diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-25-euro-sifmanet-valletta-report.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-25-euro-sifmanet-valletta-report.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a038bd5e --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-25-euro-sifmanet-valletta-report.md @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Euro SIFMANet Valletta Report +author: Andrew Mackay and Tom Keatinge +date : 2024-04-25 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/Hc3OikA.jpeg +#image_caption: "" +description: "European Sanctions and Illicit Finance Monitoring and Analysis Network: Valletta Report" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Discussions held in Malta in March 2024 reveal the challenges that public and private actors face in implementing sanctions and tackling illicit finance._ + + + +In mid-March 2024, the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI convened one-to-one meetings with key representatives of the public and private sectors in Malta. CFS also held a sanctions-focused roundtable discussion involving 25 local stakeholders, as well as an evening event consisting of a panel discussion and networking with over 100 attendees from the public and private sector, and the University of Malta. These events were held under the Chatham House rule and as part of RUSI’s ongoing study of sanctions implementation and wider responses to illicit finance (Euro SIFMANet). This report represents the findings and views of the CFS team that participated in the visit. The visit was funded by the UK’s Serious Organised Crime Network (SOCNet). + + +### Background + +As with previous engagements under the Euro SIFMANet programme, the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) evaluation of the host country, this time Malta, underpins the discussions about illicit finance. This is especially relevant for Malta given it was placed on the FATF list of Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring (the “grey list”) for strategic deficiencies in its regime to counter money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing between June 2021 and June 2022. This was primarily due to the “detection of inaccurate company ownership information and sanctions on gatekeepers who fail to obtain accurate beneficial ownership information, as well as the pursuit of tax-based money laundering cases utilising financial intelligence”. Sanctions were not identified as a factor contributing to Malta’s placement on the grey list with technical compliance for Recommendation 6 and Recommendation 7 rated as Largely Compliant and Compliant respectively. For Immediate Outcome 10 concerning terrorist financing preventive measures and financial sanctions and Immediate Outcome 11 regarding proliferation financing financial sanctions, Malta received a Moderate and Substantial rating, respectively. + +Roundtable participants and wider interviewees all agreed that Malta has a unique experience in Europe in implementing UN and EU sanctions given its historic and close economic exposure to Libya during the era of Muammar Qadhafi and following the Arab uprisings of 2011 when sanctions were imposed. This ensured that sanctions structures and frameworks were already in place for both the public sector – and elements of the private sector – prior to the sanctions related to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. For example, Malta had already established a sanctions public–private partnership (PPP) known as the Joint Economic Financial Sanctions Implementation Task Force (JEFSI). JEFSI facilitates outreach and engagement to share information and gather the financial sector’s views. Roundtable participants considered the Libya sanctions as having been more disruptive than Russia sanctions because Malta had greater prior exposure to Libya. + +While Malta does not implement US sanctions, there was consideration of Libya-related sanctions issued by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) because of Malta’s reliance on US correspondent banking services. However, Maltese courts have delivered judgments that, in effect, invalidate OFAC sanctions since they conflict with EU, and therefore Maltese, laws. + +More widely, interviewees also noted that while not explicitly related to sanctions, there is an ongoing issue with compliance-related fines levied by the Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit (FIAU) being appealed and substantially reduced on constitutional grounds. These rulings at the First Instance are being appealed and this issue awaits a ruling by the Constitutional Court. This has impacts on the FIAU’s bandwidth and credibility. + + +### Overview of Legislative and Enforcement Framework + +In Chapter 365 of the Laws of Malta, sanctions are implemented under the National Interest (Enabling Power) Act. The National Interest Act, Article 7 has established the Sanctions Monitoring Board (SMB) as the national competent authority responsible for monitoring the implementation and operation of sanctions legislation in Malta. The SMB was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs and Trade (MFET) and comprises 18 officials