diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2023-03-28-NATO-a1_c-cognitive-warfare.md b/_collections/_heros/2023-03-28-NATO-a1_c-cognitive-warfare.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c3a0dd32 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_heros/2023-03-28-NATO-a1_c-cognitive-warfare.md @@ -0,0 +1,2160 @@ +--- +layout: post +title: "Cognitive Warfare" +author: "NATO" +date: 2023-03-28 12:00:00 +0800 +image: https://i.imgur.com/7Crk156.png +#image_caption: "" +description: "Mitigating and Responding to Cognitive Warfare" +position: center +--- + +The NATO Science and Technological Organization (STO) Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Exploratory Team (ET) 356 performed an assessment of the Science and Technologies required to mitigate and defend against Cognitive Warfare (CogWar). The ET-356 proposed a Science and Technology (S&T) roadmap to guide NATO and Allied Partners in future research activities and investments. + + + +For NATO to have the capability to acquire and preserve Decision and Cognitive Superiority over their adversaries and across the conflict spectrum, scientific based knowledge is needed to support and increase NATO’s operational readiness to respond to CogWar. CogWar is not necessarily new but has emerged as a product of the integration and confluence of many technological advances and as availability and access to information and technology has increased. CogWar takes well-known methods within warfare to a new level by attempting to alter and shape the way humans think, react, and make decisions. CogWar has emerged replete with security challenges due to its invasive, intrusive, and invisible nature and _where the goal is to exploit facets of cognition to disrupt, undermine, influence, or modify human decisions_ (proposed by ET-356). + +CogWar represents the convergence of a wide range of advanced technologies along with human factors and systems, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), Machine Learning (ML), Information Communication Technologies (ICT), neuroscience, biotechnology and human enhancement that are being deliberately used by NATO’s adversaries in the 21ˢᵗ century battlespace. CogWar presents a significant risk to global defence and security at every level including economic, geopolitical, social, cultural, as well as threatening human decision making. + +The task of ET-356 was focused solely on identifying and suggesting defensive S&T to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence against CogWar and improve NATO’s and national resilience critical to NATO’s core tasks to safeguard Allied nations, societies, and shared values. + +CogWar gives rise to the adversaries’ ability to shape human cognition, perception, sensemaking, situational awareness, and decision making at all levels. The ability to intentionally (mis)use information within digital networks and disseminate it globally on various platforms such as social media has given rise to new tools and methods for the adversary. CogWar also aims at disrupting relationships and targets human vulnerabilities, such as trust and cognitive bias, at both individual and national levels, and its impact is across all operational domains. This report presents a summary of the key areas of S&T that are required to mitigate and defend against CogWar. + +The proposed S&T Road map is based on a “House Model,” developed by ET-356, and is linked to the operational Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) decision cycle. The House Model represents seven main _S&T knowledge areas and enablers_ that are cross-cutting and intersectional related: Pillars: Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive and Behavioral Science, Social and Cultural Science; and Bars: Situational Awareness and Sensemaking, Cognitive Effects, Modus Operandi and Technology and Force Multipliers. The seven areas provide the basis for research discussions within NATO STO and its Panels and Groups. + +This report provides guidance for future research within NATO STO, Allies, and national S&T investments for defence against current and future CogWar and to strengthen NATO’s technological edge and strategic advantage against CogWar. The work by the HFM ET-356 underpins the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept and its Warfare Development Initiative Cognitive Superiority, and the new NATO Strategic Concept declared at the NATO Madrid Summit 2022. + + +### Chapter 1 ‒ TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETENCIES FOR FUTURE NATO OPERATIONS + +> #### Janet M. Blatny +> #### Norwegian Defence Research Establishment +> #### NORWAY + +> #### Yvonne R. Masakowski +> #### US Naval War College +> #### UNITED STATES + +_Strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks define our broader security environment. The threats we face are global and interconnected... We will invest in our ability to prepare for, deter, and defend against the coercive use of political, economic, energy, information and other hybrid tactics by states and non-state actors._ + +#### 1.1 INTRODUCTION – A NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT + +The complexity of the 21ˢᵗ century operational environment has increased significantly since the turn of the 20th century. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has expanded its membership and increased the level of multinational military coalition operations, as well as the range of missions, including humanitarian, disaster relief, counterterrorism, regional conflicts, and traditional warfare. The complexity, diversity and tempo of these multinational military operations has increased, driven by factors such as the influence of technological advances, increase in regional conflicts and asymmetric warfare, as well as the emergence of conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine war where Russia invaded Ukraine 24 Feb 2022 (Zinets and Vasovic, 2022). + +During the NATO Summit in Brussels 2021, the following was stated (NATO 2021, Brussels Summit): + +- _We remain concerned with China’s frequent lack of transparency and use of disinformation._ + +- _We are increasingly confronted by cyber, hybrid, and other asymmetric threats, including disinformation campaigns, and by the malicious use of ever-more sophisticated emerging and disruptive technologies._ + +The NATO 2030 Reflection Group stated (NATO 2030 Reflection Group, 2020): + +> NATO and Allies must develop more capabilities for operating in the cognitive and virtual dimensions, including at the tactical level. These capabilities are needed to detect disinformation and provide support in preventing or limiting its impact, including by better understanding people, networks, online information, and related narratives. Simultaneously, NATO and Allies need to establish the legal and ethical framework to be able to operate in these dimensions effectively and legitimately. + +These statements clearly highlight the need to have defence and security measures against hybrid tactics including CogWar approaches that our adversaries might and can use against NATO. + +The 2010 Strategic Concept in NATO specified NATO’s core missions: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security (NATO, 2010). These three-core mission concepts were discussed in the NATO Strategic Concept 2022, declared at the NATO Madrid Summit 2022 (NATO, 2022). The Madrid Summit 2022 highlighted the concern of the radically changed security environment and stated, _“Today we endorse a new Strategic Concept to ensure our Alliance remains fit and resourced for the future”_. Furthermore, the concern stated in 2021 at the Brussel Summit was again stressed during the Madrid Summit 2022: _“We are confronted by cyber, space, and hybrid and other asymmetric threats, and by the malicious use of emerging and disruptive technologies”_. The new 2022 Concept emphasizes NATO’s responsibility of ensuring the collective defence using a 360-degree approach to strengthen deterrence and defence across all domains and threats and enhances the need for military and civilian collaboration especially within cyber defence. + +NATO faces an environment that is dynamic, global, complex, and uncertain. The boundaries between peace and conflict, political and military, strategic and tactical, kinetic, and non-kinetic are blurring. Potential strategic competitors continuously seek to undermine NATO’s political and military-strategic objectives by deploying increasingly sophisticated strategies, often through coordinated political, military, economic, and information efforts. This has required new ways of thinking and approaches resulting in the important strategic NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC) document (2021) that addresses temporal, spatial, functional, and structural aspects of the Alliance’s approach to long term warfare development and warfighting (Tammen, 2021). + +This concept describes NATO’s focus on the new Alliance thinking and approach towards a simultaneous, non-linear paradigm to balance the efforts across the operational contexts of shaping, contesting, and fighting. This is critical, especially as the traditional peace, crisis, and conflict paradigm increasingly constrains NATO’s ability to out-think and out-perform an adversary. _This report highlights the Science and Technology Roadmap to defend against the influence and impact of Cognitive Warfare._ + +The NWCC focuses on five Warfare Development Imperatives (WDI) to accomplish NATO’s core missions: cognitive superiority, layered resilience, influence and power projection, collaboration and coalition of cross-domain command, and integrated multi-domain defence (see call-out box, below). CogWar is centered in Cognitive Superiority (NWCC, WDI) and has ramifications _for layered resilience, influence and power projection and cross-domain command_. + +> #### `NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC) Warfare Development Initiatives (WDI)` + +__`Cognitive superiority:`__ _`Truly understanding the operating environment, the adversary and the Alliance’s goals entails cohesive and shared political-military understanding of the threats, adversaries and environment NATO operates in, from tech and doctrine, to JISR and big data. Equally, it will focus on providing the right tools for the political-military level to operate effectively (rapidly and dynamically) and safeguard decision making in the modern information age.`_ + +__`Layered resilience:`__ _`Underpinning deterrence, the Alliance needs to be able to withstand immediate shocks to supply lines and communications, as well as effects in the cognitive dimension. It must be prepared to persevere in challenging situations over long periods and be ready from day zero.`_ + +__`Influence and power projection:`__ _`To shape the environment to its strengths, including generating options and imposing dilemmas on adversaries, the Alliance must be proactive in taking initiative through various means to reach its objectives.`_ + +__`Integrated multi-domain defence:`__ _`The threats that the Alliance faces are no longer in any one domain, so a joint and flexible approach to a fluid environment is essential to protect the Alliance’s integrity against all threats, regardless of their origin or nature.`_ + +__`Cross-domain command:`__ _`Command insight at the blink of an eye, the hallmark of great generals, may be out of reach in a multi-domain and integrated battlespace. Investing in our people, the art of command, critical thinking and audacious action will underpin success. `_ + +The impact of Emerging Disruptive Technologies (EDTs) relates to the five WDIs, as technology is one of the main drivers for WDI. Technology and Cognitive Superiority are critical elements to counter CogWar. Technological advances, as well as advances in cognitive neurosciences will influence our ability to achieve situational awareness and maintain the decision advantage in military operations (NATO STO, 2021). The strategic defence against CogWar requires that NATO maintain technological and cognitive superiority to strengthen NATO’s resilience and military operational readiness. + +In addition to the five operational domains (land, air, sea, cyber and space), discussions within various communities are ongoing to consider a new domain: “the cognitive (or the human) domain” (Cole and Le Guyader, 2020). The cognitive dimension represents a space where intra and inter domain cognitive operations can be conducted. This discussion is addressed in Chapters 11 and 12. + +The NATO HQ ACT Concept Development Branch is currently developing a NATO concept on CogWar (2022). The work is part of the implementation of the NWCC, and the CogWar Concept is a delivery under the WDI Cognitive Superiority Initiative. The concept work started in 2021 and the proposed end state of the concept work is for NATO to regain the initiative by establishing a better, shared understanding of the cognitive dimension, the creation and countering of cognitive effects, and the protection of NATO’s decision-making processes. Also, the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) is conducting a study on Standards for Cognitive Augmentation for Military Applications (NIAG, 2022).There are several definitions of CogWar put forth, however, there is not yet a commonly accepted definition of CogWar. For example, CogWar is a multidisciplinary approach combining social sciences and innovative technologies to directly alter the mechanisms of understanding and decision-making to destabilize or paralyze an adversary (Pappalardo, 2022). Du Cluzel (2022) describes CogWar as the manipulation of the enemy’s cognition aimed at weakening, influencing, delaying, and even destroying the enemy (Claverie et al., 2022). This type of warfare aims at influencing the heuristic of the human brain to win the “war before the war” (Takagi, 2022). Attacks of this type now no longer target policymakers or military decision-makers alone, but a broad mass that can potentially influence national decision-making (Takagi, 2022). In general, CogWar addresses the human’s ability to process information and use it conflicting purposes, such as influencing military and civilian populations, organizations, and nations. + +_`The HFM Exploratory Team 356 has therefore proposed the goal of CogWar as to exploit facets of cognition to disrupt, undermine, influence, or modify human decision making. This covers decisions also made by technological advances, as humans will always be a part of all operations.`_ + +The first NATO symposium on CogWar was held in Bordeaux, June 2021, arranged by the NATO ACT innovation Hub and the Ecole Nationale Superieure de Cognitique (ENCS), France (Claverie et al., 2022). + +#### 1.2 THE CHALLENGES AND IMPACT OF COGNITIVE WARFARE + +CogWar has been described as a multidisciplinary approach that provides a means for altering human thought, understanding, and decision making (Pappalardo, 2022). Adversaries infiltrate global digital networks at all levels to achieve their strategic objectives. CogWar attacks aim to create chaos, confusion, disrupt societies and government, and shape the geopolitical and social environments in accordance with an adversary’s strategic objectives. CogWar has been viewed as an extension of Information Warfare and Psychological Operations (PsyOps). However, CogWar differs as it is the convergence of PsyOps, Information Operations (Ops) and Cyber Operations, integrated with Artificial Intelligence (AI) / Machine Learning (ML) networks and capabilities that extend its reach globally to military and civilian populations. CogWar attacks impact the broad mass population to influence and impact civilian and military decision making. Advances in AI/ML technologies have made this technology a force enabler for the dissemination of misinformation and disinformation. Adversaries exploit these advances to set the conditions in the physical and digital battlespace in accordance with their military and national agendas. + +Traditional warfare is being and will continue to be transformed by advances in AI/ML and BMI technologies. Advanced AI/ML technologies have given rise to the design of cognitive-inspired systems, which have facilitated the dissemination of misinformation and disinformation campaigns aimed at shaping human thinking, behavior, and actions. EDTs such as AI, ML, big data, cloud computing, IoT, GANs, multi-reality tools, modern ICTs, biotechnology, neuro-technologies, and other human augmenting technologies have contributed to the “power of CogWar” (NATO S&T Technology Trend Report, 2020). Increased access to information has augmented the velocity and accuracy of attacks and threats to civilian and military populations. + +CogWar presents a danger to national and global stability and security at every level, including economic, geopolitical, social, and cultural. The technologies that facilitate the rapid dissemination of information to a global audience do it at a lower cost and present less risk to the aggressor. The recent COVID-19 pandemic provides evidence of the impact of disinformation campaigns on social media platforms. Lessons learned because of the spread of COVID-19 disinformation were recently published by Gill and Goolsby (2022). + +> _The use, misuse, and even the weaponization of information and advanced cognitive-inspired systems, serve as a critical threat to human thinking and decision making, not only between humans but between humans and machines, as well as autonomous machine decision making._ + +CogWar targets human vulnerabilities as a means of creating chaos and confusion in the mass consciousness, across nations, and the within militaries. Adversaries will target vulnerabilities in the OODA decision-making framework (Chapter 9) as a means exploit cognitive vulnerabilities, or to deliver cognitive effects. Thus, NATO nations must invest in S&T tools, techniques, and technologies that will defend against CogWar. + +To address these threats, there is a need to understand the future impact of convergence between human and machine as technology develops and advances. “It becomes increasingly clear that the teaming of human and computers will become essential for any form of CogWar, whether offensive or defensive” (Chapter 9). Future human-machine teams will work collaboratively to transform the future battlespace, influencing military and civilian communities, and impacting society, including economic and political domains. + +CogWar capability to impact decision making (positively or negatively) across all domains within the OODA decision framework highlights the need to develop tools for information validation and measures to ensure that data is dependable, accurate and from a trusted source. As technologies and tools evolve, there is a need to prepare to counter the effects of such tools when used by the adversary and ensure that the NATO Alliance can defend against potential attacks. + +> _CogWar transforms the battlespace and presents challenges and threats/danger. There is therefore a strategic and operational imperative to develop Science and Technology (S&T) initiatives to mitigate and defend against CogWar if we are to ensure the defence and security of NATO and Allied Partners’ nations._ + +Misinformation and disinformation campaigns, as well as “poisoned” training datasets embedded in algorithms may be introduced into trusted networks or social media, and/or databases to influence human thought and behavior towards supporting an adversary’s strategic agendas. Thus, human cognitive processes can unwittingly be manipulated to shape human decisions and behaviors that align with those of an adversary. _“Trust” is the adversaries’ target and an essential component of CogWar in which the human is the vulnerable target._ + +#### 1.3 TO DEFEND AND MITIGATE + +The operational environment consists of physical, virtual/cyber, and human/cognitive dimensions ‒ in other words – a socio-technological environment. Therefore, increasing defensive CogWar capabilities within NATO requires multidisciplinary responses across these dimensions and where they interface. + +NATO nations must address CogWar from a defensive position by building resilience and defence into AI/ML data networks that will defend against intrusions, attacks, and manipulation by adversaries. + +Investments in multidisciplinary research such as cognitive and neuroscience, cognitive and behavioral science, and social and cultural studies in addition to technology is essential to defend against CogWar. + +NATO nations need to develop cognitive security measures to defend information pathways and protect it from manipulation, modification, and the influence of an adversary’s intrusions. Cognitive Security sits at the intersection of multidisciplinary fields including neuroscience, brain research, human cognition, perception, and decision making. Thus, there is a need to conduct research on CogWar and cognitive security to ensure the development of a defensive toolbox for countering the influence and impact of all aspects of CogWar. + +#### 1.4 HFM-ET-356 SCOPE, AIMS, AND PROPOSED OUTCOMES + +The NATO STO HFM Exploratory Team (ET) 356 __“Mitigating and Responding to Cognitive Warfare”__ aimed to increase understanding of how defensive CogWar will provide effective prevention and mitigation strategies and countermeasures to increase defence and security within the NATO Alliance. As humans are part of all military operations and understanding the human and the brain is a central element in CogWar, the NATO HFM Panel included and highlighted “Cognitive Warfare” to its Program of Work (PoW) in 2021. Other STO Panels do have ongoing S&T activities that are associated with CogWar defence measures, from a technological or a systems analysis perspective. + +The HFM-ET-356 team developed the “House Model” as the foundation for the development of a S&T strategic roadmap. This model was linked with the operational Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) decision framework to highlight and facilitate understanding and the important synergy between research and operational communities. + +The House Model represents seven main S&T knowledge areas and enablers that are cross-cutting and intersectionally related: Pillars: Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive & Behavioral Science, Social and Cultural Science and Bars: Situational Awareness and Sensemaking, Cognitive Effects, modus operandi and Technology and Force Multipliers. + +The House Model was presented at the Cognitive Warfare Workshop during the Scientific Track of the NATO ACT Tide Sprint conference (4‒8 April 2022, Sopot, Poland). + +The current report presents the House Model framework to guide the NATO Alliance towards their S&T priorities. The Authors provide summaries of selected S&T areas (not exclusive), their relevance to defensive CogWar and propose various areas of research to eliminate capability gaps. Narratives are also provided to expand the description of the research areas and their relevance to defensive CogWar. + +Given the complexity of CogWar and dynamic military operations, it has been necessary to consider strategies for developing education and training methods to prepare leaders for future CogWar challenges. + +CogWar is an essential component of future military defence and warfare. It is therefore incumbent upon the S&T community to address the technology gaps that will ensure future cognitive security and the ability to defend against CogWar. + +__The aim of this report__ is to enhance each nation’s awareness of CogWar, provide a S&T roadmap for the development of tools, technologies, education, and training that will support NATO’s and partner nation’s defence against CogWar. The investment in S&T research will strengthen NATO and its Allied partner nation’s ability to counter the influence and potential impact of future CogWar. + +#### 1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT + +This report examines the S&T efforts for defending against CogWar and mitigating its influence and impact on human perceptions, thinking, and decision making. This report can be read in full, or individual chapters can be selected and read independent of the whole report. + +> #### Chapter 1 ‒ Towards a Framework of Science and Technological Competencies for Future NATO Operations + +Introduces the concept of CogWar as a multidisciplinary approach combining social sciences and innovative technologies to directly alter the mechanisms of understanding and decision making to destabilize or paralyze an adversary. CogWar is discussed within the context of NATO’s strategic concept. + +> #### Chapter 2 ‒ Towards a Science and Technological Framework “The House Model” + +Introduces the need to develop a framework of human and technological competencies for future NATO operations. The chapter presents the key S&T topics related to the evolution of the CogWar. The HFM-ET-356 House Model serves as a guide for investment in S&T research in the defence against CogWar. The House Model represents the intersection of multidisciplinary S&T topics and the intersection with the characteristics of the OODA decision framework that can be seen as underpinning military operations (i.e., sensemaking, SA, social, cultural, and political contexts that influence operations). The House Model reflects a multifaceted and multidimensional approach to CogWar and lays the foundation for the development of the S&T Roadmap. The HFM-ET-356 House Model aims to capture an array of independent academic fields that become interdependent when operationalized and viewed through the lens of NATOs defence against CogWar. + +> #### Chapter 3 ‒ Cases and Scenarios of Cognitive Warfare + +This chapter introduces scenarios of CogWar to illustrate the range of activities, challenges and techniques associated with CogWar. The range of CogWar attacks at all levels from civilian, societal, and military operations, requires an ability to defend against adversaries in all environments. The purpose of this section is two-fold. The first purpose is to illustrate the breadth of activities, as well as supporting techniques, which constitute CogWar, as well as diversity and range of potential target audiences. The second purpose is to link the varies incidents (case studies) to specific components of the House Model. This chapter is essential for understanding how best to defend against CogWar and which S&T topics must we invest in to ensure adequate defence against future CogWar. + +> #### Chapter 4 ‒ The Influence and Impact of Social and Cultural Sciences in Cognitive Warfare + +This chapter aims to discuss the role of the social and cultural sciences in CogWar. It offers unique insight into the issue of CogWar. Specifically (but not limited to) the socio-technical mechanics of audience engagement and psycho-social effects generation, as well as potential interventions or responses to neutralize, mitigate or counter cognitive attacks on audiences. In other words, the social and cultural sciences offer insight into and can help inform the development of both offensive and defensive facets of CogWar, particularly at the meso- and macro- levels of analysis (i.e., characteristics of social interaction between groups and organizations through large-scale societal interactions). + +> #### Chapter 5 ‒ Cognitive and Behavioral Science (Psychological Interventions) + +This chapter focuses on the Cognitive and Behavioral Science (CBS) pillar of the House Model. It focuses on the ways that adversaries target human vulnerabilities in the cognitive and behavioral domain. Furthermore, this chapter discusses ways that adversaries may exploit human psychological vulnerabilities to their advantage in CogWar. This chapter highlights the need to defend cognitive vulnerabilities and develop tools and technologies that will mitigate and defend against future CogWar targeting human cognitive and psychological vulnerabilities. + +> #### Chapter 6 ‒ Developing Cognitive Neuroscience Technologies for Defence Against Cognitive Warfare + +This chapter focuses on advances in our understanding of brain function and the development of sophisticated neuroimaging tools and analysis methods from biomedical/neuro-engineering fields. These advances have influenced the development of novel neural network models of human cognitive processes embedded in AI/ML network designs. This area of research plays a critical role in future CogWar. The evolution of Brain-Machine-Interfaces (BMI) presents opportunities for adversaries to seek news ways of hacking the human brain. This further suggests that adversaries may also find ways to hack the BMI network integrated with future command and control systems. This chapter addresses advances in neuroscience, brain research and the development of BMIs. These are critical areas of research that may prove to be the most significant areas of defending against CogWar in the future. + +> #### Chapter 7 ‒ Defence Against 21ˢᵗ Century Cognitive Warfare: Considerations and Implications for Emerging Advanced Technologies + +This chapter focuses on the emergence of disruptive technologies on future CogWar. For example, how the evolution of AI/ML algorithms, BMI, genetics, quantum computing will continue to advance and afford adversaries the opportunities to weaponize technologies and transform the battlespace. This chapter discusses the ethical challenges associated with the development of advanced super-intelligent machines, and the ethical deployment of such technologies. This chapter focuses on addressing the challenges and evolution of CogWar and seeks ways to forecast the best defence against CogWar. + +> #### Chapter 8 ‒ Situational Awareness, Sensemaking and Future NATO Multinational Operations + +This chapter focuses on Sensemaking and Situational Awareness as critical for effective decision making in military operations. CogWar focuses on the weaponization of information, including how adversaries distribute information, how it is understood, and how information influences human thought, behavior, and decision making. This chapter examines the relationship between human understanding and the OODA decision framework. Further, it highlights the impact of the evolution of AI/ML networks and the development of independent, sentient robots with independent decision-making capabilities that will present vulnerabilities in the future CogWar battlespace. + +> #### Chapter 9 ‒ Human-Machine Teaming: Towards a Holistic Understanding of Cognitive Warfare + +This chapter presents the evolution of CogWar and its technologies from each era. This chapter takes an historic perspective of warfare wherein Sun Tzu sets the foundation for the discussion that takes us from the spear to the Human-Machine teaming age. Sun Tzu’s philosophy of “Know thy enemy” is the theme to monitor throughout the ages as it provides a means of understanding intent and motivation of potential adversaries. This discussion includes the expansion of the OODA framework transformed into a “bow tie” model that reflects the complexities of human-machine decision making. The latter model highlights the need to consider the nested nature of the holistic model of CogWar if we are to defend effectively against CogWar. + +> #### Chapter 10 ‒ Education and Training for Cognitive Warfare + +This chapter highlights the need to develop more in-depth knowledge and advanced tools for supporting training in the defence about CogWar. For example, as CogWar focuses on the weaponization of information, the military should develop more awareness of the multiple CogWar practices and be able to detect and counter disinformation campaigns at an early stage. Virtual environments and wargaming provide a means of developing the skills required to operate in CogWar. The complexities of future CogWar mandate the need for more sophisticated training content, methods, and tools to meet the demands of the future CogWar environment. This requires the development of an overall framework for detecting, mitigating, countering, and developing CogWar operations on both the strategic and tactical levels. + +> #### Chapter 11 ‒ SOMULATOR: Developing CogWar Resilience Through Social Media Training + +Given the current state of propaganda and disinformation on social media, training needs to be provided for a broad range of users. This chapter summarizes the issues that were considered when a tool called ___“Somulator”___ was developed for social media training purposes. A range of open-source tools were chosen to emulate different social media platforms and presented to stakeholders. Feedback received laid the foundations for additional, custom development that were used to integrate core elements into a complete training solution. In addition, the core lessons learned from early use of the tools is discussed. The results of this pilot study have implications for defence against CogWar. Thus, the Somulator tool that emerged from this research holds great promise in contributing to research and training to defend against CogWar in the future. + +> #### Chapter 12 ‒ Legal and Ethical Implications Related to Defence against Cognitive Warfare + +The legal and ethical implications discussed in this chapter serve as a lens for evaluating how we might address the defence of CogWar. Today, there is no legal framework directly applicable to CogWar. This chapter discusses the implications for addressing the challenges of CogWar from a moral and legal perspective. This chapter presents challenges related to military actions within the cognitive domain and the unlawful use of force. It presents an argument for the need to develop legal policies and doctrine like those developed for cyber warfare, which define the legal parameters of CogWar itself. + +> #### Chapter 13 ‒ Cognitive Warfare and the Human Domain: Appreciating the Perspective that the Trajectories of Neuroscience and Human Evolution place on Cognitive Warfare are at Odds with Ideas of a Human Domain + +This chapter focuses on the discussion surrounding whether CogWar is unique or merely part of the “Human Domain.” The general argument is that a Cognitive Domain is too restrictive as it does not sufficiently encompass the action space in which human thinking and behavior is being weaponized. This chapter takes perspective of a ‘human domain’ as it does not a priori align with the trajectory of neuroscience and of human evolution in the context of CogWar. Instead, it argues for S&T approaches that focus on a cognitive domain, where CogWar attacks are directed and hence what needs to be protected. + +> #### Chapter 14 ‒ Science and Technology Roadmap Based on the House Model + +This chapter focuses on the development of a S&T roadmap as guide to invest S&T to ensure NATO and partner nation’s military readiness to meet the demands of future CogWar. The S&T roadmap is based upon the House Model and aims to guide the development of an effective S&T defence strategy. There are seven main S&T knowledge areas and enablers that are cross-cutting and intersectional related: Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive & Behavioral Science, Social and Cultural Science, Situational Awareness and Sensemaking, Cognitive Effects, modus operandi and Technology and Force Multipliers. The Chapter assess technological gaps and potential vulnerabilities associated within the scientific areas of the House Model, which is linked to the overarching military OODA decision-making objective. + +> #### Chapter 15 ‒ Conclusion and Recommendations + +This chapter highlights the main results of examining critical S&T topics within selected technologies and human factors. Examples are ICT, AI/ML, BMI advances, command and control, human-machine teaming, as well as social and cultural and cognitive & behavioral factors and their impact and/or function in CogWar. The complexity of CogWar increases with each technological advance and innovation and must be addressed within a socio-technical system perspective. There is a need to address future challenges by anticipating the intersection of multidisciplinary scientific topics and how these advances may be dual purposed by adversaries to their strategic advantage. Nations must anticipate and prepare to defend against such threats to global security. This chapter concludes with a series of recommendations for future S&T investment and technological development to ensure an effective defence against CogWar. + +#### 1.6 REFERENCES + +Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. (2022). Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (France) ‒ 21 June 2021. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France. + +[Cole, A. and Le Guyader, H. (2020). NATO Sixth’s Domain of Operations. FICINT document. Norfolk (VA, USA), NATO ACT Innovation Hub](https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/NATO%27s%206th%20domain%20of%20operations.pdf). + +Gill, R. and Goolsby, R. (2022). COVID-19 Disinformation: A Multi-National, Whole of Society Perspective. Springer Cham. + +NATO (2010). Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon 19‒20 November 2010. NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Belgium. + +NATO (2021). Brussels Summit Communiqué. Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021. + +[NATO (2022). NATO Strategic Concept 2022. Adopted at the Madrid Summit, 29‒30 June 2022](https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html). + +NATO 2030 Reflection Group (2020). United for a New Era. Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General 25 Nov 2020. + +NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) (2022). NIAG-N (2022)0005, NIAG Study on Standards for Cognitive Augmentation for Military Applications. + +NATO STO (2020). NATO Science &Technology Trend Report, 2020. Science & Technology Trends 2020‒2040. Exploring the S&T Edge. NATO Science & Technology Organization, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France. + +NATO STO (2021). AC/323-N (2021)0023. NATO Science & Technology Board Read Ahead for the Fall 2021 Executive Session. Agenda Items 7 and 8 – STO Plans & Programmes Workshops 2021 and 2022. + +[Pappalardo, D. (2022). Win the War Before the War? The French Perspective on Cognitive Warfare. War on the Rocks, 1 August 2022](https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/win-the-war-before-the-war-a-french-perspective-on-cognitive-warfare/). + +[Takagi, K. (2022) The Future of China’s Cognitive Warfare: Lessons from the War in Ukraine. War on the Rocks. 22 July 2022](https://warontherocks.com/2022/07/the-future-of-chinas-cognitive-warfare-lessons-from-the-war-in-ukraine/). + +Tammen, J.W. (09 July 2021). NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept: Anticipating the Changing Character of War. NATO Review. + +[Zinets, N. and Vasovic, A. (2022). Missiles Rain Down Around Ukraine](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-orders-military-operations-ukraine-demands-kyiv-forces-surrender-2022-02-24/). + + +### Chapter 2 ‒ TOWARDS A SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK “THE HOUSE MODEL” + +> #### Benjamin J. Knox +> #### Norwegian Armed Forces Cyber Defence +> #### NORWAY + +#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION + +CogWar is transformative and affords the adversary the opportunity to gain the strategic advantage by exploiting advances in technologies such as, AI, ML, BMI, as well as exploiting existing technologies in new ways. The weaponization of advanced technologies drives the need to develop tools, techniques, procedures, education, and training methods to counter the CogWar threat. The adversary uses CogWar to shape and affect the tactical, operational, strategic, and geopolitical environment in an insidious and often invisible manner to support achieving their strategic objectives. Therefore, developing an S&T roadmap that lays the foundation for how NATO can mitigate and respond to CogWar is a critical first step. + +To this end, the House Model (Figure 2-1) was developed to guide S&T research concerning how NATO can ‘get ahead’ in the realm of CogWar. Getting ahead implies a journey involving a catching-up process to identify where the vulnerabilities are that need defending and what, therefore, are the knowledge needs to counter CogWar. + +The House Model reflects the multifaceted and multidimensional nature of CogWar. Planned and applied with old and new methods, CogWar achieves overt and covert objectives below and above the threshold of war, affecting how we think, act, and make decisions. It does this by exploiting facets of cognition to disrupt, undermine, influence, or modify human decision making. With modern technological enablers that act as force multipliers, these goals become more realizable with less effort, resources, and risk. Novel methods and ways of operating (modus operandi) inspired by, or grounded in fields of contemporary or existing knowledge, allow adversaries to deliver cognitive effects that target our situational awareness and ability to sense-make by penetrating and permeating the conscious and subconscious of individuals and the collective. As such, the HFM 356 roadmap model aims to capture an array of independent academic fields that become interdependent when operationalized and viewed through the lens of NATOs defence against CogWar. The following is an introduction to the House Model. Further details can be found in Chapter 14. + +#### 2.2 THE HOUSE MODEL + +The CogWar House Model aims to guide the delivery of scientific outcomes that go beyond conventional thinking by challenging what we think we already know and exploring what we know we don’t know. Through well-defined research goals that reflect the cross-cutting model architecture, we can learn how to support the NATO warfighter in perceiving CogWar and comprehending it when it has occurred, and/or when it is already delivering its effect(s). Finding ways to ‘catch-up’ and ‘get ahead’ in terms of prediction and developing counter measures, or counter effects, can only occur when the right tools (cognitive and technological) operate within, or at that the edge of, _NATO Security and Defence, NWCC, Legal and Ethical Frameworks (ELSEI)_, without adversarial interference. This then ensures our sensemaking is precise and timely enough that our Situational Awareness (SA) is formed from trustworthy input data. + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/bRdBA4O.png) +_▲ Figure 2-1: The House Model Developed by HFM-ET-356._ + +> #### 2.2.1 The Pillars + +The three pillars in the model identify primary fields where knowledge is required to influence or modify a Target Audience (TA) (Figure 2-2). The pillar titles (Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive and Behavioral science, and Social and Cultural science) identify priority areas (or fields) that require research effort, including applied interventions. CogWar is a multi and inter-disciplinary concept. As such, each pillar intends to be inclusive, opening space for broad and niche research involvement. The pillars acknowledge and encourage research that exposes, investigates, and aims to understand discipline, organizational, and institutional overlaps. It is here where the adversary may be operating unchecked. + +![image02](https://i.imgur.com/1dA1Ofz.png) +_▲ Figure 2-2: The Scientific Pillars of Knowledge ‒ House Model of CogWar ET 356._ + +> #### 2.2.2 The Horizontal Bars + +The horizontal bars identify enablers and force multipliers to the knowledge pillars (see call out box, below). The aspects of SA & Sensemaking, Cognitive Effects, modus operandi, and Technology Enables are independent areas of research that have inter-dependencies across and between the pillars of knowledge. They present opportunities to consider the ‘HOW & WHEN’ of S&T knowledge needs. + +> #### `Enablers and Force Multipliers` + +__`Situational Awareness (SA) / Sensemaking:`__ _`Examination of the factors that enable or block attempts to make sense of an ambiguous situation. Sensemaking informs and is a prerequisite to decision making. It requires trusted data input, evaluation of meaningful information, integration with knowledge and experience to achieve an understanding of evolving non-linear events.`_ + +__`Cognitive Effects:`__ _`Describes the effects an actor may try to create on a target audience IOT achieve desired goal. Could be doctrinal effect verbs, e.g., distort, distract, etc., or more elaborate descriptions, e.g., degrade TA’s trust in democratic institutions or politicians, persuade TA to believe A instead of B, etc. Related to neurobiology the effects could be to, for example, injure or impair cognitive functions, stimulate emulative functions, or trigger social contagion.`_ + +___`modus operandi:`___ _`Examination of adversary methods and stratagems to generate the desired effect on the target/target audience, including when methods/stratagems are employed to exploit ‘cognitive openings’ and other opportunities for intervention (i.e., how and when). This effort is also concerned about the synchronization of activities by adversaries to psychologically prime and target. A better understanding of when and how adversaries conduct CW provides insights on the development and validation of countermeasures and defensive strategies.`_ + +__`Technology Enablers and Force Multipliers:`__ _`Use technology to enable the actor to utilize one, two or all of the three knowledge pillars simultaneously, in pursuit of the goal. This aspect enables the above aspects. e.g., EDTs ICT CIS / Big Data / AI & ML / Social Media / Directed Energy / Biotech / Nanotech, etc.`_ + +#### 2.3 SUMMARY + +Future NATO military leaders will face a wide range of dilemmas as CogWar has the potential to pervade and influence all aspects of NATOs role to safeguard the Allies’ freedom and security by political and military means. The intrinsic, invasive, and invisible nature of CogWar with its global network of technological enablers, will provide a continuous challenge regarding identifying the truth and making sense of what to trust in data, and data sources. Advancements in areas such as Deep Learning, Synthetic media, Neuroscience and Human-machine teaming means the Information Environment will become more contested, significant, and defining. Understanding, acknowledging, and managing the long and short-term effects from CogWar activities and operations requires we educate and train our leaders and warfighters with new approaches and adaptive ways of viewing competition, conflict, and warfare. This is essential if we are to address the challenges CogWar brings to SA and decision making. Only then can we ensure effective and accurate mitigation and response tactics – the Cognitive Superiority needed – to possess and apply faster, deeper, broader and / or more effective military thinking and understanding than adversaries. The resulting effect enables NATO and Allies to hold the information initiative and not be influenced by the potential impact of CogWar. + +Future military operations will encompass the range of topics presented within the House Model. Most significantly it is likely they will be revealed at the points of creation and discovery where the pillars and the horizontal bars overlap in novel ways. We anticipate that this framework can be used to inform those who will lead competency and capability development for future NATO operations. We contend that nations would benefit from using the House Model as a reference and guide to the development of their respective national S&T research portfolio. The model encourages intra, inter and multi-disciplinary activities that can fill gaps in understanding and allow us to gain some advantage as we look to defend the entire socio-technical system against the effects of CogWar. + +The following chapters will begin the discussion of each of these pillars and provide insight as to the role that each topic will play in future CogWar as a means of evaluating and assessing ways to mitigate and defend against CogWar. + + +### Chapter 3 ‒ CASES AND SCENARIOS OF COGNITIVE WARFARE + +> #### Matthew A. Lauder +> #### Defence Research & Development +> #### CANADA + +> #### Eskil Grendahl Sivertsen +> #### Norwegian Defence Research Establishment +> #### NORWAY + +#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION + +There are a myriad of forms or types of Cognitive Warfare (CogWar) occurring at all levels of operation and across the spectrum of conflict, from peacetime through limited intervention, irregular warfare, and major combat operations. For example, at the tactical level, CogWar may take the form of SMS text messages disseminated to specific geographic areas (i.e., narrowcasting) and designed to undermine the morale of enemy soldiers by spreading disinformation about defections, non-payment of the soldier’s salary, promoting contempt of senior officers, or simply threatening retaliation. In some cases, the messages are combined with a kinetic attack, such as an artillery or missile strike, to further antagonize the intended recipient. In other cases, CogWar can occur at the operational and strategic levels by targeting entire populations, policy makers, or political and military leaders. For example, large populations may be manipulated by through advanced psycho-behavioral modeling, artificial intelligence, and machine learning to target individual psychological pressure points and societal fault lines, ultimately amplifying political dissent, and encouraging internecine violence. In other cases, mass media can be manipulated to create a false understanding of a political decision, which could lead to false assumptions about the enemy and undermine the decision-making process of senior political and military leaders. + +The purpose of this section is two-fold. The first purpose is to illustrate the breadth of activities, as well as supporting techniques, which constitute CogWar, as well as diversity and range of potential target audiences. The second purpose is to link the varies incidents (case studies) to specific components of the house model. + +#### 3.2 COGNITIVE WARFARE CASE STUDY #1: CHRYSTIA FREELAND SMEAR CAMPAIGN + +Although largely occurring in Canada – or at least much of the effort appears to have been executed in Canada – the smear campaign conducted against Chrystia Freeland was arguably designed to undermine the credibility of the Canadian government as well as the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) presence in Eastern Europe, primarily Ukraine, but also Latvia. Literally launched the same day that Freeland was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Kassam, 2017), the smear campaign started with a series of posts on a pro-Russian social media account, seemingly located in Canada, on 10 January 2017 that cited documents from the archives of the Alberta government about Freeland’s grandfather, Michael Chomiak, and accused her of being sympathetic to Nazism. + +The following day, an editor from VICE magazine, who was conducting an interview on an unrelated matter at the Russian embassy in Ottawa, was handed a dossier from an unidentified embassy staff member detailing Freeland’s grandfather’s interaction with the German military in occupied Ukraine during World War II (Ling, 2017; Glavin, 2017b). Like the previous day’s social media posts, the dossier was based on publicly available information held in the archives of the government of Alberta. + +A week later, on 19 January 2017, a lengthy and detailed article written by John Helmer appeared on his blog, Dances with Bears, and also in the Russia Insider, a pro-Russian newspaper believed to be funded by Konstantin Malofeev (a Russian oligarch close to Putin and accused of having funded pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine and the attempted coup in Montenegro), as well as other pro-Russian social media sites (Shekhovstov, 2015; Helmer, 2017a). Seemingly based on archival documents, the article claimed Freeland lied about her grandfather’s interaction with the German army during WWII and stated that she was actively “preaching race hatred of Russians” (Helmer, 2017a). Helmer, a former White House aide, who moved to Moscow in 1989, is reputed to have been an agent for the KGB (Glavin, 2017a). + +Between 19 and 26 January 2017, more than 30 different pro-Russian Twitter accounts posted or re-tweeted the claims regarding Freeland’s grandfather or linked to and promoted the Helmer article. Many of the social media accounts, some of which had thousands of followers, were known Russian social media trolls belonging to or affiliated with the Internet Research Agency (IRA) On 27 January 2017, a computer-generated audio recording reciting the text of Helmer’s article was posted to YouTube as well as several other social media platforms. The Helmer article was published by the Strategic Culture Foundation, a Russian thinktank and online journal operated by the Russian foreign intelligence (SVR) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a known outlet of Russian propaganda and disinformation (Ponce de Leon and Andriukaitis, 2020). Within a week, the story of Freeland’s grandfather, and accusations that Freeland was sympathetic to Nazism, went viral across several social media platforms. + +Just over a week later, Stanislav Balcerac, a Polish journalist known to support rightwing political movements, published an article on the same topic in the Warszanka Gazeta (Warsaw Gazette), a weekly publication known to publish hate-based and anti-Semitic articles (Balcerac, 2017; Glavin, 2017a). The same article was also published in Polska Bez Censury (Poland Without Censorship). Later in February, Arina Tsukanova, a pro-Russian journalist allegedly based in Crimea (Global Engagement Center, 2020), published an article in Consortium News, a US-based independent, online news service repeating many of the claims from the Balcerac article (Tsukanova, 2017). Although Consortium News sued a Canadian news network for claiming it was part of an elaborate Russian cyber-influence campaign (Lauria, 2020), Tsukanova was subsequently reported to be a sock puppet (i.e., a fictitious persona) operating for the Russian foreign intelligence service through the Strategic Culture Foundation (Global Engagement Center, 2020; Ponce de Leon and Andriukaitis, 2020). + +During a press conference on 6 March 2017 about the extension to Operation UNIFIER, the Canadian military training mission to Ukraine, a reporter asked Freeland about Russian media outlets and websites and claims her grandfather was a Nazi collaborator. In response, Freeland stated that Russian disinformation and other smear campaigns, like those that recently occurred in the US and Europe, should be expected. However, the question of her grandfather’s role during WWII at the press conference, which was covered by several Canadian national news media agencies, served not only to push the story into the mainstream but also provided an opportunity for the Russian government – through Kirill Kalinin, the press secretary of the Russian embassy in Ottawa – to publicly criticize Freeland and question her credibility. The story of Freeland’s grandfather’s role in WWII, and Freeland’s warning of Russian disinformation, effectively dominated news media reporting and overshadowed the announcement of Canada’s renewed commitment to Operation UNIFIER in Ukraine, which was likely the objective of the Russian disinformation campaign (Glavin, 2017a; Glavin 2017b). + +However, that was not the end of the smear campaign. On 21 March 2017, leveraging the story of Freeland’s grandfather and accusing her of lacking integrity and engaging in anti-Russian bias, the Russian Congress of Canada lodged a formal complaint with the Prime Minister. In addition to making spurious claims that Freeland lacked the proper qualifications for the job (as Minister of Foreign Affairs), the letter implied a connection between her grandfather’s role in WWII and her support for Ukrainian exiles and related political issues, suggesting she acquired pro-fascist sympathies from her grandfather (Russian Congress of Canada, 2017). + +While initially generating significant news media attention and public interest in Canada and abroad, as well as generating some negative coverage, some of which called into question the veracity of claims the incident was an act of Russian disinformation, the smear campaign was and is still used in Russian information confrontation, especially those designed to shape the opinions of Russian linguistic audiences in Eastern Europe (Glavin, 2017b). In addition, the smear campaign is often referenced in other disinformation activities designed to undermine Ukrainian political support abroad, particularly in Canada (Brown, 2019). + +In response to the smear campaign and the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom by GRU agents, the Canadian government announced the expulsion of four Russian diplomats in March 2018. The diplomats, who were based in Ottawa and Montreal and included Kalinin (who was alleged to have orchestrated the smear campaign by sending information about Freeland’s grandfather to various news agencies), were identified as intelligence officers and alleged to have interfered in the operation of democratic institutions, including to have engaged in a campaign to shape Canadian public opinion (Guly, 2018). Three of the four were also identified as having conducted cyber-influence activities while based at the Russian consulate in Montreal, specifically an effort designed to discredit the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and spread other disinformation related to Canadian institutions (Fife and Carbert, 2018). + +_Model Components to the House Model:_ + +- __Required Knowledge:__ Cognitive and behavior science, social and cultural science. + +- __Technology Enablers:__ Social media platforms and accounts, sock puppets, and online advocacy/populist news media. + +- __Modus Operandi:__ Smear campaign, combined with disinformation, highly emotive topics. + +- __Cognitive Effects:__ Attempted to create uncertainty and serve as a distraction. + +- __Situational Awareness/Sensemaking:__ Use of highly emotive language was an attempt to confuse and undermine the government’s ability to respond to the smear campaign. + +- __Goal:__ To undermine credibility of the target and the Canadian government, more generally, but also to disrupt decision-making about Canadian military contributions to NATO. + +#### 3.3 COGNITIVE WARFARE CASE STUDY #2: NOVI SANZHARY COVID-19 RIOTS + +With a population of less than 10,000 people, Novi Sanzhary is a small town approximately 335 kms east of Kiev in central Ukraine. On 18 February 2020, a plane carrying evacuees from China (45 Ukrainians and 27 foreign nationals, including flight personnel) arrived in Kharkiv, Ukraine. However, as soon as the plane landed, rumors started to circulate on various social media platforms that the passengers were infected and in the process of being transferred to an unidentified medical facility. In response to the rumors, the Ukrainian government confirmed the arrival of the plane, but indicated that the passengers had been tested prior to departure and that no infections or positive COVID-19 tests were reported. Ukrainian government representatives confirmed that all the passengers would be transferred to a national guard medical Center located in Novi Sanzhary and placed in a 14-day quarantine as a precautionary measure. + +Following the government announcement, however, additional disinformation about the evacuees was posted and shared across multiple social media platforms, including Viber, Facebook, and Instagram. Moreover, local politicians and residents asserted they were not informed of the evacuees prior to the arrival of the plane and complained of a lack of information from the central government officials in Kyiv. Angered by the situation, residents of Novi Sanzhary started to mobilize on 19 February using social media and constructed barricades to block the arrival of the evacuees at the medical clinic. Residents also gathered and protested at the city center. Later that day, dedicated channels on various social media platforms were created which disseminated dire warnings of “countless deaths” and spread disinformation about the evacuees, as well