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diff --git a/columns.xml b/columns.xml index 3c4e2fea..6e8b192a 100644 --- a/columns.xml +++ b/columns.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-07-04T21:14:42+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIV重庆燃气公司犯了哪些法律?2024-04-22T12:00:00+08:002024-04-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/what-laws-did-chongqing-gas-company-violate<p>重庆燃气公司燃气表多收费事件有了处理结果。公司总经理被免职,退回了多收用户的燃气费,远程校准了燃气表。</p> +Jekyll2024-07-06T12:06:05+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns.xmlThe Republic of Agora | ColumnsUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIV重庆燃气公司犯了哪些法律?2024-04-22T12:00:00+08:002024-04-22T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/columns/what-laws-did-chongqing-gas-company-violate<p>重庆燃气公司燃气表多收费事件有了处理结果。公司总经理被免职,退回了多收用户的燃气费,远程校准了燃气表。</p> <!--more--> diff --git a/feed.xml b/feed.xml index dd7fea50..05516dcb 100644 --- a/feed.xml +++ b/feed.xml @@ -1 +1 @@ -Jekyll2024-07-04T21:14:42+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file +Jekyll2024-07-06T12:06:05+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/feed.xmlThe Republic of AgoraUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIV \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/heros.xml b/heros.xml index 035ce62e..15a38915 100644 --- a/heros.xml +++ b/heros.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Jekyll2024-07-04T21:14:42+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIVSuperconducting Supercomputer2024-05-15T12:00:00+08:002024-05-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/AnnaHerr_QuentinHerr-a1_c-superconducting-supercomputer<p>Before the explosion of generative AI, scientists had predicted that by 2040, almost 50 percent of the world’s electric power will be used in computing. The amount of computing resources used to train the AI models has been doubling every 6 months for the past decade. <!--more--> At this rate, by 2030 training a single artificial-intelligence model would take one hundred times as much computing resources as the combined annual resources of the current top ten supercomputers. Simply put, computing will require colossal amounts of power, soon exceeding what our planet can provide.</p> +Jekyll2024-07-06T12:06:05+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HerosUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIVSuperconducting Supercomputer2024-05-15T12:00:00+08:002024-05-15T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/heros/AnnaHerr_QuentinHerr-a1_c-superconducting-supercomputer<p>Before the explosion of generative AI, scientists had predicted that by 2040, almost 50 percent of the world’s electric power will be used in computing. The amount of computing resources used to train the AI models has been doubling every 6 months for the past decade. <!--more--> At this rate, by 2030 training a single artificial-intelligence model would take one hundred times as much computing resources as the combined annual resources of the current top ten supercomputers. Simply put, computing will require colossal amounts of power, soon exceeding what our planet can provide.</p> <p>One way to manage the unsustainable energy requirements of the computing sector is to fundamentally change the way we compute. Superconductors could let us do just that.</p> diff --git a/hkers.xml b/hkers.xml index 9532b3fd..d5c20ef6 100644 --- a/hkers.xml +++ b/hkers.xml @@ -1,4 +1,187 @@ -Jekyll2024-07-04T21:14:42+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIVNew Opportunistic Aggression2024-06-06T12:00:00+08:002024-06-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/new-opportunistic-aggression<p><em>The United States faces an increasingly contested strategic environment. As policymakers grapple with the “two-near-peer” challenge, a crucial question remains: How should the United States mitigate the risk of opportunistic aggression?</em></p> +Jekyll2024-07-06T12:06:05+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers.xmlThe Republic of Agora | HkersUNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIVAlgorithmic Stability2024-06-10T12:00:00+08:002024-06-10T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/algorithmic-stability<p><em>This report delves into the future of deterrence and the role of human judgment in an AI-focused crisis simulation.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<h3 id="in-the-future">In the future…</h3> + +<ul> + <li> + <p><strong>States will integrate artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) into their national security enterprises to gain decision advantages over their rivals.</strong> The question will not be if a web of algorithms extends across the military, intelligence community, and foreign policy decisionmaking institutions, but how lines of code interact with the human clash of wills at the heart of strategy.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>New technology will change the character but not the nature of statecraft and strategy.</strong> States will still combine diplomacy, economic coercion, and influence campaigns with threats of military force to signal rivals and reassure allies. Human decisionmaking, while augmented by algorithms, remains central to strategy formation and crisis management.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><strong>Information about AI/ML capabilities will influence how states manage escalation.</strong> Escalation risks will continue to emerge from how warfighting changes the balance of information available to update models and support human decisionmaking. Intelligence gaps on adversary algorithms increase the likelihood of escalation but only once states have crossed the Rubicon and fight beneath the nuclear threshold.</p> + </li> +</ul> + +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> + +<p>How will the adoption of AI/ML across a state’s national security enterprise affect crisis decisionmaking? For example, what would the Cuban Missile Crisis look like at machine speed?</p> + +<p>Beyond current policy debates, congressional testimony, new strategies, and a drive to identify, test, and evaluate standards, there is a fundamental question of how computer algorithms will shape crisis interactions between nuclear powers. Further, will refined AI/ML models pull people back from the brink or push them over the edge during crises that are as much about fear and emotion as they are rational decisionmaking? How will humans and machines interact during a crisis between nuclear powers?</p> + +<p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">This edition of On Future War uses a series of wargames as an experiment to analyze how players with 10 or more years of national security experience approach crisis decisionmaking given variable levels of knowledge about a rival great power’s level of AI/ML integration across its national security enterprise.</code></em></p> + +<p>To answer this question, the CSIS Futures Lab held a series of crisis simulations in early 2023 analyzing how AI/ML will shape the future of deterrence. The games — designed as a randomized control trial — explored human uncertainty regarding a rival great power’s level of AI/ML integration and how this factor affected strategic stability during a crisis.</p> + +<p>Two major findings emerged. First, across the simulations, varying levels of AI/ML capabilities had no observable effect on strategy and a general trend of trying to combine multiple instruments of power when responding to a crisis. While data science and the use of AI/ML to augment statecraft will almost certainly be a defining feature of the near future, there appear to be constants of strategy that will survive the emergence of such new technologies. Diplomacy, economic coercion, and influence campaigns will survive even as machines collect and process more information and help shape national security decisionmaking. AI/ML will augment but not fundamentally change strategy. That said, there is an urgent need to start training national security professionals to understand what AI/ML is and is not, as well as how it can support human decisionmaking during foreign policy crises.</p> + +<p>Second, how nations fight in the shadow of nuclear weapons will change as states selectively target the battle networks of their rivals. Even though the perceived risk of escalation is not likely to be affected by the balance of AI/ML capabilities, the criteria used to select flexible response options will change. States will need to balance countering adversary algorithms with ensuring that they do not blind an adversary and risk triggering a “dead-hand” — a fast and automated system developed by the Soviet Union to launch nuclear weapons — escalation spiral. This need to strike the right balance in military targeting will put a new premium on intelligence collection that maps how rival states employ AI/ML capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. It could also change how states approach arms control, with a new emphasis on understanding where and how AI/ML capabilities augment crisis decisionmaking.</p> + +<h3 id="deterrence-battle-networks-and-aiml">Deterrence, Battle Networks, and AI/ML</h3> + +<p>Modern deterrence literature focuses on how states bargain, short of war, through threats and commitments. These signals change how each side calculates the costs and benefits of going to war, implying that the less information each side has about the balance of capabilities and resolve, the harder it becomes to encourage restraint. Signaling and communication play a central role in how states seek to manipulate risk to deny an adversary an advantage, including incentives for seeking a fait accompli by military force. Even literature that stresses the psychological and cultural antecedents that shape how foreign policy leaders approach crisis diplomacy share this emphasis on the central role of information. Rational calculations break down based on past information (i.e., how beliefs shape expectations) and flawed weighting (e.g., bias and prospect theory).</p> + +<p>In modern military planning and operations, information is managed through battle networks. The ability to conduct long-range precision strikes and track adversary troop movements all rests on aggregating and analyzing data. This logic is a foundation for the Coalition Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) network, which is designed to push and pull data across distributed networks of sensors and shooters connected by faster communication, processing, and decision layers informed by AI/ML. The network is the new theory of victory at the center of the new Joint Warfighting Concept, which prioritizes synchronizing multidomain effects in time and space. For this reason, information is now a key component of military power and, by proxy, a state’s ability to bargain with a rival. The more information a state can process, assisted by algorithms, the more likely it is to identify windows of opportunity and risk as well as align ends, ways, and means to gain a relative advantage.</p> + +<p>Yet, most of the emerging literature on AI/ML and the future of war focuses more on risk and ethical considerations than bargaining advantages. First, multiple accounts claim that AI/ML will create new risks, including “flash wars,” and are likely to produce destabilizing effects along multiple vectors. The thinking goes that the new era of great power competition will be marked by an “indelicate balance of terror” as Russia, China, and the United States race to acquire technological game changers. To the extent that AI/ML alters military power, it could affect how states perceive the balance of power. As perceptions about power and influence change, it could trigger inadvertent escalation risks. Inside the bureaucracy, defense planners could rely on brittle and black-boxed AI/ML recommendations that create new forms of strategic instability. At the tactical level, the speed of autonomous weapons systems could lead to inadvertent escalation while also undermining signaling commitment during a crisis.</p> + +<p>There are two issues with these claims. First, arguments about the destabilizing role of AI/ML have yet to be explored beyond literature reviews, alternative scenarios, and illustrative wargames designed more for gaining perspective than for evaluating strategy. In other words, hypotheses about risk and escalation have not been tested. Second, accounts about emerging technology and inadvertent escalation often discount the role of increased information in reducing tensions. To the extent that algorithms applied across a battle network help reduce uncertainty, they are likely to support deterrence. You can never lift the fog of war, but you can make weather forecasts and describe what is known, unknown, and unknowable. This alternative logic sits at the foundation of the “wargame as an experiment” the CSIS Futures Lab constructed to analyze how AI/ML could affect strategic stability.</p> + +<h3 id="would-you-like-to-play-a-game">Would You Like to Play a Game?</h3> + +<p>In 2023, the CSIS Futures Lab conducted two tabletop exercises exploring a crisis scenario involving AI/ML’s effect on strategic decisionmaking. The tabletop exercise focused on a crisis involving a third-party state between two rivals, each of which had nuclear weapons and a second-strike capability. The rival states in the exercise were abstracted to remove bias about current rivalries that define the international system, thus reducing, but not eliminating, the risk of confounding factors skewing gameplay. As a result, players made choices about how to respond to a crisis and which elements of a rival state’s battle network (i.e., CJADC2) to target. The games consisted of 29 individual players, each with over 10 years of national security experience.</p> + +<blockquote> + <h4 id="the-game"><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Game</code></h4> +</blockquote> + +<ul> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Two tabletop exercises analyzing how players develop flexible deterrent and flexible response options during a crisis between rival nuclear states</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Fake scenario to reduce bias</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Players all had at least 10 years of national security experience</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Players randomly assigned into different treatment groups</code></em></p> + </li> + <li> + <p><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Three rounds of crisis interactions, moving from competition to the early stages of a military conflict</code></em></p> + </li> +</ul> + +<p>The game design adapted an earlier tabletop exercise used to study modern competition and cyber escalation dynamics known as Corcyra. This game put players in a fictional scenario involving a crisis standoff between two nuclear rivals: Green State and Purple State over a small state, Orange State. Green State and Orange State are treaty allies. Purple State and Orange State have a maritime territorial dispute. Players, assuming the role of Green State, make decisions about the best mix of flexible deterrent (competition) and flexible response options as the crisis unfolds. The game scenario — involving a territorial dispute, enduring rivalry, and alliance networks — built in dynamics associated with escalation to focus on low-probability, high-consequence foreign policy events. The use of fake countries seeks to make players less likely to introduce bias in the results based on prior beliefs about current powers such as the United States and China.</p> + +<p>Unknown to the players, Purple State’s moves and decisions were predetermined to walk players up the escalation ladder, a technique known in the wargame community as a 1.5-sided design. This game design captures the uncertainty and interactive complexity (i.e., reaction, counteraction) of two-sided games but better supports capturing and coding observations about player preferences and assessments of risks and opportunities. Applied to Corcyra, a 1.5-sided game design enabled the CSIS Futures Lab to collect data on how players made decisions about competition and conventional conflict in the shadow of nuclear weapons.</p> + +<p>As the game proceeded, players were randomly assigned into two different treatment groups and led into different rooms with a facilitator. Each group was given an identical game packet that included an overview of the crisis and military balance between Green State and Purple State as well as the standing policy objectives for Green State to deter Purple State’s actions against its treaty allies while limiting the risk of a broader war (i.e., extended general deterrent). The only difference between the two groups was in the intelligence estimate of the extent of Purple State’s AI/ML capabilities in relation to Green State. As seen in Table 1, this difference meant that everything was constant (e.g., military balance, policy objectives, and Purple State’s actions across the game) except for the knowledge the players received about their rival’s level of AI/ML capabilities. This design reflects a factorial vignette survey, controlling for whether AI/ML capability is known or unknown.</p> + +<p>Over the course of the game, each group (i.e., Treatment A and B) responded to a set of adversary escalation vignettes. Unknown to the participants was that each subsequent move would see their rival escalate and move up the escalation ladder to ensure a more dynamic interplay between current decisionmaking and maintaining sufficient forces and options for future interactions. The design also ensured that players were forced to confront the threat of conventional strikes on the nuclear enterprise and the limited use of nuclear weapons in a counterforce role.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/V6FPvbW.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Table 1: Excerpts from the Corcyra Game Packets</em></p> + +<p>The first round of the game dealt with flexible deterrent options and crisis response. Afterwards, each group received a brief about a crisis — between their treaty ally (Orange State) and nuclear rival (Purple State) — and each player (Green State) was asked to craft a response using multiple instruments of power (e.g., diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) by picking three options from a menu of 24 preapproved flexible deterrent options. Each instrument of power had six response options based on the implied level of escalation. This design allowed the CSIS Futures Lab to see if varying levels of AI/ML capabilities had an effect on how players approached competition and campaigning as part of a larger deterrent posture. Specifically, it allowed the research team to test how the capability affected overall competition strategy and escalation dynamics.</p> + +<p>The second round began with a limited military strike by Purple State on Orange State. Players were briefed that Purple State conducted a series of limited strikes on an airfield and naval base in Orange State. Orange State intercepted 50 percent of the cruise missiles in the attack, but the remaining 20 — fired from a mix of Purple State aircraft and naval warships — damaged an Orange State frigate, downed two maritime patrol aircraft, and destroyed an ammunition depot. Initial reports suggested that as many as 20 Orange State military personnel were killed in action, with another 30 wounded. There were also four Green State military advisers working on the base at the time who were killed in the attack. The attacks coincided with widespread reports of global positioning system (GPS) denial, jamming, and cyber intrusions in both Orange State and Green State. Purple State said the attack was limited to the military facility Orange State had used in past provocations, but it vows broader attacks if Orange State or Green State responds. In this manner, Purple State’s conventional military response reflected core concepts in modern military theory about multidomain operations, joint firepower strikes, and sixth-generation warfare.</p> + +<p>After receiving this intelligence update, players were asked to nominate flexible response options. First, the players had to recommend which of the military responses from the menu of 24 options they recommended in response to a limited military strike by Purple State on Orange State. Players also had to specify which layer of Purple State’s battle network they wanted to affect through their recommended response: sensing, processing, communicating, decision, or effectors. This game design limited the range of options open to players to support statistical analysis and comparison between the two treatments.</p> + +<p>The third round examined if players adjusted their military response options to conventional strikes on their nuclear enterprise. Players were briefed that Purple State conducted a series of conventional strikes against Orange State and Green State. In Orange State, the strikes targeted major military facilities and even the Orange State leadership (both military and civilian) with a mix of cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and special operations forces (SOF) raids. The attacks included striking Green State intelligence satellites and major early-warning radars as well as key airfields where Green State keeps the majority of its strike and bomber aircraft squadrons. The mass precision conventional strikes — launched largely by a mix of long-range strike and bomber aircraft and submarines — also targeted key port facilities in Green State used to reload vertical launch cells and support Green State submarine forces. Orange State lost over 30 percent of its military combat power and 50 percent of its civilian critical infrastructure related to water treatment, energy, and telecommunications. Its leaders survived the decapitation strikes but are enacting continuity of government protocols. Green State has suffered 10 percent attrition in its air and naval forces. Purple State has threatened that it may be forced to expand strikes, to include using nuclear weapons, if Green State conducts additional military strikes.</p> + +<h3 id="what-the-game-revealed-about-the-future-of-deterrence">What the Game Revealed about the Future of Deterrence</h3> + +<h4 id="flexible-deterrent-options">Flexible Deterrent Options</h4> + +<p>Throughout the game, each player had three options from any category (i.e., diplomatic, informational, military, or economic) to choose. Table 2 summarizes how frequently each player selected flexible response options linked to different instruments of power during the initial crisis response (i.e., Round 1). Analyzing these choices provides a window into how players with at least 10 years of national security experience approached the “ways” of crisis management toward the “end” of reestablishing deterrence. If AI/ML is inherently more escalation prone, one would expect to see a statistically significant difference between the treatments.</p> + +<p>There was no statistically significant difference between the two treatments. The balance of AI/ML capabilities did not alter how players approached their competitive strategy and crisis management. Across the treatments, players developed an integrated approach, often choosing multiple instruments of power to pressure their rival, as opposed to focusing on a strictly military response. No player in either treatment used only a singular instrument of power, such as only responding with military options. On the contrary, over 60 percent of players in each treatment selected multiple instruments of power. In other words, the level of AI/ML capabilities between rivals did not directly alter early-stage crisis response and the development of flexible deterrent options designed to stabilize the situation and reestablish deterrence. This finding runs contrary to perspectives that see AI/ML as inherently escalatory and risk prone. While AI/ML will augment multiple analytical processes from the tactical to the strategic level, national security leaders will still make critical decisions and seek ways to slow down and manage a crisis. The risk is likely more in how people interact with algorithms during a crisis than in the use of data science and machine learning to analyze information and intelligence. AI/ML does not pose risks on its own.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/WhstiFg.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ Table 2: Selected Deterrent Options</em></p> + +<p>During discussions in Round 1 for Treatment A (AI/ML Capabilities Known), players focused more on strategy as it relates to shaping human decisionmaking. In the first round, participants were divided over whether Purple State’s actions were hostile or not but conceded that Purple State was attempting to signal that Green State’s actions in the region were unwarranted. Of note, this focus on signaling was more about human intention than algorithmic assessments. The players generally saw the crisis as about human leaders in rival states seeking advantage through national security bureaucracies augmented by AI/ML capabilities. In their discussions, humans were in the loop and focused on finding ways to de-escalate the crisis without signaling weakness. The discussion was less about how algorithms might skew information and more about how to have direct communication and clear messages passed through diplomats to other human leaders.</p> + +<p>This logic drove the players to focus on developing the situation through diplomatic outreach while increasing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in the region. Although participants agreed upon the utility of diplomacy as a response to the crisis, they diverged in their opinion on whether the efforts should publicly call for de-escalation or privately use third parties or influence campaigns to warn Purple State’s elites about further escalation. Group members widely supported increasing ISR assets in the region to provide early warning of future Purple State military deployments and increase protection of friendly communications and intelligence-collection assets. Additionally, group members sought to privately share intelligence with allies in the region. Again, AI/ML was less a focal point than a method to gain better situational awareness and identify the best mechanisms for crisis communication with the rival state (i.e., private, public, or third-party). People, more than machines, were central to crisis management.</p> + +<p>Where AI/ML did enter the discussion was with respect to how the rival battle networks with high degrees of automation could misperceive the deployment of additional ISR capabilities during a crisis. Although participants strongly believed that this action was essential, they recognized the possibility that Purple State’s AI/ML augmented strategic warning systems may not be able to interpret the difference between signaling resolve or deliberate escalation. At the same time, they thought the direct communication channels should augment this risk and that most algorithmic applications analyzing the deployment of ISR assets would be more probabilistic than deterministic, thinking in terms of conditional probabilities about escalation risks rather than jumping to the conclusion that war was imminent.</p> + +<p>Put differently, since all AI/ML is based on learning patterns from data or rules-based logic, the underlying patterns of past ISR deployments would likely make the system — even absent a human — unlikely to predict a low-probability event (i.e., war) when there are other more common options associated with a ubiquitous event such as increasing intelligence. If anything, the reverse would be more likely. Since wars and even militarized crises are rare events, an AI/ML algorithm — depending on the training data and parameters — would treat them as such absent human intervention. This does not mean there is a zero probability of “flash wars” and misreading the situation. Rather, the point is that given the low number of wars and militarized crises between states, there are few patterns, and there will almost certainly be a human in the loop. No senior national security leader is likely to cede all decisionmaking to an algorithm in a crisis.</p> + +<p>Treatment B saw a similar discussion between players that focused on using multiple instruments of power and identifying de-escalation opportunities. Of note, it also saw more diplomatic outreach, with players wanting to ensure they could cut through the uncertainty about Purple State’s AI/ML capabilities through direct and indirect diplomatic engagements and crisis communication. In Treatment B, concern about the strengths and limitations of an unknown AI/ML capability in Purple State had a significant impact on group decisionmaking. Group members desired a mutual understanding of Green State and Purple State’s AI/ML capabilities, believing that greater clarity over the balance and use of AI/ML capabilities between rivals would lead to stability, rather than the current instability they faced.</p> + +<p>This focus led participants to recommend deploying ISR capabilities to identify how and if Purple State was using AI-assisted ISR that might misread their intentions. Some players expressed concern about whether the use of ISR would undermine their efforts at de-escalation. Players suggested that if Purple State detected increased deployment of collection and early-warning assets, they would feel pressured to deploy military forces to prevent the appearance of a capability gap.</p> + +<p>Ultimately, players believed that deploying additional ISR was worth the potential escalation risk because it was essential to analyze adversary actions as they unfolded. These groups sought to combine diplomatic, flexible deterrent options such as third-party mediation and redeployment of naval and aviation assets away from Purple State to signal a desire to de-escalate. In other words, national security professionals wanted to ensure there was a check on algorithmic reasoning during a crisis and were willing to deploy assets to that end and even slow down operations to buy time and space for diplomacy and clear signaling.</p> + +<p>This reasoning runs counter to claims that AI triggers a security dilemma that leads to inadvertent escalation. In international relations, a security dilemma is a situation where efforts by one state to increase its security cause rival states to experience more insecurity. The concept is used to explain why states find themselves pulled into arms races, crisis escalation, and war. The security dilemma can become especially acute based, among other things, on new technologies that make it difficult to assess whether offensive or defensive military capabilities create strategic advantage. As a result, one would expect to see the emergence of AI/ML capabilities trigger a security dilemma and inadvertent escalation. Rival states would opt for more severe crisis response options in their selection of flexible deterrent options.</p> + +<p>Yet, this dynamic did not emerge in the crisis simulations based on player discussions and statistical analysis. Players could select from a menu of 24 crisis response options varying by magnitude across each of the instruments of power. Using this magnitude, the CSIS Futures Lab could analyze whether there was more or less coercive pressure applied across the treatments. As can be seen in Table 3, there was no statistically significant difference in the magnitudes across the two treatments. The balance of AI/ML capabilities did not affect how rival states approached crisis management and competitive strategy. Based on discussions, players searched for ways to escape the security dilemma through diplomatic outreach and intelligence across both treatments.</p> + +<p>While the average escalation level between the two treatments is not different, there appear to be inverse preferences for weak signaling and crisis probing that players adopted to manage crisis escalation. Table 3 below shows the levels of escalation magnitude, ranging from 1 (“low”) to 6 (“high”), that players opted for when they selected diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of power to signal their rival and shape the crisis. Lower magnitude signals (1) — which were predominantly diplomatic and intelligence activities — were more than twice as likely in Treatment A (10) than in B (4). Players assessed that AI/ML-enabled battle networks would detect weak signals and help support a defensive posture while searching for a crisis off-ramp. Inversely, in Treatment B (AI/ML Capabilities Unknown), players adopted more of probing strategy using mid-range signaling (i.e., level 3 escalation magnitude) to test adversary capabilities and resolve. In Treatment A (AI/ML Capabilities Known), only 36 percent (14) of the responses fell in this range while Treatment B (AI/ML Capabilities Unknown) saw 60 percent (23). This finding implies that the balance of knowledge about AI/ML capabilities could alter escalation dynamics in the future.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/R2zmJge.png" alt="image03" /> +<em>▲ Table 3: Contingency Table Escalation Magnitude</em></p> + +<h3 id="battle-networks">Battle Networks</h3> + +<p>During the second round, players found themselves confronting a series of limited strikes by a rival state. In the third round, the situation escalated to theater-wide conventional strikes to evaluate how players shifted their military strategy. In these rounds, players recommended how best to attack their rival state’s battle network in terms of the optimal layer to target: sensor, communications, processing, decision, or effects. If the balance of AI/ML capabilities affects military operations, one would expect to see targeting differences across the treatments.</p> + +<p>Yet,there was no statistically significant difference across the treatments in relation to battle network targeting preferences. As seen in the contingency table below, targeting preferences varied across the treatments, but not as much as expected. In treatments where AI/ML capabilities were known and balanced, players preferred to try and target the processing and decisionmaking layers in an effort to deny the other side tempo and a decisionmaking advantage.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/9dBT491.png" alt="image04" /> +<em>▲ Table 4: Battle Network Targeting Preferences</em></p> + +<p>Player discussions drew out the logic behind the difference. When AI/ML was known, players discussed how targeting the decision layer could be a pathway to slow down a crisis and give humans a chance to respond and degrade the ability of a rival to retaliate at machine speed. At the same time, they wanted to limit targeting the processing layer. Players discussed how this layer, which consists of large data hubs, is a new form of critical infrastructure that is often co-located with energy and telecommunications infrastructure to support powering computers and distributing information. Hitting this layer could pull a rival state deeper into an escalation spiral due to concerns about civilian deaths and counter-value targeting. As a result, they discussed how best to target the decision layer, including introducing new forms of flexible deterrent and response options designed to spoof and confuse AI/ML applications that help senior leaders analyze a crisis. The goal was to gain an information advantage and use it for leverage without triggering inadvertent escalation.</p> + +<p>When AI/ML was unknown, participants opted to target effectors (e.g., conventional weapons) because it was assessed as the highest payoff target given uncertainty about adversary decisionmaking capabilities. In the absence of knowledge about the depth of AI/ML in a rival state’s battle network, players opted to change the correlation of forces in terms of neutralizing military capabilities capable of launching a retaliatory strike. Although players debated the use of cyber capabilities to degrade Purple State’s military capabilities, players wanted a kinetic strike because it was a visible signal, could be quickly executed, and could target a limited range of proportional targets to demonstrate resolve to the international community without significant escalation risk. This insight impliesaneed to rethink aspects of military targeting in an era almost certain to be defined by increasingly sophisticated AI/ML applications supporting crisis decisionmaking.</p> + +<h3 id="escalation-risks">Escalation Risks</h3> + +<p>Despite valid concerns about AI/ML and nuclear escalation, there were no statistically significant differences between the treatments in relation to how players assessed the risk. This finding is based on comparing assessments of nuclear escalation risks for Treatment A (AI/ML Capabilities Known) and B (AI/ML Capabilities Unknown). In each round, players selected how likely their flexible response option was to trigger nuclear escalation by picking a number from 1 to 6 with the following values: (1) no risk, (2) risk of limited conventional military confrontation, (3) risk of conventional strikes to degrade nuclear enterprise, (4) risk of limited nuclear attack, (5) risk of large-scale nuclear attack against nuclear enterprise, and (6) risk of large-scale nuclear attack against civilian targets.</p> + +<p>In Round 2, when players had to recommend a flexible military response option to counter a rival state, there was no statistically significant difference in their risk assessment. In both games, players assessed the risk as a rival state responding with nonnuclear, limited conventional retaliatory strikes. When AI/ML capabilities were unknown, it created a unique discussion about escalation dynamics. Some players expressed concern that targeting the communication layer in a battle network could lead bad algorithms to get even worse. Absent new information, a rival state’s AI/ML models would be more prone to provide bad or at least outdated advice.</p> + +<p>In Round 3, when players had to respond to widespread conventional military strikes, there was also no statistically significant difference in players’ risk assessment. Across both treatments, players saw an increased risk of a retaliatory conventional strike on their nuclear enterprise. When AI/ML capabilities were known, players expressed more concern about a limited nuclear strike and how to best understand the algorithms their rival integrated across the national security enterprise at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. More than technological advantage, players assessed that the key to understanding future AI/ML escalation risks during a nuclear crisis rests in mapping how algorithms inform decisionmaking at echelon. This requirement to understand the range of AI/ML systems augmenting a national security enterprise creates entirely new intelligence requirements critical to early warning and arms control.