representing various government ministries and authorities. The SMB has the power to propose persons or entities for de-listing, to unfreeze their assets, or to propose entities to be designated by the UN Security Council or the Council of the European Union. The FIAU, Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA) and the Malta Gaming Authority (MGA) collaborate with the SMB to ensure that subject persons comply with the Act. + +UN sanctions are automatically applicable in Malta under the National Interest Act, and regulations and restrictive measures of the Council of the European Union and European Commission also apply due to Malta’s EU membership. Fines for sanctions violations are imposed by the National Interest Act. Individuals convicted of such violations face imprisonment ranging from 12 months to 12 years, and fines ranging from €25,000 to €5 million, while legal entities may be fined between €80,000 and €10 million. While OFAC sanctions are not directly enforceable under Maltese law, the SMB has issued several guidance notes drawing attention to decisions made by the OFAC, particularly concerning Maltese nationals and legal entities featured on the list. + + +### Malta’s Wider Financial Landscape + +Interviewees, more broadly, noted Malta’s effective tax rate of 5% for foreign companies has likely contributed to an industry for designated non-financial businesses and professionals (DNFBPs) and trust and company service providers (TCSPs). Like many international financial centres, the economy is heavily dependent on this sector with significant income from company formation and fiduciary services. However, there were historically significant issues with the quality of due diligence checks as evidenced by the FATF grey-listing. There have been improvements that resulted in Malta’s removal from the grey list and extensive documentation has been published by the FIAU. The move to a harmonised international taxation system could be a significant blow to Malta’s economy unless there is further diversification and new income streams. + +Similarly, interviewees raised issues related to Malta’s citizenship by investment (CBI) or “golden passport” programme. Under this scheme, individuals can become Maltese citizens by investing between €600,000 and €750,000, residing in Malta between 12 and 36 months, and purchasing or renting property. Since 2014 there have been 2,300 applicants of which 735 were Russian or Belarussian nationals. Of these, 559 were successful and some applicants were very high-profile. In 2020, Russians were still the largest group of new Maltese citizens. Some of these applicants also held dual or multiple nationalities. Since 2022, the CBI programme has been suspended for Russian and Belarussian applicants due to the difficulties in obtaining information to conduct due diligence checks. While new citizens are published annually in theMalta Gazette, how they became citizens – for example, by marriage or the CBI process – and their original nationality are not stated. There is no requirement to retain a nexus or remain in Malta once citizenship is granted. There is also an unhelpful view locally that most Russian golden passport holders and their funds pose only a limited risk as they do not often remain in Malta. + +Citizenship can be revoked through a deprivation process. However, this is rare. Once placed on the OFAC sanctions list, Russian golden passport holders have been stripped of their Maltese citizenship. Other procedures are ongoing against nationals who have appeared on EU and US sanctions lists. There is a right of appeal in the deprivation process that can add legal complexity. + +The European Commission is currently taking legal action against Malta. It considers granting EU citizenship in return for pre-determined payments without a genuine link to a member state to be a breach of EU laws. There have been improvements in conducting CBI-related enhanced due diligence, policies and procedures, and collaboration with the FIAU following grey-listing. The final judgment by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is expected by the end of 2024. This may lead to the closure of the CBI programme, significant amendments to it, or, least likely, the continuation of the programme without change. + +As at the end of December 2022, there were 338 remote gaming or online gambling companies registered in Malta. These are a significant part of Malta’s economy, making up 9.6% of gross value added (GVA) of Malta and employing 5.5% of the country’s total workforce. Online gaming companies are regulated entities under the Malta Gaming Authority and have the usual obligations under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) and the National Interest Act. Wider discussions with interviewees noted that online gaming companies are focused on growth, revenue generation and technology development with compliance often a secondary consideration. This is reflected in the funding and resourcing of compliance departments. The low prioritisation of compliance is especially the case in the numerous smaller companies. Online gaming compliance has traditionally been focused on responsible gambling