukraine War. Reports have also been made that Russian generals have begun to seriously discuss tactical and theater nuclear options, and members of the U.S. Congress have debated the need for new nuclear armed cruise missiles as a possible counter to such Russian weapons.
+
+It is far from clear what holdings Russia and each NATO country now have of operational weapons because many are in storage, but unclassified estimates in Figure Four indicate that Russia has close to 2,000 theater and tactical nuclear weapons out of an inventory of as many as nearly 4,500 stored weapons, and the U.S. has some 3,750.
+
+It is also clear that nuclear weapons represent the one major area where Russia is still a true superpower in military terms. The Ukraine war has made its weakness in conventional forces all too clear, and current estimates of its research and development resources indicate that it cannot compete with the West in military technology, or with the rising technology base of China. It does, however, have major holds of nuclear weapons that it inherited from the former Soviet Union.
+
+While some aspects of such estimates are uncertain – particularly for China; the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is almost certainly broadly correct in estimating that Russia had some 6,257 nuclear weapons in its total inventory in 2021. This compared with 5,550 for the U.S., 350 for China, 225 for Britain, 290 for France, 160 for India, 165 for Pakistan, 90 for Israel, and 45 for North Korea.
+
+Russia’s holdings also give it the ability to deploy large numbers of theater/tactical nuclear weapons, although the figures involved are uncertain. An unclassified estimate by the FAS indicates that Russia had 2,565 strategic nuclear warheads and 1,912 non-strategic and defensive force warheads in early 2022 and reported that some experts felt the latter number might double 2030. It also listed possible deployments of tactical and theater weapons in naval, air, land, and missile defense forces, and a wide range of possible delivery systems.
+
+There are no similar estimates of the holdings of non-strategic weapons by most other states, but the FAS does indicate that the U.S. may be the only power with large holdings that could be rapidly adapted for theater and tactical use. It could draw upon 2,000 nuclear in storage and 1,750 more weapons awaiting dismantlement.
+
+The FAS also reports that the U.S. had 100 B-61 nuclear bombs in Europe for F-16, F-18, Tornado, and F-35 combat aircraft with yields from 50 KT to 170 KT and is adapting some strategic weapons to have a lower yield option that could be used for theater and tactical targeting. It states that, “Belgian, Dutch, German, and Italian air forces are assigned nuclear strike missions with US nuclear weapons.” It reports France had some 300 variable yield nuclear weapons – three sets of 16 for its submarines and 54 cruise missiles for carrier and land-based Rafale delivery systems which could be used for both strategic and theater strikes. It does not report Britain as having tactical or theater nuclear weapons and indicate all of its weapons are for its SSBNs.
+
+The Arms Control Association reports that the United States has some 100 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs, and that that are forward-deployed at six NATO bases in five European countries: Aviano and Ghedi in Italy; Büchel in Germany; Incirlik in Turkey; Kleine Brogel in Belgium; and Volkel in the Netherlands. Another 130 U.S. B-61s are in inventory. France and Britain also may have low yield or other nuclear weapons in storage that could be used or modified for theater use.
+
+In short, a situation already exists where there is a revival of active competition in the deployment of theater nuclear forces as forms of military leverage and a higher – if still limited – risk of their use actual warfare fighting. It is also clear that the future of arms control is highly uncertain, and that Russia has on obvious incentive to try to use its nuclear weapons to obtain political and military leverage. Combined with the faltering progress in arms control and the fact the U.S must now compete with China as well as Russia, the War in the Ukraine again highlights the fact that there is another kind of Winter War, and one that potentially is far more dangerous.
+
+![image04](https://i.imgur.com/xJhpzzQ.png)
+_▲ __Figure Four: Estimate of Total World Nuclear Weapons Holding by Country.__ Source: [Hans M. Kristensen. Matt Korda, and Robert Norris, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” 2022](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces)._
+
+![image05](https://i.imgur.com/9LVHP02.png)
+_▲ __Figure Five: Russian, and Chinese Nuclear Modernization.___
+
+> #### Chinese Nuclear Modernization
+
+- Seems to be more than doubling its stockpile of nuclear weapons. May have risen from around 200 to 350 by 2020. 272 operational for exiting missiles and bombs and 78 for new systems. Possibly grew by 118 warheads during 2020-2021.
+
+- Have detected 270+ new missile silos. 119 in Northwestern China seem to be for ICBMs.
+
+- Has shunned arms control and transparency.
+
+- Steadily improving nuclear command and control and battle management systems.
+
+- Deploying advanced solid-fuel mobile ICBMs (DF-21 & DF-31/DF-31A/DF-32AG), MIRV’d liquid-fueled ICBM (DF-5B), new MIRV’d DF-41 ICBM, Type 094 SSBN with JL-2 SLBMs.
+
+- Developing low noise 096 SSBN and 9,000 kilometer range 096 SLBM.
+
+- Progressively harder to determine what theater and short-range delivery systems may become dual-capable. DF-21 MRBM (2,150 KM) and DF-26 IRBM (4,000 KM) known to be nuclear. DF-21 is precision strike, dual-capable and could deliver low-yield nuclear weapons.
+
+- Modifying H-6 nuclear bombers to H-6N with refueling, missile carrying capability. H-20 stealth bomber in development.
+
+- May be evolving far beyond countervalue second strike capability. Examining use as theater warfare threat?