as to encourage residents to ‘take action,’ including confronting soldiers and setting fire to the hospital (Miller, 2020). Some of the social media channels also suggested residents watch online broadcasts about the situation from NASH TV, a station own by a pro-Russian politician, as well as other online pro-Russian broadcasters (Velichko, 2020). In some cases, the administrators of social media channels did not conceal their Russian identities and overtly promoted a pro-Russian narrative and provided links to Russian news media outlets. + +Dozens of police officers and security personnel, including members of the National Guard, arrived in Novi Sanzhary by the morning of 20 February 2020. However, rather than alleviating concerns, the arrival of the security services heightened tensions and, at least to residents, served as confirmation of the rumors the evacuees were infected. Increasing the level of collective anxiety, a spoofed health advisory (which was sent to the entire contact list of the Ministry of Health) confirming that at least five of the evacuees were positive with COVID-19 was released from what appeared to have been the Ukrainian Health Ministry email address. While government officials declared the email to have been spoofed, rumors of the infections still took hold and, along with paid agents provocateurs on the ground inciting violence, the situation in Novi Sanzhary reached a tipping point (Velichko, 2020). As the buses carrying the evacuees arrived in Novi Sanzhary, several hundred residents manned barricades and set fires to block their progress. In response, police in riot gear attempted to push the protesters back and clear a path for the buses, using armored personnel carriers to move vehicles blocking the road. The situation quickly degenerated into violent clashes, with residents throwing stones and other projectiles at the passing buses (Melkozerova and Parafeniuk, 2020). Aggravating the situation and adding to the uncertainty, additional disinformation was released by at least one news media outlet suggesting the staff at the medical center resigned in protest over concerns about a lack of proper equipment and training. + +Later that day, and to defuse the situations, Oleksiy Honcharuk, the Ukrainian prime minister, arrived in town, along with Arsen Avakov and Zoryana Skaletska, the interior and health ministers, respectively. However, the appearance of national political officials as well as public statements, including a Facebook post by Ukrainian President Zelensky pleading for calm, did nothing to reassure the residents. By the time the riots subsided, at least nine police officers and one civilian were injured, and 24 people arrested. Both Honcharuk and Skaletska were subsequently dismissed from their government positions. + +_Model Components to the House Model:_ + +- __Required Knowledge:__ Cognitive and behavior science, social and cultural science. + +- __Technology Enablers:__ Social media platforms and accounts, sock puppets, television broadcasts, online news media, email spoofing. + +- __Modus Operandi:__ Disinformation combined with highly emotive topics and exploitation of uncertainty to generate rumors, cyber-attacks. + +- __Cognitive Effects:__ Exploiting pervasive fear, created an elevated level of uncertainty and anxiety and undermined public confidence in Ukrainian government institutions. + +- __Situational Awareness/Sensemaking:__ Campaign took advantage of a lack of information released from the Ukrainian government and a general distrust of political institutions. + +- __Goal:__ To undermine the credibility of and trust in the Ukrainian government. + +#### 3.4 COGNITIVE WARFARE CASE STUDY #3: RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR (2008) + +The exact event that triggered the five-day war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 is difficult to pinpoint. At the time, Mikheil Saakashvili, the President of Georgia, was blamed by many analysts for being reckless and for antagonizing Russia, which was also how the Russian government wanted the conflict to be portrayed (Lauder, 2019). However, those claims have been revisited by scholars, and many now assert the Russian government carefully planned and escalated the incidents to provoke the Georgian government into a disproportionate response which was then used by the Russia government to justify military intervention (Lauder, 2019). The provocative activities by the Russia government included an assassination attempt on the head of the Georgian-backed administration in South Ossetia, attacks on Georgian police officers, indiscriminate shelling of Georgian towns by South Ossetian militias, threats that Cossack militias and other volunteers were mobilizing, and a series of computer network attacks that disrupted the ability of the Georgian government to communicate with the public. + +After a week of increasingly violent skirmishes between South Ossetia militias and Georgian defence forces, which included the arbitrary shelling of residential areas, and based on intelligence that Russian troops were about to invade through the Roki Tunnel, Saakashvili ordered the Georgian military to mobilize and advance into South Ossetia on the early afternoon on 7 August. At the same time, Georgian personnel vacated the Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) headquarters, which included a joint monitoring force of Russian, South Ossetian and Georgian military representatives. + +Although the situation was tense and unpredictable, Saakashvili hoped that pushing Georgian defence forces into South Ossetia would force an end to the artillery strikes and prevent the Russian military from entering the region. Shortly after the mobilization, Saakashvili declared a unilateral ceasefire and ordered a halt to the advance. This decision was based on input from the Russian military representative at the JPKF who indicated that the Russian military did not have control of South Ossetian militias, implying that Russia was not responsible for the current situation. The Russian military representative also suggested Georgian authorities order an immediate stop to the mobilization and declare a unilateral ceasefire, which Saakashvili did. Later in the day, both Russian and South Ossetian diplomatic representatives failed to appear at a prearranged meeting with Georgian authorities to negotiate a settlement. Saakashvili provided an update on live television and publicly called for negotiations with South Ossetian and Russian officials. Saakashvili also reconfirmed a promise of unrestricted autonomy for South Ossetia and pleaded for the international community to intervene. Taking advantage of the ceasefire, South Ossetia militias renewed their shelling of Georgian towns, which forced civilians to flee. Sensing there was no other remedy or way to curtail the violence, Saakashvili rescinded the ceasefire and, at approximately 23:30 hours on 7 August, re-ordered the Georgian military to move into South Ossetia. Within hours of that-order, two Russian motorized rifle brigades passed through the Roki Tunnel and entered South Ossetia. The brigades, which were a part of the Russian 58ᵗʰ Army, recently participated in Kavkaz-2008, a joint counterterrorism and peacekeeping exercise. While some of the participants of the exercise returned to their bases, the two brigades were sent to the Russian side of the tunnel and told to wait for the order to enter South Ossetia. Putin, then Prime Minister of Russia, denounced the Georgian mobilization as an act of aggression against South Ossetia and threatened a Russian response. Russian news media, many of whom were prepositioned in South Ossetia by the Russian government days prior to the conflict, also accused Georgian authorities of atrocities against the civilian population. + +While Georgian defence forces made some early gains, the next five days (8–12 August) saw Russian forces, as well as the various militias operating in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, make significant advances into Georgian territory, with the main Russian armored column halting less than 60km from Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. During this period, Putin, who was attending the 2008 Summer Olympics in China, arrived in North Ossetia and took charge of the military operation. Putin also claimed the Georgian government’s actions were criminal, and that more than 30,000 refugees fled the country and dozens of civilians were killed by Georgian forces. Despite a willingness on part of Georgian authorities to negotiate, the Russian military, along with supporting militias, conducted offensive operations along numerous fronts. Russia also conducted a well-organized cyber operation that employed both professional hackers and hacktivists which effectively crippled Georgian government, law enforcement, financial sector, and news media websites and attempted to smear Saakashvili by defacing government websites with Nazi symbols. + +By 13 August, the conflict was largely over, as both sides agreed to a peace plan hastily brokered by France. On 26 August, Dmitry Medvedev, the President of Russia, signed a Presidential decree recognizing the Republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. The decree also authorized cooperation and mutual assistance agreements, including on defence and military support. Several features of this operation suggest that maskirovka was employed by the Russian military and a significant degree of reflexive control of the Georgian leadership may have been achieved. First, the timing of the intervention, which followed closely on Kavkaz-2008, was designed to allow the Russian military to mass troops along the border without causing undue suspicion. Second, the Russian military did not make a concerted effort to conceal their position or intention to invade, including permitting South Ossetian border guards to use Georgian telephone lines to report the initial movement of a Russian armored unit through the Roki Tunnel in the early hours of 7 August. These phone calls, which were intercepted by Georgian intelligence services, helped frame Saakashvili’s understanding of the situation, and seemingly substantiated his concerns that Russia was invading, which ultimately led him to mobilize the Georgian military and push into South Ossetia (the false-optimal solution). Third, and likely sensing a degree of trepidation on part of Saakashvili, as well as his reputation for impulsivity, the Russian military exploited his eagerness to negotiate a settlement by suggesting he should halt the advance, announce a unilateral ceasefire, and have emissaries meet to discuss a peaceful solution, a meeting that both Russian and South Ossetian representatives failed to attend. There is also evidence suggesting the Russian government generated and published an extensive psychological profile of Saakashvili, which may have been used to design the manipulation (Blandy, 2009). This manipulation of Saakashvili by the Russian military served to critically delay the arrival of Georgian troops in South Ossetia which provided enough time for the remaining Russian forces to transit through the tunnel. Lastly, and while he thought he was acting in self-defence, Saakashvili’s mobilization of Georgian defence forces provided the Russian government with the moral and legal justification to invade. Moreover, this pretext was further reinforced by Russian government accusations of human rights violations by the Georgian military, including claims of ethnic genocide, which may have served to prevent Western military intervention in the conflict. In this example it seems as though the Georgian government, specifically Saakashvili, never recognized the extent to which the Russian government was manipulating the situation. + +_Model Components to the House Model:_ + +- __Required Knowledge:__ Cognitive and behavior science, social and cultural science. + +- __Technology Enablers:__ State-controlled and aligned news media, DDoS attacks, digital graffiti, and defacements. + +- __Modus Operandi:__ Disinformation and cyber-attacks. + +- __Cognitive Effects:__ Elevated level of uncertainty about adversary intentions. + +- __Situational Awareness/Sensemaking:__ Sent mixed signals to confuse the target, disrupted the ability of the Georgian government to function. + +- __Goal:__ To disrupt the ability of Saakasvili to make timely decisions and to choose a false-optimal solution. + +#### 3.5 REFERENCES + +[Balcerac, S. (08 February 2017). The New Foreign Minister of Canada Chrystia Freeland – Proud Granddaughter Collaborator! Warszanka Gazeta](http://warszawskagazeta.pl/polityka/item/4562-nowa-minister-spraw-zagranicznych-kanady-chrystia-freeland-dumna-wnuczka-kolaboranta). + +[Blandy, C.W. (2009). Provocation, Deception, Entrapment: The Russo-Georgian Five-Day War. Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/97421/09_january_georgia_russia.pdf). + +[Brown, C. (17 January 2019). Top Russian News Host Takes Aim at Ukrainian Canadians. CBC News](https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/top-russian-news-host-takes-aim-at-ukrainian-canadians-1.4980859). + +[Fife, R. and Carbert, M. (29 March 2018). Russian Spies Aimed to Discredit WADA, Spread Disinformation about Canada with Cyber Campaigns. The Globe and Mail](https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-russian-spies-aimed-to-discredit-wada-spread-disinformation-about/). + +[Glavin, T. (8 March 2017a). Terry Glavin: Enter the Freeland-Nazi Conspiracy – and Amping-Up of Russia’s Mischief in Canada. The National Post](http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/terry-glavin-enter-the-freeland-nazi-conspiracy-and-the-amping-up-of-russias-mischief-in-canada). + +[Glavin, T. (14 March 2017b). How Russia’s Attack on Freeland Got Traction in Canada. MacLeans](https://www.macleans.ca/politics/how-russias-attack-on-freeland-got-traction-in-canada/). + +[Global Engagement Center. (August 2020). Pillars of Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem](https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Pillars-of-Russia’s-Disinformation-and-Propaganda-Ecosystem_08-04-20.pdf). + +[Guly, C. (13 April 2018). Smear Campaign Against Freeland Linked to Russian Diplomats’ Expulsion, says Trudeau. The Ukrainian Weekly](http://www.ukrweekly.com/uwwp/180711-2/). + +[Helmer, J. (19 January 2017a). SCOOP: Canada’s New Foreign Minister Lying about Family’s Ukrainian Nazi Past. Russia Insider](https://russia-insider.com/en/victim-or-aggressor-chrystia-freelands-family-record-nazi-war-profiteering-and-murder-crakow-jews). + +[Kassam, A. (10 January 2017). Canada Names Chrystia Freeland, Leading Russia Critic, as Foreign Minister. The Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/10/canada-chrystia-freeland-foreign-minister-russia-critic). + +[Lauder, M.A. (2019). Limits of Control: Examining the Employment of Proxies by the Russian Federation in Political Warfare. Journal of Future Conflict, Issue 1](https://www.queensu.ca/psychology/sites/psycwww/files/uploaded_files/Graduate/OnlineJournal/Matthew_Lauder-Limits_of_Control-Examining_the_Employment_of_Proxies_by_the_Russian_Federation_in_Political_Warfare.pdf). + +[Lauria, J. (13 October 2020). Consortium News Sues Canadian TV Network for Defamation Over Report CN was Part of ‘Attack’ ‘Directed’ by Russia. Consortium News](https://consortiumnews.com/2020/10/13/consortium-news-sues-canadian-tv-network-fordefamation-over-report-cn-was-part-of-attack-directed-by-russia/). + +Ledeneva, A.V. (2016). How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped post-Soviet Politics and Business. Cornell University Press. + +[Ling, J. (3 March 2017). Canada’s Foreign Minister Warns of Russian Destabilization Efforts – and She Might be a Target. VICE](https://www.vice.com/en/article/8xmyna/canadas-foreign-minister-warns-of-russian-destabilization-efforts-and-she-might-be-a-target). + +[Media Bias/Fact Check. (n.d.). Consortium News. Media Bias Fact Check](https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/consortium-news/). + +[Melkozerova, V., and Parafeniuk, O. (3 March 2020). How Coronavirus Disinformation Caused Chaos in a Small Ukrainian Town. NBC News](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/how-coronavirus-disinformation-caused-chaos-small-ukrainian-town-n1146936). + +[Miller, C. (20 February 2020). A Viral Email about Coronavirus Had People Smashing Buses and Blocking Hospitals. BuzzFeed](https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/christopherm51/coronavirus-ukraine-china). + +[Ponce de Leon, E., and Andriukaitis, L. (24 September 2020). Facebook Takes Down Assets Linked to Russian Disinformation Outlet. Medium](https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-takes-down-assets-linked-to-russian-disinformation-outlet-acab0164e3d4). + +Russian Congress of Canada. (21 March 2017). Appeal to Prime Minister Trudeau to Question Minister Freeland’s Integrity. Russian Congress of Canada. + +[Shekhovtsov, A. (23 November 2015). Is Russia’s Insider Sponsored by a Russian Oligarch with Ties to the European Far Right? The Interpreter](https://www.interpretermag.com/is-russia-insider-sponsored-by-a-russian-oligarch-with-ties-to-the-european-far-right/). + +[Staff Writer. (26 January 2017). And You Are a Nazi, Too! EU East StratCom Task Force](https://us11.campaign-archive.com/?u=cd23226ada1699a77000eb60b&id=d50f54d197). + +[Tsukanova, A. (27 February 2017). A Nazi Skeleton in the Family Closet. Consortium News](https://consortiumnews.com/2017/02/27/a-nazi-skeleton-in-the-family-closet/). + +[Velichko, L. (28 February 2020). Masters of Panic: A Pro-Russian Network in Ukraine Organized a Riot in Novi Sanzhary. Texty](https://texty.org.ua/articles/100356/specoperaciya-imeni-portnova-ta-shariya-yak-rozhanyaly-paniku-v-novyh-sanzharah-i-hto-za-cym-stoyit/). + + +### Chapter 4 ‒ THE INFLUENCE AND IMPACT OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SCIENCES IN COGNITIVE WARFARE + +> #### Matthew A. Lauder +> #### Defence Research & Development +> #### CANADA + +#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION + +Informed by a variety of academic disciplines (e.g., anthropology, sociology, psychology, cultural studies, political sciences, communication sciences, and development studies, amongst others) and generally defined as _scientific activities focused on better understanding social behaviors, patterns, processes, and structures_, the social and cultural sciences offer unique insight into the issue of cognitive warfare (CogWar), specifically (but not limited to) the socio-technical mechanics of audience engagement and psycho-social effects generation, as well as potential interventions or responses to neutralize, mitigate or counter cognitive attacks on audiences. In other words, the social and cultural sciences offer insight into and can help inform the development of both offensive and defensive facets of CogWar, particularly at the meso and macro levels of analysis (i.e., characteristics of social interaction between groups and organizations through large-scale societal interactions). + +#### 4.2 METHOD AND THEORY + +A distinctive feature of the social and cultural sciences is the breadth of methodological approaches, research techniques, and theories and analytical frameworks that can be employed to examine or underpin CogWar. For example, the social and cultural sciences includes both qualitative (e.g., case studies, participant observation, unstructured surveys, focus groups, etc.) and quantitative research methods (e.g., data surveys, correlational research, longitudinal surveys, etc.), which can also be integrated to support a mixed methods approach. Moreover, the social and cultural sciences are inherently flexible, allowing for the use of grounded theory (i.e., building theory from evidence) or more traditional approaches, such as hypothesis testing and theory validation through experimental research. Although a comprehensive list is beyond the remit of this report, some of the more prominent theories employed in the social and cultural sciences to enhance understanding of the socio-technical mechanics of, and the psycho-social effects generated by, CogWar, include: + +1) __Social identity theory:__ Originally developed by Henri Tajfel and John Turner (2004), social identity theory asserts that an individual’s affiliation to a group, and the perceived status, legitimacy, and distinctions of that group, play a significant role in determining social behavior, including both social-constructive and anti-social behaviors. Two fundamental aspects of social identity theory include ingroup favoritism (showing preferential treatment to those affiliated with the ingroup) and out-group (or social) comparison (evaluating the in- to out-groups to establish a favorable perception of status), both of which play a role in developing a positive social identity and have an impact on group processes, norms, and structures as well as intergroup relations. + +2) __Symbolic interaction theory (symbolic interactionism):__ Less of a theory and more of a framework for understanding, symbolic interactionism asserts that actors respond to the subjective meanings attached to social phenomena and states that meaning may be modified through social interaction. In other words, meaning is adaptable, negotiated and reciprocal, and that reality is primarily a social product (i.e., socially constructed). + +3) __Structural functionalism (or functionalism):__ Structural functionalism is not a single, unifying, or grand theory; but a family or constellation of sometimes competing theoretical approaches and conceptual frameworks that comprehend society as a complex, open system in which the component parts strive for and maintain a degree of dynamic, interactive stability (i.e., homeostasis). Structural functionalism examines the system structures, relationships, interdependencies, functions, and conditions of a given society, the aggregation of which gives meaning to and regulates (i.e., bounds) human action. + +4) __Conflict theory:__ Commonly associated with Karl Marx, conflict theory refers to a set or constellation of theories that posits society is in a perpetual state of conflict because of competition for and access to limited resources, and that social order is maintained through power, primarily through political suppression and economic exploitation (Lauder, 2022). However, this theory posits that rather than an entirely destructive force, conflict is regarded as the engine of social change and transformation, such as through revolution. + +5) __Framing theory:__ Popularized by Irving Goffman, framing theory (also known as _frame analysis or simply framing_) is a multidisciplinary research method used to examine the process of selecting and creating as well as the transference, assessment, and the effects of message content on individuals and collectives (Lauder, 2022). Framing theory is often applied to news media reporting, political campaigns, and social movements, particularly to examine the construction and maintenance of meaning and account for behavioral effects. As a central component of framing theory, frames (what may also be called interpretative schemas) provide a way for people to interpret and understand social phenomena (i.e., events, issues, behaviors, etc.) by describing and giving them meaning in ways that appeal to and leverage shared knowledge structures. + +6) __Structural strain theory:__ More of a class of theories or frameworks than a single theoretical construct, structural strain theory asserts that society puts pressure on individuals to achieve a range of abstract normative goals, such as being successful. Perceiving a gap between one’s status and societal goals, and lacking the means to attain these goals, people often resort to criminal activity to gain financial security. As a result, unconventional, deviant, and other anti-social behaviors become normalized. In other cases, people join sub-cultures, which allows them to reject mainstream society and substitute societal goals with more achievable goals (i.e., achieve an alternate definition of success). + +7) __Rational choice theory:__ A widely employed theory, rational choice theory proposes that an individual, motivated by self-interest, will conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine the most profitable or beneficial option (i.e., to maximize utility or achieve the highest payoff). + +8) __Chaos theory:__ Applied across a range of disciplines, from anthropology to mathematics, chaos theory posits that, while appearing random, complex systems (such as social systems) can be distilled to underlying patterns, which can be used to predict system behavior. A central concept of chaos theory is that of the butterfly effect, which posits that, due to sensitive dependence on initial conditions, slight changes in a system can result in massive, downstream effects. + +9) __Complexity theory:__ Also referred to as _complex adaptive systems_ and borrowing from chaos and systems theory, complexity theory posits that complex systems, while dynamic and adaptive, may be viewed as interdependent and constrained by order-generating rules that may predict system behavior. + +#### 4.3 AREAS OF INVESTIGATION WITHIN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SCIENCE IMPACTING COGWAR + +There are several areas of investigation to which the above-listed theories and analytical frameworks may be used to examine, or underpin the development of, CogWar. The following summary provides a list of broad topics for further consideration: + +1) __Amplifying and exploiting social and political divides:__ One facet of CogWar is for the adversary to stoke internal rifts in a target country, such as political, ethnic, economic, or class divides. The idea is that, by manipulating national discourse, often through disguised social media accounts (i.e., pretending to be a member of the targeted audience, also called _sock puppets_) and the employment of highly emotive, symbolic, and sometimes offensive language, an adversary can amplify divisions and lead to violent confrontation between groups and the state. A better understanding of the socio-technical mechanics and effects of this approach may be understood by several theories, particularly social identity theory, conflict theory, framing theory, and structural strain theory. For example, social identity theory, conflict theory and structural strain theory may offer insights into social, economic, and political divisions that may help us understand how audiences may be encouraged or incited towards rejecting normative structures, processes and engage in extreme violence, typically targeting other groups or the state. Moreover, framing theory may offer insights into how grievances are formalized, presented, and rationalized to inspire collective action. + +2) __Disseminating rumors, gossip, and disinformation to generate collective anxiety and uncertainty:__ Another key approach of CogWar employed by adversaries is that of rumors, gossip, and other forms of disguised or unattributed (e.g., black) disinformation (e.g., smear campaigns) that are specifically designed to be disseminated by and through social networks, whether virtual Peer-to-Peer (P2P) or Face-to-Face (F2F). The purpose of these attacks is to capitalize on and amplify uncertainty and create debilitating levels of fear and anxiety in a population so that they are not able to properly function. Another goal is to create conditions of social and political instability by generating distrust between the public and the state, particularly by creating a crisis of credibility on part of the state and normative structures. A range of theories can enhance an understanding of this area of investigation, including symbolic interactionism, structural functionalism, and complexity theory. For example, symbolic interactionism may offer insights into how meaning is generated and disseminated within specific audiences, particularly to ensure a high degree of message resonance. Likewise, structural functionalism and complexity theory may support better understanding of the role of social structures, including institutions and norms, in mitigating effects of negative or hostile messaging, as well as how messages spread throughout social networks. + +3) __Exploiting cognitive errors in the decision-making process:__ Often referred to as reflexive control and employed as a part of _maskirovka_ (operational masking), and closely associated with perception management, the Russian government intentionally seeks to gain indirect and external control of a target’s decision-making process, specifically to create conditions that lead the target to unwittingly make a false-optimal decision (i.e., a decision that favors the instigator). This may be achieved through the careful creation, selection, management, and release of information to the target, particularly to leverage and amplify any faulty perceptions, erroneous assumptions, or other cognitive errors, such as cognitive distortions, cognitive biases, and logical fallacies, et al., on part of the target. Critical in this approach is that the false-optimal decision may be selected voluntarily rather than coerced or forced upon the target by the instigator of reflexive control. In other words, the target must always cling to the idea of the _illusion of control_ created by the instigator (Lauder, 2022). Other theories may help us to develop countermeasures to reflexive control and maskirovka, including framing theory, rational choice theory, and chaos theory. + +4) __Building societal resilience to disinformation:__ A range of factors have been identified as limiting societal resilience to disinformation, such as increased polarization of society, political populism, economic incentives to produce fake news, pervasive distrust of expert knowledge, mainstream news media and governance structures and traditional institutions. The question remains: How can societies build resilience to mediated forms of disinformation (i.e., disinformation that is technologically enabled)? Most solutions revolve around regulating social media platforms or identifying and removing disinformation from the information environment. However, other solutions, such as developing tools to help people evaluate information quality, address deeply embedded structural deficiencies or creating a culture of media literacy. There has been a limited amount of research conducted regarding these solutions, however, the issue of mediated disinformation continues to evolve rapidly due to changing tactics and technology. Thus, there is an array of theories presented to offer insights into how to build societal resilience, including complexity theory, structural functionalism, and symbolic interactionism. + +#### 4.4 MODUS OPERANDI – A CROSS-CUTTING ENABLER + +Modus operandi is the deliberate, rigorous, and scientifically informed examination of methods, stratagems, and other patterns of behavior designed and operationalized by adversaries to generate the desired psycho-social effect on an audience, including activities employed to psychologically prime and create cognitive openings and other opportunities for adversarial intervention (i.e., pre-propaganda). Modus operandi is not limited in scope to the examination of specific tactics or tools, such as using a loudspeaker or a fraudulent social media account (although that is a part of the investigation) but is concerned with the holistic application and synchronization of a range of methods and resources across the dimensions of the information environment (i.e., cognitive, informational, and physical) to generate psycho-social effects. + +The purpose of examining modus operandi is twofold. First, achieving a deep understanding of _what, when, and how_ adversaries conduct CogWar can provide insights to support the development and validation of countermeasures and defensive strategies, such as programs to help build and/or maintain societal resilience or developing technological responses that significantly increase the cost of CogWar to adversaries while reducing or minimizing their effectiveness (i.e., deterrence by denial). Second, a deep understanding may offer insights into an adversary’s own weaknesses and vulnerabilities, which can then inform the development and execution of offensive capabilities. For example, a close examination of Russian military reflexive control practices, and the underpinning theories and conceptual models, indicates that several vulnerabilities exist when these practices are executed, including the inadvertent release of intelligence by the instigator and the ability of the target (of the deception) to take control of the process by covertly manipulating the instigator’s sense function (e.g., release of false data, technical manipulation of sensors, etc.) or the employment of perception management techniques (Lauder, 2022). Another risk of reflexive control is that the instigator of the effort can fall victim to a range of cognitive errors, particularly if the time-to-decision is artificially compressed (i.e., a hasty decision is provoked) by the target or if the instigator’s analytical function is overwhelmed by a deluge of (false and positive) information or if the instigator’s plans are revealed. The quick declassification and public release of classified information by the US intelligence community about the Russian government’s intention to invade Ukraine during a specific time-period in February 2022 is an excellent example of undermining an instigator’s attempt at reflexive control through pre-emption. + +#### 4.5 REFERENCES + +Lauder, M.A., (2022). The Illusion of Control: A Pragmatic Retelling of Russian Military Maskirovka and Reflexive Control (DRDC-RDDC-2022-D024). Defence Research and Development Canada. + +Tajfel, H., and Turner, J.C. (2004). The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In J.T. Jost and J. Sidanius (Eds.), Political Psychology: Key Readings, pp. 276-293. Psychology Press. Doi: 10.4324/9780203505984-16. + + +### Chapter 5 ‒ COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE (PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS) + +> #### Benjamin J. Knox +> #### Norwegian Armed Forces Cyber Defence +> #### NORWAY + +#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION – COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE (PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS) + +The Cognitive and Behavioral Science (CBS) pillar intends to allow for research that can establish ways to be proactive, rather than reactive when approaching CogWar from a tactical, operational, and strategic perspective. Our adversaries study and target our psychological assets and vulnerabilities. Therefore, we must seek to know ourselves better, from an objective meta-perspective, and understand our adversaries’ way of thinking and behaving from an equally critical perspective. Finding new approaches, applying known methods, and combining human and data-driven techniques in novel ways, can help learning processes that answer the question ‘why’ things are happening. Thus, leading to research concerned with informing decisions about ‘what’ should be done in response. Hence, the Cognitive and Behavioral Science pillar describes a field that is multi-disciplinary and emphasizes the criticality of psychological interventions in CogWar research. + +Research on psychological processes and mechanisms in the last century have given psychologists a better understanding of human behavior, emotion, and cognition. Research in cognitive and behavioral science has identified, for example, factors of persuasion, manipulation, behavior change, and social processes (Cialdini, 1993; Hadnagy, 2010) that can be targeted in CogWar. For example, by understanding how dual processes of cognition function (emotional and rational cognitions), one can use this information not only to understand how CogWar techniques attack vulnerabilities but also how to increase resilience and mitigate such attacks. Seemingly then, research from the cognitive and behavioral sciences has identified factors to understand the goals of CogWar. Arising from a fundamental knowledge of human behavior, science has and must continue to focus on analyzing the requisite knowledge for identifying, securing, defending, and countering adversarial CogWar goals. This involves the complex process of creating causal understanding, establishing cause and effect between events, and the meaning of short and long-term attack methodologies and patterns. This knowledge is critical for military decision-making at the individual level, and necessary for the development of collective sustainable modes of resilience and countermeasures. + +#### 5.2 INFLUENCE OF COGNITIVE WARFARE + +Today, targeted, arbitrary, and experimental cognitive operations occur within the information space of humans primarily through the virtual domains (Montañez et al., 2020). Advancements in CogWar are interwoven with the application and integration of narrow AI into our daily lives, and these target basic cognitive functions that were evolved for survival. For example, social media giants evoke the same mechanisms by altering their algorithm to increase user engagement by dosing their feed with stories that can trigger emotional responses which leads to more heuristic processing and automatic behavior (Stieglitz and Dan-Xuan, 2013). Our emotions are driven by the autonomic nervous system and can be difficult to regulate since they can steer both attention and behavior. As an example of how CogWar can target emotional processes, research has shown that inciting outrage causes intense emotional responses in individuals (Berger, 2016; Fan et al., 2014) that in turn can create a social emotional contagion that can cause groupthink which can lead to more risky decision-making at higher strategic levels (Kramer et al., 2014). + +CogWar can also target other cognitive aspects. The mind operates through a process of pattern recognition since working memory has limited capacity, and any information that does not fit known patterns will cause increases in working memory usage to make sense of what is happening, including emotional processes. Increase in working memory can quickly be stressful as we are processing information and coping with any outcomes that can happen. The increase of working memory use decreases attention to other factors that may be relevant. In other words, CogWar can target increasing an individual’s workload so that they can be distracted or unable to identify other pertinent information. For example, when one considers that humans have such a strong tendency to impose context onto ambiguous stimuli, how one manages to redirect or override one’s own projections and perceive information as it truly exists, demands a high level of deliberate effort. Should an attacker layer his/her effort with a culturally consistent narrative, present a motivation for hypervigilance, and use social media as an amplifier, this can reinforce and further direct (or mis-direct attention depending upon attacker intent) attention (Canham et al., 2022). Today, this idea is made possible through technologies such as AI, or Generative Neural Networks (the architecture responsible for creating Deepfakes), that can be applied with a policy of, “let’s see what’s possible.” These are experiments at scale without any clear principles, rules of law, rules of engagement, ethical or moral engagement as to what the outcome may be. Whether it is used to boost or manipulate information around you, or to anchor you, or to change your opinion, one needs to be cognizant of what drives our attention, and meta enough to see something when it is interfering with our predictions, judgements, and biases (Sütterlin et al., 2022). + +#### 5.3 COGNITIVE WARFARE AND SELECTIVE ATTENTION + +This point highlights the overlap with all the horizontal factors in the model. Just as we grapple with explainability issues and bias in AI, this pillar investigates what it is like to be human and the continuous effort and motivation needed to understand the cognitive barriers and strategies that explain a state i.e., control of cognitive and behavioral factors that may be affecting current SA, such as explainability issues and bias. To use the social engineering example, while social engineering tactics have been understood in marketing and persuasion, only recently has research begun to emerge that places effort into mapping individual and cognitive-emotional factors affecting susceptibility to- and resilience against social engineering attacks in cyber domains (Brangetto et al., 2016). When CogWar operations act to influence a person, or persons, to take an action that may or may not be in their best interest; then, it will be achieved by applying well-established tactics of persuasion, such as social proof or reciprocity, depending on the target. What is new is the available technologies that can affect the _input_ data into our brains to grab or manipulate our attention to induce an emotional reaction. By redirecting attention towards internal processes such as the significance of emotional reactions or gut-feelings, this leads to impulsive decision-making: _output_. This occurs due to a manipulation to increase attentional processes to more emotional and subjective aspects instead of more reflective and more objective evaluations thus decreasing the possibility to critically examine the current situation and take more critical and reflective decisions. + +CogWar operations tend not to be transparent. This mirrors certain technologies such as AI in our daily lives. Operations happen in a black box and outcomes often cannot be explained. The current unstoppable state in terms of super-human technological development for the good of society is that explanation and transparency is unnecessary so long as the outcomes improve human intelligence, efficiency, and economic productivity (mostly in the eyes of technologists and industry). In the pattern detection of new properties that were once inconceivable to humans that lead to the production and advancement of antibiotics, education, and entertainment, we see narrow AI finding combinations that a human could never have seen or predicted. This is unquestionably positive. However, the inevitable industrialization of this technology and its dual-use potential should be addressed as a threat and not tolerated by NATO. As such, from a NATO S&T perspective, explanations of outcomes and transparency is essential as this knowledge can reduce the effects of CogWar. Whether the effects are unintended, self-inflicted, or induced, cognitive harm may occur. Such cognitive impairment (temporary or permanent) may accrue from naive over-exposure to certain technologies that may impact cognitive processes and/or development. It may also be the case that cognitive attacks remain obfuscated by the technological state of our lives and may target basic cognitive process such as cognitive bias. These technologies may have been designed by well-intentioned developers, or by consciously malicious technology companies linked with an adversary. Whatever the motivations, the goal is cognitive control, and by targeting the less regulated or vulnerable parts of the brain to encourage maladaptive behaviors, or to trigger an emotional response and shift our attention, adversaries exert control over cognitive processes and initiate disruption, social contagion, undermining our innate cognitive processes and shape decision-making in support of their objectives. + +#### 5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS + +When technology companies use researchers and ML, or deep learning techniques to study user data to understand behavior, they make rediscoveries, and identify ways to anticipate, but not understand user behavior. In the __short-term__ the Cognitive and Behavioral Science pillar should engage with behavior science experts to perform and inform studies that anticipate and test for the potential dual use of technologies. Together they can explore where technologies have been designed and operationalized already and see if users have been harmed in unintended ways. This knowledge driven approach to building understanding concerns how certain technologies are being designed and how they can be used to do harm, intentionally or unintentionally. It will allow NATO to respond not just in redirecting user behavior, but predicting CogWar operations and gain the foresight, grounded in sensemaking, to defend known human cognitive vulnerabilities before they are exposed to technologies that are intentionally designed, or misappropriated to exploit them. + +In the __medium-term__ S&T needs to investigate social engineering when it occurs at scale, across multiple perceptual levels, and through different modes of delivery, enabled by modern technology. The complexity lies in developing ways to build self-regulatory skills (such as metacognition) that lead to greater collective vigilance. Research needs to find the balance where being reserved can equate to vigilance, rather than revealing victim behaviors. This multi-disciplinary and multi-method approach is novel and combines cognitive science, social psychology, social and cultural science, and the neuroscience pillar. When this is discussed relating to national security, military intelligence, and NATO collective defence, research needs to address the multiple perceptual levels involved in CogWar. As shown above, CogWar can be a combination of things targeting perceptions. Therefore, people can’t be vigilant all the time. Methods need to be found that augment and help people learn to be vigilant intuitively. Like battle inoculation training in simulated conditions to prepare soldiers for deployments in combat, the same basic concept can be developed to level up performance in CogWar. Preparing soldiers for the effects by exposing them to the attack, helps to prepare them and enables them to learn methods for coping in a CogWar context. This will also help them regulate their own behaviors, so they become learned System 1 intuitive behaviors. When training and education for CogWar pivots to vigilance and meta-cognitive skills development, cognitive security is likely to increase as CogWar operations and attacks become more salient as the mechanisms are no longer hidden in the complexity of plain sight. Just as previous operational and combat experience helps to prepare soldiers for future situations, experiencing CogWar, teaching soldiers how it happens, letting them imagine and develop scenarios, and then perform the attack on each other. This pedagogic approach gives the learner the tools, but the process will involve such things as group consensus and individual differences, both of which CogWar targets to achieve its goals. + +Doing this can mark the beginning of the __long-term__ process of recognizing CogWar intuitively in real world situations before their working memory is blocked or overloaded by the attack. The process of making intuition a positive resource rather than a bias involves individuals understanding the mechanisms of CogWar, so they have a greater chance of intervening. This does not involve every service member becoming a cognitive scientist, but it does require awareness of the factors in NATO and the alliance (or a society) that can be targeted, knowledge of individual-level cognitive vulnerabilities that make them susceptible to attack and which skills can mitigate those vulnerabilities, and implementation of individualized and collective training efforts. + +This pillar will direct research in Cognitive and Behavioral Science through psychological interventions. Research will shed light on how today’s technological context is enabling such things as narrow AI to guide and lead our decision-making without us being aware of it too often. When an adversary is piggybacking, hijacking or part of the development process of this technology; then, it is critical that we have the knowledge and tools to minimize and defend against instances to prevent this from happening. + +#### 5.5 REFERENCES + +Berger, J. (2016). Contagious: Why Things Catch On. Simon and Schuster. + +Brangetto, P., and Veenendaal, M.A. (May 2016). Influence Cyber Operations: The Use of Cyberattacks in Support of Influence Operations. In 2016 8ᵗʰ International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), pp. 113-126, IEEE. + +Canham, M., Sütterlin, S., Ask, T.F., Knox, B.J., Glenister, L., and Lugo, R. (2022). Ambiguous Self-Induced Disinformation (ASID) Attacks: Weaponizing a Cognitive Deficiency. Journal of Information Warfare, 21(3), pp. 43-58. + +Cialdini, R. (1993). Influence: Science and Practice, 3ʳᵈ Edition, New York. Harper Collins College Publishers. + +Fan, R., Zhao, J., Chen, Y., and Xu, K. (2014). Anger is More Influential than Joy: Sentiment Correlation in Weibo. PloS one, 9(10), p.e110184. + +Hadnagy, C. (2010). Social Engineering: The Art of Human Hacking. John Wiley & Sons. + +Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. + +Kramer, A.D., Guillory, J.E., and Hancock, J.T. (2014). Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion through Social Networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(24), pp.8788-8790. + +Montañez, R., Golob, E., and Xu, S. (2020). Human Cognition Through the Lens of Social Engineering Cyberattacks. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, p. 1755. + +Stieglitz, S., and Dang-Xuan, L. (2013). Emotions and Information Diffusion in Social Media ‒ Sentiment of Microblogs and Sharing Behavior. Journal of Management Information Systems, 29(4), pp.217-248. + +Sütterlin, S., Lugo, R.G., Ask, T.F., Veng, K., Eck, J., Fritschi, J., Özmen, M.T., Bärreiter, B., and Knox, B.J. (2022). The Role of IT Background for Metacognitive Accuracy, Confidence and Overestimation of Deep Fake Recognition Skills. In International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction, pp. 103-119, Springer Cham. + + +### Chapter 6 ‒ DEVELOPING COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEFENCE AGAINST COGNITIVE WARFARE + +> #### Claude C. Grigsby +> #### US Air Force Research Laboratory +> #### UNITED STATES + +> #### Richard A. McKinley +> #### US Air Force Research Laboratory +> #### UNITED STATES + +> #### Nathaniel R. Bridges +> #### US Air Force Research Laboratory +> #### UNITED STATES + +> #### Jennifer Carpena-Núñez +> #### US Air Force Research Laboratory +> #### UNITED STATES + +#### 6.1 INTRODUCTION – COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: DEFENCE AGAINST COGNITIVE WARFARE + +Future battles will involve far less permissive environments, agile logistics, and adaptive command-and- control. With the increased role of automation, artificial intelligence-enabled virtual teammates, and remote control/supervision of technology, there is a new focus on Cognitive Warfare (CogWar). CogWar targets the human brain/mind by using disinformation, propaganda, and information overload to confuse the enemy and exploit cognitive vulnerabilities. There is a pressing need for the DoD to invest in the emerging area of CogWar, a capability that does not yet exist for allied nation’s military, but near-peer adversaries are aggressively developing such capabilities. Adversarial advances in offensive CogWar must be proactively matched and exceeded by leveraging expertise in cognitive and brain sciences, brain-machine interfaces, applied psychology and AI/ML to enhance the warfighter’s ability to counter such attacks and prevail in the modern battlefield. + +In a military context, a warfighter’s cognitive abilities are extremely important in the modern battlespace. There is a need to process vast amounts of data/information rapidly and accurately and ensure that information garnered from such processing is trustworthy, accurate, and dependable. Errors in processing may have dire cascading consequences for effective decision making in the operational environment. These abilities are often suboptimal under conditions of stress and fatigue and may further degrade information management in the command and control chain in modern joint all-domain operations. The impact of such shortfalls is detrimental to human performance and may well increase cognitive and information workload, as well as challenges related to adversaries who will exploit such errors to their advantage. These ever-increasing demands of war have led to the new concept of Cognitive Warfare. A recent NATO-sponsored study described CogWar as the _“weaponization of the brain sciences”_ and contended that advances in CogWar will offer our adversaries _“a means of bypassing the traditional battlefield with significant strategic advantage, which may be utilized to radically transform Western societies.”_ According to Claverie and Cluzel (2022), CogWar is _“the art of using technological tools to alter the cognition of human targets, who are often unaware of any such attempt,”_ or alternatively to _“manipulate an enemy or its citizenry’s cognition mechanisms to weaken, penetrate, influence or even subjugate or destroy it.”_ The ambit of CogWar can extend beyond military to target the entire nation’s human capital. + +As du Cluzel stated (Du Cluzel, 2021), CogWar _“does not focus strictly on the field of ‘information’ but on that of ‘cognition’, i.e., what the brain does with information. [...] the cognitive effect is not a consequence of the action; it is its goal.”_ As such, it threatens cognition across all levels, and from the complex psychological aspect may negatively influence and/or impact human interaction and socio-political factors to the most basic physiological (neurological) pathways associated with cognition. While CogWar remains intangible for the time being, this may not be the case for future CogWar. Simply put, neuroscience knowledge products along with emerging neurotechnologies will soon facilitate tangible avenues for CogWar. + +Below we highlight three key areas within cognitive neuroscience (and associated fields) that will heavily influence the future of CogWar: + +#### 6.2 NEUROSCIENCE AND NEUROMODULATION TECHNIQUES + +In contrast to PSYOPS, CogWar focuses on the exploitation of cognitive vulnerabilities including attention overload, perceptual narrowing (“tunnel vision”), and cognitive biases and errors of judgment that detrimentally influence decision making (Figure 6-1). This aspect of CogWar is particularly relevant to Command and Control (C²) operations. Claverie and Cluzel (2022) noted that Gen. Desclaux defined the C² strategic processes as “a cognitive triangle involving knowledge dominance, cyber confidence, and decision superiority.” Given that attention serves the decision maker by selectively acquiring the information needed to decide, attention and decision- making are highly interconnected. Hence, these two aspects of cognition serve as a central focus and distinguisher of the CogWar domain. + +![image03](https://i.imgur.com/QoPBBqt.png) +_▲ Figure 6-1: Differences Between CogWar and PSYOPS (Claverie and Cluzel, 2022)._ + +Over the last decade, nations have made tremendous advancements in our understanding of brain function due to the accelerating pace of research in neuroscience and psychology coupled with the development of sophisticated neuroimaging tools and analysis methods from biomedical/neuro-engineering. We now have a better understanding of the neural processes that are associated with learning, memory, stress, arousal, attention, emotions, and motor control – attributes that are highly relevant to cognitive performance and decision making. We have also witnessed the development of novel neural network models that describe and predict cognitive biases and their neural substrates and that, in doing so, now allow the systematic targeting of deviations from rationality that lead to suboptimal decision outcomes. In addition, emerging technologies such as non-invasive neuromodulation have shown great promise in modulating many aspects of performance enhancement. + +Notably, both neuroscience and neurotechnology are critical elements to future Counter-CogWar. Advances to neuroscience and neurotechnology including neuroimaging, multi-modal sensors, and signal decoding, etc., will provide the means to assess human cognitive states (workload, stress, emotion, and fatigue) real-time; Active monitoring of attention during future ops will enable enhanced (faster, more accurate and dependable) human-machine teaming via AI-enabled decision aids (see AI segment below). Other advances to neuropsychopharmacology and neuromodulation paradigms will provide the means to reduce fatigue, increase learning, and overall improve cognitive performance, increasing resilience against CogWar. For example, non-invasive neuromodulation (e.g., targeted transcranial electric and magnetic stimulation, peripheral nerve stimulation) and interface and interaction design (e.g., human-centered design, adaptive information portrayal) will deliver performance augmentation by selectively targeting attention and decision making. + +While allied nations and defence services have promising research efforts in cognitive neuroscience, nations have not focused their research efforts on the development of defensive CogWar capabilities. In contrast, adversarial national strategies for military-civil fusion with a focus on NBIC and CogWar has left our nation at an immense risk of being over-shadowed by adversaries in a domain that will be increasingly critical in future warfare. Indeed, CogWar is a bleeding-edge challenge space that does not exist across allied forces. Thus, an allied Counter-CogWar strategy is essential if we are to enhance our military readiness and requires that we develop programs to expand our knowledge, establish training paradigms, propel technology innovation, and deploy tactical and strategic interventions that effectively target CogWar. + +> #### 6.2.1 Neural and Brain-Machine Interfaces + +One controversial emerging neuro-technology is the concept of Brain-Machine Interfaces (BMI). This game-changing technology holds the promise to reduce cognitive burden during future wars via enhanced human-machine symbiosis and faster communication in contested environments. BMI also contextualizes the means to perform direct ‘read’ and ‘write’ from the brain, and to enable brain-to-brain communication. The most technologically mature aspect of BMIs (the ‘low hanging fruit’) is the ‘read’ element. BMIs with ‘read’ capabilities enable defensive CogWar by identifying physio-cognitive states that predict high vulnerability to adversarial CogWar, such as lapses of attention, fatigue, stress and uncertainty, and high workload. By classifying these emergent states in warfighters, the BMI system can seamlessly select and administer interventions in an autonomous manner. With ongoing efforts within the military and industry to increase the spatial resolution of “read” BMIs through new sensors/devices, it will become possible to issue commands to technology (e.g., bring up a surveillance camera feed, select a menu, etc.) through simple thought. BMIs with ‘read’ and ‘write’ capabilities, on the other hand, open a realm of possibilities for operators. For instance, closed loop monitoring of human operator attention combined with Artificial Intelligence- (AI-) driven decision aids, secure visual displays content, and Augmented Reality (AR) displays may provide the means to delivering information directly to the brain – like BMI concepts presented in the movie ‘The Matrix.’ Such technology poses clear threats to human autonomy and societal democracies, not just in terms of ELSEI and other privacy concerns but also in the context of cyber security and cyber supremacy. As stated by Orinx and Swielande, _“the development of more and more sophisticated means such as artificial intelligence, (...) and neurosciences facilitate manipulation”_ (Orinx and Swielande, 2022) [of cognitive and decision-making processes]. Thus, future wars will rely heavily on secure means of information delivery, i.e., networks and cognitive processes that can warrant cognitive security and superiority. + +> #### 6.2.2 Automation, Autonomy, and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Improved Human-Machine Teaming and Decision Making + +As mentioned, attention and decision making are key players in CogWar. Thus, capabilities that leverage automation, autonomy, and AI assistants that assist cognition will be increasingly critical. Such capabilities will facilitate communication between man and machine, reduce burden on cognitive load, and accelerate the speed and volume of information processing. Mission spaces including C², cyber defence, remotely operated vehicle control, and ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) all utilize massive quantities of data and information that are prone to information overload, cognitive bias, and/or attention tunneling. Operators often make decisions quickly under a variety of stressors (fatigue, workload, uncertainty, etc.), and their decision making is more likely to be influenced negatively by biases and misinformation. As the battle space becomes increasingly complex, adversaries will seek to gain military advantage by exploiting misinformation and injection of unprecedented levels of uncertainty, making it more challenging for decision makers to confidently detect and exploit reliable information amid the noise. CogWar capabilities that leverage or improve human-machine teaming and decision making via automation, autonomy, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) will provide cognitive security by ensuring the means to discretely and objectively informing decision makers. Such capabilities will safely modulate key brain areas associated with wakefulness and attention, helping each analyst/C² decision maker accelerate information processing speed, sustain attention, and reduce fatigue. + +Counter-CogWar capabilities assisted by AI will help monitor the types of tasks, the number of tasks, and the specific tasks that an operator is attending. Critically, this will allow autonomy/AI to provide customized support to operators such as target recognition technologies, neuromodulation, or alterations in display content, to help them maintain performance in times of distress and augment performance when necessary. Such tools can also provide the means to identify and deter threats associated with future capabilities, e.g., direct ‘read’/’write’ from the brain. These may help ‘orient’ decision makers at times of cognitive overload or CogWar attacks. + +> #### 6.2.3 Technical Areas Requiring De-Risking for Effective Counter-Cognitive Warfare + +![image04](https://i.imgur.com/E3fBW4L.png) +![image05](https://i.imgur.com/jf1NJip.png) +_▲ Table 6-1: Technical Areas of Neurotechnology Requiring De-Risking._ + +#### 6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS + +It is evident that future CogWar will benefit from capabilities that adaptively select and administer neuro-enhancing techniques to boost attention and enhance decision making. Such capabilities must protect against key cognitive stressors (fatigue, uncertainty, and information overload) during critical warfighter tasks, insulating warfighters against adversarial CogWar and empowering them to administer offensive CogWar. To accomplish this, nations must shift focus from offensive to defensive mechanisms that mitigate adversarial CogWar and interrupt their offensive campaigns. Said strategies include developing tools and technologies to increase awareness of CogWar, penetrating and disrupting misinformation campaigns, securing information sharing platforms and preventing breach, developing counter Neurotechnologies, and establishing frameworks that unify CogWar efforts. Future CogWar concepts will thus require coordinated operational imperatives, robust platforms, infrastructures and data pipelines or architectures that secure our cognitive domain and penetrate and dissolve adversarial practices. Furthermore, Nations must orchestrate efforts to: + +- Improve understanding of the psychological, sociological, and emotional variables influencing cognition. + +- Identify and address factors that increase vulnerability in individuals or groups of individuals. + +- Identify vulnerabilities and turning points (e.g., via modeling and War Games) within decision-making OODA-loops (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act). + +- Identify communication/information pathways (e.g., within social or cyber networks/platforms) and points of intervention. + +- Identify and deter cognitive attacks by ‘passive’ (i.e., via ‘ground truth’ campaigns) and ‘active’ (i.e., via neuro-interference and secure BMIs) means. + +- Identify critical warfighter tasks that must be secured/insulated against adversarial CogWar. + +- Identify militarily relevant BMI and other neurotechnologies. + +- Identify and address gaps between commercial/clinical technologies and military use cases (i.e., populations, needs, and operational environments). + +- Develop hardware/software optimization, protocols, and data processing pipelines that accelerate the development of Counter-CogWar technologies. + +- Identify and address barriers-to-adoption of Counter-CogWar technologies (including neurotechnology, neural or brain-machine interfaces, AI, etc.) created by the lack of evaluation criteria and baseline metrics. + +- Establish common practices, requirements, capabilities, and evaluation/validation criteria. + +- Develop a suite of “neuro-weapons” in the form of a highly trained workforce and BMI-enabled warfighters. + +> #### 6.3.1 Technical Gaps Limiting the Adoption of BMI Systems into Military + +Additional hurdles impact the development, deployment, and integration of BMIs. Whilst some arise from ELSEI concerns, a significant number are technical in nature. Below is a list of key technical gaps liming the adoption of BMIs into military CogWar concepts: + +1) Testing and evaluation of current and emerging Brain-Machine Interface (BMI) technologies. + +2) Quantification and assessment of signal quality, usability and comfort, and hardware and software limitations on relevant populations. + +3) Evaluation of system/operational requirements (i.e., form factor/power restrictions, signal/noise processing, network security, etc.). + +4) Non-human subjects engineering tests, sensor positioning accuracy and repeatability testing using 3D scanning, and BMI device property characterization procedures. + +5) Delivery of data-driven decision matrices for codification of strengths and weaknesses of BMI technologies and their relevance to career domains and use cases. + +6) Development of virtual reality maintenance environments and relevant tasks with the ability to quantify research subject motion dynamics. + +7) Strategic partnerships with leaders and organizations developing BMI technologies. + +8) Provide strategies for engagements/links between the BMI and operational communities. + +#### 6.4 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTIONS: THE WAY AHEAD + +Below we delineate the near-term and long-term state of neurotechnology: + +- __Now (1‒2 years):__ Mature cognitive state assessment technologies, predictive algorithms, and cognitive augmentation approaches to defend against CogWar. Leverage new sensors and stimulation techniques to increase spatial resolution for future read and write to the brain applications. + +- __Next (3‒5 years):__ Develop closed loop monitor and augment systems for personalized sustainment, augmentation of Operator performance. Develop brain activity “libraries” to read user commands directly from the brain using high-resolution BMI technology. + +- __Future: (5+ years):__ Mission specific modular systems for cognitive/physical state assessment with real-time sustainment and augmentation feedback tech; BMI with full read and write capabilities. + +#### 6.5 REFERENCES + +[Claverie, B., and du Cluzel, F. (2022). Cognitive Warfare: The Advent of the Concept of “Cognitics” in the Field of Warfare. In Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France](https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03635889/document). + +[Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. (2022) Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (France) ‒ 21 June 20201. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, pp.8, 1-6](https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Cognitive%20Warfare%20Symposium%20-%20ENSC%20-%20March%202022%20Publication.pdf). + +[Du Cluzel, F. (2021). Cognitive Warfare, a Battle for the Brain. STO-MP-AVT-211 (KN3-1 ‒ KN3-12)](https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Cognitive%20Warfare%20Symposium%20-%20ENSC%20-%20March%202022%20Publication.pdf). + +[Orinx, K., and Struye de Swielande, T. (2022). China and Cognitive Warfare: Why Is the West Losing? In Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (France) ‒ 21 June 20201. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France](https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03635889/document). + + +### Chapter 7 ‒ DEFENCE AGAINST 21ˢᵗ CENTURY COGNITIVE WARFARE: CONSIDERATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF EMERGING ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES + +> #### Yvonne R. Masakowski +> #### US Naval War College +> #### UNITED STATES + +> #### Eskil Grendahl Sivertsen +> #### Norwegian Defence Research Establishment +> #### NORWAY + +_The same wide span of Fourth Industrial Revolution technology (data, processing, connectivity, AI, robotics, biosciences, autonomy and so forth) that is changing how we live, work and play will now transform the way war is waged ‒ in a process spanning at least a generation ... Military transformation will largely be about the rapid adoption and adaptation of civil-sector-derived technology and methods in disruptive military applications ... The future of military success will now be owned by those who conceive, design, build and operate combinations of information-based technologies to deliver new combat power._ + +> #### General Sir Richard Barrons (Uppal, 2022) + +#### 7.1 INTRODUCTION + +Twenty-first century advances in technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), Machine Learning (ML), Autonomous systems, Robotics, drones, and the emergence of a vast array of Social Media platforms have transformed the 21ˢᵗ century battlespace. Cheap, commercially available drones have proven to be effective Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets that may also deliver effects in the cognitive dimension. Small drones are silent and difficult to detect. Equipped with sensors as well as explosives, such as hand grenades, and off-the-shelf drones may have a significant psychological impact on troops on the ground. Combined with other technologies, such as facial recognition software, drones become a major force multiplier for cognitive warfare. Indeed, these technologies have reconfigured the battlespace and altered the character of warfare. The evolution of advanced technologies has given rise to Cognitive Warfare (CogWar). Du Cluzel describes CogWar as the “manipulation of the enemy’s cognition” aimed at weakening, influencing, delaying, and even destroying the enemy (Du Cluzel, 2021; Claverie and Du Cluzel; 2022, Claverie et al., 2022). This type of warfare influences human heuristics and decision making and extends its reach to the public, society and to the military. CogWar represents the convergence of Psychological Operations (PsyOps), Information Operations (INFO OPS), and cyber operations with the advance of AI/ML networks that serve as an enabler for the distribution of the adversary’s strategic agenda in exploiting human vulnerabilities and shaping human understanding of events (Guyader, 2021). + +Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) have changed warfare. Today, these technologies enable actors to infiltrate the cognitive dimension of the Information Environment (IE) more effectively. Overt and covert influence and interference methods are being employed systematically by malign actors to shape and manipulate the situational awareness and decision-making process on all levels – from the international political level to the military strategic, operational, tactical, and sub-tactical level. + +Even in the most remote and less developed regions of the world, most people have Internet access, smart phones, and social media accounts. This enables them to document and share observations and information about their surroundings including military equipment, troop movements and tactics. Also, most troops are connected and have social media accounts, even if they may not use their devices on the battlefield. Commercially available drones, facial recognition software, artificial intelligence, geo-tagging, and satellite imagery have added another layer of both risks and opportunities to be understood, mitigated, and exploited by all parties, civilian and military, in areas of conflict. + +The permeation of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) in operation (AO) poses obvious risks to Operation Security (OPSEC), Information Security (INFOSEC) and freedom of maneuver for any part in any conflict. For example, in the aftermath of the downing of Malaysian Airlines MH17 over Ukraine in 2014, Bellingcat was able to identify and document Russian personnel, equipment, tactics and locations using Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) techniques including mapping of videos, images and social media accounts belonging to both civilians and Russian troops (Bellingcat, 2019). For all parts of an armed conflict today, ICTs offer vast opportunities for intelligence gathering, improved Situational Awareness (SA), Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), shaping of the battlefield and deception. However, as with all technology, the flipside of increased opportunity is increased risk. CogWar represents a new, insidious, and invisible threat to human decision making across all domains. CogWar influences human perception and decision making across the military, political, economic, and societal environments. Information has been weaponized across a wide array of platforms and used to target individuals, governments, and the mass consciousness as a means of justifying an adversaries’ strategic objectives. Thus, the Tide Sprint Cognitive Warfare workshop was focused on addressing how best to defend against CogWar as we anticipate that this trend will continue to accompany future emerging technological advances in the coming years. + +Namely, advances in brain research, brain-machine interfaces, neuroscience, quantum computing power, and genomic research, etc., will continue to be integrated in the design of future technologies. The integration of advances in AI and ML algorithms has provided adversaries with a new type of weapon. + +The automated production of content is now possible with minimal effort as enormous amounts of information may be generated and used to target individuals, governments, and the mass consciousness at a rapid rate. This capability empowers individuals such that one person may influence a wide audience across thousands of social media accounts to influence and create confusion. Adversaries may spread their influence by setting up proxy sites, such as fake news sites or blogs, which has become quick and easy (Hao, 2020). Deep fake technology is becoming readily accessible, enabling anyone with decent computer skills to create images, voice, and video recordings that seem authentic but are not. While fake, extremely convincing content may be effective in manipulating target audiences, it may also have a chilling effect, as the increased presence of deep fake material on the Internet may lead to decreased trust in digital evidence. Thus, the Internet and social media serve as vehicles of information for transmitting their message and agenda. We anticipate that this trend will continue and shape future CogWar. + +Likewise, it is easy to develop facial recognition technology that may be readily configured to identify adversaries in the battlefield. One single soldier with a cheap camera or camera drone, facial recognition software and internet access may be able to identify opposing soldiers in the battlefield. In Ukraine, drones equipped with facial recognition and social media have been used to identify Russian soldiers (Clayton, 2022). In several hundred cases, Ukrainian forces have sent photos of dead Russian soldiers to their families to stir up dissent in Russia (Lonas, 2022). So too, drones equipped with facial recognition technology has been used to conduct BDA and identify family members who were killed during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. + +Adversaries may now corrupt AI/ML networks by integrating poisoned training datasets into ML algorithms (Dickson, 2021). Adversaries can now integrate poisoned datasets into social media sites and training datasets used to develop new ML algorithms (Steinhardt, Koh, and Liang, 2017; Gregory, 2021; Koh, Steinhardt and Liang, 2022). Thus, this practice may be used to poison an entire database as it spreads like a virus throughout the social media network. At the center of this debate, AI/ML technologies are increasingly weaponized in support of adversaries’ agendas and national interests. + +CogWar is a reality in the 21ˢᵗ Century NATO operational environment. Information, as part of CogWar, is disseminated via an insidious and invisible digital network whose fingerprints are difficult to detect within the deeply embedded AI digital network. Advances in natural language, AI/ML algorithms, and the intersection of emerging scientific advances in neuroscience, genomics, quantum computing, social media platforms, and gaming will make this even more challenging in the future. The trend to enhance independent thinking via embedding advanced AI/ML algorithms in Robotics, drones, Brain-machine interfaces, etc., and developing systems with human-like logic and reasoning capabilities presents challenges for future decision makers (Aberman, 2017; Arkin, 1992; 2007; Chandra, 2017; Cole and Singer, 2020; Cummings 2007, 2010; Masakowski, 2020). These advanced Robotics, drones, and human Brain-modeled machines, etc., will evolve as colleagues, collaborators and partners designed with independent decision-making capabilities (Aberman, 2017; Arkin, 2007; Cummings, 2007; 2017; Ishiguro, 2021; Wallach and Allen, 2009; Masakowski, 2020, 2022). Thus, there is a need to imagine a future replete with advanced technologies that will outstrip current computing limitations and envision a future where autonomous AI/ML agents and machines will complement, augment, and at times, eliminate the human-in-or-on-the loop in the OODA-like decision environment. + +#### 7.2 SOCIAL MEDIA AND CYBER NETWORKS + +Social media is a powerful technological enabler of CogWar on all levels, from enabling the shaping of strategic narratives and influencing mass consciousness, to tactical deception on the ground. Examples of common tactics include the use of fake and stolen accounts to infiltrate and influence domestic conversations, micro-targeting of individuals and exclusive audiences, and the distribution of false and misleading content and coordinated inauthentic behavior to amplify or suppress selected narratives or material. + +As societies become increasingly reliant on computer networks and digital services, vulnerabilities for CogWar attacks increase. With the advent of 5G networks and the Internet of Things (IoT), the physical and the digital worlds merge, and the possibilities for data exploitation and manipulation grow. Attacks in the cyber domain may provide adversaries with valuable information that can be (mis)used to create cognitive affects ranging from discrediting countries, organizations, or key personnel to reducing trust in democratic institutions or computer systems (Pappalardo, 2022). + +The NATO Tech Trends report (NATO, 2022) highlights the potential impact of emerging, disruptive technologies that will transform the future battlespace. AI/ML, drones, robots, and BMIs will become the military defence arsenal of the future (Giordano, Kulkarni, and Farwell, 2014; Masakowski, 2020). Advances in super-intelligent AI/ML technologies will provide a new means of collaboration and decision making among human-machine teams (Dobbyn and Stuart, 2003; Dutt and TaheriNejad, 2016; Ishiguro, 2021, Wallach and Allen, 2009; Forrest, 2015; Lin, Bekey and Abney, 2017; Masakowski, Smythe and Creely, 2014; Masakowski, 2020; 2022). Autonomous AI systems will relate to BMI as part of the new command and control network (Cole and Singer, 2020; Masakowski, 2020, 2022). + +These technologies will include intelligent, integrated, and resilient artificial intelligence, analytics and decision capabilities across the technological spectrum as follows: + +- __Autonomous Systems:__ Artificial intelligence-enabled autonomous systems capable of some level of autonomous decision making. Such autonomous systems may be robotic, platform-based or (digital) agent-based. + +- __Humanistic Intelligence:__ The seamless integration of psycho-social-techno-systems supporting enhanced human-machine teaming and synergistic behaviors. + +- __Knowledge Analytics:__ Advanced analytical methods (including AI) exploring large data sets and advanced mathematics to provide insights, knowledge, and advice hitherto impractical. + +__Interconnected:__ Exploitation of the network (or mesh) of overlapping real and virtual domains, including sensors, organizations, institutions, individuals, autonomous agents, and processes. + +- __Trusted Communications:__ The use of technologies such as distributed ledger technologies (e.g., blockchain), Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), post-quantum cryptography and AI cyber-agents to ensure trusted interactions and information exchange. + +- __Synergistic Systems:__ The development of mixed (physical or virtual) complex systems-of systems allowing for the creation of novel ecosystems (e.g., smart cities). + +__Distributed:__ Decentralized and ubiquitous large-scale sensing, storage, computation, decision making, research and development. + +- __Edge Computing:__ Embedding of storage, computation and analytics/AI into agents and objects close to information sources. + +- __Ubiquitous Sensing:__ Embedding of low (or lower cost) sensors to create large sensor networks across the human-physical-information domains. + +- __Decentralized Production:__ Exploitation of AI-assisted design, novel materials, and (mixed material) 3D/4D printing technologies, to support just-in-time local digital manufacturing and production. + +- __Democratized S&T:__ Reducing costs of design and production, increasing computational capabilities and the broad availability of S&T information will increase innovation and the generation of novel science. + +__Digital:__ Blending of the human, physical and information domains to create new physiological, psychological, social, and cultural realities. + +- __Digital Twin:__ A digital simulacrum of physical, biological or information entities digitally linked (often in near real-time) to the original, supporting predictive analytics, experimentation, and assessment. + +- __Synthetic Realities:__ The creation of new perceived cognitive or physical realities based on the integration of psycho-socio-technical systems. Such realities may be augmented, virtual, social, or cultural in nature. + +The NATO S&T Trend Report (2020) considers the intersection of multidisciplinary scientific areas of research associated with security challenges in the future CogWar operational environment as illustrated in the House Model (Chapter 2, Figure 2-1). Thus, the HFM-ET-356 team contends that S&T investment meet the demands of the future battlespace environment and include research on the following topics. + +Intelligent and Distributed Autonomous AI/ML Systems, networks and Agents aimed at enhancing human capabilities also serve as a force multiplier. The development of AI-enabled Autonomous systems and Intelligent Agent networks will facilitate more sophisticated and effective decision making, support complex human-machine teaming, and expand capabilities in the cyber defence networks (Porat, Gilad, et al. 2012; Lin, Bekey and Abney, 2017; Shim and Arkin, 2012). Brain-Machine Interfaces (BMI) that may be used by warfighters as part of direct communication with command and control centers may provide enhanced Situational Awareness (SA) but may also present a vulnerability that must be defended (Giordano, Kulkarni and Farwell, 2014). + +AI-enabled Autonomous systems and intelligent agents will facilitate rapid data analysis and provide strategic advisory support for operational and tactical mission planning, as well as support the OODA-Loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act). This enhanced intelligent agent network will accelerate the speed of the decision-making cycle and require new methods of symbiotic human-machine teaming and interactions. The evolution of ML algorithms will continue to enhance SA, with faster and more accurate sensemaking strategies and facilitate the operational effectiveness across a wide spectrum of operational domains (i.e., land, air, sea, cyber, and space.) + +The interconnectedness of AI/ML digital networks will afford the development of agile and adaptive de-centralized Command and Control networks that will empower and enable operators to maintain greater SA in the battlespace. However, these AI/ML networks and human brain-machine interfaces will be targeted and subject to disinformation campaigns, cyber intrusion, and/or physical attacks. The invasive nature of cognitive attacks could be initiated prior to conflict and aim to disrupt information flow, and/or strike indirectly at personnel, logistics, information, financial, economic, medical, or other critical elements of military operational and strategic networks. Thus, CogWar presents challenges as adversaries exploit advances in AI/ML technologies and use AI/ML digital networks as a vehicle for disseminating mis-and disinformation campaigns to spread their influence aligned with their agenda (Orinx, Struye de Swielande, 2021). Consequently, CogWar mandates the need to develop defence systems that will ensure the cognitive security of the AI/ML network, as well as defend against social engineering attempts and the intrusion of systems on human perceptions, cognitive processes, and decision making. + +#### 7.3 COGNITIVE SECURITY AND SECURING THE FUTURE + +Cognitive Security (COGSEC) will be required to defend the security and reliability of information that is essential for maintaining trust with our Allied Partners. Malicious attacks across social media platforms and the intrusion of poisoned data sets being used to train ML algorithms highlights the need to develop security measures and policies regarding the source of data being used to develop AI/ML digital networks. The issue of trust in data and the resilience of the digital networks are critical for ensuring that we are sharing information that is valid, reliable, and trustworthy as that is the foundation for mission planning and decision making. + +This is especially critical for the development of trustworthy AI/ML algorithms and trustworthy AI networks. According to the literature, trustworthy Artificial Intelligence networks, must have the following set of characteristics: + +- __Validity:__ To guarantee that an AI-based system will do only and all of what it is intended to do. + +- __Security:__ To ensure robustness and resilience within adversarial conditions. + +- __Explainability:__ Provide understandable and context relevant justifications and explanations. + +- __Responsibility:__ Compliant with ethical, legal, and regulatory frameworks. + +For the warfighter, such advances will help to shape SA and influence decision making. For the adversary, these advances will serve as a force multiplier that may be weaponized to their strategic advantage. China and Russia view emerging technologies as opportunities to exploit dual-use technologies to their strategic advantage and develop military defence capabilities that will ensure technological superiority and global supremacy across all domains, including space and satellite defence (Orinx, Struye de Swielande, 2021). + +Recently, China expressed their intent to destroy Elon Musk’s ___Starlink___ satellites as they perceived it as a threat to their national security (Turner, 2022). This type of attack in space represents a new element of warfare! Satellites provide surveillance capabilities for managing networks of military defence systems on a global scale. “Hard kill” weapons refer to the ability to physically strike and attack a target; “Soft Kill” weapons refer to the ability to jam systems and satellites and laser weapons (Turner, 2022). The point is that this is just the beginning as satellite capabilities evolve and defence systems are required to prevent intrusion whether on the Internet and/or in Deep Space. Such attacks on satellites in space would have grave cascading consequences across the military, nations, and the global economy. We can no longer focus just on the traditional domains, land, air, sea, cyber but must include space defence. Indeed, we must also consider the impact of CogWar on the human domain; namely, think of ways to defend cognitive processes and decision making at all levels, including mass consciousness. We anticipate that this trend will become a pattern of defence in the future. + +Therefore, as the need for increased security forces continues to emerge, the focus on advances in AI, computing power and cyber technologies is viewed as a means of enhancing our military readiness and force capabilities. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) is the primary step for framing and preparing an effective mission plan. Autonomous, unmanned systems provide military leaders with SA across the battlespace and are an essential component for mission planning and operational success. CogWar requires the development of defensive technologies if we are to successfully defend NATO and Allied Partners’ freedoms. + +#### 7.4 DEFENDING AGAINST COGNITIVE WARFARE + +Nations must develop countermeasures to ensure operational readiness and defend their military strategic and operational plans from adversaries who would undermine their military operations on a global scale. The question is, how do we defend against CogWar? We must anticipate the impact of emerging technologies and that of the intersection of scientific areas to be effective in our defence strategy against CogWar. This CogWar report highlights various topics in the S&T roadmap chapter that reflect a strategy for the development of a defensive arsenal of advanced technologies such as AI/ML, BMIs, et al. technologies to defend against CogWar. Nations must consider the defence against CogWar as a national and global security imperative. + +A cognitive attack may be launched to target an individual or to shape mass consciousness and justify a nation’s military strategic objectives. Today, we are witnessing the influence and impact of CogWar in the Russia/Ukraine invasion. Russia is reshaping the geopolitical environment by its attack on Ukraine and provoking responses via its information network used to justify their military agenda. They are indoctrinating their youth with their version of the true enemy (New York Times, 2022). The influence of CogWar is evidenced by the level of civil unrest, political upheaval, and societal division based on perceptions and beliefs associated with manipulated information in the social media environment. This is a powerful tool for weaponizing information and inciting individuals to act based on misinformation that aligns with the adversary’s agenda. This trend is dangerous and makes us all potential victims as adversaries continue to manipulate human perceptions and decisions. The threat of CogWar is not to be taken lightly as technological superiority is the enabler for adversaries to achieve military superiority and global supremacy. CogWar is a weapon in the adversary’s toolbox used to achieve their objectives, shift our attention, reshape human understanding of events, trigger civil unrest, undermine democracies, and reshape the geopolitical and economic environment to their nation’s advantage. Russia and China have made great strides in moving toward their strategic objectives by controlling their nation’s messaging to their people, weaponizing information to global competitors, and leveraging strategic capabilities by controlling information dissemination on a global scale. + +#### 7.5 COUNTERING COGNITIVE WARFARE + +NATO and its Allied Partners, Partners for Peace (PfP) nations, et al. must develop a defence strategy against CogWar. Nations need to develop Cognitive Security programs to defend AI/ML digital networks from adversarial intrusion, manipulation, misinformation/disinformation campaigns across all domains. The time is now to develop defensive networks and systems to protect individual data and national data across all AI/ML digital networks. The manipulation of information and data associated across the AI/ML network may be weaponized to destroy a nation’s economy, undermine governments and threaten national, global security, as well as fracture democratic societies across the globe. + +NATO and its Allied partners must develop guidelines, rules-of-the-road, and recommendations for ensuring the security of data bases used in military operations. Nations must ensure that AI/ML networks are reliable, resilient, trustworthy, and secure by embedding forensic threat detection capabilities and trust analytics in their system designs to ensure the security of future networks. Adversarial data poisoning of AI/ML algorithms is emerging as a major threat to military defence (Dickson, 2021; Waltzman, 2017). Indeed, Ullrich, Dean of the SANS Technology Institute has stated in his RSA Keynote address: “One of the most basic threats when it comes to Machine Learning is one of the attackers being able to influence the samples that we are using to train our models...” (Gregory, 2021; Ullrich, 2021). Nations need to develop guidelines, policies, source certification processes and forensic tools to defend against these intrusions and defend against future attacks (Stokes, England, and Kane, 2021; Steinhardt, Koh, and Liang, 2017, 2022; Koh, Steinhardt and Liang, 2021). + +Education must also play a pivotal role in the development of future critical thinkers. Children should be taught early in school how to recognize _fake_ information on social media platforms. Children must also be taught critical thinking skills, including how to challenge assumptions, apply logic and reasoning to their thinking and develop the skills to defend against manipulation of their perceptions and reasoning. Nations must address the vulnerabilities of AI/ML networks and systems as well as defend against data breaches, poisoning of training datasets and the unrestricted exploitation of social media platforms, news networks that are used to shape public perceptions aligned with information that threatens to undermine NATO’s democratic commitment. + +NATO must develop the guidance to help nations develop their strategic plans for defence against CogWar. The NATO HFM-ET-356 Science and Technology roadmap is a first step toward establishing the policies and practices, as well as the technologies, which will need to be developed in the defence against CogWar. + +#### 7.6 ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES + +NATO needs to develop leaders who will understand how to ethically deploy advanced technologies in CogWar. It is important for military personnel and leaders to understand the ethical and legal implications of employing advanced technologies in CogWar. Given the way that adversaries are using AI/ML networks and social media platforms to engage with the population (civilian and military); there is a need to educate military personnel on the ethical issues related to CogWar attacks. NATO leaders may see these new technologies used against them on the battlefield or must make decisions on how to use new technologies within the law of armed conflict. Some of the legal and ethical questions raised by these new technologies can be addressed by the NATO Alliance in advance, but there will be unanticipated applications in contested environments that cause ethical challenges for the leaders in the immediate moment. NATO leaders must be prepared to make right decisions that are ethical, effective, and efficient in the chaos of combat. + +Future technological advances could fundamentally change NATO Command and Control military operations. Even if NATO determines it will not employ a new technology, potential adversaries may choose to develop and employ the capability. Consequently, we must recognize and be prepared to address new, asymmetric threats. NATO has a duty to preserve peace and security as well as ensure the safety of its personnel. + +For example, AI/ML systems, Robots, etc., will be the _digital partner_ of future leaders by providing a range of options and decisions based on its ability to manage vast amounts of data from distributed networks. Today, the human maintains the principal authority for decision making. However, the level of responsibility for military operations will be shared with AI-enabled systems, Robots, and networks. Robots will be partners, collaborators, and decision makers in future military operations. Regardless of the technology, i.e., Robot, drone, weaponized AUV, or an AI-enabled weapon system, the decision to implement these technologies raises grave ethical consequences for the military leader and for society itself (Department of Defense, 2012; Masakowski, 2022). Advances in our understanding of the brain and biological modeling will contribute to future advances in AI designs and autonomous unmanned systems. However, NATO must prepare its leaders to operate in the future CogWar environment that will be replete with advanced technologies that are vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. Technology will continue to develop in both complexity and capability, however, decisions to employ such technologies ethically must be retained by the human decision-maker. We must defend against the misuse of advanced technologies and at the same time, prepare to defend against adversaries who might use such advances against us in CogWar. + +#### 7.7 THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETENCY + +NATO must provide military personnel with the education, training, and experience that will prepare them for the defence against CogWar. There is a need to develop a military person’s technological competence for understanding the capabilities that advanced technologies provide to both the warfighter and the adversary. To this end, S&T investment needs to be focused on developing training tools that build Social Media expertise, provide wargaming opportunities for military to develop understanding of the technological capabilities and shortfalls of each technology, as well as provide field experience so that the military learns to employ these technologies ethically and effectively. + +NATO personnel must acquire an understanding of CogWar and the role that technologies will play in shaping the operational environment. Today, it has become more complicated with the intrusion of misinformation embedded in social media platforms. Information warfare has taken on a new level of meaning and one that is difficult to counter amid the complexity of integrated AI/ML digital networks. Therefore, military personnel must achieve technological competency and understand the capabilities and risks associated with the deployment of advanced technologies such as AI/ML networks, etc., They must also understand the ethical, moral, and legal consequences for integrating advanced technologies as part of their mission plans. Military personnel must be made aware of the gaps and vulnerabilities of these AI/ML networks that may be targeted by adversaries. + +Military leaders must be made aware of the ethical consequences associated with extensive AI/ML networks that support social media platforms, AI facial recognition surveillance systems, AI Situational Awareness systems, autonomous weaponized systems, autonomous unmanned systems, AI Robotics, etc., that present significant challenges in the defence against CogWar. These technologies impact civilian, military and society itself and thus play a critical role in how we defend against them in CogWar (Loten and Simons, 2017). Military personnel must understand how adversaries might use these technologies to their advantage if they are going to be able to counter these attacks and mitigate against their influence. Education, training, and experience will prove to be pivotal elements in NATO’s CogWar defence strategy for the future. + +#### 7.8 CONCLUSION AND THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT + +CogWar is aimed at weaponizing information to support the adversary’s agenda and will continue to capitalize on technological innovations that support their cause. It is NATO’s duty therefore to think defensively in anticipation of such events. NATO must ensure the safety and security of its allied partner nations and its respective military personnel by developing an S&T defence strategy that will ensure the development of tools, techniques, and technologies in NATO’s defence against CogWar. + +We anticipate that the emergence and integration of scientific discoveries will continue to provide adversaries with opportunities for the development of new weapons of war. However, we must also take the opportunity to develop defensive measures that will counter the adversary’s advance and potential success in CogWar. NATO must be prepared to defend against CogWar across all domains. + +The future security environment will continue to challenge NATO with its uncertainty and complexity. NATO and its adversaries will continue to exploit advances and innovation in technologies in the conduct of CogWar. The rapid rate of technological innovation adds to the level of importance in advancing S&T research for defensive technologies. + +NATO must provide the guidance for its partner nations and the HFM-ET-356 S&T roadmap will serve as a compass to guide and direct nations to invest in S&T research that will facilitate the development of critical tools and technologies. The Science and Technology roadmap (Chapter 14) will provide the coordinates for mapping out a plan for designing the future defence against CogWar. + +#### 7.9 REFERENCES + +[Aberman, J. (27 February 2017). Artificial Intelligence Will Change America. Here’s How. The Washington Post (Online)](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capitalbusiness/wp/2017/02/27/artificialintelligence-will-change-america-hereshow/?utm_term=.3e325159efd9). + +Arkin, R.C. (1992). Modeling Neural Function at the Schema Level: Implications and Results for Robotic Control. In R.D. Beer, R.E. Ritzmann and T. 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Developing Operator Capacity Estimates for Supervisory Control of Autonomous Vehicles. Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 49(1), 1-15. doi:10.1518/001872007779598109. + +Cummings, M.L., Clare, A., and Hart, C. (2010). The Role of Human-Automation Consensus in Multiple Unmanned Vehicle Scheduling. Human Factors: The Journal of Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 52(1), 17-27. doi:10.1177/0018720810368674. + +Department of Defense. (2012). Autonomy in Weapon Systems (DoD directive Number 3000.09). Washington, DC: Department of Defense. + +[Dickson, B. (2021). Adversarial Machine Learning: The Underrated Threat of Data Poisoning. The Machine: Making Sense of AI](https://venturebeat.com/ai/adversarial-machine-learning-underrated-threat-data-poisoning/). + +Dobbyn, C., and Stuart, S. (2003). The Self as an Embedded Agent. Minds and Machines, 13(2), 187-201. doi:1022997315561 + +Du Cluzel, F. (2021). Cognitive Warfare, a Battle for the Brain. In: Applying Neuroscience to Performance: From Rehabilitation to Human Cognitive STO Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Panel Symposium 11‒12 October 2021, Rome, Italy. NATO STO Meeting Proceedings. STO-MP-HFM-334-KN3. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France. + +[Dutt, N., and TaheriNejad, N. (2016). Self-Awareness in Cyber-Physical Systems. Paper presented at the 29ᵗʰ International Conference on VLSI Design and 15ᵗʰ International Conference on Embedded Systems (VLSID), Kolkata, India](http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7434906/). + +[Forrest, C. (2015). Chinese Factory Replaces 90% of Humans with Robots, Production Soars](https://www.techrepublic.com/article/chinese-factory-replaces-90-ofhumans-with-robots-production-soars/). + +Giordano, J., Kulkarni, A., and Farwell, J. (2014). Deliver Us from Evil? The Temptation, Realities, and Neuroethico-Legal Issues of Employing Assessment Neuro-Technologies in Public Safety Initiatives. 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Stronger Data Poisoning Attacks Break Data Sanitization. defenses. Machine Learning. 111(3): 1-47. December 2021, vs.2](https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.00741). + +[Lin, P., Bekey, G., and Abney, K. (2008). Autonomous Military Robotics: Risk, Ethics, and Design](http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA534697). + +[Lonas, L. (2022). Ukraine Has Used Facial Recognition Tech to Notify Russian Families of Dead Soldiers. The Hill via Nexstar Media Wire. April 18, 2022](https://www.wavy.com/russia-ukraine-invasion/ukraine-has-used-facial-recognition-tech-to-notify-russian-families-of-dead-soldiers-report/). + +[Loten, A., and Simons, J. (2017, Jan 04). Leadership Evolves Amid Tech Changes ‒ Management Styles Shift to Embrace Shorter, More Frequent Data-Fueled Development Cycles. Wall Street Journal](https://search.proquest.com/docview/1855011133?accountid=322). + +Masakowski, Y.R. (2020). Artificial Intelligence and Global Security: Future Trends, Threats, and Considerations. Emerald Press Publishing, UK. + +Masakowski, Y.R. (2022). Leader Development in the 21ˢᵗ Century. In NATO HFM RTG 286, Leader Development for NATO Multinational Military Operations. Chapter 6. August 2022. + +[Masakowski, Y.R., Smythe, J.S., and Creely, T.E. (2016). The Impact of Ambient Intelligence Technologies on Individuals, Society, and Warfare. Northern Plains Ethics Journal, 4(1), 1-11](http://www.northernplainsethicsjournal.com/NPEJv4n1/The%20Impact%20of%20Ambient%20Intelligence%20Technologies%20on%20Individuals.pdf). + +NATO Science & Technology Trends 2020‒2040. Exploring the S&T Edge. NATO Science & Technology Organization, 2020. + +[Orinx, K., Struye de Swielande, T. (2021). China and Cognitive Warfare: Why Is the West Losing?](https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03635930/document). + +[Pappalardo, D. (2022). Win the War Before the War? The French Perspective on Cognitive Warfare. War on the Rocks, August 1, 2022](https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/win-the-war-before-the-war-a-french-perspective-on-cognitive-warfare/). + +Porat, T., Oron-Gilad, T., Rottem-Hovev, M., and Silbiger, J. (2016). Supervising and Controlling Unmanned Systems: A Multi-Phase Study with Subject Matter Experts. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 568. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00568. + +Shim, J., and Arkin, R.C. (2012). Biologically Inspired Deceptive Behavior for a Robot. International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior. From Animals to Animals 12, pp. 401-411. + +[Steinhardt, J., Koh, P.W., and Liang, P. (2017). Certified Defenses for Data Poisoning Attacks. In NIPS ‘17 Proceedings of the 31ˢᵗ International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems, pp. 3520-3532](https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3294996.3295110). + +Stokes, J., England, P., and Kane, K. (2021). Preventing Machine Learning Poisoning Using Authentication and Provenance. + +[Troianovski, A. (16 July 2022). Putin Aims to Shape a New Generation of Supporters, Through Schools. New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/16/world/europe/russia-putin-schools-propaganda-indoctrination.html). + +[Turner, B. (2022). Chinese Scientists Call for Plan to Destroy Elon Musk’s Starlink. Live Science](https://www.livescience.com/china-plans-ways-destroy-starlink). + +[Ullrich, J. (2021). The Five Most Dangerous New Attack Techniques. Presentation at RSA Conference](https://www.rsaconference.com/Library/presentation/USA/2021/the-five-most-dangerous-new-attack-techniques). + +[Uppal, R. (31 December 2022). NATO Thrust on AI, Data, Space and Hypersonics as Strategic Disruptor. Future Military Operations. International Defense, Security and Technology (CA, USA)](https://idstch.com/geopolitics/nato-thrust-on-ai-data-space-and-hypersonics-as-strategic-disruptors-for-future-military-operations/). + +Wallach, W., and Allen, C. (2009). Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong. New York: Oxford University Press. + +[Waltzman, R. (2017). The Weaponization of Information: The Need for Cognitive Security](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT473/RAND_CT473.pdf). + + +### Chapter 8 ‒ SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, SENSEMAKING AND FUTURE NATO MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS + +> #### Benjamin J. Knox +> #### Norwegian Armed Forces Cyber Defence +> #### NORWAY + +> #### Yvonne R. Masakowski +> #### US Naval War College +> #### UNITED STATES + +_“Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors got to war first and then seek to win.”_ + +> #### Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” 5ᵗʰ century China + +#### 8.1 INTRODUCTION + +Success for Sun Tzu meant determining the path of success before you go to war. This meant planning prior to any engagement and applying a “know your enemy” philosophy to potentially avoid war. Sun Tzu’s goal was to “subdue the enemy without fighting” and to achieve this, entailed sensemaking and SA to understand your enemies’ perspectives, capabilities, and strategic objectives. The ‘Art of War’ codifies the philosophies of war adopted by Sun Tzu and reflect the importance of developing strategy and tactics prior to conflict engagement. The concept of winning the battle but losing the war can be understood from this philosophy wherein we may realize a pyrrhic victory, but at a punishing cost that leaves us with a devastating loss of life, wasted resources or high financial costs related to the battle. Leaders must learn to achieve competency in sensemaking and SA if they are to forge effective mission plans and achieve success without incurring severe losses. The importance of this leader competency cannot be overstated as it serves as the foundation for all mission planning. Leaders must evaluate the goodness of information across all domains and in that process, recognize truth, identify trustworthy information, evaluate its value, and assess the reliability information sources, as these elements are the building blocks for mission success and victory in war. + +This chapter focuses on the “Sensemaking and Situational Awareness” aspect of the House Model. These processes have considerable implications for how NATO confronts future military operational dimensions, such as the cognitive. Given the dynamic, rapidly evolving nature of warfare, there is a need to consider how information is received, perceived, processed, and transformed from sensemaking of data input to transforming it into SA. Military leaders are presented with a wide array of information from graphical displays, databases, HUMINT, SIGINT, OSINT to name but a few. These information sources encompass a wide array of elements, including human input, technological input, and AI programs. To this end, this chapter will provide a means of understanding how decision makers make sense of data and information from such a complex and vast network. + +For this discussion, let us review the House Model and examine its relationship to the topics of sensemaking and SA. + +As illustrated in Figure 8-1, the horizontal bars are an examination of the factors that enable and/or block attempts to make sense of ambiguous, uncertain situations. + +![image06](https://i.imgur.com/DfPF5hi.png) +_▲ Figure 8-1: The House Model: Sensemaking and Situational Awareness._ + +#### 8.2 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: A HUMAN ENDEAVOR + +Situational Awareness is a conceptualization of the current situation (Geissler, 2019). It requires experts use a holistic process involving situation recognition and pattern matching to memory structures to make accurate, and when necessary, rapid decisions. In a NATO Defence context, SA is supported by technology enablers that can sense, aggregate and process data at great speed to help build a recognized picture of a war fighting domain. + +However, irrespective of the technology resources available, SA remains a human endeavor. It is a cognitive skill to interpret and communicate information in an abstract way, with insight, contextual awareness, and creativity. At any hierarchical level, or at any time point or phase in the awareness building process or perceiving and comprehending, a situation can be affected in a way that can influence decision making. This may be a consequence of own [avoidable] self-inflicted actions, such as poor procedures, behavioral biases, poor memory structures, or novice level pattern matching. Or by actions of an adversary that aim to induce, infer, inflict, or impose an awareness or way to behave upon us. This may occur either directly or indirectly, but it will almost always include the manipulation of ‘input’ data. What or whoever the source is that [mis]shapes our understanding to influence decision making, leading to [un]favorable outcomes, it is the input data going into the brain that is the subject of interest in CogWar. If the input data can be affected, then the effect occurs on the output. + +SA requires metacognition for accuracy. Meaning that our level of metacognition can influence SA. The fact that metacognition is a skill, means when it is lacking, we can be targeted and exploited. It can also be trained, and developed to adjust maladaptive thinking behaviors, such as overconfidence in own abilities. The importance of _getting ahead_ emerges here as we look to modes of cognitive security to counter CogWar and ensure we are aware of, and resilient to, adversarial metacognitive training that aims to, for example, covertly elicit impulsive and addictive behaviors. + +For SA to lead to a level of understanding that can enable better decision making, it requires trusted data input, evaluation of meaningful information, and integration with new knowledge and experience. To achieve this level of understanding in evolving non-linear events, that may or may not have been deliberately interfered with, is reliant on sensemaking ability. + +Sensemaking informs and is a prerequisite to decision making. In contrast to SA, sensemaking concerns the process of achieving outcomes such as knowledge of the current data elements, inferences drawn from these data, or predictions made from these inferences. Sensemaking is about the strategies and the barriers encountered that constitute an explanation of a state. Sensemaking requires continuous effort and motivation to understand connections among people, places, and events (the system of systems) to anticipate their trajectories and act effectively. + +#### 8.3 COGNITIVE EFFECTS: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PILLARS + +This horizontal bar expresses the need for S&T to contribute to understanding the _Cognitive Effects_ an actor will attempt to have on a target audience (group or individual) to cause change. Linking fields of science is what can be transformative in protecting, defending against the cognitive effects of CogWar, as well as ethically and legitimately finding countermeasures. + +The effects can be a doctrinal, such as distort, distract, degrade. They can also be more varied and experimental: menace, disorientate, unravel, encourage, nudge, confuse, reduce, doubt, remove. They can be short term (temporary) to include memory loss or gain, creating a state of confusion or clarity, shock or calm, outrage or passivity, lack of coordination or improved group coordination and perception. Effects can also be long term (permanent) such as altering declarative memory or inducing a general lack of, or improvement in, emotional stability. Or in the case of for example instigating a mass psychosis, lack of control over one’s actions. Ultimately, the unifying purpose of a ‘cognitive effect’ is to (passively or actively /overtly or covertly / legally or illegally / invasively or non-invasively) change psychological processes through some form of augmentation or change in cognition that can affect emotion, attention, motivation, or sensory function. + +S&T can begin to understand adversarial cognitive effects-based approaches by applying a holistic understanding of the operational environment to any research investigation. Looking at both physical and behavioral aspects of a system of systems in a conflict state and defining it by its associated Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure (PMESII) elements. Additionally, S&T must consider implications when the operating environment is the mind, these elements can be challenged regarding how we consider effects as the system complexity of PMESII expands and opens opportunities for new ways of planning and delivering known and novel cognitive effects. Any enhancement, modifier or malignantly induced change can have side effects and unintended outcomes. This point is especially salient since it may not be scientifically possible to accurately predict the outcome of an effect due to the dynamic nature of the human nervous system, and isolated mind[s], as an operating environment. + +Cognitive effects will need to be studied with ‘own’ center of gravity as a key component. Considering the mind as a source of strength and balance, we can analyze how it could become an adversarial goal or objective (Ends) and identify what actions/effects can be achieved (Ways), and what resources and requirements an adversary will need to perform the ways (Means), can potentially provide NATO with requisite knowledge to maintain freedom of action, physical strength, and the will to fight. + +When we consider effects, and the case for research that contributes to cognitive security, such as building cognitive skills, there is a need to identify effective education and training techniques that focus effort on defending against an adversary who is not only targeting what we think, but also how we think. This means S&T has to focus on capabilities to monitor, evaluate and adapt own cognition and behaviors. These are essential to performance and maintaining clarity of mind when and the adversary is bent on exploiting the competition space between peace and war. + +Side cognitive effects (real or perceived) and second order cognitive effects of for example augmentations, whether they be technological, biological, or neurological are serious risk factors that will need a great deal of S&T focus. + +#### 8.4 DECISION MAKING AND THE OODA LOOP IN COGNITIVE WARFARE + +John Boyd is described as the fighter pilot who changed the art of war (Coram, 2002). When studying military history, Boyd found a common thread: none of the victorious commanders threw their forces head-to-head against enemy forces. Instead, they used deception, speed, fluidity of action, and strength against weakness. Leaders used tactics that disorientated and confused – tactics that, in Boyd’s words, caused the enemy “to unravel before the fight.” + +John Boyd, US Air Force Colonel, was the architect behind the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop created during the Korean War in the mid-1950s. Boyd applied the concept of combat operations to the OODA process of decision making. The model accounted for the agility of decision making under conditions of uncertainty in a dynamic environment. + +Boyd (1987, p. 18) suggested a similar conclusion in terms of shared orientations: Arrange the setting and circumstances so that leaders and subordinates alike are given the opportunity to continuously interact with the external world, and with each other, in order to more quickly make many-sided implicit cross-referencing projections, empathies, correlations, and rejections as well as create the similar images or impressions, hence a similar implicit orientation, needed to form an organic whole. + +He accounted for the need to evaluate information as it unfolded and interacted with information in the environment. Initially, according to Boyd – the cycle was far too dangerous to be fully explained. “If someone truly understands how to create menace and uncertainty and mistrust, then how to exploit and magnify the presence of these disconcerting elements, the Loop can be vicious, a terrible destructive force, virtually unstoppable in causing panic and confusion,” he said. + +#### 8.5 THE OODA LOOP DECISION MAKING CYCLE + +The OODA Loop (Boyd, 1986; 1987; 1996; Coram, 2002; 2004), is a four-step approach to decision making that focuses on filtering data input (Figure 8-2), putting it in context, deciding while knowing that changes may be made when more data becomes available. For those unfamiliar with the OODA loop created by John Boyd (1996, p.3), there are four steps of the OODA loop: + +1) __Observe__ – Data collection phase from multiple sources, i.e., aggregation of information from all sources. + +2) __Orient__ – Filter, analyze, and enrich information, i.e., information is analyzed, evaluated, and prioritized. + +3) __Decide__ – Actionable insights enable best available response, i.e., choosing between options and courses of action. + +4) __Act__ – Execute decision, determine if action was correct i.e., testing hypothesis, executing your decision, and determining if your hypothesis was correct. + +![image07](https://i.imgur.com/cJpiBce.png) +_▲ Figure 8-2: The OODA Loop Decision Cycle (John Boyd, 1986)._ + +The OODA loop is a means for understanding the decision-making process. For the military, the OODA loop serves as a framework for decision making. The OODA loop allows decision-makers to adapt to changes as they gather information in real time. This approach to decision making affords them the ability to anticipate threats as it takes advantage of additional data as it is integrated into their mental model. It allows them to test different hypotheses, integrates updated data/information and helps them to select the optimal course of action. + +The OODA loop is not a mission planning tool, and although speed is important, understanding it simply as a loop, where doing it faster than your adversary leads you to victory, is missing what Boyd had in mind. One key factor that is highly relevant to our thinking about CogWar is that understanding the OODA loop enables a commander to compress time – that is, the time between Observing a situation and taking an Action. As the commander compresses his own time, he causes time to be stretched out for his opponent, as he is forced to pause, to wonder, to question. Therefore, Boyd included the “Implicit Guidance and Control” from “Orientation” to both “Observation” and “Action” in his model. + +For the OODA framework to enhance their decision-making capabilities military commanders need to process information, i.e., Sensemaking, if they are to ensure accurate SA for operational success. To this end, the S&T roadmap highlights the need to develop sensemaking tools, techniques and technologies that will support building SA for human decision-makers. + +#### 8.