directives, fraud and, more recently, anti-money laundering (AML), countering terrorist financing (CTF) and counter-proliferation financing. The additional requirements and complexities for sanctions screening, especially the move from purely list-based screening, has challenged iGaming companies. Their ability to integrate cost-effective solutions with existing back-office systems is challenging and changes take months to implement. While there is exposure to markets in the Baltic states and Eastern Europe, there have been no reported sanctions breaches related to Russia or Belarus. + +More widely, interviewees also touched on the virtual financial assets activities in Malta. Malta has expressed its desire to attract cryptocurrency exchanges or virtual asset service providers (VASPs) as “the blockchain island” although this has been less successful than anticipated. Malta, despite its relatively small size was previously an outsize market for cryptocurrencies. In 2018, Malta reportedly saw up to €60 billion in cryptocurrency transactions. According to the World Bank, this figure was around five times Malta’s 2018 GDP of €14 billion. The figure of €60 billion is challenged by the supervisory authorities in that it likely attributes this to Binance’s trading activity. However, Binance did not ultimately apply to be licensed in Malta and the MFSA issued warnings to this effect. + +The introduction of the Virtual Financial Assets Acts (the Digital Acts) in June 2018, which are similar to the incoming EU Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) Regulations, saw a drop in the use of cryptocurrency to under €4 billion by 2020. In effect, the requirement to meet the same standards in traditional financial products meant that cryptocurrency companies did not want to operate in Malta. While this could be considered a red flag, it is just as likely that VASPs moved to find the least demanding regulatory environments that offered similarly low corporation tax benefits. + +Initially, around 180 companies had applied but 85% did not continue their activities in Malta, with 23 eventually applying for licences. As of 30 June 2023, there were 15 licensed VASPs, with 11 actively operating, one which had not started operating and three had surrendered their licences voluntarily. In 2023, Chainalysis rated Malta as 123rd in the world for cryptocurrency usage. There are no reports of Russian sanctions-related breaches. + +As part of this innovative and dynamic ecosystem of finance- and technology-focused companies in Malta, there is a prevalence of payment service providers (PSPs) – that is, payment gateways rather than money remitters. This presents a vulnerability since PSPs can process large volumes of transactions, mix payment flows and generally complicate the payment landscape. Like many of the remote-gaming companies and VASPs that they support, PSPs are often “start-up” companies with a greater focus on growth and revenue generation and lack the size and sophistication of compliance resources and technology commensurate with the volume and value of payments they facilitate. + +Private sector actors at the roundtable pointed out that the EU’s introduction of conflicting legislation was especially challenging. On 26 February 2024, the Council of the European Union adopted a regulation to make instant payments fully available in euros to consumers and businesses in the EU and EEA countries. This new regulation will mean that all banks and PSPs will be required to make credit transfers within 10 seconds of payment being ordered. Aside from the great boon to fraudsters using authorised push payment fraud schemes, this will make sanction screening even more burdensome and risky. The regulation will also change screening requirements so it is not just limited to parties; requirements will extend to consider the purpose of the transaction, the IBAN, blocked banks and countries. There is the potential for a huge number of false positives. These would then have to be investigated, requiring extensive resources as well as re-calibration of the screening tools. This requirement puts the banks and PSPs in an awkward position. They would have to satisfy competing requirements. Resolving this tension would best be addressed at an EU level to ensure the private sector can effectively implement sanctions and not expend resources and effort on false positives. + + +### Changes since February 2022 + +Since February 2022, various Maltese authorities have issued guidelines on sanctions. On 22 February 2022, the MFSA published a public notice regarding the situation in Ukraine reminding its licence holders of their obligation to effectively screen sanctions. In March 2022, in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Malta’s FIAU issued a guidance note reminding all subject persons of their obligations on sanctions and AML and CTF regulations. In June and July 2022, the SMB issued several guidance notes on the interpretation of some of the restrictive measures. Article 5n prohibited the provision of a range of services including accounting, auditing, tax and public relations. Article 5m focused on the administration of trust funds and foundations