+
+_Source: [Hans M. Kristensen. Matt Korda, and Robert Norris, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” 2022](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces); [SIPRI Yearbook, Section 2: China’s Nuclear Forces: Moving Beyond a Minimal Deterrent, 2021](https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/Chapter_3_Section_2--Chinas_Nuclear_Forces_Moving_beyond_a_Minimal_Deterrent.pdf); and DIA, China, Military Power, 2021._
+
+![image06a](https://i.imgur.com/oH31AQX.png)
+_▲ __Figure Six: U.S. Nuclear Modernization – Part One.__ Source: [Data for early 2022 are excerpted and adapted from Shannon Bugos, “Nuclear Modernization Program Fact Sheet,” Arms Control Association, January 2022](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USNuclearModernization#snapshot), and data for October 2022 are excerpted from [2022 Nuclear Posture Review, DoD web site, October 27, 2022](https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF)._
+
+![image06b](https://i.imgur.com/sjpf178.png)
+_▲ __Figure Six: U.S. Nuclear Modernization – Part Two.__ Source: [2022 Nuclear Posture Review, DoD web site, October 27, 2022](https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF), p. 21_
+
+
+### The “Winter War” in China: From Cooperation and Competition to Confrontation and Active War Planning
+
+More broadly, it is clear that the levels of tension between China and the U.S and several of its strategic partners have created yet another form of winter war. While the active combat in Ukraine has gotten more public attention than the growing level of political, economic, and military confrontation between China and the US and its European and Asian strategic partners, the extent of political and economic warfare between the U.S. and China is nearly as great, and the current level of military confrontation between the U.S. and China has received at least as much attention in U.S. strategic and war planning as the confrontation between the U.S. and Russia.
+
+The level of tension between China and the West has also increased sharply as the world has entered the winter of 2022-2023. President Xi Jinping clearly emerged at the dominant leader of China at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 and made it clear that he was committed to make China the dominant economic and military power in the world, and to expanding its political role and leverage on a global basis.
+
+#### The Role of China in the New U.S. National Security Strategy
+
+The U.S. National Security Strategy issued October 2022 makes it clear that the U.S. now sees China as the primary threat to its security, and more in terms of war than any real intention to emphasize cooperation.
+
+> The 2022 National Defense Strategy advances a strategy focused on the PRC ,and on collaborating with our growing network of Allies and partners on common objectives. It seeks to prevent the PRC’s dominance of key regions while protecting the U.S. homeland and reinforcing a stable and open international system. Consistent with the 2022 National Defense Strategy, a key objective is to dissuade the PRC from considering aggression as a viable means of advancing goals that threaten vital U.S. national security interests. Conflict with the PTC is neither inevitable or desirable. The Department’s priorities support broader whole-of-government efforts to develop terms of interaction with the PRC that are favorable to our interests and values, while managing strategic competition and enabling the pursuit of cooperation on common challenges.
+
+> ...The most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security is the PRC’s coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences, The PRC seeks to undermine U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and leverage its growing strength and military footprint to coerce its neighbors and threaten their interests, The PRC’s increasingly provocative rhetoric and coercive activity towards Taiwan are destabilizing, risk miscalculation, and threaten the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. This is part of a broader pattern of destabilizing and coercive Chinese behavior that stretches across the East China Sea, and along the Line of Actual Control. The PRC has expanded and modernized nearly every aspect of the PLA, with a focus on offsetting U.S. military advantages. The PRC is therefore the pacing challenge for the Department.
+
+> The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing has ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power. It is using its technological capacity and increasing influence over international institutions to create more permissive conditions for its own authoritarian model, and to mold global technology use and norms to privilege its interests and values. Beijing frequently uses its economic power to coerce countries. It benefits from the openness of the international economy while limiting access to its domestic market, and it seeks to make the world more dependent on the PRC while reducing its own dependence on the world. The PRC is also investing in a military that is rapidly modernizing, increasingly capable in the Indo-Pacific, and growing in strength and reach globally – all while seeking to erode U.S. alliances in the region and around the world.
+
+> ...Our strategy toward the PRC is threefold: 1) to invest in the foundations of our strength at home – our competitiveness, our innovation, our resilience, our democracy, 2) to align our efforts with our network of allies and partners, acting with common purpose and in common cause, and 3) compete responsibly with the PRC to defend our interests and build our vision for the future. The first two elements – invest and align – are described in the previous section and are essential to out-competing the PRC in the technological, economic, political, military, intelligence, and global governance domains.
+
+> Competition with the PRC is most pronounced in the Indo-Pacific, but it is also increasingly global. Around the world, the contest to write the rules of the road and shape the relationships that govern global affairs is playing out in every region and across economics, technology, diplomacy, development, security, and global governance. In the competition with the PRC, as in other arenas, it is clear that the next ten years will be the decisive decade. We stand now at the inflection point, where the choices we make and the priorities we pursue today will set us on a course that determines our competitive position long into the future.
+
+> Many of our allies and partners, especially in the Indo-Pacific, stand on the frontlines of the PRC’s coercion and are rightly determined to seek to ensure their own autonomy, security, and prosperity. We will support their ability to make sovereign decisions in line with their interests and values, free from external pressure, and work to provide high-standard and scaled investment, development assistance, and markets. Our strategy will require us to partner with, support, and meet the economic and development needs of partner countries, not for the sake of competition, but for their own sake.
+
+> We will act in common purpose to address a range of issues – from untrusted digital infrastructure and forced labor in supply chains and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. We will hold Beijing accountable for abuses – genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, human rights violations in Tibet, and the dismantling of Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedoms – even as it seeks to pressure countries and communities into silence. We will continue prioritizing investments in a combat credible military that deters aggression against our allies and partners in the region, and can help those allies and partners defend themselves.
+
+#### Growing Chinese Ties to Russia?