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT + +Today, auto designers have developed enhanced tools and technologies embedded in the auto’s interface design such that cars can now park themselves, provide early alerts to drivers of oncoming traffic, and alert the driver to icy road conditions. The vehicle now cognitively augments the human. Military personnel need tools for seeing Over-the-Horizon, as well tools to make sense of the socio-technical operating environment to increase levels and accuracy of SA. Technologies equipped with AI and adaptive ML algorithms have the potential to support sensemaking capabilities for enhanced SA in the future security environment. + +Technologies are being designed to enhance medical diagnosis and surgical treatment that may also give rise to military applications in the battlegrounds of the future. Sensemaking and SA technologies merit further exploration and research. There is opportunity for discovery amid the intersection of capabilities provided by designers in the auto industry, medical technologies, and in Robotics and autonomous systems that may facilitate decision-support technologies for future military combat missions. These research topics may further provide opportunities for leveraging capabilities that will enhance the military decision maker’s operational readiness. S&T will lead the way to develop tools that will enhance the military’s ability to sense-make as a defence against future CogWar. + +Orientation is not a new concept for the military. Within this context, military personnel attend to meaningful information in the operational environment and seek opportunities to take the decision advantage. S&T needs to develop technologies that will enhance human Orientation abilities and provide an intuitive understanding of dynamic changes within the operational environment. By so doing, we can potentially help our servicemen and women bypass parts of the OODA cycle, and Act on CogWar at Observation. Today’s technology designers must consider the challenges presented in CogWar and provide tools to defend against an adversary that adapts fluidly to technological advances in the CogWar operational environment. Cognitive Superiority demands innovation, being adaptive and prescient if we are to ‘get ahead’ and take advantage of emergent technologies. + +Advances in AI technologies (O’Flanagan, 2018; Masakowski, 2020, 2022a, 2022b) and the power of Quantum Computing will inform and facilitate sense-making and enhanced SA through the design and application of decision-support tools. Similarly, these same advances in emergent AI-enabled technologies will contribute to the complexity and impact of the CogWar environment. As great power competitors and adversaries weaponize AI enabled autonomous systems, the potential threat is elevated in the pursuit of strategic objectives. + +It is therefore incumbent upon us to establish and maintain a clear awareness of these future challenges and potential threats. This requires we develop and operationalize the capabilities (tools, technologies, and techniques) to successfully anticipate and orientate us to such advances. Where we can leverage AI autonomous systems, with for example adaptive ML algorithms, to provide the decision advantage for the military commander; we must also explicitly and continuously consider the ethical implications and consequences for these technologies. As a whole-of-society challenge, negotiating and integrating these issues into mission planning must include lawyers, philosophers, ethicists, and society. + +The evolution of autonomous unmanned systems has accelerated rapidly and with little time for consideration of the ethical consequences of their application in the military operational environment (Masakowski, 2019). As the introduction and application of AI and ML continues to evolve and transform the character of warfighting, systems with a capacity for self-awareness, and self-organization and self- explanation will be designed to make informed, rational decisions based on logic and reasoning capacities. The human role in sensemaking may well be out-looped and subject to the direction of these advanced agents and/or sentient robots. Indeed, such advancements combined with computational modeling have moved research in the direction of affective machine consciousness (Chandra, 2017; Aberman, 2017). Traditionally, humans do not remove progress but rather continue to explore, invent, and move forward as a society, continuously seeking ways to improve and integrate advances in technology aimed at improving the quality of our daily life and ensuring the security of society. Our adversaries are not no different, only they seek ways to modify advances in technology to their strategic and tactical advantage. We must, therefore, not shy from taking the perspective of the adversaries most dangerous course of action when we plan defence in CogWar. Adversaries will continue to challenge nations by attempting to create chaos, confusion, surprise, shock, and disorientation to keep their strategic opponent at a disadvantage in understanding the situation and impeding their ability to develop effective countermeasures. To this end, nations must strive to develop the tools and technologies to defend against such aspects of CogWar that target our capability to sense-make and build SA. + +#### 8.7 REFERENCES + +[Aberman, J. (27 February 2017). Artificial Intelligence Will Change America. Here’s How. The Washington Post (Online)](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-business/wp/2017/02/27/artificialintelligence-will-change-america-heres-how/?utm_term=.3e325159efd9). + +[Boyd, J.R. (1986). Patterns of Conflict. (Unpublished briefing)](http://dnipogo.org/john-r-boyd/). + +[Boyd, J.R. (1987). Organic Design for Command and Control. (Unpublished briefing)](http://dnipogo.org/john-r-boyd/). + +[Boyd, J.R. (1996). The Essence of Winning and Losing. (Unpublished briefing)](http://dnipogo.org/john-r-boyd/). + +[Chandra, R. (2017). An Affective Computational Model for Machine Consciousness](http://arxiv.org/abs/1701.00349). + +Coram, R. (2004). Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. Back Bay Books; Reprint Ed. May 10, 2004. + +Coram, R., (2002). Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. Little, Brown & Company, NY, U.S. + +Geissler, H. (2019). Bless the Fog of War. How Panopticon Will Lose the War in Metropolis. Thesis published by the US Naval War College, Newport, R.I. + +Masakowski, Y.R. (2019) Ethical Implications of Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence Enabled Systems. Institute of Navigation Cognizant Autonomous Systems for Safety Critical Applications Conference. Miami, Fl. September 16‒17, 2019. + +Masakowski, Y.R. (2020). Artificial Intelligence and Global Security: Future Trends, Threats and Considerations. Emerald Publishing. UK. + +Masakowski, Y.R. (2022a). Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Warfare. Naval War College Foundation, Newport, RI. 23 February 2022. + +Masakowski, Y.R. (2022b). AI and Global Security: The Influence and Impact of Cognitive Warfare. Navy ROTC: The College of the Holy Cross. Worcester, MA. 01 March 2022. + +[O’Flanagan, T.P. (2018). A Breach of Trust: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Society and Military Operations. Thesis published by the US Naval War College, Newport, RI](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1079769.pdf). + +[Tzu, S. [496 BC] (1910). SunTzu on the Art of War. Trans. L. Giles. London: Luzac and Co.](https://archive.org/details/the-art-of-war-by-sun-tzu-trans.-by-lionel-giles-m.-a.-1910/page/n3/mode/2up) + + +### Chapter 9 ‒ HUMAN-MACHINE TEAMING TOWARDS A HOLISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF COGNITIVE WARFARE + +> #### Frank Flemisch +> #### Communication, Information Processing and Ergonomics (FKIE) +> #### GERMANY + +#### 9.1 INTRODUCTION + +__What can we learn from history about cognitive warfare and human-machine teaming?__ Despite the continuing necessity for physical warfare, there is an increasing tendency in the defence community to think warfare beyond the physical realm. An example is the cyber domain, e.g., as cyber warfare, or in combination with conventional warfare as hybrid warfare, or the cognitive domain, e.g., as Cognitive Warfare (CogWar). What looks revolutionary on the first glance has already a long history, but with AI and autonomous machine capabilities it also enters a new stage, which might have disruptive effects for any future defence operation. + +Looking deeply back into history, Dalheim (2020) provided an historical perspective in the description of one of the earliest wooden weapons of war, the Schöningen wooden throwing spears that were excavated between 1994 and 1998 in an open-cast coal mine in the Helmstedt district of Germany (Figure 9-1). These throwing spears, dated between 380,000 and 400,000 years old, represent the oldest preserved hunting weapons of prehistoric Europe yet discovered. (Thieme, 1997; Dalheim, 2020). These spears are not only an early example of weapon technology, but also of Human Factors, for which Homo heidelbergensis (Smithsonian, 2022), a pre-runner of Homo sapiens, was already able to combine different techniques like cutting to carve and fire to harden an effective tool and adapt it to the individual bearer. These spears are also an early example of Human Systems Integration, which is understood as integration of humans, technology, organization, and environment: Close to the location of the spears, many horse bones were found. Anthropologists reconstructed that obviously a tribe of Homo heidelbergensis hunted, rounded up, speared, and ate these horses. Especially the production of the spears, which can be seen as a clever use of or integration with the environment, and the cooperative hunting took a degree of organization, which was not available to other rival species. What we can also derive from hunting techniques of animals, of so-called primitive societies or even from modern hunting traditions is that it was not only about organizing the own tribe, but to disrupt and disorganize the opponent, to trick the flock of prey in a way that they had no chance to escape. This technique represents CogWar at its early stage. It also becomes increasingly clear that these weapons, together with the cognitive development of Homo species, was quite disruptive for other animals, one of the first known disruptive technologies as defined by Christensen (1997). + +![image08](https://i.imgur.com/r50bAeq.png) +_▲ Figure 9-1: One of the Spears of Schoeningen as an Early Example of Human Factors, Human Systems Integration and of Cognitive Warfare (Thieme, 1997)._ + +Given this precedent (Christensen, 1997), we must prepare to defend against CogWar just in case cognitive warfare is as disruptive for us as this early example was for the horses. It becomes increasingly clear that not only the physical layer of these spears, transporting deadly energy over distance and temporarily out of hand of the original thrower was revolutionary and highly disruptive, but the cognitive layer of this hunting came was the one which really made a difference in survival of this Homo species. Tomasello (2014) describes how human cognition evolved together with the ability to create and handle such tools, and especially how the cooperation and shared intentionality fostered the evolution of Homo towards Homo sapiens as one of the most dominant species on this planet. Cooperation and teaming were obviously essential for this early hunting, cooperation and teaming might also be essential for today’s challenge of AI-based systems and CogWar. Weapons like these spears became not only a normal part of hunting, but also of warfare: + +> _The necessity of fighting very soon led men to special __inventions to turn the advantage__ in it in their own favour; in consequence of that the mode of fighting has undergone great alterations; but in whatever way it is conducted its conception remains unaltered, and fighting is that which constitutes war. (Clausewitz 1831, 1968)_ + +Thinking before fighting, and about fighting, i.e., cognition about warfare became an integral part of any sophisticated military. Sun Tzu, military philosopher at least well known in China, especially in the Peoples Republic of China, which is considered “a challenge to NATO’s interest, security and values” (NATO, 2022), speaks about “knowing,” which is an essential part of any CogWar: Hence the saying: “If you know the enemy and you know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and you know Earth, you may make your victory complete” (Tzu, 496 BC). + +While the first part of Sun Tzu’s quote is quite familiar for Western ears and cognitions, the second part might sound strange at the first glance but is truly remarkable: It points not only towards weather and terrain, but towards a cognition, which is open to a much bigger, holistic picture than just of yourself and a potential enemy. It might be exactly that feeling of strangeness in our ears or that of our NATO colleagues and comrades, which should make us think twice and ask ourselves: Is there something valuable not only in the first, but also in the second part of Sun Tzu’s insight that could help us to evolve our own cognitive abilities, before a system rival starts to outperform us with a more sophisticated cognition? + +Centuries later, Stephen Biko (1971) would carve another mighty weapon of cognitive defence into words, describing a fundamental cognitive relationship between opponents, which applies not only in an asymmetric warfare, but also in a hybrid war of 2022: “The most potent weapon of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed” (Woods, 1971; Peters, 2018). + +Sun Tzu and Stephen Biko each refer to the knowledge, minds, and cognitions of humans. For many centuries, cognition was thought to be a privilege of _Homo sapiens_. This would change with a gradual revolution, starting with the first process-controlled computer Z1 of Konrad Zuse in Berlin, 1936, followed by the Mark I built 1944 by Howard Aiken and the IBM team which was used to support the Manhattan Project. In close relation with this revolution in hardware, another scientific revolution happened regarding the software and scientific model. Norbert Wiener authored his famous book in which he introduced Cybernetics in 1950. It remains one of the most influential books of the twentieth century. Interestingly, Wiener is often misquoted to have written about computers. His book is more general about control and communication mechanism both in animals and machines, and sparked a revolution of system science beyond computers, especially in biology and psychology. + +Wiener’s Cybernetics is describing cognition in action, regardless of whether animals, humans, or machines, forming feedback loops which influence or even control situations (for an overview how this applies to safety critical systems see Flemisch et al. 2022). Later, Licklider (1960) sketched the Man/Human-Computer Symbiosis and sparked a whole research stream on joint cognitive systems. Our discussion on AI ties right into this research stream of cybernetics and human-computer symbiosis. + +#### 9.2 COGNITIVE WAR AND HUMAN COGNITION + +With all the discussions with Artificial Intelligence (AI), it becomes increasingly clear that this is a development towards an Artificial Cognition (Ritter, Barrett, Santoro, and Botvinick, 2017), which forms a joint cognition system in the sense of (Hollnagel and Woods 2005), together with human cognition. That is, Artificial Cognition can be thought of as a hybrid discipline that combines machine behavior and cognitive models that may be inferred from data elicited via experimentation vs directly observed. (Ritter et al. 2017). + +Based on Sun Tzu’s prescient forecast, it also becomes increasingly clear that it is not enough to look only at one human or one artificial cognition but elevate our view beyond that to a more holistic picture. + +__Step by Step from the Small to the Bigger Systems__ + +What are integral parts of a more holistic model of CogWar, and where should we start? A good starting point is to look at a single cognition and describe it in a way that it can be applied both to humans and artificial cognition (Figure 9-2). + +Figure 9-2 shows a typical loop of perception of and action on a situation. What makes these feedback loops a cognition is that this perception and action is not arbitrary, but with an intent to develop the situation towards a good situation and avoid bad situations. While Figure 9-2 shows a fundamental fork in the road of life, Figure 9-3 shows more detail, especially addressing a fundamental dilemma in any safety and time critical system like in military systems. + +![image09](https://i.imgur.com/FUQ2o8y.png) +_▲ Figure 9-2: Cognitive Loop and Perception-Action Cycle of Humans or Machines. (Inspired by Wiener 1950, including John Boyd’s OODA loop, based on Flemisch et al. 2012, Flemisch et al. 2022)._ + +As Clausewitz already describes as “fog of war,” there is always uncertainty in information about the situation, e.g., the capabilities and intent of an opponent. Figure 9-3 left shows the most fundamental aspect of uncertainty with the detection of a signal, which might lead to an action and non-action: The signal can be present or absent, and the perception and response can be there and not there, leading to two positive situations “Correct Hit” or “Correct Rejection,” and two negative states of “Miss” and “False Alarm.” Applied to action and non-action e.g., of military systems, Figure 9-3 right shows “Action” and “Non-Action,” where the valence is still undetermined, and the four possible outcomes “Correct Action,” “Correct Non-Action,” “False Non-Action,” or “False Action.” + +![image10](https://i.imgur.com/vDVBRHi.png) +_▲ Figure 9-3: Top: Signal Detection Theory; Bottom: Cognitive Loop and OODA Loop of Humans or Machines, with Decision to Action or Non-Action Under Uncertainty (“In the Fog of War”)._ + +An example for this fundamental dilemma is the recommendation of an AI leading to an action or non-action of a soldier, which can cause in a correct or incorrect use or non-use of military action. Even if there is hope that AI might alter this equation, (e.g., Wallace 2018), what makes this dilemma so problematic is time: In military combat, the price for non-action often increases with every second, while the information might still be not reliable enough to determine action to be a correct action. Soldiers sometimes call these dilemma situations “one foot in jail, one foot in the grave.” Ironically, after the combat, e.g., in a court trial, there is ample time to determine all the minute details of law and regulations. + +To understand these issues of time and cognition better, over the decades of research models or patterns have been developed which describe how to act on the world and the ability to learn (e.g., Wiener, 1950). Many years later, Damasio (1994) would describe that at least with human cognition, these models and their interactions with the world are also associated, almost inseparable with emotional states and with bodily perception (somatic markers). Kahneman (2011) outlines two systems, (i.e., autonomous, and automatic vs analytical and deliberate) models of human cognition, which work at different speeds and at different cognitive quality. + +Another example for the modelling of cognitive processes is the OODA loop (Figure 9-4), originally described by (Boyd, 1996), modelling the decision cycle for military combat/war situations. The OODA loop describes perceiving, thinking, and acting of agents in four stages of decision-making: + +- __Observation:__ Gathering of outside information and matching them with unfolding circumstances and unfolding environmental interaction. + +- __Orientation:__ Judging the observation in the light of previous experiences, genetic heritage, cultural traditions, and analyses. + +- __Decision:__ Selecting one of several hypotheses and putting them to test with reality. + +- __Action:__ Implementing the decision. + +Figure 9-5 shows another important step towards a more holistic model of CogWar: Based on Licklider’s concept of human-machine symbiosis, Rasmussen (1983) proposed the term cooperation, Hollnagel and Woods (1983) and Sheridan (2002) describing initial principles, Hoc and Lemoine (1998) and Hoc (2000) described the common ground and know-how-to-cooperate as important parts of developing human-computer cooperation. + +A major breakthrough was to think of cognition not only as something separated/assigned to individual agents, but also as Joint Cognition or Joint Cognitive System. Hollnagel also sketches how these Joint Cognitive Systems can be nested, from the small to the big, and already prepared the ground for a system-of-systems approach. Flemisch et al. (2019) described how humans and machine cognition can cooperate on levels with different time frequencies, yet still work together like the blunt end and the sharp end of a spear. Flemisch et al. (2020) extended this view also to conflicts that can happen between agents in cognitive systems, and how these can be mitigated. + +![image11](https://i.imgur.com/QAIbFXB.png) +_▲ Figure 9-4: A Look into the Details of Cognitive Processes in Individuals or Organizations: Example OODA Loop of Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action (Boyd, 1996)._ + +![image12](https://i.imgur.com/TSkRK3E.png) +_▲ Figure 9-5: Human-Machine System and Cooperation with Other Agents, Forming Joint Cognitive Systems of Interlinked OODA-Loops._ + +It becomes increasingly clear that the teaming of human and computers, e.g., in the form of AI, will become essential for any form of CogWar, whether offensive or defensive. The more cognitive processes are enabled by computer networks, the more cyber defence becomes important. A similar equation could be true for AI: the more cognitive processes are influenced, hopefully enhanced with AI, the more cognitive (warfare and) defence becomes important. This becomes even more important if the acceleration of the last decades continue (e.g., Rosa, 2013), and fighting at machine speed spreads out from its early beginnings in the realm of fast paced air and space defence systems, also to other domains or even offensive operations. Taking (Kahneman, 2011) seriously, who describes our cognitive systems No. 1 as fast, intuitive and emotional, but also as more vulnerable to mis-judgement compared to the slower but more deliberative and more logical cognitive system No. 2, an essential part of CogWar is about time and speed: Outperform an opponent in a way that he cannot unfold his full cognitive potential, and on the other side of the same coin, design systems with enough time for humans to use their system No. 2. + +#### 9.3 THE HOLISTIC BOWTIE MODEL + +This connection is even more important with the fast interconnectivity between the different layers of our systems, e.g., our defence systems with the political system. With the goal to make this more transparent, Figure 9-6 combines Hollnagel and Woods idea of the joint cognitive system with the idea of a bowtie diagram, originally derived in the incident and accident analysis of safety critical systems and adapted to a holistic bowtie diagram for the design and human systems integration of any system by Flemisch et al. (2022). + +Figure 9-6 shows the next step towards a holistic model of CogWar. It puts the core cognitive systems of few human and AI agents in the center, nested by a system-of-systems layer, organizational and societal layers. In the extreme, it is our global environment, sometimes called biosphere, which is nesting and hosting all these layers. The transversal cognitive layer depends on the physical layer and permeates all layers from the small human-machine system to the larger systems like organizations and societies. + +![image13](https://i.imgur.com/BqkWupD.png) +_▲ Figure 9-6: Holistic Bowtie Model of Human- Machine Cognition (Adapted from Flemisch et al. 2022)._ + +It becomes increasingly clear, that cognitive processes occur on each of these layers and that these layers mutually influence it other. In these layers from the smallest to the largest, cognition can be considered as distributed and interrelated. Siebert in Flemisch et al. (2022) summarizes Hutchins (1995) theory of distributed cognition by “thinking about cognition in terms of the emergence and interactions of component parts.” The theory of distributed cognition focuses not on how individual actors make decisions considering social and environmental features but focuses on a broader class of cognitive events that surpasses the individual. It is an approach to understanding cognition from a distributed perspective across members of a group, environment and through time. The goal of the holistic bowtie model is aimed at enabling a distributed, holistic perspective on cognition distributed between humans, machines, system-of-systems, organizations, societies, environment, and through time. + +Figure 9-7 shows an example how this holistic model can be used. It can help to show essential connections between the layers, e.g., how commensurate transparency helps to cultivate trust between the layers, how authority is distributed and respected, and how ability is enabled, and together with control, leads to a fair accountability for all agents, soldiers, and civilians alike, in this nested system. Figure 9-7 also shows how these essential streams and loops of authority, cognitive ability, and trust, as one of the most essential enablers of our defence cooperation in NATO, might also be attacked and corrupted, and with those cognitive processes be degraded and disturbed. It also provides a map how an adversary’s cognitive processes could be disturbed, disrupted or, if necessary, in defensive action of a major attack, be destroyed. + +Damasio (1994) also makes it clear that cognition is combined with our emotions and even bodily feelings. What becomes increasingly clear is that this applies not only for an individual agent, but is connected, from the smallest to the largest, from individuals, groups, human-computer/AI systems up to whole societies. Many of these connections and feedback loops are less understood, described, or remain yet undiscovered. A more holistic model might help to explore those connections. As CogWar might not only affect the battlefield, but all layers up to society and global environment, it will be crucial to understand and consciously shape these connections. + +![image14](https://i.imgur.com/kLAFjsX.png) +_▲ Figure 9-7: Holistic Bowtie Model of Cognitive Warfare, with Examples for Defence and Attack Vectors, and One Feedback Loop from Accountability to Ability, Authority, Transparency, and Trust._ + +#### 9.4 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: HOW TO PROCEED WITH COGNITIVE WARFARE AND BEYOND + +How holistic, how big should our picture be? Flemisch et al. (2022) describe a commensurate holism, which limits the scope with a pragmatic argument of estimated influence. We should not forget that this might still be a Western tendency to simplify, to focus, while Eastern military philosopher, Sun Tzu’s philosophy on warfare is still the basis of Asian/Chinese warfare and taught in Chinese military academies, speaks about nothing less than heaven and Earth. + +To understand that Sun Tzu is not only speaking about the weather or the load-bearing capacity of Ukrainian soil, it might also help that Sun Tzu’s perspective is related to the Chinese concept of Tianxia 天下 “(all) under Heaven,” and is understood as the entire geographical world, including humans and animals. Despite the fact, that it was used for centuries to describe the outreach of the Chinese emperor, it is also a philosophical principle, described e.g., by Daoist philosopher Guanzi how to expand the perspective from a family to a village to a state or an entire world. It was also used in Japanese history as a leitmotiv to unify Japan (by military force and balance of power), and in more recent times, this philosophy was used by Chinese philosopher Zhao Tingyang (2009) to describe a potential global perspective. + +We should not leave this potential cognitive revolution towards a holistic perspective, which connects the small with the large, humans with machines/AI’s, to our Chinese adversaries. Rather, we proposed the following objectives along short-, mid- and long-term recommendations: + +- Do not think CogWar as something only related to human cognition. + +- Think CogWar across all levels and in all domains, including space. Think of CW as warfare with and on distributed and joint cognition of humans, machines/AI including networks, organizations, societies, and a global environment. + +- Bring and hold together inter- and transdisciplinary teams of soldiers, engineers, human factors and Human Systems Integration specialists, cyber defenders, organizational and societal scientists, and politicians to refine these thinking models, to identify potential attack vectors, and to design and implement potential defence systems. + +- Develop and test defence philosophies, doctrines, and systems against cognitive attacks, in an analogous way as we acted on the cyber domain, but even more integrated with individuals, societies, economics, and politics. + +- In parallel, constantly work on the narratives, especially the defensive deterrence of NATO against any attack, physical or cognitive. + +- In parallel, cooperate with the political side and with arms control: The more we mutually agree on, assert and be able to trust not using certain techniques, the safer it will be for all of us. + +If we want to prevent the next war, or at least not lose it, we should seriously consider the lessons of Sun Tzu and not stop at the physical and cognitive layer but think beyond it. Once again, a lesson from history for many nations is that fighting power (e.g., in the sense of van Creveld, 1982), whether physical or cognitive, might not be enough: + +> _War in its literal meaning is fighting, for fighting alone is the efficient principle in the manifold activity which, in a wide sense, is called war. But fighting is a trial of strength of the __moral and physical forces__ by means of the latter. That the moral cannot be omitted is evident of itself, for the __condition of the mind has always the most decisive influence__ on the forces employed in war. (Clausewitz, 1968, Book 2, Chapter 1)_ + +Today we might talk more about ethics than moral, but the essence is quite similar. We face a system rival China, where at least two senior air force officers obviously have read not only Sun Tzu, but also Clausewitz and Creveld, and wrote about an “Unrestricted warfare” including terrorism, economic and network warfare (超限戰, Qiao et al., 1999). We face a system rival Russia, which is testing a less restrictive warfare in the Ukraine with the threat to escalate to unrestricted warfare. With a clear view in these system rivals, we in NATO are forced, motivated and already engaged to rethink, re-group, balance, and, if necessary, boost up our ethical, cognitive and physical forces, to whatever level necessary (Figure 9-8). + +In closing, future consideration about the defence against CogWar should include research on human cognition, artificial cognition, and especially shared, joint cognition in Robotic and Autonomous System design. Future warfare will integrate the human-machine team as part of the cohesive military force and thus, shared Situational Awareness will include AI-embedded Robots. Future research programs must be established to invest in S&T to enhance team performance, including humans and AI, and ensure the integrity and trustworthiness of cooperative systems with autonomous, AI-based functions that will serve as collaborators and partners in the future operational environment. + +Let us continue to foster our defensive but cooperative and strong fighting power, physically, cognitively, and ethically. Let us discuss and cultivate a common ground and work on a common balance, from a defensive but strong position to fence off any potential attack, whether physical, cognitive, or ethical. Based on a commonly agreed ethics and a defensive but strong position, let us work together towards physical, cognitive, and ethical peace, on our common home Earth, under the same Heaven. + +![image15](https://i.imgur.com/Avnedo0.png) +_▲ Figure 9-8: Outlook, Holistic Bowtie Model, Including an Ethical Layer into Physical and Cognitive Warfare._ + +#### 9.5 REFERENCES + +[Boyd, J.R. (1996). The Essence of Winning and Losing. Ed. C. Richard and C. Spinney. Bluffton, South Carolina](https://ooda.de/media/john_boyd_-_the_essence_of_winning_and_losing.pdf). + +Christensen, C.M. (1997). The Innovator’s Dilemma. When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail. The Management of Innovation and Change Series. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business Review Press. + +[Dalheim, R. (16 September 2020). Schöningen Spears ‒ Mankind’s Earliest Wooden Weapons](https://www.woodworkingnetwork.com/wood/schoninger-spears-mankinds-earliest-wooden-weapons). + +Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descartes’ Error and the Future of Human Life. Scientific American 271(4), p. 144. Doi: 10.1038/scientificamerican1094-144. + +Flemisch, F., Abbink, D.A., Itoh, M., Pacaux-Lemoine, M.P., and Weßel, G. (2019). Joining the Blunt and the Pointy End of the Spear: Towards a Common Framework of Joint Action, Human-Machine Cooperation, Cooperative Guidance, and Control, Shared, Traded and Supervisory Control. Cogn Tech Work 21(4), pp. 555-568. DOI: 10.1007/s10111-019-00576-1. + +Flemisch, F., Baltzer, M., Abbink, D., Siebert, L., Diggelen, J., and Draper, M. (2022). Towards a Dynamic Balance Between Humans and AI-Based Systems: Holistic Bowtie Model for Ability, Responsibility, Authority, Autonomy, Meaningful and Effective Control, and Accountability. In L. Siebert and D. Abbink (Eds.). Handbook on Meaningful Human Control. Cheltenham, Gloucester, UK: Edward Elgar (in press). + +Flemisch, F., Heesen, M., Hesse, T., Kelsch, J., Schieben, and A., Beller, J. (2012). Towards a Dynamic Balance Between Humans and Automation: Authority, Ability, Responsibility and Control in Shared and Cooperative Control Situations. Cognition, Technology & Work 14 (1), pp. 3-18. DOI: 10.1007/s10111-011-0191-6. + +Flemisch, F., Pacaux-Lemoine, M.P., Vanderhaegen, F., Itoh, M., Saito, Y., and Herzberger, N. (2020). Conflicts in Human-Machine Systems as an Intersection of Bio- and Technosphere: Cooperation and Interaction Patterns for Human and Machine Interference and Conflict Resolution. In: 2020 IEEE International Conference on Human-Machine Systems (ICHMS). Rome, Italy, 7‒9 Sept 2020: IEEE, pp. 1-6. + +Hoc, J.M. (2000). From Human-Machine Interaction to Human-Machine Cooperation. In Ergonomics 43 (7), pp. 833-843. DOI: 10.1080/001401300409044. + +Hoc, J.M., and Lemoine, M.P. (1998). Cognitive Evaluation of Human-Human and Human-Machine Cooperation Modes in Air Traffic Control. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology 8(1), pp. 1-32. DOI: 10.1207/s15327108ijap0801_1. + +Hollnagel, E, and Woods, D.D. (1983). Cognitive Systems Engineering: New Wine in New Bottles. In International Journal of Man-Machine Studies 18(6), pp. 583-600. DOI: 10.1016/S0020-7373(83)80034-0. + +[Hollnagel, E., and Woods, D. (2005). Joint Cognitive Systems. Foundations of Cognitive Systems Engineering. Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press](https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/subhh/detail.action?docID=263746). + +Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the Wild. Massachusetts: MIT Press. + +Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. + +Licklider, J.C.R. (1960). Man-Computer Symbiosis. IRE Trans. Hum. Factors Electron. HFE-1 (1), pp. 4-11. DOI: 10.1109/THFE2.1960.4503259. + +[NATO (2022). NATO 2022 Strategic Concept. Adopted at the Madrid Summit, 29‒30 June 2022](https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/). + +[Peters, M. (18 October 2018). The Most Potent Weapon in the Hands of the Oppressor is the Mind of the Oppressed. Red Pepper Magazine](https://www.redpepper.org.uk/the-most-potent-weapon-in-the-hands-of-the-oppressor-is-the-mind-of-the-oppressed/). + +Qiao, L., Santoli, A., and Wang, X. (1999). Unrestricted Warfare. Brattleboro, Vermont: Echo Point Books & Media. + +Rasmussen, J. (1983). Skills, Rules, and Knowledge; Signals, Signs, and Symbols, and Other Distinctions in Human Performance Models. In IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics SMC-13(3), pp. 257-266. DOI: 10.1109/TSMC.1983.6313160. + +Ritter, S., Barrett, D.G., Santoro, A., and Botvinick, M.M. (2017). Cognitive Psychology for Deep Neural Networks: A Shape Bias Case Study. International Conference on Machine Learning, pp. 2940-2949. + +Rosa, H. (2013). Social Acceleration: Columbia University Press. + +Sheridan, T.B. (2002). Humans and Automation. System Design and Research Issues. New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc. + +[Smithsonian Institute, (1 July 2022). Homo heidelbergensis. Human Origins. Smithsonian Institute](https://humanorigins.si.edu/evidence/human-fossils/species/homo-heidelbergensis). + +[Thieme, H. (1997). Lower Palaeolithic Hunting Spears from Germany. Nature 385, pp. 807-810. DOI: 10.1038/385807a0](https://www.nature.com/articles/385807a0). + +Tingyang, Z. (2009). A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-Under-Heaven (Tian-xia). Diogenes 56(1), pp. 5-18. DOI: 10.1177/0392192109102149. + +[Tomasello, M. (2014). A Natural History of Human Thinking. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: Harvard University Press (ProQuest Ebook Central)](https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kxp/detail.action?docID=3301383). + +[Tzu, S. [496 BC] (1910). SunTzu on the Art of War. Trans. L. Giles. London: Luzac and Co.](https://archive.org/details/the-art-of-war-by-sun-tzu-trans.-by-lionel-giles-m.-a.-1910/page/n3/mode/2up) + +Van Creveld, M. (1982). Fighting Power. German and US Army Performance, 1939‒1945. Contributions in Military History, 32. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. + +Von Clausewitz, C. (1968). On War. London: Penguin Books. + +Wallace, R. (2018). Carl von Clausewitz, the Fog-of-War, and the AI Revolution. Cham: Springer International Publishing. + +Wiener, N. (1950). Cybernetics. In Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 3(7), pp. 2-4. Doi: 10.2307/3822945. + +Woods, D. (1991). Biko. 3ʳᵈ rev. ed. New York: Holt. + + +### Chapter 10 ‒ EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR COGNITIVE WARFARE + +> #### J.E. (Hans) Korteling +> #### The Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) +> #### THE NETHERLANDS + +#### 10.1 INTRODUCTION + +The actual and practical execution of CogWar is not simple and may include a range of inherent complexities concerning the concrete, underlying psychological mechanisms and effective psychological strategies and tactics. In addition, according to Verall et al. (2016), compared to the Eastern cultures, the Western world, historically, has been less comfortable with psychological deception as a recognized tool for military influence. Western culture and open democracy are protected by respective government rules with layers of highly valued ethical checks and balances in the open-source, mass-media. Overt lying and feigning of information from sources such as government and/or organizations, is not tolerated nor accepted. However, Western nations and NATO countries have placed a low priority on developing pro-active countermeasures to detect, deter, and defend against CogWar. To date, research studies have focused on information manipulation from a reactive, defensive response to CogWar. For example, Korteling and Duistermaat (2018) concluded that this ad hoc, defensive, and reactive focus may be a risky approach given the deep and long-term nature of hybrid and information campaigns. Our reactive (instead of pro-active) approach may continue our relatively weak and unthreatening position in the world-wide arena. A more pro-active approach will focus on the weakening, destabilization, and undermine the position of the opponent and influence his decisions. This should be done within the boundaries set by our juridical and ethical principles that prevent us from obvious lying, feigning, or massive production and the dissemination of disinformation. In some cases, these boundaries may have a significant limiting consequence for the range of feasible CogWar possibilities. + +We contend that a pro-active approach may be more beneficial as it will focus on mitigating and undermining the adversaries’ ability to achieve their objectives, as well as weaking and destabilize their sphere of influence on a global scale. NATO should develop defence strategies against CogWar within the legal and ethical boundaries required. NATO and Allied partner nations must develop strategic defence strategies within the legal, juridical, and ethical boundaries of their respective nations. The development of countermeasures requires additional investment in training military personnel to prepare them with the required knowledge, skills, and abilities to defend against CogWar. One must develop measures to detect disinformation and misinformation campaigns at an early stage that may influence public opinion and the mass consciousness. Thus, nations must invest in the development of advanced training tools and methods for education and training personnel to recognize psychological deception and manipulation. Education and training will increase individual’s awareness and help to develop resilience with the knowledge and skills acquired to detect and mitigate deception and manipulation. Individuals must acquire the skills to counter the influence of misinformation with reliable, trustworthy, and verifiable facts. This pro-active approach to education and training will require investment in the development of effective training tools but are essential for facilitating the development of military personnel to respond rapidly and effectively. + +The development of such advanced training methods and tools is a critical first step in forging each nation’s defence against deception operations of CogWar. Virtual technologies and environments provide a means to design scenarios that will help to build the skills necessary to counter the effects of CogWar. Such scenarios in a wargaming virtual environment facilitates the individuals’ ability could practice strategic and tactical analysis across an array of hybrid scenarios based on realistic or imaginary threats (e.g., various forms of strategic gaming). This will increase awareness regarding the possible and current impact of psychological deception, as well as improve the knowledge, experience. capabilities and resilience of military personnel. + +To date, however, there is no consensus regarding the best means of training military personnel to defend against CogWar. There is a need to develop a sophisticated tool consisting of many modules, scenarios, and elements aligned with military defence measures such as those of Stratcom. For example, a prototype module might be developed that would include the steps that are essential for the execution of _critical preparatory activities_: + +- Analysis of the problem; + +- Goal definition; + +- Knowing and understanding the target group, their culture, views, and needs; + +- Determining other relevant actors or agencies and possible media; + +- Historical (context) analysis. + +This model could be expanded and tailored in design to address numerous deceptive stratagems (or tactics), scenarios, narratives, and challenges presented in a multi-media platform wherein several social media platforms may be used to verify information, develop risk management procedures, and mitigation strategies could be developed. For example, a model could be developed to focus on the analysis and selection of deceptive tactics or stratagems. This model could be used across media platforms as narratives, messages, with collaborators as a means of developing risk management procedures. + +#### 10.2 TRAINING AND EDUCATION + +The first question in this respect concerns the specification of adequate training objectives (training goals) and training trajectories, not only for initial training, but also for experts in CogWar. The questions raised are, what skills need to be developed? What are the best methods and formats for this type of training? Training objectives may vary from initial levels of making people aware of the issue and of what is (already) possible, and what can be practically done to more expert-level recurrency team training in realistic scenarios. Several years ago, TNO, in collaboration with the NLDA, organized two workshops focused on discussions concerning the knowledge, practices, policies, and possible scenarios regarding CogWar. These workshops were carried out with participants of the Dutch Armed Forces who were professionally trained on the topic of information operations. These workshops indicated that these professionals do not seem substantially more sophisticated in psychological deception and manipulation than most other well-educated civilians. Specifically, the military’s level of knowledge and experience concerning the psychology of subconscious influence and manipulation of information was equally elementary to that of a civilian staff member’s level of psychological knowledge (Korteling and Duistermaat, 2018). + +Although this was not explicitly investigated or tested, we would place (on a ‘best guess’) the level of competence of the workshop participants in the two bottom levels of the _Hierarchy of Competence_, i.e., unconscious incompetence and conscious incompetence (see Figure 10-1). This assessment is illustrated by expressions of participants like: “Since we now know that unconscious influence is normal in our daily lives, for instance in commerce and politics, targeted, strategic undermining and manipulation is also business-as-usual for the army.” Basic awareness is often highly under-developed, even on the highest levels of political and military decision making (e.g., president Biden emotionally calling President Putin a “war criminal” shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, may be considered very disputable from a psychological point of view. + +![image16](https://i.imgur.com/l56EztT.png) +_▲ Figure 10-1: Hierarchy of Competence._ + +This overall lack of knowledge and experience in the military seems to be supported by a brief survey among NATO partners involved in the NATO HFM Panel 356 on CogWar. In this survey we asked our partners (from Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Norway, Sweden, UK, US) the following questions regarding the education and training practices in five fields of information operations that are discerned by the Dutch defence: + +1) Monitoring the information environment; + +2) Understanding target groups; + +3) Countering disinformation/influence; + +4) Influencing; and + +5) Strategical Communication: + +> _a) Are there substantial Education and Training practices already carried out in your nation (or other nations you know) and if “Yes” on which ones of the above five fields is this done?_ + +> _b) Which types of O&T and which methods/tools (like simulation, gaming, etc.) are used for which kinds of training goals (e.g., board games/constructive simulations/Instruction video’s/books for the training goal of Increasing awareness of “OODA hacking” or how to counter disinformation._ + +The results of this simple survey on NATO CogWar education and training practices can be summarized as follows: + +- No substantial or dedicated education and training on the principles and methods of CogWar: + + - Few initiatives with doubtful results. + + - Governmental initiatives, e.g., debunking misinformation, are minor or negligible. + +- CogWar education and training is still an emerging topic in its initial stage: + + - Basic awareness about the impact of internet, cyber, and social media usage. + + - General awareness education is in line with public and academic initiatives not much of dedicated military training. + +- Lack of good teaching material and training methods: + + - Wargaming under development (low priority). + + - Some classrooms as well as “hands-on” exercises. + +#### 10.3 KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT + +The basic level of consciousness on this topic implies that there is a need for defence departments to educate and train military professionals and develop their critical thinking skills if they are to master a range of such competencies. The initial basic training on the development of critical thinking skills would focus on becoming aware of your vulnerabilities (e.g., cognitive bias) and the pervasive effects of influence (including how you yourself are – easily – influenced). Second, skills could be developed by training military personnel how to mitigate the influence of information operations and finally how to practically apply the basic principles to influence others or protect yourself from external influence. + +Most prominently, the military should become deeply aware of how deceptive thinking and practices are endemic in a connected, technology-driven international arena. For example, various research projects are being conducted in the Netherlands to expand knowledge, not only regarding the psychological aspects of CogWar, but also related to the physical and informational aspects. Research is being done with military personnel to gain insight on these topics by participating in strategic wargames. There are many types of these games, such as: Matrix gaming, Dilemma games, Connecting-the-dots games, Campaign games, or Interactive scenario-based discussion). Most games are mainly aimed at raising awareness (and some understanding) of the increasing importance and possibilities of hybrid aspects of modern conflicts, which are largely fought in the information domain. What is still lacking in these games is the training of more awareness and insight into the manifold psychological mechanisms of influence (and indoctrination) and how these are translated into concrete activities of psychological deception. + +Another topic is how to cope with the emotional impact and stress that may be induced by CogWar and misinformation campaigns. Dealing with these campaigns can be psychologically demanding, cause a lot of distress and therefore undermine cognitive performance. Finally, how to address erroneous data and disinformation on the internet. This may involve detecting hacks and identifying the sources or hidden intentions behind disinformation. However, this is sometimes only possible to a very limited extent due to legal and ethical provisions in the field of managing the public or public data. Simulating data can then offer a solution but it is complex, labor-intensive, and expensive. + +To develop effective training and education, good lessons-learned can be drawn from research in (neuro-cognitive science and other fields of psychology such as, how to influence consumer behavior (Adams, Sartori, and Waldherr, 2007; Cialdini, 1983; Hansen, 2013; Jowett and O’Donnell, 1992). Chapter 11 describes one training toll that has recently been developed by Bergh. Additional educational content can be drawn from neuro-psychological knowledge on how cognitive biases, originating from neural and evolutionary characteristics of the brain, can be exploited to manipulate human thinking and decision making (Heuer, 2013; Janser, 2007; Kahneman, 2011; Korteling, Duistermaat, and Toet, 2018; Korteling, Brouwer and Toet, 2018; Korteling and Toet, 2022). + +In addition, valuable insights are also available from the creative professions, such as film set design for physical deception, and from commercial marketing (Verrall et al., 2016). Since our totalitarian opponents are less hindered by ethical and juridical restrictions than we are, this vast body knowledge on influencing human perception, decision making, and behavior can be used to develop more subtle information interventions (Korteling and Duistermaat, 2018). Much attention should be paid to target audience analysis and the methodological aspects of CogWar (e.g., analysis, campaign planning, intervention, risk management, measuring effect). In general, the inclusion of how to apply our deep insights into influencing (or manipulation) human decision making needs to be one of the corner stones of the training courses to be developed. + +#### 10.4 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS + +Although the allied military remains committed to maintain its capacity for traditional warfare, military leaders recognize that hybrid approaches with an increasing informational and psychological character have become the prevailing mode of conflict. Therefore, military organizations in Western/NATO countries, who strive towards stability, need to rely more heavily on advanced informational and psychological methods and concepts to effectively engage in these hybrid conflicts. However, there seems little awareness, knowledge, or experience to integrate the cognitive aspects of operating in the CogWar dynamic information environment at a sufficient level within the NATO armed forces. In contrast to the former Soviet Union and Russia, the Western world has not yet intensively engaged in developing in-depth knowledge, experience, and adequate tools for CogWar. Improvement of this situation may require progress in the field of recruitment and selection of personnel. However, we must first design the framework for good education and training programs with proper educational content, methods, and didactics. Finally, adequate tools (like simulation and virtual and real-time wargaming) for supporting training and for the defence, preparation, and execution of CogWar must be developed. + +#### 10.5 S&T RECOMMENDATIONS + +__To be implemented now (1‒2 years):__ + +For the short-term- basic training programs can be implemented focusing on pro-active awareness and more literacy regarding the well-known pervasive effects of military influence, deception and manipulation by the weaponization of information. This includes how we ourselves are – easily – manipulated in our thinking and decision making, for example by the exploitation of our psychological vulnerabilities, such as our cognitive biases. Most prominently, the military should become much more profoundly aware that deceptive thinking and practices are endemic in a connected, information- and technology-driven international arena. Wargaming seems an effective way to promote increased awareness of the complex information environment and for recognizing the interplay of the many forms of influence and deception. It has been shown to be particularly useful for strategically complex problems and offers the possibility to analyze the potential cascading chain of events that emerge because of such actions. An important challenge is that (during the preparation phase) the processing of personal data is only possible to a limited extent – only if there is a legal basis or mandate. This makes it difficult to practice with real data and limits the possibilities in the use of ICT tools. In addition, the narrative to train in the information domain needs to be changed and clearly communicated. Regarding research with more in-depth knowledge and experience must be developed on how psychological influence and deception in a military context works or how the workings may be augmented. This knowledge will facilitate and shape the content and development of more sophisticated training methods and programs to be developed in the next phase. + +__Next (3‒5 years):__ + +Practicing within the information environment is essential to acquire the necessary skills for effective maneuvering with information. Apart from the training of the defensive and reactive aspects of CogWar, NATO allies need to foster the practical application of pro-active stratagems and tactics in valid operational contexts. Therefore, in-depth knowledge and experience on the cognitive mechanisms of influence and manipulation, such as how to deal with emotion and distress and how cognitive biases can be exploited for manipulation, must be further developed. Based on this knowledge, the educational methods and content for more sophisticated (than just awareness and literacy) operational readiness training programs and methods need to be extended. In-depth knowledge on the manifold psychological mechanisms of influence (and indoctrination) must be captured in well-structured models. These models will then be applied for the translation of tactical and strategical issues into concrete chains of military CogWar operations. This also concerns a further development of technology supporting the training of how to effectively deal with data, such as social media the large amount of information and communication on the internet. People will have to learn to work effectively with AI technology that may support the detection and identification of misinformation, disinformation and hacks carried out by opponent actors. To train the relevant competencies, this may require the provision of more sophisticated synthetic and simulated data, as well as realistic scenarios, which is difficult, labor-intensive, and therefore, expensive. Finally, more people within the military should be trained to develop critical thinking skills and become “strategic thinkers” across a broad range of relevant (sub)domains. This also requires the development of (selection tools), training methods, and didactic content to train the involved cognitive and communication skills. + +__Future towards the next level (5+ years):__ + +So, for the first 5 years to come, we must focus on the (further) development of in-depth knowledge, training methods, training content, and probably some basic support tools for CogWar. When this knowledge (and experience) has been sufficiently developed, it will become possible to focus more on the R&D of advanced (support) tools. In this “medium-to-long-term” we need the development of advanced (e.g., AI-endowed) methods and tools to support the military in the integral chain of defensive, pro-active, and offensive CogWar. In this regard, allies will need a coherent framework of different support systems, which is closely and flexibly linked to the operational environment. This approach also includes an overall shell (or framework) for detecting, mitigating, countering, selecting, designing, developing and executing CogWar operations (a “CogWar Engine”). This approach, at least on both the strategic and tactical levels, would prove helpful for the development of technical competencies required for the defence against CogWar. For example, such a model or tool must support certain critical preparation operations, such as: understanding and seeing through the opponent or selecting, preparing and executing certain cognitive tactics (operations, stratagems). Elements of CogWar for which tooling could be developed to support the integral chain of necessary activities in a coherent way are: + +- Detection of opposing psychological influence and deception, e.g., recognizing it. + +- Disinformation: + + - How to recognize false information. + + - How to mitigate or counter or bend weaponized information, as well as dealing with emotion and distress. + +- Analysis and understanding of the opponent (and the other relevant actors). + +- Selection and definition of strategic issues for CogWar operations. + +- Specification of a strategic or tactical CogWar goal to obtain. + +- Analysis of the relevant global and local circumstances. + +- Selection and specification of the kind of CogWar operation to use. + +- Means (narratives, storyboards, training scenarios), tools and media that may be used. + +- Target groups and operation levels on which to act. + +- Division of tasks, authorities and responsibilities. + +- Execution of CogWar operations (per actor, target, stratagem, timing, means, etc.). + +- Orchestrating the whole of the CogWar operation. + +- Contextual issues, involvement of the mass and social media. + +- Analyses of risks and potential negative outcomes. + +- Development of advanced support tools or tooling concepts for different phases/aspects. + +- Educate people to become “strategic thinkers.” + +In closing, there is a significant amount of research that remains to be done that will focus on the development of advanced training content, methods, and tools that will support the development of military and civilian personnel in the defence against CogWar. + +#### 10.6 REFERENCES + +[Adams, B.D., Sartory, J., and Waldherr, S. (2007). Military Influence Operations: Review of Relevant Scientific Literature. Report No. CR 2007-146. Toronto: Defence Research and Development Canada](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA477201). + +Cialdini, R.D. (1983). Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. New York: Harper. + +Hansen, W.G. (2013). Influence: Theory and Practice. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School. + +Heuer, R.J. (2013). Cognitive Factors in Deception and Counter Deception. In: H. Rothstein, and B. Whaley (Eds.), The Art and Science of Military Deception, pp. 105-133, Boston/London: Artech House. + +Janser, M.J. (2007). Cognitive Biases in Military Decision Making. US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. + +[Jowett, G and O’Donnell, V. (1992). Propaganda and Persuasion, 2ᶮᵈ edition, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 122-154](http://people.ucalgary.ca/~rseiler/jowett.htm). + +Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. London: Penguin Group. + +Korteling, J.E., Brouwer, A.M. and Toet, A. (2018). A Neural Network Framework for Cognitive Bias. Frontiers in Psychology 9:1561. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01561 + +Korteling, J.E. and Duistermaat, M. (2018). Psychological Deception. Report TNO R11532. Soesterberg: TNO Defence, Safety and Security. + +Korteling, J.E., Duistermaat M. and Toet. A. (2018). Subconscious Manipulation in Hybrid/Psychological Warfare. Report TNO 2018 R11543. Soesterberg: TNO Defence, Safety and Security. + +Korteling, J.E. and Toet, A. (2022). Cognitive Biases. In S. Della Sala (Ed), Encyclopedia of Behavioral Neuroscience, 2ᶮᵈ edition, ISBN 9780128216361, Elsevier. pp 610-619. DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-12-809324-5.24105-9. + +Verrall, N., Mason, L, Ellis, B. (2016) Military Deception. Baseline Understanding for Contemporary Information Activities. DSTL/TR90060 v1.0. UK: Dstl. + + +### Chapter 11 ‒ SOMULATOR: DEVELOPING COGWAR RESILIENCE THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA TRAINING + +> #### Arild Bergh +> #### Norwegian Defence Research Establishment +> #### NORWAY + +#### 11.1 INTRODUCTION + +Realistic simulations are beneficial for those preparing for military responsibilities. For the Trident Juncture exercise, NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre used a commercial software package that provided __Facebook__ and __Twitter__-inspired features to provide a social media element in this large, multinational exercise (Tomlin, 2016). Encouraged by the results of this, the C-SPI project at the Norwegian Defence Research Institute (FFI) undertook a research activity aimed at providing an updated social media experience for training purposes. This activity resulted in a complete tool designed for non-IT experts in a range of training and exercise situations. This tool, known as ___Somulator___, provides an online service, either through the Internet or on closed networks. + +This chapter will summarize the issues that were considered when selecting the core elements of the training tool. Then, we will discuss the feedback received from users that laid the foundations for additional, custom development that were used to integrate the core elements into a complete training solution. Lastly, we will discuss the core lessons learned from this study. + +#### 11.2 ISSUES RELATED TO SOCIAL MEDIA TRAINING + +Previous chapters have highlighted the challenges that NATO may face from the adversaries’ use of social media platforms and technologies in CogWar. There is a need to develop and train military personnel to understand and manage social media effectively. This is especially critical in CogWar where adversaries have weaponized information and disseminate it globally and invisibly across the global digital network on social media platforms. + +Thus, given the influence and impact of social media platforms, to train military personnel to understand and manage information presented on social media platforms is no longer optional. Rather, it is an essential competency that all military personnel must achieve as part of CogWar defence. Furthermore, social media is deeply embedded in everyone’s daily life, and exerts influence on everyone’s perceptions and decisions. Thus, we can no longer ignore or disconnect from information presented in social media, doing so would entail great risks. Nor can we view this as an intelligence or communication specialist issue as the wide dissemination of propaganda, disinformation and misinformation campaigns across global social media platforms affects everyone and must be addressed by each person. Indeed, information has already been weaponized across all media platforms and used by adversaries to target both the military and mass civilian population. + +There are many challenges in learning to counter CogWar in the social media environment. For example, although it would be free to open any number of social media accounts on real social media platforms and use them for training, this would immediately run into several issues. First, some social media, like Twitter, display all content by default. This would restrain the ability to train freely on any scenario and being able to fail without fear of causing offence or being ridiculed. Furthermore, most social media platforms ban the use of fake logins. Military personnel/staff would either break platform rules or face exposure. Unlike other military uses of real-life locations for regular military exercises, these limitations prohibit this approach. + +An alternative could be to simply describe a scenario, such as “fake news about an impending attack by a terrorist group is spread through Twitter.” Although this approach is often used in high-level war gaming, this would leave a lot to be desired when training practitioners in different fields. In some ways it would be akin to doing target practice through notes – social media content is chaotic and overwhelming; using a naturalistic setting is thus a better way to start build resilience. + +#### 11.3 PROPOSED SOLUTIONS + +Given these constraints, we researched how we could achieve a realistic social media simulation that would provide high quality training for a wide array of military personnel, ranging from intelligence cells in the home guard to communications staff in a government department. Attempting to recreate even a subset of a real social media platform’s functionality from scratch would be costly. It would also require the establishment of an ongoing development team to fix bugs. Furthermore, there are different types of social media platforms that each have different affordances (Bergh, 2019, p. 17), training someone on __Twitter__ does not necessarily help them on a video-based platform like __YouTube__. + +Therefore, we decided to utilize open-source “clones” of several different social media platforms in an overall tool called ___Somulator___. ___Somulator___ integrates five individual web-based applications with custom software to make them suitable for use in training. The term, open source, denotes that one is allowed to modify the software according to one’s needs. For example, we were able to amend newspaper software, so it automatically creates three newspapers for use in training. Each of the five web applications were selected after an evaluation of different products, they are: + +- Friendica (Facebook type social media platform, i.e., friends-based platform that allows sharing of many different media). + +- Mastodon (Twitter type social media platform, i.e., micro-blogging content) (Figure 11-1). + +- Pixelfed (Instagram type social media platform, i.e., photo sharing). + +- Peertube (YouTube type social media platform, i.e., video sharing). + +- Drupal (Content management software that provides online newspaper functionality). + +Each of the four social media platforms implement the key features of the originals. This includes uploading diverse types of content, communicating with, and subscribing to other users, showing content in constantly updated feeds and search results, providing tools for sharing and commenting on information, and so on. The fifth application, Drupal, is a general content management system used by many newspapers and magazines, such as the ___Economist___. Like other online newspapers, Drupal has built-in comments and article sharing tools. + +What these platforms lack are the advanced machine learning tools used by commercial social media networks to analyze uploaded content and users’ interests which are used to show content that is of interest to the individual users. This is the main aspect of social media that is manipulated for cognitive warfare purposes (Bergh, 2020, p. 17). In a training situation, this will therefore need to be replaced by manually planned and executed deployment of content. This will be discussed briefly at the end of this chapter. + +![image17](https://i.imgur.com/GVKIS3l.png) +_▲ Figure 11-1: Screenshot of Mastodon, the Twitter Clone._ + +#### 11.4 DESIGN METHODS + +> #### 11.4.1 Input from Potential Users and Core Goals that Emerged + +The decision to utilize existing open-source software that has been tested and is continuously developed was followed by an analysis of what customizations were required to turn these individual, separate applications into a coherent training platform. As a part of this analysis ___Somulator___ was discussed with different potential stakeholders. These included experienced, regional organizers of media training, staff at NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre, workshop, and exercise organizers at national public bodies in Norway, as well as the staff at the Norwegian Cyber Defence and fellow FFI researchers. + +Based on these discussions the following key requirements emerged for the different user types. Namely, we developed key requirements for 1) Trainers; and 2) Training event organizers. + +> #### 11.4.2 Low Threshold for Use + +The type of training discussed here is often done by subject specialists who do not necessarily have in-depth IT expertise. A simple method to deploy ___Somulator___ was therefore required. This requirement was managed by developing an automated means of deploying of ___Somulator___ after asking just three questions through a regular web page (see Figure 11-2). ___Somulator___ is thus what is known as “software as a service.” The ease with which ___Somulator___ can be deployed also means that it can easily be de-commissioned without worrying about the cost of deploying it again. This avoids having to keep services and servers running for longer than required due to re-deployment costs. + +![image18](https://i.imgur.com/2V8uLnT.png) +_▲ Figure 11-2: Second of the Five Steps When Deploying Somulator._ + +__11.4.2.1 Ease of Organizing Training__ + +Informants with practical training experience highlighted the workload involved in setting up tools for participants to use, typically by creating accounts and emailing login information before the training event. To handle this, a web-based administration tool was developed for ___Somulator___. This has, among other things, a built-in registration module where any number of emails can be copied into a text box and accounts will automatically be set up and the new users will be alerted through emails. + +__11.4.2.2 Content Control__ + +Finally, trainers needed simple and efficient means by which to control how and when content is published through the different social media platforms. It is the content that will facilitate learning. Content publishing therefore needs to be controlled in such a way that it can tie in with an overarching scenario (Figure 11-3). + +___Somulator___ therefore has a module for the “white cell” (also called Excon) to upload and distribute content through the different social media platforms that have been deployed. The main purpose of this tool is: + +1) To be able to spread copious amounts of content in a brief time, as one experiences it on social media; and + +2) Choose services and profiles used for diverse types of posts. + +The latter is used because different profiles have distinctive characteristics that can change participants’ perception of the shared content. A profile claiming to be a retired general may seem more authoritative on military matters than a home maker’s profile. This is also how real influence campaigns operate. + +![image19](https://i.imgur.com/d7ns8Hm.png) +_▲ Figure 11-3: Prepared Content Ready for Deployment in Somulator._ + +__For researchers:__ + +- ___Somulator___ is also a tool for researchers to learn more about how CogWar through social media works, and through this research contribute to the development of new training approaches. The features discussed above make it considerably easier to organize casual experiments for different groups that require customized setups. This makes it easier to test ideas with different scenarios/groups. In addition, it is possible to extract the data from an experiment to analyze in retrospect. + +__For organizations:__ + +- Finally, organizations, whether the armed forces or government agencies tasked with handling crises, have some overarching requirements. Although not clearly spelled out, they emerged during conversations with stakeholders that represented diverse types of organizations. + +- First, it would be very costly if a training tool in such a dynamic arena as social media was static. The ability to extend the software is therefore of paramount importance. Somulator is extendable as it uses open-source software that users may freely modify. Furthermore, users actively develop these applications within a large community of developers, who add features over time, thereby, keeping the feature set up to date. The open nature of the underlying social media platforms also means that any custom enhancements are distributed and implemented in the overarching administration tool that can be shared with other organizations. + +- Secondly, training tools that users share with other organizations are beneficial in terms of lower costs but also because the pool of people who know the software expands. Interoperability is a key feature to achieve this, and all the social media platforms used in Somulator implement the Activity Pub protocol (Webber et al., 2018). This allows two different organizations using for example Mastodon (the Twitter type platform), to connect these via the Internet if they do joint training at some point. The organization could be two different defence educational outfits or even armed forces from two different NATO member states. + +#### 11.5 LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS + +___Somulator___ was evaluated in a pilot experiment where media students from a local high school prepared disinformation-based content and worked in the white cell. Members of a youth wing of an independent defence related Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) participated in the actual experiment. + +The key finding from this experiment highlighted the importance of content that feels relevant to the participants, not only in the current experiment but also in relation to their everyday life and work. Social media is deeply embedded in everyone’s daily life. Thus, humans filter out irrelevant content, and tailor information streams according to individual interests and relevant needs. Disinformation or propaganda content that seems too outrageous may therefore simply be ignored rather than providing opportunities for learning. This may therefore be more a case of “train as you live” than train as you fight, perhaps an appropriate sentiment given that our cognition straddles everyday life and not only our defence. + +This point also shows the need during training to replace the social media platforms’ algorithms that continuously evaluate what information you are most likely to prefer, with careful preparation and deployment of information through relevant profiles. Otherwise, the content will have negligible effect on the learning as it will seem to be random information of no particular concern to the individual person undergoing training. + +Social media training therefore require considerable preparation in terms of creating relevant content for an experiment or training workshop. The possibility of using machine learning models such as GPT-2 to generate content may provide one way forward, and research is currently taking place to explore how difficult it would be to train Norwegian language models to create copious quantities of disinformation automatically. + +Looking ahead, ___Somulator___ will be used as part of a three-year project funded by the Norwegian DoD. There are also numerous actors within the Norwegian Total Defence who are eager to use ___Somulator___ in different training contexts. + +The results of this pilot study have implications for defence against CogWar. The ability to have AI/ML tools and technologies developed that will facilitate filtering of irrelevant information, detection of fake information, and information that is not valid will be more easily detected and rendered irrelevant to the end user. Thus, the ____Somulator___ tool that emerged from this research holds great promise in contributing to research and training to defend against CogWar in the future. + +#### 11.6 REFERENCES + +[Bergh, A. (2019). Social Network Centric Warfare: Understanding Influence Operations in Social Media (FFI-Rapport No. 19/01194; p. 65). Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)](http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12242/2623). + +[Bergh, A. (2020). Påvirkningsoperasjoner i sosiale medier ‒ Oversikt og utfordringer (FFI-rapport No. 20/01694; p. 58). Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)](http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12242/2724). + +[Tomlin, G.M. (2016). #SocialMediaMatters: Lessons Learned from Exercise Trident Juncture. Joint Force Quarterly](http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/793264/socialmediamatters-lessons-learned-from-exercise-trident-juncture/). + +Webber, C., Tallon, J., Shepherd, O., Guy, A., and Prodromou, E. (2018). ActivityPub-W3C Recommendation. W3C Social Web Working Group, 23ʳᵈ January. + + +### Chapter 12 ‒ LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS RELATED TO DEFENCE AGAINST COGNITIVE WARFARE + +> #### Lea Kristina Petronella Bjørgul +> #### Norwegian Defence Research Institute +> #### NORWAY + +#### 12.1 INTRODUCTION + +The sophistication of new digital technologies and advances within artificial intelligence, machine learning, and autonomous systems coupled with the increasingly widespread use of social media has made it possible for actors to reach larger audiences with customized and targeted content at machine speed. This development has arguably altered the character of warfare and given rise to Cognitive Warfare (CogWar). CogWar takes well-known and novel approaches within information, cyber, and psychological warfare to a new level through the implementation of these modern technologies by not only attempting to alter the way people think, but also how they react to information. + +States are increasingly taking advantage of these methods to achieve their strategic objectives. The end goal of CogWar is to gain some sort of advantage over another party. Consequently, the aim of CogWar is arguably the same as within the other warfighting domains; to impose ones will upon another state. This is in line with one of the main elements of Clausewitz’s definition of war: “...an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will” (Von Clausewitz, 1968, p. 101). According to Clausewitz, war is conducted for some second-order purpose. States do not go to war simply to commit violence, but to impose their will upon other states. Despite the common aim, the concept of cognitive warfare raises several new legal and moral challenges that should be carefully considered by those involved in determining the status and response to CogWar. These issues should be resolved before NATO decides whether to implement the cognitive domain as its 6ᵗʰ warfighting domain. The challenges in question are both related to the issue of _why or if_ a war should be fought (_jus ad bellum_), and _how_ a war should be fought (the conduct of war or _jus in bello_). + +#### 12.2 DEFENDING AGAINST COGNITIVE WARFARE: ISSUES RELATED TO JUS AD BELLUM + +Several measures are needed to defend against CogWar. Obvious measures include (amongst others) making society more resilient against actions in the cognitive domain across all sectors (civilian and military), to prevent the actions of an adversary to be successful. However, other defensive measures should receive thoughtful treatment. Important examples include deterrence and defensive counterattacks, as well as the problem of attribution (the problem of ambiguity as to the identity of the attacker). Against whom is one to retaliate when the identity of the perpetrator cannot be firmly established? How is deterrence to work if the punitive threat of retaliation cannot be accurately aimed? Ethical reasoning in the form of judgements about good versus harm done, the level of proof required to act, and the matter of _when and how_ to respond to actions in the cognitive domain will all be of critical importance moving forward. + +A specific issue regarding _jus ad bellum_ and defensive counterattacks that needs to be investigated is related to Article 5 (The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, Art. 5). The result of treating the cognitive domain as a warfighting domain is the implication that an action within this domain can be characterized as an act of war, and potentially trigger the right to national self-defence (and Article 5). Consequently, one main issue that the Alliance potentially needs to resolve is: _when should an action within the cognitive domain be considered an unlawful use of force?_ + +One approach to this challenge is to revisit the debate that took place when NATO declared the cyber domain as an operational domain. The main issue for the participants in this debate was that cyberattacks are non-kinetic, and most importantly, the argument that the existing international frameworks could not accommodate cyberattacks because they do not appear to use physical or violent _means_ as they only involve the manipulation of computer code. However, given the potential consequences of cyberattacks, many argued that it was implausible to suggest that no state could ever use military force to protect itself from them. This debate resulted in a definition of force that applies the existing laws of war to actions within the cyber domain only when these actions are likely to result in conventional physical harm (Petkis, 2016, p. 1431; Schmitt et al., 2013, p. 93). More specifically, the threshold suggested for the cyber domain was that actions that _directly_ and intentionally cause significant physical effects, qualify as a use of force (and could potentially trigger the right to national self-defence). Some authors have suggested that this framework can be revised and used to develop legal definitions and metrics for cognitive acts of war (Bernal et al., p. 36). + +Although a useful starting point, this definition of force, and the framework suggested for the cyber domain might not be satisfactory for establishing governing principles within the cognitive domain. Several arguments can be made for why the framework suggested for the cyber domain might not be appropriate for the cognitive domain. Most importantly, it appears that many forms of current CogWar will often not involve death and widespread physical destruction. As previously mentioned, the aim of CogWar is to alter the way people _think and react_ to information. With this aim a state could have several different goals, but one of the most well-known examples is policy change through election influence (such as the Russian influence operation targeting the American public in connection to the 2016 presidential election). Although a significant challenge to modern democracies, these types of actions do not fit the criteria of resulting in “significant physical effects.” One could argue that influence campaigns with the goal of destabilization and encouragement to violence can in fact lead to significant physical effects. However, these effects would be indirect, not direct, as the current consensus encourages (Bjørgul, 2021). The implication of this is of course that very few (if any) cognitive attacks will ever trigger a nation’s right to self-defence. However, the potential consequences of certain types of CogWar (such as influence operations) on democratic stability, raises the question of whether there are other effects than physical harm which should be considered to give rise to a _casus belli_. + +In conclusion, CogWar arguably represents a significant and new challenge to our moral and legal understanding of war and the right to self-defence. Consequently, there is a need for critical thinking about when this new type of warfare should be used, and how it should be regulated. One important and difficult challenge for the Alliance moving forward is to think fundamentally new about which actions in the cognitive domain should be considered unlawful actions of war if it decides to implement the cognitive domain as the 6ᵗʰ warfighting domain. A framework needs to be developed, from which a set of principles and legal articles can be derived, so that acts of CogWar can be identified and appropriately be responded to. + +This work will likely take time. Academics began the process of defining cyberwarfare as early as in the 1990s (Ashraf, 2021, p. 275), and the first ethical analysis of this new kind of warfare was not published until 2010 (Dipert, 2010). There is no reason to think that dealing with similar issues within the cognitive domain should be a less comprehensive task. + +#### 12.3 THE CONDUCT OF WAR: THOUGHTS ON ISSUES RELATED TO JUS IN BELLO + +The previous section of this chapter dealt some of the most critical issues related to _why or if_ a war should be fought (_jus ad bellum_). This next section will briefly describe some implications of CogWar on the conduct of war, or the issue of how a war should be fought once it has been initiated (_jus in bello_). + +One important topic in connection with the conduct of war, which is put under pressure in CogWar, is the issue of whom it is ethical to fight. In conventional war, non-combatants (those who take no direct part in the hostilities), are protected from both direct and collateral injuries. In other words, there should be no direct hostilities directed at civilian populations (Koskenniemi, 2006, para. 374). This is a principle which stands in direct contrast to one of the central elements of CogWar, namely that civilian populations often are the main targets of operations in the cognitive domain. How should this dilemma be approached? + +This leads to another important question that needs answering: _Who is, and who isn’t a combatant in the cognitive domain?_ In traditional warfare civilians may be considered legitimate targets if they directly participate in hostilities. The issue of deciding who is and who is not a combatant in the cognitive domain, and consequently who should be considered legitimate targets, is a puzzling question for several reasons. One complicating aspect is that civilian actors are often used as proxies. One example is the use of PR agencies or influencers in influence operations (Aukia, 2021; Seitz, Tucker and Catalini, 2022; Henley, 2021). + +Another prominent issue is that of the kind and degree of force it is ethical to use in different situations. The starting point of this discussion is the _in bello_ proportionality principle, which governs the degree and kind of force used to achieve a military goal by comparing the military advantage gained to the expected damage caused to civilians and civilian objects. Taking into consideration that the effects of CogWar are usually not physical damage, how should this comparison be conducted? + +#### 12.4 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH + +CogWar arguably represents a significant and new challenge to our moral and legal understanding of war. Consequently, there is a need for debate regarding how this new type of warfare should be regulated. More research on the normative and legal aspects of CogWar is essential. This should include questions regarding justifications for the resort to military force (_jus ad bellum_) and what may justifiably be done in the use of force (_jus in bello_). + +This chapter has pointed to several specific research questions which should be explored to better our understanding of CogWar, as well as its implications for war ethics and international law. First: When should an action within the cognitive domain be considered an unlawful use of force (and potentially trigger the right to national self-defence)? One might begin by considering whether there are secondary effects, other than physical harm, which should be considered that may give rise to a _casus bello_. These issues may lead to another argument regarding whether a _conventional attack_ can ever be a proportional response to an enemy _cognitive attack_. + +It is also recommended that issues related to _jus in bello_ are explored. Specific examples of potential research questions include: What defines who is and who is not a combatant in the cognitive domain? Who is a legitimate target in the cognitive domain? And lastly, how should _in bello_ proportionality be evaluated, taking into consideration that the effects of CogWar are usually not physical damage? + +In addition to supporting research efforts, NATO should organize a symposium to open the discussion for the development of policies, doctrine, and directives to guide the way ahead for the defence against CogWar. There are significant consequences for the potential abuse of information in the social media environment in CogWar. + +Workshops should also be focused on the __Human Element of Cognitive Warfare__ and how best to defend people legally and ethically from the influence and impact of CogWar. The workshop may reveal topics related to human fatigue, cognitive impairment, physiological and psychological impacts, stress, anxiety, attention deficit issues, etc., related to CogWar and pave the way to highlighting the results of CogWar that might otherwise remain hidden and unknown. Like the Havana Syndrome, the impact of cognitive attacks may be challenging to prove. Once the evidence is examined, the focus shifts to identifying the level of psychological harm or cognitive impairment and a defensive strategy can be developed to prevent, mitigate and defend against such attacks in the future. So too, there is a need to take a focused examination of the human element that is influenced negatively in CogWar. What are the consequences of such influence? How can we legally and ethically defend against the impact of CogWar? What level of CogWar crosses the Rubicon and defines it as an act of war to which we are legally responsible to defend? These questions must be addressed if we are to mitigate and defend against CogWar. + +Lastly, we anticipate that as the level of sophistication increases in advanced technologies such as AI/ML and BMI designs, there will be an exponential increase in the level of adversarial activity to deploy CogWar attacks at an increasing rate. Therefore, it is important to ensure that education and training are done on a continuous basis to ensure military readiness to counter the effects of CogWar. We must advocate for changes in international law that define the parameters of an act of “CogWar”, and establish levels of response, penalty to counter and mitigate the unethical use of technology for CogWar purposes by potential adversaries against NATO forces. + +#### 12.5 REFERENCES + +Ashraf, C. (2021). Defining Cyberwar: Towards a Definitional Framework. Defense & Security Analysis, 37(3), pp. 274-294. + +[Aukia, J. (June 2021). China as a Hybrid Influencer: Non-State Actors as State Proxies. The European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats](https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-research-report-1-china-as-a-hybrid-influencer-non-state-actors-as-state-proxies/). + +[Bernal, A., Carter, C., Singh, I., Cao, K., and Madreperla, O. (2020). Fall 2020 Cognitive Warfare: An Attack on Truth and Thought](https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/Cognitive%20Warfare.pdf). + +Bjørgul, L. (03 November 2021). Cognitive Warfare and the Use of Force. Stratagem. + +Cook, J. (2010). “Cyberation” and Just War Doctrine: A Response to Dipert. The Journal of Military Ethics 9(4), pp. 411-423. + +Dipert, R. (2010). The Ethics of Cyberwarfare. Journal of Military Ethics, 9(4), pp. 384-410. + +Eberle, C. (2013). Just War and Cyberwar. The Journal of Military Ethics Vol. 12(1), pp. 54-67. + +[Elkins, L. (2019). The 6ᵗʰ Warfighting Domain. OTH](https://othjournal.com/2019/11/05/the-6th-warfighting-domain/). + +[Henley, J. (2021). Influencers Say Russia-Linked PR Agency Asked them to Disparage Pfizer Vaccine. The Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/media/2021/may/25/influencers-say-russia-linked-pr-agency-asked-them-to-disparage-pfizer-vaccine). + +[Janson, J. (2018). It’s Time to Take the Human Domain Seriously. ISCYBERCOM is Our chance. OTH](https://othjournal.com/2018/05/18/its-time-to-take-the-human-domain-seriously-uscybercom-is-our-chance/). + +[Koskenniemi, M. (2006). Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law. United Nations](https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l682.pdf). + +[NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty (4 April 1949), Article 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm). + +[Ottewell, P. (2020). Defining the Cognitive Domain. OTH](https://othjournal.com/2020/12/07/defining-the-cognitive-domain/). + +Petkis, S. (2016). Rethinking Proportionality in the Cyber Context. Georgetown Journal of International Law. Vol 47, No. 4, pp. 1431-1458. + +Roscini, M. (2010). Worldwide Warfare – “jus ad bellum” and the Use of Cyber Force. Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Vol 14, pp. 85-130. + +Schmitt, M.N. (2013). Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. Cambridge University Press. + +[Seitz A., Tucker E., and Catalini M. (2022). How China’s TikTok, Facebook Influencers Push Propaganda. AP News](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-eileen-gu-winter-olympics-technology-business-12de242ee53092693c0711b932c1da5c). + +Silver, D. (2002). Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force Under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. International Law Studies Vol 76, pp. 73-97. + +Von Clausewitz, C. (1968). On War. Penguin Classics. + + +### Chapter 13 ‒ COGNITIVE WARFARE AND THE HUMAN DOMAIN: APPRECIATING THE PERSPECTIVE THAT THE TRAJECTORIES OF NEUROSCIENCE AND HUMAN EVOLUTION PLACE COGNITIVE WARFARE AT ODDS WITH IDEAS OF A HUMAN DOMAIN + +> #### Torvald F. Ask +> #### Norwegian University of Science & Technology +> #### NORWAY + +> #### Benjamin J. Knox +> #### Norwegian Armed Forces Cyber Defence +> #### NORWAY + +#### 13.1 INTRODUCTION + +Advances in neuroscience combined with evolving technological, cyber, and social engineering capabilities converge to form novel methods of influencing human cognition. The potential for weaponizing these methods, to wage war on the cognitive integrity of a target population, has spawned a resurgence of attention to Cognitive Warfare (CogWar). What constitutes CogWar is currently ill-defined and the existing literature arguing for its novelty struggles to make a critical look at existing literature and challenges the wide-ranging and anthropocentric convincing distinction between CogWar and psychological and influence operations (e.g., Claverie et al., 2022). An alternative position found in the literature is that CogWar is an old form of warfare made relevant with novel weapons for influencing cognition at both tactical and mass levels (e.g., Canham et al., 2022; Dahl, 1996, pp. 23-34; Whiteaker and Valkonen, 2022). + +While arguing for the novelty of CogWar, some authors have taken issue with the ‘Cognitive Domain’ as a domain of operations (Claverie and du Cluzel, 2022a, 2022b; Cole and Le Guyader, 2020; du Cluzel, 2020; Le Guyader, 2022). The general argument is that a Cognitive Domain is too restrictive as it does not sufficiently encompass the action space in which human thinking and behavior is being weaponized. For instance, one author asks whether the potential threat of biotechnologies and nanotechnologies are addressed by a Cognitive Domain, and whether an individual or a community can be _“solely defined by its cognitive capacities”_ (Le Guyader, 2020, p. 3). To address the potential limits of a Cognitive Domain, the authors suggest that we are moving towards a ‘Human Domain’ of operations (Claverie and du Cluzel, 2022a, 2022b; Cole and Le Guyader, 2020; du Cluzel, 2020; Le Guyader, 2022). + +This suggestion naturally begs the question of what exactly the Human Domain is. This chapter takes perspective of a ‘human domain’ as it does not a priori align with the trajectory of neuroscience and of human evolution in the context of CogWar. Instead, it argues for S&T approaches that focus on a cognitive domain, where CogWar attacks are directed and hence what needs to be protected. + +#### 13.2 THE HUMAN DOMAIN AS DEFINED IN THE LITERATURE + +Cole and Le Guyader (2020) argue that the Human Domain is _“the one defining us as individuals and structuring our societies”_ (p. 8) and that it is based on many sciences including (but not limited to) _“political science, history, geography, biology, cognitive science, business studies, medicine and health, psychology, demography, economics, environmental studies, information sciences, international studies, law, linguistics, management, media studies, philosophy, voting systems, public administration, international politics, international relations, religious studies, education, sociology, arts and culture ...”_ (p. 8). They argue that these sciences are being weaponized by adversaries, that none of the sciences are addressed by other domains of operation and that a Cognitive Domain would not suffice to address them (Cole and Le Guyader, 2020). + +One author (Le Guyader, 2020) argues that the Human Domain is based on the Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH), that the SSH do not fall naturally into the five existing domains but can be _“found, simultaneously, in all five current domains”_ and that they _“precede, explain, and lead to all domains”_ by providing the key ingredients to modern threats and by being _“both inside and outside”_ of all domains thus encompassing them. The author then asserts that the _“Human Domain IS a domain as such, but it is also the “womb” for all other domains whose existence is solely based on and justified by this 6ᵗʰ domain”_ (Le Guyader, 2020, pp. 3-4). + +In an article reviewing several of the threats facing human cognitive integrity (du Cluzel, 2020), the Human Domain was described as not being the military human capital but encompassing _“the human capital of a theater of operations as a whole (civilian populations, ethnic groups, leaders...), but also the concepts closely related to humans such as leadership, organization, decision-making processes, perceptions, and behavior.”_ (p. 28). The article then suggests a tentative definition of the Human Domain of operations: _“the sphere of interest in which strategies and operations can be designed and implemented that, by targeting the cognitive capacities of individuals and/or communities with a set of specific tools and techniques, in particular digital ones, will influence their perception and tamper with their reasoning capacities, hence gaining control of their decision making, perception and behavior levers in order to achieve desired effects.”_ (Du Cluzel, 2020, p. 33). + +Two authors (Claverie and du Cluzel, 2022a, 2022b) argued that the _“human enhancement networks”_, brought about and facilitated by the increased interconnectedness between humans and information technology, are typical of the Human Domain _“where the ability to solve complex problems is dependent on how information is represented, understood and developed”_ (Claverie and du Cluzel, 2022a, p. 7). + +In short, and according to the literature, the Human Domain can be understood as everything that involves humans and human societies. It encompasses the cause and outcome of all warfare, and getting an asymmetric advantage requires knowledge in SSH as well as the hard sciences. + +There are several issues with this domain as it is currently described. First and foremost, a domain where everything explains everything (like a model consisting of all variables) where one needs to know every SSH, and related science is hardly useful. A Cognitive Domain would be more useful in this regard because it indicates where attacks are directed thus what needs to be protected. Moreover, the explanations and definitions provided by du Cluzel (2020, p. 33) and Claverie and du Cluzel (2022a, p. 7) can be fully addressed by a cognitive domain. Most of the future threats addressed in the literature (du Cluzel, 2020; Le Guyader, 2020) are related to neurobiological and cognitive factors as well as information technology. Thus, to sufficiently address these threats, it will specifically require that focus is allocated to cognitive science, neuroscience, and information technology. One could also argue that the argument for moving towards a Human Domain is too anthropocentric in the sense that it may be a move in the opposite direction of the trajectory of neuroscience and of human evolution. + +#### 13.3 COGNITIVE WARFARE AND THE HUMAN DOMAIN: IS A HUMAN DOMAIN AT ODDS WITH THE TRAJECTORY OF NEUROSCIENCE AND HUMAN EVOLUTION? + +Developments in neuroscience result from applying common principles for how molecules and materials interact, and how information is represented statistically. Some of these advancements are a result of being able to avoid the bias of thinking about cognition in a human (or anthropocentric) manner, and rather identify the statistical frameworks and models underlying the brain’s ability to perceive and understand the world. Examples range from perceiving objects (Nirenberg and Pandarinath, 2012) to complex representations of physical space (Gardner et al., 2022). To understand the neuronal networks that give rise to these statistical models, neuroscientific researchers are developing tools that can be used to manipulate the networks. These tools combine material science with virus technology as delivery mechanisms; being human has little to do with it. + +Another problem with conceptualizing an anthropocentric domain is the fact that humans are increasingly becoming cyborgs and merging with technology. At the most extreme, humans are getting implants and replacing organs to attain superhuman abilities (e.g., perceptual, kinetic, etc., Tsui, 2020). If humans are becoming less human over time it begs the question of how relevant a “Human Domain” will be in the future. Cognition is cognition regardless of whether it is occurring in a machine, a human being, or an animal belonging to another species. If one accounts for the possible trajectories that human evolution may take, one could argue that a Human Domain is more restrictive than a Cognitive Domain. + +#### 13.4 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES + +The conception of a Domain of Operations should be actionable by practitioners and not solely justify the existence of academic pursuits. A Human Domain as it is currently described in the literature is arguably too wide-reaching to be actionable. It is also not clear how it is better at addressing current threats than a Cognitive Domain. The trajectory of neuroscience (including cognitive neuroscience) and human evolution is arguably moving in the opposite direction of that of a Human Domain. To keep up with- and get ahead of the threats associated with these developments, as well as being at the forefront of research that can further understanding of the brain’s ability to perceive and understand the world, efforts need to be directed towards S&T that facilitate this. Doing so can lead to anticipatory actions based upon the ability to make sense of how sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used. The outcome is the ability to apply improved and appropriate tools and methods and time relevant defensive strategies in the near and distant future. + +Anthropocentric approaches may be a mistake as we risk losing sight of cognition as processes or actions, and how manipulations (positive or negative / offensive or defensive) to these can guide our behavior. The knowledge available in the current neuroscience literature is highly applicable and can be used to develop powerful neuro-ergonomic tools to manipulate brain physiology to alter how individuals experience and interact with the world. This information can be applied by non-academic individuals to improve brain function and optimize performance (e.g., increase dopamine receptors to improve motivation and grit). The same tools can be applied by adversaries to degrade brain function and performance (e.g., reduce dopamine or other neuroactive molecules that facilitate in-group coherence). These dual-use potentials need to be mapped out to effectively defend against them. + +For the short term, the HFM-356 House Model can be used as a tool to critically assess existing [grey] literature and analyze perceived CogWar attacks. This will allow for more academic rigor to be applied regarding the how and when CogWar currently occurs, in peace, crises and war. + +In mid-term, taking the lead from neuroscience and human evolutionary trajectories, in terms of the opportunities and consequences of human-machine integration, research should proceed by avoiding the biases of ‘humanizing’ CogWar effects and instead focus on the cognitive vectors that become available to affect behavior change. In other words, identifying the how and when can it occur. + +Lastly, for the longer term, close collaboration with intra-disciplinary neuroscientists and neuroscience labs (e.g., labs and researchers that has experience with computational-, social-. cognitive-, human-, molecular- and cellular neuroscience, and in using nanotechnological and other material science methods) will be necessary to both get a sufficient SA of the current dual-use potential of neuroscientific tools and for developing sufficient defensive strategies. For instance, understanding how current virus- or molecular-based tools can be applied to manipulate human cognition (e.g., increase the likelihood of risk-taking behaviors) may provide tools for both detecting and molecularly countering such cognitive attacks. This collaborative approach needs to be combined with academically ‘plugging into’ industry technology developers to help understand how developing technologies can facilitate or interact with molecular or more indirect (yet neuro-ergonomic) methods for attacking cognition. + +#### 13.5 REFERENCES + +Canham, M., Sütterlin, S., Ask, T.F., Knox, B.J., Glenister, L., and Lugo, R. (2022). Ambiguous Self-Induced Disinformation (ASID) Attacks: Weaponizing a Cognitive Deficiency. Journal of Information Warfare, pp. 1-17, in press. + +[Claverie, B., and du Cluzel, F. (2022a). The Cognitive Warfare Concepts. NATO ACT Innovation Hub](https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/COGWAR%20article%20Claverie%20du%20Cluzel%20final_0.pdf). + +[Claverie, B., and du Cluzel, F. (2022b). Cognitive Warfare: The Advent of the Concept of “Cognitics” in the Field of Warfare. In Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France., pp. 2, 1-7, 2022, 978-92-837-2392-9](https://hal.univ-lyon2.fr/IMS-BORDEAUX-FUSION/hal-03635889v1). + +[Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. (2022). Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (France) ‒ 21 June 20201. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, pp. 8, 1-6. Hal-03635930](https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Cognitive%20Warfare%20Symposium%20-%20ENSC%20-%20March%202022%20Publication.pdf). + +[Cole, A., and Le Guyader, H. (2020). NATO Sixth’s Domain of Operations. FICINT document. Norfolk (VA, USA): NATO ACT Innovation Hub](https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/NATO%27s%206th%20domain%20of%20operations.pdf). + +[Dahl, A. B. (1996). Considering a Cognitive Warfare Framework. Command Dysfunction: Minding the Cognitive War, Air University Press: Montgomery, AL](http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep13807.9). + +[Du Cluzel, F. (2020). Cognitive Warfare. NATO ACT Innovation Hub](https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/20210122_COGWAR%20Final.pdf). + +Gardner, R.J., Hermansen, E., Pachitariu, M. et al. Toroidal Topology of Population Activity in Grid Cells. Nature 602, pp. 123-128 (2022). DOI: 10.1038/s41586-021-04268-7. + +[Le Guyader, H. (2022). Cognitive Domain: A Sixth Domain of Operations? In Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. (2022) Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (France) ‒ 21 June 20201. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, pp. 4, 1-17, 2022, 978-92-837-2392-9](https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03635898/document). + +Nirenberg, S., and Pandarinath, C. (2012). Retinal Prosthetic Strategy with the Capacity to Restore Normal Vision. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 109(37), pp. 15012-15017. DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1207035109. + +[Tsui, K. (27 May 2020). Transhumanism: Meet the Cyborgs and Biohackers Redefining Beauty. CNN](https://edition.cnn.com/style/article/david-vintiner-transhumanism/index.html). + +[Whiteaker, J., and Valkonen, S. (2022). Cognitive Warfare: Complexity and Simplicity. In Claverie, B., Prébot, B., Beuchler, N., and du Cluzel, F. (2022) Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance. First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (France) ‒ 21 June 20201. NATO STO, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, pp.4, 1-17, 2022, 978-92-837-2392-9](https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03635948/document). + + +### Chapter 14 ‒ SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP BASED ON THE HOUSE MODEL + +> #### Janet M. Blatny +> #### Norwegian Defense Research Establishment +> #### NORWAY + +> #### Yvonne R. Masakowski +> #### US Naval War College +> #### UNITED STATES + +#### 14.1 INTRODUCTION + +The HFM-ET-356 has proposed a S&T Roadmap on “Mitigating and Responding to Cognitive Warfare”. The intent was to increase understanding of CogWar and identify S&T that would increase NATO’s and each nation’s ability to defend against it. The process of understanding CogWar enables identification of key areas where S&T can support and affect how NATO’s and Allied nations improve deterrence capabilities and to ensure military readiness and collective defence capabilities (NATO Strategic Concept, 2022). Ensuring military readiness and collective defence capabilities in the context of CogWar will increase military resilience and provide more effective approaches to cognitive security. + +There will be second and third order effects that cascade through societies due to the immediate and/or longer-term effects of CogWar. Civil unrest, civil conflicts and political upheavals reflect the influence of CogWar such as evidenced by the COVID-19 pandemic, the US Congressional riots and the Russia invasion of Ukraine. NATO nations must prepare the warfighter to meet the demands of future CogWar effects via education, training, and technology development. + +The “House Model” (Figure 14-1) provides an illustration of the cross-cutting multidisciplinary topics that need to be addressed in this regard. The scientific fields that overlap and/or intersect with critical applied operational military dimensions of CogWar, such as enabling technologies, _modus operandi_, cognitive effects, and processes of sensemaking, and SA, represent a critical aspect of this report. NATO must be prepared to understand and address the potential impact along these convergent S&T areas, as adversaries will most surely view them as vulnerabilities and opportunities for further exploitation. Each of the horizontal bars in the model has the potential to enable the emergence of disruptive military capabilities. This report focuses on the assessment of S&T topics and their potential impact on future NATO military operations. + +The S&T roadmap guides: + +- Technological and socio-technological efforts necessary to give NATO nations the advantage when faced with dangerous and unpredictable security threats, and opportunities presented by CogWar and its associated processes and activities. + +- NATO in the development of its CogWar S&T defence strategy, policies, doctrine, and directives to deter, identify, and defend against CogWar. + +The S&T road map is further aligned with NATO’s S&T priorities, “Advanced Human Performance and Health,” “Cultural, Social & Organizational Behaviors”, “Information Analysis & Decision Support”, (NATO, 2016). + +The “House Model” (Figure 14-1) presents principal topics of S&T pertaining to CogWar. It serves as a strategic framework for developing short- and long-term perspectives on research programs, depending upon S&T knowledge requirements concerning own or adversarial approaches. By illustrating the multidisciplinary scientific topics and the intersection of these key areas, the model serves as a tool for guiding increased S&T investments. + +When the House Model is viewed with the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) decision cycle model, it is possible to gain further insight and understanding of the cooperation between the evolution of science and the operational military community (Figure 14-2 and call-out box, below). + +![image20](https://i.imgur.com/tLLsLw9.png) +_▲ Figure 14-1: The House Model Proposed by HFM-ET-356._ + +![image21](https://i.imgur.com/i7cMwEy.png) +_▲ Figure 14-2: The Link Between the House Model and the Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) Loop._ + +> #### `Enablers and Force Multipliers` + +__`Situational Awareness (SA) / Sensemaking:`__ _`Examination of the factors that enable or block attempts to make sense of an ambiguous situation. Sensemaking informs and is a prerequisite to decision making. It requires trusted data input, evaluation of meaningful information, integration with knowledge and experience to achieve an understanding of evolving non-linear events.`_ + +__`Cognitive Effects:`__ _`Describes the effects an actor may try to create on a target audience IOT achieve desired goal. Could be doctrinal effect verbs, e.g., distort, distract, etc., or more elaborate descriptions, e.g., degrade TA’s trust in democratic institutions or politicians, persuade TA to believe A instead of B, etc. Related to neurobiology the effects could be to, for example, injure or impair cognitive functions, stimulate emulative functions, or trigger social contagion.`_ + +__`Modus operandi:`__ _`Examination of adversary methods and stratagems to generate the desired effect on the target/target audience, including when methods/stratagems are employed to exploit ‘cognitive openings’ and other opportunities for intervention (i.e., how and when). This effort is also concerned about the synchronization of activities by adversaries to psychologically prime and target. A better understanding of when and how adversaries conduct CW provides insights on the development and validation of countermeasures and defensive strategies.`_ + +__`Technology Enablers and Force Multipliers:`__ _`Use technology to enable the actor to utilize one, two or all of the three knowledge pillars simultaneously, in pursuit of the goal. This aspect enables the above aspects. e.g., EDTs ICT CIS / Big Data / AI & ML / Social Media / Directed Energy / Biotech / Nanotech, etc.