involving Russian nationals as settlors, beneficiaries or trustees, and Article 5b of the EU regulation related to SWIFT and SEPA channels and the restrictions on deposits over €100,000. In October 2022, it published a guidance on Russia and Belarus sanctions (including the eighth package) which included new designations, wider geographic scope, and visa restrictions, financial restrictions, trade restrictions and broadcasting restrictions. In January 2024, the SMB published further guidance on the EU prohibition on the sale or transfer of ownership of oil tankers to Russia-based individuals or entities as part of the 12th EU sanctions package. Associations and commercial legal and consultancy firms have amplified these guidance notes. + + +### Public Sector Challenges and Responses + +Engagement with the public sector mainly took place during the roundtable session although there was also further engagement and discussion during the networking event. The SMB under the MFET is the lead entity for outreach, training and guidance. While relatively well-established, the SMB is under-resourced and lacks the breadth of skills necessary to drive full implementation. It therefore must use the resources of the MFSA and FIAU to conduct inspections. This does have benefits as the SMB understands sanctions. However, it does not necessarily understand the complexities and breadth of financial services. Other agencies can provide this expertise. + +During the roundtable, representatives from the SMB noted that sanctions have increased sevenfold over the past two years, with queries becoming much more technical and complex. The demands this generates have been offset by better collaboration within government and also with the private sector. There has been an increase in the amount and types of outreach with consultancies, VASPs and the commercial sector. This outreach includes logistics and import/export companies now encountering sanctions restrictions on goods and services with which they are not familiar. + +The SMB is well connected including with the European Commission, and the SMB reported that it was visited by DG FISMA (the lead Directorate for sanctions implementation) in November 2023. It is also aware of and involved in the DG REFORM-sponsored Technical Support Instrument (TSI). This is a capacity-building programme for member states – and its use must be requested by the member state itself rather than being imposed on it. + +To supplement the capacity of the SMB, the MFSA and FIAU act as agents of the SMB via memoranda of understanding. They too face challenges of resourcing and the dynamic nature of the sanctions regimes. The MFSA and the SMB require regulated (“subject”) persons – including accountants, lawyers and auditors – to screen their clients against the sanctioned individuals list. As defined under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), subject persons must monitor their business relationships and check the list of designations from the EU, the UN and the SMB. Failure to comply may result in administrative penalties ranging from €100 to €800. Interviewees who are local financial crime experts did not consider these penalties to be a proportionate, dissuasive and effective sanction. The MFSA and FIAU conduct inspections following an agreed methodology with each inspection having a separate focus on sanctions. The report is submitted to the SMB which deals with the sanctions-related elements of the inspection as required. Small entities usually used only basic and manual processes to comply with these requirements but also had requisite smaller and less complex issues. It was noted that even larger banks have struggled to deal with the increased number of sanctions-related screening hits which include false positives, as they often lack the automation or resources to deal with the higher volume. + +The Malta Business Registry (MBR) is considered a key element of the national sanctions architecture. It has benefited from the scrutiny placed on it following the FATF Mutual Evaluation and requirement to reach an agreed international operational standard. The SMB has unrestricted access to the Register of Beneficial Owners. However, following the European Court of Justice’s November 2022 ruling – that found that access to beneficial ownership interfered with privacy rights – the MBR restricted access to the registry, limiting it to subject persons and competent authorities. This matter is currently under revision in Brussels. + +The MBR has a multi-pronged approach (the registry approach, the company approach and the existing information approach) to ensure information on the beneficial ownership of a company is accurate and up to date. It conducts its own know your customer (KYC) checks and has subsequently implemented a second KYC screening system for sanctions from which positive hits are sent to the SMB. A problem raised at the roundtable is that the process companies undergo to notify of changes to information held by the registry is retrospective and lengthy: they must communicate these changes through their banks rather than directly to the MBR. While this ultimately closes the loop, it is not an efficient or timely process. + +The Malta Ship Registry is the largest in the EU and one of the largest in the world, contributing about 14% of Malta GDP. The Shipping Directorate sits within Transport Malta (TM) and has processes in place for checking databases for positive hits of ships, entities and people when new sanctions are published. There is extensive guidance published by TM Maritime on the various EU restrictive measures. Vessels are put under review on a case-by-case basis to understand their exposure to sanctions. + +The Russian Maritime Register of Shipping has been removed and, for the oil price cap, registered owners are required to give appropriate information and attest that they are abiding by the requirements. The current assessment is that no Maltese-registered vessels were facilitating operations above the price cap and no breaches have been detected. However, one participant at the roundtable commented that because of these actions, tankers that were previously registered in Malta are being sold or re-flagged; this is impacting Malta’s revenue. Others at the roundtable agreed with this view. + +Given the centrality of maritime business to Malta, Malta Customs plays a key role in sanctions implementation. Customs staff are clearly knowledgeable and have a good understanding of specific technical issues but – consistent with all government agencies in the country – lack resources and are unsurprisingly losing experience to the private sector even as their workload increases. The roundtable discussions identified a notable gap: while the customs authority has a good understanding of strategic trade controls, trade documentation and red flags, it cannot legally investigate any breaches. Should a sanctions infringement be suspected, Malta Customs refers the matter to the SMB Chair who would consider whether there is a case for referral to the police for further investigation. As a result, this documentation is sent to the SMB, along with the trade-related documents, for its consideration. However, as noted earlier, the SMB has neither the expertise nor resources to investigate these cases itself. + +Malta Customs uses the Common Customs Risk Management System (CRMS) – provided by the EU’s DG Tax and Customs Union. This system allows Malta Customs to securely share information with customs authorities of other EU member states. The upload of information is manual and time-consuming. CRMS is not available to other government entities in Malta although there are both formal and informal cross-government information sharing mechanisms. Malta Customs submits relevant reports to the World Customs Organization Customs Enforcement Network. However, sensitive sanctions information is not always shared as it is a global system and thus a wide range of actors have access to it. + +Malta Customs is aware that there has been significant downturn in transactions to Russia. However, there are more red flags related to companies potentially acting as proxies. These may include, for example, obviously newly formed companies with no justification, rationale or purpose, or changes in activity where the end user is declared as being in a new third country where previously there was little or no trading relationship. Customs is aware of the need to look at the wider connections of these suspicious entities, but there is little evidence or proof on which to take enforcement action. + +The Malta Police Force’s (MPF) Financial Crimes Investigations Department (FCID) does not have experience of investigating sanctions – the bulk of its experience relates to money laundering and terrorist financing. It is fully aware of the challenges posed by the transnational element of sanctions evasion and resulting investigations. Therefore, there is use of established cross-border information exchange mechanisms such as requests for information (RFIs) to the FIAU and SMB. The FIAU can then leverage FIUNet and the SMB can send RFIs on to the EU, for example. However, these are not always standard actions and are, of course, time consuming. The FCID has undergone extensive restructuring and now has more resources. However, it has also seen a significant churn in senior leadership. Wider discussions with interviewees noted the significant improvements in supervision but that the forthcoming, albeit currently not scheduled, Moneyval Mutual Evaluation will likely focus on the FCID’s effectiveness in investigating all forms of financial crime, including sanctions. It was also considered that despite efforts to improve the FCID, it still does not have the necessary capacity and capability to conduct complex investigations. + + +### Private Sector Challenges and Responses + +Implementation of the EU’s packages of restrictive measures on Russia has been challenging due to the volume and speed with which the packages have come forward and the lack of resources and capability in the market from a compliance perspective. Participants at the roundtable noted that these have roughly doubled the workload of the banking sectors’ compliance staff without a commensurate increase in resourcing. The larger banks already had some capacity and capability. However, the smaller banks, the non-bank financial institutions and the designated non-financial businesses and professions struggled in terms of their lack of capacity and expertise. Smaller banks have no specialist sanctions resources and rely on generalist financial crime compliance staff or the money laundering reporting officer (MLRO) or deputy MLRO to cover sanctions-related issues. + +An industry-wide issue identified by roundtable private sector participants – and consistently raised across the EU – is the need to supplement name screening against sanctions lists with the new requirement to implement activity-based sanctions (for example, the provision by clients of certain services prohibited by sanctions). This has been particularly challenging as these restrictions are unrelated to the capabilities of traditional sanctions screening or transaction monitoring systems. This is especially the case for smaller banks that are already struggling with this issue from an AML/CTF perspective. Private sector participants also noted the challenge posed by the observed shift in transactions to third countries. + +Although there are a range of potentially systemic issues facing Maltese financial institutions in effectively implementing sanctions, the risks are somewhat offset. The heightened focus of the industry on risk management in recent years means that even the larger banks now have less geographic risk. They are more focused on domestic retail banking and servicing local corporates. As Russia is not a core market for the industry, where exposure is identified, it is an easy decision to de-risk by offboarding a client. However, 48% of the companies registered in Malta do not have bank accounts in Malta itself. This is a potential vulnerability in a system where there is a reliance on controls on banks but only 52% of the companies have accounts that can be monitored. + +For the bigger banks, the issue now is passing on the information from compliance departments – that are focused on and understand the regulatory aspects – to the lines of business which are focused on revenue generation or customer service. While they aim to provide the lines of business with clear policies, procedures and training, it is also necessary to change the mindset from AML/CTF to sanctions. As an example of improvements in this area, customer risk assessments now specifically include sanctions and affect risk ratings. Even then, there are difficulties of interpretation when faced with pressure to onboard or retain customers when there is an element of risk, but no clear sanctions breach. + +The Malta Bankers’ Association reported that it has formed a sanctions sub-working group which ensures its members are kept abreast of sanctions issues, have a forum to discuss and develop best practice and also reach out to the SMB and other government agencies to make queries or give feedback. + +Beyond the banking sector, elements of the private sector such as DNFBPs and TCSPs lack sophisticated knowledge of sanctions issues. Importantly, these entities service key high-risk elements of the Russia sanctions regime, notably the maritime sector and high net worth Russians in other countries. There is an obstacle to convincing them of the necessity of these measures, especially since there has been no Russia-sanctions-evasion “smoking gun” in Malta, unlike Cyprus, and far less exposure to Russian investments, for example in the real estate sector. + +For the private sector in Malta, the lack of relevant data may suggest an absence of evidence – rather than evidence of absence – of sanctions evasion activity. However, without more detailed data and analysis, it is hard to corral effort and resources in pursuit of activity that may simply endorse the limited sanctions risk exposure Malta faces. + + +### Key Insights and Recommendations + +Malta’s experience of having to deal with UN, US and EU sanctions related to Libya and the rigours of FATF grey-listing gave it a head start in setting up the structures and processes to deal with the Russia sanctions regimes. For example, PPPs involving banks and other regulated entities are well-established. However, the lack of laws to enable prosecutions, the lack of investigative skills and resources, and weak enforcement resulting in a failure of proportionate, effective and dissuasive sanctions are key shortfalls that will need to be addressed if Malta is to prove fully effective in implementing restrictive measures on Russia. + +The following observations for consideration emerged from the roundtable and wider discussions with interviewees: + +- __Provide guidance on implementing laws to facilitate prosecution of sanctions evasion.__ Maltese law criminalises sanctions evasion but there is a need for some key amendments to facilitate and expedite prosecutions (as with AML breaches). This requires improving the quality of private sector reporting, sanctions investigations to develop intelligence and evidence, and education of prosecutors and judges. Furthermore, there needs to be the appetite and capacity to prosecute sanctions evasion, but this can only happen with an appropriate legal framework. The use of deferred prosecution agreements for sanctions breaches should be implemented. + +- __Design and deliver training programmes to upskill private sector resources.