+
+At the same time, serious questions exist about the extent to which U.S. and other security efforts to deal with China can be separated from those necessary to deal with Russia. Although most experts feel there are serious limits to the level of “friendship” and alliance between the two countries, this is far from certain. For example, Japan’s 2022 defense white paper notes that Russian and Chinese overflights and naval exercises have sharply increased in the areas north of Japan and treats them as a serious potential threat.
+
+The U.S. National Security Strategy, issued in October 2022 makes it clear that the U.S. sees both China and Russia as major threats to the international order, although it views such threats as different in character:
+
+> The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit, even as the United States remains committed to managing the competition between our countries responsibly....The most pressing strategic challenge facing our vision is from powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy. It is their behavior that poses a challenge to international peace and stability – especially waging or preparing for wars of aggression, actively undermining the democratic political processes of other countries, leveraging technology and supply chains for coercion and repression, and exporting an illiberal model of international order. Many non-democracies join the world’s democracies in forswearing these behaviors.
+
+> Unfortunately, Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) do not. Russia and the PRC pose different challenges. Russia poses an immediate threat to the free and open international system, recklessly flouting the basic laws of the international order today, as its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has shown. The PRC, by contrast, is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective.
+
+> ... we recognize that globalization has delivered immense benefits for the United States and the world but an adjustment is now required to cope with dramatic global changes such as widening inequality within and among countries, the PRC’s emergence as both our most consequential competitor and one of our largest trading partners, and emerging technologies that fall outside the bounds of existing rules and regulations. We have an affirmative agenda for the global economy to seize the full range of economic benefits of the 21st century while advancing the interests of American workers. Recognizing we have to move beyond traditional Free Trade Agreements, we are charting new economic arrangements to deepen economic engagement with our partners, like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF); a global minimum tax that ensures corporations pay their fair share of tax wherever they are based in the world; the Partnership for Global Investment and Infrastructure (PGII) to help low- and middle-income countries secure high-standard investment for critical infrastructure; updated rules of the road for technology, cyberspace, trade, and economics; and ensuring the transition to clean energy unlocks economic opportunities and good jobs around the world.
+
+> ... The world is now at an inflection point. This decade will be decisive, in setting the terms of our competition with the PRC, managing the acute threat posed by Russia, and in our efforts to deal with shared challenges, particularly climate change, pandemics, and economic turbulence.
+
+China has also made it clear since at least the early 1990s that its military build-up is focused largely on the U.S., the Pacific, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Middle East. It has cooperated with Russia in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization since the days when it was the Shanghai Five.
+
+China has also based much of its military modernization on Russian weapons and technology, and Japan’s 2022 defense white paper notes that Russian and Chinese overflights and naval exercises have sharply increased in the areas north of Japan and treats them as a serious potential threat.
+
+While it seems likely that Russia will ultimately emerge from the war in the Ukraine in greater need of a major outside strategic partners, China and Russia could both gain from a stronger partnership in the strategic aspects of their wars in energy, economics, and technology, and building up their military strength in gaining military leverage and in the event of any serious regional or theater conflict. It is true that authoritarian regimes tend to seek partnerships that serve the ambitions of their individual leader, but in this case that ambitions may increasingly coincide.
+
+#### China’s Military Build-Up
+
+China does seem to be far more successful than Russia in moving towards the point where it can compete directly with the U.S. and its strategic partners in conventional military power. The new U.S. strategy describes China’s efforts to improve its conventional military forces in terms that describe them as focusing on all the major elements of the U.S. effort to improve its conventional military forces:
+
+> In addition to expanding its conventional forces, the PRC is rapidly advancing and integrating its space, counterspace, electronic, and informational warfare capabilities to support its holistic approach to joint warfare. The PLA seeks to target the ability of the Joint Force to project power to defend vital U.S. interests and our Allies in a crisis or conflict. The PRC is also expanding the PLA’s global footprint and working to establish a more robust overseas and basing infrastructure to allow it to project power at greater distances. In parallel, the PRC is accelerating the modernization and expansion of its nuclear capabilities. The United States and its Allies and partners will increasingly face the challenge of deterring two major powers with modern and diverse nuclear capabilities – the PRC and Russia – creating new stress on strategic stability.
+
+China has already made significant progress in achieving parity with the U.S. The conventional balance shown earlier in Figure Three reflects massive increases in China’s conventional military strength since 1990, and these numbers only show a comparatively small part of the massive Chinese shift away from a reliance on creating the largest possible ground forces to defend Chinese territory in 1990 to creating land, naval forces, and air forces as modern or more modern that U.S. forces. China has been creating major power projection capabilities in the Pacific and Indian Ocean since at least the md-1990s, and China has published a variety of unclassified defense white papers and strategies that make it clear that it is seeking to become superior in its ability to use the most advanced emerging and disruptive technologies.
+
+An unclassified series of estimates of the growth of Chinese sea power relative to U.S. sea power is shown in Figure Seven, and shows that China is not only becoming a major blue water navy, but could also overtake the US Navy in numbers. While Chinese ships would generally be smaller, they do not need the ability to project power across the entire Pacific over long periods of time that the U.S. Navy must provide, and work by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and General Accountability Office (GAO) warn that the U.S. Navy may have significantly overestimated the ship building efforts that current budgets allow it to perform.
+
+The impact of Chinese efforts over the past few decades are also reflected in the estimate of the military balance in the northwestern Pacific is shown in Figure Eight. It shows that Chinese, Taiwanese, and U.S. military forces are already postured for a possible war over Taiwan, and the overall level of military confrontation in the region.
