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+---
+layout: post
+title : Chinese Engagement In AR
+author: Evan Ellis
+date  : 2024-06-05 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/SqsxudY.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Evolution of Chinese Engagement in Argentina under Javier Milei"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_In August 2023, then-Argentine presidential candidate Javier Milei declared he would not make “pacts with Communists.”_ <excerpt/> _Months later, following his election, he declined an invitation to Argentina to join the China-dominated BRICS organization, signaling a deepening of the political distancing from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that began under his once pro-PRC predecessor Alberto Fernandez. However, the move did not necessarily signal an end to the substantial private trade and investment relationship between the two countries._
+
+As Argentina’s economic crisis deepened under President Fernandez, most of China’s high-profile infrastructure projects in Argentina became paralyzed over financing and other questions. Such projects included an $8 billion nuclear reactor at Argentina’s Atucha III complex, two dams on the Santa Cruz River, work on the Belgrano Cargas rail system, dredging of the Paraguay and Paraná Rivers to support the continued operation of the hidrovía (waterway), and problems in approving a Chinese port project near Antarctica.
+
+Even before the election of President Milei in November 2023, China had deepening difficulties in Argentina, including the cancellation of Argentina’s purchase of China’s JF17/FC-1 fighters in favor of U.S.-produced F-16 fighters. China also had replaced its dynamic Spanish-speaking ambassador and military attaché with a new ambassador, Wang Wei, who spoke mainly Italian, and a new attaché whose second language was Portuguese, not Spanish. Argentine China experts perceived that the PRC was informally downgrading the relationship.
+
+Despite Argentine foreign minister Diana Mondino’s cordial, professional approach toward the PRC and her assurances of Argentina’s continued interest in transparent commercial and diplomatic relations with China, relations continued to deteriorate. The PRC suspended a $6.5 billion bank credit that it had extended to the outgoing government, and its banks have reportedly put on hold credit for major investment projects in the country. In addition to the PRC’s reaction to President Milei’s remarks about China, the PRC was also reportedly offended by Taiwanese government representatives’ attendance at an academic event with Mondino involving Kung Guo Wei, a visiting professor from Taipei’s famous Tamkang University, before Mondino became foreign minister. Nevertheless, PRC-Argentina commercial relations are significant and, arguably, poised to deepen under President Milei’s government, driven by the likely turnaround of the Argentine economy and projects by private businesspersons and provincial and local-level politicians.
+
+
+### Trade
+
+Argentina-China bilateral trade has grown substantially since the PRC entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, though, as with many countries of the region, Argentine purchases of Chinese products and services have grown far greater than PRC purchases from Argentina. Argentine exports to the PRC grew approximately eightfold, from $1.09 billion in 2002 to $7.93 billion in 2022, while Argentine imports from China grew over 53-fold, from $330 million in 2002 to $17.5 billion in 2022. Argentina’s main exports to the PRC were agricultural goods, led by soybeans, beef, and barley, while Argentina imported an array of higher value-added manufactured goods and services from China, including telephones and computers.
+
+Argentine exports of agricultural goods, as well as lithium and other minerals, are poised to expand in the coming years as the Argentine economy recovers. Argentine consumption of Chinese electronics, cars, and other manufactured goods and services is also poised to grow, bolstered, ironically, by the relatively laissez-faire posture of President Milei toward commercial matters.
+
+Despite some reasons for optimism regarding overall trade growth, the realization of value added is likely to be lopsided in China’s favor, reflecting Argentina’s limited knowledge of the PRC as a market and the limited ability of the Argentine government to help its businesspeople consummate profitable deals there. In off-the-record interviews with an Argentine China expert, the author learned that although Argentina has diplomatic offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Canton, and Hong Kong, it has centers for commercial promotion only in Shanghai and Chengdu.
+
+___`Despite some reasons for optimism regarding overall trade growth, the realization of value added is likely to be lopsided in China’s favor, reflecting Argentina’s limited knowledge of the PRC as a market and the limited ability of the Argentine government to help its businesspeople.`___
+
+
+### Political Relations
+
+Prior to the Milei government, the PRC consistently put Argentina in the highest ranks of diplomatic partnerships it possesses. In 2004, the PRC recognized Argentina as one of three strategic partners in the region, and in 2014 it upgraded the relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Consistent with this high level of relationship, the PRC tried to get Argentina to set up a ministerial-level committee to facilitate coordination across sectors, such as the COSBAN in Brazil and the High-Level Mixed Commission in Venezuela. But, according to an Argentine China expert, the Argentine Peronist government could not facilitate the required coordination between the Foreign and Commerce Ministries and other required government agencies, and the effort to create such a committee was ultimately set aside.
+
+In February 2022, the Fernandez government joined the PRC Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during a state visit to Beijing tied to the Winter Olympics held there. Fernandez was one of two Latin American presidents to attend the BRI’s 10th-anniversary celebration in October 2023. The PRC reportedly is concerned that the Fernandez government could withdraw Argentina from the BRI, however, just as it turned down membership in BRICS.
+
+In 2017, Argentina also applied and was accepted to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, but the country reportedly never paid the $7.5 million membership quota and has not attended any board meetings or otherwise participated in the affairs of the bank. According to Argentine sinologists, the new Milei government appointed a respected career diplomat, Marcelo Suárez Salvia, to represent Argentina in the PRC, though he has not served in Asia and does not speak any Asian languages.
+
+
+### Petroleum
+
+China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) is the controlling partner in Bridas and, with British Petroleum, the Pan American Energy–Axion consortium. Together, the ventures give CNOOC substantial petroleum operations in Argentina. Bridas — in which the Bulgheronis, one of Argentina’s wealthiest families, also have an important stake — is the key operator of the Vaca Muerta shale gas deposits.
+
+
+### Mining Sector
+
+In the mining sector, PRC-based companies have long had a presence in traditional operations, albeit with difficulties involving relations with local communities and government licensing. The most significant Chinese conventional mining project in the country is the Veladero gold mine, in which PRC-based Shandong Gold purchased a $960 million (50 percent) stake in 2017. Other Chinese-owned mines include Campana Mahuida, owned by China Metallurgical Corporation and shut down in 2009 due to problems with the local community; Sierra Grande, shut down in 2016 over low minerals prices; and a gold mine in La Rioja owned by Chinese conglomerate Hanaq.
+
+In the lithium sector, PRC-based companies have made major advances in recent years, courting Argentine provincial governments, which make key decisions about licensing and regulation. Chinese lithium projects in Argentina include Pozuelos and Pastos Grandes, acquired by China’s Ganfeng through its $962 million purchase of Lithea Inc. in 2022. Ganfeng also owns and is developing the Mariana salt flats in Salta and Cauchari-Olaroz in Jujuy, a joint venture with Canada’s Lithium Americas.
+
+Chinese carmaker Chery and minor partner Gotion proposed a $400 million investment in an electric vehicle plant also in Jujuy, though with the country’s economic difficulties, plans have not yet moved forward. In nearby Catamarca Province, the Chinese mining giant Zijin operates the Tres Quebradas lithium field and has proposed the construction of a plant for refining lithium and manufacturing cathodes for lithium-ion batteries.
+
+
+### Agriculture
+
+Agrologistics companies Nidera and Noble, owned by China Oilseeds and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO), have a substantial presence in Argentina, with a substantial part of their business coming from supplying agricultural goods to their parent organization COFCO. COFCO purchases for the Chinese market, giving it an advantage in competing with non-Chinese agrologistics firms such as ADM, Bunge, Dreyfuss, and Cargill. Nidera has a plant in Rosario, which suffered a high-profile explosion in 2017. It also has storage facilities in Santa Fe and Cordoba for grains, which may have some processing capabilities. There are also Chinese-owned agricultural facilities in Chaco and Tucuman, among other locations. The PRC-based company Syngenta, owned by ChemChina since 2017, has a presence in Argentina and has sought a new law for transgenic seeds to use its genetically modified organism technology in the country.
+
+Finally, during the prior government, to meet growing Chinese demand for pork, PRC-based investors had proposed $3.7 billion in investments in slaughterhouses and other pork production facilities in the country. The project became the focus of protests by environmentalists and animal rights activists, who objected to the inhumane conditions the animals were allegedly raised in. To the consternation of the Chinese, President Fernandez became involved in the dispute on the side of the protesters, including allowing himself to be photographed at one of the protests near signs that were highly derogatory toward the Chinese. The position of Fernandez effectively stopped the project from going forward.
+
+
+### Electricity Sector
+
+In Jujuy Province, a consortium led by PowerChina is currently working on the fourth phase of the Cauchari photovoltaic array, the largest solar park in Argentina and the region. The plan, according to Argentine China experts, is to leverage the project not only to power mining and other operations in the region but also to support an ecosystem of green energy facilities. PowerChina and other PRC-based firms have also been involved in the Loma Blanca wind farm and other wind projects in Neuquén and Santa Cruz.
+
+Also in Santa Cruz, PowerChina leads a consortium for the construction of two hydroelectric facilities on the Santa Cruz River — the Jorge Cepernic and Nestor Kirchner facilities — though progress on the project has been delayed over regulatory and environmental, as well as financing, issues. As noted, the construction of a nuclear pressurized water reactor by the Chinese Gezhouba Group in the Atucha complex, initially agreed to during the presidency of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, also continues to be stuck over the insistence by the fiscally imperiled prior Argentine government that the Chinese finance 100 percent of the project.
+
+PowerChina was also involved in the long-delayed Chihuido hydroelectric project, which Russia originally pursued, though neither had success in taking the project forward. PowerChina further attempted, unsuccessfully, to sell steel tubing for the construction of a gas pipeline connecting the Vaca Muerta shale gas field to Buenos Aires, but the Alberto Fernandez government chose to award the contract to the favored but much more expensive Argentine supplier Techint. According to an Argentine China expert interviewed for this project, because of the poor outcome of several PowerChina projects, CEO Tu Shuiping reportedly resigned and left for the PRC, with many of the company’s projects in Argentina remaining stagnant.
+
+
+### Transportation Infrastructure
+
+Over the past 15 years, PRC-based companies have pursued multiple train and highway infrastructure projects in Argentina, albeit with considerable delays and difficulties. The most significant of these projects are track modernization and the provision of new engines and rolling stock for the Belgrano Cargas railroad, key to moving freight within Argentina and connecting it to the ports of neighboring countries. Although work on various segments of Belgrano Cargas have been completed, work became stuck at the end of the Fernandez administration over a series of disputes, including the Chinese insisting they import their own railroad ties instead of using locally available quebracho, an Argentine hardwood. The Chinese also completed work on the Red Line (Line B) of the Buenos Aires metro (Subte), though the extension to the Buenos Aires (Ezeiza) International Airport and work on the Cordoba metro never went forward.
+
+Argentina and China explored work on tunnels through mountain passes connecting Argentina and Chile via highway, including the Agua Negra tunnel at the latitude of Buenos Aires and Santiago and a route further to the north through the Argentine province of Salta. Perhaps the most controversial Chinese infrastructure project has been the proposed construction of the $500 million multiuse Rio Grande commercial port at the tip of Antarctica in Tierra del Fuego. The area has been of interest to Chinese investors since the early 2000s when a PRC-based group explored building a petrochemical plant and maritime export terminal for urea fertilizer in the area.
+
+The potential ability of the Chinese military to surreptitiously use the port during times of war to observe and possibly inhibit transits through the Straits of Magellan or the Drake Passage has drawn attention to the project as a security concern, even obligating the governor of Ushuaia to contract a media consultant to help deal with the controversy. As of the time of this writing, the project was seen as unlikely to receive the federal approval required by the port and navigable rivers organization within the Ministry of Economy to move forward.
+
+
+### Digital Infrastructure
+
+Since 2001, PRC-based companies such as Huawei and ZTE — and today Xiaomi — have played a leading role in Argentina’s telecommunications infrastructure. By 2021, Huawei had over 500 employees in the country. Such Chinese firms are important suppliers to Argentina’s telecommunications providers, including Claro, Movistar, and Personal (which is part of Grupo Clarín). The latter relies heavily on Huawei equipment. Huawei is also a significant cloud services provider in the country.
+
+___`Since 2001, PRC-based companies such as Huawei and ZTE — and today Xiaomi — have played a leading role in Argentina’s telecommunications infrastructure.`___
+
+The outgoing Fernandez government had planned an accelerated auction of the country’s 5G bandwidth in September 2023 to raise needed funds for the government (an estimated $1 billion in royalty payments, according to Argentine China experts interviewed for this project). Companies using Huawei 5G equipment were poised to win, but the government could not conduct the bid in time, and its status with the new government remains uncertain. In Argentina, as in other countries, Huawei has a scholarship program, Seeds of the Future, to strengthen its base of tech employees in the region by bringing technically talented youth to the PRC for three months to a year.