`_ + +Technological developments in areas such as AI/ML, BMI, system integration, modelling, quantum computing, adaptive algorithms, neuroscience, biotechnology, human enhancement, and human augmentation will have significant impact on the future of conflict and competition. Individually these developments present both performance opportunities and challenges (NATO S&T Trends, 2020) across all operational domains. The intersection of these advances in technology will yield new military capabilities giving operational and strategic advantage, as well as potentially unforeseen disruptive effects. The integration of advanced technology and systems within the social, organizational, and cultural environment will contribute to the complexity of CogWar. + +It is important NATOs gains a better understanding of the vulnerabilities and exploitability of technology, digital eco-systems, human cognition, and other human vulnerabilities that can be targeted by adversaries to manipulate and shape human understanding, behaviors, and decision making. S&T will remain a strategic imperative as technologies continue to advance and evolve, contributing to new methods of CogWar. + +#### 14.2 OVERVIEW OF OVERALL FUTURE S&T AREAS + +Chapters presented in this report reflect an analytical discussion of S&T topics, military operational requirements, and their relevance and importance in the defence against CogWar as illustrated in each pillar and horizontal bar of the House Model (Figure 14-1). The House Model may be read top-down (defensive perspective or bottom-up (offensive perspective). The HFM-356 Team focused solely on the defensive perspective. + +The Three pillars identify the fields of knowledge required to influence a Target Audience (TA). These are __Cognitive Neuroscience__ (how brain functions to integrate an individual’s knowledge, experience, and information to make an informed decision), Cognitive and Behavioral Science (psychological knowledge related to sensemaking, decision making, which may be influenced by aspects of human behavior) and __Social and Cultural Science__ (socio-technical mechanics of individuals/societies, psycho-social effects, interventions). The horizontal bars identify enablers and force multipliers of the knowledge pillars: the SA and Sensemaking factors, the Cognitive Effects, the modus operandi, and the specific Technology Enablers and Force Multipliers. The horizontal aspects show the interdependence between the pillars of knowledge. They also present opportunities to consider the __“how and when”__ S&T knowledge needs. + +The triangle at the top states the Goal of CogWar on an individual and societal level according to the HFM-ET-356. “The goal of CogWar is to exploit facets of cognition to disrupt, undermine, influence or modify human-decision making.” Changing perception or cognitive capability is a means to an end, the end being creating favorable conditions for achieving own strategic goals. + +The fundamental bar represents strategic, ethical and legal guidelines for NATO security and defence. + +#### 14.3 COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, BEHAVIORAL, AND SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PILLARS + +> #### 14.3.1 Pillar One: Cognitive Neuroscience + +Pillar One is concerned with the micro-cognitive methods that affect cognitive abilities such as sensemaking and decision making. These cognitive processes are equally context sensitive and must adapt to situational complexity. Cognition is a complex process as it reflects brain functions that integrate an individual’s knowledge, experience, and the information processed to make an informed decision. There are cognitive constraints that may interfere with these processes such as fatigue, cognitive bias, and emotion. Adversaries may influence each of these cognitive processes at multiple levels such as biological, mechanistic, and socio-technical influences. + +There is extensive research in Brain-Machine interfaces (BMI) to support military operations and the neuroscience and brain research chapter (Grigsby and McKinley, Chapter 6) summarizes the development and evolution of enhanced BMI capabilities. As BMI research advances, there is the potential for intrusion, manipulation, and modification to human cognitive processes, as well as adversaries inducing deliberate emotional and behavioral responses to achieve their objectives. While BMI systems are designed to reduce cognitive workload and enhance attention and vigilance capabilities, such advances do so at increased cognitive risk. The evolution of BMI will yield further opportunities for adversaries to conduct CogWar on a new level. There is a need to develop defence systems that guard and defend against malevolent data input into the human BMI as adversaries may target human attention and emotional responses to alter behaviors in support of their military objectives. _The subjective experiences of those equipped with BMI to facilitate optimized cognitive performance and enhanced Situational Awareness must be investigated from a defensive perspective to ensure that vulnerabilities, biases and potential harm are not being introduced._ The BMI connectivity to command and control is further elaborated in Chapter 14.3.4. Nations must anticipate the evolution of the CogWar battlespace with a focus on ensuring the safety and security of individuals, warfighters, and the civilian population, as well as future military command and control systems and ensure national resilience. + +CogWar also addresses the impact of advanced neuroweapon attacks such as the “Havana Syndrome” attack of US Embassy personnel in Cuba (Dilanian, 2022; Giordano, 2021, 2022; Moore, 2022; Terra, 2021). Symptoms such as memory loss, lack of cognitive processing capabilities, fatigue, dizziness, et al., are among the symptoms experienced by Embassy personnel. Cognitive impairments, whether temporary or long term, reflect the need to invest in the development of tools and technologies that will detect, deter, and defend against the weapons of CogWar. + +> #### 14.3.2 Pillar Two: Cognitive and Behavioral Science + +The Cognitive and Behavioral Science (CBS) pillar represents the psychological knowledge related to sensemaking, and decision making, which may be influenced by aspects of human behavior such as communication, affect, and persuasion. As CogWar targets human vulnerabilities, it is easy to recognize the potential for manipulation in this regard. + +Researchers need to assess the gaps and vulnerabilities along these dimensions and find novel approaches to defending information networks and human cognitive capacities. NATO nations need to understand the elements in the OODA-loop decision chain (Chapter 9) and determine how best to defend decision making and socio-cultural attacks and manipulations at all levels (Figure 14-2). For example, SA and sensemaking are linked within the first “O” of the OODA-Loop and refers to the “Observe” phase. During the Observe phase, it is important to learn what is happening and gain clarity regarding the meaning, motivation, and uncertainty of the situation (Chapter 9). + +> #### 14.3.3 Pillar Three: Social and Cultural Science + +The application of interdisciplinary methods to better understand structural and institutional factors in social, cultural, economic, and political contexts that uphold, shape, constrain and/or empower individual and collective behavior is needed. The social and cultural sciences offer insight into and can help inform the development of both offensive and defensive facets of CogWar, particularly at the meso- and macro- levels of analysis (i.e., characteristics of social interaction between groups and organizations through large-scale societal interactions). + +Pillars Two and Three are concerned with macro-cognitive problems, such as anticipating events and adapting to dynamic contexts, uncertainty, and increased complexity. Where cognition can be individual or shared among individuals (e.g., teams, organizations, society), it is a macro-cognitive issue. Micro-cognitive research may benefit by being contextualized by macro-cognitive theory and method (Klein, et al. 2003). + +Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive list of theories related to the social and cultural aspects related to CogWar. These theories facilitate our understanding of the role of socio-cultural aspects that may be used to influence and shape CogWar. However, the following suggestions are potential areas of investigation to better understand how to counter the impact of CogWar along the Social and Cultural Science pillar (Lauder, Chapter 4). + +- Countering amplification and exploitation of social and political divides. + +- Countering dissemination of rumors, gossip, and disinformation to generate mass anxiety and uncertainty. + +- Countering exploitation of cognitive errors in decision making – the maskirovka/operational masking used to gain indirect control of a target’s decision-making process. + +- Building societal resilience to disinformation. + +The socio-cultural aspects of warfare are relevant for the conduct of CogWar. Russia “justified” the invasion of the Ukraine as an act of defending Russian citizens from a Ukraine Nazi movement that threatened Russia’s citizens. This manipulation of social and cultural aspects serves as a tool to be weaponized by adversaries in CogWar. It remains for nations to understand how adversaries may use these theories and practices as weapons for conducting future CogWar. + +#### 14.4 SENSEMAKING AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: PRECURSORS TO ACHIEVING DECISION SUPERIORITY + +The Sensemaking, SA bar illustrates its role in the OODA-loop decision-making framework (Chapters 8 and 9) and the importance of integrating information that is trustworthy, reliable, and emanates from a valid and certified source. Adversaries are conducting information warfare and psychological operations across all elements and domains of information platforms. Data poisoning of datasets being used to train ML algorithms highlights the need to develop software tools to defend against the introduction of uncertified, poisoned datasets. Thus, it is important to ensure that the tools and technologies used in a priori steps for human sensemaking and SA processes are based upon accurate data. + +John Boyd’s OODA-loop (Chapter 9) (Figure 14-3) germinated from the iterative, adaptive decision-making processes experienced by fighter pilots in military combat operations. The model describes the interaction of the human’s perceptions and cognitive processes related to observing, orienting, and modifying according to dynamic changes in the environment. Pilots in such dynamic air combat settings had to continually modify their actions. Such agile, adaptive behavior is humanistic and facilitates cognitive processes that are essential for survival in a combat environment. So too, human cognitive resilience is essential for decision making across all domains. In addition, such adaptive behavior extends to human-human teams, as well as human-machine teams. Indeed, human-machine teaming is an important element within the OODA-decision cycle loop. Chapter 9 on human-machine teaming highlights the need to understand CogWar from the individual perspective, the team level, as well as understand the adversaries’ perspectives. + +![image22](https://i.imgur.com/YwN3gTI.png) +_▲ Figure 14-3: OODA-Loop of Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action (Boyd’s)._ + +#### 14.5 COGNITIVE EFFECTS AND MODUS OPERANDI + +The second bar, ‘Cognitive Effects’ relates to the second “O” (i.e., Orient) in order to understand the situation and the adversaries’ decision approach to CogWar. _Why is it happening?_ Adversaries design CogWar to their strategic advantage and aim to create chaos, confusion, disruption, distortion and undermine democracies and social order. + +_Modus operandi_ is the deliberate, rigorous, and scientifically informed examination of methods, stratagems, and other patterns of behavior designed and operationalized by adversaries to generate the desired psycho-social effect on an audience, including activities employed to psychologically prime and create cognitive openings and other opportunities for adversarial intervention (i.e., pre-propaganda). _Modus operandi_ is not limited in scope to the examination of specific tactics or tools, such as using a loudspeaker or a fraudulent social media account but is concerned with the holistic application and synchronization of a range of methods and resources across the dimensions of the information environment. + +The _modus operandi_ in the third horizontal bar is linked with the “D” (i.e., Decide) course of action. How to counter CogWar? What methods and strategies might be employed to undermine, mitigate, interfere with CogWar? How to reduce risks associated with defence against CogWar and minimize second and third order effects? + +#### 14.6 TECHNOLOGY ENABLERS AND FORCE MULTIPLIERS + +The Technology Enabler and Force Multipliers, the fourth horizontal bar, links with the entire OODA loop. Technology enables the user (or the adversary) to take advantage of all three pillars in pursuit of their goal. + +ICTs have changed warfare, not least with regards to enabling actors to infiltrate the cognitive dimension of the IE more effectively. Malign actors are systematically employing overt and covert influence and interference methods to shape and manipulate the SA and decision-making process on all levels – from the international political level to the military strategic, operational, tactical and sub-tactical level. Even in remote and less developed areas, most people have Internet access, smartphones and social media accounts. This enables them to document and share observations and information about their surroundings including military equipment, troop movements and tactics. In addition, most troops have social media accounts, even if they may not use their devices on the battlefield. Commercially available drones, facial recognition software, AI, geo-tagging and satellite imagery have added another layer of both risks and opportunities to be analyzed, mitigated and exploited by all parties, civilian and military, in areas of conflict. + +The permeation of ICTs in the AO poses obvious risks to operational security (OPSEC), information security (INFOSEC) and freedom of maneuver for any part in any conflict. For example, in the aftermath of the downing of Malaysian Airlines MH17 over Ukraine in 2014, Bellingcat was able to identify and document Russian personnel, equipment, tactics and locations using operational security intelligence (OSINT) techniques including mapping of videos, images and social media accounts belonging to both civilians and Russian troops. For all parts of an armed conflict today, ICTs offers vast opportunities for intelligence gathering, improved SA, battle damage assessment, shaping of the battlefield and deception. However, as with all technology, the flipside of increased opportunity is increased risk. + +Other examples of technological enablers are AI/ML, adaptive algorithms, autonomous systems, system integration, unmanned systems, digital/cyber networks, modelling, quantum computing, deep fakes, neuroscience, facial recognition, biotechnology and human enhancement/augmentation (Chapter 5). + +Below are examples of how technological enablers can impact CogWar. + +> #### 14.6.1 Adaptive Command and Control, Brain-Machine Interfaces and SA + +The development of adaptive command and control networks and systems will offer distinct advantages for future military operations. The BMI will enable the development of an agile command and control (C²) capability (Chapter 7). These advantages do not come without risk. Whereas the advanced C² environment can facilitate enhance connectedness across all domains, cyber, space, maritime, land and air, and in a full multinational context, technology alone cannot ensure total defence and security. There are societal, cultural, organizational, political, and global challenges to be met, as well as considering that humans are part of all operations (human factors). + +The NATO’ defence and information environment must address the vulnerabilities associated with BMI’s that will become part of the global C² environment (Chapter 6). This entails understanding the complexity of the operational and information environment in which these BMI systems will be employed, and their interactions with the entire system; people/individuals, society, organizations, technology, and their respective policies, legal and ethical constraints (Chapter 12) also to guide military personnel and ensure the safe distribution of such technologies. As military personnel become equipped with embedded BMI, there is a need to develop defence mechanisms to ensure the security of brain interfaces to defend against hacking of these systems at a system, group and/or at an individual level. AI/ML technologies and BMI will continue to be designed to augment human capacities including cognitive, sensory, and physical abilities. However, there is a need to address the safety and security of such advances that may have potential long-term impact on the cognitive processes and health of the individual. + +The call-out box below provides an example of technological advances within brain research and its ethical/legal implications relevant for CogWar measures and that will have an impact on the development of future adaptive C² network (Binnendijk, Marler, and Bartels, 2021). + +> #### `Example of Technological Advances within Brain Research Relevant for CogWar Measures.` + +_`Brain research has yielded advances in the treatment of patients with Parkinson’s disease with brain interfaces to facilitate psychomotor response, that is used for Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) (Arlotti, et al. 2021).The intersection of the multidisciplinary sciences such as cognitive science, neuroscience, and genomics will give rise to new medical treatments to minimize the effects of Alzheimer’s, Multiple Sclerosis, et al., as well as give rise to advances in BMIs that soldiers will be equipped with for specific knowledge, skills, and abilities. This may sound like science fiction; however, the reality of such transformational technology lends itself to dual-use design that is continuously being exploited by China, which has already conducted human experimentation to create biologically enhanced super soldiers (Dilanian, 2020). Rather, each technological advance in neuroscience, brain science, genomics and BMI is examined for its dual-use application in China’s military defence arsenal. NATO nations abides by ethical requirements to ensure human subject safety and seek to identify potential medical treatment benefits associated with technological advances.`_ + +C² must be considered within the complex socio-political- technological system as technologies evolve within the geopolitical and societal environments and are used by people within the framework of their respective organizations. Thus, command and control systems consisting of with AI/ML algorithms and BMI connected to individual soldiers, become part of a matrix of national and international security systems that are vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, hacking, and cyber/cognitive attacks. + +Digital AI/ML networks must be capable of self- defence and detect, deter intrusions from external networks aimed at manipulating, poisoning data, and/or regulating the networks themselves. The C² environment is one that is robustly designed as a collection of C² nodes which provides access to information, aimed at sharing and distributing information within the network. _It is essential to ensure the security of such networks to avoid and mitigate any vulnerabilities such as data poisoning, networks, manipulation of information and attacks within the networks themselves._ + +Building an understanding of the situation requires analysis and data framing, testing hypotheses along a range of perspectives to ensure an accurate understanding of events as they develop, adapting to changes in the environment and maintaining the ability to share awareness among NATO nations. + +> #### 14.6.2 Human-Machine Teaming and Training + +Chapter 9 on human-machine teaming highlights the need to understand CogWar from the individual perspective, as well as understanding the adversaries’ perspectives. Human-machine teaming will enhance military capabilities and speed information dissemination, analysis, and decision making. War gaming, joint military exercises, and simulated virtual war gaming exercises provide a means for the military to gain experience with these advanced technologies, as well as assess their shortcomings, and human relationship (cognition). At the operational level, it is critical to understand the capabilities and shortfalls of these technologies. The range of human actors, adversaries, enemies, and adversarial AI intelligent agents may also need to play a role that should be included in these wargaming exercises. For the military leader, there are potentially ethical and moral consequences related to the deployment of future weaponized, autonomous systems that may yield unintended second and third order consequences. All aspects of war gaming should be exercised as part of military training and education. + +Military personnel must also be educated in the development of critical thinking skills, the influence of cognitive biases and how to overcome these, as well as trained in the development of analytical skills for effective decision making. Their failures will teach them to recognize the impact of their cognitive biases and help them to become more aware of the impact of perceptual and cognitive biases that mislead and misinform them in their decision making. + +There is a need to develop adaptive, applied training tools that will provide users with hands-on experience that can be used on an individual level, as well as shared with teams and/or across organizations to develop skills to counter the impact of CogWar misinformation and disinformation campaigns. Training tools (Chapter 11) that can be shared with organizations provide unique benefits associated with the training of teams and groups of people that can gain insight and expertise on propaganda, disinformation/misinformation, PsyOps, and InfoOps campaigns. + +#### 14.7 ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS + +As future military environment unfolds, replete with advanced technologies, human performance and challenges in the CogWar environment, there is a need to consider ethical and legal challenges associated with the deployment of technology as part of decisions made by humans. For example, those associated with the deployment of weaponized, autonomous systems, and advanced robots making decisions formerly made by humans (Chapter 12). The ground and fundamental bar in the House Model addressing ethical and legal policies and guidelines needs to consider such aspects. + +Policies related to the role and ethical and legal responsibilities of military personnel working in fast tempo operations where human-machine teaming collaboration is aimed at reducing workload and accelerating the decision cycle (Chapter 14.3) should be developed. What happens when things go wrong, and the intelligent AI-enabled machine made the error? How to handle the collateral damage of such errors? These are but a few of the ethical and legal questions raised that must be addressed by policy makers, doctrine authors and war game designers, and allow humans the opportunity to gain experience and insight regarding how best to work in human-machine teams ethically and effectively (Chapter 12). NATO may need to address some of these initiatives as formal doctrine in the future C² environment as netted BMI systems may become an integral part of the future C² environment. + +Several strategic documents outline the need and goal for defending against CogWar and lay at the foundation of the House Model (i.e., the bottom horizontal bar: “NATO Security and Defence, NWCC, and Legal and Ethical Frameworks (ELSEI)”). Among these documents, are the NATO Warfare Capstone Concept (NWCC) and therein, the Warfare Development Initiative Cognitive Superiority. The ethical and legal aspects, as well as the Conduct of War and Law of Armed Conflict (von Clausewitz, 1968, and UN Charter, should be considered when combating CogWar (Chapter 12). + +#### 14.8 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS + +This roadmap report summarizes the intersection of S&T topics illustrated by the House Model that require further investment in the development of human skills and advanced technologies to defend against CogWar. It is also critical to address the need for the E&T of military personnel to learn how best to implement, integrate and ethically deploy autonomous systems, advanced AI/ML digital networks etc. into the operating environment. There is also a need to develop the ethical and legal policies, directives, and guidance necessary for the ethical deployment of advanced technologies in the defence against future CogWar. + +The S&T road map provides a means of examining the House Model linked with the OODA decision loop. The goal of the CogWar is to exploit facets of cognition to disrupt, manipulate, influence or modify human decision making. Defence against CogWar calls for S&T activities involving the following cross-cutting areas: + +__Pillars:__ + +- Cognitive Neuroscience (Including AI/ML, et al.); + +- Cognitive and Behavioral Science; and + +- Social and Cultural Science. + +__Bars:__ + +- Situational awareness and sensemaking; + +- Cognitive effects; + +- Modus operandi; and + +- Technology and force multipliers. + +Recommendations for S&T investment will be discussed further in Chapter 15. + +#### 14.9 REFERENCES + +[Arlotti, M., Colombo, M. Bonfanti, A., Mandat, T., Lanotte, M.M., Pirola, E., Borellini, L., Rampini, P., Eleopra, R., Rinaldo, S. Romito, L., Janssen, M.L.F., Prior, Al, and Marceglia, S. (2021). A New Implantable Closed-Loop Clinical Neural Interface: First Application in Parkinson’s Disease](https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnins.2021.763235/full). + +[Binnendijk, A., Marler, T., Bartels, E.M. (2021). Brain-Computer Interfaces: US Military Applications and Implications, an Initial Assessment. RAND Corporation](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2996.html). + +[Dilanian, K. (2022). Havana Syndrome Symptoms in Small Group Most Likely Caused by Directed Energy Attacks Says US Intel Panel of Experts](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/havana-syndrome-symptoms-small-group-likely-caused-directed-energy-say-rcna14584). + +[Giordano, J. (2021). Nations Must Come Together to Tackle Havana Syndrome](https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/10/15/nation-must-come-together-to-tackle-havana-syndrome). + +[Giordano, J. (2022). Embassy Encephalopathy: Findings, Effectors, and Ethical Address. Video Presentation at UTSW’s Havana Syndrome Webinar. February 11, 2022](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ix_Kscvk-6g). + +Klein, G., Ross, K.G., Moon, B., Klein, D.E., Hoffman, R.and Hollnagel, E. (2003). Macro-Cognition. Intelligent Systems, IEEE. 18. 81-85. 10.1109/MIS.2003.1200735. + +[Moore, T. (2022). For Your Ears Only: What Is Really Behind Havana Syndrome](https://www.smh.com.au/national/for-your-ears-only-what-s-really-behind-havana-syndrome-20220506-p5aj70.html). + +NATO (2016). AC/323-D(2016)0008-COR1 (INV). 2017 NATO Science & Technology Priorities. + +[NATO (2022). NATO Strategic Concept 2022. Adopted at the Madrid Summit, 29‒30 June 2022](https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html). + +[NATO STO (2020). NATO Science &Technology Trend Report, 2020. Science & Technology Trends 2020‒2040. Exploring the S&T Edge. NATO Science & Technology Organization. NATO Science & Technology Organization, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/4/pdf/190422-ST_Tech_Trends_Report_2020-2040.pdf). + +[Terra, J. (2021). Havana Syndrome the Perfect Disease for a Post-Truth World](https://balkaninsight.com/2021/11/30/havana-syndrome-the-perfect-disease-for-a-post-truth-world/). + +Von Clausewitz, C. (1968). On War. London: Penguin Books. + + +### Chapter 15 ‒ CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS + +> #### Janet M. Blatny +> #### Norwegian Defense Research Institute +> #### NORWAY + +> #### Yvonne R. Masakowski +> #### US Naval War College +> #### UNITED STATES + +#### 15.1 INTRODUCTION + +Cognitive Warfare (CogWar) presents an emerging battlespace used to influence and shape global security environments in novel ways. + +Defensive CogWar must be approached from a socio-technical systematic perspective, including technological developments, as well as human and organizational factors. + +The next decade will produce advances in AI/ML technologies that will significantly alter the conduct of war and impact how NATO conducts military operations. CogWar is not new, but what is emerging is an area of operations that needs to be understood and a more nuanced, academic, and operational picture of the full extent of its current capabilities and future potential must be established. This includes how CogWar shapes the geopolitical environment, affects military operations, impacts global economics, commercial enterprises, distribution of resources (e.g., food, energy, and materials) and how information may be misused within global digital networks. It is essential to understand the social, cultural, cognitive, and behavioral context of the environment in which CogWar is executed. + +NATO STO HFM Exploratory Team (ET) 356 “Mitigating and Responding to Cognitive Warfare” aimed to increase the understanding of how to defend against CogWar, and to increase NATO’s defence, security and resilience. The HFM-ET-356 team developed the “House Model” (Chapter 2) as the foundation for an S&T Strategic Roadmap and made links to the operational Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) cycle. The House Model presents seven S&T knowledge fields and enablers that are inter-relational: + +__Pillars:__ + +- Cognitive Neuroscience. + +- Cognitive and Behavioral Science. + +- Social and Cultural Science. + +__Bars:__ + +- Situational Awareness and Sensemaking. + +- Cognitive Effects. + +- _Modus operandi_. + +- Technology and Force Multipliers. + +These seven areas provide the basis for more in depth research activities that need to be explored within NATO STO and its Panels and Groups in order to identify and deliver effective countermeasures to CogWar. The combination and intersection of multi-disciplinary topics in the House Model, gives rise to methods for influencing and destabilizing offensive CogWar processes. Despite several definitions of CogWar, the HFM-ET-356 uses the following: + +_`The goal of CogWar is to exploit facets of cognition to disrupt, undermine, influence and/or modify human decision making in accordance with the adversaries’ strategic and tactical objectives.`_ + +Recommendations for research to defend against CogWar are provided in the following sections. + +#### 15.2 EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND COGNITIVE WARFARE + +CogWar impacts all domains and dimensions of military operations. Technology is one main enablers and force multiplier in both offensive and defensive CogWar (House Model Figure 2-1, Chapter 2). + +The effects of CogWar will impact “Trust” at every level of C² and present challenges in decision making. The adversaries’ _modus operandi_ could use technological advances to their strategic advantage. NATO nations should collaborate to: + +- Conduct research on the impact of cognitive-inspired AI/ML machines that can affect all stages of the OODA decision cycle. + +- Develop certification doctrine and training dataset sources to ensure that valid, reliable datasets are used for development of AI/ML algorithms. + +- Develop and design technologies that will contribute to overall accuracy and trust of information and evaluate the validity and reliability of the information. + +- Develop validation tools to ensure accurate, reliable, and trustworthy datasets/information before they are integrated into nations’ networks and into NATO’s military C² systems. + +Future designs of technological systems and networks will alter the role of the human in the OODA decision cycle. AI/ML adaptive robots will be designed with human-like cognitive processing. As these systems become more cognitively capable, there will be more human and AI machine collaboration as “equal partners.” Decision making will no longer be the singular capability of the human. Therefore, “trust” between humans and human-machines becomes an important element in CogWar and decision making. NATO nations need to: + +- Defend against manipulation of advanced AI machine/technologies that may interfere with sensemaking capabilities. + +- Identify and act to close the vulnerability gaps within the OODA decision-making cycle, where human and AI machine converge to build SA. + +- Research, design and provide cognitive security interventions to ensure defence against second and third order CogWar effects. + +#### 15.3 FUTURE HUMAN SYSTEMS, FACTORS, AND PERFORMANCE AND COGNITIVE WARFARE + +Education plays a pivotal role in the development of leaders who will be capable of ethically deploying advanced technologies in the operational environment. Technologies and tools that will enhance human performance and capabilities must be understood by those using these advanced tools. Future military operations will see an increase in human-machine teaming wherein machines will be collaborators, and decision makers. Emerging and advanced technologies will expand military capabilities, but these advances do not come without risk. The military must educate their personnel to understand the ethical and legal implications of human-machine teaming and deploying such technologies. The evolution of such advanced tools, technologies, and systems will reconfigure the battlespace, as well as the role of the human in the decision-making cycle. NATO nations need to develop: + +- Training and education methods and tools for military personnel at all levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) regarding the capabilities and shortfalls of each advanced technology that will be used in the operational environments. This is to include understanding the importance of ethical decision making relating to the role of modern technologies in the operating environment. + +- Training scenarios, including various (simulated) environments and operations (multi-domain), to evaluate defence processes given adversaries’ potential modus operandi and attempts to affect sensemaking and SA. + +Using false information to gain strategic advantage is not new, however, new technologies afford adversaries a means of initiating misinformation and disinformation campaigns on a global scale. Adversaries seek to manipulate the mass population and leverage extremist’s causes to their strategic advantage. NATO nations need to: + +- Counter the impact of adversarial cognitive intrusions and influence effects. + +- Ensure NATO nations understand human vulnerabilities and the role cognitive security can play in defending against CogWar. + +Decision making is iterative and based upon a process of continually updating data input associated with environmental changes (Chapter 9). NATO nations need to: + +- Develop tools that will design, facilitate, and enhance accurate sensemaking, SA, and decision making. As well as validate data, to support Cognitive Superiority. + +The inability to overcome the emotional impact and influence induced by CogWar campaigns may induce fatigue, emotional distress and negatively impact performance. Thus, NATO nations need to: + +- Develop strategies and tactics to mitigate the emotional impact of CogWar to reduce the threat to judgment, decision making, physical and mental exhaustion. + +Misinformation campaigns are effective in inducing distrust within society and elevates the level of social pressure on individual and communities. Current internet /software systems and tools do not provide a means of validating the source of information. NATO nations need S&T to: + +- Develop tools that facilitate the ability to detect socio-technical manipulations and ensure the dissemination of valid information. + +- Develop defensive, agile, resilient digital networks that can defend against fake news, manipulation of socio-cultural aspects, political elections, intrusions on government, economic, and policies. + +- Develop defensive tools and techniques to detect, deter, and counter intrusions and manipulations. + +Humans make errors in judgment that often are based on misinformation or non-factual reasoning. NATO nations need S&T to: + +- Examine the impact of CogWar on human cognitive processes, emotional processes, cognitive workload, fatigue, vigilance, and safety. + +- Develop training and education material to enhance human cognitive processes and critical thinking skills. + +- Conduct research on human fatigue, emotional stress, and the influence of cognitive bias for human decision making. + +- Develop tools for accelerating the decision cycle, reducing chaos, eliminate the fog of war and reduce information overload, and reduce cognitive dissonance. + +Advances in BMI have revealed gaps in the understanding of how to defend against manipulation and hacking of the human brain. NATO nations need to: + +- Research on the use of neuro-enhancing techniques to boost attention and enhance decision making. + +- Develop the means to identify and deter both passive and active cognitive attacks via neuro-interference and secure BMIs. + +- Address barriers-to-adoption of Counter-CogWar neurotechnology. + +- Counteract the development and effects of “neuro-weapons.” + +Human Factors research includes methods for assessing cognitive workload in humans. Task analysis methods and physiological measures are often used to evaluate impact of interfaces, equipment, and technological advances. Cognitive workload analysis and task analysis methods provide an objective measure of assessment. This is especially effective when these assessments are linked with psychophysiological measurements, such as heart rate, eye movements, and pupil dilation. Eye movements and changes in pupil dilation provide valuable information regarding how users interact with complex visual displays. Pupil changes also serve as an indication of level of cognitive processing. NATO nations need to: + +- Assess human brain and cognitive processes, including cognitive modelling, human performance assessment, cognitive workload analysis, eye movement/tracking research, and the evaluation of cascading consequences for the integration of advanced technologies. + +CogWar represents a significant and new challenge, as it also targets the civilian population, to our moral and legal understanding of war. NATO nations should determine: + +- If CogWar actions trigger Article 5 – the right to national self-defence (e.g., conventional attack as a proportional response to an adversary’s cognitive attack). + +- How to deal with CogWar attacks against civilians as non-combatants. + +- Question the legal principles required to establish levels of response, penalty to counter and mitigate the unethical use of technology for CogWar. + +#### 15.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS + +The S&T recommendations presented in this report are provided to increase the ability of NATO nations to defend against CogWar. This report highlights S&T gaps and provides recommendations for investing in future S&T within NATO nations. This report also echoes the recommendations of NATO’s strategic documents, including NATO’s (2020‒2040) S&T Tech Trend Report. + +It is incumbent upon NATO to ensure the ability to collaborate, cooperate and defend against future CogWar. Failure to do so will have global cascading consequences. + +> #### `REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE` + +1.Recipient’s Reference + +2.Originator’s References + +> `STO-TR-HFM-ET-356 AC/323(HFM-356)TP/1120` + +3.Further Reference + +> `ISBN 978-92-837-2433-9` + +4.Security Classification of Document + +> `PUBLIC RELEASE` + +5.Originator + +> `Science and Technology Organization` + +> `North Atlantic Treaty Organization` + +> `BP 25, F-92201 Neuilly-sur-Seine Cedex, France` + +6.Title + +> `Mitigating and Responding to Cognitive Warfare` + +7.Presented at/Sponsored by + +> `This technical report documents the findings of HFM Exploratory Team 356.` + +8.Author(s)/Editor(s) + +> `Y.R. Masakowski and J.M. Blatny` + +9.Date + +> `March 2023` + +10.Author’s/Editor’s Address + +> `Multiple` + +11.Pages + +> `146` + +12.Distribution Statement + +> `There are no restrictions on the distribution of this document. Information about the availability of this and other STO unclassified publications is given on the back cover.` + +13.Keywords/Descriptors + +> `Artificial intelligence; Autonomous; Cognition; Cognitive warfare; Enhancement; Human performance; Machine learning; Military; Neuroscience; Social and behavioral; Social and cultural; Warfighter` + +14.Abstract + +> `The NATO STO HFM-ET-356 performed an assessment of the Science and Technologies (S&T) required to mitigate and defend against Cognitive Warfare (CogWar). CogWar has emerged replete with security challenges due to its invasive and invisible nature and where the goal is to exploit facets of cognition to disrupt, undermine, influence, or modify human decisions (proposed by HFM-ET-356). CogWar represents the convergence of a wide range of advanced technologies along with human factors, used by NATO’s adversaries in the 21ˢᵗ century battlespace. CogWar is a risk to global defence and security and threatens human decision making.` + +> `The ET-356 proposed a S&T Road map to guide NATO and Allied Partners in future research activities and investments. The proposed Road map is based on a “House Model,” and linked to the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) decision cycle. The Model represents seven main S&T knowledge areas and enablers that are cross-cutting related: Pillars: Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive and Behavioral Science, Social and Cultural Science; and Bars: Situational Awareness and Sensemaking, Cognitive Effects, modus operandi, and Technology and Force Multipliers.` + +> `This work underpins the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept and its Warfare Development Initiative Cognitive Superiority, and the NATO Strategic Concept 2022.` + + +### List of Acronyms + +AI – Artificial Intelligence + +AUV – Autonomous Undersea Vehicle + +BDA – Battle Damage Assessment + +BMI – Brain Machine Interface + +C² – Command-and-Control + +COGSEC – Cognitive Security + +CogWar – Cognitive Warfare + +DRL – Deep Reinforcement Learning + +ELSEI – Legal and ethical frameworks + +FFAO – Framework for Future Alliance Operations + +ICT – Intelligence Communication Technology + +IE – Information Environment + +INFOSEC – Information Security + +IPB – Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace + +ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance + +ML – Machine Learning + +NBIC – Nano, Biotech, Information tech, Cognitive + +NGO – Non-Governmental Agency + +OODA – Observe-Orient-Decide-Act + +OPSEC – Operational Security + +OSINT – Operation Security Intelligence + +PfP – Partners for Peace + +PSYOPS – Psychological Operations + +PTSD – Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome + +QKD – Quantum Key Distribution + +R&D – Research and Development + +S&T – Science and Technology + +SA – Situational Awareness + +TAP – Technical Activity Proposal + + +### Acknowledgements + +The Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Exploratory Team (ST) 356 on __Mitigating and Responding to Cognitive Warfare__ (HFM-ET-356) operated in the context of the NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO) Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Panel. The ET-356 team consists of representatives from Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, and the United States. Representatives from the NATO STO Information Systems Technology Panel (IST) Panel also took part. + +We would especially like to acknowledge the support of the NATO STO HFM Executive and NATO CSO staff. + +The Chair (Norway) and Co-Chair (United States) of HFM-ET-356 are grateful for all the efforts by the HFM-ET-356 Team. Over the course of its 1-year mandate, the Team held numerous virtual meetings, virtual due to the impact of COVID-19. Still, the HFM-ET-356 Team has successfully enabled the establishment of new networks and relationships through its work. + +Members of HFM-ET-356 participated in the NATO __Tide Sprint Spring Cognitive Warfare (CogWar) Workshop__ hosted in Poland, April 4‒8, 2022. The hosts of this conference provided support for the Tide Sprint CogWar workshop and facilitated virtual participation for members and participants. We would like to acknowledge the Directors, Organizers, Staff, and Facilitators of the NATO ACT Tide Sprint Spring Conference for their support of the CogWar workshop and share our team’s appreciation for their generous hospitality and the logistical support they provided. + + +### Disclaimer + +This publication contains the opinions of the respective authors only. They do not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of their institution, NATO, or any agency or any government. + +STO may not be held responsible for any loss or harm arising from the use of information contained in this report and is not responsible for the content of the external sources, including external websites referenced. diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2023-05-19-C6Xian-a1_l-c6-xian-leaders-communique.md b/_collections/_heros/2023-05-19-C6Xian-a1_l-c6-xian-leaders-communique.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..78595877 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_heros/2023-05-19-C6Xian-a1_l-c6-xian-leaders-communique.md @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +--- +layout: post +title: "中国—中亚峰会宣言" +author: "C6西安" +date: 2023-05-19 12:00:00 +0800 +image: https://i.imgur.com/cTG3gjG.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "中国—中亚峰会西安宣言（全文）" +position: left +--- + +2023年5月18日至19日，中华人民共和国主席习近平、哈萨克斯坦共和国总统托卡耶夫、吉尔吉斯共和国总统扎帕罗夫、塔吉克斯坦共和国总统拉赫蒙、土库曼斯坦总统别尔德穆哈梅多夫、乌兹别克斯坦共和国总统米尔济约耶夫在西安共同举行中国—中亚峰会。 + + + +各方在热烈、友好和相互理解的气氛中全面回顾中国同中亚五国友好交往历史，总结各领域互利合作经验，展望未来合作方向，并声明如下： + +一、各方一致认为，中国同中亚五国保持富有成效的全方位合作，符合六国和六国人民的根本利益。面对百年未有之大变局，着眼地区各国人民未来，六国决心携手构建更加紧密的中国—中亚命运共同体。 + +二、各方宣布，以举办此次峰会为契机，中国—中亚元首会晤机制正式成立。峰会每两年举办一次，中国为一方，中亚国家按国名首字母排序为另一方，双方轮流举办。各方愿充分发挥元首外交的战略引领作用，加强对中国同中亚国家关系发展的顶层设计和统筹规划。 + +各方将加快推进中国—中亚机制建设，在重点优先合作领域尽快成立部长级会晤机制，充分发挥本国外交部门作用，研究成立常设秘书处可行性，全方位推动中国—中亚合作和相关机制建设。 + +三、各方重申，在涉及彼此核心利益问题上互予理解和支持。中方坚定支持中亚国家选择的发展道路，支持各国维护国家独立、主权和领土完整以及采取的各项独立自主的内外政策。 + +中方支持中亚国家间加强合作，高度评价中亚国家元首协商会晤机制，认为该机制是维护地区安全、稳定和可持续发展的重要因素，高度评价中亚国家为维护地区及世界和平发展所作重大贡献。 + +中亚国家高度评价中国共产党的宝贵治国理政经验，肯定中国式现代化道路对世界发展的重要意义。中亚国家重申恪守一个中国原则。 + +四、各方一致认为，维护国家安全、政治稳定和宪法制度意义重大，坚决反对破坏合法政权和策动“颜色革命”，反对以任何形式和任何借口干涉他国内政。 + +各方强调，民主是全人类的共同追求和价值。自主选择发展道路和治理模式是一国主权，不容干涉。 + +各方认为，立法机构交往对促进和平、安全与稳定的全球合作具有重要作用。 + +五、各方高度评价共建“一带一路”倡议对引领国际合作的重要意义，将以共建“一带一路”倡议提出十周年为新起点，加强“一带一路”倡议同哈萨克斯坦“光明之路”新经济政策、吉尔吉斯斯坦“2026年前国家发展纲要”、塔吉克斯坦“2030年前国家发展战略”、土库曼斯坦“复兴丝绸之路”战略、“新乌兹别克斯坦”2022－2026年发展战略等中亚五国倡议和发展战略对接，深化各领域务实合作，形成深度互补、高度共赢的合作新格局。 + +六、各方认为中国同中亚国家经贸合作潜力巨大，愿充分发挥中国—中亚经贸部长会议机制作用，全面提升贸易规模。挖掘中国—中亚电子商务合作对话机制潜力，拓展数字贸易、绿色经济等新兴领域合作。 + +各方愿提升经贸合作的质量和水平，持续推动贸易发展，促进贸易结构多元化，简化贸易程序。 + +各方注意到共同制定中国—中亚新经济对话战略的重要性，包括采取相应举措保障贸易畅通，扩大各国产品供应量，建立产业合作共同空间。 + +各方愿推动基础设施和工程建设合作发展，加快数字和绿色基础设施联通，共同推进基础设施和工程建设合作可持续发展。各方愿研究建立绿色投资重点项目数据库的可能性。 + +各方宣布成立中国—中亚实业家委员会，支持贸促机构、商协会及相关组织在贸易投资促进方面密切合作，为促进中国同中亚国家经贸合作发展发挥更大作用。 + +各方愿定期举办中国—中亚产业与投资合作论坛，升级中国同中亚国家投资协定，鼓励扩大产业合作，提升地区产业发展水平，维护地区产业链、供应链的稳定和效率，创造共同价值链，鼓励提高本国外商投资政策的稳定性、公平性、透明度、可持续性，持续打造市场化、更具吸引力的投资和营商环境。 + +七、各方商定逐步有序增开航班，研究中国—中亚合作商务旅行卡等人员往来便利化举措可行性。加快推进现有口岸设施现代化改造，研究增开口岸，实现边境口岸农副产品快速通关“绿色通道”全覆盖，开展国际贸易“单一窗口”互联互通、优化口岸营商环境、促进跨境通关便利化等合作交流，积极发展地区物流网络。 + +各方强调，应巩固中亚作为欧亚大陆交通枢纽的重要地位，加快推进中国—中亚交通走廊建设，发展中国—中亚－南亚、中国—中亚－中东、中国—中亚－欧洲多式联运，包括中－哈－土－伊（朗）过境通道，途经阿克套港、库雷克港、土库曼巴什港等海港的跨里海运输线路，发挥铁尔梅兹市的过境运输潜力。 + +各方愿共同完善交通基础设施，包括新建和升级改造现有的中国至中亚铁路和公路。 + +各方指出完成中吉乌铁路可研工作的重要性，将推进该铁路加快落地建设。各方同时指出，建设中哈塔城－阿亚古兹铁路以及保障中吉乌公路畅通运行，实现中塔乌公路和“中国西部－欧洲西部”公路常态化运营具有重要意义。 + +各方指出，研究制定从中亚国家往返东南亚和亚洲其他国家的最佳过境运输方案具有重要意义。 + +各方将采取有效举措提升包括边境口岸在内的过货量，构建中国同中亚全方位、复合型、立体化、绿色低碳、可持续的交通基础设施体系。 + +八、各方愿深挖中国同中亚国家农业合作潜力，促进农畜产品贸易。中方愿增加进口中亚农产品的种类。 + +各方愿积极发展智慧农业，加强节水、绿色和其他高效技术应用和先进经验交流。 + +各方愿推动在荒漠化土地和盐碱地治理开发、节水灌溉、病虫害防治、畜牧兽医等领域开展技术与人才交流合作，增强农业系统可持续发展韧性。 + +各方欢迎2023年在乌兹别克斯坦举行国际粮食安全会议的倡议，注意到在气候变化背景下于2023年3月9日至10日在阿什哈巴德举行的国际粮食安全合作会议成果。 + +各方重申愿共同努力保障气候变化条件下的粮食安全，指出以保护生物多样性、合理利用水资源和土地资源等更加生态的方式开展农业的重要性。 + +各方指出共同完善在减少贫困、提高就业、增加收入和创造劳动岗位等方面政策的重要性，愿加强上述领域合作，出台有效社会帮扶政策，开展专家和业务交流。 + +九、各方支持建立中国—中亚能源发展伙伴关系，扩大能源全产业链合作，进一步拓展石油、天然气、煤炭等传统能源领域合作，加强水力、太阳能、风能等可再生能源合作，深化和平利用核能合作，实施绿色技术、清洁能源等项目，践行创新、协调、绿色、开放、共享的发展理念。 + +各方指出稳定的能源供应对发展经贸投资合作的重要性，支持加快中国—中亚天然气管道D线建设。 + +各方指出，能源合作是本地区可持续发展的重要组成部分。 + +各方注意到关于制定旨在发展低碳能源的联合国战略，以及在联合国主导下制定优先发展氢能国际合作路线图的倡议。 + +十、各方愿继续巩固教育、科学、文化、旅游、考古、档案、体育、媒体、智库等人文合作，推动地方省州（市）交流，促进更多地方结好，丰富青年交流形式，开展联合考古、文化遗产保护修复、博物馆交流、流失文物追索返还等合作。 + +中方邀请中亚五国参与实施“文化丝路”计划，促进民心相通。 + +各方指出进一步加强旅游合作和共同制定中国—中亚旅游线路的重要性。 + +各方认为应进一步深化卫生医疗合作，推进中医药中心建设，开展草药种植及加工合作，打造“健康丝绸之路”。 + +各方指出在生物安全、危险传染病预防等领域扩大合作的重要性，支持关于在联合国主导下建立国际生物安全多边专门机构的倡议。 + +各方强调加强人文合作、促进民心相通具有重要意义，欢迎中国同中亚国家人民文化艺术年暨中国—中亚青年艺术节启动。 + +各方支持推动高校和大学生交流，支持举办青年文化节、论坛和体育赛事。 + +各相关方将积极推动互设文化中心。中方愿继续向中亚国家提供政府奖学金名额，组织相关领域专业人才赴华参训、进修和交流。各方愿促进“鲁班工坊”职业教育发展。 + +各方鼓励拓展人工智能、智慧城市、大数据、云计算等高新技术领域合作。 + +十一、各方重申《联合国气候变化框架公约》及其《巴黎协定》作为国际社会合作应对气候变化的主渠道地位和基本法律遵循，强调各国应恪守《公约》及其《巴黎协定》目标、原则和制度框架，特别是共同但有区别的责任原则，推动《巴黎协定》全面有效实施，共同构建公平合理、合作共赢的全球气候治理体系。 + +各方支持在气候变化适应和可持续发展领域开展更紧密的合作，强调共同实施绿色措施是减缓气候变化影响的有效途径。 + +各方愿加强应急管理部门协作，深化防灾减灾、安全生产、应急救援以及地震科学技术等领域交流合作。 + +中方欢迎2022年7月21日在吉尔吉斯斯坦乔蓬阿塔举行的中亚国家元首协商会晤上通过的中亚《绿色议程》地区方案，各方支持实施绿色技术领域的地区计划和项目。 + +各方指出，2021年11月联合国教科文组织第41届大会通过的由吉尔吉斯斯坦提交的“加强山地冰川监测研究”决议、第76届联合国大会关于宣布2022年为“国际山地可持续发展年”的决议及第77届联合国大会“山地可持续发展”决议宣布在2023年至2027年实施《山区发展五年纲要》具有重要意义，高度评价2022年9月19日在纽约举行的山地可持续发展高级别会议对加强山地议题国际合作与落实的重要作用。 + +各方指出，塔吉克斯坦提交的关于宣布2025年为国际冰川保护年的联合国大会决议具有重要意义，高度评价2023年3月22日至24日由塔吉克斯坦和荷兰在纽约联合主办的联合国水事会议。 + +各方欢迎关于在阿什哈巴德建立由联合国主导的中亚气候技术地区中心并将其作为适应和减缓气候变化影响技术转让平台的倡议。 + +各方注意到乌兹别克斯坦倡议的关于宣布咸海地区为生态创新和科技区联大特别决议的重要性。 + +各方注意到关于在阿拉木图建立联合国可持续发展目标中亚及阿富汗地区中心的倡议。 + +十二、各方认为，一个稳定、发展和繁荣的中亚符合六国和世界人民的共同利益。 + +各方强烈谴责一切形式的恐怖主义、分裂主义和极端主义，愿合力打击“三股势力”、毒品走私、跨国有组织犯罪、网络犯罪等活动，加强重点项目、大型活动安保经验交流，保障战略性合作项目安全稳定运营，共同应对安全威胁。 + +各方注意到2022年10月18日至19日在塔吉克斯坦杜尚别举行了“打击恐怖主义和防止恐怖分子流窜的国际和地区安全与边境管控合作”高级别会议。 + +各方重申包容性对话对发展国家关系的重要作用，指出土方提出的将2023年定为“国际对话保障和平年”的倡议是推进国际社会维护和平、增进互信的重要手段。 + +各方欢迎“撒马尔罕团结倡议——为了共同安全与繁荣”，该倡议旨在维护和平与稳定、开展广泛的国际合作、促进人类可持续发展。 + +各方愿继续同国际社会一道，帮助阿富汗人民维护和平稳定、重建社会基础设施、融入地区和世界经济体系。 + +各方强调推动阿富汗建立各民族和政党广泛参与的包容性政府的重要性。 + +各方注意到关于在联合国支持下建立国际谈判小组的倡议。 + +各方支持把阿富汗建成一个和平、稳定、繁荣，免受恐怖主义、战争和毒品威胁的国家。 + +各方指出应合力打击毒品走私，研究在联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室参与下制定联合禁毒行动计划的可能性。 + +十三、各方认为，安全和发展是当今国际社会面临的突出问题。中亚国家高度评价并愿积极践行中方提出的全球发展倡议、全球安全倡议和全球文明倡议，认为上述倡议对实现联合国可持续发展目标、维护世界和平与安全、促进人类文明进步具有重要意义。 + +十四、各方支持在《全球数据安全倡议》框架内构建和平、开放、安全、合作、有序的网络空间，共同落实好《“中国—中亚五国”数据安全合作倡议》，共同推进在联合国主导下谈判制定关于打击为犯罪目的使用信息和通信技术全面国际公约，合力应对全球信息安全面临的威胁和挑战。 + +十五、各方将坚定维护联合国在维护国际和平、安全和可持续发展中的核心关键作用，弘扬和平、发展、公平、正义、民主、自由的全人类共同价值，反对将人权等问题政治化。 + +各方重申恪守《联合国宪章》宗旨和原则，强调各国领土完整和主权不容损害。各方坚定捍卫多边主义以及公认的国际法和国际关系准则，维护国际公平正义，推动国际秩序和全球治理体系朝着公正合理的方向发展。 + +各方愿加强在联合国、上海合作组织、亚洲相互协作与信任措施会议等多边机制内的对话与合作，就地区和国际热点问题及时交换意见、协调立场。 + +各方肯定国际原子能机构在和平利用核能方面的重要作用，指出该机构成员国有权充分参与该机构所有决策程序，支持该机构《规约》规定的主权平等进程，支持中亚国家加入该机构相关地区小组。 + +各方对中方高水平举办中国—中亚峰会表示感谢。 + +各方商定第二届中国—中亚峰会将于2025年由哈萨克斯坦主办。 + +> #### 中华人民共和国主席 +> #### 习近平 + +> #### 哈萨克斯坦共和国总统 +> #### 卡瑟姆若马尔特·托卡耶夫 + +> #### 吉尔吉斯共和国总统 +> #### 萨德尔·扎帕罗夫 + +> #### 塔吉克斯坦共和国总统 +> #### 埃莫马利·拉赫蒙 + +> #### 土库曼斯坦总统 +> #### 谢尔达尔·别尔德穆哈梅多夫 + +> #### 乌兹别克斯坦共和国总统 +> #### 沙夫卡特·米尔济约耶夫 + +2023年5月19日于西安 + +![image1](https://i.imgur.com/piIjVaH.jpg) +▲ 5月18日晚，西安市大唐芙蓉园，六国领袖贵宾前往元功门欢迎宴会。 diff --git a/_collections/_heros/2023-05-20-G7Hiroshima-a1_r-g7-hiroshima-leaders-communique.md b/_collections/_heros/2023-05-20-G7Hiroshima-a1_r-g7-hiroshima-leaders-communique.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e1c0342e --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_heros/2023-05-20-G7Hiroshima-a1_r-g7-hiroshima-leaders-communique.md @@ -0,0 +1,285 @@ +--- +layout: post +title: "G7 Communiqué" +author: "G7 Hiroshima" +date: 2023-05-20 12:00:00 +0800 +image: https://i.imgur.com/HTfH8S8.png +#image_caption: "" +description: "G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué" +position: right +--- + +We, the Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7), met in Hiroshima for our annual Summit on May 19-21, 2023, more united than ever in our determination to meet the global challenges of this moment and set the course for a better future. Our work is rooted in respect for the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and international partnership. + + + +__We are taking concrete steps to:__ + +- support Ukraine for as long as it takes in the face of Russia’s illegal war of aggression; + +- strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, towards the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all; + +- coordinate our approach to economic resilience and economic security that is based on diversifying and deepening partnerships and de-risking, not de-coupling; + +- drive the transition to clean energy economies of the future through cooperation within and beyond the G7; + +- launch the Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security with partner countries to address needs today and into the future; and + +- deliver our goal of mobilizing up to $600 billion in financing for quality infrastructure through the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment (PGII) + +as outlined in the reference documents of this Communique. + +__We are determined to work together and with others to:__ + +- support a free and open Indo-Pacific and oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion; + +- foster a strong and resilient global economic recovery, maintain financial stability, and promote jobs and sustainable growth; + +- accelerate achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), recognizing that reducing poverty and tackling the climate and nature crisis go hand in hand; + +- promote the evolution of the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs); + +- strengthen our partnerships with African countries and support greater African representation in multilateral fora; + +- preserve the planet by accelerating the decarbonization of our energy sector and the deployment of renewables, end plastic pollution and protect the oceans; + +- deepen cooperation through Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), the Climate Club and new Country Packages for Forest, Nature and Climate; + +- invest in global health through vaccine manufacturing capacity worldwide, the Pandemic Fund, the future international agreement for pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, and efforts to achieve universal health coverage (UHC); + +- cooperate on international migration and strengthen our common effort to fight the trafficking and smuggling of human beings; and + +- advance international discussions on inclusive artificial intelligence (AI) governance and interoperability to achieve our common vision and goal of trustworthy AI, in line with our shared democratic values. + +2) __We will champion international principles and shared values by:__ + +- upholding and reinforcing the free and open international order based on the rule of law, respecting the UN Charter to the benefit of countries, large and small; + +- strongly opposing any unilateral attempts to change the peacefully established status of territories by force or coercion anywhere in the world and reaffirming that the acquisition of territory by force is prohibited; + +- promoting universal human rights, gender equality and human dignity; + +- reiterating the importance of multilateralism including the role of UN and international cooperation in promoting peace, stability and prosperity; and + +- strengthening the rules-based multilateral trading system and keeping pace with the evolution of digital technologies. + +3) We will work with our international partners to achieve a world that is human-centered, inclusive and resilient, leaving no one behind. In that spirit, we welcomed the participation of the Leaders of Australia, Brazil, Comoros, Cook Islands, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, and Vietnam. + + +### Ukraine + +4) We once again condemn in the strongest possible terms the war of aggression by Russia against Ukraine, which constitutes a serious violation of international law, including the UN Charter. Russia’s brutal war of aggression represents a threat to the whole world in breach of fundamental norms, rules and principles of the international community. We reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine for as long as it takes to bring a comprehensive, just and lasting peace. We issued the G7 Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine, and with the clear intention and concrete actions set forth in it, we commit to intensifying our diplomatic, financial, humanitarian and military support for Ukraine, to increasing the costs to Russia and those supporting its war efforts, and to continuing to counter the negative impacts of the war on the rest of the world, particularly on the most vulnerable people. + + +### Disarmament and Non-proliferation + +5) Together with the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, we express our commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, through taking a realistic, pragmatic, and responsible approach. We reaffirm the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation efforts to create a more stable and safer world. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We remain committed to the universalization, effective implementation, and strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as well as the Chemical Weapons Convention. We welcome the steps taken to strengthen effective and responsible export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognize the central role of multilateral export control regimes in this regard. + + +### Indo-Pacific + +6) We reiterate the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific, which is inclusive, prosperous, secure, based on the rule of law, and that protects shared principles including sovereignty, territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of disputes, and fundamental freedoms and human rights. Given the importance of the region, G7 members and our partners have taken respective IndoPacific initiatives to help strengthen our engagement. We underscore our commitment to strengthen coordination with regional partners, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states. We reaffirm our unwavering support for ASEAN centrality and unity and our commitment to promoting cooperation in line with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. We also reaffirm our partnership with Pacific Island countries and reiterate the importance of supporting their priorities and needs in accordance with the Pacific Islands Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. We welcome and further encourage efforts made by the private sector, universities and think tanks, which contribute to realizing a free and open IndoPacific. + + +### Global Economy, Finance and Sustainable Development + +7) The global economy has shown resilience against multiple shocks including the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and associated inflationary pressures. Nevertheless, we need to remain vigilant and stay agile and flexible in our macroeconomic policy amid heightened uncertainty about the global economic outlook. In striving for strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth, we are committed to a stability- and growth-oriented macroeconomic policy mix that supports medium-term fiscal sustainability and price stability. Inflation remains elevated and central banks remain strongly committed to achieving price stability, in line with their respective mandates. Meanwhile, fiscal policy should continue to provide, as appropriate, temporary and targeted support to vulnerable groups suffering from the increase in cost of living and catalyze investment needed for the green and digital transformations while the overall fiscal stance should ensure medium-term sustainability. We also reaffirm our existing G7 exchange rate commitments. We reemphasize the importance of supply-side reforms, especially those that increase labor supply and enhance productivity. We also stress the crucial role of women and under-represented groups for the long-term success of our economies through promoting inclusion, diversity and innovation. We look forward to a successful review of the G20/Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance to strengthen sustainability and resilience of the private sector. Recognizing that our economic and social structures have undergone dynamic and fundamental transformation, we underscore the multidimensional aspects of welfare and that these aspects should be brought into policymaking in a practical and effective manner. Such efforts will help preserve confidence in democracy and a market-based economy, which are the core values of the G7. + +8) We will continue to closely monitor financial sector developments and stand ready to take appropriate actions to maintain financial stability and the resilience of the global financial system. We reaffirm that our financial system is resilient, supported by the financial regulatory reforms implemented after the 2008 global financial crisis. We strongly support the work of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and standard-setting bodies on enhancing the resilience of non-bank financial intermediation. We will continue policy deliberation on digital money to harness the benefits of innovation such as payment efficiency as well as financial inclusion while addressing potential risks to the stability, resilience and integrity of the monetary and financial system. Effective monitoring, regulation and oversight are critical to addressing financial stability and integrity risks posed by crypto-asset activities and markets and to avoid regulatory arbitrage, while supporting responsible innovation. + +9) We re-emphasize our strong political commitment towards the swift global implementation of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework Two-Pillar Solution to address the tax challenges arising from globalization and the digitalization of the economy and to establish a more stable and fairer international tax system. We recognize significant progress in the negotiation of the Pillar 1 Multilateral Convention (MLC) and reaffirm our commitment to the swift completion of the negotiation so that the MLC can be ready for signature within the agreed timeline. We welcome the progresses in domestic legislation toward the implementation of Pillar 2. We will further provide developing countries with support for strengthening their tax capacity to build sustainable tax revenue sources, highlighting the importance of assistance for the implementation of the Two-Pillar Solution. + +10) We recognize that achieving the sustainable development goals by 2030, reducing poverty, responding to global challenges including the climate crisis, and addressing debt vulnerabilities in low and middle-income countries are urgent, interrelated and mutually reinforcing. We are determined to do our part to mobilize the private and public resources needed to meet these challenges and support a just transition. Recognizing the importance of providing and protecting global public goods, we will support efforts to embed building resilience, sustainability and inclusiveness as integral elements in MDBs’ efforts to reduce poverty and promote shared prosperity. We will strive to enhance the development finance toolkit to mobilize additional financing from international financial institutions, bilateral partners, and the private sector to more effectively reduce poverty by better addressing vulnerabilities including climate change. We will work together and with partners to deliver this ambition and make concrete progress on this agenda at key moments over the coming year starting with the Summit organized in Paris on June 22-23 to revitalize global development financing, and continuing the momentum through the G20 Summit in New Delhi, the SDG Summit in New York, the 2023 World Bank Group (WBG) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Annual Meetings in Marrakech, the G20 Compact with Africa Conference in Berlin, and the 28th meeting of the Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC-COP 28) in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). + +11) We are determined to take on a leading role in reversing the setback of progress towards the SDGs. Recognizing that 2023 is the halfway point to achieve the SDGs, we highlight the importance of the SDG Summit in September and will ambitiously contribute to a successful outcome. We reaffirm our commitment to revitalizing international cooperation and strengthen multilateralism. We will accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA), and will do so in a comprehensive and gender-transformative manner including through locally-led development. We will also promote the concept of human security in the new era aiming to realize a society that leaves no one behind. We stress the critical role of development cooperation and international partnerships in addressing global challenges and the need to engage with international partners in solidarity. We also call for further domestic resource mobilization and efficient use of existing resources as well as mobilizing private financial assets to address financing gaps for sustainable development. We underscore the need for continued efforts to scale up official development assistance (ODA) and expand its catalytic use including through innovative financing mechanisms, recognizing the importance of respective commitments, such as the 0.7% ODA/GNI target that some countries adopted. + +12) We remain concerned that serious challenges to debt sustainability are undermining the progress towards the SDGs and low-and middle-income countries are disproportionately affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and wider global challenges. We reiterate the urgency of addressing debt vulnerabilities in these countries and fully support the G20’s effort to improve the implementation of the Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) in a predictable, timely, orderly and coordinated manner, providing clarity to participants. We welcome the recent approval by the IMF board of a program for Ghana. Beyond the Common Framework, debt vulnerabilities in middle income countries (MICs) should be addressed by multilateral coordination. In this respect, we welcome the launch of the creditors’ meeting for Sri Lanka under the three co-chairs, France, India, and Japan, and look forward to a swift resolution as a successful model for future multilateral efforts to address MICs’ debt issues. We also stress the importance of private creditors providing debt treatments on terms at least as favorable to ensure fair burden sharing in line with the comparability of treatment principle. We welcome the development of Climate Resilient Debt Clauses (CRDC) to enhance the safety net for borrowers facing the impacts of climate change. We welcome work by our finance ministers on this topic and encourage more creditors to offer CRDC for loan agreements. In order to enhance debt data accuracy and transparency, we invite all official bilateral creditors to join the data sharing exercise for debt data reconciliation, including through further advancing the G20’s initiative in the area of debt data accuracy. + +13) We encourage MDBs and Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) to accelerate their efforts to increase their capacity to leverage private finance, including through implementing MDB reforms. In this regard, we strongly support and encourage to expedite the ongoing work on the evolution of the MDBs to review and transform their business models to better address transboundary challenges such as climate change, pandemics, fragility and conflict, which are integral to achieving poverty reduction and shared prosperity. This evolution should come with the most efficient use of their existing capital. To this end, we will contribute to developing an ambitious G20 Roadmap on implementing the recommendations of the G20 MDB Capital Adequacy Framework Review and call on MDBs to make further progress in a comprehensive manner while safeguarding MDBs’ long-term financial sustainability, robust credit ratings and preferred creditor status. Building on key reforms to the WBG’s mission and operational model along with financial reforms that can add up to $50 billion of financing capacity over the coming decade, we look forward to further progress at the WBG toward the 2023 WBG and IMF Annual Meetings and beyond so that ambitious reforms can be made on a continual basis. We encourage other MDBs to join this initiative for a coordinated approach of MDBs as a system. We also call on MDBs to make the best use of policy and knowledge support, and explore strengthened approaches to promote mobilizing domestic resources and private capital as well as private sector engagement. We have further advanced our joint efforts to support countries most in need through the voluntary channeling of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) or equivalent contributions. We welcome that additional pledges by Japan and France, amongst others, together with our previous contributions and commitments, put the global ambition of $100 billion within reach and call for the delivery of existing pledges and for further pledges from all willing and able countries to fulfill the ambition. We support the IMF achieving its agreed 2021 fundraising targets by the 2023 WBG and IMF Annual Meetings and identifying all available options to put the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) which supports Low Income Countries (LICs), on a sustainable footing with a view to meeting the growing needs of LICs in the coming years. We will further explore viable options for enabling the voluntary channeling of SDRs through MDBs, while respecting national legal frameworks and the need to preserve the reserve assets character and status of SDRs. + +14) We stress the importance of narrowing the infrastructure investment gap in low and middle income partner countries, including by delivering financing for quality infrastructure, supporting efforts to advance policy reforms needed to attract investment, operationalizing country-led partnerships, and promoting upstream support including project preparation support. We reaffirm our shared commitment to the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) and to working together and aiming to mobilize up to $600 billion by 2027.We will continue strengthening global partnerships for public and private investments in sustainable, inclusive, resilient and quality infrastructure with partner countries. We will mobilize the private sector for accelerated action to this end. Our offer is fair and transparent and aims at accelerating global sustainable development with the focus on delivering impact at local level. We welcome the Factsheet on PGII that demonstrates how the G7 and partners have made concrete progress in fostering investments that will create lasting positive impacts and promote sustainable development. We reiterate our support to the G20 Compact with Africa as a key framework to enhance the business environment in Africa and call on reform-oriented partners to join and strengthen this initiative. + +15) We shared our determination to promote transparent and fair development finance and work together to address the gap in implementing existing principles such as debt transparency and sustainability, fair appraisal, selection, and lending practices for quality infrastructure investment. In this regard, we call on all actors to adhere to international rules, standards and principles, including the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment, the G20 Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. These rules, standards and principles also include measures to safeguard the integrity of infrastructure investments. + +16) We note the importance of addressing development, humanitarian, peace and security issues together. We are determined to address the unprecedented number of humanitarian crises, focusing on women and girls and those in vulnerable situations. In this regard, we commit to providing over $21 billion in total to address the worsening humanitarian crises this year, including in response to urgent food crises. Bearing in mind that many countries are vulnerable to disasters, including Small Island Developing States, we will accelerate international disaster risk reduction cooperation in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and the output of its midterm review conducted by the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR). We emphasize the importance of a disaster preparedness approach and investment in human capital, goods and infrastructure that contribute not only to “risk transfer” but also to “risk reduction,” resulting in the strengthening of anticipatory actions. We remain committed to holding ourselves accountable, in an open and transparent way, for the promises we have made. In this regard, we endorse the 2023 Hiroshima Progress Report, following up on the G7’s development-related commitments on food security and nutrition as well as refugees and migration. + +17) We emphasize the transformative power of cities worldwide as drivers for every aspect of sustainable development. We will continue our cooperation on sustainable urban development and task our relevant Ministers to consider the development of principles on carbon neutral, resilient and inclusive cities and on the digitalization in cities, and to accelerate the use of data and technologies for cities. This work will support exchanges with our global partners, whose cities face some of the most significant challenges relating to climate change. + + +### Climate Change + +18) Our planet is facing unprecedented challenges from the triple global crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution as well as from the ongoing global energy crisis. We are steadfast in our commitment to the Paris agreement, keeping a limit of 1.5°C global temperature rise within reach through scaled up action in this critical decade, halting and reversing biodiversity loss by 2030, and ensuring energy security, whilst leveraging synergies and recognizing the interdependent nature of these challenges. While Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine impacts energy markets and supply chains globally, our goal to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050 at the latest remains unchanged. We emphasize our strong concern, amplified by the latest finding of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and its Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), at the accelerating and intensifying impacts of climate change, and highlight the increased urgency to reduce global GHG emissions by around 43 percent by 2030 and 60 percent by 2035, relative to the 2019 level, in light of its latest findings. We reiterate our commitment made in Elmau last year to rapidly implement domestic mitigation measures aimed at achieving our Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets and to increase our ambition including, for example, by adopting or strengthening sectoral targets, by developing non-CO2 sub targets, and by adopting stringent implementation measures. Mindful of our leadership role, and noting that emissions have already peaked in all G7 countries, we recognize the critical role of all major economies in limiting increases in global temperature over this critical decade and in subsequent decades. In this context, we underscore that every major economy should have significantly enhanced the ambition of its NDC since the Paris Agreement; already peaked its GHG emissions or indicated that it will do so no later than 2025; and in particular, included economy-wide absolute reduction targets and that cover all GHGs in its NDC. Accordingly, we call on all Parties - especially major economies - whose 2030 NDC targets or longterm low GHG emission development Strategies (LTSs) are not yet aligned with a 1.5°C pathway and net zero by 2050 at the latest, to revisit and strengthen the 2030 NDC targets and publish or update their LTSs as soon as possible and well before UNFCCC-COP28, and to commit to net zero by 2050 at the latest. Furthermore, we call on all Parties to commit at UNFCCC-COP28 to peak global GHG emissions immediately and by no later than 2025. We reaffirm our commitment to the Global Methane Pledge and we will step up efforts to collectively reduce global anthropogenic methane emissions by at least 30 percent below 2020 levels by 2030. We commit to actively contributing to securing the most ambitious outcomes of the first global stocktake (GST) at UNFCCC-COP28, which should result in enhanced, immediate and ambitious actions across mitigation, adaptation, means of implementation and support. We call on all Parties to submit their next round of NDCs and LTSs well ahead of UNFCCC-COP30 that are informed by the outcomes of the GST, reflecting economy-wide absolute reduction targets including all GHGs, sectors and categories. These should reflect significantly enhanced ambition aligned with a 1.5°C pathway and should also include their revisited and strengthened 2030 targets. + +19) Noting the importance of increasing the pace and scale of action on climate change, biodiversity loss and clean energy transitions, we will globally advance and promote a green transformation, working together to realize transformation of our economies to reach net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 at the latest. We will engage with developing and emerging countries to accelerate emission reduction, including by supporting their transitions to climate resilient, circular, and nature positive economies and net-zero GHG emissions through various and practical pathways taking into account national circumstances. To that end, we reaffirm our strong commitment to supporting developing countries’ just energy transitions, which will be supported by coordinated actions, including through the PGII. We welcome progress achieved on JETPs with South Africa, Indonesia and Vietnam, and also continue our discussions with India and Senegal. We take note of initiatives that are intended to support clean energy transition in countries around the world, such as Asia Zero Emission Community (AZEC) initiative, the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA), 2050 Pathways Platform, Net Zero World (NZW), and the Global Carbon Pricing Challenge and underscore the importance of actions taken through such initiatives being aligned with a 1.5°C pathway. We will take further action on supply-side measures and recognize the need for further decarbonization efforts on the demand-side such as promoting changes in infrastructure and material use and end-use technology adoption as well as promoting sustainable consumer choice. We also recognize the vital role of sub-national governments in collaboration with other stakeholders and partners to advance climate and energy actions based on local needs and environmental conditions. We reaffirm the important role of high integrity carbon markets and carbon pricing to foster cost-efficient reductions in emission levels, drive innovation and enable a transformation to net zero, through the optimal use of a range of policy levers to price carbon. We support appropriate policy mixes including carbon pricing, non-pricing mechanisms, and incentives that effectively reduce emissions, and note that these could vary reflecting countryspecific circumstances. We strongly support the OECD Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches (IFCMA). We look forward to advancing the open, cooperative, and inclusive Climate Club, in collaboration with international partners, to advance industrial decarbonization. We encourage private entities to commit to GHG net-zero emissions throughout the value chain via credible net zero pledges and transparent implementation strategies. We also encourage and promote private entities’ work to foster innovation contributing to the emission reduction of other entities through decarbonization solutions. We welcome the progress of the Industrial Decarbonization Agenda (IDA) that decided to start working on implementation of the new Global Data Collection Framework for steel production and product emissions. We reaffirm our commitment to a highly decarbonized road sector by 2030, and recognize the importance of reducing GHG emissions from the global fleet and the range of pathways to approach this goal in line with trajectories required for keeping a limit of 1.5°C within reach. We are committed to the goal of achieving net-zero emissions in the road sector by 2050. In this context, we highlight the various actions that each of us is taking to decarbonize our vehicle fleet, including such domestic policies that are designed to achieve 100 percent or the overwhelming penetration of sales of light duty vehicles (LDVs) as zero emission vehicles (ZEV) by 2035 and beyond; to achieve 100 percent electrified vehicles in new passenger car sales by 2035; to promote associated infrastructure and sustainable carbon-neutral fuels including sustainable bio- and synthetic fuels. We note the opportunities that these policies offer to contribute to a highly decarbonized road sector, including progressing towards a share of over 50 percent of zero emission LDVs sold globally by 2030. Considering the findings of the International Energy Agency (IEA)‘s Energy Technology Perspective 2023, we also note the opportunity to collectively reduce by at least 50 percent CO2 emissions from G7 vehicle stock by 2035 or earlier relative to the level in 2000 as a halfway point to achieving net zero and to track the progress on a yearly basis. We reaffirm our commitment to strengthen global efforts to achieve GHG lifecycle zero emissions from international shipping by 2050 at the latest. We commit to support this target and introducing intermediate targets for 2030 and 2040 for the revised International Maritime Organization (IMO) GHG reduction strategy, in line with efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels through a credible basket of measures. We commit to accelerate global efforts to achieve the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)’s goal of net-zero emissions in international aviation by 2050, including making an effort for promoting and introducing sustainable aviation fuel (SAF), introducing new technologies and improving operations, also building on ICAO’s Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA). + +20) In the face of the increasing threats posed by climate change, supporting climate-vulnerable groups is essential for ensuring human security and achieving resilient and sustainable development. We will continue to scale up and enhance support to strengthen the resilience of climate-vulnerable groups through enhancing climate change adaptation and climate disaster risk reduction, response and recovery and early-warning systems including through the Global Shield against Climate Risks and other initiatives related to early warning systems and the adoption of climate-resilient debt clauses. We reaffirm our commitments to the developed country Parties’ goal of jointly mobilizing $100 billion annually in climate finance by 2020 through to 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. We will work together with other developed country Parties in order to fully meet the goal in 2023. We welcome discussions on an ambitious and fit-for-purpose new collective quantified goal (NCQG) which contributes as a global effort, from a wide variety of sources, public and private, to reaching the goals of the Paris Agreement, including making finance flows consistent with a pathway toward low GHG emissions and climate resilient development. Recognizing the critical role of the G7 and that developed country parties should take the lead in mobilizing climate finance, we underscore the need for all countries and stakeholders, who have the capabilities and are not yet among the current providers of international climate finance, to contribute to global efforts in this regard. + +21) We are committed to accelerating our own efforts to making financial flows consistent with a pathway toward low GHG emissions and climate resilient development, in line with Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement. We stress the importance of mobilizing finance especially including private finance focusing on further implementation and development of clean technologies and activities. We underline our commitment to consistent, comparable and reliable disclosure of information on sustainability including climate. We support the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) finalizing the standards for general reporting on sustainability and for climate-related disclosures and working toward achieving globally interoperable sustainability disclosure frameworks. We also look forward to the ISSB’s future work on disclosure on biodiversity and human capital, in line with its work plan consultation. We remain committed to supporting the implementation and monitoring of the G20 Sustainable Finance Roadmap. We highlight the need for corporates to implement their net-zero transitions in line with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement based on credible corporate climate transition plans. We also highlight that transition finance, in line with keeping a limit of 1.5°C temperature rise within reach, avoiding carbon lock-ins and based on effective emissions reduction, has a significant role in advancing the decarbonization of the economy as a whole. We look forward to an ambitious and successful second replenishment for the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and reaffirm the need for robust G7 pledges. We urge other countries to do the same and underscore the need to broaden the GCF’s contributor base by encouraging all potential contributors. We continue to accelerate efforts to respond to the Glasgow Climate Pact that urges developed countries to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing countries from the 2019 level by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources. We also urge MDBs to commit to ambitious adaptation finance targets, announcing revised and enhanced 2025 projections, and call on non-G7 countries to enhance provision and mobilization including private finance for adaptation. We stress the key role of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in mobilizing finance and call on them to mainstream climate and environment issues in their policies, investments, operations and governance. We also urge MDBs to increase finance for global public goods including climate finance and support ambitious regulatory reforms in developing countries via policy-based finance in order to foster the transition to net zero and enable private sector investment. Furthermore, in order to promote the development of carbon markets while ensuring their environmental integrity, we endorse the “Principles of High Integrity Carbon Markets” to facilitate their implementation in carbon credit markets. We emphasize our extreme concern at the scale of impacts that are already resulting in economic and non-economic loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change and being felt globally, particularly by the most vulnerable. Alarmed by the adverse effects of climate change globally, we will scale up action and support to avert, minimize and address loss and damage, especially for the most vulnerable countries. This will include implementing the UNFCCC-COP27/The 4th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA4) decision to establish new funding arrangements, including a fund, for developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, in the context of article 8 of the Paris Agreement, and providing support identified in the “G7 Inventory on Climate Disaster Risk Reduction, Response and Recovery”. + + +### Environment + +22) We commit to realizing the transformation of the economic and social system towards net-zero, circular, climate-resilient, pollution-free and nature-positive economies and to halting and reversing biodiversity loss by 2030, in an integrated manner, while ensuring sustainable and inclusive economic growth and development and enhancing the resilience of our economies. Highlighting that enhancing resource efficiency and circularity along value chains reduces primary resource use and contributes to achieving our climate and other environmental goals, we encourage stakeholders and in particular businesses to strengthen their action. Thus, we endorse the Circular Economy and Resource Efficiency Principles (CEREP). We will increase domestic and international environmentally-sound, sustainable and efficient recovery and recycling of critical minerals and raw materials and other applicable materials while increasing circularity along the supply chains. We reaffirm that management and governance of water-related ecosystems are essential for all life on earth. We are actively engaging in relevant international fora including following up on the UN Water Conference successfully held this year. + +23) Building on the G7 Ocean Deal, we commit to act towards realizing clean, healthy and productive oceans. We reaffirm our commitment to end illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and will take further actions to address this phenomenon in all its dimensions, including supporting developing countries and strengthening policy coordination among our relevant agencies and task them to take stock of their progress on this issue by the end of this year. In particular, we encourage non-parties to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Agreement on Port State Measures (PSMA) to join for further global acceptance and effective implementation of the PSMA. We welcome the conclusion of the negotiations for an international legally binding instrument under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) and call for its rapid entry into force and implementation. We will continue to actively engage in the development of a regulatory framework on deep seabed mineral exploitation under the International Seabed Authority (ISA) that ensures effective protection for the marine environment from harmful effects which may arise from such activities, as required under the UNCLOS. We are committed to end plastic pollution, with the ambition to reduce additional plastic pollution to zero by 2040. With this in mind, we are determined to continue and step up our actions based on the comprehensive life cycle approach. We support the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) process, look forward to the next round of negotiation in Paris with a view to completing its work with an international legally binding instrument covering the whole life cycle of plastics by the end of 2024 and call for ambitious outcomes. We will make as much progress as possible on these issues and on the broader agenda of ocean protection by the UN Ocean Conference in 2025. + +24) We welcome the adoption of the historic Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030, which is fundamental to human well-being, a healthy planet and economic prosperity, and commit to its swift and full implementation and to achievement of each of its goals and targets. In this regard, G7 members that are parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) commit to revise, update and submit our National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) aligned with the GBF and its goals and targets, or to communicate national targets reflecting as applicable all the goals and targets of the GBF in 2023 or sufficiently in advance of CBD-COP16. We will identify incentives, including subsidies, harmful to biodiversity by 2025, and redirect or eliminate them while scaling up positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity by 2030 at the latest, taking initial steps without delay. We call on all signatories to swiftly implement their commitments under the GBF and stand ready to provide support to developing countries. We reiterate our commitment to substantially increase our national and international funding for nature by 2025. We will ensure that our international development assistance aligns with the GBF. We call on the MDBs to increase support for biodiversity including through leveraging financial resources from all sources and deploying a full suite of instruments. To implement the GBF, we commit to substantially and progressively increasing the level of financial resources from all sources, and to align all relevant fiscal and financial flows with the GBF and call on others to do the same. We commit to supporting the establishment of the GBF Fund within the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and its successful launch at the GEF Assembly in Vancouver in August 2023, noting the importance of financial contributions from all sources to capitalize the new fund. We reaffirm our commitment to enhance synergies between finance for climate and biodiversity, including increased funding for Nature-based Solutions. We also commit to supporting and advancing a transition to nature positive economies, including through sharing knowledge and creating information networks among the G7 such as the G7 Alliance on Nature Positive Economy. We call on businesses to progressively reduce negative and increase positive impacts on biodiversity. We look forward to the publication of the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures’ (TNFD’s) market framework and urge market participants, governments and regulators to support its development. We stress our commitment to achieving the target of effectively conserving and managing at least 30 percent of terrestrial and inland water areas, and at least 30 percent of marine and coastal areas by 2030 (30 by 30), nationally and globally, according to national circumstances and approaches through promoting the designation and management of protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures (OECMs). We commit to conserving and protecting global marine biological diversity and sustainably using its resources based on the best available scientific evidence. In this context, we reconfirm our commitment under the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) to adopt, as a matter of urgency, proposals to designate Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in Eastern Antarctica, the Weddell Sea and the Western Antarctic Peninsula, based on the best available scientific evidence. In this regard, we will support other countries by sharing best practices for protected areas and OECMs to achieve the GBF target of 30 by 30. We will enhance international cooperation on measures against invasive alien species. We reiterate our commitment to halting and reversing forest loss and land degradation by 2030, and are committed to conserving forests and other terrestrial ecosystems and accelerating their restoration, supporting sustainable value and supply chains as well as promoting sustainable forest management and use of wood. We will work together, with high ambition to deliver integrated solutions to support the protection, conservation and restoration of high-carbon, high-biodiversity ecosystems, including by coordinating our offers through Country Packages on Forests, Nature and Climate, especially in countries which host vital reserves of carbon and biodiversity, with an initial focus on forests. We commit to continuing our efforts to reduce risk of deforestation and forest and land degradation linked to the production of relevant commodities and enhance cooperation with various stakeholders on this issue. We will, if appropriate, develop further regulatory frameworks or policies to support this. + + +### Energy + +25) We commit to holistically addressing energy security, the climate crisis, and geopolitical risks. In order to address the current energy crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and achieve our common goal of net-zero emissions by 2050 at the latest, we highlight the real and urgent need and opportunity to accelerate clean energy transitions also as a means of increasing energy security at the same time. While acknowledging various pathways according to each country’s energy situation, industrial and social structures and geographical conditions, we highlight that these should lead to our common goal of net zero by 2050 at the latest in order to keep a limit of 1.5 °C within reach. In this regard, we invite the IEA to make recommendations by the end of this year on options how to diversify the supplies of energy and critical minerals as well as clean energy manufacturing. Through this, together with our partners, we seek to holistically address energy security, climate crisis, and geopolitical risk including the expansion of global use of renewable energy in order to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 at the latest and keep a limit of 1.5 °C temperature rise within reach. Through our experience in coping with past and current energy crises, we highlight the importance of enhanced energy efficiency and savings as the “first fuel,” and of developing demand side energy policies. We also need to significantly accelerate the deployment of renewable energies and the development and deployment of next-generation technologies. The G7 contributes to expanding renewable energy globally and bringing down costs by strengthening capacity including through a collective increase in offshore wind capacity of 150GW by 2030 based on each country’s existing targets and a collective increase of solar PV to more than 1TW by 2030 estimated by the IEA and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) through means such as each country’s existing targets or policy measures. We recognize that low-carbon and renewable hydrogen and its derivatives such as ammonia should be developed and used, if this can be aligned with a 1.5 °C pathway, where they are impactful as effective emission reduction tools to advance decarbonization across sectors and industries, notably in hard-to-abate sectors in industry and transportation, while avoiding N2O as a GHG and NOx as air pollutant. We also note that some countries are exploring the use of low-carbon and renewable hydrogen and its derivatives in the power sector to work towards zero-emission thermal power generation if this can be aligned with a 1.5°C pathway and our collective goal for a fully or predominantly decarbonized power sector by 2035. We will enhance our efforts to develop the rule-based, transparent global market and supply chains for low carbon and renewable hydrogen based on reliable international standards and certification schemes adhering to environmental and social standards. We affirm the importance of developing international standards and certification including for a GHG calculation methodology for hydrogen production and mutual recognition mechanism for carbon intensity-based tradability, transparency, trustworthiness and sustainability. We reaffirm our commitment to achieving a fully or predominantly decarbonized power sector by 2035, and prioritizing concrete and timely steps towards the goal of accelerating the phase-out of domestic unabated coal power generation in a manner consistent with keeping a limit of 1.5°C temperature rise within reach and urge others to join us. We will work towards ending the construction of new unabated coal fired power generation as identified in the IEA’s Coal in Net Zero Transitions report in 2022 as one of the primary actions to be taken in line with the IEA net zero by 2050 scenario. We call on and will work with other countries to end new unabated coal-fired power generation projects globally as soon as possible to accelerate the clean energy transition in a just manner. We highlight that we ended new direct government support for unabated international thermal coal power generation in 2021. We call on other countries, especially major economies to join us in fulfilling their commitments to do the same. We acknowledge that Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage (CCUS)/carbon recycling technologies can be an important part of a broad portfolio of decarbonization solutions to reduce emissions from industrial sources that cannot be avoided otherwise and that the deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) processes with robust social and environmental safeguard, have an essential role to play in counterbalancing residual emissions from sectors that are unlikely to achieve full decarbonization. + +26) We underline our commitment, in the context of a global effort, to accelerate the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels so as to achieve net zero in energy systems by 2050 at the latest in line with the trajectories required to limit global average temperatures to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels, and call on others to join us in taking the same action. We reaffirm our commitment to the elimination of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 or sooner, and reaffirm our previous calls for all countries to do so. In view of the emerging need for net-zero and circular industrial supply chains in the transformation towards a 1.5°C pathway, we recognize the opportunities associated with decarbonized, sustainably and responsibly produced non-combustion feedstocks, and are committed to supporting our workers and communities in this transformation. We also highlight that we ended new direct public support for the international unabated fossil-fuel energy sector in 2022, except in limited circumstances clearly defined by each country consistent with a 1.5 °C warming limit and the goals of the Paris Agreement, recognizing the importance of national security and geostrategic interests. It is necessary to accelerate the phase out of our dependency on Russian energy, including through energy savings and gas demand reduction, in a manner consistent with our Paris commitments, and address the global impact of Russia’s war on energy supplies, gas prices and inflation, and people’s lives, recognizing the primary need to accelerate the clean energy transition. In this context, we stress the important role that increased deliveries of LNG can play, and acknowledge that investment in the sector can be appropriate in response to the current crisis and to address potential gas market shortfalls provoked by the crisis. In the exceptional circumstance of accelerating the phase out of our dependency on Russian energy publicly supported investment in the gas sector can be appropriate as a temporary response, subject to clearly defined national circumstances, if implemented in a manner consistent with our climate objectives without creating lock-in effects, for example by ensuring that projects are integrated into national strategies for the development of low-carbon and renewable hydrogen. We will further utilize neutral and impartial statistical data made available by international organizations such as the IEA and strengthen their data-collection and analysis functions, with a view to stabilizing energy markets. We emphasize the importance of strengthening forums for communication and cooperation between producing and consuming countries with a view to stabilizing energy markets and mobilizing necessary investment consistent with climate goals. Those G7 countries that opt to use nuclear energy recognize its potential to provide affordable low-carbon energy that can reduce dependence on fossil fuels, to address the climate crisis and to ensure global energy security as a source of baseload energy and grid flexibility. They commit to maximizing the use of existing reactors safely, securely, and efficiently, including by advancing their safe long-term operation, in addressing the current energy crisis. They also commit, domestically as well as in partner countries, to supporting the development and construction of nuclear reactors, such as small modular and other advanced reactors with advanced safety systems, building robust and resilient nuclear supply chains including nuclear fuel, and maintaining and strengthening nuclear technology and human resources. They will work with likeminded partners to reduce dependence on Russia. The G7 underlines that the highest standards of nuclear safety and security are important to all countries and their respective publics. We welcome the steady progress of decommissioning work at Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings (TEPCO)’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, and Japan’s transparent efforts with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) based on scientific evidence. We support the IAEA’s independent review to ensure that the discharge of Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) treated water will be conducted consistent with IAEA safety standards and international law and that it will not cause any harm to humans and the environment, which is essential for the decommissioning of the site and the reconstruction of Fukushima. + + +### Clean Energy Economy + +27) Emphasizing that the global climate and energy crisis highlights the urgent need to accelerate the clean energy transition towards achieving net-zero emissions no later than 2050 and to transform our energy systems, we underline the necessity of economic diversification and transformation, including in supply chains. In order to further promote clean energy transitions on a global scale, we are determined to increase our efforts and, in particular, will pursue secure, resilient, affordable, and sustainable clean energy supply chains, including those for critical minerals and clean energy technologies. In implementing energy transitions, we also reaffirm the importance of working collectively to avoid market distortions and ensuring a global level playing field. We will continue to work with international partners to realize a clean energy economy through concrete actions as laid out in the Clean Energy Economy Action Plan. + + +### Economic Resilience and Economic Security + +28) Ensuring economic resilience and economic security globally remains our best protection against the weaponization of economic vulnerabilities. Recalling our commitment from the 2022 G7 Elmau Summit, we will advance economic policies that enhance global economic resilience and economic security to protect against systemic vulnerabilities. To this end, we will engage in dialogue and follow a cooperative approach within the G7 as well as with partners beyond the G7 and globally, including in collaboration with developing countries. In so doing, we will promote international rules and norms in order to facilitate trade and promote economic resilience, based on the rules-based multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its core. Our efforts will include taking action to make our supply chains and those of our partners around the world more resilient, sustainable and reliable, as well as appropriate measures to promote prosperity for all. We will also promote trust and security in critical infrastructure. We will enhance ongoing collaboration to address non-market policies and practices that exacerbate strategic dependencies and systemic vulnerabilities, harm our workers and businesses, and can undermine international rules and norms. Building on our resolve in Elmau to increase vigilanceand enhance our cooperation to address risks that undermine global security and stability, we will enhance collaboration by launching the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to increase our collective assessment, preparedness, deterrence and response to economic coercion, and further promote cooperation with partners beyond the G7. We will deepen our strategic dialogue against malicious practices to protect global supply chains from illegitimate influence, espionage, illicit knowledge leakage, and sabotage in the digital sphere. We affirm our shared responsibility and determination to coordinate on preventing the cutting-edge technologies we develop from being used to further military capabilities that threaten international peace and security. In this context, we hereby adopt the G7 Leaders’ Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security. + +29) We reaffirm the growing importance of critical minerals in various fields, especially for the global clean energy transition, and the need to manage economic and security risks caused by vulnerable supply chains. We support open, fair, transparent, secure, diverse, sustainable, traceable, rulesand market-based trade in critical minerals, oppose market-distorting practices and monopolistic policies on critical minerals, and reaffirm the need to build resilient, robust, responsible, and transparent critical mineral supply chains. We are committed to strengthening our preparedness and resilience against emergencies such as market disruptions, and considering ways to jointly address any such disruptions, including through the support of the IEA’s “Voluntary Critical Mineral Security Program.” We welcome joint progress in efforts to diversify supply chains, including the refining and processing of critical minerals, such as the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP). We will support local value creation in critical minerals supply chains in line with the WTO rules. We will promote domestic and international recycling of critical minerals in collaboration with developing countries. We affirm that strong environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards will ensure benefits to local communities, including people living in the vicinity of areas with mineral reserves and refining and processing plants, protect workers’ rights, and promote transparency, while giving due consideration to upstream and midstream environments. In order to further promote the clean energy transition we reiterate the need to establish sustainable an resilient supply chains for critical mineral resources and products manufactured using such resources. We welcome the “Five-Point Plan for Critical Mineral Security” adopted by G7 Climate, Energy and Environment Ministers and instruct them to implement the plan. + + +### Trade + +30) We stand united in our commitment to free and fair trade as foundational principles and objectives of the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core, which proves more important than ever in the current geopolitical environment. We confirm that honoring these foundational principles is essential to creating resilient global supply chains that are transparent, diversified, secure, sustainable, trustworthy, and reliable, and that are fair for all and responsive to the needs of global citizens. We affirm our attachment to transparency, coordination and to the respect of WTO rules in our respective policies. This global trading system must be inclusive and ensure that the prosperity it can bring is felt by all, including those that have been traditionally underrepresented. To this end, we will continue to work with non-G7 partners, in particular developing country partners, which are integral partners in supply chains and in the global trading system. Based on the outcome of the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) and looking ahead to achieving a successful MC13, we underscore the importance of working towards WTO reform, including by conducting discussions with the view to having a fully and well-functioning dispute settlement system accessible to all Members by 2024 and by reinforcing deliberation to respond to global trade policy challenges. In addition, we call on all WTO members to work together to secure the prompt entry into force of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, to engage constructively on recommendations for additional provisions that would achieve a comprehensive agreement on fisheries subsidies, and the plurilateral initiatives including the joint statement initiatives (JSIs), and to make permanent the Moratorium on Customs Duties on Electronic Transmissions. We are committed to accelerating the WTO JSI ECommerce negotiations and working to conclude an ambitious outcome by the end of 2023. The outcome should be high standard and commercially meaningful. Free and fair trade flows, consistent with our commitment to our multilateral trading system, play an important role in the green and just transition. We will continue our collaboration at the WTO including to facilitate and promote trade in environmental goods and services, and technologies. We reaffirm our shared concerns with non-market policies and practices, including their problematic evolution, that distort global competition, trade and investment. We will further step up our efforts to secure a level playing field through the more effective use of existing tools, as well as development of appropriate new tools and stronger international rules and norms. We will seek to ensure that our responses to unfair trading practices will not create unnecessary barriers to our partners’ industries and are consistent with our WTO commitments. We reaffirm that export controls are a fundamental policy tool to address the challenges posed by the diversion of technology critical to military applications as well as for other activities that threaten global, regional, and national security. We affirm the importance of cooperation on export controls on critical and emerging technologies such as microelectronics and cyber surveillance systems to address the misuse of such technologies by malicious actors and inappropriate transfers of such technologies through research activities. We task our Trade Ministers to deepen these discussions towards the G7 Trade Ministers’ Meeting in October, and to explore, both within and beyond the G7, coordinated or joint actions where appropriate against trade-related challenges, including economic coercion. + + +### Food Security + +31) We remain deeply concerned with the ongoing and worsening global food security and nutrition situation, with the world facing highest risk of famine in a generation. Multiple factors including the COVID-19 pandemic, soaring energy prices, the climate crisis and shocks, biodiversity loss, land degradation, water security and armed conflicts have contributed to the global disruption and disorder in food systems and supply chains and the deterioration in global food security in recent years. In particular, Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine has drastically aggravated the global food security crisis. We are committed to continuing our efforts to address pressing issues to improve global food security including through initiatives already launched by the G7 and relevant international organizations, building on the positive outcomes achieved. Stressing that we have exceeded our joint commitment of $14 billion to the global food security announced at the 2022 G7 Elmau Summit, we will continue to provide assistance in the food and nutrition related sectors to vulnerable countries and regions affected by the current food security crisis, in particular in Africa and the Middle East. Given the scale of the needs across the Horn of Africa, we have collectively met our commitment from Elmau and have effectively delivered assistance to tackle one of the worst droughts in the region’s history. We also call on other international donors to step up their contributions in this regard. We further call on Russia to lift its measures that hinder the exports of Russian grain and fertilizers. Given Ukraine’s essential role as a major exporter of food to the world, we are seriously concerned about the current and future impact of Russia’s deliberate disruption of Ukraine’s agricultural sector on food security in the most vulnerable countries. Building on our commitment made at Elmau, we continue to provide support for the restoration of Ukraine’s agriculture sector, including support to its efforts in identifying and evidencing illegal seizure of Ukrainian grains by Russia, through the creation of a grain database which can be used to verify the origin of grain shipments. We reaffirm the importance of the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes and President Zelenskyy’s Grain from Ukraine Initiative. We reiterate the critical importance of continued and scaled-up implementation of the UN and Türkiye-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) in order to further facilitate grain exports from Ukraine and enable stable supply to those in need. We call on Russia to stop threatening global food supplies and to allow the BSGI to operate at its maximum potential and for as long as necessary. We reiterate the importance of ensuring rules-based, open, fair, transparent, predictable, and non-discriminatory trade and avoiding unjustified restrictive trade measures to keep the food and agricultural markets open and call on our G20 partners to do the same. We welcome the Ministerial Decision on World Food Programme (WFP) Food Purchases Exemption from Export Prohibitions or Restrictions adopted at the MC12 and call for its full implementation. We call for more concrete actions to address export restrictions imposed by agricultural producer countries on global food security, recognizing that such measures have a disproportionate effect on countries at greater risk of famine and acute food insecurity. We emphasize the necessity of market transparency and accurate information backed by neutral and impartial data and analysis to prevent arbitrary measures and reduce market volatility in addressing ongoing and future food crises, and commit to strengthening the G20 Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) as well as various efforts by international organizations in this regard. We underscore the importance of strengthening the capacity of low and lower-middle income countries to collect, analyze and use high quality agricultural, market and food security data and maintain the quality of data. We also recognize the value of dialogue between food exporting countries and importing countries to develop a shared understanding on crisis responses. + +32) We share the view that it is essential to focus on each human and enable stable access to affordable, safe, sufficient and nutritious food for each and every individual. In our pursuit to ensure that all people can progressively realize their right to adequate food, we affirm the need to protect and assist members of the most vulnerable populations, including women and children, in all aspects of food security from short-term food crisis responses through medium to long-term efforts to make food systems sustainable. Nutrition is also fundamental from the viewpoint of a human centered approach, and we highlight the importance of improving access to healthy diets, including through school meal programs. We recognize the urgent need of establishing inclusive, resilient and sustainable agriculture and food systems including through enhancing, diversifying and ensuring sustainability of local, regional and global food supply chains as well as through solving structural bottlenecks. This includes increasing local production capacities by making use of existing domestic agricultural resources and by facilitating trade, sustainable productivity growth with climate adaptation and mitigation and biodiversity conservation, and sustainable food consumption. We promote a wide range of innovations and technology which is suitable for local, environmental and farming conditions and benefits all stakeholders including smallholder farmers. We also underscore the role of the private sector, including small and medium enterprises and startups, in research and development (R&D) as well as responsible investment. We recognize the need to maintain the availability, affordability and accessibility of fertilizers, to diversify the production to reduce the impact of supply chain disruptions, and to promote more efficient and responsible use of fertilizers and soil health, including through the use of appropriate and safe fertilizers, for stable and sustainable agricultural production. We acknowledge the importance of supporting fertilizer value chains including local fertilizer production in line with WTO rules and through supporting the use of local sources of energy in consistency with a 1.5°C warming limit and the goals of the Paris Agreement. We strengthen broader partnerships on those efforts including through the UN Food Systems Stocktaking Moments. We commit to taking concrete steps with partner countries as outlined in the annexed “Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security”, and call for broader cooperation in the international community. + + +### Health + +33) We renew our strong commitment to developing and strengthening the global health architecture (GHA) with the World Health Organization (WHO) at its core for future public health emergencies to break the cycle of panic and neglect, recognizing that the COVID-19 pandemic has made an unprecedented impact on the international community. To this end, we commit to further enhancing political momentum toward more coordinated and sustained leader-level governance for health emergency prevention, preparedness and response (PPR) that ensures legitimacy, representation, equity, and effectiveness, noting the ongoing discussions including on a new instrument on pandemic PPR (WHO CA+), targeted amendments to the International Health Regulations (IHR), and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) High-Level Meeting (HLM) on pandemic PPR in September 2023 and the need to avoid duplication and ensure coherence between these processes, stressing the leading role of WHO. We also applaud the landmark decision at the 75th WHA to work towards increasing the share of assessed contributions to 50 percent of WHO’s 2022-2023 base budget, and which takes into account the importance of monitoring of budgetary proposals as well as progress on reforms, with a view to sustainably finance the organisation to fulfil its leading and coordinating role in global health. We also reaffirm our commitment to strengthening collaboration between Finance and Health Ministries for pandemic PPR including through the ongoing and essential work of the G20 Joint Finance and Health Task Force (JFHTF). We welcome the launch of the Pandemic Fund (PF), look forward to the successful execution of its first call for proposals, and encourage active participation and increasing contributions to the PF from a broader donor base. We also commit to working together, including by sharing work plans and tracking, encouraging efforts and progress in priority countries to achieve the G7’s target of supporting at least 100 Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs) in implementing the core capacities required in the IHR, for another 5 years until 2027 as committed in 2022. We also highlight the need for strengthening financing for pandemic response. To this end, we commit to thoroughly assess how existing financing sources can be used in pandemic response and to explore a surge financing framework that allows us to complement existing mechanisms through better coordination and deploy necessary funds quickly and efficiently in response to outbreaks without accumulating idle cash. In this respect, we welcome the G7 Shared Understanding on Finance-Health Coordination and PPR Financing endorsed by the G7 Finance and Health Ministers at their joint session. Reaffirming that strengthening international norms and regulations is essential to enhance pandemic PPR, guided by equity, we reiterate our commitment to contributing to and sustaining momentum on the negotiations of WHO CA+ with a view to adopting it by May 2024 and on the negotiations of targeted amendments to strengthen the IHR, together with all stakeholders. Furthermore, we reiterate the importance of timely, transparent and systematic sharing of pathogens, data and information in a safe and secure manner, ensuring the respect of relevant data protection rules, for multisectoral and integrated surveillance of emerging and ongoing health threats both in ordinary times and in emergencies, in line with the G7 Pact for Pandemic Readiness. We also recognize the importance of strengthening and maintaining sufficient and high-quality human resources for health worldwide at all times, such as the public health and emergency workforce including consideration of Global Health Emergency Corps. We will support the further enhancement of a global network of experts and trainings, including through initiatives such as the WHO Academy, promote decent work with equal payment for work of equal value and protect health workers during emergencies and conflicts among others. We recognize the integral role civil society plays, including by reaching those in vulnerable situations, and recommit to working together for a healthier future for all. + +34) We commit to reverse the first global decline in life expectancy in more than seven decades emphasizing the importance of achieving UHC by 2030 and accelerating progress toward SDG 3. We recommit to working alongside global partners to assist countries to achieve UHC by supporting primary health care (PHC) and developing and restoring essential health services, to achieve better than pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2025, as part of our effort to strengthen health systems in ordinary times. We commit to supporting countries to strengthen PHC delivery, including through health workforce strengthening We also commit to support bringing survival rates back to better than pre-pandemic levels, including by reducing maternal, newborn and child mortality, and consistent with the full range of SDG targets and indicators related to UHC on which we will also support progress. We recognize the importance of financial risk protection to prevent people from slipping into poverty due to health care costs. To this end, we endorse the “G7 Global Plan for UHC Action Agenda” and note the importance of a global hub function, in support of relevant international organizations, including for financing, knowledge management, and human resources on UHC. We reaffirm the essential role of UHC in addressing various health challenges significantly set back by the pandemic, including in humanitarian contexts, such as tackling communicable diseases including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, hepatitis, malaria, polio, measles, cholera, and neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), antimicrobial resistance (AMR), noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) including mental health conditions, realizing comprehensive sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) for all, and promoting routine immunization, healthy ageing, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). We are committed to spearheading research in this regard, including with a focus on understanding post COVID-19 conditions. We noted the historic outcome of the Global Fund’s 7th replenishment and welcome the financial support from the G7 and further countries towards ending the epidemics of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. We call for continued support to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) to stay on track for polio eradication by 2026. We will build on the success of the Tokyo Nutrition for Growth (N4G) Summit in 2021 for the Paris N4G in 2024 to improve nutrition. We also commit to further promoting comprehensive sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) for all individuals, including maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health, especially in vulnerable circumstances. Recognizing the increasing need for overarching, system-level coordination and alignment of global health partnerships including the Global Health Initiatives and their interface, we will take collective actions to avoid fragmentation and duplication, ensure accountability, maximize impacts, and reinforce country leadership with a view to enhancing governance in global health and to supporting the achievement of UHC. In this regard, we look forward to the outcome of the Future of Global Health Initiatives. We reiterate our determination to further contribute to achieving UHC, including through making the most of and ensuring synergies among the upcoming UNGA HLMs on UHC, tuberculosis, and pandemic PPR. In order to contribute to global health towards the post COVID-19 era, with a view to supporting the achievement of UHC as well as strengthening PPR, we highlight our financial contributions totaling more than $48 billion from the public and private sectors. We also call for further domestic resource mobilization as well as efficient use of existing resources. We emphasize the important role of the private sector towards sustainable financing in global health, including through impact investments and endorse the Triple I (Impact Investments Initiative) for Global Health. + +35) We reaffirm that innovative initiatives including those related to digital health are keys to strengthening GHA and achieving UHC. We will reiterate the urgent need to foster innovation and to strengthen research and development of safe, effective, quality-assured and affordable medical countermeasures (MCMs) as underlined by the 100 Days Mission. We commit to enhancing equitable access to MCM, including by addressing issues relating to manufacturing and delivery. In this regards, we will continue to contribute to ongoing processes, including in the G20, on an end-to-end MCM ecosystem, aligned with the ongoing discussions on the WHO CA+ and which should actively contribute to the diversification of MCM production and address the priority of the most vulnerable partner’s needs and expectations, including in terms of global governance, in cooperation with relevant partners including the WHO, the WB, UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Global Fund, Gavi the Vaccine Alliance, Global Health Innovative Technology (GHIT) Fund, Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), the Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics (FIND) and Unitaid and Medicines Patent Pool, regional organizations and the private sector. To this end, we announce the G7 Hiroshima Vision for Equitable Access to MCMs and launch the MCM Delivery Partnership for equitable access (MCDP) to contribute to more equitable access to and delivery of MCMs based on the principles of equity, inclusivity, efficiency, affordability, quality, accountability, agility and speed. We commit to work across providers of development finance, for the purpose of identifying concrete options this summer for providing for the liquidity for global health organizations to procure and deliver MCMs earlier in a crisis. This supports the mapping exercise for surge financing to be conducted by the WHO and World Bank and presented at the G20 Finance and Health Task Force and the UNGA HLM, contributing to ongoing negotiations on the WHO CA+. We also reiterate our commitment to addressing global health threats including those exacerbated by climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution through integrated measures and by applying a holistic One Health approach. Recognizing the rapid escalation of AMR globally, we continue to commit to exploring and implementing push and pull incentives to accelerate R&D of antimicrobials as well as promoting antimicrobial access and stewardship for their prudent and appropriate use toward the UNGA HLM on AMR in 2024. We remain committed to promoting policies and resources to care for people living with dementia and welcome the development of potentially disease modifying therapies for the various types of dementia, including Alzheimer’s disease. + + +### Labor + +36) We emphasize the importance of investment in human capital to ensure a just transition, in response to structural changes such as digital and green transformations as well as demographic changes including societies that are ageing, in part due to declining birth rates. In order to facilitate these transformations, we commit to supporting individuals through reskilling and upskilling measures, along with a combination of appropriate social protection and active labor market policies. As reskilling and upskilling to support workers to adapt to these changes are investments in human capital and should not be seen as a cost, we must continue to provide adequate investment necessary to address workforce transition needs including vocational training and life-long learning. We commit to efforts towards achieving a virtuous cycle of workers’ well-being and social and economic vitality, which will lead to sustainable growth and real wage growth in line with productivity, contributing in turn to further investment in human capital. We emphasize that freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining play an important role in promoting decent work and wage growth. We are resolved to build an inclusive labor market that ensures decent and good quality jobs for all and leaves no one behind, especially, women and under-represented groups, including persons with disabilities, older persons and youth, while engaging constructively with social partners and other stakeholders. We also work towards quality job creation, universal access to social protection, and further improving gender equality in the labor market. The COVID-19 pandemic has disproportionately affected women and girls, and has highlighted the unequal distribution of care work as a key cause of gender inequalities, while showing the essential role paid and unpaid care work plays in the functioning of our societies and economies. We commit to addressing underlying discriminatory social and gender norms, such as unequal sharing of paid and unpaid care-work and housework, promoting and protecting social security including parental leave, providing support for childcare and other field of care work and care economy, including by facilitating access to infrastructures and longterm care. In particular, we reaffirm the need to support and promote parenthood protection to ensure parents can combine work and family and personal life and actively contribute to all spheres of our society. We also highlight the need to recognize, reduce and redistribute unpaid care, reward care workers fairly, while generating sufficient care jobs to meet the demand for care, and give care workers representation in social dialogue and collective bargaining. We recognize the importance of enhancing work engagement and worker retention through various measures such as promoting health and well-being at work, ensuring occupational safety and health, and supporting the inclusive and equitable career development of workers. We commit to promoting decent work in line with SDG 8, including through technical cooperation, as well as ensuring respect for international labor standards and human rights in global value chains, in particular the fundamental conventions adopted by the International Labor Organisation (ILO). We reiterate our commitment to the effective abolition of all forms of forced and compulsory labor and child labor. We reaffirm our commitment to taking measures to strengthen our cooperation and collective efforts towards eradicating all forms of forced labor from global supply chains. We commit to continuing to promote decent work and protect rights-holders in global supply chains through a smart mix of mandatory and voluntary measures, including through legislation, regulations, incentives and guidance for enterprises and to engage constructively in discussions at the UN and the ILO in close consultation with all relevant stakeholders to explore ideas and options for a consensus-based legally binding instrument at the international level that adds value to the existing legal and policy approaches and is implementable. We endorse the Action Plan for Promoting Career Development and Greater Resilience to Structural Changes developed by Labor and Employment Ministers. + + +### Education + +37) We commit to making progress for ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education, including vocational education, and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all to build resilient, just and prospering societies. Recent crises have led to decreased access to education and increased learning loss amongst children and youth, especially girls, and those in the most marginalized and vulnerable situations. As education is a catalyst to achieving all of the SDGs, we reaffirm the importance of upholding education and building more resilient education systems, especially following the COVID-19 pandemic. We reiterate our firm determination to uphold the G7’s previous commitments to protecting educational opportunities for all learners, and to promoting gender equality as well as the empowerment of all women and girls in all their diversity, in and through education including by prioritizing global ODA in this regard. We welcome the UNSG’s Transforming Education Summit (TES) in September 2022, and call for continued support to the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), Education Cannot Wait (ECW) and UN agencies including the UNESCO and UNICEF as key partners in helping countries to build stronger education systems for the most marginalized children. We also reiterate the importance of foundational learning and the need for the G7 to increase investment in people in a more equitable and efficient way to provide quality learning opportunities that prepare all learners, especially children with the knowledge and skills they need to thrive and improve their own well-being, noting that education is a human right. We continue to break down gender-related barriers and underlying discriminatory social norms from pre-primary through higher education for more resilient, inclusive and gender-transformative education. We continue to encourage international exchanges between youth and international talent mobility and circulation among academics, students, and researchers, as well as cooperation between higher education and research institutions. We acknowledge the importance of investment in support of human resources that can contribute to resolving social issues while simultaneously achieving economic growth through education. We will strive for an educational environment and lifelong learning opportunities where every child can fulfil their own potential, including through the improvement of instruction. This could include promoting small class size, an improved Information and Communication Technology (ICT) environment and the effective use of digital technology to support teaching and learning, while not exacerbating the digital equality gaps. + + +### Digital + +38) We recognize that, while rapid technological change has been strengthening societies and economies, the international governance of new digital technologies has not necessarily kept pace. As the pace of technological evolution accelerates, we affirm the importance to address common governance challenges and to identify potential gaps and fragmentation in global technology governance. In areas such as AI, immersive technologies such as the metaverses and quantum information science and technology and other emerging technologies, the governance of the digital economy should continue to be updated in line with our shared democratic values. These include fairness, accountability, transparency, safety, protection from online harassment, hate and abuse and respect for privacy and human rights, fundamental freedoms and the protection of personal data. We will work with technology companies and other relevant stakeholders to drive the responsible innovation and implementation of technologies, ensuring that safety and security is prioritized, and that platforms are tackling the threats of child sexual exploitation and abuse on their platforms, and upholding the children’s rights to safety and privacy online. We continue to discuss ways to advance technology for democracy and to cooperate on new and emerging technologies and their social implementation, and look forward to an inclusive, multi-stakeholder dialogue on digital issues, including on Internet Governance, through relevant fora, including the OECD Global Forum on Technology. We commit to further advancing multi-stakeholder approaches to the development of standards for AI, respectful of legally binding frameworks, and recognize the importance of procedures that advance transparency, openness, fair processes, impartiality, privacy and inclusiveness to promote responsible AI. We stress the importance of international discussions on AI governance and interoperability between AI governance frameworks, while we recognize that approaches and policy instruments to achieve the common vision and goal of trustworthy AI may vary across G7 members. We support the development of tools for trustworthy AI through multi-stakeholder international organizations, and encourage the development and adoption of international technical standards in standards development organizations through multi-stakeholder processes. We recognize the need to immediately take stock of the opportunities and challenges of generative AI, which is increasingly prominent across countries and sectors, and encourage international organizations such as the OECD to consider analysis on the impact of policy developments and Global Partnership on AI (GPAI) to conduct practical projects. In this respect, we task relevant ministers to establish the Hiroshima AI process, through a G7 working group, in an inclusive manner and in cooperation with the OECD and GPAI, for discussions on generative AI by the end of this year. These discussions could include topics such as governance, safeguard of intellectual property rights including copy rights, promotion of transparency, response to foreign information manipulation, including disinformation, and responsible utilization of these technologies. We welcome the Action Plan for promoting global interoperability between tools for trustworthy AI from the Digital and Tech Ministers’ Meeting. We recognize the potential of immersive technologies, and virtual worlds, such as metaverses to provide innovative opportunities, in all industrial and societal sectors, as well as to promote sustainability. For this purpose, governance, public safety, and human rights challenges should be addressed at the global level. We task our relevant Ministers to consider collective approaches in this area, including in terms of interoperability, portability and standards, with the support of the OECD. We express our interest in possible joint cooperation in research and development on computing technologies. We also task our relevant Ministers to consider ways to further promote digital trade. + +39) We reaffirm that cross-border data flows, information, ideas and knowledge generate higher productivity, greater innovation, and improved sustainable development, while raising challenges related to privacy, data protection, intellectual property protection, and security including that of data and cloud infrastructure. We reiterate the importance of facilitating Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT) to enable trustworthy cross-border data flows and invigorate the digital economy as a whole, while preserving governments’ ability to address legitimate public interest. We stress our intention to operationalize this concept and our support for cooperation within the G7 and beyond to work towards identifying commonalities, complementarities and elements of convergence between existing regulatory approaches and instruments enabling data to flow with trust, in order to foster future interoperability such as through supporting multi-stakeholder engagement, leveraging the role of technologies, and clarifying domestic and municipal policies and due processes. In this regard, we endorse the Annex on G7 Vision for Operationalising DFFT and its Priorities from the Digital and Tech Ministers’ Meeting, and the establishment of the Institutional Arrangement for Partnership. We task our relevant Ministers to continue working to deliver substantive outcomes and subsequently report back to us. We welcome the OECD Declaration on Government Access to Personal Data Held by Private Sector Entities as an instrument to increase trust in cross-border data flows among countries committed to democratic values and the rule of law. We emphasize our opposition to internet fragmentation and the use of digital technologies to infringe on human rights. In this context, we should counter unjustified obstacles to the free flow of data, lacking transparency, and arbitrarily operated, which should be distinguished from our measures implemented to achieve the legitimate public policy interests of each country. We seek to increase trust across our digital ecosystem and to counter the influence of authoritarian approaches. We recognize the importance of secure and resilient digital infrastructure as the foundation of society and the economy. We are committed to deepen our cooperation within the G7 and with like-minded partners to support and enhance network resilience by measures such as extending secure routes of submarine cables. We welcome supplier diversification efforts in ICTS supply chains and continue to discuss market trends towards open, interoperable approaches, alongside secure, resilient and established architecture in a technology neutral way. Under the Japanese G7 Presidency and against the background of early deployments of Open Radio Access Network (RAN), we have exchanged views on open architectures and security-related aspects and opportunities. We recognize the need to bridge the digital divides, including the gender digital divide, and the importance of initiatives to use data and technology for cities, such as smart city initiatives, to promote digital inclusion and address challenges in urban development. We will facilitate inclusive development and enable greater employability and movement of digital experts, and restate our commitment to supporting other countries to increase digital access under principles of equity, universality and affordability while ensuring that security, interoperability, the protection of personal data and respect for human rights including gender equality are built into global connectivity. + + +### Science and Technology + +40) We support the development of advanced technologies, research infrastructures and highlyskilled human resource networks that will drive innovation to solve global challenges and enable the next stage of economic growth. To this end, we promote international talent mobility and circulation. The G7 will promote open science by equitably disseminating scientific knowledge, publicly funded research outputs including research data and scholarly publications following the Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, and Reusable (FAIR) principles. This will enable researchers and people to benefit from and contribute to creating knowledge, innovation and solutions to global challenges. We further commit to working together to promote responsible global science and technology cooperation and use of emerging technologies such as advanced computing and biotechnology with partners sharing common values and principles in research and innovation. This includes a better understanding of the seas and the ocean in the context of climate change and utilizing very large research infrastructures. We are committed to fostering and promoting a common understanding of values and principles in research and innovation through dedicated multilateral dialogues, including in the area of research security and research integrity, and international joint research based on the philosophy of open science. We welcome the forthcoming launch of the G7 Virtual Academy and release of the Best Practices Paper on Research Security and Integrity. These efforts will contribute to addressing the various challenges that arise at the intersection of security, economy, and scientific research. + +41) We reiterate our commitment to promoting the safe and sustainable use of outer space, given our ever-greater reliance on space systems. Restating the importance of addressing the issues of space debris, we strongly support the implementation of international guidelines adopted at the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as urgent and necessary. We welcome national efforts to develop further solutions for space debris mitigation and remediation as well as further research and development of orbital debris mitigation and remediation technologies. Furthermore, we commit not to conducting destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing and encourage others to follow suit in order to ensure the security, stability and sustainability of outer space. + + +### Gender + +42) Achieving gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls is fundamental for a resilient, fair, and prosperous society. We endeavor to work with all segments of society to ensure full, equal and meaningful participation of women and girls in all their diversity as well as LGBTQIA+ persons in politics, economics, education and all other spheres of society, and to consistently mainstream gender equality in all policy areas. In this respect, we commit to redoubling our efforts to overcome longstanding structural barriers and to addressing harmful gender norms, stereotypes, roles, and practices through such means as education and achieve a society where diversity, human rights and dignity are respected, promoted and protected and all people can enjoy vibrant lives free from violence and discrimination independent of gender identity or expression or sexual orientation. We welcome the work of the Gender Equality Advisory Council (GEAC) and look forward to strengthening it further. We look forward to the first revision of the G7 Dashboard on Gender Gaps and the publication of the first implementation report this year, which aims to monitor past G7 commitments to make progress on gender equality. + +43) We express our strong concern about the rollback of women’s and girls’ rights in particular in time of crisis and we strongly condemn all violations and abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms for women and girls and LGBTQIA+ people around the world. We further recognize the essential and transformative role of comprehensive SRHR in gender equality and women’s and girls’ empowerment, and in supporting diversity, including of sexual orientations and gender identities. We reaffirm our full commitment to achieving comprehensive SRHR for all, including by addressing access to safe and legal abortion and post abortion care. We are committed to championing, advancing and defending gender equality and the rights of women and girls in all their diversity, at home and abroad, and will work together to thwart attempts to undermine and reverse hard-won progress in this area. In this regard, we commit to advancing, implementing and strengthening the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda including its application to disaster risk reduction (DRR), through partnership with the WPS-Focal Points Network and support for National Action Plan development, and to promote intersectional approaches. We highlight the leading role of women in preventing violent conflict, delivering relief and recovery efforts, and forging lasting peace, and pledge to champion the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in peace and political processes. We commit to strengthening our efforts to eliminate conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, and the importance of providing comprehensive support and meaningful participation for victims and survivors, using a survivorcentered approach. We further commit to eliminating all forms of sexual and gender-based harassment and abuse both offline and online as well as aid-related sexual exploitation and abuse. We are committed to ensuring the right to education for all, and emphasize the importance of promoting equitable access to safe, gender-transformative quality education as well as to taking measures to close the gender gap in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) sectors and education, and close the gender digital gap. We see this as key to promote women’s entrepreneurship, which is an essential building block to address the climate, nature and development challenges. We also commit to promoting reskilling and upskilling, fostering decent work conditions, strengthening financial inclusion of women in all their diversity, and eliminating the gender pay gap. We further reiterate our commitments to promoting women’s full empowerment as well as their full and equal participation in decision-making processes at all levels, including in leadership positions. We recognize that quality care plays an essential role in the functioning of our societies and economies, but is a key cause of gender inequalities due to its gender unequal distribution. + +44) To advance our commitments, we emphasize the need to overcome the fragmentation and marginalization of gender equality issues by enhancing our efforts to integrate and deepening gender mainstreaming for a substantial transformation of our societies. In this regard, we call for a continuous, holistic and comprehensive approach to promote gender equality by creating a “nexus” that bridges the political and security, economic and social spheres and advocate for maximizing the efficiency and the impact of multi-sectorial policies and of our actions across diverse dimensions of policy implementation. We stress the importance of such a nexus approach in our foreign and sustainable development policy and in our ODA and endeavor to support the nexus. We reaffirm our commitment to make every effort to collectively increase the share of our bilateral allocable ODA advancing gender equality and women’s and girls’ empowerment over the coming years. In this regard, we welcome “the Fact Sheet: Promoting Gender Mainstreaming through the nexus approach” made by our experts and look forward to further progress in this area. + + +### Human Rights, Refugees, Migration, Democracy + +45) We reaffirm our commitment to upholding human rights and dignity of all, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, so that everyone can participate fully and equally in society. We commit to firmly speaking out against human rights violations and abuses, and at the same time, listening to and assisting the countries and civil society organizations that seek to defend and promote human rights through dialogue and cooperation. Recognizing the need to deepen discussions within and beyond the G7 on business and human rights, we intend to strengthen cooperation and collective efforts, including by accelerating exchange of information, towards ensuring respect for human rights and international labor standards in business activities and global supply chains, and further enhancing resilience, predictability and certainty for businesses, and call upon others to join us in these efforts. We reaffirm our commitment to protecting refugees, supporting forcibly displaced persons and supporting host countries and communities, ensuring the full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of refugees and displaced persons, and defending and promoting the rights of marginalized people or persons facing vulnerable conditions exacerbated by conflict, crisis, and displacement, including freedom from sexual and gender-based violence. We call upon the international community to follow suit. We commit to fighting against impunity and holding perpetrators to account for the most serious crimes of international concern, including conflict-related sexual violence, together with improving documentation. In this regard, we recall the need to strengthen international architecture to prevent conflict-related sexual violence in the future. We acknowledge the importance of the discussions of the International Law Commission’s draft articles on the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity. We continue to work with the international community towards the second Global Refugee Forum in December 2023. We reaffirm our commitment to support the inclusion of refugees, in the spirit of international cooperation and in line with the Global Compact on Refugees, national policies, legislation, and circumstances, ensuring full respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms. + +46) We reaffirm our commitment to ensuring the safe, orderly, and regular migration around the world. We recognize the important economic and social benefits that migrants can bring to our countries. We commit to ensure full respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms regardless of their migration status. We remain committed to preventing irregular and often highly dangerous migration whether by land or sea. We commit to joint efforts to tackle the organized criminal networks which facilitate illegal migration and the dangerous journey of migrants and asylum seekers, profiting off some of the most vulnerable. We call for firmness in dealing with this ruthless criminality that puts lives in danger and poses risks to the internal security of G7 partners. In this regard, we will intensify efforts to break the business model of organized criminal networks, including through cooperation to disrupt the supply chains that enable the criminal and exploitative operations of those engaged in the trafficking and smuggling of human beings. To this end, we will task relevant Ministers to deepen partnerships to enhance our understanding of the root causes and work together with partners around the world to address this complex challenge. + +47) We reaffirm our shared belief that democracy is the most enduring means to advance peace, prosperity, equality and sustainable development. We reaffirm our commitment to protecting the information environment by supporting media freedom and online freedom, including protection from online harassment and abuse, internet shutdowns and disruptions, as well as addressing foreign information manipulation and interference, including disinformation, which is designed to undermine trust in democratic institutions, and sow discord in the international community. We strongly condemn the widespread use of information manipulation and interference by Russia in order to gain support for its war of aggression against Ukraine and to obscure the facts of its aggression. Through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), we will work to strengthen our collective efforts to counter threats to democracy, including such manipulation, with full respect for international human rights law, in particular freedom of expression. We will work towards ensuring that fact-based, quality and trustworthy information is promoted, and call on digital platforms to support this approach. We will increase cooperation on these issues with government and non-governmental partners from all regions who share the determination to promote access to such information, including through supporting relevant international initiatives, such as the Partnership for Information and Democracy, and efforts by the UN and OECD. + + +### Countering Terrorism, Violent Extremism and Transnational Organized Crime / Upholding the Rule of Law / Anti-Corruption + +48) We reiterate our strong commitment to working together with all relevant actors to counter all forms of terrorism and violent extremism, both online and offline, as well as transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking, human trafficking, child sexual abuse and exploitation, corruption, fraud, intellectual property theft, ransomware threats, cybercrime and environmental crimes, as well as money laundering and terrorist financing in a unified, coordinated, inclusive, transparent and human-rights-based, gender-responsive manner. In countering the exploitation of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes and countering the misuses of technologies for criminal purposes, we will continue our utmost efforts to enhance global cooperation and digital response capacity. In this regard, building on our collaboration and on efforts through existing frameworks such as the Christchurch Call, and recalling previous commitments, including maintaining tightly controlled lawful access, we call on the private sector to step up their efforts to address the problem of dissemination of terrorist and violent extremist content online and to prioritize safety by design, and stop, in particular, child sexual exploitation and abuse on their platforms. We support the efforts of our partner countries to sign and ratify the relevant international agreements such as the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), and those of the Council of Europe such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, in the wide spectrum of cooperation by criminal justice and other relevant authorities that form the basis for efficient cross-border cooperation. We also recognize the significant public health and security threat of illicit synthetic drugs and will strengthen our cooperation to address it, engaging with other willing countries and the private sector. + +49) We will also strengthen bilateral, regional and multilateral coordination and cooperation in the field of law and justice, such as providing technical assistance to countries to develop and implement laws, and capacity building related to the justice sector. We will continue to step up our fight against corruption, promoting good governance and strengthening accountable, transparent, equitable and community-oriented law enforcement to make progress on many of our shared priorities, which will lead to safer and more secure societies and thus contribute to the promotion of the rule of law and respect for human rights. We further recognize that corruption and related illicit finance and proceeds of crime drain public resources, can often fuel organized crime, enable kleptocratic systems to accumulate wealth and power at the expense of citizens, and undermine democratic governance. We will pursue a stronger and more unified approach in rigorously enforcing international anti-corruption obligations and standards, and enhancing law enforcement cooperation, including through relevant regional and international organizations, and holding corrupt actors accountable. Recalling the importance of beneficial ownership transparency for the integrity and transparency of democratic systems, we reaffirm the importance of supporting African partners in establishing and strengthening registers of beneficial ownership. + + +### Regional Affairs + +50) We stand together on core foreign policy and security challenges to build a more secure and prosperous future. We also reaffirm our determination to work with a wide range of partners to address pressing global challenges and to ensure that the international system is able to respond effectively to these issues. + +51) We stand together as G7 partners on the following elements, which underpin our respective relations with China: + +- We stand prepared to build constructive and stable relations with China, recognizing the importance of engaging candidly with and expressing our concerns directly to China. We act in our national interest. It is necessary to cooperate with China, given its role in the international community and the size of its economy, on global challenges as well as areas of common interest. + +- We call on China to engage with us, including in international fora, on areas such as the climate and biodiversity crisis and the conservation of natural resources in the framework of the Paris and Kunming-Montreal Agreements, addressing vulnerable countries’ debt sustainability and financing needs, global health and macroeconomic stability. + +- Our policy approaches are not designed to harm China nor do we seek to thwart China’s economic progress and development. A growing China that plays by international rules would be of global interest. We are not decoupling or turning inwards. At the same time, we recognize that economic resilience requires de-risking and diversifying. We will take steps, individually and collectively, to invest in our own economic vibrancy. We will reduce excessive dependencies in our critical supply chains. + +- With a view to enabling sustainable economic relations with China, and strengthening the international trading system, we will push for a level playing field for our workers and companies. We will seek to address the challenges posed by China’s non-market policies and practices, which distort the global economy. We will counter malign practices, such as illegitimate technology transfer or data disclosure. We will foster resilience to economic coercion. We also recognize the necessity of protecting certain advanced technologies that could be used to threaten our national security without unduly limiting trade and investment. + +- We remain seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas. We strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. + +- We reaffirm the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to security and prosperity in the international community. There is no change in the basic positions of the G7 members on Taiwan, including stated one China policies. We call for a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. + +- We will keep voicing our concerns about the human rights situation in China, including in Tibet and Xinjiang where forced labor is of major concern to us. We call on China to honor its commitments under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, which enshrine rights, freedoms and a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong. + +- We call on China to act in accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular relations, and not to conduct interference activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities, the integrity of our democratic institutions and our economic prosperity. + +- We call on China to press Russia to stop its military aggression, and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw its troops from Ukraine. We encourage China to support a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on territorial integrity and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter, including through its direct dialogue with Ukraine. + +52) There is no legal basis for China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and we oppose China’s militarization activities in the region. We emphasize the universal and unified character of the UNCLOS and reaffirm UNCLOS’s important role in setting out the legal framework that governs all activities in the oceans and the seas. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on July 12, 2016, is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings, and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties. + +53) We strongly condemn North Korea’s unprecedented number of unlawful ballistic missile launches, each of which violated multiple UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). We demand that North Korea refrain from any other destabilizing or escalatory actions, including any further nuclear tests or launches that use ballistic missile technology, which undermine regional stability and pose a grave threat to international peace and security. Such reckless actions must be met with a swift, united, and robust international response. This must include further significant measures to be taken by the UN Security Council. We reiterate our unwavering commitment to the goal of North Korea’s complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and any other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs in accordance with relevant UNSCRs. We are concerned about North Korea’s choice to prioritize its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs over the welfare of the people in North Korea. We call on North Korea to accept repeated offers of dialogue, including from Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea. We urge North Korea to respect human rights, facilitate access for international humanitarian organizations, and resolve the abductions issue immediately. + +54) We remain deeply concerned about the deteriorating security, humanitarian, human rights, and political situation in Myanmar, and we express our solidarity with its people. We continue to support ASEAN’s efforts including its continued engagements with all stakeholders in Myanmar to implement the Five-Point Consensus, including through Indonesia as the ASEAN Chair and ASEAN special envoy to Myanmar. We continue to call on the Myanmar military to immediately cease all violence, release all political prisoners and those arbitrarily detained, create an environment for an inclusive and peaceful dialogue, and return the country to a genuinely democratic path. We reiterate our call on all states to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar. We also call for full, safe, and unimpeded humanitarian access to all people, especially the most vulnerable. + +55) We note with grave concern increased threats to stability and the dire humanitarian and economic situation in Afghanistan. We call on the Taliban to uphold its counterterrorism commitments and to ensure the territory of Afghanistan cannot be used to threaten or attack any country, to plan or finance terrorist acts, or to shelter and train terrorists. We express our strongest opposition to the Taliban’s systematic violations on human rights and fundamental freedoms, and call for the immediate reversal of unacceptable decisions, especially those against women and girls. All Afghans must enjoy full, equal, and meaningful participation in all spheres of public life, and have access to humanitarian assistance and basic services. We call upon the Taliban to respect UNSCR 2681/2023 and the UN Charter, including Article 8, and to ensure unrestricted operations of the UN in Afghanistan. To remedy the persistent lack of political inclusivity and representation, we urge the Taliban to take significant steps to engage in credible, inclusive and Afghan-led national dialogue, in which all Afghans can be involved. We recognize the need for conveying unified messages to the Taliban in coordination with other international partners. + +56) We reiterate our clear determination that Iran must never develop a nuclear weapon. We remain deeply concerned about Iran’s unabated escalation of its nuclear program, which has no credible civilian justification and brings it dangerously close to actual weapon-related activities. A diplomatic solution remains the best way to resolve this issue. In that context, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action continues to provide a useful reference. We call on Iran to take prompt and concrete actions to fulfill its legal obligations and political commitments, including nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards obligations. We reiterate our profound concern over Iran’s systemic human rights violations and abuses, including its repression of popular feminist protest as well as the targeting of individuals, including women, girls, minority groups, and journalists, in and outside of Iran. We call on Iran’s leadership to end all unjust and arbitrary detentions. + +57) We express our grave concern regarding Iran’s continued destabilizing activities, including the transfer of missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related technologies to state and nonstate actors and proxy groups, in breach of UNSCRs including 2231 and 2216. Iran must stop supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In particular, we call upon Iran to cease transferring armed UAVs, which have been used to attack Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and kill Ukrainian civilians. We welcome initiatives to improve bilateral relations and de-escalate tensions in the region, including Iran and Saudi Arabia’s recent agreement to restore ties. We emphasize the importance of ensuring maritime security in the Middle East’s waterways and call on Iran not to interfere with the lawful exercise of navigational rights and freedoms by all vessels. + +58) We call on Israelis and Palestinians to take steps to build trust toward the realization of a twostate solution. To this end, all parties must refrain from unilateral actions, including settlement activities and incitement to violence. We reiterate our support for the historic status quo in Jerusalem. We welcome the recent meetings between Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and the United States and hope their commitments will be fulfilled in good faith. We will continue our support for Palestinian economic self-reliance and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. + +59) We remain firmly committed to an inclusive, UN-facilitated political process consistent with UNSCR 2254 in Syria. We reaffirm that the international community should only consider normalization and reconstruction assistance once there is authentic and enduring progress towards a political solution. We express our continued support for the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and are committed to accountability for those responsible for the use of chemical weapons and violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as applicable. We call for full and unhindered humanitarian access to all Syrians in need, particularly through UN cross-border aid for which there is no alternative in scope or scale. We remain committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS, including durable solutions for ISIS detainees and displaced persons remaining in Northeast Syria. + +60) We further express our support to preserve stability and prosperity in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa. Regarding Yemen, we call on all parties to secure a durable ceasefire and work towards a comprehensive, durable, and inclusive Yemeni-led political process under UN auspices. We encourage the Tunisian government to meet the democratic aspiration of its people, to address its economic situation and to reach an agreement with the IMF. We also support efforts to achieve stability and unity in Libya under the auspice of the UN in coordination with the African Union and the Arab League. We urge all Libyan stakeholders to work constructively on the political process in order to hold free, fair, and inclusive presidential and parliamentary elections by the end of 2023. + +61) We reaffirm our engagement with Central Asian countries to address various regional challenges, including the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression, the destabilizing effect of the situation in Afghanistan, food and energy security, terrorism, and climate change. We are determined to foster trade and energy links, sustainable connectivity and transportation, including the “Middle Corridor” and associated projects to enhance regional prosperity and resilience. + +62) We are deepening our partnerships with African countries and regional organizations, including the African Union. We have each expressed support to African calls for stronger representation in international fora, notably the G20. We reiterate our strong commitment to supporting governments in the region to address, in a manner consistent with international law, the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, violent extremism, and instability across Africa. We are seriously concerned about the growing presence of the Russia-affiliated Wagner Group forces on the continent and their destabilizing impact and human rights abuses. Keeping in mind the situations in West Africa and the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes regions, we will work together to support African-led efforts on peace, stability and prosperity on the continent. In this regard, we welcome the positive developments stemming from the cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, and call on both parties to remain committed to full implementation. We also call for international support for the Somali President’s reform priorities and the fight against al-Shabaab. We reaffirm our commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Congo. We welcome the cessation of hostilities agreed in March and call for its full implementation. We condemn the advance of the UNsanctioned March 23 Movement armed group (M23) and join African leaders in calling for M23 to withdraw unconditionally from all territories it controls. We are also seriously concerned about the spread of terrorist threats and activities towards coastal countries in West Africa, and are available to lend our support in addressing those threats. + +63) We strongly condemn the ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. This threatens the security and safety of civilians, undermines efforts to restore Sudan’s democratic transition, and could affect the stability of the region. We urge the parties to end hostilities immediately without pre-conditions and return civilian-led democratic government. We call on all actors to renounce violence and take active steps to reduce tensions, and ensure the safety of all civilians, including humanitarian personnel. The parties to the conflict must uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law, ensure the safety of all civilians, including humanitarian personnel, and not impede or restrict the delivery of life-saving aid. We commend the bravery and fortitude of humanitarian agencies working in Sudan. We acknowledge the generosity of Sudan’s neighbors who, despite facing significant humanitarian challenges of their own, host a growing number of Sudanese refugees. We commit to supporting response operations in Sudan and across East and North Africa and the Sahel region for refugees and returnees. + +64) We highlight the importance of enhancing cooperation with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to uphold shared interests as well as values. We are committed to working with regional partners to address economic challenges, climate change, biodiversity loss, natural disasters, and other global issues. We reiterate our commitment to strengthen coordination with Latin American and Caribbean partners and other actors to promote the rule of law, respect for human rights, and meet the elevated humanitarian and security needs in the region, especially in Venezuela, Haiti, and Nicaragua. With respect to the ongoing crisis in Haiti, we underscore the importance of working towards Haitian-led solution for a return to stability and need to hold accountable those who cultivate violence, corruption and instability. + +65) We welcome the Agreement on the path to normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia and its Implementation Annex, reached under the EU facilitated dialogue in Brussels on February 27 and in Ohrid on March 18 respectively. In order to unlock its full potential for the citizens of Kosovo and Serbia and for advancing good-neighbourly relations in the Western Balkans, we call on both parties to implement expediently and in good faith their respective obligations. + + +### Conclusion + +66) We appreciate the exchanges with and the inputs from the G7 Engagement Groups. We are furthermore grateful for the valuable contributions from the Heads of the IEA, the IMF, the OECD, the UN, the WB, the WHO and the WTO who joined us in Hiroshima. + +__Reference documents:__ + +- G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament +- G7 Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine +- G7 Clean Energy Economy Action Plan +- G7 Leaders’ Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security +- Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security +- Factsheet on the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment + +![image1](https://i.imgur.com/gWYNrQo.jpg) +▲ The G7 leaders at the Itsukushima Shrine on Miyajima Island, on May 19.