+
+More broadly, Figure Nine shows that unclassified intelligence assessments, and a variety of unclassified studies by outside experts, report that that China is increasing its military spending far more quickly than Russia, and Figure Ten highlights a Japanese official estimate of how the increases in Chinese military spending are affecting some key aspects of the regional balance by showing the rising totals of modern Chinese naval surface vessels, submarines, and combat aircraft.
+
+Figures Nine and Ten show that China and Xi can also draw upon a far stronger economic base and level of military spending in stepping up such competition than Putin can in Russia. China is also making a far larger annual investment in technology and a far higher level of manufacturing capability. These affect many aspects of its comparative military industrial base and ability to eventually match the U.S. and West’s technology base – trends that are shown in detail in Major Powers and Strategic Partners: A Graphic Net Assessment.
+
+The trends in latter assessment also show that China’s rapid growth as a global economic trading power, aggressive foreign investment, and state-driven ability to seek economic ties and leverage on global basis – exemplified by its Belt and Road Initiative – have made it a much more serious challenger than Russia, although its action have alienated a number of states.
+
+China’s future growth does, however, face growing challenges. Its rate of economic growth has diminished since 2021, it has badly mismanaged its effort to deal with COVID, its property market is in a crisis, its labor and manufacturing costs are rising, it is over-regulating its technology sector, unemployment is rising, and its population is aging. Nevertheless, China is still growing sharply as a military and global power, and the U.S. National Security Strategy issued October 2022 makes it clear that the U.S. now sees China as the primary threat to its security, and more in terms of war than any real intention to emphasize cooperation.
+
+> The 2022 National Defense Strategy advances a strategy focused on the PRC ,and on collaborating with our growing network of Allies and partners on common objectives. It seeks to prevent the PRC’s dominance of key regions while protecting the U.S. homeland and reinforcing a stable and open international system. Consistent with the 2022 National Defense Strategy, a key objective is to dissuade the PRC from considering aggression as a viable means of advancing goals that threaten vital U.S. national security interests. Conflict with the PTC is neither inevitable or desirable. The Department’s priorities support broader whole-of-government efforts to develop terms of interaction with the PRC that are favorable to our interests and values, while managing strategic competition and enabling the pursuit of cooperation on common challenges.
+
+> ...The most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security is the PRC’s coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences, The PRC seeks to undermine U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and leverage its growing strength and military footprint to coerce its neighbors and threaten their interests, The PRC’s increasingly provocative rhetoric and coercive activity towards Taiwan are destabilizing, risk miscalculation, and threaten the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. This is part of a broader pattern of destabilizing and coercive Chinese behavior that stretches across the East China Sea, and along the Line of Actual Control. The PRC has expanded and modernized nearly every aspect of the PLA, with a focus on offsetting U.S. military advantages. The PRC is therefore the pacing challenge for the Department.
+
+#### Guessing at the Future
+
+There is no reliable way to project the comparative rate of Chinese and U.S. modernization at this point of time. As has already been discussed in the case of Russia, the unclassified data on Chinese military industrial base, and many key elements of its national and military technology base, are very limited.
+
+Once again, it is also important to point out that more unclassified data are available on the U.S. and Western military industrial base, and many key elements of its national and military technology base, but a close example indicates that many seemingly comparable data are not truly comparable, and that there are many gaps in coverage, particularly on actual programs, ongoing active activities, and any credible measures of effectiveness. It is also clear from the history of many national efforts that quantity is not a measure of quality.
+
+The available unclassified data do clearly indicate that China’s efforts are now massively greater than Russia. Nevertheless, it is still far from clear when China expects achieve any parity in its conventional forces and power projection capabilities in its areas of primary interest. Chinese national strategy and defense reports have listed a number of possible years for such parity that have extended from the late 2020s to well beyond 2035. In practice, however. China has been careful to qualify their meaning and strategic impact. It also has failed to tie them to future forces levels, success in meeting modernization goals, and levels of defense spending, or any clear intensions to use them for active combat as distinguished from military leverage.
+
+As noted earlier, the full range of U.S. efforts to reshape and modernize its forces to deal with China is also unclear. The full impact of the new strategy on U.S. plans to deal with China and Russia will only begin to become clear when the President submits his new defense budget proposal to Congress early in 2023.
+
+The U.S., however, is already reshaping its Navy and Marine Corps to deal with the emerging Chinese threat, however, and media reports make it clear that it is conducting a wide range of war games and studies to deal with the possibility of war to defend Taiwan from a Chinese invasion as well as to support Japan, Australia, South Korea, and other partners and friendly states. The National Security Strategy document notes that,
+
+> We have an abiding interest in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which is critical to regional and global security and prosperity and a matter of international concern and attention. We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side, and do not support Taiwan independence. We remain committed to our one China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. And we will uphold our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan’s self-defense and to maintain our capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion against Taiwan.
+
+Any major conflict or clash between the U.S. and China seems unlikely in the near term, and both President Biden and a top U.S. official in the Department of Defense have stated that war is unlikely in next two years, although he expects the PRC to increase pressure on Taiwan as it expands its military capabilities for an amphibious invasion. Two years, however, is scarcely a long period in strategic terms, and media reports make it clear that the U.S. is conducting war games and exercises to find the best way to deal with a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and is planning for a sudden war over Taiwan and one that could easily escalate to cover much of the South China Sea and the rest of the western Pacific.
+
+In practice, the “Winter War” between the U.S. and China is far more serious at a practical military level than U.S. and Chinese political rhetoric usually indicates and presents a special challenge for the US. The late Andrew Marshal highlighted this challenge early in China’s competition with the U.S. by highlight what he called “countervailing power:” The ability of one side to pressure the other by create a military crisis and build-up that forced the other spend far more of its money and military efforts to meet a challenge than the other.