+
+In the surveillance systems domain, ZTE is the key supplier for a $30 million smart cities project in Jujuy, where the PRC depends on local government support to access the province’s lithium. In addition, the Chinese firm Hikvision is a key provider of surveillance cameras in the country, including for corporate and home security systems, as well as for traffic cameras in towns and neighborhoods like Vicente Lopez.
+
+As in other parts of Latin America, customs scanners in Ezeiza International Airport, first purchased in 2016, are supplied by the PRC-based company Nuctec. With respect to taxi services, as in other parts of Latin America such as Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil, the Chinese taxi company DiDi is present in the country, with a particular focus on mototaxi and delivery services. However, competitors Uber and Cabify are more dominant in local markets.
+
+
+### Banking and Finance
+
+Three Chinese banks currently operate in Argentina. Hong Kong Shanghai Bank of China and International Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) are licensed to conduct branch banking operations in the country. ICBC entered the country following a 2012 approval by Argentine authorities of its controlling interest in the locally licensed Standard Bank.
+
+In addition, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), with offices in the Buenos Aires district of Puerto Madero, primarily conducts representational banking for Chinese companies tied to the currency swap and business in the PRC. According to an Argentine China expert interviewed for this project, the Agricultural Bank of China also has explored establishing a presence in the country.
+
+Through the PBOC, Argentina and China have an $18.5 billion currency swap arrangement. It was set up to facilitate the clearance of transactions for imports and exports between the two countries in order to avoid using U.S. dollars as the clearing mechanism. They also agreed to expand the agreement by $5 billion. The interest rate secured for the new portion of the swap, according to an Argentine China expert, was the 3.5 percent benchmark Hong Kong interest rate plus an additional 3.5 percent. The rate is considered high but still in the range of commercial norms. Under the Fernandez government, $5 billion of the swap was activated to support trade between the two countries. In addition, Argentina may have used its access to the renminbi to pay part of its installment payments to the International Monetary Fund.
+
+When President Milei took office, the Chinese reportedly asked the incoming government if it wished to activate part of the currency swap line to facilitate trade, but the Milei government reportedly declined, Argentine China experts say. Shortly after, the PRC also canceled the new $6.5 billion portion of its swap.
+
+
+### Pharmaceutical Sector
+
+During the early phases of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Chinese company Sinopharm conducted Phase 3 trials in Argentina, among other countries, and partnered with a local laboratory, Richmond Laboratories, for assembling and distributing its vaccine in Argentina. Because of the poor performance of the Chinese vaccine, however, the demand for the Sinopharm vaccine dried up once higher-efficacy Western messenger RNA vaccines came online. According to Argentine China experts, Sinopharm could not reach an agreement to produce its vaccine in Argentina or branch into other areas.
+
+By contrast, an Argentine laboratory, Bagó, had a production facility in the PRC for the production of aftosa vaccines for animals. In off-the-record interviews with Argentine China experts interviewed for this project, they expressed that although there was interest in leveraging the partnership to bring Chinese pharmaceutical capabilities to Argentina, as with Sinopharm, nothing came of the initiative.
+
+
+### Media Influence
+
+As in other parts of the region, the PRC has courted the Argentine media, including purchasing advertising supplements in important papers such as Clarín and La Nación. Grupo Clarín also has important business interests with the PRC, including its telecommunications firm Personal, which is the principal user of Chinese equipment in the country and the pioneer for Huawei’s entry into the Argentine market for 5G.
+
+
+### Intellectual Infrastructure
+
+Argentina, like most Latin American countries, has relatively limited China knowledge within its universities and think tanks. Nevertheless, its knowledge base and human connections have grown in recent years and are better than in many other parts of Latin America. Argentina’s most respected China studies centers include those at the Catholic University of Argentina (UCA), Universidad Nacional de la Plata (one of the country’s oldest China and Asia studies programs, with the China Center currently under Maria Francesca Staiano), Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero, and Universidad Nacional de Lanús, at which Argentina’s passionately Sinophile ambassador to the PRC, Sabino Vaca Narvaja, formerly taught. As in the United States, leading Argentine think tanks, such as the Argentine Council for International Relations, have China studies programs as well.
+
+Argentina currently has three Confucius Institutes in public universities, in keeping with Chinese tradition. The oldest, at Universidad Nacional de la Plata, was established in the 1980s, followed by Universidad de Buenos Aires and, most recently, Universidad Nacional de Cordoba, set up in 2020. Universidad Católica de Salta has also explored setting up a Confucius Institute.
+
+According to China-focused Argentines interviewed for this work, the number of PRC-paid trips for Argentines to study or attend forums in China has reportedly decreased from the golden age of the 2010s, with restrictions on interactions and travel for Argentines increased. Beyond PRC-sponsored education institutions and scholarships, the Sino-Argentine Chamber of Commerce is an important referent for Argentine businesses doing business in the PRC or with Chinese companies. The president of the chamber is Sergio Spadone, son of one of Argentina’s pioneers of doing business with China, and the executive director is Alejandra Conconi. In addition, former head of the chamber Ernesto Taboada now operates a small, separate organization, the Argentine-China Council, after a falling out with the chamber, which he formerly headed, according to an Argentine China expert.
+
+
+### Provincial and Local Engagement
+
+As elsewhere in the region, the PRC is particularly engaged at the provincial and local levels in Argentina, including in investment projects, the gifting of trips for local officials to the PRC, and in arrangements with local universities. These engagements include a technology and resources agreement with the National University of Jujuy, an agreement with Alibaba, agreements with PowerChina, and a $30 million contract for ZTE to install cameras and a provincial response and control system in the province, among other technologies.
+
+Beyond PRC initiatives within the Argentine provinces and with their leaders, Chinese provinces have pursued national-level representation in Argentina. According to an Argentine China expert, Hunan, Canton, and Szechuan Provinces all have representative offices in Buenos Aires but not in the Argentine provinces with which they have sister-province relations. As in Brazil under President Jair Bolsonaro, PRC engagement with Argentine local and provincial-level governments is likely to expand as a complement to a less amenable atmosphere for pursuing agreements at the national level.
+
+
+### PRC Space Sector Presence in Argentina
+
+As has been widely publicized, in 2012, the PRC signed a $300 million agreement with the Fernandez de Kirchner government, serving as the basis for the construction and operation of a deep space radar facility in a remote part of Neuquén. The facility is operated by China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control, part of the Chinese Strategic Support Force of the People’s Liberation Army. The Argentine government has only an intermittent presence at the site.
+
+In addition, since the signing of a 1989 cooperation agreement, the Chinese have operated space telescopes at the Felix Aguilar Astronomical Observatory in San Juan, constructing a satellite laser ranging station at the site in 2006. The PRC is currently constructing a 40-meter space telescope, the China Argentina Radio Telescope, at the facility.
+
+In Rio Gallegos, in the south of the country, the Chinese firm Emposat has plans to build a space tracking facility with four to six antennae. The site, if approved, would complement the Chinese polar space capabilities provided by its Antarctic research facilities at Zhongshan and Inexpressible Island, Antarctica.
+
+
+### Security
+
+The PRC has explored sales and gifts of arms and other equipment to Argentina’s police and military, though those appeared to have been decreasing at the end of the prior government and have not gone forward under the Milei administration. During the Fernandez de Kirchner administration, Argentina began exploring the purchase of Chinese 8x8 armored personnel carriers for the Cruz del Sur multinational peacekeeping brigade, which it formed with Chile, as well as P-18 offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) similar to those the PRC sold to Trinidad and Tobago and FC-1 interceptor aircraft. After purchasing four WMZ-551s for evaluation for $2.6 million, Argentina decided against the purchase of more of the vehicles.
+
+During the center-right administration of Mauricio Macri (2015–19), Argentina decided to buy French patrol boats, obviating the need for Chinese OPVs. Purchase of the Chinese FC-1 received serious consideration under the leftist Peronist government of Alberto Fernandez, including due to significant efforts by the Chinese, who saw an opportunity to introduce the fighter into the region more broadly through Argentina and who went so far as to cut the offer price by 40 percent in an attempt to win the contract, according to off-the-record interviews with Argentine security experts. The Chinese were reportedly even exploring assembly of the aircraft in Argentina in a facility of the national defense industry manufacturer FADEA for export to other parts of the region. The Chinese may have also had an additional source of leverage through Francisco Taiana, son of then minister of defense Jorge Taiana, who had received considerable access to China to write a book on the country, among other activities.
+
+In the end, however, there were serious questions about quality and maintainability, particularly because the Chinese did not use the fighter themselves. According to Argentine security experts, the Argentine evaluation team could not speak with the Pakistani pilots who had flown the FC-1s. Because the planes used a Russian-made engine, the availability of parts became uncertain in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine and associated Western sanctions. In the final months of the Fernandez government, Argentina chose to buy U.S. F-16s from Denmark rather than the Chinese fighter. Beyond these weapons purchases, Argentina also received a donation of four armored vehicles and security cameras from the PRC in conjunction with the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires, though there were no further gifts after that.
+
+In professional military interactions, the Argentine National War College (NWC) has regularly sent an officer to a six-month command and general staff course in the PRC, as well as sending officials to shorter courses. According to an Argentine security expert, the Argentine NWC, as recently as 2020, also hosted a student from the People’s Liberation Army.
+
+The Chinese National Police also maintains a presence in the PRC embassy in Argentina to support Argentine authorities in combatting Chinese-organized crime in the country. During the prior Fernandez de Kirchner government, the PRC brought in a larger presence to help the Argentine government combat the Chinese triad Pi Xue, which had grown significantly in the greater Buenos Aires area and was extorting Chinese shopkeepers. Argentine security experts note that while the reported level of extortion and other activity by Pi Xue is now much lower, the Chinese national presence in the PRC embassy in Buenos Aires continues.
+
+As in other parts of the region, the Chinese government appears to operate unofficial Chinese police stations in the country, ostensibly to assist but also to pressure Chinese nationals living in Argentina, leveraging relatives living in China. According to Argentine security experts, local authorities have identified at least two such facilities in the neighborhoods of San Martin and Tres de Febrero.
+
+In the domain of private security, China Overseas Security Group (COSG) has an office in Buenos Aires whose address, according to reports by security experts interviewed for this project, is that of the local law firm that registered it, Wilson Rae. COSG continues to advertise on its website a search for a country manager position dating to the 2019 G20 meeting in the city, though it does not have a visible presence in the city.
+
+___`As in other parts of the region, the Chinese government appears to operate unofficial Chinese police stations in the country, ostensibly to assist but also to pressure Chinese nationals living in Argentina, leveraging relatives living in China.`___
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+The Argentine-China commercial relationship is broad and substantial and will likely continue under the Milei administration, particularly in high-priority sectors such as lithium, renewable energy, and digital sectors. PRC purchases of Argentine agricultural products and other commodities and Chinese sales of a broad range of goods and services to the Argentine economy will probably continue at a significant level, though lack of political will on the Argentine side and lack of financing on the Chinese side may restrict agreements of a more political or military nature and large infrastructure projects whose business case is questionable.
+
+As in Brazil under the China-skeptical Bolsonaro regime, PRC engagements at the provincial level in Argentina may flourish compared to those at the national level, where political skepticism toward the PRC is greater. The success of the Milei government in turning around the Argentine economy will also impact its ability to engage commercially with the PRC and take new projects forward. Whatever the trajectory, the underlying economic logic between the two countries means the future of the Argentina-PRC relationship is likely to be better than some in the PRC fear and will present an opportunity for Washington to work with the Milei administration to define what a transparent, balanced relationship should look like between Argentina and a range of countries, including China, other Asian partners, the European Union, and the United States.
+
+---
+
+__Evan Ellis__ is a research professor of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, with a focus on the region’s relationships with China and other non-Western Hemisphere actors as well as transnational organized crime and populism in the region.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-ever-the-day-after.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-ever-the-day-after.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3956539a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-05-ever-the-day-after.md
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : Ever The Day After
+author: H A Hellyer
+date  : 2024-06-05 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/Jjj0tAW.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Egypt, Israel and Gaza"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accords in 1978, the first peace treaty between the Jewish state and any of its Arab neighbours. The accords are the bedrock of the region’s security architecture, but owing to Israel’s war on Gaza and its moves at the border between Gaza and Egypt, the relationship between Cairo and Tel Aviv has reached its lowest point in decades. What kind of state are Egyptian-Israeli relations in, and how might this impact the future?_ <excerpt/> _Jonathan Eyal (__JE__) asked RUSI Senior Associate Fellow H A Hellyer (__HH__) about the significance of these events._
+
+__JE__: Camp David was a historic peace treaty between Cairo and Tel Aviv, and laid down the groundwork for a new regional security arrangement for the region in general, and Egypt and Israel in particular. Are we seeing that security arrangement unravel?