__ There is a need to upskill and increase resources in certain sectors. This is not necessarily the case in larger banks, but rather the smaller trade finance banks and the sectors that are more exposed but lack experience of compliance and screening activities such as DNFBPs, TCSPs, import/export and logistics companies. Relying on the major banks to police their clients for sanctions implementation leaves significant gaps and exposes Malta to risks from those entities that do not draw on banking services in Malta. Better private sector investigations and reporting will assist government entities in their investigation and enforcement efforts. + +- __Design and deliver training programmes to upskill government sector resources.__ There is a need to upskill and increase the number of resources in key government agencies, specific to sanctions. This is a cross-government need, including the SMB, MFSA, FIAU, Malta Customs and the FCID, to ensure they can support the compliance aspects of the sanctions regimes (for example intelligence-led activity, pro-actively communicating guidance to the private sector and answering implementation queries), but more importantly identifying and ensuring successful enforcement against breaches through specialised sanctions investigations. + +What emerged from the roundtable discussion and wider interviews is that as a result of its experience of being closely linked to the Libyan economy at the time it was sanctioned in 2011, Malta clearly has a strong understanding of what is needed in terms of policies and government architecture to implement sanctions effectively. Yet it remains to be seen whether this clear understanding of policies can be effectively put into practice. There are silos of excellence but the comparatively well-developed architecture and partnerships do not mitigate the risks from the lack of resources and technical capabilities, such as investigations and intelligence analysis and dissemination. The lack of proportionate, effective and dissuasive enforcement action is also a key shortcoming. Given Malta’s position as home to international company registration, an active citizenship by investment scheme, an important maritime industry and an innovative FinTech scene made up of iGaming, PSPs and VASPs, it may well face considerable headwinds as the EU’s focus on restrictive measures moves from adding designations, to more closely monitoring the effectiveness of member state implementation. + +--- + +__Andrew Mackay__ was the Head of Financial Crime Investigations for a major bank in Malta and is co-Chair of the Malta ACAMS Chapter. He is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI, an Illicit Finance expert with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and a PhD candidate in Illicit Trade at the United Nations University for Peace (UPEACE). + +__Tom Keatinge__ is the Director of the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-29-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-68.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-29-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-68.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..327a6e85 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-04-29-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-68.md @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : 【黎智英案・審訊第 68 日】 +author: 獨媒報導 +date : 2024-04-29 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +- 陳梓華確認警察65次探監 惟非錄口供 僅談身體狀況、還柙生活和「情緒崩潰」 + + + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/EaPfbWb.png) + +【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（29日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第68日審訊。陳梓華繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，並接受辯方盤問。陳承認有協助李宇軒偷渡離港，包括聯絡其他人安排「安全屋」和船家等，亦將「升旗易得道」成員陳世德交給李。惟陳否認帶領勇武小隊，亦否認曾向李講過會擔任流亡政府的領袖和訓練軍隊。另外，辯方指警方在2021年5月7日至2024年1月15日期間，合共65次到訪荔枝角收押所或小欖精神病治療中心會見陳，歷時總共65小時。陳稱在65次會面均沒有與警察談及本案證供，僅談及身體狀況、情緒和還柙生活，「一開始，都係經常性我情緒上好崩潰，去到後來我會講吓啲生活嘢囉⋯⋯講吓，因為我喺裡面我係睇唔到太陽，所以真係講吓生活嗰啲嘢，真係想知。」 + +已認罪的被告陳梓華第10天以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供。由代表黎智英的紐西蘭御用大律師 Marc Corlett 盤問。 + +![image02](https://i.imgur.com/piJktdr.png) +▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻（左）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右） + +#### 陳梓華承認有協助李宇軒離開香港 被捕後向警稱沒有協助屬「假話」 + +辯方展示陳梓華的錄影會面謄本，就其有否協助李宇軒離開香港，陳當時向警察稱：「我冇協助李宇軒離開香港。佢曾經有詢問過『有冇船可以離開香港？』，當時我對佢嘅回答係，我本人從來冇參與，亦都唔相信有船能夠成功抵達台灣。但係我知道，出面有人係講緊，你可以去問其他人，去搵到嗰啲所謂船家嘅聯絡方式，睇吓有冇機會。」 + +辯方問上述供詞是真實還是虛假。陳起初稱不懂如何回答此問題，但是法官李運騰指問題並非法律問題，而是事實問題。陳最終回答：「當時係假話。」辯方再問，陳當時是有協助李宇軒離開香港，陳同意有。 + +辯方展示另一段供詞，陳向警察稱：「整件事上面，之前佢（李）偷渡，我本人冇資助過佢一分一毫，更莫講話協助佢離開香港。」陳確認他有向警察說過上述說話。 + +#### 陳梓華承認有向李宇軒介紹人安排偷渡船 + +另一段供詞亦顯示，陳向警察稱：「佢（李）第一天去保釋嘅時候，已經透過 Telegram 打電話畀我，問我有冇船可以畀到佢，令佢離開到香港去台灣。『去台灣』就冇講嘅；『能夠離開香港』，問得好清晰嘅。我答得佢好清晰嘅：冇。」 + +被問到上述供詞是真還是假，陳稱是「假話」。陳稱，在李保釋出來之後的第一通 Telegram Call 之中，「當時佢（李）需要地方住，佢話需要一間安全屋。然後佢話，佢畀人拉咗，佢部電話所有嘢都曝晒光，佢覺得我應該走，然後佢需要支援。我當時話，睇吓有冇人幫到佢。」陳稱二人並沒有談及離開香港，但之後的通話中則有。就安排偷渡船方面，陳承認「我有介紹人畀佢（李）識」。 + +#### 陳梓華確認替李宇軒「搭路」聯絡「升旗易得道」成員陳世德 + +另一段供詞顯示，陳向警察稱，李宇軒不想回家，「想睇吓有冇安全屋嗰啲。咁跟住之後我話 Okay，我幫佢問吓啦，安排吓啦咁樣樣。咁我哋都有提及過所謂嘅反跟蹤，有啲咩嘢技巧呀咁樣樣。」