+
+In some ways, Taiwan is a clear case in point. Competing at the far end of the Pacific where China normally deploys much of its military power, and over the comparative vast distances the Pacific imposes in terms of power projection, is far more expensive for the U.S. than for China. China could step up the level of force the U.S. needs to compete through relatively simple deployments and at little cost, and it takes relatively minimal risk. A successful U.S. defense of Taiwan would scarcely lead to an invasion of China and would confront the U.S. with having to then sustain a far greater forward military presence tailored to the defense of one strategic partner, while any U.S. failure to defend would undermine its entire strategic position in Asia. The base case for the U.S. is close to the worst case in terms of countervailing power.
+
+It is also clear from the U.S. National Security Strategy that the U.S. sees the expansion of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Gulf, the rest of the Middle East, and Africa as hostile and as a far broader threat. No one on either side can dismiss that risk of a conflicts somewhere else in the Pacific or Asia, or be certain of the level of theater-wide escalation or intensity of combat that might occur.
+
+Moreover, the level of tension over trade, economic policy, and technological espionage has also reached a level of confrontation bordering on economic warfare. China is after all the land of Sun Tzu and has already shown how well it can focus on forms of warfare that rely on economic power and military influence rather than combat.
+
+Finally, it seems likely that if the full range of Western intelligence on Chinese nuclear weapons, and nuclear and dual-capable delivery systems was made public, it might well indicate that China intends to become a far larger nuclear power and one that can directly compete in strength with the U.S. and Russia. Certainly, its improvement in ICBMs and SSBNs, and its development of a wide range of longer range and advanced strike systems will be given far greater capacity than it has had in the past.
+
+A meeting of President Biden and President XI on November 14th, 2022, tried to put a different face on these developments, and give the impression that the U.S. and China were actively seeking to improve their level of cooperation. In reality, however, it seemed to be largely an attempt to find ways to maintain trade and more limited forms of economic cooperation between two powers that were actively involved in political and economic warfare in many areas than any real progress towards real cooperation and cutbacks in their military build-ups on ongoing levels of political and economic warfare. It was all too clear from the White House statements about the meeting that the meeting did not resolve any key issues, but was designed rather to find some areas where both sides could benefit without making any serious changes in their competition, and that it reflected more of a reaction to the common problems the U.S. and China faced because of COVID and the war in Ukraine than any serious effort to change their strategic positions.
+
+In short, Xi and the 20th Party Congress, and the new US National Security Strategy issued in October 2022 have already made China part of a “winter war,” and one with all of the same major risks as the “winter war” with Russia. However, this is a combination of military confrontation and political and economic conflict whose intensity has been steadily rising for more than a decade, and that seems just as likely to ensure for years to come as the “winter war” with Putin’s Russia.
+
+![image07](https://i.imgur.com/7TyrJTw.png)
+_▲ __Figure Seven: The Massive Increases in Chinese Military Spending.__ Source: [Cailtlin Campbell, China Primer: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2021](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11719/4); and Bastian Giegerich, Emile Hokayem, and Sharinee Jagtiani, Regional security and alliances in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific: Implications for European security, IISS, Hans Seidel Foundation, January 2022, p. 3_
+
+![image08](https://i.imgur.com/EzCxl9A.png)
+_▲ __Figure Eight: U.S. Navy Estimate of Chinese Combat Shipbuilding Relative to U.S. Navy.__ Source: Adapted from Ronald O’Rourke,Chinese Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Capabilities, Congressional Research Service RL33153, pp. 9&10_
+
+![image09](https://i.imgur.com/ZMr0rw5.png)
+_▲ __Figure Nine: Japanese MOD Estimate of the Military Forces in the Western Pacific and Taiwan in 2022.__ [Adapted from Japan, Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2022, August 2022](https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22187264/doj2022_en_full.pdf), p. 5_
+
+![image10](https://i.imgur.com/cnTe5pB.png)
+_▲ __Figure Ten: Chinese Deployment of Advanced Modern Submarines, Surface Ships, and 4th and 5th Generation Aircraft.__ [Adapted from Japan, Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2022, August 2022](https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22187264/doj2022_en_full.pdf), p. 43_
+
+
+### The “Winter War” in the Middle East
+
+There are a wide range of other active and potential “winter wars,” most of which preceded the War in Ukraine, and that involve threats and actual conflicts that will continue through the winter of 2022-2023. Many seem certain to continue for years to come. All have the potential to become much worse, however, and their cumulative impact places yet another major burden on U.S. and partner resources and capabilities.
+
+One key center of such “winter wars” is North Africa, the Middle East, and the Persian/Arab Gulf. Algeria and Libya are key centers of instability and civil tension in North Africa. Syria and Iran are key centers of instability in the Middle East, Iraq’s stability and unity is uncertain, and it seems likely that the Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Tigray, Somalia, and Yemen will continue to be flashpoints in the future.
+
+This helps explain why the U.S. has been actively involved in warfare in the Persian/Arab Gulf region since at least the first Gulf War in 1990, although it was indirectly involved in the Iran-Iraq War during 1980-1988, as well as every major Arab-Israel conflict. It is still involved in the fighting in eastern Syria and support its strategic partners in their fight against terrorism and their deterrence of external threats. Russia is involved in the civil war in Libya and Syria.
+
+From a purely military viewpoint, Iran is the most current serious regional threat in the region. Its arms race with the Arab Guld states has been a war for political and military leverage. Iran is also a potential nuclear power, and one that may well have completed the design and passive testing of non-fissile nuclear weapons. It can come steadily closer to the production of weapons grade Uranium, and it that may form serious security and economic ties to Russia and China. There is also a risk that Iran may be able to form a more serious security alliance with Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and even a Hezbollah dominated Lebanon.