</p> + +<p>There was a statistically significant difference between the treatments with respect to conventional escalation. This finding (Table 5 below) is based on comparing which military response option players opted for in Round 3 in response to widespread conventional strikes. Treatment A (AI/ML Capabilities Known) players took a more measured response and conducted limited strikes on their rival’s military designed to manage escalation risk. During game discussions, players brought up the idea that they were signaling both the rival human leaders and their algorithms, trying to preserve the possibility of an off-ramp. Alternatively, in Treatment B (AI/ML Capabilities Unknown), players took a more aggressive, decisive response but still beneath the nuclear threshold. The findings are more nuanced than what the numbers tell. During the counteraction phase, participants were united in their belief that Green and Purple States were now in a state of war. All players assessed Purple State as “hostile” and considered “crisis escalation imminent.” Since players knew crisis escalation was imminent, they struggled to find an effective response that would signal resolve and commitment to their treaty ally Orange State that would not trigger strategic escalation. Treatment B players argued that “escalating to de-escalate” would be the most viable strategy to ensure a crisis would not lead to greater hostilities. For Treatment B, unknown AI/ML capabilities meant that Green State players were aware of the existence of Purple State’s AI/ML capabilities, yet they did not understand how these systems were being integrated into their decisionmaking process. The “escalate to de-escalate” approach of the Treatment B players was designed to offset the intelligence asymmetry gap with a stronger conventional military response. This finding suggests that a priority intelligence requirement in future crises will be the depth and extent of AI/ML systems across a rival state’s national security enterprise and operational battle networks. It also suggests a possible new form of inadvertent escalation risk associated with testing a rival’s capabilities to reduce uncertainty. This finding has significant implications for thinking about the future of arms control and how to approach national intelligence requirement generation optimized for an algorithmic future.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/ZavCLuX.png" alt="image05" /> +<em>▲ Table 5: Contingency Table for Military FRO Preferences</em></p> + +<h3 id="policy-recommendations">Policy Recommendations</h3> + +<p>The findings from these crisis simulations point to recommendations that the United States and its network of partners and allies should consider as they build interoperable battle networks where AI/ML supports decisionmaking at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.</p> + +<p><strong>1. Embrace experimentation and an agile mindset.</strong></p> + +<p>The national security community needs to stop worrying about Skynet, alongside other technology-related threat inflation, and start building applications that help people navigate the massive volume of information that is already overwhelming staff and decisionmakers during a crisis. There is a need for more experiments designed to calibrate how best to integrate AI/ML into national security decisionmaking that build on established efforts such as the Global Information Dominance Exercise (GIDE). These exercises connect combatant commands and test their ability to work along a seamless battle network moderated by AI/ML (i.e., human-on-the-loop) during a crisis and the transition to conflict. Each GIDE helps the larger Department of Defense think about how to support modern campaigning consistent with emerging doctrine, including the Joint Warfighting Concept and Joint Concept for Competing.</p> + +<p>The United States needs to expand the GIDE series and examine crisis response from an interagency and coalition perspective. These experiments should map how different executive agencies — from the Department of State to the Department of the Treasury — approach crisis management, with an eye toward enabling better decisionmaking through aggregating and analyzing data. Starting simple with a clear understanding of how each agency approaches flexible deterrent options and how these options are evaluated in the National Security Council will provide insight into where and how to best augment strategy formation and crisis response.</p> + +<p><strong>2. Engage in campaign analysis.</strong></p> + +<p>A constant in war is the fight for information and how commanders employ reconnaissance and security operations alongside collecting intelligence to gain situational awareness, anticipate change, and seek advantage. That fight for information will take place along complex battle networks managed by AI/ML applications, creating a need for new concepts of maneuver, security, and surprise. How a state protects its battle network while degrading its rivals could well become the true decisive operation for a future campaign and an entirely new form of schwerpunkt.</p> + +<p>The Department of Defense needs to expand modern campaign analysis to explore how to fight a network. These studies should combine historical campaign insights with wargames, modeling, and strategic analysis, with an eye toward balancing military advantage with escalation dynamics. The studies should evaluate existing processes such as joint planning and joint targeting methodologies to see if they are still viable in campaigns characterized by competing battle networks. It is highly likely that the net result will be new processes and methods that both accelerate tempo and keep a careful eye on escalation risks.</p> + +<p><strong>3. From open skies to open algorithms, start a broader dialogue about twenty-first-century arms control.</strong></p> + +<p>Finally, there is a need to start thinking about what arms control looks like in the AI era. Managing weapons inventory may prove less valuable to the future of deterrence than establishing norms, regimes, and treaties governing military actions that target the decision and processing layers of modern battle networks in rival nuclear states.</p> + +<p>In a crisis where software at echelon is searching for efficiencies to accelerate decisionmaking, there is a risk that senior leaders find themselves pulled into escalation traps. This pull could be accelerated by attacks on key systems associated with early warning and intelligence. The sooner states work together to map the risks and build in commonly understood guardrails, the lower the probability of inadvertent or accidental escalation between nuclear rivals. These efforts should include Track 2 and Track 3 tabletop exercises and dialogues that inform how rival states approach crisis management. For example, it would be better to have officials from the United States and China discuss how multi-domain strike networks and automation affect escalation dynamics before a crisis in the Taiwan Strait rather than after.</p> + +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> + +<p>Since the use of AI/ML capabilities in national security is almost certain to increase in the coming years, there needs to be a larger debate about if and how any information technology augments strategic and military decisionmaking. The stakes are too high to walk blindly into the future.</p> + +<p>As a result, the national security community needs to accelerate its experimentation with how to integrate AI/ML into modern battle networks, with an eye toward better understanding crisis decisionmaking, campaigning, and arms control. It is not enough to optimize joint targeting and how fast the military can sense, make sense, and gain an advantage. The new world will require rethinking military staff organizations little changed since Napoleon and legacy national security bureaucratic design and planning processes. It will require thinking about how best to support human decisionmaking given a flood of information still subject to uncertainty, fog, and friction.</p> + +<p>Despite the findings here that AI/ML is as likely to play a stabilizing role as it is a destabilizing role, there is a still a risk that the world’s nuclear states inadvertently code their way to Armageddon. As a result, it is important to challenge the findings and acknowledge the limitations of the study. First, the observations are still limited and could be subject to confounding effects caused by age, gender, and each player’s type of national security experience. Future efforts should increase the full range of participants. Second, the results need more observations to analyze not just the balance of known versus unknown AI/ML capabilities, but also if risk perception and escalation change based on a larger number of treatments addressing different AI/ML levels (e.g., “no AI/ML capability,” “more AI/ML capability,” etc.). Last, experts tend to get things wrong and may not see change. Future research should open the experiment up to a wider range of participants and compare how perceptions in the general public compare to those of experts. In the ideal case, these games would also involve more non-U.S. players.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Benjamin Jensen</strong> is a senior fellow in the Futures Lab at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and a professor of strategic studies at the School of Advanced Warfighting in the Marine Corps University.</p> + +<p><strong>Yasir Atalan</strong> is an associate data fellow in the Futures Lab at CSIS and a PhD candidate at American University.</p> + +<p><strong>Jose M. Macias III</strong> is a research associate in the Futures Lab at CSIS and a Pearson fellow at the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts at the University of Chicago.</p>Benjamin Jensen, et al.This report delves into the future of deterrence and the role of human judgment in an AI-focused crisis simulation.New Opportunistic Aggression2024-06-06T12:00:00+08:002024-06-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/new-opportunistic-aggression<p><em>The United States faces an increasingly contested strategic environment. As policymakers grapple with the “two-near-peer” challenge, a crucial question remains: How should the United States mitigate the risk of opportunistic aggression?</em></p> <excerpt /> @@ -355,7 +538,83 @@ <p><strong>Reja Younis</strong> is the associate fellow with PONI in ISP at CSIS, she leads research on nuclear deterrence issues, nuclear strategy, and emerging technologies.</p> -<p><strong>Lachlan MacKenzie</strong> is a program coordinator and research assistant with PONI in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p>David M. Allison, et al.The United States faces an increasingly contested strategic environment. As policymakers grapple with the “two-near-peer” challenge, a crucial question remains: How should the United States mitigate the risk of opportunistic aggression?【黎智英案・審訊第 89 日】2024-06-05T12:00:00+08:002024-06-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-89<ul> +<p><strong>Lachlan MacKenzie</strong> is a program coordinator and research assistant with PONI in the International Security Program at CSIS.</p>David M. Allison, et al.The United States faces an increasingly contested strategic environment. As policymakers grapple with the “two-near-peer” challenge, a crucial question remains: How should the United States mitigate the risk of opportunistic aggression?Euro SIFMANet CPH Report2024-06-06T12:00:00+08:002024-06-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/euro-sifmanet-copenhagen-report<p><em>Discussions held in Copenhagen in March 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Denmark.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<p>In late March 2024, the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI, with the support of Copenhagen-based policy centre Think Tank EUROPA, hosted a roundtable in Copenhagen. The roundtable, along with a series of one-on-one meetings, discussed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Denmark. None of the discussions in the event are attributable.</p> + +<p>The gatherings included representatives from national authorities with sanctions-related competences, as well as sanctions and compliance experts from financial institutions and Danish industrial groups, compliance experts from leading law firms, representatives from the industry group Danish Shipping, and other advisers. These included, among others, representatives from the Danish Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs; the Danish Customs Agency (DCA); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (MFA); the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority; the National Special Crime Unit; and other relevant agencies. This event is part of the in-country engagements conducted by the CFS-led European Sanctions and the Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.</p> + +<h3 id="denmarks-decentralised-sanctions-implementation">Denmark’s Decentralised Sanctions Implementation</h3> + +<p>The roundtable began with a discussion of the division of authority and responsibility for sanctions in Denmark, and the significant adaptations required since 2022.</p> + +<p>The conversation considered Denmark’s preparedness for the Russia sanctions following the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) fourth round of mutual evaluations, the scope of which included implementation of targeted financial sanctions. Denmark’s mutual evaluation report was concluded in 2017 and its subsequent follow-up process ended in 2021, which a government representative at the roundtable said had helped the country to prepare for expanded sanctions. They noted that Denmark was evaluated as “partially compliant” for Recommendation 7 related to targeted financial sanctions for proliferation financing, but was upgraded to “largely compliant” in the follow-up report in 2021. Addressing these gaps had, a representative said, helped the country’s preparations, but it had not been possible to prepare fully for the sanctioning of a country with which the EU as a whole had such significant economic ties, compared to jurisdictions that are subject to sanctions regimes covered by the FATF Standards and have been for a long time.</p> + +<p>Denmark has more than 25 authorities with some role in or oversight of sanctions responsibility – relatively higher than other member states where SIFMANet has held similar roundtables. The MFA is the authority with overall responsibility for coordinating the sanctions policy of the Danish government. Since 2022, the Danish “EU-Special Committee on Sanctions” and taskforces have expanded to include additional government bodies, ranging from utilities to cultural ministries. Government representatives highlighted the enhanced coordination that had been put into practice in Denmark. Steps included the establishment of a central sanctions coordinator team, vested in a newly established economic security unit in the MFA, and new intra-governmental procedures, as well as a governmental taskforce to counter circumvention, with participation from relevant national Danish authorities.</p> + +<p>Although government representatives said that this coordination between a wider group had improved effectiveness, dividing responsibility for implementation and guidance across numerous national competent authorities may also increase the risk of fragmentation in approach. This was underscored by comments from private sector participants, who said that there had been “inter-agency problems on who’s responsible for what”. One participant said that some questions had “circled for some time” as a result.</p> + +<h3 id="lacking-national-guidance-on-eu-regulations">Lacking National Guidance on EU Regulations</h3> + +<p>One source of frustration expressed by private sector participants at the roundtable was the Danish government’s reluctance to interpret European law and regulations or provide answers to specific questions, given that the debate had taken place in Brussels. One participant said that while interpretation of Danish law would take into account written remarks about the law, no such written remarks are provided for EU law and, they said, “we can only look at what the law says”. This representative also said the Danish government’s role was to provide guidance, “not counselling”. Other government representatives said they had provided as much guidance as possible, but that the scale of requests had been unprecedented.</p> + +<p>Private sector participants were frustrated with this position. They agreed that they found the EU FAQs helpful, but insisted these should be expanded further. While they appreciated the guidance that had been shared by the Danish government, they said it was both too limited and too slow. One representative of a Danish maritime industry group said that they had sent 75 to 100 requests to Danish authorities and had not yet received a clear response. Another participant, from a law firm, said the process was time-consuming and that it “can be difficult to get answers”.</p> + +<p>In addition to this, some participants said that, over time, they had stopped seeking formal clarification on the sanctions, because of concerns about privacy in the event of freedom of information requests being made to the government. One participant said they preferred to liaise through informal discussions. A business association representative also said companies had stopped seeking clarification on other matters for fear of receiving an answer that blocked a particular transaction. Overall, some private sector participants expressed their frustration that their community continued to have more experience and expertise in sanctions implementation than the public sector.</p> + +<h3 id="private-sector-information-sharing">Private Sector Information Sharing</h3> + +<p>Despite these obstacles, a business association representative said there was an overall positive public–private dialogue, and a general perception that Danish business wants to do right thing. Participants from both public and private sectors reiterated several times the importance of trust in the business environment, and a government representative said they were highly aware of companies’ willingness to comply, as well as the public support for their doing so.</p> + +<p>Another positive aspect highlighted was sharing information within the private sector, with more experienced companies sharing tools and information with smaller businesses, in order to support their compliance with the regulations. This was seen as an important support for business, given the “huge gap in compliance readiness” that a business association representative noticed among smaller companies. One participant from a multinational company said this information-sharing practice had been much more widespread in Denmark than in other European member states, an assertion supported by SIFMANet visits to other EU member states.</p> + +<p>Government-led efforts include not only the establishment of sanctions taskforces among authorities, but also substantial outreach to the private sector. This outreach included a notification that Danish authorities sent to over 1,500 companies containing information on their sanctions obligations and encouraging them to get in touch and ask for support. In addition, the Danish Business Authority has sent out targeted letters in relation to circumvention, including compliance guidance, to approximately 200 economic operators. Danish authorities had an existing relationship with obliged entities, but the government decided to engage with all companies, given the expansive nature of the Russia sanctions regime.</p> + +<h3 id="misalignment-between-banks-and-corporates">Misalignment Between Banks and Corporates</h3> + +<p>Representatives from the corporate sector, including industrial and shipping companies, expressed frustration with the banking sector, which they said had taken an overly narrow approach to allowing certain transactions – beyond what was required by the law. One participant said it was as if “every taxi driver had to ask clients what they were doing before accepting their fare”. A bank representative said the requirement to comply on the product side had fundamentally changed how financial institutions approach sanctions risk, while another participant said that they now viewed certain types of business activities as high risk, where these would not have been before 2022.</p> + +<p>Another participant, from a business association, said that several of their members had completed all compliance steps required for a certain transaction, but the banks had still refused to allow it. However, a representative from a bank said that non-US companies “need to step up”. They referred to the risks highlighted in the December 2023 amendments to US Executive Order 14024, which strengthened the US’ ability to sanction financial institutions facilitating and funding supplies to the Russian military–industrial complex.</p> + +<p>At the same time, representatives from corporates also acknowledged that there was a lack of regulation of that sector, compared to the financial industry. There is no specific “know your customer” requirement for much of Danish industry, which meant that it was challenging to convince boards to allocate resources to sanctions compliance. Meanwhile, banks now demand more compliance procedures, and have higher standards for their corporate clients.</p> + +<p>Additionally, participants from both banks and corporates cited a perception that the strictness of their compliance was harming their competitiveness compared to their European peers. They said this was a “significant” concern. Representatives of the shipping industry said that the country as a whole was now a “risk-poor environment”, with many shipping companies taking overly conservative approaches to international business, resulting in a negative impact on both that industry and the business environment overall.</p> + +<p>One area that was highlighted several times was product classification. Given the dominance of the shipping and trade sectors in Denmark, classification was a significant issue, with participants highlighting the difficulties of getting a classification on tariff codes from customs and a dual-use designation decision. Some participants agreed that there continued to be public sector resourcing issues relating to the EU sanctions over the critical goods and technologies listed under Annex VII of Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014. However, another participant mentioned that the DCA can provide Binding Tariff Information decisions.</p> + +<h3 id="enforcement-and-the-shadow-of-the-dan-bunkering-case">Enforcement and the Shadow of the Dan-Bunkering Case</h3> + +<p>The discussion then turned to the topic of enforcement, and numerous participants referred to the case of Dan-Bunkering, which was prosecuted in Denmark in 2021 for shipping $101 million in jet fuel to Syria from Kaliningrad. This case was seen by several participants as a model of enforcement. However, a representative of a business association said this represented a specific case, in which a business “wilfully turned a blind eye” to government guidance. In this way, they said, the Dan-Bunkering case was not representative of Danish business practices. Nevertheless, the experience clearly cast a shadow across public and private sector alike.</p> + +<p>Procedural questions of how investigations were initiated were also discussed, with prosecutors highlighting that many cases began with administrative infractions, escalating into cooperation between police and competent authorities. This procedure, another government representative said, had been set up after the Dan-Bunkering case, which had provided many opportunities to clarify procedures.</p> + +<p>A representative from the Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs said many investigations began with the relevant Danish authority conducting a review of the news media for negative reports or requesting documents from exporters to identify suspicious information. This information was then evaluated for potential indications of misconduct before the authority decided whether to escalate the matter to police (and potentially onwards to prosecutors). Since 2022, Danish authorities have evaluated 140 potential breaches, they said, and there were around 40 open cases. So far, six matters had been reported to police. At the same time, a customs representative said there were other steps before any potential breaches were reported, including a hearing on customs declarations, and so there was “a lot of enforcement going on behind the scenes” before any case is reported.</p> + +<p>Participants said these statistics highlighted the difficulty of comparing enforcement between different EU member states, with no centralised reporting of enforcement from the EU’s Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union. A participant from a business association said these figures were also likely to be much higher than the number of actual criminal cases, since many issues related to goods that were unintentionally misdeclared, due to the aforementioned classification difficulties, rather than deliberate evasion or circumvention.</p> + +<p>To this point from the business association, the customs representative responded that, in the majority of cases relating to possible breaches of import and export prohibitions, the DCA will go through several steps ahead of any potential filing of a police report. This includes a consultation process with the responsible party (usually the declarer), in which they are informed that the customs declaration is in possible breach of sanctions. The party will then be able to provide documentation for potential misdeclarations, so that the declaration can be corrected. Only if the responsible party is unable or unwilling to provide sufficient documentation that their goods are not in violation of sanctions will a police report be filed. Therefore, they argued, the figure is unlikely to be inflated by “unintentional misdeclarations” and similar declaration-related mistakes.</p> + +<p>Finally, participants discussed Denmark’s criminal enforcement regime for sanctions breaches, which requires proof of negligence or intent. Some participants found Denmark to have relatively high standards for criminal enforcement, and advocated for civil enforcement or other mechanisms with lower standards for deployment. Private sector representatives added that they would welcome a civil enforcement regime in Denmark, as this would allow voluntary self-disclosures and more dialogue between the public and private sectors, allowing companies to “come clean” if they have inadvertently breached sanctions.</p> + +<p>However, other participants said that widening enforcement action could damage the collaborative and cooperative nature of the public–private dialogue as well as the dialogue between private sector actors. They instead urged the government to publish findings from its investigations and reviews, even those that do not reach the standards for a criminal prosecution, as these would allow companies to learn from issues other entities have faced.</p> + +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> + +<p>Danish authorities and the private sector clearly reiterated their commitment to implementing and enforcing sanctions within Denmark at this roundtable. One particularly positive aspect of this was the commitment to information sharing in the private sector, both within business associations and between peers within industry. The roundtable discussions also demonstrated open and frank dialogue regarding the need for more guidance and support from the public sector, and authorities’ receptivity to these messages.</p> + +<p>The government’s ability to provide guidance and clear responses to queries appeared to be hampered by the spread of sanctions implementation responsibility across a large number of national competent authorities, to the degree that private sector actors complained of questions “circling” among various agencies.</p> + +<p>Further, the Danish authorities’ limitation on providing guidance on EU regulation, beyond what is stated in the wording and FAQs as adopted in Brussels, also poses practical difficulties and raised frustration within the private sector. Business representatives urged the government to share more information on its interpretations, including potentially on anonymised determinations by customs and other authorities in pre-enforcement investigations and analyses.</p> + +<p>Discussions also highlighted the potential gap in enforcement for sanctions breaches that occur due to conduct that falls below Denmark’s criminal standard. This may create a gap between Danish enforcement practice and that of other member states. At the same time, Danish business perceived its own practice as overly compliant, in comparison to other EU member states, raising concerns about Denmark’s competitiveness. Further alignment with other member states would address such concerns.</p> + +<p>In sum, like many EU member states, Denmark has discovered that the key to successful sanctions implementation starts with coordination across the wide range of agencies and departments that find themselves involved in the Russia sanctions regime. It has also discovered that investment in relations with the private sector – the frontline of implementation – is critical if the country is to play its part in restricting the funding, and particularly the resourcing, of Russia’s illegal war of aggression in Ukraine.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Olivia Allison</strong> is an Associate Fellow at RUSI and an independent consultant. She has more than 15 years’ experience carrying out complex international investigations and supporting the development of integrity and governance for state-owned companies, international companies and international financial institutions. She has a wide range of financial crime and asset-tracing experience from leadership roles held in London, Moscow, Kyiv and Kazakhstan.</p>Olivia AllisonDiscussions held in Copenhagen in March 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Denmark.【黎智英案・審訊第 89 日】2024-06-05T12:00:00+08:002024-06-05T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-89<ul> <li>料控方下周二完成案情 黎智英一方料7月作中段陳詞</li> </ul> @@ -572,96 +831,446 @@ <hr /> -<p><strong>Bonny Lin</strong> is a senior fellow for Asian security and director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> - -<p><strong>Brian Hart</strong> is a fellow with the China Power Project at CSIS.</p> - -<p><strong>Matthew P. Funaiole</strong> is vice president of the iDeas Lab, Andreas C. Dracopoulos Chair in Innovation, and senior fellow of the China Power Project at CSIS.</p> - -<p><strong>Samantha Lu</strong> is a research assistant with the China Power Project at CSIS.</p> - -<p><strong>Truly Tinsley</strong> is a program manager with the China Power Project at CSIS.</p>Bonny Lin, et al.This report lays out China’s potential motivations for a quarantine and maps out two plausible scenarios of how it could conduct operations.【黎智英案・審訊第 88 日】2024-06-04T12:00:00+08:002024-06-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-88<ul> - <li>黎智英指新冠肺炎致人命經濟損失 料美國人民會支持對中國實施制裁懲罰</li> +<p><strong>Bonny Lin</strong> is a senior fellow for Asian security and director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.</p> + +<p><strong>Brian Hart</strong> is a fellow with the China Power Project at CSIS.</p> + +<p><strong>Matthew P. Funaiole</strong> is vice president of the iDeas Lab, Andreas C. Dracopoulos Chair in Innovation, and senior fellow of the China Power Project at CSIS.</p> + +<p><strong>Samantha Lu</strong> is a research assistant with the China Power Project at CSIS.</p> + +<p><strong>Truly Tinsley</strong> is a program manager with the China Power Project at CSIS.</p>Bonny Lin, et al.This report lays out China’s potential motivations for a quarantine and maps out two plausible scenarios of how it could conduct operations.【黎智英案・審訊第 88 日】2024-06-04T12:00:00+08:002024-06-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-88<ul> + <li>黎智英指新冠肺炎致人命經濟損失 料美國人民會支持對中國實施制裁懲罰</li> +</ul> + +<excerpt /> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RhrcN6m.png" alt="image01" /></p> + +<p>【蘋果案】黎智英指新冠肺炎致人命經濟損失 料美國人民會支持對中國實施制裁懲罰</p> + +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(4日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第88日審訊。昨日辯方指黎身體不適及發抖,至今日黎如期出庭應訊。控方繼續播放國安法生效前黎智英受訪片段,在2020年6月與美國神父 Robert Sirico 的對談中,黎指經過新冠肺炎疫情之後,西方國家不再信任中國,並以審慎的態度與中國貿易;而且中國經濟變得衰弱,對美國來說是一個好時機去改變中國,乃至拯救全世界。黎又指新冠疫情導致很多美國人喪失親友、企業倒閉和蒙受金錢損失等等,他們對於中國忿忿不平,必定會支持時任美國總統特朗普制裁中國。</p> + +<h4 id="黎智英對談節目稱初來香港感受到自由-八九民運後創辦壹週刊雜誌">黎智英對談節目稱初來香港感受到自由 八九民運後創辦《壹週刊》雜誌</h4> + +<p>昨日辯方指黎身體不適及發抖,法官指黎需要送院作進一步檢查,遂押後至今日續審。今日黎如期出庭應訊,辯方指黎感覺比昨天好轉,因此審訊繼續。</p> + +<p>控方播放2020年6月18日美國智庫 Acton Institute 的節目影片,當中黎智英與美國神父 Robert Sirico 對談。</p> + +<p>黎憶述他年輕時初到香港,看到早餐有很多選擇,感到這個地方有自由、深受感動,雖然晚上要在工廠留宿,但他感到日子過得十分開心,因為感到這裡享有自由,獲得所有機會去證明自己、奮鬥、成就他想做的事。黎在工廠打工,期間自學英語,後來因為懂得英語而獲得機會晉升至推銷員。1969年,黎再獲得機會赴美國工作,當時正值胡士托音樂節舉行,後來演變成暴動,黎指他當時正在前往紐約,惟路途被截斷。</p> + +<p>直至27歲,黎成立自己的小型工廠,後來工廠規模變大,黎亦創立了成衣品牌「佐丹奴」。1989年北京爆發民運,黎全力支持,六四鎮壓之後他去信譴責李鵬,之後開始被中國打壓,被禁止在中國經營門市,黎因而被迫賣出「佐丹奴」,轉做傳媒生意。</p> + +<p>八九民運之後,黎創辦《壹週刊》雜誌,並打正旗號作為一個反對中共的雜誌,黎形容業務非常成功。他指當時所有人都自我審查、不敢得罪中共,而他在那時創辦雜誌,是一個很好的時機去填補市場的空白。黎其後創辦香港《蘋果日報》,成為香港最大報紙之一,後來再創辦台灣《蘋果日報》。</p> + +<h4 id="黎智英指很多主教替中國說好話-只有陳日君敢於與中國唱反調">黎智英指很多主教替中國說好話 只有陳日君敢於與中國唱反調</h4> + +<p>談到天主教徒身份,黎指其太太對他影響甚大,因為太太是一名虔誠的天主教徒,每逢星期日,黎與太太一同前往教堂,直至1997年黎皈依天主教。他表示從來不是以一種「為了社會或為了其他人」的心態而去爭取民主自由,而是他覺得自己應該去做,便去做,有時可能做得對,有時亦可能做錯。</p> + +<p>被問到何時認識天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君樞機,黎指當他皈依天主教的時候,陳日君仍是一名主教,由於二人追求自由的理念一致,所以多年來是好友。黎引述陳曾說過「梵蒂岡出賣了地下教會」,使陳十分傷心。</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4432cDt.png" alt="image02" /> +▲ 天主教香港教區榮休主教 陳日君樞機(資料圖片)</p> + +<p>黎又指很多主教都親中國、不時替中國說好話,甚至有的羅馬天主教會的樞機主教立場保守,希望避免得罪中國,唯一敢於與中國唱反調的樞機是陳日君。</p> + +<p>黎指,香港人的價值觀與西方一致,惟中國有著截然不同的價值觀,當中國以截然不同的價值觀與外界進行貿易來往時,世界將永無寧日。黎又指,當中國愈來愈富裕的時候,他們並不會愈來愈接近西方價值,反而會愈來愈不同,甚至想轉過來改變西方。他形容習近平是「人類史上最極端的獨裁者」,想帶領中國變回毛澤東時代,甚至懂得利用科技來監控人民。</p> + +<h4 id="黎智英指疫情令美國人蒙受損失-若特朗普推制裁會支持">黎智英指疫情令美國人蒙受損失 若特朗普推制裁會支持</h4> + +<p>黎形容美國是唯一「救星」,他提到經過新冠肺炎疫情之後,西方國家不再信任中國,並以審慎的態度與中國貿易;而且中國經濟變得衰弱,對於時任美國總統特朗普來說,這是一個好時機去改變中國,乃至拯救全世界。</p> + +<p>黎指,若然特朗普推行一連串的制裁和懲罰措施,他會得到很多來自美國人民的支持,因為新冠疫情導致很多美國人喪失親友、企業倒閉和蒙受金錢損失等等,他們對於中國忿忿不平,必定會支持制裁中國。黎形容這是一個絕妙的方式去促使中國改變。</p> + +<h4 id="控方接著播放黎智英whatsapp搜獲影片-大部份為羅傑斯發言片段不涉黎">控方接著播放黎智英WhatsApp搜獲影片 大部份為羅傑斯發言片段、不涉黎</h4> + +<p>控方其後播放多段由黎智英 WhatsApp 接收的影片,大部份為「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯(Benedict Rogers)的受訪和公開發言片段。播片前,法官李運騰質疑影片不涉及黎智英,控方有什麼基礎播放這些影片,又指影片是在海外拍攝,可以怎樣協助控方舉證。控方代表、高級檢控官徐倩姿則指,這些影片是在黎智英的 WhatsApp 發現,能夠顯示黎對影片內容知情,而且影片內容能夠讓法庭了解案發時的背景。</p> + +<p>在2019年7月19日,羅傑斯向黎智英傳送一段《大紀元時報》節目「美國思想領袖」(American Thought Leader)片段。當時反修例運動已爆發,羅傑斯在節目中指香港在97年主權移交以後,自由逐漸被侵蝕,而政府推動《逃犯條例》修訂,該草案容許政府將所有「眼中釘」從有法治的香港,去到沒有法治、只有「以法治國」(rule by law)的中國,不少香港人視草案為「最後一根稻草」,若修訂草案通過,中港之間的「防火牆」將會消失,形容這是主權移交22年以來最差的時候。</p> + +<p>被問到近年中國情況,羅傑斯指中國對基督教教堂、法輪功和西藏進行打壓,沒有宗教自由,難以理解為何一個主張「真、善、忍」的信仰系統,會遭受中國當局如此殘酷的回應。</p> + +<p>羅傑斯又稱,不知名人士曾寄送恐嚇信給他的鄰居和家人,要求羅傑斯停止繼續發聲。在一次公開場合中,有義工遭受襲擊。</p> + +<p>羅傑斯指,中國問題不僅限於中國內的人權和自由問題,如今更已對外國構成了威脅。他形容香港站在戰線前沿,因香港作為國際金融中心,也是亞洲最開放的城市之一,如果失去香港則後果不堪設想。</p> + +<h4 id="羅傑斯英國有責任帶頭呼籲制裁中國">羅傑斯:英國有責任帶頭呼籲制裁中國</h4> + +<p>控方另播放羅傑斯在2019年12月9日於倫敦「國際人權日」的發言、同月呼籲劍橋大學撤銷前特首林鄭月娥榮譽院士名銜的行動發言,以及2020年3月5日的受訪片段。羅傑斯指懂得區分「反中」與「反中共」是很重要,他18歲時曾到中國居住6個月,在當地認識了不少內地朋友,他強調在文化和朋友的層面上很喜歡中國。至於前特首林鄭月娥,羅傑斯指她不願聆聽6月9日一百萬上街市民的聲音,也不願聆聽6月16日二百萬上街市民的聲音,因此不值得擁有榮譽院士名銜。另外,在2019年11月25日的影片中,羅傑斯指英國有責任帶頭呼籲制裁中國。</p> + +<p>案件明日續審,控方表示尚餘6小時影片需要播放。</p> + +<hr /> + +<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英指新冠肺炎致人命經濟損失 料美國人民會支持對中國實施制裁懲罰Framing Sanctions2024-06-04T12:00:00+08:002024-06-04T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/framing-sanctions<p><em>This paper examines the question: How does the EU use strategic communications to persuade third countries to cooperate on sanctions? The paper analyses how the EU is using arguments linked to upholding values and appealing to the interests of third countries.</em></p> + +<excerpt /> + +<p>Diplomacy and strategic communications are key to making sanctions effective. Tackling the challenge of sanctions circumvention requires the cooperation of non-sanctioning (or third) countries, and sanctions diplomacy plays an important role in persuading them to cooperate. This paper offers a data-driven analysis of the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions against Russia, showing that the EU relies mostly on addressing interests (such as EU accession and economic interests) and framing support for sanctions as economically or politically desirable for third countries. To a lesser degree, values also play a role in the EU’s outreach, mostly in relation to protecting the principles of international law. This is in line with EU foreign policy’s broader shift to focusing more on interests.</p> + +<p>On the issue of sanctions circumvention, EU sanctions diplomacy applies a “stick and carrot” approach to both warn third countries of the potential negative impact on their economies if they allow such activities, and praise the efforts of countries that pledge to tackle circumvention. This communication implies that becoming a platform for circumvention can lead to reputational damage, resulting in fewer investments.</p> + +<p>However, the EU takes a different communication approach towards EU candidates than towards other third countries. Regarding the wider set of third countries, the EU generally accepts their wish not to align on sanctions, and only aims to compel them to tackle circumvention. On the other hand, EU candidate countries are reminded of their commitment to align with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy as part of the accession process, including alignment on sanctions.</p> + +<p>On values, the EU links cooperation on sanctions to defending the values of international law, offering third countries an opportunity to frame their support for sanctions as a way to help uphold the principles of international law, rather than framing them as explicit measures against Russia.</p> + +<p>The EU should focus on tracking policy developments in third countries, following their pledges to tackle circumvention, and adjust EU sanctions diplomacy accordingly. The EU should also resort more strongly to highlighting the requirement for EU candidate countries to align with sanctions. For other third countries, the EU should offer framings that highlight international norms and explore different options, such as environmental concerns surrounding Russia’s shadow fleet.</p> + +<h3 id="introduction">Introduction</h3> + +<p>Since February 2022, the EU and its allies have adopted a series of sanctions to respond to Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. A key challenge of making these restrictive measures effective is the tackling of circumvention, as redirecting trade of sanctioned goods through third countries can diminish the impact of sanctions. However, beyond stricter enforcement within the EU, this also requires the cooperation of non-sanctioning countries, as taking action to hinder circumvention through their territory is their sovereign choice.