+
+__HH__: The Camp David Accords had a number of annexes attached to them. One of these describes several different zones; Sinai is divided into three zones (A, B and C), and then there is “Zone D” which is along the border between Gaza and Egypt, on the Gazan side. Article 2/D of Annex 1 is very clear about what type of Israeli military forces are allowed to exist in that zone, which was later described as the “Philadelphi Corridor”. There’s no question that when the Israelis moved tanks into the Corridor on 7 May and took over the Rafah border crossing, they violated that article, and they’ve done much more since then. Last week, Tel Aviv declared that it had taken over the entire corridor, again violating the terms of the Camp David Accords.
+
+We should be clear-eyed about this: Israel’s moves are seriously endangering the region’s security architecture, and many analysts – myself included – have warned over the past eight months that reckless escalatory behaviour will put all under the “law of unintended consequences”. If we’re frank, Israel’s moves over the past eight months have been incredibly reckless and have raised the likelihood of conflict breaking out across the region – between Israel and Iran, Israel and Lebanon, and now Israel and Egypt. It’s a testament to the region that we haven’t seen all-out war break out, despite these kinds of moves; it shows how little appetite there is for widespread conflict. But I think Tel Aviv is pushing the envelope hard, and it’s difficult to imagine there won’t be consequences.
+
+__JE__: Are you saying Egypt might pull out of Camp David?
+
+__HH__: No, I think Cairo continues to place great value on the treaty, and will be looking for other ways to express its rejection of Tel Aviv’s moves. As recently as 2 June, when Israel, the US and Egypt convened to discuss the issue, Cairo reiterated its demand that the Israelis withdraw from the Rafah border crossing. This is why, for example, Egypt announced it would join South Africa’s case at the International Court of Justice against Israel, and Cairo refused to coordinate with the Israelis on usage of the Rafah border crossing, clearly seeing such coordination as recognising the legitimacy of the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) presence there. Cairo may be pointing to the fact there are seven other border crossings, also completely under Israel’s control; several of them have been permanently closed by the Israelis, such as Karni and Sufa, but could be opened in order to provide aid relief to Palestinians in Gaza. Moreover, Israel’s official spokesperson, David Mencer, said to journalists that Israel had asked Egypt to open up so that Palestinians who wanted to flee to Sinai could do so, but that the request had been declined. There’s widespread concern in Cairo that Israel will take any opportunity to ethnically cleanse Palestinians from Gaza and displace them to Sinai, if it can do so; such admissions by Israel’s officials do not help.
+
+___`Israel’s moves over the past eight months have been incredibly reckless and have raised the likelihood of conflict breaking out across the region`___
+
+But there are other things to be concerned about, as Israel continues to engage in more reckless behaviour. A recent clash near the Rafah border crossing led to the death of an Egyptian soldier; Israeli media itself reported that the clash resulted from an Israeli provocation, designed to test Egypt’s reaction. Even without such moves, the risk assessment is serious; Israeli forces along the border in Rafah are seen by the Egyptians not only as violating the peace treaty, but also as part of an occupying power in occupied territory – which is also how London, the EU, the UN and most governments see Israel in Gaza. Egyptian soldiers on the border are no doubt impacted by that; they are seeing an occupying power in Gaza, right on their doorstep, where they know it’s not supposed to be, and they also know that nearby, that same army is engaged in massive hostilities against Palestinians in Rafah. Those soldiers see the same news reports that you and I see, and know that the UN and various agencies are reporting all manners of suffering as a result of the IDF operation. This time, the clash resulted in the death of one soldier; what happens next time, considering everything else that is going on?
+
+__JE__: OK, so things are rocky. But we have a normalisation of political relations between Egypt and Israel going back more than four decades. We also have a more recent set of normalisations between Israel and Arab states in terms of the Abraham Accords, and a new deal being proposed that would normalise relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. How does that impact Egypt, as it was the first to normalise, which gave it a certain leverage in terms of relations with Western powers?
+
+__HH__: There are a few things to mention here; the first is that the Biden administration has invested tremendous energy in expanding the Abraham Accords. Indeed, many analysts characterised Biden’s Middle East policy as prioritising extending those accords, and very little else. Incredibly, despite the massively destructive conflict of the past eight months, the administration has still directed a lot of its limited bandwidth towards efforts to normalise Israel’s political relationship with Saudi Arabia. There’s a lot to unpack there, but I’m not convinced it will succeed, because Tel Aviv has already said it won’t accede to the fairly minimalist demands that Saudi Arabia has, which are all about fulfilling certain UN Security Council resolutions.
+
+Be that as it may, there were also concerns expressed in 2020, when the Abraham Accords were signed, in terms of what they might do to Cairo’s geopolitical standing. The talk at the time was that they would decrease Cairo’s – and also Amman’s – importance in the region, because now there were other Arab states that had relations with Israel. But the truth is, whenever a crisis emerges involving Israel, the world still calls on Cairo and Amman, and moreso on Cairo. None of that has changed; they don’t call on Abu Dhabi, Manama or anywhere else in the same way. Cairo in particular has relationships not only with the Israelis, but with pretty much every major Palestinian faction.
+
+In any case, my assessment of the Saudi-Israeli normalisation deal remains the same – I’m not sure we’ll be seeing that anytime soon.
+
+___`Whenever a crisis emerges involving Israel, the world still calls on Cairo and Amman, and moreso on Cairo. They don’t call on Abu Dhabi, Manama or anywhere else in the same way`___
+
+__JE__: Perhaps, but the normalisation deal is all about the “day after”, and Biden’s plan put a lot of focus on trying to see beyond the current hostilities. What’s Egypt’s role in that regard?
+
+__HH__: There are a lot of scenarios being discussed for Gaza following the end of hostilities. The problem is, most of them have been vetoed by the Israelis, so it becomes rather academic and abstract to even discuss them without addressing the elephant in the room, which is Israel’s occupation of Gaza, along with its military presence therein. Even the Israelis have found themselves in rather awkward situations due to this; Netanyahu announced in early May that the Emiratis could be involved in governing Gaza following the war, only to be met with a very public denunciation of the idea by the Emirati foreign minister. The stumbling block, including for Abu Dhabi – irrespective of the Abraham Accords – was the Israeli occupation, and the absence of a Palestinian government with “integrity, competence and independence”, which would then have the capacity to invite the UAE to assist.
+
+It’s not only Arab states that reject “providing cover for the Israeli presence in the Gaza Strip”, as the Emiratis put it; I don’t think any country or multilateral organisation is interested in assisting in governing Gaza, without a clear commitment from the Israelis that they are leaving. Otherwise, such a presence would simply be interpreted as being Israel’s police force in the Gaza Strip – and thus quite likely targeted as part of the occupation. I’m not sure anyone would willingly take on that role; Cairo certainly won’t.
+
+I think if Biden is successful in getting a permanent ceasefire and an Israeli withdrawal of troops, as well as a commitment to allow a track towards a Palestinian state that includes Gaza, then yes, Egypt could probably be convinced to deploy troops as part of a broader and temporary international force, similar to KFOR in Kosovo, for example.
+
+But that’s a lot of “ifs”. The irony of all of this is that it is actually quite clear what a workable plan in Gaza entails, and it has been for decades. The question has always been: is the international community in general, and the US in particular, going to use its leverage to push such a workable plan forward? So far, the answer has been a firm “no” – and the Israelis know it.
+
+---
+
+__H A Hellyer__ is the Senior Associate Fellow of RUSI. Specialising in geopolitics, security studies, political economy, and belief, he has more than 20 years of experience in governmental, corporate advisory, and academic environments in Europe, USA, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-06-friendshore-lithium-ion.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-06-friendshore-lithium-ion.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-06-friendshore-lithium-ion.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Friendshore Lithium-Ion
+author: William Alan Reinsch, et al.
+date  : 2024-06-06 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/EGndAl9.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Friendshoring the Lithium-Ion Battery Supply Chain: Battery Cell Manufacturing"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_This white paper outlines the technical details behind the production of the active battery materials stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain and how U.S. government policies are impacting friendshoring efforts in the sector._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+### Introduction
+
+Nearshoring the lithium-ion battery supply chain requires substantial policy efforts at every stage. Upstream inputs, such as critical minerals sourcing and processing, are concentrated in a few nations. Although many more countries engage in midstream and downstream processing of critical resources, access to this end of the supply chain is becoming less secure for U.S. manufacturers because of uncertainty in the domestic and geopolitical spheres.
+
+Commensurate to the breadth of the challenges is the importance of overcoming them. An adequate, predictable supply of lithium-ion batteries, as well as the supply chain and raw materials, is essential to reaching green transition goals in the United States. These batteries power key products that enable a sustainable, large-scale switch away from fossil fuels essential to long-term environmental goals.
+
+Calls to accelerate the shift to renewables are accompanied by other goals and legislation that have a significant impact on the direction of U.S. economic and trade policy. Recognizing China’s dominance over the supply of several goods critical to U.S. prosperity and security, policymakers say they intend to spur de-risking of these supply chains by diversifying import sources away from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as creating redundancies to protect against potential unforeseen shocks such as pandemics. Policymakers’ de-risking agenda goes hand in hand with government measures designed to bring production of critical goods back to the United States. They perceive renewing U.S. domestic manufacturing capabilities as a geostrategic shield as well as the pathway to creating more profitable and equitable opportunities for workers.
+
+Congress and the administration under President Joe Biden have thus undertaken several policies to simultaneously tackle three objectives that will transform the landscape of U.S. lithium-ion battery production, among other sectors. These policies aim to drastically quicken the pace of the U.S. green transition, reshore production capabilities in critical sectors, and diversify away from the PRC’s dominance in these key areas. While these three goals may all be critical to U.S. economic security in the long term, actions that enable the latter two could hamper achievement of the first. Unfortunately, measures aimed at securing the lithium-ion battery supply chain through industrial policy packages that emphasize reshoring threaten to hinder U.S. consumers’ access to this technology.
+
+This brief, the second in a series of three, builds upon the first’s findings on refining and processing and examines the production of active materials — the next step of the lithium-ion battery supply chain. The paper first outlines the technical steps necessary for active materials production — namely, mixing, coating, calendaring, and slitting, as well as production of the separator and electrolytes. It then describes current U.S. capabilities at this stage of the supply chain relative to the global market, considering the country’s nearshoring and onshoring ambitions.
+
+In addition, the brief addresses the Biden administration’s incentives, such as tax credits included in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) and grants programs enabled by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA). It continues with an examination of different regulations and their potential impact on the ability of lithium-ion battery input manufacturers to scale up their capabilities in the face of growing demand. Lastly, the report unpacks recent policy recommendations from Congress relevant to lithium-ion battery nearshoring considerations.
+
+
+### Manufacturing a Battery Cell
+
+#### Active Materials Production
+
+__Technical steps.__ After mining or extracting the raw minerals and materials — typically, lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite — processors and refiners purify them. The materials are then used to create cathode and anode active battery materials, which are commonly referred to as the midstream portion of the lithium-ion battery supply chain. Noteworthily, the active material production stage requires complex processes and advanced technologies and chemistries, meaning there are few producers and significant technical barriers to entry.
+
+As mentioned in the first paper of this series, a lithium-ion battery usually includes multiple lithium-ion cells, which function as interconnected building blocks. A lithium-ion cell is chiefly made up of an anode, a cathode, a separator, and an electrolyte. The anode is the negative electrode in a cell, whereas the positive side is the cathode. During charging, the lithium ions move from the cathode, through the separator, to the anode.
+
+The cathode component of the lithium-ion battery may comprise various formulations, chemistries, and crystalline structures. Metal oxides like cobalt, nickel, manganese, aluminum, iron, and phosphate, among others, make up the formulations and chemistries known as the cathode active materials (CAMs). Binders and cognitive additives such as polyvinylidene fluoride (PVDF) are also critical to the battery’s performance, especially for safer and longer-range applications. As mentioned in the first paper of this series, graphite is paramount to anodes, though industry is searching for ways to use alternative materials such as silicon or lithium given that they present opportunities for higher energy density and power.
+
+The process of converting a set of refined and purified critical minerals into functional components of electrodes — namely, a positively charged cathode and a negatively charged anode — may be divided into five key steps. These are mixing, coating, calendaring, slitting, and electrode making.
+
+_Mixing._ The active materials of the cathode, lithium, nickel, manganese, and cobalt, are dry blended in a planetary vacuum mixer. The active material of the anode is blended to ensure it approaches a viscous consistency. The anode and cathode materials are blended separately to ensure they do not react with one another. A solvent is added to both mixes to increase viscosity, which is critical as the viscosity, density, and solid content of the slurry affect battery longevity and performance. An additional key concern in the mixing process is air quality: controls on moisture level can limit air particles or impurities that contaminate the electrode slurry, but if moisture is not controlled, then the nickel is likely to corrode. Adding phosphoric acid or another solvent can also prevent corrosion.
+
+_Coating._ Coating broadly describes the process of applying the separate aluminum-cathode and copper-anode slurries onto metal foils. Once poured, the slurries are dried via an internal heater that operates between 70°C and 150°C. While warmer temperatures lead to lower production costs, there is a negative effect on the performance and overall longevity of the battery. Coating and drying are achieved via a slot die coater, which disperses the slurry through gaps onto moving metal foil. Once the slurry is dispersed, air flotation drying is used to evaporate any added solvents and provoke the sedimentation of particles, which is critical to battery performance. The newfound metal coating successfully protects the slurry from corrosion and damage. Both drying temperature and the speed at which drying occurs affect the distribution of slurry in each electrode. Generally, drying at room temperature, while slower, creates a more uniform dried slurry, thereby increasing the quality and longevity of the electrode.
+
+_Calendaring._ Calendaring occurs through compression of the coated electrodes onto collector metal foils. This improves the energy density of the battery and further controls for dust and humidity within the electrode. This compression to a point of even thickness and density of the dried slurry increases performance. A roller calendar is used during this stage. Generally, higher calendaring pressure increases the energy density of a given battery, thereby increasing battery life.
+
+_Slitting and electrode making._ A roller slitting machine then cuts the coated electrode into several slices. An electrode-making machine welds and cuts the electrode, and the anode, cathode, and separator are either stacked or wound into a spiral, depending on the type of battery. The machine clearly marks each side as “+ve” or “–ve,” and the electrolyte fluid (a lithium salt solution) is injected into the battery cylinder or pouch. The battery cell is then sealed and thus ready for use.
+
+_Separator production._ Separators may be manufactured via a dry or wet process. Regardless, they are made of either polypropylene or polyethylene (types of plastic). In the dry process, either plastic type is pushed through a machine to create a thin sheet. The sheet is then heated until the plastic melts. This step controls the size and alignment of the tiny crystal structures within the sheet that allow lithium ions to pass through once the battery is functional. The sheet is then stretched again to create a set of additional slit-like holes. The stretching occurs until the sheet has a porosity of roughly 40 percent. The wet process, in contrast, involves mixing softening agents that can turn polymers into plastics once heat is applied. The heated mixture is pushed out of a machine to form a sheet, which is stretched until a network of pores is present. The softening agent is then washed out, leaving a porous surface that allows lithium ions through.
+
+_Electrolyte solution production._ Electrolytes enable the conductivity of lithium-ion batteries by allowing for the movement of ions from the cathode to the anode when the battery is charging and from the anode to the cathode when the battery is in use. Electrolyte solutions are made up of soluble salts, acids, and other bases in a liquid format. When these solutions are mixed with various carbonates, such as vinylene carbonate, conductivity can increase, leading to improved battery performance.
+
+#### Current U.S. Capabilities
+
+As it stands, China dominates the active materials production portion of the lithium battery supply chain. In addition, South Korea and Japan have significant capacity. The United States finds itself a distant fourth, a position where it is likely to remain for 10 years despite significant investment. As of 2022, China produced roughly 90 percent of anodes and lithium electrolyte solutions.
+
+China also produces 70 percent of cathodes, 74 percent of separators, 82 percent of electrolytes, and 85 percent of anodes. Japan, a secondary player in the industry, produces 14 percent of cathodes, 11 percent of anodes, 31 percent of separators, and 19 percent of electrode solutions. South Korea manufactures 15 percent of the world’s cathodes and 3 percent of anodes. The United States occupies a far more modest role in the supply chain than its peers in East Asia, responsible for roughly 7 percent of battery production. It imports most components, such as cathodes and anodes, from abroad.
+
+One factor that hampers onshoring efforts in the United States is the high cost of production. Whereas the average lithium ferrophosphate cell factory in China costs $650 million to build, it costs roughly $865 million to build a similar facility in the United States or Europe due to differences in labor costs and supporting facilities. This difference in cost has created a global status quo that has favored, and will continue to favor, Chinese hegemony over the midstream. While the United States is predicted to see battery production increase to roughly 1.2 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2030, corresponding increases in Chinese production will ensure most global battery production continues to occur in China. By 2030 the United States is set to produce 0.8 million metric tons of cathodes per annum, though demand will stand at 1.3 million metric tons. Domestic anode supply will also stand at roughly 500,000 metric tons per annum, with demand hovering at 700,000 metric tons. These shortfalls will therefore drive the importation of cell components, such as cathodes and anodes, for locally produced batteries. Nonetheless, domestic demand for battery cells in the 2030s will likely outstrip the supply of battery active materials despite increases in domestic manufacturing.
+
+> #### `The PRC’s Influence over Commodity Prices`
+
+_`China’s dominance over commodities critical to the lithium-ion battery supply chain — along with the PRC’s internal demand for lithium-ion battery products, chief among them electric vehicles (EVs) — has a marked effect on the global prices of these commodities. In recent years, an annual doubling of Chinese demand for EVs has caused prices of key minerals and battery components to remain elevated. While demand is still increasing as of 2023, the rate of increase has slowed to only 30 percent. Analysts predict this leveling off of demand will continue in the coming years and that the era of annual doubling has ended.`_
+
+_`This reduction in demand has led to a 50 percent decrease in nickel futures since December 2022 and an 80 percent decrease in lithium carbonate prices. The oversupply of critical minerals resulting from the relative drop in Chinese demand is further exacerbated by the fact that nations that produce critical minerals used in EVs — such as those in the Lithium Triangle (Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia) and Indonesia, which produces nickel — have drastically increased their investment in mines in the hope that demand would continue to double annually for the coming few years. To that end, annual lithium production increased by 23 percent worldwide in 2023, while nickel output grew by 10 percent, according to U.S. Geological Survey estimates.`_
+
+_`In response to this decrease in prices, China’s government is planning to increase the size of its strategic stockpiles of cobalt by buying up 3,000 tons of privately owned cobalt from producers to add to the nation’s commodity stockpile. China added 5,000 tons of cobalt to its stockpile in July, representing another opportunity to take advantage of low cobalt prices, which have decreased by 60 percent since May 2022 due to rising supplies from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Indonesia. These stockpiles are being expanded to protect domestic producers and military manufacturers from supply and price shocks.`_
+
+_`While S&P Global projects that commodity prices will stabilize in the coming years, existing price volatility poses a challenge for new firms entering the industry. Firms that are profitable while commodity prices are low, for example, may be forced to shut down prematurely if prices of lithium carbonate spike. Both nascent and long-standing firms therefore require some protection from the ebbs and flows of the market.`_
+
+_`To that end, China acts to protect its domestic battery industry from external shocks by enforcing export license requirements on graphite, which is regarded as the most critical mineral for battery anodes. Given the market for graphite is expected to triple in the next five years and that China produces more than 90 percent of spherical graphite — the type primarily used in batteries — export licensing efforts give China leverage over the price and global supply of both graphite and anodes. Adoption of the export license requirement comes on the heels of an August 2023 rule that requires export licenses for rare earth elements gallium and germanium, which are both primarily used in semiconductors, though they have applications in EVs as well. For instance, gallium nitride can handle a lot of power without generating heat, making it ideal for onboard chargers and inverters. The new export license requirement led to a sharp increase of 25 percent in gallium prices, which has remained constant since. More critically, these curbs highlight China’s willingness to use export license requirements as a means to control the supply and price of key minerals in the supply chains of electric appliance components.`_
+
+_`This export licensing effort serves two PRC objectives. The first is a means of geopolitical leverage, especially against nations that have tense relations with China despite significant trade, such as the United States. The second is an attempt to boost the competitiveness of China’s domestic high-value industries. To that end, Beijing increased the number of restrictions on critical raw materials needed for electric cars and renewable energy, such as lithium, cobalt, and manganese, by a factor of nine between 2009 and 2020.`_
+
+#### Recycling
+
+As the demand for lithium-ion batteries continues to grow, efficient recycling methods become increasingly relevant. The minerals and raw materials involved in producing a lithium-ion battery can be scarce and costly to extract and refine. Recycling lithium-ion batteries is therefore less energy intensive than producing new batteries from raw minerals. A thriving recycling industry enables lithium-ion battery manufacturers to bypass the challenges of the upstream stages of the supply chain and closes the loop of the circular economy by enabling additional cell production.
+
+With their easily separable and durable components, traditional lead-acid batteries are relatively simple to recycle. Over 90 percent of lead-acid batteries are recycled as a result. The recycling process for lithium-ion batteries, however, is substantially more complex since lithium is highly reactive (flammable). Typically, devices that contain lithium-ion batteries are collected by the original retailers, an e-waste collector, or a business that specializes in collecting used electronics.
+
+Battery packs are sorted and shipped to collection and processing facilities. Some packs are designated for repair or reuse. Those that are not undergo a process called shredding, through which the battery is chopped into pieces, creating a “black mass” — granular material made up of the dismembered cathodes and anodes of batteries. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), there are currently no industry standards defining the exact components of black mass from which valuable metals like cobalt and nickel are extracted. The shredding and extraction processes require a relatively high amount of energy, decreasing the extracted components’ value and creating some disincentives for reprocessing. Additionally, the lack of common regulations or standards for EV battery recycling, particularly advanced chemical processes for recycling as well as restrictions on the trade of used batteries, serve as additional limiting incentives for reprocessing and recycling efforts.
+
+In response to these issues, the U.S. Department of Energy has devoted $62 million in funding set forth in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law toward efforts that entice consumers to engage in battery recycling and improve the overall economic viability of private recycling efforts. Examples of these investments include $14.4 million in student education and outreach programs that will strengthen collection efforts for end-of-life electronics and $40 million toward projects that generate “greater market demand for recycling consumer electronics batteries” through cost-savings approaches within the preprocessing and sorting sectors. Government and private sector efforts to establish battery drop-off programs also received $7.2 million in funding.
+
+
+### Promoting Active Materials Production
+
+Key to U.S. economic security is the assurance that critical goods — among which lithium-ion batteries are included given their importance to the green transition — have resilient and secure supply chains. The lithium-ion battery supply chain is currently dominated by countries of concern and a just-in-time model that can withstand neither geopolitical fragmentation nor black swan economic shocks. In particular, U.S. dependence on PRC inputs reflects a long-term risk to national security that should be addressed. U.S. economic partners and allies are currently in a better position to satisfy demand for active materials: nearshoring and friendshoring efforts therefore represent a necessary step toward countering such dependence. Another important piece of the puzzle is to promote domestic production. The Biden administration and Congress have leveraged several policy tools to spur the latter, such as tax incentives, grants, and loans.
+
+___`The lithium-ion battery supply chain is currently dominated by countries of concern and a just-in-time model that can withstand neither geopolitical fragmentation nor black swan economic shocks.`___
+
+#### Biden Administration Policies
+
+__Tax incentives.__ Current tax incentives included in recent industrial policy packages — chief among them the IRA — aim to provide a launchpad for domestic manufacturers. They are meant to spur production of multiple goods necessary to the green transition, including the active materials production stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain.
+
+When it comes to producing electrode materials, such as anodes and cathodes, the IRA’s 45X advanced manufacturing production tax credit (PTC) is a boon for U.S. manufacturers. With eligible materials receiving a credit of 10 percent of the cost of production, the PTC is designed to support development of the active materials production stage of the supply chain. The tax credit applies to both equipment and minerals produced in the United States and sold between December 31, 2022, and December 31, 2032. Further, the produced equipment must be sold to an unrelated party as part of the taxpayer’s trade or business. There is a credit amount phaseout beginning in 2030 for only the manufactured components, but credits for critical minerals will expire without phasing out over time.
+
+However, the effectiveness of this tax credit is somewhat limited as it applies to specific production costs only. It does not cover direct or indirect material costs, nor does it include expenses related to the extraction, production, or acquisition of raw materials. These exclusions limit the overall utility of the credit in boosting domestic production of electrode active materials and instead ensure that it is only an impetus for production for firms at the margins.
+
+Another supply-side incentive the IRA provides is the 48C investment credit, awarded by the Department of Treasury in partnership with the Department of Energy. It awards credits of up to 30 percent of capital investment, provided the relevant project satisfies wage and apprenticeship requirements. This incentive has more regulatory barriers than the 45X credit, as project developers must apply to the Department of Energy and receive a decision from the Internal Revenue Service. In addition, total financing for the investment credit is capped at $10 billion.
+
+The 48C investment credit is geared toward bridging the gap between the required capital expenditures to develop factories in the United States and China. According to Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, the capital expenditure intensity in the United States averages around $90 million per gigawatt-hour (GWh), about a third higher than the $60 million per GWh capital expenditure required in the PRC. China clearly maintains the dominant position in access to raw materials, processing capabilities, and active materials production. Nevertheless, the investment credit helps enhance U.S. competitiveness. U.S. gigafactory capacity in the pipeline through 2030 has increased by roughly 70 percent, from around 700 GWh in July 2022 (before the IRA) to just over 1.2 TWh in July 2023.
+
+__Grants and loans.__ While the United States is currently not a major player in refining and active material assembly, significant amounts of onshore capacity are expected to come online in the coming years. Spurred by government-backed loans and private investments totaling $1.6 billion, firms such as Our Next Energy are set to begin producing 20 GWh of cathode materials and battery cells in a Michigan plant set to come online in late 2024. Plans for the gigafactory were announced in October 2022, giving it an ambitious timeline of roughly two years between the announcement of additional capacity and that capacity coming online.
+
+The two-to-three-year timeline also applies to gigafactory projects that Redwood Materials, Tesla, and Gotion are currently pursuing. These factories, which will focus on cathode production, anode manufacturing, and lithium refining, respectively, will collectively amount to 200 GWh in capacity once operational.
+
+However, the rollout of these gigafactories is already experiencing some setbacks. Ford announced it would pause development of a 35 GWh plant worth $3.5 billion in Michigan. Delays in battery cell factories coming online arise largely due to shortages in skilled labor, efficiency limitations, and unforeseen price increases for active materials. In recent years, pricing hurdles were driven by a surge in lithium carbonate prices from roughly $6 per kilogram in 2020 to $70 per kilogram in November of 2022. Since cathode active materials represent roughly 50 percent of total manufacturing costs for battery cells, such increases have placed barriers to entry on expanding battery cell manufacturing capacity. Yet in the last two years, these increases have largely reversed, and prices have plummeted back to $14.50 per kilogram. While this value is almost three times higher than in 2020, the effect of pricing concerns on gigafactory rollout is far more modest than it was in 2022.
+
+Additionally, U.S. workers may lack the necessary manufacturing experience, effectively ensuring that even when plants and gigafactories come online, they will not produce active materials with high efficiency. Gigafactory construction requires a set of competencies related to “equipment maintenance [and] troubleshooting production” not widely available within the U.S. workforce. Additionally, once factories have begun producing materials and finished cells, they also face assembly line staff shortages, as the U.S. workforce is largely trained in internal combustion engine manufacturing rather than in battery production. Ohio, for instance, has 58,000 open roles related to EV manufacturing. Aside from competencies, another cause of this labor shortage is the relatively low compensation levels compared to the broader automotive sector. The starting wage at a GM battery cell plant in Ohio is $16.50 an hour, while the average assembly line worker at a United Auto Workers plant makes roughly $28 an hour. While lower wages serve as a hedge against active material price increases, they also ensure labor shortages going forward.
+
+Initial production yields for battery cell lines among new entrants to the sector in the United States are often as low as 50 percent. As shown by the Center on Global Energy Policy, projections through 2032 clearly show North America will have the gigafactories to satisfy cell demand but will not have the local supply of cathodes and anodes to construct those cells.
+
+The Biden administration’s EPA sees lithium-ion battery recycling and repurposing as a means of domesticating this lithium-ion battery supply chain, particularly since U.S. lithium reserves make up just 4 percent of the world total. In the near term, the EPA seeks to take the following steps to encourage these processes:
+
+1. Foster the design of battery packs for ease of second use and recycling.
+
+2. Establish successful methods for collecting, sorting, transporting, and processing recycled lithium-ion battery materials, with a focus on reducing costs.
+
+3. Increase recovery rates of key materials such as cobalt, lithium, nickel, and graphite.
+
+4. Develop processing technologies to reintroduce these materials into the supply chain.
+
+5. Develop methodologies for proper sorting, testing, and balancing for second-use applications.
+
+6. Establish federal recycling policies to promote collection, reuse, and recycling of lithium-ion batteries.
+
+The IIJA grant disbursement notes that the focus of the funding is primarily on lithium processing, with nickel and graphite processors also receiving some grant money. The IIJA guidebook provides a comprehensive overview of all IIJA programs and grants, including several focused on active materials production and battery recycling:
+
+1. Battery Manufacturing and Recycling Grants ($3 billion total)
+
+2. Battery and Critical Mineral Recycling ($125 million total)
+
+3. Lithium-Ion Recycling Prize ($10 million total)
+
+4. Battery Recycling Best Practices ($10 million total)
+
+5. Electric Drive Vehicle Battery Recycling and Second Life Applications ($200 million total)
+
+The U.S. Department of Energy also announced $192 million in funding in June 2023 to expand battery recycling research and development, calling the investments “essential” to the advancement of a domestic supply chain of critical materials for the energy transition.
+
+However, the Biden administration’s investments in recycling capabilities may face similar roadblocks as the active materials production hubs. In October 2023, Li-Cycle Holdings Corp., which was set to receive significant backing from the Biden administration, saw its share price cut by almost 50 percent after announcing it would pause construction on a lithium-ion battery recycling plant. Li-Cycle assessed that it was facing escalating costs in attempting to operationalize its fabrication plant.
+
+While battery recycling is a relatively new market in North America, more mature firms abroad are also encountering issues. In the PRC, for instance, there are too many recyclers and not enough materials to go around, making many businesses’ operations currently untenable. It may take several years for recycling to become a viable industry in the United States: there are still relatively few EVs on the road, and other electronics that contain lithium-ion batteries are challenging to collect and too few in number to meet the needs of budding lithium-ion battery demand. Thus, the sector may encounter losses before becoming sustainable.
+
+#### Congressional Considerations
+
+A report by the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, released in December 2023, offers some insight into the bipartisan ad hoc committee’s thinking on diversifying the lithium-ion battery supply chain. The report’s recommendations may be split into two categories: those that pertain to critical minerals and those that pertain to battery manufacturing.
+
+When it comes to critical minerals, the committee’s report recommends enacting legislation to “encourage sectoral agreements with key trading partners and allies with strong rules of origin and high standards on critical minerals,” in addition to sourcing critical minerals and materials domestically and from friendly nations. This demonstrated openness to ensuring U.S. partners and allies become a stronger part of the country’s critical minerals supply chain, instead of solely focusing on onshoring, could enable lithium-ion battery manufacturers to scale up their production capabilities.
+
+However, the report recommends incentives with domestic content requirement guardrails that partially defeat the friendshoring purpose of the overarching recommendations. Limiting the sourcing of necessary minerals and materials to U.S. production in part negates the diversification objectives in these tax credits. The enhanced recycling measures the report recommends — such as requiring the Defense Logistics Agency Strategic Material Recovery and Reuse Program to pilot a recovery program to extract strategic and critical materials from end-of-life government hard disk drives — would likely not make up, in time or amount, for the production capabilities of U.S. partners.
+
+The report’s recommendations about batteries pose a similar issue, as its proposals largely emphasize the need to “encourage a domestic battery recycling industry.” Ramping up recycling efforts could help the U.S. lithium-ion battery industry become self-sufficient as more batteries are retired, while limiting incentives to domestic efforts would curtail U.S. access to additional lithium-ion battery materials. In addition, recycling is a technically challenging, labor-intensive process. Given the difficulties, it would not wholly replace production of original active materials.
+
+Instead, coordinating the ramping up of recycling operations with economic partners and allies who are also aiming to enhance their capabilities in this sector would enable more effective diversification results. U.S. efforts are not occurring in isolation: the EU lithium-ion battery recycling market is set to increase to 130 GWh, or 700 kilotons, by 2030. In addition, the EU market is set to expand again, threefold, by 2040 to 2,100 kilotons. Japan and South Korea are also aiming to expand their battery recycling industries. For instance, key Japanese firms have collaborated with the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization, a state-owned energy research agency, to develop technology that increases their capacity to extract recyclable materials from used batteries. This initiative is set to enable a recycling ratio of 70 percent for lithium, 95 percent for nickel, and 95 percent for cobalt by 2030. South Korea is also investing some 40 trillion won ($30 billion) to facilitate recycling efforts and second-life applications for used battery components. A U.S. strategy that prioritizes working with partners who are also investing in their own capabilities would improve the likelihood of successful diversification away from China and an effective transition to renewables.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+The second stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain examined in this paper — active materials production destined for cathodes and anodes — poses challenges to current onshoring policies. It demands physical capital and labor to accomplish technical work. Active materials production involves several steps — namely, mixing, coating, calendaring, slitting, and electrode making — in addition to producing the separator and electrolyte solution key to the functioning of a lithium-ion battery.
+
+As noted, China largely dominates this portion of the lithium battery supply chain, followed by South Korea and Japan. China’s dominance is strengthened by its sway over the production of inputs higher up the supply chain, as well as its strong influence over the global prices of key commodities. The United States is also limited by higher costs in penetrating the market, given its relative dearth of operational manufacturing capabilities and challenges in obtaining workers, which stem both from more robust labor standards and the lack of a sufficiently trained workforce.
+
+Policies that emphasize onshoring capabilities in the active materials production stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain are already confronted with the limitations of U.S. capacity. Projects launched by grants and loans under the IIJA and IRA are facing various hurdles, such as inadequacies in the domestic labor market as well as difficulties in making a nascent recycling industry profitable. These barriers are in part self-imposed by restrictions around domestic content requirements.
+
+___`Policies that emphasize onshoring capabilities in the active materials production stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain are already confronted with the limitations of U.S. capacity.`___
+
+Likewise, current congressional considerations and recommendations on providing the sector with additional launchpads also turn largely inward, hindering the green transition and impeding the country’s ability to successfully diversify away from Chinese manufacturing dominance. Given that other large players at this stage — namely, Japan and South Korea — are valuable partners in achieving long-term U.S. geostrategic objectives, U.S. policymakers should revisit the limitations set on incentives designed to spur active materials production. In addition, the United States should recognize that foreign direct investment from partners and allies has played an essential role in stimulating the domestic battery sector. Further efforts should be made to deepen ties with these nations and encourage additional investment. Ideally, policymakers should turn to negotiating plurilateral agreements with major players to secure this stage of the battery manufacturing supply chain. More ambitious agreements would enable partners to coordinate industrial policy efforts, enhance information sharing for research and development efforts in the field to improve manufacturing efficiency, and eliminate trade barriers in critical goods.
+
+The business community is currently engaged in reassessing the risk of doing business with the PRC given potential supply chain resiliency risks. In light of current geopolitical tensions, private entities now are striving to create redundancies in supply sources to mitigate the consequences of large-scale shocks on current choke points. The United States, along with economic partners and allies, is also moving to de-risk supply chains, but the cornerstone of the Biden administration strategy is to spur domestic production anchored by industrial policy initiatives.
+
+These efforts overlap with the push to spur a green transition, for which the lithium-ion battery is a key technology. However, if diversifying supply chains away from China occurs too soon, achieving enough domestic capabilities to effectively spur the green transition in the United States will not be possible. Likewise, a diversification strategy that does not consider the benefits of nearshoring will prove lengthy and costly. In addition, the United States should develop an effective materials management policy that incentivizes development of additional supply chains and regulatory cooperation with like-minded countries. This policy should be pursued in a manner that does not hamper domestic manufacturers from investing or commercializing products.
+
+In short, the United States is pursuing three goals: accelerating the transition to renewables; reshoring production capabilities in key sectors, which include several items necessary to the green transition; and diversifying away from China in these critical areas. Policies that prioritize one of these goals get in the way of the other two.
+
+Finally, nearshoring and friendshoring considerations lead to questions of what it means to be “near” and a “friend.” In addition, lithium-ion batteries are the current bedrock of a transition to renewables, but there are numerous research projects underway aiming to find more efficient alternatives. The final paper of this series will discuss both of these issues, in addition to describing policy challenges surrounding the final stage of the lithium-ion battery supply chain — the assembly of battery cells into modules, packed and sold to manufacturers of various end products.
+
+---
+
+__William Reinsch__ holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
+
+__Meredith Broadbent__ serves as a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.
+
+__Thibault Denamiel__ is an associate fellow with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.
+
+__Elias Shammas__ is a research intern with the Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-07-russia-and-china.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-07-russia-and-china.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-07-russia-and-china.md
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+---
+layout: post
+title : Russia And China
+author: Callum Fraser
+date  : 2024-06-07 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/opxLH2L.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The True Nature of their Cooperation"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_Strategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing has visibly intensified in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, Russia is now firmly the weaker partner in the relationship, with China exploiting the Kremlin’s situation for its own ends._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+On 29 May, US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell spoke to NATO representatives in Brussels on the seriousness of Chinese-Russian relations. His words underscore the true nature of the “no-limits” arrangement between Beijing and Moscow. It is not a partnership of convenience, but a concerted effort to shift the geopolitical centre of gravity towards Asia. While the West often talks about “bleeding Russia dry” through the conflict in Ukraine, Campbell warns that it risks suffering a similar drawn-out death. China does not represent a voice of reason in Russia’s ear as has been suggested by some Western leaders, but has a vested interest in destabilising the West and distracting it from Beijing’s own objectives in the Indo-Pacific.
+
+Increasing political, economic, and social burdens stemming from the invasion of Ukraine have kneecapped Russian agency in the international arena. As the divide between Russia and the West grows, the Kremlin is increasingly focusing its attention on China, with ties between the two states growing ever stronger. In defiance of the West, Russia characterises its relationship with China as an alliance between two great civilisations. However, as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to China has highlighted, Moscow is increasingly finding itself a pawn of China’s geopolitical aspirations.
+
+Amid increasing geopolitical turbulence, the concept of multipolarity is becoming acknowledged as a global trend. Russia and China have been quick to label themselves as key players in this emerging world order, and have collectively strived towards the formation of a bloc that is set to rival Western hegemony. At a glance, the relationship appears natural: two rising authoritarian powers are joining forces to challenge the prevailing order. Yet upon delving deeper into the relationship’s dynamics, Russia’s commitment to its war on Ukraine, its stagnating economy, and its search for support extraneous to the West have led to its foreign policy objectives becoming slowly subsumed into China’s vision of the future international order.
+
+
+### The New World Order
+
+Geopolitical constraints provide Russia and China with a plethora of reasons to band together. Their distrust of Western hegemony, authoritarian governments, and similar political ambitions have nurtured relations between Moscow and Beijing for the last political generation.
+
+In their recent press conference, both states agreed that civilisational differences shape spheres of influence; that international institutions are polarised against their interests, requiring shifts in structure to accommodate “new realities”; and that there is no place for military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. Noticeably, the conversation focused on the developing trade partnership between the two states, with comments on external affairs remaining limited in detail. In comparison to Putin’s usual damning rhetoric on the collective West, the restraint within this meeting is a sign of the true dynamics of the situation – namely, that they are shaped primarily by Chinese interests.
+
+
+### Cooperation over Competition?
+
+Despite exorbitant bilateral proclamations of partnership, dynamics between the two states remain cautious, partly as a result of historical tensions. Putin’s reference to Russia and China remaining “brothers forever” seems to skip over the Treaty of Peking (1860), the Soviet invasion of Xinjiang (1934) and nuclear posturing during the Sino-Soviet split, to name a few “breaks” in their historical relationship. These memories are still fresh in the minds of much of the Chinese population, including scholars who note an incongruence between Russian and Chinese visions of a new world order. Despite the friendly veneer, distrust remains.
+
+___`Russia’s refocused economy means it has no ability to provide incentives for greater integration within its historical sphere of influence in the face of Chinese economic competition`___
+
+With Russia’s economy concentrated on supporting the war effort in Ukraine, its exports have become focused on shipping fossil fuels and other raw materials to Eastern partners. Meanwhile, imports from China now cover a diverse field of industrial and consumer goods, providing essential resources to sustain both Russia’s economy and the conflict in Ukraine. This asymmetrical balance is forecasted to increase over the coming years as Russia struggles to survive on its war economy, and consequently, China will become an ever more important lifeline for the Russian state.
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/B7FwpbK.png)
+![image02](https://i.imgur.com/60uJ7y3.png)
+_▲ __Chinese-Russian Trade Complexity.__ Variance in export complexity suggests that Russia has become a Chinese petrol station, while China provides necessities for Russia’s struggling war economy. [Source](https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/rus?depthSelector=HS2Depth)._
+
+This imbalance has precipitated unusual geopolitical concessions from Russia. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Russia’s customs union – initially conceived in part to limit Chinese influence in Russia’s historical sphere of influence – contains several states operating a multi-vector foreign policy, including investment from China’s global development project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Putin’s comments at the 2023 Eurasian Economic Forum supporting the pairing of the EAEU and BRI demonstrate both a concession in terms of Russia’s dominance over Eurasia and an acceptance of the nature of relations with China.
+
+Development and investment have become the dominant tools for building influence in Eurasia; in this context, Russia’s economic integration with former Soviet states offers only limited influence over its neighbours. Its refocused economy means it has no ability to provide incentives for greater integration within its historical sphere of influence in the face of Chinese economic competition.
+
+Therefore, Russia finds itself increasingly reliant on a partner with historical grievances as well as ambitions in its own backyard. If Russia continues to stagnate, it must either make further concessions regarding its geopolitical position within Eurasia, or risk severing its life support mechanism.
+
+
+### Russia’s Excessive Optimism
+
+Putin’s recent visit to China, the first since his fifth inauguration as president, highlighted Russia’s strategic dependence upon its neighbour. In the opening address by the two countries’ leaders, one could see an incongruence in the rhetoric surrounding the state of Sino-Russian relations. Putin’s reference to collaboration reaching unprecedented levels was met with lukewarm compliments from Chinese President Xi Jinping about the level of cooperation, indicating a desire for improvement.
+
+These comments exemplify Russia and China’s positions. Ultimately, Russia needs China far more than China needs Russia. The relationship hardly extends beyond the transactional, with strict limitations on bilateral cooperation on projects that do not favour Chinese interests. During Putin’s visit, aspirations for a second gas pipeline linking the two states were dashed by yet another unenthusiastic response from Beijing. While Russia still has use for China, there are clear limits to how far China will cooperate with the Kremlin’s interests.
+
+![image03](https://i.imgur.com/9ttmIWg.png)
+_▲ __Average Russian Oil Exports by Country and Region, 2021-2023 (million barrels per day).__ Russia’s growing reliance on China and other Asian partners to mitigate Western sanctions on Russian exports. [Source](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/average-russian-oil-exports-by-country-and-region-2021-2023)._
+
+
+### The Ukrainian Question
+
+Victory in Ukraine has become integral to the continuation of Putin’s reign, and consequently, the progress of the Russian invasion now dictates every facet of Russian domestic and foreign policy. This opens the door to external exploitation. China, along with other Asian states, have profited from cheap Russian oil; Central Asian states have transformed into crucial transport hubs for goods to and from Russia; and the supply of goods now underproduced within Russia’s war economy is driving increased exports from the East. The longer Russia’s attention is focused on Ukraine, the longer Russia’s neighbours will profit from its increased reliance on them.
+
+___`China will happily tolerate a conflict in Ukraine, even going as far to prop up Russia’s military economy, but this does not denote an equal partnership or a friendship`___
+
+Therefore, while China continues to seek a “political solution” to the conflict in Ukraine, it seems more than happy to put up with a protracted conflict. China has typically remained neutral on external matters, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has presented Beijing with a narrow path through which it can prioritise its interests without suffering secondary sanctions from the West. On the surface, Beijing is fostering a growing trade relationship with Russia in a very particular manner, through the export of components with both civilian and military applications such as machine tools, satellite equipment, and drone technology – enough to turn a nice profit and maintain the status quo in the conflict, without overtly support Russia.
+
+However, Campbell’s words suggest that China is providing much greater support in terms of materiel to help reconstitute Russian forces, kept out of sight to avoid Western retaliation. Ultimately, this situation seems likely, and Russia’s aggressive revanchism in Ukraine serves as an exemplary case study of the limits of Western resolve. Meanwhile, Xi’s Taiwanese ambitions loom large; with an ever narrowing window of opportunity for military action, China will likely be analysing its Russian guinea pig while propping it up just enough to continue to drain Western military and political resources.
+
+Ultimately, China will happily tolerate a conflict in Ukraine, even going as far to prop up Russia’s military economy, but this does not denote an equal partnership or a friendship. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine suits a very particular purpose for China, distracting and draining the West. As long as this status quo continues, we can expect China to keep exploiting Russia’s position.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+Sino-Russian relations are strengthening in the political, economic, and military domains, posing a direct threat to Western security interests. The long-term dynamics of this relationship suggest a purely transactional approach, with China exploiting Russia’s economic weaknesses. However, the war in Ukraine also presents an opportunity for China to bleed Western resolve, drain NATO resources, and distract attention from Beijing’s interests in the Indo-Pacific. Ultimately, Putin, through his dreams of Russian revanchism, has transformed Russia into a tool for its ambitious and unreliable Eastern neighbour.
+
+---
+
+__Callum Fraser__ is a Research Fellow in the International Security Studies department at RUSI, specialising in the confluence between Russian foreign policy and its periphery states. Callum is particularly interested in the evolution of geopolitics within Eurasia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. He also specialises in researching the underlying motivations, justifications, and dynamics of conflict within the Eurasian space along ethnic, identity, cultural, and political dimensions.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-11-f16s-unleashed.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-11-f16s-unleashed.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8f41fd4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-11-f16s-unleashed.md
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : F-16s Unleashed
+author: Christopher Koeltzow, et al.
+date  : 2024-06-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/P2m5chu.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "How They Will Impact Ukraine’s War"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_The paper explores the implications of supplying F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine._ <excerpt/> _It examines the strategic- and tactical-level effects, outlines limitations and obstacles in their utilization by the Ukrainian Air Force and presents recommendations to leverage the platform’s capabilities to support Ukraine objectives. This document provides invaluable insights for policymakers, military strategists, and academics grappling with the intricate dynamics of European security._
+
+
+### Background
+
+Ukrainian F-16s will be challenged to independently create conditions for a much-desired breakthrough in the war with Russia. But with the right strategy, doctrinal approach, logistical support, and training, F-16s could provide a critical advance in enhancing Ukraine’s border defense and establishing localized air superiority, significantly bolstering Ukraine’s position on the ground. The underwhelming 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, combined with finite Western materiel support, prompts the question: what role can Ukrainian F-16s play in 2024?
+
+Rather than a year marked by significant military maneuvers, 2024 may become a rebuilding period for both Ukraine and Russia. As in a rebuilding phase in sports, recently trained Ukrainian F-16 pilots will likely showcase periods of excellence while gaining vital experience that could lay the groundwork for lasting advantages over Russian forces. Consequently, the authors expect the impact of giving Ukraine F-16s in 2024 to be primarily strategic, offering long-term benefits rather than immediate tactical gains.
+
+The first section of this brief describes the strategic implications of giving F-16s to Ukraine. The next section describes the challenges expected during F-16 integration and their potential tactical influence on the battlefield in 2024. Finally, the authors offer a set of short- and long-term recommendations that policymakers can incorporate to complement the political aims of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s strategy to support Ukraine’s war effort.
+
+
+### Part I: Strategic Impacts
+
+1. __Opponents of the free world fear the airpower of the United States and its allies.__ These air forces have been purposely built to strike strategic targets, counter the power of great armies and navies, and defend sovereign territory. They have been highly successful over the past 80 years. A significant portion of the power of these air forces comes from the technological superiority they possess over their adversaries, in addition to the might of their combined size across the alliance. The F-16 is the most prolific Western fourth-generation fighter jet produced, with thousands still in active service and highly upgraded versions still in production. Furthermore, as the mainstay of NATO air forces for decades, and with its impressive combat record, giving Ukraine such an iconic jet sends a strong message of U.S. and NATO commitment to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty.
+
+2. __The capabilities of the F-16 enable Ukraine to hold more Russian targets at risk and, in turn, gain more leverage in the war and at the negotiation table.__ To create a strategic “fleet in being” that Russia must respect, the size of the F-16 fleet matters. NATO countries have committed 65 F-16s to Ukraine. However, more are needed to give the Ukrainian Air Force more power to affect the ground war. As a simple starting point, NATO should be willing to replace all of Ukraine’s Soviet-era fighters with F-16s or equivalent NATO-standard aircraft and dramatically expand the size of Ukraine’s fighter fleet beyond pre-2022 strengths. Some estimates suggest that the size of Ukraine’s fighter fleet was only 69 aircraft in March 2023. By NATO standards, that number of aircraft may make up no more than three fighter squadrons (with 18 aircraft per squadron). Ukraine needs close to 12 fighter squadrons to achieve the air support needed for the war on the ground, with four squadrons primarily responsible for each core mission set: (1) suppression of enemy air defenses, (2) air interdiction, and (3) defensive counter air. This aim would require 216 F-16s, with 18 aircraft in each squadron. Additionally, NATO should have a reserve of F-16s available for resupply on demand, proportional to historical combat loss rates.
+
+   The well-known conventional strengths of the F-16 fit neatly within the core mission sets Ukraine needs to execute. Ukraine can leverage these advantages while placing the Russian forces in its territory at a disadvantage. Additionally, F-16s can carry a significant variety of weapons in the U.S. Air Force (USAF) inventory that are supported by an active and expanding industry. Alternatively, F-16s could increase the potency of Ukraine’s interdiction campaign in the Black Sea, further degrading the effectiveness of Russia’s Black Sea fleet or threatening the flow of sanctioned trade to and from Russian ports in the Black Sea.
+
+   The quantity of targets Ukraine can hold at risk with F-16s is a function of (1) the overall quantity of F-16s Ukraine receives, (2) the type and quantity of weapons it receives, (3) U.S. and NATO employment restrictions placed on Ukraine (i.e., restricting employment beyond Ukraine’s borders), (4) the fusion of intelligence between NATO and Ukrainian sources, (5) the proficiency of the pilots and support personnel that can optimize F-16 effectiveness, and (6) the air strategy Ukraine chooses to use for its F-16s (primarily for air defense or offensive missions such as strategic attack or interdiction of fielded forces and Russian logistics).
+
+   Additionally, giving Ukraine F-16s presents NATO and the United States with a unique opportunity to gather intelligence on the potency of allied aircraft and weapons against Russian and Iranian equipment and tactics. This could be leveraged as an opportunity to gather strategic intelligence as Russia reacts to the introduction of the F-16 and follow-on security packages of logistical support for use with the aircraft. With collaboration between Ukraine and NATO, these insights can inform NATO’s leaders of the viability of the alliance’s strategy and tactics in certain domains.
+
+3. __Giving F-16s to Ukraine is a significant step forward to further integrate the country into the U.S. and European economic and defense ecosystem, which will increase Ukraine’s strength in the long term.__ Assuming the belligerent countries have equal will to fight, attritional wars are typically won by the side with the greatest economic and industrial strength and the greatest ability to manifest those strengths on the battlefield through more equipment, people, and ammunition. In The Wages of Destruction, Adam Tooze asserts that the economic and material strengths of the Allies in World War II overwhelmed Germany’s capacity to field enough equipment and people to resist the persistent assault over the long term. In 2020, the Ukrainian economy was about 9.5 times smaller than Russia’s ($155.5 billion compared to $1.5 trillion), and the Ukrainian population was 3.5 times smaller than Russia’s. For economies with equivalent levels of industrialization, industrial capacity roughly follows the measurements of gross domestic product and population.
+
+   Sustainment and reconstitution of warfighting formations, including aviation, is a challenge for Ukraine. Before the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s military used equipment mostly from the former Soviet Union, and many of the supply chains to repair or replace the equipment and its ammunition needs no longer exist or are controlled by Russia. Over time, these Soviet relics have lost their effectiveness as damage and shortages in parts and ammunition render them unfit for combat. The situation cannot support a positive outcome for Ukraine in a long attritional war. Therefore, supplying Ukraine with NATO or U.S. standard equipment is critical to sustain Ukrainian efforts because those weapon systems and Ukrainian operational needs can be integrated into U.S. and NATO supply chains. Over time, Ukraine would become more systemically integrated with NATO.
+
+4. __The U.S. resupply of Israel during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 shows how commonality of equipment becomes a strategic asset in sustaining forces during attritional wars.__ The lessons from the Yom Kippur War should inform NATO decisionmakers of the value of supplying the Ukrainian Air Force with F-16s. During the war, a coalition of Arab countries led by Egypt strategically surprised Israel, leaving it little time to prepare for the invasion. Israel’s military doctrine called for preemptive air strikes similar to those it had used during the 1967 war to offset its quantitative disadvantages in personnel and equipment vis-à-vis its adversaries. However, U.S. national security advisor Henry Kissinger made clear that U.S. support was contingent on Israel receiving the first blow. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) plan and strategy depended upon preemptive strikes. When the option for a preemptive strike disappeared, Israel lost a significant advantage. The IAF paid dearly: it lost 15 percent of its total combat aircraft (60 aircraft) in less than 24 hours and about 35 percent of its total combat aircraft by the war’s end — catastrophic losses for any air force in such a short period. By the end of the first week of the war, Israel was in bad shape and gravely needed a resupply of ammunition, tanks, and aircraft. 
+
+   Luckily, the IAF had modernized most of its fleet prior to the war with U.S.-made A-4 Skyhawks and F-4 Phantoms, also flown by the USAF and U.S. Navy (USN). Israeli prime minister Golda Meir asked the United States for assistance, which kicked off a large resupply effort, including Operation Nickel Grass, in which the United States provided Israel with large numbers of 155 mm howitzers, M-60 and M-48 main battle tanks, and 100 USAF F-4s and 36 USN A-4s to reconstitute the IAF inventory. Consequently, the resupply efforts by the United States to Israel outpaced those of the Soviet Union to the Arab coalition, allowing Israel to change the balance of the war enough to secure a negotiated settlement about 10 days after the first U.S. resupply.
+
+5. __Finally, while F-16s alone will not provide air superiority, they are a vital component of this goal.__ For more than 100 years, militaries have known air superiority is essential to the success of any conventional ground campaign, but World War II was the first time the technology and capacity of mass production existed at the degree necessary to demonstrate the merits of air superiority. Examples include the Germans during the Blitz of 1939–40, the UK Royal Air Force and U.S. Army Air Forces’ air campaign in Europe in 1944–45, Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War of 1967, and the swift U.S. defeat of Iraq in Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In each case, casualties for the ground forces operating under air superiority were relatively low compared to those of their counterparts fighting without air superiority. Additionally, the tempo of ground campaigns improved significantly compared to the ground campaigns of World War I, in which each ground force maintained relative parity with others in terms of technology and the size of its army.
+
+   Per the USAF Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-01, control of the air is among the top priorities of the joint force and is classified into three categories: (1) air parity, (2) air superiority, and (3) air supremacy. The air war in Ukraine over the past two years is best classified as one of air parity, where no force controls the air for its own ends or faces significant interference. According to U.S. Air Force doctrine, air superiority is the “degree of control of the air by one force that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats. Air superiority may be localized in space (horizontally and vertically) and in time, or it may be broad and enduring.”
+
+   Air supremacy results when one side is incapable of effective air interference in the operating area, which the United States has generally enjoyed in conflicts over the past few decades.
+
+   Today, each side of the war in Ukraine has a relatively robust air defense capability such that each can deny air superiority to the other. The missing component of air superiority for Ukraine is an offensive air capability, which the F-16s will begin to provide. Therefore, ground forces find themselves locked in relatively static battles of attrition, unable to create the conditions for a decisive maneuver campaign that could change the trajectory of the war. The robust Russian Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) makes establishing air superiority over the entire occupied territory a difficult feat. However, the Ukrainian Air Force can focus on establishing localized air superiority over limited areas for limited times. Such localized air superiority would be coordinated with Ukrainian land offensives to support a breakthrough operation and would be most effective with combined arms operations. Giving F-16s to Ukraine is an essential move toward establishing air superiority.
+
+   Gaining air superiority enables the land component to bypass or maneuver through enemy forces and obstacle belts. Trench warfare exists on both sides because neither side has air superiority. However, trenches cannot stand up to the constant bombardment and might of 500–2,000-pound bombs, as demonstrated by the U.S. coalition in Operation Desert Storm, in which an air war lasting more than 40 days pulverized the Iraqi military to such a degree that it surrendered less than 100 hours after the start of the ground invasion. Likewise, tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles will succumb to cluster bombs, Maverick missiles, and 500–2,000-pound bombs. With air superiority, Ukraine’s F-16s can bring these effects to the battlefield.
+
+
+### Part II: F-16 Integration Challenges and Tactical Influence in 2024
+
+The Ukrainian Ground Forces has showcased its adeptness in assimilating cutting-edge Western weaponry into its arsenal with remarkable efficacy. Within its artillery corps, the Ukrainian Ground Forces phased out antiquated Soviet systems, replacing them with the technologically advanced M142 High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and accompanying munitions supplied by the United States. Following a three-week training regimen for M142 operators and maintainers, Ukrainian forces learned effective tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), enabling them to proficiently target Russian ammunition and fuel depots, bases, command and control nodes, and critical resupply infrastructure. While Ukrainian troops were familiar with various rocket launchers, HIMARS represents a substantial leap forward compared to Ukraine’s previous reliance on organic BM-30 Smerch and BM-27 Uragan systems, boasting superior capabilities including extended range, improved precision, enhanced mobility, and a faster rate of fire. While Ukraine’s successful integration of HIMARS presents tactical and operational challenges for Russia, mastering the integration of F-16s into the war strategy to produce impacts of a similar magnitude will be a formidable endeavor.
+
+___`It will be years before the Ukrainian Air Force has enough experience to execute combat missions effectively. However, if supplied with the proper air-to-ground munitions, they will quickly be able to execute long-range strikes (air interdiction).`___
+
+It will be years before the Ukrainian Air Force has enough experience to execute combat missions effectively. However, if supplied with the proper air-to-ground munitions, they will quickly be able to execute long-range strikes (air interdiction). Training a proficient F-16 pilot takes a long time. For instance, the training timeline for USAF fighter pilots, from initial flight training to certification as a combat-qualified wingman, spans three to four years. Furthermore, the total training duration extends to four to five years when factoring in leadership training essential for executing formations of fighter tactics in combat. While Ukrainian fighter pilots already possess basic airmanship skills, adapting to an aircraft with a fundamentally different cockpit interface and instrument layout, designed around a different concept of human factors engineering, requires an alternative way of thinking. This reality means experienced fighter pilots will also need time to transition effectively. Furthermore, their flying experience with Soviet-era fighter aircraft will not necessarily translate to the fly-by-wire controls and design of the F-16.
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/kd9Tsgh.jpeg)
+
+To fully leverage the capabilities of the F-16, Ukrainian fighter pilots must become familiar with battle-proven TTPs honed over the past four decades. To make a significant combat impact, Ukrainian F-16 pilots must excel in three mission sets: offensive counter air/air interdiction (OCA/AI), offensive counter air/air operations–suppression of enemy air defenses (OCA/AO-SEAD), and defensive counter air (DCA). These mission sets will allow the Ukrainian Air Force to maximize the combat capabilities of the F-16 while not exposing them to higher combat losses executing more complex combat missions.
+
+___`Ukraine must start flying combat sorties and build experience immediately.`___
+
+Learning and applying Western TTPs proficiently will likely take Ukrainian fighter pilots over a year. As a historical reference, the United States delivered the first F-16s to Israel in 1980. Eleven months later, the IAF flew the new platform on a daring and successful air strike against an Iraqi nuclear weapons production plant. The IAF, despite the advantages of combat and Western tactics experience, chose to wait almost a year before employing the F-16. It takes time and experience to build the proficiency needed to employ a complex fighter effectively. Ukraine must start flying combat sorties and build experience immediately. Therefore, it will be difficult to measure the significant battlefield impacts of the F-16s until 2025, and expectations should be managed accordingly.
+
+Ukraine must be able to organically maintain and repair the F-16s. One crucial lesson learned throughout U.S. military operations in Afghanistan was the vital role host-nation service members, rather than contractors, play in aircraft maintenance and repair. In Afghanistan, contractors predominantly handled maintenance support. Following the order to withdraw, their departure led to a significant decrease in mission-capable combat-ready aircraft. Similarly, the time, training, and experience required to cultivate proficient F-16 pilots are equally essential for developing competent F-16 maintainers. On average, it takes approximately five to eight years of on-the-job experience and rigorous certification (known in the USAF as “7-level” certification) to ensure the resident knowledge necessary for maintaining these aircraft. While not all maintainers are certified with “7-level” proficiency, the mid and upper levels of leadership, and their expertise, are essential to effective maintenance operations.
+
+Ukrainians must embrace a military culture in which all recommendations or voices are heard, specifically from the junior ranks. Ukraine’s impressive performance early in the war, and during the Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives, demonstrated its will and fighting ability. To capitalize on this fighting spirit, Ukraine must adopt NATO’s method to improve pilot performance and proficiency — specifically, a somewhat scientific and rigorous debrief of each flight. Reviewing the data recorded from each flight (“watching the tapes”) is crucial to this learning process. All aircrew are debriefed regardless of rank. Pride and ego must be sidelined to improve combat effectiveness and save lives. Furthermore, accurate battle damage assessment (BDA) should be reported back through the planning channels to maximize the efficiency of airpower by assigning strikes only to essential targets. Finally, this method of debriefing and the BDA feedback loop improve pilots’ rate of learning and the effectiveness of all air operations.
+
+___`Ukrainians must embrace a military culture in which all recommendations or voices are heard, specifically from the junior ranks.`___
+
+Poor doctrine presents a potential obstacle to maximizing the effectiveness of the F-16. Doctrine is a collection of best practices used to accomplish military objectives or effects. Ukraine should establish desired effects or objectives and then combine combat experience with Western TTPs to develop best practices. Rather than simply apply NATO or U.S. airpower doctrine, which is built around a robust command and control and resupply network, Ukrainians should own their doctrine while continuously improving it to confront the challenges from Russia on the battlefield.
+
+Once introduced on the battlefield, F-16s will increase the Ukrainian Air Force’s air-to-air capabilities. Leveraging its combat-proven radar, coupled with variants of the AIM-120 AMRAAM missile, Ukraine will extend its maximum air-to-air engagement range up to 180 km. This is an appreciable engagement range improvement compared to Ukraine’s Soviet-era MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter aircraft. Additionally, Ukrainian F-16s can more effectively disrupt Russian close air support missions across contested battlefields. During the summer of 2023, Russian helicopters impeded and delayed the Ukrainian counteroffensive. With the introduction of the F-16, these helicopters will become vulnerable and less effective in supporting Russian defensive or offensive operations. Lastly, expect Ukrainian F-16s to suppress the long-range glide bombs tactics Russian fighters have adeptly used around Kharkiv.
+
+___`The F-16 can improve Ukraine’s layered air defense, contributing to detection and elimination of incoming drones and missiles.`___
+
+Furthermore, the F-16 can improve Ukraine’s layered air defense, contributing to detection and elimination of incoming drones and missiles. The recent successful defense of Israel against the Iranian assault of over 300 drones and missiles highlights the significance of this capability, as USAF F-15Es shot down over 70 drones. However, the effectiveness of this approach hinges significantly on the interoperability of Ukrainian doctrine and technological systems. In the short term, while Russian IADSs remain intact, the battlefield conditions will make close air support too risky for Ukrainian F-16s. Instead, the Ukrainian Air Force should incorporate the F-16 as another platform capable of long-range strikes with the British Storm Shadow or French SCALP. Ukraine has already received ground-launched small-diameter bomb (SBD) launchers and should likewise be given the air-launched versions for its F-16s. Dropping SDBs from F-16s would complicate the Russian air defense, provide more opportunities for successful long-range fires, and enable targeting time-sensitive targets similar to the HIMARS — and at a far more economical rate.
+
+
+### Part III: Short- and Long-Term Recommendations to Capitalize on the F-16’s Advantages
+
+#### Short-Term Recommendations (in 2024)
+
+1. __To assist in the quality of learning, NATO should embed fighter pilots with Ukrainian Air Force units to aid with debriefing, learning, and mission planning, or set up virtual options for video footage review.__ In February 2024, French president Emmanuel Macron opened the door to Western nations sending their troops to Ukraine, stating, “Nothing should be excluded.” Should future policy allow, NATO fighter pilots should aid Ukrainian aircrew and train them to review the tapes on every training or combat sortie to find lessons learned and improve tactics, techniques, and procedures. This tape review must be incorporated into the battle rhythm of Ukrainian fighter pilots. This will reinforce a culture of learning and ensure pilots provide and receive constructive feedback from every rank. Tape reviews increase tactical effectiveness and minimize losses. During review, learning is best achieved when individuals with the most expertise or proficiency lead the debrief, even if they do not hold the highest rank. Examples of this culture of debriefing may be found in the fighter and bomber units of the USAF and USN as well as within NATO air forces. 
+
+2. __The United States and NATO should authorize the use of cluster bomb munitions, GBU-39B SDBs, and Storm Shadow or SCALP missiles with the F-16s.__ Specifically, the Cluster Bomb Unit (CBU)–87/89 and smart bomb equivalents (CBU-103/105) are most relevant for military targets in this context. A specific set of guidelines or restrictions on how the munitions may be used could be attached to the authorization of the weapons to minimize the risk of collateral damage. These weapons would aid in defending Ukrainian territory if Russia gains momentum toward a breakout on the battlefield. Cluster bomb munitions degrade and destroy large concentrations of personnel or equipment with fewer aircraft or strikes, while the SDB, Storm Shadow, and SCALP munitions can strike targets at great distances, improving the survivability of the employing aircraft. In 2023, Russia used attack helicopters with success to blunt the Ukrainian counteroffensive. If Russia can muster a breakout situation, it will require a concentration of personnel and equipment that cluster munitions are well suited to counter. Additionally, it is essential to include longer-range variants of the AIM-120 AMRAAM in the ammunition package. Enhanced air-to-air capabilities will bolster Ukraine’s capacity to deter Russia’s deployment of glide bombs.
+
+3. __The United States and NATO should set up a permanent training rotation program for Ukrainian F-16 aircrew and maintainers.__ After six months of combat, aircrew and maintainers should rotate to Ramstein Air Base for debriefing and the opportunity to rest and recuperate (R&R). After R&R, they should be allowed to refine their skill sets on a high-quality training range such as the Nevada Test and Training Range before returning to Ukraine for combat. The USAF and USN put their aircrew and maintainers through predeployment flying exercises to improve combat effectiveness, and these programs could be leveraged to provide Ukrainian units with a similar experience. For example, the USN saw dramatic improvements in combat effectiveness following the stand-up of the Navy Top Gun program during the Vietnam War, as evidenced by a 600 percent improvement to its aerial kill-to-loss ratio from Rolling Thunder (1968) to Linebacker (1972). The USAF had equivalent improvements to its combat effectiveness after the creation of Red Flag in 1975, in which the Air Force kill ratio hovered around 2:1 throughout the Vietnam War. In contrast, the USAF achieved 31 kills without a single loss in direct air-to-air combat in Desert Storm. Vastly improved training and doctrine account for a significant portion of the dramatic improvement to each service’s combat effectiveness. Following this logic, dedicating a unit at Nellis Air Force Base or another NATO base to orchestrate housing and training for Ukrainian aircrew and maintainers would make this initiative more effective. 
+
+4. __NATO should commit more F-16s in the next couple of months to bring its total commitment to at least 90.__ This would allow Ukraine to convert five squadrons to F-16s (18 jets per squadron) using similar operations, maintenance, and sustainment practices as NATO units. For planning purposes, each additional set of 18 like-model F-16s would equate to another unit’s worth of aircraft. Since operational planning assigns missions and tasks to tactical units, the United States could help the Ukrainian Air Force by sending appropriately sized packages that can be seamlessly integrated into operations for improved efficiency. These numbers are the minimum needed and exclude aircraft needed for pipeline training and attrition. 
+
+5. __Ukraine should prioritize converting its units to F-16s based on criteria that will maximize the combat capability the F-16 brings to the Ukrainian Air Force in as little time as possible.__ The authors recommend three actions to aid in this decision. First, prioritize the units that most need fighter aircraft and that are most capable of meeting the needs of Ukraine’s air strategy with the proper amount of aircraft and equipment. With these criteria, the equipment is the limiting factor — not the number of qualified people. Second, choose the unit currently assigned a mission that is the most similar to the anticipated role of the F-16 to capitalize on the culture, experience, and expertise ingrained in the people of the unit. Finally, access to higher-quality infrastructure and logistics will minimize the time aircraft sit grounded awaiting repairs or maintenance between missions. Therefore, picking a unit that already operates in a location with these features and remains beyond the range of most Russian air attacks will also aid Ukraine in reaping the dividends of the aircraft’s capabilities sooner rather than later.
+
+#### Long-Term Recommendations (Beyond 2024)
+
+1. __To substantially increase Ukraine’s chances of victory, NATO should give Ukraine the equipment it needs to establish air superiority within its national borders.__ Providing F-16s is a step in the right direction toward this goal, but more equipment is needed. The authors estimate Ukraine needs 12 fighter squadrons of F-16s to significantly improve its position in the war. With 18 jets per squadron, this requires 216 F-16s on the front lines, and more should be placed in a reserve that can replace losses. Much has been written about the necessity of air superiority to support successful land campaigns. The remaining recommendations address helping Ukraine establish localized air superiority first, with broad and enduring air superiority as the eventual aim, to enable airpower’s subsequent use to support the land war.
+
+2. __Should U.S. and NATO political commitments allow, establish a NATO-Ukraine undergraduate pilot training (UPT) exchange program similar to programs for NATO pilots through USAF UPT bases.__ Alternatively, the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Program could be modified to include Ukrainian pilots for a similar purpose but could also invest in building strategic relationships, with a multitude of NATO pilots going through the same program. Capturing Ukrainian talent early in their flying careers and training them with NATO methods and doctrine offers the greatest return on investment in the long term. This will result in a generational change of air doctrine that will take several years to bear fruit and, hence, a long-term strategic impact on integrating Ukraine into NATO methods.
+
+3. __For more impact on Ukraine’s strategy, the United States and NATO should consider minimal restrictions on how Ukraine uses its F-16s.__ The recent loosening of restrictions on munitions from the United States and other partners needs to continue with the inclusion of the F-16. Strikes should not be confined to Ukrainian territory. Ukraine may need to use its air force to interdict Russian logistics and forces or for strategic attack. Additionally, the Ukrainian Air Force may need other systems to strike IADSs positioned in Russian territory, beyond the operational range of Ukraine’s weaponry, to facilitate F-16 strikes. Such options may entail operations beyond Ukraine’s borders. Additionally, restricting the use of F-16s to attacks within Ukraine’s borders may result in a longer conflict such as the one the United States experienced throughout the Vietnam War until Operation Linebacker II, coupled with key diplomatic efforts led by the administration of U.S. president Richard Nixon, aggressively applied direct pressure to the leadership of North Vietnam. If Western support for Ukraine wavers, a longer conflict of attrition will favor Russia.
+
+4. __The United States should flood the Ukrainian Air Force with F-16s and other aircraft by incorporating decommissioned U.S. aircraft from the boneyard or those divested from its force structure.__ This recommendation is not novel; it echoes CSIS senior fellow Ben Jensen’s proposal in a Wall Street Journal commentary dated August 9, 2023. His insights remain pertinent and could be even more impactful today. Coupled with the ongoing manpower shortages facing Ukrainian forces, bolstering the Ukrainian Air Force’s capabilities is imperative. Introducing EA-6Bs, A-10s, C-12 Hurons, AH-1s, UH-1s, and MQ-8 Fire Scout helicopters would substantially augment Ukraine’s airpower. Leveraging existing artificial intelligence technology could transform many of these platforms into unmanned vehicles capable of complementing manned aircraft operations. This capability was demonstrated recently with the Air Force secretary riding in the front seat of a pilotless F-16 flight.
+
+5. __Do not impose U.S. doctrine or methods of warfare onto the Ukrainian Air Force.__ The United States has a lot of experience, but the Western way of war may not fit Ukraine’s methods or needs at this time. The U.S. role must be to impart hard-learned lessons, tried-and-true TTPs, and the capabilities and limitations of the F-16. Adaptation and understanding of the local realities and motivations is crucial to the success of a military strategy.
+
+6. __Ensure Ukraine can maintain and repair the F-16s.__ Effective maintenance and robust supply support are indispensable for preserving the operational readiness of military equipment. To secure the sustained operational lifespan of fixed-wing platforms, a vigorous and ongoing training pipeline must run in parallel with pilot training, alongside the modernization of maintenance personnel. Furthermore, F-16 maintenance teams should establish direct connections to experts (utilizing telemaintenance), facilitating the swift access required to support combat-ready fighters in the field.
+
+
+### Conclusion
+
+In 2024, Ukraine faces a critical juncture as its manpower, supplies, and ammunition reserves dwindle, providing an opportunity for Russia to seize momentum and exploit the West’s waning support. Adding the F-16 to the Ukrainian Armed Forces will assist in stalling Russia’s potential counteroffensive and further integrating Ukraine into the U.S. and European economic and defense ecosystem. This move also provides better sustainment of Ukraine’s air power, improves the security of its airspace, and increases Ukraine’s ability to hold more Russian targets at risk. It will take time to observe how Ukrainian F-16s affect combat operations. However, localized air superiority, followed by broad and enduring air superiority, should be the long-term goal, which will require more aircraft. Now is the time to ensure short- and long-term adjustments are made to partnership capacity in order for F-16s to play a critical role in 2024 and beyond. At the policy level, when addressing Ukraine’s capabilities and capacity, the United States must decide what type of Ukrainian armed force it wants to support. Is it a Ukraine that can defend, deter, or defeat Russia? Regardless of wanted outcomes, Ukraine needs more aircraft, and it needs them now.
+
+---
+
+__Christopher Koeltzow__ is a military fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
+
+__Brent Peterson__ is a national security fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.
+
+__Eric Williams__ is a military fellow with the International Security Program at CSIS.
diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-11-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-90.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-11-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-90.md
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+++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-06-11-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-90.md
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title : 【黎智英案・審訊第 90 日】
+author: 獨媒報導
+date  : 2024-06-11 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: ""
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+- 控方完成案情 黎智英要求法庭裁表證不成立 案件押後至7.24續審
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/KBf0rKU.png)
+
+【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（11日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第90日審訊。控方正式表示完成控方案情；黎智英一方將有中段陳詞，要求法庭裁定3項控罪表證不成立。控辯雙方將於6月提交書面陳詞，早前定於7月9日作口頭陳詞，惟法官另有工作要處理，故改於7月24及25日續審。
+
+甫開庭，法官杜麗冰表示於6月7日收到黎智英代表律師事務所羅拔臣的信件，要求法庭批准黎智英缺席今天聆訊，又指黎乃自願缺席，而在他有法律代表的情況下，他的權利不會受到影響。杜官表示，考慮到今天聆訊的性質，只是處理翻譯文本的問題，並沒有重要事項，而且黎有法律代表保障其權利，因此批准黎毋須出席今天聆訊。
+
+控方向法庭提交經修訂的翻譯文本和證物列表，其後正式表示完成控方案情。
+
+黎智英一方將有中段陳詞，要求法庭裁定3項控罪表證不成立。早前經控辯雙方商討，黎一方須於6月18日向法庭提交書面中段陳詞，控方則須於6月25日提交陳詞，之後黎一方須於7月2日提交回應控方的書面陳詞。
+
+法庭早前定於7月9日庭上聽取口頭陳詞，惟法官李運騰今表示有其他案件需要處理，故改期至7月24及25日續審。
+
+代表「蘋果日報有限公司」、「蘋果日報印刷有限公司」及「蘋果互聯網有限公司」的大律師王國豪則早前表示不會有中段陳詞。
+
+---
+
+案件編號：HCCC51/2022