+
+China and Russia are both competing with the U.S., Britain, and France for military influence and leverage in the region. China now has a military base in Djibouti, is playing a major role in the development of Pakistan’s ports and may be seeking to create more serious ties to Iran that include port facilities on its territory outside the Gulf. Russia is buying missiles and drones from Iran and Russian mercenaries have been active in the Libyan civil war. In contrast, U.S. ties to Egypt and the Arab Gulf states are weakening, as is European influence and ability to deploy land and air forces east of Suez. It is also clear that extremist and terrorist movements continue to be a threat.
+
+As Figure Eleven shows, the Middle East and nearby areas in North Africa and Asia are also major centers of terrorism and extremism. The terrorist activities sometimes interact on a regional basis, and most are driven by both failed governance and development, and at least low-level fighting between sects, ethnic groups, and tribes.
+
+As yet, these shifts do not seem to pose serious risks of new levels of conflict, but they do have that potential. Moreover, U.S. relations with Turkey do seem to be steadily more distant, and the overall level of development, stability, and security in the region continues to decline.
+
+![image11](https://i.imgur.com/fvl0Eni.png)
+_▲ __Figure Eleven: Major Terrorist Groups in Africa and the Middle East.__ [Adapted from Japan, Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2022, August 2022](https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22187264/doj2022_en_full.pdf), p. 43_
+
+
+### The “Winter War” in Asia and the Koreas
+
+The Afghan conflict seems to be over, although the Taliban have yet to show they can actually govern effectively. However, Asia and the Indian Ocean region present a continuing range of regional and internal security problems and the own range of wars for territory and military influence. China has recently clashed with India. India and Pakistan are steadily arming for another possible round of war, that could involve the use of nuclear weapons. Myanmar is a nightmare of internal conflict and repression, Afghanistan faces major internal instability, and there is a wide range of religious and ethnic tensions that include Chinese repression of the Uyghurs.
+
+The most serious current risk of a major conflict in the in the region, however, seems to be the rising level of tension and arms race between North Korea and South Korea, which could easily escalate to involve the U.S. and Japan, and possibly Russia and China.An estimate of the conventional military balance in the Koreas is shown in Figure Twelve, but it seems likely that the level of U.S. forces in South Korea would change so quickly if a serious combat began that such a Figure can only provide limited insight into the risks involved. It also does not mention North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons.
+
+The second half of Figure Twelve also warns that North Korea has begun a new kind of “winter war” by sharply increasing its missile firings, and this chart does not include the further massive increases in missile tests, and violations of South Korean territory in October and November of 2022. By early November. North Korea had already launched 86 missiles – an annual record – and fired 23 missiles in one day.
+
+The Northern Korean missile tests have illustrated its potential threat to Japan, and to U.S. military bases in Japan and Guam, and North Korea seems to have tested an ICBM-like missile in November 2022, although the test failed. It is clear that North Korea is increasing its nuclear weapons inventory, is making extensive use of its centrifuge facilities to produce more fissile material and may conduct its first nuclear weapon test in years during the winter of 2022-2023.
+
+At present, this new level of confrontation does seem to be designed more to use military force to gain influence than present a near-term risk of any major conflict. Nevertheless, the possibility remains of that incident could trigger such a conflict. North Korea’s ties to China, its recent sales of artillery weapons Russia, and the sheer extremism of North Korea’s authoritarian leader are all warnings that such an incident could occur in ways that involve all of the major powers.
+
+![image12](https://i.imgur.com/wnNM2W5.png)
+_▲ __Figure Twelve: Developments in the Korean Military Balance.__ [Adapted from Japan, Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2022, August 2022](https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22187264/doj2022_en_full.pdf), pp. 77&120_
+
+
+### The “Winter Wars” in Gray Area, Spoiler, and Proxy Campaigns
+
+There is no way to predict what existing or new gray area, spoiler, or proxy campaigns will escalate to the point where they become serious problems for the U.S. or its partners, but many risks already exist – including ones in Latin America and the rest of Africa, and rising tensions with China and Russia will inevitably increase this risk over time.
+
+As noted earlier, Russia’s trade war with the West qualifies as a serious level of gray area operations, as does the West’s proxy war in the Ukraine, and Russia’s more direct proxy roles in Syria and Libya. So does China’s effort to control critical mineral and manufacturing resources in solid state devices, batteries, and other areas.
+
+The U.S. and its strategic partners also have come to realize how serious industrial and technology espionage and efforts to dominate key areas of trade have become, and that these are serious forms of gray area warfare that they have taken actions to address that approach to economic warfare. The same seems to be true of Chinese efforts to control strategic minerals and investment patterns that have been designed to give China added economic leverage, particularly in areas like the materials need for advanced batteries and solid-state devices – area critical to both civil and military technology.
+
+
+### The “Winter War” in Fragile, Divided, Autonomous Undeveloped States, and Against Terrorism and Extremism
+
+Finally, there is no doubt that the larger “winter wars” are only part of the overall threat to the developing world, where most states face increasing problems in terms of food supplies, energy imports, and poverty this winter, as well as serious damage from climate change and global warming. These have, however, been increased to some extent by the War in the Ukraine’s impact on food exports and energy costs, and many of these problems are the result of internal tensions and violence.
+
+The new U.S. National Security Strategy recognizes the existence of a growing global food crisis and energy problems. The various NGO lists of fragile states also reflect a growing number of what are called “fragile states,” also they often should really be called “failed states” or governments – something that is all too clear when the rankings of “fragile states” are compared with the corruption rankings of Transparency International and the governance rankings of the World Bank. UN estimates of population growth, and various failed state indices of NGOs warn that this is a major problem for poorer and less developed states that gets far too little practical attention.