</p> + +<p>The paper examines the following question: How does the EU use strategic communications to persuade third countries to cooperate on sanctions? The paper analyses how the EU is using arguments linked to upholding values (supporting sanctions to protect the values of international law) and appealing to third countries’ interests (such as EU accession and economic interests) in its strategic communications on sanctions.</p> + +<p>The EU has taken several steps to close loopholes and strengthen the role of sanctions diplomacy – in other words, diplomatic efforts “to persuade [third] countries to follow suit”. As the paper demonstrates, however, in the case of the EU, sanctions diplomacy has been used not only to persuade countries to follow suit, but also to incentivise third countries to address circumvention.</p> + +<p>The 12th sanctions package of the EU, adopted in December 2023, has strengthened its anti-circumvention measures, which were already put at the top of the agenda in the 11th sanctions package in June 2023. Furthermore, the 13th package, adopted in February 2024, listed several companies in third countries that have been involved in sanctions circumvention. The EU’s diplomatic efforts to tackle sanctions evasion have also been supported by the appointment of the International Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions (EU sanctions envoy) at the end of 2022.</p> + +<p>At the same time, several third countries have been expressing their reservations about and even opposition to sanctions. Latin American countries reportedly advocated for omitting mentions of support for Ukraine from the July 2023 EU-CELAC summit declaration. South Africa claimed sanctions against Russia were causing collateral damage to “bystander countries”. India has been denying criticisms that the country would be facilitating sanctions circumvention by reselling refined Russian oil.</p> + +<p>These developments underline the need for constructive dialogue between the sanctions senders and third countries. They also highlight the importance of the public element of the EU’s sanctions diplomacy, namely the EU’s strategic communications as a “goal-directed communication activity”.</p> + +<p>Research on the perceived challenges of the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions has been relatively sparse. Nevertheless, existing literature contends that the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions have been driven by values rather than interests. This also led to the suggestion that the EU should reformulate its sanctions diplomacy “with more focus on the interests of states in joining the collective sanctions against Russia”. This paper argues that the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions have been focusing on interest-based arguments, in line with a shift towards highlighting interests in the EU’s foreign policy, as discussed in Chapter I.</p> + +<p>The paper is comprised of three chapters. Chapter I examines the role of sanctions diplomacy, the factors influencing third countries’ approaches to sanctions, and the EU’s shifting foreign policy, which form the context of the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions. Chapter II breaks down the communications strategies of EU officials in relation to Russia sanctions using a data-driven approach including an expert survey and word frequency analysis. Chapter III interprets the results and examines how the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions have balanced values- and interest-based communications in relation to the countries visited by the EU sanctions envoy. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations on how the EU can optimise its strategic communications on sanctions.</p> + +<h4 id="methodology">Methodology</h4> + +<p>The paper is based on a review of speeches, press conferences and interviews: strategic communications that create expectations ahead of meetings between the EU and third countries, and frame outcomes after such meetings. The paper analyses the communications outputs of two key EU representatives: the EU sanctions envoy, David O’Sullivan; and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (EU HR/VP) Josep Borrell. The analysis looked at EU communications issued between February and September 2023.</p> + +<p>The definitions of strategic communications and public diplomacy are not universally accepted. For Philip M Taylor, public diplomacy is one of the four pillars of strategic communications, while for Michael Vlahos, “public diplomacy” and “strategic communications” are synonymous. According to Guy J Golan and Sung-Un Yang, public diplomacy is the “management of communication” among diplomatic actors which have an objective of reaching foreign publics to promote national interest. However, for Nicholas J Cull, strategic communications is just one of many terms that describe what is essentially “conducting foreign policy by engaging foreign publics”. For Ali Fisher, strategic communications is the “telling” end of the spectrum of public diplomacy, messaging directly to foreign audiences. As this paper examines the EU’s direct messaging to foreign audiences through press releases, blogs and media interviews, it relies on Fisher’s definition, and employs the term “strategic communications”.</p> + +<p>Within the wider category of third countries targeted by strategic communications, the paper focuses on countries where the EU sanctions envoy has led negotiations. Within this group of countries, the paper examines six countries (out of nine) in which the EU sanctions envoy and third country officials communicated publicly around the negotiations: Armenia; Georgia; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Serbia; and Uzbekistan. Three of the nine countries had to be omitted from the analysis as no public statements could be identified on the EU sanctions envoy’s visits to the following jurisdictions: Türkiye; Pakistan; and the UAE.</p> + +<p>The review relied on desk-based research to retrieve the relevant communications materials and compile an analysis of academic literature. In its analysis of communications of relevant EU officials, the paper relies as much as is feasible on direct quotes, and not on reporters’ interpretations or descriptions. This ensures that only the language directly attributable to the EU officials is analysed, with the exception of Armenia and Serbia, for which the analysis sources did not reveal direct quotes by the EU sanctions envoy; the paper therefore uses secondary sources.</p> + +<p>The paper introduces the typology of “values-based” and “interest-based” communications, building on international relations and public diplomacy literature. For the purposes of this paper, “interest-based” communications focus on appealing to strategic interests, including political, military, economic and trade. “Values-based” communications focus on culture, values and ideals (political, economic and social systems), which can create an enabling environment for national interests.</p> + +<p>The methodology is inspired by Gry Espedal and colleagues’ book on researching values, with a special focus on Arild Wæraas’s chapter on making values emerge from texts and Benedicte Maria Tveter Kivle and Gry Espedal’s chapter on identifying values through discourse analysis. Furthermore, Paul Baker provides valuable insights on employing frequency analysis and using occurrences in discourse analysis. The paper’s methodology builds on two key approaches: the term “frequency analysis” as used by Steven Louis Pike; and Francis A Beer, Barry J Balleck and Ricardo Real P Sousa’s classification of idealist and realist vocabulary.</p> + +<p>On the use of frequency analysis, Kathleen Ahrens found that “narrowly focused corpora are suitable for identifying different viewpoints through an examination of lexical frequency patterns”. Pike used frequency analysis to research the narrative-driven shifts in US public diplomacy messaging and strategy. According to Baker, discourse analysis can point to “patterns in language (both frequent and rare) which must then be interpreted in order to suggest the existence of discourses”. To identify the main framings used by the EU to compel third countries to cooperate on sanctions, the paper builds on a frequency analysis of terms (collocations) used in EU sanctions communications.</p> + +<p>For the main analysis, the author worked with 23 texts (10,921 words) published between February and September 2023 (see Annex). The texts were published online, on EU institutional websites, on governmental websites in Armenia and Serbia, and through media outlets in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.</p> + +<p>To mine the most often-used terms, the statistical programme “r” was used, which can be used to measure term and document frequency and the co-occurrence of words, among other things. This allows for the calculation of possible collocations, which, according to Andreas Niekler and Gregor Wiedemann, “comprise two (or more) semantically related [words] … which form a distinct new sense”. Two terms, if they occur “significantly more often as direct neighbours as expected by chance”, can be treated as collocations.</p> + +<p>The most-often used collocations were listed in a survey which asked respondents to assign each collocation a score from 1 (values-based) to 7 (interest-based), based on their perception. This Likert scale allowed respondents to express the nuances of the level to which they perceived that collocations were falling towards a more values-based approach (scores 1–3), or a more interest-based approach (scores 5–7), or whether the collocations were neither explicitly values- nor interest-based (score 4).</p> + +<p>The survey was completed during January 2024 by 15 members of the European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), experts who have worked on sanctions within the framework of the network and focus on international relations studies. They represent think tanks from the UK and eight EU member states: Czechia; France; Germany; Hungary; Latvia; Lithuania; Poland; and Sweden. This covers perceptions from across different regions of the EU and the UK, thereby attempting to reflect geographic diversity.</p> + +<p>The survey presented the respondents with the topic of the paper, a description of the corpus and the definition of values- and interest-based communications as described above.</p> + +<h4 id="challenges-and-limitations">Challenges and Limitations</h4> + +<p>Key challenges for the research included the sample size of texts that could be analysed, as the sample is limited by the number of countries that the EU sanctions envoy has visited and where public communications were part of the envoy’s visit. Furthermore, sources being in the third countries’ languages posed a challenge, which was surmountable through the use of online translation tools, cross-checking against dictionaries and translation applications.</p> + +<p>Another challenge was developing a list of concepts to be used in the analysis to better understand the mode of communication (values-based or interest-based) employed by the EU in its sanctions diplomacy. The “coding” or classification through experts in the field of international relations from across the EU and the UK allowed for minimal cultural bias and an independent assessment of the terms employed in EU strategic communications.</p> + +<h3 id="i-eu-sanctions-communications-towards-third-countries">I. EU Sanctions Communications Towards Third Countries</h3> + +<p>The EU has consistently used strategic communications as part of its sanctions diplomacy towards third countries, aimed at reinforcing its sanctions policy. This is critical, as “active non-cooperation by [third] countries can sabotage the effort by providing offsetting assistance to the targeted regime”. This shows that third countries’ positioning in the dispute between the sanctions sender (EU) and the target (Russia) is highly relevant for the efficacy of sanctions, with “multilateral” sanctions deemed more successful than “unilateral” sanctions.</p> + +<p>Strengthening sanctions diplomacy efforts, the EU appointed David O’Sullivan as sanctions envoy in December 2022. The role of sanctions diplomacy was further reinforced by the 11th package of sanctions, adopted on 23 June 2023, which set out a multi-step approach to tackling sanctions circumvention, starting with the strengthening of “bilateral and multilateral cooperation through diplomatic engagement with, and the provision of increased technical assistance to, the third countries in question”.</p> + +<p>If the first round of diplomatic efforts yields no results, the EU can employ targeted proportionate measures aimed solely at depriving Russia of strategic resources. If this approach still fails to deliver results, the EU pursues re-engagement with the relevant third country. However, if these diplomatic efforts to tackle circumvention still fall short, the EU can adopt exceptional last-resort measures, including the restriction of sale, supply, transfer or export of sensitive dual-use goods and technology to the third country. At the time of writing, the EU has not yet resorted to the use of such last-resort measures for a third country.</p> + +<h4 id="eu-strategic-communications-to-third-countries">EU Strategic Communications to Third Countries</h4> + +<p>Going beyond tackling circumvention, the EU has also been attempting to incentivise certain third countries to align with its sanctions policies. Alignment has no legal definition, but in diplomacy, it is used to signal a third country’s public willingness to adopt sanctions similar to those of the EU. Between February and September 2023, the EU offered the opportunity for 14 non-EU countries to align with EU sanctions, and those which did were listed in declarations and statements issued by the EU HR/VP. While these declarations and statements are not legally binding, they offer a way for the EU to communicate the international support for its sanctions regime.</p> + +<p><em>EU Candidate Countries, EEA Member Countries and Eastern Partnership Countries</em></p> + +<p>As sanctions form part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), candidate countries are formally required to progressively align with those sanctions, reaching full alignment prior to accession. This expectation of candidate countries was also expressed in the European Council conclusions of 24 June 2022. However, as the evidence shows, not all candidate countries have been aligning themselves with the EU sanctions regime.</p> + +<p>The EU’s attempts to see countries join its sanctions efforts are most successful in its immediate neighbourhood, specifically among certain EU candidate countries and European Economic Area (EEA) countries. The declarations and statements by the EU HR/VP on the “alignment of certain countries” show that from February 2022 to September 2023, EU candidate countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Ukraine, and EEA members Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway have been consistently aligning themselves with EU sanctions. The candidate countries Georgia (potential candidate country until December 2023), Moldova (candidate country since June 2023) and Serbia were listed in certain declarations, while candidate country Türkiye and Eastern Partnership countries Armenia and Azerbaijan were not listed in any declarations regarding the alignment on sanctions against Russia between February 2022 and September 2023.</p> + +<p><em>EU Partner Countries</em></p> + +<p>While certain regional partners of the EU are not invited to join the declarations on alignment, they still communicate their adherence to the sanctions policy on Russia. Switzerland, for example, has issued its own announcements on its alignment with EU sanctions packages, without joining the EU HR/VP’s declarations. In the case of the 10th sanctions package, this “room for manoeuvre” was used in the Swiss Federal Council’s announcement to highlight that while the country was implementing the package, it also “introduce[d] a new means of safeguarding Swiss economic interests in specific cases”.</p> + +<p>For third countries, the alignment with EU sanctions depends both on a political evaluation of adopting the sanctions as a national foreign policy measure and on the political consequences of expressing public support for the EU’s sanctions regime.</p> + +<h4 id="factors-influencing-third-countries-approaches-to-eu-sanctions">Factors Influencing Third Countries’ Approaches to EU Sanctions</h4> + +<p>This section examines the factors that third countries take into consideration when deciding whether to support sanctions regimes. This can offer valuable insights into the factors that can also determine the success of the EU’s sanctions communications towards third countries.</p> + +<p>Research for this paper demonstrates that the economic links between the third country and the sanctioned country play a key role. For countries with close economic ties to Russia, sanctions present high costs and incentives to bust sanctions and provide indirect access to the sanctioned economy. Countries that are more economically dependent on Russia could therefore have limited means to implement sanctions, especially where social and economic groups have vested financial interests in continuing trade with the sanctioned country and lobby against sanctions implementation. Similarly, countries close to Russia in a vulnerable financial situation may fear economic disruption from the implementation of sanctions. Furthermore, the geopolitical orientation of third countries can also influence their decision on whether to support sanctions regimes. Another approach has been to look at the role of commercial and other actors in third countries, as “sanctions imposed against a target can make trade more profitable for a third party, presenting commercial opportunities”.</p> + +<p>The case of Georgia showcases the interplay of several elements of the factors described above. The country did not decide to adhere to the sanctions against Russia, but introduced certain restrictive measures, particularly in the financial sphere. For Georgia, Russia is the third-largest trade partner, and the EU’s share, while it is still the main trade partner, is decreasing. The circumvention challenge in Georgia is further complicated due to its trade with the Eurasian Economic Union, which is used by Russia to conceal the destination of trade flows. Furthermore, Georgia is economically benefiting from the inflow of Russian citizens and capital to the country. These factors, among others, contribute to Georgia’s complex approach to sanctions.</p> + +<p>Given the efforts of the EU to incentivise third countries to join its sanctions policies and the considerations influencing third countries’ choice of whether to support sanctions, it is important to analyse the type of goals EU sanctions diplomacy can attempt to achieve. Returning to the challenge of tackling circumvention, another avenue is for the EU to incentivise third countries to commit to tackling evasion through their territory, without asking them to align themselves with the EU’s sanctions regime.</p> + +<h4 id="the-eus-shifting-foreign-policy-and-strategic-communications">The EU’s Shifting Foreign Policy and Strategic Communications</h4> + +<p>Understanding the EU’s approach to foreign policy and strategic communications is fundamental for a more comprehensive study of the EU’s sanctions policy. The EU’s foreign policy has been analysed, to a limited extent, through the prism of discourse analysis, finding that its foreign policy and identity are articulated by referencing liberal values. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union presents these as the values that the Union is meant to defend and further internationally.</p> + +<p>On the role of the EU’s public diplomacy and strategic communications, it has been noted that while the European External Action Service (EEAS) should be key to helping “ethical Europe” grow, it should also provide a keen sense of strategic direction and interests. The EU has been described in the literature as a “normative power”, as it “was constructed on a normative basis, [which] predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics”. However, the 2016 EU Global Strategy set out the “principled pragmatism” approach, which considers the combination of interests and values as a guiding principle of the EU’s external action. The focus on interests was reinforced in the 2022 EU Strategic Compass, in which Borrell stated that the EU has to learn lessons from recent crises, including “finally getting serious about threats to our strategic interests that we have been aware of but not always acted upon”. The shift in the EU’s strategic communications to interests is also in line with the view of Allan Rosas, who highlighted that “sanctions should not be seen as value imperialism … as the Union is taking them to pursue not only its values but also its interests”.</p> + +<h3 id="ii-expert-perception-of-eu-sanctions-communications-on-the-values-interest-spectrum">II. Expert Perception of EU Sanctions Communications on the Values-Interest Spectrum</h3> + +<p>To better understand the role of the EU’s sanctions communications as a foreign policy tool, the paper assesses them along the values-interests spectrum. To this purpose, the paper examined the speeches, interviews and other communications outputs of the EU sanctions envoy and the EU HR/VP from February to September 2023.</p> + +<p>Analysis of the communications led to identifying the most frequently used pairings of two words in communications outputs, or “collocations”. Using the statistical programme “r”, the analysis computed 395 collocations using the “quanteda.textstats” package.</p> + +<p>The programme identifies collocation candidates based on the co-occurrence of patterns of words. The programme takes out the most frequently used word fillers or “stop words”, including “of”, “to” and “but”, which therefore do not appear in the 395 collocations that were computed. Of those, 116 collocations occurred three or more times and 279 collocations occurred two times across the 23 texts analysed. To focus only on collocations that occur a significant number of times across the 23 texts, the paper does not consider the 279 collocations that occurred only twice in EU communications. This process led to the reduction of the number of collocations to 25 and four synonyms.</p> + +<p>Next in the analysis, the collocations were to be categorised on the values-interest spectrum. Respondents completed the survey asking them to assign each collocation a score from 1 (values-based) to 7 (interest-based) based on their perception, reflecting the subjective judgement of each anonymous respondent. The responses were recorded anonymously and exported to Excel. The analysis used the rounded median of the responses to avoid the result being skewed by outliers. Table 1 shows the rounded median of the survey’s ratings and the number of times the collocation occurred in the 23 texts analysed.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/VXJyJ3D.png" alt="image01" /> +<em>▲ Table 1: Most-Often Used Collocations in EU Sanctions Communications</em></p> + +<p>For a better understanding of where the collocations lie on the values-interest spectrum, the results are summarised in Figure 1.</p> + +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/l2NVZzq.png" alt="image02" /> +<em>▲ Figure 1: Collocations on the Values-Interest Spectrum</em></p> + +<p>Figure 1 plots both the number and the occurrence of collocations in each of the seven categories along the values-interest spectrum, ranging from strongly values-based to strongly interest-based. The number of collocations (dots) shows how many of the terms were perceived to fall into each of the seven categories by the expert respondents to the survey. The occurrence of collocations falling into each category (bars) shows how many times the terms appeared across the analysed texts.</p> + +<p>Figure 1 demonstrates that interest-based collocations occurred significantly more often (91 times in total, including both weakly and moderately interest-based collocations) than values-based terms (17 times in total, including both weakly and moderately values-based collocations) or terms that were perceived as neither values- nor interest-based (16 times). The 11 moderately interest-based collocations occurred 60 times across the 23 texts analysed, making them the most commonly occurring terms.</p> + +<p>The results of analysis demonstrate that the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions strongly rely on interest-based terms. However, values and particularly the norms of international law also play a role in its communications – this is examined in more detail in Chapter III. Furthermore, the EU also employs terms that are neither values- not interest-based among the most-occurred terms in the analysed communications.</p> + +<h3 id="iii-the-balance-between-values--and-interest-based-eu-communications-on-sanctions">III. The Balance Between Values- and Interest-Based EU Communications on Sanctions</h3> + +<p>The results of the survey demonstrate the complexity of the EU’s sanctions diplomacy. While collocations that are perceived as interest-based by experts occur more often in quotes by O’Sullivan and Borrell, the use of values-based communication adds a nuance to the picture and raises the following questions. How are the collocations used in EU communications? How can they be interpreted in the context of the EU officials’ declarations? What do they divulge about the EU’s sanctions diplomacy?</p> + +<h4 id="preventing-circumvention-targeting-third-countries-interests">Preventing Circumvention: Targeting Third Countries’ Interests</h4> + +<p>Collocations related to circumvention and evasion have a central importance in EU sanctions diplomacy, playing a particular role in conveying a message targeting the interests of third countries. The EU is warning third countries that allowing their territories to be used for circumvention could damage their economies. Conversely, third countries’ efforts to tackle circumvention are met with praise in EU communications, setting a clear expectation for third countries. The circumvention- and evasion-related collocations were perceived to be moderately interest-based by the expert respondents to the survey, further confirming the role of these expressions in appealing to the interests of both the EU and third countries.</p> + +<p>“Platform [for] circumvention” was a particularly often used expression, with 10 occurrences. It was used to point out a threat and underline how becoming a platform for circumvention would go against the interest of third countries. O’Sullivan underlined the importance of the reputational damage that ensues when a country is proven to be a platform for sanctions circumvention, noting that “it will have a chilling effect on the companies of other countries. They no longer want to work with a country that helps them circumvent sanctions”. This was a clear message to third countries, highlighting the fact that allowing for circumvention will damage their investment prospects. In Georgia, the government’s efforts were highlighted by O’Sullivan in June 2023, who noted that the “Georgian authorities are taking very seriously the issue of not allowing this country to be used as a platform for circumvention”, noting that the country has put in place export-controlling measures on the most sensitive battlefield products.</p> + +<p>Addressing the challenge of “platform [for] circumvention” was also used to describe the very focus of the mission of O’Sullivan, who declared that “cooperating and engaging in a dialogue with third countries that could be used as a platform for circumvention is vital”. The expression was also used when describing the expectation of EU sanctions diplomacy, with O’Sullivan declaring about third countries that “what they usually say is that they don’t want to align with EU sanctions, but at the same time they don’t wish to be a platform for circumvention or evasion of sanctions, and therefore they will cooperate with us in trying to prevent that”. However, there are differences between the expectations towards EU candidate countries and non-candidate countries, as demonstrated below.</p> + +<p>Similarly, the expressions “circumvent sanctions” and “circumvention [of] sanctions” occurred exceptionally often in EU sanctions communications – in total, 13 times in the texts analysed – and those expressions were perceived as moderately interest-based. They fulfilled a similar role to the expression “platform [for] circumvention” in EU communications, warning of the negative impact of allowing circumvention, and praising efforts to tackle it. O’Sullivan focused on the former when he declared that “we are particularly concerned if there’s any circumvention of the sanctions on these [battlefield] products. This has led us to visit a range of countries in the last few months”. In Uzbekistan, for example, O’Sullivan used circumvention in the context of commending the country’s assurances on being against having its territory used for sanctions circumvention, while “respect[ing] Uzbekistan’s desire to remain neutral [in Russia’s war against Ukraine]”.</p> + +<p>The two expressions linked to evasion, “sanction evasion” and “evade sanction”, occurred seven times in total, placing them among the most-often used collocations in the analysed texts. They were used in the same way as expressions mentioning circumvention, focusing on warning and praising third countries. O’Sullivan highlighted that “our legal powers now enable us to sanction an entity in a non-EU country that is aiding a European company to evade sanctions”. As a positive assessment, he underlined that, for Georgia, “there are various ways in which people can try to evade sanctions, whether that’s at customs points or false declarations. And the Georgian authorities have put in place, as I say very impressive measures of trying to monitor this and make sure that it doesn’t happen”.</p> + +<h4 id="beyond-tackling-circumvention-addressing-implementation-and-alignment">Beyond Tackling Circumvention: Addressing Implementation and Alignment</h4> + +<p>EU communications addressed the options beyond tackling circumvention through third countries, including the questions of implementation, adoption and alignment on sanctions. These play an especially important role in the difference between the EU’s communications towards EU candidate countries and its communication towards other third countries. EU candidate countries are formally required to progressively align with the EU’s CFSP, which includes sanctions. A full alignment on sanctions needs to be reached prior to accession. This provides the EU with a tool to use regarding EU candidate countries to appeal to their political and economic interests in pursuing the EU accession process successfully.</p> + +<p>EU sanctions communications used three key collocations to describe how far countries potentially could go in supporting EU sanctions. On one hand, these expressions offered a way to remind EU candidate countries of their commitments. On the other, they offered a way to demonstrate that in most third countries, the EU is not asking for alignment, but only for help in tackling circumvention. These can be seen as a “compromise offer” by the EU to non-candidate countries, highlighting that while it could ask for more efforts, it is accepting tackling circumvention as a commendable policy.</p> + +<p>The terms used for communicating these interests are the weakly interest-based terms “implement sanctions”, along with its synonym “sanctions implementation” (among the most-used terms, occurred eight times) and “impose sanctions” (six times) and the moderately interest-based term “align sanctions” (four times).</p> + +<p>Speaking about his country visits, O’Sullivan highlighted that in the cases of EU candidate countries, “the context is always different of course in … Serbia and Türkiye … candidates for accession to the European Union, so there is actually potentially an obligation on them to align with our sanctions”. In the same statement, he also underlined that non-candidate countries, such as countries in central Asia or certain countries in the Caucasus, have no obligation to align with EU sanctions. This point was repeated by Borrell in September 2023, noting that “we expect our partner countries and, in particular those who aspire to become members, to align with our foreign policy decisions”.</p> + +<p>The EU’s relationship with candidate and potential candidate countries demonstrates that the issues of implementation, adoption and alignment on sanctions can be used to appeal to EU candidate countries’ interests on joining the EU. It also allows the EU to express disapproval of certain policies, including engaging with sanctioned entities. In September 2023, Borrell noted that the EU regretted the Georgian government’s decision to resume flights to and from Russia and allow sanctioned individuals to enter the country, highlighting that “these decisions go against EU’s policy and international efforts to isolate Russia internationally due to its illegal war”.</p> + +<h4 id="naming-the-war-stopping-russias-war-machine">Naming the War: Stopping Russia’s War Machine</h4> + +<p>The EU has countered Moscow’s continuous refusal to call the war in Ukraine by its name, referring to it as a “special military operation”, by clearly referencing “the war” and Russia’s “war machine” in its communications. The terms “war machine” and “invasion [of] Ukraine” were perceived as neither values- nor interest-based and are therefore seen as more descriptive expressions by the expert respondents to the survey. However, the importance of these terms is signalled by the number of times they occurred (“war machine” seven times and “invasion [of] Ukraine” six). They offer a clear way for the EU to steer third countries towards using the same framing.</p> + +<p>The expression “war machine” was primarily used to describe the “Russian war machine” as a concept. It was employed to underline that most third countries do not wish to contribute to fuelling the Russian war machine, while remaining neutral in the conflict. In general, the aim of the EU’s restrictive measures is described in terms of “crippling Russia’s war machine”, targeting both the material and financial means of the Kremlin.</p> + +<p>Mentioning the “invasion [of] Ukraine” fulfilled a similar role in the EU’s sanctions diplomacy. While “war machine” was used in relation to the aim of sanctions, “invasion [of] Ukraine” was used in the context of describing the reason for the sanctions being put in place. O’Sullivan noted that the EU’s most important message is that “we oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine”.</p> + +<h4 id="appealing-to-values-the-role-of-international-law">Appealing to Values: The Role of International Law</h4> + +<p>While the results of the analysis show that the EU predominantly communicated by addressing interests, its sanctions diplomacy also contains an important element of values-based communications, focusing primarily on international law. Three values-based collocations, “UN Charter”, “war crime” and “international law”, were used to appeal to the values of international law. These terms were used both to remind third countries of the importance of upholding these principles and to praise third countries’ cooperation by specifically referring to international law. By linking the cooperation on sanctions to international norms, the EU offers an opportunity for third countries to frame any support for tackling circumvention as a positive effort to strengthen the norms of international law. This can be an attractive framing for third countries that have close geopolitical or economic ties to Russia and might be reluctant to communicate cooperating on these measures explicitly as steps against Moscow.</p> + +<p>Borrell noted that he “appreciated the ‘principled position of Kazakhstan based on respect for the UN Charter and the territorial integrity of all UN members, including Ukraine’”. He also highlighted that the EU is asking “all countries … to stand on the side of the principles and values of the UN charter and international law”. This demonstrates the EU’s expectation of third countries to support its sanctions efforts not only because it is in their economic interest, as the use of circumvention-related expressions shows above, but also because it is essential for upholding the norms and values of international law.</p> + +<p>Underlining this approach, O’Sullivan summarised the EU’s message as “we believe that Putin’s actions are completely contrary to the UN charter, it is a war crime” and noted that “in the case of Russia, we are dealing with a particularly egregious breach of international law”. Similarly, Borrell noted that “what is happening in Ukraine is a blatant violation of the UN Charter and the international rules-based order”.</p> + +<p>“Support Ukraine” and its synonym “Ukraine support” were perceived as the most strongly values-based terms among the 25 collocations analysed, with six occurrences in total. The term was primarily used to express that the EU is “supporting Ukraine, and we will support Ukraine for as long as it takes”, framing it as a goal of the EU’s sanctions policy, linking the support for the EU’s sanctions to supporting Ukraine. This can differ from the approach of highlighting international law, as it links the support for sanctions more explicitly to supporting Ukraine, not just international law in general.</p> + +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> + +<p>EU strategic communications on sanctions rely heavily on addressing economic and political interests. As the results of the data-driven analysis show, the most-often occurring terms in EU communications are perceived to target political and economic interests. Only a minority of terms appeals to values, mostly related to international law.</p> + +<p>The paper’s use of data analytics and an expert survey on perceptions offer a unique contribution to the discussion on EU sanctions communications, allowing for a more structured analysis along the values-interest spectrum. This data-driven approach provides a more informed understanding of EU communications and formulates more targeted and evidence-based recommendations on how to improve EU sanctions diplomacy.</p> + +<p>The paper presents the following findings and recommendations to EU policymakers and diplomats.</p> + +<blockquote> + <h4 id="1-eu-sanctions-communications-overwhelmingly-rely-on-appealing-to-interests">1. EU sanctions communications overwhelmingly rely on appealing to interests.</h4> +</blockquote> + +<p>The EU tends to frame support for tackling sanctions circumvention as an economic interest of third countries. It employs a “stick-and-carrot” approach – the stick is a warning to third countries of the potential negative economic consequences and reputational damage of allowing circumvention, which can lead to fewer investments, while the carrot is the EU’s praise of the efforts of third countries which pledge to tackle circumvention through their territory, which can help bolster their reputation.</p> + +<p><strong>Recommendation: The EU should hold third countries to their promises.</strong></p> + +<p>The “carrot” of positive reputation through the EU’s praise can only be credible if the EU revises its communications consistently. As the EU can strengthen third countries’ reputations by praising their efforts, the EU also needs to withdraw its praise in public communications when third countries do not enact effective and enforceable policies. The EU needs to adapt this communication by expressing either continued praise if third countries indeed implement and enforce the announced anti-circumvention policies or change course and highlight shortcomings when the announced policies do not become reality or are not enforced.</p> + +<p><strong>Recommendation: The EU should not fear using its economic power to compel countries to tackle sanctions circumvention.</strong></p> + +<p>The EU needs to continue warning countries of the negative impact of allowing sanctions circumvention and use the designation of third country companies as a credible threat. The “stick” of warning third countries of the consequences of allowing circumvention only works if the negative impact is demonstrated credibly, including through the listing of third country companies that facilitate sanctions circumvention.</p> + +<blockquote> + <h4 id="2-the-eu-communicates-different-expectations-for-eu-candidate-countries-and-other-third-countries">2. The EU communicates different expectations for EU candidate countries and other third countries.</h4> +</blockquote> + +<p>Countries on the path to join the EU are formally required to progressively align with the EU’s CFSP, including sanctions, reaching full alignment prior to accession. This expectation is expressed in references to imposing, implementing and aligning with EU sanctions communications, which are among the most-often used terms. Non-candidate countries have no obligation to align with the EU’s sanctions regime, and consequently, the EU communicates their efforts to address circumvention as a sufficient policy step.</p> + +<p><strong>Recommendation: The EU should continue to use accession as a motivation for EU candidate countries to ensure they align with EU sanctions against Russia.</strong></p> + +<p>The EU should make more explicit reference to the accession process in its communications to make EU candidate countries move forward with their alignment on sanctions against Russia. The communications around accession negotiations and other meetings of EU officials with EU candidate countries should be used as a platform to remind EU candidate countries of the clear incentive to adopt EU sanctions and signal their commitment to the accession process. This needs to be highlighted in public communications in the candidate countries, informing the public of this requirement.</p> + +<blockquote> + <h4 id="3-the-eu-uses-the-referencing-of-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-in-eu-sanctions-diplomacy-as-a-tool-to-counter-russias-narrative-in-third-countries">3. The EU uses the referencing of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in EU sanctions diplomacy as a tool to counter Russia’s narrative in third countries.</h4> +</blockquote> + +<p>The EU uses the referencing of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in neither a values-based nor interest-based manner. However, it can serve as a tool to counter Russian narratives in third countries which have a high degree of political and economic ties to Russia.</p> + +<p><strong>Recommendation: The EU should continue to use all available forums to counter Russia’s narratives, including press conferences and other public statements from the EU sanctions envoy.</strong></p> + +<p>The EU sanctions envoy regularly visits countries with different degrees of ties to Russia, where the EU’s messages might not get the desired visibility. These visits can offer an opportunity to highlight the EU’s narrative and counter Russia’s disinformation. By giving interviews and being featured in the press, EU officials can create more visibility for the EU’s narratives in third countries, therefore the EU sanctions envoy and other officials should use all channels at their disposal to engage with the media during their in-country visits.</p> + +<blockquote> + <h4 id="4-while-values-play-a-less-important-role-than-interests-in-the-eus-sanctions-communications-the-communications-employ-a-valuable-framing-tool-related-to-international-law">4. While values play a less important role than interests in the EU’s sanctions communications, the communications employ a valuable framing tool related to international law.</h4> +</blockquote> + +<p>The EU addresses values mainly by referring to international law and linking the support for sanctions to strengthening these values. The EU HR/VP has explicitly commended the “principled position of Kazakhstan based on respect for the UN Charter” and, in this context, acknowledged Kazakhstan’s “efforts to ensure its territory is not used to circumvent European and international sanctions against Russia”, which demonstrates the impact of values in EU strategic communications.</p> + +<p><strong>Recommendation: The EU should continue to use the values of international law in its strategic communications, which would help third countries to frame their efforts against circumvention.</strong></p> + +<p>The EU should reinforce its focus on the values of the UN Charter as it can offer an opportunity to third countries to frame their anti-circumvention policies as a contribution to upholding the principles of international law. This could be especially useful in third countries that have close geopolitical or economic ties with Russia. In these countries, a framing referring to strengthening international law might be more attractive than a more explicit framing of anti-circumvention policies as measures directed against Russia.</p> + +<blockquote> + <h4 id="5-eu-sanctions-communications-could-explore-an-environmental-framing">5. EU sanctions communications could explore an environmental framing.</h4> +</blockquote> + +<p>There are certain dimensions that were not addressed in EU strategic sanctions communications analysed for this paper, including Russia’s “shadow fleet”, mostly made up of uninsured old ships that transport oil to evade the oil price cap. The shadow fleet therefore presents a real environmental threat that could affect any of the littoral countries along the fleet’s routes.</p> + +<p><strong>Recommendation: The EU should explore referencing the environmental threat posed by Russia’s sanctions circumvention by sea in its strategic communications.</strong></p> + +<p>This would offer another incentive for third countries to support the EU’s sanctions efforts by tackling circumvention. Similar to the values of international law, environmental framing would allow third countries to frame their efforts to collaborate on tackling sanctions circumvention as a response to environmental concerns, rather than a measure directed more explicitly against Russia.</p> + +<h3 id="annex-sources-used-for-the-main-analysis">Annex: Sources Used for the Main Analysis</h3> + +<ol> + <li> + <p><a href="https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/statement-eu-sanctions-envoy-david-osullivan-first-sanctions-coordinators-forum-2023-02-23_en">European Commission, “Statement by EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan on the First Sanctions Coordinators Forum”, 23 February 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/fisma/items/778510/en">European Commission, “David O’Sullivan: Interview with Newly Appointed International Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions”, 28 February 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eus-new-sanctions-envoy-set-to-fight-sanction-cirvumvention/">Jakob Hanke Vela and Barbara Moens, “EU’s new Sanctions Envoy Shifts Focus to Enforcement”, Politico, 1 March 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://www.euwatch.be/russia-sanctions-will-remain-in-place-for-a-long-time/">EU Watch, “‘Russia Sanctions will Remain in Place for a Long Time’: EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan”, 6 March 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://24.kg/english/261840_EU_Envoy_Sanctions_should_not_cause_deterioration_of_relations_with_Kyrgyzstan/">Tatyana Kudryavtseva, “EU Envoy: Sanctions Should not Cause Deterioration of Relations with Kyrgyzstan”, 24 KG, 28 March 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://24.kg/english/261838_Import_of_goods_from_EU_to_Kyrgyzstan_increases_by_300_percent/">Tatyana Kudryavtseva, “Import of Goods from EU to Kyrgyzstan Increases by 300 Percent”, 24 KG, 28 March 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://arminfo.info/full_news.php?id=75406&amp;lang=3">Marianna Mkrtchyan, “Date of EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan’s Visit to Armenia not yet Known”, ArmInfo, 29 March 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://kz.kursiv.media/2023-04-24/zhnr-putin/">Zhania Urankaeva, “Kazakhstan will not face Sanctions for Partnership with Russia and Putin – EU Special Representative”, 24 April 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://qaz.ulysmedia.kz/news/5897-eo-okili-kai-zhagdaida-kazakstanga-sanktsiialar-salynuy-mumkin-ekenin-aitty/">Ulysmedia, “ЕО өкілі қай жағдайда Қазақстанға санкциялар салынуы мүмкін екенін айтты” (“The Representative of the EU said in Which Case Sanctions may be Imposed on Kazakhstan”), 24 April 2023</a>. Author translation.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://astanatimes.com/2023/04/eu-begin-talks-with-kazakhstan-to-prevent-re-export-of-sanctioned-goods-to-russia/">Aibarshyn Akhmetkali, “EU Begin Talks with Kazakhstan to Prevent Re-Export of Sanctioned Goods to Russia”, Astana Times, 25 April 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://kaztag.kz/en/news/kazakhstan-will-not-fall-under-secondary-sanctions-due-to-putin-s-visit-eu">KazTag, “Kazakhstan will not fall Under Secondary Sanctions Due to Putin’s Visit”, 25 April 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://www.gazeta.uz/en/2023/04/28/sanctions/">Gazeta.uz, “‘We are Grateful Uzbekistan is Against Having its Territory used to Circumvent the Sanctions’ – EU Special Envoy”, 28 April 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/transcript-press-point-eu-sanctions-envoy-mr-david-o’sullivan_en?s=221">Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, “Transcript of Press Point of the EU Sanctions Envoy, Mr. David O’Sullivan”, 28 June 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/07/04/third-countries-now-making-it-more-difficult-for-russia-to-acquire-sanctioned-goods-eu-env">Mared Gwyn Jones, “Third Countries now Making it ‘More Difficult’ for Russia to Acquire Sanctioned Goods – EU Envoy”, Euronews, 4 July 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-finance-podcast-future-finance/eu-finance-podcast-one-about-eu-sanctions-envoy_en">European Commission, “EU Finance Podcast: The One About the EU Sanctions Envoy”, 26 July 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/war-ukraine-partnerships-non-alignment-and-international-law_en">Josep Borrell, “The War on Ukraine, Partnerships, Non-alignment and International Law”, EEAS, 1 February 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://jam-news.net/aviation-sanctions-against-russia/">JAMnews, “European Union Calls on Georgia to Join Sanctions Against Russia in Aviation Sector”, 12 May 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-asia/news/eu-acknowledges-kazakhstans-efforts-to-curb-russia-sanction-circumvention/">EurActiv, “EU Acknowledges Kazakhstan’s Efforts to Curb Russia Sanction Circumvention”, 16 May 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/some-clarifications-circumvention-eu-sanctions-against-russia_en">Josep Borrell, “Some Clarifications on the Circumvention of EU Sanctions Against Russia”, EEAS, 19 May 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/serbia-not-a-platform-for-circumventing-eu-sanctions-says-the-prime-minister/">Bojana Zimonjić Jelisavac, “Serbia not a Platform for Circumventing EU Sanctions, Says the Prime Minister”, EurActiv, 12 May 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2023/05/24/eu_san/12023">Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, “Meeting of the Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia Mnatsakan Safaryan with David O’Sullivan, the International Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions”, 24 May 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/interview-josep-borrell-eu-high-representative-european-union-foreign-affairs-and-security-policy_en">Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, “Interview with Josep Borrell, EU High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission”, 7 September 2023</a>.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-press-remarks-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-after-meeting-prime-minister_en">EEAS, “Georgia: Press Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell After Meeting with Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili”, 8 September 2023</a>.</p> + </li> +</ol> + +<hr /> + +<p><strong>Balázs Gyimesi</strong> is the Communications Manager of RUSI Europe in Brussels.</p>Balázs GyimesiThis paper examines the question: How does the EU use strategic communications to persuade third countries to cooperate on sanctions? The paper analyses how the EU is using arguments linked to upholding values and appealing to the interests of third countries.【黎智英案・審訊第 87 日】2024-06-03T12:00:00+08:002024-06-03T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-87<ul> + <li>辯方指黎智英身體不適、打冷顫 官提議送院檢查 押後至明日續審</li> </ul> <excerpt /> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/RhrcN6m.png" alt="image01" /></p> - -<p>【蘋果案】黎智英指新冠肺炎致人命經濟損失 料美國人民會支持對中國實施制裁懲罰</p> - -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(4日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第88日審訊。昨日辯方指黎身體不適及發抖,至今日黎如期出庭應訊。控方繼續播放國安法生效前黎智英受訪片段,在2020年6月與美國神父 Robert Sirico 的對談中,黎指經過新冠肺炎疫情之後,西方國家不再信任中國,並以審慎的態度與中國貿易;而且中國經濟變得衰弱,對美國來說是一個好時機去改變中國,乃至拯救全世界。黎又指新冠疫情導致很多美國人喪失親友、企業倒閉和蒙受金錢損失等等,他們對於中國忿忿不平,必定會支持時任美國總統特朗普制裁中國。</p> - -<h4 id="黎智英對談節目稱初來香港感受到自由-八九民運後創辦壹週刊雜誌">黎智英對談節目稱初來香港感受到自由 八九民運後創辦《壹週刊》雜誌</h4> - -<p>昨日辯方指黎身體不適及發抖,法官指黎需要送院作進一步檢查,遂押後至今日續審。今日黎如期出庭應訊,辯方指黎感覺比昨天好轉,因此審訊繼續。</p> - -<p>控方播放2020年6月18日美國智庫 Acton Institute 的節目影片,當中黎智英與美國神父 Robert Sirico 對談。</p> - -<p>黎憶述他年輕時初到香港,看到早餐有很多選擇,感到這個地方有自由、深受感動,雖然晚上要在工廠留宿,但他感到日子過得十分開心,因為感到這裡享有自由,獲得所有機會去證明自己、奮鬥、成就他想做的事。黎在工廠打工,期間自學英語,後來因為懂得英語而獲得機會晉升至推銷員。1969年,黎再獲得機會赴美國工作,當時正值胡士托音樂節舉行,後來演變成暴動,黎指他當時正在前往紐約,惟路途被截斷。</p> - -<p>直至27歲,黎成立自己的小型工廠,後來工廠規模變大,黎亦創立了成衣品牌「佐丹奴」。1989年北京爆發民運,黎全力支持,六四鎮壓之後他去信譴責李鵬,之後開始被中國打壓,被禁止在中國經營門市,黎因而被迫賣出「佐丹奴」,轉做傳媒生意。</p> - -<p>八九民運之後,黎創辦《壹週刊》雜誌,並打正旗號作為一個反對中共的雜誌,黎形容業務非常成功。他指當時所有人都自我審查、不敢得罪中共,而他在那時創辦雜誌,是一個很好的時機去填補市場的空白。黎其後創辦香港《蘋果日報》,成為香港最大報紙之一,後來再創辦台灣《蘋果日報》。</p> - -<h4 id="黎智英指很多主教替中國說好話-只有陳日君敢於與中國唱反調">黎智英指很多主教替中國說好話 只有陳日君敢於與中國唱反調</h4> - -<p>談到天主教徒身份,黎指其太太對他影響甚大,因為太太是一名虔誠的天主教徒,每逢星期日,黎與太太一同前往教堂,直至1997年黎皈依天主教。他表示從來不是以一種「為了社會或為了其他人」的心態而去爭取民主自由,而是他覺得自己應該去做,便去做,有時可能做得對,有時亦可能做錯。</p> - -<p>被問到何時認識天主教香港教區榮休主教陳日君樞機,黎指當他皈依天主教的時候,陳日君仍是一名主教,由於二人追求自由的理念一致,所以多年來是好友。黎引述陳曾說過「梵蒂岡出賣了地下教會」,使陳十分傷心。</p> +<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kq8HIkX.png" alt="image01" /></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/4432cDt.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 天主教香港教區榮休主教 陳日君樞機(資料圖片)</p> +<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(3日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第87日審訊。控方打算繼續播放黎智英在《國安法》生效之前的受訪片段,惟辯方指黎身體不適,明顯可見正在「打冷顫」,又指昨晚黎見了醫生,惟只獲處方止痛藥。法官杜麗冰提議安排黎送院接受檢查,並且今天不應在黎缺席下續審,遂押後至明日續審。</p> -<p>黎又指很多主教都親中國、不時替中國說好話,甚至有的羅馬天主教會的樞機主教立場保守,希望避免得罪中國,唯一敢於與中國唱反調的樞機是陳日君。</p> +<p>甫開庭,代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻表示不幸地有一個壞消息要報告法庭,因黎智英身體不適,現時明顯地可見被告欄內的他正在「打冷顫」,又指昨晚黎見了醫生,惟只獲處方止痛藥(Panadol)。庭上所見,黎能夠自行步入及步出被告欄,他今天身穿啡色大褸上庭,而非平日所穿的普通外套。</p> -<p>黎指,香港人的價值觀與西方一致,惟中國有著截然不同的價值觀,當中國以截然不同的價值觀與外界進行貿易來往時,世界將永無寧日。黎又指,當中國愈來愈富裕的時候,他們並不會愈來愈接近西方價值,反而會愈來愈不同,甚至想轉過來改變西方。他形容習近平是「人類史上最極端的獨裁者」,想帶領中國變回毛澤東時代,甚至懂得利用科技來監控人民。</p> +<p>法官杜麗冰聽罷指,黎需要送院接受進一步身體檢查,不認為今天的審訊要在黎不在場下繼續,又表示理解黎有相當年紀及最近天氣不佳。杜官指示辯方律師在今日下午4時再了解情況及醫生意見,並且通知法庭。控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行則表示會與懲教人員和警方溝通以作出安排。</p> -<h4 id="黎智英指疫情令美國人蒙受損失-若特朗普推制裁會支持">黎智英指疫情令美國人蒙受損失 若特朗普推制裁會支持</h4> +<p>黎一度在被告欄內與律師團隊溝通,其後彭耀鴻向法官轉述黎智英擔心自己浪費在座所有人的時間。法官杜麗冰則稱沒有問題,最重要是黎在感到舒服的情況下才能繼續審訊,最終押後案件至明日不早於上午11時續審。</p> -<p>黎形容美國是唯一「救星」,他提到經過新冠肺炎疫情之後,西方國家不再信任中國,並以審慎的態度與中國貿易;而且中國經濟變得衰弱,對於時任美國總統特朗普來說,這是一個好時機去改變中國,乃至拯救全世界。</p> +<hr /> -<p>黎指,若然特朗普推行一連串的制裁和懲罰措施,他會得到很多來自美國人民的支持,因為新冠疫情導致很多美國人喪失親友、企業倒閉和蒙受金錢損失等等,他們對於中國忿忿不平,必定會支持制裁中國。黎形容這是一個絕妙的方式去促使中國改變。</p> +<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導辯方指黎智英身體不適、打冷顫 官提議送院檢查 押後至明日續審No Silver Bullets2024-06-03T12:00:00+08:002024-06-03T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/no-silver-bullets<p><em>Removing restrictions on the use of weapons supplied to Ukraine by international partners will help Ukraine’s defence against Russia, but it is not a war-winning move on its own.</em></p> -<h4 id="控方接著播放黎智英whatsapp搜獲影片-大部份為羅傑斯發言片段不涉黎">控方接著播放黎智英WhatsApp搜獲影片 大部份為羅傑斯發言片段、不涉黎</h4> +<excerpt /> -<p>控方其後播放多段由黎智英 WhatsApp 接收的影片,大部份為「香港監察」創辦人羅傑斯(Benedict Rogers)的受訪和公開發言片段。播片前,法官李運騰質疑影片不涉及黎智英,控方有什麼基礎播放這些影片,又指影片是在海外拍攝,可以怎樣協助控方舉證。控方代表、高級檢控官徐倩姿則指,這些影片是在黎智英的 WhatsApp 發現,能夠顯示黎對影片內容知情,而且影片內容能夠讓法庭了解案發時的背景。</p> +<p>Overnight on 30 May, media reporting claimed that US President Joe Biden had apparently relaxed restrictions on the use of US weapons against targets in Russia. This followed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky voicing his frustration at the continued existence of such limitations. The issue has been given extra relevance by Russian forces based in Belgorod launching a new operation around Kharkiv, and has been taken up by the NATO Secretary-General and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Journalists and analysts have been left to parse the meaning and phrasing of every (ambiguous) sentence uttered by Western politicians on the subject.</p> -<p>在2019年7月19日,羅傑斯向黎智英傳送一段《大紀元時報》節目「美國思想領袖」(American Thought Leader)片段。當時反修例運動已爆發,羅傑斯在節目中指香港在97年主權移交以後,自由逐漸被侵蝕,而政府推動《逃犯條例》修訂,該草案容許政府將所有「眼中釘」從有法治的香港,去到沒有法治、只有「以法治國」(rule by law)的中國,不少香港人視草案為「最後一根稻草」,若修訂草案通過,中港之間的「防火牆」將會消失,形容這是主權移交22年以來最差的時候。</p> +<h3 id="current-ukrainian-operations-and-existing-constraints">Current Ukrainian Operations and Existing Constraints</h3> -<p>被問到近年中國情況,羅傑斯指中國對基督教教堂、法輪功和西藏進行打壓,沒有宗教自由,難以理解為何一個主張「真、善、忍」的信仰系統,會遭受中國當局如此殘酷的回應。</p> +<p>The start point, on which everyone seems to be in agreement, is that it is both legitimate and legal for Ukraine to attack military targets on Russian territory. It is defending itself against a Russian attack and can respond under Article 51 of the UN Charter, having been engaged in an International Armed Conflict since 2014. Provided it acts in accordance with International Humanitarian Law, it has a wide range of targets from which to choose, including oil and fuel production facilities which, while they may have a civilian function, are also contributing to the Russian war machine – so-called “dual use facilities”. Added to this would be the airbases for long-range Russian bombers that have been launching strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure and other civilian targets; military production facilities; ammunition dumps and storage facilities for other materiel; and a variety of military bases including the Russian ports for the Black Sea Fleet.</p> -<p>羅傑斯又稱,不知名人士曾寄送恐嚇信給他的鄰居和家人,要求羅傑斯停止繼續發聲。在一次公開場合中,有義工遭受襲擊。</p> +<p>The suggestion of caveats first appeared with the provision of sophisticated and mostly longer-range weapons that arrived in mid-2022 and early 2023, from multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) like the US HIMARS and UK M270, to cruise missiles like the UK Storm Shadow and French SCALP. Biden stated at the time that HIMARS would not be used against targets in Russia, and it later emerged that technical alterations had been made to ensure this was not possible. Meanwhile, UK statements on the use of Storm Shadow heavily emphasised its use inside Ukraine (including areas illegally annexed by Russia, like Crimea), mirroring apparent restrictions on the use of UK M270. The overriding concern in these early debates was the risk of escalation involved in any Russian response to the provision of more sophisticated and more threatening weapons.</p> -<p>羅傑斯指,中國問題不僅限於中國內的人權和自由問題,如今更已對外國構成了威脅。他形容香港站在戰線前沿,因香港作為國際金融中心,也是亞洲最開放的城市之一,如果失去香港則後果不堪設想。</p> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Removing restrictions on HIMARS and other MLRS systems, as well as Ukrainian artillery firing Western-supplied ammunition, would allow Ukraine to strike massing Russian forces and conduct counter-battery fire against artillery situated just over the border</code></em></strong></p> -<h4 id="羅傑斯英國有責任帶頭呼籲制裁中國">羅傑斯:英國有責任帶頭呼籲制裁中國</h4> +<p>That debate continues to rage, with the benefit of two years’ observations on Russian rhetoric and actions, including strikes against Ukrainian civilian targets and growing suggestions of a Russian sabotage campaign inside Europe. But alongside the serious consideration of managing this escalation (or calling Russia’s bluff) should be a discussion on the military utility of – and possible targets for – such weapons. Ukraine is already running a deep strike campaign using drones against a range of targets, occasionally hitting Moscow itself, but more frequently striking refineries and production facilities. These attacks reduce supplies going directly to Russian forces, and also cut revenue used to fund the war. In addition, a campaign against bomber airfields has destroyed both long-range bombers and smaller fighter-bombers. Some of these attacks have used drones and have taken place at extreme ranges of over 1,000 miles, but there also appears to be an element of infiltration and ground sabotage against bases and rail links, including some over 3,000 miles from Ukraine. Finally, Ukraine’s use of both air and maritime drones against the Black Sea Fleet has sunk a number of ships and even threatened the port at Novorossiysk. What, then, would other weapons add?</p> -<p>控方另播放羅傑斯在2019年12月9日於倫敦「國際人權日」的發言、同月呼籲劍橋大學撤銷前特首林鄭月娥榮譽院士名銜的行動發言,以及2020年3月5日的受訪片段。羅傑斯指懂得區分「反中」與「反中共」是很重要,他18歲時曾到中國居住6個月,在當地認識了不少內地朋友,他強調在文化和朋友的層面上很喜歡中國。至於前特首林鄭月娥,羅傑斯指她不願聆聽6月9日一百萬上街市民的聲音,也不願聆聽6月16日二百萬上街市民的聲音,因此不值得擁有榮譽院士名銜。另外,在2019年11月25日的影片中,羅傑斯指英國有責任帶頭呼籲制裁中國。</p> +<h3 id="the-value-of-deep-strike">The Value of Deep Strike</h3> -<p>案件明日續審,控方表示尚餘6小時影片需要播放。</p> +<p>The answer is that the types of targets and the defences around them work against the drone programme. First, the drones used by Ukraine tend to be slow and have limited payloads. They use sheer numbers to get through to targets, and although they have very long ranges – it can be hard, especially in the face of Russian air defences – to get sufficient numbers through to cause major and long-lasting damage, especially against hardened targets or those under cover. Flight time can vary, but for long-distance targets is sufficient to give the Russians early warning, which necessitates Ukrainian mass or much closer (and riskier) infiltration operations. For the long-distance and relatively predictable targets, this may be enough, but Ukraine needs firepower that it can bring to bear rapidly and with little warning. This is where ATACMS – with multiple variants – comes into play, and it could provide a valuable weapon for striking airbases hosting both fighter-bombers and attack helicopters, as well as rear-area logistics and ammunition dumps. Depending on which variants have been provided, both cluster and unitary warheads have ranges of up to 190 miles, providing a threat to static locations, such as in Belgorod, Voronezh, Kursk and maybe even Lipetsk oblasts.</p> -<hr /> +<p>Longer-range air defence systems could also play a role, albeit with some significant risks involved. Russian bombers mostly launch their cruise missiles within Russian airspace, so the launching aircraft are outside the ranges of systems like IRIS-T (15 miles) or point defence like Starstreak (5 miles). The same is true of some aircraft launching glide bombs, which are currently being used to devastating effect both on civilian areas and Ukrainian forces on the front line. Some can be released from 25 miles away; in the north this can be done from Russia. They are almost impossible to intercept, and this can only be achieved at great cost with expensive missiles used for multiple incoming bombs. Ideally, launch aircraft would be caught on the ground, but as a fallback, a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system like Patriot – with a range of around 100 miles (depending on the target) – could be pushed closer to the front line to shoot down Russian aircraft before release. So-called “SAMbushes” involve removing launchers from around infrastructure and putting them at greater risk of attack, but pose a challenge to Russian aircraft which currently fire from airspace where they believe themselves to be safe. There is some doubt over the extent to which this represents a “strike” on Russian “territory”, but media reporting suggests there has been disquiet over the use of German systems, which at least indicates the expectation of some kind of existing constraint.</p> -<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導黎智英指新冠肺炎致人命經濟損失 料美國人民會支持對中國實施制裁懲罰【黎智英案・審訊第 87 日】2024-06-03T12:00:00+08:002024-06-03T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-87<ul> - <li>辯方指黎智英身體不適、打冷顫 官提議送院檢查 押後至明日續審</li> -</ul> +<p>The new development which raises the question of a potentially unintended constraint being rendered nonsensical by changes on the ground is the Russian assault towards Kharkiv and the massing of forces over the border from Sumy. Up until now, the “close” fight has largely been conducted unambiguously on Ukrainian territory. In the case of Kharkiv, the proximity to the border means that Russian assault forces have been able to mass and assemble inside Belgorod, and artillery fire from within Russia can reach Ukrainian forces along the front. Removing restrictions on “standard” HIMARS and other MLRS systems, as well as standard Ukrainian tube artillery firing Western-supplied 152mm and 155mm ammunition, would allow the Ukrainians to at least strike massing Russian forces and conduct counter-battery fire against artillery situated just over the border. In the case of HIMARS it would allow the Ukrainians to out-range the equivalent Russian guns (although reporting has indicated there is effective Russian interference with guided projectiles).</p> -<excerpt /> +<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The lesson of the past 18 months is that the deep battle complements fighting close-in and along the front line, but is not a substitute for it</code></em></strong></p> -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/kq8HIkX.png" alt="image01" /></p> +<p>Perhaps surprising by their absence from this priority list are the Storm Shadow and SCALP missiles. While these would be useful for arms dumps, command locations and logistics targets with protection against drones, their (publicly-acknowledged) range of around 160 miles means that the launch point for the Ukrainian aircraft carrying them comes uncomfortably close to Russian air defences if the target is deep within Russia. For this reason, both have been used on targets much closer to the front line, including in and around Crimea. The provision of German Taurus, with a slightly larger warhead and a range up around 300 miles, could make striking deeper targets in Russia much more feasible, or bring additional firepower to bear on targets further south around Crimea, including the Kerch Bridge, where Russian air defences have already been degraded.</p> -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(3日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第87日審訊。控方打算繼續播放黎智英在《國安法》生效之前的受訪片段,惟辯方指黎身體不適,明顯可見正在「打冷顫」,又指昨晚黎見了醫生,惟只獲處方止痛藥。法官杜麗冰提議安排黎送院接受檢查,並且今天不應在黎缺席下續審,遂押後至明日續審。</p> +<h3 id="keeping-the-russians-guessing">Keeping the Russians Guessing</h3> -<p>甫開庭,代表黎智英的資深大律師彭耀鴻表示不幸地有一個壞消息要報告法庭,因黎智英身體不適,現時明顯地可見被告欄內的他正在「打冷顫」,又指昨晚黎見了醫生,惟只獲處方止痛藥(Panadol)。庭上所見,黎能夠自行步入及步出被告欄,他今天身穿啡色大褸上庭,而非平日所穿的普通外套。</p> +<p>It is worth concluding with an acknowledgement of the military benefits of ambiguity and what a change in policy would not achieve. The public Western position around the use of such weapons has been hugely variable; UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron, for example, did not explicitly say UK-supplied weapons could be used in Russia, and many of the recent statements of support have been generic. Beyond the question of escalation management, it would be prudent to keep Russia guessing about what sophisticated weapons may or may not be used against its forces, because this poses dilemmas about what mix of air defence systems to deploy and what level of dispersal or early-warning systems may be necessary. We can assume that Storm Shadow (for example) has not yet been fired against a Russian target as no components have emerged from debris, but the potential exists if the right tone is struck. It may also be the case that, behind the scenes, some constraints have already been lifted. At sea, the UK has retrospectively claimed credit for the use of maritime drones against the Black Sea Fleet. Given the UK’s role, alongside others, in providing support to Ukrainian drone programmes, it is possible that a number of countries have already provided components for weapons that have struck Russian targets. The ambiguity over this support not only evades questions of escalation, but also provides few clues for Russia that would allow it to prepare countermeasures until after such weapons can be used.</p> -<p>法官杜麗冰聽罷指,黎需要送院接受進一步身體檢查,不認為今天的審訊要在黎不在場下繼續,又表示理解黎有相當年紀及最近天氣不佳。杜官指示辯方律師在今日下午4時再了解情況及醫生意見,並且通知法庭。控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行則表示會與懲教人員和警方溝通以作出安排。</p> +<h3 id="larger-challenges-remain">Larger Challenges Remain</h3> -<p>黎一度在被告欄內與律師團隊溝通,其後彭耀鴻向法官轉述黎智英擔心自己浪費在座所有人的時間。法官杜麗冰則稱沒有問題,最重要是黎在感到舒服的情況下才能繼續審訊,最終押後案件至明日不早於上午11時續審。</p> +<p>At the same time, caution should be taken not to see a change in policy as a panacea for Ukraine’s current challenges. The successful campaign against Russian energy infrastructure has not forced Russia to reassess its campaign overall. The long-range bomber force has had to disperse and has reduced its strike capabilities, but has not ended attacks on civilian infrastructure. The decimation of the Black Sea Fleet has reopened exports from Odesa, but made little contribution to the ability of 2023’s counteroffensive to retake lost territory. And strikes on arms dumps behind the front lines and sabotage within Russia have reduced the flow of materiel going to the Russian army, but not to the extent that it has had to fall back. The lesson of the past 18 months is that the deep battle complements fighting close-in and along the front line, but is not a substitute for it. Striking forces across the border from Kharkiv will provide some immediate relief to Ukrainian forces and be of significant tactical benefit; in doctrinal terms, this is a “close battle” that happens to straddle the border with Russia. Overall, the challenges for Ukraine in 2024 and potential answers remain the same as before this decision: resupply of equipment and ammunition, recruitment and training of personnel, and effective defences to prevent or slow down Russian ground advances. Deep strike is not a silver bullet.</p> <hr /> -<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導辯方指黎智英身體不適、打冷顫 官提議送院檢查 押後至明日續審【初選47人案・審訊判詞】2024-05-31T12:00:00+08:002024-05-31T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-dictum<ul> +<p><strong>Matthew Savill</strong> is the Director of Military Sciences at RUSI, focussing on developments and trends in modern conflict, and the use of force in the 21st Century.</p>Matthew SavillRemoving restrictions on the use of weapons supplied to Ukraine by international partners will help Ukraine’s defence against Russia, but it is not a war-winning move on its own.【初選47人案・審訊判詞】2024-05-31T12:00:00+08:002024-05-31T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-hk-democrat-primary-elections-dictum<ul> <li>官指無差別否決財案迫政府回應五大訴求 屬違《基本法》及濫權</li> <li>官:戴耀廷終極目標推翻現行制度 游說參與者 運用否決權成絕大部分人共識</li> </ul> @@ -5418,329 +6027,4 @@ <p><strong>Eliza Lockhart</strong> is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI. Her research examines matters at the intersection of law, finance, and global security; with a particular focus on how evidence-based policy can promote democratic resilience and protect the rule of law against foreign interference. Eliza’s current projects include whistleblowing, state threats and economic security.</p> -<p><strong>Tom Keatinge</strong> is the founding Director of the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI, where his research focuses on matters at the intersection of finance and security. He is also currently a specialist adviser on illicit finance to the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee ongoing enquiry.</p>Justyna Gudzowska, et al.This Policy Brief identifies common mechanisms by which professional service providers facilitate sanctions evasion and makes recommendations for how policymakers can work together to minimise the use of professional service providers to circumvent sanctions.【黎智英案・審訊第 70 日】2024-05-06T12:00:00+08:002024-05-06T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-70<ul> - <li>被捕後落假口供 數月後決定協助警方調查道出實情 陳梓華:唔想受到良心嘅責難</li> -</ul> - -<excerpt /> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/FD0Jxl6.png" alt="image01" /></p> - -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(6日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第70日審訊。陳梓華繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。陳早前承認在2020年10月首次被捕之後,在錄影會面中向警察提供虛假陳述,為了與黎智英、李宇軒和「重光團隊」等撇清關係;直至2021年3月底,陳決定做控方證人,並向警方道出實情。被問到為何改變主意,陳表示:「因為我一開始畀嘅口供唔係事實,後來我希望將個事實講返出來」,他之後又說:「因為我唔想再受到責難。」控方追問受到誰人責難,陳稱:「我唔想受到良心嘅責難。」</p> - -<p>已認罪的被告陳梓華第12天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。代表黎智英的紐西蘭御用大律師 Marc Corlett 早前完成盤問,現由控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行覆問。</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/vo4nicT.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 副刑事檢控專員 周天行</p> - -<h4 id="陳梓華想與攬炒巴等人撇清關係-因為知道大家犯法">陳梓華:想與攬炒巴等人撇清關係 因為知道大家犯法</h4> - -<p>控方指,陳梓華在2020年10月10日首次被捕,之後在警署進行了兩次錄影會面,陳在早前承認在該些錄影會面中向警察提供虛假陳述,並解釋稱因為當時以為可以與黎智英、其私人助手 Mark Simon、李宇軒、「攬炒巴」劉祖廸和「重光團隊」撇清關係。</p> - -<p>被問到為何想撇清關係,陳回答:「因為當時我知道其實大家都有犯到法」,因「重光團隊」繼續推動制裁,他知道 Mark Simon 和劉祖廸仍然有參與,而他自己也是美國線一員,所以他認為大家已經觸犯了《國安法》。而當時李宇軒已經被捕,陳相信警方很大機會已經查到他與李宇軒等人的關係。</p> - -<h4 id="陳梓華稱起初說謊後來說真話-因唔想受到良心嘅責難">陳梓華稱起初說謊後來說真話 因「唔想受到良心嘅責難」</h4> - -<p>控方指,直至2021年3至4月,陳梓華同意協助警方調查,並於4月28日首次以控方證人身份進行錄影會面。控方問陳,在該次錄影會面,以及其後的所有錄影會面中,有否向警方講真話。陳表示有。</p> - -<p>控方指,在決定做控方證人之前,陳向警方提供虛假陳述,可是他決定做控方證人之後,似乎有一個想法上的轉變,問陳為何後來決定向警方如實交代實情。陳表示:「因為我一開始畀嘅口供唔係事實,後來我希望將個事實講返出來」,他之後又說:「因為我唔想再受到責難。」</p> - -<p>控方追問陳梓華不想受到誰人責難。陳表示:「我唔想受到良心嘅責難。」所以在後來一次錄影會面中,他提出要求做控方證人,「因為嗰時3月尾已經想將所有嘅真相都講出嚟。」</p> - -<h4 id="陳梓華被捕前已丟棄手機-故錄口供時警方沒有出示通訊對話憑記憶作供">陳梓華:被捕前已丟棄手機 故錄口供時警方沒有出示通訊對話、憑記憶作供</h4> - -<p>控方展示陳的書面證供,他提及黎說過不論是宣揚港獨還是主張維持一國兩制,總之要百花齊放,在香港本土保持熱度。陳梓華指,這裡的「熱度」是指抗爭的熱度,整體上是反政府和爭取「五大訴求」的立場。他稱這部份證供與其早前庭上指黎說過不是不支持勇武是有關係,因為黎智英認為勇武派是保持抗爭熱度的其中一個原因。</p> - -<p>辯方在早前盤問中質疑,就2020年1月台北陽明山別墅的會議,陳未曾在任何錄影會面或書面供詞中提及過,他自己向黎智英指「攬炒巴」劉祖廸曾去過美國,以及其團隊在德國和愛丁堡舉辦過遊行。而陳亦確認。</p> - -<p>在控方覆問下,陳解釋錄取口供的時候,他只記起黎智英和劉祖廸之間的對話內容,而開場白和自我介紹則沒有記起到,所以便沒有向警察提起。</p> - -<p>陳又提到,在他被捕之前,他已經丟掉了他的手機,所以他被捕之後,載有訊息的手機並沒有被警方檢取,其後進行的錄影會面中,警察並沒有向他出示任何訊息紀錄,因此當時全部憑記憶錄口供,而他與李宇軒和黎智英之間的 Signal 訊息紀錄,也是他上庭作供時才第一次見到。</p> - -<h4 id="陳梓華指黎智英籲他把訊息同身邊嘅人講-意思是告訴ipac和swhk">陳梓華指黎智英籲他把訊息「同身邊嘅人講」 意思是告訴IPAC和SWHK</h4> - -<p>陳早前供稱,2020年6月赴壹傳媒大樓與黎智英會面期間,陳稱他向黎表達對國安法的關注,認為需要「褪」,即所有人都不應該繼續倡議制裁,黎則籲陳叫其他人繼續在文宣和國際線上工作。辯方質疑上述說話從沒出現在陳的錄影會面或書面供詞中,亦指陳從沒有在該次會面中向黎談論 IPAC 和 SWHK。</p> - -<p>控方今展示陳的供詞紀錄,他曾向警察引述黎的說話:「你應該同身邊嘅人講呢⋯⋯係 pass on 個 message 畀身邊嘅年青人,叫佢哋勇於去繼續發言、繼續發聲⋯⋯啲國際游說嘅工作,咁呀繼續去做,唔好停咁樣樣。」</p> - -<p>陳回應,當時黎智英叫他繼續做國際游說的時候,黎是想他將這個訊息告知 SWHK 成員;而黎說「你應該同身邊嘅人講」,是因為李宇軒有協助 IPAC,而且 SWHK 當時剛剛加入 IPAC,所以黎想陳向 IPAC 和 SWHK 傳遞訊息。</p> - -<p>控方展示另一份供詞,陳當時向警察引述黎稱:「而且他會以身作則繼續於各大媒體呼籲關注及制裁中國及香港,並要求我繼續呼籲各界進行文宣、國際游說及參加初選等。」陳解釋,上文提到的「國際游說」是指 SWHK。</p> - -<h4 id="陳梓華自稱傳聲筒-如團隊遇難題會轉達給mark-simon">陳梓華自稱「傳聲筒」 如團隊遇難題會轉達給Mark Simon</h4> - -<p>辯方亦質疑,陳從沒有在錄口供時提及他與美國線有紛爭,要求黎的私人助手 Mark Simon 出面調停,其後 Mark Simon 出手擺平爭拗,往後與美國線保持聯繫。就此,控方展示陳的口供紀錄,當中陳稱:「好多時例如眾籌嘅時候,佢哋有啲信息呀,或者有啲時候遇到難題咁,可能要搵到阿 Mark 或者係搵到黎智英嘅時候呢,咁我就係一個傳聲筒咁樣樣嘅,就會幫佢哋將個 request ,即係佢哋嘅訴求話到畀阿 Mark 知。」</p> - -<p>陳確認上述證供,並舉例指有一次黎智英說「要有啲耐性」,因為當時日本線接觸不到「枱底人」,於是陳告訴李宇軒:「黎智英話要有啲耐性,同埋或者可以搵阿 Mark 幫手。」此外,陳稱黎說過:「IPAC 好重要」,而他亦有跟李宇軒轉達黎的說話,叫李應該留在 IPAC 及繼續國際游說。</p> - -<p>陳梓華早前庭上供稱他曾告知 Mark Simon,李宇軒頑固地不想離開香港,惟辯方質疑此對話從沒出現在其供詞紀錄中。在控方覆問下,陳指警方錄取口供時,從沒有問及他與 Mark Simon 之間有關李宇軒的對話內容,也沒有向他展示他與李宇軒之間的 Signal 訊息對話。</p> - -<p>辯方亦質疑陳從未向 Mark Simon 提及 IPAC,僅在庭上首度提及。控方問陳,為何錄取口供時沒有向警察提及相關對話。陳則指沒有特別原因,「只係因為我冇具體參與喺 IPAC 入面,所以我印象唔係好深刻。」</p> - -<h4 id="陳梓華黎智英想組大台橫跨勇武和理非-相當於主導整個社運">陳梓華:黎智英想組「大台」橫跨勇武和理非 相當於主導整個社運</h4> - -<p>辯方盤問時指出,黎智英從沒說過想做勇武派的領袖,也不是想做勇武派一員,去破壞公物或縱火。在控方覆問下,陳表示:「我諗佢(黎)唔係話想成為勇武隊嘅領袖,佢係想組織一個橫跨和理非同埋勇武嘅大台,而呢個大台係佢可以主導嘅。」</p> - -<p>陳又指,當時勇武派沒有「大台」,只有零零星星比較出名的勇武小隊,所以一旦不同勇武小隊的領袖,以及和理非的領袖,兩者能夠組成「大台」,「咁就相當於主導晒成個社會運動,呢個就係我當時嘅意思。」</p> - -<h4 id="陳梓華稱對swhk背景和目的沒有存疑-但會跟朋友說負面風評">陳梓華稱對SWHK背景和目的沒有存疑 但會跟朋友說負面風評</h4> - -<p>陳梓華於2020年10月的錄影會面謄本顯示,他當時向警察稱:「因為我對於 Stand with Hong Kong 嘅某啲目的,甚或乎背景,我一直有存疑,咁可能我會有所貶抑,對佢哋一啲負面嘅評論,可能會喺私底下同朋友上面,或者係同家人有講過。」在辯方盤問下,陳稱為了想與 SWHK 撇清關係而說謊。</p> - -<p>在控方的澄清下,陳表示對於 SWHK 的背景和目的並沒有存疑,所以向警方稱「一直有存疑」是謊話;不過「咁可能我會有所貶抑」則是真話,「有啲唔好嘅風評,我係有同朋友講過。」</p> - -<h4 id="陳梓華稱黎智英起初對攬炒態度負面-區選後不再批評或反對">陳梓華稱黎智英起初對「攬炒」態度負面 區選後不再批評或反對</h4> - -<p>控方指,陳梓華曾被辯方問到,黎智英、李柱銘和 Mark Simon 是否都對「攬炒」抱持負面態度,當時陳回答「最初係」,控方問後來上述人士的立場是如何。</p> - -<p>陳指,在2019年區議會選舉之後,黎智英和 Mark Simon 對於「攬炒」的取態有改變,「佢哋(老泛民)唔再批評或者反對攬炒派,尤其是喺國際線上面,佢哋認為攬炒派係可以團結嘅。」</p> - -<h4 id="陳梓華稱黎智英繼續呼籲制裁-辯方質疑沒看過文章內容">陳梓華稱黎智英繼續呼籲制裁 辯方質疑沒看過文章內容</h4> - -<p>控方表示覆問完畢。在法官的提問下,陳稱在《國安法》生效之後,有在網上見到黎智英繼續呼籲制裁,包括推動「避風港法案」,又邀請很多外國智庫和政經界名人來做訪問,以及在社交媒體上繼續發表意見。</p> - -<p>不過在辯方御用大律師 Marc Corlett 的提問下,陳梓華稱不記得自己看過的黎智英文章和直播影片內容,他稱當時在 Telegram 上見到一條連結,相信是通往黎智英的一篇文章,而且相信內容是關於呼籲制裁。</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/6XjMYdi.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻(左)、大律師 Marc Corlett(右)</p> - -<p>辯方質疑,陳梓華之所以說黎智英在《國安法》之後繼續呼籲制裁,是因為他只在 Telegram 上看過一篇或多於一篇的文章標題,可是他並沒有按進去連結來閱讀文章內容。</p> - -<p>此時法官杜麗冰表示留意到時間,辯方表示他要問的問題是很重要的範疇,因此杜官押後至明日再續。控方表示,明天陳梓華完成作供之後,將傳召下一名證人、前壹傳媒財務總裁周達權,惟他並非以「從犯證人」身份作供,而是一名市民證人。</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QnjVBYF.png" alt="image04" /> -▲ 左起:張劍虹、黎智英、周達權(資料圖片)</p> - -<p>法官李運騰問控方,周達權作供需時多久。控方指一日或一日之內便可完成主問。李官笑言,他有需要問控方這些問題,因為「我還有其他的事要忙(“I am busy with something else.”)」。控方又指,現時控辯雙方正在商討能否以書面方式處理香港城市大學法律學院教授、梁美芬丈夫王貴國的證供,而毋須他出庭作供。</p> - -<p>辯方則指,根據陳梓華的證供,有不少警察曾經到懲教所探訪他,因此要求傳召涉事的6至7名警員出庭作供。法官問辯方是否堅持要在庭上播放長達35小時的「Live Chat with Jimmy Lai」影片,辯方則指這些影片是重要。辯方表示,本來相信審訊可於5月底完成,但是現在相信還需要6月初的時間。</p> - -<hr /> - -<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導被捕後落假口供 數月後決定協助警方調查道出實情 陳梓華:唔想受到良心嘅責難【黎智英案・審訊第 69 日】2024-05-03T12:00:00+08:002024-05-03T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-69<ul> - <li>庭上認向警作虛假陳述 陳梓華:當時有僥倖心態、以為可與黎智英撇清關係</li> -</ul> - -<excerpt /> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/QiBjkBm.png" alt="image01" /></p> - -<p>【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪,案件今(3日)於高院(移師西九龍法院)踏入第69日審訊。陳梓華繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供,並接受辯方盤問。陳連日來在庭上供述他與黎智英和 Mark Simon 之間的對話,惟辯方質疑陳從沒在錄影會面或書面供詞中提及該些對話,並質疑陳在證人台上捏造一些陳述出來,為自己謀取利益。陳否認。此外,陳早前承認在2020年10月首次被捕之後,在錄影會面中向警察提供虛假陳述,包括他並非「重光團隊」成員、經常取笑攬炒派、沒有協助李宇軒逃離香港等等。被問到為何要說謊,陳稱:「當時我仲有一個僥倖嘅心態」,以為可以與黎智英和「重光團孩」等撇清到關係,並且可在獲釋之後得到 Mark Simon 安排離開香港。</p> - -<h4 id="辯方指陳梓華部份庭上供述對話-從未在落口供時提及-陳同意">辯方指陳梓華部份庭上供述對話 從未在落口供時提及 陳同意</h4> - -<p>陳梓華早前作供時引述自己及黎智英等人的說話,包括黎表示他並非不支持勇武,但是要迎合西方的要求,國際的支持比勇武的支持更加重要。辯方質疑上述說話從沒在陳的書面證供或錄影會面中提及過。</p> - -<p>陳則引述其書面證供,當中提及黎說過不論是宣揚港獨還是主張維持一國兩制,總之要百花齊放,在香港本土保持熱度;惟陳最終承認他在這部份的證供中沒提及過黎說「希望你明白我並非不支持勇武」。</p> - -<p>辯方逐一指出以下對話並未曾在陳的錄影會面或書面供詞中提及過。陳確認。</p> - -<ul> - <li> - <p>在台北的陽明山別墅會議中,黎問「攬炒巴」劉祖廸為何眾籌可以達到如此龐大規模,二人繼而分析原因;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>在台北的陽明山別墅會議中,「攬炒巴」劉祖廸聽畢黎智英的說話後,表示要跟李宇軒商討;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>陳稱自己曾告訴黎智英,劉祖廸不想打議會線,但會全力打國際線,而且日本線有李宇軒牽頭;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>陳稱他與美國線有紛爭,要求黎的私人助手 Mark Simon 出面調停,其後 Mark Simon 出手擺平爭拗,往後與美國線保持聯繫;</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>在壹傳媒大樓的會面中,陳稱他向黎表達對《國安法》的關注,認為需要「褪」,即所有人都不應該繼續倡議制裁,黎又問 IPAC 會否使用眾籌的款項,並籲陳叫其他人繼續在文宣和國際線上工作</p> - </li> - <li> - <p>陳稱他曾告知 Mark Simon,李宇軒頑固地不想離開香港</p> - </li> -</ul> - -<h4 id="辯方質疑陳梓華利用謊言來謀取利益-陳否認想將個事實講出嚟">辯方質疑陳梓華利用謊言來謀取利益 陳否認:想將個事實講出嚟</h4> - -<p>辯方質疑,陳以上對話是陳在庭上作供時才首次捏造出來。惟陳不同意,又堅稱對於上述對話有真實記憶。</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/enbWBdW.png" alt="image02" /> -▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻(左)、大律師 Marc Corlett(右)</p> - -<p>辯方引述陳在錄影會面中自稱:「純粹係我好討厭有啲人利用謊言去為佢自己謀取利益」,質疑陳如今在證人台上捏造一些陳述出來,為自己謀取利益,正正是錄影會面中他所批評的同一類人。惟陳不同意,「正正就係因為我討厭(利用謊言來謀取利益的人),所以我想將個事實講出嚟。」</p> - -<h4 id="早前承認向警作虛假陳述-陳梓華當時有僥倖心態以為可撇清關係">早前承認向警作虛假陳述 陳梓華:當時有僥倖心態、以為可撇清關係</h4> - -<p>辯方盤問完畢,控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行覆問時指,陳在2020年10月10日被警方以「協助罪犯」罪拘捕,之後於10月10及11日在警署進行了兩次錄影會面,當其時陳尚未決定以證人身份協助調查。</p> - -<p><img src="https://i.imgur.com/vJITGZI.png" alt="image03" /> -▲ 副刑事檢控專員 周天行</p> - -<p>在辯方早前盤問之下,陳承認當時錄影會面中向警方說出虛假陳述,例如他並非「重光團隊」成員、經常取笑攬炒派等。控方則問陳,為何會向警方作出虛假陳述。陳回答:「當時我仲有一個僥倖嘅心態。我以為可以撇清到關係。」控方追問,陳想與什麼撇清關係。陳指是黎智英、其私人助手 Mark Simon、李宇軒、「攬炒巴」劉祖廸和「重光團隊」。</p> - -<p>陳又指:「我以為當時畀完口供,或者離開咗警署之後,Mark Simon 可以安排到方法畀我離開香港。」</p> - -<p>陳於2021年2月被正式起訴及還柙,直至2021年3月31日決定以證人身份協助警方調查,之後於4月28日以證人身份進行首次錄影會面。</p> - -<p>案件下周一(5月6日)續審。</p> - -<hr /> - -<p>案件編號:HCCC51/2022</p>獨媒報導庭上認向警作虛假陳述 陳梓華:當時有僥倖心態、以為可與黎智英撇清關係Cyber Indo-Pacific2024-05-03T12:00:00+08:002024-05-03T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/cyber-indo-pacific<p><em>As geopolitical tensions grow, governments across the Indo-Pacific region are racing to develop their cyber capabilities in order to ensure their future security and prosperity. But what implications does this have for norms on responsible state behaviour and transparency around cyber operations?</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<h3 id="a-complex-chessboard-for-cyber-capabilities-the-indo-pacific">A Complex Chessboard for Cyber Capabilities: The Indo-Pacific</h3> - -<p><em>Louise Marie Hurel</em></p> - -<p>Comprising approximately 40 economies, the Indo-Pacific is set to represent over 50% of the world’s GDP by 2040, with China, Japan, India, South Korea and Australia’s combined GDPs already totalling more than the whole of the EU put together. Throughout the past years, this vast and diverse region has also become central to strategic engagement by Five Eyes countries on a range of topics. Canada, the UK, the US, Australia and others have published their own strategies for the Indo-Pacific and forged security partnerships such as the trilateral AUKUS initiative, which have also focused on “developing a range of capabilities, to share and increase interoperability between […] armed forces” – with a dedicated a pillar for cyber capabilities, AI, quantum and other emerging technologies.</p> - -<p>But beyond economic, defence-focused or external incentives, the Indo-Pacific region forms a chessboard for complex technological disputes over the production of semiconductors in Taiwan, US-China geopolitical clashes concerning the latter’s state-linked cyber operations, thorny concerns around the conflation of cyber security and content control and moderation, as well as increasing cyber threats from both state and non-state actors. At the same time, ASEAN and other cross-regional efforts such as the Quad grouping have also sought to address some of these challenges by focusing on cyber capacity building, critical infrastructure protection and building shared resilience.</p> - -<p>However, cyberspace has become a reflection of tensions within the region. Earlier this year, a reported leak from a Chinese company showed that the country had been conducting cyber espionage campaigns against multiple governments in the region. This included telecom service providers in Pakistan, Mongolia and Malaysia, as well as various parts of the Indian government. India, meanwhile, has sought to ramp up its own capabilities through the establishment of a National Cyber Agency in 2018, as well as conducting advanced persistent threat (APT) operations. At the same time, Pakistan has not fallen short of developing capacities in this area, with the alleged Pakistan-linked APT36 group targeting organisations in India. Moreover, in Southeast Asia, Vietnam-linked APT32 has targeted human rights defenders within the country as well as organisations in the Philippines and Laos.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Indo-Pacific region forms a chessboard for complex technological disputes over the production of semiconductors in Taiwan, US-China geopolitical clashes concerning the latter’s state-linked cyber operations, thorny concerns around the conflation of cyber security and content control and moderation, as well as increasing cyber threats from both state and non-state actors</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>While far from being devoid of challenges, countries in the region have nonetheless committed to norms for responsible state behaviour at the UN. The question that remains, however, is how they will attempt (or not) to reconcile the commitment to such norms with the development of cyber capabilities such as the establishment of cyber commands, the use of offensive cyber capabilities, or having a more active posture when it comes to responding to and preventing cyber operations.</p> - -<p>While one might not exclude the other, this does raise the question of how states should be held accountable when they (explicitly or implicitly) seek to enhance their cyber capabilities, be it for domestic or international use. Additionally, some countries in the region – especially those beyond China and North Korea – can often be overlooked in their ongoing development of capacities to act and engage in cyber operations, and this calls for a deeper analysis of other Indo-Pacific economies.</p> - -<p>In this piece, we gather experts from the region to reflect on the often-thorny relationship between state responsibility and the development of capacities to conduct cyber operations, the internal justifications countries have devised to legitimise doing so, and the institutions devised to support such capacities.</p> - -<h3 id="indias-strategic-ambiguity-in-cyberspace-and-cyber-operations">India’s Strategic Ambiguity in Cyberspace and Cyber Operations</h3> - -<p><em>Arindrajit Basu</em></p> - -<p>India’s security doctrines have always been shrouded in strategic ambiguity. Unsurprisingly, the development and deployment of cyber capabilities has been no exception. While external analysts and former officials have acknowledged the state’s capacity to conduct cyber operations or orchestrate India-backed hacktivist groups against geopolitical adversaries, there has been no overarching pronouncement or “cyber doctrine” guiding these developments.</p> - -<p>However, military doctrines have acknowledged the tactical necessity of integrating cyber capabilities with kinetic warfare, although they have stopped short of articulating clear objectives or normative rules of engagement. Despite the often-challenging task of reading between the lines regarding mandate and legality of operations, India has allegedly used cyber capabilities such as cyber intrusive tools for both domestic and external surveillance. This has been seen in recent reports which have further highlighted India’s use of targeted surveillance capabilities such as the NSO group’s Pegasus spyware against geopolitical adversaries and internal opposition figures, although the government has issued clear denials.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">India’s security doctrines have always been shrouded in strategic ambiguity</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>Even so, India is trying to project itself as a responsible global power, including in cyberspace. This projection comes not from grand proclamations but through subtle diplomacy. For example, unlike several other countries, India is yet to publish a clear statement on how international law applies in cyberspace. However, the country has engaged in concerted cyber diplomacy both bilaterally and through “minilateral” partnerships like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the Counter Ransomware Initiative and the G20. In multilateral forums, India has consistently emphasised issues that most closely mirror its geopolitical interests, including cyber terrorism, the protection of critical information infrastructure, and capacity-building. The overarching global objective lies in what I have assessed elsewhere as “ideological agnosticism and selective engagement” – that is, maintaining flexibility on doctrinal questions and evading controversial normative debates while tactically engaging on less controversial issues and working with partners to shore up India’s cyber security posture and existing capabilities. Relatedly, there appears to be limited appetite for a public discussion of its doctrine or capabilities. While India’s present strategy appears to be working as it reaps the dividends of its geopolitical “sweet spot”, its aspirations for global leadership must be underpinned by demonstrable commitments to the UN framework on responsible state behaviour, both in word and deed.</p> - -<h3 id="the-role-of-cyber-capabilities-in-advancing-vietnams-security-and-prosperity">The Role of Cyber Capabilities in Advancing Vietnam’s Security and Prosperity</h3> - -<p><em>Bich Tran</em></p> - -<p>Often overlooked in global cyber security debates, Vietnam has made significant efforts to develop capabilities to advance its interests in cyberspace over the past decade. In 2023, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh stressed that ensuring cyber safety and security is an important and long-term task. While motivations might vary, Vietnam has arguably deployed cyber operations to protect the communist regime, defend national sovereignty, and advance its economic interests.</p> - -<p>The Communist Party of Vietnam perceives the current cyber landscape as a struggle against what it sees as a “peaceful revolution,” with many dissidents and anti-regime groups using online platforms to further their agendas. Vietnamese officials also regard cyberspace as an important battlefield alongside the air, land, sea and space domains. Cyber attacks from alleged Chinese hackers targeting the country have demonstrated how cyberspace has become a theatre for Vietnam–China territorial disputes.</p> - -<p>To address these issues, Vietnam has established two cyber units. Task Force 47, named after Directive No. 47 issued in 2016 by the General Political Department, consists of over 10,000 members. Its mission is to counter what the Party considers “wrongful views” promoted by “hostile forces”. The second unit is the Cyberspace Operations Command, established in 2017 and announced in 2018 as a combat unit of the Ministry of National Defence. It is responsible for protecting national sovereignty in cyberspace and maintaining cyber security within the military. While Task Force 47 specialises in anti-disinformation, the Cyberspace Operations Command is concerned with comprehensive cyber security, including technical aspects. In essence, Task Force 47 is primarily concerned with regime security, while the Cyberspace Operations Command focuses on safeguarding national sovereignty.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">The Communist Party of Vietnam perceives the current cyber landscape as a struggle against what it sees as a “peaceful revolution”, with many dissidents and anti-regime groups using online platforms to further their agendas</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>The development of cyber capabilities is also essential for Vietnam to reach its goals of becoming an upper middle-income developing country by 2030 and a high-income developed country by 2045. The 2020 National Digital Transformation Programme (NDTP) for the period through 2025, with a vision extending to 2030, set a target for the digital economy to contribute 20% of Vietnam’s GDP by 2025 and 30% by 2030.</p> - -<p>The NDTP also aimed to put the country in the top 40 of the Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) by 2025 and the top 30 by 2030. This goal was surpassed as Vietnam’s ranking jumped from 50th out of 175 countries in 2018 to 25th out of 182 countries in 2020. The 2022 National Cybersecurity Strategy aims to ensure that Vietnam’s ranking on the GCI stays between 25th and 30th by 2025.</p> - -<p>Besides its own efforts, Vietnam has leveraged external resources to enhance its capabilities through cyber diplomacy. Bilaterally, it has strengthened cyber security cooperation with its partners, such as India, the EU and Australia. Multilaterally, the country has engaged with the international community on cyber security issues to promote its interests in cyberspace and contribute to the development of international norms and rules governing cyber activities.</p> - -<h3 id="japans-hesitant-shift-toward-active-cyber-operations">Japan’s Hesitant Shift Toward Active Cyber Operations</h3> - -<p><em>Wilhelm Vosse</em></p> - -<p>Since Japan began to codify its response to the opportunities and growing threats of cyberspace in its information and later cyber security strategies in 2006, its main objective was to strengthen the rule of law in cyberspace. Japan’s primary instrument has long been international cooperation with like-minded countries in bilateral cyber dialogues, regional organisations such as ASEAN, and global mechanisms such as the UN Group of Governmental Experts and the Open-Ended Working Group. Over the last decade, Japan has become one of the most active players in cyber diplomacy, promoting cyber norms, an international legal framework, and responsible behaviour in cyberspace. Japan has limited itself to an almost exclusively diplomatic and normative response to growing security threats because this reflects its inherent preference for non-militaristic foreign and security policy and its general risk-aversiveness. These factors also explain why Japan has responded to cyber attacks against both public and private entities through a crime-based perspective, viewing them as a concern that needs to be taken care by the police and the judiciary. And even in cases such as the 2021 Cybersecurity Strategy that signalled an intent to extend the country’s response through the development of active cyber defence capabilities (ACD), the details remained vague.</p> - -<p>However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to a fundamental rethinking of Japan’s security policy. The latest National Security Strategy, issued in December 2022, states for the first time that Japan will introduce an active cyber defence capability, which will include the penetration and neutralisation of the servers of potential attackers. Such language should not be overlooked: it represents a significant leap from Japan’s traditional preference for more passive and risk-averse tactics.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to a fundamental rethinking of Japan’s security policy</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>But beyond words, the government has also committed to further investments in this area. Funding and personnel for the Ministry of Defense’s Cyber Defence Command to prepare and conduct such cyber operations are planned to be significantly increased until 2027. Still, this remains an ambitious plan. The commitment to develop ACD has triggered questions in parliament about what active cyber defence operations really entail and whether the government is willing to accept potential counterattacks. This debate is still ongoing, but it can be assumed that active measures will only be deployed after other diplomatic measures have been exhausted.</p> - -<p>Apart from the risk of potentially triggering dangerous responses from countries like China or North Korea, Japan needs to fundamentally strengthen the security of its domestic critical information infrastructure before embarking on this route. Going from planning to operationalisation might be a bigger challenge than expected, as it is already struggling to find qualified personnel and still needs to revise privacy and other laws to make such operations legal in Japan. To what extent Japan is willing to take the risks of active or offensive cyber operations remains to be seen.</p> - -<h3 id="australias-evolving-perspective-on-cyber-operations">Australia’s Evolving Perspective on Cyber Operations</h3> - -<p><em>Mike Bareja</em></p> - -<p>In 2016, the Australian government confirmed its offensive cyber capability, making Australia one of the few countries to make such activity publicly known. The Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) leads Australia’s offensive cyber capabilities, probably sharing capabilities with the Australian Defence Force’s Cyber Warfare Division. This capability is growing. Announced in 2022, an A$10 billion budget increase over 10 years for project REDSPICE will triple Australia’s offensive cyber capability.</p> - -<p>Australian cyber operations align with international norms such as those set by the UN framework of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. They also comply with Australian and international law.</p> - -<p>ASD’s primary legislation is the Intelligence Services Act 2001, which sets out its purpose (functions) and the authorisations it must obtain for this activity. The legislation also says that the agency must abide by the law and only act in the performance of its functions. Otherwise, an employee is liable to face civil and criminal legal action.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Australian cyber operations align with international norms such as those set by the UN framework of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>All Australian intelligence agencies have robust oversight, including through Parliamentary committees. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) also scrutinises ASD’s intelligence activities for legality and propriety. The IGIS works to ensure that each activity is legal, reasonable and proportional, and publishes an unclassified, publicly available annual report of their findings.</p> - -<p>The Cyber Security Strategy 2023–2030, released in August 2023, states that while “details of specific offensive cyber capabilities and operations remain classified, we are committed to transparency about the rights and obligations that govern their use”. However, the Australian government remains vague about these details and what strategic objectives guide its use of offensive cyber.</p> - -<p>What has been made public is that offensive cyber is used to support military operations, disrupt cybercrime and “enable ASD to manipulate, disrupt or degrade our adversaries’ capability”. The Strategy also states that Australia will “amplify our domestic law enforcement and offensive cyber activities to make Australia a harder target for cyber criminals”.</p> - -<p>Although Australia has made small improvements to the transparency of its offensive cyber capabilities, more must be done. Public dialogue and increased accountability on these capabilities will promote international engagement on states’ rights and obligations in this realm; facilitate collaboration between policymakers, academics and the private sector on responsible and effective cyber capabilities; and help improve the ability of offensive cyber to act as a deterrent.</p> - -<h3 id="accountability-and-transparency-from-mirage-to-commitment">Accountability and Transparency: From Mirage to Commitment?</h3> -<p>Gatra Priyandita</p> - -<p>While the approaches vary, a common thread among these countries is the recognition of cyberspace as a critical domain of national security and international engagement. From the Russian invasion of Ukraine and concerns about foreign surveillance to regime security considerations, the shifting landscape of global cyber security underscores the diverse approaches countries are adopting to harness their cyber capabilities. While not all of these countries have been transparent about the motivations driving their cyber capability development, their approaches demonstrate that the global framework on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace is insufficient – on its own – to ensure that states comply. The ability to deter cyber-enabled threats from state actors also requires investments in cyber capabilities. Given that military power is ultimately needed reinforce international law and norms, this is, of course, unsurprising.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">A common thread among these countries is the recognition of cyberspace as a critical domain of national security and international engagement</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>But for cyber capabilities to be effective instruments of diplomacy, states must also be transparent about their intentions. As with military power, developing cyber capabilities without some degree of transparency creates uncertainties, which breed distrust. While no state is expected to be completely open about the systems that make up its cyber security capabilities, it remains important that states demonstrate their commitment to the UN global framework of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace by establishing clear doctrines, ensuring rigorous oversight, and fostering transparency through engagements with both international and domestic partners. These elements not only enhance operational effectiveness but also contribute to the stability and security of the global cyber environment. As countries continue to evolve their cyber strategies, it is fundamental that they work to develop trust through confidence-building.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Louise Marie Hurel</strong> is a Research Fellow in the Cyber team at RUSI. Her research interests include incident response, cyber capacity building, cyber diplomacy and non-governmental actors’ engagement in cyber security.</p> - -<p><strong>Gatra Priyandita</strong> is an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). His research focuses on cyber politics in emerging economies, as well as foreign policy and security issues in Southeast Asia.</p> - -<p><strong>Arindrajit Basu</strong> is a PHD Candidate at Leiden University.</p> - -<p><strong>Bich Tran</strong> is a postdoctoral fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. Her research interests include Vietnam’s grand strategy, Southeast Asian states’ relations with major powers, and political leadership.</p> - -<p><strong>Wilhelm Vosse</strong> is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the International Christian University, Tokyo, Japan.</p> - -<p><strong>Mike Bareja</strong> is Deputy Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Cyber, Technology and Security programme. Mike has spent over 15 years leading Australia’s national approaches to complex challenges at the intersection of technology, national security and public policy.</p>Louise Marie Hurel, et al.As geopolitical tensions grow, governments across the Indo-Pacific region are racing to develop their cyber capabilities in order to ensure their future security and prosperity. But what implications does this have for norms on responsible state behaviour and transparency around cyber operations?Kurdistan Regional Elections2024-04-30T12:00:00+08:002024-04-30T12:00:00+08:00https://agorahub.github.io/pen0/hkers/kurdistan-regional-elections<p><em>After many delays, Iraq’s Kurdistan Region is scheduled to hold internal elections in June. But with one major party boycotting the polls, their success hangs in the balance.</em></p> - -<excerpt /> - -<p>Iraq’s Kurdistan Region last held internal elections to its self-governing political institutions in September 2018. New elections to the Kurdistan Parliament were originally scheduled for October 2022, but internal tensions caused repeated postponements. The polls are now planned for 10 June. As a result of the knock-on effects caused by the earlier delays, they will be administered by Iraq’s federal government. One of the two ruling parties – the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) – plans to boycott the election as a protest against what it sees as unfair rules imposed by Baghdad. Observers already expected low turnout amid widespread voter dissatisfaction, but it could hit record lows given these unprecedented circumstances.</p> - -<p>The democratic legitimacy of political institutions in the Kurdistan Region is at stake. The Kurdistan Parliament is no longer sitting, and the current Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) cabinet is functioning well beyond the time it would ordinarily be in office. Elections are necessary to renew the mandate of these institutions. Yet, there are urgent questions about whether the election process will be free and fair given the outsized ability of the ruling parties to prevent participation, influence voter behaviour, and subsequently control the institutions of government. What sort of democratic legitimacy such an election would confer is, therefore, an open question.</p> - -<p>This piece will seek to address several topics. First, does legitimacy in the Kurdistan Region actually come from elections, or does it originate from other sources? Second, will the elections in June confer legitimacy in the eyes of voters, political parties, and other stakeholders? Third, what will this mean for the future of the Kurdistan Region?</p> - -<p>Ultimately, failing to hold an election is worse than having an imperfect one because it makes it easier to foreclose the possibility of future, better elections. The Kurdistan Region’s parties should recommit to an inclusive, democratic process, including but not limited to elections. Outside players like the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq and foreign governments should be unwilling to accept anything less.</p> - -<p>In a democracy, political legitimacy ideally comes from the people. Usually, this is conferred through free and regular votes on candidates and issues under conditions that allow for fair competition. The resulting institutions are able to accommodate transfers of power when they occur. However, the exact mechanisms for these processes differ from place to place due to political and historical development.</p> - -<p>The Kurdistan Region emerged in 1991 after a long struggle against the central government in Baghdad and, at that particular time, the Ba’athist dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Just three years earlier, the Ba’athists had perpetrated the genocidal Anfal campaign. Creating self-governing Kurdish institutions was not a political science experiment to provide authentic representation for a minority group, but a necessary measure for survival and protection. The continued need for such a bulwark is evident amid recent efforts by Baghdad to rebalance power within Iraq’s federal system.</p> - -<p>These institutions were formed largely through a partnership between the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which had fought Baghdad and each other for decades. As a result of this development path, the ruling parties have always been stronger than the state. To this day, party elites largely dictate governmental affairs through a variety of formal and informal mechanisms, elections being just one. This reflects – and validates – their military and administrative control over roughly half of the Kurdistan Region each. Even when the Gorran Movement beat the PUK in both the 2013 parliamentary election and the 2014 provincial election in Sulaymaniyah, the latter did not fully relinquish control over state institutions in a transfer of power. The imbalance between party and state complicates efforts to establish the democratic legitimacy of institutions and processes.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Elections in the Kurdistan Region are more political theatre than democratic substance, tending to validate pre-existing power dynamics rather than challenging them</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>A second important aspect of the Kurdistan Region’s political and historical development is the role played by international actors. This influence is evident from the no-fly zone that operated following the Gulf War, the 1998 Washington Agreement that ended the Kurdish civil war, the removal of Saddam Hussein, and the war against Islamic State. During each of these interventions, efforts were made to strengthen Kurdish political institutions. When international attention waned, the two ruling parties increased their influence over the state. As a consequence, the functionality of the KRG declined.</p> - -<p>The parties’ dependence on strong ties with the international community is evident in their media and propaganda. Foreign diplomats like the UK’s current consul general are given space in party-connected outlets to praise the Kurdistan Region. Routine meetings are turned into complex protocol events designed to stress the importance of officials from the Kurdish parties. A common refrain among opposition groups and disgruntled voters is that KDP and PUK officials are more responsive to international demands than the interests of Kurdish citizens.</p> - -<p>Increasingly, state bodies in Baghdad also wield significant influence over political affairs in the Kurdistan Region. Rulings by the Federal Supreme Court ended the latest term of the Kurdistan Parliament, eliminated the seats reserved for ethnic and religious minorities, and gave administrative control over elections to the federal electoral commission. The KDP in particular has complained bitterly about these decisions. While the party’s own self-interest clearly drives its objections, there is nevertheless no substantive mechanism for the Kurdish public to hold the federal court accountable.</p> - -<p>Control of state institutions by the ruling parties, the role of the international community, and interference from the federal state undercut notions that the KRG’s institutions derive their legitimacy from a popular mandate. As a result, elections in the Kurdistan Region are more political theatre than democratic substance. They tend to validate pre-existing power dynamics rather than challenging them. The initial emergence of Gorran in 2009 sought to change this paradigm, but the party was rapidly co-opted into the system. This is the dynamic that will confront voters in several weeks when they head to the polls.</p> - -<p>Given this state of affairs, establishing democratic legitimacy in the Kurdistan Region is baseline difficult. The specific circumstances of the 10 June election exacerbate efforts to do so in the eyes of voters, parties and other stakeholders.</p> - -<p>Past elections in the Kurdistan Region have been dogged by allegations of fraud perpetrated by the KDP and the PUK, which at the time controlled the regional electoral commission. The ruling parties allegedly used their patronage networks to force public servants to vote for whichever party was in control of their workplace or governorate. Without irony, each has accused the other of using this to their respective advantage. The opposition has also claimed that the KDP and the PUK misused voter cards and that members of the partisan-affiliated security forces voted more than once. There is far less international observation of regional elections than elections for the parliament in Baghdad, which does not aid transparency.</p> - -<p>Dissatisfaction with governance in the Kurdistan Region and mistrust of the electoral process have resulted in progressively lower turnout. In the 2013 regional elections, 76% of voters in Duhok and 73% in Sulaymaniyah cast ballots, but this slid to 54% and 37% respectively in the 2021 federal parliamentary election, which was the last one held in the Kurdistan Region. Observers expect that turnout will continue to decline – a factor that counts against democratic legitimacy. Developments over the past few weeks have made this even more likely.</p> - -<p><strong><em><code class="highlighter-rouge">Both ruling parties enjoy massive structural advantages against the other parties in terms of campaign resources, media ownership, and the security forces</code></em></strong></p> - -<p>Elections for the Kurdistan Parliament were originally scheduled to occur on 1 October 2022. Disagreements between the KDP and the PUK over how the elections should be held caused an initial delay. Since then, multiple court cases related to an attempt to extend the Kurdistan Parliament’s mandate and the constitutionality of reserved minority seats have forced additional postponements. Previous elections were run by the Kurdistan Region’s own election commission – which was dominated by representatives of the KDP and the PUK – but the upcoming polls will be administered by the federal government.</p> - -<p>The KDP has won the most votes in every election in the Kurdistan Region since 2005, but it will boycott the upcoming polls. In a statement, the party said that the Federal Supreme Court’s recent rulings are politicised and will result in “unconstitutional and undemocratic elections”. It particularly objected to the elimination of the seats reserved for religious and ethnic minorities, which critics argued were de facto controlled by the KDP. No other major Kurdish parties support the boycott, and they intend to go forward with the elections.</p> - -<p>The KDP leadership fears that it will lose seats under these circumstances – it would say unfairly – and will be forced into working with the PUK to form a government, which it had hoped to avoid. The party’s decision is unprecedented, and it is hard to predict what the consequences will be for the future of the Kurdistan Region. In a democracy, there would be some kind of accountability for not participating in an election, but the KDP’s grip over the security forces in Erbil and Duhok governorates means that it will remain in power in those areas.</p> - -<p>Even if the KDP had chosen to participate in the election, it is hard to see how the polls would have been free and fair enough to enhance the democratic legitimacy of Kurdish self-governing institutions. The biometric voting machines currently in use in Iraq address methods of fraud used in past elections, but the pressure that the KDP and the PUK exert on voters through social and patronage networks means that voting is not always entirely free. Moreover, both ruling parties enjoy massive structural advantages against the other parties in terms of campaign resources, media ownership, and the security forces which mean that the elections are definitely not fair. Turnout will likely hit a record low as a result of voter apathy and the KDP’s boycott.</p> - -<p>The situation puts the Kurdistan Region’s foreign partners in a difficult position. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, for example, pleaded for elections to go forward with all parties participating during a press conference on 5 April. Far more than the KDP and the PUK, Western governments need an election in the Kurdistan Region in order to claim that they are working with a like-minded government that shares their democratic values, as is regularly claimed. This was always a conceit, but it has become an increasingly fragile edifice since 2018. How this election plays out may force difficult choices that have been some time in coming.</p> - -<p>At this point, many practical matters are uncertain. Much depends on the KDP’s behaviour. If it prevents campaigning or voting in Erbil and Duhok, it will violate the constitutional rights of Kurdish voters in order to serve its narrow self-interest. If it prevents the next Kurdistan Parliament from sitting in Erbil, it will fundamentally break the KRG. It is vitally important to understand that the KDP’s actions represent a choice that it did not necessarily have to take. The international actors that serve as a source of legitimacy for the KDP and the PUK must weigh in strongly against these anti-democratic impulses.</p> - -<p>Regardless of the needs or interests of the KDP, the PUK or the international community, the Kurdish public deserves a government that operates with democratic legitimacy. It is incumbent on all stakeholders to provide credible, free and fair elections now. Failing to do so harms the chances that elections will continue to occur in the future.</p> - -<p>The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><strong>Winthrop Rodgers</strong> is a journalist and researcher based in Sulaymaniyah in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. He focuses on politics, human rights and political economy.</p>Winthrop RodgersAfter many delays, Iraq’s Kurdistan Region is scheduled to hold internal elections in June. But with one major party boycotting the polls, their success hangs in the balance. \ No newline at end of file +<p><strong>Tom Keatinge</strong> is the founding Director of the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI, where his research focuses on matters at the intersection of finance and security. He is also currently a specialist adviser on illicit finance to the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee ongoing enquiry.</p>Justyna Gudzowska, et al.This Policy Brief identifies common mechanisms by which professional service providers facilitate sanctions evasion and makes recommendations for how policymakers can work together to minimise the use of professional service providers to circumvent sanctions. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/hkers/2024-06-03-no-silver-bullets.html b/hkers/2024-06-03-no-silver-bullets.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f6165703 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-06-03-no-silver-bullets.html @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ + + + + + + + + + + No Silver Bullets · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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No Silver Bullets

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Removing Constraints on Support to Ukraine

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Matthew Savill | 2024.06.03

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Removing restrictions on the use of weapons supplied to Ukraine by international partners will help Ukraine’s defence against Russia, but it is not a war-winning move on its own.

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Overnight on 30 May, media reporting claimed that US President Joe Biden had apparently relaxed restrictions on the use of US weapons against targets in Russia. This followed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky voicing his frustration at the continued existence of such limitations. The issue has been given extra relevance by Russian forces based in Belgorod launching a new operation around Kharkiv, and has been taken up by the NATO Secretary-General and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Journalists and analysts have been left to parse the meaning and phrasing of every (ambiguous) sentence uttered by Western politicians on the subject.

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Current Ukrainian Operations and Existing Constraints

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The start point, on which everyone seems to be in agreement, is that it is both legitimate and legal for Ukraine to attack military targets on Russian territory. It is defending itself against a Russian attack and can respond under Article 51 of the UN Charter, having been engaged in an International Armed Conflict since 2014. Provided it acts in accordance with International Humanitarian Law, it has a wide range of targets from which to choose, including oil and fuel production facilities which, while they may have a civilian function, are also contributing to the Russian war machine – so-called “dual use facilities”. Added to this would be the airbases for long-range Russian bombers that have been launching strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure and other civilian targets; military production facilities; ammunition dumps and storage facilities for other materiel; and a variety of military bases including the Russian ports for the Black Sea Fleet.

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The suggestion of caveats first appeared with the provision of sophisticated and mostly longer-range weapons that arrived in mid-2022 and early 2023, from multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) like the US HIMARS and UK M270, to cruise missiles like the UK Storm Shadow and French SCALP. Biden stated at the time that HIMARS would not be used against targets in Russia, and it later emerged that technical alterations had been made to ensure this was not possible. Meanwhile, UK statements on the use of Storm Shadow heavily emphasised its use inside Ukraine (including areas illegally annexed by Russia, like Crimea), mirroring apparent restrictions on the use of UK M270. The overriding concern in these early debates was the risk of escalation involved in any Russian response to the provision of more sophisticated and more threatening weapons.

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Removing restrictions on HIMARS and other MLRS systems, as well as Ukrainian artillery firing Western-supplied ammunition, would allow Ukraine to strike massing Russian forces and conduct counter-battery fire against artillery situated just over the border

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That debate continues to rage, with the benefit of two years’ observations on Russian rhetoric and actions, including strikes against Ukrainian civilian targets and growing suggestions of a Russian sabotage campaign inside Europe. But alongside the serious consideration of managing this escalation (or calling Russia’s bluff) should be a discussion on the military utility of – and possible targets for – such weapons. Ukraine is already running a deep strike campaign using drones against a range of targets, occasionally hitting Moscow itself, but more frequently striking refineries and production facilities. These attacks reduce supplies going directly to Russian forces, and also cut revenue used to fund the war. In addition, a campaign against bomber airfields has destroyed both long-range bombers and smaller fighter-bombers. Some of these attacks have used drones and have taken place at extreme ranges of over 1,000 miles, but there also appears to be an element of infiltration and ground sabotage against bases and rail links, including some over 3,000 miles from Ukraine. Finally, Ukraine’s use of both air and maritime drones against the Black Sea Fleet has sunk a number of ships and even threatened the port at Novorossiysk. What, then, would other weapons add?

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The Value of Deep Strike

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The answer is that the types of targets and the defences around them work against the drone programme. First, the drones used by Ukraine tend to be slow and have limited payloads. They use sheer numbers to get through to targets, and although they have very long ranges – it can be hard, especially in the face of Russian air defences – to get sufficient numbers through to cause major and long-lasting damage, especially against hardened targets or those under cover. Flight time can vary, but for long-distance targets is sufficient to give the Russians early warning, which necessitates Ukrainian mass or much closer (and riskier) infiltration operations. For the long-distance and relatively predictable targets, this may be enough, but Ukraine needs firepower that it can bring to bear rapidly and with little warning. This is where ATACMS – with multiple variants – comes into play, and it could provide a valuable weapon for striking airbases hosting both fighter-bombers and attack helicopters, as well as rear-area logistics and ammunition dumps. Depending on which variants have been provided, both cluster and unitary warheads have ranges of up to 190 miles, providing a threat to static locations, such as in Belgorod, Voronezh, Kursk and maybe even Lipetsk oblasts.

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Longer-range air defence systems could also play a role, albeit with some significant risks involved. Russian bombers mostly launch their cruise missiles within Russian airspace, so the launching aircraft are outside the ranges of systems like IRIS-T (15 miles) or point defence like Starstreak (5 miles). The same is true of some aircraft launching glide bombs, which are currently being used to devastating effect both on civilian areas and Ukrainian forces on the front line. Some can be released from 25 miles away; in the north this can be done from Russia. They are almost impossible to intercept, and this can only be achieved at great cost with expensive missiles used for multiple incoming bombs. Ideally, launch aircraft would be caught on the ground, but as a fallback, a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system like Patriot – with a range of around 100 miles (depending on the target) – could be pushed closer to the front line to shoot down Russian aircraft before release. So-called “SAMbushes” involve removing launchers from around infrastructure and putting them at greater risk of attack, but pose a challenge to Russian aircraft which currently fire from airspace where they believe themselves to be safe. There is some doubt over the extent to which this represents a “strike” on Russian “territory”, but media reporting suggests there has been disquiet over the use of German systems, which at least indicates the expectation of some kind of existing constraint.

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The new development which raises the question of a potentially unintended constraint being rendered nonsensical by changes on the ground is the Russian assault towards Kharkiv and the massing of forces over the border from Sumy. Up until now, the “close” fight has largely been conducted unambiguously on Ukrainian territory. In the case of Kharkiv, the proximity to the border means that Russian assault forces have been able to mass and assemble inside Belgorod, and artillery fire from within Russia can reach Ukrainian forces along the front. Removing restrictions on “standard” HIMARS and other MLRS systems, as well as standard Ukrainian tube artillery firing Western-supplied 152mm and 155mm ammunition, would allow the Ukrainians to at least strike massing Russian forces and conduct counter-battery fire against artillery situated just over the border. In the case of HIMARS it would allow the Ukrainians to out-range the equivalent Russian guns (although reporting has indicated there is effective Russian interference with guided projectiles).

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The lesson of the past 18 months is that the deep battle complements fighting close-in and along the front line, but is not a substitute for it

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Perhaps surprising by their absence from this priority list are the Storm Shadow and SCALP missiles. While these would be useful for arms dumps, command locations and logistics targets with protection against drones, their (publicly-acknowledged) range of around 160 miles means that the launch point for the Ukrainian aircraft carrying them comes uncomfortably close to Russian air defences if the target is deep within Russia. For this reason, both have been used on targets much closer to the front line, including in and around Crimea. The provision of German Taurus, with a slightly larger warhead and a range up around 300 miles, could make striking deeper targets in Russia much more feasible, or bring additional firepower to bear on targets further south around Crimea, including the Kerch Bridge, where Russian air defences have already been degraded.

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Keeping the Russians Guessing

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It is worth concluding with an acknowledgement of the military benefits of ambiguity and what a change in policy would not achieve. The public Western position around the use of such weapons has been hugely variable; UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron, for example, did not explicitly say UK-supplied weapons could be used in Russia, and many of the recent statements of support have been generic. Beyond the question of escalation management, it would be prudent to keep Russia guessing about what sophisticated weapons may or may not be used against its forces, because this poses dilemmas about what mix of air defence systems to deploy and what level of dispersal or early-warning systems may be necessary. We can assume that Storm Shadow (for example) has not yet been fired against a Russian target as no components have emerged from debris, but the potential exists if the right tone is struck. It may also be the case that, behind the scenes, some constraints have already been lifted. At sea, the UK has retrospectively claimed credit for the use of maritime drones against the Black Sea Fleet. Given the UK’s role, alongside others, in providing support to Ukrainian drone programmes, it is possible that a number of countries have already provided components for weapons that have struck Russian targets. The ambiguity over this support not only evades questions of escalation, but also provides few clues for Russia that would allow it to prepare countermeasures until after such weapons can be used.

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Larger Challenges Remain

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At the same time, caution should be taken not to see a change in policy as a panacea for Ukraine’s current challenges. The successful campaign against Russian energy infrastructure has not forced Russia to reassess its campaign overall. The long-range bomber force has had to disperse and has reduced its strike capabilities, but has not ended attacks on civilian infrastructure. The decimation of the Black Sea Fleet has reopened exports from Odesa, but made little contribution to the ability of 2023’s counteroffensive to retake lost territory. And strikes on arms dumps behind the front lines and sabotage within Russia have reduced the flow of materiel going to the Russian army, but not to the extent that it has had to fall back. The lesson of the past 18 months is that the deep battle complements fighting close-in and along the front line, but is not a substitute for it. Striking forces across the border from Kharkiv will provide some immediate relief to Ukrainian forces and be of significant tactical benefit; in doctrinal terms, this is a “close battle” that happens to straddle the border with Russia. Overall, the challenges for Ukraine in 2024 and potential answers remain the same as before this decision: resupply of equipment and ammunition, recruitment and training of personnel, and effective defences to prevent or slow down Russian ground advances. Deep strike is not a silver bullet.

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Matthew Savill is the Director of Military Sciences at RUSI, focussing on developments and trends in modern conflict, and the use of force in the 21st Century.

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+ + + + diff --git a/hkers/2024-06-04-framing-sanctions.html b/hkers/2024-06-04-framing-sanctions.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..90f26419 --- /dev/null +++ b/hkers/2024-06-04-framing-sanctions.html @@ -0,0 +1,405 @@ + + + + + + + + + + Framing Sanctions · The Republic of Agora + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
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Framing Sanctions

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EU Strategic Communications to Support Sanctions Against Russia

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Balázs Gyimesi | 2024.06.04

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This paper examines the question: How does the EU use strategic communications to persuade third countries to cooperate on sanctions? The paper analyses how the EU is using arguments linked to upholding values and appealing to the interests of third countries.

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Diplomacy and strategic communications are key to making sanctions effective. Tackling the challenge of sanctions circumvention requires the cooperation of non-sanctioning (or third) countries, and sanctions diplomacy plays an important role in persuading them to cooperate. This paper offers a data-driven analysis of the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions against Russia, showing that the EU relies mostly on addressing interests (such as EU accession and economic interests) and framing support for sanctions as economically or politically desirable for third countries. To a lesser degree, values also play a role in the EU’s outreach, mostly in relation to protecting the principles of international law. This is in line with EU foreign policy’s broader shift to focusing more on interests.

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On the issue of sanctions circumvention, EU sanctions diplomacy applies a “stick and carrot” approach to both warn third countries of the potential negative impact on their economies if they allow such activities, and praise the efforts of countries that pledge to tackle circumvention. This communication implies that becoming a platform for circumvention can lead to reputational damage, resulting in fewer investments.

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However, the EU takes a different communication approach towards EU candidates than towards other third countries. Regarding the wider set of third countries, the EU generally accepts their wish not to align on sanctions, and only aims to compel them to tackle circumvention. On the other hand, EU candidate countries are reminded of their commitment to align with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy as part of the accession process, including alignment on sanctions.

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On values, the EU links cooperation on sanctions to defending the values of international law, offering third countries an opportunity to frame their support for sanctions as a way to help uphold the principles of international law, rather than framing them as explicit measures against Russia.

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The EU should focus on tracking policy developments in third countries, following their pledges to tackle circumvention, and adjust EU sanctions diplomacy accordingly. The EU should also resort more strongly to highlighting the requirement for EU candidate countries to align with sanctions. For other third countries, the EU should offer framings that highlight international norms and explore different options, such as environmental concerns surrounding Russia’s shadow fleet.

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Introduction

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Since February 2022, the EU and its allies have adopted a series of sanctions to respond to Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. A key challenge of making these restrictive measures effective is the tackling of circumvention, as redirecting trade of sanctioned goods through third countries can diminish the impact of sanctions. However, beyond stricter enforcement within the EU, this also requires the cooperation of non-sanctioning countries, as taking action to hinder circumvention through their territory is their sovereign choice.

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The paper examines the following question: How does the EU use strategic communications to persuade third countries to cooperate on sanctions? The paper analyses how the EU is using arguments linked to upholding values (supporting sanctions to protect the values of international law) and appealing to third countries’ interests (such as EU accession and economic interests) in its strategic communications on sanctions.

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The EU has taken several steps to close loopholes and strengthen the role of sanctions diplomacy – in other words, diplomatic efforts “to persuade [third] countries to follow suit”. As the paper demonstrates, however, in the case of the EU, sanctions diplomacy has been used not only to persuade countries to follow suit, but also to incentivise third countries to address circumvention.

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The 12th sanctions package of the EU, adopted in December 2023, has strengthened its anti-circumvention measures, which were already put at the top of the agenda in the 11th sanctions package in June 2023. Furthermore, the 13th package, adopted in February 2024, listed several companies in third countries that have been involved in sanctions circumvention. The EU’s diplomatic efforts to tackle sanctions evasion have also been supported by the appointment of the International Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions (EU sanctions envoy) at the end of 2022.

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At the same time, several third countries have been expressing their reservations about and even opposition to sanctions. Latin American countries reportedly advocated for omitting mentions of support for Ukraine from the July 2023 EU-CELAC summit declaration. South Africa claimed sanctions against Russia were causing collateral damage to “bystander countries”. India has been denying criticisms that the country would be facilitating sanctions circumvention by reselling refined Russian oil.

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These developments underline the need for constructive dialogue between the sanctions senders and third countries. They also highlight the importance of the public element of the EU’s sanctions diplomacy, namely the EU’s strategic communications as a “goal-directed communication activity”.

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Research on the perceived challenges of the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions has been relatively sparse. Nevertheless, existing literature contends that the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions have been driven by values rather than interests. This also led to the suggestion that the EU should reformulate its sanctions diplomacy “with more focus on the interests of states in joining the collective sanctions against Russia”. This paper argues that the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions have been focusing on interest-based arguments, in line with a shift towards highlighting interests in the EU’s foreign policy, as discussed in Chapter I.

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The paper is comprised of three chapters. Chapter I examines the role of sanctions diplomacy, the factors influencing third countries’ approaches to sanctions, and the EU’s shifting foreign policy, which form the context of the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions. Chapter II breaks down the communications strategies of EU officials in relation to Russia sanctions using a data-driven approach including an expert survey and word frequency analysis. Chapter III interprets the results and examines how the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions have balanced values- and interest-based communications in relation to the countries visited by the EU sanctions envoy. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations on how the EU can optimise its strategic communications on sanctions.

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Methodology

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The paper is based on a review of speeches, press conferences and interviews: strategic communications that create expectations ahead of meetings between the EU and third countries, and frame outcomes after such meetings. The paper analyses the communications outputs of two key EU representatives: the EU sanctions envoy, David O’Sullivan; and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (EU HR/VP) Josep Borrell. The analysis looked at EU communications issued between February and September 2023.

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The definitions of strategic communications and public diplomacy are not universally accepted. For Philip M Taylor, public diplomacy is one of the four pillars of strategic communications, while for Michael Vlahos, “public diplomacy” and “strategic communications” are synonymous. According to Guy J Golan and Sung-Un Yang, public diplomacy is the “management of communication” among diplomatic actors which have an objective of reaching foreign publics to promote national interest. However, for Nicholas J Cull, strategic communications is just one of many terms that describe what is essentially “conducting foreign policy by engaging foreign publics”. For Ali Fisher, strategic communications is the “telling” end of the spectrum of public diplomacy, messaging directly to foreign audiences. As this paper examines the EU’s direct messaging to foreign audiences through press releases, blogs and media interviews, it relies on Fisher’s definition, and employs the term “strategic communications”.

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Within the wider category of third countries targeted by strategic communications, the paper focuses on countries where the EU sanctions envoy has led negotiations. Within this group of countries, the paper examines six countries (out of nine) in which the EU sanctions envoy and third country officials communicated publicly around the negotiations: Armenia; Georgia; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Serbia; and Uzbekistan. Three of the nine countries had to be omitted from the analysis as no public statements could be identified on the EU sanctions envoy’s visits to the following jurisdictions: Türkiye; Pakistan; and the UAE.

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The review relied on desk-based research to retrieve the relevant communications materials and compile an analysis of academic literature. In its analysis of communications of relevant EU officials, the paper relies as much as is feasible on direct quotes, and not on reporters’ interpretations or descriptions. This ensures that only the language directly attributable to the EU officials is analysed, with the exception of Armenia and Serbia, for which the analysis sources did not reveal direct quotes by the EU sanctions envoy; the paper therefore uses secondary sources.

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The paper introduces the typology of “values-based” and “interest-based” communications, building on international relations and public diplomacy literature. For the purposes of this paper, “interest-based” communications focus on appealing to strategic interests, including political, military, economic and trade. “Values-based” communications focus on culture, values and ideals (political, economic and social systems), which can create an enabling environment for national interests.

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The methodology is inspired by Gry Espedal and colleagues’ book on researching values, with a special focus on Arild Wæraas’s chapter on making values emerge from texts and Benedicte Maria Tveter Kivle and Gry Espedal’s chapter on identifying values through discourse analysis. Furthermore, Paul Baker provides valuable insights on employing frequency analysis and using occurrences in discourse analysis. The paper’s methodology builds on two key approaches: the term “frequency analysis” as used by Steven Louis Pike; and Francis A Beer, Barry J Balleck and Ricardo Real P Sousa’s classification of idealist and realist vocabulary.

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On the use of frequency analysis, Kathleen Ahrens found that “narrowly focused corpora are suitable for identifying different viewpoints through an examination of lexical frequency patterns”. Pike used frequency analysis to research the narrative-driven shifts in US public diplomacy messaging and strategy. According to Baker, discourse analysis can point to “patterns in language (both frequent and rare) which must then be interpreted in order to suggest the existence of discourses”. To identify the main framings used by the EU to compel third countries to cooperate on sanctions, the paper builds on a frequency analysis of terms (collocations) used in EU sanctions communications.

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For the main analysis, the author worked with 23 texts (10,921 words) published between February and September 2023 (see Annex). The texts were published online, on EU institutional websites, on governmental websites in Armenia and Serbia, and through media outlets in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

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To mine the most often-used terms, the statistical programme “r” was used, which can be used to measure term and document frequency and the co-occurrence of words, among other things. This allows for the calculation of possible collocations, which, according to Andreas Niekler and Gregor Wiedemann, “comprise two (or more) semantically related [words] … which form a distinct new sense”. Two terms, if they occur “significantly more often as direct neighbours as expected by chance”, can be treated as collocations.

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The most-often used collocations were listed in a survey which asked respondents to assign each collocation a score from 1 (values-based) to 7 (interest-based), based on their perception. This Likert scale allowed respondents to express the nuances of the level to which they perceived that collocations were falling towards a more values-based approach (scores 1–3), or a more interest-based approach (scores 5–7), or whether the collocations were neither explicitly values- nor interest-based (score 4).

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The survey was completed during January 2024 by 15 members of the European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), experts who have worked on sanctions within the framework of the network and focus on international relations studies. They represent think tanks from the UK and eight EU member states: Czechia; France; Germany; Hungary; Latvia; Lithuania; Poland; and Sweden. This covers perceptions from across different regions of the EU and the UK, thereby attempting to reflect geographic diversity.

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The survey presented the respondents with the topic of the paper, a description of the corpus and the definition of values- and interest-based communications as described above.

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Challenges and Limitations

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Key challenges for the research included the sample size of texts that could be analysed, as the sample is limited by the number of countries that the EU sanctions envoy has visited and where public communications were part of the envoy’s visit. Furthermore, sources being in the third countries’ languages posed a challenge, which was surmountable through the use of online translation tools, cross-checking against dictionaries and translation applications.

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Another challenge was developing a list of concepts to be used in the analysis to better understand the mode of communication (values-based or interest-based) employed by the EU in its sanctions diplomacy. The “coding” or classification through experts in the field of international relations from across the EU and the UK allowed for minimal cultural bias and an independent assessment of the terms employed in EU strategic communications.

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I. EU Sanctions Communications Towards Third Countries

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The EU has consistently used strategic communications as part of its sanctions diplomacy towards third countries, aimed at reinforcing its sanctions policy. This is critical, as “active non-cooperation by [third] countries can sabotage the effort by providing offsetting assistance to the targeted regime”. This shows that third countries’ positioning in the dispute between the sanctions sender (EU) and the target (Russia) is highly relevant for the efficacy of sanctions, with “multilateral” sanctions deemed more successful than “unilateral” sanctions.

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Strengthening sanctions diplomacy efforts, the EU appointed David O’Sullivan as sanctions envoy in December 2022. The role of sanctions diplomacy was further reinforced by the 11th package of sanctions, adopted on 23 June 2023, which set out a multi-step approach to tackling sanctions circumvention, starting with the strengthening of “bilateral and multilateral cooperation through diplomatic engagement with, and the provision of increased technical assistance to, the third countries in question”.

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If the first round of diplomatic efforts yields no results, the EU can employ targeted proportionate measures aimed solely at depriving Russia of strategic resources. If this approach still fails to deliver results, the EU pursues re-engagement with the relevant third country. However, if these diplomatic efforts to tackle circumvention still fall short, the EU can adopt exceptional last-resort measures, including the restriction of sale, supply, transfer or export of sensitive dual-use goods and technology to the third country. At the time of writing, the EU has not yet resorted to the use of such last-resort measures for a third country.

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EU Strategic Communications to Third Countries

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Going beyond tackling circumvention, the EU has also been attempting to incentivise certain third countries to align with its sanctions policies. Alignment has no legal definition, but in diplomacy, it is used to signal a third country’s public willingness to adopt sanctions similar to those of the EU. Between February and September 2023, the EU offered the opportunity for 14 non-EU countries to align with EU sanctions, and those which did were listed in declarations and statements issued by the EU HR/VP. While these declarations and statements are not legally binding, they offer a way for the EU to communicate the international support for its sanctions regime.

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EU Candidate Countries, EEA Member Countries and Eastern Partnership Countries

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As sanctions form part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), candidate countries are formally required to progressively align with those sanctions, reaching full alignment prior to accession. This expectation of candidate countries was also expressed in the European Council conclusions of 24 June 2022. However, as the evidence shows, not all candidate countries have been aligning themselves with the EU sanctions regime.

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The EU’s attempts to see countries join its sanctions efforts are most successful in its immediate neighbourhood, specifically among certain EU candidate countries and European Economic Area (EEA) countries. The declarations and statements by the EU HR/VP on the “alignment of certain countries” show that from February 2022 to September 2023, EU candidate countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Ukraine, and EEA members Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway have been consistently aligning themselves with EU sanctions. The candidate countries Georgia (potential candidate country until December 2023), Moldova (candidate country since June 2023) and Serbia were listed in certain declarations, while candidate country Türkiye and Eastern Partnership countries Armenia and Azerbaijan were not listed in any declarations regarding the alignment on sanctions against Russia between February 2022 and September 2023.

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EU Partner Countries

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While certain regional partners of the EU are not invited to join the declarations on alignment, they still communicate their adherence to the sanctions policy on Russia. Switzerland, for example, has issued its own announcements on its alignment with EU sanctions packages, without joining the EU HR/VP’s declarations. In the case of the 10th sanctions package, this “room for manoeuvre” was used in the Swiss Federal Council’s announcement to highlight that while the country was implementing the package, it also “introduce[d] a new means of safeguarding Swiss economic interests in specific cases”.

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For third countries, the alignment with EU sanctions depends both on a political evaluation of adopting the sanctions as a national foreign policy measure and on the political consequences of expressing public support for the EU’s sanctions regime.

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Factors Influencing Third Countries’ Approaches to EU Sanctions

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This section examines the factors that third countries take into consideration when deciding whether to support sanctions regimes. This can offer valuable insights into the factors that can also determine the success of the EU’s sanctions communications towards third countries.

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Research for this paper demonstrates that the economic links between the third country and the sanctioned country play a key role. For countries with close economic ties to Russia, sanctions present high costs and incentives to bust sanctions and provide indirect access to the sanctioned economy. Countries that are more economically dependent on Russia could therefore have limited means to implement sanctions, especially where social and economic groups have vested financial interests in continuing trade with the sanctioned country and lobby against sanctions implementation. Similarly, countries close to Russia in a vulnerable financial situation may fear economic disruption from the implementation of sanctions. Furthermore, the geopolitical orientation of third countries can also influence their decision on whether to support sanctions regimes. Another approach has been to look at the role of commercial and other actors in third countries, as “sanctions imposed against a target can make trade more profitable for a third party, presenting commercial opportunities”.

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The case of Georgia showcases the interplay of several elements of the factors described above. The country did not decide to adhere to the sanctions against Russia, but introduced certain restrictive measures, particularly in the financial sphere. For Georgia, Russia is the third-largest trade partner, and the EU’s share, while it is still the main trade partner, is decreasing. The circumvention challenge in Georgia is further complicated due to its trade with the Eurasian Economic Union, which is used by Russia to conceal the destination of trade flows. Furthermore, Georgia is economically benefiting from the inflow of Russian citizens and capital to the country. These factors, among others, contribute to Georgia’s complex approach to sanctions.

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Given the efforts of the EU to incentivise third countries to join its sanctions policies and the considerations influencing third countries’ choice of whether to support sanctions, it is important to analyse the type of goals EU sanctions diplomacy can attempt to achieve. Returning to the challenge of tackling circumvention, another avenue is for the EU to incentivise third countries to commit to tackling evasion through their territory, without asking them to align themselves with the EU’s sanctions regime.

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The EU’s Shifting Foreign Policy and Strategic Communications

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Understanding the EU’s approach to foreign policy and strategic communications is fundamental for a more comprehensive study of the EU’s sanctions policy. The EU’s foreign policy has been analysed, to a limited extent, through the prism of discourse analysis, finding that its foreign policy and identity are articulated by referencing liberal values. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union presents these as the values that the Union is meant to defend and further internationally.

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On the role of the EU’s public diplomacy and strategic communications, it has been noted that while the European External Action Service (EEAS) should be key to helping “ethical Europe” grow, it should also provide a keen sense of strategic direction and interests. The EU has been described in the literature as a “normative power”, as it “was constructed on a normative basis, [which] predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics”. However, the 2016 EU Global Strategy set out the “principled pragmatism” approach, which considers the combination of interests and values as a guiding principle of the EU’s external action. The focus on interests was reinforced in the 2022 EU Strategic Compass, in which Borrell stated that the EU has to learn lessons from recent crises, including “finally getting serious about threats to our strategic interests that we have been aware of but not always acted upon”. The shift in the EU’s strategic communications to interests is also in line with the view of Allan Rosas, who highlighted that “sanctions should not be seen as value imperialism … as the Union is taking them to pursue not only its values but also its interests”.

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II. Expert Perception of EU Sanctions Communications on the Values-Interest Spectrum

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To better understand the role of the EU’s sanctions communications as a foreign policy tool, the paper assesses them along the values-interests spectrum. To this purpose, the paper examined the speeches, interviews and other communications outputs of the EU sanctions envoy and the EU HR/VP from February to September 2023.

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Analysis of the communications led to identifying the most frequently used pairings of two words in communications outputs, or “collocations”. Using the statistical programme “r”, the analysis computed 395 collocations using the “quanteda.textstats” package.

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The programme identifies collocation candidates based on the co-occurrence of patterns of words. The programme takes out the most frequently used word fillers or “stop words”, including “of”, “to” and “but”, which therefore do not appear in the 395 collocations that were computed. Of those, 116 collocations occurred three or more times and 279 collocations occurred two times across the 23 texts analysed. To focus only on collocations that occur a significant number of times across the 23 texts, the paper does not consider the 279 collocations that occurred only twice in EU communications. This process led to the reduction of the number of collocations to 25 and four synonyms.

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Next in the analysis, the collocations were to be categorised on the values-interest spectrum. Respondents completed the survey asking them to assign each collocation a score from 1 (values-based) to 7 (interest-based) based on their perception, reflecting the subjective judgement of each anonymous respondent. The responses were recorded anonymously and exported to Excel. The analysis used the rounded median of the responses to avoid the result being skewed by outliers. Table 1 shows the rounded median of the survey’s ratings and the number of times the collocation occurred in the 23 texts analysed.

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image01 +▲ Table 1: Most-Often Used Collocations in EU Sanctions Communications

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For a better understanding of where the collocations lie on the values-interest spectrum, the results are summarised in Figure 1.

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image02 +▲ Figure 1: Collocations on the Values-Interest Spectrum

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Figure 1 plots both the number and the occurrence of collocations in each of the seven categories along the values-interest spectrum, ranging from strongly values-based to strongly interest-based. The number of collocations (dots) shows how many of the terms were perceived to fall into each of the seven categories by the expert respondents to the survey. The occurrence of collocations falling into each category (bars) shows how many times the terms appeared across the analysed texts.

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Figure 1 demonstrates that interest-based collocations occurred significantly more often (91 times in total, including both weakly and moderately interest-based collocations) than values-based terms (17 times in total, including both weakly and moderately values-based collocations) or terms that were perceived as neither values- nor interest-based (16 times). The 11 moderately interest-based collocations occurred 60 times across the 23 texts analysed, making them the most commonly occurring terms.

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The results of analysis demonstrate that the EU’s strategic communications on sanctions strongly rely on interest-based terms. However, values and particularly the norms of international law also play a role in its communications – this is examined in more detail in Chapter III. Furthermore, the EU also employs terms that are neither values- not interest-based among the most-occurred terms in the analysed communications.

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III. The Balance Between Values- and Interest-Based EU Communications on Sanctions

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The results of the survey demonstrate the complexity of the EU’s sanctions diplomacy. While collocations that are perceived as interest-based by experts occur more often in quotes by O’Sullivan and Borrell, the use of values-based communication adds a nuance to the picture and raises the following questions. How are the collocations used in EU communications? How can they be interpreted in the context of the EU officials’ declarations? What do they divulge about the EU’s sanctions diplomacy?

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Preventing Circumvention: Targeting Third Countries’ Interests

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Collocations related to circumvention and evasion have a central importance in EU sanctions diplomacy, playing a particular role in conveying a message targeting the interests of third countries. The EU is warning third countries that allowing their territories to be used for circumvention could damage their economies. Conversely, third countries’ efforts to tackle circumvention are met with praise in EU communications, setting a clear expectation for third countries. The circumvention- and evasion-related collocations were perceived to be moderately interest-based by the expert respondents to the survey, further confirming the role of these expressions in appealing to the interests of both the EU and third countries.

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“Platform [for] circumvention” was a particularly often used expression, with 10 occurrences. It was used to point out a threat and underline how becoming a platform for circumvention would go against the interest of third countries. O’Sullivan underlined the importance of the reputational damage that ensues when a country is proven to be a platform for sanctions circumvention, noting that “it will have a chilling effect on the companies of other countries. They no longer want to work with a country that helps them circumvent sanctions”. This was a clear message to third countries, highlighting the fact that allowing for circumvention will damage their investment prospects. In Georgia, the government’s efforts were highlighted by O’Sullivan in June 2023, who noted that the “Georgian authorities are taking very seriously the issue of not allowing this country to be used as a platform for circumvention”, noting that the country has put in place export-controlling measures on the most sensitive battlefield products.

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Addressing the challenge of “platform [for] circumvention” was also used to describe the very focus of the mission of O’Sullivan, who declared that “cooperating and engaging in a dialogue with third countries that could be used as a platform for circumvention is vital”. The expression was also used when describing the expectation of EU sanctions diplomacy, with O’Sullivan declaring about third countries that “what they usually say is that they don’t want to align with EU sanctions, but at the same time they don’t wish to be a platform for circumvention or evasion of sanctions, and therefore they will cooperate with us in trying to prevent that”. However, there are differences between the expectations towards EU candidate countries and non-candidate countries, as demonstrated below.

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Similarly, the expressions “circumvent sanctions” and “circumvention [of] sanctions” occurred exceptionally often in EU sanctions communications – in total, 13 times in the texts analysed – and those expressions were perceived as moderately interest-based. They fulfilled a similar role to the expression “platform [for] circumvention” in EU communications, warning of the negative impact of allowing circumvention, and praising efforts to tackle it. O’Sullivan focused on the former when he declared that “we are particularly concerned if there’s any circumvention of the sanctions on these [battlefield] products. This has led us to visit a range of countries in the last few months”. In Uzbekistan, for example, O’Sullivan used circumvention in the context of commending the country’s assurances on being against having its territory used for sanctions circumvention, while “respect[ing] Uzbekistan’s desire to remain neutral [in Russia’s war against Ukraine]”.

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The two expressions linked to evasion, “sanction evasion” and “evade sanction”, occurred seven times in total, placing them among the most-often used collocations in the analysed texts. They were used in the same way as expressions mentioning circumvention, focusing on warning and praising third countries. O’Sullivan highlighted that “our legal powers now enable us to sanction an entity in a non-EU country that is aiding a European company to evade sanctions”. As a positive assessment, he underlined that, for Georgia, “there are various ways in which people can try to evade sanctions, whether that’s at customs points or false declarations. And the Georgian authorities have put in place, as I say very impressive measures of trying to monitor this and make sure that it doesn’t happen”.

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Beyond Tackling Circumvention: Addressing Implementation and Alignment

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EU communications addressed the options beyond tackling circumvention through third countries, including the questions of implementation, adoption and alignment on sanctions. These play an especially important role in the difference between the EU’s communications towards EU candidate countries and its communication towards other third countries. EU candidate countries are formally required to progressively align with the EU’s CFSP, which includes sanctions. A full alignment on sanctions needs to be reached prior to accession. This provides the EU with a tool to use regarding EU candidate countries to appeal to their political and economic interests in pursuing the EU accession process successfully.

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EU sanctions communications used three key collocations to describe how far countries potentially could go in supporting EU sanctions. On one hand, these expressions offered a way to remind EU candidate countries of their commitments. On the other, they offered a way to demonstrate that in most third countries, the EU is not asking for alignment, but only for help in tackling circumvention. These can be seen as a “compromise offer” by the EU to non-candidate countries, highlighting that while it could ask for more efforts, it is accepting tackling circumvention as a commendable policy.

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The terms used for communicating these interests are the weakly interest-based terms “implement sanctions”, along with its synonym “sanctions implementation” (among the most-used terms, occurred eight times) and “impose sanctions” (six times) and the moderately interest-based term “align sanctions” (four times).

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Speaking about his country visits, O’Sullivan highlighted that in the cases of EU candidate countries, “the context is always different of course in … Serbia and Türkiye … candidates for accession to the European Union, so there is actually potentially an obligation on them to align with our sanctions”. In the same statement, he also underlined that non-candidate countries, such as countries in central Asia or certain countries in the Caucasus, have no obligation to align with EU sanctions. This point was repeated by Borrell in September 2023, noting that “we expect our partner countries and, in particular those who aspire to become members, to align with our foreign policy decisions”.

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The EU’s relationship with candidate and potential candidate countries demonstrates that the issues of implementation, adoption and alignment on sanctions can be used to appeal to EU candidate countries’ interests on joining the EU. It also allows the EU to express disapproval of certain policies, including engaging with sanctioned entities. In September 2023, Borrell noted that the EU regretted the Georgian government’s decision to resume flights to and from Russia and allow sanctioned individuals to enter the country, highlighting that “these decisions go against EU’s policy and international efforts to isolate Russia internationally due to its illegal war”.

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Naming the War: Stopping Russia’s War Machine

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The EU has countered Moscow’s continuous refusal to call the war in Ukraine by its name, referring to it as a “special military operation”, by clearly referencing “the war” and Russia’s “war machine” in its communications. The terms “war machine” and “invasion [of] Ukraine” were perceived as neither values- nor interest-based and are therefore seen as more descriptive expressions by the expert respondents to the survey. However, the importance of these terms is signalled by the number of times they occurred (“war machine” seven times and “invasion [of] Ukraine” six). They offer a clear way for the EU to steer third countries towards using the same framing.

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The expression “war machine” was primarily used to describe the “Russian war machine” as a concept. It was employed to underline that most third countries do not wish to contribute to fuelling the Russian war machine, while remaining neutral in the conflict. In general, the aim of the EU’s restrictive measures is described in terms of “crippling Russia’s war machine”, targeting both the material and financial means of the Kremlin.

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Mentioning the “invasion [of] Ukraine” fulfilled a similar role in the EU’s sanctions diplomacy. While “war machine” was used in relation to the aim of sanctions, “invasion [of] Ukraine” was used in the context of describing the reason for the sanctions being put in place. O’Sullivan noted that the EU’s most important message is that “we oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine”.

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Appealing to Values: The Role of International Law

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While the results of the analysis show that the EU predominantly communicated by addressing interests, its sanctions diplomacy also contains an important element of values-based communications, focusing primarily on international law. Three values-based collocations, “UN Charter”, “war crime” and “international law”, were used to appeal to the values of international law. These terms were used both to remind third countries of the importance of upholding these principles and to praise third countries’ cooperation by specifically referring to international law. By linking the cooperation on sanctions to international norms, the EU offers an opportunity for third countries to frame any support for tackling circumvention as a positive effort to strengthen the norms of international law. This can be an attractive framing for third countries that have close geopolitical or economic ties to Russia and might be reluctant to communicate cooperating on these measures explicitly as steps against Moscow.

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Borrell noted that he “appreciated the ‘principled position of Kazakhstan based on respect for the UN Charter and the territorial integrity of all UN members, including Ukraine’”. He also highlighted that the EU is asking “all countries … to stand on the side of the principles and values of the UN charter and international law”. This demonstrates the EU’s expectation of third countries to support its sanctions efforts not only because it is in their economic interest, as the use of circumvention-related expressions shows above, but also because it is essential for upholding the norms and values of international law.

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Underlining this approach, O’Sullivan summarised the EU’s message as “we believe that Putin’s actions are completely contrary to the UN charter, it is a war crime” and noted that “in the case of Russia, we are dealing with a particularly egregious breach of international law”. Similarly, Borrell noted that “what is happening in Ukraine is a blatant violation of the UN Charter and the international rules-based order”.

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“Support Ukraine” and its synonym “Ukraine support” were perceived as the most strongly values-based terms among the 25 collocations analysed, with six occurrences in total. The term was primarily used to express that the EU is “supporting Ukraine, and we will support Ukraine for as long as it takes”, framing it as a goal of the EU’s sanctions policy, linking the support for the EU’s sanctions to supporting Ukraine. This can differ from the approach of highlighting international law, as it links the support for sanctions more explicitly to supporting Ukraine, not just international law in general.

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Conclusion

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EU strategic communications on sanctions rely heavily on addressing economic and political interests. As the results of the data-driven analysis show, the most-often occurring terms in EU communications are perceived to target political and economic interests. Only a minority of terms appeals to values, mostly related to international law.

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The paper’s use of data analytics and an expert survey on perceptions offer a unique contribution to the discussion on EU sanctions communications, allowing for a more structured analysis along the values-interest spectrum. This data-driven approach provides a more informed understanding of EU communications and formulates more targeted and evidence-based recommendations on how to improve EU sanctions diplomacy.

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The paper presents the following findings and recommendations to EU policymakers and diplomats.

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1. EU sanctions communications overwhelmingly rely on appealing to interests.

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The EU tends to frame support for tackling sanctions circumvention as an economic interest of third countries. It employs a “stick-and-carrot” approach – the stick is a warning to third countries of the potential negative economic consequences and reputational damage of allowing circumvention, which can lead to fewer investments, while the carrot is the EU’s praise of the efforts of third countries which pledge to tackle circumvention through their territory, which can help bolster their reputation.

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Recommendation: The EU should hold third countries to their promises.

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The “carrot” of positive reputation through the EU’s praise can only be credible if the EU revises its communications consistently. As the EU can strengthen third countries’ reputations by praising their efforts, the EU also needs to withdraw its praise in public communications when third countries do not enact effective and enforceable policies. The EU needs to adapt this communication by expressing either continued praise if third countries indeed implement and enforce the announced anti-circumvention policies or change course and highlight shortcomings when the announced policies do not become reality or are not enforced.

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Recommendation: The EU should not fear using its economic power to compel countries to tackle sanctions circumvention.

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The EU needs to continue warning countries of the negative impact of allowing sanctions circumvention and use the designation of third country companies as a credible threat. The “stick” of warning third countries of the consequences of allowing circumvention only works if the negative impact is demonstrated credibly, including through the listing of third country companies that facilitate sanctions circumvention.

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2. The EU communicates different expectations for EU candidate countries and other third countries.

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Countries on the path to join the EU are formally required to progressively align with the EU’s CFSP, including sanctions, reaching full alignment prior to accession. This expectation is expressed in references to imposing, implementing and aligning with EU sanctions communications, which are among the most-often used terms. Non-candidate countries have no obligation to align with the EU’s sanctions regime, and consequently, the EU communicates their efforts to address circumvention as a sufficient policy step.

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Recommendation: The EU should continue to use accession as a motivation for EU candidate countries to ensure they align with EU sanctions against Russia.

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The EU should make more explicit reference to the accession process in its communications to make EU candidate countries move forward with their alignment on sanctions against Russia. The communications around accession negotiations and other meetings of EU officials with EU candidate countries should be used as a platform to remind EU candidate countries of the clear incentive to adopt EU sanctions and signal their commitment to the accession process. This needs to be highlighted in public communications in the candidate countries, informing the public of this requirement.

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3. The EU uses the referencing of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in EU sanctions diplomacy as a tool to counter Russia’s narrative in third countries.

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The EU uses the referencing of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in neither a values-based nor interest-based manner. However, it can serve as a tool to counter Russian narratives in third countries which have a high degree of political and economic ties to Russia.

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Recommendation: The EU should continue to use all available forums to counter Russia’s narratives, including press conferences and other public statements from the EU sanctions envoy.

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The EU sanctions envoy regularly visits countries with different degrees of ties to Russia, where the EU’s messages might not get the desired visibility. These visits can offer an opportunity to highlight the EU’s narrative and counter Russia’s disinformation. By giving interviews and being featured in the press, EU officials can create more visibility for the EU’s narratives in third countries, therefore the EU sanctions envoy and other officials should use all channels at their disposal to engage with the media during their in-country visits.

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The EU addresses values mainly by referring to international law and linking the support for sanctions to strengthening these values. The EU HR/VP has explicitly commended the “principled position of Kazakhstan based on respect for the UN Charter” and, in this context, acknowledged Kazakhstan’s “efforts to ensure its territory is not used to circumvent European and international sanctions against Russia”, which demonstrates the impact of values in EU strategic communications.

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Recommendation: The EU should continue to use the values of international law in its strategic communications, which would help third countries to frame their efforts against circumvention.

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The EU should reinforce its focus on the values of the UN Charter as it can offer an opportunity to third countries to frame their anti-circumvention policies as a contribution to upholding the principles of international law. This could be especially useful in third countries that have close geopolitical or economic ties with Russia. In these countries, a framing referring to strengthening international law might be more attractive than a more explicit framing of anti-circumvention policies as measures directed against Russia.

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5. EU sanctions communications could explore an environmental framing.

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There are certain dimensions that were not addressed in EU strategic sanctions communications analysed for this paper, including Russia’s “shadow fleet”, mostly made up of uninsured old ships that transport oil to evade the oil price cap. The shadow fleet therefore presents a real environmental threat that could affect any of the littoral countries along the fleet’s routes.

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Recommendation: The EU should explore referencing the environmental threat posed by Russia’s sanctions circumvention by sea in its strategic communications.

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This would offer another incentive for third countries to support the EU’s sanctions efforts by tackling circumvention. Similar to the values of international law, environmental framing would allow third countries to frame their efforts to collaborate on tackling sanctions circumvention as a response to environmental concerns, rather than a measure directed more explicitly against Russia.

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Annex: Sources Used for the Main Analysis

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    European Commission, “Statement by EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan on the First Sanctions Coordinators Forum”, 23 February 2023.

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    European Commission, “David O’Sullivan: Interview with Newly Appointed International Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions”, 28 February 2023.

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    Jakob Hanke Vela and Barbara Moens, “EU’s new Sanctions Envoy Shifts Focus to Enforcement”, Politico, 1 March 2023.

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    EU Watch, “‘Russia Sanctions will Remain in Place for a Long Time’: EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan”, 6 March 2023.

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    Tatyana Kudryavtseva, “EU Envoy: Sanctions Should not Cause Deterioration of Relations with Kyrgyzstan”, 24 KG, 28 March 2023.

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    Tatyana Kudryavtseva, “Import of Goods from EU to Kyrgyzstan Increases by 300 Percent”, 24 KG, 28 March 2023.

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    Marianna Mkrtchyan, “Date of EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan’s Visit to Armenia not yet Known”, ArmInfo, 29 March 2023.

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    Zhania Urankaeva, “Kazakhstan will not face Sanctions for Partnership with Russia and Putin – EU Special Representative”, 24 April 2023.

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    Ulysmedia, “ЕО өкілі қай жағдайда Қазақстанға санкциялар салынуы мүмкін екенін айтты” (“The Representative of the EU said in Which Case Sanctions may be Imposed on Kazakhstan”), 24 April 2023. Author translation.

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    Aibarshyn Akhmetkali, “EU Begin Talks with Kazakhstan to Prevent Re-Export of Sanctioned Goods to Russia”, Astana Times, 25 April 2023.

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    KazTag, “Kazakhstan will not fall Under Secondary Sanctions Due to Putin’s Visit”, 25 April 2023.

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    Gazeta.uz, “‘We are Grateful Uzbekistan is Against Having its Territory used to Circumvent the Sanctions’ – EU Special Envoy”, 28 April 2023.

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    Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, “Transcript of Press Point of the EU Sanctions Envoy, Mr. David O’Sullivan”, 28 June 2023.

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    Mared Gwyn Jones, “Third Countries now Making it ‘More Difficult’ for Russia to Acquire Sanctioned Goods – EU Envoy”, Euronews, 4 July 2023.

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    European Commission, “EU Finance Podcast: The One About the EU Sanctions Envoy”, 26 July 2023.

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    Josep Borrell, “The War on Ukraine, Partnerships, Non-alignment and International Law”, EEAS, 1 February 2023.

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    JAMnews, “European Union Calls on Georgia to Join Sanctions Against Russia in Aviation Sector”, 12 May 2023.

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    EurActiv, “EU Acknowledges Kazakhstan’s Efforts to Curb Russia Sanction Circumvention”, 16 May 2023.

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    Josep Borrell, “Some Clarifications on the Circumvention of EU Sanctions Against Russia”, EEAS, 19 May 2023.

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    Bojana Zimonjić Jelisavac, “Serbia not a Platform for Circumventing EU Sanctions, Says the Prime Minister”, EurActiv, 12 May 2023.

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    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, “Meeting of the Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia Mnatsakan Safaryan with David O’Sullivan, the International Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions”, 24 May 2023.

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    Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, “Interview with Josep Borrell, EU High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission”, 7 September 2023.

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    EEAS, “Georgia: Press Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell After Meeting with Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili”, 8 September 2023.

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Balázs Gyimesi is the Communications Manager of RUSI Europe in Brussels.

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Euro SIFMANet CPH Report

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European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network: Copenhagen Report

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Olivia Allison | 2024.06.06

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Discussions held in Copenhagen in March 2024 addressed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Denmark.

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In late March 2024, the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI, with the support of Copenhagen-based policy centre Think Tank EUROPA, hosted a roundtable in Copenhagen. The roundtable, along with a series of one-on-one meetings, discussed the state of sanctions implementation and enforcement in Denmark. None of the discussions in the event are attributable.

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The gatherings included representatives from national authorities with sanctions-related competences, as well as sanctions and compliance experts from financial institutions and Danish industrial groups, compliance experts from leading law firms, representatives from the industry group Danish Shipping, and other advisers. These included, among others, representatives from the Danish Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs; the Danish Customs Agency (DCA); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (MFA); the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority; the National Special Crime Unit; and other relevant agencies. This event is part of the in-country engagements conducted by the CFS-led European Sanctions and the Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network (SIFMANet), supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.

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Denmark’s Decentralised Sanctions Implementation

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The roundtable began with a discussion of the division of authority and responsibility for sanctions in Denmark, and the significant adaptations required since 2022.

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The conversation considered Denmark’s preparedness for the Russia sanctions following the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) fourth round of mutual evaluations, the scope of which included implementation of targeted financial sanctions. Denmark’s mutual evaluation report was concluded in 2017 and its subsequent follow-up process ended in 2021, which a government representative at the roundtable said had helped the country to prepare for expanded sanctions. They noted that Denmark was evaluated as “partially compliant” for Recommendation 7 related to targeted financial sanctions for proliferation financing, but was upgraded to “largely compliant” in the follow-up report in 2021. Addressing these gaps had, a representative said, helped the country’s preparations, but it had not been possible to prepare fully for the sanctioning of a country with which the EU as a whole had such significant economic ties, compared to jurisdictions that are subject to sanctions regimes covered by the FATF Standards and have been for a long time.

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Denmark has more than 25 authorities with some role in or oversight of sanctions responsibility – relatively higher than other member states where SIFMANet has held similar roundtables. The MFA is the authority with overall responsibility for coordinating the sanctions policy of the Danish government. Since 2022, the Danish “EU-Special Committee on Sanctions” and taskforces have expanded to include additional government bodies, ranging from utilities to cultural ministries. Government representatives highlighted the enhanced coordination that had been put into practice in Denmark. Steps included the establishment of a central sanctions coordinator team, vested in a newly established economic security unit in the MFA, and new intra-governmental procedures, as well as a governmental taskforce to counter circumvention, with participation from relevant national Danish authorities.

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Although government representatives said that this coordination between a wider group had improved effectiveness, dividing responsibility for implementation and guidance across numerous national competent authorities may also increase the risk of fragmentation in approach. This was underscored by comments from private sector participants, who said that there had been “inter-agency problems on who’s responsible for what”. One participant said that some questions had “circled for some time” as a result.

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Lacking National Guidance on EU Regulations

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One source of frustration expressed by private sector participants at the roundtable was the Danish government’s reluctance to interpret European law and regulations or provide answers to specific questions, given that the debate had taken place in Brussels. One participant said that while interpretation of Danish law would take into account written remarks about the law, no such written remarks are provided for EU law and, they said, “we can only look at what the law says”. This representative also said the Danish government’s role was to provide guidance, “not counselling”. Other government representatives said they had provided as much guidance as possible, but that the scale of requests had been unprecedented.

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Private sector participants were frustrated with this position. They agreed that they found the EU FAQs helpful, but insisted these should be expanded further. While they appreciated the guidance that had been shared by the Danish government, they said it was both too limited and too slow. One representative of a Danish maritime industry group said that they had sent 75 to 100 requests to Danish authorities and had not yet received a clear response. Another participant, from a law firm, said the process was time-consuming and that it “can be difficult to get answers”.

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In addition to this, some participants said that, over time, they had stopped seeking formal clarification on the sanctions, because of concerns about privacy in the event of freedom of information requests being made to the government. One participant said they preferred to liaise through informal discussions. A business association representative also said companies had stopped seeking clarification on other matters for fear of receiving an answer that blocked a particular transaction. Overall, some private sector participants expressed their frustration that their community continued to have more experience and expertise in sanctions implementation than the public sector.

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Private Sector Information Sharing

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Despite these obstacles, a business association representative said there was an overall positive public–private dialogue, and a general perception that Danish business wants to do right thing. Participants from both public and private sectors reiterated several times the importance of trust in the business environment, and a government representative said they were highly aware of companies’ willingness to comply, as well as the public support for their doing so.

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Another positive aspect highlighted was sharing information within the private sector, with more experienced companies sharing tools and information with smaller businesses, in order to support their compliance with the regulations. This was seen as an important support for business, given the “huge gap in compliance readiness” that a business association representative noticed among smaller companies. One participant from a multinational company said this information-sharing practice had been much more widespread in Denmark than in other European member states, an assertion supported by SIFMANet visits to other EU member states.

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Government-led efforts include not only the establishment of sanctions taskforces among authorities, but also substantial outreach to the private sector. This outreach included a notification that Danish authorities sent to over 1,500 companies containing information on their sanctions obligations and encouraging them to get in touch and ask for support. In addition, the Danish Business Authority has sent out targeted letters in relation to circumvention, including compliance guidance, to approximately 200 economic operators. Danish authorities had an existing relationship with obliged entities, but the government decided to engage with all companies, given the expansive nature of the Russia sanctions regime.

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Misalignment Between Banks and Corporates

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Representatives from the corporate sector, including industrial and shipping companies, expressed frustration with the banking sector, which they said had taken an overly narrow approach to allowing certain transactions – beyond what was required by the law. One participant said it was as if “every taxi driver had to ask clients what they were doing before accepting their fare”. A bank representative said the requirement to comply on the product side had fundamentally changed how financial institutions approach sanctions risk, while another participant said that they now viewed certain types of business activities as high risk, where these would not have been before 2022.

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Another participant, from a business association, said that several of their members had completed all compliance steps required for a certain transaction, but the banks had still refused to allow it. However, a representative from a bank said that non-US companies “need to step up”. They referred to the risks highlighted in the December 2023 amendments to US Executive Order 14024, which strengthened the US’ ability to sanction financial institutions facilitating and funding supplies to the Russian military–industrial complex.

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At the same time, representatives from corporates also acknowledged that there was a lack of regulation of that sector, compared to the financial industry. There is no specific “know your customer” requirement for much of Danish industry, which meant that it was challenging to convince boards to allocate resources to sanctions compliance. Meanwhile, banks now demand more compliance procedures, and have higher standards for their corporate clients.

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Additionally, participants from both banks and corporates cited a perception that the strictness of their compliance was harming their competitiveness compared to their European peers. They said this was a “significant” concern. Representatives of the shipping industry said that the country as a whole was now a “risk-poor environment”, with many shipping companies taking overly conservative approaches to international business, resulting in a negative impact on both that industry and the business environment overall.

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One area that was highlighted several times was product classification. Given the dominance of the shipping and trade sectors in Denmark, classification was a significant issue, with participants highlighting the difficulties of getting a classification on tariff codes from customs and a dual-use designation decision. Some participants agreed that there continued to be public sector resourcing issues relating to the EU sanctions over the critical goods and technologies listed under Annex VII of Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014. However, another participant mentioned that the DCA can provide Binding Tariff Information decisions.

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Enforcement and the Shadow of the Dan-Bunkering Case

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The discussion then turned to the topic of enforcement, and numerous participants referred to the case of Dan-Bunkering, which was prosecuted in Denmark in 2021 for shipping $101 million in jet fuel to Syria from Kaliningrad. This case was seen by several participants as a model of enforcement. However, a representative of a business association said this represented a specific case, in which a business “wilfully turned a blind eye” to government guidance. In this way, they said, the Dan-Bunkering case was not representative of Danish business practices. Nevertheless, the experience clearly cast a shadow across public and private sector alike.

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Procedural questions of how investigations were initiated were also discussed, with prosecutors highlighting that many cases began with administrative infractions, escalating into cooperation between police and competent authorities. This procedure, another government representative said, had been set up after the Dan-Bunkering case, which had provided many opportunities to clarify procedures.

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A representative from the Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs said many investigations began with the relevant Danish authority conducting a review of the news media for negative reports or requesting documents from exporters to identify suspicious information. This information was then evaluated for potential indications of misconduct before the authority decided whether to escalate the matter to police (and potentially onwards to prosecutors). Since 2022, Danish authorities have evaluated 140 potential breaches, they said, and there were around 40 open cases. So far, six matters had been reported to police. At the same time, a customs representative said there were other steps before any potential breaches were reported, including a hearing on customs declarations, and so there was “a lot of enforcement going on behind the scenes” before any case is reported.

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Participants said these statistics highlighted the difficulty of comparing enforcement between different EU member states, with no centralised reporting of enforcement from the EU’s Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union. A participant from a business association said these figures were also likely to be much higher than the number of actual criminal cases, since many issues related to goods that were unintentionally misdeclared, due to the aforementioned classification difficulties, rather than deliberate evasion or circumvention.

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To this point from the business association, the customs representative responded that, in the majority of cases relating to possible breaches of import and export prohibitions, the DCA will go through several steps ahead of any potential filing of a police report. This includes a consultation process with the responsible party (usually the declarer), in which they are informed that the customs declaration is in possible breach of sanctions. The party will then be able to provide documentation for potential misdeclarations, so that the declaration can be corrected. Only if the responsible party is unable or unwilling to provide sufficient documentation that their goods are not in violation of sanctions will a police report be filed. Therefore, they argued, the figure is unlikely to be inflated by “unintentional misdeclarations” and similar declaration-related mistakes.

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Finally, participants discussed Denmark’s criminal enforcement regime for sanctions breaches, which requires proof of negligence or intent. Some participants found Denmark to have relatively high standards for criminal enforcement, and advocated for civil enforcement or other mechanisms with lower standards for deployment. Private sector representatives added that they would welcome a civil enforcement regime in Denmark, as this would allow voluntary self-disclosures and more dialogue between the public and private sectors, allowing companies to “come clean” if they have inadvertently breached sanctions.

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However, other participants said that widening enforcement action could damage the collaborative and cooperative nature of the public–private dialogue as well as the dialogue between private sector actors. They instead urged the government to publish findings from its investigations and reviews, even those that do not reach the standards for a criminal prosecution, as these would allow companies to learn from issues other entities have faced.

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Conclusion

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Danish authorities and the private sector clearly reiterated their commitment to implementing and enforcing sanctions within Denmark at this roundtable. One particularly positive aspect of this was the commitment to information sharing in the private sector, both within business associations and between peers within industry. The roundtable discussions also demonstrated open and frank dialogue regarding the need for more guidance and support from the public sector, and authorities’ receptivity to these messages.

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The government’s ability to provide guidance and clear responses to queries appeared to be hampered by the spread of sanctions implementation responsibility across a large number of national competent authorities, to the degree that private sector actors complained of questions “circling” among various agencies.

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Further, the Danish authorities’ limitation on providing guidance on EU regulation, beyond what is stated in the wording and FAQs as adopted in Brussels, also poses practical difficulties and raised frustration within the private sector. Business representatives urged the government to share more information on its interpretations, including potentially on anonymised determinations by customs and other authorities in pre-enforcement investigations and analyses.

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Discussions also highlighted the potential gap in enforcement for sanctions breaches that occur due to conduct that falls below Denmark’s criminal standard. This may create a gap between Danish enforcement practice and that of other member states. At the same time, Danish business perceived its own practice as overly compliant, in comparison to other EU member states, raising concerns about Denmark’s competitiveness. Further alignment with other member states would address such concerns.

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In sum, like many EU member states, Denmark has discovered that the key to successful sanctions implementation starts with coordination across the wide range of agencies and departments that find themselves involved in the Russia sanctions regime. It has also discovered that investment in relations with the private sector – the frontline of implementation – is critical if the country is to play its part in restricting the funding, and particularly the resourcing, of Russia’s illegal war of aggression in Ukraine.

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Olivia Allison is an Associate Fellow at RUSI and an independent consultant. She has more than 15 years’ experience carrying out complex international investigations and supporting the development of integrity and governance for state-owned companies, international companies and international financial institutions. She has a wide range of financial crime and asset-tracing experience from leadership roles held in London, Moscow, Kyiv and Kazakhstan.

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Algorithmic Stability

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How AI Could Shape the Future of Deterrence

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Benjamin Jensen, et al. | 2024.06.10

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This report delves into the future of deterrence and the role of human judgment in an AI-focused crisis simulation.

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In the future…

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    States will integrate artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) into their national security enterprises to gain decision advantages over their rivals. The question will not be if a web of algorithms extends across the military, intelligence community, and foreign policy decisionmaking institutions, but how lines of code interact with the human clash of wills at the heart of strategy.

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    New technology will change the character but not the nature of statecraft and strategy. States will still combine diplomacy, economic coercion, and influence campaigns with threats of military force to signal rivals and reassure allies. Human decisionmaking, while augmented by algorithms, remains central to strategy formation and crisis management.

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    Information about AI/ML capabilities will influence how states manage escalation. Escalation risks will continue to emerge from how warfighting changes the balance of information available to update models and support human decisionmaking. Intelligence gaps on adversary algorithms increase the likelihood of escalation but only once states have crossed the Rubicon and fight beneath the nuclear threshold.

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Introduction

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How will the adoption of AI/ML across a state’s national security enterprise affect crisis decisionmaking? For example, what would the Cuban Missile Crisis look like at machine speed?

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Beyond current policy debates, congressional testimony, new strategies, and a drive to identify, test, and evaluate standards, there is a fundamental question of how computer algorithms will shape crisis interactions between nuclear powers. Further, will refined AI/ML models pull people back from the brink or push them over the edge during crises that are as much about fear and emotion as they are rational decisionmaking? How will humans and machines interact during a crisis between nuclear powers?

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This edition of On Future War uses a series of wargames as an experiment to analyze how players with 10 or more years of national security experience approach crisis decisionmaking given variable levels of knowledge about a rival great power’s level of AI/ML integration across its national security enterprise.

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To answer this question, the CSIS Futures Lab held a series of crisis simulations in early 2023 analyzing how AI/ML will shape the future of deterrence. The games — designed as a randomized control trial — explored human uncertainty regarding a rival great power’s level of AI/ML integration and how this factor affected strategic stability during a crisis.

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Two major findings emerged. First, across the simulations, varying levels of AI/ML capabilities had no observable effect on strategy and a general trend of trying to combine multiple instruments of power when responding to a crisis. While data science and the use of AI/ML to augment statecraft will almost certainly be a defining feature of the near future, there appear to be constants of strategy that will survive the emergence of such new technologies. Diplomacy, economic coercion, and influence campaigns will survive even as machines collect and process more information and help shape national security decisionmaking. AI/ML will augment but not fundamentally change strategy. That said, there is an urgent need to start training national security professionals to understand what AI/ML is and is not, as well as how it can support human decisionmaking during foreign policy crises.

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Second, how nations fight in the shadow of nuclear weapons will change as states selectively target the battle networks of their rivals. Even though the perceived risk of escalation is not likely to be affected by the balance of AI/ML capabilities, the criteria used to select flexible response options will change. States will need to balance countering adversary algorithms with ensuring that they do not blind an adversary and risk triggering a “dead-hand” — a fast and automated system developed by the Soviet Union to launch nuclear weapons — escalation spiral. This need to strike the right balance in military targeting will put a new premium on intelligence collection that maps how rival states employ AI/ML capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. It could also change how states approach arms control, with a new emphasis on understanding where and how AI/ML capabilities augment crisis decisionmaking.

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Deterrence, Battle Networks, and AI/ML

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Modern deterrence literature focuses on how states bargain, short of war, through threats and commitments. These signals change how each side calculates the costs and benefits of going to war, implying that the less information each side has about the balance of capabilities and resolve, the harder it becomes to encourage restraint. Signaling and communication play a central role in how states seek to manipulate risk to deny an adversary an advantage, including incentives for seeking a fait accompli by military force. Even literature that stresses the psychological and cultural antecedents that shape how foreign policy leaders approach crisis diplomacy share this emphasis on the central role of information. Rational calculations break down based on past information (i.e., how beliefs shape expectations) and flawed weighting (e.g., bias and prospect theory).

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In modern military planning and operations, information is managed through battle networks. The ability to conduct long-range precision strikes and track adversary troop movements all rests on aggregating and analyzing data. This logic is a foundation for the Coalition Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) network, which is designed to push and pull data across distributed networks of sensors and shooters connected by faster communication, processing, and decision layers informed by AI/ML. The network is the new theory of victory at the center of the new Joint Warfighting Concept, which prioritizes synchronizing multidomain effects in time and space. For this reason, information is now a key component of military power and, by proxy, a state’s ability to bargain with a rival. The more information a state can process, assisted by algorithms, the more likely it is to identify windows of opportunity and risk as well as align ends, ways, and means to gain a relative advantage.

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Yet, most of the emerging literature on AI/ML and the future of war focuses more on risk and ethical considerations than bargaining advantages. First, multiple accounts claim that AI/ML will create new risks, including “flash wars,” and are likely to produce destabilizing effects along multiple vectors. The thinking goes that the new era of great power competition will be marked by an “indelicate balance of terror” as Russia, China, and the United States race to acquire technological game changers. To the extent that AI/ML alters military power, it could affect how states perceive the balance of power. As perceptions about power and influence change, it could trigger inadvertent escalation risks. Inside the bureaucracy, defense planners could rely on brittle and black-boxed AI/ML recommendations that create new forms of strategic instability. At the tactical level, the speed of autonomous weapons systems could lead to inadvertent escalation while also undermining signaling commitment during a crisis.

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There are two issues with these claims. First, arguments about the destabilizing role of AI/ML have yet to be explored beyond literature reviews, alternative scenarios, and illustrative wargames designed more for gaining perspective than for evaluating strategy. In other words, hypotheses about risk and escalation have not been tested. Second, accounts about emerging technology and inadvertent escalation often discount the role of increased information in reducing tensions. To the extent that algorithms applied across a battle network help reduce uncertainty, they are likely to support deterrence. You can never lift the fog of war, but you can make weather forecasts and describe what is known, unknown, and unknowable. This alternative logic sits at the foundation of the “wargame as an experiment” the CSIS Futures Lab constructed to analyze how AI/ML could affect strategic stability.

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Would You Like to Play a Game?

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In 2023, the CSIS Futures Lab conducted two tabletop exercises exploring a crisis scenario involving AI/ML’s effect on strategic decisionmaking. The tabletop exercise focused on a crisis involving a third-party state between two rivals, each of which had nuclear weapons and a second-strike capability. The rival states in the exercise were abstracted to remove bias about current rivalries that define the international system, thus reducing, but not eliminating, the risk of confounding factors skewing gameplay. As a result, players made choices about how to respond to a crisis and which elements of a rival state’s battle network (i.e., CJADC2) to target. The games consisted of 29 individual players, each with over 10 years of national security experience.

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The Game

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    Two tabletop exercises analyzing how players develop flexible deterrent and flexible response options during a crisis between rival nuclear states

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    Fake scenario to reduce bias

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    Players all had at least 10 years of national security experience

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    Players randomly assigned into different treatment groups

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    Three rounds of crisis interactions, moving from competition to the early stages of a military conflict

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The game design adapted an earlier tabletop exercise used to study modern competition and cyber escalation dynamics known as Corcyra. This game put players in a fictional scenario involving a crisis standoff between two nuclear rivals: Green State and Purple State over a small state, Orange State. Green State and Orange State are treaty allies. Purple State and Orange State have a maritime territorial dispute. Players, assuming the role of Green State, make decisions about the best mix of flexible deterrent (competition) and flexible response options as the crisis unfolds. The game scenario — involving a territorial dispute, enduring rivalry, and alliance networks — built in dynamics associated with escalation to focus on low-probability, high-consequence foreign policy events. The use of fake countries seeks to make players less likely to introduce bias in the results based on prior beliefs about current powers such as the United States and China.

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Unknown to the players, Purple State’s moves and decisions were predetermined to walk players up the escalation ladder, a technique known in the wargame community as a 1.5-sided design. This game design captures the uncertainty and interactive complexity (i.e., reaction, counteraction) of two-sided games but better supports capturing and coding observations about player preferences and assessments of risks and opportunities. Applied to Corcyra, a 1.5-sided game design enabled the CSIS Futures Lab to collect data on how players made decisions about competition and conventional conflict in the shadow of nuclear weapons.

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As the game proceeded, players were randomly assigned into two different treatment groups and led into different rooms with a facilitator. Each group was given an identical game packet that included an overview of the crisis and military balance between Green State and Purple State as well as the standing policy objectives for Green State to deter Purple State’s actions against its treaty allies while limiting the risk of a broader war (i.e., extended general deterrent). The only difference between the two groups was in the intelligence estimate of the extent of Purple State’s AI/ML capabilities in relation to Green State. As seen in Table 1, this difference meant that everything was constant (e.g., military balance, policy objectives, and Purple State’s actions across the game) except for the knowledge the players received about their rival’s level of AI/ML capabilities. This design reflects a factorial vignette survey, controlling for whether AI/ML capability is known or unknown.

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Over the course of the game, each group (i.e., Treatment A and B) responded to a set of adversary escalation vignettes. Unknown to the participants was that each subsequent move would see their rival escalate and move up the escalation ladder to ensure a more dynamic interplay between current decisionmaking and maintaining sufficient forces and options for future interactions. The design also ensured that players were forced to confront the threat of conventional strikes on the nuclear enterprise and the limited use of nuclear weapons in a counterforce role.

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image01 +▲ Table 1: Excerpts from the Corcyra Game Packets

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The first round of the game dealt with flexible deterrent options and crisis response. Afterwards, each group received a brief about a crisis — between their treaty ally (Orange State) and nuclear rival (Purple State) — and each player (Green State) was asked to craft a response using multiple instruments of power (e.g., diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) by picking three options from a menu of 24 preapproved flexible deterrent options. Each instrument of power had six response options based on the implied level of escalation. This design allowed the CSIS Futures Lab to see if varying levels of AI/ML capabilities had an effect on how players approached competition and campaigning as part of a larger deterrent posture. Specifically, it allowed the research team to test how the capability affected overall competition strategy and escalation dynamics.

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The second round began with a limited military strike by Purple State on Orange State. Players were briefed that Purple State conducted a series of limited strikes on an airfield and naval base in Orange State. Orange State intercepted 50 percent of the cruise missiles in the attack, but the remaining 20 — fired from a mix of Purple State aircraft and naval warships — damaged an Orange State frigate, downed two maritime patrol aircraft, and destroyed an ammunition depot. Initial reports suggested that as many as 20 Orange State military personnel were killed in action, with another 30 wounded. There were also four Green State military advisers working on the base at the time who were killed in the attack. The attacks coincided with widespread reports of global positioning system (GPS) denial, jamming, and cyber intrusions in both Orange State and Green State. Purple State said the attack was limited to the military facility Orange State had used in past provocations, but it vows broader attacks if Orange State or Green State responds. In this manner, Purple State’s conventional military response reflected core concepts in modern military theory about multidomain operations, joint firepower strikes, and sixth-generation warfare.

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After receiving this intelligence update, players were asked to nominate flexible response options. First, the players had to recommend which of the military responses from the menu of 24 options they recommended in response to a limited military strike by Purple State on Orange State. Players also had to specify which layer of Purple State’s battle network they wanted to affect through their recommended response: sensing, processing, communicating, decision, or effectors. This game design limited the range of options open to players to support statistical analysis and comparison between the two treatments.

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The third round examined if players adjusted their military response options to conventional strikes on their nuclear enterprise. Players were briefed that Purple State conducted a series of conventional strikes against Orange State and Green State. In Orange State, the strikes targeted major military facilities and even the Orange State leadership (both military and civilian) with a mix of cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and special operations forces (SOF) raids. The attacks included striking Green State intelligence satellites and major early-warning radars as well as key airfields where Green State keeps the majority of its strike and bomber aircraft squadrons. The mass precision conventional strikes — launched largely by a mix of long-range strike and bomber aircraft and submarines — also targeted key port facilities in Green State used to reload vertical launch cells and support Green State submarine forces. Orange State lost over 30 percent of its military combat power and 50 percent of its civilian critical infrastructure related to water treatment, energy, and telecommunications. Its leaders survived the decapitation strikes but are enacting continuity of government protocols. Green State has suffered 10 percent attrition in its air and naval forces. Purple State has threatened that it may be forced to expand strikes, to include using nuclear weapons, if Green State conducts additional military strikes.

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What the Game Revealed about the Future of Deterrence

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Flexible Deterrent Options

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Throughout the game, each player had three options from any category (i.e., diplomatic, informational, military, or economic) to choose. Table 2 summarizes how frequently each player selected flexible response options linked to different instruments of power during the initial crisis response (i.e., Round 1). Analyzing these choices provides a window into how players with at least 10 years of national security experience approached the “ways” of crisis management toward the “end” of reestablishing deterrence. If AI/ML is inherently more escalation prone, one would expect to see a statistically significant difference between the treatments.

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There was no statistically significant difference between the two treatments. The balance of AI/ML capabilities did not alter how players approached their competitive strategy and crisis management. Across the treatments, players developed an integrated approach, often choosing multiple instruments of power to pressure their rival, as opposed to focusing on a strictly military response. No player in either treatment used only a singular instrument of power, such as only responding with military options. On the contrary, over 60 percent of players in each treatment selected multiple instruments of power. In other words, the level of AI/ML capabilities between rivals did not directly alter early-stage crisis response and the development of flexible deterrent options designed to stabilize the situation and reestablish deterrence. This finding runs contrary to perspectives that see AI/ML as inherently escalatory and risk prone. While AI/ML will augment multiple analytical processes from the tactical to the strategic level, national security leaders will still make critical decisions and seek ways to slow down and manage a crisis. The risk is likely more in how people interact with algorithms during a crisis than in the use of data science and machine learning to analyze information and intelligence. AI/ML does not pose risks on its own.

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image02 +▲ Table 2: Selected Deterrent Options

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During discussions in Round 1 for Treatment A (AI/ML Capabilities Known), players focused more on strategy as it relates to shaping human decisionmaking. In the first round, participants were divided over whether Purple State’s actions were hostile or not but conceded that Purple State was attempting to signal that Green State’s actions in the region were unwarranted. Of note, this focus on signaling was more about human intention than algorithmic assessments. The players generally saw the crisis as about human leaders in rival states seeking advantage through national security bureaucracies augmented by AI/ML capabilities. In their discussions, humans were in the loop and focused on finding ways to de-escalate the crisis without signaling weakness. The discussion was less about how algorithms might skew information and more about how to have direct communication and clear messages passed through diplomats to other human leaders.

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This logic drove the players to focus on developing the situation through diplomatic outreach while increasing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in the region. Although participants agreed upon the utility of diplomacy as a response to the crisis, they diverged in their opinion on whether the efforts should publicly call for de-escalation or privately use third parties or influence campaigns to warn Purple State’s elites about further escalation. Group members widely supported increasing ISR assets in the region to provide early warning of future Purple State military deployments and increase protection of friendly communications and intelligence-collection assets. Additionally, group members sought to privately share intelligence with allies in the region. Again, AI/ML was less a focal point than a method to gain better situational awareness and identify the best mechanisms for crisis communication with the rival state (i.e., private, public, or third-party). People, more than machines, were central to crisis management.

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Where AI/ML did enter the discussion was with respect to how the rival battle networks with high degrees of automation could misperceive the deployment of additional ISR capabilities during a crisis. Although participants strongly believed that this action was essential, they recognized the possibility that Purple State’s AI/ML augmented strategic warning systems may not be able to interpret the difference between signaling resolve or deliberate escalation. At the same time, they thought the direct communication channels should augment this risk and that most algorithmic applications analyzing the deployment of ISR assets would be more probabilistic than deterministic, thinking in terms of conditional probabilities about escalation risks rather than jumping to the conclusion that war was imminent.

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Put differently, since all AI/ML is based on learning patterns from data or rules-based logic, the underlying patterns of past ISR deployments would likely make the system — even absent a human — unlikely to predict a low-probability event (i.e., war) when there are other more common options associated with a ubiquitous event such as increasing intelligence. If anything, the reverse would be more likely. Since wars and even militarized crises are rare events, an AI/ML algorithm — depending on the training data and parameters — would treat them as such absent human intervention. This does not mean there is a zero probability of “flash wars” and misreading the situation. Rather, the point is that given the low number of wars and militarized crises between states, there are few patterns, and there will almost certainly be a human in the loop. No senior national security leader is likely to cede all decisionmaking to an algorithm in a crisis.

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Treatment B saw a similar discussion between players that focused on using multiple instruments of power and identifying de-escalation opportunities. Of note, it also saw more diplomatic outreach, with players wanting to ensure they could cut through the uncertainty about Purple State’s AI/ML capabilities through direct and indirect diplomatic engagements and crisis communication. In Treatment B, concern about the strengths and limitations of an unknown AI/ML capability in Purple State had a significant impact on group decisionmaking. Group members desired a mutual understanding of Green State and Purple State’s AI/ML capabilities, believing that greater clarity over the balance and use of AI/ML capabilities between rivals would lead to stability, rather than the current instability they faced.

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This focus led participants to recommend deploying ISR capabilities to identify how and if Purple State was using AI-assisted ISR that might misread their intentions. Some players expressed concern about whether the use of ISR would undermine their efforts at de-escalation. Players suggested that if Purple State detected increased deployment of collection and early-warning assets, they would feel pressured to deploy military forces to prevent the appearance of a capability gap.

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Ultimately, players believed that deploying additional ISR was worth the potential escalation risk because it was essential to analyze adversary actions as they unfolded. These groups sought to combine diplomatic, flexible deterrent options such as third-party mediation and redeployment of naval and aviation assets away from Purple State to signal a desire to de-escalate. In other words, national security professionals wanted to ensure there was a check on algorithmic reasoning during a crisis and were willing to deploy assets to that end and even slow down operations to buy time and space for diplomacy and clear signaling.

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This reasoning runs counter to claims that AI triggers a security dilemma that leads to inadvertent escalation. In international relations, a security dilemma is a situation where efforts by one state to increase its security cause rival states to experience more insecurity. The concept is used to explain why states find themselves pulled into arms races, crisis escalation, and war. The security dilemma can become especially acute based, among other things, on new technologies that make it difficult to assess whether offensive or defensive military capabilities create strategic advantage. As a result, one would expect to see the emergence of AI/ML capabilities trigger a security dilemma and inadvertent escalation. Rival states would opt for more severe crisis response options in their selection of flexible deterrent options.

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Yet, this dynamic did not emerge in the crisis simulations based on player discussions and statistical analysis. Players could select from a menu of 24 crisis response options varying by magnitude across each of the instruments of power. Using this magnitude, the CSIS Futures Lab could analyze whether there was more or less coercive pressure applied across the treatments. As can be seen in Table 3, there was no statistically significant difference in the magnitudes across the two treatments. The balance of AI/ML capabilities did not affect how rival states approached crisis management and competitive strategy. Based on discussions, players searched for ways to escape the security dilemma through diplomatic outreach and intelligence across both treatments.

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While the average escalation level between the two treatments is not different, there appear to be inverse preferences for weak signaling and crisis probing that players adopted to manage crisis escalation. Table 3 below shows the levels of escalation magnitude, ranging from 1 (“low”) to 6 (“high”), that players opted for when they selected diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of power to signal their rival and shape the crisis. Lower magnitude signals (1) — which were predominantly diplomatic and intelligence activities — were more than twice as likely in Treatment A (10) than in B (4). Players assessed that AI/ML-enabled battle networks would detect weak signals and help support a defensive posture while searching for a crisis off-ramp. Inversely, in Treatment B (AI/ML Capabilities Unknown), players adopted more of probing strategy using mid-range signaling (i.e., level 3 escalation magnitude) to test adversary capabilities and resolve. In Treatment A (AI/ML Capabilities Known), only 36 percent (14) of the responses fell in this range while Treatment B (AI/ML Capabilities Unknown) saw 60 percent (23). This finding implies that the balance of knowledge about AI/ML capabilities could alter escalation dynamics in the future.

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image03 +▲ Table 3: Contingency Table Escalation Magnitude

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Battle Networks

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During the second round, players found themselves confronting a series of limited strikes by a rival state. In the third round, the situation escalated to theater-wide conventional strikes to evaluate how players shifted their military strategy. In these rounds, players recommended how best to attack their rival state’s battle network in terms of the optimal layer to target: sensor, communications, processing, decision, or effects. If the balance of AI/ML capabilities affects military operations, one would expect to see targeting differences across the treatments.

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Yet,there was no statistically significant difference across the treatments in relation to battle network targeting preferences. As seen in the contingency table below, targeting preferences varied across the treatments, but not as much as expected. In treatments where AI/ML capabilities were known and balanced, players preferred to try and target the processing and decisionmaking layers in an effort to deny the other side tempo and a decisionmaking advantage.

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image04 +▲ Table 4: Battle Network Targeting Preferences

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Player discussions drew out the logic behind the difference. When AI/ML was known, players discussed how targeting the decision layer could be a pathway to slow down a crisis and give humans a chance to respond and degrade the ability of a rival to retaliate at machine speed. At the same time, they wanted to limit targeting the processing layer. Players discussed how this layer, which consists of large data hubs, is a new form of critical infrastructure that is often co-located with energy and telecommunications infrastructure to support powering computers and distributing information. Hitting this layer could pull a rival state deeper into an escalation spiral due to concerns about civilian deaths and counter-value targeting. As a result, they discussed how best to target the decision layer, including introducing new forms of flexible deterrent and response options designed to spoof and confuse AI/ML applications that help senior leaders analyze a crisis. The goal was to gain an information advantage and use it for leverage without triggering inadvertent escalation.

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When AI/ML was unknown, participants opted to target effectors (e.g., conventional weapons) because it was assessed as the highest payoff target given uncertainty about adversary decisionmaking capabilities. In the absence of knowledge about the depth of AI/ML in a rival state’s battle network, players opted to change the correlation of forces in terms of neutralizing military capabilities capable of launching a retaliatory strike. Although players debated the use of cyber capabilities to degrade Purple State’s military capabilities, players wanted a kinetic strike because it was a visible signal, could be quickly executed, and could target a limited range of proportional targets to demonstrate resolve to the international community without significant escalation risk. This insight impliesaneed to rethink aspects of military targeting in an era almost certain to be defined by increasingly sophisticated AI/ML applications supporting crisis decisionmaking.

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Escalation Risks

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Despite valid concerns about AI/ML and nuclear escalation, there were no statistically significant differences between the treatments in relation to how players assessed the risk. This finding is based on comparing assessments of nuclear escalation risks for Treatment A (AI/ML Capabilities Known) and B (AI/ML Capabilities Unknown). In each round, players selected how likely their flexible response option was to trigger nuclear escalation by picking a number from 1 to 6 with the following values: (1) no risk, (2) risk of limited conventional military confrontation, (3) risk of conventional strikes to degrade nuclear enterprise, (4) risk of limited nuclear attack, (5) risk of large-scale nuclear attack against nuclear enterprise, and (6) risk of large-scale nuclear attack against civilian targets.

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In Round 2, when players had to recommend a flexible military response option to counter a rival state, there was no statistically significant difference in their risk assessment. In both games, players assessed the risk as a rival state responding with nonnuclear, limited conventional retaliatory strikes. When AI/ML capabilities were unknown, it created a unique discussion about escalation dynamics. Some players expressed concern that targeting the communication layer in a battle network could lead bad algorithms to get even worse. Absent new information, a rival state’s AI/ML models would be more prone to provide bad or at least outdated advice.

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In Round 3, when players had to respond to widespread conventional military strikes, there was also no statistically significant difference in players’ risk assessment. Across both treatments, players saw an increased risk of a retaliatory conventional strike on their nuclear enterprise. When AI/ML capabilities were known, players expressed more concern about a limited nuclear strike and how to best understand the algorithms their rival integrated across the national security enterprise at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. More than technological advantage, players assessed that the key to understanding future AI/ML escalation risks during a nuclear crisis rests in mapping how algorithms inform decisionmaking at echelon. This requirement to understand the range of AI/ML systems augmenting a national security enterprise creates entirely new intelligence requirements critical to early warning and arms control.

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There was a statistically significant difference between the treatments with respect to conventional escalation. This finding (Table 5 below) is based on comparing which military response option players opted for in Round 3 in response to widespread conventional strikes. Treatment A (AI/ML Capabilities Known) players took a more measured response and conducted limited strikes on their rival’s military designed to manage escalation risk. During game discussions, players brought up the idea that they were signaling both the rival human leaders and their algorithms, trying to preserve the possibility of an off-ramp. Alternatively, in Treatment B (AI/ML Capabilities Unknown), players took a more aggressive, decisive response but still beneath the nuclear threshold. The findings are more nuanced than what the numbers tell. During the counteraction phase, participants were united in their belief that Green and Purple States were now in a state of war. All players assessed Purple State as “hostile” and considered “crisis escalation imminent.” Since players knew crisis escalation was imminent, they struggled to find an effective response that would signal resolve and commitment to their treaty ally Orange State that would not trigger strategic escalation. Treatment B players argued that “escalating to de-escalate” would be the most viable strategy to ensure a crisis would not lead to greater hostilities. For Treatment B, unknown AI/ML capabilities meant that Green State players were aware of the existence of Purple State’s AI/ML capabilities, yet they did not understand how these systems were being integrated into their decisionmaking process. The “escalate to de-escalate” approach of the Treatment B players was designed to offset the intelligence asymmetry gap with a stronger conventional military response. This finding suggests that a priority intelligence requirement in future crises will be the depth and extent of AI/ML systems across a rival state’s national security enterprise and operational battle networks. It also suggests a possible new form of inadvertent escalation risk associated with testing a rival’s capabilities to reduce uncertainty. This finding has significant implications for thinking about the future of arms control and how to approach national intelligence requirement generation optimized for an algorithmic future.

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image05 +▲ Table 5: Contingency Table for Military FRO Preferences

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Policy Recommendations

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The findings from these crisis simulations point to recommendations that the United States and its network of partners and allies should consider as they build interoperable battle networks where AI/ML supports decisionmaking at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

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1. Embrace experimentation and an agile mindset.

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The national security community needs to stop worrying about Skynet, alongside other technology-related threat inflation, and start building applications that help people navigate the massive volume of information that is already overwhelming staff and decisionmakers during a crisis. There is a need for more experiments designed to calibrate how best to integrate AI/ML into national security decisionmaking that build on established efforts such as the Global Information Dominance Exercise (GIDE). These exercises connect combatant commands and test their ability to work along a seamless battle network moderated by AI/ML (i.e., human-on-the-loop) during a crisis and the transition to conflict. Each GIDE helps the larger Department of Defense think about how to support modern campaigning consistent with emerging doctrine, including the Joint Warfighting Concept and Joint Concept for Competing.

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The United States needs to expand the GIDE series and examine crisis response from an interagency and coalition perspective. These experiments should map how different executive agencies — from the Department of State to the Department of the Treasury — approach crisis management, with an eye toward enabling better decisionmaking through aggregating and analyzing data. Starting simple with a clear understanding of how each agency approaches flexible deterrent options and how these options are evaluated in the National Security Council will provide insight into where and how to best augment strategy formation and crisis response.

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2. Engage in campaign analysis.

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A constant in war is the fight for information and how commanders employ reconnaissance and security operations alongside collecting intelligence to gain situational awareness, anticipate change, and seek advantage. That fight for information will take place along complex battle networks managed by AI/ML applications, creating a need for new concepts of maneuver, security, and surprise. How a state protects its battle network while degrading its rivals could well become the true decisive operation for a future campaign and an entirely new form of schwerpunkt.

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The Department of Defense needs to expand modern campaign analysis to explore how to fight a network. These studies should combine historical campaign insights with wargames, modeling, and strategic analysis, with an eye toward balancing military advantage with escalation dynamics. The studies should evaluate existing processes such as joint planning and joint targeting methodologies to see if they are still viable in campaigns characterized by competing battle networks. It is highly likely that the net result will be new processes and methods that both accelerate tempo and keep a careful eye on escalation risks.

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3. From open skies to open algorithms, start a broader dialogue about twenty-first-century arms control.

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Finally, there is a need to start thinking about what arms control looks like in the AI era. Managing weapons inventory may prove less valuable to the future of deterrence than establishing norms, regimes, and treaties governing military actions that target the decision and processing layers of modern battle networks in rival nuclear states.

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In a crisis where software at echelon is searching for efficiencies to accelerate decisionmaking, there is a risk that senior leaders find themselves pulled into escalation traps. This pull could be accelerated by attacks on key systems associated with early warning and intelligence. The sooner states work together to map the risks and build in commonly understood guardrails, the lower the probability of inadvertent or accidental escalation between nuclear rivals. These efforts should include Track 2 and Track 3 tabletop exercises and dialogues that inform how rival states approach crisis management. For example, it would be better to have officials from the United States and China discuss how multi-domain strike networks and automation affect escalation dynamics before a crisis in the Taiwan Strait rather than after.

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Conclusion

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Since the use of AI/ML capabilities in national security is almost certain to increase in the coming years, there needs to be a larger debate about if and how any information technology augments strategic and military decisionmaking. The stakes are too high to walk blindly into the future.

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As a result, the national security community needs to accelerate its experimentation with how to integrate AI/ML into modern battle networks, with an eye toward better understanding crisis decisionmaking, campaigning, and arms control. It is not enough to optimize joint targeting and how fast the military can sense, make sense, and gain an advantage. The new world will require rethinking military staff organizations little changed since Napoleon and legacy national security bureaucratic design and planning processes. It will require thinking about how best to support human decisionmaking given a flood of information still subject to uncertainty, fog, and friction.

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Despite the findings here that AI/ML is as likely to play a stabilizing role as it is a destabilizing role, there is a still a risk that the world’s nuclear states inadvertently code their way to Armageddon. As a result, it is important to challenge the findings and acknowledge the limitations of the study. First, the observations are still limited and could be subject to confounding effects caused by age, gender, and each player’s type of national security experience. Future efforts should increase the full range of participants. Second, the results need more observations to analyze not just the balance of known versus unknown AI/ML capabilities, but also if risk perception and escalation change based on a larger number of treatments addressing different AI/ML levels (e.g., “no AI/ML capability,” “more AI/ML capability,” etc.). Last, experts tend to get things wrong and may not see change. Future research should open the experiment up to a wider range of participants and compare how perceptions in the general public compare to those of experts. In the ideal case, these games would also involve more non-U.S. players.

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Benjamin Jensen is a senior fellow in the Futures Lab at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and a professor of strategic studies at the School of Advanced Warfighting in the Marine Corps University.

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Yasir Atalan is an associate data fellow in the Futures Lab at CSIS and a PhD candidate at American University.

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Jose M. Macias III is a research associate in the Futures Lab at CSIS and a Pearson fellow at the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts at the University of Chicago.

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UNITE THE PUBLIC ♢ VOL.42 © MMXXIV ♢ C2
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Algorithmic Stability

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Benjamin Jensen, et al. | 2024.06.10
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This report delves into the future of deterrence and the role of human judgment in an AI-focused crisis simulation.

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【黎智英案・審訊第 89 日】

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【黎智英案・審訊第 87 日】

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Framing Sanctions

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獨媒報導 | 2024.06.03
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  • 辯方指黎智英身體不適、打冷顫 官提議送院檢查 押後至明日續審
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Balázs Gyimesi | 2024.06.04
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This paper examines the question: How does the EU use strategic communications to persuade third countries to cooperate on sanctions? The paper analyses how the EU is using arguments linked to upholding values and appealing to the interests of third countries.

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How Wagner Lost Syria

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No Silver Bullets

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Antonio Giustozzi | 2024.05.31
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Despite the death of its former leader, the Wagner Group continues to operate in some parts of the world. In Syria, however, its presence has long since evaporated. What went wrong?

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Matthew Savill | 2024.06.03
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Removing restrictions on the use of weapons supplied to Ukraine by international partners will help Ukraine’s defence against Russia, but it is not a war-winning move on its own.

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An Uncertain Future

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【初選47人案・審訊判詞】

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Ryan C. Berg and Leonardo Moraveg | 2024.05.31
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This report examines indicators of democratic backsliding that took place during the presidency of Andrés Manuel López Obrador and warn against a deteriorating democracy in Mexico.

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獨媒報導 | 2024.05.31
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【初選47人案・審訊裁決】

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獨媒報導 | 2024.05.30
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  • 李予信罪脫 官:李後期才參選、對公民黨簽「墨落無悔」不知情
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  • 吳政亨罪成 官:即使「三投三不投」或自發 亦與戴耀廷有協議實行謀劃
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  • 黃碧雲、林卓廷、梁國雄罪成 官:資深議員必然知道政府永遠不會同意「五大訴求」
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  • 楊雪盈、柯耀林罪成 官無相反證據下推論楊知悉「墨落」 柯認為政制腐敗簽「墨落」不出奇
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  • 鄭達鴻、彭卓棋罪成 官拒信鄭不跟黨立場 指彭「投機取巧」、拒納說「選舉語言」
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The UK As An AI Superpower

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Pia Hüsch and Noah Sylvia | 2024.05.30
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The UK has ambitions to be a global AI superpower. But even with the best intentions, fast-paced adoption and implementation of AI in the public sector will involve significant challenges.

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