陳確認他有在通話中與李談及「安全屋」和反跟蹤；他亦有在 Telegram 上聯絡一名叫「Kyle」的人，有關安全屋的事宜。 + +辯方問，陳梓華有否將一名叫陳世德的人的聯絡方式交給李宇軒。陳確認有，其後李宇軒有告訴他，已經與陳世德聯絡上，並且已經安全。 + +翻查報道，陳世德為 YouTube 頻道「升旗易得道」成員、「Friends of Hong Kong」前發言人。據10.1荃灣中槍學生曾志健的承認案情，陳世德於2020年主動接觸他，不斷游說他逃離香港。陳亦要求曾拍攝片段引起其他國家關注及籌款，威脅若曾不遵從，便不會安排他離港。 + +陳梓華另確認他有聯絡一名叫「Cap」的人，「當時佢話佢可以提供到協助。」陳確認，「Cap」向李宇軒提供釣魚工具和船家的聯絡方式，以讓李掩飾他身處船上的目的。陳亦確認後來李告訴他，已經聯絡上「Cap」，並準備乘船出發；在李登船之前，李亦有聯絡陳，表示準備離開香港。 + +辯方問，陳梓華有否告訴李宇軒，當他到達台灣之後，要自首和尋求協助。陳則稱：「我唔記得係咪我講。」辯方又問陳有否跟李宇軒說，當他獲台灣當局釋放之後，要乘坐捷克官員的私人包機前往捷克。惟陳否認。 + +#### 陳梓華確認其法律代表於2021年5月去信律政司作認罪協商 + +辯方指2021年5月7日，代表陳梓華的劉豹律師行去信律政司，提出在陳承認「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」的情況下，律政司可考慮另一項「協助罪犯」控罪留法庭存檔。至同年5月21日，律政司回覆事務律師行，表示接受提議，同意「協助罪犯」控罪留法庭存檔。最終陳承認了「串謀勾結外國勢力危害國家安全」罪，「協助罪犯」罪則存檔。陳確認。 + +#### 陳梓華否認帶領「勇武小隊」 亦否認曾告訴李宇軒其小隊牽涉數宗暴力事件 + +辯方指，陳梓華上週供稱他並非「勇武小隊」的成員，也沒有參與示威活動中的暴力行為。辯方今再問陳是否帶領一隊或多於一隊「勇武小隊」，陳否認。辯方又問陳是否視「勇武」為一種手段，營造一種香港政府不能有效地管治香港的印象。陳亦不同意。 + +在辯方盤問下，陳梓華確認他在大約2019年7至8月的時候，叫李宇軒到火炭工業區一幢建築物出席分享會，同場有一名叫「Captain」的男子和一名叫「Cath」的女子，惟另一名叫「Cap」的車手，以及一名叫「廢老」的男子則當日不在場。 + +辯方問陳梓華有否告訴過李宇軒，「Captain」是勇武小隊的隊長，而「Cath」是負責「科學實驗」、製造爆炸品和汽油彈；亦表示知道勇武小隊儲藏爆炸品的地方。陳否認。 + +辯方又問，陳有否告訴過李，陳自己的勇武小隊曾經涉及7.21白衣人事件、中聯辦外的騷亂事件、2020年農曆新年之前邊境口岸的爆炸品事件，以及大埔有人開槍的事件。陳一概否認。 + +陳補充，當時介紹「Captain」和「Cath」給李宇軒的時候，「佢哋自己講嘅，都只係話自己係前線抗爭者，我唔會同佢（李）講到畀佢聽，佢哋有做過炸彈或者任何嘢。」他又稱在當日的交流會中，「我冇講過我有一隊勇武小隊，做過啱啱講過嘅任何嘢。」 + +法官李運騰問，在同一場合中，有沒有任何人向李提及上述事件。陳回答：「確實有可能。」 + +在辯方的盤問下，陳梓華表示他相信「Captain」和「Cath」都是勇武小隊的成員，惟「Captain」並不是隊長。 + +#### 陳梓華否認說過負責訓練軍隊或以色列可提供訓練 + +辯方問陳梓華，在過往任何場合之中，陳有否向李宇軒談及如果成立到流亡政府的話，陳會擔任領袖；如果成立到軍隊的話，便會由陳及勇武派負責訓練軍隊。陳否認。 + +辯方續指，陳有否告訴過李，以色列軍隊可以向勇武派提供訓練。陳亦否認。 + +#### 陳梓華稱有提出配合警方調查 直至決定做控方證人之前共會見警察6次 + +辯方庭上展示陳梓華與警方會見的紀錄列表，並指陳大約於2021年3月31日向警方提出轉做控方證人，其後在同年4月28日，陳首次以控方證人的身份進行錄影會面。陳確認。 + +辯方續指，在2021年3月31日至4月28日期間，即由陳向警方提出直至他決定做控方證人的這段時間，警方與陳一共會面了6次，歷時合共為18小時。辯方問，在上述的會面裡，陳有否向警察提及證供內容，還是在4月28日才開始在會面中談及證供。惟陳表示沒有印象。辯方追問上述會面中談論了什麼。陳則指：「主要都係當時我嘅情緒。」 + +當辯方問及上述6次會面期間，陳是否記得警察有做任何手寫或電腦紀錄，陳則表示3月31日那次「好似有」，「但係我問可唔可以配合警方調查，其他我無印象。」 + +#### 警到羈押所探訪65次 陳稱僅談情緒、身體及還柙生活 + +辯方引述列表指，陳分別在2021年4月28日、4月29日和4月30日，一共與警方進行了4次錄影會面。另外，在2021年5月3日、5月4日、5月5日及2022年11月10日，警察替陳分別錄取了4份書面供詞。除了上述數次錄口供之外，警察在2021年5月7日至2024年1月15日期間，有到訪荔枝角收押所或小欖精神病治療中心會見陳，合共65次，歷時總共65小時。 + +辯方問在該65次會面之中，陳與警察有否談及本案證供，惟陳表示沒有。 + +辯方又問陳與警察談論了什麼話題。陳則稱：「身體囉⋯⋯跟住，主要都係，講喺（羈押所）裡面嘅生活。」辯方再問還有什麼話題，陳稱：「抱怨囉。」 + +法官李運騰指，該65次會面表面上似乎並不是錄取證供或進行錄影會面。陳同意，而且印象中也沒有任何協助他喚起記憶的事宜。 + +李官遂問，陳會如何形容該些警察探訪或會面的目的。陳表示：「一開始，我以為係情緒上，要望一望我點。」他說這是一開始的想法，但是被問到後來有沒有改變，陳稱：「一開始，都係經常性我情緒上好崩潰，去到後來我會講吓啲生活嘢囉⋯⋯講吓，因為我喺裡面我係睇唔到太陽，所以真係講吓生活嗰啲嘢，真係想知。」 + +李官又表示，出於好奇，問陳梓華在小欖精神病治療中心還押期間，院方是否容許家人和朋友前來探訪。陳則指：「唔係所有囉，因為都要做申請。」 + +辯方其後引述紀錄指，警察於2021年5月14日探訪陳梓華的時候，是到達小欖精神病治療中心，而非荔枝角收押所，問陳是否因為精神狀態而被轉移至小欖。惟陳表示不知道。 + +辯方又問，就陳的精神狀態，有否任何醫生介入治療。陳表示沒有，亦確認他的精神狀況並非嚴重到要醫生介入。 + +--- + +案件編號：HCCC51/2022 diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-03-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-69.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-03-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-69.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..af5d2942 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-03-trial-of-jimmy-lai-day-69.md @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : 【黎智英案・審訊第 69 日】 +author: 獨媒報導 +date : 2024-05-03 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/LciFH41.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +- 庭上認向警作虛假陳述 陳梓華：當時有僥倖心態、以為可與黎智英撇清關係 + + + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/QiBjkBm.png) + +【獨媒報導】壹傳媒創辦人黎智英及3間蘋果公司被控串謀勾結外國勢力及串謀刊印煽動刊物等罪，案件今（3日）於高院（移師西九龍法院）踏入第69日審訊。陳梓華繼續以「從犯證人」身份出庭作供，並接受辯方盤問。陳連日來在庭上供述他與黎智英和 Mark Simon 之間的對話，惟辯方質疑陳從沒在錄影會面或書面供詞中提及該些對話，並質疑陳在證人台上捏造一些陳述出來，為自己謀取利益。陳否認。此外，陳早前承認在2020年10月首次被捕之後，在錄影會面中向警察提供虛假陳述，包括他並非「重光團隊」成員、經常取笑攬炒派、沒有協助李宇軒逃離香港等等。被問到為何要說謊，陳稱：「當時我仲有一個僥倖嘅心態」，以為可以與黎智英和「重光團孩」等撇清到關係，並且可在獲釋之後得到 Mark Simon 安排離開香港。 + +#### 辯方指陳梓華部份庭上供述對話 從未在落口供時提及 陳同意 + +陳梓華早前作供時引述自己及黎智英等人的說話，包括黎表示他並非不支持勇武，但是要迎合西方的要求，國際的支持比勇武的支持更加重要。辯方質疑上述說話從沒在陳的書面證供或錄影會面中提及過。 + +陳則引述其書面證供，當中提及黎說過不論是宣揚港獨還是主張維持一國兩制，總之要百花齊放，在香港本土保持熱度；惟陳最終承認他在這部份的證供中沒提及過黎說「希望你明白我並非不支持勇武」。 + +辯方逐一指出以下對話並未曾在陳的錄影會面或書面供詞中提及過。陳確認。 + +- 在台北的陽明山別墅會議中，黎問「攬炒巴」劉祖廸為何眾籌可以達到如此龐大規模，二人繼而分析原因； + +- 在台北的陽明山別墅會議中，「攬炒巴」劉祖廸聽畢黎智英的說話後，表示要跟李宇軒商討； + +- 陳稱自己曾告訴黎智英，劉祖廸不想打議會線，但會全力打國際線，而且日本線有李宇軒牽頭； + +- 陳稱他與美國線有紛爭，要求黎的私人助手 Mark Simon 出面調停，其後 Mark Simon 出手擺平爭拗，往後與美國線保持聯繫； + +- 在壹傳媒大樓的會面中，陳稱他向黎表達對《國安法》的關注，認為需要「褪」，即所有人都不應該繼續倡議制裁，黎又問 IPAC 會否使用眾籌的款項，並籲陳叫其他人繼續在文宣和國際線上工作 + +- 陳稱他曾告知 Mark Simon，李宇軒頑固地不想離開香港 + +#### 辯方質疑陳梓華利用謊言來謀取利益 陳否認：想將個事實講出嚟 + +辯方質疑，陳以上對話是陳在庭上作供時才首次捏造出來。惟陳不同意，又堅稱對於上述對話有真實記憶。 + +![image02](https://i.imgur.com/enbWBdW.png) +▲ 資深大律師 彭耀鴻（左）、大律師 Marc Corlett（右） + +辯方引述陳在錄影會面中自稱：「純粹係我好討厭有啲人利用謊言去為佢自己謀取利益」，質疑陳如今在證人台上捏造一些陳述出來，為自己謀取利益，正正是錄影會面中他所批評的同一類人。惟陳不同意，「正正就係因為我討厭（利用謊言來謀取利益的人），所以我想將個事實講出嚟。」 + +#### 早前承認向警作虛假陳述 陳梓華：當時有僥倖心態、以為可撇清關係 + +辯方盤問完畢，控方代表、副刑事檢控專員周天行覆問時指，陳在2020年10月10日被警方以「協助罪犯」罪拘捕，之後於10月10及11日在警署進行了兩次錄影會面，當其時陳尚未決定以證人身份協助調查。 + +![image03](https://i.imgur.com/vJITGZI.png) +▲ 副刑事檢控專員 周天行 + +在辯方早前盤問之下，陳承認當時錄影會面中向警方說出虛假陳述，例如他並非「重光團隊」成員、經常取笑攬炒派等。控方則問陳，為何會向警方作出虛假陳述。陳回答：「當時我仲有一個僥倖嘅心態。我以為可以撇清到關係。」控方追問，陳想與什麼撇清關係。陳指是黎智英、其私人助手 Mark Simon、李宇軒、「攬炒巴」劉祖廸和「重光團隊」。 + +陳又指：「我以為當時畀完口供，或者離開咗警署之後，Mark Simon 可以安排到方法畀我離開香港。」 + +陳於2021年2月被正式起訴及還柙，直至2021年3月31日決定以證人身份協助警方調查，之後於4月28日以證人身份進行首次錄影會面。 + +案件下周一（5月6日）續審。 + +--- + +案件編號：HCCC51/2022