+
+The global trends in the winter of 2022-2023, and the risk they create of more serious forms of war, are also clear. The IMF World Economic Outlook for 2022, issued in October 2022, warns that,
+
+> Our latest forecasts project global growth to remain unchanged in 2022 at 3.2 percent and to slow to 2.7 percent in 2023 – 0.2 percentage points lower than the July forecast – with a 25 percent probability that it could fall below 2 percent. More than a third of the global economy will contract this year or next, while the three largest economies – the United States, the European Union, and China – will continue to stall. In short, the worst is yet to come, and for many people 2023 will feel like a recession. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues to powerfully destabilize the global economy.
+
+> Beyond the escalating and senseless destruction of lives and livelihoods, it has led to a severe energy crisis in Europe that is sharply increasing costs of living and hampering economic activity. Gas prices in Europe have increased more than four-fold since 2021, with Russia cutting deliveries to less than 20 percent of their 2021 levels, raising the prospect of energy shortages over the next winter and beyond. More broadly, the conflict has also pushed up food prices on world markets, despite the recent easing after the Black Sea grain deal, causing serious hardship for low-income households worldwide, and especially so in low-income countries.
+
+> Persistent and broadening inflation pressures have triggered a rapid and synchronized tightening of monetary conditions, alongside a powerful appreciation of the US dollar against most other currencies. Tighter global monetary and financial conditions will work their way through the economy, weighing demand down and helping to gradually subjugate inflation. So far, however, price pressures are proving quite stubborn and a major source of concern for policymakers. We expect global inflation to peak in late 2022 but to remain elevated for longer than previously expected, decreasing to 4.1 percent by 2024.
+
+The World Bank warns that while the rise in global poverty caused by COVID may now be declining, this decline is uncertain and that some 75 to 95 additional millions of people are still in a state of dire poverty. Its 2022 Poverty and Prosperity Report indicates that, “nearly half the world – over 3 billion people – lives on less than US $6.85 per day, which is the average of the national poverty lines of upper-middle-income countries,” and that “574 million people – nearly 7 percent of the world’s population – will still be living on less than US $2.15 a day in 2030.”
+
+It is no coincidence that the World Bank list of Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations in FY2022 shown in Figure Thirteen includes so many countries governed by regimes that have failed to develop effectively, have failed to heal the division between their peoples are actively exploited, and/or highly authoritarian and repressive.
+
+At the same time, the UN Human Development Report for 2022, reports record levels of political polarization, and negative views of the world, and that more than 6 in 7 people polled feel insecure about the level of global progress. It notes that declines on the Human Development Index (HDI) were widespread, with over 90 percent of countries enduring a decline in 2020 or 2021. The Global Peace Index, which covers 163 countries, found the 11th deterioration in peacefulness in the last fourteen years.
+
+These negative trends were partly driven by the impact of COVID, and the inflation and food crisis caused by the War in the Ukraine, but they were also driven by failed national governance over what has normally been periods of several decades, and the end result is that there has been a steady rise in global political extremism, and in ethnic, sectarian, and tribal tensions and conflicts. They have also led to a more than 100% increase in the number of refugees since 2011, and an 8% increase in 2021.
+
+The UNHCR report on the global trends in refugees for 2022 reports that by the end of 2021, there were 27.1 million refugees globally and 53.2 million people displaced within their home countries. In virtually every case, the country involved at most received humanitarian aid and only provided temporary relief and failed to make any serious advances in development or providing lasting solutions to the problems that were creating more refugees.
+
+The sheer scale of the current level of global conflicts is illustrated in the fact that the summary list of ongoing conflicts that is available on Wikipedia is four pages long, although this list ignores many smaller ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and other low-level internal civil conflicts. ACLED also provides an extensive analysis of such conflicts.
+
+The level of global terrorism and extremism have also risen in recent years, as is shown in the graphs showing the trends in global terrorism developed by START shown in Figure Fourteen, and in the series of maps in available in the Counterterrorism Guide of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence. It also is all too clear from the 2021 U.S. State Department Country reports on Terrorism.
+
+A key irony behind any focus on these trends in terrorism and extremism, however, is that they are a relatively minor part of the problems affecting the overall patterns in global violence, particularly in lower incomes states. If one examines the trends and impact of poor governance, corruption, leadership that favors given internal factions, failed development efforts, and repression; they almost certainly do more to threaten their populations than terrorists or extremists.
+
+This is especially true of governments that Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have characterized as competitive authoritarianism: “In competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Governments that control a pliant or cowed media as well as the security services and many elements of the economy and where the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy.”
+
+In fact, such authoritarian governments probably do at least an order of magnitude more damage to their peoples than terrorist and extremist movements. They also make their countries more vulnerable to exploitation by more developed powers and encourage more developed powers to exploit their weakness and instability interact with the forces creating instability. One key example is Assad’s Syria. His Russian-backed war to reestablish his power and control has been estimated to have killed as many as 499,700 to 600,000 by March 2022. More conservative estimates put the figure at over 350,000.
+
+Estimates of the total deaths caused by terrorism and extremism differ sharply, but a high estimate indicates that they average around 26,000 per year over the same ten-year period as the estimate for Syria, or a total 260,000. Statista reports annual figures ranging from 11,098 to 32,763, or 250,141 for the eleven years of the Syrian civil war. The Global Terrorism Index For 2022 reports only 7,142 deaths from terrorism and extremism, in 2021, and an uneven pattern of decline in deaths from a peak of only 10,669 in 2015.
+
+And Syria is only the worst of many countries where governments kill their peoples. No similar estimates are available, but there are all too many examples. Myanmar is certainly one of the worst. Iran is another, and there are all too many additional states in Africa and Asia.
+
+And it should be remembered that all of these trends generally interact with failures to adequately cope with disease, global warming, and population growth. The first two of these trends are already the source of global attention, but Figure Fifteen indicates a massive rate of actual population growth between 1950 and 2020 that makes the additional threat from population pressure all too clear.
+
+![image13](https://i.imgur.com/pbXOA3H.png)
+_▲ __Figure Thirteen: World Bank List of Fragile States and Conflict Situations in 2022.__ [Adapted from World Bank, date base](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/bb52765f38156924d682486726f422d4-0090082021/original/FCSList-FY22.pdf)._
+
+![image14](https://i.imgur.com/J2en6fb.png)
+_▲ __Figure Fourteen: START Estimate of Trends in Global Terrorism: 1970-2020.__ Source: [START, University of Maryland](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime&search=map)._
+
+![image15](https://i.imgur.com/BJMa752.png)
+_▲ __Figure Fifteen: The Growing Global Threat from Population Pressure: 1950-2020.__ Source: [United Nations, World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/graphs/) and, [United Nations, Data Portal](https://population.un.org/dataportal/data/indicators/49/locations/900/start/1950/end/2100/line/linetimeplotsingle)._
+
+
+### From Peace, “Globalism,” and a “Global Village” to a World Filled with Global Tensions and Warfare
+
+In conclusion, this discussion of “winter wars” may seem to be deliberately pessimistic and to focus on worst cases. It also discusses wars that have sometimes already gone on for decades, and many that seem likely to gone on for a decade or more after the winter of 2022-2023. It is still striking, however, that it describes overall patterns in global violence and conflict a world where it has taken less than a decade to go from a focus on how the world might come together in a form of “globalism” – one that approximates a peaceful and cooperative “global village” – to a world with so many tensions and risks.
+
+As for the broad use of the term “war,” this analysis also shows that Sun Tzu was all too correct in stating that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” World War I and World War II have shown how dangerous it can be to escalate to major conflicts, and today’s world of nuclear weapons, tightly integrated global supply chains, and steadily more lethal forms of conventional combat have greatly increased the damage a truly major war can inflict. It is all too clear that the relations between the great powers, and between the more advanced and developed democracies and authoritarian and repressive states, have shifted from the image of cooperation to active confrontation.
+
+The analysis shows that major powers and developed nations are actively involved in trying to achieve the “supreme art of war.” The list of “winter wars” makes it all too clear that major powers now focus on political and economic conflicts and confrontations and on efforts to use military force that are limited to exploiting political and military leverage without engaging in combat.
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+While the major powers still seem to find it obligatory to at least mention “cooperation,” and actively seek to keep some degree of real-world cooperation in areas where all sides can still benefit from cooperation, the primary focus of their political and economic confrontation, and military build-ups, has clearly shifted. They are all trying to achieve their strategic objectives by creating a far more confrontational set of military goals and plans, and taking more serious risks in terms of political and economic struggles that at least approach a form of warfare and increase the risk of some form of escalation to the actual use of force.
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+Moreover, the analysis does understate the full threat of “winter wars” to the extent it has touched relatively briefly on the number of developing and poorer states that are experiencing serious internal violence, and where the failures of their governments to come to grips with internal tensions, population growth, and sustained development makes them as much of a threat to their peoples as any terrorist or extremist faction. It has not tried to address the combined impact of war, climate change, population pressure, and disease – although all of these problems reinforce each other, and climate change, population pressure, and disease – like failed governance – often have greater impact.
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+Finally, the analysis has concentrated on the nature and scale of key types of political, economic and military conflicts, but not on whether any given side has a clear strategic objective in trying to “win.” Putin’s grand strategic objective seems to be close to one of rebuilding the former Soviet Union and strategic partnerships of equal importance, but there is no way to know how real this goal really is. The same is true of China’s grand strategic objectives which are equally broad and vague.
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+The U.S. new national strategy does talk about the creation of a world with a common economic system and set of international rules – one most it strategic partners support but does not present any plan for achieving it. As for all too much of the rest of the world – rhetoric aside – the national grand strategic goal of its leadership seems to be to retain or expand their power at the national, local, and regional level. The current process of a given “winter war” is clear, but the grand strategic goal is not defined beyond some broad level of rhetoric.
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+Santana once warned that “he who forgets the past is condemned to repeat it.” In some ways, the world has already done so in two World Wars. For all of the military tensions that preceded World War I, most Europeans though assumed that the equivalent of a stable level of deterrence had been established following the war of 1870, which would prevent any major European conflict in spite of the arms races that were increasing the lethality and size of European forces.
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+The results were devastating, but similar assumptions about postwar stability largely governed Europe until the depression and the collapse of the Weimar democracy in Germany, and then helped encourage isolationism and appeasement until the German invasion of Poland. The result was World War II – a war that did even more damage on a global basis than World War I, and then helped to create a Cold War that may well be returning in more lethal and even more global form.
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+If anything, this analysis of Winter Wars warns that the corollary to Santana’s thesis may well be that “we repeat the past regardless of whether we remember it or not.”
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+__Anthony H. Cordesman__ is the Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He has previously served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Department of Energy. Dr Cordesman also served as the national security assistant to Senator John McCain, and he previously held the position of adjunct professor at Georgetown University.
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+__Paul Cormarie__ is the Intern of the Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS.